BOOK REVIEWS


The publication of this book, which is either an abbreviated first draft or a part of an ampler work to appear in the future, was hastened by the author’s desire to combat certain views propagated in Martin Jugie’s monumental *La mort et l’assomption de la sainte Vierge.* The latter volume, though less than three years old, has already won wide acclaim as one of the few outstanding theological contributions of the present century, and is undoubtedly the greatest work on the Assumption ever written. Yet some of its theories are open to question, especially the proposal that Mary was taken up into heaven without having undergone death. P. Faller is satisfied that this doctrine has been soundly refuted by Charles Balić, O.F.M. For his part, he undertakes to show that Jugie exaggerates the silence of the early centuries concerning the Assumption. He thinks that this period of silence was far from being as long as Jugie estimates, and that it was not at all significant, but on the contrary was necessary, owing to the theological preoccupations of early ecclesiastical writers with trinitarian and Christological heresies.

These two questions, about the era of silence and the significance of that silence, are treated with vigor and clarity. The author displays full competence as a patristic scholar and as a theologian. In the opinion of this reviewer, he has established his case against Jugie. Particularly convincing is his examination of the evidence for the Assumption from the writings of St. Andrew of Crete and St. Epiphanius. At any rate, theologians who have read Jugie can hardly be justified in yielding definitive assent to his views without weighing Faller’s criticism and reconstruction.

In the third part, an attempt is made to demonstrate the existence of an implicit belief in the Assumption during the very earliest centuries, down almost to the Apostolic age. This last section of the book reveals traces of hurried composition, and is not as clearly and forcefully put as the first two parts. The reader will not be greatly impressed unless he reflects carefully on every item of testimony and discovers for himself the way to conclusions barely indicated. A gold mine is here opened up, but not exploited. Very likely a future and enlarged edition, written with greater leisure, will enable the author to realize his plans more completely.

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**Cyril O. Vollert, S.J.**

This is the first translation in any language of the important little work of St. Bonaventure known as the Breviloquium. It is hard to understand why the Breviloquium has not been translated before, particularly when we learn that there have been at least nineteen editions of the work and that, with the possible exception of his Life of St. Francis, the Breviloquium has been printed more often than any other work of St. Bonaventure (p. xii). The text followed by Mr. Nemmers is the one found in the Quarrachi edition.

St. Bonaventure wrote this work shortly before 1257; the exact date is not known. It seems to be a compendium of his Commentarii in quattuor libros Petri Lombardi, which were finished in 1255. We have in the Breviloquium an excellent example of theology in its sacra doctrina stage, the stage in which it remained down to the year 1267, when St. Thomas began his Summa Theologica. This is why the Breviloquium is of such interest to a student of St. Thomas. After a prologue, consisting of six sections that deal with the meanings of Holy Scripture, the Breviloquium is divided into seven parts. These seven parts treat successively of the Trinity, creation, the corruption of sin, the Incarnation, grace, the sacraments, and the last judgment. St. Bonaventure follows a simple and clear method of presentation throughout: after presenting the teaching of the Church on each of these topics, with their subdivisions, he gives his own explanation, which he regularly introduces with the formula: “The explanation of this is as follows.” In the Breviloquium St. Bonaventure deduces all things from the first principle, which is God, instead of reducing them to that principle, as he does in the De reductione artium and in the Itinerarium.

The reader will recognize some doctrines that are peculiar to St. Bonaventure, and even peculiar to the Breviloquium, in the present translation. Among others, he will notice the lack of distinction between natural and revealed theology (p. 24); the notion of gratia gratis data as a divinely given aid without which no one can adequately prepare himself for salvation (p. 144); the infinite malice of sin, without any qualification (p. 148); the statement that, although the sacraments are called the cause of grace, this does not mean that grace is effected causally by them (pp. 176–77); the doctrine that extreme unction is intended to remove venial sin (pp. 181, 204–206) as penance is for mortal sin (pp. 181, 201–204); the assertion that Christ received three sacraments—baptism, the Eucharist, and holy orders (p. 183); that the word Amen belongs to the baptismal formula by divine institution (p. 191); that baptism in the early Church was administered in the
name of Christ, in which the Trinity is understood (p. 192). Many of these views were held by others besides St. Bonaventure.

When we come to evaluate the work of Mr. Nemmers as a translator, we must keep in mind two things. First, his is a pioneer work. Secondly, Mr. Nemmers does not seem to be quite at home in the field of theology; this becomes evident when we review some of his renditions of theological terms and phrases. What follows is a list of renditions that are either not altogether happy or theologically incorrect. P. 24: theology is a “united science” (*scientia una*). P. 25: the first person “proceeds from nothing” (*prima a nulla est,* which means: the first person does not proceed from any other person). Faith is “the beginning of the cultivation of God” (*principium cultus Dei*). Would not “devoutly” be a better equivalent of “piissime” than “virtuously”? P. 28: that hypostasis “which is the first basis of an existence from the very beginning” (*hypostasis ilia, in qua est prima ratio principiandi,* which means: the first hypostasis [the Father] is the first source or principle of the other hypostases). “By the mode of position in a negative manner” (*per modum positionis cum negatione,* which simply means: by way of affirmation with a negation). P. 29: “in divinis” is a technical phrase that does not mean “in the divine persons” but simply “in matters that pertain to God.” Likewise, “secundum modum se habendi” used in reference to the divine persons must not be translated, “according to the mode of behavior.” It refers to the relation, not the behavior, of one divine person to another (this mistake also occurs on p. 31).

P. 31: “Illud quo distinguitur” of the original should not be rendered: “the one from whom he is distinguished” but “that by which he is distinguished.” P. 35: “reason” is not a good rendition of “ratio” when it refers to the intelligible concept of each of the persons of the Trinity. P. 36: St. Bonaventure never said that *unum, verum,* and *bonum* are qualities attributed to the first principle (God). P. 37: “willing” would be a better equivalent of “velle” than “wishing” in the context. “The power to know is a certain power” is hardly an accurate rendition of “posse scire est aliquid posse.”

P. 42: the sentence beginning, “The divine will,” is not clear in the translation. P. 49: the divine power is immense (*immensa*), not “tremendous.” P. 55: the sentence beginning, “This is said,” does not make any sense. P. 60: “every corporeal reason” incorrectly renders “omnis actio corporalis.” In paragraph 9, if the word “that” were omitted after “saving science,” the meaning would be clearer. P. 69: “first collective power” does not accurately describe the *phantasia* as the “prima virtus collativa.” P. 75: “Every effect” should be “Every intellect.” Clearly the line beginning
"Omnis enim effectus" of the Latin text has not been translated. P. 110: "if the redeemed were a mere creature" should read "if the redeemer were a mere creature." P. 112: "not of the assumed but of the assuming" ought to read "not of the person assumed but of the person assuming," for the sake of clearness. In the next sentence, "its negation is implied" would bring out what St. Bonaventure means by "clauditur negatio" better than the term "absence" of the translation. P. 115, n. 5: the statement that for St. Thomas "the redemption of the angels relates only to atonement," with a reference to De Veritate, q. 29, is meaningless. P. 120: "in our works or the effect" should be "in its work or effect." P. 129: "Beatitudo frui- tionis" does not mean "the blessedness of productivity" (twice this occurs) but of fruition or enjoyment. P. 130: "there was in Christ no struggle or resistance" does not do justice to "colluctatio et pugna" of the original; Christ had no interior struggle or conflict in the sense of struggling with unruly passions, but does this mean that He offered no resistance to anything? P. 132: "Jesus Christ . . . in so far as He was man was not innocent and was the debtor of death" is exactly the opposite to what St. Bonaventure says: "Christus Jesus . . . in quantum homo innocens, nullatenus erat debitor mortis." P. 135: again St. Bonaventure is made to say the opposite of what he actually said when "those who follow Him" is given as a translation of "qui Christi adventum praecesserunt."

P. 142: "a godlike series" is not the meaning of "habitus deiformis." The last sentence on p. 143 is obscure and meaningless. P. 150 and passim: "the division of grace into the habits of the virtues" is not the meaning of "de ramificatione gratiae in habitus virtutum." P. 156: "the habits of benefits and senses" does poor justice to "habitus fructuum et sensuum. On p. 157 poverty of spirit is the remedy for "the evil of swelling." Why not the evil of pride? Again, the sentence beginning, "Because the perfect progression," is left unfinished. Finally, on the same page, St. Bonaventure's "perfectio religionis, praelationis et internae sanctitudinis" is meaningless when it becomes "the perfection of religion, of manifestation, and of internal sanctity." "Praelatio" regularly becomes "manifestation" from this point onwards; the translator evidently is unaware of the technical or canonical meaning of both "religio" and "praelatio." P. 176: "vessel of grace" on line 33 should be "vessels of grace." P. 188: "it is common to all the sacraments to be repeated neither on the same person," etc., is a clumsy way of saying what St. Bonaventure teaches: "It is common to all the sacraments not to be repeated (non iterari) on the same person," etc. On p. 189 the same sentence continues: "yet three sacraments must not in a certain sense be repeated, namely, baptism, confirmation, and orders."
What St. Bonaventure says is that these three sacraments are not to be repeated to any extent ("non sunt aliquatenus iteranda"). On p. 211, n. 37, it is difficult to understand what the Quarrachi editors state from the sentence as it stands.

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WILLIAM R. O'CONNOR


The problem which the author attempts to solve is the practical one of how to deal with unbelievers. Hitherto the approach followed the line of argumentation which arose from the controversies with the deists and rationalists of the past three centuries. This approach restricts the field of apologetics to extremely narrow limits, and fails to take into account that there is an intellectual abyss separating believers from unbelievers. It also overlooks the method which Christ Himself used in His dealings with the incredulous, and neglects to consider how God ordinarily leads men to the faith.

Accordingly the author proposes a solution which rests upon two fundamental truths: (1) that straight thinking is necessary for faith; (2) that faith is necessary for straight thinking.

If an unbeliever is asked: "Why can't we get together?" he will immediately answer: "You Catholics renounce all free thought; you enslave the intellect and surrender your use of reason by substituting for it obedience to what your Church teaches. That is intellectual suicide, to which I will never submit."

To convince him of his error, no single argument, or line of arguments that bring in the supernatural will be of any value. He will not acknowledge the divinity of Christ, nor the argument from miracles. He is likely to be somewhat impressed by the Catholic Church as a whole, the entire Christian plan of salvation, or, as the author puts it, the whole Christ in His Church. But since the infidel is convinced that the dogmas of the faith cannot be treated with the same rigorous methods of logic which characterize other sciences, a different approach must be made to show the reasonableness of the Church's teachings. The author suggests three steps whereby a man of scientific habit of mind can persuade himself of this fact.

First, he is conscious of being able to learn the truth, and he must feel the responsibility to search for it. This is a personal responsibility, as individual as any responsibility for moral actions. To shirk this duty is really to frustrate the purpose for which God gave him the use of reason. Now
among the truths for which he must search belong the truths of faith, and the reasons for believing.

The second step is that the searcher for truth must persuade himself that his intellect is not to remain passive. He must actively combat his prejudices and resist the temptation to doubt all religious truth. He can with effort and sincerity acquire certainty about some truths that will prepare the way for faith. God's indirect manifestation of Himself in nature, the spirituality and immortality of the soul, and other truths will appear reasonable, and the need for accepting them as certain can be known without having recourse to revelation.

The third step is essentially supernatural. So far intellect, will, conscience, and heart have cooperated in the search for religious truth. In all probability divine grace aided the process, but theoretically at least the searcher could proceed thus far without it. He has merely been asked to assent to truths which were within the scope of his natural reason. But to assent to truths which are beyond the grasp of the human intellect, he requires the light of faith. With this light he will be able to see that there is knowledge which cannot be attained naturally—to know God in His essence—and that there is an intellectual act which surpasses natural comprehension—the intuitive knowledge of God in the beatific vision—and that there is a human act alone capable of directing one to this intuitive vision—the act of faith. When the sincere searcher for truth admits this, he finally understands that it can hardly be "intellectual suicide" for human reason to renounce itself in order to surpass itself, to raise itself above its natural powers and enrich itself with the very riches of God. If divine grace then prompts the will to tend to that supernatural good, which is eternal life, the act of faith will follow.

Unbelievers often misunderstand and misinterpret our attitude in matters of faith, and we, too, are guilty of misjudging their religious outlook. To this practical point of showing due respect to a religious adversary, the author devotes a chapter. Another explains the difference between Catholic and Protestant exegesis. He analyses the process of loss of faith in the case of Ernest Renan and of Alfred Loisy. A section is devoted to the four ways in which Catholic thought is particularly at variance with modern thought, viz., doctrinal security vs. agnostic uncertainty; firm adherence to Christ's revelation vs. pragmatic change of doctrines and principles; the pre-eminence of religious influence in the individual and in society vs. modernism, positivism, and rationalism; respect for authority and order as founded on divine authority vs. communism and anarchy. Finally, as an epilogue,
there is a clear and detailed statement of the Christian creed, and the reasons for firmly adhering to the same.

In the preface, the author modestly disclaims originality of thought and development in his work. But he has expounded his thesis clearly and logically, with sound doctrinal background, and in a way that will interest and impress the reader. We heartily wish the book a wide circulation.

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HENRY WILLMERING, S.J.


The mind of the seasoned theologian is not like a virgin slate. This becomes especially evident in his study of patristic literature. Unless the scholar struggles to preserve, as far as possible, a neutral and impartial attitude of mind there is great danger that the impact of the teaching of the Fathers, especially those of the East, will be unduly cushioned by the metaphysical synthesis which, through long years, the Western theologian has built up within his mind. And, unless he exercise great care, he will channel the fresh and nervous expressions of the Greek Fathers along a route and fit them into a mold of his own making. From this it may well result that much of the richness and form of the Fathers' teaching is lost. In the opinion of this reviewer, P. Galtier has not approached the Greek Fathers with that docility and lack of parti-pris which are essential to an exact understanding of the doctrine of the Greek Fathers on the role of the Holy Spirit in our sanctification.

The first section of the present work discusses the role of the third divine Person as taught in the New Testament and in the Fathers who wrote prior to the controversies over the so-called Macedonian heresy. In the second part, P. Galtier presents the doctrine of those Fathers actually engaged in refuting the Pneumatomachoi, beginning with St. Athanasius and concluding with St. Cyril of Alexandria. Forty pages are devoted to St. Basil, sixty to Cyril. The final six pages of conclusions are substantially the same as those in Galtier's former study, L'Habitation en nous des trois Personnes, namely, the insistence of the Greek Fathers upon the part played by the Holy Spirit in our sanctification is to be explained in terms of appropriation, pure and simple.

One gathers that the author sees only two possible positions with respect to the indwelling of the Holy Spirit: either one holds the theory of Petavius, or one must maintain pure appropriation (cf. pp. 25, 30, 51, 167, 220, 266).
The student of the Greek Fathers will find two series of texts regarding the part of the Blessed Trinity in our sanctification. At times the absolute unity of power and essence is stressed; at other times, the role of the individual Persons. The impartial and objective scholar will try to interpret each class of texts literally, if that is at all possible. In my opinion, P. Galtier does not do this. Because the Greek Fathers maintain the absolute unity of operation in works dealing obviously with efficient causality (such as the Holy Spirit’s speaking through the prophets or effecting the Incarnation), it is not thereby justifiable to conclude that in those places where the role of the Holy Spirit is stressed in our sanctification this emphasis must be explained by mere appropriation. One must first show that, in every form of causality, the special role of the third Person is to be understood in terms of pure appropriation. This P. Galtier does not prove.

Again, it seems illogical to conclude in favor of simple appropriation, merely because the Greek Fathers held that our sanctification came “equally” from all three divine Persons (p. 266, and passim). One may hold, I believe, that our holiness comes from all three Persons, but from each divine Person communicating the same one reality, but in a manner relatively different as modified by the personal hypostatic character of the individual Persons. In a word, as A. Eröss observed of Scheeben (Scholastik, XI, 1936, 393), there is a possible middle stand between the theory of Petavius and the doctrine of pure appropriation. By avoiding the theory of Petavius we preserve the divine unity so accurately set forth in the Council of Florence (DB, 703) and, at the same time, we are not confined to the doctrine of pure appropriation which, according to J. Beumer (Theologie und Glaube, XXX, 1938, 504), uses beautiful language but seems, on further analysis, singularly devoid of content.

P. Galtier readily admits that each divine Person comes and dwells within the soul, each according to His proper manner, the Father as such, and the same with regard to the Son and Holy Spirit. Nevertheless, he maintains, this diversity lies solely within the inner circle of their proper trinitarian life; there is no difference whatsoever in the manner in which the divine Persons are present and communicate the divine life to the soul (cf. p. 244, and passim). If this be so, one may ask, how can the learned author explain the fact that the new divine presence is toto coelo different from the presence of Deus Unus in the purely natural order? If our new divine life is a real communication to us of trinitarian life and our entry into the inner life of the Godhead, must there not be a passive reception in the soul of trinitarian life, and not merely of the abstract divine essence? If the three divine Persons communicate themselves to us, then we must receive
And since all the newness of the presence comes from the created term in the union, i.e., the change in the human soul, then, so it seems, within that soul there must be a passive reception and possession of each divine Person. For, according to Galtier, each divine Person is present within the soul according to His proper manner. We may hold that the reality communicated is one, namely, a created participation in divine trinitarian life; but the manner of communication is three-fold relative, passing as it does through the triple channel of the divine Persons. The one reality received in a three-fold different manner establishes the foundation for a triple relation, a relation to and union with each distinct Person.

In such a theory, there is room for appropriation; but this type of appropriation will not be that which we use, for example, in appropriating creation to the Father.

The author wisely points out that the teaching of the Greek Fathers must be considered against the background of the theological disputes which gave rise to their teaching. This background will certainly explain why they taught these doctrines at this particular time; but the polemic nature of their teaching does not adequately explain what they taught. That was ruled by the deposit of faith, already existent, of which the Fathers might be called the publishers.

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Malachi J. Donnelly, S.J.


The series of New Testament commentaries entitled Verbum Salutis was begun in 1923 by the French biblical scholars, PP. Durand, Huby, and Jouon of the Society of Jesus. The most recent volume of this series to reach America is François Amiot's Épitre aux Galates and Épitres aux Thessaloniens. Like its predecessors, it is directed to the educated laity rather than to the biblical specialist. Nevertheless the professor of Sacred Scripture will read this work with profit to himself and will not hesitate to recommend it to his students.

The author devotes almost two hundred and forty pages to his explanation of Galatians and about one hundred and forty to that of Thessalonians. Like the other volumes of Verbum Salutis, this one contains brief indices and an unpretentious but clear map.

In his Avant-propos P. Amiot declares that these Epistles are probably the earliest writings of the New Testament. Quoting Prat, he says that Galatians proclaims the end of a world, that of the Old Testament, and
Thessalonians, the end of the world; it is, moreover, a source of wonder and admiration that within twenty years after the Passion the coherence, maturity, and spiritual wealth of Christianity should be so manifest.

About eighty-five pages are devoted to an introduction to Galatians, in which the usual subject matter is discussed—authenticity, destination, date, etc. P. Amiot treats at great length the famous question of the destination and date of Galatians and upholds the opinion that the Epistle was written in 49 at Antioch and sent to Southern Galatia. It must be said that he argues convincingly and presents objectively and completely the arguments of those who favor other opinions.

The difficult question of the value of the Mosaic Law as contrasted with the New Law is examined intelligently and lucidly. P. Amiot shows that he has understood the problem, for his explanation is clear and highly reasonable. The divinity of Christ is held to be the ultimate solution and the author stresses the fact that non-Catholic exegetes who do not appreciate the Christocentric value of the Epistle can hardly hope to arrive at a proper understanding of Paul's ideas as found in Galatians.

Trinitarian texts are explained; the value of the Mosaic Law is preserved but it is shown to be only a preparation for the Law of Christ. Justification could not be obtained by works of the older Law; it was to be sought and found in faith in Christ. The moral consequences of Paul's teaching are briefly outlined and the true nature of the Church, the new Israel, graphically described.

The translation into idiomatic French is based more on the Greek than on the Vulgate and after each section of the translation an explanation of several pages follows.

As in Galatians, so in Thessalonians the author treats the introductory problems at great length, in about forty pages. I Thess. was written at the end of 50 or in the beginning of 51, and II Thess. a little later. He proves quite satisfactorily that II Thess. is Pauline, there being, generally speaking, no question about the authorship of I Thess.

The principal subject of both Epistles is eschatology, and in his introduction P. Amiot devotes over twenty pages to it. Those living at the end of the world will not have to die. Paul did not share the common belief that the parousia was imminent. The adversary is not so much an individual as a series, and its opponent is the collection of preachers of the Gospel. In his explanation of the text, the author holds that I Thess. 4:4 refers to man's body, not to his wife, and that 4:6 refers not to business but to carnal sins. He offers in 5:23 a good explanation of "spirit," "soul," and "body," and in footnote 5 on p. 372 he gives from another source a clear summary of Paul's
teaching on the *parousia*. He does not hesitate to part company with exegetes whose works have been looked upon as more scholarly; but he presents their views objectively and fairly.

In keeping with the nature of the work, the bibliography is short and quite up-to-date, though the references in the footnotes are far more numerous and modern; it is in these that Catholic books in English are occasionally cited. Despite the printing difficulties under which French publishers must be laboring, this book is remarkably free from serious misprints. P. Amiot makes frequent use of Greek in his footnotes.

His treatment of these three important Epistles is not exhaustive; at the same time it certainly is not sterile. The many spiritual suggestions which he offers enhance the value of the book and prove that a commentary on Sacred Scripture can profitably be used for the best kind of spiritual reading.

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A smoothly written, penetrating analysis of the most intriguing problem in the Old Testament. Prefacing his work with short summaries of Egyptian and Babylonian beliefs concerning the future life, the author proceeds to examine Hebrew ideas on the same subject. In general, his treatment follows the chronological order of the various sacred books, and presupposes not only that revelation is progressive among the Hebrews (as it is), but also that that progress is molded to a slowly developing spiritual sense among the Chosen People. Two chapters (VI and VII) are given over to an excellent examination of the notion of *Sheol* in the Old Testament, and to a clarification of the standpoint from which the sacred writer views *Sheol*; the latter point had needed expression for a long time, in order to remove a misunderstanding of the gloom which seems to surround the idea of *Sheol* in the sacred text. The measured conclusion of the book is that apart from a belief in survival after death (held in all stages of Israel's history), Hebrew thought until after the exile remained nebulous and negative about conditions connected with that survival; in its declining centuries the Jewish community held definite belief in a personal resurrection and in rewards and punishments in the after life.

Despite sincere admiration for the book as a whole, the present writer does not see eye to eye with the author in all details. Father Sutcliffe, for instance, denies any influence of Egyptian thought upon Hebrew ideas, but considers a Babylonian influence (in a wholly acceptable sense) to be perfectly natural and expected (p. 20). But this seems utterly impossible on the
face of it: Abraham severed connections with Ur more than five hundred years before the Exodus, and no normal contact with Mesopotamian ideas is made by Israel for six hundred years after the Exodus; furthermore, such religious ideas as Abraham may have left to his descendants, even if they retained them over a thousand years, did not have their provenance in Ur, but were given to him after he had left the land of his ancestors. On the other hand, four hundred years of living in Egypt where ideas on the future life were highly, if erroneously, developed, could not but give to the Israelites an awareness of life after death far more "advanced" than anything to be found in the earlier part of the sacred record. Moses himself was brought up and educated in the house of Pharaoh, and would have been conversant with the details of Egyptian beliefs. Hence there are grounds for a strong suspicion that the Egyptian sojourn exerted a very powerful, if negative, influence on the officially expressed Hebrew ideas of the future life: because of the proneness of the people to idolatry, and because of fundamentally polytheistic ideas of the future life current among the Egyptians, the thoughts of the Hebrews were focused down to this life in which God was immediate Rewarder and Punisher. For inevitable queries from minds already awakened to Egyptian concepts, a simple oral instruction would have sufficed; the official silence of the Wilderness record need not be interpreted as an indication of ignorance.

Again, in the matter of progressive revelation the author seems to demand an orderly development of ideas which the sacred record does not substantiate. If David could announce the divinity of the Messias a thousand years before the revelation of the doctrine of the Blessed Trinity, and do it without explanation, there is no a priori reason why he could not also have expressed the idea of resurrection. About fourteen pages of the present work are given to the effort to remove that idea from Psalms 15 and 16 because it is chronologically out of order, though some of the shrewdest commentators on the Psalms accept it. Father Sutcliffe's argumentation is not convincing here any more than it is when he tries to water down the import of Job 19:25-27 (pp. 131 ff). To interpret "after my skin has been thus destroyed" as though merely the skin and not the whole body were intended, would be to introduce a bathos into the text and to ignore the struggle with his misfortune which earlier forces him toward the same idea more briefly (14:13 f; 17:13 f).

With the author all will agree that there is much more silence than might be expected in a divine record on so important and so vital a religious point. But it must not be overlooked that we know almost nothing of the oral traditions of the Hebrew people, nothing of the religious instruction from
the beginning which made use of the written record as a starting point for explanation and illustration. Hence it is one thing to admit our ignorance of any specific development of thought concerning the future life, but quite another to presume from the silence of the official record that already possessed thoughts on rewards and punishments in the after life were not purified. Full development would have to await the messianic moment, obviously, not only because that moment was the habitual term of the Old Testament’s outlook, but also because until the messianic moment Heaven remained closed, as the divine Author knew, whether or not it was known to His human instruments.

These differences of opinion aside, Father Sutcliffe’s work is recommended unreservedly. No other book on this subject in the reviewer’s experience says so much so well in so short a space.

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Dr. Tasker propounds a doctrine which is right by means of theories which are often wrong. It is his purpose to scan each of the books of the New Testament to show how the authors of these books appreciated a significance in the Old Dispensation Scriptures beyond the obviously literal meaning. He states his purpose “To them [the writers of the N.T.] the whole story of the People of Israel, their divine call, their redemption from Egypt, the giving of the law on Mt. Sinai, the triumphant establishment of the worship of Jehovah in the Holy Land, the building of the Temple, the tragedy of the exile, and the subsequent resurrection and return of the remnant of Zion, are all foreshadowings of the greater and final salvation given in the life, death and resurrection of Jesus, apart from which they have in themselves no abiding significance and are not fully comprehensible” (p. 16). There is, then, a progressive unfolding of the Old Covenant in the New and of the New in the age of eternity which the latter foreshadows—both Covenants being but the development of the divine plan ordained by Providence which gives meaning to human life and human history. All this is correct.

When Dr. Tasker expounds St. Paul’s epistles (pp. 90–113) he writes as a man of vision and understanding. He takes St. Paul to be the author of the epistles and is, for the most part, quite orthodox in this chapter. But his exposition of the Gospels and the life of Christ is not so happy. First he accepts, as though it were a fact, that Matthew, Mark, Luke, and John were really not the authors of the four gospels. “As is now generally
realized, the records of the life and teaching of Jesus which we find in the Four Gospels were composed a generation or more after the events they describe” (p. 19). Consequently he can accept as truly historical only that part of the gospel narrative which appeals to his preference from the internal evidence of the text. That his criterion of the Gospels’ historical accuracy is internal evidence escapes from his pen when he writes: “The fact that this [the twelve-year-old Christ in the Temple in Luke’s account] is the only incident of the boyhood of Jesus recorded in the Canonical Gospels, and that there are a large number found in the Apocryphal Gospels, and that by comparison this story is free from those marks of precocity and exaggeration which are characteristic of legends, which tend to be formed later around the boyhood of ‘heroes,’ affords us very strong justification for regarding it as historical” (pp. 22–23). What good, one wonders, comes from knowing that the narration about Jesus amplifies the meaning of the Old Testament books if the narration itself may not be accurate history?

This study of the New Testament is a reaction against “undue concentration by scholars upon the literary and historical study of the Bible” (p. 15). The author wants to rediscover the “world in which the early Fathers of the Church, or the theologians of the Middle Ages or of the Reformation lived” (p. 15). It is unfortunate that in this pursuit he forgets that scholars in that lost world accepted the gospels as historical documents written by the authentic evangelists, and that he accepts as sound the conclusions of higher critics against whom he is reacting. Once admitted, these conclusions will naturally lead to such incongruous assertions as the following: that Luke’s gospel is “off the main stream of primitive Christianity” in that it makes “no mention of the Messiah’s death as an atonement” (p. 47). Does Dr. Tasker forget that Lk. 22:20 (“This cup is the new covenant in my blood, which shall be shed for you”) is explicitly speaking of atoning blood?

There are many other unintelligible statements, chiefly about Christ, in this book. Although the author persists in maintaining that Jesus is the Son of God, he can assure us that “it was to become increasingly clear, as the years went on, to the developing mind of Jesus that the perfect and effective sacrifice must be made by Himself” (p. 23), that “He came gradually to realize that the perfect sacrifice could only be made by perfect obedience” (p. 23), that “the Gospels leave us in no doubt that it was after His Baptism at the hands of John the Baptist that Jesus received the divine assurance that He was what He had already become increasingly conscious of being, the unique Son of God, called to be the Christ of Jewish expectation” (p. 24). It seems odd, indeed, that such statements can be made of the all-knowing God and that they can be climaxed with an assertion like
The atmosphere which clings to this book probably can be made appreciable in this simple statement of the author: "Matthew's story [about the children crying out, 'Hosanna to the Son of David'] is therefore probably not historically accurate; but it contains a theological truth" (pp. 21–22). We might summarize Dr. Tasker's procedure as follows: Critics in the past have attempted to establish what is historically and literally true in the Scriptures. The new approach is not to bother about the historicity but the theological truth in the Scriptures. The probably unhistorical and therefore unobjective truths of the New Testament are an amplification of the probably unhistorical and therefore unobjective truths of the Old Testament. In all this Scriptural unobjectivity let us take comfort, on it let us base our faith.

West Baden College

Edward J. Hodous, S.J.


The New Testament Letters, particularly the Epistles of St. Paul, offer many serious difficulties to modern readers. One is often tempted to ask: "Were these writings clear to the original readers? Among the first Christians were many illiterate tradesmen, housewives and slaves, and if they understood the Apostle's message, why cannot the average layman of today do the same?" Various solutions are suggested, as for example: the Apostle had previously instructed these persons to whom the letters are addressed; or, these Epistles are simply the residue of a more copious correspondence; or again, the Apostle is answering difficulties proposed by the readers, or is giving directions in an emergency clearly known to them, but not to us. There is some truth in all this, and another source of difficulty in understanding the Epistles comes from faulty translation of the original text.
Dr. Wand tries to eliminate many of these obscurities. His introductory notes to each Letter inform the modern reader of the circumstances which called forth the document. The translation is couched in clear, idiomatic English. The Greek sentence structure is changed to a form more suitable to our language, and where St. Paul’s thought is left incomplete, the sentence is rounded out. Thus we have an elucidation of the Apostle’s thought, which calls for very definite and clear-cut interpretation of the text.

With many of these interpretations we are in full accord; but there are some which we can legitimately challenge. Granting that God is all holy, just and mighty, is it consonant with these divine attributes to translate δικαιοῦμαι almost universally with “reckon righteous,” and the passive form with “be acquitted at the bar of divine justice.” Cannot God make a man righteous? Does St. Paul consider a verdict of acquittal adequate for a truly repentant sinner? The expression, “Let a man make up his mind and then let him eat of the Loaf and drink of the Cup” (I Cor. 11:28), is misleading, since it gives the impression that a Christian may believe in the divine presence or not, at his choice, which is most certainly not what St. Paul wished to imply when he wrote: δοκιμάζετω δὲ ἄνθρωπος εαυτὸν. Among the qualifications to be sought for in both a bishop and a deacon St. Paul lists ἄνδρα μιᾶς γυναικὸς. Are we to think that bigamy was so common among early Christians that a man “with only one wife” had to be sought out for such high offices in the Church? Why do we read in Heb. 2:3: “by one who actually heard him,” when the original text says: ὠτὸ τῶν ἀκούσαντων?

Such are a few samples, taken at random, of loosely translated phrases. Not that such free versions are frequent, but every now and then they occur. Another peculiarity is that all quotations from the Psalms, and some from Isaias, are rendered in rhyming quatrains. These are sometimes attractive in themselves, but at other times they ruin a rhetorical passage, e.g., Rom. 8:36; Heb. 1:7-12; 3:7-12. The chief value of the version is its clearness; it fails to reproduce the splendid rhetorical passages of St. Paul and Hebrews.

St. Mary's College

H. Willmering, S.J.


This book is the outgrowth of lectures given by the author in 1938 at the Jewish Institute of Religion in New York. The author set himself the difficult task of analyzing certain extraordinary religious movements which have appeared in modern Judaism from the days of the Mishnah to the
latest phase of European Hasidism in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. With this purpose in view, he investigates their origin, their protagonists, their environment, their characteristics, their connection with antecedent and contemporaneous Jewish thought, and their relation to similar non-Jewish abnormalities. It is evident from the book that he possessed the knowledge and ability requisite for the attainment of his purpose. He is familiar with the literature of psychology and mysticism; he read his sources as far as possible in the original languages; he strives for precision of expression. In consequence of his passion for truth and his scientific bent, he has made a notable addition to the history of supranormal phenomena and produced an informative book on obscure phases of Jewish religious life, for which we have reason to be grateful. His understanding of Catholic mysticism, to which he alludes occasionally, is not discriminating nor profound, but perhaps we cannot expect this from a man of his background.

All the movements which the author reviews reveal a fierce desire of the Jewish soul to come into contact with the deity in a way more intimate than that suggested by the Law or the ordinary methods of prayer. The Christian reader, however, will see all of them as vagaries. Thus the devotee of the Merkebah mysticism was taught how to pass through trials and dangers, the heavens and the heavenly palaces, to the throne of God. This was but a variety of gnosticism which paid little attention to the moral consequences which should follow from this exalted form of contemplation. Medieval Hasidism, which inculcated asceticism of a high order, was nevertheless contaminated with magical practices and incorporated Philonic and Platonic aberrations. Equally futile was Abulafia's attempt to lead the soul to contemplation by the combination of the letters of the Hebrew alphabet. The spiritual outlook of the Zohar is summed up "as a mixture of theosophic theology, mythical cosmogony and mystical psychology and anthropology" (p. 243). The Lurianic system was analogous to Manicheism, to which it added the doctrine of the transmigration of souls. The paradoxical character of Sabbatai, the great Jewish pseudo-Messias (1625–1676), led to the bizarre belief that it may be meritorious to commit sin to overcome the power of evil (p. 319). Modern Hasidism, which was a burst of religious enthusiasm drawing its strength from the people, invested the prayer of its leaders with magical powers.

As the author anticipates, the terrible crises through which the Jewish people has passed in modern times will most probably give rise to new endeavors to find union with God. It is to be hoped that any form of mysticism which may captivate the Jewish masses in the future will be founded on
a more rational understanding of God and His revelation. To avoid misconceptions, we wish to add in conclusion that the author does not champion any of these movements but merely strives to make them intelligible. His book is a splendid tribute to his learning, industry, and acumen.

Catholic University of America

MICHAEL J. GRUENTHANER, S.J.


This book merits serious attention for several reasons. It is a collaboration by some of our most distinguished modern scholars; and it is a venture in a kind of interpretation which scholars too frequently shy from. The separate essays were first presented as lectures in the Division of the Humanities of the University of Chicago. The authors, with the general educated public in mind, have kept documentation and technical discussion down to a minimum. In some instances this means that opinions are presented with no supporting evidence, and nothing to indicate that they are mere opinions. The authors apologize for this procedure by saying that professional scholars will be able to distinguish accepted views from new interpretations. This seems hardly fair to the general public, to whom the book is addressed. The layman is inclined to give unqualified assent to the scholar in his own field, especially when the scholar asserts himself with almost pontifical authority. This danger, always present when scientific questions are discussed before a large audience, is avoided only by a meticulous caution, which is generally, but not universally, apparent in the present book. Each of the essays is followed by a short list of suggested readings. The index is satisfactorily full.

The book is described in the subtitle as an essay on speculative thought in the ancient Near East. The introductory and concluding chapters, which give general background and summarize the conclusions of the essays, are written by Dr. and Mrs. Frankfort. Egypt is treated by Dr. Wilson, and Mesopotamia by Dr. Jacobsen, and Israel by Dr. Irwin. Dr. Wilson, Dr. Jacobsen divide their treatises into three sections: the universe, the State, and human values. Dr. Irwin's chapters are entitled "God," "Man," "Man in the World," "Nation, Society, and Politics." The limits of this review do not allow us more than an unjustly brief appraisal of the separate contributions.

In the introductory chapter, Dr. and Mrs. Frankfort explain the meaning of mythopoeic thought and speculative thought as understood in the book. They find that myth and speculation are both opposed to scientific thought,
which alone gives an objective interpretation of experience. Myth, they say, is characterized by the personalizing of the external world, which is perceived as the term of an “I—Thou” relationship. They explain myth as the earliest form of speculative thought, which, like myth, transcends experience and is unscientific. They conclude that speculation, severely limited by modern science, can never pretend to be more than a working hypothesis. Such a profession of philosophical skepticism is as unjustified as it is unnecessary; and to present it as the only philosophical approach is indefensible.

Dr. Wilson’s three chapters on Egypt are a splendid example of objective treatment. Never out of touch with his sources, he interprets the ancient Egyptian’s beliefs about the universe, the State, and the values of human life with profound insight. He admits his indebtedness to Breasted; but he has escaped the limits of Breasted’s narrow scheme of cultural evolution. The idea which he finds dominant in Egyptian thought is “consubstantiality”: the elements of the universe were all of one substance. Thus human behavior was the frame of reference for non-human phenomena, whether these occur on the divine or on the sub-human level. Dr. Wilson presents this view with due moderation and reserve, and he argues the point well; it is a factor which must be included in the interpretation of Egyptian ideas.

The same tribute can be paid to Dr. Jacobsen’s three chapters on Mesopotamia. The dominant idea by which Dr. Jacobsen interprets Mesopotamian religion, politics, and ethics is a “cosmic order . . . obtained by the integration of many individual cosmic wills . . . potentially divergent, potentially conflicting, fraught with a possibility of anarchy.” This conception he illustrates abundantly from Mesopotamian myths, many of which are quoted at length. Like Dr. Wilson, he does not entirely escape the danger of over-simplifying; but his key-idea, like Dr. Wilson’s, demands serious study.

The longest essay, and the one of most interest to the theologian, is Dr. Irwin’s essay on Israel. It is also the most difficult to evaluate. There is much learning here, and many points of true insight into the Scriptures. Any student of the Scriptures who possesses solid erudition and the critical faculty will learn from Dr. Irwin; lacking these endowments, he will certainly be misled. Dr. Irwin’s interpretation follows in general the lines of the classical theories of religious evolution and literary criticism. He has not been entirely unaffected by the recent unfavorable treatment of these theories at the hands of numerous scholars; thus, he is more considerate of the possibility of pre-prophetic monotheism than he was in his earlier writings. He finds Hebrew thought characterized by certain unresolved con-
tradictions concerning the nature and personality of God, the natural law, and the covenant; and he explains these as due to the persistence of primitive beliefs in prophetic and priestly religion. Here his critical theories have run ahead of the evidence. In particular his opinions on inspiration and revelation color his entire treatment. The fundamental question is whether God has actually intervened in the world or not. Dr. Irwin is sure He has not. The Hebrews believed He did; on this assumption—granted that it leaves certain problems unsolved—the supremacy of Hebrew thought can be explained without appealing to any dogmas of cultural evolution, which not only leave certain problems unsolved, but also raise some embarrassing new questions. The Hebrews may have believed that the voice of God was heard “deep in personal consciousness”; but they never merged the voice and the consciousness into one. Dr. Irwin admits the obvious sincerity of the prophets in claiming that what they heard in their own consciousness came from God; but to him this means merely that they believed in “a process of knowledge quite divorced from sense experience ... very close to what is now called intuition.” From the prophetic experience “a sense of personal communion with the divine ... accepted as a valid experience of reality” became standard in Hebrew thought. This simply does not do justice to the prophets’ insistence on the divine origin of what they proposed. It is small service to the men who always separated the precious from the vile to say that the word of God is really the word of man, unknown to himself. Dr. Irwin sincerely believes that authoritarian religion is a menace to human welfare because it claims to speak with divine authority. No amount of special pleading on behalf of the prophets will save them from the same damnation.

The concluding chapter summarizes the results. The essays show that the God of the Hebrews transcended nature and mythopoeic thought. But Dr. and Mrs. Frankfort find that the Hebrews achieved this only to create the much more powerful myth of the will of God. So, they conclude, it was left for the Greeks to emancipate human thought from myth, and make science and true speculative thought possible. The fog of religious and philosophical skepticism which appeared at the beginning of the book has closed in more thickly at the end.

A reviewer must always devote so much space to faults which he is unwilling to pass over that he fears lest his presentation be distorted. The importance of this book and its many excellences in detail must not be discounted. Such syntheses must be written, and will be; and it would be a mistake to think that orthodoxy alone will guarantee the high standards of workmanship set here. As a comparative study of the great Near Eastern
cultures it is a book that no student of these cultures can afford to ignore. The authors have written an eminently readable book. They will be the last, I am sure, to object if we notice that it must be read with critical caution. When speculative thought—and, consequently, its interpretation—cannot pretend to more than the dignity of a working hypothesis, they will not be surprised if those who work from different hypotheses will, while accepting the many splendid aids to our understanding of ancient cultures which this book affords, make free to reject in whole or in part the underlying assumptions which have been noticed in this review.

West Baden College

John L. McKenzie, S.J.


This commentary on the Code of Canon Law is a welcome addition to the works in this science already published in English. Its purpose, as stated in the preface, is to present not the most learned commentary but a practical one, one that will meet the needs of seminarians and priests who have relatively little time for the study of canon law. Examination of the work reveals that this design has been achieved in a very satisfactory manner. The explanation of the whole body of law has been compressed into one volume of 942 pages. Restricting the matter within these limits was a difficult task, yet it has been done with such masterly care and precision that elucidations and illustrations helpful and desirable for general use do not seem to have been sacrificed for the sake of brevity.

Since this book has been designed to be used in the closest co-ordination with the Latin text of the Code, the matter treated in the seven parts into which it is divided has been arranged to follow the order found in the Code itself. Ordinarily this system is preferred, for it is the most convenient in works intended for ready consultation.

In order to keep within the restricted course that is generally offered in seminaries, the authors have omitted the following sections of the Code: Part One of Book III on the sacraments (with the exception of indulgences, orders, and matrimony) and Part Five on benefices; the whole of Book IV with the exception of Title XXXIII on the manner of procedure in inflicting suspensions ex i...
confusion to non-specialists. A vast wealth of material has been drawn upon to furnish students with preliminary surveys, questions, cases, and readings pertinent to the diverse elements of Church law. Interspersed throughout the chapters are synoptical outlines, lists, and diagrams that will greatly help the student to visualize and to remember difficult topics of law. Chief among these are: a summary of the Catholic Oriental Rites (p. 16), tables for the reckoning of time (pp. 48–50), a diagram depicting the organization of the Church (pp. 160–61), a list of plenary indulgences (pp. 354–57), an outline of previous censure of books (p. 712), and finally a detailed outline and a chart of the principal censures *latae sententiae* found in the Code. The numerous references, especially to post-Code authors, will supply both the ordinary and the special student with valuable directions towards a more profound study of important canonical issues. Solidity of doctrine is manifest in the entire work.

As is inevitable in technical works of this kind, there are several minor points to which one might take exception. Quite noticeable is the lack of references to classical pre-Code authors. The reading lists at the end of each chapter are also made up almost entirely of post-Code English writings. These preferences, if they may be called such, are probably due to the practical purpose of the book. Yet, in this reviewer's opinion, the value of the references and readings would be enhanced by the addition of selections from such proven authoritites as St. Thomas, Suarez, Barbosa, Benedict XIV, Reiffenstuel, Schmalzgrueber, Piatus, Wernz—to name but a few of the classical pre-Code authors.

On page 21, the assertion is made: "Canons which re-enact the old law without change are in reality nothing more than the old law." Now, with regard to the interpretation of such canons, it is true to say that *in content* they are nothing more than the old law. However, these canons are in reality new law, for, as the author has correctly stated on page 8, the Code is now properly called the only source book of canon law.

The explanation (p. 34) of the basic norm of interpretation contained in canon 19 is an oversimplification that is misleading. Since the meaning of this important canon is still disputed and many writers disagree with the opinions proposed by the author, it would be more satisfactory to make some reference to this dispute. Also, concerning the explanation offered, it may be well to remark regarding canon 621, which the author classifies as an exception to law, that it is inaccurate to assert: "The Code Commission has interpreted this exception strictly." According to many writers, it may be simply denied that canon 621 is an exception to law, and it should be denied that the Code Commission has interpreted the canon strictly.
BOOK REVIEWS

The Commission was asked whether canon 621, §1, is to be understood as applying only to religious who are mendicants in the strict sense. The Commission replied in the affirmative (cf. Cod. Com. 16 Oct. 1919; AAS, XI, 478). In other words the Commission stated that the expression "Regulares, qui ex instituto mendicantes vocantur et sunt" signifies mendicants in the strict sense. One can reasonably maintain that the Commission in effect merely declared the sense of an expression which was already certain in its meaning, and consequently did not give a strict interpretation. Moreover, the question put to the Commission was restricted to the interpretation of the one element of canon 621 just quoted, so that the reply given affects only that element. From its very nature and from the interpretation of approved authors the privilege and law on begging contained in the cited canon is subject to broad interpretation.

As already stated, these criticisms are of minor importance, and consequently can hardly detract from the genuine value of the work under review. The authors are to be congratulated on their excellent Commentary which truly merits wide circulation.

Alma College

JOSEPH D. O'BRIEN, S.J.


In 1940, Father Brodrick published The Origin of the Jesuits, an account of the Jesuits to the death of St. Ignatius Loyola. This volume takes up the narrative and brings it down to 1579, just before the election of Claudius Aquaviva, "the greatest of Jesuit generals" (p. 180).

In this work as in its predecessor, Father Brodrick displays his immense learning and fine critical faculty, but he is always light in hand. His intention is not to write solemn history, but he has nevertheless produced a scholarly work. He is more familiar, apparently, with the pages of the Monumenta Historica Societatis Jesu than with the histories of Astrain, Duhr, Fouqueray, Rodrigues, and Poncelet. Consequently, one should not look here for a summary of what is contained in the earlier parts of Jesuit regional histories. The author makes no pretense at being complete; he chooses his heroes and scenes with an eye for effect. This explains, no doubt, why a colorful chapter is devoted to "Prester John's Business," and only a few lines to Cardinal Toledo and St. Stanislaus Kostka. The fact that he is writing for English-speaking readers explains why a chapter is devoted to the dealings of an obscure, if interesting, Jesuit with Mary Stuart, whereas rulers to whom the Jesuits owed immense debts of gratitude are scarcely mentioned.
One of the unexpected results of this method is to make clear the relative unimportance of the Jesuits during the years covered. The Society of Jesus was then a small organization. The appearance on the scene of an organizer of genius in the person of Aquaviva was required to bring the plans of Loyola to full fruition. This does not mean, of course, that the generation which lived before Aquaviva was lacking in great men. Father Brodrick makes the most of St. Peter Canisius in a brilliant sketch, of St. Robert Bellarmine and St. Francis Borgia, not to mention James Lainez, Jerome Nadal, and a score of others. The reader is presented with a good cross-section of the Jesuit history of the period. Although he occasionally gets outside his period into the past and future, the writer is concerned with making the generation which follows the death of St. Ignatius live again.

One or two statements in the book appear open to question. In his account of the early Jesuit mission in what is now the American South, Father Brodrick has Father Segura and his companions retiring "into the far interior of the country." Actually they sailed up the coast to Chesapeake Bay and were martyred on the Rappahannock, thirty miles south of Washington, D. C., in February 1571.

Strange to say, Father Brodrick's estimate of St. Pius V is not flattering. The holy old man, he thinks, believed too strongly in the employment of temporal weapons for the achievement of spiritual ends. "Sanctity seems never to be enough in the conduct of this world's affairs and Pius might have done the Church better service if he had been less of a saint and more of a diplomatist." If this were intended to be a balanced judgment of Pius V, it would be quite unjust. As it occurs in a passage which deals with the failure of Mary Stuart, we are not justified in looking upon it as such. No doubt the greater failure of the excommunication of Elizabeth was in the writer's mind. But even these acts of Pius have been explained and in part defended as beneficial. Those who consider them unmitigated mistakes should not forget the thrill which went through the hearts of Catholics everywhere when it became known, after Pius' election, that a saint was again on the throne of Peter. St. Ignatius Loyola had said that the Church needed a pope who would reform the Church by reforming himself, the Curia, and Rome. St. Pius V fulfilled this program to perfection.

No works on Jesuit history have been more cordially acclaimed or more avidly read than these books of Father Brodrick. They deserve their popularity. They are domestic history of a high order. For non-Jesuits they should be of value as studies of the spirit of the Society of Jesus.

Woodstock College

E. A. Ryan, S.J.
INITIATION À L'HISTOIRE ECCLÉSIASTIQUE. By Dom Charles Poulet.

In the introduction to a previous volume under the above title Dom Poulet gave reasons for not going beyond the year 1789; in the introduction to this companion volume he tells us why he changed his mind and wrote this survey of the history of the Church from 1789 to about 1940. This study follows the same pattern as the previous one; it too regards the general reader and ignores the scholar; it has no index, and the bibliography is confined to books most accessible in France, and hence none in a foreign language are listed. The style is vivid, the narrative is entertaining. As in the other book, there is emphasis on the history of the Church in France. Indeed, to many it will seem that there is overemphasis, for while attention is focused in a decreasing degree on the Church in Germany, Italy, England, and Ireland, less than three pages are devoted to the Church in the United States, and the rest of the western hemisphere is totally ignored, as are Asia, Africa, Eastern Europe, and the Scandinavian countries. Spain rates merely a few pages on the recent revolution and the accession of Franco to power. Such overemphasis and disregard may easily give the not too well-informed reader a false impression; to him the Church may appear to be predominantly French, and almost entirely European. Apart from this serious limitation, induced by the purpose of the author, this book has much to recommend it. Although Dom Poulet glories in being French and ultramontane, it cannot be charged that he fails in critical attitude. Quite the contrary, his outspoken criticism, and at times condemnation, of men and events, of policies and tactics, is both refreshing and scholarly. In our opinion the best pages are those which treat of recent and contemporary developments in France where the author waxes eloquent. Like so many books of French provenance this one takes such liberty with English and German proper names as to be amusing.

West Baden College

Charles H. Metzger, S.J.


In 1945, the Laudian Professor of Arabic at Oxford University delivered the Haskell Lectures at Chicago, which now appear in book form. Accurately and tastefully printed, the book is a pleasure to read. The material is well selected and well arranged; it is presented with the literary skill which we have learned to associate with Oxford.

There are only a few Western Arabists who equal Professor Gibb in his
knowledge of modern Islam. One thinks immediately of Arthur Jeffery and Louis Massignon, both eminent Islamic specialists who have long been in intimate touch with the modern Near and Middle East. On page xi, Gibb states his own credo, which may be described as right-wing liberal Protestant. He candidly says: "My view of Islam will necessarily be the counterpart of this." Such candor should be imitated by other scholars who write about controversial topics, since it would save the reader much uncertainty and help the cause of truth enormously.

The author deals in successive chapters with the fundamentals of Islamic thought and the tension between conservative Islam and ideas coming from the West; he sketches with remarkable clarity the growth of modernism in Islam, calling attention to its superficiality and its failure to come to grips with any really fundamental principle. His conclusion (pp. 123 ff.) is that orthodox Islam is not a petrified religion, as often described, but is living and vital—thanks to such movements as mysticism in recent centuries—with a bright future, once Muslim scholars have adopted Western historical method and have adapted it to the reinterpretation of historical Islam. Though he protests against a narrow understanding of this process, the latter remains an essentially rationalistic approach to a religious problem which defies rationalism. This solution is curiously like an *apologia pro domo*, since the author's own field of specialization is precisely the historical study of Islam.

Regardless of the merits of his own solution, which is characteristic of a liberal Protestant student of Islamic theology and history, the author moves surefootedly through the intricacies of past and present Islamic history. The reviewer has not recognized a single factual error in the author's own field. However, there are many questionable observations, some of which seriously affect the entire structure of his argument. A very few illustrations must suffice. On pp. 3–7, he stresses certain alleged differences between the "Semitic," or "Arab," or "Eastern" mind and its Western counterpart. The Arabs are said to respond to artistic speech with an immediacy foreign to the West, to create artistically by a series of separate, disunited moments instead of in the Western fashion of superimposing harmony and congruity, to have an immediate awareness of the unseen world, to lack a sense of law, etc. He repeatedly speaks of the Arab mind as atomistic. The reviewer rejects this racial theory *ab origine*, admitting only that Arab higher culture became relatively stagnant in the Middle Ages. Some of these psychological reactions would have been equally true of medieval European ways of thinking and of experiencing, before the development of modern music and drama, or of the modern sense of the dominion of natural "law." In other
words, the mentality in question is characteristic of a given culture or stage of culture, not of a people as such.

*Baltimore, Md.*

W. F. ALBRIGHT


The War of Independence severed not only the political but also the ecclesiastical ties between England and her American colonies. It was almost inevitable, therefore, that the formation of a new and independent government for the former colonies should be followed by the formation of a new and independent church for the large portion of the population which had previously belonged to the Anglican Church and been governed by English bishops. But it was by no means inevitable that this new church should become an Episcopal Church; for, while the political authority of the newly-formed U. S. government could be solidly based on the will of the people, it was not quite so easy to find a suitable basis for the ecclesiastical authority of the newly-formed church. During the century and a half after the founding of the American colonies no English bishop took up residence among his American subjects, and, despite the serious inconveniences caused by the lack of resident bishops, the colonists seem to have been quite content to get along without them. But this lack of bishops quickly created a critical problem for the new American Episcopal Church. From the beginning of the War of Independence it became impossible to continue the previous practice of sending candidates for the ministry to England for ordination; yet the longer the war dragged on, the more acutely the need of a new supply of ministers made itself felt. How, then, in the absence of any bishops of its own, could the new church provide itself with a clergy and an episcopate?

On August 8, 1782, Rev. William White, the thirty-four-year-old rector of the United Episcopal Churches of Philadelphia, who had been chaplain to Congress since 1777, proposed a solution to this problem in a pamphlet entitled *The Case of the Episcopal Church in the U. S. Considered.* In view of her previous history, he thought it likely that the new church would wish to retain the episcopal form of government and to maintain the apostolic succession, if that were possible. Assuming, however, that the war with England made it impossible to obtain this succession for the present, he went on to argue that episcopacy and the validity of ordination does not really depend upon the apostolic succession, and that the Episcopal Church in the United States, though without bishops, could and should create an
episcopate for itself. While acknowledging that some of his co-religionists held episcopacy to be of divine institution, he considered it merely of ecclesiastical origin, coming down from the time of the apostles, and being, therefore, the most ancient, and, all things considered, the most desirable form of church government. This theory of episcopacy he believed to be "the sentiment of the great body of Episcopalians in America; in which respect they have in their favor, unquestionably, the sense of the Church of England, and the opinions of her most distinguished prelates, for piety, virtue, and abilities."

In support of these opinions, the author advanced three chief arguments. First, that the Thirty-nine Articles, "which were evidently intended for a comprehensive system of necessary doctrine," obviously did not consider the ordination of priests or the consecration of bishops a divine ordinance like baptism or the Lord's Supper, but merely something that should not be denounced as "superstitious and ungodly" or "repugnant to the word of God." Second, that on the accession of Queen Elizabeth, when English Protestants who had taken refuge on the continent during the reign of Queen Mary flocked back to England, some of them, who had been ordained by Lutherans in Germany or by Presbyterians in Geneva, were admitted, without re-ordination, to preach and hold benefices in the Church of England. Third, the teaching of the classical Anglican divines, who state explicitly that apostolic succession, however desirable it may be, is not absolutely necessary, and that in case of necessity prince or people may create an episcopate even though they have no bishops to assist them.

To illustrate this last argument the author quotes four pillars of the Church of England, the "Venerable Hooker," Bishop Hoadly, Archbishop Usher and Archbishop Cranmer.

With the arguments of such men to support him, Rev. William White felt that his fellow-Episcopalians would be "scarcely worthy of the name of Christians" if they refused to create for themselves an episcopate, for which legitimate succession might be obtained from England later on, when peace had been restored, and "any supposed imperfections of the intermediate ordinations might, if it were judged proper, be supplied, without acknowledging their nullity, by a conditional ordination resembling that of conditional baptism in the Liturgy."

As is well known, the Episcopal Church in America did not find it necessary to adopt Rev. William White's suggestion. Within a few months, a group of Episcopal clergymen in Connecticut, determined to import the apostolic succession, selected Rev. Samuel Seabury as their bishop and sent him to England to be consecrated. Refused consecration by the
English bishops because he would not take the oath of allegiance, Bishop-elect Seabury journeyed on to Scotland, and there, at Aberdeen, in November 1784, was consecrated by the non-juring Scotch bishops. Though the validity of his consecration was questioned by some for several years after his return to America, his success in Scotland showed clearly enough that it would not be necessary for the Episcopal Church in America to adopt the desperate expedient of creating an episcopate for itself. But, while the Episcopalians did not adopt Rev. William White’s solution to their problem, it is interesting to notice how they reacted to his very un-Catholic ideas about the nature and origin of holy orders, of priestly and episcopal powers, and of apostolic succession as a condition of their transmission. In our own day the publication of such opinions by one of their clergymen would doubtless arouse violent protest on the part of High Church Episcopalians, but there is no evidence to suggest that they caused any great disturbance in 1782. On the contrary, the youthful author who proposed them became almost overnight one of the acknowledged leaders of the Episcopal Church in America, and was the only man considered when the time came soon afterwards to elect a bishop for Pennsylvania. Nor is there any evidence to show that Bishop White modified any of these theories during the fifty years of his episcopate. Moreover, the recent movement to unite the Presbyterians and Episcopalians of the United States into a single church shows quite clearly that his opinions are still very prevalent in the Episcopal Church.

Catholics who wonder on what basis Presbyterians and Episcopalians could possibly unite might well study Dr. Temple’s book. The author devotes a hundred pages to selected essays of Bishop White and fifty pages to an introductory survey of his theological position. Except for the chapter on the “Theory of the Church” and the corresponding section from the Bishop’s writings, entitled “The Basis of Episcopacy,” there is very little in this book that would be of interest to the average Catholic reader, though professors of theology might find some stimulating ideas in Bishop White’s essay “On the Terms Sacrifice, Altar, Priest.”

Alma College


Rarely has a book, prior to publication, received more extravagant praise than has this volume. It has been hailed as a Copernican change in scientific attitude. Some have ranged it with Darwin’s Origin of Species, with
Einstein’s work on relativity. A distinguished Catholic editor has said of Du Noüy’s book that it is “the most remarkable essay in natural theology attempted by any scientist of our age.”

Why all this stir? The psychology behind it seems to be that of surprise. The man bites the dog, a scientist criticizes science, or a scientist postulates the existence of God. And, it is true, Du Noüy is no ordinary scientist. He has considerable achievements to his credit. His interest in the problems mooted in this book date back to a meeting and later association with the late Dr. Alexis Carrel. He has pondered the problems for decades, tested his conclusions and now presents them in English for the first time.

The book is a sign of the times. An almost religious allegiance to science and its data has not brought satisfaction to all scientists; much less has it given peace either individually or collectively. Rather a growing number of scientists are disillusioned with the net achievements of materialism and mechanicism. Many scientists have come to share the disappointment of Carl Jung, when he averred that “matter is just as inscrutable as mind.” Certainly there are many psychologists who no longer look to the nervous system to explain the data of their science. And, as for biologists, some of the most mechanistic, like Gerard, now postulate the “epiorganism” to explain what the organism would no longer explain. The consolations and hopes of the simple gene theory have been disappointing. And here Du Noüy enters the picture.

His critique of evolution is not new. If anything it is no more searching than some other recent criticisms. I think of Goldschmidt’s exposé of the inadequacy of current biological theory to explain “macro-evolution” as opposed to “micro-evolution.” But Goldschmidt fails to extricate himself from the impasse, because he still pins his hopes on mechanicism. Du Noüy does attempt to escape. In the recent past, purpose was rigorously excluded from evolutionary theory. Lately, Julian Huxley has derided this violence to the facts. But then, by a tour de force, he attempts to explain purpose mechanistically. Here again Du Noüy avoids the obvious subterfuge of Huxley and breaks with the pure-chance tradition. He holds a truly purposive and intelligent action in evolution, which demands a First Cause. He is not concerned whether scientists will accept this Cause only under the comforting pseudonym of anti-chance or be willing to admit God.

The thesis is that evolution shows a magnificent purposiveness, which the author calls telefinalism. A study of the paleontological evidence reveals, says Du Noüy, a general progressive law; “life has evolved as if there were a goal to attain,” as if the culmination of the process were to be the “advent of human conscience,” and then, in these latter days and in
the future, man's growth in moral perfection. In other words, with the coming of man, evolution ceases, in the case of man at least, to be a purely biological phenomenon. The direction of the process has changed and it was foreshadowed by the "original sin." In Du Noüy's interpretation, the latter is merely man's actual or attempted disregard of his destiny, which is to master his animal instincts and follow reason (p. 202).

This general law does not void the real objective particular laws, which, the author affirms, cannot be attained but only derived through the senses. God "created" these laws, whose goals are attained by the most varied methods, in conformity with the physico-chemical and ordinary biological laws. It would seem that a progressive goal is foreseen by the intelligent First Cause, who also establishes the general law of new emergences. But that law must run the gauntlet of the particular laws of chance. And Du Noüy says explicitly that the First Cause is quite powerless to influence after the provision of the general law. To show how consistent Du Noüy is in this limitation of God's power, I might mention his opinion that God's power over man is curtailed once He has made man free. Du Noüy's God is a severely limited one.

He stands mysteriously at the beginning of things. After the "creation" of the general law of new emergences, not only does He become helpless, but it is difficult to see how those new emergences are to be explained. For Du Noüy will have nothing to do with vitalism or a principle that could explain—by means of seminal potencies, for instance—the origin of dissymmetry. All evolution must be explained in conformity with the physico-chemical and ordinary biological laws. And the operation of these seems to depend on chance. It would seem therefore that, despite his good intentions, the author lands back in the morass of mechanicism. If chance is at the basis of everything, then there is no room for purpose and there is no need or possibility of bringing in a deus ex machina other than chance. Besides, this god would be the plaything of chance. My conclusions from his premises are certainly beyond his intentions. He certainly wants to rescue us from chance—and does so when he attacks the problem of origins. But out of respect for chance or because of his epistemological prepossessions, he waters down his earlier arguments against chance as the sole basis of origins.

How does he proceed? By employing the calculus of probability, he shows how slim the chances are of accounting for the existence of the first organic compound. Taking into account the "probable" age of life on this planet, the chances or probability amount to virtual if not actual impossibility. In fact, if the first organic compound was very complex, that im-
possibility seems to be attained. But even then we have not accounted for life, which is something qualitatively different from non-living matter, even though the chemical composition be the same. For life "is born out of coordination of complexity and not out of the complexity of a mixture of gases" (p. 37). The author is attempting here to reverse the chancist argument. But in reality it is only his metaphysical argument that turns the tables.

Du Noüy does not enter into the origin of the first matter or universe. Here even the calculus of probability is of no avail because it presupposes something, some particles that can move and by chance form a compound or mixture. Perhaps if he had, he would have seen chance in perspective and not as something mysteriously beyond God—something like the Hellenist Ate. He invokes God to preside over the origin of life and the telefinalism that culminates in man. But, while to all appearances the laws of pure chance are defied, they are still operative.

Again to show the new direction that affected evolution, once life had appeared, Du Noüy juxtaposes the tendencies of living and non-living matter. By the laws of physics, the evolution of non-organic matter at least tends to entropy. The evolution of life has tended in different directions, towards the emergence of ever new forms of life, reaching its apogee in the development of intelligence and conscience in man. Chance cannot explain these new emergences, which defy the law of entropy. Hence you need an intelligent First Cause to explain the telefinalism observable in the evolution of life. Such is the basic argument of Du Noüy for the existence of a First Cause. However, if I understand him correctly, the new emergences are still a matter of little steps, which are regulated by the ordinary biological laws, by which I presume he means the chance mutation steps of the neo-Darwinist.

But if the new emergences, which the rock archives amply document, are ultimately only a matter of small chance steps, i.e., random mutations, as I understand the author to imply, the argument used by Du Noüy to establish the need of a First Cause crumbles, because there would be no need of a cause beyond chance.

Here we have an example of the inconsistency of the author. He rightly sees that chance cannot explain the long trends observable in orthogenesis. And he is right. Not even Julian Huxley's nominalistic feat of calling orthogenesis orthoselection and then triumphantly claiming that even orthogenesis yields to a chancist treatment, can alter that fact. But for some reason Du Noüy still maintains the ultimate primacy of chance. It may be his reverence for the first principles of a mechanistic science or his
adherence to a Kantian epistemology that make him doubt the reality of the emergences which form the basis of his postulation of a First Cause. Perhaps both are involved.

Of course one could, if one wished to interpret the author, assert that all that Du Noüy wishes to claim is that chance as well as purpose operate in the production of the progressive changes in the panorama of life. In that case, his position would be orthodox. But I believe this would be reading orthodoxy into his argument. It would be an interpretation and not a report of Du Noüy's argument. I might add that even if he is thus interpreted, his argument hardly reaches transcendence to the infinite. For the argument taken from the calculus of probability hardly reaches certitude.

It is to be hoped that no Catholic apologist will hazard the statement that Du Noüy intended to, or has, overthrown the evolutionary theory. Neither assumption would be correct. Du Noüy does see the weaknesses of the monophyletic type of theory. But he holds it as a dogma along with legions of others.

It is regrettable that he should feel himself called upon to lecture theologians. Often he does so. He believes in a naturalistic religion without dogma and berates theologians for not scrapping dogma for the simple teachings of Jesus. Nowhere is Christ held up as divine, and the religion preached is one of the many forms of indifferentism.

If we prescind from the author's notions of the divinity, it can be said that he does believe in unchanging standards of morality. The book contains some excellent advice on early moral training and an excoriation of certain fads in education that side-step moral education. For that Du Noüy deserves great praise. But I regret that I cannot share the enthusiasm of some reviewers—some of them Catholic—for this book.

Woodstock College

HUGH J. BIHLER, S.J.


Although the title of this volume suggests merely a narrative of the supplanting of paganism by Christianity in the Roman Empire, the author informs us in the introduction that he is offering the “story of the transformation of Christianity into a secularized institution during its struggle with the pagan order of the Roman Empire” (p. 7). In this he promises to be guided by “the spirit of critical scholarship of our time.” The opening chapter sketches the sources and characteristics of the native Roman religion, its borrowings, fusions, evolution and deterioration into anthropo-
morphism and emperor-worship. Then we have a chapter on the mystery cults—Cybele, Isis, Atargatis, Mithra—and another on Judaism. Thus the author recreates the religious milieu into which Christianity was introduced.

But what is Christianity? To answer this question Dr. Hyde inserts chapters on the personality and teaching of Jesus. An inkling of what Christ and Christianity signify to him is given when he asserts that “the documents which record his life and teaching . . . will be presented as being what they appear to be, human and not divine, sacred but not inspired” (p. 111). On this basis he rules out all passages in the gospels that contain prophecy, miracles, or the supernatural.

Let Dr. Hyde’s words speak for themselves. “Born in Nazareth” (p. 113), “the son of a village carpenter and his wife Miriam” (p. 109), Jesus “had brothers and sisters” (p. 113). The story of Bethlehem “it seems clear... was a later addition to connect Jesus as Messiah with David” (p. 129), and the flight to Egypt is “an episode evidently clumsily inserted into the text to fulfill a prophecy of Hosea” (p. 128). “Jesus’ faith... was simple and naive” (p. 132), for He believed in hell, Satan, and bodily resurrection. It appears that occasionally He had a surmise “that he was the Messiah” (p. 155), but “the idea of Jesus as mediator through his sufferings and death came from Paul” (p. 149). The “charge of hypocrisy hurled at them (the Pharisees) by Jesus was in general unjust” (p. 93). Jesus’ “simple ethics” classify Him with “Gautama and Socrates” (p. 163). “He regarded sacraments, dogmas and ritual as trivial in comparison with his vision of the kingdom of heaven” (p. 157). “It was Paul rather than Jesus who was the real founder of Christianity” (p. 161). “It has been said that should Jesus return... he might be astonished that men had made him out to be God” (p. 163).

Despite the fact that Paul’s “ideas were largely alien to those ascribed to Jesus in the Gospels” (p. 159), Dr. Hyde holds that Paul was the more important of the “two founders” of Christianity. Paul’s superiority is due to the fact that some of Christianity’s “most essential doctrines were formulated” (p. 159) by him; for example, “Paul’s idea of man’s redemption from evil as necessary because of an assumed prehistoric sin” (p. 159). By adding “this evil doctrine” (p. 159), “this notion of original sin, redemption and grace” to “Jesus’ simple ethics” “Paul started Christian theology with a false belief” (p. 160). However, Paul’s guilt is mitigated by the fact that he “says little of heaven or hell, future rewards or penalties” (p. 169).

Such is Dr. Hyde’s conception of Christ and Christianity, of “our religion.” Comment on this as theology or exegesis is futile, but we would
arraign the defective scholarship of the author. What becomes of impartiality or consistency when the evidence of early Christian writers on the mystery cults is excluded on the score that they are hostile and therefore unreliable witnesses, but the opinions of all and sundry, even of professed enemies of Christianity, are treated as impartial and reliable evidence; for example, Celsus is quoted to the effect that "much of the Gospel material was fictitious and that it had been written to meet controversial needs" (p. 124). Similarly, Strauss, Renan, Spinoza, and Gibbon, among others, are treated as authorities, while scholars such as Lebreton, Grandmaison, and Lagrange are ignored. It would seem that, however much "higher critics" contradict one another, all of them present trustworthy evidence when they attack Christianity. If "scientific criticism" began with Strauss, and with Renan, whose work is said to be "a combination of learning and imagination," its reliability is assuredly open to question.

Something more than mere assertion is needed to justify the declaration that the darkness and other phenomena that accompanied the death of Christ "are merely embellishments from the Jewish Messianic eschatology" (p. 139), and that the appearances of Christ after the Resurrection are "perhaps to be explained as a group hallucination" (p. 164). Emphatically it is not true that "science has disproved" (p. 146) the fall of man, for that matter is theological and beyond the scope of other sciences. To assert that "to place incense in the incense burner on the emperor's statue" is "an act no more difficult to observe than the modern custom of saluting a national flag" (p. 184) betrays utter misconception of the issue involved. It is positively untrue that the Church has "stopped the spirit of progress within the Church, and forbidden its priests to express their ideas" (p. 237); and it is arbitrary and unscholarly to hold that "any deviation from the known laws of nature in the past if exposed to historical evidence should not be accepted" (p. 188); for, however baffling it may be, such evidence must be accepted if it conforms to the accepted canons of historical criticism. Procedure such as Dr. Hyde advocates reveals how truly rationalism is a prejudice and an obstacle to scholarship. Apart from being an epitome of objections to Christianity and Catholicity, and the expression of the conception of "our religion" entertained by the author, this work has little significance or value.

*West Baden College*  
CHARLES H. METZGER, S.J.

This book might well be called a brisk, popular, up-to-the-minute variation on a theme. As Dr. Case (former dean of the Divinity School at the University of Chicago and for the past eight years professor of religion and dean of the School of Religion at Lakewood, Florida) himself puts it: “The present volume presents a survey of historical data previously used in my *Experience with the Supernatural in Early Christian Times*, published in 1929 and long since out of print” (p. vi). The variation has been called for because “in recent years there has been a vigorous revival of interest in supernaturalism” (p. v).

The theme is the familiar one of the religious liberals or naturalists. Dr. Case throughout his book’s ten chapters propounds the thesis that the supernaturalism of primitive Christianity was but a syncretic carry-over from the unenlightened religious milieu in which it arose, heightened and gradually institutionalized by the early Christian missionaries for the purpose of demonstrating the superiority of Christianity over its rivals. Christian supernaturalism, therefore, arose to serve a functional need. As such it rendered valuable service at the time. Today, however, the type of life of early Christian believers is more important than the theoretical justification adopted to support its validity, since religion is more ultimately an experiential way of life that may be subjected to varying interpretations according to current ways of thinking regarded as valid at different times and by different people. In this day and age, religious naturalists “find in history and in the normal processes of human living evidences of a spiritual reality that seems to them more tolerable, trustworthy, and significant than anything propounded by the traditional type of belief in revelation handed down from a transcendent realm” (p. 232).

While the style of the book is always engaging, the argumentation is vitiated by the wonted rationalistic assumption of the impossibility of the supernatural and by a clever, but withal uncritical, method of *a pari* reasoning from the spurious supernaturalism of the pagans, notably of the Greeks and Romans, to a supposedly like supernaturalism of Christianity. The rapid transitions from multiplied instances of the former—apparitions, sorceries, divine books, sibylline oracles, heroic saviors, etc.—to sweeping conclusions about the latter are ingenious, but singularly unsubstantiated. The existence of the pearl of great price of Christian supernaturalism is not negated by the display of many false pearls of pagan “supernaturalism.”

*Alma College*  

**William A. Huesman, S.J.**

Dr. Bennett, Professor of Christian Theology and Ethics at Union Theological Seminary, attempts in these published lectures to suggest a method by which the individual Christian may discover how his actions that have an impact on society should be morally regulated. The attempt suffers from the confusion arising from the author's conception of Christianity and the Church. It is obviously difficult to predicate anything of the "Christian Church" if that Church is not one but the collectivity of all the conflicting institutional religions that claim the name. Neither can that "Christian Ethics" correspond to objective right under which contradictories can be comprehended, for instance, the impossibility of a just war for the Quaker or Mennonite, and its possibility for the Catholic. There is implicit another confusion, that between moral evil and physical evil, so that one is considered as sinning whenever his duty leads him to harm another, as would be the case of the soldier who kills an enemy in battle. And while the author clearly rejects the notion that a good end can justify an evil means, yet he seems to think that a judgment on the morality of atomic bombing may be derived solely from a consideration of the end intended, the shortening of a war, without inquiring whether or not the means to that end might not be the murder of non-combatants.

The author is at his best when he defines the difficulties that are encountered in seeking the just solution of a moral problem that touches international amity, interracial justice, economic relations, or any other social sore point. The distinction between the morally imperative goal to be aimed at and the means to that goal, which are usually morally indifferent, so that the question of fact—which of several possible methods is most likely to succeed—must be answered, is well made. The conclusion is drawn that the decision rests with the expert in his technical field as well as with the ethician. But the technical expert and the ethician will be hindered in their investigations by many factors, both subjective and objective, that will make it difficult for them either to apply in practice a solution on which they agree, or even to be convinced of the moral necessity of a given goal. It is undoubtedly true that the long historical existence of many evil institutions, the conflicting prejudices of communities within which problems must be solved, a human tendency to cloak self-interest with idealism, and the minimizing of individual responsibility for the common good, warp judgment and make practical action difficult.

The chapter that evaluates various strategies employed by religious groups to solve the problem is sound in showing the insufficiency, to say the least, of withdrawing completely from all contact with a social difficulty, of proposing some special indifferent means as the only Christian program, or of
admitting a public morality at variance with private morality. The Catholic way, the authoritative proposal of a positive and developed social program based on the natural law, the author finds unacceptable for many reasons. The chief objection would, of course, be the Church’s claim to divine institution and unique possession of the commission of Christ: “Teach ye all nations.” Nor is the author quite sure that ethical teaching based on the natural law is Christian; though its premises may be contained in Scripture, the conclusions are not formally revealed. However, a concluding note to the book in which this apparently current Protestant theological difficulty is discussed contains a clear and well conceived defense of the natural law.

The author’s own proposed method of solution suggests useful cautions against false expectations and presuppositions that would invalidate any approach to the problem, but its positive contribution is of little value. For instance, the principle that one should be guided in all by Christian faith and ethics, does not, while obviously true, provide a norm of action so long as Christian faith and ethics represent the formless, unanchored concepts of modern Protestantism. However, this little volume, so sincerely written, will interest a Catholic student of moral science.

Woodstock College

THOMAS E. HENNEBERRY, S.J.


The inclusion of this book in the popular Que sais-je? series is an indication that the cultivated French public is as curious as the American to know something about existentialism. A reliable master in the art of haute vulgarisation has been chosen to present the main positions of this popular contemporary movement. In his foreword, Paul Foulquié remarks that professional philosophers and their journals have had little to do with explaining and criticizing existentialism, leaving this work for the purely literary scribes. This neglect has played in the favor of Sartre and his group, for they have profited by a great amount of unchecked lay propaganda and also by the dramatic and near-pornographic elements introduced into their tracts. If for no other reason, this book is commendable as a serious analysis of existentialist doctrines placed in the context of philosophical traditions.

The general plan of approaching existentialism historically is a sound one, since an exposition made only in terms of that viewpoint would be provided with no critical norms of appraisal. Unfortunately, Foulquié’s thesis cannot be sustained in one of its major contentions. He groups
together all philosophers and schools up to the advent of the existentialists as representing philosophical essentialism. Plato and Augustine, Aquinas and Descartes, Newton and Husserl—all the leaders in Western philosophy and science are said to agree in according to essence a primacy over existence. Plato, indeed, is taken as the prototype of this way of thinking, whereas many of the other essentialists are admitted to have given some place to existence in their systems. Since this remarkable generalization is developed in less than thirty pages at the beginning of the book, it would not be fair to criticize the thesis in detail. It is an extreme case of reading into philosophical doctrines of the past a set of concepts, distinctions, and options which the actual texts do not bear out. That the problem of essence and existence has a definite and sometimes tortuous history is not made plain here. Nor is any mention made of the embarrassing claim of Thomists that their master is the philosopher of existence par excellence.

The proportions of the book should, however, be respected. The second and main section is devoted to an explanation and evaluation of existentialism itself. After fixing a number of traits which are common to all its exponents, Foulquié acknowledges that there are as many existentialisms as there are existentialist philosophers. Keeping his actual readers in mind, the author limits himself to the situation in France today. Here a major division does suggest itself between atheistic and Christian existentialism, a division which Sartre himself has recently stressed in his pamphlet on humanism. Jean-Paul Sartre is studied as typical of the atheistic variety, while Kierkegaard and Gabriel Marcel are here taken as the representatives respectively of the Protestant and the Catholic versions of philosophy of existence.

The account of Sartre’s theories is concise and orderly. After exposing his underlying doctrine on choice as absolute freedom, Foulquié then discusses his responses to the great metaphysical questions concerning the nature of the world and man, and his denial of God except as an expression for man’s aspiration to wholeness of being and consciousness. Many of the obscurities surrounding the Sartrean concepts of en-soi and pour-soi are removed in the course of this lucid analysis. Attention is also paid to the weaknesses and inconsistencies in Sartre’s hymn to the radical absurdity of existence. Curiously enough, in a footnote on page 59, the author provides a principle of correction not only for Sartre’s misunderstanding of the older views on essence and existence but also for his own excessively schematic presentation. Where these factors are taken as co-principles of being, it is impossible to speak about the unqualified priority of one over the other.
Little of significance is said here about Kierkegaard. I sometimes think that Kierkegaard helped to defeat his own ends by providing posterity with so much autobiographical material that psychological surmises could plausibly be substituted for a rigorous examination of his thought. On the other hand, the few pages devoted to Gabriel Marcel, the Catholic playwright and philosopher, are quite penetrating. Although the comparison is not stressed, Marcel supplies by way of anticipation a correction of the atheistic, pessimistic, and deterministic trends of left-wing existentialism.

Foulquié does not let the matter stand with this study of acknowledged existentialists, but adds a third section on a philosopher who is seeking to do justice to the essential as well as the existential principle of being. It is high time that the work of Louis Lavelle and its historical significance become known in America. Elsewhere (see The Philosophical Review, March, 1947), I have made a similar suggestion concerning Lavelle's position in contemporary French philosophy. He is attempting to counteract an excessive cult of existence by vindicating the rights of the essential structure of being. In the field of moral philosophy, the stakes are very high. For either we must agree with Sartre that human freedom posits its own norms and ends absolutely or we must be prepared to examine Lavelle's claim that even anterior to our choice there is a human ideal by which our free acts are measured and specified by way of finality. Apart from its worth as an exposition of existentialism in general, this study is notable for its incisive presentation of the issues which are raised for ordinary people by the atheistic version which is so popular today in France.

St. Louis University

JAMES COLLINS


Toward a Better World is a volume prepared under the direction of Bishop William Scarlett for the Joint Commission on Social Reconstruction of the Protestant Episcopal Church in an effort to relate basic Christian principles to some fundamental modern problems, domestic and international. An impressive list of persons have contributed papers: Bishop Angus Dun on the social responsibility of the Christian and the Church, Mrs. Franklin D. Roosevelt on minorities, Walter Russel Bowie on the negro, Edward L. Parsons on the Japanese-American, Frances Perkins on full employment, Eduard Heimann on man and the State, Sumner Welles on the United Nations, Reinhold Niebuhr on our relations with Russia, William Ernest Hocking on the treatment of Germany, Arthur Holly Compton on the
morality of the atomic bomb. Stringfellow Barr concludes the series of papers with some suggestions on the duty of a Christian in the modern world. It was evidently thought necessary to observe that the papers express the opinions of each contributor and not necessarily the mind of the entire Commission. The search for the solution of these problems admits, naturally, of some difference of opinion, but the Commission must have been satisfied with the efforts of the contributors. It is not easy to understand why they published the papers if they were not satisfied.

Not all the major problems of our nation are considered in this volume, but much depends on the correct solution of those selected for discussion. In turn, the correct solution depends on the right approach to the problems. There is only one approach for the Christian; it must be, the Commission notes, "within a religious view of life and the world," since Christianity is "either the Rock on which we build our civilization or else it is the Rock against which civilization will continue to pound itself to pieces." Because this is the only approach, it would seem as if the Commission has ignored the cardinal domestic problem of this nation: the terrifying trend towards paganism which compels us to admit that our society is becoming one wherein the light of Christian revelation is growing faint, if not already extinct, in the souls of thousands of Americans. How can we expect to solve these and other problems "within a religious view of life and the world" unless we first check this plague? Stringfellow Barr hints at this critical situation, but more than hints are needed.

These papers do not pretend to be learned presentations of the problems. They are written, with one exception, in simple, straightforward language with the intention of helping the laity and study groups to understand the gravity of the situation and the necessity of concerted action. Our responsibility in solving them is great indeed. The responsibility for the domestic problems is ours alone and we can solve them once we have decided to practice daily the doctrines of Christ; if we fail, the blame is entirely ours. This is not true of the international problems. Here, too, our responsibility is great and we must face and discharge that responsibility. But they are international in scope and demand the sincere cooperation of other nations. It is a mistake to give the impression that the United States alone can restore peace. The United Nations is, as Sumner Welles remarks, a great opportunity for leadership toward peace and a challenge to the American people. But our best efforts will not insure success; other nations, Russia included, must cooperate.

Reinhold Niebuhr points out the inherent peril in the existence today of two centers of world power: Washington and Moscow. However, he does
not think that the ideological conflict between the two powers is primary, nor does he consider the morality of Russian Communism identical with Nazism. The reason offered is that Communism is a Christian heresy. So too, we were told, was Nazism. To Arthur H. Compton the "morality of the atomic bomb is identical with the morality of war," and the real moral problem now is whether the Americans have the right to divest themselves of this power. We have no right to do so, he tells us, until a competent agency with the power to prevent war has been established with our aid and direction. Barr makes a good point in conclusion: "If these problems are solved at all, they will be solved by God's will, and we shall indeed be in a happy position—even in disaster—if we shall have made ourselves faithful instruments of that will." I trust Barr has pardoned the culprit liable for the misprint which makes him say he finds "very little of our discussion and documentation relevant if the Incarnation did indeed take place."

_Holy Cross College_  

**William L. Lucey, S.J.**


This slim volume, by an Anglican missionary in South Africa, is a sincere and at times deeply moving appeal for Christian justice towards all men, whatever their color, based on the universal missionary vocation of Christ's Church. Every follower of Christ, the author says, is called to share in the missionary life and work of the Church, either actively in the foreign missions, or at least through prayer and almsgiving. Though "in England the Church almost ceased to be missionary for more than 500 years," our own times have seen an awakening of the missionary zeal. And the author is able to call on his experiences in South Africa to illustrate the principles that, he feels, should guide his church in its mission work.

The booklet lays special emphasis on the need of an intelligently planned educational system, through which the Church may not merely "convert" men, but in literal truth "make disciples" of them. But there is a large place, the author also feels, for the social apostolate in the missions, through medical missionary work and in general through Christian concern for the social well-being of the natives. The last chapter is an especially effective exposé of the manifold injustices inflicted on the Bantu in South Africa by the "Christian" whites, through absentee landlordism, and through the practical denial of almost every fundamental human right. In spite of its Christian principles, the author frankly confesses, "The Church itself acquiesces in these divisions and propagates them. It is not only the railway
carriages that are for ‘Europeans Only’ but the Anglican Churches.” But he adds “the Roman Catholics will have none of it. They set us an example of what is right, while we are miserably ruled by expediency.”

One regrets, in such a work, an occasional sentence such as the following: “The Jesuit missionaries in America, India and Japan, the English Evangelical and Methodist accepted it as a matter of course that the heathen was doomed to the eternal torments of hell” (p. 22). Or this: “[The body of Jesus Christ] is in a real and spiritual sense given to Christians as they receive the bread and wine in the Holy Communion” (p. 59).

Woodstock College

John F. Sweeney, S.J.


This is one of a series of books being edited by members of the Anglican Community of the Resurrection, of Mirfield, England, which are “designed to give clear and orthodox teaching about the fundamentals of Catholic Faith and Morals and subjects closely allied thereto.” And Then the Judgment was written “to state as plainly as possible what the Christian religion declares to be the destiny of man; what lies before us when this brief day is done.” A preliminary discussion of the nature of man as immortal and made in the image and likeness of God is followed by chapters on heaven, hell and purgatory, and the book concludes with a “Note on the Resurrection of the Body.” Of the Christian significance of death, and of the particular and general judgements, there are only incidental remarks.

Heaven, we are told, is not an everlasting state of idleness, but eternal life; it is more than a mere continuance of this present existence, as Spiritualism would have it; it is essentially the vision of God, in close fellowship with other men. In consequence, it is the vision of Truth and Beauty, in which all man’s noblest aspirations find their perfect fulfilment. This leads to the somewhat surprising conclusion that, since happiness is an activity of the soul, and since “of all human activity worship is the highest,” heaven’s highest joy must lie in eternal worship of God. It is difficult to avoid the impression here that the author in some vague way has confused worship with caritas, and has conceived of the adopted sons of God as little more than servants, even in their Father’s house.

The fundamental reasonableness of the eternal punishment of hell is rightly stressed in its relation to man’s freely made and deliberately retained choice of an alternative to God; and hell is rightly said to lie essentially in the everlasting loss of the vision of God. The further punishment of hell,
“the everlasting fire,” is, however, a metaphor not essentially different from the metaphoric “worm” that dieth not. “The fire is the blaze of God’s own glory. All that is good is illumined by that flame; all that is evil is consumed.”

The treatment of purgatory is, unfortunately, not without confusion. A prayer towards the end of the Office for the Visitation of the Sick, in the Book of Common Prayer, is cited to illustrate the belief of the Established Church in purgatory. The “descended into hell” of the creeds is understood to refer to purgatory; so, too, is I Peter 3:18,19. And on the basis of “a lovely description of this state of beatitude” from the Ecclesiastical History of the Venerable Bede the impression is conveyed that the souls in purgatory “experience a gradual and ever-increasing conformity to the will of God.” The relation of temporal punishment to God’s infinite justice is, however, clearly recognized, and the chapter concludes with an affirmation of the Christian tradition of intercession for the faithful departed.

Finally, the doctrine of the resurrection of the body, to many “a source of the greatest difficulty,” is strongly affirmed in view of the clear teaching of Holy Scripture and of the full meaning of the redemption: “It is man’s whole nature that comes under the redeeming work of Christ. If then the body were excluded, that redemption would be incomplete.”

Woodstock College

JOHN F. SWEENEY, S.J.


The work of the missions is no mere marginal activity in the life of the Church, and yet it is only in the last twenty years that theologians have been at work elaborating a theology of the missions. Practically, the question “Why the missions?” raises no difficulty; for the Church has ever been conscious of Christ’s urgent imperative, “Go and make all nations my disciples.” P. de Lubac states that this is the essential answer to which nothing will be added. In this context it is well to reflect on the words of Leo XIII: “Ecclesiae quidem non solum ortus sed tota constitutio ad rerum voluntate libera effectarum pertinet genus” (Satis Cognitum, AAS, 28, 711). Yet reason, illumined by faith, can search for some measure of fruitful understanding, and to this end P. de Lubac raises the question, “Why has Christ willed that his Church be a missionary Church?” The answer comes that it is charity, love of God and love of man, that prescribes the work of the missions, just as it commands the entire range of the Church’s apostolic activity. The missions are then finalized on the glory of God and the salvation of man—materially two identical ends.
The question then arises of the relation that obtains between the missions and the salvation of men. Do the missions make the salvation of a pagan possible or merely less difficult? The first solution is certainly false, and the alternative is rejected by P. de Lubac as unsatisfactory. We either claim too much or too little for the work of the missions. How to escape the dilemma? P. de Lubac suggests that the original question has been badly stated, because the concept of "salvation" has been taken to mean merely the minimal degree necessary to achieve heaven. But if we take "salvation" to mean the utmost degree of perfection which each man can reach, then the missions become "pour l'infidèle en général" not so much an affair of life and death as of the plenitude of life. Indeed, if we reflect that this plenitude must be considered "comme de l'essence même du salut," then we can say that this plenitude of life can become in a sense a question of life and death.

P. de Lubac seems to feel that this is no real amelioration of the problem; for he proposes a more radical approach, one in which it is possible to bypass any explicit reference to the absolute or relative spiritual indigency of the pagan. The Church is, in P. de Lubac's fine phrase, "messagère et organisatrice de charité" (p. 45), "le corps de la charité sur terre" (p. 40). The Church, then, if it be true to the law of its nature, must be missionary, for it is the law of love to be universal, to be limitlessly expansive, to seek to communicate its flame to all. It is, then, the inward compulsion of charity rather than any consideration of finality or utility that determines the missionary life of the Church. If the immediate end or proper object of the missions come under consideration, P. de Lubac denominates it under the phrase "plantare Ecclesiam," the same doctrine which P. Charles has preached in season and out of season.

P. de Lubac's positions do not fail to stir the questioning mind. It is useful to reflect that Christ Himself is the exemplar of the theandric life of the Church. On the cross Christ died for all men, especially for those who were to make up his Church, and from His pierced heart was born the Mystical Body, the Church which was to continue in space and time His redemptive work. On the cross our Lord merited that the Holy Spirit of Love be sent to unify and vivify His Mystical Body, the Church, and to assimilate that Body, its organs and its members, to its august Head. Just as Jesus, then, being lifted up drew all men within the range of His redemptive love, so too did He wish that His Mystical Body, wherein that redemptive love is incorporated, should keep its heart and hands open to the world. The Church was made by love and for love; the Church is the meeting-place of love on earth. Love is dynamic, and the Spirit of Love seeks "ut filios Dei
qui erant dispersi, congregaret in unum” (John 11:52). But we cannot think of the missionary work of the Church without explicit reference to the “scattered children of God” any more than we can think of the work of the Incarnate Word without explicit reference to the “propter nos et propter nostram salutem.”

The dictum “Gloria Dei, vivens homo,” could well be transposed to read “Gloria Ecclesiae, vivens homo.” It is the glory of the Church to be the bearer of God’s life to men. As Pius XII says: “... in carrying out the work of Redemption (our Savior) wishes to be helped by the members of His Body. This is not because He is indigent and weak, but rather because He has so willed it for the greater glory of His unspotted Spouse. Dying on the Cross, He left to His Church the immense treasury of the Redemption; towards this she contributed nothing. But when those graces came to be distributed, not only does He share this task of sanctification with His Church, but He wants it in a way to be due to her action. Deep mystery this, subject of inexhaustible meditation” (Mystici Corporis, America Press ed., pp. 20–21). The work of the missionary plays a profound part in this deep mystery, and his labor and suffering overpass the geographic limits of his mission territory to fructify, by God’s mercy, for those who are without. It is impossible to plot a graph of this fact, but the principle abides.

The theology of the missions is still in fieri, and P. de Lubac’s booklet will aid all those who wish to follow the theologians at their work.

Weston College

FRANCIS X. LAWLOR, S.J.

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