

VIOLENCE: RELIGION, TERROR, WAR

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The survey examines writings in three areas: (1) the causes and cures of the rise of religious violence and terrorism, with particular attention to how Christian theology and the Bible contribute to or challenge this violence; (2) the ethical challenges of terrorism and the need to find a moral response to this threat; and (3) the strengths and limits of just war thinking in responding to contemporary forms of violence.

THREE CONCERNS have held center stage in conversations about the ethics of violence since September 11, 2001: identifying the links between religion and violence, formulating moral responses to terrorism, and examining “just war” criteria in the light of changing forms of international violence. This segment of “Notes on Moral Theology” will explore writings for the past five years on religious violence, terrorism and its responses, and the just war theory.

RELIGION AND VIOLENCE

Whatever else was true about the terrorists of 9/11, “their motives—as revealed by the instructions that guided their final days—were intensely and profoundly religious,” and the religious terrorism they engaged in was neither an anomaly nor the sole property of any single faith.¹ By 1998 religious organizations made up more than half the Secretary of State’s 30 most dangerous groups; over half the conflicts going on around the globe had an important religious dimension; and every major world reli-

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¹ Bruce Lincoln, *Holy Terrors: Thinking about Religion after September 11* (Chicago: University of Chicago, 2003) 16.

gion was implicated in terror.² Michael Ignatieff argues that “today most of the justifying ideologies (for terrorism) are religious,”³ and military analyst Paulette Otis contends that religion “is now emerging as the single most important political-ideological default mechanism in global conflict,” and that religious violence is often more lethal and intractable than its secular counterpart.⁴

The rising tide of religious terror and violence has surprised secularists who could not imagine religion as a major factor in modern international conflict, and scandalized believers who see religion as a force for peace. Still, while many would agree with Aruna Gnanadason’s assertion that “all religions have at their center a commitment to peace . . . [or] a spirituality of nonviolence,”⁵ they would also acknowledge the truth of Oliver McTernan’s claim that all religions have “sanctioned violence to protect or promote their own sectarian interests,” and that contemporary religious terrorists and extremists can find a storehouse of justifications for their use of violence in the teachings and history of their faith.⁶

Discussions about the emergence or reemergence of religious violence and terror focus on several questions: First, how deeply is religion implicated in contemporary violence and terrorism? Second, what sorts of religious groups are more likely to beat their plowshares into swords and take up arms against the forces of evil? Third, what elements of religion contribute to or exacerbate the violence of terrorism or war? Finally, what resources does religion itself provide to resist or overcome religious—or secular—violence or terrorism?

Implicating Religion

Opinions vary on religion’s involvement in contemporary violence and terror. Samuel Huntington sees religion as a central culprit, pointing to the irrational, absolute and divisive character of religious faith, particularly

² Mark Juergensmeyer, *Terror in the Mind of God: The Rise of Religious Violence* (Berkeley: University of California, 2000) 6; Bruce Hoffman, “Old Madness, New Methods: Revival of Religious Terrorism Begs for Broader U.S. Policy,” *Rand Review* (Winter 1998) <http://www.rand.org/publications/randreview/issues/rr.winter98.9/methods.html> (accessed November 12, 2005).

³ Michael Ignatieff, *The Lesser Evil: Political Ethics in an Age of Terror* (Princeton: Princeton University, 2004) 1.

⁴ Paulette Otis, “Religion and War in the Twenty-first Century,” in *Religion and Security: The New Nexus in International Relations*, ed. Robert A. Seiple and Dennis R. Hoover (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2004) 11–24, at 11, 16.

⁵ Aruna Gnanadason, “Religion and Violence: A Challenge to the Unity of the Churches,” *Political Theology* 5 (2004) 61–75, at 65.

⁶ Oliver J. McTernan, *Violence in God’s Name: Religion in an Age of Conflict* (Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis, 2003) xi, 76.

that of extremists or fundamentalists.⁷ Robert Pape and William Cavanaugh are not persuaded that religion plays a major role in international violence or terrorism, or that religious fundamentalism or intense religious faith makes violence more likely or lethal.⁸ Bruce Lincoln, McTernan, and Ignatieff see religion as a culpable but unwilling accomplice, a major resource for contemporary extremists seeking justification and support for their use of terror and violence.⁹

Mark Juergensmeyer suggests religious violence is on the rise because religion provides persons and groups threatened and humiliated by modernity and globalism with resources to recast their struggle for identity and dignity as a “cosmic war,” a metaphysical and apocalyptic conflict in which even the most senseless and fruitless acts of terror become a type of “performance violence,” charged with a symbolic and transcendent power enabling perpetrators to assert and regain lost dignity in the face of overwhelming odds.¹⁰ Still, religion is not just a tool for the marginalized or weak. Lincoln shows how both George W. Bush and Osama Bin Laden appropriate the religious myth of cosmic war to justify their use of force and enlist allies in a global conflict.¹¹

In response to the standard complaint that religious violence is tragic or scandalous because “all religions preach peace,” Lincoln warns against a romantic or inadequate notion of religion that ignores the countercharge that “all religions sanction, even enjoin the use of violence under certain circumstances.”¹² For though religion is generally a force for stability and peace within cultures, religion and religious differences can also exacerbate conflicts, and religion often functions as a tool of resistance and rebellion

⁷ Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Changing World Order* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996) 96, 209–11, 254. Sam Harris goes much further in *The End of Faith: Religion, Terror, and the Future of Reason* (New York: W. W. Norton, 2004), but this unpersuasive polemic tends to demonize religious belief and organized religion as the central villains in the drama of global terror.

⁸ Robert A. Pape, *Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism* (New York: Random House, 2005) 4, 46; William T. Cavanaugh, “Killing in the Name of God,” in *I Am the Lord Your God: Christian Reflections on the Ten Commandments*, ed. Carl E. Braaten and Christopher R. Seitz (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2005) 127–47. McTernan lists several authors who downplay the role of religion in international conflict in *Violence in God's Name* 10–19.

⁹ Lincoln, *Holy Terrors* 73; McTernan, *Violence in God's Name* xii–xiii, 20–43; Ignatieff, *Lesser Evil* 124–26.

¹⁰ Juergensmeyer, *Terror in the Mind of God* 122–26, 145–63.

¹¹ Lincoln, *Holy Terrors* 19–32. See Ira Chernus, “George Bush’s War on Terrorism and Sin,” *Political Theology* 5 (2004) 411–30 for an alternate description of Bush’s use of the religious myth of global war.

¹² Lincoln, *Holy Terrors* 73.

among oppressed groups taking up arms against the ruling class and its religion of the status quo.¹³

Michael Barkun opposes the popular trend that identifies religious violence or terrorism with fundamentalism, a term originally referring to an American Protestant response to the Modernist controversy and currently stretched beyond recognition by its use as a synonym for reactionary extremists or dogmatic literalists.¹⁴ Barkun argues that attempts to screen religious groups for violence by checking for fundamentalism ignores the fact that both the history of American fundamentalism and the practice of the vast majority of contemporary groups identified as fundamentalists are decidedly nonviolent, and the reality that religious beliefs alone are a poor indicator of any propensity to violence.

Cavanaugh goes even further, opposing the notions that the absolute or dogmatic character of religious belief makes it dangerous or lethal, and that those who take their religion too seriously or the Scriptures too literally will be more inclined to violence than those who kill for a wide range of political or secular purposes.¹⁵ Instead, Cavanaugh argues, the Bible makes it clear that persons must not kill except when commanded by God, and that the biblical narrative increasingly points to a God unwilling to utter that command or to permit violence. Thus, believing that it is permitted to kill only in God's name should make persons decidedly less likely to kill.

Christianity and Violence

Gnanadason notes that "this is particularly not the moment for Christian triumphalism and arrogance," since Christianity is as deeply implicated in religious violence as other faiths, and since triumphalism has so often been the cause of Christian violence.¹⁶ Recent writing on the ties between Christianity and violence acknowledge and explore Christianity's violent history, elements of Christian theology used to support violence, and Christian resources for the struggle to overcome violence: Joseph Lynch, Luis Rivera Pagan, David Gushee, and Victoria Barnett review the violence of the Crusades, the *Conquistadores*, and the Holocaust,¹⁷ while Lee Griffith and

¹³ Ibid. 77–91.

¹⁴ Michael Barkun, "Religious Violence and the Myth of Fundamentalism," *Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions* 4.3 (2003) 55–70. David Harrington Watt offers similar objections to the confused understanding of fundamentalism in "The Meaning and End of Fundamentalism," *Religious Studies Review* 30.4 (2004) 271–74.

¹⁵ Cavanaugh, "Killing in the Name of God" 127–47.

¹⁶ Gnanadason, "Religion and Violence" 66–68.

¹⁷ Joseph H. Lynch, "The First Crusade: Some Theological and Historical Context," in *Must Christianity Be Violent? Reflections on History, Practice, and Theology*, ed. Kenneth R. Chase and Alan Jacobs (Grand Rapids: Brazos, 2003) 23–36;

others point to Augustine and Ambrose's early justification of war and the torture of heretics, as well as the Inquisition, the wars of religion, and the current involvement of Christian groups in sectarian violence and terrorism.¹⁸ This bloody history uncovers the ambivalent and sinful character of Christianity's involvement in violence, and provides contemporary Christian extremists with historical models and theoretical justifications for their violence.

J. Denny Weaver and others add their voices to a chorus of feminist authors implicating the theology of atonement, particularly Anselm's satisfaction model, in Christian violence.¹⁹ Weaver calls for a reworking of the notion of atonement and the sacrifice of the Cross, lest God be seen as implicated in or justifying violence.²⁰ Gnanadason points to an imperial or dominion model of evangelization as a longstanding source and justification of Christian violence, and sees this religious imperialism present in George W. Bush's current wars on terror and Iraq.²¹ Lisa Isherwood, Helen Hood, and Christine McMullen argue that a theology characterized by patriarchy has hampered Christianity's attempts to acknowledge, repent, and overcome its involvement in domestic violence and torture.²²

Several recent texts explore the tradition and theology of nonviolence as

Luis N. Rivera Pagan, "Violence of the *Conquistadores* and the Prophetic Imagination," *ibid.* 37–49; David P. Gushee, "Christians as Rescuers During the Holocaust," *ibid.* 69–78; Victoria Barnett, "Beyond Complicity: The Challenges for Christianity after the Holocaust," *ibid.* 97–106.

¹⁸ Lee Griffith, *The War on Terrorism and the Terror of God* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2003) 20–31, 134–35; Gnanadason, "Religion and Violence" 68; Jurgensmeyer, *Terror in the Mind of God* 19–43.

¹⁹ See J. Denny Weaver, "Violence in Christian Theology," in *Teaching Peace: Nonviolence and the Liberal Arts*, ed. J. Denny Weaver and Gerald Biesecker-Mast (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003) 39–52; Weaver, *The Nonviolent Atonement* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2001); Gnanadason, "Religion and Violence" 71; Helen Hood, "Speaking Out and Doing Justice: It's No Longer a Secret But What Are the Churches Doing about Overcoming Violence against Women?" *Feminist Theology* 11 (2003) 216–25, at 221; Christine McMullen, "One Day I Went to a Theological Consultation on Domestic Violence," *Feminist Theology* 11 (2003) 197–202, at 200; S. Wesley Ariarajah, "Religion and Violence: A Protestant Christian Perspective," *Ecumenical Review* 55 (2003) 136–43, at 138.

²⁰ Weaver, "Violence in Christian Theology" 46–51. For defenses of traditional understandings of atonement, see Richard J. Mouw, "Violence and Atonement," in *Must Christianity Be Violent?* 159–71; Hans Boersma, *Violence, Hospitality, and the Cross: Reappropriating the Atonement Tradition* (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2003).

²¹ Gnanadason, "Religion and Violence" 68. See also Ariarajah, "Religion and Violence" 138; Rivera Pagan, "Violence of the *Conquistadores*" 37–45.

²² See Lisa Isherwood, "Marriage: Heaven or Hell? Twin Souls and Broken Bones," *Feminist Theology* 11 (2003) 203–15, at 206; Hood, "Speaking Out" 220; McMullen, "One Day" 199–200.

a Christian resource in the struggle against violence. Walter Wink and Ira Chernus point out the long history and unnoticed successes of nonviolence,²³ while Weaver and Gerald Biesecker-Mast offer a collection of strategies for teaching peace to undergraduates,²⁴ and Stanley Hauerwas, Thomas Merton, and John Dear argue that nonviolence is the Christian response to contemporary violence and global terror.²⁵

John de Gruchy, Nigel Biggar, and others have suggested ways Christian notions of forgiveness and reconciliation could help resist, overcome, and recover from violence.²⁶ Jay McDaniel and Gnanadason see ecumenism, inter religious dialogue, and tolerance as essential parts of a Christian response to religious violence.²⁷ Clarke Chapman argues that a Christian pastoral theology imbued with a realistic view of sin, a commitment to the common good and an unshaken hope in the Resurrection provides the resources to address the underlying causes of religious violence.²⁸ And Cavanaugh and Kevin Kelly explore ways in which the Eucharist and a Christian notion of martyrdom serve to transform and overcome violence.²⁹

Scripture and Violence

Discussing how “the Bible appears to endorse and bless the recourse to violence,” John Collins points to biblical texts depicting God performing

²³ See Walter Wink, *Jesus and Nonviolence: A Third Way* (Minneapolis: Fortress, 2003); Ira Chernus, *American Nonviolence: The History of an Idea* (Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis, 2004).

²⁴ *Teaching Peace* (see n. 19 above).

²⁵ Stanley Hauerwas, *Performing the Faith: Bonhoeffer and the Practice of Nonviolence* (Grand Rapids: Brazos, 2004); Thomas Merton, *Peace in the Post-Christian Era* (Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis, 2004); John Dear, *Living Peace: A Spirituality of Contemplation and Action* (New York: Doubleday, 2001).

²⁶ John W. de Gruchy, *Reconciliation: Restoring Justice* (Minneapolis: Fortress, 2002); Nigel Biggar, ed. *Burying the Past: Making Peace and Doing Justice after Civil Conflict* (Washington: Georgetown University, 2003); Luiz Carlos Susin and Maria Pilar Aquino, ed., *Reconciliation in a World of Conflicts* (London: SCM, 2003). For a note on how a Christian notion of forgiveness might contribute to violence, see Isherwood, “Marriage: Heaven or Hell?” 213.

²⁷ Jay B. McDaniel, *Gandhi's Hope: Learning from Other Religions as a Path to Peace* (Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis, 2005) 6–7; Gnanadason, “Religion and Violence” 71–75.

²⁸ G. Clarke Chapman, Jr., “Terrorism: A Problem for Ethics or Pastoral Theology?” *Cross Currents* 54 (2004) 120–37.

²⁹ Cavanaugh, “Dying for the Eucharist or Being Killed by It? Romero’s Challenge to First-World Christians,” *Theology Today* 58 (2001) 177–89; Kevin Kelly, “Eucharist and Violence,” *Furrow* 56 (2005) 25–36.

or commanding acts of horrific, indiscriminate violence, and argues that these narratives have provided ancient and contemporary believers with justification for their own violence.³⁰ The solution, Collins argues, is not to excise these passages, but to see the Bible as providing “an unvarnished picture of human nature and . . . of religion and the things people do in its name” without assuming that this biblical portrayal offers an unqualified reflection of God’s will or a justification for our imitation of such violence. The violent commands found in Scripture are morally repugnant, and the Bible, “for all the wisdom it contains, is no infallible guide on ethical matters.”³¹ Indeed, for Collins, “the Bible has contributed to violence in the world precisely because it has been taken to confer a degree of certitude that transcends human discussion and argumentation.”³²

Dale Allison reports on a long tradition of Jewish and Christian believers questioning biblical texts that seem to endorse violence. In spite of their scriptural status, biblical passages (like Num 16; 2 Kings 1:9–12; 2:23–25) calling for or celebrating God’s wrathful judgment on our enemies were challenged by ancient Jewish and Christian texts affirming God’s infinite mercy and compassion.³³

Like Collins, J. Richard Middleton, Barbara Reid, David Janzen, and Walter Dietrich do not wish to gloss over violent biblical passages, but they seek to place or view these problematic texts within a larger context or perspective. For Middleton the nonviolent creative power of God revealed in Genesis 1 offers a template for every human exercise of power and a corrective to every violent image of God.³⁴ For Reid the nonviolent friendship Jesus models in John’s Gospel helps us to recast notions of sacrifice and atonement in ways that do not support or sanction violence, while the eschatological character of Matthew’s parables reminds us that their violent endings are not a model for human action, which is to follow the directives of the Sermon on the Mount.³⁵ Janzen contends that the non-violence of Jesus reveals the true character of the God portrayed in the Scriptures, and that we must read biblical passages about divine violence

³⁰ John J. Collins, “The Zeal of Phinehas: The Bible and the Legitimation of Violence,” *Journal of Biblical Literature* 122 (2003) 3–21, at 8.

³¹ *Ibid.* 20.

³² *Ibid.* 21.

³³ Dale C. Allison, Jr., “Rejecting Violent Judgment: Luke 9:52–56 and Its Relatives,” *Journal of Biblical Literature* 121 (2002) 459–78.

³⁴ J. Richard Middleton, “Created in the Image of a Violent God? The Ethical Problem of the Conquest of Chaos in Biblical Creation Texts,” *Interpretation* 58 (2004) 341–55.

³⁵ Barbara E. Reid, “The Cross and Cycles of Violence” *Interpretation* 58 (2004) 376–85; “Violent Endings in Matthew’s Parables and Christian Nonviolence,” *Catholic Biblical Quarterly* 66 (2004) 237–55.

through this lens.³⁶ Dietrich, who catalogues six types of violence presented in the Hebrew Bible, believes that “the Hebrew scriptures are not a primer on violence but, in a surprising fullness and diversity, offer guidance for overcoming violence,” and show how biblical passages guide readers to hinder, limit, reject, and prevent violence and eliminate its causes, all the while offering hope of an ultimate end to violence.³⁷

Terrence Fretheim argues that, far from Scripture presenting readers with a violent God who commands or teaches humans to be violent, the Bible recounts a tale of human violence, in which the Lord who will not abandon us to our own destructiveness becomes tragically involved.³⁸

TERROR AND THE WAR ON TERROR

If terrorism is to be more than a synonym for “unjust killing,” the term must be defined in ways that clarify the specific injustice of this type of killing or attack. C. A. J. Coady and most authors discussed in this review reject “political” definitions describing terrorism as violence “by those who are unauthorized to use it”—that is, substate agents—and adopt a “tactical” definition describing terrorism as a direct attack upon those we have no right or authority to kill.³⁹ But even a standard “tactical” definition like Coady’s, which describes terrorism as “the organized use of violence to attack *noncombatants or innocents* . . . for political purposes”⁴⁰ does not completely resolve the question, as not everyone agrees that every direct attack on noncombatants is terrorism, or that all indirect attacks on innocent persons are not.

Essays in a recent “Symposium on Terror, War, and Justice” ask whether traditional moral principles like discrimination, double effect, and self defense adequately delineate the difference between justifiable force and terrorism.⁴¹ Half the authors suggest that these norms, particularly the *jus in bello* criteria of discrimination, do not capture or address the moral complexity of war. The other half argue that traditional use of these norms

³⁶ David Janzen, “The God of the Bible and the Nonviolence of Jesus,” in *Teaching Peace* 53–62.

³⁷ Walter Dietrich, “The Mark of Cain: Violence and Overcoming Violence in the Hebrew Bible,” *Theology Digest* 52 (2005) 3–11.

³⁸ Terrence E. Fretheim, “I Was Only a Little Angry”: Divine Violence in the Prophets,” *Interpretation* 58 (2004) 365–75.

³⁹ C. A. J. Coady, “Terrorism, Morality, and Supreme Emergency,” *Ethics* 114 (2004) 772–89, at 723. See also David Rodin, “Terrorism without Intention,” *Ethics* 114 (2004) 752–71, at 752–55.

⁴⁰ Coady, “Terrorism” 773 (my emphasis).

⁴¹ Christopher Heath Wellman, ed., “Symposium on Terrorism, War, and Justice,” *Ethics* 114 (2004) 647–805.

has allowed violence against innocent parties, permitting or justifying acts of terror.

F. M. Kamm argues that the principles of double effect and discrimination are not adequate guides for moral conduct in war, that certain acts condemned by these principles (like the terror bombing of combatants and noncombatants) could be permissible in certain settings, and that general principles are unsuited to address war's complexity or uniqueness.⁴² Jeff McMahan offers three objections to traditional just war thinking, placing his greatest emphasis on a rejection of discrimination's distinction between combatants and noncombatants. Using a "responsibility criterion," McMahan argues for the morality of attacking certain noncombatants.⁴³ Saul Smilanski employs a "political" definition of terrorism to question whether the rational principles of the just war theory ever constrain the use of terror.⁴⁴ Still, practical reasons persuade both McMahan and Smilanski that the rule against attacking noncombatants should be maintained.⁴⁵

Coady, who believes that major acts of terrorism are always impermissible, opposes Michael Walzer's exception to the principle of discrimination for states under a "supreme emergency," since nonstate entities could just as easily claim this exemption.⁴⁶ Noam Zohar worries that the principle of discrimination, particularly if informed by an "extended doctrine of self defense," permits the unjustifiable killing of "innocent attackers" (soldiers attacking without any culpability) or "innocent threats" (non-attacking soldiers), and opens the door to the terrorist killing of noncombatants and innocent bystanders.⁴⁷ David Rodin makes a similar argument against traditional use of the principles of discrimination and double effect, arguing that placing too much weight on intent results in permitting a range of reckless and negligent attacks on noncombatants or innocent persons. Terrorism, he argues, would be better defined as "the deliberate, negligent, or reckless use of force against noncombatants."⁴⁸

John Kelsay's analysis of the immorality of suicide terrorism employs arguments culled from both the Islamic Shari'a and the Christian just war tradition. Reporting on intra-Muslim debates about suicide bombings, Kel-

⁴² F. M. Kamm, "Failures of Just War Theory: Terror, Harm, and Justice," *ibid.* 650–92.

⁴³ Jeff McMahan, "The Ethics of Killing in War," *ibid.* 693–733.

⁴⁴ Saul Smilanski, "Terrorism, Justification, and Illusion," *ibid.* 790–805.

⁴⁵ McMahan, "Ethics of Killing" 729–33; Smilanski, "Terrorism, Justification, and Illusion" 801.

⁴⁶ Coady, "Terrorism" 777–89. See Smilanski's opposition to the "Antioppressionism Exception" claimed by nonstate groups in "Terrorism, Justification, and Illusion" 801–5.

⁴⁷ Noam J. Zohar, "Innocence and Complex Threats: Upholding the War Ethic and the Condemnation of Terrorism," *Ethics* 114 (2004) 734–51, at 734.

⁴⁸ Rodin, "Terrorism without Intention" 755.

say notes that defenses of these suicide attacks as “martyrdom operations” have been met with counterclaims that martyrs do not kill women and children, and argues that neither the just war tradition nor the Shari’a justify the indiscriminate and disproportionate killing involved in suicide attacks.⁴⁹ Naim Ateek critiques the moral and theological problems of suicide bombings from the perspective of a pacifist Palestinian Christian, and though Ateek is clearly sympathetic to humiliated and hopeless persons who use this weapon against Israeli occupation, he condemns suicide bombings as a violation of God’s law, an injustice against oneself and others, and a form of collective punishment; rather, he calls for an authentic nonviolent martyrdom that bears but does not inflict suffering.⁵⁰

A War on Terror

In the immediate wake of 9/11 President Bush called for a crusade and then a war against terror, indeed, a global conflict cast in apocalyptic language not unlike Juergensmeyer’s “cosmic war.”⁵¹ This choice has prompted questions about whether a war on terror was the appropriate ethical response to the attacks on New York and Washington, to Al Qaeda, or even to the rise of terror with a global reach.

Acknowledging the rhetorical purpose served by this call to arms, Bryan Hehir, Brian Johnstone, and others have questioned the possibility of fighting a discriminate, proportionate, or winnable war against a practice like terror,⁵² a practice, Johnstone, Lincoln, and Griffith argue, employed by the United States and its allies throughout the cold war, and engaged in by several states being sought as allies in the proposed war on terror.⁵³ Raising further questions about proportionality and last resort, John Mueller reports on a long-standing tendency of the U.S. government to overestimate and overreact to security threats, a trend he sees continuing in current American responses to terror.⁵⁴ Griffith finds a similar rush to war in

⁴⁹ John Kelsay, “Suicide Bombers: The ‘Just War’ Debate, Islamic Style,” *Christian Century* 119.17 (2002) 22–25.

⁵⁰ Naim Ateek, “Suicide Bombers: What Is Theologically and Morally Wrong with Suicide Bombings? A Palestinian Christian Perspective,” *Studies in World Christianity* 8 (2002) 5–30.

⁵¹ Lincoln, *Holy Terrors* 19–22; Chernus, “George Bush’s War” 417–24; Gnana-dason, “Religion and Violence” 68.

⁵² J. Bryan Hehir, “What Can Be Done? What Should Be Done?” *America* 185 (October 8, 2001) 8–12, at 11; Brian V. Johnstone, C.S.S.R., “The War on Terrorism: A Just War?” *Studia moralia* 40 (2002) 39–61, at 60.

⁵³ Johnstone, “War on Terrorism” 61; Lincoln, *Holy Terrors* 21; Griffith, *War on Terrorism* 81.

⁵⁴ John Mueller, “Simplicity and Spook: Terrorism and the Dynamics of Threat Exaggeration,” *International Studies Perspectives* 6 (2005) 208–34.

recent U.S. history and in America's wars on crime, drugs, and terror,⁵⁵ and Chernus notes a longstanding U.S. tendency to recast national struggles in language of apocalyptic conflict, an approach President Bush found much more successful than his earlier campaign for "compassionate conservatism."⁵⁶ Finally, Griffith and Ignatieff suggest that a mimetic response to terror (that is, matching Osama bin Laden's call for a global conflict with an opposing war on terror) may be the precise reaction sought by terrorists, and the course most likely to generate intractable violence and to undermine democratic structures.⁵⁷

Edward LeRoy Long argues that the rush to declare a war on terror allowed the American government and people to avoid asking difficult questions about the underlying causes of terror that include a range of political and economic injustices in which the United States and other wealthy nations are deeply implicated.⁵⁸ Like Griffith and Ignatieff, Long argues that the greatest danger terrorism poses is the transformation of democratic societies into police or security states with drastically weakened civil and political liberties; he contends that the war or crusade model embraced by the U.S. government is the most likely path to such a fortress society.⁵⁹

In place of a war on terror, Long explores the advantages of a law enforcement model that seeks to contain the criminal activity of terrorists, as well as a peacemaking approach informed by Glen Stassen's work on "just peacemaking."⁶⁰ Stassen himself establishes the need for other models, arguing that a threatened American public will always choose war unless presented with a specific alternative.⁶¹ Laurie Johnston proposes a model given scant attention by policymakers, asking how the biblical command to love our enemies (Matt 5–7, Lk 6:20–49) should inform the U.S. response to terrorism.⁶²

Michael Ignatieff asks how liberal democracies may defend themselves against terrorism without destroying the very values for which they stand, since the fight against terrorism "may require coercion, deception, secrecy

⁵⁵ Griffith, *War on Terrorism* 77, 84–97.

⁵⁶ Chernus, "George Bush's War" 411–12.

⁵⁷ Griffith, *War on Terrorism* 220–32; Ignatieff, *Lesser Evil* 60–61, 73–75, 114.

⁵⁸ Edward LeRoy Long, Jr., *Facing Terrorism: Responding as Christians* (Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 2004) 19–26, 41–42.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.* 60.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.* 50–59.

⁶¹ Glen Stassen, "Just Peacemaking as Hermeneutical Key: The Need for International Cooperation in Preventing Terrorism," *Journal of the Society of Christian Ethics* 24.2 (2004) 171–92, at 172.

⁶² Laurie Johnston, "Love Your Enemies: Even in the Age of Terrorism," *Political Theology* 6 (2005) 87–106.

and violation of rights.”⁶³ His answer is twofold: “the way to meet the challenge of terrorism . . . is to ensure that the oppressed always have peaceful means of political redress,” and democracies may sometimes use coercive measures and suspend civil and political rights, provided that these violations are “temporary, publicly justified (in an open, adversarial process), and deployed only as a last resort.”⁶⁴ Even so, Ignatieff contends, torture, illegal detention, and unlawful assassination may never be permitted.

Liberal democracies, Ignatieff argues, tend to overreact to the threat of terror, placing too little faith in their own democratic structures and too much in increased powers of the police, security, and military forces. Leaders and citizens in these democracies fail to grasp that all too often “it is the responses to terrorism, rather than terrorism itself, that does democracy the most harm,” for in overreacting to the threat of terror democracies end up inflicting the very damage upon themselves that terrorist groups seek but are incapable of rendering.⁶⁵

Both Ignatieff and David Cole note that democratic societies confronted with security threats exhibit a disheartening readiness to protect the interests of the majority by abrogating the rights and liberties of minorities. Cole, who has seen this pattern throughout America’s longstanding wars on crime and drugs, argues that it continues in the current war on terror.⁶⁶

Griffith also believes that the response to terror is more dangerous than terror itself. In his view, the greatest and most frequent concession to terrorism is mimesis, and that those who take up a war on terror are most likely to imitate their terrorist opponents. He opposes a war on terror because history shows that violent and punitive reactions tend not to curtail terror but to undermine civil and political rights and produce more casualties than the original attacks.⁶⁷

Mueller reports that the U.S. has consistently exaggerated the international terrorist threat, and argues that the nation’s overreaction to this threat furthers the central purpose of terrorism, which is to create insecurity, fear, and hysteria, and to undermine citizens’ confidence in the democratic structures and freedoms that a war on terror is supposed to defend. He therefore argues that “efforts against terrorism should be considered more like a campaign against crime than like a war.”⁶⁸

⁶³ Ignatieff, *Lesser Evil* vii.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.* x, viii.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.* 61, 54–81.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.* 73–76. David Cole, *Enemy Aliens: Double Standards and Constitutional Freedoms in the War on Terrorism* (New York: New Press, 2003) 17–21.

⁶⁷ Griffith, *War on Terrorism* 220–25.

⁶⁸ Mueller, “Simplicity and Spook” 220–23.

Torture

The torture and abuse of prisoners at Abu Ghraib, Guantánamo Bay, and elsewhere must surely be the most disheartening example of mimetic overreaction, lawless disregard for human rights, and counterproductive violence in the U.S. war on terror. In the wake of 9/11 Alan Dershowitz proposed an exception to the ban on torture that would allow police officers dealing with a “ticking-bomb” scenario (captured terrorist with information about an imminent civilian attack) to apply for a “torture warrant.”⁶⁹ Not long after the fall of Baghdad Mark Bowden defended the use of “torture lite” (excruciating tactics “that leave no permanent marks and do no lasting physical harm”) in the war on terror; “The Bush administration has adopted exactly the right posture on this matter . . . , he asserted. “Torture is a crime against humanity, but coercion is an issue that is rightly handled with a wink, or even a touch of hypocrisy; it should be banned, but also quietly practiced.”⁷⁰

As it turns out, however, Bowden’s essay went to print just as U.S. forces in Iraq, frustrated with a growing insurgency and rising casualties from “improvised explosive devices,” indiscriminately rounded up over 8,000 Iraqi citizens in “cordon and capture raids.” Even though 70 to 90 percent of the captured were known to have been arrested by mistake and were thought to possess no “actionable intelligence,” they were detained for months on end without any semblance of due process, and then subjected to an array of immoral and illegal practices—hooding, beating, sodomizing with a chemical light, threatening with rape, and water boarding—that inflicted irremediable harm on both the victims and the war on terror, while producing little or no useful intelligence.⁷¹

Subsequent investigations of the torture and abuse of prisoners at Abu Ghraib uncovered charges of similar violations at Guantánamo Bay and Afghanistan and brought to light the practice of “extraordinary rendition,” in which U.S. intelligence officers are believed to have handed over several hundred terror suspects to nations suspected of using torture.⁷²

Mark Danner and Seymour Hersh’s investigative studies on the torture

⁶⁹ Alan Dershowitz, “Is There a Torturous Road to Justice?” *Los Angeles Times*, November 8, 2001, B19. Dershowitz, *Why Terrorism Works: Understanding the Threat, Responding to the Challenge* (New Haven: Yale University, 2002) 131–64.

⁷⁰ Mark Bowden, “The Dark Art of Interrogation,” *Atlantic Monthly* 292 (October, 2003) 51–76, at 76.

⁷¹ Mark Danner, *Torture and Truth: America, Abu Ghraib, and the War on Terror* (New York: New York Review of Books, 2004) 3–9, 33–37.

⁷² *Ibid.* 36–37. Jane Mayer, “Outsourcing Torture: The Secret History of America’s ‘Extraordinary Rendition’ Program,” *New Yorker* 81 (February 14, 2005) 106–23.

and abuse of prisoners at Abu Ghraib and elsewhere revealed that whatever “wink” the Bush administration had given in its conditional support of the Geneva Conventions or the U.N. Convention on Torture, any secret or limited sanction of coercion had swiftly become a frighteningly public, widespread, and lawless practice of physical abuse and torture.⁷³ The Danner and Hersch pieces also clearly established that not only was this abuse and torture unnecessary, ineffective, and grotesquely counterproductive, but it provided terrorists and insurgents operating in the region with invaluable propaganda and alienated countless previously sympathetic Iraqis.

Confirming what retired military interrogators told Danner and Hersch, Stephen Budiansky reports that the U.S. military intelligence agencies have long known that torture and humiliation are unreliable and counterproductive means of securing intelligence. A 1943 report by Marine Major Sherwood F. Moran directed interrogators to treat captured enemy personnel as human beings,⁷⁴ and a recent document by retired interrogator Major Anthony F. Milavic condemns the use of torture at Abu Ghraib and Guantánamo Bay and points to the historical ineffectiveness of torture.⁷⁵

Ignatieff supports a complete ban on torture, which he describes as “the deliberate infliction of physical cruelty and pain in order to extract information.”⁷⁶ Not only is torture likely to get swiftly out of hand and prove both ineffective and counterproductive—there is hardly a better way to recruit terrorists—but torture is the ultimate violation of both the human being subjected to this abuse and any democratic society that engages in it. Torture, Ignatieff argues, subjects victims to irremediable harm and exposes torturers to ultimate moral hazard. At the same time, it violates a liberal society’s central commitment to the dignity and freedom of the human person and expresses the intolerable position that human beings are expendable.⁷⁷

Cavanaugh suggests that torture is the “performance violence” the state wages on the bodies of its enemies, an act of theater “ritually enacting [the state’s] power on the bodies of others” and reinforcing the notion that

⁷³ Danner, *Torture and Truth* 32–33, 42–46; Seymour Hersch, “Torture at Abu Ghraib,” *New Yorker* 80 (May 10, 2004) 42; Hersch, “Chain of Command,” *New Yorker* 80 (May 17, 2004) 38. See also Elisa Massimino, “Leading by Example? U.S. Interrogation of Prisoners in the War on Terror,” *Criminal Justice Ethics* 23.1 (2004) 2, 74–76.

⁷⁴ Stephen Budiansky, “Truth Extraction,” *Atlantic Monthly* 295 (June, 2005) 32–35.

⁷⁵ Anthony F. Milavic, “The Use of ‘Torture’ in Interrogation,” on the Marine Corps Interrogator Translator Teams Association website, <http://www.mcitta.org/torture.htm> (accessed November 12, 2005).

⁷⁶ Ignatieff, *Lesser Evil* 136.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.* 136–44.

these enemies of the state are subhuman. In this sense, torture is the state's enactment of a holy war. He also argues that Christians, united to the tortured and resurrected (decidedly undisappeared) body of Christ, should find this practice particularly abhorrent.⁷⁸ Diana Ortiz's autobiographical account of her own torture in Guatemala offers a haunting narrative of this all too common form of state-sponsored terror.⁷⁹

MORE ON THE JUST WAR

Much of the recent conversation about just war has focused on the Bush administration's attempts to defend a preemptive or preventive military intervention in Iraq as a response to global terrorism or the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, a discussion Kenneth Himes analyzed with clarity and depth in the 2004 "Moral Notes."⁸⁰ This debate about the justice of the war in Iraq continues, particularly as rising casualties raise fresh concerns about the proportionality of this conflict.⁸¹

Other recent texts have explored reinvigorated interest in the just war doctrine in response to questions about genocide and humanitarian intervention,⁸² presented the history and criteria of the just war doctrine in the light of contemporary challenges, or compared just war thinking with pacifism or other religious perspectives on war.⁸³ Michael Walzer has published a fresh collection of his writings on just and unjust wars,⁸⁴ Jean Bethke Elshtain has written a just war defense of America's war on Afghanistan

⁷⁸ William T. Cavanaugh, "Taking Exception," *Christian Century* 122 (January 25, 2005) 9–10.

⁷⁹ Dianna Ortiz with Patricia Davis, *The Blindfold's Eye: My Journey from Torture to Truth* (Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis, 2002).

⁸⁰ Kenneth R. Himes, "Intervention, Just War, and U.S. National Security," *Theological Studies* 65 (2004) 141–58.

⁸¹ See Franklin Eric Wester "Preemption and Just War: Considering the Case of Iraq," *Parameters: US Army War College Quarterly* 34.4 (Winter 2004–2005) 20–39; Paul Savoy, "The Moral Case against the Iraq War," *Nation* 278 (May 31, 2004) 6–20; Stephen Strehle, "Saddam Hussein, Islam, and Just War theory: The Case for a Preemptive Strike," *Political Theology* 5 (2004) 76–101; Michael Novak, "Just Peace and the Asymmetric Threat: National Self-Defense in Uncharted Waters," *Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy* 27 (2004) 817–41; Joseph Betz, "Proportionality, Just War Theory, and America's 2003–2004 War against Iraq," *Social Philosophy Today* 21 (2005) 137–56.

⁸² Maria Pilar Aquino and Dietmar Mieth, ed., *The Return of the Just War* (London: SCM, 2001).

⁸³ Jeff Ashley, David Brown and Ann Loades, ed., *War and Peace: A Reader*, (New York: T. & T. Clark, 2003); Oliver O'Donovan, *The Just War Revisited* (London: Cambridge University, 2003).

⁸⁴ Michael Walzer, *Arguing about War* (New Haven: Yale University, 2004).

and terrorism,⁸⁵ and Thomas Shannon and Thomas Massaro have updated Shannon's earlier work on Catholic teaching on war and peace.⁸⁶

Still, not everyone is enamored with just war thinking. Most of the participants in the previously noted "Symposium on Terrorism, War, and Justice" found the traditional understanding of the principle of discrimination too permissive or restrictive,⁸⁷ and Anthony Burke argues that the just war theory's formalized understanding of discrimination and proportionality permit massive, avoidable, and unjustified losses of innocent life, so long as they are unintentional or indirect.⁸⁸ Curiously, Stephen Strehle voices an opposite complaint, finding just war criteria too restrictive.⁸⁹ It seems unlikely that Christianity needs a more permissive war ethic.

Duncan Forrester does not criticize the formality or criteria of just war thinking; rather, he believes that a just war theory informed by a Christian predisposition against violence and an orientation to reconciliation rightly seeks to restrain and discipline the use of violence. Still, he believes that just war thinking fails to attend sufficiently to the psychological and social roots of violence, the moments of transition from violence (requiring a *jus ex bello*), or alternative modes of conflict resolution.⁹⁰ The Christian response to violence must do more than decide whether a particular use of military force is just. It must include education, prevention, and a wide use of alternative means, all guided by prudence and a fundamental commitment to reconciliation and peace.

For his part, Glen Stassen continues to explore how a "just peacemaking" paradigm focused on prevention instead of justification might address some of the limits of just war thinking. He offers what he describes as ten "realistic, historically situated practices that are empirically demonstrating their effectiveness in preventing war."⁹¹

⁸⁵ Jean Bethke Elshtain, *Just War against Terror: The Burden of American Power in a Violent World* (New York: Basic Books, 2003).

⁸⁶ Thomas J. Massaro and Thomas A. Shannon, *Catholic Perspectives on Peace and War* (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003).

⁸⁷ See n. 41 above.

⁸⁸ Anthony Burke, "Just War or Ethical Peace? Moral Discourses of Strategic Violence after 9/11," *International Affairs* 80 (2004) 329–53.

⁸⁹ Strehle, "Saddam Hussein" 81–90.

⁹⁰ Duncan B. Forrester, "Violence and Non-Violence in Conflict Resolution: Some Theological Reflections," *Studies in Christian Ethics* 16.2 (2003) 64–79.

⁹¹ Glen H. Stassen, "The Unity, Realism, and Obligatoriness of Just Peacemaking Theory," *Journal of the Society of Christian Ethics* 23.1 (2003) 171–94. A recent collection of eight essays explores and critiques the strengths and limits of Stassen's paradigm in "Resource Section on Just Peacemaking Theory," ed. Glen H. Stassen, *Journal of the Society of Christian Ethics* 23 (2003) 171–84.

A Presumption for War?

In the 2004 “Moral Notes” Himes noted and critiqued George Weigel’s and Michael Novak’s objection to the contemporary and widespread belief that just war thinking begins with a presumption against war, a position Weigel traces to the U.S. Catholic bishops’ 1983 pastoral, “The Challenge of Peace,” and describes as an abandonment of classic Catholic just war thinking.⁹² Indeed, for Weigel this new Catholic “default position” has reduced the just war theory to “a species of functional or *de facto* pacifism.”⁹³

Richard Miller and Gregory Reichberg take opposing sides in the debate about whether one can find a presumption against war in the writings of Thomas Aquinas.⁹⁴ Miller argues that the structure of Aquinas’s four objections in the *Summa theologiae* 2-2, q. 40, a. 1, where he asks, “Is it always a sin to wage war?” reveals a presumption against war and a privileging of nonviolence over violence.⁹⁵ Reichberg, on the other hand, argues that Aquinas has more in common with contemporary just war theorists like James Turner Johnson, who believe that just war thinking begins with a presumption against injustice.⁹⁶

Alongside this debate about whether just war thinking does or should begin with a presumption against war is the larger reality that the vast majority of American Catholics and Christians approach the moral analysis of every call to arms with a strong presumption in favor of war.⁹⁷ Shannon and Massaro show that traditional Catholic just war thinking precluded conscientious objection, requiring citizens to answer their leaders’ call to arms, and that American Catholics long offered uncritical support to their nation’s wars.⁹⁸ And long after Vatican II approved of conscientious objection and the U.S. bishops condemned “uncritical conformism” and “exaggerated nationalism,”⁹⁹ Michael Baxter reports that American Catholics

⁹² Himes, “Intervention, Just War” 150–52.

⁹³ George Weigel, “The Just War Tradition and the World after September 11,” *Logos* 5.3 (2002) 13–44, at 16.

⁹⁴ Richard B. Miller, “Aquinas and the Presumption against Killing and War,” *Journal of Religion* 82 (2002) 173–204; Gregory M. Reichberg, “Is There a ‘Presumption against War’ in Aquinas’s Ethics?” *Thomist* 66 (2002) 337–67.

⁹⁵ Miller, “Presumption against Killing” 186.

⁹⁶ Reichberg, “Presumption against War?” 366–67.

⁹⁷ See Stassen, “Hermeneutical Key” 172–75; Jennifer Lucas and David Matzko McCarthy, “War Is Its Own Justification: What Americans Think about War,” *Political Theology* 6 (2005) 165–92; Michael J. Baxter, “Catholics Should Be More Conscientious about Objecting to War,” 67.12 (2002) 21–23 *U.S. Catholic*; Griffith, *War on Terrorism* 81.

⁹⁸ Massaro and Shannon, *Catholic Perspectives* 17–22.

⁹⁹ *Ibid.* 29–30.

and their hierarchy continue to exhibit a striking willingness to support U.S. wars.¹⁰⁰

Weigel and Novak's opposition to a presumption against war fails to acknowledge that the actual "default position" for the vast majority of U.S. Catholics and Christians involves giving the government a "blank check" when it comes to war, and recent works by Christopher Hedges, Andrew Bacevich, Glen Stassen, and others illustrate how deeply embedded a presumption in favor of violence is in our culture, how strong the unacknowledged attractions of war are, and how much we require a corrective presumption against violence.¹⁰¹ Indeed, Cavanaugh argues that the state—whose central apparatuses are birthed and fueled by war—has a vested interest in promoting war, and that neither individual Catholics nor the Church should surrender to the president or the state their responsibility to make moral judgments about when a war is just or not.¹⁰²

Andrew Fiala and Baxter argue that the strong presumption in favor of war needs to be resisted by embracing a stance of practical pacifism.¹⁰³ Indeed, Fiala, who is not a pacifist, argues "that ordinary citizens of democracies should be strongly committed to pacifism in practice."¹⁰⁴ Since these citizens must participate in decisions about war, since they rarely have sufficient information to make a good choice, and since wars unleash horrible violence, citizens have a duty to question and demand proof; they ought to begin with a presumption against the call to arms. "Violence and killing are such evils that we should establish a high burden of proof for those who would justify them," Fiala asserts.¹⁰⁵ Baxter agrees, arguing that Catholics in particular should constitute an army of conscientious objectors

¹⁰⁰ Michael J. Baxter, "Dispelling the 'We' Fallacy from the Body of Christ: The Task of Catholics in a Time of War," *South Atlantic Quarterly* 101 (2002) 361–73.

¹⁰¹ Chris Hedges, *War Is a Force That Gives Us Meaning* (New York: Anchor Books, 2003); Andrew Bacevich, *The New American Militarism: How Americans Are Seduced by War* (New York: Oxford University, 2005); Stassen, "Hermeneutical Key" 172–74; Lucas and McCarthy, "War Is Its Own Justification," 176–86; Perry Bush, "Violence, Nonviolence, and the Search for Answers in History," in *Teaching Peace* 77–88; James H. Satterwhite, "Nonviolent Political Movements as Missed Opportunity," *ibid.* 89–101.

¹⁰² See William T. Cavanaugh, "Killing for the Telephone Company: Why the Nation-State Is Not the Keeper of the Common Good," *Modern Theology* 20 (2004) 243–74, at 249–50; William T. Cavanaugh, "At Odds With the Pope: Legitimate Authority and Just Wars," *Commonweal* 130 (May 23, 2003) 11–14.

¹⁰³ Andrew Fiala, "Citizenship, Epistemology, and the Just War Theory," *Logos* 7.2 (2004) 100–17; Fiala, "Practical Pacifism and the War on Terror," *Humanist* 62.6 (2002) 14–16; Fiala, *Practical Pacifism* (New York: Algora, 2004); Baxter, "Dispelling the 'We' Fallacy" 364–67.

¹⁰⁴ Fiala, "Citizenship" 100–1.

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.* 108.

to resist the popular consensus and to call for serious engagement with the moral problems associated with justifying any war.¹⁰⁶

Sanctions

Just war thinking requires that nations turn to military intervention only as a last resort. Economic sanctions, therefore, have become increasingly popular, being seen as a less coercive and violent means of addressing injustice. However, the disproportionate and indiscriminate harm produced by over a decade of comprehensive U.N. sanctions against Iraq suggests that sanctions might be a continuation of war rather than an alternative to it. Indeed, in cases like Iraq, comprehensive sanctions could be a form of total warfare, even a war crime. Thus, there have been calls to develop a set of criteria for “ethical sanctions,” largely informed by the just war theory.

Joy Gordon, Ray Pentland, and Thomas Claire argue that the first problem with economic sanctions—particularly comprehensive ones—is their tendency to render grave harm to noncombatants while having little impact on political or military leaders, thus turning the principle of discrimination on its head.¹⁰⁷ Twelve years of U.N. sanctions against Iraq took the lives of a million citizens and over half a million children. Attempts to defend these deaths as unintended collateral damage ignore the fact that these consequences were predictable and that the punitive suffering inflicted on these noncombatants was the explicit means chosen to achieve military and political ends.¹⁰⁸

As they did in Iraq, economic sanctions can also inflict disproportionate harm, matching or exceeding the casualties of war, including the destructiveness of weapons of mass destruction.¹⁰⁹ Such cases belie the notion that economic sanctions are an alternative to war and suggest instead that they represent a form of total or siege warfare, in which indiscriminate and disproportionate harm is rendered on the general public.¹¹⁰

Pentland, Gordon, and others point to the failure of the U.N. sanctions

¹⁰⁶ Baxter, “Dispelling the ‘We’ Fallacy” 364–67.

¹⁰⁷ Joy Gordon, “Cool War: Economic Sanctions as a Weapon of Mass Destruction,” *Harper’s Magazine* 305 (November, 2002) 43–49; Gordon, “Economic Sanctions, Just War Doctrine, and the ‘Fearful Spectacle of the Civilian Dead,’” *Cross Currents* 49 (1999) 387–400; Ray Pentland, “Just War—Just Sanctions,” *Political Theology* 3 (2002) 178–95; Claire Thomas, “Civilian Starvation: A Just Tactic of War?” *Journal of Military Ethics* 4.2 (2005) 108–18.

¹⁰⁸ Gordon, “Cool War” 44–47; Thomas, “Civilian Starvation” 108–10.

¹⁰⁹ Joseph E. Capizzi and Tobias Winright, “The ‘Slow War’ against Iraq: A Moral Analysis,” *Josephinum Journal of Theology* 8 (2001) 27–42, at 40.

¹¹⁰ Pentland, “Just Sanctions” 189–91; Gordon, “Economic Sanctions” 391–93.

against Iraq to achieve any real success,¹¹¹ and Jovan Babić and Aleksandar Jokić argue that sanctions tend to take on a life of their own by escalating the action beyond its original purpose and justification without achieving the stated end or coming to a satisfactory conclusion.¹¹² Thus, while economic sanctions may seem like a less costly alternative, their failure to achieve success makes them quite costly.

George Lopez and David Cortright try to resolve the problems with unjust sanctions by calling for smart or restricted sanctions that target military and political leadership,¹¹³ while Euclid Rose argues that there needs to be a shift away from sanctions as punishment to sanctions as persuasion or bargaining.¹¹⁴ Like any other form of violence, there is always a danger of fueling the hatred and opposition of one's enemies. As Gordon points out in her analysis of the Iraq sanctions, it is hard to imagine a better way to breed vengeance and terror than to starve a nation's children to death.¹¹⁵

Conclusion

The twin scandals of religious violence and democratic societies discarding human rights and civil liberties offer a sobering reminder that yielding to the temptation to demonize and destroy our neighbors seduces and corrupts communities both sectarian and secular. Neither churches nor states can point a guiltless finger at the beam in the other's eye. The appeal of war and violence—the sense of moral righteousness that flows from drawing a Manichean line in the sand between our forces of light and their forces of darkness—is embedded in human hearts and structures, and must be uncovered and resisted by a repentant Christian community that acknowledges its own violence and makes a preferential option for peace.

At the same time, the failure of traditional just war norms to adequately protect countless innocent men, women, and children from being killed by our military interventions or economic sanctions is a reminder that the lines we draw between terror and justifiable force are often political and self-serving, and that we must be constantly vigilant in our efforts to oppose and constrain the terror and tragedy of violence. Indeed, we must do much better than we have done so far.

¹¹¹ Pentland, "Just Sanctions" 191; Gordon, "Economic Sanctions" 390.

¹¹² Jovan Babić and Aleksandar Jokić, "Economic Sanctions, Morality, and Escalation of Demands on Yugoslavia," *International Peacekeeping* 9.4 (2002) 119–26.

¹¹³ See David Cortright and George A. Lopez, with Linda Gerber, *Sanctions and the Search for Security: Challenges to UN Action* (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 2002); Cortright and Lopez, ed. *Smart Sanctions: Targeting Economic Statecraft* (Lanham, Md: Rowman & Littlefield, 2002).

¹¹⁴ Euclid A. Rose, "From a Punitive to a Bargaining Model of Sanctions: Lessons from Iraq," *International Studies Quarterly* 49 (2005) 459–80.

¹¹⁵ Gordon, "Cool War" 49.