
Judith Anne Brown, the daughter of John Allegro, calls him “the maverick,” acknowledging the controversial figure he became for his interpretation of the Scrolls and their bearing on Christianity. She has written a readable account of his life (1923–1988), using his papers and letters—especially those written from Jerusalem to his wife, Joan, and many others—about his work on Qumran Cave 4. These writings are an invaluable testimony to the history of the publication of the Qumran fragments. She uses them well to record her father's reactions to the many controversies he was part of. Her account is generally fair and recognizes—even if her father did not—that in some controversies his critics were right.

On some occasions, however, B.'s account does not tell the full story. The main one concerns his publication of the Cave 4 fragments in the official series, *Qumran Cave 4: I* (1968). Allegro started to work on these 29 fragments in October 1953, but he did not publish them until 1968. In various letters, he complained about the delay and attributed it to Roland de Vaux, the French Dominican who was head of the inter-denominational team of scholars working on the fragments in the Palestine Archaeological Museum. Much of the delay, however, was occasioned by Allegro's own distracting controversies. When his texts finally appeared in 1968, his British colleague, John Strugnell (now Harvard professor emeritus), wrote a lengthy review of it in *Revue de Qumran* 7 (1969–1971) 163–276 (not 168–76, as B. gives it [155 n. 8]). Strugnell pointed out mistranslations, misidentifications, questionable readings, confusing plate-numbers, ending his comments with a Latin distich, "R’ habet Italicum liber hic, habet atque Pelasgum, necnon Hebraeum, praetereaque nihil!" (errores, [mistakes] and nothing else!). Subsequently, I published a bibliographical aid (*CBQ* 31 [1969] 59–71), collecting the articles that restudied the texts Allegro had published earlier in preliminary form, which he failed to mention in his final publication. A German scholar (K. Willer, 1971) said of Allegro's work: “DJD V is really the worst and most unreliable Qumran publication which has been presented to the reader since the beginning of the discovery.”

Later in *The Sacred Mushroom and the Cross* (1970), Allegro hoped to convince his readers that early Christians were members of a fertility cult that feasted on the hallucinogenic red- and white-spotted cap mushroom, *Amanita muscaria*. Allegro maintained that they had transcribed their esoteric knowledge into a “cryptic document” (the New Testament), the cryptography of which he cracked using Sumerian, the language of Sumer in southern Mesopotamia in the 4th–3rd millennia B.C.! There never was a historical Jesus. “The story of a rabbi called Jesus,” invested “with the
power and names of the magic drug,” was merely a cover-up for the sacred mushroom. “The ‘Jesus’-fungus” was really a hoax to dupe the Romans who were persecuting mushroom worshipers. B. acknowledges that “The Sacred Mushroom and the Cross ruined John’s career” (185). She quotes Allegro’s letter to André Dupont-Sommer that cites “the British Academic Establishment,” namely, Oxford Prof. G. R. Driver and “fourteen of his cronies,” who wrote to the Times of London that the book was only “an essay in fantasy rather than philology.” (The 14 cronies were noted professors of Oxford, Cambridge, London, and Edinburgh.) She acknowledges that the erotic element in the book is an obsession; even if it is not central to Allegro’s thesis, it forms a major part of his fanciful speculation. His book would have been better entitled, “Phallus in Fungusland.”

I met Allegro in the summer of 1957 in Jerusalem. He was finishing his work on 4QpNahum, a commentary on the prophecy of Nahum. From this text above all he proposed that the Wicked Priest (Jannaeus) dragged the Teacher of Righteousness from his desert home and handed him over to Gentiles to be crucified, as he had done already to more than 800 of his enemies. After the priest left, the scattered community returned, took down the broken body of their Teacher, to stand guard over it until Judgment Day. Such an interpretation of an important text caused the rift between Allegro and his colleagues, five of whom wrote to the Times of London in protest: “We are unable to see in the texts the ‘finding’ of Mr. Allegro” (92). B. quotes this letter of March 16, 1956, and attributes it to what she and her father call “the Catholic Monopoly,” failing to realize that at that time Strugnell, who had signed the letter, was not yet a Catholic.

In her filial loyalty, B. has given a good account of her father’s side of the story, but about a third of it needs to be retold.

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THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF EARLY CHRISTIAN LITERATURE. Edited by Frances Young, Lewis Ayres, and Andrew Louth. New York: Cambridge University, 2004. Pp. xxv + 538. $120.


Literaturgeschichte is apparently making a comeback. In the last five years the English-speaking world has witnessed publication of no fewer than four reference works that, in a variety of ways, catalogue the literature of early Christians. In 2000 Crossroad offered scholars A Dictionary of Early Christian Literature, a translation of the Lexikon der antiken christlichen Literatur (1998) edited by Siegmar Döpp and Wilhelm Geerlings,
and in 2003 Westminster John Knox published *The Westminster Dictionary of New Testament and Early Christian Literature and Rhetoric*, authored nearly exclusively by David Aune. In the last two years, two more important works, both of which will be reviewed here, have entered the market. *The Cambridge History of Early Christian Literature* is edited by Frances Young, Lewis Ayres, and Andrew Louth, all of whom also authored, along with several additional contributors, the 40 essays that comprise this tome. Hendrickson, in turn, has published a two-volume *Early Christian Greek and Latin Literature: A Literary History*, a translation of *Storia della letteratura cristiana antica greca e latina* (1995–1996). With the exception of Lorenzo Perrone’s section on Eusebius, all the chapters were authored by Claudio Moreschini and Enrico Norelli (the prefaces to both volumes specify their respective writing assignments). Both of these works, distinct from the first two mentioned above in their eschewal of the dictionary format, are of value for scholars, though they go about their business in different ways.

Of the two works, Hendrickson’s *Literary History* more clearly fits the profile of a *Literaturgeschichte*. Beginning with the writings of the New Testament and extending into the sixth century, readers will find discussions of documents that orient them to authorship, date, provenance, and audience. As well, they will discover brief outlines of the documents’ contents and, of particular value, considerations of rhetorical contours that include reflections on genre, structure, and literary style. Moreschini and Norelli also invariably offer brief discussions of the manuscript status of the works in question. Furthermore, helpful bibliographies of both the critical editions and selected studies follow the discussions of documents. These bibliographies admirably canvass the breadth of international patristic scholarship, though occasionally when English translations have been overlooked (for example, we find Alois Grillmeier’s “*Christ in Christian Tradition*,” in vol. 2, p. 581, but “*Gèsu il Cristo nella fede della Chiesa*” in vol. 2, p. 566). Perhaps most important for a literary history of this scope is ease of reference, and I find the tables of contents in both volumes sufficiently detailed to facilitate quick access. The most general organizing principle for the *Literary History* is chronology, and more specific ordering principles include authorship (vol. 1, chap. 15: “Origen”), genre (vol. 1, chap 12: “The Beginnings of Christian Poetry”), epoch (vol. 2, chap. 16: “The Period of the Council of Ephesus”), and region (vol. 2, chap. 14: “The Age of the Barbarian Invasions in the West”), etc. Pertinent and informative details of a literary work can be readily discovered.

The *Cambridge History* divides into three main parts: “The Beginnings: The New Testament to Irenaeus,” “The Third Century,” and “Foundation of a New Culture: From Diocletian to Cyril.” Each of these, in turn, subdivides into the “Literary Guide” and “Context and Interpretation.” All the essays fall under one of these two headings. The book is prefaced by a helpful chronological table of early Christian literature and a map of the Roman Empire. It concludes with lists of bibliographies, each of which refers back to its corresponding essay, and a detailed index.
There are several noticeable differences between the Cambridge and Hendrickson volumes. One point of contrast lies with presentation. The Hendrickson volumes have a more detailed organization that encourages quick, precise consultation (for example, Chapter 15: Origen/4. Treatises/a. First Principles). The Cambridge History, on the other hand, offers larger essays which might require a little more hunting for a specific title (Chapter 11: The Alexandrians), though the essay format also provides a more extensive literary context of the particular title in question.

The most obvious difference lies in the scope and detail of the material covered. Both projects begin with the New Testament. The Literary History surveys, in roughly 1100 pages, Greek and Latin literature through the sixth century. The Cambridge History, on the other hand, brings its survey to a close in the middle of the fifth century, a bit premature, since most reference works on the early church extend by at least one century. While Syriac literature is also woven into the fabric of Cambridge History, this 538-page book is decidedly less ambitious than Literary History and is clearly less detailed. To take one example, in the Literary History, Augustine receives 47 pages of consideration, whereas in the Cambridge History he is canvassed in a scant (though masterful) 14 pages. There is also the matter of selectivity. Texts like Origen’s Hexapla and Methodius’s Symposium, and even inscriptions like those of Abercius and Pectorius, as well as lesser known figures like John of Jerusalem or Severian of Gabala, find discussion in the Literary History, though go unmentioned in the Cambridge History.

Perhaps the most significant difference between these two projects is that the Cambridge History is much more than a literary guide. Twenty-eight of the 40 essays belong to the “Literary Guide,” whereas the remaining pieces comprise “Context and Interpretation” and go by the titles “Social and historical setting,” “Articulating identity,” and “Christian teaching.” No one would contest that these contributions to ecclesiastical, social, and doctrinal history, as well as to the larger Greco-Roman and Persian milieux, complement the literary history narrated in this volume. In so doing, they also broaden the contours of this work. Perhaps this work ought to have received a more ambitious title fitting its more comprehensive content. The volume appears undecided about whether it will offer readers, more narrowly with its title, a history of early Christian literature, or more broadly with its content, a history of early Christianity.

The editors of the Cambridge History might very well insist that their work is, in fact, properly titled, that the essays which supplement the literary guide in “Context and Interpretation” reflect a new understanding of what it means to write a history of literature. Young, whose editorial hand is most pronounced in this work, certainly makes gestures in the direction that this is not your father’s Literaturgeschichte (for example, xi–xiii, 105–11). A pinch of feminism, a dash of Foucault, and a handful of theory, we are told, flavor this insipid genre. If this is, in fact, the direction that the genre ought to be taken, then a more transparent and detailed discussion of preliminaries would certainly have been helpful. What is “Christian
literature” and what exactly are we narrating when we talk about it? Readers should be told why concerns that animate other histories of early Christian literature, like diction, style, and manuscript status, are largely avoided.

Both of the works here reviewed are of value for the scholar. The *Cambridge History* offers much more than an orientation to the literature of the early Church and in this regard provides a more comprehensive guide to early Christian studies than its title suggests. Its essay format, combined with its circumvention of lesser-known figures and documents, will lend itself to students and teachers in search of accessible and expansive overviews. For its part, the *Literary History* offers a more focused, technical, and complete discussion of early Christian literature, also organized to facilitate quick reference. As such, it will be especially profitable to the scholar who, with several early Christian reference works already on the shelf, wants one specifically devoted to the literature of the early church.

University of Notre Dame

PETER W. MARTENS


The title chosen by O’Donnell for his biography of Augustine harks back to the 1969 biography by Peter Brown, namely, *Augustine: A Biography.* O. tells us that there are many Augustines, but “this book is about two in particular, the one who lived and died a long time ago and the one who lives to be remade by us and is known from his works. It’s impossible to tell the story of the one without the other” (5). O. warns us against using the *Confessions* to understand Augustine’s life, wants us to “read his words with resistance and imagination,” and promises that, if we do so, “they will reveal him to us in many ways” (6). In chapter 1 we encounter “some of the things he [Augustine] chose not to mention” (7), namely, Hippo Regius (where Augustine came to live in 391 as a priest) and the wider Mediterranean world. O. theorizes interestingly that, if we read between the lines of Letter 21 to Valerius, in which Augustine begs his bishop for a sabbatical in order to study the Scriptures, we can conjecture that the newly ordained priest had fled from Hippo after his ordination and was trying to get out of it. Then in 397, after being raised to the bishopric, “Augustine comes out” (26), as O. labels the new bishop’s emergence as a powerful preacher and writer during the years of struggle “to make a name for himself and to rescue his church from obscurity” (34).

Chapter 2, “Augustine Confesses,” turns to the making of the *Confessions.* Here O. warns that “we need to be cunning in evading the snares he [Augustine] laid for his biographers” (37), but that he will in the next few pages present in simple terms the story Augustine told in books one to nine. Soon things get complicated, however. O. tells us, “Augustine believed with a zealot’s conviction that his church was the true church and with a snob’s commitment to cosmopolitanism he was committed to make
the church’s success his success (and vice versa)” (41). O. suggests that Augustine was embarrassed to mention Monica’s Donatist past and conjectures that Augustine renounced sexuality in his effort to become a Christian philosopher. Oddly, O. spells “God” with a small “g” to keep us from assuming that Augustine’s God is our God. He also refers to the church that Augustine called Catholic as the Caecilianist Church.

The fourth chapter, “Augustine Unvarnished,” has subsections dealing with Augustine as self-promoter, as social climber, as correspondent, as friend with his friends, as a private person, and as a trouble-maker. O. acknowledges Augustine’s initial enthusiasm over the neo-Platonists, but claims that by the time of the City of God these men “who had once meant so much to him that he could claim that they had changed his life forever, were now the stooges for a philosophical dumb-show” (123). In a reply to a correspondent’s question about killing in self-defense, O. sees “the muddled moderation that led to his acceptance of ‘just war’” (154).

Chapter 7, “Augustine and the Invention of Christianity,” argues that before the fourth century there was no relatively homogeneous Christianity, which O. sees as Augustine’s invention. In a subsection, “Don Quixote of Hippo,” O. suggests that Augustine “is Don Quixote in a world that really takes him and his obsessions seriously” (204). In chapter 8, “The Augustinian Putsch in Africa,” O. recounts Augustine’s struggle with the Donatist Church (the majority church in Augustine’s North Africa), but which Augustine succeeded in bringing back into the Caecilianist (also known as Catholic) Church, at the Council of Carthage in 411. Chapter 10, “Augustine’s Great Failure,” tells the story of Augustine’s struggle with Pelagius and, later, with Pelagius’s disciple, Julian, the bishop of Eclanum. In O.’s view, “very, very few readers except the most devout Calvinist will find themselves agreeing with the Augustinian view” (276). The title of chapter 11, “Augustine the Theologians” (which O. assures us is not a misprint) emphasizes Augustine’s different moods, voices, and even counterfeits. O. makes a number of controversial claims, such as that “neither Augustine nor anyone else could ever explain what” God’s being a spirit “might mean” (293) and that “the doctrine of original sin” was “his most original and nearly single-handed creation” (296).

O. writes with a flair that makes him fun to read. Although my judgment on Augustine and his heritage differs in many respects from that of the author, he certainly does get his reader to take a fresh look at the man who has dominated the language and thought of the Christian West for over 16 centuries.

Marquette University, Milwaukee

ROLAND J. TESKE, S.J.


Bernard Prusak’s study in the history of ecclesiology has many merits. The entire book shows serious scholarly research and clear, intelligent
thinking, and it has a calm, irenic tone that gives it more value than some other books on this subject. It also is quite readable. His concern, P. tells us, is to "trace the creative visions of those who in past eras shaped the dynamic, living reality of the Church" (8). In pursuing this agenda he focuses not only on theories, but devotes much attention to praxis, that is, to the lived reality of the Christian community, particularly the celebration of the Eucharist, at each historical period.

P. describes at great length the warmly authentic quality of early Christian life. The whole first third of the book (!) dwells on the New Testament Christian community, when the ideals of Jesus were well understood and earnestly put into practice. A note of melancholy pervades P.'s account of all that follows, as the author tells how "juridicism" and clericalism began their unfortunate but steady inroads into Christian life, becoming dominant within a few hundred years. Yet, it is impressive that P. is able to refrain from polemical language about these developments. For example, he actually ascribes fairly good motives to popes like Damasus I and Leo I when they claimed primatial authority over all other bishops, and P. does not think it necessary to portray the gradual adoption of celibacy in simply negative or conspiratorial terms.

The great claims of medieval popes like Gregory VII and Boniface VIII to power over kings and emperors are likewise discussed in a dispassionate and irenic manner. P. speaks of the legitimate concerns that they actually were pursuing. It would have been good if he had also noted that the claims of these popes did not really get much beyond words on paper. (Pius XII said in a 1955 address to historians that the doctrine of Gregory and Boniface was really only a minority view even in their own time.) Nor does P. mention that both these popes failed catastrophically in their attempts to impose their will on the kings of Germany and France. Both were put down by military force and both died in their efforts.

The development of treatises de ecclesia in modern times is dealt with quite perceptively and competently in a chapter entitled "The Birth of Ecclesiology: Theology Responding to Crises, AD 1400–1900." According to P., beginning with Juan de Torquemada's strongly asserted, very monarchical version of papal primacy, writers of the times really thought that there was a need to shore up papal authority in the face of divisive European tendencies. The section on what Vatican I's Pastor aeternus says about papal supremacy and infallibility is particularly well done, as P. has gone very carefully through the texts in Mansi. Even this council, P. says, "had no intention of diminishing the essential role of bishops, both within the universal church and within their particular churches" (257). But P. might miss the fact that the drafters of Pastor aeternus really did assert a papal magisterium modeled on the most severe ideal of absolute monarchy (the pope does need to adhere to the consensus of the church, but only he can decide what that consensus is).

The sections on Vatican II and its aftermath also offer very intelligent and perceptive comments. P. aptly notes that Lumen gentium contains two juxtaposed ecclesiologies. Along with the richly renewed ideas of people of
God and collegiality, it also reaffirms the centralized juridical order of Vatican I. The “unfinished church” of the present will need to work many years to blend together these two ecclesiologies. In this process, the historical and imaginative insights of Gaudium et spes, P. rightly thinks, will be most valuable. Some very profound thoughts on Plato, Marx, the death of God, the crucified Christ, and the eschaton were largely lost on this reader, but P.’s work does competently offer a wealth of information and thought on ecclesiology. The book lacks a bibliography but has 50 pages of meticulous notes.

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RICHARD F. COSTIGAN, S.J.


This book, already praised in history and medievalist journals, revises substantially our understanding of religious practice in the “cities of God” (communes of central and northern Italy, 1125–1325 A.D.). Recounting the currently standard and expected categories that shape studies of this generally well-known terrain, Thompson notes that something is missing: “Heretics, popes, theologians, Franciscans, and saints,” he catalogs, then asks, “Where is everyone else?” (1). The book is precisely about “everyone else.” T. argues that his study allows the period’s vitality to come forward in a way truer to the original than top-down studies.

Getting to the ordinary laypeople in high medieval Italy requires both a medievalist’s skills (consulting primary sources in Latin and medieval Italian dialects, in both printed and manuscript form) and a historian’s rigor (often arguing against received interpretations of events and models used for interpreting those events). The result is a book of more than 450 pages, heavily documented but an easy and pleasant read, with 61 photographs, printed to bring the modern reader into the sacred space that is the book’s subject.

T. gathers the book’s ten chapters under two main headings: the sacred geography (la citade sancta) and the city’s religious observance (buoni Cattolici). From the start T. is compelled by his research to speak of these “unexceptional Italian men and women” who were the practitioners of holiness in a way that differs from the usual, starkly bifurcated accounts that pit the Italian city-state and the church against one another. For one thing, the commune was hardly an essentially secular contrivance, as is the default assertion of standard histories of the Italian communes. As T. argues in chapter 2, much of the democracy that characterized the communes emanated from lay confraternities. Local communities within the communes identified themselves with their parish church and its specific rituals. The saints that often emerged from communes were co-opted by the cities to define what good citizenship was. One saint refused a butcher’s half-price offer on some soupbones, because that would have been unjust to other citizens (193). Being unusually holy, or being a penitent, may have
made for one’s being called a saint during one’s lifetime, but being a saint did not exempt one from civic awareness or obligation.

When it comes to the religious living of these good Catholics, T. is no less insistent that citizens of the city were genuinely active, not passive, in the commune’s worship; the busy cycle of the church’s year provided feasts and seasons that the lay faithful embraced, especially on a particular city’s patron’s feast day. The city’s seasonal obligations (for example, Lent) were shared in common, and public penance was alive and well—for one thing, confessions were made to priests usually in the open nave or behind the high altar (286), and public sins (homicide, theft, adultery, perjury, and damage inflicted upon clerics) often required public penance (299–304). City baptisteries were hardly mere holdovers from paleochristianity; instead they had special importance as a visible sign of civic identity and pride. They were the “womb of the city,” where the city’s infants, during Holy Week, were publicly “brought into the Church” by full immersion in the baptismal font, joining Christ’s own entombment and then resurrection. Being baptized, of course, allowed one access to all the other activities and sacraments that characterized full citizenship in the commune. In chapter 9 T. argues that private prayer was also a central feature of the Catholic’s life (private prayer being more than simply prayers said during the liturgy). T. also argues for such prayer’s being quite orthodox, thus dissenting from the usual notion of “popular religion” as involving a distancing from the doctrine, liturgy, and prayer of the “institutional” church. Of particular importance is chapter 10, “World without End. Amen,” which describes the thinking and behavior surrounding Christian death from the perspective of the laity (largely uncharted territory). Having worked hard not to privilege the mendicant orders, T. does bring his book to a close with an epilogue that argues against any assumed positive impact by the mendicants on the communes, using a 1299 altercation between the citizens of Bologna and the Dominican inquisition as the principal narrative source.

T’s robust book does present “everyone else.” Not having tractates from the period that speak about ordinary Italian Catholics, he had to assemble a mosaic-like picture using small bits of information garnered from far-flung sources. Specialists in medieval Italian history may challenge this or that suggestion, but the mosaic T. produces describes Catholics who were aware and active, familiar and attractive. The details and complexity of the book may challenge nonhistorical theologians, but the effort spent (especially on the second half, on religious observance) will repay any theologian, both intellectually and spiritually.

Mark F. Johnson

Marquette University, Milwaukee


Sometimes something is worth the wait. This is supremely true of the much-anticipated second volume of Moffett’s A History of Christianity in
Asia. Scholars and students alike of Asian Christianity are deeply indebted to the Henry W. Luce Professor of Ecumenics and Mission Emeritus at Princeton Theological Seminary for this splendid history of Christianity in Asia.

In Asia M. includes not only East (the Far East), South, West (the Middle East), but also Russian North Asia (Central Asia). M. sees the history of Christian missions in Asia from their beginnings to 1900 as composed of a series of five advances and three recessions: the first advance—the Syrian tradition (50–225); the second advance—the Nestorian missions along the Old Silk Road (225–900); the third advance—the reappearance of Nestorians and the coming of Catholics (1000–1350); the fourth advance—the return of Catholics and the arrival of Protestants (1500–1750); the fifth advance—the “Great Century” of Protestant missions and Catholic recovery (1800–1900). The three recessions are: the first—the schism of 451 and the Muslim advance (450–1000); the second—the conversion of Central Asia to Islam (1270–1500); the third—Catholic decline (1750–1830). Volume 2 covers the period of the fourth and fifth advances and the third recession.

The book is divided into three unequal parts. Part 1 discusses missions (predominantly Catholic) from 1500–1800; part 2 (the shortest: 39 pages) narrates early Protestant missions; and part 3 (the longest: 400 pages) describes the “Great Century” of mostly Protestant missions. The scheme of advance-recession provides coherence and clarity to the history of Christian missions amidst the geographical vastness of Asia and its dizzyingly diverse cultures, languages, and religions. Given the variety and complexity of the Asian context, it is well-nigh impossible for a single historian to provide a comprehensive overview of Christian missions in Asia, yet arguably M.’s effort is a tour de force. His command of the primary and secondary sources is awesome, as the 90 pages of bibliography attest.

Of course, historians of Asian Christian missions in a particular country will lament that their favorite missionary or event has not been given due treatment. Personally, I am grateful that in his account of missions in Vietnam M. includes Alexandre de Rhodes, a giant in the league of Matteo Ricci and Roberto di Nobili, yet hitherto ignored by historians. More importantly, younger historians, especially Asian, will complain, perhaps rightly, that M.’s narrative of Christian missions in Asia is too narrowly focused on what Western missionaries did; they would look for a fuller account of how the Asian Christians themselves have appropriated the gospel and created their own brands of Christianity. In M.’s defense, it may be pointed out that this “Eurocentricity” at this stage of the historiography of Asian Christianity is inevitable. M. has provided an indispensable framework in which later historians can construct their own narratives of the local churches.

One small suggestion: chapter 14, “The Catholic Century in Asia,” contains confusing repetitions (for example, two accounts of the founding of the Korean Catholic Church). A new edition would benefit from a revision of this chapter. But this quibble should not hide my enormous admiration...
of and gratitude to the author. M. has no wish to whitewash the history of Christian missions in Asia, which he bluntly describes as “a tumbled mixture of guns, greed, and amazing grace” (xiv). Yet, he is no less convinced that the gospel is a blessing for Asia. As he movingly and beautifully puts it at the end of his labor of love: “Jesus Christ was born in Asia. Some say that Christianity has failed in Asia. Not so. The numbers tell us otherwise. And the mounting chorus of voices from Asia’s Christians should remind us, the doubting West, that God never fails” (649). The churches in Asia owe M. an incalculable debt, and their (and my) fervent prayers are that his wish that the good God grant him enough time to take “a look at the critical hundred years of the twentieth century” will come to pass.

Georgetown University, Washington

Peter C. Phan


Anne Winston-Allen, associate professor of German at Southern Illinois University at Carbondale, provides an interesting window into the lives of cloistered women in German-speaking territories during the Middle Ages. Through previously untouched chronicles of their lives, W.’s original translations and scholarship present a new and fuller view of the thousands of women religious, and complements the ample work done on Italian-speaking medieval nuns.

The sheer size of W.’s potential field of endeavor is staggering, for thousands of women led silent, secret cloistered lives, chronicled in sister-books, but rarely considered by men in search of a systematic definition of the history of medieval spirituality. For example, the women’s branch of the Dominican order grew to include 70 women’s convents (compared to 46 friaries) in its first 200 years, and southern Germany was home to many of these. Northern Germany, by comparison, was filled with Cistercian houses of women—by the 16th century there were 43 Cistercian women’s convents to 15 men’s monasteries in the north. But, as W. points out, “almost all the primary texts used by modern scholars to study medieval women were recorded by men” (3–4). Her text, therefore, explores not the tales told by men about women, but the historical narratives women set down of their own lives.

W. helpfully begins her work by explaining the ways by which women entered religious life. Whether by choice or by cause, W. gives the reasons put forth by women. Some women were placed in convents as children, after one or both parents died. Others sought out life in common with women. There are subtle variations in each original story she translates, but typically women either chronicled a positive vocation to chastity, a vocation born of rejection of marriage, or a positive vocation fulfilled once widowhood arrived.

Typical of women who entered convents for their own reasons is Hedwig
von Gundelsheim whose story is written by Katherina von Gueberschwihr in the Unterlinden sister-book (c. 1320). Hedwig desired convent life and refused to swear a marriage vow on a sword, as was the custom: “she put up such resistance that no man by his strength could get her hand out of her pocket” (27). This passage echoes others that record women’s free choice in choosing the divine bridegroom, a choice less often understood (or believed) by male chroniclers. As it happened, Hedwig’s intended spouse released her from the prospective marriage, but her family abused her until advisers suggested that, should she survive her ordeal, she be allowed to enter a convent.

W. samples vitae in other sister-books, and moves rapidly across time and space to late medieval convents, where her narrative moves to the period of lax observance and then to reform. Here, rather than arranging her topics chronologically, W. chooses thematic presentation of women’s writing, first focusing on convent management and membership, then moving to living conditions and daily life, arts and education, work, and spiritual life. At times the reader is overwhelmed with detail, much of it without comment. After noting the various orders that established reform, W. lists what reform meant: (1) revival of poverty and divestiture of property; (2) restoration of common meals and quarters; (3) enclosure; (4) elimination of exemptions and privileges for nobles; (5) more open admission policies (84).

Happily, W. translates selections from women writing about Beguines, presenting a feminine understanding of the ways and reasons for the Beguine movement. Her lengthy next section on the women of the reform gives voice as well to the opponents of reform and enclosure, speaking to the natural feminine rejection of the either-or fallacy so often imposed by men: either wife or cloistered nun. However, W. presents women who themselves argued for reform. She insists that “the Observant reforms of the fifteenth century cannot be viewed—as they so often have been—simply as efforts by men to subordinate women or of the church hierarchy” (236).

W. includes plates, unfortunately in black and white, of women’s illustrated manuscripts that provide contemporaneous documentation of women writing about women. Her ample notes include the original German from which she has translated selections from women’s writings, and her sturdy bibliography is a compendium of works for further research. Overall, W. has created a work of scholarship that specialists and others can refer to for engaging detail on the lives of medieval women religious.


Linda Hall presents an outstanding comparative work on Spanish and American devotion to Mary. She skillfully handles a diversity of Marian
imagery, moving with ease from one instance to the next, describing the theological, dogmatic, and even regional differences of each cult. The book covers several centuries, including an interesting analysis of the evolution of Mary’s image during the 20th century. As she indicates in her introduction, two of her purposes in writing are to raise questions that will require the ongoing attention of scholars from very different disciplines and to help us understand the scope, diversity, and importance of Mary in all Hispanic societies. The book makes for a valuable and fascinating read.

H. devotes part 1 to the evolution and spread of Marian cults from the Spanish Reconquista to the establishment of colonial rule in the Americas. The relationships between time periods and regions give rise to a convincing and enticing argument for the importance of placing each devotion in context, especially in Latin America. While the relationship between the Marian faith of the Spanish conquistadors and the evolution of local cults has been made elsewhere, H. highlights parallels between different regions. She suggests that there is a commonality or link between migrant experiences and Marian devotions, whether those of the Spanish conquistadors entering the Americas or of Hispanic immigrants coming into the United States. While much has been said about migrant identity and Marian devotions for the 20th century, H. suggests that we need a new reading of the role it played in multiple and far-ranging moments of Spanish and Latin American history.

Most current Marian research concentrates on particular Marian devotions and cults. H. focuses on a broader picture. This comparative analysis opens a discussion to the comparative phenomenology of this devotion beyond local history and theology. While one single book cannot exhaustively detail each cult, H. manages to present sufficient evidence to capture the meaning of Mary in each particular society. She asks what Mary signified to the conquistadors, or in the Andean indigenous revolts, or to Argentineans during Perón’s rule, while she continually also asks why these different societies turned to Marian devotion with such familiarity and emotion. H. suggests that there is a strong understanding of “real presence” that goes beyond normal Roman Catholic theologies of presence, with important iconographic and phenomenological implications. The author has formulated questions that can further a comparative discussion of all these issues.

I should mention some qualifications. First, H. touches only some of the hundreds of Marian cults and devotions that have existed in Latin America and Spain. One could, therefore, question the conclusions she presents precisely because her book is not sufficiently encyclopedic. Her greatest contribution, however, lies not in the taxonomy of these cults but in the questions she raises from her broad perspective. Second, her need to provide historical frameworks for her accounts can either make for a delightful and adequate reading or for too much detail, depending on the reader’s familiarity with those histories. Third, H.’s own familiarity with some regions more than with others plays itself out as some of her presentations are nearly anecdotally overwhelming while others are somewhat less than
sufficient. South America in general is touched upon more lightly than Mexico. However, again, her objective is to suggest different areas to which comparative analyses ought to move, which she succeeds in establishing. Finally, the most significant gap in her book is not regional but temporal. While devoting considerable attention the 15th and 16th centuries, insufficient attention is given to the evolution of cults throughout the subsequent two centuries. This lack is understandable in that professional historiography has yet to provide a thorough explanation of how Marian devotions became so widespread and significant in this period, a lack that H. leaves unrelieved.

Mary, Mother and Warrior raises questions and presents arguments that need to be studied and discussed further—issues about iconography, popular religious belief, the relationship between migration and Marian devotion, the role of religion in the conquest of the Americas, and the political implications of Marian language. As more publications begin to address the importance of Marian devotion in both Spanish and American societies, H.’s comparative methodology offers an approach that will shed much light on its history and evolution. I hope that H.’s challenge to contemporary scholarship will be taken up by different disciplines, thereby expanding our understanding of the role that Mary has played in the evolution of modern Hispanic societies.

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Admirers of Brito, Jesuit professor at Louvain-la-Neuve, will recall his earlier books on the Christology of Hegel (1981), creation according to Schelling (1984), Schleiermacher’s pneumatology (1994), and the philosophy and theology in Schelling (2000). This study of Fichte is more a library than a book. There are two presentations of Fichte on religion: a historical survey and an evaluative summary. They are preceded by multiple “introductions” giving the reasons for reconsidering Fichte, the state of research, the history of interpretation of Fichte and of his discussion of religion, a summary of the Christianity in Fichte and of Fichte in histories of Christianity, and interesting references and excursus on theologians mentioning Fichte. Is all this information on the German philosopher of value? “It is without doubt excessive to see [in him] an influence comparable to that of Hegel or Schelling; still, in certain circles of the university world, the work of Fichte enjoys today an undeniable prestige” (2).

In the years leading up to 1800, the age of Enlightenment yielded to the age of Romanticism and Idealism. Friedrich Schlegel proclaimed that three events—the French Revolution, Fichte’s Wissenschaftslehre, and Goethe’s Werther—introduced the modern era. “The movements of the external
world.” Schelling then wrote, “correspond according to a necessary law to the more quiet and deep metamorphoses taking place in the human spirit.” With Fichte, the technical beginnings of Kant’s analysis of the subject became the source and geography of all that is rational and spiritual. The self is the world of knowing and the new philosophy is the science of sciences. Fichte met the young Schelling at Tübingen in 1794 and in the same year became at Jena a colleague of Friedrich Schiller. Schelling established two streams flowing from the Absolute—nature and consciousness—both on similar journeys. Fichte, on the other hand, never renounced his monist elaboration of the solitary self, his key for thinking about revelation and church.

Christianity was never totally absent from Fichte’s thought. During his Jena period he drew religion and Christianity into practical and ethical expression, while subsequently in Berlin from 1799 to 1806 he looked more at God and Jesus. Throughout, a transcendental approach remains. “The kingdom of God, by taking on the form of the Wissenschafstlehre, liberates itself from historical faith; revelation and faith are ultimately absorbed in reason” (223). B. treats twelve works dealing explicitly with Christianity, ranging from a 1793 essay on revelation to the writings in 1798–1800 on atheism, two further late works on ethics and politics, and smaller works on the state and church, the Masons, and aspects of the New Testament. The 1792 Attempt at a Critique of All Revelation (which Kant found impressive) located the conditions for revealed religion in moral law, that is, in practical reason producing something useful to human society. The self suffices.

Through four parts B. historically traces the Fichtean enterprise as it moves from sermons to explicit critiques and, then, on to more positive evaluations of religion and Christianity. A fifth part treats that material synthetically, mustering chapters on the New Testament, the major dogmas of Christianity, Christian ethics, and mysticism. A conclusion of 30 pages looks critically into the religious meaning of the philosopher’s work.

Fichte struggled with theologians and church leaders as he insisted that faith, the message of Jesus, ministry in the church, and ethics are fashioned by the creative self—just as the history of art and the evolution of politics flow from the human spirit. He explored Jesus’ consciousness of being the Son of God while avoiding the Incarnation, for Christ is an idea made real in Jesus’ life, not a saving history. Not surprisingly, Fichte was seen as a challenge, an outsider, and a danger. Christianity is ultimately the realities of Trinity and Incarnation, and, while he tempered the controlling imperium of the “Ich,” his teaching could not accept an outside source of justification, revelation, or grace.

In his insistence on reducing any supra-natural realm to reason and being, on explaining religion and revelation as dramatic, cultural manifestations of the self, is he not a source of the following century and a half of liberal Protestant theology? Fichte may be important, as B. implies, more for the history of religion than of philosophy. “Fichte finds in the historical element of Christianity only sensed expressions of ultimate metaphysical truth. He preserves the Christian content only by suppressing the form of
faith to the mastery of the intellect. As his science unifies, it liquidates theology. Although he seeks to let his thinking grasp a real God, he refuses the divine personality. He is not an atheist but atheism easily emerges from what he leaves behind” (774–75).

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Only recently have some figures less central to the Roman Catholic Modernist movement received their due with full-length, critical biographies, for example, Brigitte Waché’s Monseigneur Louis Duchesne (1847–1922) (1992), and Christian Sorrel’s Liberalisme et modernisme: Mgr Lacroix (1855–1922) (2003). Less prominent does not equate with lacking in significance, as those and now Sardella’s study of Monseigneur Eudoxe Irénée Mignot make clear. Although the quantity of Mignot’s published contributions to the work of intellectual renewal was comparatively modest, his extensive correspondence with Alfred Loisy and Friedrich von Hügel among others, his initiatives with Roman authorities in support of issues central to their work, and, not least, his episcopal status make him well worth studying. S. confines his investigation to Mignot’s involvement with the intellectual issues of his time, notably the questions posed to the Catholic faith by critical reason applied to the Bible, to Christian origins, and to the body of Catholic dogma. His subject’s pastoral accomplishments as bishop of Fréjus (1890–1900) and archbishop of Albi (1900–1918) are intentionally left aside, as is his engagement in the conflicts between the Republic and the Church. Even with these limitations, this is a substantial work.

Part of the difficulty any would-be biographer faces with regard to Mignot is how to reconcile his involvement with Modernist questions and prominent Modernists with the orthodoxy requisite to the episcopacy. Even if he were exonerated of the accusation that passages from his writings were targeted in certain propositions of Lamentabili (1903), there remains the matter of his close association with Loisy, extending to approval of the manuscript of L’Évangile et l’église—which subsequently came under Vatican censure—and his unwillingness to admit the absolute incompatibility of Loisy’s work with orthodoxy. If Mignot’s own orthodoxy is to be upheld, it appears that a biographer would have to ignore Loisy’s consequences for the faith. Put plainly, either Mignot was a poor judge of character—of Loisy and his productions—and was thereby deceived, or the archbishop was perceptive indeed—more so than the Vatican—and silence all the more necessary.

In part 1, S. traces the formative influences on Mignot. Among those highlighted are heritage (Gallican roots), persons (the Sulpician John Hogan who introduced him to John Henry Newman’s work on develop-
ment of doctrine and to Newman’s example as a model of the intellectual believer), ideas and issues (Scholastic theology negatively, insofar as it failed to satisfactorily address current questions; biblical studies that provided a more positive alternative). This last interest developed more intensively after seminary and thus, like Marcel Hébert, Albert Houtin, Joseph Turmel, and many other Modernists, Mignot remained an autodidact with respect to historical criticism. An unpublished manuscript on the problem of biblical inspiration provides access to his mind on a controversial issue that was exercising Catholic scholars already in the 1860s and into the 1890s.

Part 2 commences with Mignot’s appointment as bishop of Fréjus. With it came his awareness of possibilities for action based on the Church’s assimilating the legitimacy of historical criticism and on the necessity of freedom for researchers. The ecclesial events of these years are familiar to any student of the period—the issuance of Providentissimus Deus (1893); the difficulties encountered by Loisy, the crisis precipitated by the publication of L’Évangile et l’église (1902), condemnation of five of the exegete’s books (1903); the formation of the Pontifical Biblical Commission; the Vatican condemnations of Modernism (1907)—well traveled terrain, but examined here from the episcopal perspective of Mignot. Access to unpublished writings and liberal extracts from correspondence shed light on both Mignot and the causes he supported.

Part 3 provides systematic consideration of Mignot’s positions on a number of issues: apologetics, faith and reason, revelation and criticism, development of dogma, and ecclesiology. The preceding historical sections enable S. to give a dynamic cast to these more systematic chapters, framing the issues that posed difficulties for Mignot, and highlighting how he evolved in attempting to meet those difficulties. Part of the overall strategy of the biography—to delineate Mignot by situating him in relation to others (for example, Maurice Blondel, Loisy, George Tyrrell, von Hügel)—is very effectively employed. S. brings many of the strands surfaced in parts 1 and 2 into clearer relation and solidifies the nature of Mignot’s contributions to the debates of his times.

This is a first-rate study, exhibiting mastery of primary sources and secondary materials, with appeal to more focused interests (Newman, seminary reform, and the status and functioning of the episcopacy) as well as to broader engagement with Modernism and French intellectual history of the period.


Joseph Turmel’s life (1859–1943) encompassed ordination to the Catholic priesthood and intellectual convictions that placed him among the ranks of freethinkers. Since these two incompatible commitments coexisted for several decades—he lost his Catholic faith a few years after his ordination as a result of his historical research on doctrine, but continued a sacramental ministry for several decades thereafter—unsurprisingly a paramount concern in his autobiography is a defense of his moral integrity. For, from the latter 1880s until his excommunication in 1930, T. labored with an intent not to reform, but to subvert, Catholic teaching. More subtly under his own name and more blatantly under pseudonym, he wrote to undermine the institution that had knowingly and systematically deceived its faithful. His self-perception emerges as that of an “apostle of truth”; that mission serves as justification for equivocation or indeed outright denial of authorship of pseudonymous writings. The institution that had lied to him in representing legendary material as veridical, in suppressing counterfactuals, and in sanctioning those who sought to bring the truth to light had forfeited all right to truth. T.’s autobiography provides a fascinating account of the corrosive effects of critical scholarship upon a seminary-trained Scholasticism at the time of the Modernist movement and beyond.

Originally written as an integral text, the autobiography initially saw publication in two parts, Comment j’ai donné congé aux dogmes (1935) and Comment l’Église romaine m’a donné congé (1939). While the first of these volumes occasionally appeared in antiquarian catalogs, the second has been virtually introuvable. Its republication as part of this reedition of T.’s works is a real service to those interested in the dynamics of the renewal movement known as Modernism and to those desiring further insight into the mindset of libre pensée, especially over the period of its expansion and high point.

T.’s foray into Marian dogma, published in 1907 under the name Guillaume Herzog, was one of those texts he had to explicitly disown when confronted with similarities between it and writings published under his own name. This reedition combines the version that appeared as a brochure shortly after La virginité Marielle’s serial publication, three contemporary critical pieces by Catholic theologians, and—ironically—a review by T. himself, written under his own name in response to a request from the editor of the Revue du clergé français to critically evaluate Herzog. La sainte vierge dans l’histoire reflects T.’s naturalistic interpretation of dogma...
as the product of human creativity in response to contingent circumstance, a stance that set him worlds apart from the exalted claims for Mary then advanced by neo-Scholastic theologians on the basis of their deductive method and recourse to the principle of fittingness.

Mariology is tied, theologically and historically, to the Christology that forms an underlying theme of *Les religions*. This writing belongs to the post-excommunication period of T.’s life and his organizational affiliation with free thought. It was designed to advance the latter’s agenda by giving a critical account of the evolution of religions. More than two-thirds of the book is dedicated to Christian development. T. accords to Marcionism a pivotal role in this history, catalyzing a break from Christianity as a movement of national liberation, terrestrial in its concerns, to a religion of mystical redemption effected by a divine savior. Critical dissection of religion is intended to liberate minds, opening them to an ideal religion of beauty, truth, and justice established on a materialist foundation. *Libre pensée* thus afforded T. a forum for continuing his apostleship of truth.

T.’s conviction that Christianity emerged in its recognizable form in the second century governs his interpretation of the Johannine corpus. *Deux écrits* brings together one of his pseudonymous works, Henri Delafosse’s *Le Quatrième Évangile* (1925) with *L’Apocalypse* (1938) published under his own name. Both reflect his use of source criticism to discern multiple layers in these texts. Tensions and ambiguities discerned in the Christology of the Fourth Gospel lead to the conclusion that an original Marcionite text that emerged around the first third of second century had been appropriated and extensively redacted by a Christian author in the last third of that century (creating a problem of why such an appropriation would have been made). A second-century Jewish origin is predicated of Revelation, again with later Christian appropriation and expansion. The texts are given in T.’s translation, showing the results of his attributions via his source critical reconstruction.

In 2003 *Libre Pensée Rennaise* dedicated a colloquy to T. and his work, emphasizing the concerns that united him with free thought: separation of church and state, the laic character of French schools, the critique of religion as a necessary condition of *laïcité*. Thus it is more T. the *libre penseur* than the Modernist that dominates these pages.

T. is a relatively neglected figure in Modernist scholarship, but one that merits closer scrutiny. Renewed scholarly interest in *libre pensée* suggests additional relevance for the reedition of his works.
ers’ rights, and a cultural and social critic. So O’Brien’s fine study portrays him, as he outlines Higgins’s social theology: his theological understanding of the meaning of work, of the rights and responsibilities of workers, of the role of organized labor in American democracy, of labor-management cooperation, and of justice for the poor. O. argues that Higgins’s social theology “rests on the idea of economic citizenship” (16), by which Higgins meant the right of workers to make decisions and to participate in decisions that affect their economic security. Economic citizenship, in turn, requires of all of us a recognition of and respect for workers’ labor, their contributions of the general welfare of society, and their inherent dignity as children of God.

After introductory chapters on public theology (he calls Higgins a “public intellectual”) and on the historical development of American Catholic social teaching, O. organizes his study chronologically in three chapters that focus on Higgins’s early development (1945–1962), his mature years (1963–1980), and the years after his retirement from the United States Catholic Conference (1981–1994). Throughout these chapters, O. uses Higgins’s “Yardstick” articles as a primary source for his thinking—and the evolution of that thinking—on a variety of issues facing the workers and the poor in American society. From 1945 to 1994, Higgins regularly prepared these brief essays on a host of social and cultural issues, essays that the National Catholic Welfare Conference distributed to Catholic newspapers across the nation. O. provides a very valuable, chronologically arranged bibliography of the “Yardstick” columns (246–304), in itself worth the price of the book for future researchers in American Catholic social thought.

O. represents Higgins as an inheritor of the social tradition of John A. Ryan, though by no means as a slave to that tradition and the natural law theories that informed Ryan’s approach. Coming out of the Catholicism of 1930s Chicago and of Reynold Hillenbrand, Higgins had a solid introduction to the emerging liturgical revival and mystical body theology that then influenced his conception of social regeneration. A new social order depends on a genuine spiritual renewal. Like many in the American liturgical movement, he was convinced that a renewed liturgy can act to convert the human heart to justice for the worker. His “Yardstick” articles reflected his wide reading in the liturgical movement and, then, of his appropriation of the theology of Vatican II (at which he was a peritus). In the post-Vatican II era Higgins promoted the conciliar teachings, was involved in the Catholic-Jewish dialogue, participated in the 1971 International Synod of Bishops, was the American bishops’ chief advocate on farm labor, and supported the rights of Catholic teachers and health-care workers to unionize. Higgins, the activist social thinker, took seriously the council’s call to dialogue with the modern world in an attempt to bring about better economic living conditions.

O. relies not only on Higgins’s columns but also on the bishops’ annual Labor Day Statements, most of which, between 1955 and 1990, Higgins himself wrote. Those statements reinforced his call for a strong labor movement that he believed “was necessary and essential for a vital democratic
When many in American society and in American Catholicism had taken up other social issues, Higgins remained publicly steadfast in his support for labor unions, making him the best known labor priest in the last half of the 20th century. “We are not likely,” he repeatedly wrote especially during the Reagan era, “to have a free and democratic society without a free and democratic labor movement. Trying to have economic democracy without unions is like trying to have political democracy without political parties” (189).

O. gives us a good introduction to Higgins and his importance in American Catholicism, situates him within his historical context, sympathetically interprets his multiple roles within the American Catholic Church, and provides future researchers with useful and needed bibliographies and a helpful index. I recommend the book not only for researchers but for a general readership. O.’s presentation of Higgins and Catholic social thought, written with clarity and without jargon, should have a wide appeal.

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This is the third in a series of histories published by the World Council of Churches; the previous two were finished in 1954 and 1970. It is a welcome addition to historical and ecumenical literature. Its comprehensiveness makes it both invaluable and yet extremely condensed, even in close to 700 pages. Its point of view is that of the World Council as it participates in ecumenical interaction, as one would expect. However, it gives significant treatment to other ecumenical developments, including those of the Catholic Church, around the world.

The volume consists of five sections: general perspectives, particular areas of ecumenical life, regional ecumenical developments, an essay on the changing shape of ecumenism, and bibliography and reference material. The five general essays in section 1 review the global context (Martin Marty), church trends (Lukas Vischer), evaluations of the ecumenical movement (Michael Kinnamon), church unity developments, theological and ecclesiastical (Melanie May), and Christian World Communions (Harding Meyer). Catholic theologians and ecumenists may find Vischer’s assessment of Catholic developments a bit one-sided and be disappointed that bilateral and full communion developments are so condensed. One also misses the specific attention given to changes within Catholicism that were noted in earlier volumes of the history. (While Catholicism has developed too slowly for some of its ecumenical colleagues, it has moved much more rapidly than some sectors of the church are ready to absorb.)

The issues treated in section 2 follow the priorities of the World Council during the years covered, touching missions, interfaith dialogue, ecumenical formation, spirituality, Scripture, ecumenical social thought, justice and
peace, racism and ethnicity, science and technology, and inclusiveness with special emphasis on gender. There is also a very useful analytical essay on the critics of the ecumenical movement, both within the member churches and outside. The lack of treatment of ecumenical efforts among evangelical Protestants, and the minimal discussion of their relationships with Catholics, Orthodox, and historic Protestants is a limitation in this section. Many areas where common witness has developed, for example surrounding the life issues, are not treated.

Section 3 presents possibly the most far-reaching single survey of historical material on regional ecumenical movements. The diversity of churches that dominate parts of the world, like Orthodoxy in Eastern Europe and the Middle East or Catholicism in Latin America, makes for a varied and rich texture of challenges and developments in interchurch relations. The fall of Marxism and apartheid in 1989 has influenced major sectors of ecumenical life, providing moments for both celebration and of challenge. The sectors covered include the Pacific, North America, Europe, Asia, Africa, the Caribbean, and the Middle East. The uniqueness of each of these situations demonstrates the amazing variety and challenge for reconciling global Christianity in its diversity of local situations. The Latin American contribution provides a progressive Protestant perspective on a largely Catholic and Pentecostal context. Still, it is particularly unfortunate that the last ten years of very fruitful collaboration between the Catholic bishops (CELAM) and the Latin American Council of Churches in building bridges to the Pentecostal churches was not included.

Section 4 ends with a discussion of the changing shape of the ecumenical movement. The interpretive perspective of the writer gives a sobering, realistic assessment of the growth that has taken place and the adjustments that are continually necessary as the churches move forward together on the pilgrimage toward that unity for which Christ prayed.

The WCC’s institutional structures and missional orientation were formed by European Protestantism and supported by Orthodox and Protestant leadership for decades before Roman Catholicism—the largest Christian community—began its gradual entry. It is difficult to overestimate the effect that 40 years of Catholic engagement has had on the movement studied here. The Catholic Church itself has been deeply changed in its self understanding and pastoral life by the decision at the Vatican Council to be fully ecumenically involved. That decision has changed relationships in the ecumenical movement and has transformed social religion differently in various parts of the world—a story that deserves to be further spelled out as part of the history presented here.

The efforts of the authors to provide a history that makes the story “accessible to the general reader” (xvii) may disappoint the technical scholar. However, the extensive bibliographies provide enough resources for anyone wishing to press further the research synthesized in the essays collected here.

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Loyola School of Theology has honored Luis A. G. Tagle, its former professor and, since 2001, Bishop of the Diocese of Imus, by publishing his doctoral dissertation as the first volume in its series of Landa Monographs. The dissertation, written at the Catholic University of America under the direction of Joseph Komonchak, was completed in 1991. In the preface, T. notes that although material on Vatican II published since 1991 would update and correct some portions of his work, it was decided to publish the original dissertation. He was able to make use of more recent material in writing the chapter, “The ‘Black Week’ of Vatican II (November 14–21, 1964),” which he contributed to volume four of the History of Vatican II (2003). The fact that Komonchak both directed T.’s dissertation and edited his chapter in the History gives us an initial assurance of the quality of his work.

The title of this volume indicates its twofold topic: the notion of episcopal collegiality as it was developed at Vatican II, and the influence of Paul VI on this development. “The Influence of Paul VI” is the subtitle. However, the original dissertation was entitled “Episcopal Collegiality in the Teaching and Practice of Paul VI (1959–1967).” This gives us reason to expect that the major contribution of the present volume will be the light it throws on the influence that Paul VI had on the way the doctrine of collegiality was hammered out in the course of the council. This expectation is verified. While T. offers a carefully researched and well-organized treatment of episcopal collegiality at Vatican II, this has also been done by others. And it is true that a great deal of light has been thrown on the role of Paul VI in the conciliar drama by the volumes published by the Istituto Paolo VI of Brescia. But I am not aware of any other book that gives so clear and detailed an account of the thinking of Paul VI on episcopal collegiality and of his influence on the formulation of this doctrine by Vatican II.

Here it will be possible to give only a few instances of what this volume has to offer. T. notes that in a discourse in which Cardinal Montini spoke of the coming council, he said that in a council the episcopal college can enjoy the papal prerogatives of infallible magisterium and supreme jurisdiction (51). This statement could be taken to mean that the pope confers what are strictly papal prerogatives on the council and thus is the source of its power. T. shows that this was certainly not the mind of Paul VI when he chose to promulgate the decrees una cum venerabilibus Patribus. T. found a clear expression of the meaning that formula had for Paul VI, in his Christmas message of 1963, where he said that the supreme power of the council “proceeds from that of the conciliar members united to the sovereign power of the pope” (108).

The principal contribution made by this volume is its detailed treatment of the key interventions of Paul VI with regard to chapter three of Lumen
The first of these was occasioned by the initiative of the moderators to propose a “vote of orientation” on four questions regarding collegiality. T. observes that Paul VI “definitely had a hand in the final version of these questions” (82), and concludes that “if the four questions with the three interpretative notes are to be taken as the central points of the doctrine on collegiality confronting the council, Paul VI would have voted yes to all four” (133).

T. gives a careful exegesis of the 13 “suggestions for the revision of chapter three” that Paul VI offered to the doctrinal commission, and concludes from the pope’s “respectful acceptance of the commission’s decisions on the thirteen modi . . . that he found the revised text confirmatory enough of Vatican I teaching on papal primacy, of the pope’s juridical independence from the college, and, to some extent, of the college’s dependence on the pope” (181). Finally, T. gives a detailed account of Paul VI’s involvement in the genesis and formulation of the Nota explicativa praevia in the light of which he wished chapter three to be understood. T. concludes: “It can be argued that the authoritative and official nature of NEP [Nota explicativa praevia] coming from the pope’s ‘authorship’ and its role in the final approval and promulgation of LG does not have to be denied to ‘relativize’ its theological import” (260).

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Inclusivism may presently claim the default position in Catholic theologies of religion, but things stand quite otherwise among Evangelical Christians whose strong sense of human depravity and firm insistence on the need for personal surrender to Christ incline them to an ecclesiocentric stance. Such was the posture that Terrance L. Tiessen—a professor of theology and ethics at Manitoba’s Providence Theological Seminary—found challenged when he concluded an investigation of Irenaeus on the Salvation of the Unevangelized (1993). In this current study he reassesses that claim. Troubled by questions about God’s justice that a strict ecclesiocentrism raises, T. devotes his first twelve chapters to constructing an “accessibilist” position on the availability of salvation, and then spends another eight chapters working out a carefully circumscribed view of the place of the religions in God’s providence.

In mounting his argument T. aspires to a strict Calvinist orthodoxy whose central doctrines are represented by the acronym TULIP (total depravity, unconditional election, limited atonement, irresistible grace, perseverance of the saints). It is this richly developed theological tradition that informs his position, both determining his articulation of the problematic and supplying scripturally supported premises for the 30 theses that comprise its resolution. At the same time he addresses a broader commu-
nity, providing a glossary of terms for those unfamiliar with the Calvinist lingua franca. He engages Evangelicals of other traditions, notably Armenians and Wesleyans, often taking care to show how one might arrive at his conclusions from their distinctive positions on grace and election. Catholic authors and magisterial figures receive a respectful hearing as well.

Who, then, can be saved? Besides the universally normative special revelation in Christ, T. finds scriptural warrants for recognizing both a general revelation and special, nonuniversally normative revelations. God, he posits, will hold only individuals accountable for their response to the revelation available to them, and T. appeals to the instance of the saints of Israel to ground the possibility that the response God elicits—to whatever mode of revelation God makes available—can qualify as saving faith. Given the axiomatic necessity of saving faith, in the hard cases of miscarriages, abortions, infants, and the mentally incompetent, he appeals to the nonreducibility of the human spirit to its material substrate to postulate the possibility of infant faith, a mysterious movement of the undeveloped human being in response to God’s gracious self-communication. Given the normative status of the revelation in Christ, T. further hypothesizes that all who have been gifted with saving faith will bring that faith to completion in an encounter with Christ at the moment of death. Finally, to safeguard both God’s justice and the doctrine of limited atonement, T. proposes a distinction: while God gives to all sufficient grace to render them responsible for their response to revelation, only the elect receive efficacious grace.

Thus T. develops his “accessibilist” position on the availability of salvation. What of the religions? No religion saves; God does. The religions of the world are ambiguous phenomena, humanly constructed responses to some form of divine revelation, but distorted by human fallenness and demonic deception. Their scriptures, lacking the inspiration of the Holy Spirit, bear a mixture of truth and error and hence other religions are not analogous to Israel as preparatory to the revelation in Christ. Christians, can, however, seek to discern in them traces of authentic revelation, and Scripture bears witness to the manner in which Israel appropriated concepts and practices from their neighbors without falling into syncretism, thus modeling the contemporary task of inculturation. Hence Christians today should engage in dialogue, the aim of which is mutual understanding, while frankly admitting their desire to share God’s special, universally normative revelation in Christ with all, including Jews. While other religions as such are not vehicles of saving grace, in God’s providence they may be instruments of common grace for the betterment of human kind, and this understanding encourages Christians to engage in interreligious activities so long as the basis proposed for such activities is not some fictitious religious common denominator. The same concern excludes the possibility of common worship.

Catholics may profitably read T.’s work as an admirable instance of theological inquiry at the service of the development of doctrine within the ethos of a tradition other than their own. T. exhibits none of the scornful
hostility toward Catholicism that has been a hallmark of American Evangelicals, and his performance commands a respect that William Dinges has found lacking in recent Vatican pronouncements on “sects” and “fundamentalism.” Coming from what William Shea has termed a “soft Evangelical” position, T.’s work offers an opportunity for mutually beneficial dialogue on religious pluralism, ecclesiology, and grace.

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WILLIAM P. LOEWE


The subtitle of this book concisely indicates the cultural and historical scope of this impressive study. David Katz, the Abraham Horodisch Chair for the History of Books at Tel-Aviv University, excels at tracing the historical, social, religious, and cultural factors that have affected how the Bible has been understood. This volume is not about the history of the Bible per se, but rather about the impact of the Bible on English culture, and the impact of that changing culture on how the Bible was viewed. K. clearly sets the contexts for the individuals and movements that he discusses, while he also frequently allows the major figures who played influential roles in the changing attitudes toward the Bible to speak for themselves, quoting entire paragraphs from their writings. Lesser-known persons whose influence was limited but nevertheless influential are also discussed. K. demonstrates a thorough command of both primary and secondary literature covering this English-speaking culture and period.

There is a forward movement in the successive chapters as K. moves the reader through the Renaissance, the Reformation, the age of scientific and Newtonian revolutions, Darwinian evolution, and the impact of geological and archeological studies, concluding with American fundamentalism—with suggestive chapter titles such as (3) “Cracking the Foundations: Biblical Criticism and the Newtonian Synthesis”; (5) “The Occult Bible: Aestheticization and the Persistence of the Supernatural”; (6) “Divine Copyright and the Apotheosis of the Author in Eighteenth-Century England”; and (8) “Unsuitable Paternity: Darwin, Anthropology, and the Evolutionist Bible.” There are also a methodological preface, “The Biblical Reader and the Shifting Horizon of Expectation,” and a conclusion, “The End of a World and the Beginning of Fundamentalism.” The volume closes with notes, suggestions for further reading, and an index.

The final sentences of this book are a good summary of the story traced by K.: “From the viewpoint of our story, the birth of the Fundamentalist movement brings us right back to the beginning, when scriptural authority was axiomatic and the Bible was self-evidently God’s Last Words to mankind. Far from being a deviant group of religious extremists, Fundamentalists are actually those whose theological position is closest to the mes-
sage of the Protestant revolution, while we are the ones who have gone into the sunset of the ‘horizon of expectations.’”

K. convincingly demonstrates that throughout the various periods some of the people who had tried in various ways to maintain the authority of Christianity and the Bible ironically contributed to undermining that viewpoint. Three examples will here suffice. During the Renaissance, the careful study of the text ended by revealing troublesome textual anomalies. Then again, Latitudinarians in the 17th century insisted that faith and reason were not contradictory; indeed reason was seen as an essential element of religious thought, a means for confirming the truth of revelation. Yet, when they rejected teachings such as the Trinity as offensive to rational thought, they subverted traditional Christian faith. Also in the 17th century, various studies of biblical chronology destabilized pious foundations. “The most ardent supporters of sola scriptura were so convinced of the impregnability of biblical authority that they fearlessly investigated every conceivable aspect of Scripture, and were amazed to discover that their examinations themselves caused irreparable cracks in the entire edifice” (74).

One is also struck by how dangerous it was throughout much of the period for people to question the truth and authority of the Bible. To cite only two examples among many: Thomas Woolston (1670–1733) of Sidney Sussex College, Cambridge, was found guilty of blasphemy in 1729, and being unable to pay the fine of £100, he remained in jail until his death four years later. More than 150 years later, William Robertson Smith was removed from his teaching position in Aberdeen for writing that Old Testament religion developed in an evolutionary manner from a relatively crude to a relatively mature form.

Whatever one thinks about the Bible, it is an incontrovertible fact the one cannot fully understand English history without understanding how the Bible has shaped English culture and how that changing culture has shaped the understanding of the Bible. K. provides an interesting and well-researched account in God’s Last Word.

United Bible Societies, Reading, England


Christopher West has undertaken the daunting task of making John Paul II’s “theology of the body” (TOB) accessible to a broad audience. The book is a detailed exposition of the 129 general audiences on TOB given by the late pontiff between 1979 and 1984, punctuated by the author’s own brief observations on various related issues. Organized according to “cycles” (the topics of the audiences), the book provides an extensive summary of and commentary on John Paul’s audiences, and each section concludes with a point-by-point review of the major issues raised. The book is as “user-friendly” as a theological summary of John Paul’s ideas can be; it also includes bibliographical resources and a detailed index.
W. acknowledges at the outset the difficulty that the lay reader may encounter with John Paul’s dense philosophical prose and even observes that some find his writings excessively repetitive. In defense, W. suggests that the most helpful perspective is to see John Paul’s writings as “spiraling” ever more deeply into the meaning of married life. W. provides a brief overview of Wojtyla’s philosophical background and suggests further reading for the interested student. The sections summarize, in chronological order, the main points of the TOB: its theological anthropology (“Original Man,” “Historical Man,” and “Eschatological Man”) and the pontiff’s understanding of marriage (“The Sacramentality of Marriage” and “Love and Fruitfulness”). The “Nuptial Mystery” is his guiding image in which the complementarity of man and woman reflects that of God and humanity, Christ and Mary, and the cosmos itself. W. explains how John Paul saw this metaphor as the most significant of all biblical metaphors. Also highlighted is the positive emphasis on embodiment characteristic of John Paul’s theology. Far from being anti-body, W. argues, Christianity is the very “antithesis” (11) of suspicion towards the body. The self-gift of couples to each other in marriage is a reflection of God’s own self-gift in his Son.

For many readers familiar with John Paul’s ideas, W.’s treatment of this theology will appear faithful and carefully done. His treatment will also appear uncritical, in the sense that this text is not meant to be a scholarly reflection on the TOB. W. shows how the late pope’s major foci—doctrines of God, Christ, Mary, sin and grace, sacraments and moral theology, with the exception of his social ethics—are all contained within this theology. W.’s patient and diligent exploration of the lengthy material is admirable, as is his listing of secondary resources.

W.’s book, along with the workshops he conducts and his web site, has popularized the TOB. At this reviewer’s institution, some undergraduate students have begun a study group on the topic, relying on W.’s faithful and exhaustive handbook on the topic. Yet, the TOB is not without its critics. Gender complementarity is at the heart of this theology, encompassing both husband-wife as well as God-human relationships. W. sees “God [as] symbolically ‘masculine’ as the Heavenly Bridegroom . . . woman stands as the archetype of all humanity” (141). John Paul’s creative and mystical reading of the Genesis accounts gives the TOB a biblical grounding, but not one with which all biblical readers and scholars may agree. This is a highly idealized understanding of marriage that reads Ephesians 5, for example, in the most positive light, and extols motherhood as “the whole constitution of woman’s body” (121). Marital life becomes a “liturgical way of life” (412) in which the body itself becomes a sacramental means of grace.

Such a view of marriage and the human relationship to God has much to commend it; contemporary society is in desperate need of an authentic approach to sexuality. Yet, for this reviewer and for others, the “nuptial mystery” so faithfully described by W. raises a number of concerns. First among them is John Paul’s “essentialist” understanding of sexuality, in which male and female sexuality are distinguished by their unique features: for men, it is the initiation of love, and for women, it is receptivity to love.
Although as humans, men and women are both receptive to God’s love and gift of self, this understanding results in women being seen as primarily receptive and men as initiators and therefore as more like God. A further concern is the extent to which this understanding of marriage offers meaningful resources for everyday married life. The positive responses by many adherents of the TOB would suggest an affirmative answer, but the statistics on American Catholics’ use of contraception, rates of abortion, and support for the ordination of women and a married priesthood suggest otherwise. Whatever one’s evaluation of the TOB, this book provides a thorough and admiring introduction.

_Loyola University, Chicago_  
_Susan A. Ross_


The recent untimely death of Stanley Grenz has deprived North American evangelical Christians of one of their greatest scholars. _Rediscovering the Triune God_, G.’s penultimate book, provides a glimpse of the style and scope that defined G.’s prolific career in service to the church. The book is an excursus on the first chapter of his celebrated _The Social God and the Relational Self_ (2001). It surveys the landscape of 20th-century trinitarian thought through the works of eleven theologians G. deems to have made the most significant contribution to the renewal of trinitarian thought in the last century. Each of these authors penned works commonly regarded as theological milestones. Four of the book’s five chapters summarize the contributions of these theologians and also provide separate summaries of the critical response to their work.

While not designed as a textbook, a survey such as this seems destined for classroom use. In that context, G.’s introductory narrative “from Arius to Hegel” is both helpful and yet somewhat limited. Contemporary debates about the Trinity, perhaps more so than most theological topics, cannot be understood without sufficient background. G. offers a telescoped presentation of this background that omits notables such as Bonaventure (also omitted in his presentation of Hans Urs von Balthasar) and dismisses the contributions of Thomas Aquinas and his heirs because, while they offered “rich theoretical achievements,” their theologies did not resonate with popular piety or religious experience. Such an assessment is unfortunate, since the demise of trinitarian thought is rightly attributed to decadent Scholasticism of the late Middle Ages and the manualist tradition rather than to Aquinas. On the other hand, G. offers keen rehabilitation of Friedrich Schleiermacher, usually dismissed as a symptom of trinitarian demise rather than a precursor of its revival. G. also includes a brief but helpful presentation on Hegel. It is his appreciation of these two 19th-century Germans that helps make the introductory chapter on 20th-century trinitarian theology immensely useful for the classroom.

Any survey of 20th-century theology is necessarily selective and thus
open to debate, but G.’s choice of theologians is fairly representative and adequate to his purpose. The survey begins, as one would expect, with Karl Barth and Karl Rahner. Catholic readers in particular will find G.’s emphasis on Barth useful and his overview of Rahner’s ideas and Yves Congar’s constructive response clear. The rest of the survey consistently engages the contributions of “the two Karls” as it presents triads of select theologians under the headings: “The Trinity as Fullness of History” (Jürgen Moltmann, Wolfhart Pannenberg, and Robert Jenson), “The Triumph of Relationality” (Leonardo Boff, John Zizioulas, and Catherine Mowry LaCugna), and “The Return of the Immanent Trinity” (Elizabeth Johnson, von Balthasar, and Thomas Torrance).

While G.’s presentation of each individual theologian is thorough and balanced, his organization of the triads mentioned above may cause some concern. For example, one cannot but wonder whether Moltmann’s overarching concern for social justice should not place him in the company of Boff. Additionally, the pairing of Johnson and von Balthasar may strike some as odd, given the penchant of the latter to subvert the foundations of modern theology in favor of the church fathers or Bonaventure, while Johnson affirms these foundations in her methodology, particularly in her pastoral concerns. Even if the logic of G.’s grouping may be questioned, the arrangement of the book remains clear, and G. presents the theologians in their own right, though often with fewer direct quotes or excerpts than one might have wanted. Additionally, G. painstakingly assembles the various responses these theologians have provoked and thus provides students with important questions about these theological proposals. G.’s writing style, however, can be frustrating at times; he quotes critics in paragraph after paragraph, repetitively dropping names in the text. Some editorial help could have cleaned up his presentation and made it more reader-friendly.

Despite these minor concerns, the volume successfully provides both students and teachers with a valuable resource. G. has offered a fine summary of one of the most important theological developments in the 20th century, and he has done so with an eye to engaging the Catholic tradition. This book, like so many of his earlier contributions, stands as a testimony to the growing fellowship between Catholic and Evangelical scholars. While such fellowship may draw the ire of some on the Evangelical side (G. suffered from such criticism), G.’s work does and will bear great fruit. And while recent years have seen the likes of G. proliferate, his death leaves open at least two important questions: (1) who else is willing to brave the charges of heresy on the Evangelical side to engage Catholic thought, and (2) are Catholic theologians prepared to reciprocate?

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Christopher McMahon

As priest, professor of law, and former member of Congress, Drinan has firsthand experience of the complexities involved in balancing the demands of God and Caesar. D. draws on a lifelong commitment to the cause of human rights to issue a passionate call for an enforceable international covenant protecting religious freedom, and a new international tribunal to monitor covenant compliance and provide a forum to which victims alleging violations of their religious freedom can present their claims.

D. argues that, despite a remarkable recent consensus that religious freedom is a fundamental human right, religious freedom has not received the protection that international law provides to other fundamental rights. This “neglect of religious freedom pulls apart the seamless garment of which all human rights are a part” (242). As befits a book whose title is itself a question, D. persistently raises (while declining to answer in any definitive way) a host of difficult questions that attend any attempt to respect the claims of religious conscience in a religiously pluralistic world.

A few examples convey the spirit of the book: How is law to protect sincere religiously motivated activity without unleashing religious zealots who wish to violate the rights of others? Does official recognition of a national religion inevitably make members of religious minorities second-class citizens? To what extent can a government properly support religion as a way of promoting the moral and social values that are necessary for common life? Can the state protect members of a majority religion from proselytizing by other religions? Would the rulings of a new tribunal on religious freedom ever find acceptance in the Muslim world? In China? And how would such a tribunal resolve conflicts that may arise between the rights of women enshrined in international law and the rights of religious groups to put into practice beliefs that some human rights advocates might understand to subordinate women?

That final question squarely presents the issue highlighted by the book’s subtitle: can the demands of religious freedom and the requirements of international law be balanced? As the preceding questions suggest, however, the book’s primary focus is actually on a significantly different balancing problem: can the mechanism of international law provide a useful framework for resolving the conflicts that inevitably arise between the demands of religious conscience and a government’s desire to function as the exclusive arbiter of order in society?

Political authorities often resist calls to limit what they understand as their sovereign prerogatives, whether those calls come from proponents of international human rights law or from religious individuals and institutions. D. contends that an enforceable international covenant based on the 1981 U.N. Declaration on Religious Freedom might provide the moral and political principles that could establish an armistice between government and religion. A tribunal charged with monitoring covenant compliance would provide a forum for the nations to engage in the moral, political, and legal dialogue necessary to forge greater consensus on what religious freedom appropriately demands in the face of the requirements of just public
order. As D. notes, however, experience with an already existing regional tribunal, the European Court of Human Rights, suggests that the balance struck under international law may weigh heavily in favor of maintaining governmental authority to restrict religiously motivated conduct. Can we reasonably hope for significantly better results from a new U.N. tribunal dedicated to the issue of religious freedom?

The dialogue D. expects from an international tribunal might over time bear fruit. He could have assisted that dialogue by developing further his discussion of the contribution to the moral framework needed for vigorous protection of religious freedom made by Vatican II’s Declaration on Religious Freedom. The promising heart of that framework lies in a dual recognition: human dignity demands protection for responsible freedom, and the state’s role in promoting the common good is limited, thus placing moral limits on the state’s legitimate use of legal coercion.

John Noonan asserts that the “central problem of the legal enterprise is the relation of love to power.” D. concludes his provocative book with a related insight—an insight that constructively qualifies his faith in international law. “Law is a feeble instrument to bring about [the] laudable objective” of peaceful coexistence between God and Caesar. “If law is to be effective, it must be joined with love—and love for others is at the core of every religion and every code of conduct” (245–46). Perhaps the balance D. hopes to promote will only be attained when those who wield power themselves recognize the moral limits of what properly can be achieved through law—limits demanded by loving respect for persons whose dignity, and therefore whose rights, are rooted in the gift of God’s love for each member of the human family.

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**Gregory A. Kalscheur, S.J.**


In five chapters Eberhard Schockenhoff informatively traces through and develops historical, modern, and biblical conceptions of the term “conscience.” Those familiar with S.’s work might be surprised that he takes the personal experience of conscience as his starting point for addressing a very modern concern, namely, the question of the reliability and credibility of conscience. Such a reflective method, he claims, offers the only way of formulating an adequate understanding of conscience for our times.

In chapter 1, S. searches out how conscience operates in human societies. He gives many historical examples that highlight perennial understandings of following one’s conscience and of the personal formation of conscience (e.g., Antigone, Socrates). But he also turns to modern understandings of the operation of conscience, for example, the conscience of research scientists who do not want to act against their consciences, even when refusing to do so might well cost them their jobs. Among these many examples of adherence to personal conscience, and our usual individualistic under-
standings of them, however, S. does not find an adequate understanding of conscience.

For a more adequate understanding, S. insists that we must view even personal conscience as essentially a social reality; it is substantively shaped by the type of society within which the individual lives. He then compares and contrasts conscience within free and totalitarian societies. There is the example of the person who boycotts taxes because of the governmental use of taxes for, say, bombing of civilians. S. normatively claims that those standing in protest must allow no doubts about the seriousness of their decisions, and that often the best way to demonstrate that seriousness is by accepting into themselves the consequences of their actions. Possible sanctions must be endured personally. Within a fairly healthy society, such tactics hold some promise of becoming sources for the development of law.

The strategies of the conscience must be considered differently in a totalitarian regime. Here S. speaks of the dangers of the manipulated conscience. He discusses conscientious objection and official protest as an aspect of Christian responsibility (with attention to Franz Jägerstätter [1907–1943]). (S. frankly admits that, despite the church’s long history of reflection on this topic, its distant attitude to conscience has led to its own lack of credibility, augmenting our contemporary problems with the reliability of conscience.)

In chapter 2, S. surveys the biblical dimensions of conscience. The Old and New Testaments are examined for their understanding of conscience (with the focus on the Epistles of Paul). Here S.’s treatment of biblical understandings of conscience is not exceptional.

S.’s third chapter presents the positions of Augustine, Thomas Aquinas, and John Henry Newman on conscience. Newman especially informs S.’s treatment. In an appendix to this chapter, S. points out the (hermeneutical) critical points between empirical psychology/sociology and theology and suggests a way for a beneficial combination of the different perspectives. He insists here and throughout that it is important to pay attention to the theological sources, for both the scientist and the theologian.

Chapter 4 examines in detail the texts of the Second Vatican Council. S. begins by acknowledging the current embittered controversy regarding the interpretation of the council, suggesting as a corrective a hermeneutics that gives space for the pastoral character of the texts while acknowledging our difficulties in understanding the council.

Regarding conscience in the documents, there appear two distinct conceptions, one Scholastic and the other influenced by a modern theology. Both lines of thought, S. correctly claims, influence his own approach to conscience as presented in chapter 5, “Freiheit um der Wahrheit willen” (Freedom for the Sake of the Truth). Truth and freedom cannot be separated from each other. Conscience is essentially related to both. On the one hand, the formation of conscience depends on the truth. On the other hand, moral truth can only be grasped within the freedom of the human person.

I recommend this book for its explication of conscience for modern times and its integration of theological resources into that understanding. It is
written from a European perspective with typical European examples. However, S. also refers to North American authors (for example, William C. Spohn). He also claims the importance of the contemporary concept of the Other (der Andere), relying on Paul Ricoeur, Emmanuel Levinas, and parts of the ethics of Jesus. However, this line of influence is briefer than the reader might expect. Nonetheless, the variety of examples and the courage in presenting an extraordinary approach to the problem of conscience contribute to the vividness of the book.

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Kerstin Schlägl-Flierl


This book is the 13th volume in the “Basic Bioethics” series published by MIT Press. As its subtitle suggests, recent advances in genetics and in bioengineering raise limit questions about the descriptive and prescriptive functions of concepts of nature and human nature and the appropriate relations between them. Arthur Lovejoy once traced dozens of definitions of “nature” as a literary notion; there is probably a similar number one could assign to the meanings of nature in theoretical and applied ethics. Nature has long been a central normative appeal in various philosophical and religious traditions. In the wake of Hume’s critique, earlier views that assumed the relevance of nature to moral reflection have fallen on hard times. Yet questions about the normative status of nature and human nature are unlikely to be either resolved or set aside any time soon. Instead, they are raised in perhaps their starkest form by recent developments in genetics and bioengineering. Unless one is prepared to argue that nature and human nature are endlessly malleable, genetics and biotechnology confront us with fundamental challenges about where to draw appropriate lines in our blueprints for altering the world and ourselves. In the process, we call ourselves to account in quite material terms: do genetics and biotechnology, with their accruing powers, emerge as different merely in degree from earlier forms of human dominion, or, at some point do these interventions so alter the human prospect that they become different in kind by subverting any further claims for the constancy of human nature as a coherent notion?

Rather than focusing on the rapidly changing details of current science, *Is Human Nature Obsolete?* addresses larger philosophical, theological, and sociocultural questions posed by recent efforts at genetic engineering applied to human beings. The book assembles papers from a 2001 conference at the University of Scranton, and focuses on two core issues: “Does genetic engineering of humans require a new understanding of what it means to be human?” and “should [there] be effective limits to what can be done?” (3). In four sections, it considers historical perspectives, the rela-
tions between notions of embodiment and self-identity, contested notions of essentialism and teleology in the light of human freedom, and sociopolitical critiques of issues of institutional power and distributive justice posed by the global context of genetic developments.

Virtually without exception, the book’s 14 chapters are well written, wide ranging, and engaging. They offer various disciplinary lenses that invite similar themes to be distinctively refracted in ways that allow rich comparisons and contrasts to be drawn among the contributions. All the chapters deserve careful reading, but four are especially noteworthy in their arguments from two quite different vantages. From one side, Mark Sagoff and Paul Rabinow dismiss appeals to a fixed human nature as outmoded. Sagoff explores the traditional distinction between nature and artifice and concludes that recent human genetics poses fundamental challenges to the continuing cogency of that dichotomy. While sympathetic to the cultural and political issues raised by human genetic engineering, he ultimately calls for the development of a new ethic of responsibility. In the absence of an essentialist vision of human nature arises the real challenge of engineering the genome: “not so much that it will alienate or separate us from our human nature . . . but that it will increasingly make us responsible for it” (90). Paul Rabinow echoes Sagoff’s conclusion, but offers an interesting gloss by drawing on insights from Freud and Weber. According to Rabinow, in accepting the scientific demystification of the natural world, we thereby foreclose the essentialist illusions of the past and face truthfully both the possibilities and the perils of self-production at the genetic level.

From the other side, Jean Bethke Elshtain and Lisa Cahill defend the continued relevance of appeals to human nature as a constraint upon the visions of unfettered freedom championed by constructivists and technophiles. Elshtain criticizes the unrestrained vision of genetic enthusiasts for its thoroughgoing rejection of the “sphere of the unchosen.” As an antidote, she urges that we acknowledge the “complex nature of human embodiment” (163) and “challenge cultural projects that deny finitude” (170). Finally, Cahill, in a prophetic critique, blends elements from Catholic social thought and Reinhold Niebuhr’s Christian realism to confront issues of maldistribution, including future genetic resources, which generate the scandalous disparities between the world’s haves and have-nots.

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ANDREW LUSTIG


David Kelly has written a well-researched and, at times, provocative book on Catholic health care ethics. He provides a unique historical perspective on the theological basis, methods, and applications involved in the formation of that ethics. These three areas constitute the major divisions of the book, which conclude with a glossary and an extensive bibliography.
In examining each of the three areas, K. recognizes that it was Catholic moral theologians who had done the most extensive work in health care ethics before the bioethics trend that began in the United States in the 1960s.

The importance of a creative tension when making health care decisions is a theme running throughout the book. K. proposes that theology prevents a too facile resolution of complex issues, reminding us that we are not totally of this world and that the material realm cannot answer all human needs and hopes. The basis of our human dignity, K. states, “arises in large measure from the fact that God has created us with this predestiny to transcend ourselves, to move beyond our own horizons and that of our surroundings, to share in God’s life” (16). In the practical realm, this tension plays itself out in the Catholic Church’s teaching on death and dying—in the distinction it makes between ordinary and extraordinary means—a tension that allows us to respect life, but also allows us to not do everything possible to stay alive.

In the section on method, K. covers familiar ground, describing various ways to formulate ethical conclusions while especially highlighting the Catholic Church’s natural law approach. K. shows how this approach developed historically, shifting from “physicalism” (with an emphasis on human nature) to personalism (focusing on “the personal or human dimensions of the act in its circumstances” [95]). He uses the example of birth control to highlight this shift, and describes how the Church came to accept the use of a woman’s sterile period to prevent conception. K. emphasizes principles, especially the principle of double effect, and their application to acts. Although he acknowledges that the use of principles can lead to incongruities and untenable positions (for example in the case of an ectopic pregnancy where principle seems to support the removal of the tube and the embryo but not just the embryo), he nevertheless remains focused on principles and their application. He does not describe the role of conscience or the virtue of prudence in making medical decisions, and one may, therefore, conclude that, for him, right reason may be found only in the proper application of principles. His goal is to better define the principles and improve their use.

In his last section on application, K. reveals a strong hospital-based orientation. Most of the chapters in this section deal with death and dying in an institutional environment—with emphasis on medical technology, decision-making capacity, and institutional concerns such as ethics committees and futile treatment. Through a study of court cases he traces the historical development of institutional policies regarding the withdrawal of treatment and physician-assisted suicide. His last two chapters deal with the allocation of scarce health care resources, but here too his context is institutional. For example, he makes no reference to those who are chronically ill or disabled, or to nursing services or rehabilitation and equipment needs, surely central concerns in home care. Health care for these individuals is an ongoing need, involving nontechnological issues such as family relationships that institutional analysis fails to capture.
Overall, K. provides a solid, well-written text for those who wish to understand contemporary Catholic health care ethics. His focus, however, is institutional on both the ecclesial and the health service sides. There is little mention of the creative work that women and virtue ethicists have done in medical moral theory. Likewise, although he claims his approach to be holistic, it appears that K. views morality as totally external to the human agent (one might conclude this from the fact that he presents no moral psychology, except for a brief chapter on human freedom). Nevertheless, to properly understand institutional aspects of the Catholic moral tradition on health care, this book should be consulted.

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MARILYN MARTONE


The legal and deliberate killing of incarcerated persons by any state as a penalty for crimes presents a major ethical problem to all moral traditions that revere human life. That practice is also an important theological problem for religious traditions, especially those that proclaim the sacred worth of humans and the central norm of universal love. The theological and ethical questions associated with capital punishment in the United States are the primary focus of Religion and the Death Penalty. Not surprisingly, both proponents and opponents of the penalty in this collection argue that their positions are grounded in reverence for life and commitment to the common good.

Most of the 17 essays were originally papers given at a 2002 conference sponsored by the University of Chicago. The three editors were, at publication, doctoral students. Besides the editors, the contributors include theologians, ethicists, lawyers, legal scholars, governors, a political philosopher, a senator, a justice, and a journalist. They are united, according to the introduction, in recognizing the important role that religion plays in the controversy (15). A central purpose of the book, then, is to show how religion influences the debate and how it should do so in the United States. (Reciprocal influences between religious institutions and surrounding cultures are regularly evident in these pages—with both good and bad effects coming ambiguously from both directions, despite the editors’ apparent assumption that the influence is unidirectional: religious institutions shaping culture.)

“Religion” was not broadly represented in the selection of authors. Nineteen of the 21 are Protestant or Catholic Christians. A Jew and a Muslim are the others. Yet, the essay by Islamic legal scholar Khaled Abou Fadl is one of the most potent in the collection. He destroys the stereotype of Islam as a blood-lusting faith. Being “extremely reluctant” to impose the penalty, Muslim jurists erected strong barriers against its use, including the demand for certitude of guilt. (One wonders: if a “no doubt,” rather than “no reasonable doubt,” standard of evidence were operative in the United
States, as Governor Frank Keating proposes, would capital punishment then be rare, perhaps even a paper penalty?)

Catholic theological and ethical thought is not well represented. Cardinal Avery Dulles devotes his space to a procedural argument, namely, that recent magisterial opposition to the death penalty is not a reversal but rather a continuation of the moral tradition—a prudential judgment based on social conditions in the United States and similar countries. Justice Antonin Scalia disagrees with Dulles and the encyclical Evangelium vitae. He argues that his support for the death penalty, grounded on Romans 13:1–5 as a proof text, represents the true Catholic tradition.

“Liberal” Protestant theological and ethical thought, the tradition with which I identify, is not represented. This is not a grievous loss, since many of the moral concerns on which humanistic Protestants focus—such as the injustices in the administration of the penalty from legal corruption and incompetence to racial and class discrimination, and the need for alternative means of social protection and restoration—are well expressed in the testimonies of Governor Mario Cuomo, Senator Paul Simon, Governor George Ryan, and, most poignantly and powerfully, public defender Jeanne Bishop. Moreover, the competent biblical exegesis of Michael Westmoreland-White and Glenn Stassen will warm the hearts of liberal Protestants. Reviewing all relevant texts, they subvert the simplistic proof-texting characteristic of much Christian support for the death penalty. Still, the views of some liberal theologians and ethicists would have been valuable as a counter to Stanley Hauerwas, Gilbert Meilaender, J. Budziszewski, Victor Anderson, and others, on such questions as the purposes and limits of punishment, the meaning of restorative justice for both offender and society, and the bonds of the moral community.

Combined, the essays raise nearly all the important concerns in the current social conflict, from cases for and against retribution to disagreements about the legitimacy of confessional arguments in the public forum. Justifiably, deterrence is not a major focus here, as it might have been in the past, because there is no clear correlation between the existence of the penalty and the incidence of capital crimes, and because of growing doubts about the justice of killing one person to discourage others from murdering.

One major religious problem, however, receives only passing attention: capital punishment as blood satisfaction for victims’ families to effect “closure.” The state becomes the therapeutic avenger. This increasingly prominent justification of capital punishment appears to be rooted in an intertwined religious fundamentalism and cultural “vendettism.” It warrants full exposure and clear condemnation. In the religious traditions represented in this book, both supporters and opponents of the death penalty surely can find one patch of common ground in censuring this rationale.

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JAMES A. NASH

Working in the analytic tradition, this Irish philosopher mounts a pains-taking argument against noncognitivist, subjectivist, skeptical, projectionist, and relativist theories of morality. While his argument is formally quite different from Charles Taylor’s demonstration of the fundamental incoherence of a subjectivist account of “authenticity” (The Ethics of Authenticity [1992]), it is similarly successful. I have quibbles regarding his treatment of some side issues, but find his argument sound, save that it does not decisively show as insupportable all forms of relativism.

M. supports a form of “folk morality” or a “common sense,” everyday understanding of moral objectivity over against those who deny the objectivity of moral claims. Moral objectivity requires, roughly, (1) that moral judgments can be judged true or false; (2) that two or more individuals can affirm the same moral judgment; (3) that at least sometimes one can derive “ought” from “is.” The first requirement is supported by demonstrations, primarily against noncognitivists, that such theories simply cannot account for aspects of moral judgments we actually make. The second requirement is supported primarily by arguments against those who find third-person claims cannot be equivalent in force to first-person moral claims.

With respect to the third requirement, M. takes on Hume and his successors by significantly improving on John Searle’s demonstration that, in at least some cases, proper factual descriptions of social actions entail moral claims. He marshals predominantly commissive speech acts, such as betting, oath-taking, borrowing, and promising. Even the Machiavellian politician (who does not accept a moral notion such as “promises made ought to be kept”) is capable of describing another’s making a promise. If then the Machiavellian says that “she is not under an obligation to fulfill that promise (or to tell the truth under oath, or to return what one has borrowed, or to pay up when one loses a bet), his utterances are incoherent. When I perform a commissive speech act, I give another a right to have me fulfill my commitment (as a theory of “rights transfer” would have it). As having or transferring rights is a moral notion, so commissives carry not only a generic, but also a moral, obligation. Hence, the third requirement is fulfilled; indeed, it seems analytically true (and is so from the perspective of “folk morality,” according to M.).

By using a Machiavellian for one of his exemplars, M. goes far to support (2) and finds no sufficient reason to deny (1) (“How in heaven could you say it is false that one ought fulfill one’s commitments?”). True third-person descriptions of commissive acts entail a moral judgment about the rightness of fulfilling the commission. M. supports his case with extensive arguments against those who would oppose this view or some of its necessary conditions: inter alia, Williard V. O. Quine, Hilary Putnam, Gilbert Harmon, Philippa Foot, and William D. Hudson.

M.’s theory of “rights transfer” is not entirely convincing. However, even if my commissive speech act does not transfer a right, it does, as Searle
finds, put me under an obligation; M.’s brief argument against Searle’s view that this is not a “moral” obligation is convincing, so even if the “rights transfer” account does not stand, the fundamental argument for (3) is not undermined. M. also argues that humans have three fundamental natural rights: to life, bodily integrity, and to freedom of action, the last of which makes it possible to transfer subsidiary rights. Even if one might be unconvinced by a pluralistic, naturalistic foundation for objective morality in universal human rights, one could note that humans in society would have the ability, if not the “liberty right,” to engage in commissive acts, and that would be sufficient to support (3). Such a theory would leave open the possibility of a “social relativism” in morality—that moral rights and duties are inextricably bound to the particular society to which one belongs and that it is not clear that all societies have just the same range of moral rights and duties. Hence, M.’s argument may not defeat all forms of relativism.

Along the way, M. develops elegant descriptions of moral conflict to show how such conflict does not undermine moral objectivity. The use of examples and telling counterexamples brings many an “aha!” moment in reading his argument. One never loses track of just where one is in the battle M. wages for an objective account of morals despite the complexity of the argument and the number of envisioned opponents. Many will think such an argument unnecessary (because they never thought morality anything but objective) or excessively abstract (as it deals little with moral practices or moral dilemmas), but it is a challenging and worthwhile exercise to work through M.’s argument.

The University of Dayton

TERRENCE W. TILLEY


Models of the Eucharist is an expansive liturgical, sacramental, and theological study of the Eucharist as it is celebrated each Sunday in its various approaches and modes of enactment. The book is divided unevenly into three parts. Part 1 (3–38) focuses on contemporary issues that surround Sunday Eucharist, such as poor Mass attendance, eucharistic devotions, Sunday celebrations with deacon and/or lay presiders, and the polarization between “liberal,” “orthodox,” and “conservative” Catholics that often divides rather than unites people under the banner of “Eucharistic Banquet.” Part 2 (39–292) takes up ten Eucharist models outlined below. Part 3 (293–330) consists of one concluding chapter entitled “A Liturgical Eucharistic Spirituality.”

In part 2, Irwin delineates ten models of the Eucharist, which I here list by title and brief description. Model 1, the Cosmic Mass, integrates creation theology and creation spirituality, coupled with the principle of sacramentality. Model 2, the church’s Eucharist, is a traditional Catholic interpretation of ecclesial and liturgical ministry of the Eucharist, maintain-
ing that the Eucharist builds the church and the church makes the Eucharist. Model 3, the Effective Word of God, provides a theological rationale for a richer understanding of the table of God’s Word or the ambo as a means of spiritual enrichment and empowerment. Model 4, the Memorial of the Paschal Mystery, is a biblical, liturgical, and theological explication based on Jesus’ table injunction to “do this in memory of me.” Model 5, Covenant Renewal, concentrates on covenantal themes within the liturgy, recalling especially biblical covenant pericopes. Model 6, the Lord’s Supper, focuses on the epiclesis prayer within the four primary eucharistic prayers of the Roman Rite. Model 7, Food for the Journey, integrates the theme of healing embodied in the Catholic Sacrament of Anointing the Sick (Rite for Pastoral Care of the Sick: Rites of Anointing and Viaticum [1972]). Model 8, Sacramental Sacrifice, explores the classical Catholic concepts of sacramental presence and eucharistic sacrifice within the liturgical action of the Sunday celebration. Model 9, Active Presence, is based on various interpretations of real presence and the mode of change that takes place during a Catholic Mass, as understood throughout conventional ecclesiastical history. Model 10, Work of the Holy Spirit, highlights the role of the Holy Spirit within the liturgy, especially through the performance of the epiclesis (invocation) joined with the anamnesis (making memorial), evoking rich trinitarian theology.

While I.’s list is helpful, Models of the Eucharist has some significant limitations. Its first obvious weakness is its lack of evaluative analysis; missing, for example, are sections at the end of each chapter or at the end of the book that discuss the strengths and limitations of each model. Such analyses would help the reader to identify pastorally, and comprehend more fully, the liturgical and theological advantages and disadvantages of each model. Second, and related to this first problem, is the book’s lack of any table or chart by which each model could be juxtaposed to the others, and through which the theological ramifications and pastoral outcomes of each model could be highlighted. Third, the overall study is ecumenically inadequate, both in scope and in theology. I. does present a few pages on intercommunion (85–92) and on the Lutheran understanding of the Eucharist (220–25). However, in both sections the Catholic position is simply asserted as justified. Since Eucharist is both a common element in liturgical Christian denominations and since we are called as theologians to be ecumenically sensitive in today’s world, this lack of ecumenical concern is glaring. Fourth, although I. repeatedly returns to the term spirituality, it would seem that the theme he is actually trying to tap into would be more accurately described as discipleship and not spirituality per se—discipleship being an overarching paradigm for Christian living, and spirituality fitting within that paradigm, as one facet of discipleship. It is interesting and baffling that the term discipleship is not mentioned once in the entire text. Fifth, I. has put little effort into incorporating inclusive language or into taming ecclesiastical and dated sources written emphatically in non-inclusive languages. Yet, despite these minor deficiencies and shortcom-
ings, the classifications of *Models of the Eucharist* are still a helpful and thoughtful contribution to liturgical and sacramental theology.

_Silver Lake College of the Holy Family,_  
_Maniowoc, Wis._  
ARTHUR DAVID CANALES


Since the landmark works of Gerald McCool, S.J., there has been a growing body of work explaining the historical development of Thomism in the 20th century and assessing its potential to prompt creative contemporary philosophy and theology. In this book, Murphy makes an important contribution to this literature, presenting a vivid intellectual biography of one of the most prominent Thomists of the last century.

M.’s approach to Gilson is refreshing in a number of ways. Unlike many authors, who have viewed Gilson primarily as an eminent historian of philosophy, M. presents a strong case for reading him also as an innovative philosopher. She shows that Gilson’s work as a historian led him to develop a “perspectival” approach to philosophy. According to M., Gilson carried out in philosophy something analogous to what Cubists had done in painting; Gilson viewed Aquinas’s philosophy from a variety of perspectives, drawing a vast array of sources together into a unified and harmonious philosophy. Although, the keynote of Gilson’s philosophy is certainly Thomistic, Gilson incorporated insights from thinkers as diverse as Henri Bergson, Dante, Erasmus, Lucien Lévy-Bruhl, Bonaventure, and Blaise Pascal. The fact that Gilson was able to bring together such diverse resources without falling into mere eclecticism is in large part what makes him a philosopher worthy of serious consideration (275–89).

The book is organized chronologically, and the main themes are developed through an account of Gilson’s growth to maturity as a thinker, beginning from his early childhood through his studies and various teaching positions, to his role as a leading figure in European and North American Catholic philosophy. Special attention is given to Gilson’s role in recovering the historical study of medieval philosophy as well as his place in the contentious debates over Christian philosophy, critical realism, and esthetics. Through M.’s vivid prose these controversies come to life, giving the reader a good sense of the vitality they had at the time.

Of special interest is M.’s concluding chapter that highlights aspects of Gilson’s influence on contemporary theology. She shows, somewhat surprisingly, that Gilson’s thought plays an important role in Hans Urs von Balthasar’s theology of the Trinity, creation, and Christ (331–32, 335–37, 339–40). Less surprising is her account of Gilson’s impact on the theology of Herbert McCabe (334–37, 341–42) and Thomas Weinandy (331–34, 338–39, 341–42). Her treatment of contemporary theology, although brief, is
insightful and brings out an aspect of von Balthasar’s thought that is too often overlooked.

However, M. neglects to give any attention to Gilson’s continuing influence in philosophy. In this respect one would expect some mention of Gilson’s impact on W. Norris Clarke’s philosophy of the person, John Callaghan’s epistemology, John F. X. Knasas’s account of being, or John Haldane’s philosophy of mind. Further, while M. discusses Gilson’s appreciation of Heidegger’s metaphysics, she does not mention John D. Caputo’s influential *Heidegger and Aquinas* (1982). Caputo argues at length that neither Gilson nor Aquinas avoid falling into what Heidegger saw as the chief sin of philosophers, “forgetfulness of Being.” Since Caputo’s work presents an important challenge to Gilson’s philosophical project, M. should have addressed it.

The only other criticism I would make of M.’s account is that she overemphasizes the importance of Gilson’s reaction to so-called “Roman Thomism,” that is, the use of Aquinas by priests who had influence in the Holy Office, such as Charles Boyer, S.J., and especially Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange, O.P. While Gilson often makes passing references to anachronisms in neo-Scholastic uses of Aquinas, he rarely offers a detailed argument against these authors. (The one exception is Gilson’s book *Thomist Realism* [1984].) M. mentions Garrigou-Lagrange in almost every chapter, even though there are only about five pages in Gilson’s entire corpus that directly discuss him. This gives the impression that refuting neo-Scholastics was one of Gilson’s dominant passions. Yet, I would argue that Gilson was far more concerned to demonstrate the importance of medieval philosophy to his secular university colleagues than he was with ecclesiastical infighting. In fact, this is partly why his work remains relevant for contemporary philosophy and theology.

Nevertheless, M.’s account of Gilson is dynamic and filled with vitality. Unlike so many of Gilson’s admirers, M. eschews a dry academic style. Rather, she strives to imitate Gilson’s beautiful prose, which she does with remarkable success. In this work Gilson’s thought and personality are brought to life in an engaging manner. Accordingly, this book will surely interest anyone concerned with the recent history of Thomism and its prospects for the future.

*Newman Theological College, Edmonton*  

J. L. A. WEST

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This is a book worthy of its subject—artful, comprehensive, paradoxical, informative. Joakim Garff may know Kierkegaard’s books and papers better than Kierkegaard himself did. No student of Kierkegaard, no matter how long he has been at it, can fail to learn from this book. I myself have been reading and lecturing on him all my life, but G.’s biography often
made me wonder if I had ever before really gotten the hang of the Dane. G. is fortunate to have as his translator Bruce Kirmmse to whom we are indebted for Kierkegaard in Golden Age Denmark (1990) and Encounters with Kierkegaard (1996).

The book is divided into parts and the parts into years, but the operative atoms of the book are the titled sections making up the parts, each a well-wrought essay. Life and literature are intertwined here, as they were for Kierkegaard. G.'s claims that the books and mounds of papirer were a sustained effort on Kierkegaard's part to shape his own life for posterity. On this assumption, G. moves carefully through passages that seem factual and objective, but he is on the alert for what we are not given. Kierkegaard has found in G. the man who may be his definitive biographer; we are given the subject, warts and all.

G. opens and closes with Regine Olsen, but Kierkegaard's broken engagement with her is only one of the major elements in his life on which new light is shed. Another is Kierkegaard's relationship to his father—and to a lesser degree to his brother Peter—where G. seeks clues for the mystery of the broken engagement. The final attack on the established church is handled well, and G. avoids the trap of assuming that Kierkegaard's enemies were as bad as he depicts them (for example, Martensen and Andersen).

We get a sense of Copenhagen in the early 19th century—its economy, its pastimes, its social hierarchy, its journalistic duels, its salons, its sewage system. But it is Kierkegaard's friends and enemies—the setting for the short and troubled life (1813–1855)—that continues to fascinate. Thanks to G., a new generation of readers will be drawn to Kierkegaard. G. discusses but leaves tantalizingly unresolved whether Kierkegaard was epileptic, though the malady could have been at the source of his obsessive writing. I think G. is right not to decide; we just do not know enough. He is good on Kierkegaard's personal finances, giving reason to doubt the received opinion that he went broke publishing himself.

Kierkegaard was not a saint, certainly not an ascetic. He lived well, inherited money, diverted himself with travel, ate, drank, and smoked, had a valet and other servants, yet was throughout, as he claimed, a religious writer on foundational questions: What does it mean to be a Christian? What is faith? Kierkegaard mounted devastating analyses of reductionistic philosophers who would cut Christianity to the procrustean bed of reason alone. Perhaps it would be too much to claim that he was at his best as a critic, in the polemical mode. There is, after all, The Works of Love. We must seek Kierkegaard's affirmative views in polemics, particularly in the attacks published as The Moment that led to his collapse. At the end, he refused the consolations of the Danish Lutheran Church and died a Christian freelance. Yet he may correctly be regarded as the quintessential Protestant, the apotheosis of private interpretation.

How does one adjudicate disputes over what is or what is not Christianity? As Johannes Climacus, Kierkegaard kicked from under faith the props of history, church, and biblical scholarship. From the realization that to be
a Christian each must take up the task for himself, Kierkegaard moved to the view that each must decide what it is he is becoming. It is the subjective side, not any objective complement, that matters. The atomization of Christianity logically follows: there is no community, there is no church, there is only the isolated individual, and nothing can support the decision that he makes. Faith is against reason; reason has nothing to do with faith.

As a rhetorical ploy, in pseudonymous works, this radical subjectivism can seem merely instrumental. Becoming a Christian amounts to appropriating something, but Kierkegaard is no help in learning what that something is. Perhaps everyone is supposed already to know. He does say in the papers that his literature, being aimed at nominal Christians, would not work for someone who quite literally did not know what was being talked about. This suggests that there must be a prior direct communication, but did he mean it?

These and a host of other questions will be discussed with renewed enthusiasm as a result of this magnificent biography.

*University of Notre Dame*  
RALPH McINERNY
SHORTER NOTICES


The volume contains 14 essays on the New Testament letter of James, four of which are new or unpublished. Johnson, of Emory's Candler School of Theology, is the Anchor Bible commentator on James (1995). The essays here include an introduction to the Letter of James; two sketches of the history of its interpretation; an account of its reception in the early church and another of its canonization; some limited information on the social world of the letter; treatments of use made of Leviticus and the saying of Jesus; examinations of 1:22–25 (“the mirror of remembrance”); 1:26–27 (“taciturnity and true religion”), 3:13–4:10 and the topos of envy; 4:4 and discipleship; and a reflection on gender in James. Indexes of authors, scriptural references, and ancient sources close the volume.

The study abounds with positions sure to be challenged. Contrary to the prevailing view, J. regards the James of 1:1 not as a pseudonym but as the actual blood brother of Jesus, whose letter "provides evidence for Christianity in Jerusalem before the year 62" (20; see also 122, 222, and passim). The letter straddles the worlds of Torah and Greco-Roman moral philosophy. Its versions of the sayings of Jesus are earlier than the Synoptic redactions. James’s is a “sectarian, rigorous, egalitarian, countercultural voice” reflecting the earliest stage of the church’s life and most closely resembling that of Paul. When commenting on the literary features of the letter, J. is at his best. His rejection of social scientific criticism, however, results in rather superficial comments on its social-cultural context and the social issues it addresses. No essay, for instance, treats the conflict of rich and poor in James, or the troubled relation of community and society, or the definition of true piety as care for the most vulnerable, or remaining uncontaminated by society (1:27). As a consequence, the letter's situation and socio-rhetorical strategy, and ultimately its potent theological message, remain unclarified. The inspiration provided by James for the church’s current preferential option for the poor is curiously left unexamined by this Roman Catholic author.

JOHN H. ELLIOTT
University of San Francisco

Bond argues that the high priest Caiaphas was undeservedly vilified by gospel apologetics. The man himself, she claims, was a dutiful and pious priest. B.'s study divides into two parts, a historical reconstruction and a redaction/narrative analysis of each gospel portrait of Caiaphas.

For the first, B. must rely on sources such as Josephus, Philo, the Dead Sea Scrolls, the Pseudepigrapha, and certain rabbinic texts to reconstruct the patterns of early education, priestly training, consecration, and temple duties of men like Caiaphas. Her research is impeccable, yet her conclusions are overly benign. For example, having recalled Josephus's report of the Jerusalem riots of 26 C.E., B. explains the absence of the high priest as his attending to his many duties in the temple. Perhaps, she offers, he did not wish to make matters worse by inserting himself into the situation, or he was trusting God to remedy the situation (51). This and similar descriptions that absolve Caiaphas of complicity in Pilate's brutal rule do appear more apologetic than factual. Early on B. notes that Gratus, the prefect prior to Pilate, changed high priests every year. Yet, he left Caiaphas in place from 19 to 26, and Caiaphas remained in place during Pilate's term, 26–36, being discharged only in 37. In the face of such brutal rule, what could plausibly account for the high priest's survival?

The Gospels portray the high priest as a villain, although Mark does not use his name, and Luke, who shows he knows it (Luke 3:2), does not use it in the trial scene. But Matthew and John do use it and underline his evil character. B. speculates that their negative portraits of Caiaphas reflect, perhaps, some situations when the Evangelists' communities later suffered under powerful Jewish authorities. At best though, the Caiaphas B. portrays, calmly and piously removed in the face of Roman aggression, is a man with ice in his veins rather than fire.

WENDY COTTER, C.S.J.
Loyola University, Chicago


Peerbolte sets out to evaluate whether Paul—as asserted by Adolph von Harnack—learned his proselytizing missionary practices from the Pharisees. Following an introduction that establishes his question and approach, P. examines Paul's world and concludes that Paul could have gotten such proselytizing impetus neither from his Jewish background nor from surrounding Hellenistic cults or philosophical movements. Then where did he get that style of preaching? P. argues that the primitive pre-Pauline (Jewish and Gentile) Christian community at Tarsus focused on the Christ event in a manner in direct continuity with Jesus' own preaching. Then, he claims, Tarsus, Paul's birthplace, significantly influenced Paul's understanding of his prophetic commission and shaped his initial mission to the Christian community in Antioch. Only after the Apostolic Council of Jerusalem (Acts 15 and reflected in Galatians 2) did Paul come to view himself as the apostle to the Gentiles, proclaiming a Law-free gospel. Afterward Paul began the independent mission that is reflected in his letters, but a mission still aimed at both Jews and Gentiles, first, as preaching the gospel and, second, as nurturing the resulting communities. A concluding chapter summarizes the points made throughout the book.

There are in P.'s argument certain assumptions, the full set of which might be difficult to maintain. Those suppositions include: (1) Paul's birthplace was Tarsus and the Cynics of Tarsus are important for understanding Paul's missionary method and lifestyle; (2) Paul's contact with the Christians he had previously persecuted led to his conversion; (3) methodologically one cannot assume Paul held theological points prior to his mentioning them in a letter; (4) although the sequence in Acts is not historical, the account Acts gives—that Paul proclaimed first to Jews, then to pagans—originated in the first period of Paul's public ministry; (5) only after the
Council of Jerusalem did Paul carry out an independent mission; (6) Paul had no overarching plan for his missionary activity; (7) he did not go to Rome to preach the gospel (but see Rom 1:15). For those who do not share these assumptions, P.’s argument will not be altogether convincing.

PAUL J. ACHTEMEIER
Union Theological Seminary in Virginia


Westerholm provides a fair-minded, irenic, and detailed analysis of a disputatious epoch in Pauline scholarship. Here he expands his earlier Israel’s Law and the Church’s Faith: Paul and His Recent Interpreters (1988) to include (1) a fuller introduction to the “Lutheran Paul”—meaning the way Paul was interpreted by Augustine, Luther, Calvin, and Wesley (3–100), (2) a comprehensive survey of the 20th-century scholars who challenged that older reading, including figures from William Wrede to Terence Donaldson (101–200), and (3) a sample of contemporary voices who support the older way of reading Paul (201–487). He then weighs in with his own understanding of key Pauline concepts in dispute, especially the Law (261–439).

W. defines the dispute this way: the “Lutheran” Paul is read in terms of the justification by faith apart from works of the Law, whereas the critics’ position is that Paul was interested most of all in the way “Gentiles are included in the people of God without the bother of becoming Jews” (445). W. thinks there is merit in both readings.

This is a valuable scholarly resource that gives patient and precise attention both to the patristic and Reformation figures that are too often simply summarized, and to a wide spectrum of more recent scholars on both sides of the dispute. Although W. has a light touch, the book is still a fairly heavy slog for anyone not already deeply committed to getting Paul right. He pays perhaps too little attention to the significance of the recent debate over the meaning of the faith of/in Christ for Paul’s theological argument. And he would have helped readers if he had taken one step further back from the details to point out that the disparate readings of Paul actually arise from distinct theological perspectives. The older reading is soteriological and the newer is ecclesiological. That said, this is a book that Pauline scholars must read, and New Testament scholars generally ought to read.

LUKE TIMOTHY JOHNSON
Emory University, Atlanta


During the first six centuries of the Common Era, Jewish scholarship produced a rich and diverse commentary on the Hebrew Scriptures known as the rabbinic midrash (at the root of midrash is the Hebrew word for interpreting). Neusner brings his immense knowledge of rabbinic literature to bear on this topic. This book serves as a prologue to his twelve-volume translation and commentary of the rabbinic midrash, but it also stands on its own as an introduction to the rabbinic midrash compilations and their theology.

In many ways, N.’s introduction facilitates that entry as he leads the beginner through clear introductions and sample texts of the major works within the rabbinic midrash. The first chapter helpfully illustrates how the ancient rabbis read the Scriptures. There follow the main body of the book comprised of introductions to each of the principal documents of the midrash. Throughout, N. focuses on their theological message. The book closes with an overall account of the theology of rabbinic midrash.

N. calls theology a generalizing science (207). The Torah supplies the data, namely, the facts of God’s presence and activity among humankind. From that data the sages form general statements
about God and his self-manifestation in
the Torah. N. argues that the Torah, ac-
cording to rabbinic midrash, embodies
God’s truth “in the way in which logic
and mathematics mark truth; true for all
time and for every circumstance” (7).

While it seems to me that N. fre-
quently imposes patterns and systematic
thoughts that do not naturally evolve
from the rabbinical accounts, N. pre-
sents midrashic methods and content
that will engage both the beginner and
the more seasoned specialist.

MICHAEL WIDMER
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FORMATION OF CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY,
Volume 2, THE NICENE FAITH. By John
Behr. 2 vols. Formation of Christian The-
ology 2. Crestwood, N.Y.: St. Vladimir’s

This brilliant work joins with the first
of this series (The Way to Nicaea [2004])
in presenting a new approach to the
topic of doctrinal development. As
Behr describes, for centuries historical
theology has concentrated on short
trinitarian and christological formulae
as if they were the overriding issues of
the period. Rather, B. carefully and
convincingly argues, lived belief in the
death and exaltation of Jesus Christ, the
One still to come, as contemplated
within the church’s exegesis of Scrip-
ture, was the prime shaping force for
Christian liturgy, life, and thought, in-
cluding doctrine. Living faith, not the
demands internal to systematic theology
or philosophy, were the major factors
that shaped Christian doctrine.

B. provides a sensitive introduction to
how he conceives his task, then dis-
cusses “controversies and categories”
and the “theological background” pro-
vided by Methodius of Olympus, Lucian
of Antioch, and Pamphilus of Caesarea.
After a chapter on fourth-century coun-
cils, he studies Alexander, Arius, the
Council of Nicaea, Basil of Caesarea,
Gregory of Nazianzus, and Gregory of
Nyssa. He deftly keeps his focus in view
while he points out the differences
within this development.

I offer two caveats. First, B. inappro-
priately softens Athanasius’s violence.
When Athanasius pleaded for Chris-
tians to follow Christ’s virtues, his own
words ought to have called him to ac-
count. Second, B. deals well with theol-
ogy and economy in the Gregory of Na-
zianzus’s writings, but stumbles on a
significant issue. Several Gregorian pas-
sages not included in these volumes
show that Gregory speaks of a human
subject in order not to ascribe weakness
to divinity (theology) and to make the
human nature full and real (economy).
Gregory refused two sons and in some
places two subjects as B. indicates, but
his view of Christ is more complex than
B. suggests. Timothy I of Baghdad
(780–823), the East Syrian (Nestorian)
Catholics of Baghdad, saw Gregory as
their most useful theologian.

Everything considered, however, this
is a masterwork. We expectantly await
the next volume. No library, patristic
scholar, or contemporary theologian
should be without this one.

FREDERICK W. NORRIS
Emmanuel School of Religion,
Johnson City, Tenn.

REMAINS OF THE JEWS: THE HOLY LAND
AND CHRISTIAN EMPIRE IN LATE ANTI-
QUITY. By Andrew S. Jacobs. Divinations:
Rereading Late Ancient Religion. Stan-
+ 249. $55.

One has to get to the end of this book
to figure out exactly what it has been
about. Jacobs adopts postcolonial
theory as a “strategy” to avoid separating
“rhetoric and reality” in early Chris-
tian discourses about Jews. As imperial,
Christian language was not incidental;
“when imperial subjects speak authori-
tatively we cannot dismiss it as ‘mere
rhetoric’” (207). Christian writings
about Jews created new realities: “Chris-
tians enacted their own dominance
through the idiom of the iconic Jew of the
Christian holy land” (ibid.). To be a
Christian meant possessing power for
the first time—power over the Jew—
and that power signified imperial power
over a Christianized universe.

J. begins his study by laying out his
case for using postcolonial theory to ex-
plain “how the early Christian holy land
functioned as a site of explicitly Chris-
tian power” (2). Unsurprisingly, J. casts the Jew as the colonial subaltern. He wants to “underscore how Christian discourse about Jews, especially and specifically the Jews of the Christian Holy Land, instantiated and elaborated a new mode of Christian identity, one that was explicitly and unapologetically imperial” (12). In the writings of familiar and not-so-familiar church fathers he shows how Jews were either historicized or written out of history, how they were “mastered” by imperial discourse, how their past, patriarchs, and texts were appropriated. J. gives smart readings of some familiar sources and draws connections that no one has seen before.

This brief book offers much to think about, but also is burdened by two serious weaknesses. First, there were not a few Christian writers for whom the imperial project was dubious, making J.’s understanding of Christian imperialism sometimes primitive and often exaggerated. Second, J. has undoubtedly shown how some Christians identified themselves vis-à-vis the Jews, but he leaves one to suppose that this is how all Christians always and everywhere came to define themselves. J.’s postcolonial analysis does not do as much heavy lifting as he thinks, while it certainly turns patches of prose turgid.

THOMAS F. X. NOBLE
University of Notre Dame

SAINT CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA AND THE
CHRISTOLOGICAL CONTROVERSY: ITS
HISTORY, THEOLOGY, AND TEXTS. By
$22.95.

Just over ten years ago (1994) John McGuckin first published his lucid study of Cyril of Alexandria and the christological controversy of the early fifth century. In this new edition, he argues that the availability of new English translations of Cyril’s writings (L. R. Wickham, Cyril of Alexandria: Select Letters [1983]; J. I. McEnerney, Cyril of Alexandria: Letters [1987]; N. Russell, Cyril of Alexandria [2000]), together with fresh studies of the historical and theological issues of the period (discussed and cited in his preface [xi] and expanded bibliographies [403–20]) have set the stage for a needed reassessment of the historical context and the theological issues surrounding the debate between Cyril, Patriarch of Alexandria, and Nestorius, Patriarch of Constantinople, culminating in the Council of Ephesus, 431. In the preface to this expanded paperback edition, M. expresses the hope that “a new range of readers will be attracted to the story and find this book illuminating—discovering in the process the inner vitality of Orthodox Christology and patristic thought” (xii).

Historical and theological issues are explored in four chapters: The Context of the Ephesus Crisis, The Christology of Nestorius, The Christology of Cyril, and The Ecumenical Reception of Cyril’s Theology. Chapter 5 consists of a series of twelve Cyriline texts, together with Nestorius’s reply to Cyril’s Second Letter and the Synodal Deposition of Nestorius. Athanasius of Alexandria’s letter to Epictetus and Gregory Nazianzen’s letter to Cledonius, both of which were quoted by Cyril in his arguments against Nestorius, are included as appendixes. A series of study bibliographies, indexes, and maps (401–25) complete the volume. M. directs this work to a wide student readership as well as to specialists in the field. Given the sound pedagogical focus of the volume (extensive historical context, probing and balanced christological studies—including Eastern and Western perspectives, together with a rich and pertinent series of texts), this edition is particularly welcome.

PAMELA BRIGHT
Concordia University, Montreal

A MIRROR FOR THE CHURCH: PREACHING
IN THE FIRST FIVE CENTURIES. By

Precious few studies in English are to be found on preaching and homiletics in the early church. Studies of individual preachers or themes might be available, but as yet no comprehensive introduction to the topic exists. Dunn-Wilson’s
work does not claim to be comprehensive, but it does offer a very basic introduction to the topic.

The work is arranged thematically and, for the most part, chronologically. After addressing the New Testament evidence about preaching (the first two chapters), D. treats in succession the preachers he characterizes (in an admittedly contrived way) as apologists (largely Tertullian and Origen), ascetics (Anthony, Pachomius, Macarius, Theodoret, Ephrem, and Pseudo-Macarius), liturgists, theologians (the Cappadocians, Hilary, and Leo), and finally homiletics (Ambrose, Augustine, and Chrysostom). In a number of instances, D. is forced, due to the absence of extant homiletic material (or, for example, in the case of Anthony, its dubious attribution), to make inferences about a preacher’s approach or style based on his other works. Later figures whose homilies have survived receive understandably greater attention.

The bibliography, while extensive, is spotty and curiously arranged, making it not particularly user-friendly (in fact, the endnotes, bibliography, and index comprise 100 of the book’s 224 pages). While citing Ramsay MacMullen’s provocative essay (186 n. 206) on “The Preacher’s Audience (A.D. 350–400)” (Journal of Theological Studies [1989]), he fails to include Philip Rousseau’s important corrective, “‘The Preacher’s Audience’: A More Optimistic View” (in Ancient History in a Modern University, ed. T. W. Hillard [1998]). Also absent is perhaps the most important work on the topic of patristic preaching (which still awaits translation into English), Alexandre Olivar’s comprehensive and magisterial La predicación cristiana antigua (1991).

As a whole, D.’s work is synthetic and reliant upon a broad range of secondary sources, and perhaps this is fitting, given his aim that, in light of his introduction and epilogue, seems largely pastoral.

MICHAEL HEINTZ
University of Notre Dame


Scholarship on Duns Scotus has advanced dramatically in the last few decades, thanks especially to the publication of several of his works in reliable critical editions and translations, and to the appearance of many studies on specific aspects of his thought. Still, no easy, general access to such a rich but also intimidating mass of material has been available. Two renowned specialists in the field, Mary Beth Ingham and Mechthild Dreyer join their forces to provide the missing introduction to Scotus. The result is remarkably successful. Faithful to their intention to initiate the beginner to Scotus’s “philosophical vision,” they guide the reader through main philosophical doctrines. Both Scotus’s theory of cognition and his metaphysics are given clear and extended treatment. But it is the treatment of Scotus’s ethics—of which I. is an acknowledged authority—that deserves special mention. The pages devoted to natural law and divine will, to the relationship between intellect and will, and to the role of virtues in Scotus’s practical thinking are an admirable example of balance between thoroughness and clarity. They will be appreciated by beginners and specialists alike as a state-of-the-art overview of Scotus’s penetrating but also difficult views.

From these pages, Scotus emerges as an Aristotelian who, after the crisis of 1277, successfully managed to recast the legacy of ancient philosophy in a Christian context. In their final chapter, I. and D. stress the link between Scotus and modern thought. I myself hope that works like this will dispel much of the fog that still surrounds Scotus and help to position him in the outstanding place he deserves not just among specialists of the Middle Ages but among philosophers and theologians tout court.

GIORGIO PINI
Fordham University, New York

KNOWING GOD BY EXPERIENCE: THE SPIRITUAL SENSES IN THE THEOLOGY OF WILLIAM OF AUXERRE. By Boyd Taylor

The first English-language monograph on William of Auxerre, this work fills a gap in the study of the early Scholastics. Instead of following the tractates in linear order, Coolman creatively focuses on a theme that undergirds all William's reflections, that of the spiritual senses. Through this lens, C. examines the whole of the Summa aurea, keeping firmly before our eyes William's integration of spirituality with theology.

C. begins with eternal beatitude as an experience of "sensing" and "knowing" God. He then treats this same reality in the present life, notably through the virtue of faith that "sees" God and charity that ".touches" God. The presentation builds to a splendid climax in C.'s summary of how we come to "know" God. First, through "symbolic theology" we know God through the beauties of external creation. Second, through "mystical theology" we learn through a gradual inner progression from scientia (the articles of the Creed as theology's first principles) to intellectus (a deeper penetration into the meaning of these truths), and finally to sapientia (theology's fulfillment in an experiential delight in the sweetness of God).

Since William understands intellectus and sapientia as the last two gifts of the Spirit, the integration of theology and spirituality is kept firmly in the foreground. Recent scholarship has focused on presenting medieval "spiritual writers" as properly theological. C. reverses the issue, demonstrating how a work of medieval Scholastic "theology" is properly "spiritual."

C. speaks of William's "overarching concern" as "intelligible beauty" (163), both the beauty of God and of creation. This felicitous phrase sums up well my experience in reading this exquisitely crafted book. The writing is clear and graceful throughout, and the book itself is beautifully rendered by CUA Press. From the perspective of both content and the pleasure of reading, this one is not to be missed by anyone with a love for medieval theology.

JOAN M. NUTH
John Carroll University, Cleveland


Claire Waters studies the fluid nature of preaching in the late Middle Ages, demolishing any lingering myth of the Middle Ages as an era defined rigidly by order, status, or sex. In an era when rapid rates of social and economic change defied attempts to secure social boundaries, preaching—that citadel of clerical authority—became contested ground for women whose bodies had traditionally excluded them from "textual authority" and from "the pulpit."

W. rejects the modern idea that (medieval) women were excluded from preaching, a task so crucial to Christianity (Rom 10:15–17). Rather, they have always preached and have never ceased laying their claim to do so. If "faith comes from hearing," then women's "preaching" over the centuries has been integral to preaching the word "in season or out of season," whether in the home, with friends, children, husbands (see 2 Tim 3:16). Furthermore, women often performed "extraordinary" preaching as prophets, mystics, or charismatics. W. scours a range of sources—artes praedicandi, saints' lives (Hildegard of Bingen, Birgitta of Sweden, Katherine of Alexandria, Catherine of Siena, Mary Magdalene), exempla, fabliaux, and especially Chaucer's Canterbury Tales—to explore the various strategies women used to negotiate their authority to preach, to speak freely and "exploit their claims to experience without being confined by those claims and the stereotypes that accompanied them" (123). W.'s exposition of the rich sermonic milieu of the late Middle Ages leads particularly to fresh views on Chaucer's Parson, Pardoner, and above all the Wife of Bath, whose tales explode social boundaries and illuminate the fluidity of roles between the ordinary and extraordinary, the institutional and charismatic, the authorized and unauthorized, male and female, clerical and lay, and so forth.

W.'s fine lead should encourage other scholars to understand the literature.
those women produced and to further bring out the importance of sermons in forming, challenging, and unsettling persons of every status in late medieval Europe.

Frederick J. Mc Guinness
Mount Holyoke College,
South Hadley, Mass.


The strength of this study lies in Korschke’s gifts as a literary critic. For example, he reads Rousseau’s Julie, or the New Heloise to explore the impact of the bourgeois ideal of marriage as developed in Enlightenment marriage guidebooks. There the woman must transform her lover of the courtship into the paternal husband who occupies God’s place. Man, somewhat like Joseph, keeps the expression of his passion in check to reason. This Enlightenment ideal fits with K.’s view of the Holy Family: “The history of Christian monotheism is, from the outset, a history of the splitting of the father function into an empirical and a transcendent part, into a present but powerless patriarchal authority and an absent one ruling from afar. This schism of fatherhood . . . represents the key mechanism in a system of power whose directives are issued in the name of the Father” (24). K. approaches Christianity from a secular position asking how Christianity still influences elementary social codes. His interest, he claims, is less “in the truth or refutability of historical facts than in the logic of cultural phantasms” (7).

K.’s reduced interest in historical facts mars his work. One of several errors places Lateran IV in 649 rather than 1215, confusing it with an earlier local synod. Another claims that in 451 Mary was given the title of “Ever Virgin,” a stretch from the conciliar statement that Christ was born of the virgin Mary, itself hardly new in 451. K.’s attention to the relationship between church marriage policy and kinship systems is helpful, but the worth of that contribution is proportionate to the degree to which K. relies (heavily) on Jack Goody’s work (for example, Goody’s The Development of the Family and Marriage in Europe [1983]). Still, theologians can find some help in this book for the history and the canons of their own disciplines.

Mary Ann Donovan, S.C.
Jesuit School of Theology at Berkeley


The French Dominican Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange (1877–1964) was one of the dominant Roman Catholic theologians during the first half of the 20th century. His Le sens commun (1909) challenged the Modernist philosophers and theologians condemned by Pope Pius X in Pascendi Dominici gregis (1907). In his last active period, Garrigou-Lagrange took on the “new theologians” of the 1940s and played a major role in shaping Pope Pius XII’s encyclical Humani generis (1950) with its censures of these theologians. For Garrigou-Lagrange, the new theologians were resurrecting Modernism, rooted in the work of lay Catholic philosopher Maurice Blondel. Over these years, he touched on nearly every aspect of theology (ethics aside) and had particular importance in applying dogmatic theology to the spiritual life. He played a major role in French Catholic political discussions as a supporter of L’Action Française, Franco’s nationalist movement in Spain, and the Vichy government in France, although he rarely wrote about such matters.

Peddicord’s book is the most complete account in any language of Garrigou-Lagrange’s life and thought. It covers not only the principal works, but also his complex relationships with Blondel, Jacques Maritain, and M.-Dominique Chenu. Although the “sacred monster of Thomism” comes from a harsh judgment by François Mauriac,
P. presents Garrigou-Lagrange sympathetically. He does not want him dismissed with epithets like rigid, intransigent, integrist, or fascist, as became the fashion after Vatican II. Furthermore, P. tries to assess the significance of Garrigou-Lagrange’s thought for current theological controversies. Like all human beings, Garrigou-Lagrange was complex enough for criticism and sympathy. The pleasure of reading him comes from the clarity and vigor of his writing even when he is one-sided or unfair in treating an issue or an opponent. P.’s book has similar virtues and vices. Some presentations are necessarily thin, but in the case of certain thinkers of the past (Blondel) and of the present (Elizabeth Johnson) he too seems one-sided and unfair.

MICHAEL J. KERLIN
La Salle University, Philadelphia


Catherine Clifford, professor of theology at St. Paul University, Ottawa, has produced a carefully crafted, synthetic study of this European ecumenical team, inaugurated in 1937 by Abbé Paul Couturier (1881–1953), the father of “spiritual ecumenism.” The dialogue group—not formally mandated by church authorities, composed of French-speaking members of the Église Réformée and the Roman Catholic Church—is a precursor of the official bilateral consultations. The group continued to meet even during the dangerous World War II years, passing through various stages and entering its most productive years after Vatican II. Nearly all its seven postconciliar consensus statements, covering themes such as the Eucharist, reconciliation of ministries, sacramental theology, episcopal ministry, the Petrine office, the communion of saints, and especially its 1991 document on the conversion of the churches, have been translated into English.

C. consulted archival material, especially at the Cistercian Abbaye Notre Dame des Dombes (after which the group is named) and interviewed a number of long-term members, including those responsible for the final redaction of the texts. The group has enjoyed a distinctive continuity because of its members’ “staying power” (turnover of membership is slow). Consultation meetings are not hurried; worship and prayer form a central role in the gatherings.

Besides the volume’s informative overview of the early years of European ecumenism and of Couturier’s initiatives, perhaps the study’s most valuable feature is its application of Bernard Lonergan’s functional specialties (outlined in his Method in Theology [1972]) to the cumulative theological contributions of the group. By analyzing the implicit methodology at work in the consultation, C. is able to account for maturation in the design and purpose of the agreed statements. The stress on the need for conversion in both churches helps to explain why official pleas for forgiveness for ecclesial sins and errors are in order. Finally, the consultation’s call for a relecture convertie—a converted rereading—of the history of the churches is shown to be a valuable instrument for promoting church unity.

MICHAEL A. FAHEY, S.J.
Marquette University, Milwaukee


Once again the Canadian theologian Douglas John Hall has provided an insightful book for thoughtful Christians. Approximately ten years ago H. completed his three-volume work on Theology in the North American Context. This new book, while relying on the motifs of that larger work, is an original essay in its own right. His introduction sets out themes familiar in his work. He defends the need for theology as “the continuous process of disciplined and prayerful thought through which a community of faith seeks to understand what it believes and thus to be guided in its living out of that belief” (3). The prime en-
emies here are “triumphalism” and the “ideological personality” who “is constantly on guard against the intrusion of reality, of the unallowable question, of the data that does not ‘fit’ the system” (25). Over against this triumphalism and ideology, H. sets the paradox of a tradition in which the violent death of a man forms the basis of a theology defiant of death and oriented toward abundant life.

The starting point of H.’s theology is Luther’s theologia crucis. He presents this theology as both necessarily contextual and engaged in the modern world. Then, through this “lens” of the cross, he explores major foci of Christian theology: God as the suffering trinitarian God, the nature of humanity as both “fallen” and “lifted up,” soteriology, ecclesiology (the suffering church), the disestablishment of Christianity and globalization today, discipleship and mission, and God’s future (eschatology).

Throughout, H. is both consistent and well grounded in his approach. He uses the best of historical/theological scholarship—relying on Dietrich Bonhoeffer and Jürgen Moltmann—while attending open-eyed to our contemporary world. The result is a text well worth owning and reading multiple times. This book would be a great addition to any graduate syllabus and/or to the bookshelf of one’s personal library.

CYNTHIA S. W. CRYSDALE
Catholic University of America, Washington


In a partial but not fully convincing explanation of this collection’s focus on both Aquinas and Wittgenstein, Jeffrey Stout comments: “It so happens that the evolving debates over these two figures in theology and the philosophy of religion became inextricably intertwined in the second half of the twentieth century” (1). Among these new essays, dedicated to Victor Preller (1931–2001), professor of religion at Princeton and priest of the Oratory of the Good Shepherd, the intertwining of Aquinas and Wittgenstein is most evident in contributions by Joseph Incandela, Stanley Hauerwas, John Bowlin, and Jennifer Herdt. The remaining essays, by Bruce Marshall, Fergus Kerr, David Burrell, Eugene Rogers, Jr., G. Scott Davis, Douglas Langston, J. Jamie Ferreia, and Preller (a posthumously published lecture), target just Aquinas or Wittgenstein, or, more frequently, link one or the other with other thinkers (for example, Aristotle, Cicero, Augustine, Karl Barth, Eric Mascall, Victor White, Pierre Hadot, Catherine Pickstock, Preller). Thus the unifying rationale of the collection is not perfectly perspicuous. However, in these competent, well-written essays, most of the comparisons appear reasonable, apt, or enlightening. The essays touch a wide range of topics such as: the world’s contingency, theological method, grace, virtue, creation, wonder, vision, love, Trinity, natural law, the Holy Spirit, knowledge of God. Occasionally the comparative mode does not prevent the issues themselves from being addressed in some depth. A brief preface by Robert MacSwain opens the book and a memoir on Preller by Mark Larrimore, followed by an index, closes it.

GARTH L. HALLETT, S.J.
Saint Louis University


Using George Lindbeck’s postliberal “grammar” of doctrine, Alisdair MacIntyre’s concept of traditions, and features from others, Sumner thoroughly updates the influential Barth-Kraemer theology of religions. This dialectical theology is keyed to the “final primacy” of Jesus Christ. It is Jesus, not the church, that is “the First and Last” end of all historical developments (17–19, 60–61). The church does not supersede Israel, but the new covenant preempts the old (37).

S.’s “template” is Scripture’s meta-narrative appropriations of others’ par-
tial/preparatory/exemplary insights (13–14), appropriations that supply typological, secondary, theological explanations of the unknown Logos, of nature/grace, law/gospel, and emerging self/God-consciousness (21). The relativizing, post-Enlightenment, pluralistic, “nuanced externalism” (of, for example, John Hick, Wilfred Cantwell Smith, Paul Knitter) inverts Jesus’s unique mediating agency, in contrast to the properly apologetic, missiological, “nuanced internalism” (of Lesslie Newbigin, Joseph DiNoia, Paul Griffiths) that reads the world into Christ (35, 44, 50). On the import of varied nuancing, see S.’s contextual reading of “the unknown Christ of Hinduism” (62).

As studied in chapter 3, orthodoxy issues in faithful proclamation (Karl Barth), hopeful awareness (Karl Rahner), and neighbor-loving expectation (Wolfhart Pannenberg). Rationality requires piecemeal, intra-traditional disputation (51, 123, 212–13) that probe continuities and discontinuities, not the wholesale acceptance or rejection of others (156). The rule of Christ’s final primacy is always S.’s criterion for assessing these cumulative arguments. (Somehow, dogmatic assertions of Christ’s primacy escape the sinfulness of other claims.)

“External” tests of the rule’s coherence are still important, coming from indigenous Christians’ minority responses to Hinduism (for example, from Dalits) and African debates concerning contextualization (chapters 6–7). S. seems to imply that enculturation can only oppose tradition (176), overlooking enculturation’s part in the initial biblical template (notably in the Fourth Gospel). S. ducks Maurice Wiles’s query on how partial realizations of God’s truth can be thought to be too lacking in saving grace, preferring to probe playfully parallel readings of textual “receptor sites,” as in Clooney’s “midrashic” hermeneutics (214).

Generally a good marker of current issues, terminology, and authors, this is an important study of Christian claims concerning others, not others’ claims for themselves.


With American governmental deception launching a war and a bestselling memoirist found out as a fabricator, this excellent study that strongly supports Augustine’s absolute ban on lying is most welcome. But is such a cure the right one for the mendacity of our times?

Griffiths finds the source of our culture of lying to be in our late capitalist, run-amok ideas of ownership and autonomy. In fact, he argues, the pervasive reach of these ideas extends into the way we use language. We think that we own concepts and words and that we can remake them at will. The result of such convictions is the casual detachment of what we say from what we think: we fabricate easily. Against this culture and source, G. arrays Augustine’s ban on the lie. For Augustine, to say something is true when one knows it is false is to violate the divine image in us. G. explicates these views of Augustine in an introduction and in six rich opening chapters. In nine succeeding chapters, he deftly reads through Augustinian lenses the writing on lying of such great figures as Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas, Kant, and Nietzsche.

G. implores the church to be the “community of truth” where the ban on lying is observed and where those in and outside of the church learn the habits of truth. But, we might ask, would the efforts of such a community be hobbled by Augustine’s infused and highly introspective understanding of truth? Democracies may be struggling now with widespread and knowing falsehoods, but these same democracies will succeed not only by truthful speech—but also by free speech—in an often chaotic public square. Here Augustine’s inward gaze at truth is a less plausible means for rectifying our present difficulties than are the views of figures like Aquinas and Kant who more clearly link the problem of lying with the public requirements of justice.

This extraordinary book is the third in a trilogy that presents Christian worship as a means of articulating and challenging beliefs about God, about the worshiping assembly, and about the cosmos in which God is worshipped. The author suggests how present Christian worship can accept and sanctify the cosmos as understood in the postmodern, scientific ethos of the 21st century.

The description of how liturgy accomplishes this task is more sophisticated and nuanced than a brief review can articulate. The author presents Christian liturgy as capable of challenging and renewing the assembly (and the cosmos itself) through a series of dialectic moments that call into question the “maps” humans create to describe their reality. Two biblical images are central in performing this function. Mark 10:46–52 is presented as a challenge to the Greek philosophical understanding of a rational cosmos, thus offering Christians the possibility of challenging all cosmologies, including their own. However, the cosmos—the everyday world as we experience it—is at the same time holy, as expressed in the words of God to Moses in the burning bush, “This ground is holy” (Exod 3:5).

This dialectical tension is described in the first section of the book, “Cosmos—Liturgical Worldmaking.” The lived implications of this constant challenge are addressed in the second section of the book, “Maps—Liturgical Ethics.” A local assembly is called to celebrate its own identity while also honoring that of others and indeed honoring the cosmos itself. In the third section, “One is Holy—Liturgical Poetics,” some of the false “maps” that assemblies can create are unmasked and the author suggests ways in which liturgy can keep Christians focused on the “unmapped” graciousness of God.

One of the most beautifully written books of theology I have ever read, it is itself poetry and prayer. Its beauty conceals great learning and a sure sense of liturgical practice. For anyone interested in liturgy, this is a delightful necessity.

GARY MACY
University of San Diego


These essays examine issues facing the Catholic Church in Argentina in its contemporary pastoral practice. The author, Osvaldo D. Santagada, a veteran pastor and theology professor, reviews key challenges posed by the Second Vatican Council. He asks how the Church in Argentina has implemented conciliar reforms, and suggests how it can better respond to present challenges in the spirit of the council. This, then, is a book of pastoral theology, reflecting erudition but also S.’s considerable experience and pastoral wisdom. The 16 essays cover ecumenism, liturgy, traditional Catholic devotions, and the pastoral problems posed by contemporary urban culture. There are essays on the practice of confession, Marian devotion, and a short, controversial treatment of sexual abuse.

One important thread is the critique of an excessive “European” rationalism in the implementation of liturgical and pastoral reforms, reforms that have therefore failed to respond to people’s need for symbol, art, the sensibly concrete, and emotion to express religious meaning and experience.

Although S. mentions liberation theologians with sympathy, the principal social issues he treats are those that affect parish life directly: consumerism, materialism, individualism, secularism. He writes with sensitivity about the need for parishes to practice the works of mercy and solidarity. However, references to the documents of Medellín, Puebla, and Santo Domingo by the Latin American and Caribbean bishops are scarce, and the church’s prophetic role in society is not developed. Nonetheless, pastoral problems are handled with creativity and sensitivity to contemporary cultural challenges.
Since S. gives the clear impression that he is addressing Argentine Catholics, this book will be of less interest outside the Argentine Catholic Church. References to Argentine places and customs lack explanation. Some essays are marred by typographical errors as well as occasional repetition and digression.

DEAN BRACKLEY, S.J.
Universidad Centroamericana “José Simeón Cañas,” San Salvador


Arguing that Pope John Paul II used many of Max Scheler’s insights, Jeffreys defends the pope’s political vision against both political realists and idealists. John Paul’s personalistic hierarchy of values, supported by moral norms, allowed him to recognize with “realists” mankind’s fallen state, without abandoning normative morality in international relations. The intuitive recognition of a value hierarchy let John Paul overcome the impasse between proportionalist (consequentialist) thinkers (whose insistence on a common measure of value justifies the performance of “evil” to realize a greater good) and basic goods theorists (with their incommensurability of goods). Not only is an “ought” given in immediate experience (not dependent upon a previous “is”), but also spiritual values, as indivisible, surpass material values and are not commensurate with them in a calculation of consequences. The value of the free human person has to be acknowledged and respected in all moral political decisions. J. perceptively notes in the pope’s own thought the tension between metaphysical (Thomistic) and phenomenological strands, seeing them as complementary.

P.’s first chapter lays the groundwork in the pope’s understanding of the human person, emphasizing the individual knowing subject whose freedom is realized in self-gift. Yet he does not adequately recognize the relationality of personhood. The person is originally both “in-himself” (metaphysical emphasis) and “relation” (phenomenological emphasis). This would both ground better “structures of sin” and “rights of nations” through an analogous application of responsibility, and explain the balance between “liberal” interventionist (universal human rights) and “realist” non-interventionist (sovereignty of particular nations) emphases in the pope’s thought. Beyond the papal criteria regarding intervention (174), one senses the contemporary need for greater reflection on how respect for personal values influences the final judgment for or against intervention in international politics. J.’s rejection of traditional proportionalism in just war theories (139–45) only complicates the matter. Quantity (matter) and quality (spirit) may be irreducible for human intelligence, but they form the human person; more reflection on universal norms and their individual applications as well as on formal and final causes is required. J.’s is a very fine book on a complex topic.

JOHN M. McDERMOTT, S.J.
Pontifical College Josephinum, Columbus, Ohio


This highly accessible and yet sophisticated volume gathers six lectures that Dastur delivered at the University of Louvain. Much of the book’s verve, which renders the volume palatable to non-Heideggerians, derives precisely from the preservation of its originally oral form, to which bibliographical references and a few explicatory notes have been added. Having rightly identified Heidegger’s concern as ontological—that is, as the interrogation into the question of being rather than into the equally anthropocentric questions of the self (characterizing modernity from Descartes to Husserl) or the Other (surfacing in the second half of the 20th century, especially with Levinas)—D. explores the status that can nevertheless be attributed to human beings within the ontological question (6). Despite Heidegger’s radical break with anthropo-
pocentrism, the question of anthropology remains for him fundamental, D. argues, since, as he clarifies in a 1969 interview, “one cannot pose the question of being without posing the question of human beings” (8). Through a masterful and yet extremely clear analysis of Heidegger’s treatment of the themes of existence, mortality, finitude, the abysmal difference between human beings and animals, the relation between the world and mortals as well as between human beings and language, D. follows Heidegger’s new approach to the being of humans (l’être de l’homme) from the earlier writings (Sein und Zeit [1927] and Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik [1929]), through some middle essays (Die Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik [delivered during the winter semester 1929–30] and “Brief über den Humanismus” [1947]), to later writings (Vorträge und Aufsätze [1954] and Unter-
wegs zur Sprache [1959]). What emerges is a conceptualization of human existence that departs from traditional metaphysical notions of subjectivity and substance in the direction of a “constellation” that being and humans form, and that is ultimately the “internal différence of the gift and its reception” (120). The thinking of Ereignis (a concept appearing as early as 1936–1938) as language (a connection elaborated in Identität und Differenz [1957]) is indicated by D. as Heidegger’s ultimate reply to modern anthropocentrism. Besides its scholarly vividness, clarity, and precision, a major attractiveness of the volume consists in its sympathetic presentation of Heidegger as a thinker deeply concerned with humans rather than merely with being.

SILVIA BENSO
Siena College, Loudonville, N.Y.

BOOKS RECEIVED

SCRIPTURAL STUDIES


Lincoln, Andrew T. The Gospel according to Saint John. Black’s New Testament Com-

**HISTORICAL**


**SYSTEMATIC**


Gutenson, Charles E. *Reconsidering the Doc-

**MORALITY AND LAW**
Alford, Helen, et al, ed. Rediscovering Abundance: Interdisciplinary Essays on Wealth,


PASTORAL, SPIRITUAL, AND LITURGICAL


**PHILOSOPHY AND OTHER DISCIPLINES**


