
Friedmann is professor of comparative private law and former dean of the Law School of Tel-Aviv University. Of interest to theologians, ethicists, and biblicists is his review of stories in the Hebrew Bible, with emphasis on Genesis, 1 and 2 Samuel, and 1 and 2 Kings. His chapters are quick-paced, and narratives retold with learned but accessible comparisons with the Code of Hammurabi, Homer’s Iliad, Greek and Roman mythology, Talmudic midrash, medieval commentators Rashi and Radak, Maimonides, Icelandic and Norse sagas, Shakespearean drama, English common law, and modern American and Israeli case law. These extrabiblical citations are aimed at explaining a legal motif to a general audience, not providing grist for plaintiffs’ or defendants’ attorneys.

For undergraduate professors of Hebrew Bible as Literature, the approach of most chapters models effective teaching: set up the theme by focusing on a central narrative; analyze the characters and their relationships; do comparative analysis with other biblical texts; cite other ancient laws and myths; return to the central narrative; and finally, make allusions to contemporary legal cases in modern law that illustrate how the legal principle is treated differently today.

Without dealing with literary genres, philology, or the “immensity of scholarly literature in these fields,” F.’s project is to “infer from the biblical stories the legal and moral concepts they reflect and the system of laws underlying them” (vii). His caveat may explain the absence of a theory underlying the composition and redaction of Hebrew scriptural narratives (e.g., JEPD). Citing texts in simultaneous voice from many different historical periods around a central legal motif is probably best described as the style of Talmudic commentary.

However, a theological literalism (five books of Torah composed before the succession narratives in 1 and 2 Samuel) frustrates the reader in rationally accounting for F.’s assertion that there was a progressive development in biblical law. F. says that legal provisions in the Bible reflect an evolution of moral consciousness from “earlier” to “later,” periods, such as the replacement of the ordeal of bitter water in which God was the judge with a juridical procedure involving examination of witnesses. “Discrepancies” in the trajectory are explained as adoption of nonbiblically-based regional legal conventions. He likewise argues that the social status of women was “higher” in the patriarchal period, given the strong characterization of Sarah, Rachel, and Rebekkah, and “lower” in the period of the judges and monarchy because of references to David and Solomon’s polygamous marriages and their concubines.
F. also maintains that the deception, fraud, and deceit of biblical characters, such as Jacob stealing Esau's birthright, seems to be rewarded and not punished. Despite his citation of scholars of folklore and literary motif, F. does not interpret the stories of deceit and fraud as standard narrative typology of "the deceiver," designed to engage the reader in the story, but rather as circumstantial evidence of a lower stage of society's moral consciousness at that time. Despite sociological generalizations which the narrative review cannot support, F. demonstrates his skills of literary analysis when he compares and contrasts David and Ahab (90–91) and David and Jacob (290–91).

The prophets, such as Amos and Isaiah, are F.'s heroes, because they evidence a higher moral consciousness and rail against the exploitation of the poor, but his treatment of prophecy and exile (chaps. 11, 12) is more homiletic, focused on sin rather than on analysis of legal provisions. A homiletic rather than legal approach governs a retelling of how the moral failures of Saul and David contributed to the collapse of Saul's reign and characterized the succession after David.

F.'s purpose is to examine "the world outlook of ancient Israelite society as reflected in the rich biblical literature that describes individuals and families as well as historical and political events in the governance and monarchy" (307). This aim is more satisfactorily carried out in the last third of the volume which addresses the status of women, legal prohibitions against adultery, monogamy, polygamy, surrogate motherhood, infertility, the tension between responsibility to undertake a levirate marriage and the prohibition against incest, divorce, rape, murder, bastardy, conversion, and forcible separation of husbands from "foreign" wives. Still, an argument that there was a linear development from "earlier" moral consciousness to "later" and "higher" moral consciousness cannot be built without a theory of textual composition and redaction, despite an impressive citation of legal sources and captivating presentation.

Finally, feminists long familiar with these biblical stories about women and their families will be frustrated to note the complete absence of reference to women's biblical and legal scholarship of the last 35 years, even while F. cites contemporary male authors of English sources in British and American law and Bible. Standing with men on one side of a mehitzah, separated from women scholars, detracts from F.'s aim to effectively engage a gender inclusive audience.

Silicon Valley Law School, San Jose, Calif. ELOISE ROSENBLATT, R.S.M., PH.D., J.D.


The book represents Mathieu's revised doctoral dissertation completed under the direction of Marcel Dumais at the University of St. Paul in Ottawa. After a detailed discussion of the past research regarding Peter in

The analysis demonstrates that three mandates are conferred on Peter: to capture people in order to give them life (Lk 5:10), to strengthen his brothers (22:32), and, with the other Apostles, to judge the twelve tribes of Israel at the end of time (22:30). Luke-Acts shows how Peter accomplished the first two of these mandates. In doing so three important aspects of the figure of Peter are underlined: Peter is a disciple, he is chosen as one of those responsible for the community, and he has the unique role of strengthening his brothers.

Peter models for the audience what it means to be a disciple of Jesus, which includes both progressing and regressing in faith. Although Peter regresses to the point of denying Jesus, thanks to Jesus' intervention, he (unlike Judas) becomes rehabilitated and profoundly configured to the person of Christ. For the audience of today Peter is important not only for those engaged in discussions about the papacy or ecclesiastical authority but, more generally, for whoever wishes to follow Christ as a disciple.

Peter's role of responsibility for the community is not to take the place of Christ, but to allow the power of the name of Christ to work within him. This reminds the audience that church leaders must follow the example of Christ as one who serves (Lk 22:24–27). This means that church leaders should exercise the kind of authority that proposes rather than imposes. The role of church leaders is to guide the discerning process in which the entire Church has a part. As illustrated in Acts 15, a church leader should not impose an unbearable yoke upon disciples but remind them to rely essentially on the grace of the Lord Jesus.

Beyond being a model disciple and an exemplary leader, Peter has the unique role of strengthening his brothers. His experience of the risen Christ enables him to fulfill this role. It permits him to be the first witness and originator of Easter faith for the entire Church. In various ways in Acts, Peter not only strengthens his "brothers" (broadly interpreted as including not only Apostles but fellow Jews and even Gentiles) within the narrative but also his brothers within the audience of Luke-Acts.

Some points of criticism about M.'s use of the narrative-critical method can be raised. It would be more technically accurate to use the term "implied audience" rather than "implied reader," since Luke-Acts would have been listened to in a communal setting rather than read privately by individuals. M. often disturbs the narrative progression by introducing material from later chapters that the audience has not yet heard, though this does not seem to substantially detract from his major results.

Along the way M. points out a plethora of subtle exegetical details and narrative interrelationships. Some are very insightful but others seem a bit far-fetched, imaginative, and somewhat forced. For example, it is implied
that almost every use of the verb "raise" or "rise up" is a symbolic refer­
ence to the Resurrection. Although the work is generally well researched
and contains ample bibliography, there are some surprising absences. Miss­
ing, for example, are some works pertinent to an investigation such as this:
Lorenzo Tosco, Pietro e Paolo ministri del giudizio di Dio: Studio del
genere letterario e della funzione di At 5,1–11 e 13,4–12 (1989); Marion L.
Soards, The Speeches in Acts: Their Content, Context, and Concerns (1994);

All in all, however, this is a truly noteworthy contribution to the study of
the figure of Peter not only as a model disciple and leader but also as a
unique figure of authority whose legacy has endured to this day. It opens
the way for similar narrative-critical investigations of other figures of au­
thority in Luke-Acts, such as James, Philip, Barnabas, and Paul.

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JOHN PAUL HEIL

PAUL AMONG THE POSTLIBERALS: PAULINE THEOLOGY BEYOND CHRISTEN­

"Postliberals" is a term whose meaning I am never quite sure of. To
encounter Paul among them is a challenge at which I jumped and have
pondered considerably. Douglas Harink, who teaches at The King's Uni­
versity College, Edmonton, Alberta, is forthright about influences on his
Baptist heritage (9–11). In graduate studies he discovered Karl Barth.
Other influences were Krister Stendahl ("the Introspective Conscience of
the West"), Stanley Hauerwas, John Howard Yoder (The Politics of Jesus,
1972); and on Paul: the “New Perspective” (E. P. Sanders; J. D. G. Dunn,
whose huge Theology of Paul the Apostle [1998] has been mastered “only
a little”), apocalyptic perspective, and R. Hays (pistis Christou as “the faith
of Jesus”). From this mix is to emerge what a Pauline theology is “for our
time” (13–22).

A first step (25–65) is to replace traditional views of justification (Lutheran, Roman Catholic; the Joint Declaration of 1999, 45 n. 43), liberal
Protestant, etc., with justification as “God's deliverance of the Gentiles
[not Jews] from their former religious-sociopolitical allegiances” to “give
their unreserved loyalty (pistis) to the one God of Israel” as “a new people,
under a new Lord and ... the kingdom of God, ... the ekklesia.” Faith is
“Gentiles ... baptized” and “obedient ... to their Lord, repeating the
pattern of his obedience and faithfulness in” a “way of life ... social and
personal, ... economic and political” (64). Emphases come from Hays,
Barth, Yoder, and Hauerwas, and feature exegetically 1 Thessalonians.
Add S. Stowers, Rereading Romans [1994], for the claim that all “Paul's
letters have Gentiles as their implied ... audience” (39 n. 30). The view
that Jewish particularistic nationalism is the problem (Dunn, N. T. Wright)
is set aside in five lines (39 n. 29).
To understand "apocalypse," chapter 2 goes to Hauerwas and J. Louis Martyn's commentary on Galatians: "'apocalypse' is shorthand for Jesus Christ" (68, 78). The "new perspective on Paul" is judged "insufficiently apocalyptical/theological" (71). Hauerwas's theology "in an apocalyptic mode" is primarily an onslaught against liberalism. The ultimate for today is an "institutional ... Christian imperialism that seeks to conquer the world through ... nonviolent politics" (103).

"Politics" (105-49) emerges as especially important in H.'s mix, developed with Yoder as a plea for nonviolent sociopolitical mission. Philippians 2:3-14 is the prime NT passage, the "hymn" read in Anabaptist style to show a model for imitation. The Barthian claim emerges of a christological basis for the state and for the Haustafeln (from Jesus, not from Stoic sources). One can speak of "the politics of Paul" in recent NT studies, but as H.'s notes suggest, many adherents see a much more activist, anti-Roman Paul, not nonviolent (N. Elliott, n. 82; R. Cassidy, n. 83; W. Wink, n. 29; plus R. Horsley, L. Bormann, and others). My own reading of Philippians (Anchor Bible, forthcoming) can only suggest how partial H.'s effort is, both in the sense of limited and one-sided.

Under "Israel" (151-207) N. T. Wright is dismissed as supersessionist. The alternative is Yoder on Diaspora Judaism as a model for the Church that fell into Hellenization, Romanization, and Constantinianism, from which the Radical Reformation rescued the Diaspora model. One must hold to the "irrevocable election of Israel."

"Culture" (209-54) may be the most difficult chapter. H. takes Romans as a plea for "Jews and messianic Gentiles together" to constitute "the one people of God" (218); the synagogue would have to agree that "Jesus was in fact the Messiah of Israel"; in the Church there would be "voluntary Judaizing of Gentile believers" (220). Alas, "We do not know whether Paul's hope became a reality in Romans" (225; probably we do: the supposed hope did not occur). From 1 Corinthians comes a different model: the Christian assembly is to function like a Diaspora synagogue, in contrast to pagans. It is convenient not to have to deal with relations with Jerusalem (for synagogue or Pauline Church) or 2 Corinthians.

The book's conclusion (255-60) tells succinctly how to preach on justification, apocalypse, politics, election, and culture. (One may ask what is missing from a syllabus of Paul; e.g., anthropology, sin.) The subtitle should be taken seriously: beyond Christendom (most of historic Christianity) and modernity (anything post-Enlightenment), "Pauline theology" has been reconstructed.

A systematic theologian may put things together as he or she wishes. I have learned much about the authors H. summarizes. But his Paul is difficult to recognize when a more balanced picture of NT work is considered. To use on Paul works by J. L. Martyn, M. D. Nanos, or B. W. Winter as if not post-Enlightenment is disingenuous. The whole is interesting and idiosyncratic, but does it hang together?

Lutheran Theological Seminary, Philadelphia (emeritus)  JOHN REUMANN

New Testament studies has not yet come to a consensus on how best to describe the social structure and internal life of the early Christian groups. Models from the ancient Mediterranean environment include the household, the voluntary association, the synagogue, and the philosophic or rhetorical school. In this important book, a substantially revised doctoral dissertation (University of Toronto, under John S. Kloppenborg), Philip Harland makes a compelling, persuasive case for the voluntary association (Latin: collegium), which builds a rising tide of support for what others have proposed of late: Richard S. Ascough, Paul's Macedonian Associations (2003); John S. Kloppenborg and Stephen G. Wilson, ed., Voluntary Associations in the Graeco-Roman World (1996).

The book's foil is Wayne A. Meeks, The First Urban Christians: The Social World of the Apostle Paul (1983), which finds “significant analogies” in all four models but concludes that “none captures the whole of the Pauline ekklesia” (84). Problematic in Meeks's influential study, according to H., are the simplification of early Christian congregations into a uniform picture (based primarily on social data from Corinth), the assumption that Christian groups were unique (“incomparable”) in social formation, the depiction of associations as lacking in corresponding terminology, and the wholesale adoption of sect as the main sociological typology (177–84, 210). Yet H.'s polemical tone is excessive. A more productive critique would expose those scholars who exaggerate or simplify Meeks's claims—readers familiar with his First Urban Christians know that he nuances his conclusions about associations carefully, as the preface to the second edition (2003) makes clear: “The clubs of Ephesus, for example, have left an extensive record that could reinforce and enlarge my comparison of the Pauline groups with voluntary associations” (x).

The central argument is that local epigraphic evidence acts as a control against exclusive reliance on the legal and literary sources (mostly concerning Rome) for reconstructing the historical actualities of associations. Part 1 (“Associations in Roman Asia”) examines Greco-Roman polytheism on the level of the civic cult, part 2 (“Imperial Cults and Connections among Associations”) studies the integration of emperor worship within that civic life, and part 3 locates Diaspora synagogues and Christian congregations within this main framework. H. classifies associations (also called “guilds”) according to their profile of membership—household, ethnic or geographic, neighborhood, occupation, and temple or cult. Associations, synagogues, and congregations are found to represent the same phenomenon of acculturation, assimilation, and dissimilation within the polis of the Greek East.

The book thus questions a whole tradition of scholarship that depicts unofficial associations as consisting of only the poorest in society, as lacking genuine religious dimensions, and as being inherently subversive to Roman
imperial rule (59–61). The exegetical payoff is not only new light on Paul and his communities but also a nicely focused, regional study of early Christian writings pertaining to Roman Asia Minor: 1 Peter, Revelation, the Pastoral Epistles, the Martyrdom of Polycarp, Melito of Sardis, and the Acts of Paul and Thecla.

H. provides a successful refutation of decline theories and of a standard "public" vs. "private" paradigm in the study of ancient Mediterranean religions. His judicious use of social network analysis shows that sacrifice and monumental honors not only strengthened the sense of belonging within an ancient group but also "placed" the group within a cosmology that legitimated the ideology of Roman rule. A problem, though, appears in fitting martyrdom into this thesis. H. downplays the importance of non-participation in emperor worship, asserting, "In effect, Christians were not martyred for refusing to worship the emperor" (244). I would need more analysis of the martyrdoms as social history to be convinced, especially since H. contradicts what the martyrdoms themselves claim (e.g., The Passion of Perpetua). Indeed, nonparticipation in emperor worship may reflect early Christian resistance to social changes that accompanied the new religious roles of municipal elites in the service of the imperial realities of the Augustan settlement—namely, redirected cliental behavior among the local elite to the emperor as princeps.

Yet, in sum, this highly recommended book deserves a place among the best in biblical studies. A fascinating read, it sheds new light on an important question in New Testament scholarship.

Indiana University, Bloomington  
J. Albert Harrill


Cyril of Alexandria's Christology has received much scholarly attention, especially because it sought to remedy the errors of Nestorius and it set the theological and political stage for the Council of Ephesus in 431. Daniel Keating, however, has rightly seen a need to focus on an often mentioned but seldom studied aspect of Cyril's thought, his understanding of human deification. As he himself explains, K.'s aims are fourfold: (1) to study theosis in the light of Cyril's other concerns, (2) to see how Cyril's understanding of our "appropriation of the divine life" is bound up with his scriptural commentary, (3) to offer a corrective to variant readings on this connection, and (4) to bring Cyril's sense of deification into dialogue with three contemporaries.

K. admits from the outset that the term appropriation best fits what he has discovered in Cyril, because this one word captures the action of both human and divine persons. That is, appropriation accurately defines who
Christ is and who we become: how the divine life is both appropriated to us and by us in Christ's theandric mission.

Chapter 1, “The Divine Plan of Salvation in Cyril” (20–53), maps out the mechanics of Cyril's narrative of salvation, which K. approaches through Cyril's exegesis on Christ's baptism, death, Resurrection, and Ascension. Three main points emerge here. First, Christ's humanity is the primal divinized nature and thus stands as the primary referent for what union with God signifies. Second, Cyril's First-Second Adam typology allows him to represent the Christ life as both actively mediated and received. Third, the Holy Spirit's indwelling in the elect completes this look at how God wishes to communicate his own life.

What this life consists in is the topic of chapter 2, “The Gift of Divine Life” (54–104). Here K. examines how the human person comes to enjoy union with the divine and concludes with two central concepts: “We receive Christ into ourselves, participating in him and his life, and thus in the divine nature, through a twofold means: the indwelling of the Holy Spirit, normally related to baptism, and partaking of the flesh and blood of Christ in the Eucharist” (89). The dual effect of the deified creature's being brought to the Father is therefore not only a psychic transformation but a physical incorruptibility and integrity as well.

Chapter 3, “The Reception of Divine Life” (105–43), focuses on the human cooperation needed for creaturely advancement in godliness. Having been made in the divine image, no other communion will complete the human creature. Yet, while “divine initiative is primary” (141), the human response in one's moral life is likewise necessary. To make this point, Cyril holds up Jesus as the human moral paradigm. K. thus accurately sees, against some traditional criticisms of Cyrilline Christology, how Christ's humanity plays an active and pedagogical role, his obedience to the Father proving to be the way to deified humanity for all.

Chapter 4, “Partakers of the Divine Nature” (144–90), treats the indispensable role of participation (as inherited from Plato through Plotinus) first within patristic thought in general and then in Cyril in particular. K. notes that Cyril employs 2 Peter 1:4 more than any other early Christian theologian, but even he is unwilling to explicate this pivotal passage very thoroughly. Instead, he relies more on images of Christ as the perfect mediator to explain how the divine life reaches human persons and how one's filial status is effected before the Father.

Chapter 5 essentially concludes the work while the sixth and final chapter juxtaposes Cyril's view of appropriated divinity with the views of Theodore of Mopsuestia (d. 428), Pope Leo the Great (d. 461) and Augustine (d. 431). This welcome aspect of K.'s work highlights not only Cyril's unique contribution to the history of theosis, but also the contributions of three other figures whose views on this particular topic have been neglected.

K., professor of theology at Detroit's Sacred Heart Major Seminary, relies on Pusey's translation of Cyril, the only complete English text available, but he provides the Greek where appropriate. What began as a doc-
toral dissertation under Thomas Weinandy at Oxford University proves to be a masterly study not only of Cyril but also of the dynamics of *theosis* in general. Anyone interested in Cyril and the development of Christology and soteriology should consult this work. It deserves wide attention.

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David Meconi, S.J.


The question of Augustine's influence on Descartes arose immediately after the publication of the *Discourse on Method* in 1637, and in his *Objections to the Meditations* Antoine Arnauld pointed out to Descartes in 1641 that the *cogito* argument is found in the writings of St. Augustine. Ever since then, the relationship between Cartesian philosophy and Augustine's works has been warmly debated in scholarly circles. The present volume began simply as a translation of the French original, but the English version has added appendixes on Bacon's and Montaigne's influence on Descartes.

The index is divided into sections on the Letter to the Sorbonne, on the six parts of the *Meditations*, and on the topic of the eternal truths; it includes a list of passages from Descartes's works mainly in Latin juxtaposed with others from Augustine in Latin. Their English translations are found on the facing pages. Janowski says, "I have included only those passages from the writings of St. Augustine about which I could affirm with certainty or a high degree of probability that Descartes knew them" (9). Many sections of the index are divided into two parts, the first containing, as J. claims, "passages that are literal or almost literal quotations from St. Augustine" (10), the second containing borrowings that are merely possible. The index, which runs from page 14 to 99, is followed by 66 pages of commentary and by appendixes of texts and translations from Thomas Aquinas, John Duns Scotus, Francis Bacon, and Michel de Montaigne, along with short essays on the relationship of Bacon and Montaigne to Descartes.

The heart of J.'s work is an exercise in Quellenforschung, or source-criticism, with which I am more familiar in terms of studies of Plotinus's influence on Augustine. That case was further complicated by the fact that Marius Victorinus's Latin translation of the *Enneads*, which Augustine used, is no longer extant. In the case of Plotinus's influence on Augustine, however, scholars have been held to a much higher standard for admitting a direct influence of the great Neoplatonist on the greatest of the Western Fathers than that which J. has set for himself in selecting instances of supposedly direct quotation. A mere similarity of various words is insufficient proof that Descartes actually read Augustine and quoted him, for such a similarity can at least often be explained in other ways. On the other hand, the sheer number of passages that J. cites certainly supports some influence of Augustine on the founder of modern philosophy.

Another weakness in the index lies in the large number of mistakes in
the Latin quoted. There are multiple typos or errors in the Latin on almost every page. While such a lack of care in proofreading does not undermine the scholarly content of the index of textual parallels, it does at least raise the question why a scholar of J.’s caliber did not check the Latin text with greater care.

The commentary provides an interesting essay in which J. argues that the title of the Meditations is not derived from the works of either Marcus Aurelius or Ignatius of Loyola, but rather reflects Descartes's method of withdrawing the mind from the influence of the senses. J. argues that the argument of the Meditations has nothing to do with skepticism, but rather with atheism, which Descartes, of course, saw as tied to the existence of truth. Despite some valuable insights, this section of the work also suffers from deficient proofreading. For instance, J. quotes from a letter to Mersenne of May 27, 1630, that God “is the author of the essence of created things no less than of their existence; and this essence is nothing other than the eternal truths” (106). Then J. immediately adds from an earlier letter of May 6, 1630, that Descartes “concludes: ‘If God did not exist these truths would nevertheless be true,’” although the French text of the letter has immediately prior to this latter quote: “Il ne faut pas done dire que....” The addition of this introductory clause is essential to what Descartes said and also to the thesis that J. holds.

The commentary does, however, offer some very interesting insights into the reception of Cartesian philosophy in the intellectual world of the 17th century by Augustinian and non-Augustinian thinkers, and for that this part of the volume is certainly worth reading.

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Roland J. Teske, S.J.


According to Karl Rahner, many of us Christians (excluding, of course, readers of this journal) are unwitting tritheists and monophysites. Tertullian was neither, and it is gratifying to have a book by a scholar who obviously likes him and takes his theology seriously. When read accurately, Tertullian moves the tradition a long way toward (and maybe beyond) both Nicaea and Chalcedon, and Alexandre does not ignore that contribution. But there is far more, and arguably richer fare in Tertullian on Christ, the neglect of which would leave us poorer theologically. So A. offers an effectively inclusive study, in four long chapters, based on the problems Tertullian actually confronted.

The first, most wide-ranging chapter, “Christ and Christians,” lays out how Christ was confessed in and presented to a non-Christian world. A. uses some 16 of Tertullian’s treatises here, but especially the Apology, adding generous excerpts from the Prescription against Heretics, On Patience, and On Baptism. “The Christ of the Creator” is based on the books Against Marcion: Jesus is the Christ of the one God, the Creator, known in
Israel’s Scriptures. “Son of God and Son of Man” is a solid analysis of *On the Flesh of Christ*, opposing docetism generally, and underlining Christ’s humanity as well as the unity and distinction of the two “natures.” Finally, “The Christ of the Trinity” takes the reader through *Against Praxeas*, on how Tertullian sees the Father and Son as at once united and distinct.

For A., to “get” Tertullian’s theology of Christ (and Trinity), one must attend to the underlying unity “between Trinity and Christology, Christology and history, and history and the theology of creation” (235). The last item is crucial for A., who further contends that this Christ is “the complete and definitive response to the question of the meaning of creation” (26).

Linked to the theology of creation is Christ’s role—with all other humans—as the image of God in his humanity, in his flesh. Further, Christ’s weakness and authentic anguish in the face of suffering and death provide not only an example for the martyr, but demonstrate the humanity of his soul as well. Tertullian’s insistence on Jesus’ humanity was timely in a world in which the “devaluation of earthly realities” (164) was common; but it was also a noteworthy contribution to a future when certain monophysite and Alexandrian Christologies tended toward “not preserving intact” (209) that humanity.

In the “trinitarian” chapter, on *Against Praxeas*, A.’s analysis displays how Tertullian does a more-than-adequate job in arguing for a distinction among Father, Son, and Spirit without abandoning his own “moderate” or “ordered” monarchianism, defending him against “the common prejudice . . . about the imperfection of trinitarian thought accepted and transmitted in the Church prior to Nicaea” (236). However impenetrable might seem Tertullian’s claim that Father, Son, and Spirit are “tres . . . non statu sed gradu, nec substantia sed forma, nec potestate sed specie” (Prax. 2.4), for him (and for us) there is one God, and Father and Son are not the same. When he can, A. deftly unpacks Tertullian’s vocabulary: e.g. *persona* and *substantia*; *ratio* and *sermo* for *logos*; *dispositio/disponere*; *spiritus* as the name of the third “Person” and as the designation for the divine in Jesus. He also brings out where the Stoic substratum of Tertullian’s thought is important, for example, on the *logos*, and on his enthusiasm for opposites and their reconciliation. Finally, A. provides a good defense of Tertullian against the inaccurate and unfair claim that he saw the “time of the Spirit” as surpassing and replacing the time of Christ.

Regrettably, there is no debate or exchange with any but French scholarship. More disconcerting to me, however, is A.’s apparent obliviousness to the anti-Judaism in the texts he quotes and with which he works. He can write of the “inevitable” anti-Judaism of Marcion (88) and that of Harnack (156 n. 1). Only once, in a footnote (141 n. 3), does he acknowledge that Tertullian can express “opinions unfavorable to Jews.” But in the long discussion of the skill with which Tertullian organizes *Apology* 21 (on how Christians have replaced the Jews who had been God’s people but faithlessly “blew it,” 19–26); in much of the material *Against Marcion* (“God was not at fault; the Jews were,” 118–36 and elsewhere); and in A.’s en-
thusiasm for Against Praxeas 31 (on the Christian "new way" of believing in [a triune] God, as opposed to the Jews, who did not "get it" and refused to include the Son and Spirit in/with the one God, 283–84): in all that, not a word.

Nevertheless, for Tertullian's sake, and for Christ's, the book is worth a serious look.

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DAVID P. EFROYMSON


Diefendorf, professor of history at Boston University, demonstrates how French women were active agents of religious reform in the half century or so after the Wars of Religion. She repeatedly challenges those who picture early modern devout Catholic women as but "hapless victims" (9) of misogynistic male clerics who sought to confine them to convents to control female sexuality. A student of Natalie Davis, D. is well known for her work on the religious and political cultures of late 16th-century Paris. Here D. shows how, from ca. 1590 to 1650, pious French women reformed old institutions, created new ones, and made critical decisions that lay at the heart of the Catholic Reformation in France.

Relying on an impressive abundance of primary sources, printed and manuscript, D. identifies several developments during and just after the French wars of the later decades of the 1500s. These developments include both fluid gender boundaries born in a time of crisis—boundaries that allowed women various leadership opportunities—and an "ascetic impulse" (49) in response to war and famine that saw many Parisian women embrace lives of austerity and mortification and reform of religious houses. French women could and did inherit property, and more than a few wealthy heiresses chose to give large sums for the construction of new convents devoted to penitential practices. Many women saw asceticism not as a burden promoted by church authorities, but as a personal choice that integrated both imitation of the suffering Christ and personal self-control. Barbe Acarie's success in bringing Discalced Carmelite women from Spain to Paris was a phenomenal catalyst. French vocations to this austere life of meditation on the Passion of Christ flourished; by 1625 there were 37 Carmelite convents in France.

Prominent clerics such as Pierre de Bérulle were involved in supervising the French Carmelite houses, but D. shows that Acarie retained considerable authority and initiative. She even played a major role in selecting Carmelite novices. Acarie's house was a busy place where one could meet and talk with a kind of Who's Who of Catholic Reformation Paris. Clerics and devout laity came to her, seeking advice and support.

D.'s pious women sometimes acted as spiritual directors and even as preachers. Women, both religious and lay, had "spiritual" daughters and sons who came to them for conversation and advice. Even in cloistered
convents, women and men “found their way to the parlor grille and sought advice from nuns with a reputation for spiritual discernment” (158). As prominent a figure as Count Philippe-Emmanuel de Gondi, commander of the king’s galleys, reformed his life and sought ordination as a priest, after conversations of this kind. In many convents, male, clerical preachers were brought in only for certain occasions. Most of the time, spiritual exhortations were given by women.

Nowhere is D. more passionate than on the question of cloister. She insists that historians have it all wrong when they imagine cloister as imprisonment. Rather, strict claustration was willingly embraced by many women as “a symbol and a tool of worldly renunciation” (145). Cloister was not about a male effort to discipline women’s allegedly unruly sexuality; “one clue” (145) is the fact that rules governing conversations in convent parlors concerned not meetings with single men, but with parents and other members of a nun’s family. Cloister was closely related to the efforts of reformed convents to eliminate the socio-economic distinctions among their members. No longer could nuns furnish their cells with furniture from their families, or bring private servants with them into the convent.

A simplistic juxtaposition of older, contemplative houses with newer, more active ones also receives much criticism from D. She shows how a continuum of models, ranging from contemplative to active, grew in the first half of the 17th century. By the 1630s, charitable work became a growing focus of attention for pious women, and the emphasis on penitence faded. Events such as plague, famine, and the entrance of France into the Thirty Years’ War all played a role in this shift, but so did choices made by women such as Louise de Marillac, founder (with Vincent de Paul) of the Daughters of Charity. For many pious women, charitable service of the needy henceforth took precedence over penitential practices. This change was more pronounced than a move away from contemplative life, and indeed many convents continued to attract vocations to a life of silence and prayer. By the mid-1600s, devout women in Paris had a diverse range of options for how to live out their piety.

This book will be very significant for historians of early modern France and for scholars interested in the interactions of religion, gender, and culture.


This important volume focuses on “the life, governance, and administration of the fourth general of the Society of Jesus” (xiii) and on the formation of the “culture” of the order during this time (book’s sub-title).
The short term of the Belgian Everard Mercurian as head of the order, from 1573 until his death in 1580, is sandwiched between the better known figures of Ignatius Loyola himself, Diego Lainez, and Francis Borja, the first three generals, and the long term of Claudio Aquaviva from 1581 to 1615. In all sorts of ways, however, Mercurian's term of office was pivotal. He was the first general to be elected who was not part of Ignatius's inner circle of companions, and he was the first non-Spaniard to be elected. He was crucial to the formation of the Society of Jesus as an institution, the crystallizing of the charism and work of Ignatius into an enduring religious order. The transition is usually associated with Aquaviva, but a constant refrain of the volume is that the foundations for the passage were laid by Mercurian.

Twenty-nine authors, 18 of whom are Jesuits, contribute a total of 30 articles. The authors come from eleven countries (xx), largely from the West: 13 are from United States or hold teaching posts there. They gather the fruits of the renaissance in Jesuit history in recent years, brought about by scholars both inside and beyond the Society of Jesus. Each article is accompanied by a full bibliography, which together provides an impressive insight into the huge amount of work that has been done to make possible the present volume: Monumenta Historica Societatis Jesu, the collection of edited texts, remains foundational.

In recent years the English-speaking world has made a major contribution. There, perhaps most of all, has occurred a healthy correspondence between Jesuit and secular historians. The history of the Society of Jesus is now firmly within the mainstream of modern history as an academic discipline, not just an interesting but somewhat separate branch of study. John O'Malley's The First Jesuits (1993), which looms large in the background of the present volume, has become the most obvious recognition of this new situation within Anglophone scholarship. The present volume is a further powerful contribution to this development: the questions and interests of secular scholars, and indeed of postmodernism more generally, are properly addressed, yet the fascination and centrality of Christianity itself, and of religion more generally, is maintained without embarrassment or apology.

The coverage is partial, as the editor recognizes. The countries of Western Europe, Brazil, China, and Japan, are nicely covered, as are the themes of prayer and the Spiritual Exercises, formation and studies, government, casuistry, and art. There are chapters on Simon Rodrigues and Nicholas Bobadilla, founding members of the Society, and on Antonio Possevino and Francisco de Toledo. Peter Canisius, Emond Auger, and other well-known personalities feature prominently. Indeed, altogether the approach is properly individual and personal. There are gaps for India, Austria, Eastern Europe, and Spanish America, as well as for various individuals and themes that the editor would have liked to include (xix). We should be grateful for what is there rather than lament what is not. Many of the gaps, moreover, were covered at two international conferences held at Boston College in 1997 and 2002. The proceedings of the first were published as
The Jesuits: Cultures, Sciences and the Arts, 1540–1773 (1999), those of the second are forthcoming.

The tone is remarkably modern. Mercurian's own election as general was the result of the pope's wish that a non-Spaniard be elected: partly paralleling John Paul II's interventions in the government of the Society following the illness of Fr. General Pedro Arrupe. We see a constantly overstretched order having to make painful decisions about what it could and could not do. In personal terms we find a mixture of sanctity and sinfulness: one (mentally disturbed) Jesuit murdered three members of his community: the rector, minister, and regent (88)! Mercurian himself comes off well: of sound judgment yet also creative and bold, rather than a somewhat timid and wooden figure as he has sometimes been portrayed. The order grew in numbers from some 3,500 to over 5,000 during his generalate. The rich selection of plates illustrate the vigor and diversity, also the trials and tensions, of the still young Society. The whole volume is well produced and a pleasure to read, completed with excellent indexes.

Gregorian University, Rome

NORMAN TANNER, S.J.


Franz Xaver Kraus (b. August 18, 1840), a priest of the Diocese of Trier, was one of the most highly regarded German Catholic scholars of the late 1800s. He taught the history of Christian art at Strasbourg (1872–1878) and church history at Freiburg im Breisgau (1878–1901). He applied critical historiography to the study of the Church in his erudite Lehrbuch der Kirchengeschichte für Studierende (1872–1875). When this work's second edition was put on the Index of Forbidden Books in 1882, Kraus immediately published a modified third edition that was approved by the Holy Office but at the cost of the historical thoroughness of the earlier editions. With his multi-volume works, Realencyklopädie der christlichen Altertümer (1883–1896) and Geschichte der christlichen Kunst (1895–1900), Kraus founded the study of Christian archeology in Germany. He was a candidate for the office of bishop in Trier, Freiburg, Strasbourg, and Bamberg, but was passed over because of his relative openness to contemporary thought and his public criticism of centralization in the Church. From 1885 into 1899, Kraus anonymously published in Munich's Allgemeine Zeitung his Kirchenpolitische Briefe, a series of critical analyses of politics in the Vatican.

Since Kraus's death at San Remo, Italy, on December 28, 1901, scholars have referred to Kraus as a "liberal" (H. Schiel, N. Trippen, T. Loome), as a leader of "reform Catholicism" (O. Köhler), and as a "modernist" (O. Weiss). In this monograph, which originated as a doctoral dissertation at the University of Eichstätt, Graf argues that Kraus is not adequately identified by classifications. He contends: "The unique individual Franz Xaver
Kraus was caught in the transition from an old era to a new one, so that his personal facets form a prism in which people in his day and since have perceived in him what they have wanted to see. Taking this approach, one does not, however, apprehend Kraus himself” (280). To make his case, G. begins his study of Kraus’s life and thought in the early 1880s as Kaiser Wilhelm I and Pope Leo XIII were taking steps to move beyond the Kulturkampf. G. ends his account at the fin de siècle after the Holy Office condemned the writings of Herman Schell (December 15, 1898), and after Leo XIII condemned Americanism (January 22, 1899) and ordered Kraus in the spring of 1899 to stop writing his Kirchenpolitische Briefe.

In eleven chapters, G. shows the complexity of Kraus’s views and actions. In the early 1880s, Kraus was asked by the Kaiser to help improve communications between the Reich and the Vatican, and during 1895 and 1896 Kraus resided in Rome with funding from Kaiser Wilhelm II in order to report back to the Reich on Vatican politics as Leo XIII’s health was declining. With the assistance of Baroness Augusta von Eichthal, Kraus sought to cultivate an alliance with Archbishop John Ireland, Bishop John J. Keane, and Monsignor Denis J. O’Connell, as they struggled in Rome to defend their efforts to enculturate Catholicism in the United States. On the one hand, Kraus appealed to the Americans because of his call for the Vatican’s recognition of the legitimate authority of the local churches. But, on the other hand, he troubled them because of his ties with the German emperor, his criticism of French Catholicism, his opposition to democracy, and his controversial character. In Kraus’s judgment, church leaders should promote a “religious Catholicism” that would complement the civil authority of Europe’s monarchies, including the Italian monarchy. At the same time, Kraus fought for intellectual freedom in the Church. In particular, he tried to provide moral support for Herman Schell while his writings were under scrutiny by the Holy Office. But Kraus held that the Jesuits were responsible for the lack of intellectual vitality in the Church as well as for ecclesiastical centralization and Ultramontanism. In holding this view, he implicitly supported the section of the Kulturkampf’s May Laws that expelled Jesuits from Germany, a law that was not rescinded until 1904.

G.’s monograph is an excellent resource for understanding one component of German Catholicism in the late 1800s. Along with G.’s detailed reconstructions and analyses of Kraus’s activities and thought, this study includes an appendix with a few of Kraus’s short writings and a summary of each of his 48 “letters” from July 1, 1895, to June 2, 1899, in his Kirchenpolitische Briefe.

University of Notre Dame

ROBERT A. KRIEG


Philip Rule’s book is the product of more than 40 years of reflection and teaching on two of the most prominent figures in 19th-century religious thought. John Henry Newman, once marked with the apparent dishonor of
the Modernist controversy, has proven a decisive contributor to modern Catholic theology, particularly since Vatican II. Less well known to some contemporary theologians is the contribution of the English Romantic poet and philosophical theologian Samuel Taylor Coleridge, whose Neoplatonic vision of Christianity provided an important impetus for not only the anti-rationalism of the Oxford Movement but, more importantly, Newman’s late works on belief and assent.

R. provides the clearest demonstration to date of the pivotal manner in which both thinkers grounded their systems of divinity on a universal epistemological foundation: the human conscience. R. interprets Coleridge and Newman through a fascinating series of “parallel readings” that “suggest that everything they wrote springs from and returns to a conviction that the human person can rise, under the direction of conscience or moral self-consciousness, to a level of self-transcendence that enables the person, aided by faith, to come to the new cognitive horizon that is God” (3). Conscience thus points to the fundamentally religious nature of the human person and thereby draws forth the necessity of duty—toward both others and the divine reality.

R. develops his thesis through a series of careful, “structural” readings of several major works by Coleridge and Newman. Notably, he sets up the readings in the first chapter (“The Age, the Issues, the Men”), not by primarily examining the contributory social or intellectual factors that elicited reflection on the developing self by these thinkers, but rather with the fictional representations of novels such as Dickens’s *Hard Times*, which allows R. to evoke “[t]he novelist’s imaginative grasp of human experience” and thereby to capture “more fully how people were feeling than does the historian’s social analysis” (13). Subsequent chapters develop *The Centrality of Conscience* through comparative textual analysis.

Among the most important readings in the book is R.’s examination of the process whereby an individual moves from undifferentiated consciousness toward personhood in Coleridge’s long-unpublished *Opus Maximum*. Anticipating Martin Buber and Gabriel Marcel, Coleridge demonstrates how the infant at its mother’s breast develops a sense of self through relationship with an other, a “Thou,” saying “I am not here, touch me, Mother, that I may be here!” (51)

R. uses this foundational chapter to introduce what he refines in later ones: how each thinker sought to defend personal development through autobiographical narratives (*Biographia literaria* and *Apologia*) that reveal the “self as a moral and religious being” (65); how each wrote amidst a society in “profound social change” and attempted to ground the growth of the individual in a system of national, university, or ecclesial education (*On the Constitution of the Church and State* and *Essay on Development*); and how each invites readers in key works (*Aids to Reflection* and *Grammar of Assent*) “to enter into the very process of self-reflection—of becoming conscious of oneself as a questioner and a knower” (137). R.’s study thereby serves not only as a close rereading of a series of influential
texts, but—particularly through the lens of Lonergan's transcendental Thomism—as a systematic examination of the development of the knowing and loving self.

R.'s thoughtful recovery of Coleridge and Newman is certainly a timely project. Although specialists will be disappointed to find that some of the relevant secondary literature has not entered into R.'s discussion of these texts (Douglas Hedley's cogent treatment of *Aids to Reflection* [2000] comes to mind), still most readers will find fresh insight in R.'s analysis of Newman on the developing self, and many will be pleasantly surprised to find in Coleridge’s sustained reflections on the person a wealth of largely untapped theological literature.

Subtly, R.'s "structural" method often deemphasizes the social and intellectual influences at work in these polymathic thinkers; one wonders if this does not lead to a neglect of a full appreciation of both the likenesses as well as real differences between the approaches to conscience recommended by our principal players. Nonetheless, R.'s interdisciplinary examination does effectively portray an era when moral duty and conscience moved to the fore amidst a society—not unlike our own—increasingly skeptical of religious truth claims and suffering from the loss of a sense of awe and mystery. Thus, particularly given the current theological interest in the person, relationality, and the role of the individual self in the community, the book will prove a valuable addition to most theological libraries as well as some graduate seminars devoted to moral philosophy or theological anthropology.

*Oral Roberts University, Tulsa*

**JEFFREY W. BARBEAU**


Of the plethora of literature on Catholic and Evangelical Christians, ranging from Pentecostal, Baptist, and Holiness dialogues with Catholics to defensive and apologetic treatises, this overview provides a unique, very personal, and well-researched cultural analysis. Formal Catholic and Evangelical dialogues have been going on for over three decades; thanks to the Glenmary Home Missioners, the U.S. bishops have had full-time staff working with the Southern Baptists even as they have turned more fundamentalist; and academic fora like the Society for Pentecostal Studies and the Academy of Catholic Hispanic Theologians have brought Evangelical and Catholic together in conversation and research.

Even before mid-century, Catholics and Evangelicals in communities around the country had been marrying each other, studying at each other's universities, and working together in their local communities. This volume, however, provides a much needed, overall assessment of the rhetoric, polemic, and apologetic literature that has burdened these relationships. One of the multiple tasks in ecumenical reconciliation is the healing of memo-
ries. This particular relationship in the United States has a backlog of alienation that needs to be subjected to careful scrutiny.

The book is divided into three parts. The first of three chapters gives us the landscape, the typological analysis that Shea will use in his survey, and a chapter on nativism and politics that, while integral to the story, is not the focus of the subsequent chapters. The core of the book surveys the history of Protestant anti-Catholicism, analyzing its theological issues, rhetoric, and motivation. S. makes a distinction between the “hard” Evangelical assessment that does not allow Catholicism a place among the Christian denominations, and the “soft” apologists who concede the Christianity of Catholics in spite of their heretical Church.

The five chapters of part 3 survey Catholic apologetic and polemical responses to the Protestant critiques in the 19th and 20th centuries. S. recounts the history of Catholic apologetics, theological analyses, and reactions to Evangelical Christianity, and brings the story up to date with the contemporary bishops’ and scholars’ defenses against fundamentalism. He ends with a very personal conclusion of directions he sees as hopeful for reconciling these two communities.

S. has provided a theologically and historically informed cultural analysis of these two Christian communities, both of which are characterized by a reaction to the Enlightenment and its modernist pretensions, a sense of marginalization in American culture, and a solid commitment to a core of orthodox Christian faith. Both have undergone a mid-20th-century reassessment—Evangelicals, under the leadership of Carl F. H. C. Henry, Billy Graham, and the founding of the National Association of Evangelicals (1942), and Roman Catholics with the Second Vatican Council.

S.’s intent and interpretive scheme are ironically irenic, even though the most valuable portions of the book recount the hostility and misinterpretation that characterize the history of these communities and some of their present evaluations of one another. His focus is on the Reformed stream within the neo-Evangelical subculture, especially taking account of fundamentalism and phenomena characterized as such by Catholic analysts. However, the breadth and scope of his overview provide some generalizations applicable to the wider Evangelical community and in some instances to Protestantism in general.

When looking especially at contemporary Catholic analyses, S. quite appropriately criticizes the distortions and psychological reductionism that characterize some of the authors and even the magisterium. His typological analyses of myth and tribe, contrasting Catholic liturgical Christianity and Evangelical biblical Christianity, are useful in making certain contrasts. However, they suffer from the limitations of these sociological tools, as they emphasize differences in what is a continuous gradation within a common Christianity. Catholic theology of the Church, noting the real if imperfect communion that Evangelicals and Catholics share, seems a more solid irenic ground for understanding these fellow Christians.

Those interested in the reconciliation of Protestant and Catholic Christianity may find the disciplined theological work of the ecumenical dia-
logues more enlightening, but for a broad sweep of some of the hurdles before these communities on the cultural landscape, S.'s study can be a significant contribution to an ever expanding and engaging conversation.

United States Conference of Catholic Bishops, JEFFREY GROS, F.S.C.
Washington


In an era of extensive online bibliographical resources that are available on demand and updated regularly, this three-volume collection might, at first glance, strike some as a quaint relic of a bygone era. Scholars who view all printed bibliographical collections as obsolete and outdated from the moment they are finalized and sent to the printers—and therefore avoid these resources like a plague—would miss the publication of this important landmark. Hailed as a groundbreaking publishing event by important Asian theologians and scholars across the denominational divide, Asian Christian Theologies is the culmination of an ecumenical collaboration that began in mid-1997. It aimed to produce a pan-Asian comprehensive survey of emerging Asian theologies across denominational boundaries, and publish a research guide that would illuminate the contributions of individual theologians, explore the emergence and development of important theological movements, and gather sources for further study, research, and teaching.

Volume 1 surveys South Asia, Australia, and New Zealand; volume 2 examines Southeast Asia (Myanmar, Cambodia, Laos, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Philippines, Thailand, and Vietnam); while volume 3 covers Northeast Asia (China, Hong Kong, Inner Asia, Japan, Korea, Macau, and Taiwan). Each region is introduced with a survey of important historical events and theological developments, followed by biographical discussions of the various Asian theologians and listings of their important writings. In addition to person and subject indexes at the end of each volume is a list of “Key Bibliographical Sources” that provides details of contact information for scholars interested in pursuing further research. Unfortunately, for those researching a specific topic across different Asian regions, there is no consolidated person and subject index for the entire collection.

The collection's central focus is contextual theologies emerging from Asia. Michael Amaladoss, the Indian Jesuit theologian, makes this point clearly in his foreword to volume 1: “Asian theology is contextual. This characteristic is not unique to it. All theology must be contextual. . . . But
Christians in Asia have felt the need to make the Word of God relevant to their life-situation. . . . Asian Christians, with their roots in the soil, began to read the Gospel and interpret it in their living context. This gave rise to authentic Asian theology. As these volumes show, we have gone far beyond the stage when we were saying that an Asian Theology is needed. We have an Asian theology, or rather Asian theologies, now" (xiii–xiv).

Amaladoss explains that Asian theologies are primarily contextual and liberational in orientation, seeking to put themselves at the service of life in Asia. They generally eschew abstract, theoretical discussion of theological questions and prefer instead an ongoing dialogue with the realities of life in the complex and diverse Asian milieu, including the ancient Asian religions, cultures, and the immense numbers of Asians mired in poverty and suffering (xv–xvi). Responding to the observation that many of the resources in this collection are written in English, Amaladoss points out that Asian theologies are culturally rooted, notwithstanding the need to use English as a medium of communication that transcends boundaries (xvi). Finally, he suggests that Asian theologies are holistic in orientation, undergirded by a vision of harmony and positive regard for human ideals and ethical values in the various Asian religious and cultural traditions (xvii–xix).

Volume 1 is divided into three parts. Part 1, "Asia as a Region" (1–166) introduces readers to a hitherto often neglected dimension of church history, namely, the history of ancient Christianity in Asia before the arrival of European missionaries in the middle of the second Christian millennium. This history is presented in two sections: from the seventh to the 15th centuries (3–26), and from the 16th to the 18th centuries (27–77). The former section focuses mainly on India, while the latter focuses primarily on China. Because there are fewer extant theological writings in the earlier period, the editors have included often overlooked resources, such as ancient hymns and songs, rituals, biographical narratives, letters, and inscriptions on monuments.

On the one hand, it makes sense to discuss the historical developments of ancient Asian Christianity separately, so as to provide a historical context and framework of discussion for the emergence of Asian contextual theologies in the 19th and 20th centuries. On the other hand, this separation creates some confusion with respect to countries such as India and China. For example, researchers seeking information on Chinese theologies might be stymied by the fact that the historical and theological developments pertaining to Assyrian (or Nestorian) Chinese Christianity and Matteo Ricci's endeavors to inculturate the Christian Gospel in China and their bibliographic resources are found in volume 1, while the rest of the discussion on Chinese Christianity and theologies is found in volume 3.

"Asia Regional and Ecumenical Theologies" (78–166)—section 3 of volume 1, part 1—surveys specific theological developments from the 18th to the 20th centuries. It begins with records of theological heritage from the fourth to the 19th centuries, then presents important theological developments and supporting bibliographies for the whole of Asia in three periods:
1957–1973, 1973–1990, and 1990–2000. The focus here is on "ecumenical theologies" emerging from the vision of a shared, collaborative mission among various Asian Christian Churches. This section not only presents key ecumenical texts, but also discusses the contributions of Asian women as well as the history and contributions of Asian Christian ecumenical associations such as the Christian Conference of Asia (CCA) and the Federation of Asian Bishops' Conferences (FABC). This section concludes with a twelve-page supplementary bibliography on Asian Church history, theology, and spirituality from 1950 to 2000.

The treatment of India is the most extensive—more than 300 pages discuss more than 100 individual Indian theologians—followed by China as a distant second. On the other end of the spectrum, the treatment of "Inner Asia"—the term used to classify the entire region of Central Asia—is embarrassingly scant, covering a mere nine pages. This lacuna also reveals the inadequate discussion of theological developments among Asian Christians from the Orthodox and Oriental Orthodox Churches, many of whom live in this region; the exception is the detailed historical discussion of ancient Asian Christianity of this region in volume 1, part 1.

For the most part, Protestant and Catholic theologies are discussed together on equal terms, without any sharp distinction between the two, except in volume 3 where Protestant and Catholic theologies in China are discussed separately. One wonders whether this is merely an editorial oversight or reflects a difference in thinking among the scholars who authored this section. In addition, for historical reasons, the discussion on China in volume 3 is split into four separate sections: Mainland China, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Macau.

While this ambitious collection seeks to present a comprehensive survey of Asian theologies over two millennia, the editors admit that they "have no illusions that these volumes offer an exhaustive guide to Asian Christian theologies" (xliii). Because the cut-off date for all biographical and bibliographical entries was 2000, many of the entries were outdated even before the collection was published. Nevertheless, this collection represents an important step in providing a systematic and synthetic presentation of emerging Asian contextual theologies to a broader audience that has not been matched by any other publication. This indispensable resource in Asian theologies should find a place on the bookshelves of all serious scholars of Asian Christianity in general and Asian theologies in particular.

Xavier University, Cincinnati

JONATHAN Y. TAN


Taken on its own terms, this book can no more be reviewed than Mozart or muzak. To "sell" it (or the opposite) to potential readers by assessing its virtues and shortcomings would be to employ language in a way that Hart deplores and takes enormous pains to escape. What he has written can, to
some extent, be described. It would be true to say, for example, that the language he uses for writing it is lavish. But to summarize the book, extracting an “essential” argument, would be to do violence. Summaries are impoverishing, abstract; and “abstraction is the thing most deadening and contrary to the truth [Christianity] offers” (28). Nor can it be determined by rational judgment that this truth is truth: it “must be allowed to disclose itself as rhetoric, persuasion, narrative form” (117). To a book that proposes, as this one does, to allow such a disclosure to happen, by narrating the *forma Christi*, an appropriate response in words would have to be something like a hymn.

That, in a sense, is what the second and longest of the book’s three parts presents—an ode in four strophes, arranged in the (roughly) narrative order of the Creed: God, creation, salvation, the “last things.” H.’s name for this part, *dogmatica minora*, is apt. He writes dogmatically, in the sense of simply laying out his themes as they appear on the “surface,” rather than systematically, in the sense of explaining them or interpreting them or attempting to understand them in relation to other things. The result tends to resemble, in his own phrase, marginal notes to Balthasar. It will persuade, if it does, because it is beautiful. And so it is, sometimes, in this case. To ask what it means to say it is beautiful, or why its being so is important, would be to raise questions that lead beyond the esthetic horizon within which H. positions himself, thus he does not entertain them. He is aware that his project is consequently open to the charge of “attempting to represent rhapsody as reason” (145), and that to refute the charge, as stated, would be to admit that it is fair. But his own concern lies in the other direction. The book’s part 3 is a short meditation on whether even the sort of narrative persuasion that part 2 has tried to effect might itself turn out to be violent—dogmatic in the bad sense.

Less evident is the relation of part 2, which could probably stand on its own and is probably where H.’s real interest lies, to part 1, with its march through postmodernity in the persons of Nietzsche and the usual 20th-century *mélange* of French successors. Between the two parts, it might seem, something like a method of correlation is operative, with postmodern thought giving rise to a question that (only) Christianity answers. Nietzsche did set up an antithesis that H. expounds—Dionysus versus the Crucified—but Nietzsche had atrocious taste (125), Dionysus is a bore (140), and H.’s own, more subtle, antithesis is Dionysus and Apollo versus Christ crucified and raised. As for Nietzsche, the antithesis to him throughout the *dogmatica minora* is Gregory of Nyssa, especially in the brief and somewhat disappointing section on eschatology. More ample and more persuasive is the preceding soteriological section, in which H. discusses sacrifice and pacifism, tragedy and divine impassibility, Anselm, Girard, and a good deal more, with sometimes magisterial insight. It may not be coincidental that here, although the postmodernist conceptuality in some sense presides, it does not set the agenda.

The book is not solely narrative. It is, by intention, argumentative also, for H. does not dismiss apologetics of every kind. It is therefore permissible
to ask what presuppositions the argument rests on. There are at least three. One is that the authoritative, unsurpassable rule of Christian language is the "Nicene" creed as formulated at Constantinople (no Filioque). Another is that being is what shows itself. A third is that beauty and peace are coincident and one. This last might not seem to be a presupposition, since the whole book can be said to constitute an argument for the coincidence of peace and beauty. But argument, in the sense that is relevant here, does not issue in an increment of knowledge, but only in an increment of persuasiveness in what has already shown itself. Thus, as a hymn is a good hymn if those who sing it want to sing it again, so such an argument as H.'s is a worthy argument if the reader wants to read it again. This reader does.

Boston College

CHARLES HFLING


This is a courageous, prophetic, but pessimistic book. José Comblin, a liberation theologian born in Belgium who has spent most of his life in Latin America, calls for a return to the principles of Vatican II. More specifically, he calls for a return to the people of God image that was the council's main theological contribution, affecting all the conciliar documents and the best expression of the "spirit" of Vatican II. C. argues that, beginning in the final years of Paul VI and during the papacy of John Paul II, the people of God ecclesiology has been virtually suppressed and an ecclesiology of "communion" has been substituted, most notably at the 1985 extraordinary synod.

The Council Fathers, C. says, "fully intended to bring about a profound change in ecclesiology" leaving behind almost 700 years of an ecclesiology based on the notion of a societas perfecta that had become, in Congar's term, a virtual "hierarchology" (3). This earlier ecclesiology so concentrated on the hierarchy that lay people became passive objects to be cared for by the hierarchy. The council expressly intended to change that, as both the majority and the minority realized. Hence, "any effort to downplay the concept of people of God goes against the council's most explicit intentions" (3).

The attempt to abandon the people of God ecclesiology by Cardinal Ratzinger and others in the Roman curia denigrates the Church as a full human and historical reality, leads to a decline in ecumenism, and reasserts the power of the central bureaucracy, and directs the Church ad intra and away from its mission in and for the world as articulated in Gaudium et spes. It is an attempt, in C.'s view, to return to the Church of Pius IX and Pius XII (60). Other consequences include the failure to become the Church of the poor, discrediting episcopal collegiality, opposition to liberation theology that presupposed a people of God ecclesiology, and a refusal to pursue inculturation. While these may be deplorable conditions in the contemporary Church, it is not at all clear that they are direct...
consequences of the shift from a people of God ecclesiology. There may be a number of other nontheological factors involved.

C. also offers some broad historical sketches of the people of God and makes some generalizations that could be nuanced and qualified, but he is insightful, if idiosyncratic. He believes that Christendom was a mistake, that the people of God became identified with Western civilization and ceased to be a leaven among the peoples. He sees this failure exemplified today in Latin America where parishes have ceased to have any impact on urban life. In many places in Latin America there is an illusion that Christendom still exists and that the Church speaks for the world and parishes actually reach society. Instead, he says, "We are no longer a people, we are a parish" (73). The creativity of the people of God has declined and Christian culture has become a museum. Today, Christians produce very little culture—"They manage the museum" (89). While this may sound unduly pessimistic, at least in some places in Western Europe and Latin America, I am afraid it is accurate.

For C., Medellín was a moment when the Church, under the leadership of some bishops and theologians, reemerged as the people of God in Latin America, but that moment has passed. CELAM (the Episcopal Conference of Latin America), he says, "was so humiliated in Santo Domingo (1992) that it is now virtually useless" (117). He also laments the lack of dialogue and open discussion of the major issues—leaving decisions to be made by the hierarchy in secret, "as if secrecy were a divine mark" (186)—and the lack of subsidiarity and bishops being appointed by the pope with little or no input from the local church (189).

If the book seems like a prophetic lament, C. still thinks that small groups of Christians working and sharing life together can make a difference, that Christians can once again become a people of God. He wonders if the next papacy can reverse the present trends. I am doubtful.

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T. HOWLAND SANKS, S.J.


This collection of essays, originally published in French, is a serious effort to elaborate the anthropology of Pope John Paul II and his call for a "new feminism" as found in his March 25, 1995 encyclical, Evangelium vitae. The contributing scholars have a deep and broad knowledge of the Western philosophical and Christian theological traditions and impressive international credentials, European, Latin and North American.

The editor and author of three articles, Michele Schumacher, is a researcher at the University of Fribourg in Switzerland. Sister Prudence Allen, R.S.M., is chair of philosophy at St. John Vianney Theological Seminary in Denver, Colorado. Beatriz Vollmer Coles taught philosophy at the Gregorian University in Rome, as well as at the diocesan seminary in her native city of Caracas, Venezuela. Other contributors, Hanna-Barbara
Gerl-Falkovitz, Marguerite Léna, Anne-Marie Pelletier, and Sibylle von Streng have studied and taught in Germany, France, and Belgium. Two American scholars, Jean Bethke Elshtain of the University of Chicago and Elizabeth Fox-Genovese of Emory University, are well-known authors.

The collection is divided into three sections. The first explores the philosophical basis of the anthropology of the "new feminism." The second defends its theological foundations, and the third section explores its practical, ethical consequences. The authors critique both patriarchy and what they call "old" or "traditional" feminism. Some, such as S., are clear that the call for a "new feminism" in no way denies the oppression of women under patriarchy (170).

But "traditional" feminism is also seen as having failed. Current forms of feminisms are criticized as having denied any differences between women and men, ignored and even despised the female body and sexual body differences, defined all psycho-cultural differences of men and women as mutable social construction and, finally, as simply imitating the life style of males in a way that sells out women's distinctive "genius." The most prolonged attack on "old feminism" is found in Elizabeth Fox-Genovese who declares it to be merely an aggressive expression of competitive individualism that denies all social obligations to others, specifically to men, to children, and to church authority. Its defense of abortion reveals its true nature as a "culture of death" (297–311).

The anthropology defended in this volume, seen as exemplified in Edith Stein and John Paul II, attempts to avoid polarity (male and female as opposites), hierarchy (one better than the other), and sameness (a single humanity with no real differences between men and women). The authors seek to explicate an anthropology in which both men and women are fully human and yet different as male and female, or, as S. puts it, "one nature that necessarily exists in two modes or 'expressions,' the female mode and the male mode" (40).

This anthropology is called complementarity. Neither males nor females are complete in themselves and only together enter into communion and mutual self-giving that expresses the fullness of humanity. This, in turn, reflects the nuptial relation of humanity with God expressed in the communion of Christ and the Church. Mary as the type of the Church is the model of the "feminine" mode of humanity.

It is questionable, however, whether the term "complementarity" transcends the problem of dual natures the authors seek to avoid. The term, in fact, means "that which must be added to complete a symmetrical whole" (Funk and Wagnalls, *International Dictionary of the English Language* (1982). An anthropology of complementarity defines women as having one set of capacities, typically those of mothering, altruism, emotionality, and self-giving, to "complete" the male capacities seen as rationality, aggression, individualism, and self-affirmation. Whether the feminine qualities are seen as inferior, superior, or of equal value to male qualities, difference triumphs over a shared humanness.

The anthropology of these authors, despite their claims, veers toward
such polarization, with women ever defined in terms of mothering and self-giving capacities. These are often seen as of superior value to those of male capacities, with men needing to learn from women how to be self-giving. But the relation fails to be reciprocal. S., defending the exclusion of women from ordained priesthood, declares that only males can represent Christ’s act in initiating redemptive life, while women’s body symbolizes humanity’s self-giving response to Christ. Men can also be “brides of Christ,” despite their male bodies, but women cannot represent the christological side of this relation (201–31).

This collection is an important contribution to a discussion of feminism that should be taken seriously by feminists. But such dialogue is not well promoted by either stereotyping a “bad old” feminism that has failed, or by dismissing this particular brand of “new feminism” as merely “old femininity.” A respectful recognition that both groups share a desire for common values of justice, peace, and male-female relations of loving mutuality is needed.

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ROSEMARY RADFORD RUETHER


This Festschrift was prepared to honor the Belgian Jesuit, Jacques Dupuis, on his 80th birthday in October 2003. He outlived its publication by only a little over a year, dying in Rome, December 28, 2004. This is not quite the everyday Festschrift, however. It does contain the usual collection of academic essays prompted, more or less, by the work of the man it honors, but it also contains no less than four personal tributes to the man, his life, and his work. This unusual degree of biographical interest is in large part a response to the investigation (in the language of canon law, a “contestation”) of Dupuis’s 1997 book Toward a Christian Theology of Religious Pluralism, undertaken by the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith [CDF] between 1998 and 2001. That investigation culminated in a “Notification,” issued by the CDF and agreed to by Dupuis, in which what the CDF called some “ambiguous statements and insufficient explanations” in parts of the book were clarified. Such contestations typically kindle fierce passions on all sides, and since this one occurred so recently it is not surprising to find it thoroughly documented and exhaustively commented upon here, and almost exclusively in terms that present Dupuis as the injured and righteous party.

But the fact of having been investigated by the CDF is not the most important or interesting thing about Dupuis. He was a serious and significant theological thinker whose central systematic concern was with the theology of religions. He had, it seems, read everything written on this topic from the Apostolic Fathers to the late works of John Paul II, and his own works on it were compendious, thoughtful, always carefully articu-
lated with the data of the tradition, and for the most part in line with developing magisterial teaching. Indeed, he was himself a contributor to this teaching, having had a hand in the composition of the 1991 curial document *Dialogue and Proclamation*, which was itself a descendant of Vatican II's *Nostra aetate* and a precursor to the International Theological Commission's *Christianity and the World Religions* (1997) and the CDF's *Dominus Iesus* (2000). Dupuis's own proposals treated difficult questions having to do with the relations between the work of the incarnate Logos and that of the eternal Logos, the salvific significance of the non-Christian religions, the extra-ecclesial work of the Holy Spirit, and the nature and importance of interreligious dialogue and interreligious prayer.

All these topics, and more, are taken up in the essays collected here. There are, inevitably, analyses of the theological meaning of dialogue (Avery Dulles, Michael Barnes, Claude Geffré) both as discussed by Dupuis and normatively. There are discussions of the terminology recently current in the theology of religions—Terrence Merrigan has an especially stimulating essay in this vein on the meaning of "inclusivism." There are essays by Asian theologians and about the relations between Asian Christian thought and Dupuis's work, analyses of the significance of particular Christian texts and thinkers for Dupuis's work and for the theology of religions in general (Francis Sullivan on Clement of Alexandria, Luigi Sartori on *Lumen gentium*, Dorothy Lee on the Gospel of John), and there are discussions of the spiritual significance of dialogue.

The standard of the essays is for the most part high. Considerable historical and theological learning is exhibited, and the volume provides excellent witness to the state of play on at least some of the questions belonging to the theology of religions at the beginning of the third millennium. But the volume also shows that the neuralgic points of the theology of religions—those identified by the CDF, which are also the threads running through Dupuis's work of the last two decades—have, for the most part, so far only been identified and described. There is as yet no deep agreement among those working in this field even about the proper vocabulary (for example, is the inclusivism-exclusivism-pluralism trichotomy exhausted?), and much less about the systematic form to be given to the questions. There are also some striking lacunae. The most interesting work done by Catholics in the theology of religions during the past couple of decades (I have in mind books and essays by Francis Clooney, Gavin D'Costa, David Burrell, and Joseph DiNoia, among others) is neither represented nor, for the most part (Merrigan's essay is the only real exception), discussed in this volume. This is a pity, for it is work of this kind, simultaneously serious about the grammar of the Catholic faith and about the importance of close study of the particulars of the intellectual traditions of religious others, that provides the way forward.
BOOK REVIEWS 691


Historian James Turner Johnson has recently argued that the just war criterion of political authority warrants renewed attention in contemporary scholarship. We are fortunate to have two new books—Oliver O'Donovan's and Michael Walzer's—that rightly point current debate on the meaning of authority toward a more complex consideration of war in a democratic context.

O.'s book is the more academic. He recapitulates just war reasoning for the present day in a series of theoretical philosophical essays on the concepts of authority, discrimination, and proportionality. More practically, he sees the crucial unsolved question about the future of war to be "whether the [United Nations] can be shaped to act with reliable effectiveness" (136). W.'s work is more popular and concrete. Arguing About War is not the academic heir to his classic, Just and Unjust Wars (1977, 1992\(^2\)). Rather, it is a collection of topical essays from the last decades that first appeared in venues such as The New Republic, Dissent, and Social Research. Among the topics covered are Rwanda, Kosovo, and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The book is at heart an argument on behalf of the ongoing relevance of moral criticism about war in the aftermath of what W. calls the "triumph of just war theory." By this he means that the theory has come in from the cold and now occupies a central place in the thinking of American political and military leaders. W.'s is the more recent of the two books, and includes writing from late 2003 on the Iraq War (which he calls "unjust" because disarming Iraq "could almost certainly have [been] achieved with measures short of full-scale war" [160]). But O.'s book taps into the martial signs of the times as well with its late 2002 references to the run-up to regime change in Baghdad.

From their markedly different starting points—O. is a political theologian, W. is a leading secular moral philosopher—they have several points of convergence. Both books deftly mix an affirmation of universal value with a vivid historical sense. Both recognize the provisional nature of justice in war—a welcome corrective in a time inclined toward crusades. Both place tested but abiding hope in international law and in the United Nations. And both firmly root the moral problem of war within the context of the concatenation of responsibilities—of citizens, soldiers, theologians, church leaders, and politicians, et al.—that constitute the political life of a democracy.

The last of these points of convergence makes both books helpful responses to Johnson's call for renewed attention to the just war criterion of authority. For Johnson and like-minded writers, the criterion of authority has diminished in importance in recent years. In part, this diminishment is the effect of the criterion of just cause assuming undue prominence: once
a cause for war is found to be just, it has become a short step to have political authority ratify the finding and go to war. Johnson’s point is a good one: It is time to consider more specifically the criterion of authority in just war reasoning. But his point does not go far enough. For while he points to the importance of authority, he also favorably invokes top-down models of premodern political authority conceived by figures like Aquinas and Luther. By contrast, O. and W. construe political authority in a manner more consistent with a democracy deciding about war.

To be sure, O. shares some of Johnson’s criticisms of the contemporary theological diminishment of the role of political authority in war. For instance, he takes to task the Church of England’s leadership for usurping the role of government officials by offering prudential analyses rather than moral principles to a British public considering war with Iraq. He also faults the “presumption against force” theological school for assuming that just war reasoning says more about what a government should not do in the face of injustice than about what it should do.

But O. departs from Johnson’s assumptions about authority in several crucial ways. First, he more richly locates political authority in a theological framework. Where Johnson considers political authority in the light of the doctrines of sin and the sovereignty of God, O. locates authority within these same doctrines but understood as aspects of a more evidently Christian dispensation. Thus he calls the political use of force on behalf of justice an “exercise of Gospel faith” and the “evangelical counter-praxis to [un-restrained] war” (6). Second, where Johnson turns to Aquinas as the “font” of thinking on just war, O. appeals to early modern writers like Vitoria, Grotius, and Suárez. More so than Aquinas, these writers evoke the complex interplay of rulers and ruled consistent with modern societies in times of war.

Finally, O. argues on behalf of a broadly construed political understanding of the practical reasonableness always at stake in democratic deliberations about war. There are different roles and corresponding responsibilities to undertake such deliberations—on the part of politicians, generals, soldiers, bishops, theologians, and all citizens. The task of the Church is not to replace the judgment of politicians. Rather, it is to invite all roles to take on their responsibilities for praxis in the light of principles of justice.

O. may still defer too much to the prerogative of high government officials to make judgments on the basis of information unavailable to citizens. The intelligence debacles of the Iraq War have rightly undermined such confidence and pointed anew toward the requirement and responsibility of democratic accountability in time of war. Here W. helps out. “As the old saying goes,” he says, “war is too important to be left to the generals; just war even more so. The ongoing critique of warmaking is a centrally important democratic activity” (15).

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David E. DeCosse

Flescher’s project generates conversation between deontological and virtue-based ethics, focused on the concept of supererogation. F. says deontologists commonly portray duty as obligatory and virtue as optional; meanwhile, some virtue ethicists eschew language of duty altogether. While neither secular nor religious authors have produced a comprehensive analysis of duty and supererogation within a virtue ethic, religious thinkers are familiar with the ideas that we ought to improve our character, and that moral maturity entails a sense of obligation to exceed minimum expectations—a duty to surpass duty. By heeding these religious sensibilities, says F., secular ethicists can refine a more nuanced framework for describing moral obligations.

F. advocates a “developmentalist” approach; this character-centered framework incorporates deontic concepts: (1) duty and supererogation are defined primarily with reference to specific agents, rather than specific actions; (2) humans are bound by a meta-duty to become more virtuous over their lifetimes; and thus (3) while everyone is obligated to certain minimal positive and negative duties, one’s sense of duty will expand as one becomes more virtuous, and the scope of supererogation for that person will gradually diminish. For ordinary people, concepts of duty and supererogation remain meaningful as a “yardstick to which agents may refer in order to measure their distance from the fully virtuous person” (257). Heroes are ordinary people who become extraordinarily virtuous, often through formation in virtuous communities. Heroes such as Holocaust rescuers, who insist they have done simply what was required, rightly regard as their duties behaviors that are, for the time being, supererogatory for less virtuous folk. Heroes do not really supererogate, F. contends. Rather, they fulfill rigorous duties perceived by persons with a vivid sense of responsibility—the sort of persons we should all strive to become.

F. contrasts developmentalism with the approach of J. O. Urmson and David Heyd, who promote a minimalist ethic wherein no one can be considered blameworthy for failing to strive beyond basic obligations. In their “standard” view, duties are universal and fulfillable by most people; behaviors of saints and heroes are, by definition, supererogatory. F. convincingly demonstrates flaws in the standard view, particularly (1) a fixed level of duties that neglects moral maturation and promotes stagnation and complacency, (2) portrayal of heroes and saints as superhuman, mistaken in their assessment of duty, and irrelevant as moral guides for ordinary people, and (3) failure to explain why we search for excuses when we decline to participate in supererogatory behavior.

The developmentalist approach is also differentiated from maximalist systems that depict good behaviors as obligatory for everyone, even if great sacrifice is entailed. F. rightly faults these approaches because their agent-neutral depiction of duty overlooks moral maturation and alienates moral
novices. They disregard the moral maxim, "ought implies can" (149). F.'s framework intelligently analyzes how humans—from saints to beginners—can be united in a community of moral striving while each matures at a unique pace.

Despite the book's advertised focus on ordinary morality, it explores few ordinary examples. There is extensive analysis of highly publicized heroes and heroines, but commonplace moral discernment is illustrated by brief examples of a spoiled girl who has difficulty sharing cookies, and a person who repeatedly rebuffs charitable solicitors with the excuse that dinner is boiling over. These examples seem trite for an otherwise serious book; they undermine F.'s assertion that, "Critics of virtue ethics frequently worry that it is 'structurally unable to say much of anything' about what people ought to do. The developmentalist's modified ethics of virtue . . . is not susceptible to such a charge" (257).

F. probably focuses on extraordinary examples because he assumes that "moral claims made on the self by others . . . typically emanate from the impersonal other, or stranger" (24) and that when strangers and special relations pose competing demands, our obligations to special relations "should never override universal altruism when the benefits to each recipient are equal or weigh in favor of the impersonal other" (24). F. acknowledges that many feminists and Aristotelians may disagree with this claim, but says they can agree with his agent-specific model of duty and supererogation; he says analysis of special relations must wait for a separate project. This debate comprises little more than a paragraph; it deserves more attention.

The book is prompted by the question, "What ought we expect ordinary people to do for others who need their help?" (1) But, once claims of special relations are demoted to secondary status, real-life quandaries are recast almost as straw-man arguments. Moreover, what of dilemmas posed by competing claims among special relations, or among multiple strangers? Often, as we struggle to allocate finite resources, the most pressing question is not whether to go beyond the call of duty, but which potential beneficiaries should be asked to defer satisfaction of their needs. In a future project, F.'s elastic sense of duty and supererogation, which "allows agents some leeway to pick and choose their own 'character battles,' ” (282) might be adapted to these important moral arenas.

Academy of the Sacred Heart, New Orleans  FLORENCE CAFFREY BOURG


Florence Caffrey Bourg offers to the community a carefully researched and constructed paradigm for thinking about the role of the family within the Church. The use of the term "domestic church" for the family received renewed attention in the documents of the Second Vatican Council (par-
particularly the *Dogmatic Constitution on the Church*) and has been used in various church documents since then. B. traces the use of the term historically and theologically and, more significantly, traces the meanings attached to the term within the Christian tradition. She effectively illustrates the sometimes conflicting ways in which the term has been employed and is understood by church officials, theologians, and families. At times the term has been used to invoke a juridical standard against which families were measured (or against which they measured themselves). B. suggests that, “domestic church is primarily a symbolic expression. It should function first and foremost to stimulate imaginations to a deeper appreciation of the mystery of the Church and of how family life figures into God’s plan of gracious presence in history” (25). By developing the image of domestic church as a symbol of grace, B. opens the way to a development of a theology of sacramentality in which ordinary families are fundamental occasions for the revelation of God at work in the ordinary “stuff” of creation.

B. examines the ecclesiological tension that has accompanied (and still accompanies) the idea of the family as domestic church. She sets out the challenges that a serious understanding of domestic church presents to traditional paradigms of a hierarchically focused Church. By invoking the traditional theological elements found in official church teaching and documents and significant theological guides (Karl Rahner in particular) as well as more contemporary writers on the issues of family and sacramental theology, she builds a persuasive case for her argument that families are under-appreciated, under-represented, under-acknowledged sites of sacramental experience and revelation.

Of particular significance is B.’s exploration of what she terms, “ordinary, imperfect family life” (50–68). Many believers have become used to having idealized conceptions of their vocation function as a criticism of their lived reality. B. is aware of this hagiographic tendency and its destructive results, and she suggests that within actual family life (and she offers concrete examples from her own experience of raising four young children) are precisely the occasions where grace is experienced. Most importantly, she takes up the reality of families whose form of being is judged “irregular” by ecclesial standards. This is a needed perspective for the hundreds of thousands of families who do not reflect the ecclesial ideal because of “irregular” marriages and same-sex unions and the desire of many members of such families to be recognized for the unglamorous fidelity and commitment that their lives and families reflect. B. addresses the writings of John Paul II regarding families, particularly *Familiaris consortio* (1981) and *Letter to Families* (1994), and notes that in both documents an opportunity was missed to make much more explicit links between the God who remains present to us in suffering, and the actual experience of families. “What I wish for in *Familiaris Consortio* and *Letter to Families* is more attention to the Jesus who, like so many parents, is continually asked to give more when he seemingly has nothing left to give” (64).
B. offers examples from her own life and the lives of others that help the reader understand the theological principles she presents. This is a different strategy in theological writing and is very effective because it exactly makes B.'s point that growth in holiness does not occur primarily (ever?) through correct theology, but through lives lived in the daily belief that God is to be found in the midst of the ordinary.

The book should be especially welcomed in diocesan family life offices, by those teaching sacramental theology and/or courses on marriage and family in seminaries and schools of theology, and by parish leaders who have responsibility for the nurturance of families in the parish. It offers a refreshing and needed vision regarding the centrality of families as tiny communities where we may discern God's presence and action in human lives. It challenges the sacramental theology of the Church to give far greater attention to the most fundamental human experience that most people know, and it decenters sacramental theology from a clerical base to a human base in which the ordinary and messy phenomena of families are blessed, graced, and the locus of God's revelation.

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**FAITH IN THE FUTURE: HEALTHCARE, AGING, AND THE ROLE OF RELIGION.**  

It should come as no surprise, given recent trends to privatize social services and to award faith-based initiatives funds for operations that had been the purview of the Social Security Administration, Health, Education, and Welfare, Medicare, and Medicaid, to find a text extolling the virtues of faith-inspired volunteers who would take up the cause of elder care. Koenig and Lawson are no strangers to the subject of faith in practice: K. has written extensively on the positive influence of faith practices, spirituality, and health; L. has raised funds for nonprofit organizations and has two books promoting volunteerism for the benefits that accrue to self and to the world community. Likewise, the Templeton Foundation has supported K.'s work particularly for showing the confluence of the spiritual life and healthcare (this text is the sixth of K.'s Templeton publications).

Not to disparage the premise and contribution of the text to the discussion of elder care, I was struck by the lack of attention to the social milieu in which solicitation and then dependence on faith-based initiatives becomes a simple federal response to healthcare reform. The text rightly recognizes a crisis looming on the horizon. As the population ages and life-expectancy increases, as healthcare costs rise, and as healthcare institutions begin to cut back on services, the nation will soon face a critical shortage of basic and critical care. This shortage may be remedied by a creative reordering of national priorities, a radical redistribution of limited resources from tax revenues, or a commitment on the part of faith communities to redirect some of their outreach programs to the needs of infirm
elders. The text fails, however, to consider healthcare as a basic human right, akin to the legally established rights of education, housing, enfranchisement, and protection that need affirmation; a basic human rights approach to healthcare, such as the European and Canadian models of socialized healthcare insurance programs, provides another alternative to the crippling capitalist captivity of U.S. health policies.

Many studies have shown the positive effects that people's faith can have on their overall health and sense of well-being. K. and L. cite a number of studies to corroborate anecdotal evidence on longevity and faith practices with quantitative research. Skeptics will argue that these correlations are self-serving and that, regardless of one's religiosity, everyone dies eventually. For example, the authors cite the conclusions of one study: "The risk of dying for frequent attenders was 46% lower than for those attending services less often" (79)! Moreover, to suggest that people who do not attend religious services, pray, or engage in spiritual exercises live shorter lives or experience more adverse health conditions points to utilitarian purposes (Marx?) of religion at large rather than purposes of worship, community, and conscience formation. Nevertheless, the data convince overall that faith functions positively throughout a lifetime of health and illness.

Many religions have a historic tradition of caring for the sick; this text considers, principally, Christian denominations with some notice of Jewish- and Muslim-sponsored care programs and a nod to Hindu and Buddhist traditions. Faith-inspired care traditions are plainly recognizable in the religious-sponsorship of many healthcare institutions. Less known are effective local and national volunteer and outreach programs. Shepherd's Centers of America, founded in 1972 in Kansas City, Mo., by Methodist pastor Elbert C. Cole on the premise that "the religious elderly were prepared to serve as volunteers" (13), provide health screenings, enhancement, and education as well as opportunities to enrich seniors' lives with study and community partnerships. Central Dallas Ministries and Project Access, founded in 1988 by the Preston Road Church of Christ and other Dallas congregations to serve the inner-city poor, coordinate free or low cost healthcare, legal services, employment, and after-school programs: healthcare workers consider volunteer work as a tithe.

These and other faith-based initiatives are attractive (e.g., Catholic Charities, Habitat for Humanity, Lutheran Services in America, and Parish Nursing). And it makes sense for people of faith to respond to the needs of those unable to care for themselves. Further (and despite the potential for abuse), the bond established through faith communities naturally fosters a trust between the healthcare volunteer and a congregant needing care that endures through sickness and in health.

Certainly, faith-based initiatives have already responded to the needs of many; and institutional support is available through grants from the federal government and private foundations. More faith communities could embrace the creation of housing complexes, especially for seniors, near houses of worship. Such housing could relieve the isolation many elders experi-
ence, could accommodate volunteer home care and cleaning services, and could afford seniors the comfortable surroundings of their own neighborhoods. K. and L. provide an important response to the U.S. healthcare crisis. Their text offers practical steps for putting faith into action.

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MARY JO IOZZIO


At the beginning of his 1981 social encyclical *Laborem exercens*, Pope John Paul II asserted that “work as a human issue is at the very center of the social question” and that the subject of human labor “constantly demands renewed attention and decisive witness.” While this insight is accurate enough, the Holy Father could easily have mentioned the subject of property as an equally “essential key to the whole social question.” Indeed, a substantial portion of the overall corpus of modern Catholic social teaching focuses squarely on the twin themes of work and possessions. Magisterial voices have long been eager to affirm that proper social order depends on establishing justice in both work arrangements and property relations.

Much more has been written about work than about possessions, so this volume is a most welcome contribution to theological reflection on this topic. The editors collect 16 essays from as many contributors. The essays are grouped into three thematic divisions: (1) biblical and theological meanings; (2) philosophical reflections on having and using the body and the material world; and (3) greed and grace in social, cultural, and religious imagination. The volume grew out of an impressive grant-supported, multi-year, and quite international project that brought together scholars in such fields as economics, political science, history, cultural studies, and biblical and theological ethics. The volume concludes with a helpful appendix that consists of an annotated bibliography of works on the topic of property and possessions; it is well organized both chronologically and by sub-topic.

As is often the case, a key strength also turns out to be a primary weakness. The ambition of this collection to cover so much ground leads to a diffuseness that may bewilder the reader. Without exception, each essay is worth reading, but even within the three thematic divisions, few of the essays demonstrate much overlap or feature common points of departure. The authors for the most part do a fine job of marshaling the data of their respective disciplines in pursuit of insights regarding normative claims about possessions, but the resulting essays rarely reflect a shared understanding of even the most basic terms and issues in question.

To bring some focus to the many thoughts generated by the 16 authors, the co-editors devote an introductory essay to contextualizing the challenges facing our understanding of property today. The editors cite the phenomena of globalization, mass consumption, and the expansion of mar-
ket economies as emblematic signs of our times. Donning their hats as theologians, they then insist that those who bring religious resources to contemporary economic and social situations must neither become apologists for the status quo nor succumb to the illusion that they can somehow stand above the fray of claims and counterclaims about appropriate social practices. Rather, what is called for is a methodology of engagement in a thoroughgoing dialogue in which all cultural assumptions remain negotiable and subject to constant revision.

The editors' preferred label for this methodology is "a material hermeneutics of culture" (4), a phrase that remains quite opaque despite substantial efforts to explain it. At least this much is clear: the editors encourage a careful reflection on all systems of social meaning associated with possessions, including those "encoded with ancient meanings and practices found among the biblical traditions" (9). Familiarity with the previous work of William Schweiker, particularly his groundbreaking *Power, Value, and Conviction* (1998), will assist those seeking a fuller appreciation of the important project of constructing a Christian theological ethics in a postmodern age.

While it would be an exaggeration to say that the subsequent essays completely disregard the way the table had been set, they generally lose track of what could have emerged as a promising focus. One particularly insightful essay is Margaret Mitchell's analysis of John Chrysostom's sermons against the hoarding of superfluous wealth. Another is Kathryn Tanner's essay on grace and possessions, in which she challenges "Christian theology [to] regain its ability to startle, to expand the Western social imaginary in the present" in order to suggest alternative "logics of property" (356) beyond the exclusive holding of material goods.

Those interested in pursuing a critique of current understandings of property and social practices regarding possessions will find in this scholarly volume plenty of material to advance their reflections. Although in the end the collection emerges as not much more than the sum of its parts, it is a resource that contributes a great deal to our understanding of a topic much neglected in theological circles.

Weston Jesuit School of Theology

THOMAS MASSARO, S.J.


On the one hand, Merkle's book appears to be another commentary on the social ethics tradition seen mainly from the encyclical tradition. On the other hand, its contribution is to locate this tradition within a broader ecclesial and theological perspective. It is the contextualizing of the tradition that gives the book significant added value.

Part 2—chapters 5 through 10—presents the standard material on the social ethics tradition, but even here there is a welcome difference. Chapters 5 and 6 thoughtfully and clearly present the tradition from its official
beginnings with Leo XIII through Vatican II. The remainder of part 2 is
different and very helpful. Chapter 6 is devoted to political theology, chap­
ter 7 to liberation theology, chapter 9 to Black, Hispanic, feminist, and
Asian theologies as well as American Episcopal teaching on peace and the
economy. These chapters, with appropriate bibliography, are comprehen­
sive in scope. While the material on political and liberation theology may
be familiar, the presentation is fresh and thought-provoking. Chapter 9
articulates seldom heard voices that bring important perspectives and in­
sights to the table. Chapter 10 provides a very clear and concise analysis of
John Paul II’s contributions. Particularly helpful is M.’s contextualization
of his theology.

But as important a contribution as part 2 is, part 1 is the critical section.
Chapter 1, on whether social teaching is to be lived or professed, notes how
the social teaching is the public voice of the Church with two consequences:
(1) The Church must be in dialogue with the world both to learn from it but
also to influence it; and (2) the faith tradition, which grounds the social
ethics tradition, highlights different resources, values, and nuances of the
tradition to engage the community in discerning how to speak to the world.

Chapter 2 is a very thoughtful reflection on the relation of faith and
social teaching. Here M. highlights how transcendent elements in faith lead
us never to be satisfied with the status quo but to push ever further to refine
our religious vision that in its turn helps us transform society. The faith that
engenders our salvation is not a merely private experience but is a dra­
matically social one that leads us to confront the social evil imbedded in
the world. Faith teaches us how to live in society and that faithfully living in
society is a most profound way of being Church.

Chapter 3 presents a spirituality for the world, the project of establishing
the kingdom of God that is coincident with the project of human life. This
orientation enables M. to better ground the necessity of dialogue with the
world and to show the profound social implications of the Church’s being
in the world. Thus the promise of the kingdom is also a call for the Chris­
tian to engage in the world’s transformation.

Chapter 4, a thoughtful analysis of the Church in society, is particularly
helpful in the light of recent discussions about whether the Church is to be
countercultural. The chapter highlights changing understandings of the
Church, how those understandings shape the relation of the Church to the
world, and concludes with a discussion of the Church’s right to engage in
social teaching.

This is a most satisfying book, particularly because of how M. contextu­
alizes the Church’s social teaching and incorporates underdeveloped
themes. Additionally, the book develops a current theological context that
will help those new to the tradition understand not only how the social
ethics tradition developed, but also the theological context that both
grounds the teaching and is the source of its renewal for each generation.
Those looking for an excellent text for undergraduates and master’s can­
didates need look no further. Even doctoral candidates in ethics would be
advised to read at least the introductory chapters because of M.'s excellent development of a broader theological framework from which and in which the social ethics tradition develops.

Worcester Polytechnic Institute

THOMAS A. SHANNON


Why do we need liturgy? What meaning does it provide for our age? How do we make sense of the ritual acts of worship? These are questions of concern for Graham Hughes. While his discussion is directed toward academics, he is concerned for church-goers whose religious meanings received on Sunday help shape meanings for the week ahead (52).

The book is divided into three equal parts. Part 1, "The Making of Meaning," sets liturgical construction of meaning within the larger cultural context of late 20th-century meaning theory. Part 2, "Signs of Wonder," looks at a worship service as a semiotic system. In part 3 H. turns his concern to those who have been greatly influenced by "disenchantment."

This notion of disenchantment, an idea borrowed from Max Weber, is an underlying theme of the book; it is a problem H. believes liturgical scholars need to address. According to Weber, Western technology has separated the world from any religious reference, so that the world can be seen no longer religiously. Thus H. asks whether God, as represented in the Jewish-Christian tradition, can mean anything for people living in a thoroughly secularized age.

H. attempts a rapprochement between liturgy and semiotics (119). H. notes that, with the exception of a few authors, liturgical scholars and semioticians have not worked together. He believes that by grounding the study of liturgy in semiotic theory Christians will be able to better grasp the meaning of their worship. And, according to H., no one is more qualified to illustrate this semiotic theory than Charles Sanders Peirce, the American founder of pragmatism (6). Students of Peirce believe that, while his work has been largely neglected for nearly a century, a renewed appreciation is surfacing.

H. explains "meaning" in terms of the act of comprehension, that is, the activity of grasping the various signifying elements into a synthetic whole. These elements originally may not have been thought of as linked, but within the generation of meaning we now see them as such (77–78). Peirce's theory, which H. describes as labyrinthine and obscure, nevertheless explains how this new meaning is generated. Peirce's notion of "thirdness" is essential here. It moves away from the dualism of signifier and signified, and recognizes three elements within every sign-act. In Peirce's terminology, the representamen, or signifier, refers to that which stands for something else. The object, or signified, refers to that for which the sign stands. The third element, the interpretant, introduces a dynamic activity
into the sign-act, as it effects the relationship between the signifier and the
signified. The addition of this third element recognizes that the interpreter
participates in the unfolding of meaning in every sign-act, in the way we say
that one “makes sense” of something; that is, something is produced here.
This activity of making sense is a collaborative effort between the producer
of the sign, who has a particular object in mind, and the interpreter who
brings an interpretation to the process (122).

H. applies Peirce’s notion of thirdness to Christian worship. The purpose
of worship is for the worshiper to apprehend that the meaning derived
from the worship event was the intentional meaning of those who devised
and executed the words and actions; and to grasp that God was the inner­
most subject matter of the worship event (216).

H.’s work contributes to liturgical theology in several ways. First, he
moves away from the assumption that language is the definitive model for
the study of signification. This could prove helpful with the growing con­
cern for multicultural liturgies in which several languages are spoken. Sec­
ond, his book is timely, given the burgeoning field of theological esthetics.
Esthetics becomes more than mere decoration; it creates a habitus of feel­
ing that disposes the assembly towards a more profound act of worship. In
this way H. gets to the true meaning of active participation, as described in
Vatican II’s Sacrosanctum concilium, namely, fostering an interior disposi­
tion of worship. Third, this work draws from many contemporary sources
in liturgical theology as well as from a variety of semioticians. It must be
noted, however, that the appeal to semiotics is not unproblematic. As one
adroit colleague opined in a discussion of this book, “Does it need to be
this difficult?” Readers not well acquainted with Peirce will need help in
applying H.’s theory to the situation of liturgy today. Some familiarity with
Peirce’s own lexicon as well as philosophical logic will also help. This being
said, H.’s work provides a movement toward an enhanced relationship
between liturgy and semiotics.

Jesuit School of Theology at Berkeley

AN ECOLOGICAL VISION OF THE WORLD: TOWARD A CHRISTIAN ECOLOGI­
CAL THEOLOGY FOR OUR AGE. By Cho Hyun-Chul, S.J. Serie Teologia,

THE PARADISE OF GOD: RENEWING RELIGION IN AN ECOLOGICAL AGE. By

The global ecological crisis prompted the research that resulted in Cho’s
dissertation study. The book is not a scientific investigation of the crisis
itself, but an exploration into some of the religious principles that under­
gird, or should undergird, our attitude toward the natural world. C.
employs a correlation method of analysis that is both dialogic and
apologetic. As such, it seeks to bring the Christian tradition into dialogue
with the experience of and concern for ecological matters, in an attempt to convince contemporary women and men of the need for an alternate way of understanding, valuing, and living in the world.

C.'s method follows the classic propositional approach: first, the main proposition is stated; supporting propositions follow; theological resources are then introduced to explicate, develop, and support the propositions; finally, the main proposition is restated, now reinforced by the arguments developed throughout. C.'s main proposition states that the Christian tradition provides an ecologically sensitive vision of the world. His subsequent propositions maintain that in this vision all finite beings are interrelated and interdependent; they also have their own intrinsic, though not absolute, value; in the end, C. argues that this new vision of the natural world is compatible with concern for the poor. He correlates each proposition with the thinking of Karl Rahner, Jürgen Moltmann, Leonardo Boff, and Sallie McFague.

C. moves his argument along carefully and methodically. He begins by explaining the significance of his study and the method employed. He then provides a brief overview of the ecological crisis facing our world. Next he sketches two contemporary perspectives. The first is a cosmological view that emerges from insights gleaned from modern sciences. The second flows from this new "story of the earth." This perspective is dynamic and relational, challenging the classical, mechanistic viewpoint that regards the rest of the natural world as an object to be controlled and exploited by humankind. He argues that the Christian tradition is compatible with this dynamic, relational perspective. He then demonstrates the validity of these initial theses. Finally, he discusses some of the contemporary implications of his conclusions.

The personal challenge of this examination is found in the last chapter of the book where C. offers a glimpse of Christian spirituality grounded in the ecological vision of the world he has sketched. He maintains that the realization of the interconnectedness of all creatures and an appreciation of their intrinsic value will result in a world sensitive to cosmic and social justice, peace, and harmony.

Though cogently argued, carefully written, and easily understood, the book is burdened with the complexity and repetitiveness of a dissertation. While there is little material here from his primary theologians, C. is insightful in the way he gleaned it. He advances several of their theological positions, chief among them are: the dynamic unity of spirit and matter; the world as the body of God the Spirit; a panentheistic view of creation; implications of the compatibility of ecological sensitivity and social concerns. The information gathered here makes the book a useful resource.

Wirzba does more than simply lay out the status quaestionis. His book was prompted by the same concern found in C.'s study, for it seeks to discover "the character of creation, its moral and cultural significance, so as to help us see what our proper place within the created order should be" (viii). However, W.'s focus is slightly different. He investigates the Jewish/
Christian doctrines of creation with a particular interest in the insights into agrarian/scientific ecology that the doctrines might afford us, bringing these insights into dialogue with contemporary scientific thinking. He sees the ecological crisis as a crisis of culture, an inability to connect with the sources of life. He approaches the natural world as a moral and spiritual topography.

W. examines many of the biblical passages usually included in such a study: the creation accounts in Genesis, the ecological significance of the Sabbath, the mystical experience of Job, the meaning of new creation in Christ, and the eschatological vision of new heavens and new earth. While his treatment of these passages is quite interesting, most provocative is his chapter "Culture as the Denial of Creation." There he discusses modernity's role in the Western world's contemporary disenchantment with the cosmos. He begins by commenting on the radical shift in perspective that took place with the move away from an allegorical approach to the Bible. The collapse of the metaphorical worldview that resulted from this move, along with the demise of agrarian life and the later influence of technology, all served to eclipse a sense of the divine.

W. rightly credits the new insights into the balance of nature with both a recognition of the harm done by the extreme form of anthropocentrism holding sway in the Western world, and a realization of the need to develop a new way of understanding the unique place of humankind within the broader ecological scheme. According to him, what has emerged is an ecological revolution as significant for our time and the future as was the Copernican astronomical revolution of the 16th century. This new revolution will require the fashioning of a new ecological worldview and a corresponding new ecological ethic.

W. offers the reader a glimpse into what he calls a "culture of creation." In such a worldview, humanity embraces its true place in the natural world as a creature along with other creatures. This in no way minimizes the uniqueness of the human creature. On the contrary, the "culture of creation" concerns this uniqueness in new and challenging ways. W. advocates a day-to-day manner of living that conforms to the rhythms of creation. He calls this a kind of Sabbath economy that boasts three major characteristics: appreciation for the integrity and health of the whole creation; fidelity to human responsibility for and care of creation; an attitude of delight in and gratitude for the gifts of creation. W. proposes nothing less than a complete change of mind and heart, a metanoia. The current ecological crisis requires such a radical change, if life as we know it will continue and thrive.

These two books begin at the same starting point—the need to address the ecological crisis from within the riches of the Christian tradition—and bring us to the same end point: an ecologically sensitive worldview that requires a radical change of mind and heart.

Catholic Theological Union, Chicago

DIANNE BERGANT, C.S.A.

In his 1988 Ethics after Babel, Jeffrey Stout defended an objective and rational approach to ethical argument in the face of profound disagreements not just about particular questions of morality, but also about the very possibility of human beings engaging with each other coherently across cultural, religious, and philosophical barriers. For S., professor of religion at Princeton University, the key to maintaining objective and rational conversation "after Babel" lay in shared social practices more than in theories. His method was one of "bricolage," of putting together the pieces of life and discourse that happen to fit without any grand explanation of why they fit with each other. Fifteen years later, in Democracy and Tradition, he has returned to many of these same problems and strategies, as he tries to show that a society like the United States, despite its plurality and division, is heir to a tradition, to an assemblage of practices and reflections, rendering it possible to talk even about plurality and division.

In making his present case, S. confronts resistance from two camps. On the one side is a school of thought, best represented by Richard Rorty who views religion as a "conversation stopper" and who would exclude appeal to religious beliefs in settling our most important disputes. On the other side stands a variety of thinkers such as John Milbank, Alasdair MacIntyre, and Stanley Hauerwas, who despair of post-Enlightenment society as too morally, intellectually, and spiritually impoverished for fruitful conversation about issues like abortion, war, poverty, and sexuality. Thus we have the anomaly of Rorty and the earlier John Rawls asking Milbank, MacIntyre, and Hauerwas to bracket their Christian convictions as a condition for entering the conversation about these matters, and of these Christians turning their backs on the same conversations as bankrupt and encouraging their fellows to do likewise. Anyone familiar with these discussions could point out that a great part of the audience for all these writers is the very people rejected as conversation partners, something illustrated by a standing-room only symposium on S.'s book with Rorty and Hauerwas as well as Cornel West and S. himself on the dais at the November 2003 meeting of the American Academy of Religion in Atlanta.

S. could have used meetings like the one just described as prima facie evidence of a contradiction in action and as a reason for dismissing the resistance, but his preference is not to take such a shortcut. Rather the strategy of Democracy and Tradition is more elaborate. First S. analyses the way Americans, and perhaps people in Western democracies generally, actually settle disputes in areas as diverse as law and sports. They look for common ground, for practical precedent, for judges tested in wisdom and fairness—all without reaching foundations in theory. The second element of S.'s strategy is to bring the reader back repeatedly to a body of literature, particularly the writings of Ralph Waldo Emerson, Walt Whitman, and John Dewey, for models of thinking about democracy as a way of living and
reasoning together instead of merely a system of casting votes and selecting leaders. Understood in terms of these practices and thinkers, a democratic society has a place for anyone who would put his beliefs and justifications before his fellows in the most difficult of disagreements.

One of S.'s repeated claims in this book as in *Ethics after Babel* is that there is nothing subjectivist or relativistic about his approach to ethics or politics. He is even ready to speak of ethical and political truth, to maintain the truth of his own positions, and to invite others to make such truth-claims on their part. What he formally abjures is any sort of epistemological or metaphysical scheme like the ones we associate with correspondence, coherence, or pragmatist concepts of truth. He finds too many paradoxes on all sides to accept any of these accounts, although my own sense is that making this move returns us to epistemological realism and correspondence concepts of truth by default. It is how we spontaneously think and speak about what is and what should be. In the end, I am happy to let S. avoid epistemology and metaphysics in his clear, fair, engaging, and wise book. There are further books to be written by him, however—perhaps one exploring the democratic tradition on a specific thorny topic, say abortion, or one in which he would deal more extensively with the significance of 9/11/01 and its aftermath for democratic society and tradition. Can the extreme groups of the pro-life and pro-choice movements meet fruitfully with S. at the AAR? Can an Osama bin Laden find a place with him on a panel? A session with Rorty, Hauerwas, and West, North American academics all, is child's play in comparison.

La Salle University, Philadelphia

MICHAEL J. KERLIN


Secularization theory in sociology forms a continental divide: scholars ranging on either side. Some prominent sociologists deny secularization. Robert Bellah affirms modern society as equally pregnant with religious possibility as any other. Andrew Greeley insists that the sacred stubbornly persists and flourishes. Other preeminent sociologists, such as Bryan Wilson and Peter Berger, espouse secularization theory, that is, that crucial factors of modernity (variously listed as differentiation, rationalization, urbanization, pluralism) inevitably lead to a decline of religiousness.

Clearly, some things religious persist. People still vigorously believe and practice. There have even been religious resurgences. But just as clearly, religion seems to have a diminished sway of authority over the institutions of public life in modern society. Only some fresh look at secularization would lure people with settled positions to new inquiry about it. Sociologist of religion Christian Smith, who teaches at the University of North Carolina, looks anew at the process of secularization. He changed the received paradigm by insisting that secularization was not some inevitable, if per-
haps unintended, by-product of modernization. Rather it was the outcome of a struggle between contending groups with conflicting interests seeking to control socially strategic public institutions. A new and expanding knowledge class consciously struggled to dethrone the Protestant establishment.

Classic statements of secularization tend to be overly abstract (ascribing the process to generic factors, such as "differentiation"). They also tend toward over-determinism. The typical accounts of secularization "offer transformation without protagonists, action without actors; historical process without agents" (14). S. takes as his research aim to explain the historical loss by Protestant establishment elites of the influence they once wielded in American public institutions.

The virtue of S.'s approach, with its stress on agency, interests, power, resources, and conflict, is that it makes problematic and contingent what did happen. Some alternative alliances (e.g., between Catholics and liberal Protestants on the public school question) could have yielded different results. A more theoretically argued Protestant position might have staved off sweeping secularization. If the current patterns of American secularization of public life were not inevitable, they can also be rethought.

S. espouses a position he calls structural pluralism. His structural pluralism considers the old Protestant establishment as oppressive and deserving of challenge by the emerging groups it excluded. S. does not bemoan the passing of a 19th-century "Christian" America. Structural pluralism leads him, however, to postulate that strict separationism is also oppressive and unjust, especially for religious believers whose faith cannot be privatized without violation, or when it rankly simply privileges the secular over the religious voice.

Although the book is a collection of essays by nine different authors, S.'s social mobilization motif sets a coherent research tone. Each essay is an exercise in careful historical sociology. One essay plots a seismic shift as Baconian science—seen as an enterprise compatible with and to some extent at the service of theism—yielded to a positivist view of religion as obscuring science. Non-existent "wars" between science and religion got trumpeted. The crafters of the newly emergent discipline of sociology marginalized the early "sociologists" of the Social Gospel as rank amateurs. Education (both higher and primary/secondary) underwent a shift from a view of a generalized Protestantism in the schools that emphasized a kind of "common faith," allowed Scripture reading in the schools, and assumed that there was no viable morality without religion to a later view of the schools as stringently secular. The chapter on the National Educational Association plots the agents who brought this change about and why. Other chapters ably portray the agents who plotted the overthrow of the liberal Protestant establishment in law and the media and the replacement of "care of souls" by a secular psychology. Liberal Protestants, opting for an accommodation strategy, often unwittingly played into the hands of the secularizers.

In some essays (e.g., the one on Moral Reform Movements), a thick
description of one case (e.g., the Watch and Ward Protestant group in Boston that censored books) made me wonder if the case, interesting as it was in its historic particularities, could be legitimately generalized to other such Protestant moral reform groups in cities such as Chicago, New York, and San Francisco. I also wished the collection had treated in some depth the one area of public life—social welfare—that was more resistant to the secular takeover. Why did the secular revolution—never inevitable—not take so strongly there?

Sociologists, students of American religion, and general audiences will profit from this carefully researched, well written, and original book.

Loyola Marymount University, Los Angeles

JOHN A. COLEMAN, S.J.


Vining begins this wise, gentle, and impassioned book with a reference to a scientific experiment. A song sparrow nestling is deafened, and when it grows up it cannot sing. The experimenter concludes that certain skills comparable to linguistic skills must be imprinted on the brain in childhood, or they will not be imprinted at all. V. asks why we cannot secure still more useful data on the subject by deafening a child. He shows that in the middle of the 20th century some totalitarian regimes and their scientific establishments mounted human experiments worse than that. He indicates that a good deal of contemporary science has rejected any understanding of the human that would stand in the way of such experimentation. He makes his point by juxtaposing quotations from theorists of science with reports of experiments: "Basic to our world view is the idea that human beings and other higher animals are part of the biological order like any other organisms. Babies, elephants, and mountain ranges are examples of systems" (7–8, quoting John Searle). "Unit 731 experimented on a three day old baby, measuring the temperature with a needle stuck inside the infant's middle finger" (6, quoting a New York Times report on human experimentation in Manchuria, 1932–1945).

So V. finds a connection between "the total in twentieth-century totalitarian social and political thought and the total in visions today that exhaust the nature of the world" (12). The total theories he addresses here "are marked by their exclusiveness. In them, the world, the universe, the cosmos is introduced with the excluding phrases 'nothing but,' or 'nothing more than,' 'only,' 'merely,' followed by the details of the total vision being urged" (14). Such theories are coercively imposed by their proponents on all who aspire to serious status within the proponents' scientific field, and any hint of disagreement within the discipline is only tentatively and apologetically put forth.

For V. such a theory is its own refutation. People put theories in books and present them at conferences because they wish to persuade other
people to accept them: If they and their colleagues were mere blobs of tissue, why would they care? Furthermore, no scientific theory can rest entirely on the empirical observations of the person adopting it. Scientists are constantly building on the results of other scientists' experiments. To do so, they must trust the experimenters in question—they must have faith, if not in a transcendent order, at least in their colleagues.

Since the effective pursuit of science requires persuading others and learning from them, there are important similarities between legal and scientific methodologies, which V., comfortable in both disciplines, is able to present persuasively. Lawyers are ex officio aware that although truth is unitary and objective, it must be pursued dialectically and articulated in open-ended forms. They understand the uses and limitations of authority in the work. Scientists need the same awareness and understanding if they are to locate their enterprise in the cosmos we all share. The need to persuade, the possibility of refusal, and the inadequacy of language are always present.

Thus, V. makes science another form of human inquiry, and points to a synthesis of law, science, and art as a single human pursuit, opening out to what he is willing to call "spirit" (123). Human beings are unique through their participation in this pursuit, and so the law protects them against being turned into objects. This is what V. calls "the claim of the child" in a penultimate chapter by that name. In a final chapter on "the claim of the sparrow," he suggests that extending some recognition to sentient beings as such may be called for to support our recognition of one another: "Listening to the song of the song sparrow as a song, not a 'song' that is an arrangement of sounds produced by a system, may in fact help us listen to our own song. Hearing the cry of the dog as a cry may help us hear the cry of a human being as a cry, and help us act in response to it" (149–50).

I have had only one difficulty with the book: my incredulity at the report that people with serious academic credentials have actually been saying the things V. quotes them as saying, and have actually been taken seriously in saying them. It is as if I had been reading a meticulous refutation of the flat earth theory or a convincing demonstration that Francis Bacon did not write Shakespeare's plays. I must lead a sheltered life here at Notre Dame. I would have been content to shrug off the whole lot of V.'s authors with Jacques Maritain's line about not taking folly too seriously, but V. would not let me. He does not take the folly of his authors too seriously, but he takes their humanity very seriously indeed. In so doing, he reclaims them and their enterprise for our common reflection on reality, our common pursuit of truth. He puts me to shame.

University of Notre Dame

ROBERT E. RODES, JR.
SHORTER NOTICES


Every new volume by Walter Brueggemann is worth careful study, especially by anyone interested in the faith and Scriptures of Israel. As possibly the finest contemporary American scholar in the field of Old Testament theology, B. invariably unites creative study and penetrating methodological criticism with a compelling command of the Western scholarship that has dominated this discipline over the past century. With our contemporary emergence from recent modern preoccupation with questions of history, fresher rhetorical and theological approaches can receive a serious hearing.

This work collects under one cover 13 essays variously published and gathers them under three headings: “Biblical Authority” (three essays), “Old Testament Theology in the Twentieth Century” (six essays), and “A Conversation with Other Theologians” (four essays). Only four of these studies were written prior to the publication of B.’s magisterial Theology of the Old Testament (1997). Because these individual articles continue to ponder critical questions of modern and postmodern methodologies, a certain repetitive overlap is apparent, especially for any student already familiar with the splendid 100-page survey that forms the introduction to B.’s Theology.

Von Rad’s focus on the creed of Israel in the 1950s and Eichrodt’s stress on covenant in the 1950s reflected the concerns, social and theological, of mid 20th-century European scholars. B. continues to celebrate and critique those contributions, but equally to engage in repeated respectful but sharply critical conversations with more contemporary scholars such as Bernhard Anderson, James Barr, Brevard Childs, Jon Levenson, and J. Richard Middleton among others. In particular, B. finds canonical criticism too narrow and too easily subject to ideology.

As is well known, B. approaches the Scriptures from a Presbyterian perspective and is willing to argue about issues he considers of vital importance for the contemporary world and our social context. This collection is less homiletic than some other of B.’s recent monographs. His consistent clarity in exposition remains a blessing for anyone desiring further study of the revealing Word of God.

RICHARD J. SKLBA
Archdiocese of Milwaukee


For Knohl, the Bible (and the early Jewish traditions that flow from it) consists in different schools of tradition that together create a symphony. These voices correspond to the traditional scholarly sources of the Old Testament, the Priestly writing (but he dates “P” much earlier than most), the Yahwist, and the others. These traditions deal differently with the common questions of Israel’s religion. K. focuses on three: Is God abstract or anthropomorphic? Is God for all the people or just some? Does God reward prayers and rituals that materially benefit the one who prays?

There is much to like about this short work. It provides a worthy alternative to the tendency among interpreters to harmonize the divergent voices in the biblical text. K. illumines and embodies the rabbinical tradition of dispute and comfort with ambiguity.

Following Y. Kaufmann, K. insists on the radical dissimilarity between non-Israelite (Canaanite, pagan) religious belief and authentic Israelite belief. In his view, monotheism characterizes authentic Israelite belief, which implies belief in a non-anthropomorphic, abstract God. K. pays unequal attention to
the different traditions he covers. His special concern for the Priestly Torah is obvious, although his clear admiration of them is tempered by some trenchant criticisms.

The book has some problems. If you remain unconvinced (as I do) of his central premise that the Priestly Torah is early, much of his subsequent insights have limited utility. His ruling metaphor of a symphony creates difficulties. He assumes a fundamental agreement among all the voices on a few key theological points (such as monotheism). But it is apparent to many scholars that polytheistic and near-polytheistic voices remain part of the Israelite milieu throughout their history. K. appears to assume that the symphony must ultimately make a single, unified, harmonious sound. I contend that there are texts in the Bible that remain discordant to the dominant voices. I found the book provocative and worthy of consideration.

DAVID PENCHANSKY
University of St. Thomas, St. Paul, Minn.


Hoffken, until recently, professor at Lüneburg, has produced a book useful for an orientation to the Isaiah literature published in the last 30 years. The bibliography takes up about a quarter of the book. H. emphasizes that this bibliography is not complete and provides information about where more complete bibliographic information might be found. He remarks in the foreword that the task of assembling even only the more recent Isaiah literature is too Herculean for any one individual and recommends that in the future a group work together on the project. Combined efforts would take care of one of the problems with this book: citations of books and articles on Isaiah in languages other than German, English, and French are rare. That being said, the Isaiah literature in these languages is so vast that the book remains useful.

Although the book represents only one scholar’s reading of the more recent literature on the Book of Isaiah, it is useful as a source of bibliography.

DEIRDRE A. DEMPSEY
Marquette University, Milwaukee


With literary or narrative criticism Resseguie examines Luke’s physical, social, and economical “landscapes” along with the action and discourse of characters to develop and elaborate Luke’s understanding of the spiritual life. Physical landscapes include the desert, lake, mountain, and river—places of spiritual awakening and testing; the social landscape takes in families, households, meals, and clothing. Economically, what we do or fail to do with our possessions reflects our spiritual values and commitments. For R. Luke has three defining features of the spiritual life: Spirituality is a journey to the kingdom of God; Luke does not separate material, everyday experiences from
spiritual ones; and the challenge is to know and to do God's will. R. provides a preface and introduction and develops his theory in six chapters along with a conclusion. There are extensive notes (121-61) and bibliography, and indexes of both modern authors and topics.

While the strength of R.'s book lies in its potential benefit to the reader's spiritual life, scholars will surely accept his general understanding of the above-indicated data in Luke's Gospel—R. has written a perceptive and solidly academic book. However, one can question some of his interpretations. For example, "landscapes" may not best express what R. is trying to convey. In Luke 3:7-17, the text offers no theme of crossing the Jordan (10-11), nor of a cloak of darkness in 23:44-45 (98). Does the journey to Jerusalem (34-43) end at Luke 19:45 or rather at the Ascension (see 9:51)? Not everyone will accept the understanding proposed for the parables of the tower builder and of the king contemplating a campaign (40-41). Surely, Jesus' discarded shroud suggests his passage from death to life; but it seems an exaggeration to claim that it signals death's defeat (93-94).

Aside from these few reservations, R.'s new way of interpreting biblical texts will definitely interest scholars and prove spiritually helpful to many readers.

ROBERT F. O'TOOLE, S.J.
Pontifical Biblical Institute, Rome


The book says "yes" to the question posed by the title, but not all readers will be convinced. The question itself is reasonable enough, for Greco-Roman culture did practice literary mimesis: imitation of classical exempla was fundamental to Hellenistic education, and if there is a New Testament writing where dependence on Homer would most likely be found, it would surely be in the second volume of Luke-Acts, where the author, largely free of the constraints of prior gospel compositions, was able to shape his narrative according to whatever models lay to hand.

After an extended introduction states his thesis and lays out his criteria for determining literary imitation (1-15), MacDonald considers four passages of Acts in comparison with four passages of Homer's Iliad: the visions of Cornelius and Peter and Iliad 7 (19-67); Paul's farewell at Miletus and Iliad 6 (69-102); the selection of Matthias and Iliad 7 (105-119); Peter's escape from prison and Iliad 24 (123-45). A succinct conclusion, "Yes, Acts does imitate Homer!" (146-51) is followed by a very helpful display of Greek and Latin parallels (153-65), ample notes (167-207), and a bibliography useful for any student wishing to investigate the New Testament in the light of Greek literature (209-19).

But does M. actually demonstrate Lukan literary dependence on Homer? The inherent difficulty facing M. is the fact that the influence of Homer had already helped shape the many literary constructions of the Hellenistic world that scholars already acknowledge as intertextual resources for Luke, and that these lay much nearer to hand than did the Homeric epics themselves. M. can claim the Iliad as part of the Hellenistic intertexture for interpreting Luke-Acts, but he fails to show that there is anything uniquely in Acts and Homer that can be explained only by literary imitation. The book fails to convince on its central point, and fails to suggest what difference it might make for any reader of Acts if its central point were correct.

LUKE TIMOTHY JOHNSON
Emory University, Atlanta


and updated English version in 2000 (T. & T. Clark), which Fortress Press has reprinted.

The book is a selective commentary on Acts, identifying and explicating passages in which pagan and magical elements are present. As such, it very helpfully supplements the standard commentaries on Acts that often do not probe these elements in great detail.

Intriguing insights abound. Discussion of Simon Magus is interesting in its own right, but comparison with Philip the evangelist, in the whole context of Acts 8, is very suggestive. K. wonders if the narrative of the impiety and death of Agrippa I, whose voice was said to be that of a god (Acts 12:22), may not have been a veiled criticism of the imperial cult, which imagined that Caesar spoke with the voice of god. The discussion of Bar-Jesus, the magician and false prophet who opposed Paul and Barnabas, is also very interesting. The Lukan Evangelist may well have intended his readers to think of this sinister opponent of the apostolic message as a false “son of Jesus.”

K.’s discussion of the disastrous failure on the part of the sons of Sceva (Acts 19:13–16) is fascinating, implying the failure of pagan magic in the face of the Christian gospel. Indeed, the end of magic is dramatized in the burning of the books of magic (which will have included magical papyri, complete with spells, incantations, and charms), said to have an enormous monetary value (Acts 19:17–20). The protest of the silversmiths notwithstanding, Artemis is overthrown!

These are only a few of the highpoints in this learned book. A select, useful bibliography is also provided.

Craig A. Evans
Acadia Divinity College, Nova Scotia

The Gospel of Mary of Magdala: Jesus and the First Woman Apostle.

Karen King’s translation and study of the Gospel according to Mary is an extremely useful tool for introducing recent developments in the study of early Christianities to a non-academic audience. Professionals should read it to better appreciate the intersection of textual-historical analyses and their normative implications for practitioners.

K.’s assessments of Christian origins and of the major issues therein are lucid and convincing, but most professional readers will already know them. More important is K.’s sensitivity to how those conclusions may impact the self-understanding of modern Christians. For example, K. specifically recognizes her interpretive claims’ potential implications in promoting women’s leadership among modern Christians. This is problematic: the popular reader may not have a critical framework with which to distinguish K.’s historical claims from more prescriptive ones. With that in mind, it would have been preferable if she had explicitly indicated when she was moving from an analytical role to that of an advocate. As it is, her prescriptive conclusions are usually placed side-by-side with analytical ones. By arguing that the Gospel according to Mary defends women occupying leadership roles in Christian communities, for instance, K. assumes (without explicit textual support) that Mary’s role in the Gospel is intended as a model, rather than as an exception to prove the norm (such as the unattainable ideal for women’s roles presented by the Virgin Mary in various Christian traditions).

Given the state of the original text, and that we do not know what communities produced/transmitted it, we cannot know for certain how the ancient audience would have understood Mary Magdalene’s role. K.’s discussion, however, is clearly oriented towards a modern liberal Christian audience’s concerns. Academic readers would do better with K.’s other works, such as her What Is Gnosticism? (2003) for a more in-depth example of her analytical scholarship, but will find this text extremely useful in understanding the ramifications of our work for living communities, and how scholarship and advocacy may intersect in various ways.

Tennyson Jacob Wellman
University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia

Amirav succeeds in situating John Chrysostom, the exegete, in the wider world of ancient Christian biblical exegesis. Her approach is literary and exegetical rather than socio-anthropological, and her focus is on Chrysostom's rhetorical use of exegetical traditions. A. not only demonstrates that Chrysostom consciously appropriated well-established exegetical traditions, but also examines the rhetorical use he made of those traditions. Wisely limiting her corpus to three of Chrysostom's 67 Lenten homilies on Genesis (Homilies 22 [Gen 6:1-7], 23 [Gen 6:8-9], and 24 [Gen 6:10-7:5]), A. offers extensive and detailed comparison of Chrysostom's exegesis with that of commentators such as Eusebius of Emesa, Diodore of Tarsus, Theodore of Mopsuestia, Didymus the Blind, Eusebius of Caesarea, and Origen.

The book argues two main points. The first is that previous studies of Chrysostom have not taken into account his indebtedness to established exegetical arguments. A. remedies this by comparing Chrysostom to his predecessors and contemporaries, making effective use of recently edited Greek catenae. She demonstrates the concern Chrysostom and his contemporaries had to offer a philanthropic image of God, one that served to unite the two Testaments. A. also shows that the Pauline Epistles played an important role for most Christian interpreters of the Old Testament, here arguing against recent scholarship suggesting that Chrysostom was distinctive in his extensive use of Paul as a hermeneutical guide. Her work thus represents a welcome return to a focus on Chrysostom, the exegete, in his exegetical milieu.

A.'s second point is that Chrysostom is firmly rooted in the traditions of Antiochene exegesis, a school of thought she clearly distinguishes from that of Alexandria. Here A. counters the trend to see the traditional distinction between Alexandrian and Antiochene schools as largely a modern and misleading one. She marshals compelling evidence that the approach Chrysostom takes is consistently Antiochene and that this approach differs in substantive and predictable ways from that found in the writings of Alexandrian exegetes.

A.'s important study will be of particular interest to students of early Christianity and the history of biblical interpretation.

Stephen D. Ryan, O.P.
Dominican House of Studies, Washington


This text is a well-executed retrieval and expansion of Newman's concept of the illative sense using the resources of contemporary epistemology in the analytic philosophical tradition. Following a fine exposition of the illative sense as a belief-forming process, Aquino argues that Newman's individualist understanding of it should be augmented by attention to the constitutive role of social factors in the individual's beliefs. So augmented, the illative sense may then help resolve the problem of a common measure, that is, how radically diverse communities may rationally adjudicate conflicting claims. The remainder of the text draws on a variety of resources, especially virtue epistemology (Linda Zagzebski), reliabilism (Alvin Goldman), and social epistemology (Frederick Schmitt), to trace the dialectical relations between individual and community, and the centrality of a community of informed judgment for the cultivation of the illative sense.

My questions concern the second part of the argument. A. draws on many sources and addresses a variety of distinct issues. It is not clear that the parts add up to a consistent whole. I question the assumption that there is an essential relation between the rational deontologically understood and truth taken in a realist manner. It is far from clear that
this assumption, deeply embedded in epistemology since Descartes, is true. A. presents the illative sense as the key­stone in a theory of rationality and as a reliable truth-conducive process, but these presentations tend to pull away from one another because each re­sponds to distinct epistemic desiderata. To emphasize the first arguably under­mines the second, and to emphasize the second counter-intuitively constricts the first. Perhaps related to this tension is A.’s tendency to lapse into statements manifesting an epistemic concept of truth contrary to his own and certainly Newman’s intention. Finally, the prob­lem of a common measure is not so much solved as displaced into long-term trust in a community’s well-formed ex­ercise of the illative sense. These issues notwithstanding, there is much to be learned from this text and the author is to be commended for his engagement of a philosophical tradition much ne­glected in theological circles.

J. A. COLOMBO
University of San Diego


In the drama that was Catholic Modern­ism, two of the most striking charac­ters were Baron Friedrich von Hügel (1852–1925) and Maude Dominica Petre (1863–1942). With a thoughtful introduction and skillful editorial in­sight, Kelly renders a valuable resource to students of the Modernist Movement in his presentation of the correspon­dence of these pivotal figures. The epis­tolary conversation, however, is largely one-sided: 102 letters from the Baron, and only two from Miss Petre (and one of these is partial). Still, the vigorous reach and interplay of two seasoned, disciplined minds are apparent through­out these pages, as the Baron grapples at length with ideas and issues that Petre had placed before him.

The brief foreword by Gabriel Daly is very helpful in priming the reader for the strain and clashes that will develop between Petre and von Hügel, and also for noting some of the scholarly skir­mishes that would occur two genera­tions later, particularly over von Hü­gel’s role in the Modernist Movement and his delineation of two types of Mod­ernism. Both figures had a vision of a Catholicism that they wished at the same time to cherish and challenge. But especially after the death of their mutual friend George Tyrrell, a rift opened between them. These letters at least allow latter-day readers to see the fuller texture of von Hügel’s own rationales than those tendered in Petre’s reporting of them.

K.’s text is a valuable addition to the published literature on Modernism. The work will be more useful to scholars of the Movement than for general readers. Even in this genuinely fine presenta­tion, however, one could wish for more identification of references in the text. A biographical glossary would have made the text more accessible for those less conversant with the Movement.

CLYDE F. CREWS
Bellarmine University, Louisville


I highly recommend O’Donnell’s con­cise volume primarily for those who are new to Karl Rahner. The biographical material and the judicious selection of both theological and devotional themes pay a fitting tribute to this theological titan on the 100th anniversary of his birth and the 20th of his death.

O. underscores the sapiential inter­locking of Rahner’s theology and spiri­tuality, that is, a theology always grounded in living faith. This Ignatian, mystical theology, focused on God as the holy Mystery who communicates his very own self to every person, grounds Rahner’s “mysticism of everyday life.” Everyone, to Rahner, experiences God, even if only implicitly.

O. synthesizes lucidly major aspects of Rahner’s Christocentrism: his Scotis­tic view that God created for the sake of Incarnation, that all grace is Christ’s,
and that Jesus' obedient sacrificial death involved no change in God but created a new situation for humanity. Rahner's reflections on Jesus' Sacred Heart, Mary, the saints, and his nourishing meditations on the liturgical year are also well presented. Stressing Christ as God's sacrament, Rahner understood the Church as Christ's social-historical-traditional sacrament and the individual sacraments as the Church's self expression at significant times in a person's life.

Rahner viewed faith in a "wintry season" as a dying with Christ to all things, the true test that God alone suffices. Love of neighbor, to Rahner, is love of God—a love searching for Christ, the only assurance that loving one's sinful neighbor is not meaningless. The excellent section on hope unfolds Rahner's focus on God as our absolute Future that gives us the courage to keep trying to make the world more humane.

Minor disagreements: Rahner left Munich because at Münster he could have doctoral students in theology—not because he was less popular than his predecessor, Romano Guardini. Also, Rahner understood the "supernatural existential" as God's permanent self-offer, that a person may freely accept or reject. Something should have been said about the "obediential potency," the human being's capability of receiving God's offer.

Harvey D. Egan, S.J.
Boston College


Thompson's careful investigation of Schillebeeckx's ecclesiology provides a basis for a new vision of being Church while providing a systematic framework for addressing the increasingly polarized debates about church governance and the proper roles of ordained and lay members. It is a welcome voice in the midst of the many 40th-anniversary revaluations of Vatican II and the reper-

cussions from the sexual abuse scandal.

In six chapters, T. guides the reader from Schillebeeckx's Thomistically based pre-Vatican II ecclesiology to his methodologically eclectic post-Vatican II stances toward ecclesial authority. T. engages a twofold premise: "theologies of revelation and theologies of the church exist in a mutually determinative relationship made concrete by the actual praxis within Christian communities" (5), and that relationship is best investigated through the lens of epistemology (9). The title of the final chapter encapsulates his conclusion that "theological dissent and critical communities [are] sacraments of the future church" (see especially 157).

The epistemological analysis of chapter 1 explores Schillebeeckx's deep reflections on the relationship of knowledge and experience that saturate his work. T. introduces the phrase "non-antithetical and dialectical" (12) to describe both Schillebeeckx's fundamental method of critical correlation of tradition and situation and the relationship among three hermeneutical circles identified as ontology of subject and object, hermeneutics, and critical theory and praxis (13). Armed with an epistemological roadmap, T. skillfully navigates Schillebeeckx's vast corpus adding a series of nonantithetical and dialectical relationships that militate against any timeless, purely theoretical, and propositional notion of authority in the Church. These relationships include but are not limited to: creation and salvation, Jesus and the New Testament (chap. 2); Church and Jesus, world, Spirit (chap. 3); word and sacrament (chap. 4); and the theologian's relationship to the church community, other disciplines, and the magisterium (chap. 5). Using these relationships, T. convincingly argues that Schillebeeckx's concern for maintaining the apostolicity of the Church is in fact the basis for dissent and critical communities as sacraments of the future Church.

Respectful yet passionate, T.'s work offers a rich framework for future productive explorations of dissent.

Elena G. Procario-Foley
Iona College, New Rochelle, N.Y.

In her deeply appreciative and evocative reading of Ricoeur's interpretation of Augustine on evil, time, Scripture, and memory—the four main areas where Ricoeur has called on Augustine—Bochet is struck by the delicacy with which Ricoeur treats Augustine's unabashedly theological point of departure on these topics. As a philosopher in a post-Enlightenment world, Ricoeur cannot start with Augustine's faith. Yet, throughout his life, he has been interested in these liminal topics that for Augustine presupposed revelation. As a philosopher Ricoeur was determined to stay within a philosophical framework. In listening to Augustine, he transformed these boundary topics into points of disclosure of inescapable enigmas and aporias of thought. B. shows Ricoeur's profound indebtedness to Augustine for thinking at the boundaries of philosophical thought.

While B.'s concern is the mode, style, and validity of Ricoeur's interpretation of Augustine, the underlying theme of the slim book is modernity's distinction between philosophical and theological discourse. For Augustine this distinction was unthinkable. In Ricoeur, as shown in his decision to leave out a scriptural hermeneutics of the self from the published text of his 1986 Gifford Lectures, B. sees a certain nostalgia for the historical unity between philosophy and theology (99). For Ricoeur the split between the two discourses in today's academy jeopardizes the unity of the self as testimony. The attesting self is left with a question mark as to the source or referent of the attestation. On the positive side, the embargo of the academy has permitted Ricoeur to disclose in these four areas a surplus of meaning, an enigma of reality or an aporia in thinking as residues of theological reflection.

B.'s generous interpretation of Ricoeur's Augustine reawakens the desire to rethink the relationship of philosophy and theology beyond the suspicious and all-too-narrow portal of modern rationality. She has done a real service by bringing together Augustine who so dominated the premodern symbolic framework of the West and Ricoeur's inflected interpretation of Augustine in a time when we succumb too easily to the disjunctive siren of late modernity.

JOHN VAN DEN HENGEL, S.C.J.
Saint Paul University, Ottawa


This expansion of Buckley's D'Arcy Lectures of 2000 adds significant highlights to his claim advanced in At the Origins of Modern Atheism (1987) that "the dialectical genesis of modern atheism" (xi) lies in the theological apologetics that engaged the worldview, emergent from the new science, of mechanistic principles governing a universe of matter and motion.

After providing vignettes of the "three distinct settlements negotiated between the new knowledge and the ancient faith" (23) by Galileo, Kepler, and Newton, B. responds to John Milbank's criticism of his dialectical claim by sketching three "great 'theological experiments.' " (29) These further illustrate the pattern of contradiction by which "atheism as an argument and a theory was generated by the very intellectual forces enlisted to counter it" (28). Since the core of the contradiction lies "in the bracketing of the religious" (46), B. then addresses the charge, paradigmatically articulated by Tillich, that Aquinas bears major responsibility for blazing the path on which affirmation of God is mediated theoretically by inference rather than experientially in religious encounter. B. argues that close textual reading shows Aquinas's view to be that "God was not primordially reached as a conclusion ... but as a presence" in which "[t]he first moment is given by human longings and loves" (62). B. then puts 19th- and 20th-century critiques of "the divine as the antithesis of the human" and "the di-
vine as projection... of the human” (100) in creative interplay with a renewed 20th-century interest in contemplation, mystical life, and apophatic theology (108). Both approaches radically call in question “the self-projection inescapably present in religious ideas” (110) so that, paradoxically, “the secret revealed by nineteenth-century atheism had been recognized for centuries by a tradition of radical spirituality” (121).

B. concludes this elegant set of essays by proposing a further negation of the dialectic of religious argument that issued in atheism: retrieval of a “religious intellectuality” (xv) that acknowledges cognitive weight in “the claim of God” (133) disclosed in the witness of holiness in human lives, and in the absolute claims of truth, beauty, or justice upon our human attention and assent.

PHILIP J. ROSSI, S.J.
Marquette University, Milwaukee


In this sizable volume, Étienne Grieu of the Centre Sèvres in Paris proposes a fundamental theology that starts not solely from revelation nor from personal experience but from the milieu of one’s existence. For G. this means examining faith in the fuller context in which it arises: in the midst of the life of the Christian believer. He thus begins his work by interviewing 33 committed Catholics actively involved in both church and society in France (e.g., Action catholique ouvrière, Jeunesse étudiante chrétienne, Confédération française démocratique du travail). Each is asked to tell, in his or her own words, how they came to believe in God. The resulting “life stories” become the primary material on which G. bases his work.

The book is structured into three parts, each exploring a different aspect of one’s relationship with God. Filiation is the common theme. Part 1 focuses on recognizing and accepting oneself as God’s son or daughter. Part 2 turns to one’s relationship to others and the possibility of welcoming others as brothers and sisters. Part 3 examines the believer’s experience in relation to the world.

In each part, G. uses biblical texts from both Old and New Testaments and contributions from such contemporary theologians as Metz, Rahner, and Tillich to illuminate his argument.

Nés de Dieu is a creative endeavor; its approach is not entirely new, but G. argues that it has been somewhat forgotten. In recent years, he says, theologians have been more concerned with either the origin of faith or its goal but not in the way believers express their faith. Those interested in the relationship of revelation and faith, its discernment and transmission, are encouraged to consider this work.

MICHAEL ATTRIDGE
University of St. Michael’s College, Toronto


Larive articulates a theological understanding of work modeled on the work-related characteristics of the Trinity. His overall theme is that everyday human work has a metemphatic value that incorporates not only humanity’s concerns, but also God’s. Unfortunately, this metemphatic value has been virtually ignored by both Christian clergy and scholarship, even though it forms the basis for the theological significance of human work.

In the opening chapters, L. offers contemporary views on work, demonstrates the “firewalls” constructed by Christian theology to undermine the significance of secular work, and introduces a framework from which the laity can begin to recognize their work as a vocation. These chapters are helpful because L. draws from the social sciences to help bridge the often experienced disconnect between faith and everyday life. He also persuasively argues that the life and work of the laity need to be afforded a “primary identity” status within the Christian Church.

In the next three chapters, L. explores
how characteristics of the Trinity relate to his theology of work. These chapters are the least-convincing sections of the book. The Father is depicted as the "maintainer" of creation, the Son as "creator of new things," and the Holy Spirit as exemplar of the skills or gifts we bring to our work along with the rapport we build with fellow workers. While these "applications" are not necessarily wrong (particularly those concerning the Spirit), they are somewhat constrictive, and the means L. uses to arrive at them (natural theology, quantum unpredictability theory, etc.) need to be developed much more clearly.

L. then offers a lucid account of what entails good or "Godly" work by returning to his argument for work's metaphatic value and by further developing the notion of "pleroma," that the fruits of human work are not "scarce" but can be shared among many. The true value of the book lies in this and the first three chapters. The final chapter restates the themes and summarizes the main arguments.

JOZEF D. ZALOT
College of Mount St. Joseph, Cincinnati


This collection of essays, written on various occasions on the theme of the dialogue between the gospel and the cultures of Asia, is one of a projected trilogy; the other two deal with the dialogues of the gospel with the poor and the religions. The keyword is, of course, inculturation. Part 1 deals with how the involvement in inculturation leads to a new way of being Church and a new theology of mission focused on the kingdom of God. Part 2 speaks of worship and prayer in the Asian way, with particular reference to popular religion. Part 3 talks of doing theology in an Asian way. The concluding chapter illustrates the reception of Vatican II in Asia by the contribution of the Asian bishops to the Asian Synod.

The reflection is contextual in two ways. One is Phan's own experience of the Church in Vietnam: popular devotion to Mary in the context of the feminine divine mercy figure in the Buddhist tradition (Kwan-Yin), the history of the controversy on the Chinese Rites with reference to the veneration of ancestors, and the comparative theology of Alexandre de Rhodes. Second, this local context is complemented by the documents of the Federation of Asian Bishops' Conferences.

The idea of dialogue emerges as the key theme: dialogue as the very way of mission when Christianity recognizes other religions as facilitators of salvific divine-human encounter; the activity of mission itself as a threefold dialogue of the gospel with the poor, the cultures, and the religions of Asia; and, finally, the dialogue with the religions taking four different forms: of life, of spiritual experience, of intellectual exchange, and of common action for liberation. Dialogue involves the crossing of borders. For instance, P. remarks how the practice of the veneration of ancestors, incorporated today in the Christian liturgy, honors also ancestors belonging to other religions.

The volume is a good introduction to emerging Asian theology.

MICHAEL AMALADASS, S.J.
Institute of Dialogue with Cultures and Religions, Chennai, India


The extent to which classical Christian texts can be mined on behalf of women has been an important question for contemporary feminist theology and ethics. DeCrane's careful study shows not only that a feminist-liberationist retrieval of Aquinas's principle of the common good is possible but that a critical principle of the common good can offer a new perspective on persistent problems at the intersection of gender, race, and access to health care in the U.S.
Drawing on the work of Sandra Schneiders, Rosemary Radford Ruether, and Martha Nussbaum, D. proposes a five-step feminist hermeneutical method for assessing the usefulness of Aquinas’s formulation of the common good. Starting with women’s shared experience of suffering, informed by a rich account of the requirements for human flourishing, D. moves through a “prophetic and liberating” reconstruction of the text/tradition and finally to the development of strategies for practical, political action. She argues persuasively that we can look beyond Aquinas’s faulty anthropology—and thus his problematic conclusions about women’s status and social roles—to find valuable resources for articulating the demands of justice and for mediating the relationship between the good of individuals and the integrity of the community.

Especially important is Aquinas’s development of the virtue of prudence. If D. is correct, prudence not only functions to underscore the dynamic interplay between the pursuit of individual flourishing and the common good, as well as the need for ongoing assessment of the relationship between the ends to which the community is committed and choices concerning means, but as a “demand for redress.” Read in light of an option for the poor, prudence requires practical action to address the greater vulnerability of women to poverty and other conditions that threaten human flourishing.

The concluding chapter uses the current disparity in prognosis for White and Black women with breast cancer in the U.S. as a creative test case for illustrating the potential of a reconstructed principle of the common good. While D. highlights an important and often neglected issue in social and medical ethics, a different case would have proven better the book’s claims to provide principles that can be applied cross-culturally. Still, the work is a hopeful sign of what is possible when we are faithful both to present and past wisdom in discerning the requirements of justice.

MAURA A. RYAN
University of Notre Dame


The questions at stake here are both academic and practical. Does authentic Christianity teach or undermine male headship in family life? Is any form of male headship compatible with the Christian imperative to love one’s neighbor (including one’s spouse) as oneself? Or must male headship, even “soft patriarchy” which rejects servile roles for women, be discarded by Christians and supplanted by marriage based on “equal regard”? Is gender “complementarity,” a third alternative to male headship and equal regard, the most compelling framework for successful marriage?

The authors of the collection are diverse: men and women, conservative and progressive, Protestant and Catholic, specialists in theology and Scripture, social psychology, law, and public policy. Yet they agree that a key measure of success in marriage is overcoming the “male problematic,” the pattern of men who do not maintain ongoing emotional and practical support for their children and their children’s mothers. Contributors consider whether the plight of abandoned mothers and children is reason enough to promote a soft patriarchy that calls men to a distinctively male role as heads of households. Some, such as Robert Godfrey, contend that male headship is a scriptural idea that authentic Christians cannot fail to embrace. Others, like Maggie Gallagher, promote the idea that male headship is a matter of pragmatism, not principle; even feminists could tolerate endorsing men as heads of households as a small price to pay for men’s long-term investment in their families. Meanwhile, Don Browning and others insist that equal regard is the most authentically Christian model for marriage, and that this idea can best remedy the male problematic, assuming it is supported by comprehensive cultural and religious initiatives that make family stability a
centerpiece of political and economic policy.

The male problematic warrants sustained, nationwide attention beyond this brief volume. These essays can serve as a springboard for further dialogue and strategizing among the broad cross section of citizens who seek to stabilize fatherhood, and who are optimistic that Christian Scripture and tradition can be not simply part of the problem, but part of the solution.

FLORENCE CAFFREY BOURG
Academy of the Sacred Heart,
New Orleans


Dokecki provides a forensic of the sexual abuse crisis by giving us, in six chapters, a multilevel analysis of clergy sexual abuse starting with one fairly thick and detailed case, that of Edward J. McKeown, a former priest from Nashville. While chapter 1 is a compelling exposé of the manipulative and coercive power exercised throughout the McKeown case, chapter 2 allows D. to extend his claims to other cases and dioceses, notably Boston. Having taught professional ethics, D. proposes then his “ethics of human development and community” that promotes such values as caring and truth-telling but also seeks to correlate professional formation with human flourishing. I hoped this chapter would be the most successful; I was looking for how professional ethics functions in a clerical, hierarchical Church. D. did not deliver, however, because he seemed more interested in arguing the utility of his particular model of development and so delved more into the theoretical, in-house differences among the models rather than focusing on the actual issues of what would constitute ecclesial professional ethics.

Chapter 4 on “human science perspectives” is the most engaging. It offers first a veritable potpourri of issues—for example, authority versus authoritarianism—but then studies types of institutional structures that promote or inhibit sexual abuse. These institutional insights along with the analysis of power issues from chapters 1 and 2 allow him next to explore the theological material relevant for ecclesiological reform. That in turn lets him close with a heuristic on reforms of parishes, dioceses, national churches, and finally the universal Church. All in all a very organic, accomplished work.

JAMES F. KEENAN, S.J.
Boston College


Fischer clearly recognizes a problem: people today want to believe in an afterlife, but they are unable to relate to images of that life that have previously sustained their hopes, whether from the Scriptures, creeds, or such popular notions as the “gates of heaven” or the “fires of hell.” The need is evident, she claims, to transpose the classical last things into contemporary categories. In at least one respect she is correct: heaven, hell, and purgatory have to begin even now in our lives (she is less successful in making her case regarding resurrection). The Mystery, as she calls it, needs intimations within everyday experiences.

Thus, in metaphorical settings from our world, she finds the soul’s immortality in an uncanny sense of knowing (there is more than we can see). Resurrection is a butterfly-like metamorphosis as already found in nature, rather than the transformation stories of Jesus’ Resurrection as portrayed in the Scriptures. The resurrected body can employ Paul’s seed metaphor (1 Cor 15:35-44) to give us a sense of continuity; what emerges is a groping, like Paul’s, to express our future connectedness. Life in heaven needs a kind of awareness on this side that signals a transition to another state of consciousness, much like enlightenment descriptions in Buddhism or Hinduism. Hell, however, is difficult to imagine now as everlasting in light of a loving God; it is for this reason
that purgatory assumes attractive proportions, as a possible transforming encounter with divine Love. There is even something appealing about reincarnation: hope that we can correct our mistakes and get it better each time around. In a word—paraphrasing one chapter title—earth is crammed with the last things.

Certainly the last things need relevance for our world. My only question is whether it can be done with earthly metaphors. Even the term "afterlife" fails to give a hint of the newness of eternal life, where there is no trace of any "after." Perhaps F.'s problem may lay in the failure to grasp the nature of the evidence of the last things: earthly metaphors must give way to a grammar of faith.

J. M. DITTBERNER
Saint Paul Seminary, Minn.


Sanneh engages a range of issues pertaining to the interface between faith and culture in an African context but with implications for Christianity in other contexts.

In 1978, Karl Rahner spoke of a new epoch in the history of Christianity—the emergence of a world Church, or post-European-centered Christianity. However, in other writings, Rahner muses on the future of Christianity as a minority community in the world. S.'s thesis corroborates Rahner's recognition of the emergence of a post-Western-world Christianity, but in contrast to Rahner's speculations on the future of Christianity, S. is more optimistic, recognizing the continued expansion of Christianity in the developing world.

The current climate of tolerance and pluralism and the heightened awareness of Christianity's fraught colonial past have contributed to the neglect of the data of continued Christian expansion as well as to the indigenous roots of this expansion. Christianity has declined in the West, but has continued to grow in the non-Western world, and S. is encouraged by this trend. He even suggests how China may be poised to embrace Christianity in the main.

S. distinguishes world Christianity from global Christianity. The former differs from the latter in that it has "nothing of the global structures of power and economics" of global Christianity (78). World Christianity is grass roots, emerging from various local indigenous contexts that translate the Christian message into the "mother tongue." In fact, S. argues that Christianity is a religion that, from its inception, lends itself to the language of its followers rather than of its founder. This fact sets the precedent for Christianity to continue translating the Bible into the vernacular of all cultures where it is implanted. It follows that Bible translation should incorporate the indigenous names for God.

The missionary propaganda of the colonial age of Christian expansionism has been replaced by a secular propaganda that is hostile to the idea of Christianity growing in the developing world. However, S. recognizes the possibility of a mutual dialogue between world Christianity and the post-Christian West, especially with respect to democratic principles and the preferential option for the poor.

JOHN DADOSKY
Regis College, Toronto


With few exceptions, the essays collected here deliver on the promise of their title. They are sound essays on vexing Catholic issues, composed to help practicing and thinking Catholics, clerical and lay, resolve puzzles and discover a bigger picture. The bigger picture is the encounter of Catholicity and culture in the West.

The book, autobiographical in flavor, treats issues in the Irish-Catholic subculture in the British Isles. Many of its elements are there, and whichever are not can be supplied from literature or memory: the shared poverty; the sense
of inferiority; the communal emancipation of the unsubtle kind, administered by tough brothers, sisters, and priests running tight ships; the reassuring charity of nuns; the sense of “having it right” in the teeth of easier-going non-Catholics and their married partners: the Anglicans—high to low—and the “chapel people,” some dour, some kindly; the bastions, Benedictine, Dominican, and Jesuit, polished but distant, and their feminine counterparts: Sacred Heart “Madams” and other ladylike nuns; and most of all, the common fervors: the Blessed Virgin, the Mass, the sacraments, the christenings, weddings, bereavements, and wakes.

Duffy is part of the harvest of the past half-century’s Catholic emancipation. He has a right to speak and enjoys it. More importantly, the book’s subtitle is an understatement. How so?

Aidan Nichols, expert in doctrinal development, writes in the Tablet (October 23, 2004): “What this book and its vision are missing is an adequate sense of doctrine and its place in the Church.” Yet does what Nichols finds wanting exist? Must it not, in Wittgenstein’s idiom, be “shown” rather than claimed as extant, defined, true? D.’s book is a modest sample of a Catholic project barely begun: global Catholicity. Introducing Nostra aetate in the first English translation of Vatican II, John Courtney Murray wrote: “The notion of development [of doctrine], not the notion of religious freedom, was the real sticking point.... But the Council formally sanctioned the validity of the development itself; and this was a doctrinal event of high importance for theological thought in many other areas.”

Projects like Martin Marty’s “fundamentalism project” and John McGuckin’s fairly recent “intellectual biography” of Gregory Nazianzen are beginnings. How has Catholic tradition happened? D.’s book “shows” the urgency of the question.

FRANS JOZEF VAN BEECK, S.J.
Loyola University, Chicago


The title of this book will remind readers of Langdon Gilkey’s classic, Catholicism Confronts Modernity (1975). While that volume dealt with the critical challenges to Catholicism stemming from the Enlightenment, Woods’s book concerns itself with a narrow slice of church history, the Catholic theoretical response to the American Progressive era. Although the work is an expanded doctoral dissertation, it moves briskly and gracefully through the thorny issues confronting the Church during the first two decades of the 20th century. W.’s thesis is that Progressive intellectualism in American society was often at antipodes with Catholic self-understanding. Catholic thinkers, however, did not simply reject Progressive ideology out of hand; instead, they selectively appropriated fundamental themes, carefully weaving them into a larger, recognizably Christian, tapestry.

Given the contemporary influence of neoprاغmatic philosophers such as Habermas, theologians will find the chapter on pragmatic philosophy to be particularly interesting, especially the Catholic response to the work of Progressive thinkers William James and John Dewey. James, for example, insisted that pragmatism was inexorably anti-dogmatic, even calling his method “philosophic Protestantism.” Catholic respondents of the time, generally committed anti-modernists, resisted the pragmatic distaste for first principles and natural law arguments while recognizing that James himself sought to justify the legitimacy of religious experience to a skeptical academic community. W. then proceeds to examine deftly the Progressive program, and the Catholic riposte, across the disciplines of sociology, education, economics, and ethics.

The argument of the book’s epilogue, not very convincing, is the well-known claim that the sense of uniqueness that prevailed among Catholics in the Progressive era, and before Vatican II generally, was effectively dismantled by the council. In fact, W.’s exegesis of the
council is quite brief and undeveloped, so it is difficult to rest his "dissolution" thesis, itself a questionable hypothesis, on the council alone. Despite this weakness, the book is an effective and detailed examination of Catholic intellectual life during a little-studied period.

THOMAS G. GUARINO
Seton Hall University, South Orange, N.J.

SO WAHR MIR GOTT HELFE! By Reiner Preul. Darmstadt, Germany: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, February 2003. Pp. 208. €19.90. Reiner Preul, professor of practical theology at the University of Kiel, has written eight books since 1969 and over 85 articles. Unfortunately for the English reader they are all in German. He is a respected member of the Lutheran theological community of Germany (Evangelische Kirche) and beyond. He was one of the 247 Lutheran scholars who publicly objected to the 1999 Joint Declaration on the Doctrine of Justification between the Roman Catholic Church and the Lutheran Church. He follows not only Luther but also Schleiermacher. True to these theological roots declaring an absolute dependence on God, P. is very concerned about the individualization and privatization of religion in the modern world so much so that religion is compartmentalized out of the rest of our life.

This concern about individualization and privatization is not simply a general concern. It is spelled out clearly in the book under review from chapter one, which critiques our religionless society, through the subsequent five chapters that examine the marketplace, the society of young persons, and other religious traditions, with subsections devoted to the new age movements and civil religion. For anyone interested in how "sola fide, sola scriptura, sola gratia" can be lived out today according to a believing Lutheran theologian, this book is an excellent source. P. does not confine himself to German sources but uses the sociology of religion of Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann as well as the ethics of John Rawls.

When you "Google" his name, "Reiner Preul," the helpful translation from the German of material provided renders his name as "purely Preul." I suspect this book is just that—purely Preul's thought. I hope the book gets translated into English. We can all benefit from it.

GAILE M. POHLHAUS
Villanova University, Penn.

THE FRACTURE OF GOOD ORDER: CHRISTIAN ANTILIBERALISM AND THE CHALLENGE TO AMERICAN POLITICS. By Jason C. Bivins. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina, 2003. Pp. x + 218. $45; $18.95. Bivins focuses on three religious movements that are not usually grouped together and have largely escaped notice in recent discussions of the public role of religion. He studies the evangelical politics of the Sojourners Community in Washington, D.C., a struggle over public education led by the new Christian right in West Virginia, and the protest movement led by Philip Berrigan, Elizabeth McAlister, and Daniel Berrigan. These movements exemplify what B. calls "Christian antiliberalism," an approach to politics that finds the orderly, neutral procedures of liberal democracy unresponsive to the radical requirements of Christian faith.

For all the differences among these groups, B. finds that they share four characteristics that set them and similar movements off from the rest of American religious life. (1) They are all "politically illegible." Standard definitions of left and right or liberal and conservative that we use to "read" political agendas in the U.S. do not seem to apply to them. (2) Their politics has a "sacred register." It is a deeply felt part of their identity, associated with their religious faith and not just a political interest. (3) They engage in various forms of ritual protest. (4) They maintain a Christian koinonia that sets them apart from more familiar voluntary organizations.

B.'s identification of Christian antiliberalism could use some further theoretical refinement. It is not clear what kind of thing these four identifiers are, or
that they are all subject to the same kind of investigation. B. refers to them variously as "qualities," "categories," "features," or "practices." Whether thoughtful observers could come to consensus on which groups qualify as Christian antiliberals by these criteria and whether they could be put to use by other authors remains to be seen.

Nevertheless, it seems intuitively correct to say that there is a phenomenon here that has not received enough attention from scholars of religion, and even less from scholars of politics. Christian antiliberals, as B. observes them, are often radically democratic in their principles, and it is important to ask whether and how liberal democracy can accommodate this other kind of democratic identity.

ROBIN W. LOVIN
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Ably translated by Davenport, Chrétien’s monograph is a new entry in the controversy over "the religious turn" in recent French phenomenology. Siding with the radicals, who want to expand phenomenology by incorporating the data of revelation, C. develops a phenomenology of speech that draws broadly from theological and mystical categories. Using Saint Paul’s vocation as a model, C. studies human speech in terms of the divine call and response that creates each human being as existent and agent.

Subsequent meditations explore the nature of this human voice. Scriptural epiphanies, such as the gift of the divine law on Sinai, present the paradox of a voice become visible that inaugurates acts of justice in the human agent. Another type of voice, the silent interior voice, questionably identified by modern philosophers as the voice of conscience, manifests itself as an irreducible chorus of voices, involved from its origin in the work of translation and transformation. Citing the mystical theology of Saint John of the Cross, the closing meditation studies how the deepest utterances and silences of the human voice regarding God constitute a type of touch.

Like C.’s earlier works, this one uses a lyrical rhetoric of paradox, spiritual exegesis, and artistic references to evoke rather than analyze the object of his reflections. For radicals in the phenomenological civil war, this robustly theological lyricism constitutes a laudable enrichment of a philosophical tradition; for minimalists, it marks the abandonment of a rigorous, secular method for unverifiable effusions of piety. In his careful attention to the status of the senses in the constitution of the human voice as speaking and acting, C. extends current phenomenological explorations of human corporeity. In its evocation of the human person as created by a call that defies human comprehension and mastery, the treatise sketches a negative anthropology to complement the negative theology that has become a standard category in the radical Christian wing of the phenomenological tribe.

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BOOKS RECEIVED

SCRIPTURAL STUDIES
Callahan, Allen Dwight. A Love Supreme: