BOOK REVIEWS


Gorman offers a fresh thematic reading of key passages of Paul’s major letters. Although the title may seem at first unintelligible, it becomes the perfect mnemonic for the contents of the book. For G., each word in the title and subtitle becomes a shorthand reference to major themes in his synthesis of Paul’s thought. They are best explained in reverse order.

By “Paul’s narrative soteriology” G. means the plot of the hymn in Philippians 2:5–11 understood in light of its preface (2:1–4) and its immediate application (2:12–18). Whether the hymn is something Paul inherited (the majority opinion these days) or his own work, G. argues that the vision of the hymn provides a major key to Paul’s theology and spirituality. The “kenosis,” of course, is the self-emptying of 2:7, which he understands as the self-emptying in incarnation of the preexistent Son, who “did not consider his equality with God as something to be exploited for his own advantage” (2:6). The narrative of the kenosis hymn expresses Paul’s primary soteriology in that the poem provides the foundational model of how God the Father saves by revealing the divine nature in the self-emptying and self-humiliation of Jesus in the incarnation and in his obedient life, death, and resurrection.

“The cruciform God” of the title refers to the nature of God precisely as revealed in the self-giving humiliation of Jesus. The “form” is the morphē of God that Jesus refuses to exploit, but also, paradoxically, expresses in his emptying out and humbling service, even to death on the cross. In that sense God is revealed as “cruciform.” The context of the hymn in Philippians, and indeed in the rest of Paul’s work, shows that Christian disciples are saved to the extent that they “inhabit” the faithfulness of Jesus by living out the life of Jesus through the koinonia of the Christian community. This process can be called “theosis” in the sense that one becomes like God to the extent that one participates in this life and mission. The community itself becomes cruciform to the extent that it serves the world in the same Spirit known in the cruciform revelation of the Father in Jesus. Thus understood, theosis is another way of describing justification, now seen as “the restoration of right covenantal relations—fidelity to God and love for neighbor—with the certain hope of acquittal/vindication on the day of judgment” (53).

However one receives this reworking of traditional theological discourse, G. has provided a fresh and coherent rereading of Paul’s theological vision that promises to become an enduring contribution to any future conversation about Paul’s meaning.

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DENNIS HAMM, S.J.
This collection engages the discipline of biblical criticism in terms of race, ethnicity, class, gender, sexuality, nation, and colonialism. Of its 14 contributors, five are African-American, five Asian-American, and four Latino/a. In part 1, eleven biblical scholars discuss the state of minority biblical scholarship and criticism under the subheadings “Puncturing Objectivity and Universality,” “Expanding the Field,” “Problematizing Criticism,” and “Taking an Interdisciplinary Turn.” Part 2 provides critical assessments by three external interlocutors speaking from the specialties of systematic theology, religious education, and ethnic studies. The collection concludes with a summary of key findings as well as a discussion of unresolved issues.

The resulting collection of well-written and well-argued essays is significant for three reasons. First, here a group of minority scholars, from three major racial-ethnic communities in the United States, are free to carry out biblical criticism in their own terms, that is, without the presence of and intervention from dominant racial-ethnic groups. Thus the authors more easily respond to issues and concerns raised within their own ethnic communities, as they also more easily respond from within their communities to questions from the wider society. In both tasks, they challenge and offer alternatives to the Eurocentric cast of much contemporary biblical criticism. Each contributor, however, is not left simply within his or her own separate ethnic community; the project’s structure encourages collaboration across racial-ethnic lines, and thus also addresses a recurrent criticism that “groups of color rarely write across to each other; they write for themselves or white people” (14).

Second, participants’ specialties and the interdisciplinary framework of their discussion allow for assessments of minority criticism from “discursive perspectives outside biblical criticism” (366), yielding results that are not only interracial and interdisciplinary, but also sophisticated, creative, and critical. They contribute valuable insights into the practices of biblical criticism, theology, religious education, and ethnic studies, resulting in reading biblical texts against the backdrop of migration, racialization and ethnicization, boundary constructions, dominant versus minority identities, exile and diaspora, as well as assimilation and resistance.

Third, the essays offer new perspectives and creative ways for understanding and engaging specific biblical texts. For example, Cheryl Anderson juxtaposes Ezra’s ban on Jewish men marrying foreign women and his expulsion of all foreign women and their children with African-American experiences with racial segregation and antimiscegenation laws in the United States; she thereby challenges a dominant Eurocentric interpretation of this passage that casts it as a positive example of ethnic-religious identity construction, and offers as a coherent alternative an African-American hermeneutic that reveals the passage’s dehumanizing and marginalizing
Jean-Pierre Ruiz points out the futility of defending linguistic, identity, and communal boundaries, concluding that “linguistic mestizaje/multizet” is inevitable and should be welcomed (93). Similarly, Ruiz juxtaposes Nehemiah’s sharp displeasure with non-Hebrew-speaking Jews who marry foreigners with Samuel Huntington’s vehement displeasure with Latinos/as who fail to learn English or assimilate into the white Anglo-Saxon ethos. Gale Yee eschews Eurocentric readings of Ruth as “an enchanting bucolic story about female empowerment and romantic heterosexual love” (127); she compares the plight of Ruth as a foreign woman who was exploited to benefit Boaz and Naomi with Asian-American women who are stigmatized, discriminated against, and exploited in the United States (e.g., as mail-order brides). She concludes that Ruth’s suffering is “an indictment of those of us who live in the First World who exploit the cheap labor of developing countries and poor immigrants” (134).

Perspectives on or by Native Americans are absent from this collection. Segovia explained that the omission was not accidental but deliberate because “the severe lack of Native American critics and the goal of equal representation among the participant groups made such presence highly problematic” (367). Nevertheless, S. acknowledged that their absence leaves the project “glaringly wanting in terms of symbolic representation within the U.S.” (ibid). I agree and hope that the next volume will address this lacuna, responding to the frustration of readers who are troubled by the absence of Native American voices.

Gale Yee


Few revised doctoral dissertations, even those from Notre Dame in patristics, under Brian Daley’s direction, emerge as classics. This volume has. It belongs with the best books on Gregory written in the past 25 years. Actually, no full book on Gregory’s theology has appeared since the 1940s; and none of the earlier ones is as detailed and compelling as Beeley’s. The quality of his work is grounded in his penetrating translations and his broad learning in early Christian history and theology.

B.’s preface plainly states the centrality of the Trinity for Gregory, and the principal thesis of this book. “The doctrine of the Trinity . . . represents the fundamental origin and goal of the Christian life”; it is neither “a quasi-mathematical problem” nor “the abstract logic of the Christian God. . . . Gregory’s doctrine of the Trinity is at every point about salvation” (viii). “Gregory’s doctrine does not recognize the sort of division between knowledge and experience, theory and practice, or theology and spirituality to which many moderns are so accustomed” (x). That is why Gregory was known as “the Theologian”; much contemporary theology withers in
comparison. B. has captured the dynamics of Gregory’s theology so thoroughly that this book could easily serve as a first, somewhat demanding introduction to a course on the nature of theology. It should always be among the last consulted in the education of any theologian, whatever his or her specialties and career plans.

The presentation is well thought-out. The introduction offers a biographical and intellectual sketch of Gregory. Chapter 1 treats “God and the Theologian” with emphasis on the “purification” and “illumination” involved in Gregory’s understanding of the very task of theological reflection. Chapter 2 concerns Gregory’s understanding of Jesus Christ, tracing both his high Christology and concluding with a section on christological spirituality. Chapter 3 concentrates on the Holy Spirit, treating Gregory’s high Pneumatology and ending with a section aimed at lived spirituality, “Spiritual Exegesis and the Rhetoric of Piety.” Chapter 4, on the Trinity itself, spells out topics such as the divine economy, the monarchy of God the Father, and conceptions of the Trinity, and closes with spirituality concerns, “Participation in the Trinity.” After a first chapter on theology conceived as a living with God and the final “spirituality” sections of the subsequent directly trinitarian chapters, we come to an often missing but absolutely necessary final chapter dealing with “Pastoral Ministry.” Too many works on Gregory paint him as a confused and whining thinker who wished to avoid being a pastor. Such a reading will not be possible after B.’s final chapter: it includes a grand excursus on “The Love of the Poor” in the middle of four other pastoral sections. Finally, B.’s conclusion puts Gregory in his context from Origen in the East to Damasus in the West, and insists on Gregory’s formative influence upon all orthodox theology. A number of scholars helped B. along his way, but this is his own wisdom. The book is strong and at most points entirely persuasive.

Several of B.’s judgments will be questioned. Are Gregory’s theological letters primarily focused on Diodore and only “merely” concerned with Apollinaris? In 1899, Arthur James Mason pointed out twelve passages in the *Theological Orations* that to him resembled Nestorius. And, does B.’s brilliant solution deal well with all the NT verses Gregory mentions that speak of Jesus Christ’s words and actions? Also, several interesting paths along the lines of this tome could be pursued—for example, the question of Gregory’s influence on Maximus the Confessor (d. 662). Maximus praised Cyril’s solution and wrote thoughtful praise and commentary on some of Gregory’s texts, sensing that some ambiguities needed explanation. Another example: Timothy I of Baghdad, *catholico*, “arch bishop” 780–823 of the East Syrian (Nestorian) Church that stretched from Cyprus to Beijing, unexpectedly quoted Gregory more favorably in his limited extant letters than he praised Nestorius. Sebastian Brock claims that East Syrian theologians should not be seen as Nestorians. Are they more like Gregory and thus in some ways akin to Cyril, or do they see Gregory as safely related to a tamed Nestorius?
These are not quibbles; they require articles and books on passages not meant to be dealt with in this volume, which is sound and pushes our research to another level.

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Mason is concerned with the relationship between historiographical and literary methodologies, encapsulated in his insistence that we must read Josephus through and not read through Josephus for historical information. In making his case, he helps reorient the study of Josephus by arguing for the importance of understanding Josephus’s agenda. The essays are arranged in three parts dealing with Josephus as an author, his portrait of “Judeans,” and Christian origins.

In part 1, M. rejects the early Christian acceptance of Josephus as an authority simply on the basis of his person; he also rejects the Enlightenment’s acceptance of Josephus’s authority on the basis of reason. The problem with considering Josephus as an authority especially for the reconstruction of Judean history is that—unlike the claim of Tacitus (Ann. 1.1)—Josephus wrote cum ira et studio. Josephus cannot therefore be trusted as the sole source of information. M. works out the extent and limits of reasonable reliance on Josephus in the next three chapters. He first notes that Josephus wrote for, and consistent with the interests of, a sophisticated Roman audience (chap. 2). M. next argues that Josephus cultivated irony or the capacity to say something without really saying it (chap. 3). M. rejects the view that contradictions of Josephus’s texts indicate different sources or suggest indirect evidence, concluding that Josephus wrote what he needed for each situation, even though this created tensions within his own writing. The upshot is that, when Josephus is the sole source, we can with confidence use him to understand late first-century Flavian Rome but not first-century Judea (chap. 4). Concerning this last restriction, I am not as skeptical as M. about using Josephus as a historical source for Judah. If we understand and take into account Josephus’s aims, we are able to use him with profit, within an acceptable range of probabilities and possibilities.

Part 2 initially focuses on a debate over the term Ioudaios. Since ancient Ioudaioi were considered an ethnos rather than a religious movement, M. argues that the term should be rendered “Judean,” not “Jew.” However, Ioudaioi were an ethnos only in unique ways. Even while they maintained strong ethnic identity, they welcomed others into their ethnos on their acceptance of a distinctive way of life. Thus I still prefer “Jew” since it captures the unusual nature of this particular ethnic group. The next two chapters address the Pharisees. The Pharisees were marginal for Josephus: they were a nonaristocratic group with popular support who occasionally
challenged the elite (chap. 6). Josephus presented them as one of three philosophical groups in Judaism and shaped his three presentations to meet the needs of his narrative (chap. 7). Concerning Josephus’s portrait of the Essenes (chap. 8), M. argues that they embodied Jewish ideals, representing a courageous form of virtue most closely aligned with a utopian Spartan model. This leads M. to question the identification of Josephus’s Essenes with the community at Qumran; he does not see how Josephus could move from the distinctive features of the covenanters to his portrait of the Essenes (277). If, however, Josephus presented the Essenes in the literary tradition in which authors routinely presented religious-philosophical groups, we should then expect him to emphasize what they have in common with the groups immediately recognized within Hellenistic and Roman paradigms.

Part 3 turns to Christian origins. The connection with parts 1 and 2 is methodological rather than substantial, although in the final chapter M. does draw on Josephus. In chapter 9, he argues that to euangelion (tentatively rendered “the announcement”) was alien to early Christians. Paul introduced it in the first generation; Mark alone used it in the second generation; and Luke continued to avoid it in the third generation. Only in the second century had it lost its distinctive Pauline edge and become commonplace. In chapter 10, M. argues that Romans was addressed to Judean Christians; Gentile Christians might have read it, but their issues were not considered. The final chapter explores the chief priests, Sadducees, Pharisees, and Sanhedrin comparatively in Luke-Acts and Josephus. M. suggests that both authors lack sympathy for the Sadducees and understood the Pharisees to occupy a middle ground in Jewish society between the elites and the people.

In its entirety, this collection makes a serious statement about the importance of understanding a narrative before using it for historical purposes. Although there is room to differ on specifics and, more important, on the historical worth of Josephus, M.’s central methodological argument is solid, framed by an independent mind that has helped redirect the study of Josephus.

University of Notre Dame


Stroumsa searches for the principal “vectors” that account for the interlocking cultural and religious mutations, that is, the revolutionary paradigm shift (to use Thomas Kuhn’s term) that intervened in the Roman Empire from the second to the fourth centuries C.E. He wants “to show how one may follow, roughly from Jesus to Mohammad, the transformation of the very concept of religion” that was at the heart of the Christianization of the Empire and marked the foundation, first, of the three medieval...
cultures (Byzantium, Islam, and the Latin West) and, eventually, of European culture (1–2, 6). S. takes on five central transformations: care of the self, religion of the Book, ritual, community, and spirituality.

S. develops a two-part thesis. On the one hand, the transformations witnessed in the Roman Empire were essentially religious, not simply cultural “transformations of societies and of the Zeitgeist,” of which religious transformations were only a part and which Christians were alone able to exploit. Christian religious ideas, beliefs, and practices were the cause, not merely the consequences; one must account for the radical changes initiated by Christian beliefs and practices (6, 8, 10–11).

On the other hand, S. reinscribes Judaism, often absent from studies of these transformations, into the religious matrix of Late Antiquity (4). From S.’s vantage point in Israel, the usual dichotomies fail to explain the new religious reconfigurations of Late Antiquity (xii). The transformations were the result neither of the binary oppositions Athens/Jerusalem (à la Tertullian), Athens/Rome, reason/faith, nor were they a transition from the modern constructs of “polytheism” to “monotheism,” “paganism” to “Christianity” (xii, 11–12, 5). Rather, they occurred during a period of multiple cultural encounters and combinations, within a geographical “triangle” whose “legs” were Jerusalem, Athens, and Rome (12). Christianity, the victorious new Jerusalem, retained the dimensions of the old. It was and remained a Near Eastern religion; it conquered the Roman Empire “with Jewish weapons” (7, 11–12).

Judaism was more than simply a source; it was one of the two survivors of the “crumbling of the ancient systems of the Greeks and Romans.” It survived because it had been forced to reinvent itself by seizing on the “implicit medium of change”—namely, the interiorization of religion—that would define the radical transformations of Late Antiquity (4, 2, 63–70). It became the “laboratory,” the prime instance and precursor of the transformations that would be effected by the Christianization of the Empire. S. presents ample evidence of the extent to which early forms of Christianity developed in tandem with early rabbinic Judaism. Both were without blood sacrifice, though neither abandoned the idea of bloody sacrifice and the attendant prospect of violence. They were both persecuted minorities. In both, prayer, fasting, charity, and reflective study of the Scriptures became primary, spiritualized religious practices replacing animal sacrifices. They were both “religions of the book”: bitter rivals, drawing from and disputing the correct interpretation of the same Jewish Scriptures. The New Testament and the Mishnah (Repetition) were “the most concrete fruits” of the claim of each to be the “true Israel”; both texts offered a hermeneutical key to their respective communities for actualizing (and ritualizing) the Scriptures and at the same time marked the parting of the two religions (47–48). Recently scholars have insisted that the NT reflects intra-Jewish polemics in the second half of the first century. Israel Jacob Juval (Two Nations in Your Womb, 2006) has argued that (postbiblical) rabbinic Judaism was, at least sometimes, influenced by Christian theology and practices. S. does not
dwell on this prospect. The strength of his overall thesis lies in his tracing Christianity’s radical transformations of the very idea and structures of religion to their roots in Judaism.

The title of S.’s brilliant work may focus attention on the eventual abolition of public sacrifices in 416 C.E. S.’s transformative “end” of sacrifices is of those in the Jerusalem temple. Otherwise, the primary agent of their effective disappearance in the Empire was the Christian transformations in the conception of religion, and these transformations, I would argue, are best captured in S.’s first chapter: his discussion of the Christian discovery and Christianization of the self. The specificity of the Christian revolution did not lie in the difference of its pantheon from those of Greece and Rome—the “pagan” Neoplatonist, Celsus, was more monotheistic than was his Christian opponent, Origen. Greco-Roman intellectual elites themselves questioned the ontological value of blood sacrifice and proposed a spiritual sacrifice, prayer, alongside them. The “most essential” differences between Christianity and the religions it supplanted are “anthropological conceptions and ethical attitudes” (xii).

Collins meticulously explores the complicated relationships between early modern German hagiographers, their patrons, and communities—relationships that shaped their narratives in a manner that respected the concerns of all interested parties. C. starts from the principle that these vitae must “be analyzed on their own terms in the context of their composition and reception rather than in anticipation of Luther or Erasmus” (14). He aims to capture how humanist scholars reworked or reformed the lives of individual saints to new historical contexts. The book is not, however, about ecclesial reform; only five pages are exclusively dedicated to exploring how humanists used these vitae to promote ecclesial reform. C. is more interested in exploring the interaction between hagiography, humanism, and society through the use of redaction criticism or, in a manner of speaking, the reform of the saints themselves.

By comparing variations from the older medieval versions of saintly vitae as well as by studying the revisions and corrections demanded by patrons and sponsors, C. highlights the negotiations and compromises the humanists made with diverse segments of society. He confirms Eugene Rice’s findings that the humanists participated in the cult of the saints and that this commitment cannot be reduced to an interest in achieving biographical or philological accuracy (122; see Rice, Saint Jerome in the Renaissance, 1985). Whereas Rice’s work looked at how Saint Jerome was treated by a variety of humanists in the 15th and 16th centuries, C. concentrates on a briefer period and limits his research to one region to draw attention to

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synchronic regional and cultural variations concerning popular devotion and hagiography.

The restricted focus of the study throws into stark relief the complexity of how the humanists interacted with their sources and patrons. Chapter 2, for example, is dedicated to comparing two editions of Sigismund Meisterlin’s vita of Saint Sebald and two editions of Albert von Bonstetten’s vita of Ida of Toggenberg. C. shows how the authors resolved contradictions in the medieval sources they were using, shifted regional and political concerns to their contemporary situation, treated miracle accounts, incorporated classical elements, and drew scriptural parallels. The results, as C. notes, show Meisterlin revising his work to be less humanist and Bonstetten reinforcing humanist elements. Although these are only two examples, C. concludes that these divergent editorial directions undermine the thesis that there was a common humanist strategy (52). This conclusion does, however, seem a bit premature. Perhaps they shared common aims, and the concerns of the patrons or the intended audiences diverted those aims.

Chapters 3 and 4 concentrate on chorography and the vita of the saintly hermit Nicholas. C. defines chorography as a form of narrative cartology that describes a region’s most important characteristics. He shows that chorographical additions and alterations were among the most common changes made by the humanists in these vitae. Inspired by the efforts of the Italian humanists to create a sense of national identity, the German humanists made chorographical changes that reinforced a sense of distinctively German identity and history. C. uses the case of the hermit Nicholas to show how the Swiss gradually reformed him from a German saint to a Swiss one by comparing vitae composed by humanists from 1488 and 1501. In the end, C. concludes that the humanists “could and did instrumentalize the cult of the saints diversely and to cross-purposes” (122).

For those looking for a book on the history of reform within the Catholic Church, this volume will be a bit of a disappointment; but for those interested in the history of humanism, hagiography, or popular devotions, it will be a welcome addition to their library. This is perhaps the most focused and detailed study of late medieval or early renaissance hagiography available in English. There is one drawback to looking at such a restricted set of saintly lives: the conclusions of the book point more to the flaws and generalizations of previous studies that viewed humanists as disdaining hagiography or as forerunners of Luther than to a new understanding of German humanism. C.’s approach seems more consistent with history as an independent discipline rather than as a work of historical theology; however, his work is consistent with the direction that historical theology has taken over the past three decades. One hopes that excellent studies like this will provide enough material to allow historical theologians to return to the task of construction rather than to deconstruct older scholarship.

Mowbray’s treatment of pain and suffering in the works of Parisian theological masters (ca. 1230–1300) provides a wide-ranging and valuable contribution to our understanding of medieval Scholastic thought. He demonstrates how regent masters, such as Alexander of Hales, Albert the Great, Thomas Aquinas, Bonaventure, William of Aquasparta, Walter of Bruges, Richard Middleton, Giles of Rome, Godfrey of Fontaines, and Henry of Ghent, variously developed their theologies about this-worldly and postmortem pain and suffering in discussions of the relationship of the human body and soul (chap. 1); the passion and human nature of Christ (chap. 1); gender difference and equivalence with regard to pain and suffering (chap. 2); satisfaction for sin and penitential suffering (chap. 3); limbo and the eternal fate of unbaptized children (chap. 4); the possibility of the separated soul suffering the physical punishment of hell-fire (chap. 5); and the nature of the damned body’s suffering in hell (chap. 6). M. lucidly shows how these Parisian masters—in conversation with such auctoritates as Augustine, Gregory the Great, Anselm of Canterbury, Hugh of St. Victor, and Peter Lombard—established a technical vocabulary and conceptual structure for understanding pain and suffering in diverse theological contexts. In so doing, M. argues that “understanding the masters’ ideas about pain is . . . crucial for an understanding of their theological work as a whole” (162).

M. admirably gathers and explicates a great number of significant Scholastic texts, particularly noteworthy in that some are available only in manuscript, most have not been edited critically, and nearly all have received insufficient scholarly attention. M.’s detailed analysis conveys well the passion and precision with which the masters treated questions such as whether an infant who dies while being carried to the baptismal font will be saved (101–2), or whether the gnawing of the worm of conscience (see Isa 66:24) punishes those in hell more severely than the pain of fire (139–44). M. treats how, in their appropriation of both Augustinian thought and Aristotelian categories, Scholastics were led to conceive new ways of negotiating the thorny problem of how the incorporeal soul, having been separated from the body at death, could suffer the corporeal fire of hell (chap. 5). In the process, M. sheds much light on 13th-century approaches to traditional theological questions.

While each fascinating chapter is guided by one or more central arguments, the book as a whole lacks a robust, clearly identifiable, unifying thesis. Also, M.’s study is limited methodologically in that he draws on the traditional Scholastic genres of Sentences commentaries, disputed questions, and theological summae (9), but makes virtually no use of other crucial Scholastic sources, including university sermons and scriptural
commentaries. It can be easily missed that a university master in theology, who bore the official title *magister in sacra pagina*, was also required to lecture on Scripture and to preach, beyond normal participation in private and public disputations. We realize the magnitude of M.'s omission when we consider, for example, that Thomas Aquinas uses the word *dolor* 245 times in his OT commentaries alone, compared to ten occurrences in the *Summa contra Gentiles* and 167 in all his disputed questions combined. M.'s study also would have benefited considerably from recent scholarship on 13th-century theological thought (e.g., Jan Aertsen and Kent Emery, *Nach der Verurteilung von 1277* [2001]; and Rik Van Nieuwenhove and Joseph Wawrykow, *The Theology of Thomas Aquinas* [2005], the latter containing relevant contributions on sin and death, Christ’s passion vis-à-vis soteriology, and eschatology). Although M. repeatedly alludes to “recent studies” (3) and scholarly work “in the last decade” (2), his most recent sources were published in the mid-1990s, and most much earlier. His lack of updated sources is surely tied to the fact that his book began as “a research project at the University of Bristol more than fifteen years ago” (vii).

In spite of these shortcomings, this work is a welcome and engaging addition to current scholarship on medieval notions of pain and suffering and on 13th-century theology more generally. It will interest not only students and scholars of medieval Scholasticism, but also contemporary systematic theologians, particularly those studying questions of sin and suffering, Christology, gender, and eschatology.

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**Franklin T. Harkins**


Bergin’s study, impressive in size and learning, is the product of a career spent studying 17th-century French Catholicism. After a prologue that explains why he included or excluded certain topics, individual chapters delve into specific topics that pivot around issues of ecclesial change or reform. Chapter 1 examines the demographics of the French Church, especially the enormous variation in the sizes of dioceses and the number of parishes in each. According to B., efforts to unite smaller dioceses or divide larger ones floundered in the face of local opposition. B. then moves to another area needing change, despite the fact that then-current practices hampered reform: the Church’s wealth and revenues. B. rightly states that “tithe and trouble were synonymous” (42). He displays the complex relationship among wealth, benefices, and the clergy, though he might have provided a broader discussion of tithe-collecting, including how the practice of using secular collection agents upset the peasantry. He concludes that the system of benefices “set genuine structural limits to reform” (58).
The heart of the work lies in the section on France’s “Clerical Worlds.” Here B. first treats the secular clergy—the clerical group most needing reform—and he finds that the 17th-century Church elevated the ordinary priest to a plane virtually equal to that of the monastically vowed, achieving this by rigorously enforcing celibacy and instituting minimum standards for ordination, thereby reducing the large number of clerics who remained in minor orders or went unbefitted. The Church also established new seminaries, but B. concludes that these were too few to play a major role in transforming the secular clergy. No one, however, thought to eliminate the system of benefices—benefices that allowed clerics to lead reasonably secure lives, but also retained a persistent corrupting element in clerical life.

Religious orders, B. notes, experienced a dramatic increase in houses and membership. Most of the increase took place in the new orders or, more properly, new congregations. Equally dramatic was the increased practice of *commendatio*, where the office of the traditional monastic abbot was given to a nonmonastic cleric. B. judges that commendatory abbots did not always ignore reform, but that the practice reduced the number of monks who rose to positions of church authority. B. also traces how several new female orders avoided cloister, which allowed them to serve as teachers and nurses.

B. then takes up the “Instruments of Religious Change,” focused on agents of spirituality. He portrays the role of saints and shrines as providing opportunity for religious instruction of the faithful, while they reduced expectations for miracles. B. devotes a chapter to changing perception and practice of each of the seven sacraments.

The final section, “Movers and Shakers,” looks at the confraternities, the *dévots*, and the Jansenists. B. agrees with Gabriel LeBras that the 17th century was the second great age of the confraternity, despite clerical efforts to reduce their influence. His discussion of the *dévots* centers on the Company of the Holy Sacrament, founded to encourage charity, religious devotion, and virtuous lives. Its success, including increased political clout, led to the 1666 royal order to disband it. The Jansenists posed an even greater threat but, unlike the Company, they refused to concede anything and did not go quietly. B. argues that the conflicts the Jansenists engendered have overshadowed the impact of the neo-Augustinian revival of which Jansenism was only one aspect.

Several points of B.’s study could use amplification. He frequently mentions in passing the political problems of the Jesuits in France but gives little information on what they were. The Huguenots hover like a specter over the pages, but with little on how the Catholic Church dealt with them. The author concludes that “France had built a religious culture that increasingly appealed to the Catholic elites of Europe” (430), but he understates the Italian influence on that culture for the half century after 1580. Finally, while the title indicates that the book covers the decades before and after, B.’s focus is firmly on the 17th century. Consequently there are a number of points pre-1600 and
post-1700 on which the author might have spent more time, and a glossary of terms used in French Catholicism would have been helpful. But none of this detracts from what is a masterful examination of 17th-century French Catholicism. B.’s book is sure to remain the standard work on French Catholicism in the 17th century for a long time to come.

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Cattoi compares the theologies of divine embodiment in the Greek Father Maximos the Confessor (580–662) with the Tibetan Buddhist Tsong kha pa (1357–1419). Although comparative theology remains a difficult task, challenged by many methodological issues, C. successfully and creatively engages in a penetrating analysis of spiritualities within Christianity and Buddhism. His introductory chapter situates his methodology within a wide range of recent paradigms that illustrate the complexities of doing comparative theology. This study, C. explains, represents an “experiment in comparative theology” in which he argues that Maximos’s notion of divine embodiment provides the foundation for a “theology of contingency which is truly conducive to human flourishing” (14). In this comparative exploration, C. advances an understanding of notions of divine embodiment by contrasting the salvific role of nature within Christian and Buddhist traditions. Prior to engaging in an analysis of Maximos and Tsong kha pa, C. critically overviews select Christian and Buddhist antecedents, most notably the writings of Origen of Alexandria, Evagrius Pontikos, the anonymous Kun byed rgyal po (“The All-creating Sovereign”), and other Buddhist texts such as ‘Jigs med gLing pa’s kLong chen sNyin tig. In this comparative analysis, C. uncovers many points of contact and difference between Christianity and Buddhism; for instance, he contrasts the Origenist and the rDzogs chen traditions through assessing the rDzogs doctrine of the universal mind and Evagrius’s undifferentiated nous. C.’s overview of Maximos and Tsong kha pa’s antecedents is not merely cursory; rather, his assessment provides the reader with relevant context that illuminates his impending analysis of Maximos and Tsong kha pa.

After providing detailed assessments of their respective predecessors, C. compares Maximos and Tsong kha pa’s theologies of divine embodiment. Ultimately, C. argues that Maximos, unlike Tsong kha pa, provides a theology that redeems the contingency and particularity of the created order. Furthermore, C. concludes that the Christian image of creation is one of “overflowing plenitude,” whereas the wisdom of the dharmakaya is a “gift that leads one toward emptiness” (157). While this study constructively
employs a diverse range of theorists and critics ranging from Jean-Luc Nancy to Paul Knitter, one discerns that C.’s privileging of Maximos’s Chalcedonian Christology over Tsong kha pa’s notion of *dharmakaya* shapes the outcome of this “experiment.”

In the introductory chapter, C. describes his study as an “apologetic exercise”; as such, one wonders how much his theological commitments serve as a starting point that sets forth the trajectory of his investigation. However, it should be clearly stated that this study is not an ordinary exercise in rote apologetics; rather, C. provides a self-reflexive and fecund dialogue with Buddhism, the “other” theological tradition that ultimately shapes and illuminates C.’s analysis of Maximos and the Christian tradition.

Although C. anticipates and provides preliminary responses to possible objections to his comparative theology, he ultimately remains steadfast in his contention that Maximos’s incarnational model provides an answer to the problem of religious pluralism. In his final chapter, C. concludes that a “Christocentric ontology of participation” distinguishes the Chalcedonian theology of religions from other approaches. Furthermore, he asserts that Maximos’s model of the incarnate Logos suggests that the “eternal Logos does not suppress other religious traditions, but underscores their hidden Christocentric significance” (275). In closing, C. provocatively argues that if *theoria* entails the engagement of the *logoi* within different religions, then interreligious dialogue stands as an important practice for spiritual growth (277). In other words, comparative theology is not merely an academic exercise or an apologetic maneuver; rather, interreligious dialogue creates the possibility of contemplating divine realities imbedded within different traditions.

I enthusiastically commend this exemplary study of Maximos and Tsong kha pa as a penetrating performance of comparative theology. C.’s favorable appraisal of Maximos’s theology of divine embodiment does not hinder his constructive engagement with Buddhist perspectives. On the contrary, C.’s recognition of his own theological location demonstrates the type of self-reflexivity necessary for authentic explorations of interreligious dialogue. One may disagree with C.’s positive appraisal of Maximos’s theology, but if the reader maintains a dialogical disposition, points of divergence could potentially provide space for constructive engagement. Occasionally C.’s expert analysis may prove too technical for the novice of comparative theology, engaging, as C. does, multiple authors and viewpoints. Overall, however, this well-written book is accessible to the diligent reader interested in a comparative approach that illuminates dimensions of Christian spirituality while recognizing the value within other spiritual traditions. This study can serve as an excellent resource for university or seminary teachers and students interested in a constructive model for engaging the questions and challenges inherent within interreligious dialogue.

*Columbia University, New York*  
MATTHEW J. PEREIRA
If we understand John Henry Newman’s spiritual journey mainly in light of the *Apologia*, Newman seems to have read the Church Fathers linearly and, in that reading, discovered Catholic orthodoxy by a careful perusal against the background of the religious issues of his own day. Thus, in that understanding, Newman concluded that the Semi-Arians were the Anglicans, the Arians were the Protestants, and the Catholics were right where they were in the fourth century, namely, holding the orthodox ground. Similarly, in his dramatic account of the matter in the *Apologia*, Newman was chagrined when Bishop Wiseman observed in a *Dublin Review* essay that the Anglicans were the contemporary equivalents of the Donatists against whom Augustine uttered his *securus judicat orbis terrarium* that shattered his construction of the *Via Media*. It is the burden of Benjamin King’s careful, if tediously researched, volume to show that the reality was far more complicated than Newman’s forensic defense against Kingsley would have it. As a bonus, K. also provides a substantive study of patristic hermeneutics in the 19th century in his explanation of, among other things, (1) how Newman read the Fathers against the 17th-century readings of both the Caroline divines and such Catholic historians as Dionysius Petavius, and (2) how Newman reread the Fathers in his Catholic days when he entered into a critical dialogue with the Roman theologians both during his sojourn in Rome and later as his works tangled with the Scholastics who viewed much of his work with more than a grain of criticism.

As K. abundantly demonstrates, Newman’s sympathies were with the Alexandrians against the Antiochenes, which meant that he saw the roots of heresy in reading Scripture literally as opposed to the more figural readings favored by the great Alexandrian Fathers. That favoritism also explains why Newman was a far more sympathetic reader of Origen than one might expect. Indeed, one pleasure in reading this text is K.’s careful elucidation of Newman’s attitude toward Origen, who, in our own time, has been undergoing a rehabilitation.

To say that Newman was an Alexandrian partisan, however, is not to say that Newman accepts the orthodoxy of Athanasius and Nicaea as a conclusion to a syllogism. In fact, K.’s study convincingly shows that, over the decades, Newman had a developing attitude toward Nicene orthodoxy in general and Athanasius in particular. In the nearly two decades in which Newman applied himself to an intense study of the Fathers (from the 1820s until the time of *Arians of the Fourth Century* [1831] through his sojourn at Littlemore and entrance into the Catholic Church in 1845), he wrestled with a host of vexatious and contested patristic issues, which K. tracks in some detail. Were the pre-Nicene Fathers orthodox in their trinitarian thought or subordinationist? What were the intellectual roots that led to Arius? Did the conciliar use of the term *consubstantial* solve a theological
conundrum or did it occasion the rise of many theological conundras? What were the theological and intellectual roots of the use of the words nature and person, and how were they variously used in different parts of the Catholic world? Furthermore, how did one articulate an adequate vocabulary to understand the relationship of the trinity of Persons in itself and in relationship to the economic Trinity? These issues are and were so complex that Newman himself has had the accusatory finger of Monophysitism pointed at him for some of his own christological formulations.

Finally, Newman thought Origen orthodox even though Newman did not have the technical vocabulary to instantiate the latter’s orthodoxy, just as Athanasius had argued that even with the definition of the homoousios at Nicaea there was still a deeper truth to be ascertained. It was in those insights that one must search for Newman’s most fundamental convictions about how doctrine develops. It is too facile to argue that development is purely reactive in its struggle against heresy; the attempt to refine further trinitarian theology and, by extension, Chalcedonian Christology could not be solved by the formulaic. As K. shows, Newman’s answer to the question posed much later by Karl Rahner’s question, “Is there Christology after Chalcedon?,” would have been yes, as evidenced by his interest in those who reflected on Christology after AD 451. K. rightly and approvingly cites Ian Ker’s observation to the effect that an idea must change not for the sake of change but for the idea to remain the same.

K. ’s book is a complex and detailed study on Newman and the Alexandrians that manages to be well situated in the patristic scholarship of Newman’s own age, while it offers resonances pertinent to our own. K. rightly observes, almost in passing, that he himself learned (and hopes to teach us) that when Newman read the Fathers so assiduously, he did so with presuppositions and against a background that were his own, not ours.

University of Notre Dame


Michael Printy’s first monograph helps to fill two important lacunae in Enlightenment studies: First, it contributes to the nearly decade-long effort to realign the Enlightenment worldview in a less inherently antireligious manner. Second, it shows that religious reform was not restricted to Protestant efforts; there was a Catholic religious Enlightenment, and its impact was not marginal. P. offers a meticulous account of 18th-century German Catholic efforts to reimagine the Church in a way that would make it both viable and effective.

Earlier generations of Enlightenment studies focused on the intellectual coherence of an “Enlightenment project” that included replacing religious structures with secular ones. More recent scholarship frames the Enlightenment as a set of “media” that enable changes in society and social horizon. Within this approach “the Enlightenment” becomes a
highly fraught term, hence the lack of a definite article in P.’s title. Yet the most important Enlightenment historian today, Jonathan Israel, has pushed back against this trajectory and declared that the Enlightenment is indeed about a war of big ideas, even if the terrain and the players need to be adjusted. Further, Israel has suggested that the real Enlightenment is the radical Enlightenment of Spinoza, not the moderate Enlightenment of Leibniz, only the latter of which churches sometimes supported (see Israel, Radical Enlightenment, 2001; and Enlightenment Contested, 2006).

P. gives a nod to some of these disputes, but his aim is more modest: to show how 18th-century Catholic reformers, especially in the field of canon law, advanced the cause of the Church by imagining a more modern and Febronian German Catholicism that would meet the spiritual needs of bourgeois Catholics (9). He does not recount how Catholic intellectuals responded to Enlightenment notables like Wolf, Lessing, and Kant. Instead he introduces readers to such figures as the canonists Peter von Osterwald and Josef Pehem, the philosopher Mattäus Fingerlos, and the historian Michael Ignaz Schmidt—hardly household names, even for students of the German Enlightenment. P.’s efforts to recount the arguments of these and many other important but unknown figures is laudable, as is his mastery of the secondary literature. Yet, he almost entirely omits more broadly known Catholic figures such as Johann Michael Sailer and Heinrich von Wessenberg, not to mention the Catholic Tübingen School.

P. does document the Catholic reformers’ scorn for the Jesuits. The apex of this animus came from Peter Philipp Wolf, whose four-volume Allgemeine Geschichte der Jesuiten (1791) bemoaned their fostering of Baroque piety, especially devotions, shrines, and pilgrimage (128–38); and their promoting Aberglaube (superstition) and keeping ordinary believers in a state of what Kant calls Unmündigkeit (tutelage). Even after the 1773 suppression of the Society of Jesus, ex-Jesuits exercised their influence in securing what Wolf calls “the enslavement of a people’s understanding and the spreading of ignorance” (134). The Benedictines, on the other hand, played a more active role in the “creation” of German Catholicism.

One unresolved tension in the book is that between the more bourgeois desires for reform and the apparent complacency of rural Catholics with Baroque forms. At the core of the enlightened imagination was a twofold universalism embodied in the convictions (1) that an increasing segment of the populace could experience enlightenment and (2) that the common nature of humanity and the universal operation of reason ought to encourage a cosmopolitan vision. So it is unclear why Jesuit appeals to the rural populace and advocacy of an international universalism was less “enlightened” than the efforts of urban reformers operating within the horizon of the hoped-for German nation.

Due to the high quality of its scholarship and the manageability of its contents, P.’s study should be read by scholars of German Catholicism. Yet P. never establishes the importance of his thesis, although he carefully shows that Catholic Aufklärer created an idea—of a particularly “German” Catholicism—that sought to keep up with a Germany that would radically
reshape itself in the wake of the Napoleonic conquest. Yet the Ultra-
montanists won the day, and this triumph was not simply that of a populist
campaign, as P. implies (216), but it was also an intellectual triumph,
indicated by the increasingly numerous pro-Roman camp of German theo-
logians. German Catholicism failed to prevent the Church from making
Ultramontanism into a doctrine; it also failed to keep its important theolo-
gians (Döllinger et al.) in communion with Rome, to use its political
power to check Wilhelmitian imperialism and to convince other moderate
political forces to oppose Hitlerism. How, then, was the “idea” of a
German Catholicism so important? I hope that the promise P. shows will
result in further efforts to understand the previously neglected role of
Catholicism in the formation of German identity.

Saint Louis University

GRANT KAPLAN

REGULARS AND THE SECULAR REALM: THE BENEDICTINES OF THE CONGREGA-
TION OF SAINT-MAUR IN UPPER NORMANDY DURING THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY
AND THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. By Mary Kathryn Robinson. Scranton, Pa.:

Historians of late 18th-century France generally hold the French clergy of
that revolutionary period, and especially its monks, to have been a degener-
ate lot, as having easily and comfortably collapsed before the required oath
of loyalty to the Civil Constitution of the Clergy. Robinson challenges this
thesis through a detailed study of the Benedictines of Saint Maur. In eight
lucid chapters she argues that, despite the revolutionary drama, the Maurist
monks remained faithful to their vocations. She defends this thesis by follow-
ing the subsequent careers of the monks. She documents the fact that a
significant number of civilly released Benedictines stayed in the vicinity of
the former monastery, lodging with former monks to continue their religious
lives as best they could. Others remained in contact with their former fellow
monks, even as they became pastors in the Constitutional Church, which they
could do only if they swore the oath of loyalty to the Civil Constitution.
Curiously, R. counts those who took the oath and assumed parish duties as
remaining true to their vocations; only monks who decided to marry are
charged with “abandoning” their calling.

R.’s underlying concept of vocation raises a number of questions, among
them: what exactly ought to count as a degenerate abandonment of a
monastic vocation? It can be argued, for example, that many monks
entered into married life (a vocation itself?) only after their order, and thus
their vow of chastity, was suppressed. It can also be argued that becoming a
member of the Constitutional Church was a direct violation of their monas-
tic vows, principally that of obedience. R. appears to base her judgment
that these ex-Benedictines were not particularly degenerate on how consist-
tently they remained in the practice of their vowed chastity and, equally,
how thoroughly they moved into the forms of pastoral ministry that were
available, albeit within the Constitutional Church.
It can be further argued, and not against R.’s own leanings, that the truest, or at least most effective, of the monks at preserving their religious tradition were those who, after the suppression, used their academic positions in state institutions of higher learning or in libraries to be in close proximity to former monastic members and to the cultural heritage of monasticism, keeping it alive through subsequent secularist republics. Certainly a number of Maurist Benedictines resisted the oath of loyalty to the Civil Constitution, but their behavior revealed no outstanding heroic stances, no spirit of martyrdom such as was evident in Compiègne, no zeal to witness to the strength of their vocations by dying for them. R. has not here answered perhaps a common expectation that such heroism would offer a better proof of a vital religious order than does their assimilation to republican political changes and the contentment of most of these ex-monks after the closing of their abbeys.

Thus several questions emerge on what constitutes faithfulness to a vocation, but they in no way diminish the merit of this well-written, original book. Rather, they demonstrate that R.’s study helpfully reintroducts the concept of “vocation” into the academic discussion of religious history, which can and will serve as an important starting point for further research.

Marquette University, Milwaukee

Ulrich L. Lehner


Pilgrims to the Northland is both a history of the Archdiocese of St. Paul (renamed “St. Paul and Minneapolis” in 1966) and an archetypical chapter in the story of the Catholic Church in the Upper Midwest. Marvin O’Connell, a priest of the archdiocese since 1956, has previously authored the monumental biography John Ireland and the American Catholic Church (1988). Pilgrims follows the Church in its missionary phase, its immigrant period, its emergence onto the American scene during the “Americanism” crisis, and its solidification up to Vatican II.

Early chapters describe the zeal and sometimes-Jansenist spirituality of the mostly French missionaries, including their ongoing commitments to native peoples. With the erection of the Diocese of St. Paul (1850), the French-born Joseph Cretin was appointed bishop (1851–1857), followed by Thomas Langdon Grace, O.P. (1859–1884), and then John Ireland (1884–1918). All these bishops prized education. The arrival of the Sisters of Saint Joseph of Carondolet in 1852 facilitated and deepened the diocesan commitment to education and health care. O’C. depicts the ministry of the various orders of women religious in glowing but sometimes Victorian language (e.g., 214–15). He describes the roles of clergy and laity in establishing churches of every shape, variety, and location, along with descriptions of their pastors—among the frontier clergy were the wayward as well as the holy. The story telling is well done.
Bishop Cretin’s decision to send two young Irish immigrants, John Ireland and Thomas O’Gorman, to study for the priesthood in France had far-reaching effects. Ireland would become coadjutor to Grace, ordinary in 1884, and archbishop in 1888. Ireland’s influence on Catholic colonization, education, the Knights of Labor, the temperance movement, and the “Americanism” crisis are legendary. His ecclesiology, influenced by Isaac Hecker and Orestes Brownson, opened new and distinct vistas for the American Church. Without Methodist philanthropist James J. Hill (“the empire builder”), however, Ireland might not have survived. Hill bailed Ireland out of financial difficulties and donated a half million dollars for constructing the Saint Paul Seminary in honor of his Irish Catholic wife, Mary Theresa Mehegan Hill.

O’C.’s narrative continues through the tenures of Archbishops Austin Dowling (1919–1930) and John Gregory Murray (1932–1956), their extensive building programs, punctuated by occasional financial crises such as the one that handed over the College (now University) of Saint Thomas to the Holy Cross Fathers and Brothers, but only briefly. During the early- and mid-20th century, the soul of the archdiocesan building and educational programs was shaped by a revival of neo-Thomistic theology, a euphoric celebration of which was the Ninth National Eucharistic Congress in St. Paul (1941). Within this neo-Thomistic revival emerged people such as the social justice scholar and advocate Msgr. John A. Ryan, with his connections to the New Deal. The archdiocese also encouraged growth of the liturgical movement, linking Collegeville and St. Paul in the work of Virgil Michel, O.S.B., William Busch, and a younger generation of enthusiasts who formed the Leaflet Missal and the Catholic Digest. Murray’s public sensitivity to Jewish concerns in the 1930s is deftly described. In ecumenical matters and moral directives, Murray was exceedingly strict, although he was loved as a person of the people who regularly rode the trolley cars. His successor, William O. Brady (1956–1961), talented and authoritarian, “was never unsure of anything” (464). During his brief time as archbishop he served on a preparatory commission for Vatican II but died unexpectedly in Rome before the council began.

O’C. makes extensive use of archival sources and takes advantage of 20 masters theses in church history written by students at the Saint Paul Seminary. Unfortunately he does not provide dates of interviews, or page numbers (only chapters) when referring to the theses. There are some dating and quotation slips. For example, Pius XI’s quotation is “We are spiritually Semites,” not as misquoted on page 524.

Writing an institutional history is an enormous challenge; multiple threads need to be woven into a tapestry of lives and institutions against the background of civic and ecclesiastical dilemmas, both national and international. Occasionally O’C.’s storytelling seems to get beyond him. For example, he extensively elaborates Murray’s correspondence with the papal duchess Genevieve Brady Macaulay, the content of which, however, does little to enhance the history of the archdiocese. Still, the volume illustrates the pivotal role of the Archdiocese of St. Paul regarding liturgy,
social justice, and an ecclesiology at home in America. O'C.'s solid research, written in fascinating style and integrated into a larger vision, is a valuable addition to the study of Catholicism in Minnesota and beyond.

*University of St. Thomas, St. Paul*  
MARY CHRISTINE ATHANS, B.V.M.


Archbishop Rembert Weakland's fascinating and insightful memoir can be read at three levels. First, it is an honest and probing reflection on the development of his own vocation as monk and priest, an experience that also serves as a lens through which he now attempts to understand the contemporary clerical sexual abuse crisis. Like many of his generation, W. discovered his vocation at an early age and entered into a formation process that encouraged piety but promoted little in the way of personal growth, particularly regarding one's own sexuality. W. also writes of his experience, early in his priestly and religious formation, of the discreet and often ill-conceived treatment of priests thought to be abusing adolescents, as well as of the general lack of understanding of pedophilia and ephebophilia. Given his own multileveled experience of inadequate formation and institutional blindness, he locates the source of many instances of clerical sexual abuse in the sexual immaturity and ignorance of many clergy. He treats frankly the gradual recognition of his own same-sex orientation, as he does his acute loneliness as a young bishop that led to his inappropriate relationship with another man. Here W.'s honesty is admirable, even while there is a rawness to this aspect of his memoir that suggests the still early stages of the process of making sense of this dimension of his life story.

Second, the volume offers a fascinating history of the reception of Vatican II. W. is uniquely equipped for this task. He served as a member of the Consilium, a commission established for the implementation of the liturgical reforms mandated by the council. While serving as abbot primate for the Benedictine order and residing in Rome (1967–1977), he became a close confidant of Pope Paul VI and also had ample opportunity to observe the inner workings of the Vatican curia. As abbot primate he visited hundreds of men's and women's Benedictine communities around the world, thereby witnessing the emergence of a postconciliar global Church. He chaired the U.S. Roman Catholic–Orthodox ecumenical dialogue and attended almost every episcopal synod in the postconciliar period up to his retirement as the archbishop of Milwaukee in 2002.

This unique background confers a particular gravitas to his disappointment regarding the substantial failure of the postconciliar Church to realize key elements of the council's vision. In spite of his overall admiration for Paul VI (his reading of Paul VI's pontificate is quite valuable), he bluntly criticizes some of Paul's actions, particularly his mollifying of conservative curial elements that then reinforced an overall atmosphere of caution. W. is especially critical of the pontificate of John Paul II. While he acknowledges
John Paul’s contributions to Catholic social teaching, ecumenical dialogue, Catholic-Jewish relations, and the Church’s engagement with culture, he judges that these advances were largely eclipsed by the pope’s rigidity on the question of a married clergy, his ultramontane exercise of papal authority, and his failure to differentiate between central dogmatic beliefs and secondary doctrinal points, reflected in his complete intolerance of theological dissent. These criticisms have been voiced by others; more distinctive is W.’s claim that Vatican leadership under John Paul allowed the complaints of a vocal minority to trump the sound sociological and theological analyses that were available to the Vatican in its assessment of crucial pastoral issues.

Finally, this memoir can be read as the reflections of a local bishop who dedicated two decades to implementing the council’s teaching on the integrity of the local church and episcopal collegiality. His understanding of the bishop’s ministry is evident in his controversial decision to have listening sessions with women on the issue of abortion and in his renovation of the local cathedral against Vatican objections. His insider’s account of the process of producing the U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops’ pastoral letter Economic Justice for All (he was the chair of the drafting committee) reminds us of a fleeting moment when the council’s vision of episcopal collegiality was taken seriously. W.’s memoir stands as an exercise in practical ecclesiology that deserves consideration by all scholars interested in the implementation of the council’s ecclesial vision.

University of Toledo, Ohio


This accessible and beautifully written book is filled with careful theological reflection and profound spiritual insight; indeed, it might well serve as a standard against which good theological writing should be measured. It focuses on the themes of its subtitle, collecting a number of the author’s separately published essays (each quite significant, but some having appeared in out-of-the-way places). The essays have been interwoven with care. In some sense, they offer a systematic theology in miniature: chapters range from theological anthropology to Christology, ethics, and eschatology, all developed within a strongly trinitarian and incarnational framework.

Soskice teaches philosophical theology at the University of Cambridge. Her groundbreaking Metaphor and Religious Language (1985) is one of the most significant theological works of the late-20th century and has become a standard text for doctoral students. The care that S. demonstrates for religious language is not merely an intellectual interest; it is embodied in a style of writing that is simultaneously learned, invitatory, and compelling.
The “kindness” of the title is twofold: God is not only merciful and loving but is also “of our kind,” our kin, related to us through bonds that we recognize because of our own ties of tribe and family. S. is careful not to infringe the infinite qualitative difference between God and humanity, but she takes seriously the doctrines of the *imago Dei* and the Incarnation, in which God’s “kindness” (in both senses) is clearly made manifest.

This theme is sounded throughout the book via a number of creative variations. It appears in chapter 1 as an indictment of the Enlightenment’s focus on “rational man,” retrieving instead a patristic and medieval focus on the importance of *love* and *attention*—and employing insights from Charles Taylor, Martha Nussbaum, and Iris Murdoch, that “most religious of agnostics” (7). Kindness also emerges as central to the joys and sorrows of calling God “Father”: analogical language that profoundly emphasizes the bond of loving kinship while sometimes also disastrously invoking, for some, authoritarianism and violence. Analogical and relational language for God is given fuller analysis in “Trinity and the ‘Feminine Other,’” a 1994 essay that significantly influenced my own trinitarian theology. Later, these same concerns are transposed from “relations in God” to “relationships among human beings” in a moving essay on the theological contours of friendship.

Particularly significant is a previously unpublished essay that gives the book its title: “The Kindness of God: Trinity and the Image of God in Julian of Norwich and Augustine.” Julian’s intimate, physically focused *Revelations of Divine Love* might seem to have few points of contact with the abstract intellectual gymnastics of Augustine’s *De Trinitate*. But S. demonstrates their deep resonances, not only in theological content, but also in dramatic style and rhetorical effect. Both works explore our kinship with God: Julian by focusing on Christ’s bodily nature and his motherhood; Augustine in his subtle explorations of the *vestigia trinitatis* that we bear (created, as we are, in the image of God). Certainly there are differences: most important, Julian makes space for the fragility of the human body and its intimate relations to other bodies, whereas Augustine retains a Platonic anxiety about such matters (though S. demonstrates that this is moderated somewhat in the late books of *De Trinitate*). Julian wisely focuses on the incarnate, embodied Christ: we are saved by “that blessed kynde that he toke of the maiden.” S. comments: “Christ is ‘our kind,’ a human being like us, and by extension ‘our kin’. Clothed in human flesh in the Virgin’s womb, Christ will in turn clothe us in God’s love” (142). Here and throughout the book, the sustaining power of divine love becomes the key to various theological riddles.

The book is deeply engaged with feminist concerns, but not in precisely the idiom that readers might expect. Certainly S. shares the interest in embodiment, relationality, and intimacy that has been at the center of much feminist theology, along with an implicit critique of the excesses of abstraction, rationalism, and ascesis that have dominated much of Christianity’s androcentric past. But S. refuses to divide and conquer; instead,
she mines the biblical, patristic, and medieval sources for everything in them that can be redeemed, while treating their occasional and incipient misogyny with, well, kindness: with allowances for their historical context and their philosophical inheritance, though never simply ignoring their serious errors. Commentators on all sides of “theology and gender” discussions have much to learn from this book, not only from its content but also from its combination of appreciative appropriation and gentle critique.

This book will be an intensely satisfying and productive read for convinced and devoted Christians (clergy and laity, academics and general readers). But it might even more profoundly affect the skeptic, the nominal Christian, the disappointed, and the distracted. It is hardly a typical work of Christian apologetics, but if I could get just one recent book of theology into the hands of thoughtful people whose particular experience of Christianity has left them dubious, or wounded, or worse, this would be the book. Its “kindness” is apparent in more than just its title.

Albert-Ludwigs-Universität Freiburg

John Haughey states that his book addresses “two poverties” manifest in the Catholic intellectual tradition and especially in Catholic universities. “The first is a poverty not of educational theory, but more foundationally of cognitional theory. Another way of saying this is that there is an almost universal inattentiveness to the spirituality latent in the act of coming to know” (xiii). The second poverty, peculiar to Catholicism, is doctrinal: the ecclesiological mark of “catholic” has been undeveloped; consequently, Catholicism’s contribution to education itself is also largely undeveloped.

The integrating bridge-notion in H.’s understanding of Catholic universities is Bernard Lonergan’s “notion of being,” that is, that toward which all our searching—and our research—is heading. Such a notion is not just a concept; primarily it is the very dynamism of our human spirit as it moves out to explore this or that area on its way to all that is true and good. H. develops this notion in terms of “catholicity,” that is, the search for meaning in any and every particular area. As he describes it, he is “connecting the dots,” making “wholes” where previously there had been only unintelligible heaps.

If it is true that Jesus is fully human as well as fully divine, then whatever contributes to a fuller humanity in whatever area can be integrated into the Catholic intellectual tradition; this includes the contributions made by faculty members—whether Catholic or not—at Catholic universities. H. concretizes his thesis with several biographical accounts of faculty who
in their research are extending the frontiers of knowledge. They are professors of Islamic studies, international economics, Kantian philosophy, international migration. Is it possible that each of these is contributing to the Catholic intellectual tradition? H.’s answer is a resounding yes! insofar as each is following the light of intelligence and extending the boundaries of knowledge for the good of all. H. calls attention to the inner experience of “catholicity,” that is, the drive for wholeness that sparks such journeys. If a person comes to understand her own academic specialty through this “inner road,” she will find the core vein that is the key to an interdisciplinary view of the university.

To live in line with this vision, however, Catholic universities have to become truly welcoming of the faculty who through the years have been teaching on their campuses. Such a spirit of hospitality requires truly listening to these experts in “where knowing is going.” H. concretely recommends that each Catholic university have some group specifically dedicated to fostering such a spirit of hospitality. Within the context of such welcoming interdisciplinary dialogue, faculty can come to understand the important role they play in extending the boundaries of the Catholic intellectual tradition.

This is an optimistic book. It does not begin with hand wringing about “how few Catholics we have on our faculty”; rather, it begins by asking how we can help the faculty we now have to understand the relationship of their expertise to the Catholic intellectual tradition. If the incarnation means that God truly entered our world to sanctify our human endeavors, then the research going on at Catholic campuses is truly holy. Unlike Max Weber who saw the academic enterprise as an unceasing cycle of improving upon one’s predecessors only to be surpassed by younger scholars, H. sees a theological telos or goal in authentic scholarship itself. In a wonderful chapter he invokes Maximus the Confessor, Karl Rahner, and Teilhard de Chardin in their testimonies as to where knowing is going. Teilhard’s “Mass upon the World,” for example, links all genuine research to that fullness of consciousness in which “Christ will be all in all.” This eschatological future-orientation of all scholarship can help explain why we go to so much trouble maintaining more than 200 Catholic colleges and universities in the United States.

To my mind, H. has thrown his whole self into this work. Where Is Knowing Going? manifests a cosmic desire expressed in lapidary formulae, pithy expressions, and gripping turns of phrases. In answer to the question posed by the title, one follows here a theologically intuitive mind in his search for Being. One follow-up suggestion would be to set these incisive reflections within the context of Lonergan’s functional specializations in theology. In that way the Catholic intellectual tradition, flowing from and feeding into the doctrinal tradition, could become even more a leaven within contemporary academia, infiltrating like yeast the whole enterprise and illuminating contemporary efforts.

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RICHARD M. LIDDY
Gascoigne, professor of theological ethics at the Australian National Catholic University, has penned an elegantly argued essay that espouses and theologically justifies a consistent, post-Vatican II, Catholic church-world model. He posits that contemporary liberal societies embody two quite different stories of secularity. One involves the positive story of freedom of conscience and the development of shared space for all citizens, unconstrained by tradition. At its best, this first positive story allows for, even assumes, the ongoing resort to tradition, not as a constraint on citizenship, but as a resource. In this view, liberalism allows a personal (or communal, by a subgroup in society) appropriation of tradition, which appropriation might help society anchor, as the outcome of shared social debate, an ontology of the human. The second story of liberal freedom is more ominous. It reduces the notion of freedom to sheer freedom of choice. In this second view all choices are equal. There can be no ontology of the human or social construal of the common good or the goods of human flourishing (since these latter are disputed).

G. tries to relate these two stories of liberal society to Augustine’s two loves (the second being Augustine’s libido dominandi and libido consumendi). G. attempts to refute those (e.g., John Milbank) who claim that Augustine equated the secular with sin. Rather, Augustine showed ambiguity. In some cases, Augustine’s civitas terrena involved an ambiguous mix of sinners and saints. It represented a mixed state. At its best it allowed some shared loves that could anchor a “relatively” just society. At other times, Augustine slipped into a usage of civitas terrena as composed only of the reprobate.

In a chapter entitled “Church, Kingdom and Secularity,” G. proposes that the Catholic Church needs to help liberal secular society tell its better story. Following Charles Taylor’s account in A Secular Age (2007), G. does not think it is viable (or desirable) to return to an older church-world strategy that mobilizes Catholics around a strong demarcation against the secular world. The Church faces two temptations vis-à-vis modern secular society: it can reduce its message to an equivalent of that of the liberal secular world, or it can so stress its distinctiveness that solidarity with non-Christians or nonbelievers becomes almost precluded. The theological notion of the kingdom urges solidarity with all men and women of good will. G. accepts the position of John Rahls on public reason. Religious people can draw upon their religious resources to illuminate their choices and policy decisions, but in the end they must, in principle, make a case for their public policy choices in languages that are intelligible and accessible to others. G. thinks that persons of faith can espouse, in public, truths of faith that can be communicated in ways that do not require an assent to faith. In sum, he continues to espouse some variant of Catholic natural law thinking.
Chapter 3, “The Virtues of Noninstrumental Relationships,” lays out the virtues necessary for a good society and reports on Christian accounts of such virtues. The chapter exalts notions of civil society between state and individual. In a nutshell, the two stories of liberal society revolve around disputes about an underlying notion of the self. Is the self implicated in communal relations, called to sometimes sacrifice for the common good, or is the self simply an uncontextualized autonomous chooser? No matter what, liberal societies often enough become rife with individualist and gratificatory messages and images. In chapter 4, “Christian Hope and the Eucharist,” G. insists that liberal societies represent an ethical project. As such, they need some ontological grounding, some grounding of hope. Yet it is hard to ground hope on purely secular terms.

In the end, G. eschews theological accounts (e.g., those of William Cavanaugh) that so stress the Church as “a contrast society” that solidarity with those outside the Church (or learning from them) becomes nearly impossible. He thinks the Church should primarily stand against instrumentalization and commodification of humanity on a global scale. This comprehensive stance should, of course, include the importance of sexual and life ethics to the Church’s vision of the human. But this stance avoids any too exclusive emphasis on these questions as the primary defining demarcation mechanism that precludes solidarity, on other grounds, with groups who also oppose elements involving the instrumentalization of the human. I strongly recommend this cogent book for those trying to think though a principled and theologically grounded Catholic stance on public policy.

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JOHN A. COLEMAN, S.J.


Cavanaugh amplifies his controversial article about the religious nature of the so-called Wars of Religion (“‘A Fire Strong Enough to Consume the House’ . . . ,” Modern Theology 11 [1995] 397–420), situating his earlier research on early modern wars within a larger context about the nature of religion and the conflict between modernity and Christianity. Chapter 1 recounts the creation and perpetuation of the myth that undergirds the modern, secular worldview. A myth, says C., is a story that becomes unquestioned (6). In this case the story is liberalism’s: that its political arm—the secular state—was necessary to the survival of a Europe that had become enmeshed in bloody confessional disputes, which theology both triggered and had no means of resolving. Given the inherent dangers in religion, the key to a peaceful future means universalizing the Western project of secularization, entailing the privatization and domestication of religion. Premodern religion, so says the myth, presents the greatest danger to peace, because it refuses to be privatized and makes grand metaphysical
claims about ultimate reality that are not subject to rational refutation. This myth offers not only a justification for the secular state but also a program of action that the rest of the world should follow.

Chapter 2 treats theories of religion. C. aims to show that attempts to define religion coincide with early modern efforts to develop a government in which military power and right of force resided entirely with the sovereign. Relying heavily on Wilfred Cantwell Smith’s *The Meaning and End of Religion* (1962), C. shows that scholarly endeavors to define religion as a transhistorical and transcendental reality have failed miserably. C. details these incoherencies among scholars of religion unwilling to accept the consequence that religion resulted from a peculiarly modern social imaginary. The very efforts to define religion are inseparable, says C., from attempts to domesticate religion and to establish the ontological priority of secular space.

Chapter 3 reviews the literature on early modern warfare that largely contradicts the myth that liberalism saved Europe from religious warfare; to the contrary, new power constellations attempted to centralize military force. This force, along with more advanced technology, underlay the increased bloodshed in 16th- and 17th-century Europe. It should be noted here that C. thinks that attempting to assign blame to religious, political, or economic factors is anachronistic and futile. Chapter 4 concludes by suggesting that liberalism, as a pseudoreligion, remains blind to its own capacity for violence—seen as rational, calculative, necessary—by contrasting it with religious violence—deemed passionate, irrational, exuberant.

C. shows that the Enlightenment myth about the wars of religion has not merely been articulated by extreme secularists or anti-Christians; moderates and even self-effacing Christians have largely adopted these arguments. Not only Sam Harris and Christopher Hitchens come under C.’s fire, but also more moderate and even purportedly proreligious voices such as Scott Appleby and Martin Marty. When reading C.’s argument, we recognize how profoundly mistaken Hans Küng’s most noted dictum is: “no world peace without religious peace” (*Global Responsibility* [1993] 76). C. might lead his readers to conclude: there will be peace only when liberalism is honest about its origins, history, and inclination to violence.

C. has been influenced by John Milbank’s 1990 *Theology and Social Theory*, at the center of which is a countermodern critique of modernity and secularism. Milbank’s highly abstract critique remains too theoretical to convince many readers more rooted in the concrete and empirical. C. provides an easily traceable argument that supplies plentiful examples, especially about the contingencies concerning early modern warfare, and largely refrains from the jargon of French poststructuralism that infects much of Milbank’s work.

Since the Twin Towers fell, arguments about religion and the liberal project have regularly produced more heat than light. The subject of C.’s work dovetails nicely with the historically based apologetics of David Bentley Hart (*Atheist Delusions*, 2009) and Rodney Stark (*The Victory of Reason*, 2005, inter alia). C. helps provide needed counternarratives that try to
retell the history of the West fairly and evenly. Yet, unlike some recent disputants, C. refrains from the impassioned rhetoric that may induce cheers from one side but hardly dispels the doubts held by the other. He makes his points persuasively, but without devolving into larger, less clearly established rhetorical claims. Nor does he whitewash the historical failures of Christians and the role that churches have played in instigating and perpetuating violence.

Impatient readers might find the pace of the book too plodding. The chapters are exceedingly long. Yet the book merits a wide reception. Ideally it would be read to complement more theoretical accounts of modernity, as one finds in Milbank, but also Alisdair MacIntyre, Charles Taylor, Louis Dupré, or as an antidote to typical Lockean accounts of the origin of the liberalism and the secular state. The Myth of Religious Violence is an important contribution to theology, early modern studies, political theology, and Christian apologetics.

Saint Louis University

GRANT KAPLAN


Responding to a 2004 request by then-Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger, scholars at the University of Notre Dame undertook a systematic investigation of the continued relevance and utility of the natural law tradition in providing a basis for moral agreement in a pluralistic society. Alasdair MacIntyre’s initial, substantive essay on the foundational problem of moral disagreement provides the basis for this resulting collection, with other contributions either responding directly to MacIntyre or expanding his argument. The final essay is MacIntyre’s response to his interlocutors.

MacIntyre’s basic challenge is that the precepts of natural law are preconditions, rather than products, of rational inquiry. These normative precepts—protection of life, liberty, truth, community, and family—MacIntyre holds as the necessary prerequisites for shared rational inquiry. He writes in his concluding essay, “I am committed to holding that if the requirements of practical reason are rightly understood, then practical rationality provides everything that is required for the moral life, independently of any theological ethics. Practical reason not only provides us with good reason to act in accordance with natural law, but also guides us in how to apply it” (315).

Jean Porter and Gerald McKenny respond most directly to Ratzinger’s request and MacIntyre’s essay. Each in turn challenges not MacIntyre’s basic position, which he claims to get from Aquinas, that the precepts of natural law are universal, exceptionless, and unchanging, but rather his more controversial claim that these preliminary precepts are both specific enough to guide moral conduct and foundational enough to be known by all apart from any theology. Repeating many points made in her impressive
Nature as Reason (2005), Porter asks whether the natural law provides a universally valid morality; she predictably responds that it does not. For Porter, the natural law comprises a universally valid and accessible law, but its concrete precepts cannot be logically derived from the first principle to “do good and avoid evil.” Rather, the specific action-guiding norms of natural law must be “defended in terms of a contentious metaphysical theory, developed with an overarching theological context” (73).

McKenny compares MacIntyre to Ratzinger in that both identify the source of moral disagreement in a form of “error theory,” a historical failure to come to agreement about the nature of the good following the post-Enlightenment abstraction of reason from concrete historical traditions. McKenny, like Porter, wants to ground the natural law in the Christian tradition, arguing that the moral claims traditionally made by Christians can still be affirmed, but not convincingly articulated to those in disagreement by, as MacIntyre seems to favor, an appeal to practical reason alone.

The remaining essays are largely aimed at widening the scope of inquiry into other disciplines, rather than taking on MacIntyre’s arguments specifically. The topics vary widely from Daniel Philpott’s treatment of a Catholic ethic of reconciliation, to Cathleen Kaveny’s discussion of prophetic rhetoric in U.S. political discourse, to John Coughlin’s exploration of the foundation of human rights in canon law. Though each essay is illuminating on its own terms, the topics seem, at times, only tangentially related to the original question concerning a persuasive foundational morality grounded in natural law.

The collection is not meant to provide a systematic response and critique of all the various interpretations of the natural law tradition. The “new natural law theories” of Germain Grisez and John Finnis et al. are not addressed, nor are non-Christian natural law scholars included. As Cunningham writes, the committee at Notre Dame decided to “engage directly the thinking of Alasdair MacIntyre so that the end product of the research presented here would be a tightly organized symposium not \textit{viva voce} but in the form of a learned exchange after the model of John Henry Newman’s observation that the university is the place where ‘mind clashes with mind’” (ix).

The book will appeal to a wide array of moral theologians and philosophers interested not only in the possibility of a foundational morality grounded in natural law, but also in questions of human rights, interreligious dialogue, moral rhetoric, and sacramental life in broadly pluralistic societies. As for answering Ratzinger’s request concerning the possibility of a natural-law based foundational morality, this collection raises more questions than it answers. Although the stated goal is to clarify the terms of the argument, not to provide decisive conclusions about perennial questions in natural law scholarship, the diversity of foci among the essays not specifically in response to MacIntyre seems to obscure more than clarify.

\textit{Boston College} \hspace{1cm} \textbf{Beth K. Haile}

Franks shows how Aquinas’s economic teachings can significantly contribute to our conceptions of not only theological economics but also moral theology and Christian doctrine. He does so by demonstrating how in Aquinas the evangelical counsels, especially the mendicant call to abandon or renounce property, are central for all human action, lay and religious—a centrality that demonstrates the practical import of Aquinas’s dictum, “grace perfects nature.” F. argues against any two-tiered distinction between nature and grace, or philosophy and theology, and shows how the “poor Christ” is present in Aquinas’s reflection on the most basic forms of natural economic exchange, without abandoning either metaphysics or natural theology. Both disciplines have a role in understanding and shaping an economy. In fact, F. critiques a poor metaphysics for causing moderns to rely solely on exchange values at the expense of use values. The latter assume a deference to nature that the former do not.

F. appeals to Alasdair MacIntyre’s shift from “shared practices” in After Virtue (1981), to “claims about nature” in Dependent Rational Animals (1999), to argue that Aquinas’s economic teachings require the latter’s “Aristotelian deference” to nature (94). But Aquinas’s Christology led him also to consider nature in terms of “created lowness” or “ontological poverty.” F. does not follow recent turns back to a rigid neo-Scholastic distinction between nature and grace or philosophy and theology. Instead he argues that the “dependence and vulnerability” that MacIntyre claims for nature should be supplemented by a “theological contemplation,” especially “the lowness of the cross” (7–8). He finds evidence in Aquinas’s teaching on economics for Henri de Lubac’s interpretation of Aquinas (19): Christ matters integrally for Aquinas’s use of Aristotle’s deference to nature. The Christ who matters is the one who abases himself in the incarnation and crucifixion. This gives definition to an “ontological poverty” that is a “self-offering charity taught by Christ” as “the telos of all human action” (105).

Key to F.’s reading is a reexamination of the importance of mendicancy for Aquinas’s economics. Aquinas is often credited, or blamed, for tempering the mendicant movement by conceding too much to “nature” and its necessities, at the expense of the evangelical counsels. This is not just a modern or Protestant concern; it began with Peter Olivi (d. 1298) (135). But, for F., both those who fault and those who credit Thomas for tempering mendicancy misrepresent his work. They neglect how “nature” is understood in terms of the ontological poverty of the poor Christ. The “counsels,” although they are “instrumental” for perfection, are nonetheless significant for all Christ’s followers. They “embody” the true telos toward which the commands likewise aim. Mendicancy requires a social order
deferential to natural ends that prizes charity and gift above utility. It was not a separate social order on top of a natural one, but integrated with it.

F. concludes by juxtaposing the “humble vulnerability” in Aquinas’s metaphysics with the “metaphysical oddity” of exchange in our market society. Our process of exchange is an oddity because it can only be a “human convention” that ignores our basic, everyday natural ordering. F. does not conclude with any grand narrative on how to fix this oddity. He calls for a “natural ethic” that can attend to the virtues present in Aquinas’s teaching. Between the opening analysis of Aquinas’s teaching on mendicancy and the concluding application to current market realities, F. builds his argument through analyses of usury, just price, the place of the counsels in relation to the commands, mendicancy, and the completion of nature in Christ’s poverty.

This is a wonderfully conceived and executed work. Many discussions of nature and grace, metaphysics and Christology, soon become so abstract that they move beyond contemplation to obfuscation, and one is left doubting that the discussions matter at all. F. shows why they do matter. He repeatedly returns to everyday life—how we do, and should, exchange with each other. This question frames his discussion such that the relation between nature and grace, or the place of metaphysics in Christology, is more than only speculative; it is also eminently practical. F.’s work deserves to be read not only by theologians and ethicists but also by priests, laypersons, and all who work in business or the financial industry.

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D. STEPHEN LONG


Marriage offers a timely glimpse into conversations on the theological ethics of marriage and family life that have emerged within Catholicism during the past 60 years. As headlines in the popular media feature stories about same-sex marriage and adoption, questions are in the air about what constitutes marriage and family, as well as about who has the proper jurisdiction over these most intimate aspects of our lives. This collection is interdisciplinary, including articles from scholars of moral theology, Scripture, systematic theology, and pastoral care. It is divided into three sections: historical development, theology/spirituality of marriage, and specific issues, the last including interchurch marriage, same-sex marriage, cohabitation, indissolubility, and divorce (including articles on remarriage and participation in the Eucharist).

Curran’s essay, “Pope John Paul II and Post-Vatican II U.S. Catholic Moral Theologians on Marriage,” concludes the section on historical development but ought to be read first, as it provides a helpful key to the volume as a whole. Theodore Mackin’s, “The Second Vatican Council and Humanae Vitae” offers an insightful bridge to section 2. He notes that in contrast to
Casti connubii, “the thematic worry of Gaudium et spes was not about any deliberate secularist denigration of the holiness of marriage nor about sins committed by the married. It was about the fragility of family life and marital love under the duress of economic and political forces that attack stable society at every point” (58).

In section 2, William Roberts reflects on the themes of marital partnership, intimacy, and sacramentality, insightfully connecting the latter with baptism, Eucharist, reconciliation, and the priesthood of believers, inviting us beyond the link to indissolubility. Angelo Scola explores the imagery of nuptial mystery as a source for marital spirituality. The volume does not distinguish between spirituality and ethics, so it should be noted that the contributions here are less about spiritual practices per se, and more about striving to bear ethical witness to the gospel within marriage and family.

The method and the questions that emerge differ markedly in the remaining essays in this section. Florence Caffrey Bourg, Julie Hanlon Rubio, and David Matzko McCarthy each deliberately highlight personal experiences that spark their moral reflection on fundamental questions, and with Lisa Sowle Cahill they engage sources from other Christian denominations. The importance given to experience as a source of moral insight is crucial even though the experiences of particular married couples vary widely as do marriages across global cultures. Yet these essays, along with those in section 3 that reflect on pastoral experiences, bring home the concrete ways in which our theological ethics impacts the lives of real people striving to build and sustain Christian marriages. These voices are beckoning the Catholic Church to bridge the connections between our ethics of marriage, parenthood, and family, and the Church’s commitment to social justice and the common good. They begin to tease out the implications of marriage as a communion of life and love, and the family as a school of solidarity.

The last section highlights points of conflict between progressive and conservative Catholics. Essays by Michael Lawler, Kevin Kelly, Elsie Radtke, Margaret Farley, and the bishops of the Upper Rhine forcefully reflect on the pastoral implications of current church teaching. The Church’s position on same-sex marriage, which is shaping political debate in the United States, is positively articulated by William May and critiqued by Stephen Pope, though there is no theological argument in this volume in favor of such unions.

Marriage is ideal for college, graduate school, and seminary courses. It provides concise access to material that represents major concerns in the tradition from key contributors. Syllabi though would do well to include essays from Curran et al., Feminist Ethics in the Catholic Moral Tradition (1996), as Marriage gives only limited substantive analysis of the patriarchal assumptions in the tradition (indeed it includes only six essays by women), nor does it offer a rigorous critique of the notion of complementarity that is central to the theology of the body articulated by John Paul II (John Grabowski, Richard Hogan, and John LeVoir).
Other urgent ethical issues influencing marriages and families need nuanced attention from Christian ethicists, such as domestic violence, poverty, welfare programs, immigration and migration, aging populations (with attendant chronic illnesses including Alzheimer’s), marriage after retirement from work outside the home, and the “sandwich generation” caring for children, grandchildren, and elders, as well as an internal Catholic question about the compatibility of the vocation of marriage with vocations to other forms of ministry. These highlight the interdependence of marriage and family life with other institutions of civil society including our places of worship. A fruitful moral theology of marriage will thus need to articulate a vision of the virtues necessary to sustain family relationships, as well as an account of the social conditions that nurture the cultivation of such virtues.

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MARY M. DOYLE ROCHE


This book follows a trail blazed by James Keenan’s _Catholic Ethicists on HIV/AIDS Prevention_ (2000), a stellar collection by Catholic moral theologians from around the world. This new volume has a similarly global scope, but its contributors are exclusively female. They give voice to the experiences of women who have been affected by the disease, and they pay particular attention to the importance of gender as a category of analysis.

Lisa Sowle Cahill’s excellent essay anchors the opening section on justice. Swiftly and clearly she describes the main lines of an argument that others take up in more detail. Many factors combine to make women more vulnerable than men to the spread of HIV, such as their anatomy, vulnerability to sexual violence, and inferior access to prevention service and medical care. Empowering women is both a demand of basic justice and a necessary component of any effective approach to reducing the incidence of HIV/AIDS.

Margaret Farley captures some of the enthusiasm that led to the publication of this volume. She describes how her involvement in the All-Africa Conference: Sister to Sister (AACSS) and in the Circle of Concerned African Women Theologians shaped and energized her thinking. She tells of “profound experiences of the power that is unleashed when women come together to share their experiences of HIV and AIDS, the power whereby women empower one another” (50). Farley sees projects like those sponsored by the AACSS as models because they forge partnerships across continents, are attentive to issues of inculturation, and recognize Christianity as a world church. Farley explains these points briefly, but regrettably the book does not include any essay-length treatments of these important topics.
Carolyn Sharp delivers a rich, thought-provoking essay on the meaning of sexual flourishing among HIV-positive persons. She notes that the stereotypical image of an HIV-infected person as emaciated and dying is contrary to the experience of many who now experience the disease to be chronic rather than fatal. She calls for more reflection about how erotic desire, pleasure and ecstasy, sexual intimacy, and related goods might be integrated into the lives of those living with HIV/AIDS. Some issues are raised by several contributors. Anna Kasafi Perkins and others highlight the need to attend to the ways that destructive theologies of suffering have been used to blame victims of the disease, many of whom are women. Other essays call upon Catholic leaders to revisit what the Church teaches about the use of condoms as a tool for preventing the spread of HIV/AIDS, especially among HIV discordant couples. Hille Haker states this indictment most powerfully: “Presented in this way, the moral teaching of the Catholic Church may bear some responsibility for the death of innocent people, and we cannot be silent about this” (106–7).

The quality of this collection is somewhat inconsistent. Let me give one example. Therese Tinkasiimire offers a superb essay that reports on the response to HIV/AIDS in Hoima Diocese, Uganda. Her work draws on timely, primary research that examined what messages Catholic men and women reported hearing from church representatives and studied the extent to which those messages hindered or assisted HIV prevention strategies. The results are constructive and illuminating, and provide a strong basis for Tinkasiimire’s recommendation that the Church must devote more energy to taking a prophetic stance against traditional customs and practices that harm women. Her work is in sharp contrast to the essay preceding it that has only 13 footnotes over nine pages, half of which draw upon sources from 2001 or earlier.

The book’s organizational structure leaves a great deal to be desired. None of the four essays in the “Migrants and Immigrants” section addresses that topic directly, and only two of them deal with migration in any substantial way. The remaining divisions (“Challenges to Justice,” “Challenging the Church,” “Invisible and Vulnerable,” and “The Female Face of AIDS”) are not organizationally helpful because almost every essay could have been placed under any of those headings. The result is unnecessary overlap and repetition that might have been avoided if the various essays had addressed a more distinctive and specific set of themes or topics.

Iozzio has succeeded in producing a book that is attentive to voices, populations, and categories of analysis that have been neglected in the theological literature on the HIV/AIDS pandemic. But perhaps the book’s greatest contribution lies in its effort to model how moral theologians should pursue their craft in a “world church.” One hopes this model will be emulated and refined by others in the years ahead.

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Christopher P. Vogt
Gerrie Ter Haar draws from his rich experience and long association with sub-Saharan Africa to make a case for the inclusion of a religious dimension in the West’s otherwise secular engagements with this subcontinent, especially in the areas of human rights and development. Africans’ traditional concept of religion, he correctly observes, includes “a widespread belief in an invisible world, inhabited by spiritual forces or entities that are deemed to have effective powers over the material world” (1). Such spiritual forces can be good, bad, or neutral. African Christians have taken this traditional understanding of religion into Christianity. This invisible world is congenial to notions of the Holy Spirit, who figures much more prominently in African spirituality than in Western Christianity.

Africans explore ways of taking advantage of this invisible, spiritual world for both their spiritual and material wellbeing. H. contends that the West’s—and by this he means Western Europeans’—lack of understanding of this “spirit idiom” (28) explains why it has tended to adopt an exclusively secular and structural approach to human rights, or what he calls the “juridification of human rights” (61), to the neglect of the human dimension. Such an approach, he argues, will not work in Africa where the world or reality is conceived more holistically or inclusively as “and/and” rather than “either/or” (19). For Africans and religious people in general, “the moral-spiritual approach to human rights takes priority over the moral-legal one that is characteristic of secular people” (62). For H., the only way that the Universal Declaration on Human Rights can be achieved is if human rights becomes a two-way process of inculturation in which both the religious and the secular meet and are mutually enriched. Similarly, H. argues, religious or spiritual resources can be explored for the achievement of human development broadly conceived.

H. refers several times to the former Catholic archbishop of Lusaka, Emmanuel Milingo, holding him up as the true face of African Christianity, with its emphasis on religious or spiritual healing, a dimension that has traditionally been neglected by mainline European churches. H. sees this disconnect as the reason behind Milingo’s troubles with the Vatican. He does not explain, however, why, of all the many priest-healers and inculturation enthusiasts in Africa, Milingo was singled out by the Vatican for censure. Certainly, there is more to it than a lack of understanding on the part of the Vatican. I agree, however, with H.’s understanding of inculturation as including not just the search for an authentic African Christianity but also for ways in which African thought and practice can enrich global Christianity, with the healing ministry being one such area of enrichment. Here Jesus the great Healer assumes a dominant role.

In his final chapter, H. discusses the arrival of African Christianity on the global stage. International migration, he observes, has set in motion a “reverse mission” (91) that has seen African migrants bringing their
African-initiated churches to Europe and seeking to reevangelize the continent that brought them the faith but that now has lost it. Because these churches have gone international, H. proposes retaining their acronym "AICs" but changing the meaning from African independent/indigenous/initiated churches to African international churches. I consider such a rechristening unnecessary as most of the AICs are still local. We can simply add "international" to the above list, indicating also globally reaching AICs, including especially the more recent, charismatic or Pentecostal-leaning AICs.

H. dismisses the idea of an African "re-enchantment" with Christianity, preferring to speak rather of a continuing enchantment or revival, making the case that Africa has never been disenchanted with Christianity since having accepted it. I agree, and so would many researchers of African Christianity and religions in general. They point to this when they speak of the innate religiosity of Africans. But it is equally true that this innate religiosity has been heightened in recent times by the difficult political and economic conditions under which many postindependence Africans have been living. H. acknowledges this when he speaks of many observers who attribute the recent religious revival in Africa not only to difficult material conditions but also to Africans' "creative use of spiritual resources that have proved their effectiveness in the past" (57). H. dwells more on the latter reason for the revival and gives only a passing glance to the former. A fuller account would require that this other side of the story be highlighted as well. Bad politics and poor economy have helped in no small measure in God's becoming African.

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Influenced by the literary theory of René Girard, Albreg reinterprets the religious philosophy of Jean-Jacques Rousseau by arguing that the concept of scandal is the keystone of the philosopher's theology. "The origin of the system is scandal and it itself is also scandalous" (178). Commentators have long noted the theological scandal of Rousseau's denial of the Christian doctrine of original sin and argued that this denial is part of the philosopher's thoroughgoing naturalism, with its concomitant defense of the inherent goodness of humanity. But A. argues that scandal is more central to Rousseau's religious thought than his disciples and critics have alleged. According to A., Rousseau's rejection of original sin stems from his rejection of a more central doctrine: the redemption of humanity through the cross of Christ. Rousseau perceives this claim of atonement as scandalous since it cancels out the moral responsibility that each human person should bear for the good or evil chosen over a lifetime. A. argues that this theological scandal has been little noticed by previous commentators because they have ignored one of the key tenets of Rousseau's religious philosophy:
the immortality of the human soul. After death, each moral agent will receive divine reward or punishment for his or her deeds. False appeals to divine forgiveness should not obscure the violent retribution awaiting the wicked members of humanity at the moment of judgment.

Through a close reading of Rousseau’s major texts, A. defends his thesis on the primacy of scandal in Rousseau’s religious thought. The autobiographical Dialogues rejects the aristocratic code of pardon and offers the persecuted Rousseau as an alternative to Christ himself. The celebrated “Profession of Faith” within the novel Émile insists on divine judgment based on moral conduct and rejects appeals to revelation as immoral and unbelievable. Moreover, the profession reflects the larger narrative of the novel, in which student and tutor find themselves mutually victimized and capable of effecting a reconciliation that does not involve forgiveness. The Discourse on the Origin of Inequality offers an alternative history of humanity to that proposed by the OT. It is the expansion of private property, with its related inflation of pride and mimetic envy, that inflames human violence. The doctrine of original sin finds no foothold. In the Discourse on Arts and Sciences, an outraged Rousseau condemns modern technology as a stimulant of social envy and as a corrupter of the martial virtues that once permitted people to be devoted citizens. Even the bucolic Reveries of a Solitary Hiker praises nature only inasmuch as it provides sanctuary from a cosmopolitan society specialized in the destruction of personal reputation and the fabrication of scandals for popular consumption.

In his effort to reinterpret Rousseau’s religious philosophy, A. convincingly demonstrates how the rejection of original sin derives from Rousseau’s more fundamental rejection of the Christian doctrine of salvation and belief in a final moral reckoning by God of each immortal human soul. But A.’s single-minded emphasis on scandal as the key to Rousseau’s theology produces some forced readings. As A. admits with some embarrassment, several of the texts he analyzes never employ French terms for scandal, and some of the “scandals” A. unearths seem little more than controversies over theories defended by Rousseau and certain quirks of Rousseau’s self-dramatizing personality. Against still-current portraits of Rousseau’s religious philosophy as a sentimental Deism, A.’s rereading of Rousseau underscores the militantly anti-Christian nature of the philosopher’s theology and how his opposition to the Christian concept of salvation is rooted in loyalty to a just but wrathful God.

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Mark Graves attempts to link the empirical results of cognitive science—a relatively new discipline—with the traditional notions of mind, brain, soul, and spirit that have arisen in theology and considerations of religious
experience. Since cognitive science itself is a generic term for six interrelated subfields—psychology, the social sciences, linguistics, philosophy, neuroscience, and computer science—his project is ambitious. After a preliminary description of the mind from various perspectives (chap. 1) and of the conjoint development of general systems theory, cybernetics, information theory, and game-theory, all emerging in the 1940s (chap. 2), G. introduces the philosophical notion of dynamic form as the preferred way to capture “the unchanging aspect of what otherwise is in flux” (37). Unlike the classical notion of form or essence, dynamic form is understood to evolve, but more slowly than the other constituents of the system in question. With this notion, subsequent chapters deal with various levels of human existence (subatomic, physical, biological, psychological, and cultural); the threefold emergence of higher levels of existence and activity from lower-level fields of activity; and the emergence of transcendent-level systems of existence and activity through cross-cultural dialogue and exchange. G. then analyzes all these systems as being at work in the human brain, ending with a subsection on decision-making as grounded in various tendencies or habits. He closes by narrating why he has chosen the philosophy of Charles Sanders Peirce as the framework for his systems approach to the mind-body problem, and by spelling out a systems-oriented understanding of the human soul as “the constellation of constitutive relations that enable real possibility” (218).

As a longtime student of the metaphysics of Alfred North Whitehead, I have both favorable comments and some reservations about G.’s scheme. On the one hand, I welcome his systems approach to analysis of the human person as a body-soul dynamic reality, because what G. means by “system” nicely corresponds to what should be meant by a Whiteheadian society, namely, an objective set of relationships between “regularly interacting parts or activities that form a whole” (12). On the other hand, in his attempt to retain with modifications the classical understanding of the soul as the form of the body, G. inadvertently flirts with metaphysical determinism. While human freedom is always exercised within either self-imposed or environmentally imposed constraints (202–4), the distinctive mark of human freedom (and of spontaneity at other levels of existence and activity within Nature) is the ability to transcend and thereby modify those same constraints through self-constituting decision. In this sense, Whitehead’s description of the soul as an unpredictable “entirely living nexus” of actual occasions—with no predetermined pattern of logical or temporal succession and with direct access to all the different “parts” or systems at work within the brain—may be a better safeguard against covert metaphysical determinism than G.’s description of the soul as dynamic form. Be that as it may, G. unquestionably deserves great credit for bringing systems theory and, with it, a rudimentary metaphysics of becoming into a contemporary rethinking of the classical understanding of the soul-body relation.

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