BOOK REVIEWS


Aletti’s presuppositions are clear. First, living in our period in which the exegesis of Romans is for the most part stagnant, a synchronic rhetorical approach to Romans is preferred since it is more sensitive to literary techniques and less tempted to the sometimes injudicious conclusions reached by the historical-critical approach. Second, the message that Romans intends is “justification by faith alone” (18), but this message has ethical and ecclesial implications inherent in the personal relationship to Christ. Further, if “the Good News—the Gospel—was not the revelation of divine justice, it would be necessary to consider it as the most pernicious of alienations. Yes, but how to understand divine justice?” (23). Given this presupposition, A. devotes a substantial section to arrangement and meaning with particular application to the theme of divine justice. Further, before rhetorical genre can be determined, the major thesis or theses (propositiones) of the letter must be examined. Through the use of a general propositio in Romans 1:16–17, as well as other propositiones distributed through Romans 1–11, it becomes evident that the first chapters of the letter are argumentative. Precisely because Paul transforms Greek rhetoric for his own purposes, we must follow closely the dynamic of Paul’s argumentation throughout in order to grasp its intention; only then can one discuss with assurance the theological consequences of the argumentation.

A careful analysis of Romans 1:18–3:30 finds Paul employing Jewish traditions to reveal the universality of God’s anger without exception. Romans 2 demonstrates that the “Jewish sinner, at the final judgment, will not escape the chastisement that he merits: his Jewish identity will absolutely not protect him from the anger” (80). This chapter negates “Jewish particularity” (81), and in Romans 3 all Jews “find themselves grouped with the sinners, the evildoers, who are corrupt and merit divine anger” (82). Absence of difference here thus allows Paul to expound his doctrine of impartial and gracious justification by faith for all, Jews and non-Jews, and Romans 3:21–4:25 reaffirms that the gospel of justification is for all and without condition.

A.’s chapter dealing with “Faith and Law in Romans” responds to a number of controversial interpretations in contemporary Pauline scholarship. (1) Rejected is Richard Hays’s view that Romans 3:22 should be translated as the “faithfulness of Christ” since the context, especially the rhetorical context, in Romans 3:21–4:25 prohibits it: “the Apostle does not insist on the behavior (or the interior dispositions) of Christ, but on those of God and His motivations” (112). Building on previous observations, Romans 10 insists that “whoever, Jew or non-Jew, wants to be saved must
from now on confess Jesus Christ” (123). (2) A.’s rhetorical analysis indicates that Paul’s statements on the Law in Romans 9–11 and Romans 1–8 are not contradictory. Rather, a unity and coherence mark the diverse Pauline pronouncements on Law. The Law itself makes known the mystery of faith. Without Romans 9–11 the development and confirmation of the main propositio of Romans 1:16–17 would be lacking, and Romans 9–11 stands as the logical conclusion to the first eleven chapters of the letter. (3) How is Romans 10:4, namely, that “Christ is the telos of the Law,” to be understood? Given the Law’s “incapacity for giving salvation” (152), especially in its primary role as “the sacrificial cult for the forgiveness of sins” (155), “end” is the only appropriate translation of telos since, according to Romans, Christ “brought an end . . . to the domination of the Law over the believer” (146).

The term “all Israel” in Romans 11:26 comprises both the holy remnant of Romans 9 and those who in Romans 10 have rejected the gospel. For A. the regrafting of the recalcitrant Jews can occur only if they believe, and according to Romans 10, such belief is defined as “a faith in the Lord Jesus Christ” (223). To deny this position “would manifest a total incomprehension of the argumentation’s dynamic and of the function of Rm 10” (224). But then, can the believers who have come from paganism and for whom their only necessity is the confession of Jesus Christ exist without Israel? The response is an emphatic no, for by being cut from the root of Abraham they will lose their identity since “filial adoption and belonging to the descendants of Abraham cannot exist without each other” (231).

These intriguing snippets suggest that this tightly argued volume is provocative throughout and that the rhetorical emphasis bears considerable fruit in transcending current exegetical enigmas. Obviously a volume as rich and aggressive as this deserves broad attention. But I limit my query to one statement made by A.: “even if the epistle was occasioned thanks to Paul’s trip to Rome, it is not only a document of circumstance: It deserves the title of ‘Treatise on the Gospel’” (238). Unfortunately, that the aspect of specific circumstance is muted, that the study lacks any treatment of Romans 12–16, and the conclusions made, namely, that “these exhortations do not refer to the precise problems of the Romans but to all the situations that confront Christians,” are likely to be disputed. A.’s synchronic rhetorical construct, despite its valuable contributions, has become, I suggest, too removed from the social situation that Paul is addressing.

Smith College, Northampton, Mass. KARL PAUL DONFRIED


Ronning dedicates this book to Frank McNamara’s vindication, “hopeful that at last Dr. McNamara’s advocacy of the Targum background for the
This monograph provides solid evidence for the Targumic position that should serve as a basis for scholarly acceptance of McNamara’s perspective. R. convincingly demonstrates that “the Logos title is based on the Targumic Memra and that in John’s adaptation, ‘the Word’ means ‘Yahweh the Son’” (222). R. also explicates the Johannine view that the Son of God was present throughout the Old Testament as the preincarnate Yahweh the Son—the God of Israel.

Methodologically, R. employs intertextual analysis, consisting largely of meticulously detailed comparison of Johannine passages to material found in the MT, LXX, and Targums. The comparisons include parallel structures, allusions, and echoes. R.’s method, however, discloses a weakness: since he scarcely discusses his methodology, methodological terms—such as “allusion”—are undefined, and important distinctions within intertextual method are unnoticed. For example, R. cites allusions (e.g., Jn 1:32–33 alluding to Tg. Ps.-J., Num 7:89, and Isa 11:1–2) and echoes (e.g., Jn 12:34 echoing Isa 9:6–7) without identifying or distinguishing them as such, suggesting that they may carry the same intertextual certitude and function as the same kind of trope. This methodological disconnect neglects important developments of intertextual analysis during the past three decades by such notables as Robert Brawley, Richard Hays, and Kenneth Litwack. Intertextual clarity would further strengthen R.’s thesis. Nonetheless, his intertextual observations and insights are impressive.

R. begins by discussing three predominant scholarly proposals that explain appropriative influence on John’s title of “the Word” in his Prologue. The first is the OT Word of the Lord, the second is wisdom in wisdom literature, and the third is Philo’s Logos. R. presents a plausible case for each position, but then contends that a fourth one—the divine Word of the Targums forming the background of the Word of John’s Gospel—is the most plausible. This proposal carries strengths of the other three, and, unlike the others, does not require modification of the source concept. R. argues that in the Targums, the “Word (Memra/Dibbura) of the Lord”—or even just “Word” (Dibbura)—is used in substitution of the Tetragrammaton. The divine Word, then, is a metonym for God, and is not a hypostasis distinct from the divine.

R. elucidates the nature, categories, distinctions, and relevance of the Targums, and refers to various Targumic passages hundreds of times in his analysis. He also counters an obvious objection to his thesis: the Targums postdate the Gospel of John. R. supplies persuasive evidence that the Gospel of John is illuminated by Targumic passages that feature the divine Word—passages that likely would have been read publicly in synagogues in first century CE in Palestine. The development and influence of the Targums predated extant copies, and R. reminds us “that we are dealing with likely allusions rather than direct quotations” (271). He also shows that Philo’s Logos shares conceptual similarities to Memra and may have been influenced by it. Both Philo’s Logos and the Targumic Memra were used to guard God’s transcendence, and the Targums used the divine Word to refer
to God’s interaction with creation. In the latter, John adapted the Targumic use of the divine Word to depict the novelty of the incarnation.

Throughout the book, R. discusses insights implied by his thesis. For example, positing a Targumic background to John’s Logos title in the Prologue complements the divine “I am” sayings in the body of the Gospel. This shows that both identify Jesus as divine, and the complement connects the Prologue to the body of the Gospel.

R.’s study monumentally contributes to Johannine scholarship. However, in addition to providing methodological clarity, R. would enhance the clarity of this impressive work by identifying spiritual senses of Scripture when he clearly discusses spiritual senses at certain junctures. Perhaps most importantly, R. argues for the superiority of the Targumic view over the plausibility of the other three without exploring enough the possibility of John’s familiarity with and use of all four. For example, the OT Word of the Lord and passages in the Book of Wisdom may at times suggest circumlocutions for the divine as well, and could be the foundation of John’s appropriation of the divine Word title into his Prologue. John subsequently may have considered and appropriated Philo’s Logos and Wisdom. In this more comprehensive scenario of Johannine appropriation and adaptation, the Targumic Word would have further clarified John’s intentions of using the divine Word as a means of expressing that Jesus Christ is YHWH the Son. In any case, R.’s fresh insights will stimulate further research.

Lay Formation Institute, La Crosse, Wis.

MARK W. KOEHNE


Biblical scholars have always known that written New Testament texts were intended to be communicated orally. Estimates of literacy in the ancient world range from 0.5 to 15 percent. Scribes were an elite minority; the vast majority of people encountered the texts as proclaimed. Moreover, it is probable that many communicators did not deliver the text verbatim but rather memorized its general ideas and dramatized the interactive presentations to evoke emotional responses, thus helping explain the fact that the manuscripts we have are rife with problems.

Scholars who take these oral beginnings seriously have examined ancient treatments of rhetoric to clarify what Greek authors were intending. Others have attempted oral performances of biblical texts in English or other translations to learn how hearing a text proclaimed in community differs from reading it alone in silence. Margaret Lee and her former professor Bernard Scott argue that it is imperative to explore how the Greek texts were composed, proclaimed, heard, understood, and remembered. To accomplish this, they have developed an analytic approach by which they map a composition’s sounds in graphic form called a “sound map.” They analyze these sound maps according to listening conventions that existed at
the time the texts were created. Sounds were intended to influence how listeners would understand and remember what they heard.

The five chapters of part 1 present theoretical foundations for understanding sound mapping and analysis, drawing heavily on Hellenistic reflections on language. The review of the technology of writing in antiquity indicates that writing was a multiperson project, with wax tablets as a key medium for information storage and retrieval. Various methods and uses of memory, comparable to these wax tablets, were pivotal in that retrieval. The chapter on the “Grammar of Sound” explains how “faulty hearing” was just as responsible for manuscript errors as “faulty eyesight.” Illiterate cultures did and do rely on remembering and organizing what they hear (“memorial cultures”), with repetition as an important structuring device.

The proclaimer is best assisted by a colometric manuscript, that is, one arranged in breath-by-breath units or sense lines (cola). Therefore, anyone designing a sound map must ignore the arbitrary chapter (first introduced by Stephen Langston in 1226) and verse (introduced by Robert Estienne in 1551) indicators in their Bibles. The final chapter of part 1 explains how to develop sound maps, which involves the tedious syllable-by-syllable examination of the text. Using the Greek text of Nestle-Aland as their basis, L. and S. plot its sounds—cola, periods, rhymes, and other sound effects—to expose the text’s structure around which ancient listeners organized the spoken text in their minds. Such an analysis produces the sound map that now can be analyzed and interpreted.

Part 2 presents six NT illustrations of the utility of sound maps: maps for the centurion in Mark’s crucifixion scene, Paul’s letter to Philemon, the resurrection report in John 20, Luke’s nativity story, the Sermon on the Mount, and Q on anxiety. Each example contains a problem not yet solved by exegetes. Readers will have to decide if sound mapping has helped resolve the problems outlined.

L. and S. unquestionably have made a major contribution to sharpening our ability to read and interpret the NT respectfully. Sound mapping belongs in our exegetical toolboxes. However, I offer a caveat. With regard to the Gospels, it is important to consider any hypothesized Aramaic substage to discover what the Greek may have contributed to misrepresenting what might have originally been said by Jesus who did not teach in Greek. Retroversions from Greek to Aramaic have highlighted wordplays and puns lost in the Greek. Impressive as L. and S.’s model is, I sympathize with Vernon Robbins who told S.: “When I hear you explain this, I know you’re on track; but when I try to do it myself, I don’t know where to start” (5). Even knowing where to start, however, a scholar must deal with the fact that no one knows how ancient Greek was pronounced or how it was heard.

Though the authors claim to have revised each other’s work considerably, the chapters written by L. (2–5, 10) are overdocumented—nearly every sentence is footnoted!—perhaps a residue of the dissertation origins of these chapters. The choice for lists of resources after each chapter breeds
redundancy; a master bibliography would have been preferable. The included indexes of ancient and modern authors are helpful, but an index of subjects would have improved the book’s usefulness.

*Georgetown University*  
John J. Pilch


How can graduate biblical education become “a radical democratic space of critical inquiry, sociopolitical ethical exploration, and creative religious re-visioning”? This is the question that Schüssler Fiorenza poses in her newest book, where she lays out both the theoretical framework and a proposed pedagogical paradigm for such an endeavor. Readers familiar with her previous work will recognize that this book builds on and refines her thinking on method, moving now to articulate ways in which emancipatory pedagogy could transform society, culture, and biblical religion. She rightly calls biblical scholarship to public accountability, since biblical knowledge is power that can be used for either domination or liberation.

The book’s title is deliberately ambiguous. “Biblical studies” can be understood either as the subject, that is, the democratizing influence and impact of biblical studies, or as the object of investigation, that is, how pedagogical practices of biblical education can be democratized. S.F. intends both. She begins by examining the present rhetorical space of graduate biblical studies and shows that instead of educational paradigms that rest on a scientific, objectivist ethos, what is needed is a rhetoric of inquiry that seeks wisdom. Such a rhetoric of inquiry “pays special attention to the argumentative discourses of scholarship and their theoretical presuppositions, social locations, investigative methods, and sociopolitical functions” (47). Prime attention must be given to analyzing issues of power and access by wo/men and other disenfranchised persons (S.F. uses “wo/men” to lift into consciousness the linguistic violence of so-called generic male-centered language).

Chapter 2 redescribes, evaluates, and renames four paradigms of biblical studies that S.F. has elaborated in previous works: the Religious-The*logical-Scriptural Paradigm (S.F. uses “G*d” and “the*logical” to indicate the brokenness and inadequacy of human language for naming the Divine), the Critical-Scientific Modern Paradigm, the Cultural-Hermeneutic-Postmodern Paradigm, and the Emancipatory-Radical Democratic Paradigm. S.F. sees these four paradigms as “a republic of many voices,” not in competition with each other, but “actively communicating with each other as equals, albeit each with a different accent. They can also be imagined as overlapping moving circles that deepen and correct each other” (83). S.F. observes that the emerging fourth paradigm is still not given an equal place. Her third and fourth chapters, the heart of the book,
are dedicated to an elaboration of the theoretical frameworks and pedagogical structures and practices of the fourth paradigm.

S.F. rightly critiques the lack of sustained critical engagement with feminist scholarship on the part of other emancipatory paradigms that have emerged. She elaborates how emancipatory pedagogy analyzes power inscribed in social structures and in the biblical text, and understands its capacity to create a different social order. Emancipatory pedagogy empowers subjects to become agents in processes of social transformation, understands the teacher as an agent of transformation, and recognizes education as a site of struggle along diverse axes of power, not as neutral space. The space of struggle, possibility, and vision is the “ekklēsia of wo/men.” In such a space, the four paradigms of biblical studies could constitute a forum, “a public space of critical-constructive debate, ethical evaluation, and interpretive practices” (119).

In chapter 4, S.F. critiques the banking model, master-disciple model, and consumer model of biblical studies, and then sets forth a feminist pedagogical model. She shows how the standard didactic triangle of knowledge, teacher, and students needs to be reformulated. Instead of a triangle, we might envision a spiraling circle, with relationships of radical equality. S.F. dispels the notion that this means that teacher and students are the same. Rather, students and teachers cooperate and dialogue, where each has power of knowledge, but in different ways, and together “create new knowledge in a way that is critically interactive with the body of knowledge and scholarship already available” (153).

It is a rare scholar who, in addition to being expert in her discipline, can also move the field forward in methodological analysis and in pedagogical praxis. S.F. does all this with razor-sharp insight. Throughout the book she dialogues with and critiques the work of other scholars, showing both their positive contributions and their pitfalls. In her concluding “Metalogue” we have a taste of how to put into practice what she has so well theorized. Here students share their experiences in her seminar, “Democratizing/Emancipatory Biblical Studies” held at Harvard Divinity School in the fall of 2008.

This book is essential reading for all involved in graduate theological education, not only in biblical studies. If S.F.’s pedagogy were widely adopted, there would be great potential for radical transformation of the academy, church, and world.

Catholic Theological Union, Chicago

BARBARA E. REID


The language of the Zohar, the sprawling masterpiece of the Kabbalah, is famously forbidding to even the most seasoned scholars of the Jewish mystical tradition. Melila Hellner-Eshed takes us on a guided tour of the
work, along the way deciphering its often impenetrable Aramaic idiom and elucidating its literary agenda. H.-E., a lecturer at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, employs a virtuosic knowledge of her subject in what amounts to a fine and inviting topical study of Zohar, covering its contents, its context within the Jewish intellectual tradition, and, most innovatively, the phenomenology of its mysticism.

The book is divided into four topical parts. Following an erudite discussion of the background and composition of the Zohar, part 1 introduces the major *dramatis personae* of its narrative, namely, the second-century (CE) sage Rabbi Shim'on bar Yoḥai and his disciples. H.-E. cogently argues that the Zohar’s characterizations of Rabbi Shim’on and his companions were meant to represent the 13th-century Castilian sages who created the work. These pseudonymous authors further mapped themselves onto their literary creation through allusion to the more distant past. Likening Rabbi Shim’on and his companions to the beneficiaries of the divine visage assumed by Moses at Sinai and the ecstatic wisdom of King Solomon, the medieval authors of the Zohar effectively cast themselves as curators of a continuous tradition of metaphysical religious experience as old as the Jewish experience itself.

In part 2 H.-E. explores the practical dimensions the Zohar’s mysticism, discussing how its authors presumed to commune with the divine. She pays particular attention to the two modes of bodily transfiguration ascribed in its pages to Rabbi Shim’on and his companions. The first is said to have occurred as the ancient sages traversed the roads of Galilee. Engrossed in discussion of divine matters, the sages would effectively get lost in thought *en route* to their destinations, turning the otherwise pedantic experience of travel into one of profound spiritual discovery. The other, more common mode of mystical experience was through dreams. In the dreamscape, Rabbi Shim’on and his companions are said to have undertaken journeys to the otherwise ineffable *sephirot*, or unearthly realms, of wisdom and understanding. The authors of the Zohar, H.-E. argues, considered such nocturnal flights of elevated consciousness the most real and most readily accessible conduits between the physical and metaphysical worlds.

Part 3 focuses on the textual mechanics of the Zohar’s mysticism. The Zohar’s narrative interludes appear amid a far more expansive and, generally speaking, less easily comprehensible exposition of the Torah. Although the Zohar’s authors drew extensively upon earlier exegetical traditions, borrowing liberally from the Babylonian Talmud and the classical Midrash, their tendency to adapt said materials to the purposes of their literary creation lends their reading of the Torah a character all its own. Central to its exegetical program is the idea of an ever-present tension between the revealed wisdom of the Torah and the hidden wisdom of the Kabbalah. To gain access to the latter, one must begin with the former; only through applied study of the Torah while awake can one unlock its secrets while in the state of heightened awareness that comes with sleep. One must therefore continually strive to master the boundary between conscious and
unconscious thought. In addition to providing the would-be mystic the key to spiritual enlightenment, H.-E. therefore argues, the Zohar envisions Torah study as the quintessential act of piety for all who yearn to commune with God.

Part 4 delves more deeply into the linguistic metaphysics of the Zohar. Citing recurring exegetical figures of speech such as light, fire, water, aroma, and sexual arousal, H.-E. attempts to characterize the Zohar’s mystical experience in corresponding human terms. The authors of the Zohar crafted their commentary on the Torah with the conviction that they and, by extension, their readers could achieve the heights of physical pleasure and emotional acuity by partaking of its esoteric wisdom. They therefore inscribed their work with a distinct awareness of the textual practices needed to perpetuate their mystical traditions, effectively urging their readers to do as they did, to meditate on the Torah, to record their reflections on it, and to share their experiences with others. This, H.-E. concludes, has ensured the Zohar’s capacity to continually engage and inspire its readers.

H.-E. expects a fair degree of familiarity with classical rabbinic culture. One may reasonably presume that the book’s original Hebrew-language edition was intended for a readership already somewhat familiar with the Zohar’s idiom. That proviso aside, I found the book quite accessible and a pleasure to read. The author and the translator have created an inviting, informed, and intellectually stimulating point of entry to the critical study of the Zohar and the mystifying world of the Kabbalah.

Marquette University, Milwaukee

JOSHUA EZRA BURNS


This complex book about biblical and postbiblical perceptions of God’s “physicality” and presence is unusual in many regards. The text occupies only pages 1–174, and a full 100 pages, 175–275, are devoted to endnotes. Sommer’s approach is, by his own design, simultaneously scholarly and popular, and he attempts to address widely diverse interests: Jewish mysticism, Jewish and Christian theology, comparative literature, religious education, classics, Assyriology, Ugaritology, and, in general, biblical studies. Finally, his methodologies for understanding biblical texts are sometimes unusually jarring.

S., a professor of biblical and Semitic language studies at the Jewish Theological Seminary of America, tries to do too much and attempts to bridge too many disciplines, with the result that, despite his impressive erudition and command of the literature, he ultimately fails to bring clarity to a difficult concatenation of ideas. Nonetheless, even though one may disagree with his conclusions and even his methodology, what he has to say provocatively forces a rethinking of commonly understood biblical categories and a reexamination of concepts of the presence of God. This challenge
to examine our own ways of thinking about how God is present to us makes
the book well worth reading.

The study’s theme and purpose—and perhaps a clue to its complexity—
are summarized in a note preceding the table of contents: “Sommer
investigates the notion of God’s body and God’s self in ancient Israel,
Canaan, and Mesopotamia. He uncovers a lost ancient Near Eastern
perception of divinity according to which an essential difference between
gods and humans was that gods had more than one body and fluid,
unbounded selves.” Further, in his own introduction S. asserts “the God
of the Hebrew Bible has a body. This must be stated at the outset. . . .
God has many bodies located in sundry places in the world that God
created” (1).

The problem with this thinking is that S. fails to distinguish between the
physical repercussions of a theophany and the theophany itself. The OT
frequently attributes dramatic disruptions in the natural order of things
(see, e.g., Hab 3:3) when God is present, but these physical manifestations
do not necessarily imply a corporeality in God. In chapter 3, “The Rejec-
tion of the Fluidity Model in Ancient Israel,” S. describes kavod, “glory,”
as a shining body of God (58–62), whereas it is much more likely a
description of the physical result of God’s noncorporeal presence. Simi-
larly, he interprets those references to Near Eastern gods (including, as he
idiosyncratically renders it, “Yhwh”) who are mentioned as gods of vari-
ous places or are given a variety of epithets, as suggesting a fragmentation
or “multiple embodiment” of the divinities (24–30), whereas the more
usual interpretation is that the god, say Baal, is at one time active in
Sidon, at another time in Tyre or elsewhere, or acting now in this manner,
now that.

When the Bible mentions the angel or messenger of YHWH (ml’k
yhw), such as in Genesis 32 where such a figure wrestles with Jacob, S.
sees this “angel” as God’s fragmented self in a “small-scale manifestation,”
reflecting “the belief that the selves of an angel and the God Yhwh could
overlap” (41). It is at least as likely that the authors in this and similar
passages (e.g., in Gen 18 and 19) wished to express the physical repercus-
sions of God’s presence but avoid excessive anthropomorphism and thus
being compromised by a representative of God.

Although S. discusses Adam and Eve as “exiles” in the garden (109–18),
surprisingly he does not analyze the varied modalities of God’s presence in
the Priestly and Yahwist creation stories of Genesis 1–3, modalities that
clearly bespeak an effort to assert God’s immanence while preserving his
transcendence. Even God’s “walking in the cool of the evening” does not
necessarily bespeak a belief in God’s having a body; rather it functions as a
poetic way of expressing how intimate God is with his new creation.

S. briefly pursues later Jewish thought, especially the Kabbalah, offering
an interesting discussion of “sexual descriptions of interactions among
aspects of God” (130). In his brief foray into Christian perspectives,
S. surprisingly observes that “J and E are Catholic in an even more signif-
icant way: Just as the Israelite God became present in many bodies on earth
as Israelites anointed stelae and sacred poles, so too the Christian God’s body is present in many locations at once whenever Catholics or Orthodox Christians gather for the Eucharist” (135).

In addition to the extensive notes, there are a large bibliography and scriptural and subject indexes. Throughout, wherever there are citations in Hebrew script, either a transcription or a translation is provided.

Loyola Marymount University, Los Angeles WILLIAM J. FULCO, S.J.


Radde-Gallwitz analyzes two ongoing philosophical issues for Christianity: the divine simplicity and our knowledge of God. He commendably presents the ways Basil of Caesarea and Gregory of Nyssa, as they propagated their doctrine on divine simplicity, met the challenge of Aetius and Eunomius of Cyzicus. R.-G. provides clear definitions of philosophical terms and consistently builds that terminology as he proceeds through the historical background with a thoroughness and clarity that in itself makes his book indispensable. Two theses prevail: First, what R.-G. calls the “identity thesis”: “some theologians have taken the doctrine of divine simplicity to entail that every term one attributes to God names God’s essence or substance, and that, metaphysically, God’s essence and God’s properties are in fact identical” (5). And second: “Basil and Gregory transformed divine simplicity . . . by articulating a version of the doctrine of divine simplicity that avoids the horns of total apophaticism and the identity thesis” (6). “Herein lies the uniqueness of Basil and Gregory’s account of divine simplicity” (13–14).

Chapters 1 to 3 present a wealth of philosophical and theological background of Christian thinkers on whom both Eunomius and the Cappadocian brothers either relied or with whom they disagree: Ptolemy, Marcion, Clement of Alexandria, Origen, Justin, Dionysius of Alexandria, and Athanasius. R.-G. analyzes Ptolemy’s Letter to Flora separately from Irenaeus, a focused exposition rarely attempted in Christian studies. R.-G. successfully shows that Ptolemy introduced divine simplicity as one of the “interpretive tools” Christians would continue to use for elucidating Scripture and God. Throughout, R.-G. sustains an important conversation with modern philosophers and theologians, such as Christopher Stead, Rowan Williams, and Hilary Putnam—an unusual bonus, situating historical arguments in their contemporary discussions.

R.-G.’s masterful analyses of Eunomius, Basil, and Gregory in chapters 4 to 7 are remarkable in organization, comprehensiveness, and consistency. Even though he isolates the specific contributions of each Father, he connects them through their arguments about epinoiai (“conceptualizations”). Epinoiai are specific notions about God that describe different attributes of God without saying anything at all about divine simplicity or divine
essence. Because Eunomius held that God’s essence and attributes are identical, he thought the doctrine of epinoiai absurd. For Eunomius, all attributes of God are identical with each other and the divine essence; thus to know attributes of God is to know God’s essence. The Cappadocian brothers, however, denied all possibility of knowing the divine essence. By “rehabilitating the category of ‘conceptualization,’ . . . they articulated a coherent theological epistemology that does not include knowledge of God’s essence” (112).

It is not surprising that several problems concerning epinoiai arise in R.-G.’s discussion. In the section “Saving Gregory from his Defenders” of chapter 7, R.-G. explains how the later trajectory of Orthodox theology, so exquisitely articulated by Gregory Palamas, reads the Palamite distinction of essence and energies into the theology of Gregory of Nyssa. With less neglect of the larger development of historical theology, R.-G. could have nuanced his argument significantly. Gregory Palamas relied on the Cappadocians, and his reading of them is not aberrant, just different. The theology of the Cappadocian Fathers is foremost in Palamas’s tradition. R.-G. himself asks different questions than did Gregory Palamas. Amid this tangle, R.-G. does not answer very definitively how and in what respects conceptualizations cannot be considered “energies.”

This study is invaluable for historical theologians, for scholars of the Cappadocian Fathers, and for all people serious about finding new approaches to interreligious dialogue. R.-G. demonstrates eminently that the theological discourses of Basil and Gregory do not obfuscate, let alone truncate, theological debate—and in the process he successfully counters Lim’s thesis that the heterousians fostered open theological exchange much more than the homoeousians, “who shrouded it in authoritarian appeals to mystery” (121). Basil, in fact, offered a sophisticated, extensive vocabulary for theological discourse, for example, his idea of oikeiosis (i.e., living a life in affinity with God) or “ethical knowledge (knowing God through participating in divinity itself)” (128). Such a theology is profound, since it acknowledges that theology is experiential, not simply intellectual.

Second, the book underscores the need for a weighty Christian exposition of divine simplicity other than those of Augustine and Thomas Aquinas. Augustine and Aquinas, R.-G. points out, became proponents of “an identity thesis vastly more sophisticated” than Eunomius’s, and came to exclusively represent Christian thought “in contemporary discussions of divine simplicity among philosophers of religion” (5). R.-G.’s work helps bring the Cappadocians’ thought to the table: their doctrine of divine simplicity provides a distinct way of speaking about the unity of God from a completely different Christian perspective. It therefore can contribute greatly to dialogues with Muslims and Jews. This is indeed a valuable contribution.

Temple University, Philadelphia

VASILIKI LIMBERIS
In 1593 the Society of Jesus decreed that those of Jewish ancestry were henceforth forbidden from entering the Society. This discriminatory measure was slightly mitigated 15 years later by restricting searches for signs of so-called impurity to only the past five generations of a candidate’s family. On one level, the 1593 decree was unremarkable; such rubrics reflected contemporary general anxieties about racial and religious purity and pollution. Spain, for instance, had been avidly pursuing the goal of pureza de sangre since the middle of the 15th century. In Spain and elsewhere, restrictive legislation had been passed, but especially in Spain (not least in the wake of the 1492 Jewish expulsion) concerns about conversos (Jewish converts to Christianity) and their heirs had sometimes reached hysterical levels. On another level, however, as Maryks’s splendid book reveals, such obsessions within the Society are rather surprising in the context of early Jesuit history.

The Society’s founder, Ignatius of Loyola, for instance, possessed a relatively enlightened attitude toward those of Jewish lineage. This stance was shared by Ignatius’s loyal and far-traveling emissary Jeronimo Nadal who, in 1554, explicitly insisted that candidates for admission should not be discriminated against on grounds of lineage. Ignatius’s immediate successors sustained this outlook, and until the early 1570s the Society’s leadership outlawed discriminatory practices so that early Jesuit luminaries of Jewish ancestry (e.g., Juan Alfonso de Polanco and Diego Laínez), even with their converso family backgrounds, operated within the highest echelons of the Society. During this early period, however, certain local Jesuits pursued prejudicial policies (Antonio Araoz, the provincial superior for Spain, being a prime example) and were often taken to task.

As M. explains, everything changed in 1573. Following the death of Francisco de Borja, the Society’s third General Congregation assembled to install a new superior general. The maneuvering of Italian and Portuguese Jesuits succeeded in blocking the election of Polanco, the odds-on favorite. M. convincingly argues that concerns over Polanco’s ancestry played a pivotal role in his defeat. In the post-1573 Mercurian and Acquaviva years, this newfound suspicion of those of Jewish ancestry gained considerable ground. This went down well in some Jesuit circles, but dislike of the leadership’s policy was one key factor behind internal Jesuit dissent, sparking, for instance, the antics of the so-called memorialistas, who pursued self-determination for the Society’s Spanish branch. Some Jesuits sincerely sought to return to more benevolent policies. The writings of Jesuits such as Antonio Possevino and Juan de Mariana (who were dismayed by the 1593 ruling) were instrumental in bringing about the (decidedly limited) concessions of 1608. For all these voices of opposition, however, the last quarter of the 16th century
witnessed a sea change in official Jesuit attitudes toward purity of blood. As M. puts it, “the lineage-hunting season began” (xxviii).

M.’s important book rightly suggests that the Jesuit encounter with the question of blood purity has never received the attention it deserves. Earlier scholarship tended to sweep less edifying moments under the historiographical carpet. M. demonstrates beyond any doubt that debates on such issues represented one of the most significant pulse-beats of early Jesuit discourse. He places this discourse in its wider cultural context, provides many nuanced readings of tracts on both sides of the argument, and, most impressively, combines an intimate knowledge of the existing secondary sources with some excellent archival detective work. M. has unearthed previously unreported documents and blown the dust off others that have suffered from neglect.

This is required reading for all students of early Jesuit history, and it will also be of great interest to historians of early modern attitudes toward religious and racial difference. Perhaps its most telling lesson is that, from the outset, a uniform Jesuit “way of proceeding” was an elusive goal.

_Hartlepool, UK_  
_JONATHAN WRIGHT_


Today only specialists know the works of Andrew Michael Ramsay (d. 1743)—and among those specialists are hardly ever any Catholics, despite the fact that he was one of the most intriguing and original Catholic thinkers of the early-18th century. David Hume appreciated his “noble Christian freethinking,” and Alexander Pope considered Ramsay’s famous _Cyropédie_ as one of the greatest works of the time. Hitherto, one could only lament the lack of a critical biography of the “chevalier” as he was also called. Now Eckert has provided just that but also much more. At more than 800 pages, E. delivers a tour de force not only through the life and works of Ramsay, but also through the cultural and social life of the period that shaped academic discourse. Ramsay’s life looks at first sight similar to the lives of other converts—after all, he was born a member of the Anglican Church, became a radical skeptic, and then a Catholic mystic (under the tutelage of Fénelon). However, unlike others, Ramsay’s Catholicism did not become ultramontane but universalist. With the help of the classics, which he had studied in depth, he reinvented the old tradition of the _theologia prisca_, merged it with a mysticism that was shaped by his mentor Fénelon and the Cambridge Platonists, and rationalized such findings with the philosophical language of Spinoza, Malebranche, Bayle, Wolff, and Newton. Moreover, Ramsay developed a political theory that was inspired by the virtues of Homer and the classics, but also entailed one of the most advanced Catholic statements on religious tolerance. Originally his anonymous _Essay_ was thought to have been written by Montesquieu; fame came
with his educational novel *The New Travels of Cyrus* (1727, orig. French). Hume, Pope, Swift, Coleridge, and others considered *Travels* a first-rate work, and it was immediately translated into German, English, Danish, Dutch, Spanish, Portuguese, and Russian. *Travels* was an ingenious piece of philosophy/theology of history; its critics, however, charged it with being shaped by a pluralist theology that marginalized Christian revelation, stating as it did that “the principal doctrines of revealed religion, concerning the states of innocence, corruption, and renovation, are as ancient as the world” (444). Interesting also is Ramsay’s concept of Catholic masonry—an idea that, if picked up by the Curia, could have helped the Church to avoid strong conflicts with the lodges. Ramsay’s posthumous *Philosophical Principles of Natural and Revealed Religion* (1748) are a summa of his thought. It is remarkable that his system rests on Fénelon’s conviction of God’s love for creation. From this principle Ramsay derives an ontology that also carries ethical consequences: “To love God for himself and all beings proportionately as they resemble him, is the eternal, immutable and universal law of all intelligences. This is the true law of nature, of which all particular, positive laws, whether civil or religious, are but branches, and consequences” (617). Ramsay follows this mystical insight through the ancient religions of India and China as well as through the Old Testament, and he comes to the conclusion that Christianity was indeed as old as creation (M. Tindal), but also that “Christianity is the true road to happiness in this life, as well as in the next. . . . The three remote, external, and accessory means of reuniting the soul to God are scriptures, churches, and sacraments” (621–22). This statement also shows why Ramsay’s thought was shunned by Catholic colleges and universities: his Christian universalism and his eclipse of “institutionalized” religion were considered dangerous. Nevertheless, and quite surprisingly, none of his works were ever censored.

I hope that this well-researched biography—as well as Gabriel Glickmann’s recent articles on Ramsay (“True, Noble, Christian Free-thinking,” in *Leben und Werk Andrew Michael Ramsays [1686–1743]* [2009])—will resuscitate interest in Ramsay’s work among not only historians but also theologians.

*Marquette University, Milwaukee*

ULRICH L. LEHNER


Arnold and Losito present an important case study of anti-Modernist reaction to Alfred Firmin Loisy, the highest-profile figure of the identified “Modernists.” Consisting of a collection of Vatican documents on the 1903 censuring of Loisy, along with lengthy editorial introductions, this extraordinarily valuable volume adds to the growing library of resources on the Roman Catholic Modernist Crisis. Anyone curious about how the Vatican Congregations of the Index and Inquisition, forerunners of our current
Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, functioned in general and specifically in Loisy’s case, will find this work absorbing. Not only does it publish for the first time critical editions of all the extant Vatican documents on the *affaire Loisy* and relate them to relevant documents in French archives; the editors also provide stirring, interpretive narratives of the Congregations’ inner workings. Scholars should be grateful to the *Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft* for financing this work and to the Vatican Press for publishing it—and flawlessly.

Until now, who did what, who was responsible for prosecuting Loisy’s case, and how the judgment was finally reached were largely matters of inference and conjecture based on correspondence in extra-Vatican archives. Now the picture is as clear as it is ever likely to get. Not only do we learn, for example, the identities of the Congregations’ consultants, their theological and ideological leanings, and their judgments on Loisy; we also learn whose forceful voices ultimately carried the argument with Pius X by playing into his anxieties about the dangers facing the Church, and so whose voices and arguments led genetically to *Lamentabili sane exitu* (1907), *Pascendi domenici gregis* (1907), and to *Sacrorus antistitum* (1910), the motu proprio imposing the Oath against Modernism.

A. and L. conclusively demonstrate that the anti-Modernist campaign was well formulated and functioning already in 1903, at the end of Leo XIII’s and the beginning of Pius X’s papacies—in contrast to the till-now dominant view of most Modernist scholars that the campaign coalesced only from 1905 to 1907 (9–10). As A. puts it, pace Lorenzo Bedeschi, “the rigorous antimodernists had already developed their theological, ecclesio-political strategy prior to 1903” (11).

Of the book’s 459 pages, 130 are given to the two introductions; the remainder to the nine archival documents on the five delated works of Loisy. The eight votes of the consultants of the Congregation of the Index on the works of Loisy were those of: (1) David Fleming, O.S.F., on “La religion d’Israël—les origines”; (2) Laurent Janssens, O.S.B. Cass., on “La religion d’Israël—les origines”; (3) Louis Billot, S.J., on *L’Evangile et l’Église* (1902); (4) Enrico Gismondi, S.J., on “La religion d’Israël—les origines”; (5) Janssens on *Études évangéliques* (1902); (6) Gismondi on *L’Évangile et l’Église*; (7) Gismondi’s second vote (211–324) on *L’Évangile et l’Église*; and (8) Rafael Merry del Val on “La religion d’Israël—les origines.” The ninth document is the lengthy *Relatio* for the Holy Office of the Inquisition (333–445) by Pie de Langogne, O.F.M. Cap. (a.k.a. Pierre-Armand Sabadel) on the three works noted above plus *Autour d’un petit livre* (1903) and *Le Quatrième Évangile* (1903).

The editorial introductions remind us that the first delation of a work by Loisy—his introduction to *Le Livre de Job* (1892)—occurred April 29, 1893. It was a harsh denunciation, accusing Loisy of introducing “German biblical rationalism into France, England, and elsewhere,,” a rationalism that “was carrying out a ‘war’ against Scripture.” What allegedly made Loisy extremely dangerous is that he was “pretending to be Catholic” whereas he was really “a wolf in sheep’s clothing” (12). This imagery set
the tone for all subsequent expressions of alarm that Loisy was involved in a conspiracy to infiltrate the ranks of Catholic teachers, thereby to pervert the minds of seminarians, who would then peddle this rationalism to the unsuspecting, defenseless laity.

Both A. and L. point out that Loisy, if he had really wanted to avoid censure, should not have published his Autour d’un petit livre (the second “red book”—and this without imprimatur—as an apologia for L’Évangile et l’Église (the first “red book”). Not only was he exceedingly impolitic in this, but the moderates among the Index consultors were scarcely more political. Their reports on Loisy’s works lacked precision and rambled on with excessive detail, particularly Gismondi’s, making it unlikely that the other consultors did scarcely more than scan the reports. The rigorously anti-Loisy consultors read his works with less than open minds, yielding brief and sharp reports and sweeping and ideologically driven condemnations. Louis Billot, the most powerful of the later integrist, carried the vote in late December 1903 to place Loisy’s five works on the Index. This was the beginning of the end of Loisy’s life in the Catholic Church.

One element lacking in this marvelous work is a robust church-state contextualizing of the anti-Loisy forces: Pius X, Secretary of State Rafael Merry del Val, François Richard (archbishop of Paris), and various Vatican officials, as well as the Congregations’ consultors. Such a context would have accounted for the vehemence of the anti-Modernist reaction. Scholars of this period and research libraries will surely want to have this study.

Marquette University, Milwaukee

DAVID G. SCHULTENOVER, S.J.


The interpretation of pre-Vatican II theology, including the Nouvelle Théologie, is an ongoing project with significant implications for both the internal life of the Catholic Church and ecumenical dialogue. Hans Boersma contributes to this project with a synthetic account of the underlying theological concerns of the Nouvelle Théologie movement during the 20th century. He identifies an internal unity within the Nouvelle Théologie consisting of a “shared sensibility” that envisions created realities as “sacramental means leading to eternal, divine mysteries” (7). While B. admits that the theologians associated with the Nouvelle Théologie did not constitute a homogeneous theological school, he argues that their approach to diverse theological problems—including the interpretation of Scripture, the theology of history, the development of doctrine, nature and grace, and ecclesiology—evinced an underlying sacramental view of reality.

The heart of the Nouvelle Théologie is formed by what B. calls a “sacramental ontology,” an account of how created, sensible realities are signs, anticipations, and mediations of divine realities. He endorses this sacramental ontology as a corrective to what he believes was an erosion of
sacramentality in both Catholic and Protestant theology following the Reformation. Though this sacramental sensibility is characteristic of Catholic theology, B. believes that it holds promise for Protestants as well. Recent engagement with the Nouvelle Théologie from outside Roman Catholic circles confirms his intuition.

Chapter 2 traces this sensibility through four “Precursors to a Sacramental Ontology”: Johann Adam Möhler, Maurice Blondel, Joseph Maréchal, and Pierre Rousselot. Chapter 3 argues that Henri de Lubac’s doctrine of the desire for the supernatural and Henri Bouillard’s account of analogical language about God exemplify their sacramental vision. Created and contingent reality—whether the deepest desire of “the human spirit or [of] human discourse” (115)—functions as a sacrament of union with God. While B. suggests alliances between the “sacramental ontology” of the New Theologians and Neoplatonic metaphysics, he also shows that they integrated the Neoplatonism of the Greek Fathers with a Thomistic metaphysics. Chapter 4 extends his reflection on sacramental ontology through an exploration of Hans Urs von Balthasar’s theology of analogy and Marie-Dominique Chenu’s reflections on the nature of theology itself. B. constructively situates the debate between Karl Barth and Balthasar on the analogy of being within his treatment of “sacramental ontology.”

The centerpiece of the book (chap. 5) concentrates on the spiritual interpretation of Scripture in de Lubac and Jean Daniélon. It correlates the earlier material on metaphysics and theological language with the later chapters on the theology of history in Yves Congar and Daniélon (chap. 6) and ecclesiology in de Lubac and Congar (chap. 7). Although B. covers a lot of terrain, he reveals that sacramental relationships—between the sign and signified, the letter of Scripture and its spiritual depth, the visibility of the church and its eschatological fulfillment in the kingdom—constitute the pivotal confluence of the diverse theological issues addressed by the Nouvelle Théologie.

B.’s most provocative claim concerns the interpretation of Roman Catholic theology preceding Vatican II. He argues that the Nouvelle Théologie was neither theologically continuous with Roman Catholic Modernism nor with “the theological pluralism of the post-Second Vatican Council period” (289), a later theological pluralism that B. never clearly defines. The discontinuity between Modernism and the Nouvelle Théologie rests, he argues, on a “sacramental ontology” that takes its inspiration more from the Scriptures and the Fathers than from a desire to conform Christianity to the modern world. In other words, B. emphasizes ressourcement over aggiornamento. At one point, he alleges that both Modernism and neo-Scholasticism colluded in a nonsacramental mentality. Other authors, such as Jürgen Mettepenningen (Nouvelle Théologie—New Theology: Inheritor of Modernism, Precursor of Vatican II, 2010), find greater continuity between Modernism and the Nouvelle Théologie.

B.’s application of the theme of “sacramental ontology” to the Nouvelle Théologie proves fruitful for examining the underlying motivations of the movement without overlooking the diversity of theological commitments
within it. Uniting a breadth of theological themes with its exploration of sacramental depths, B.’s book is one of the best introductions to the *Nouvelle Théologie*. One can hope that it stimulates continued dialogue about the interpretation of pre-Vatican II theology as well as about the ecumenical potential of “sacramental ontology.”

Marquette University, Milwaukee

JOSEPH S. FLIPPER


Attempting to correct for the individualism that dominates many doctrines of sin, Nelson attends to the social structures of sin and to a relational understanding of the self. Holding Friedrich Schleiermacher and Albrecht Ritschl in conversation (chap. 2), as well as John W. Nevin and Charles G. Finney (chap. 3), N. distills two rejections of individualistic accounts of sin. The “structural sin type” is based on Ritschl’s extension beyond Schleiermacher’s doctrine, using the language of “kingdom of sin” to build on more traditional articulations of individual sin. In this view, all humanity as the sum of individuals is the subject of sin, but the kingdom of sin is more than the sum of individual actions, and it limits human freedom in choosing the good (45–47). The “relational self type” represents the idea that one person’s sin is “never the individual’s alone, precisely because the ‘self’ emerges as an acting subject by relating to a whole host of other relata which are not the self” (7). Nevin’s critique of Finney’s doctrine of sin reveals how Finney exemplifies this type.

Using this binary framework, N. identifies the Latin American liberation theologies of Gustavo Gutiérrez, Juan Luis Segundo, Leonardo Boff, Juan Alfaro, Justo González, and Aldo Etchegoyen, as well as Rebecca Chopp’s appropriation of liberation theology (chap. 4), with the first type, finding Gutiérrez’s formulation to be the most adequate. Chapter 5 offers the longest analytical treatment employing the typology; eight theologians’ approaches to sin, spanning feminist (Mary Potter Engel, Elisabeth Schüssler Fiorenza, Ivone Gebara), womanist (Jacquelyn Grant, Delores Williams, Emilie Townes), and Reformation (Serene Jones, Deanna Thompson) points of departure, are briefly considered and located also within the structural sin category. The treatments of Marjorie Suchocki and Rosemary Radford Ruether find a place in the relational self type, with the latter pointing toward a possible synthesis of the two types. Both chapters 5 and 6 would benefit from a closer connection back to Ritschl’s understanding of how the kingdom of sin functions to constrain human freedom. In cases in which N. rightly worries about the attribution of agency to structures (e.g., 96–97, 101, 104–5, 129–30, 136, and 184–85), further exploration of the dynamics by which individual moral agents participate in objectively disordered structures with a sort of false consciousness, as Gregory Baum has argued (*Religion and Alienation* [1975])
N.’s discussion of the Minjung theologies of Ahn Byung-mu and Andrew Sung Park (chap. 6) provides a solid, contextualized overview of their work. While he locates their approaches in the structural sin type, the analytical framework laid out in the earlier chapters functions as more of an addendum here, rather than as an integral part of his argument. Overall, N.’s typology is a useful, creative heuristic that sharpens comparison among the wide variety of theologies considered. Ultimately, N. recommends a combination of the structural sin and relational self types, with a view toward developing a more cohesive account of social sin. Ruether’s approach, in his estimation, represents a hopeful step in this direction. With further exploration of the theological anthropology of Catholic social thought, he could tease out a similar connection between structures and relationality in Gutiérrez’s conception of social sin.

N. expresses a desire for greater theological correlation on social sin between a trinitarian understanding of relationality and notions of the human personhood. Appropriately, he sees his task in this volume as mapping the terrain for such work. Even within the parameters of this text, however, some consideration of particular cases of social sin would afford an opportunity to experiment with a trinitarian approach as part of his vision of integrating the structural sin and relational self types. Readers, particularly in classroom settings, might find a casuistic method a fruitful device for engaging N.’s work.

For upper-level undergraduate and graduate students in theology as well as those serving in pastoral ministry, N.’s well-written, thoughtful text provides an informative, sweeping introduction to the concept of social sin. The ecumenical character of this survey, uncommon among examinations of social sin, is commendable and renders it accessible across a wide range of theological commitments.

University of Notre Dame

Margaret R. Pfeil


Most overviews of the Christologies taking form in Asia, Africa, and Latin America have been mainly descriptive with minimal evaluation. Brinkman’s study provides descriptive details of these Christologies but also situates them within the dynamics of inculturation and moves toward considerations of the normative theological consequences of the Asian and African namings of Jesus. The opening two chapters explore the general dynamics of bringing traditions about Jesus into new contexts, focusing on what happens to the meaning of those traditions, both in their earlier contexts and now in their new ones. Such considerations lead B. to posit a
principle of “double transformation,” wherein mutual dealing with a tradition between the two contexts brings forth new meaning in both. It is another (and useful) way of getting through the impasse of characterizing such changes as syncretistic. B.’s careful reading of newer images of the tradition has a theological dimension: he wishes to ascertain what becomes of the classical christological contentions about the person and work of Christ in these new settings. This normative questioning concerns primarily the six titles noted in the book’s subtitle. Do these new titles, B. asks, faithfully convey the weight of Christian tradition? Does their refraction back onto that tradition make us rethink concepts such as Trinity and atonement?

In his appeal to Buddhism, Hinduism, and Asian local traditions, B. has many written primary texts to work with; not so in dealing with African religions. With these latter he relies on secondary reports by African sources, often simply restating what African theologians have already said. In both the Asian and African instances, the presentations of the Christologies are themselves prefaced with reflections on the overall contexts. These presentations are careful although generalized. In the case of Asia, B. moves country by country, beginning with China. There he focuses on similarities and differences between the image of Jesus of Nazareth and the Buddhist concept of bodhisattva, especially as presented in Chinese forms of Buddhism. Next come chapters on Japan and Korea. The former is concerned with how Jesus is presented against the backdrop of Japanese history. The latter is especially concerned with relating Jesus to ancestor veneration and the strong shamanistic traditions of Korea. The section on India focuses on the images of avatar and guru as suitable vehicles for expressing the meaning of Jesus (with some attention to dalit representations of Jesus as well). The section on Indonesia devotes a chapter to images of Jesus in that country, something that frequently gets scant attention, but the Dutch colonial connection ensures a much more thorough treatment. The much briefer African section is arranged thematically around the titles of ancestor and healer, with little attention to other titles except for Christ as giver of life.

Testing of the relative fidelity of the images of Jesus as presented in Asian and African concepts is based on a principle B. calls the “catholicity of the church,” by which he means the continuous and living transmission of the message of Jesus in the Bible, church history, and liturgy. This is roughly similar to what other authors and the World Council of Churches have suggested.

The book is written in an ecumenical spirit (although the author’s own Reformed tradition is well in evidence, especially around the treatment of the atonement), and so would serve as a good classroom text for students interested in Christology in the world church today. The translation is quite good, save for a few oddities where titles or concepts have a standard form in English (e.g., “Analectica of Confucius” instead of “Analects”; “battles of rites” instead of “rites controversy”; “farmers’ war” instead of “Peasant War”). But these are minor blemishes. All in all, B. has given us a useful
theological reading of significant proposals of Christology in Asia and, to a lesser extent, in Africa. Extensive and helpful bibliographies conclude this fine book.

Catholic Theological Union, Chicago

ROBERT SCHREITER, C.PP.S.


A collection of 14 lectures by leading scholars, delivered over two years, this volume’s background is Christian theodicy, framed philosophically, though multidisciplinary and cross-cultural in content. Topics include three Muslim “faces of Satan” (Eric Ormsby), Hindu Kali devotees (notably Ramakrishna), Deshika’s Shrivaishna theology (Rachel Fell McDermott, Francis Clooney), Tibetan Buddhist syncretic traditions (George Dreyfus), classic Christian literary renderings from Dante through Dostoevsky to Dorothy Sayers (Peter Hawkins, Edwin DeLattre), and the modern, secular conceptions of Freud and the producers of Rosemary’s Baby (discussed by David Frankfurter). There is nothing on Oceania or African notions of white and black magic.

Several authors note that 20th-century convulsions and 9/11 have again made evil a major topic, while prompting no original philosophical analyses (e.g., Manfred Kuehn, who also states wrongly that Augustine thought himself evil “by nature,” 132–33). The two major modern philosophers addressed are Hannah Arendt—by Richard Bernstein, discussing American pragmatic fallibilism and Manfred Kuehn, a Kantian, addressing Rawlsian and Marxist distinctions between good and bad—and Paul Ricoeur, brilliantly summarized by Alan Olson, for whom layered, plurivocal symbols (cosmic, oneiric, poetic) give rise to thought reflecting on experience, not theodicy (94–95). Mark Larrimore corrects misconstruals of Augustine’s insistence that evil is parasitic privation of substantive ways of being, not due to any single agency with independent existence.

Against the proverbial assumption that the road to hell is paved with good intentions, DeLattre’s “Evil, Reciprocity and Rights” (115–29), based on consultations regarding hardened offenders and case studies of unrepentant mass murderers, argues that thoughtlessness is not always excusable. We can accurately judge psychopaths with superiority complexes as responsible for their choices, without claiming that childhood traumas rendered them morally innocent. Corrupt police who consider themselves above the law, ignoring constitutional safeguards for confessed criminals, should be called to account.

Kimberley Patton, “Can Evil Be Redeemed? Unorthodox Tensions in Eastern Orthodox Theology” (186–206), demonstrates that official repudiation of Origen’s universalism has not deterred a minority throughout the history of Christian theology, including Britain’s Kallistos Ware (seemingly
independently of Karl Barth), who concluded that judging Satan is God’s business, not ours. Several theists note that Satan is our adversary, not God’s (193).

Richard Kearney’s “Desire: Between Good and Evil” (207–21) astutely contrasts two strands in both biblical and Hellenistic traditions, one of the less seeking the more, the other of the more seeking the less. For Augustine, metaphysical desire is to possess what absolutely is not ours, namely, divine power. Nietzsche was wrong to blame only Christianity on this overreach. For Plato and Aristotle divine desire was a contradiction in terms, but in the Bible, the Song of Songs “amplifies the range” of divine speech beyond that in Exodus 3 to include lovers’ bodies and landscapes, uniquely privileging a young woman’s voice. Desire is at once human and divine, not metaphorically and allegorically but incarnationally “meontological” and eschatological (213).

Psychoanalyst Anna-Maria Rizzuto offers empirical grounds for concluding that evil is psychically contagious, while systemic evil is often screened by stereotypes (citing Emilie Townes on Aunt Jemima, 233). However, individuals can and have been weaned from avowedly willing evil by therapists’ transforming respect for the dignity of every self, naming our need for love as the foundation of evil dispositions (234).

Missing is any discussion of Reinhold Niebuhr’s modern restatement of Augustine’s doctrine of original sin and moral perversion (recently reexamined by Eric Gregory and Charles Matthewes) and Paul Tillich’s Schellingian notion of the demonic in divine being as such, exemplified by 20th-century violations of the Protestant principle, both National Socialist and consumer capitalist. Applying his dynamic conception of the demonic in history to the ambiguous imaging of deity in other traditions might have enriched what in this volume are primarily descriptive accounts of those alternative visions. Also missing are Denis de Rougemont’s dictum that we are each responsible for evil to the extent that we could do something about it but do nothing, and Gandhi’s that we should so act that the consequences of our mistakes fall more on ourselves than on others.

Trinity College, Toronto

Peter Slater


This volume is an impressive introduction to contemporary Catholic feminist theology. The essays outline a number of major questions and concerns, as well as make constructive proposals that are themselves significant contributions to Catholic theology. The editors and authors avoid the trap of trying to do too much; they smartly limit the volume to three major areas of Catholic theology: theological anthropology, Christology, and ecclesiology. The result is a focused and consistently excellent book.
A number of themes crisscross the essays. Michele Saracino and Jeannine Hill Fletcher both critique romanticized notions of motherhood and offer theologies that attempt to uphold motherhood without essentializing women. Saracino brings together motherhood and the post-colonial understanding of hybridity to rethink theological anthropology through the lens of maternal hybridity. The complex, multistoried realities of being a mother show that there can be no single story of being human.

Hill Fletcher also takes on problematic views of motherhood. She develops a Christology of relationality, rethinking the image of the breastfeeding Christ. Rather than romanticizing the self-giving of mothers, Hill Fletcher points out that “self-giving at three in the morning is none of these: it is not glamorous, self-satisfying, supra-human, or rooted in mutuality. It is a plain old exhausting pattern of being depended upon” (87). Such a pattern of self-giving is illuminative for imagining Christ but can be dangerous if pushed on to women. Hill Fletcher closes with powerful interreligious illustrations of a Christ waiting for his mother’s milk to come in.

Procario-Foley picks up on interreligious concerns with an excellent essay on feminist Christology and anti-Judaism. She critically examines feminist (re)constructions of Jesus that unwittingly embedded anti-Jewish themes in their Christologies, and makes a compelling argument for dialogue with Jewish feminism.

Teresa Delgado and LaReine-Marie Mosely focus on the bodily integrity of women of color. Delgado contends that religious and cultural traditions have distorted the “pillars” of theological anthropology, relationality, and grace. As a result, Latin American women and Latinas in the United States are commodified, exploited, and devalued. They are “double-crossed” by culture and theology, manifest in the dual scourges of trafficking/slavery and HIV/AIDS. A theology of the cross cannot therefore glorify sacrificial suffering. In the end, Latin American women and Latinas must hold together relationality, grace, and sexuality.

Mosely also argues for a more holistic theological anthropology. She includes a powerful reflection that connects the experience of having a mother with Alzheimer’s disease with the Church’s inconsistent recognition of Black Catholics. Mosely is concerned with the denial of the humanity of women of color, seen in the increased health risks of African-American women. She calls on African American women to choose “honest bodies” of wholeness.

Laura Taylor, Elizabeth Groppe, Rosemary Carbine, and Susan Abraham all, to varying degrees, raise the question of women’s ordination. While Taylor proposes a shift to a performative, rather than imitative, view of the Body of Christ, Groppe draws out the many ways in which women already stand in persona Christi, and Carbine highlights the praxis of the public church, a praxis in which women clearly lead the Church. Finally, Abraham sums up the volume nicely with a call for justice to be the hallmark of Catholic feminist ecclesiology. She argues for a symbolic imagination that makes room for all persons of the community.
The roundtable discussions that end each of the book’s three major sections are innovative and helpful. In each of these conversations, the partners flesh out important themes and offer their own thoughts in light of these themes. These collaborative chapters helpfully interweave the essays in each section and relate them to other sections. This serves to both deepen and broaden the conversation. A disappointment with these roundtables, however, is that the distinct contributions of the participants are integrated into one written voice; the different reactions and voices are not preserved. Indeed, the participants seem to agree more than they disagree, which aids in the coherence of the book as a whole; it does not, however, necessarily illustrate the extent to which feminist approaches can fruitfully interact, even when diverging from—or even seriously disagreeing with—one another.

Explanatory boxes, discussion or reflection questions, and bibliographic sources for further reading make the book ideal for inclusion in advanced undergraduate courses or introductory graduate courses. Beyond their pedagogical value, the essays are important Catholic proposals in theological anthropology, Christology, and ecclesiology.

Loyola Marymount University, Los Angeles

TRACY SAYUKI TIEMEIER


Keenan’s intellectual history of moral theology lucidly focuses on the development of fundamental moral theology as a discipline and, in particular, on renewed attention to the virtues. After a brief introduction followed by a discussion of three important manualists from the beginning of the 20th century (Thomas Slater, Henry Davis, and Heribert Jone), K. describes the reform efforts of Odin Lottin, Fritz Tillmann, Gérard Gillemann, and Bernard Häring, before considering the work of the “neo-manualists” and post-Vatican II developments in moral method and theological anthropology, including renewed interest in casuistry and reconsideration of natural law. In the later chapters, K. provides a particularly helpful description of the contributions of his teacher, Josef Fuchs. Appropriately, the book’s final chapter addresses the current “global discourse on suffering and solidarity” among moral theologians that K. has done so much to promote. Each section ends with analysis of a recent work that reflects the chapter’s theme.

While many historical studies in moral theology have focused on either distant or very recent developments, K. admirably emphasizes the contributions of early- and mid-20th-century reformers to the evolution of a biblically grounded, personalist, and historically conscious moral theology that is attentive to the significance of the virtues in the life of discipleship. Thus K. describes innovators within this long reform history as revisionists, rather than applying the term only to proportionalists or
other recent practitioners of the discipline. This approach offers a helpful corrective to the caricature of late-20th-century moral theology as radically disconnected from the legacies of its predecessors. Indeed, K. suggests that one of the most methodologically significant shifts in the Catholic moral tradition during the 20th century occurred when papal and episcopal statements increasingly replaced the manuals as sources of ethical insight, while in effect mirroring the analytical strategies of the manualists (118). Thus K.’s work invites us to reassess the continuities and discontinuities in moral theology as it developed during the century.

In addition to outlining the general history of the period, K. summarizes the development of significant concepts and debates (e.g., the sanctity of life, the goodness/rightness distinction, *Humanae vitae* and its aftermath, fundamental option, autonomous ethics/ethics of faith) in a clear, accessible fashion that will be particularly helpful for advanced undergraduate and graduate students. It will come as no surprise to readers of K.’s contributions to “Notes on Moral Theology” in Theological Studies that this book’s references to the literature are topically, geographically, and linguistically wide-ranging; thus both students and professionals will find the book useful in developing their reading lists, especially concerning African and Asian publications. K. also includes some intriguing anecdotes about the impact of theological mentoring, and what might be called the guild functions of moral theologians during the century (see, e.g., 59, 99, 121, 127, 133–34, 142–46). For all these reasons, K.’s work represents an important contribution to the study of the history of moral theology and might profitably serve as a reading for advanced seminars in fundamental moral theology as well.

While K. has deliberately set out to write an intellectual history of fundamental moral theology, he necessarily goes beyond those parameters to deal with events (e.g., World War II) or issues in applied ethics (e.g., contraception) that shaped influential figures and debates. The book’s limited focus, however, provides an agenda for future research. As K. points out, much of the current work regarding the history of moral theology is intellectual rather than social history (49). How might an analysis of social and cultural forces affect our understanding of the discipline’s development? Similarly, how would the picture of 20th-century moral theology change if one focused on applied ethics rather than on fundamental moral theology? (Today, some of the most illuminating differences among ethicists, especially those K. describes as neomanualists, concern their resolution of concrete moral problems.) Moreover, while foundational concerns dominated moral theology for much of the century, developments such as the growth of specialization within the discipline, the practical impact of *Veritatis splendor*, and the increasing emphasis on social justice and historical studies eventually have created circumstances in which a theologian could spend much of his or her career without explicitly addressing foundational questions that no manualist could have avoided. K.’s brief and commendably focused history, therefore, provides an excellent foundation for further
examination of this important and turbulent period in the evolution of moral theology.

Creighton University, Omaha


Rziha displays a marvelous gift for expositing Aquinas’s theology with clarity and precision. He begins by sketching Aquinas’s approach to the Creator-creature distinction. Combining participation (Plato) with act and potency (Aristotle), Aquinas holds that God creates finite modes of participating in his infinite actuality. Although these participations are not ontologically on the same level as God, they are analogously related to God’s actuality as finite effects. But what exactly does “participation” mean ontologically (see Paul Griffiths’s argument that “participation” is a mere metaphor [Intellectual Appetite, 2009]). R.’s first chapter evaluates influential treatments of Aquinas’s doctrine of participation. Drawing on Cornelio Fabro, R. gives the example of hot water, which is hot not by nature but by participation, that is, by receiving heat from something hot by nature. The same can be said about all created actuality, which is actual not by nature but by receiving actuality, according to a finite mode, from its uncreated cause.

Chapter 2 plunges into R.’s main concerns. He examines first “God as the efficient, exemplary, and final cause of all created perfections” (31). Eternal law has particularly to do with God’s exemplary causality, because God moves creatures “in accord with the exemplar in His mind to the end He created them to fulfill” (62). Eternal law and providence both are God’s plan for the ordering of all things to their end; they are distinct insofar as “providence” denotes God’s ordering wisdom, while “law” denotes God’s ordering command (41). R. defines eternal law as “the act of God’s practical reason commanding all creation to act for its divinely appointed end. . . . God’s command of what He has foreseen in His providential wisdom is the eternal law” (42).

We humans participate in the eternal law both through our substantial act of being and through our proper operation (and superadded abilities). The latter way of participating in the eternal law has two aspects. First, like all creatures, “humans are moved and directed by the eternal law to their operation in accord with their form” (72). God gives our intellect and will the power to act and their natural inclinations to truth and goodness. God gives the forms by which our intellect understands, and God is the source of the goodness that moves our will. Second, we cognitively participate in the eternal law by knowing and agreeing with the divine ratio for ordering us to our ultimate end.

The grace of the Holy Spirit gives a supernatural participation in God. Grace perfects our substantial being by uniting us more intimately to God’s
goodness and enabling us to “cooperate with God in causing supernatural acts” (82). By grace, God moves and governs us through “a supernatural principle of actions” (87), and grace also enables a higher cognitive participation so that we can know and will our supernatural end. In the course of this discussion, R. explores topics such as how providence permits defective actions, how God’s transcendent action is consistent with “the integrity of creatures who are true causes of their actions” (92), and how the eternal law is the source and measure of all other law (natural, human, and divine).

R. then takes up two aspects of Aquinas’s notion of human participation in the eternal law, namely, the human subject understood as a moved and governed agent (chap. 3) and as cognitively active (chap. 4). Concerning the interrelationship of these aspects, R. explains, “participation as governed is the cause of cognitive participation. . . . God governs all creatures to act in accord with their form” (113), moving and governing us both through natural and supernatural virtues that perfect the natural inclinations, as well as through the gifts of the Holy Spirit. For its part, cognitive participation has to do with the character of our speculative and practical knowing, perfected by faith, by the infused virtue of prudence, and by the gifts of understanding, science, counsel, and wisdom. When we perfect the natural inclinations through the natural and supernatural virtues and the gifts of the Holy Spirit, we participate in the eternal law more deeply. The final chapter addresses contemporary concerns about autonomy, the roots of human law, and how to discern God’s will in one’s daily life.

This superb book highlights the coherence of Aquinas’s theology of divine and human action in the context of God’s ordering of all things. I note particularly how Pauline Aquinas’s perspective is, not only as regards its theocentric character (including the missions of the Son and Spirit) but also as regards its view that God’s permission of the permanent corruption of the wicked does not frustrate God’s plan. Without presuming to solve this riddle, R. attains to the very heart of Aquinas’s moral theology.

University of Dayton, Ohio

Matthew Levering


Moved by working with street children in Trinidad, Regan seeks an ethics that protects the rudiments of decent human living but also extends toward human fulfillment; that is universal yet incorporates the particularity of history and cultures; that is religious but also includes the secular; that focuses on rights and still listens to other approaches to life; that is social, interpersonal, and individual; that sounds the alarm in response to evil but also illuminates inspiring ideals; that covers not only political but also socioeconomic issues; and that is not only theoretical but also deeply involved with the practical. The agenda is wonderful, the follow-through is much less comprehensive, and the path taken is interestingly circuitous.
R. begins by rehearsing the fragile negotiations that resulted in the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights, explaining how the real, recently experienced suffering of World War II had enabled consensus among otherwise disparate parties. She then traces official Catholic teachings from the rights and duties stressed by John XXIII through the optimistic humanism of Vatican II to the antirelativism of Benedict XVI. She observes how John Paul II’s writings thickened the Church’s social teaching on human rights but also increasingly opposed the secular world, even to the point of ignoring what is good in that culture and selectively emphasizing the Church’s contributions to human life.

R. next turns (curiously) to theologians outside the human rights tradition. (In these treatments, she presupposes certain familiarity with the authors she surveys.) Moltmann, she suggests, typifies those theologians who contrast or deemphasize human rights in favor of God’s right. R. herself holds that, fundamentally, human rights are grounded in the doctrine of the *imago Dei*. Yet she turns to Karl Rahner, who does not appeal to this image in his understanding of the dignity of being human, and who does not use the language of human rights. Nevertheless, R. reviews his theology for its shift toward anthropology, insisting that his exploration of freedom and transcendental experience offers a new foundation for human dignity. She criticizes Rahner for individualism and a farsightedness that overlooks how present sufferings prevent, say, abused children from experiencing the generosity of existence. Rahner remains important, however, because he formed a generation of theologians who took from him the turn to the subject and, thus, a religious turn to the one who has dignity and bears rights. In the process R. corrects Rahner’s somewhat ahistorical and asocial approach.

R. then evaluates the ethics of memory in the Guatemalan Catholic truth and justice commission and in Metz’s political theology. Rights are not prominent in either, but R. holds that rights language can help testify to horrors where human rights have been violated. Metz’s memory of Auschwitz eventually disrupted his theology and set him on a new path. Memory, though often inadequate and sometimes harmful, can build solidarity, make people attentive to suffering elsewhere, and evoke prophetic action.

R. admits that liberation theology, which she considers the most significant theological movement of the last century, also resisted using rights language, thinking that such discourse promotes an individualistic liberal anthropology. Still, when Ellacuría and others insisted that theology account for the burden of reality, they were led to claim that the poor deserve a preference of both viewpoint and practice. As liberationists eventually employed a discourse of rights to argue for systemic institutional reform, their concern remained less with the theory and more with the historical plight of the poor and their mystagogy that points to action for the poor as the locus for hearing God.

R. rounds out her review with three postliberal authors who strongly reject the use of rights language. Millbank, Hauerwas, and Bell, she writes, have a disdain for the secular, understood as the realm of rights. Second, they prefer
theological politics that centers on the life of the church rather than on political theology that brings theological reflection to the polis. Third, they impatiently reject the provisional compromises of capitalistic, militaristic statecraft in favor of the purity of the gospel lived within the church. R. argues that these Augustinian postliberals exaggerate the goodness of the ecclesial realm and ignore the ethical possibilities in the earthly city.

R.’s metaphor of boundary allows her to explore some of the edges of mainstream human rights debates. She mainly discusses those who do not use its language but are kindred spirits, and those who disagree with it. She brings into critical conversation several people who do not fit the usual human rights discourse, to point out their weaknesses and to stretch the range of concerns usually associated with individual human rights. The metaphor of boundary also enables her to let the lives of people at the margins of society critique those debates.

Boston College School of Theology and Ministry  EDWARD C. VACEK, S.J.


Compasion, O’Connell observes, is a central theme in the Bible, but also a “veritable chameleon” (35) shaped by social, political, and cultural forces that evolve over time. As such, compassion invites critical evaluation. O. argues in this regard that while in North America this biblical disposition (“being a Good Samaritan”) is widely avowed, it is constrained by “particularly American values and beliefs”: individualism, autonomy, self-sufficiency, consumerism, and the prevalence of “bourgeois Christianity” (21–28). Under the pressure of these values and beliefs, compassion tends to manifest itself in isolated increments of charitable giving (making us “compassionate by proxy”). Such “compassion” is often about making the giver feel good and rarely leads to critical evaluation of the underlying structural causes of suffering and of the ways that the prosperous are often complicit, consciously or unconsciously, in those causes. Given the ambiguous reality of globalization and the need to promote the flourishing of all rather than allow the exacerbation of our already scandalous social divisions and economic inequalities, we need, O. argues, a reconfigured and more precisely articulated view of compassion.

To this end, and after a selective overview of philosophical and theological resources, O. deploys certain elements from philosopher Martha Nussbaum and theologian Johann Baptist Metz, to press the case for what she calls “political compassion.” Political compassion involves not just the immediate succor of the one suffering but also a transformation of the prosperous person who is observing and responding to the situation (usually from a safe distance afforded by various kinds of privilege, particularly white privilege), as well as a transformation of the broader situation in which many suffer unjustly while a few can observe from that safe distance (169–70). It is not just the man who fell victim to robbers whose situation
needs transforming, but that of the Samaritan himself and, indeed, that of the road going down from Jerusalem to Jericho. A compassion adequate to these tasks must include or catalyze—it was not completely clear to me which verb is more appropriate—a willingness and capacity to observe ourselves self-critically; a humility that seeks out and affirms the perspectives of those who suffer and their perception of causes and possible solutions; and, finally, an active and unreserved commitment to transform the situation (194).

O. draws on Nussbaum’s account of the emotions as being integral elements of moral reasoning, her capabilities approach to the quest for justice, her argument for the centrality of tragic questions for moral reasoning, and her proposal of a “thick vague conception of the good,” specified contextually by seeking “overlapping consensus” with diverse constituencies, particularly those most unlike oneself. From Metz O. takes an understanding of compassion as a mysticism that transforms one’s view of oneself, of God, and of the world; she also appeals to his various strategies for deprivatizing Christian faith and theology, including his emphasis on anthropological categories of memory, narrative, and solidarity. This appropriation makes for a rich and provocative menu, and the book is perhaps at its most powerful in its discussion of the difference that political compassion could make in the case of Hurricane Katrina’s landfall on the Gulf Coast in August 2005, along with the painful and scandalously prolonged aftermath, particularly in New Orleans.

O.’s central argument is compelling. I found myself wondering, however, about the relationship of O.’s two primary sources. To be sure, the book is not (and need not be) a detailed comparison of Metz and Nussbaum. However, when attempting to think through the philosophical and theological anthropologies presumed by O.’s reconstructed account of compassion, I asked myself how Nussbaum’s neo-Aristotelian liberalism fits with Metz’s decidedly non-Aristotelian anthropology, with the latter’s categories of memory, narrative, and solidarity. When and under what conditions does one “trump” the other? At times O.’s description of political compassion seemed to resonate more with Metz’s theological anthropology and at other times with Nussbaum’s philosophical anthropology, which was a bit unsettling. I also wondered how O.’s proposed integration could navigate Nussbaum’s suspicion of religious frameworks (discussed on 30–32) and Metz’s equally pointed and growing suspicion of the utility of the Greek intellectual tradition (not discussed) that is the mirror image of his advocacy of “anamnestic reason.” These suspicions modulate their anthropologies in very different ways. I suspect that more extensive attention not just to the resources offered by these two thinkers, but to the dynamisms and tensions between them, could further thicken O.’s account. In the end, though, I suggest these not as fatal flaws but as agenda items for sharpening the focus in this admirable contribution to moral theology in general and to a North American political theology in particular.

University of Notre Dame

J. Matthew Ashley
Continuing the work of innovators (Jana Bennett and David McCarthy) and renowned scholars (Lisa Sowle Cahill and John Kavanaugh), Hanlon Rubio has taken the next step in the development of Catholic marriage ethics. She begins by embracing the recent shift in the theology of marriage away from a focus on individual morality and toward perspectives that see marriage primarily in terms of its social nature and implications. She then smoothly moves to refocus family ethics on the ordinary and to offer resources and examples of five practices for ordinary Christian families.

In part 1, H.R. argues that the modern theological emphasis on the social importance of marriage requires a turn to practice if we are to develop the kind of marriages that can participate in God’s reign. Models of saints and heroes inspire greatness but also risk justifying an “exceptionalism.” H.R. therefore refreshingly turns to literature (Flannery O’Connor) to explore the virtues and vices of the “ordinary” family. Significantly she gives special attention to two neglected portions of Catholic social teaching (CST): the American episcopal documents from the early-20th century and John Paul II’s *Ecclesia in America*. Her analysis of CST is challenging; she faults modern CST for its overemphasis on policy (50–51). Lamentably, however, she does not appeal to Benedict XVI’s encyclicals, especially *Caritas in veritate*, which, with its attention to the “economy of communion,” would have been particularly helpful to her argument.

Part 2 explores and critiques the current state of five practices of Christian marriage (sex, eating, tithing, serving, and prayer), offers biblical and traditional resources for these practices, and suggests concrete actions for typical Christian families. H.R.’s treatment of sex identifies four necessary goods of faithful sexual practice: vulnerability, self-sacrifice, self-love, and bodily belonging with one’s spouse (99). Procreation does appear occasionally, but curiously she does not include “the child” or “procreation” among the basic goods of married sex (which is arguably permissible regardless of one’s position on contraception). The chapter on eating studies Jesus’ open table fellowship and modern, environmentally-friendly eating. It suggests that the Christian home should prioritize Jesus’ inclusiveness over the early church’s liturgical exclusivity (154–55). Interestingly H.R. concludes that Jesus’ table fellowship was more concerned with changing ideas of purity and social structures than it was with conversion and sanctification (136–37). Here Yoder’s *The Politics of Jesus* might provide more balance. Likewise, H.R.’s attention to the environmental impact of food is laudable, but more information on the human injustices involved with American eating habits would have completed the picture.

Finally, H.R.’s chapter on prayer identifies the key problem for married Christians—disparity of faith. H.R. collapses much of the distinction
between mixed marriages and same-church marriages by noting the wide range of belief and commitment among spouses, even in Catholic couples. Practices of prayer are lacking because contemporary spiritual manuals unwittingly assume a unity of faith and ecclesial commitment between spouses. H.R. presents prayerful practices of silence, gratitude, immersion in spiritual texts and art, reflection on doubts or questions, and petitions as means to honor the common spiritual journey of the entire, ecumenical, domestic church (230). This section emphasizes the primary (though shared) role of the family in the sanctification of the child (seen in the Didache, John Chrysostom, John Paul II’s Familiaris consortio, etc.). The sermons of Alphonsus Liguori and Francis de Sales’s Introduction to the Devout Life would bolster and add to these insights. I would argue here that prayer would be better treated as first among marriage practices since the family’s spiritual ends should take priority in developing practices of Christian family life. I applaud H.R. for her effort to point out that minimal parish involvement and nonexistent prayer life both find root in a couple’s disparity of faith and lack of commitment to Christian discipleship in general. As H.R. puts it, integrating Christian practices into family life is possible only “if parishes can sustain a culture in which Christian discipleship is imbued and absorbed” (208).

Family Ethics belongs on undergraduate, graduate, and scholarly bookshelves. For undergraduates, H.R. offers analyses of often neglected sources (e.g., associations of lay faithful), as well as a relevant, practical approach. For the graduate student, the suggestions above should indicate that the book can stir discussion about how a family ethics should be organized (e.g., could H.R. have used John Paul II’s four tasks of the family outlined in Familiaris consortio as the ordering principle for the book?) and what the moral purpose of family spirituality is (e.g., what are the implications of H.R.’s seeing mixed marriage as an ecumenical model?). Readers are likely to find this monograph exciting for the numerous avenues it opens toward the development of better practices of Christian family life.

Marquette University, Milwaukee

KENT LASNOSKI

RELIGIOUS VOICES IN PUBLIC PLACES. Edited by Nigel Biggar and Linda Hogan. New York: Oxford University, 2009. Pp. xi + 334. $120.

What place should religious perspectives be granted in the public discourse of liberal democracies? More specifically, should religious voices be heard only in what Rawls calls the background culture of civil society and in private, with discourse in the public institutions of the legislature, the executive of government, and the courts being stripped of all religious reference? In recent years, surprisingly, influential liberal theorists, including Jürgen Habermas, have changed their minds somewhat about this question. The question has also gained new prominence at research centers such as the Social Science Research Council, New York, and the Institute for Human Sciences, Vienna. Religious Voices in Public Places valuably
contributes to this discussion by helping to clarify what is really at stake if religious voices are given or denied a place in public discourse, and the type of discourse envisaged if religious perspectives are voiced in public institutions. Twelve essays address the question from four angles: the philosophical, the theological, public policy, and contextual (i.e., studies of religious public voices in several nations). Hogan introduces the volume, identifying its primary themes.

A fundamental issue underlying the question of religious voices in public discourse is the nature of liberal regimes, and particularly the way that secularity and pluralism are conceived within them. The philosophical essays discuss this issue mainly through an examination of the thought of Rawls and Habermas. The views of those two thinkers undergo further scrutiny in the theological essays, as do the works of Jeffrey Stout and Alasdair MacIntyre. But the finest exploration of this issue is offered in Nigel Biggar’s public policy essay “Not Translation, but Conversation: Theology in Public Debate about Euthanasia.” B. argues that, despite Habermas’s broadened sympathy for the religious perspective, he has still not freed himself from a modernist prejudice against religion. Habermas now holds that both believers and secularists have much to learn from each other, but for public discourse in the legislature and elsewhere, religious perspectives must be translated into “secular language.” B. recognizes that religious perspectives must be accessible if they are to be voiced in public discourse and should never be expressed in an authoritarian fashion, but, he argues, that does not mean that religious presuppositions cannot be expressed. He asserts, “If we are to have a public dialogue where citizens have the possibility of learning something new and important, then they must be accorded the opportunity to encounter significant ideas with which they are not familiar and with which they do not immediately agree” (171).

B. favors the “wide view” of the “very late Rawls” (although his reading of Rawls here differs from that of most other contributors to this volume), which, B. believes, requires theology to speak in relevant terms but does not compel it to abandon its own language in public discourse (183). B. would extend Rawls’s view in the direction of Stout’s understanding of conversation. In B.’s lucid conclusion to the collection, he reprises the theme of conversation, arguing that public discourse should “model itself on the kind of conversation that proves fruitful in daily practice” (314). Such conversation could invite religious leaders and theologians to account for the source of their hope: “So in public discussion a Christian theologian might well present his case in terms of human and public goods that are widely recognized. So far, so familiar. But if he is going to say anything interesting, then at certain points he will take pains to show that theological belief makes a difference that is helpful and attractive” (318). B. suggests that theologians could advance this “conversation” approach to public discourse by reflecting on the virtues that enable conversation (314–15). While that is surely true, I believe that an even more fertile source of insight resides in Hans-Georg Gadamer’s
and Charles Taylor’s hermeneutical explorations of what conversation entails.

These essays started life as papers for a colloquium at the University of Leeds in June 2003 and have been reworked, encompassing recent writings including Habermas’s *Between Naturalism and Religion* (2008). As with all collections, the authors address their common concern from a variety of perspectives, making different assumptions, with the result that each essay requires close reading. This excellent volume deserves attention from graduate students, theologians, and social ethicists. Besides B.’s essay and conclusion, I valued especially the chapters by Nicholas Wolterstorff, Raymond Plant, and Robert Gascoigne. The other chapters were not far behind.

*Flinders University, South Australia*  
**James Gerard McEvoy**


Gregory clearly delineates the complexity of Augustinian political theology and proposes ways in which that theology might be constructively related to political liberalism. He challenges both antiliberal Augustinians (e.g., Alisdair MacIntyre, Stanley Hauerwas, and John Milbank) and anti-Augustinian liberals (Hannah Arendt, Paul Ramsey, and Timothy Jackson), critiquing both groups for unnecessarily dichotomizing Augustine’s theology and liberal political thought. As a constructive alternative, G. offers a careful, sophisticated Augustinian reading of liberalism, understood as endorsing limited power, legal separation of the church from state, and alertness to the temptations of power that beset collective political institutions.

G. begins with an even-handed and clear typology of Augustinian realism (exemplified by Reinhold Niebuhr and his heirs), Augustinian proceduralism (Rawlsians), and Augustinian civic liberalism (Martin Luther King Jr. and his followers). Each school accents the importance of a characteristic virtue: the first focuses on hope, the second on justice, and the third on love. G.’s constructive agenda develops the third position, an updated and culturally engaged Augustinian civic liberalism. In six chapters he addresses, respectively, Augustinian civic virtue, the development of Augustinian liberalism, correspondences and differences between Augustinian love and the feminist ethics of care, insights and shortcomings in Hannah Arendt’s assessment of Augustine, love as a virtue that acknowledges the moral and political potential of compassion, and love as a virtue that incorporates the moral and political potential of civic friendship.

G. seeks to show that Augustine’s attentiveness to the interplay between love and sin offers intellectually compelling considerations upon which one can rethink distinct virtues and responsibilities of citizens and
the justice of institutions within liberal democracies. G. moves beyond both the pessimism of Augustinian realists, who focus on the restraint of evil, and the minimalism of Augustinian proceduralists, whose privatization of morality excludes compassion and friendship from politics. Politics is more than an institutional means of restraining sin, G. argues, and Augustine’s theology is stunted if reduced to a world-hating pilgrimage to heaven. Augustinian civic virtue encourages us, on the contrary, to regard politics as a means (among others) to promote a more compassionate, just, and egalitarian society. The doctrine of creation encourages us to recognize the goodness of the world; the doctrine of redemption, to work as best we can for its healing. The state is an important locus of political activity, but its end is terrestrial peace rather than the salvation of the human race.

Augustine’s account of charity, the graced virtue of love of God and neighbor, is the basis of a broad social vision within which G. believes liberalism might be properly interpreted. He helpfully corrects distorted readings of Augustinian charity as merely “using” the neighbor as a way to love God and thereby to attain one’s heavenly reward. Augustinian love of God and neighbor seeks the flourishing of human beings—the temporal good of society—as a worthy, if not ultimate, goal of human moral aspiration. This temporal good encompasses both particular local communities and the cosmopolitan good of humanity as such. Pursued through the formation of “political friendships,” the temporal good can provide collective leverage that can be used to counterbalance or correct the misuse of power by entrenched socioeconomic and political elites. G.’s “perfectionist” position promotes human flourishing through the encouragement of both personal virtue and institutional progress. His moral vision is meliorist, incremental, and balanced.

This superb monograph carries a number of distinctive strengths: it provides a comprehensive yet incisive analysis of a vast amount of literature; it deals with rival positions fairly and honestly; and it makes judgments with suitable qualifications and modesty. Augustinian scholars will appreciate the author’s consistent effort to distinguish what Augustine himself wrote from what contemporary Augustinians attempt to draw out of his work in light of later theoretical and practical challenges to our notions of citizenship, governance, law, and the like. The work is bold in challenging Augustinian realism, the dominant strand of Augustinian liberalism of the past 50 years or so, and in attempting to read Augustine as an ally rather than as an enemy of certain core affirmations of feminism, particularly regarding the ethics of care. G.’s careful attention to the range of potential criticisms of his position itself affirms the value of liberal democracy while also recognizing its moral ambivalence. He makes a strong case that Augustine can help us take a realistic reading of the moral possibilities as well as of the moral dangers of liberalism.

Boston College

STEPHEN J. POPE

As a theologian and psychotherapist, Calvin Mercer offers valuable insight into Christian fundamentalist religious thinking, highlighting the underlying psychological dimensions of the phenomenon. His purpose is to help nonfundamentalists understand the fundamentalist worldview in order to promote dialogue and, it appears, what can be considered recovery.

In section 1, M. traces the history of Christian fundamentalism from its origins in a 19th-century reaction to modernity in general and to theological liberalism in particular. The publication of 12 booklets from 1910 to 1915 titled The Fundamentals was in effect both the distillation of this reaction and the setting of the fundamentalist Christian agenda for the next century. Crucial to these and subsequent texts was a rejection of Darwinian evolution in favor of a literal reading of the creation myth set out in Genesis. This theological response soon became part of a mainly U.S.-based political agenda that surfaced in the 1920s Scopes “Monkey Trial” and in attempts to reconfigure U.S. history along a distinctly Christian line. In recent decades, fundamentalists have moved rapidly into political parties (notably the Republican party) and onto civil society organs like school boards with a view to legislating and legitimating their worldview. Their battle with modernity continues.

The underlying psychological reasons for fundamentalist Christian forms of belief, M. argues in section 2, is rooted in an anxiety/panic/depression mindset and in a fear that, if any part of their worldview is demonstrated to be untrue, then everything about it will collapse. Fearing that if they hold wrong beliefs, they will go to hell or will not be “taken up,” fundamentalists ferociously deny ambiguity and defend “truth” even in the face of conflicting evidence—and thus submit themselves to what has been called a “sacrifice of intellect.” This puts them inevitably on a collision course with modern and postmodern culture.

How then does a nonfundamentalist talk to a fundamentalist? It is not easy, M. argues from experience, but it can be done. Direct confrontation is not helpful. Openness to them, a willingness to understand where they are coming from, in particular the anxieties that the belief system expresses, is the key first step. Then one must find ways to neutralize the anxiety, which may involve helping the fundamentalist see that even within their tradition not everything in the Bible is taken literally, that texts are almost inevitably interpreted even by fundamentalist scholars and pastors. Another sometimes helpful approach is to ask fundamentalists to consider what their beliefs were when they were converted and what they are now; change in belief has almost always occurred and can be used to help fundamentalists see the complexity of belief itself.

M. has written a helpful, nontechnical guide that can be of use to pastors and professors in theology (particularly but not exclusively in Scripture)
who are confronted with fundamentalist Christians. The best part of the book deals with psychological and pastoral-care aspects of the issue. Here M. manages to translate complex psychological theory into lay terms and to show how to apply it in a teaching context. From a practical point of view, this is the core of the book.

The book dwells too heavily on the history and doctrine of fundamentalist Christianity. Especially those who are already fairly familiar with fundamentalist religious movements may find that the first 120 pages are the least useful, that they limit the more helpful sections, and that the remaining 100 pages could have benefited from deeper and more detailed discussion of psychological issues. Despite this, M. has done theologians and pastors a great service in focusing in on the pastoral dimensions of modern fundamentalism.

The Jesuit Institute – South Africa, Johannesburg  
ANTHONY EGAN, S.J.


The contributors to this collection were first brought together at the Yale Institute of Sacred Music in 2008. Their leading questions were: how is the Holy Spirit unveiled during ritual prayer, and how does ritual prayer give insight into the nature and activity of the Spirit? The conference brought together an extraordinary group from across the Judaeo-Christian traditions, contributing essays on God’s presence in Jewish worship; on the rediscovery of the Spirit in the Christian West; on the understanding of the Spirit in Byzantine, Syrian, and Ethiopian expressions of faith; and on what are called newer ecclesial movements, the African, the Pentecostal, and the charismatic. The resulting essays are together grounded in or in reference to the initial biblical essay on the Spirit, and each presents a rich feel for who this Spirit is and how this Spirit acts.

For those in the Western traditions who are struggling to understand the role of the Spirit in eucharistic praying or Christian initiation, this collection offers refreshing insight and guidance. For those in the Eastern traditions, where the role of the Spirit has frequently become overly orchestrated, this collection reminds us that the Spirit blows where she wills. And for those in the Jewish traditions and those in the newer Spirit-filled communities, the contributors relate how diverse is the entrance of God into history, and how that diversity presents in each tradition the many faces of God.

The collection consciously builds on past developments in liturgical theology. As the introduction notes, a common starting point is Vatican II’s Constitution on the Sacred Liturgy, Sacrosanctum concilium (1963), which states that “the promotion and restoration of the liturgy is a movement of the Holy Spirit in the Church” (SC 43). Although this is a Catholic decree, in fact it has been reverenced and adopted throughout the Judeo-Christian
liturgical world. There followed in 1969 a conference titled “The Holy Spirit in the Liturgy,” at the Orthodox Institute of Saint Serge, which focused on key public rites and liturgical texts, giving little notice to newer ecclesial movements. The Yale conference has gone a few steps further, by including traditions previously unaccounted for, styles of prayer previously unnoticed, media realities that did not then exist, and by including both women and men within the discussion.

The book falls into three sections: “Foundations” explores from a variety of traditions the theology of the Spirit; “Historical Trajectories” studies several non-Western traditions where the Spirit acted; and “Newer Ecclesial Movements” brings in contemporary Spirit-led churches. Each essay is excellent. I here highlight several that intrigued me.

In the section on foundations, N. T. Wright’s “Worship and the Spirit in the New Testament” offers a rich sense of the Spirit particularly in Paul and Luke. In addition, Ruth Langer’s essay on the presence of God in Jewish liturgy illustrates how even a nontrinitarian understanding of God can have access to the language of the Spirit in worship. In the section on history, of particular note is the essay from the Syrian tradition on the “Wombs of the Spirit,” especially in the baptismal tradition. Having worked for 25 years as a priest in the Maronite (West Syrian) tradition as well as in the Latin tradition, I was both delighted and enriched by this essay. And, in the section on newer ecclesiastical movements, I found most intriguing the essay on Pentecostalism, on the Holy Spirit invading the hearts of believers and making worship possible in fixed ritual form or at free-flowing charismatic moments.

The Yale conference and this collection have skillfully entered into and advanced our explorations of the diverse ways the Spirit enters into worship. In spite of the diversity of traditions and imagery, the essays nicely unfold a coherent story of the Spirit’s presence and action. They challenge us to continue to discern the Spirit’s liturgical presence \textit{in actu} and to give account of evidence for her presence. A second challenge is more methodological, but with theological hooks: can the various ways of reasoning about worship remain in conversation with one other? The 2008 conference has demonstrated that much can be learned together. A way into that future for students, teachers, pastors, preachers, and anyone else who wishes to understand the Spirit and her role in worship would be to appropriate the insights presented in this collection.

\textit{St. Francis Xavier Church, New York City} \hspace{1cm} \textbf{PETER E. FINK, S.J.}


This collection makes readily accessible the dominant ideas and vision of Josef Pieper (1904–1997), a prominent German Catholic philosopher
who drew heavily on the thought of Thomas Aquinas. Accentuating Pieper’s view that contemplation and celebration are primary in human life, contributors discuss Pieper’s many writings, including *The Four Cardinal Virtues* (1937), *Leisure—The Basis of Culture* (1948), and *Hope and History* (1967).

Bernard Schumacher (University of Fribourg) opens the book with an overview of the unfolding of Pieper’s thought about human existence, and he subsequently analyzes Pieper’s understanding of philosophy as the pursuit of transcendent truth. Berthold Wald (University of Paderborn) locates Pieper’s thought in relation to the work of other 20th-century philosophers such as Theodor Adorno, Max Horkheimer, Jacques Derrida, Hans-Georg Gadamer, Jürgen Habermas, and Martin Heidegger. Frank Töpfer (University of Tübingen) explicates Pieper’s analysis of forms of totalitarianism, including today’s utilitarianism. Hermann Braun (University of Wuppertal) reviews Pieper’s early scholarship in social theory (e.g., that of Johann Plenge) and his brief, naïve effort in 1933 to influence Adolf Hitler’s National Socialism in light of Pope Pius XI’s *Quadragesimo anno* (1931). Thomas Hibbs (Baylor University) expounds Pieper’s writings on the virtues, highlighting their Thomist origins and comparing them to Alasdair MacIntyre’s *After Virtue* (1981). Turning to Pieper’s reflections on history, Joseph Godfrey (Saint Joseph’s University) develops Pieper’s insight, drawn from Gabriel Marcel, that ultimate hope concerns not what we can have, but who we can become beyond death; this hope arises from a sense of God’s presence and action in human affairs. Kenneth Schmitz (University of Toronto) explains Pieper’s view that philosophy must remain anchored in tradition, especially in the wisdom passed down over the centuries from Athens and Jerusalem. Matthew Cuddeback (Providence College) elucidates Pieper’s philosophical anthropology in relation to Aquinas’s, highlighting Pieper’s acceptance (contrary to Kant) of the ancient axiom that “everything that is, is true.” Finally, Juan Franck (Catholic University of Argentina) recounts Pieper’s lifelong dialogue with Plato, evident in *Abuse of Language—Abuse of Power* (1970).

This systematic exposition of Pieper’s philosophy clarifies his ideas and their unity while also providing valuable information about the man and his intellectual world. It helpfully sheds light on how a major 20th-century Catholic scholar perceived and responded to the Enlightenment, modernity, and postmodern thought, at a time when we ourselves are still struggling with our own similar perceptions and responses. Along with helpful notes, the book includes a full bibliography of primary and secondary literature as well as an index of names. Translators have cast texts into clear, straightforward English.

*A Cosmopolitan Hermit* answers some primary questions and prompts others. Pieper’s early mentor was Romano Guardini; the question appears to remain open to what extent Pieper adopted Guardini’s theory of *Gegensätze*, that is, the notion that human life and thought develop in the creative, even conflictive, interacting of opposites. Also of interest to those
in the field is why Pieper stayed with the approach to Aquinas that he learned from Erich Przywara, and did not adopt the transcendental Thomism of Joseph Maréchal, as did Pieper’s contemporary Karl Rahner. Of further interest would be how Pieper regarded Vatican II and its teachings. As this monograph attests, Pieper was an insightful, widely respected philosopher within a significant trajectory of 20th-century Catholicism; there remains much to learn from his life and thought. This collection helps fill in some gaps and points us toward others.

*University of Notre Dame*  
Robert A. Krieg