BOOK REVIEWS


The excavations of the Agora, pursued by the American School of Classical Studies at Athens since 1931, have produced a copious store of new materials to illustrate the history, art, cult, and culture of the pagan city. In comparison with this abundance, or with that of the Christian remains from ancient Rome, the early Christian yield from Athens is slight. Yet these "few humble tombstones" deserved to be edited with all scholarly care; and the present monograph, a reprint from Hesperia XVI (1947), is welcome.

After an introduction, which includes an account of previous publications in their field, the authors present, with revisions and commentary, a selection of twenty-two inscriptions already known, and thirty-four new ones, recovered in the current excavations.

Of notable interest among the new epitaphs is no. 5, which may be translated as follows: "Resting place of Andrew, reader, of St. Agathoclia's." The same saint's name, and as title of a church, had been conjecturally restored in another epitaph from Athens. A church of this name, which stood near the Agora in the early nineteenth century, was destroyed by fire during the War of Independence. The commemoration of St. Agathoclia is kept by the Greeks on September 17.

To the editors' materials on her legend, succinct comment may be added from the Propylaeum ad Acta Sanctorum Decembris (Brussels, 1940). The notice in the Roman Martyrology for September 17, observe the Bollandists, agrees with the Greek lives read in the synaxaries. Back of these may lie an earlier Passion, which has now disappeared: "quamque sinceram et genuinam fuisse nulla ratio suadet" (op. cit., p. 403).

It is gratifying to have now, in an inscription as old as the sixth century, conclusive evidence of the antiquity of the cult, and confirmatory evidence of its place of origin. The saint's day may also be of old tradition; and the name of Agathoclia, so beautifully Greek, is secure.

Waiving an extensive critical study, the reviewer submits to the authors of Early Christian Epitaphs from Athens a few points that have met the eye. There is a self-evident misprint on page 20: "domuments." The reference in footnote 182, "I. G. I, 4878," should be, I imagine, 4873. Plate X, no. 34, appears to have been printed in negative: see p. 16, "the open rho is to the left of the upper arm of the cross," and f. n. 87. A state-
ment on page 19, that itacism "is of a much later date than the documents with which we are dealing," seems not to say what the authors must have intended. On the name Sambatis (p. 42), see the informing article, "Sambathis," by Herbert C. Youtie, *Harvard Theological Review*, XXXVII (1944), 209–218.

Ann Arbor, Michigan

EDGAR R. SMOTHERS, S.J.


Protestants no less than Catholics are becoming progressively more conscious of the common priesthood of all the faithful. And yet the expression has an altogether different meaning on the lips of Protestants than it has on the lips of Catholics. This divergence of meaning is the result of two important traditions, the one heterodox, the other orthodox, and Father Rea has succeeded admirably in presenting an historical survey and a synthesis of each. The work is divided into two fairly equal parts, the first dealing with the heretical concept of the common priesthood, the second with the Catholic concept.

Working with primary sources wherever available, the author traces in Part I the genesis and development of the basic ecclesiological heresy of which the heterodox teaching on the priesthood of all believers is the corollary. The heresy itself, which regards the Church as an invisible society of the saints rather than a visible organism for the sanctification of men, was first propagated by the Montanists, indirectly furthered by the early Manicheans and later Cathari, directly fostered by the Waldensians and Wickliffites, and received its final form in the writings of Martin Luther. Within the framework of this invisible church, which was looked upon as an aristocracy of the just or predestined, there was to prevail an egalitarian rather than an hierarchical priesthood. Each of the just would exercise his priesthood in the temple of his own soul, without need of external ritual, sacramental ceremony or sacerdotal intervention. As the author, however, points out (p. 128), the earlier heretics were less consistent in applying their master principle than the later reformers: "The Montanists and the Waldensians and some, at least, of the Lollards, despite the fact that they had thoroughly interiorised all the truly essential means of sanctification, clung to the sensible sacraments and to the sacrifice of the Mass as realities, and conceded to the laity real powers of consecration and consecration. With the later Lollards and with the Lutherans, all aspects of religion were interiorised, that is de-sacramentised. All sacraments
became empty symbols; all sacrifice and all priesthood became unreal and metaphorical. And this was the logical outcome to which even the earlier heresies must have come, had they remained consistent with their first principles."

The following sentence will sum up the first part of Father Rea’s work: "The exercise of the common priesthood, as understood by each of the four groups of heretics, reveals a movement away from an inconsistent reality to a consistent unreality" (loc. cit.). The importance of the truth here expressed is on a par with the felicity of its expression. For it is well to stress the fact that modern Protestantism, in gracing its members with the title “priest,” confers a dignity that is devoid of any strictly sacrificial function, and hence a priesthood that is meaningless or at most metaphorical.

Hence, if the first part of Father Rea’s study serves as a warning to those who would so exaggerate the priesthood of the laity as to prejudice the exclusive prerogatives of the priest in orders, it should serve no less as a corrective to those who would so impoverish the concept of the common priesthood as to reduce the Catholic layman to the unenviable status of the pious Protestant, who can exercise a priesthood that is at most metaphorical. Father Rea is evidently aware of this second tendency among Catholic writers and marshalls his evidence from the patristic and Scholastic period accordingly. Tracing the teaching of the Fathers and theologians, with a special emphasis on what he calls the Augustino-Thomistic concept, Father Rea concludes that the common priesthood is not a metaphor, but a real though analogous sharing in the priesthood of Christ from whom all priesthood is ultimately derived. Ontologically, the reality of the common priesthood is founded upon the character of baptism which connotes a power to offer, though mediately, the objective sacrifice of the Mass: "Since the common priesthood is a real participation of the priesthood of Christ, and as such, a potency really though mediately to offer the Eucharistic sacrifice, it is not simply a metaphor, to be emptied of all reality, by the prefixing of the adjective “spiritual.” It is a real but analogous priesthood participating in the reality of the one priesthood of Christ, which is the sole source and origin of all priesthood" (p. 233).

Thus far we would express perfect agreement with Father Rea’s interpretation of what is at least implied in the teaching of the past. Unfortunately, however, a note of confusion, if not inconsistency, is introduced when the author contrasts the common priesthood of the members of the Mystical Body with the priesthood of the ordained. After stating the impropriety of referring to laymen as “priests” and to lay-women as “priestesses,” terms which are admittedly offensive to pious ears, the author gives
the following reason for the impropriety: "To refer to the individual baptized layman as a priest in any but a metaphorical sense is to forget that his priesthood is not in him, as an individual, integral and absolute, but that it is in him as a member of the Mystical Body, finding its integrity not in himself, but in the whole Body. It is in this way that the common priesthood is adequately distinguished from the special priesthood of the ordained, which is also a real but analogous participation of the one priesthood of Christ, but is integral and absolute in each one who possesses it" (p. 234).

We said that the passage is confusing. In the first place, it is difficult to see how the priesthood of the ordained is integral and absolute when the fullness of the priesthood is found only in Christ, from whom all priesthood is ultimately derived. Again, the impression is given that the ordained priest, unlike the layman, exercises his priesthood independently of the whole Body, when, as a matter of fact, even in those actions which are peculiarly his, he acts as the organ of the whole Body in whose unity he remains. But the passage is also inconsistent with what has gone before. Father Rea based his argument for the reality of the common priesthood on the reality of the participation through baptism of the priesthood of Christ, and the reality of the potency to offer, if mediately, the Eucharistic sacrifice. Now surely it is not the Body that is baptised but the members of that Body, and if the common priesthood taken in a collective sense is real and not metaphorical, it is such only because the individual members of the Body enjoy a real priestly dignity and function. True, the individual layman will not exercise his priesthood outside the Body of which he is a member, any more than the duly ordained priest will exercise his function apart from the whole body whose organ and representative he is. Hence it is not the absolute character of the priesthood of orders that distinguishes the ordained priest from the lay priest. Rather, both priesthoods are distinguished according to the degree that each is a participation of the fullness of the priesthood of Christ. And yet there is a sense in which the layman’s priesthood is less absolute than that of the priest in orders. Both priesthoods, hierarchical as well as lay, are derived from and exercised dependently upon Christ; but the layman’s priesthood is dependent as well on the priesthood of orders; not in the sense that he shares in the priesthood of orders, but in the sense that without the duly ordained priest, who alone consecrates and alone posits the liturgical act of oblation, the layman’s priesthood would be devoid of any strictly sacrificial function. And this may be the meaning of Father Rea’s use of the term “absolute.” However, just as dependence on Christ does not argue to a metaphorical
priesthood in the ordained priest, so neither should it imply a metaphorical priesthood in the individual layman.

We will, then, agree with Father Rea that it is improper to refer to the layman as a priest; however, we do not feel that the reason for the impropriety is to be found in the metaphorical character of the layman’s priesthood. Actually, the proper concept of priesthood is verified in the layman, although we reserve the expression “priest,” unless qualified, to those who share more intimately and more fully in the priesthood of Christ. It is one thing to call the layman a priest; it is another to acknowledge in him a real priestly dignity and function. We can and should do the second, while at the same time reserving the term to those who, in the words of St. Augustine, “are properly called priests in the Church of God.”

By focusing our attention on what may appear to many a mere question of terminology, we realise that we have done scant justice to the scholarly research and impartial analysis that characterises Father Rea’s work. However, the doctrine of the common priesthood demands above all a precise terminology, and when an acceptable terminology has been reached it will be found that Father Rea has contributed not a little to its fashioning.

Woodstock College

Paul F. Palmer, S.J.


The first part of this doctoral dissertation is an accurate and objective treatment of the now famous and much mooted theory of Rousselot on the essentially supernatural perception of the motives of credibility in the process of faith. Rousselot holds that it is only by virtue of the lumen fidei that the preambles of faith can be accepted as proving the fact of revelation. Thus, too, he rejects all purely natural faith. “Since to see,” he says, “one needs eyes, and since to perceive the things beneath the discursive aspect of being one needs a natural sympathy with the totality of being, which sympathy is designated intelligence, so, to believe, one must acquire a spiritual sympathy with the object of belief which we properly call the grace of supernatural faith.”

In a second part, the author collates the many texts of St. Thomas touching on the same problem and then gives a clear and unbiased interpretation of those texts. In a third and principal part of the thesis, which is the author’s greatest original contribution, the two systems are compared and contrasted.
In developing his "Les yeux de la foi," Rousselot pretends to draw his doctrine from St. Thomas and thus to establish contact again with a tradition that had been abandoned for several centuries (p. 33). The author's conclusion is, however, that Rousselot's pretensions were not well founded and that he differed greatly from St. Thomas in the capital notion of the formal object of the act of faith. He shows that for Rousselot this formal object is not God Himself, the Veritas Prima, but something created: "le témoignage de Dieu s'insérant sans heurt dans la trame des événements ordinaires de la vie" (p. 96), and that this created testimony is not objectively valid, i.e., can engender no legitimate certitude unless it is "appréhendé dans la lumière de la foi" (p. 107). Outside the sphere of this light of faith, signs can lead only to judgments of probability and never to that objective conviction which postulates of necessity an absolute and speculative assent (p. 109). On the contrary, for St. Thomas the lumen fidei is a veritable participation by man's intellect in the uncreated Truth, the Veritas Prima, which participation becomes a guarantee against error and a solid foundation for the objective certitude of faith (p. 48).

Various texts of St. Thomas which might have led Rousselot to elaborate his theory of "Les yeux de la foi" are carefully scrutinized. The author rightly and deftly concludes, I think, that Rousselot's interpretation can scarcely be reconciled with the Angelic Doctor's clear exposition of the general principles upon which the resolution of the act of faith must be based. De Wolf regrets that in Rousselot's theory the act of faith has lost most of the mystical signification, that divine "envolée," which it has in St. Thomas' theory.

Though the author in his Introduction denies any intentions of entering into a dogmatic or theological discussion of the speculative merits of the two theories, or even of offering a direct critique of the relative merits of each, there are many passages of profoundly reasoned observations which add greatly to the value of the dissertation.

One cannot but praise the clarity of this critical analysis and sound exegesis of the controverted texts of St. Thomas, and the restraint and charity with which it treats the various interpretations of those texts by authors of various schools of thought (pp. 18, 55).

The dissertation is highly technical and is by no means easy to read. But it will be of service to theologians and students of theology in their study of the analysis of the act of faith, if only for the complete assemblage of all the pertinent texts from St. Thomas and for the presentation of the theory of "Les yeux de la foi." This theory is back again in vogue in some seminaries in France and is closely allied with the current theological
controversy on the supernatural, about which such a vast amount of theological literature has been written since the end of the war. Rousselot’s link to this latter controversy seems to be this: some recent writers draw great inspiration from his celebrated thesis published in 1909, _L’Intellectualisme de S. Thomas_, in which is enunciated the principle that the intellect of man as such is not the faculty of being but the faculty of the divine. Man’s intellect is _capax entis quia capax Dei_, because “l’homme n’intelligence les choses qu’en tant qu’il désire Dieu.”

One might have wished that the author had attempted an answer to one or other of the grave difficulties that have been marshalled against the Thomistic analysis of faith (which theory he seems to favor throughout the dissertation), as, for instance, the difficulty concerning the quasi-experimental character of the perception of faith (p. 59).

_St Mary of the Lake, Mundelein_  

EDWARD B. BRUEGGEMAN, S.J.


_Mediaeval Studies_ continues its patient and solid work of reducing our _libertas errandi_ in interpreting mediaeval documents. I. Th. Eschmann, O.P., brings to book those who would foist on St. Thomas an acceptance of the moral validity of the notion of collective guilt; the investigation is thorough but incomplete; a further article is promised. Professor Gilson works out the puzzle of St. Augustine’s references to Egypt in his account of the works of the Platonists. Dr. Landgraf gives valuable notes on mediaeval usage of the terms “editio” and “facultas,” and on the mediaeval manner of citing authors. Armand Maurer, C.S.B., publishes a corrected text of a question by Siger of Brabant on _esse_ and _essentia_ and conducts an admirable analysis to the conclusion that Siger did not understand the real distinction. George Klubertanz, S.J., deals with the same question in St. Bonaventure, to find that _esse_ and _essentia_ do not differ, while _existere_, in its technical sense, meant for St. Bonaventure _esse hic et nunc_; it would seem that there is a patron saint for the naive epistemologists who are concerned exclusively with the real as a “something out there.”

A. J. Denomy, C.S.B., gives a detailed study of the _De Amore_ of Andreas Capellanus and raises the question of a doctrine of two truths being advanced in the twelfth century. V. L. Kennedy, C.S.B., argues that the date of the Parisian decree on the elevation of the Host at Mass should be set a few years later than 1208. John Hennig investigates Cataldus Rachav in a study of the early history of diocesan supremacy in Ireland. Professor Gilson’s notes on the history of _ens_ are useful not only to phi-
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I believe philosophers but also to theologians concerned with the Latin equivalents to hypostasis. Dr. Pegis argues for caution in interpreting De Potentia, q. 3, a. 5, as though Aquinas attributed a doctrine of creation to Aristotle.


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*Bernard J. F. Lonergan, S.J.*


George Tyrrell wrote to Loisy, “When I first read the document (the encyclical Pascendi), I, like others perhaps, found myself in every paragraph; but now I see that in most cases, it is impossible to say whether I, or Laberthonnière, or Newman, or Le Roy, etc., be the culprit.” And Henri Bremond prophesied, “Born sixty years later, Newman would not have written the University Sermons or the Grammar, but L’Action.” Such are some samples of the posthumous misunderstanding that fell to Newman’s lot when his religious philosophy was appropriated by thinkers or popularizers whose views he would never have recognized as his own. This solid study by Father Flanagan is directed against certain of these misunderstandings and is meant to dissipate any lingering remnant of uneasy impressions that Newman’s religious philosophy cannot be examined too closely without manifesting sharp resemblances to the religious aberrations of the turn of the century. It is a pity that such work should still need to be done, but in doing it the author finds himself a quiet fellow-worker of F. Bacchus, H. Tristram, E. Przywara, and M. D’Arcy, all of whom have labored efficiently to efface the false image of Newman that had gained currency.

Father Flanagan’s problem, viz., to show that there are no “solid grounds for accusing Newman of Modernism or even Semi-modernism” (p. 3), commands the methodology of his book, which consists in taking Newman’s “teaching on faith to pieces, testing each piece as we went along” (p. 162), all the while quoting “extensively from Newman’s works because there seems no other way of convincing the reader that my interpretation is not without foundation” (p. 3).

The exegesis of Newman’s thought presents preliminary problems quite dissimilar to those encountered when one Scholastic thinker approaches the
work of a fellow Scholastic. In the latter case we have a homogeneity of vocabulary, similar patterns of thought, common presuppositions, etc. Not so with Newman, whose case is further complicated by the fact that his writings on faith fall within both the Anglican and the Catholic periods of his life.

First of all, Father Flanagan had to situate Newman in his intellectual milieu. Newman was no intellectual Melchisedech; rather he was keenly alive to the ground swell of philosophic and religious thought of his day. It is in the light of this contemporary religious thought that the University Sermons and the Grammar of Assent must be read, else much of what they say and do not say will remain a puzzle to one who prefers his philosophizing conducted on a level more detached from the immediacies of life.

Secondly, Father Flanagan insists that Newman was not a pure theorist, but a practitioner in things of faith; that "all his writings (on faith) were meant to solve practical difficulties or to answer real objections" (p. 5); that he was intent on presenting practical, not scientific apologetics. As Newman said in the Grammar of Assent, "I wish to deal, not with controversialists, but with inquirers." Such basic preoccupations and attitudes reveal why we find in Newman's works less the ontology of faith than the psychology of faith, less the act of faith in itself than the genesis of the act of faith. Such questions as the resolution of the act of faith are speculative enquiries foreign to Newman's practical purposes, and the theologian need expect nothing here.

With regard to the logical and psychological access to faith, we find in Newman, according to Father Flanagan, not anything that is not Catholic and traditional, but rather fresh insights and emphases that will afford a valuable counterweight to the perilous tendency to hypostasize a pure intellect that assesses the evidence of credibility with all the impersonal detachment of an electric eye. Newman, who was a pioneer in religious psychology, affirmed his conviction that "in the reasoning process which leads to faith the mind works in the same way as it does in questions which are not connected with religious belief" (p. 73), and above all emphasized the "continuity of our psychical life" (p. 165), which a crude interpretation of Scholastic philosophy might tend to dissociate. "Accordingly, Newman gave his attention to certain aspects of the question which are summarily treated in scholastic works. The need of good dispositions, the effect of our previous knowledge, the condition of our minds, the different ways in which the evidence strikes different people, the influence of the internal arguments, of antecedent probabilities, and, above all, the effect of grace, which is the root of all,—these are treated by Newman more
explicitly and completely than they are discussed by the general run of apologetical writers” (p. 168).

Father Flanagan insists that these fresh insights and emphases are in no wise solidary with Newman’s philosophical shortcomings or with his denigration of formal logic.

Newman chose ever to prize open shut minds by suggestion, indirection, and stimulus rather than by detonating syllogistic charges, and sought to be a healer of sick souls and spoiled minds rather than a “malleus haereticorum.” To the director of souls, the parish priest, the convert instructor there is much here that is most precious.

It is comforting to know that Newman’s thought is still energizing men’s minds. In Bonn in 1941 there appeared a study on Newman’s philosophy of faith, and during 1945–46 at Einsiedeln there was published a two-volume anthology of Newman’s writings on the Church. Now comes the work of Father Flanagan, whose competence leads one to hope that he will interpret for us Newman’s ideas on the development of dogma. As P. Congar, O.P., says, Newman is “vraiment l’un des hommes capables de nourrir l’effort actuel de la pensée catholique dans le sens de l’intégration.”

Weston College

Francis X. Lawlor, S.J.


Father Hanley has translated and adapted with the aid of the author, Die ewige Weiderkehr des Naturrechts (Leipzig 1936). New parts have been added; references and footnotes have been adapted for American readers. The original work seems to have been two semi-popular essays. The first was an historical survey of the growth, decline, and return of the idea of natural law; the second, an exposition of the rational origin and content of the natural law according to the Scholastic tradition. In spite of the addition to the original work, the present volume will serve only as a good introduction to the problems of the natural law.

The seven historical chapters are of varying quality. The picture of the Graeco-Roman period suffers from the common tendency either to be too sketchy or to read too optimistically the earlier writers. Dr. Rommen endeavors to make up for this by his concluding paragraphs, but he has drawn too favorable a picture of Plato and Aristotle, the Stoics and Roman Law to explain them away in a page. The chapter on the “Age of Scholasticism” reflects a competent knowledge of St. Thomas and Suarez; and
the dangers inherent in the voluntarism of Scotus and Occam are men­tioned. Surprisingly, Dr. Rommen accepts the idea that Grotius secular­ized the natural law by his admission that it could be derived from the notion of human nature even if there were no God. A footnote indicates that at least Chroust holds another opinion with regard to Grotius. No mention is made of James Brown Scott's investigations of the relation be­tween Grotius and the later Scholastics, especially Vasquez. This notion plays such an insignificant part in Grotius's argumentation that this reviewer cannot see the justification for the idea that Grotius secularized the natural law. The decline of the natural law is given in its main phases. The author might have improved his discussion if he had also pointed to the concomitant decline in the teaching of the philosophia perennis. It was not only the rationalists and the philosophers of the Enlightenment who were defending particular economic and social conditions by bringing them under the banner of the natural law. There would have been no need of Aeterni Patris, if Catholic teachers of philosophy had maintained the dynamic attitude towards the natural law that characterized its leading exponents. Unless we point out our failings in this line, they will be used to prove to us that the natural law theory is reactionary or unreal.

The renaissance of the natural law forms the last part of the historical discussion. The European experience of the author gives him some hope of a radical return to natural law philosophy. There is little doubt that positivism has been found wanting, but there is also so little grasp of the natural law position that we may be too hopeful in relying on mere verbal resemblances. In American legal thought, whether we take Holmes, Cardoza, Pound, or the present Supreme Court, pragmatism and relativism still play the leading role. Some mention should have been made here of Geny's Méthode d'interprétation et sources en droit privé positif, which was important enough to be translated in the Modern Legal Philosophy series.

The second part of the work is a survey of Scholastic philosophy. Chap­ters on "Being and Oughtness," "Intellect and Will," and "The Structure of the Sciences" lead to the key chapters on "The Nature of Law," "Law and Morality," "The Contents of the Natural Law," and "Natural Law and Positive Law." A plethora of footnotes are given to supplement this outline. Not all are of the same quality. Some refer to rather elementary college texts that suppose an instructor who will develop them. In general, the author follows St. Thomas and Suarez, emphasizing the rational element in law in contrast to the voluntaristic theories of Occam and the later positivists. Epistemologically, he is a Thomist, but he does not develop the difference between the Suarezians and the Thomists in their interpre-
tation of ordinatio rationis. He rejects the extreme rationalist position and seems to look with disfavor on the traditionalism of Donoso Cortes and De Maistre.

The author's method is expository rather than argumentative and probative. Now and then he slips into an ad hominem with references to the modern totalitarians or liberals. His choice of material is so broad that he can give only the highlights. The best section is on the contents of the natural law, where the relations of the family and other groups to the State are treated. Property, its importance and limitations are outlined.

The translation is generally free and idiomatic. Certain parts of the chapter on "Being and Oughtness" betray a stiffness; without the original we cannot say whether it is due to the author or translator.

This work should serve as a challenge to Catholic scholars. It will recall the various masquerades that pass by the name of natural law, and reveal how the term has been used with evident sincerity by Hobbes, Kant, and others to develop variant ethical and legal systems. A careful reading will also manifest the present limits in the application of the natural law, and why any suggestion of a return to metaphysics and the natural law is met with hostility or indifference. Professor Rommen has focused the problems. We hope he will continue and publish more intensive studies of the various topics of the present work.

Boston, Mass. BRIAN A. McGRATH, S.J.


This brief booklet is a bold attack on the role of credit creation in modern economy. The descriptive economics, though not always happily expressed, is on the main points sound and in many instances refreshingly realistic. A needless defect is the repeated indictment of economists for things which, as a group, they simply do not hold.

To readers of this review the chief point of interest is the writer's view on interest and usury. A passage from De Malo is given to prove that Thomas Aquinas held that "Money Is Sterile." The passage actually proves that in a contract of mutuum the title to the "substance" of the article is "sold" and therefore becomes the property of the borrower and the lender cannot charge the borrower for the use of the borrower's property. This is the root meaning of mutuum (meum-tuum) and is the crux of all Scholastic analysis of usury. Whether money is intrinsically or extrinsically sterile or productive is a secondary question.
Having set up this point, the author justifies by example rather than by analysis the following proposition: “Nevertheless it would seem to be the teaching of St. Thomas that money is by nature sterile, and can only increase through interest on these two conditions, that the money is lent out to productive use or that the lender suffers damage” (page 9).

Only the last of these conditions is significant. All titles to interest are reducible to “the lender suffers damage.” Damnum emergens, periculum sortis, lucrum cessans, all impose a cost on the lender. The more “productive” money is, the more frequently will these costs be incurred by lenders and the greater will they be. But great or small they represent the sole title to interest.

After narrating the notorious evils of credit expansion and inflation, the author concludes that, money being sterile, these evils are to be avoided by recognizing that fact. What he has proved is that money in an expanding economy may be (extrinsically) extremely productive—else why the demand for it? The evil lies not in the fact that money is sterile but that, through the effects of credit expansion on price levels and income distribution, the benefits of saving accrue to those who have not saved. The interest paid is in itself fully justified but under the present banking arrangement it is paid to the wrong people. Because people who have a title to something do not get it, we must not conclude that the title does not exist.

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B. W. DEMPSEY, S.J.

KATECHETISCHE ERNEUERUNG. By Dr. Franz Michel Willam. Tyrolia-Verlag, Innsbruck, Austria. Pp. xii + 152.

Dr. Willam thinks that the Catholic catechisms of previous centuries, in harmony with the spirit of their age, were too exclusively intellectual in their presentation of doctrine, and need to be replaced now by other catechisms which, without being less intellectual, will do justice to every aspect of the Christian life. That this is also the opinion of many competent European experts in the field of catechetics is made clear by an abundant and very valuable series of quotations from such writers as Delcuve, Ranwez, Godin, Pichler, Stieglitz, Mey, and such works as the Programmschrift für einen neuen Katechismus, published by Herder in 1944.

According to Dr. Willam, Pope Pius X, influenced by such writers as Cardinal Newman and Abbot Guéranger, was among the first to recognise the need for a more modern catechism and to attempt to meet it with the Compendio della Dottrina Christiana which he himself composed as a catechism for the dioceses of central Italy. Wilhelm Pichler’s catechisms, too, Dr. Willam considers to be a big improvement over those of earlier centuries,
but he makes no secret of his opinion that the closest approach to the ideal
that has yet appeared is the recent French catechism of Quinet and Boyer,
*Catechisme à l'usage des dioceses de France, publié pour le diocese du Mans*
(Tours: Maison Mâme, 1943). Based on the Catechism of Pope Pius X, the
work of Quinet and Boyer incorporates the most valuable educational
features of the catechetical systems of Gustav Mey, Wilhelm Pichler, and
the Munich method. Much of *Katechetische Erneuerung* is devoted to a
comparison of the new French catechism—and its small, complete units of
study, each in three parts—with previous works of the same kind, especially
the work of Pope Pius X. In a twelve-page appendix, Dr. Willam presents
in a German translation two sample chapters from Quinet and Boyer.

*Alma College*  

**JOHN J. HEALY, S.J.**

**EVIL AND THE CHRISTIAN FAITH.** By Nels F. S. Ferré. New York:

In this book, the second of the series which Dr. Ferré means to be his
life-work, *Reason and the Christian Faith*, the author attempts with deep
sincerity to show the necessity of personal acceptance of a Christocentric
perspective if man is to have any peace when faced with the enigma of evil.
He rightly scores naturalists and hedonists for “solving” the problem from
partial or mixed perspectives: reason cannot handle the problem positively.

In his argument against those who, seeing only the mere facts of evil,
deny God’s infiniteness, Dr. Ferré betrays assumptions that lead him into
strange ways. For him such people are guilty of halting the life-process in
which no fact is mere fact. His conclusion is good, namely that we must
take into consideration the eternal purpose behind all facts. But the point
is made on the Bergsonian base that past facts are modified and even canceled
out by present process: “the wasness of the was is different from the isness of
the was” (p. 7). When this natural “redemptive” principle is added to the
principle that all evil, including all suffering, must be wiped out if God’s
goodness is to be omnipotent, the conclusion is made that hell is not irrev-
ocable; Dr. Ferré’s interpretation of St. Paul’s text on the universality of
God’s salvific will supports this conclusion. However, this position is not a
real synthesis of faith and reason, but one commanded by sentimental
rationalism.

In dealing with sin Dr. Ferré works on the assumption that “all have to
rebel against God, at least in temptation, in order to become free, to become
real selves, to become willing sons who know why they have been chosen to
be adopted into the family of God” (p. 34). In effect, he demands adulthood
as a requisite for acceptance of grace, and seems to make God responsible
for sin to the extent of His willing our self-centredness as a means to Christian fellowship (p. 49). He speaks of the Fall but has not the Catholic idea of original justice. In fact grace does not seem to be supernatural.

The chapter on "Evil and Nature," in which is admitted the possibility of the development of animal souls to the level of human consciousness, is understandable, if it be given that the outweighing of pleasure by pain demands redress, that the soul is consciousness, and that universal evolution is a fact. The chapter "Evil and History" vividly delineates the socially educative value of the needs and environment God has given us: they drive us together for mutual support, an excellent preparation of Christian fellowship.

If the author's earlier work, *Faith and Reason* has not been read, a summary is conveniently provided in Appendix B. It is important for grasping why truth "must by the very nature of knowledge be a living synthesis in thought and deed of knowledge and faith" (p. 166). Here we see the deep influence of Kierkegaard, the inevitable paradox of objective thinking, the swallowing-up of the paradox by the subject's grasp of another Person. In Ferré's terms this means that "from the point of view of our strictest thinking based on partial evidence, there is an arbitrary, even if not absurd element in faith" (p. 167), while the dynamic synthesis of faith and reason is in the "selective actual," in "history's most high," in Christ.

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During the past two decades the traditions and cultural phases of life in these United States have been the subject of intensive critical and historical study. *A History of American Philosophy*, if it does not crown, at least gives emphatic point to the significance and worth of such inquiries into the nation's philosophical past; it is doubtless the kind of survey long looked for by those engaged in the American situation.

Dr. Schneider thinks our past every bit as perplexing and resistant to understanding as our present and offers the opinion that "the reader of this story will probably be at least as bewildered as I am in trying to tell what American history teaches us or what American philosophy 'stands for.'" It eludes measure, then, in terms of a central content, a dominant note, or moral lesson. Nevertheless, under the process of the descriptive method, analysis of the various phases of the American tradition yields the elements of a whole, a complexus of ideas, a pattern that shows forth more distinctly than any previous synthesis the continuity of philosophical speculation and
the interpenetration and interdependence of economic, political, metaphysical, and religious principles. The author interprets the New World philosophy as a series of variations on Old World themes, in one instance resisted or distorted, in another adapted and revised in terms of the national genius, environment and experience.

From colonial New England to New Deal America, the narrative is well sustained, rich in information and insights, indicating tendencies and tracing influences of speculative thought on various phases of American culture, in the areas of literature, politics, social theory and religion. One has an impression of journeying across vast flat-lands, with few eminences, into the marshes of speculation, the end of a road being empiricism. But such is the story of America's intellectual past; the historian has completed his task. America's many philosophies and their chief proponents are separated off under eight master themes in an aggregate of forty-one chapters. As guides to further study, helpfully annotated lists of primary and secondary materials support each part and chapter. The index is excellent.

*Weston College*  
WILLIAM F. FINNERAN, S.J.


This volume contains an interesting group of essays on the life and thought of five men who, for one reason or another, are important to present-day thinking. M. S. Chaning-Pearce contributes a study of Søren Kierkegaard, the Danish religious thinker, who is important to modern thought as the father of Existentialism. G. K. Chesterton is the subject of a chapter by F. A. Lea, which is somewhat marred by a conviction on the part of the author that Chesterton drastically limited his intellectual outlook by becoming a Catholic. The essay on Eric Gill, by Donald Attwater, is very sympathetically written and is the best and most readable in the book. Nicol Macnicol contributes a study of Charles Freer Andrews, clergyman of the Church of England (which he later repudiated), missionary in India, friend of Gandhi and Rabindranath Tagore, and defender of his beloved Indians against race prejudice in Kenya, South Africa, and British Guiana. The last essay, by Evgueny Lampert, concerns Nicolas Berdyaev, Russian modernist Christian in religion and Marxist in economics. The essays are only incidentally biographical but chiefly concern the thought of the various subjects as manifested in their published writings. Five more disparate personalities could scarcely be treated in a single volume, but each is well worth the study given him.

*West Baden College*  
C. L. FIRSTOS, S.J.

This report, prepared for the American Council on Education by the Committee on Religion and Education, is an attempt to solve the problem of introducing the study of religion into our tax-supported schools, within the framework of existing legislation and without violation of the principle of separation of Church and State.

The committee expresses its conviction that this principle does not exclude religious subject-matter from the curricula, but only indoctrination. It analyzes and deplores the secularization of our tax-supported schools. It admits the need of some religion in the schools, but for obvious reasons it rejects the solution of trying to teach a body of minimum essentials that might be approved by at least the major religious groups. The committee's own solution is the teaching about religion, without indoctrination, in other words, it approves of teaching youth about the objectives of religion, about historical and contemporary religious institutions, and so forth. This solution is proposed, not as something final, but as a means "of breaking down the barrier between the religious and the secular in the educational system," and as something that will lead to further exploration and experimentation.

As expressive of the findings of earnest and capable men, the report is well worth reading. But the conclusion, even in its present modest form, is hardly satisfactory. However, the present writer doubts if there is any satisfactory solution.

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GERALD KELLY, S.J.

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