Emphasizing the plural, “theologies,” Gerstenberger aims to study the multiple testimonies about God across the vast and diverse traditions represented in the Old Testament. In the introduction, G. echoes the program of Walter Eichrodt from years ago. Arguing that any Old Testament theology must be studied in conjunction with the historical and social context in which it was developed, expressed, and preserved, G. proceeds to draft a deeply contextualized program. The overarching framework of his study manifests this conviction. After an initial discussion in chapter 2 of our own contextual conditions that limit our grasp of the biblical witness, G. explores the five major social formations or stages—family and clan, village and small town, tribal alliances, monarchic state, and the confessional and parochial communities—across which Israel develops. In keeping with his often recited conviction that all theological statements, both those of the Old Testament and our own, are conditioned by time and space, the discussion across chapters 3 to 8 provides thickly sketched social-historical portraits of each of these developments in biblical Israel. Methodologically, for his data, G. draws heavily upon archeological research, ancient Near Eastern inscriptions, and the biblical texts themselves. Out of the reconstructions from his data, G. claims to illuminate the contextualized theological testimonies.

However, unlike Eichrodt and others after him, G.’s historical study does not seek to illuminate the deeper meaning of the religious thought-world as the subject of theology. Rather, in this excavatory work, he identifies religious practices, defines cultic observances, and tallies the various names and notions about gods that are derivative of each stage in Israel’s social evolution. Here religion is elucidated primarily as a sociocultural phenomenon of each historically embedded time period. Moreover, his observations about religion are disproportionately slight compared to the preponderance of material generated on the internal framework of institutions, interpersonal relations, authority dynamics, resource distribution, customs, priorities, taboos, and characteristic values for the five social formations noted above. Though G. addresses the ethical observances of each social framework, his analysis discloses that even ethics was rooted in or was at the service of maintaining a particular social network rather than necessarily related to theology, as he claims.

As a follow-up to this extended discussion of the social formation of Israel, chapter 9 reflects on the shift in conceptualization of God across the aforementioned five formations or stages. It explores how the transitions from tribal society to statehood and from agrarian communities to urban
settlement coincided with and influenced the development from polytheism, through syncretism, to the eventual claim of the oneness of God and exclusive worship of Yahweh at the beginning of the sixth century. Thus, two-thirds of G.’s study reads as a social history of biblical Israel with specific attention to its religious developments.

At this point, one can legitimately question whether the rubric “theologies” adequately captures what is presented here. Throughout the investigation, G. insists that the objective of studying the Old Testament’s testimonies resides somewhere in the interaction between two horizons. In the engagement of the theologies of biblical Israel and those of our own time, the Old Testament becomes “our dialogue partner in the most difficult questions of life and faith” (17).

Having outlined the theological concepts embedded in the sociohistorical context of Israel, G. turns in chapter 10 to elaborating what contemporary thinkers bring to this discussion. In broad outline he discusses factors that condition our belief and affect our faith articulation—topics such as autonomous human being, anthropology, relativism, globalization, and pluralism. But the expected conversation between the spaciotemporal embedded beliefs of the Old Testament and those of our era remains only a proposal. G. never undertakes an actual engagement of the two. Though he makes clear that his “aim is to attempt a conversation” (18), it never occurs. The religious characteristics of the ancient Israel and of our own era remain only juxtapositioned in separate chapters. In fact, in one instance, G. even says that “I can only hint at some point at which discussion with the Old Testament is rewarding” (297).

Those who assume Old Testament theology to be a history of religion or a history of god(s) will welcome and be richly rewarded by the dense historical sociological analysis that G. musters. However, those seeking an exchange between contemporary faith and the religious testimonies of biblical Israel as the objective of an Old Testament theology will have to look elsewhere.

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Gina Hens-Piazza


Modern scholarship of biblical monotheism has generally focused on the history of the concept that there is only one God. There is a widespread agreement among scholars that Israel only decisively rejected polytheism from the exilic period onwards (see R. Gnuse, No Other Gods, 1997). Hence the underlying model is a lengthy process of development and refinement, whereby “monotheism” is frequently perceived as a superior understanding of God and the world over the alleged pre-exilic polytheistic cosmology.
In this study MacDonald is not primarily concerned with the history behind the concept of “monotheism.” Rather, he sets out to assess the appropriateness, usefulness, and accuracy of the concept of “monotheism” in relation to the biblical witness as found in the Hebrew text of Deuteronomy. More specifically, he looks at the meaning and significance of YHWH’s oneness as it is presented in the chapters framing the deuteronomistic law code. Thereby he provides a thorough theological exposition of a seminal biblical tradition and examines it in relation to the contemporary category of “monotheism.”

In the first chapter M. traces the term “monotheism” back to the Enlightenment (Henry More, 1614–1687) and raises important questions regarding its truthful reflection of the biblical text. The following five chapters examine the theme of YHWH’s oneness in Deuteronomy. M. uses the Shema (Deut 6:4–9), Israel’s prime confession of exclusive covenant loyalty, as the organizing structure of his work.

M. brings his exegetical results into illuminating comparison with the widespread modern understandings of “monotheism.” He argues that many of the modern descriptions of Israel’s “monotheism” reflect more Enlightenment ideals and ideas of God than the biblical portrait of God’s oneness. In fact, according to M., nowhere does Deuteronomy present a doctrine of God that may be described as “monotheistic,” at least not in the sense in which the term is usually used (a metaphysical concept that there is only one God, while other deities are mystical figments of the imagination). Deuteronomy does not deny the existence of other gods. In fact, as M. points out, the demand to show exclusive loyalty to YHWH depends on the common recognition that other gods exist. Because YHWH is God of gods and Lord of lords (Deut 10:17; see Ex 15:11), Israel is called to love, obey, and worship him. This claim to uniqueness is not based on creation, or because YHWH, the high God, distributes the earth among other gods (Deut 32:8), but primarily because of YHWH’s faithful, merciful, and righteous acts towards Israel (see Ex 20:2–3). M. speaks of a soteriological claim rather than an ontological one (215).

What then may we say about the term “monotheism” as a structuring category? M.’s rigorous study prompts us to reconsider the appropriateness and accuracy of this time-honored term that is often taken for granted among biblical scholars. M. appeals to biblical scholarship to work on more useful biblical categories to describe the dynamics between God and God’s people. Thereby he suggests a closer focus on the acts of God (i.e., the one who creates and saves) than on making ontological claims. Thus the dictum in Isaiah 4, “I am YHWH and besides me there is no savior” (see Hos 13:4), appears to be closer to the sense of the biblical text.

M.’s critique of “monotheism” is not novel. Several scholars have been expressing unease with the term as a description of Israelite or early Jewish belief. One can probably say, however, that M. offers us one of the most rigorous attempts to assess the usefulness of the term in relation to the biblical text as we find it in Deuteronomy. That said, there is clearly scope for more work to be done. M. poses himself the challenging question
whether what has been shown to be true of Deuteronomy may also be true of the rest of the Old Testament, including the priestly material and Isaiah 40–55” (209). He leaves these questions open and wishes for more detailed exegetical work in these areas.

I would have wished, however, for some broad reflections on the canonical relationship between the deuteronomistic witness and the priestly creation account (Gen 1–2:4), which appears, at least in its classic exposition, to stand in tension with M.’s findings. With regard to Deutero–Isaiah, obviously without being able to substantiate it in a book review, chapters 40–55 appear to be partially about YHWH’s incomparability in relation to other gods and seem thus to endorse M.’s suggestion (see Is 46:9). Since M. describes his approach as “canonical,” one could perhaps have also hoped for some general reflections on the implications of his findings for NT studies.

Nevertheless, M. deserves praise for tackling a topic that is not only at the very heart of biblical studies, but has potentially tremendous implications for Christian theology as well.

University of Durham

MICHAEL WIDMER


The honoree of this volume, Jan Lambrecht, has been at the heart of Catholic biblical studies for the past half-century—particularly as a member of the Flemish Faculty of Theology at the Katholieke Universiteit Leuven since its reorganization in 1969, Dean of that Faculty from 1985 until his retirement in 1990, and then as professor at the Pontifical Biblical Institute in Rome until 2001. His writings on the NT letters, Gospels, and Apocalypse have been extensive and significant; his impact on the world of biblical scholarship has been notable; and his influence on a large number of graduate students profound. In all of his works, Lambrecht has demonstrated reverent critical scholarship, rigorous exegetical craftsmanship, regard for the theological importance and pastoral implications of the biblical texts, and personal humility. This Festschrift of 27 articles by Leuven colleagues, former students, and international New Testament scholars carries on many of these same qualities.

The Festschrift focuses on issues having to do with “resurrection” in the New Testament (as its title forthrightly states), which has been a topic of major concern to the honoree himself. The 19 articles in English, six in German, and two in French are arranged in logical and canonical order, with seven on background and definitional issues, seven on the resurrection portrayals in the Gospels and Acts, ten on the resurrection of believers in the Pauline letters, two on resurrection in Petrine materials, and a con-
cluding one on artistic representations of Christ’s Resurrection in the Middle Ages. While the articles vary in quality and importance, the volume contains some exegetical gems and presents much that is provocative and challenging on particular passages.

Two background and definitional articles are especially helpful. One by Daniel J. Harrington on “afterlife expectations” in Pseudo-Philo, 4 Ezra, and 2 Baruch builds on the author’s 1969 Harvard dissertation; a judicious presentation of “what some Jews in Palestine around the time when the New Testament writings were being composed thought about life after death and related matters” (21) it highlights a number of “implications” for the understanding of cognate concepts in the New Testament. The essay by Gergely Juhász, professor of English Literature at Leuven, presents an interesting analysis of the 16th-century controversy between William Tyndale and George Joye on the meaning of “resurrection” in the New Testament: Does it refer solely to a future “bodily resurrection” (so Tyndale) or diversely, depending on context, sometimes to a conscious, immortal “intermediate state between death and resurrection” and sometimes to a future “bodily resurrection” (so Joye)? And though seeming to side with Joye, Juhász aptly points out that this controversy was widespread during the 16th century and continues to underlie every discussion of resurrection hope today.

Four of the articles on Paul are particularly significant and well done. Margaret Thrall’s, “Paul’s Understanding of Continuity between the Present Life and the Life of the Resurrection,” is (1) a linguistic analysis of the anthropological terms sōma, pneuma, esō anthrōpos, and egō, (2) an exegetical study of how Paul relates these terms in major passages to his teaching on the resurrection, and (3) a biblical-theological treatment of how Paul conceptualized personal continuity between the believer’s present life and his or her future resurrected life. Eduard Lohse’s article “Der Wandel der Christen im Zeichen der Auferstehung” argues briefly, though effectively, for the “indicative” of Romans 6:1–11 as the basis for the “imperative” of Romans 12–15. Morna Hooker in “Raised for Our Acquittal” (1) surveys the use of dikaiōsis and its cognates in Romans, (2) analyzes Romans 4:25 in the light of those other uses, and (3) concludes that Romans 4:25 is not just purely rhetorical, as some have proposed, but actually functions as a neat summary which fits in with Paul’s understanding of Christ as the one who became what we are in order that—in him—we might become what he is” (340). Thus, in effect, Hooker encapsulates what she has called in her earlier writings Paul’s concept of “interchange.” And Frank Matera, in “Apostolic Suffering and Resurrection Faith,” shows how structurally 2 Corinthians 4:7–5:10 is not just an intercalation or discrete unit of material that somehow has been inserted between Paul’s descriptions of his new covenant ministry in 2:14–4:6 and his work of reconciliation in 5:11–21, but that this rather hotly debated passage actually “plays a crucial role in Paul’s defense of his apostolic ministry in 2:14–7:4 by encouraging the Corinthians to distinguish between appearance
and reality in light of Christ’s death and resurrection as reflected in Paul’s ministry” (405).

While the above-mentioned articles are the gems, much more in the book can profitably be mined by serious New Testament exegetes. The volume is a real tribute to its honoree and a substantial contribution to biblical scholarship.

Wycliffe College, University of Toronto Richard N. Longenecker (Emeritus)


Schimanowski has written a rather encyclopedic and detailed commentary on Revelation 4–5, the chapters presenting John the Seer’s vision of the celestial throne and attendant personnel. His chosen procedure is the 19th-century historical-critical and literary-critical type, currently still in vogue with the vast majority of scholarly commentators on Revelation. In line with this Received View model, he believes one can understand the significance of these chapters by situating John’s activity within a historical setting, by using philology and literary analysis, and by discovering and setting out parallels to what the author writes. As expected, the historical setting is Roman supremacy in Asia Minor, while philology and literary analysis provide meanings of central words, and the parallels derive for the most part from Israel’s Scriptures. S.’s distinctive contribution consists in setting out further parallels to the passage, notably from Israel’s “mystical” traditions, such as those in Qumran and especially in that category of Pharisaic scribal writings called Hekhalot literature. The subtitle of the volume underscores this perspective. S. is fully aware that the Hekhalot writings date from the second to the sixth centuries A.D., yet in his estimation, these writings provide the best sort of parallel for understanding what John the Seer experiences and describes.

The commentary is interspersed with a number of interesting excursuses. These brief essays deal with the history of religions background of the divine throne in Revelation; the history of the Trisagion of Isaiah 6 (which S. prefers to call Qedusha, although Revelation is a Greek document); the proskynesis (obeisance); the three qualities in divine acclamations: praise, honor, power; the tradition history of the biblion (small scroll) in apocalyptic texts; the background of the two Messianic titles (Rev 5:5): Lion of the tribe of Judah and root or shoot of the root of David; the victory motif; and finally, the origin and background of the axios acclamation.

S. avoids or ignores three useful avenues to the study of Revelation, that are likewise absent from the Received View. The first is social science
methods. The fact is, meanings derive from social systems. Hence the study of any word, such as *axios* (honor) without Mediterranean social system information can only lead to some Teutonic meanings, in this case outfitted with the late Hebrew passages of the Hekhalot writings. The second is first-century astronomy, to which S. makes brief allusion, even though the Seer tells his audience he is in the sky, and that the throne vision describes a celestial throne (at the stellar pole) with the first created constellation (the Lamb, Aries) and four living creatures at four corners facing each other and supporting the throne (Leo, Taurus, Scorpio, Thunderbird), with 24 Decans in attendance around the throne. The third absent avenue to studying John’s trance visions as well as those in the Hekhalot literature is that provided by the social psychological studies of altered states of consciousness. Each of these three approaches has a rather large “literature,” as the Germans would have it, that totally escapes the notice of the Received View. S. likewise makes no mention of recent commentaries on Revelation using this sort of information.

As a result, S. has authored a fine and quite thorough study of Revelation 4–5 that well fits the canons of the prevailing academic Received View. But the meanings he claims that the text imparts simply cannot be verified with the tools he employs. As with the Received View conclusions in question, one is always left with the impression that S.’s assessment of the extremely relevant meanings for contemporary theology in Revelation were available to him well before his study was attempted.

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**Bruce J. Malina**


Each year numerous books are published in Pauline studies, most covering such well-worn topics as the theology of Romans or the pastoral problems in Corinth. By comparison, Paul’s earliest letter, 1 Thessalonians, has suffered neglect. Like the Gospel of Mark, it was judged a good first attempt, but one lacking in rhetorical skill and theological sophistication. The advent of redaction criticism and, more recently, narrative criticism has led to a renewed appreciation of the literary skills and theological insights of the second evangelist. In a comparable way, Donfried’s book guides the reader to a reevaluation of the historical and theological worth of 1 Thessalonians.

The book is actually a collection of 15 articles, most of them previously published. They vary in scope: some examine methodological and theological issues, others are detailed exegetical studies. In a helpful introduction D. states the thesis of each chapter as well as its connection to other chapters. As a collection, one finds some disjointedness and repetition, but the introduction provides a good road map to the work’s unity of purpose and methodology.
I will focus on three main areas that run through a number of the chapters, without being able to do full justice to the exegetical precision and theological insights that abound. These areas are (1) Paul within his Jewish context, (2) 1 Thessalonians in its Greco-Roman context, and (3) key theological issues in Pauline studies.

D. rightly argues that Paul must be studied within his Jewish context. Indeed, he speaks of a paradigm shift away from interpreting Paul strictly within a Greco-Roman context to a new appreciation of Paul the Jew in dialogue with the multifaceted Judaism of his day. This shift leads to a new appreciation of 1 Thessalonians. After arguing for an early dating (early 40s), D. claims that this letter gives us a portrait of the “early Paul,” one that aligns better with early Judaism and the Paul of Acts than with the “later Paul” of Romans. The early dating also provides more time for Paul’s theological development than does the current consensus that dates the letter to the early 50s.

D. notes some intriguing connections between the thought and language of Paul the Pharisee and the Essene writings found at Qumran. Both the Essenes and the early Paul of 1 Thessalonians use the language of “election,” speak of a call to “holiness,” and designate themselves as the “Assembly of God.” D. suggests that Paul could have been exposed to the teachings of at least one branch of Essenes when he studied in Jerusalem as a Pharisee, and this “dialogue” might have influenced his language and theological development.

D. does not neglect the Greco-Roman context. In his chapter on the “Cult of the Thessalonians,” he proposes the thesis that a reconstruction of the religious and political history of Thessalonica must be the starting point for the letter’s interpretation. After surveying the archeological evidence for a cult of Dionysus in Thessalonica, he makes a tentative suggestion for the proper translation of skeuos (4:4, NRSV “body,” NAB, RSV “wife”). He asks “whether this emphasis on the phallus and sensuality [in the Dionysian cult] offers a possible background” (24) and notes the influence of his view on the NRSV’s translation (xx).

D. moves beyond 1 Thessalonians to study such key theological issues as “kingdom” in Paul and the relationship between justification and last judgment. His careful study of the kingdom language leads D. to argue that Paul is in continuity with Jesus in viewing the kingdom as both present and future. He begins his study on the relationship between justification and last judgment by noting how this issue has been a source of division among Christians. His thesis is that justification is a gift of God, but a gift that demands a response, the “obedience of faith” (Rom 1:5). Justification is the beginning of Christian life, actualized in sanctification and consummated with salvation. The criterion of the last judgment is “whether someone has held fast and remained obedient to their new life in Christ” (268).

This collection of important articles raises historical and theological issues that will continue to be debated. Through close attention to the original text and critical use of both archeology and Acts, D. challenges the interpreter to read 1 Thessalonians with a deeper appreciation for its his-
torical context and theological depth. Each of these articles is thought provoking and clearly argued, even if at times one disagrees with D.’s conclusions.

Washington Theological Union, Washington  JAMES P. SCULLION, O.F.M.


The sites of Khirbet Qumran and ’Ain Feshkha, near the caves in which the Dead Sea Scrolls were discovered, were excavated by Roland de Vaux, O.P., archeologist of the École Biblique, in 1951, 1953–1956, and 1958. He wrote yearly preliminary reports on the excavations in the Revue biblique and published a general overview of the archeology of Qumran in the Schweich Lectures, originally in French (1961) and in a revised English version, Archaeology and the Dead Sea Scrolls (1973). Unfortunately, de Vaux died in 1971 without having published the full reports of his excavations. The present archeologist of the École Biblique, J.-B. Humbert, together with A. Chambon, finally brought out a volume of de Vaux’s field notes and photographs, Fouilles de Khirbet Qumrán et de Aín Feshkha (1994).

Jodi Magness, professor at the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, is an archeologist who has worked in Israel and Greece. In this book she presents a new interpretation of the excavations, “which combines all of the available (published) archaeological evidence and the information provided by the scrolls and our ancient historical sources” (16). She adds that she was permitted by Humbert in 1991 to inspect the Qumran pottery stored in the Rockefeller Museum in Jerusalem, which still has to be studied in detail in a future volume of Fouilles. Her new interpretation, admittedly tentative, is well presented in a very readable fashion and accompanied by enough details from Qumran scrolls to give the ordinary reader an adequate account of how archeological evidence assists in the understanding of many of the texts that have been retrieved.

Two aspects of M.’s interpretation are important. First, whereas de Vaux considered the excavated Khirbet Qumran to be the remains of a sectarian settlement, the community center of Essene Jews whose scrolls were found in the caves, several scholars in the 1980s and 1990s disagreed with his understanding of the site and interpreted it otherwise: as a villa rustica (R. and P. Donceel [1991]), a manor house like contemporary Roman agricultural estates (Y. Hirschfeld [1998]), a commercial entrepot (A. D. Crown and L. Cansdale [1994]), and even as a fortress having nothing to do with the scrolls (N. Golb [1985]). Now M. rightly disposes of these revisionist interpretations and insists that the objections raised by de Vaux’s critics have not obscured the fact that “his interpretation of the site is basically correct” (16).
Second, M. differs with de Vaux’s interpretation of the phases of occupation of the site. De Vaux distinguished four periods: Ia (130–100 B.C.), Ib (100–31 B.C., which ended when Kh. Qumran was damaged by fire and an earthquake recorded by Josephus, after which the site was abandoned for about 30 years), II (4–1 B.C.–A.D. 68, when the site was reconstructed but finally razed by the Romans on their way to the siege of Jerusalem), and III (A.D. 68–73/74, when the site was occupied by a few Roman soldiers). Now, however, M.’s study of the archeological evidence reveals that the site was not occupied in the second century B.C. but became a sectarian settlement sometime between 100 and 50 B.C. This means that Period Ia did not exist, that Period Ib has to be subdivided into pre-31 B.C. and post-31 B.C. phases, that the site was not abandoned for 30 years, but reconstructed after the earthquake, that it was burned sometime around 9/8 B.C., and that Period II began shortly thereafter, perhaps 4–1 B.C. A cache of Tyrian coins dated ca. 9/8 B.C. suggests this terminus post quem. This reinterpretation of the phases of occupation of Kh. Qumran is acceptable, because it eliminates some of the problems that other students of the scrolls and Qumran archeology have often had with de Vaux’s interpretation. Moreover, it fits in well with other recent evidence brought forth for the dating of the scrolls, especially with Michael Wise’s dating of the time of the Teacher of Righteousness mentioned in some scrolls (Journal of Biblical Literature 122 [2003] 53–87).

There are many other good discussions in the book—on common meals, toilets, miqva’ot (ritual baths), women, Qumran cemetery, temple tax—which shed new light on problematic scroll-texts. The book has 36 pages of illustrations enhancing its excellent commentary. Unfortunately, however, M. repeats the erroneous information that “all of the scrolls that were still unpublished in 1991 have since been published” (3). Still awaited are at least two more volumes of Oxford University Press’s series, Discoveries in the Judaean Desert.

*Catholic University of America, Washington*  
Joseph A. Fitzmyer, S.J.

**The Spirit of Early Christian Thought: Seeking the Face of God.**  

Wilken, a foremost scholar of the early Church, presents to the general public a thoroughly persuasive case for a clear thesis. He asserts that the Christian intellectual tradition of the first eight centuries takes its inspiration, categories, terms, and chief challenges mainly from God’s self-revelation in historical persons and events attested by the Bible, celebrated and made present in the liturgy, and echoed in the Church’s way of life. With copious examples, W. accurately and convincingly argues that the early Church’s approach to its most characteristic issues is historical, biblical, and incarnate, not just timeless, philosophical, and spiritual. He shows
that the thinking of the early Church engaged a concrete love for persons coming to meet us more than the search for an abstract knowledge of principles inertly awaiting discovery. He notes that this approach was built on faith’s self-investment and life-changing participation in the known, not on the value-neutral objectivity of detached reason.

Such contrasts reveal an apologetic intent. Against Harnack’s thesis of the Hellenization of Christian thought, W. effectively presents the attraction of early Christianity as an alternative to certain aspects of classical Greco-Roman culture. His deep acquaintance with a vast array of early church authors helps him manifest clearly how the early Christian intellectual tradition made several original and significant contributions to the transformation of Greco-Roman thought, even while drinking deeply from that very source. His treatments of Trinity, Christology, and likeness to God demonstrate this transformation particularly well. At the same time, W. often paints early Christian thought in colors brighter than those he chooses for some current trends in Western intellectual life, to which he seems to compare it implicitly. His comments on the importance of prayer and faithfulness in early Christian theology, over against the originality prized today, exemplify such an implicit comparison (27).

W.’s enthusiasm for early Christian thought is not, however, uncritical. In Chapter 5, we find forthright references to the disedifying aspects of the Christological controversies, as well as an admission of the limits in the Christologies of Athanasius, Gregory of Nazianzus, and Chalcedon. W. notes that Ambrose did not entirely succeed in his attempt to adapt the Roman moral tradition to Christianity (281), and he indicates the difficulty that Clement of Alexandria and Evagrius had integrating Stoic *apatheia* with the Christian love commandment (296).

Some of the attractiveness of W.’s demonstration comes from the complete fit between his style and that of early Christian thought. Aided by a story from his own life, he points out that the martyrs of the early acts “always speak in the first person” (181–82). His passionate attunement to the human depths of his subject matter gives the impression that, just like the authors he discusses, he personally knows the realities of which he speaks. He narrates the histories of doctrinal disputes in their political and cultural context with enough detail to make the plot interesting. And he never distracts from the essential point of chapters on the distinctive approach of representative early Christian authors to some very basic life issues: the sources of our acquaintance with God (sacred history, liturgy, Bible); God’s character and action (Trinity, Christology, creation); faith’s role in the lives of individuals and in society; and the Christian impact on literature and art, morality and emotions. W.’s short, sometimes lapidary sentences and pithy chapter summaries should make the book accessible to undergraduates.

But the book sometimes leaves a false impression that could have been avoided. The Resurrection of Jesus does allow Christians to identify Wisdom “with events that had taken place in time and space” (95–96), but Sirach 24 had already equated Wisdom with the Law given on Sinai. Did...
Christianity really introduce into intellectual life the notion of faith as “the portal that leads to the knowledge of God” (165), when Jewish sages had already identified fear of the Lord with knowledge of God (Proverbs 2:5)? Also, the dating of Pentecost is problematic: since the late-fourth-century *Apostolic Constitutions* mentions the feast (5.20.4; 8.33.5), it would seem not to have emerged “only in the fifth century” (100).

Despite a few such difficulties and too many errors in spelling, syntax, and references, this work provides an effective, dependable, even inspiring introduction to early Christian theology for the educated reader. The manageable bibliographies for each chapter helpfully indicate the next steps for beginners, many of whom will probably find themselves eager to plunge more deeply into a subject so masterfully and attractively presented.

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JOSEPH G. MUELLER, S.J.


This is the introductory volume to the four-volume *Creeds and Confessions of Faith in the Christian Tradition* edited by Jaroslav Pelikan and Valerie Hotchkiss. The set (with CD ROM) presents more than 225 documents that have been the principal statements of faith of Christian churches from biblical times to the present and from many cultures. The collection supersedes the three-volume *Creeds of Christendom* (1877) by Philip Schaff that till now has been the authoritative English-language source for creedal study.

*Credo*, by the eminent church historian P., is a full discussion of the definition of creeds and confessions, their origins, authority, and history. This is the most sustained discussion of its kind, funded by P.’s lifetime work and immense learning.

Creeds and confessions are unavoidable. They emerge from Christian faith in believing communities. Believing and confessing have “always been correlatives” (37). Faith can mean knowledge, assent, and trust. There is “the faith which one believes [fides quae creditur]” and “the faith with which one believes [fides qua creditur]” (49). Both what is “confessed” and what is to be “believed,” according to the New Testament, is Jesus Christ, the content of Christian confession (59).

Christian doctrine, the teaching of the Church, is both a process and a content (67). Christian creeds and confessions are human expressions that seek to be faithful to the New Testament command to be “sound” and “orthodox” (77). Doctrine in all creeds and confessions have as their purpose to “promote, strengthen, and regulate, but also and first of all to
articulate” what Cardinal Newman called “the orthodoxy of the body of the faithful” in the Church (85).

These backgrounds launch P.’s development of the genesis of creeds and confessions. They arise from four factors: exegesis, prayer, polemics, and politics (125). P. treats each in a chapter as: “Scripture, Tradition, and Creed”; “The Rule of Prayer and the Rule of Faith”; “Formulas of Concord—And of Discord”; and “The Formation of Confessions and the Politics of Religion.” P. amply illustrates the human contexts in which creeds and confessions originate and grow. Those who approach the study of creeds for the first time as well as veteran scholars will find much of importance here.

Yet how do these expressions of belief and believing function as authorities? This is a recurring and crucial question, especially in the current context where “deeds” instead of “creeds” is a more natural proclivity. In some cases, creedal dogma functions as church law where orthodox teachings “must be enforced to be effective” (261). Confessional subscription means that legal compliance must be met.

A challenge to the authority of creeds and confessions has been the perception of a disjunction between moral codes and dogmatic creeds. P. strongly affirms an “inseparable bond between ‘deeds’ and ‘creeds’” (300) and that Christian love is the presupposition for Christian confession. He draws a parallel between deeds and creeds with the United Nations’ “Universal Declaration of Human Rights” (1948). The “Declaration” is the standard to which nations aspire, a shared “rule of faith,” and in this sense it functions as do creeds and confessions, even when ideals are imperfectly met (304).

Creedal documents are transmitted to other cultures. When they are, a new definition of authority for that culture must be constructed with “a myriad of decisions about its indigenization and inculturation” (311). The paradigm here is the line from the Deuteronomic Shema to the Homoousios of the early Church (330). As faith is transmitted and culturally embedded in new places, new forms of expression must emerge.

Part 4 of the volume considers the history of creeds and confessions. This is a historical and theological look at periods of the Church and the prominent standards to emerge in the early Church, Eastern Orthodoxy, the Medieval West, the Reformation era, and Modern Christianity. These periods correspond to the five-part division of subject matter in the four volumes of the set. These chapters are especially rich for a thorough discussion of the issues and contexts that gave rise to important documents in these periods. A comprehensive bibliography and indexes to the set conclude the volume.

One cannot speak too highly of the mass of information and precise discussion P. provides here. All students of creeds and confessions will find Credo an indispensable resource. The work is an achievement unlikely to be surpassed.

Westminster John Knox Press, Germantown, Tenn. DONALD K. MCKIM
Pranger offers a new but not always convincing approach to monastic texts, focusing on literary devices and tropes used by monastic writers, specifically Anselm of Canterbury. P. relates some of these devices and tropes to other medieval monastic authors such as Gregory the Great and Bernard of Clairvaux, but he then goes beyond them to authors well outside the monastic realm, such as André Malraux, James Joyce, and Charles de Gaulle (!). Into this happy mélange P. also puts nonmonastic religious writers such as Ignatius Loyola and Pierre de Bérulle. While such a wide range often provides perceptive insights, it detracts from the focus on medieval monks. P. clearly knew that, but I as a church historian found it disconcerting.

The title is intended to be provocative. Since the familiar meaning of artificiality is “fraudulent” or “phony,” P. knows the word will engender some interest, but the reader quickly finds out that the word is meant in the classical sense, a combination of ars and facio. P. first constructs what he understands to be the monastic Weltanschauung and then demonstrates how the monks used literary devices to express that in their writings.

P.’s superb insights appear early and often. He insists that “the combined forces of doctrinal theology and devotion . . . have denied literary historians, as indeed all lovers of literature, the benefit of appreciating monasticism as one of the constitutive elements of Western culture” (3). “The monastery . . . is purposely artificial. As such it is small and intense. The world . . . seen from the monastic viewpoint, belongs to the disuse area of weak structures and the insignificance of everything” (23).

Perhaps the insights of greatest value are those relating Anselm to his monastic environment. How often does one read books on Anselm that focus on his philosophical views and relate them to other thinkers but never to the Rule of Saint Benedict, by which Anselm lived his daily life? “In [the Proslogion Anselm] addressed a quintessentially monastic problem. . . . [Since] the monk’s full-time profession consists of evoking divine presence through ritual, prayer, and chant, how is it that God thus established cannot be seen? Living in inaccessible light, God apparently chooses to be aloof and remote” (97). P. takes the same approach to Cur Deus Homo?, contending that the theologians’ emphasis on its treatment of redemption causes the reader to miss the shape and argument of the book, which P. believes can only be understood in a monastic context. “Prayer and meditation have been rediscovered as the constitutive frame of his every reflection and argument” (177).

So far, so good. But caught up in this approach, P. emphasizes it too much. One can agree that scholars should understand the monastic concerns of Anselm—after all, monks made up his primary audience—but the main reason why we care about Proslogion and Cur Deus Homo? is their intellectual content. Many medieval monastic texts survive in justified ob-
scurity, even though we could learn as much about the monastic Weltanschauung from them as from Anselm.

When P. moves from Anselm to other writers, he is less surefooted, partly because he simply does not give them the depth of treatment that Anselm receives, but partly because he takes a method that works for Anselm and applies it to an ever-broadening canvas. Some analyses are insightful, such as the demonstration that baroque piety lost its natural locus, becoming instead just a vehicle to help the mind. On the other hand, some analyses are merely puzzling. In a treatment of Ignatius Loyola and John Calvin, titled “Text and Soul,” P. tells us: “Tough, dense, and effective [their writings—the Exercises for Ignatius] may be. What they conspicuously lack, however, is a soul of their own” (228). What is the reader to make of this? Why do the Exercises lack a soul? How did Ignatius fail to impart one to them? Do those who know and who have made the Exercises recognize this supposed barrenness?

The book is in many ways a fine study of monastic literature and monastic life. Readers will immediately recognize how right P. is when he compares the timelessness of the monastery to the vagaries of history occurring outside its door; and, with P., the reader will wonder how that dichotomy worked its way out in monastic literature. But I suspect that many readers will share my wish that, instead of trying to universalize his monastic-inspired theories, P. had written a more in-depth study of Anselm.


This lengthy volume is the first in a planned three-volume study of the “Augustinian platform,” the distinctive vision for faithfulness and reform that developed in the Order of Hermits of Saint Augustine (OESA) in the later Middle Ages and beyond. Six hefty chapters of main text are followed by five appendixes. Saak begins with the partnership between the OESA and the papacy that developed in the late 13th century during the struggle for preeminence between emperor and pope. This, S. argues, was a quid pro quo relationship on both sides. The papacy approved and supported the Augustinians (particularly in their struggles against the Augustinian Canons over the heritage—including the relics!—of their common name-sake), while Augustinians like Giles of Rome and Augustinus of Ancona provided the theoretical framework for a comprehensive Christian society under papal rule, that is, Christendom. S. leaves no doubt that he considers the “myth” of Christendom (largely an Augustinian creation) one of the most pernicious notions in Western history, in large measure, apparently, because a unitary society would be by definition intolerant. At the same
time that the OESA was developing its theory of papal absolutism, S. shows, it was also developing its own myth, using biographical studies of Augustine to create a seamless linkage between the order and its presumed founder. Members were socialized into an extended community that understood itself quite literally as the unified body—“one heart and soul in God”—through which their great head continued his work.

In his effort to tease out the OESA’s distinctive “platform,” S. for the most part eschews the works of great Augustinian thinkers like Giles, turning instead to one of its lesser known journeyman theologians, the lector Jordan of Quedlinburg. While Frater Jordanus was no original thinker, he was the author of the order’s influential Liber Vitasfratrum, a text widely used to introduce novices to Augustinian ideals and commitments, particularly in the order’s studia, schools for preachers and teachers. By means of this “pastoral theology” (Frömmigkeitslehre)—as opposed to the Scholastic theologies of the universities—the Augustinians formed their order’s own theology and spirituality, and shaped the faith of others. This occurred, S. argues, within the broader context of the “religionization” of late medieval Western Christianity, i.e., the application of the “religious” life (in the diverse forms provided by traditional monasticism, mendicancy, confraternities, etc.) to all Christians.

Having begun with the election of Giles as prior general of the OESA in 1292, S. concludes with Martin Luther’s decision in 1524 to cease wearing his Augustinian habit, years after he had been released from his vow of obedience. S. tries to shed light on the difficult question of the OESA’s significance for Luther’s theology by means of a retelling of the story of Luther’s initial investiture and later voluntary divestment as an Augustinian. A close reading of the painful correspondence between Luther and his superior, Johannes von Staupitz, forms the substance of this chapter (6). Here, in an even more significant sense, however, the book itself comes full circle, particularly in the connections it makes clear between S.’s work on the Augustinian order, and the work of his doctoral mentor, the late Heiko Oberman, on Martin Luther’s connections to the so-called schola moderna Augustiniana. (Appendix A helpfully includes an exhaustive history of research on Augustinianism in the later Middle Ages.) Oberman’s controversial attempt to show that Luther made his “reformation breakthrough” as a theologian working self-consciously in the tradition of Gregory of Rimini (via Gregorii) clearly forms the starting point for S.’s investigation of Luther, and perhaps of the Augustinian order as well. S.’s claims are more modest than Oberman’s, however, because he limits himself to solid textual evidence in the form of the Staupitz-Luther correspondence. More importantly for present purposes, these connections suggest that S.’s study of Augustinianism is driven at least in part by the interests of Reformation history.

S.’s study is a work of immense historical learning and essential reading for anyone interested in late medieval religion. It is also methodologically sophisticated, moving almost effortlessly from straightforward historical narrative, to social historical analysis, to the history of theology and back
again. S. also frequently connects his work to contemporary issues in church and academy in a manner that reveals his own convictions as a Christian historian. At times these digressions will probably distract some readers, but in the end S. should be commended for his decision to fly his colors and drop the historian’s traditional pretense of neutrality.

Marquette University, Milwaukee

Mickey L. Mattox


Simon’s Erlangen dissertation examines early Christian understandings of Christ’s once-for-all sacrifice making itself present in the symbolic action of eucharistic celebration. But the Platonic assumptions of this concept gave way in the Carolingian age, especially after Berengar (d. 1088), to insistence on consecratory words in the institution narrative. Western medieval missals separate the Preface from the Canon and develop the latter with intercessory prayers, with the effect of defining the sacrifice not from Christ’s death sacramentally present but from the Church’s and priest’s offering of Christ’s Body and Blood to the Father. Official doctrine did not formulate a late medieval conception of the Mass, although major theologians knew well there was no repeated offering of Calvary. More telling were the notions concretized in piety, for example, in compassionate pondering of Jesus’ passion seen allegorically in the priest’s vestments and gestures; in the benefits promised to those who look adoringly on the elevated Host; and in requiem Masses offered in ample number since the priest’s offering is surely of only limited value.

S. presents Luther’s alternate view of sacrifice in the Lord’s Supper, moving from the early lectures into major statements of 1518–21, with added reports on single works of 1525 and 1530. The account is dense, ample in argument with other scholars, and lucidly summarized at each point of transition.

Two major insights fuse in Luther’s constructive concept. First, in 1518 the pro hominibus constituitur in Hebrews 5:1 led to affirmations, then developed on Hebrews 7:1, 9:14, and 9:24, concerning God-for-us in Christ and on sacraments as addressing divinely sanctioned and consoling words to us for acceptance in justifying faith. Second, two works of 1520 (On Good Works and On the New Testament) worked out the meaning of the Mass from the words of institution, taken as Christ’s testamentary declaration of the inheritance for his heirs of what his Cross brings to us, that is, forgiveness of sin and eternal life. The institution narrative promises and grants to believers the gift then sealed by his Body and Blood offered to us. In another context Luther terms the words of institution the summa evangelii proclaiming here and now that Christ died for our salvation.

Luther’s trenchant criticisms of existing practice, especially in The Babylonian Captivity of the Church (1520), begin with rejection of a silent Latin
consecration, for one must hear and believe that Christ’s Body and Blood are given for us. Preparation for worthy Communion is not confession and penance, but avid hunger for the grace Christ conveys. Proper reception lies in most certain faith in the gift conveyed to us in the community of believers. As God’s coming to us in Christ, the Mass cannot be a good work toward God, for that would reverse the essential direction of the action. Since God comes to his people via the words and signs, Mass cannot be offered to benefit persons or souls not present to hear and believe. Finally, when believers offer sacrifice to God, this cannot be the Mass itself, which is God’s offering to them, but must lie beyond the sacrament, in the praise, thanks, and proclamation which concretize the “spiritual worship” of Romans 12:1.

Luther’s distinctive account of the Lord’s Supper applies normative scriptural texts on the Last Supper in a manner contrary to the tradition expressed in early Christian eucharistic anaphoras. The Supper is not the community’s action to memorialize God’s gift in Christ, as Zwingli held, for God in Christ is the active subject. Luther says little about Christ’s death as propitiatory sacrifice offered to the Father, but focuses on the descent of God in the Incarnation, Cross, and Supper to otherwise lost humans. This perspective leads to the heart of justifying faith, which is not active commitment, but trusting acceptance of a grace-filled, consoling word.

In four chapters, S. moves on to treat early Reformation receptions of Luther’s critical and constructive theology of sacrifice. A first phase unfolded in Luther’s absence in Wittenberg, led by Andreas Karlstadt, whom Luther opposed in his famous Invocavit sermons against coerced reform. But S. finds central principles of Luther’s concept largely understood and creatively applied in pamphlets of 1521–24, which attack “sacrifice” as an unbiblical notion of the sacrament of the Supper and call for a form of service that centrally announces to believers Christ’s testament of forgiveness.

S. presents a challenging Luther, who assimilated the eucharistic institution narrative to absolution from sin, and so featured receptive faith in this word to the point of marginalizing in eucharistic participation our being fed by Christ’s Body and Blood in Communion. The challenge to ecumenical dialogue is to ascertain a reconciled diversity between contemporary Lutheran receptions of this part of Luther’s legacy and the Catholic conception of Christ’s sacrifice operative in the Church’s celebration of Eucharist.

Gregorian University, Rome  

JARED WICKS, S.J.


Noting the historiographical tradition that either indicts or defends the Jesuits in Bohemia, Shore seeks to contribute a balanced work on the order’s role in the remaking of Czech culture after Bohemia’s defeat in
1620 at the hands of the Habsburgs. S. reflects an ambivalence about the role of the Jesuits who, he says, worked with the Habsburgs in “the imposition on the Bohemian peoples of a faith they had once rejected” [217]. The result is a nuanced portrayal of this group of men to whom was given the task of converting the people of Bohemia.

S. recognizes that after 1620 Bohemia’s ethos was replaced by Baroque Catholicism, backed up by Habsburg power. He begins by describing Bohemia’s bleak existence, in which peasants were abused by foreign aristocrats, the university of Prague became marginalized, Bohemia’s physical infrastructure was ignored, and its culture suppressed. He then devotes himself to the Jesuit schools and their role in Baroque religion and culture, and to the Jesuits’ work of conversions, their relationship to ethnic Bohemians and to Bohemia’s Jews, and to a description of some leading Jesuit intellectuals both before and after the order’s suppression in 1773. He points out that Bohemia’s re-Catholicization came at the hands of not only foreigners but that many of the prominent Jesuits were ethnic Czechs. Regardless of nationality, S. concludes, there was widespread hostility and resentment at the Society’s draconian repression of heresy.

S. describes how Baroque culture addressed and in many ways met the Czech people’s needs. Bohemian artists mixed the sensual with the mystic in the figure of the Infant Jesus, and combined hope with dread and fear in presenting miraculously preserved parts of saints’ bodies. The remodeled Bethlehem chapel of John Hus reminded Bohemians that the Roman Church was glorious, powerful, and triumphant over its enemies.

S. sees the Jesuits as living most fully among the people when they were making converts. Their “Letters to Rome” apparently report on these activities most fully, but he provides little descriptive detail from the reports. It would be interesting to learn what terms and ideas were expressed by the converts. Were the reports to Rome entirely formulaic? Even so, the formulaic expressions would be of interest. S. does provide details when the “Letters” discussed personal lives and issues like sex, incest, prostitution, and suicide, but he steers clear of any analysis or evaluation of the Jesuits’ interest in sex.

Prominent people of Prague participated spontaneously and with delight in public demonstrations of Baroque devotion, and the Marian cult resonated with folk culture, especially with the pre-Christian goddesses, Lada and Devana. S. is apparently unaware of how the Jesuits recruited the legendary White Lady of Czech folklore for the Counter Reformation.

S. illuminates well the Jesuits’ interest in female Jewish converts. The order set off the lone young, innocent, and vulnerable Jewess against the unreasonableness of Jews as a group, led by educated adult males. He concludes that the prejudice against Jews exhibited by Jesuits was strictly religious, not racial or cultural.

The Jesuits’ monopoly of the educational curriculum, which ignored Newtonian physics and modern languages, led in the end to a stultified system at the time of the order’s suppression. To nuance the Jesuits’ gen-
erally unenlightened approach to culture, S. briefly describes the contribution made by such Jesuits as Josef Stepling to mathematics, electricity, and astronomy, and Franciscus Zeno, the father of Czech geology.

S. expresses amazement at the lack of interest former Jesuit students had in the order after its restoration. Prominent Jesuits, such as Josef Jungmann († 1847) and Josef Dobrovsky († 1829), who had taken up secular studies after the suppression, showed no interest in the post-restoration order. The indifference of these bright recruits suggests that entering the order might have been primarily a career move into academia.

As a cornerstone to his work, S. introduces the Litterae annuae, the annual reports sent by the Bohemian Jesuits to Rome, as well as “an unedited manuscript” in the Strahov monastery. He describes these previously unexploited sources as extensive and detailed, but he does not entirely deliver. More descriptive detail would have served readers’ desire to know at least the kind of discourse used by the Jesuit reporters. Given current interest in understanding masculinity, for instance, it would be useful to learn how the Jesuit “men of Prague” understood themselves personally and their own maleness, if, indeed that was even an issue for them.

In sum, S. provides a readable and informative account of the religious, social, and intellectual life of the Jesuit order in Prague.

Trinity Western University, Langley, British Columbia    JOHN KLASSEN


Published on the tercentenary of Edwards’s birth, Marsden’s biography has enjoyed unusually enthusiastic acclaim from a broad range of critical reviews: “a magisterial synthesis”; “a masterpiece; “the best book ever written about America’s greatest theologian”; “the standard benchmark for generations to come”; “definitive biography of America’s Augustine.” M.’s careful scholarship, historical expertise, and theological convictions have all contributed to what surely will be an enduring classic. If Edwards can be called America’s Augustine, M. might be called Edwards’s Peter Brown.

The success of this new Life builds in part on M. and in part on the “generation of Edwards scholars who made this work possible” (v). M. is well known in the field of American religious history for a careful but creative scholarship that has generated new perspectives on contemporary issues as well as revisionist understandings of the past. The “generation of Edwards scholars” refers not only to The Works of Jonathan Edwards project at Yale University Press, now in its 23rd volume, but also to the “revolution in Edwards studies, especially during the past decade” (xvii).
The last full critical biography of Edwards won the Pulitzer Prize for Ola Winslow, but was published in 1940. Modern Edwards scholarship began in the 1950s, under the inspiration of Perry Miller, who also served as first general editor of the Yale Works, inaugurated in 1957. Since Miller’s time, Edwards has been “a major scholarly industry” (502), but Miller, like many of the early Edwards scholars, often took their subject out of his historical context and rarely understood his theological framework. Miller created a portrait of a “revolutionary intellectual prodigy . . . the romantic image of the lonely genius” (61). The “most influential historian of New England,” Miller also “let his creativity get the best of him” (60). In later years, but especially in the last decade, numerous scholars have brought a new balance and a carefully articulated theological depth to Edwards studies, providing the groundwork for M.’s work.

M. opens and closes his study by talking about his own aims, assumptions, and criteria. He hopes to bridge one of the obvious gaps in Edwards studies: the gap between students of American culture and students of theology. He sees himself working “most directly as a cultural historian,” but “always with an eye on the theological question, taking his thought seriously as part of the larger Christian tradition” (502). Indeed, one of the great achievements of this Life is its mastery in depicting the complexity of the social, political, and intellectual contexts, along with a penetrating study of theological concerns and the broader theological context not only of New England Puritanism, but of the international Reformed movement and its roots in patristic and medieval theology. M. explains his notion of historical scholarship as aiming not “simply to take things apart, to destroy myths” but also “to use history for the guidance it offers, learning from great figures in the past—both in their brilliance and in their shortcomings” (502).

Throughout his extraordinarily thorough account of Edwards’s life and thought, M. succeeds both in moving beyond facile assumptions or scholarly distortions and in challenging the assumptions of our own culture with the very different assumptions of an earlier culture, as articulated in the writings of one of its greatest exponents. M. sees his task as historian “to enter sympathetically into an earlier world” (2) rather than judging the past for not having outlooks like our own, and only then to evaluate critically the outlooks of the past. Such a project is particularly challenging in a nation that grew out of a deeply rooted Puritanism, which was subsequently the target of visceral negative reactions and eventually became caricatured in a habit of “Puritan-bashing.” Once again, M. succeeds admirably in offering a truly critical but sympathetic account of the Puritan world and of Edwards’s place within that world.

Keeping in mind the 21st-century reader, M. plays the role of an expert teacher by introducing us to a world that is much more British than American, because it had not yet developed “most of the traits that were soon to be associated with ‘America’” (2)—a world that was monarchical and controlled by social hierarchies, that was “at the vortex of conflict among three civilizations—the British Protestant, the French Catholic, and the Indian”
(3), and that “was in many respects closer to the world of medieval Christendom than it was to that of even nineteenth-century America” (7). At the same time it is a world that is the foundation of the America we know today, a nation where evangelical Christianity has flourished and has even become “one of America’s leading exports” (9).

Spring Hill College, Mobile

Christopher J. Viscardi, S.J.


This is the second of a projected three-volume *History of New Testament Research* by William Baird, Professor Emeritus of New Testament at Brite Divinity School. The first volume, *From Deism to Tübingen* (1992), reviewed the period from 1700 to 1870; the volume under review covers research from 1870 to 1940; the third volume intends to investigate the post-1940 period. Carefully structured and engagingly written (e.g., “Like an unconscious sleepwalker, Overbeck awoke in mid-career to find himself in theology; he was never quite sure how he got there” [138]), B.’s work should be helpful to students of theology and history as well as of the New Testament, since it explains how scholars who embraced the historical-critical method interpreted the history and doctrine of the New Testament.

B. divides his work into two parts: “New Testament Research in the Era of Expanding Empire” and “New Testament Research in the Era of Global Conflict.” In part 1 he reviews 19th-century American research; the establishment of historical criticism in Great Britain under the Cambridge three (Hort, Lightfoot, and Westcott); the triumph of Liberalism on the Continent (Ritschl, Reuss, Weizsäcker, B. Weiss, Holtzmann, and Harnack); and the return of skepticism (Overbeck, Wrede, Wellhausen, Jülicher, and Loisy). In part 2, he deals with the linguistic, geographical, and historical contributions of Deissmann, Moulton, Dalman; methodological developments such as the history of religion, thoroughgoing eschatology, and form criticism; the advances in American New Testament research at Union Theological Seminary, Yale, Chicago, Princeton, and the rise of feminist studies; the conservative reaction on the Continent of Von Dobschütz, Feine, Zahn, Schlatter, and Lagrange; and the refinement of historical criticism that resulted from progress in textual criticism, lexicography, and studies in Jewish background, Hellenism, and the history of early Christianity.

More than a chronicle of research, B.’s work is a fascinating narrative of scholars and their struggle to understand what nearly all of them considered to be the most important book ever written. Each chapter begins with a brief overview of the cultural and political history of the times, indicating how New Testament studies reflected the concerns of its environment. The chapter then discusses the most significant scholars and their works, be-
ginning with a biographical statement for each scholar, and concluding with a fair and insightful evaluation.

B. skillfully summarizes the major works of the scholars treated. He acknowledges that his focus is primarily on German, British, and American scholarship, most of it Protestant, apart from the work of Loisy, Lagrange, and a few Jewish authors. One understands this limitation since Catholics had not yet embraced the historical-critical method, but one wonders what was happening in Catholic institutions of higher learning, especially in Germany, France, and Belgium.

Reading B.’s work allows one to appreciate the contribution of the historical-critical method to New Testament scholarship, as well as why many have called the method into question. On the one hand, the historical-critical approach can point to significant achievements in the areas of textual criticism, philology, geography, the history of early Christianity, as well as the Jewish and Hellenistic backgrounds that influenced the New Testament. Moreover, the historical-critical method has produced significant histories, commentaries, and works of New Testament theology of enduring value. On the other hand, B.’s history shows how liberal and conservative scholars, who claimed to have approached the text with the objectivity the method proposes, came to divergent conclusions, for example, the Princeton and the Chicago exegetes at the beginning of the 20th century and the liberal and conservative continental scholars after World War I. Although the scholars of this period aimed for scientific objectivity, they were not always aware of the presuppositions that they brought and that the method imposed on them. In one of his many neat turns of phrase, B. says of liberal scholarship, “Yet from the perspective of distance, how inadequate the method appeared to be—depicting a Jesus who looked out of place in ancient Galilee, but quite at home in nineteenth-century Berlin!” (136)

A valuable aspect of the book is its 60-page bibliography which lists the primary works of the scholars discussed, as well as secondary literature about them, thereby providing readers with a guide to the most significant New Testament studies of this period. This feature, coupled with B.’s lively discussion of these writings, reminds readers of what is enduring and still worth reading from this productive period.

Catholic University of America, Washington

FRANK J. MATERA


This is a remarkable book. Readers will encounter a rich use of the French language, a daunting vocabulary, and a forbidding list of persons. Tilliette adopts an approach not unlike that of intellectual and cultural history as he follows the movement from the French Revolution and its impression on German writers of the Sturm und Drang through their sub-
sequent influence on French thinkers. Germany and France predominate but there are also references to other Europeans and to the English. T. gives a lot of credit to an erudite Franco-American, Frank Paul Bowman, for *Le Christ romantique, 1789* and *Le Christ des barricades, 1789–1848* (1987).

There is no one Romantic Jesus. However, in the many portraits that appear there are some leitmotifs of a holy sadness, a longing for the infinite, an identity with suffering, and the stark collision between confidence in the continual progress of humanity and the reality of limit, illness, suffering, and defeat, of which the humanity of Jesus serves as a reminder and is either a source of a new hope or an admission of defeat. The book, though a mini-anthology, is remarkable for its brief but incisive portraits. T.’s masterful sketch of the principals makes his anthology all the more valuable even for those who might argue with the portraits of the Romantic Christ, for he finds the Christ portrait in places where others may have been unwilling to look.

There is a recurrence of Hegel’s death of God theology, speculative Good Friday, kenotic Christology, and seductive dialectical philosophy that touched thinkers, dramatists, musicians, poets, and painters of the century. There is a sampling of those for whom this era of the death of the Christian God, faith in Jesus Christ lost, and the Christian Church empty represents the triumph of evolution and revolution. There are others for whom a certain nostalgia is predominant and who would like to keep something of the previous role of Christ in culture without the supernatural structure and the confinement of dogma.

The German novelist Jean Paul Friedrich Richter and his fragment, “The Dream,” translated by Madame de Staël, influenced many later writers. The haunting exchange between the infants and Jesus is thematic. “Jesus, do we no longer have a Father?” Jesus answers, “We, all of us, are orphans.” This theme of the absence of God sets the mood for the recurrent search for the eternal invisible through the visible and the transient. The introductory matter is followed by a presentation of the divine in chiaroscuro. Corregio, for example, says in art what the dialectic says in philosophy: how the negative reveals the positive by readying for a new kind of transcendence. This dialectic shows how darkness brings out light and how light is perceived in darkness, and it picks up the baffling experience of how the eternal is found in the temporal and how Geist is manifested in its apparent opposite, flesh. Hence the radical Incarnation is to reveal the abolition of divine transcendence and to show that life is found in death as in the death of Jesus on the Cross. Holbein’s painting of Christ being taken down from the cross gets frequent mention to show in the pale image of the Christ crucified either an invitation to despair or to hope in the promise of life.

There is a pervading wistful and gripping sadness, a religious thirst for some form of the eternal to be obtained through mystical experience, a detestation of restrictive dogma and confining ecclesial structures, and some attachment to the suffering Jesus in whom is seen humanity sick for
the infinite and carrying le malaise existentiel, le malaise de l’être from which a mystical Christianity may still somehow be their only liberation. No one seems to be able to identify or specifically locate this sickness, but in all there is the heavy burden of an incomplete destiny.

Because T. has presented his readers with condensed but insightful information about known and less well known romantics, women and men, it is very helpful to consult the index of names and observe the frequency of their occurrence. This book will reward those for whom either literary or theological interests predominate.

Marquette University, Milwaukee

WILLIAM J. KELLY, S.J.


This volume, the latest in the Jésus et Jésus-Christ series directed by Joseph Doré, is the result of collaboration among seven prominent Blondel scholars, “under the direction of René Virgoulay.” The volume is comprehensive, in that it covers all of Blondel’s works, including letters and other texts not written for publication. The order of the essays is chronological, although for those not well acquainted with Blondel’s writings, after the first essay, which serves as a kind of introduction, it might be best to read the last three essays, beginning with Claude Troisfontaines’s.

The first essay, by Yvette Perico, provides a useful introduction to Blondel’s career by examining his spiritual diaries, Les carnets intimes, which he started writing as a student, a decade before the defense and publication of his thesis, L’Action, in 1893. She shows that Blondel had a very clear sense of his philosophical career as a vocation, rooted in his devotion to Christ. In a prayer to Christ, Blondel wrote, “I would like to guide to you those who have no path” (24). Furthermore, very early in his studies Blondel had become convinced that the problem of the Incarnation was “the touchstone of a true cosmology, of an integral metaphysics” (25). Just what place the Incarnation came to occupy in Blondel’s philosophy, however, is a complicated question; the succeeding essays all address it in some way as they follow his long career.

The question centers on Blondel’s idea of le panchristisme. The order of the essays is somewhat puzzling, however, for both logically and chronologically the topic that provides the essential background is that treated in the fifth essay by Claude Troisfontaines—Blondel’s understanding of Leibniz’s idea of vinculum substantiale, the “substantial bond.” The idea of a vinculum substantiale appears in some of Leibniz’s correspondence as a tentative answer to the question of how there could be a composite substance, in which all the monads would not be merely gathered together as an aggregate under a dominant monad but truly united as a substance. In Leibniz’s system, there would need to be something beyond the monads, something that bound them together as a true unity, a “substantial bond.” Whatever its role in Leibniz’s thought, Blondel incorporated the idea of a
vinculum substantiale into his own thought in various ways, most prominently by envisaging action as a kind of vinculum.

Inspired by various Pauline texts, such as “in him all things hold together” (Col 1:17), Blondel applied the idea of the vinculum to the Incarnate Word, conceiving of Christ as a universal mediator, vinculum vinculumorum, who united humanity and all creation in himself. Blondel came to describe this concept as “Panchristism.” He insisted on Christ’s cosmic function, asserting that nothing in the universe, whether intelligent, living, or material, achieved a stable existence or reached its perfection without the intervention of the Incarnate Word, “solidifier of the universe” (161). Blondel wholeheartedly embraced the Scotist position on the motive for the Incarnation. For him, Emmanuel is an integral part of the whole plan of creation—its final cause. For this reason, he argued that neither the existence nor the destiny of anything in the created order can ultimately be explained apart from Christ, the Incarnate Word. Consequently, the Incarnation has profound metaphysical consequences that must be taken into account not only by the theologian, but also by the philosopher, since “the supernatural is in continuity with metaphysics” (39).

Panchristism, however, rarely appeared in Blondel’s published works and had little influence on subsequent philosophers and theologians. Early in his career, the idea appeared in only three brief and quite obscure passages, with which Blondel soon became dissatisfied. Panchristism did not reappear in his published works for many years and only received prominent treatment in his very last work, La philosophie et l’esprit chrétien. Nevertheless, as several essays in the volume make clear, although Panchristism did not figure prominently in Blondel’s published works, the idea was often a major topic of discussion in his voluminous correspondence with prominent philosophers and theologians.

Taken together, the essays in this volume present a strong case that, although the importance for Blondel of the notion of Panchristism may not be readily apparent in his published writings, this idea of an Incarnate Mediator was a crucial inspiration underlying his philosophical vision. Although he significantly revised his conception, he never abandoned it. The essays also convincingly argue that Blondel’s Panchristism is an idea rich in implications for both philosophy and theology, offering new perspectives on Blondel’s philosophical œuvre, on the relationship between philosophy and Christianity, and on the role of the Incarnate Word in the divine plan for creation.

**BOOK REVIEWS**

**U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops, Washington**

**JAMES LE GRYS**


James Treat documents a specific Native American religious movement, the Indian Ecumenical Conference. Organized in 1969, it conducted organizational meetings and large annual gatherings from 1970 until 1983 with
a short revival in 1987 and 1988 and a last meeting in 1992. T. deftly interweaves the history of the Conference with the political, social, and religious changes among Native American peoples in the United States and Canada and for the general populations of these two countries.

As T. points out, the activities of Native American militancy movements (Red Power) of this era are well known: the protest at Cornwall Island, the occupation of Alcatraz, The Trail of Broken Treaties, and subsequent Take-Over of the BIA in Washington, D.C., and Wounded Knee II in South Dakota where extensive press coverage continues to appear in both popular and scholarly literature. Yet this equally significant and probably more far-reaching movement, designed to unify Indian peoples of all religious faiths, has remained relatively undocumented and obscure.

T.’s thesis is that the Indian Ecumenical Conference represents a spiritual rather than political engagement by Native people with their own changing world as well as the changing world around them. While many movements of the latter part of the 20th century were high profile political protests against past and present injustices in the American system, the Conference worked quietly to unite Native people themselves by bridging a long-standing and growing gap between traditional and Christian Indians, and along the way to address the generational gap in Indian communities, the urban/reservation divide, the split between mixed-bloods and full-bloods, and a variety of political justice issues.

T. begins this carefully documented history of the Conference with a Unity Convention in 1969 on the Onondaga reservation. He then provides biographies of key conference leaders such as Bob Thomas, the original organizer and sustainer of the movement, Episcopal Priest Ian McKenzie, director of Rochdale College’s Indian College Wilf Pelletier, Stoney Indian leader John Snow, anthropologist and advocate Sam Stanley, and Native spiritual leaders such as John Hascall, Ernie Willie, Ernest Tootoosis, Stewart Etsitty, and Albert Lightning. T. also gives background information on each of the conferences, the first of which took place on the Crow reservation and then found a permanent home on the Stoney reserve in Canada. He also examines the political and social realities of reservation and urban Indian life during that time period. In addition, he examines the changing attitudes of the mainline Christian Churches—particularly the Canadian Anglicans—toward Native people and Native religions, as the Conference attempted to strengthen ties with these groups and enlist their financial and social assistance. While many of the actors of this era believed that all Native problems were precipitated by the coming of Whites and their colonial system, some (like T. himself) are able to look at internal as well as external conflicts and misperceptions, particularly those that arose as the Conference waxed and waned and attempted to keep its original ecumenical focus despite its being pulled in opposite and often conflicting directions.

T. perceptively points out that the history of the Conference serves as a microcosm for larger social trends in Indian society and in the relationship
between Indian peoples and the mainline Christian churches and secular governmental bodies that continue today. Through the book one can trace the origins and growth of burning contemporary issues such as non-Natives engaging in Native ceremonies, the relationship of Native religion to Christianity, and the continued negotiations between Christianity and Native religion to this era.

T.’s style is lively, engrossing, and readable. He sometimes pauses for his own analysis of the religious and social processes at play or to highlight specific issues such as the non-inclusion of women in the governing board of the organization. The work is carefully documented and has an invaluable bibliography and set of photographs.

T. is a particularly apt guide through this material. He himself is Native, coming from a Muscogee Baptist family, and knows both Native and Christian traditions. He currently teaches at the Honors College of the University of Oklahoma. He has produced a unique anthology: Native and Christian: Indigenous Voices on Religious Identity in the United States and Canada (1996), and also edited For This Land: Writings on Religion in America by Vine Deloria, Jr. (1999). Readers might also be interested in examining his syllabus, “Native Americans and Christianity”: http://www.aarweb.org/syllabus/syllabi/native_americans_and_christianity-treat.html

The book is highly recommended to those interested in interreligious dialogue, ecumenism, the relationship between Native Christianity and Native spirituality, the history of Indian-White relations and contemporary Indian history.

Creighton University, Omaha RAYMOND A. BUCKO, S.J.


At least from the time of Plato’s allegory of the cave scholars have looked suspiciously on claims to “reality.” But the distinction between appearance and reality was usually drawn in favor of reality, and indeed, according to both Plato and Kant, the distinction between reality and appearance would make no sense without assuming a reality out there existing beyond human imagination. Hegel, however, famously dispensed with Kant’s noumena (the inherently unknown but posited “real things” hidden behind the appearances), which left us with only the phenomena and a systematic study of them (“phenomenology”), a move that came to its final conclusion in Dilthey’s axioms: (1) “The world exists nowhere else but in the representations of men.” (2) “Nature is alien to us. It is a mere exterior for us without any inner life. Society is our world.” (3) “Everything brought about [in this world] is the mainspring of the will. . . . Even the sense of justice is not a fact of cognition but rather a fact of the will” (Selected Works [1989] 1:81, 88, 103, 105).
Alister McGrath has completed his trilogy, *A Scientific Theology*, the first volume of which, called simply *Nature*, I reviewed in this journal (vol. 74:171–72). As I said there, the fact that M., a Reformed theologian, began with nature shows how much the latest in Reformed theology was moving away from Karl Barth’s attack on natural theology. But having set out to concede to nature a self-subsistence of its own, whose deliverances must be respected alongside those of revelation, M. must now take on the postmodern “cultured despisers” of reality who follow in the wake of Hegel and Dilthey. In that regard, one almost never finds nowadays realists who defend extramental reality without taking into account the popularity of postmodern epistemology. In fact, any strategy that ignores the Hegelian challenge is derisively called “naïve realism.” But many philosophers happily admit to subscribing to “critical realism,” which tries to take into account and answer the postmodern thinkers who hold that reality is entirely socially constructed and language-determined. Thus M. opens the book with a programmatic admission that knowledge of the real is “modulated by the existing ideas and beliefs of the knower” (3); and he defends the view that “knowledge arises through a sustained and passionate attempt to engage with a reality that is encountered” (4).

In other words, M. avoids the binary alternatives of naïve realism and postmodern skepticism; but since no one holds to the former, while most academics subscribe to the latter, his fire must be directed against them before he can present his own positive proposals. This gives the book a certain polemical edge, as when M. characterizes Richard Rorty’s replacement of the idea of objectivity with the idea of solidarity (i.e., epistemological solidarity—when a particular community happens to agree with itself) as merely hegemonic group-think that would be incapable of resisting Nazism or Stalinism on its own terms (6–11). Or when he rehearses with undisguised glee the famous “Sokal hoax” (188–91) perpetrated by Alan Sokal, a professor of physics, who submitted to a journal an article claiming cultural variations in the law of gravity; written in a pastiche of postmodern clichés, the article was accepted, at which point Sokal admitted the hoax and left the postmodernists feeling acutely embarrassed. But M. also extends his polemic to wider targets, including the Yale School of Theology, which he calls barren (40), stuck in the sands (41), and outmoded (42).

I do not want to leave the reader with the impression that the gravamen of the book is merely polemical. It is not. Chapter 10 especially (chapter-numbering of vol. 2 begins with 7 to link up with vol. 1) defends a critical realism based on M.’s own thorough acquaintance with scientific methodology (M. had been a professional chemist), in which the stratification of the sciences reflects the basic ontological stratification of reality (hence, science itself, in its actual practice, refutes reductionism).

The final chapter (11) provides the theological payoff, in which M. insists, based on the previous analysis, that a scientific theology, as Barth held and Don Cupitt would deny, is a faithful response to an existing reality. Moreover, theology’s concept of nature-as-creation provides the only way
of making sense of the correlation between the human mind and the ordered universe.

All well and good, and M. has certainly thrown down the gauntlet to all members of the “social construction” or “hermeneutical” school of theology, but I wonder if he has not tried to prove too much, as in his too-ready identification of the Logos of God with the rationality of scientific law. For that reason, there seems to be a certain hankering for old-style determinism. Perhaps because of M.’s earlier background in chemistry or his Reformed stress on predestination, the impact of probabilistic quantum physics gets next to no attention in these pages, and even the radical contingency of creation itself is inadequately thematized. Despite these criticisms, however, M. has written what will no doubt be considered one of the most significant essays in theological epistemology in our new century.

*Mundelein Seminary, Ill.*

**EDWARD T. OAKES, S.J.**

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In the first part of this clearly written book Frosini summarizes the ways in which the Resurrection of Christ has been expounded throughout Christian history; in the second part F. turns to the New Testament testimony to the Resurrection. The third and longest part of the book examines the revelatory and salvific impact of the Easter mystery, from its function in manifesting the Trinity through to its moral and spiritual message. F. persistently connects the Resurrection of the crucified Christ with the sacraments and draws repeatedly on the witness of the liturgy. He has an eye for illuminating quotations: from Gregory of Nyssa, Augustine of Hippo, Thomas Aquinas, and many others (including Ludwig Wittgenstein’s defense of the empty tomb and of the role of love in the making of Easter faith).

In documenting the revived interest in the Resurrection that F. X. Durrwell did so much to bring about, F. cites a startling example from the early 20th century. The *Catechism of Christian Doctrine*, published under the auspices of Pope Pius X, taught that the principal mysteries of our faith are two: (a) the unity and trinity of God; and (b) the Incarnation, passion, and death of our Lord Jesus Christ. While missing from that list, the Resurrection is in fact central and fundamental to Christian faith. F. aims to show how the whole of faith can and should be developed on the basis of the truth of the Resurrection.

Jon Sobrino is wrongly called Mexican (117); Sebastian Karotemprel’s name is misspelled (212, 319), and so too is that of Gerd Lüdemann (164, 312, 319). Although Lüdemann’s reductive account of the Easter experiences could be seen to update that of D. F. Strauss (100), it is not accurate to lump him together with Rudolf Bultmann and Willi Marxsen (164 n. 72). Lüdemann’s reductive version (rejection?) of the Resurrection has led him
further—into questioning the existence of God, something certainly not true of Bultmann and Marxsen. Moreover, their differences in approaching the Resurrection set Bultmann and Marxsen apart, as even the evidence provided by F. illustrates (107 n. 11), it is misleading to call Marxsen a “follower of the Bultmann school” (107).

Once or twice F.’s careful use of language falters, as when he follows a current, inflated use of “absolute” and describes the Resurrection of Christ as an “absolutely original event” (11). The New Testament itself suggests a range of partial precedents and analogies: for instance, the exodus from Egypt, the celebration at the Passover, the entrance into the holy of holies on the Day of Expiation (the Letter to the Hebrews), and the Jonah story (Matt 12: 39–41).

Here and there the use of Scriptures could be improved. In 2 Corinthians 3:17, Paul is commenting on Exodus 34:34 and primarily says this: “The Lord of whom this passage speaks is the Spirit.” F. slides over the point of the verse when he writes: “in some sense . . . the resurrection transforms Christ into the Spirit” (186). F. quotes a passage from Augustine which illuminates well the self-emptying expressed by Philippians 2:7: that “kenosis” entailed in “accepting the form of a servant” but not “losing the form of God” (215). F. might, however, have been more qualified in citing the Philippians hymn in support of Christ’s “nomination” as Son (181). The high title explicitly used in that hymn is “Lord”; “Son” is merely implied by the phrase about “the glory of God the Father” (Phil 2:11).

Yet, all in all, the book provides a broad, well-balanced study of the Resurrection which recalls Leo Scheffczyk’s Auferstehung: Prinzip Christlichen Glaubens (1976) and forms an updated version of the 1950 classic by F. X. Durrwell, La résurrection de Jésus, mystère de salut.

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Gerald O’Collins, S.J.


Scognamiglio, an experienced teacher of dogmatic theology in Naples and Rome, has read widely, helped by the many Italian translations of German theological works. His book is a comprehensive presentation of 20th-century eschatology, comparable to J. Ratzinger’s Eschatologie, Tod, und ewiges Leben (1977, E.T. 1988) but fuller. (Brevity is not S.’s strong point.) The work is divided into four chapters, each a small book in itself. Chapter 1 surveys 20th-century eschatologies of hope (and despair). Chapter 2 offers a theology of salvation by tracing the mission of Jesus on earth. Then follows a treatment of the liturgical and eucharistic dimensions of salvation, which includes a section on globalization and what S. calls eschatological economic ethics. Chapter 3 treats messianism, the Resurrection of Jesus as a trinitarian event, and our new life in the Trinity. The final
chapter deals with classical questions of death, immortality of the soul, resurrection, the just mercy of God in judgment, and the beatific vision. It concludes by invoking Thomas Campanella’s utopian vision of the City of the Sun.

S. says the first chapter is the most difficult (i.e., academically serious). I will concentrate on it. After invoking the Jubilee for the Third Christian Millennium and the “apocalypse” of 11 September 2001, S. considers three models of eschatology: prophetic, apocalyptic, and anthropological-transcendental. He seems to favor the first and third of these, although he does not like to tip his hand. He then presents five “contributions” of 20th-century eschatological theology. The first of these, salvation history, is itself divided into five eschatologies: consistent, realized, self-realizing, mediating (Cullmann), and revelation as history (Pannenberg). The other four contributions are: transcendental (Kant, Barth, Bultmann), Christological (Teilhard de Chardin, Congar, Daniélou), hermeneutical (Balthasar and Rahner), and practical (Metz and Moltmann).

S. then tries to pin down what eschatology is by appealing to three approaches. The first is more lexicographic and contrasts the static logos (rational discourse) of Greek philosophy with the biblical breakthrough-event of Jesus’ Resurrection. It emerges that Abraham Calov (1612–1686) invented the term eschatology. The second approach is the apophatic one of Eastern Christian theology (Berdyaev, Lossky, Evdokimov): we cannot say what the reality behind eschatological hope is and especially whether anyone will be damned forever (apokatastasis). We do not know the extent of God’s mercy and we must not set limits to it. The third approach, inspired by theologians like Juan-José Tamayo-Acosta, Gerhard Ludwig Müller, and Ugo Vanni, passes through a Mariological moment to arrive at an essentially kerygmatic, manualist position that wants to avoid any rough, revolutionary, apocalyptic imagery. S. rejects this approach as kataphatic, mythological (i.e., primitive), and, implicitly, politically disruptive and dangerous. After a brief presentation of eschatology in the world religions (Jacques Dupuis), S. concludes with an original, interesting treatment of negative eschatology. He cites the familiar denial of Christian hope by Nietzsche in favor of an eternal, cyclical return with no hope except the coming of the Superman, then passes on to some recently published texts of Heidegger (Beiträge zur Philosophie, 1989) that speak of the ultimate or final God, as opposed to other, outdated views of God (e.g., the Christian God is too historically determined). Finally he treats Schelling’s thesis of the presence of evil in God (Isaiah 45:7) and the tragic Christianity of Luigi Pareyson.

I find two related weaknesses in the book: first, S. offers no clear criterion of theological truth or error, biblical or otherwise; second, he seems not to have a firm grasp of Scripture. Two examples: S. provides a sound, common sense, southern Italian, Franciscan critique of Heidegger and the early Rahner’s view of death as the goal of life, but in doing so he fails to note the Stoic, Mediterranean traditions of the noble death present in the Bible (e.g., 2 Maccabees 6). More central and perhaps more debatable, S.’s
aversion to apocalyptic leads to blurred contours, an unwillingness to see that there are conflicting perspectives in the Bible, where one must take a stand.

An alternative would be to start with the historical Jesus’ preaching of the soon-to-arrive-on-earth kingdom of God inspired by Daniel’s visions. This is the primordial Christian hope held by Paul and even by at least some strata of John’s Gospel. Jesus’ shameful death on the cross becomes intelligible as part of the great tribulation (Matt 24:21), the experience of his Resurrection is a foretaste of our resurrection and of his parousia. His judging refers to his governing the living and the (risen) dead. The end of planet Earth is spoken of only in 2 Peter 3:10 (the conflagration). The beatific vision, derived primarily from 1 John, while certainly belonging to the total picture of eternal beatitude, is too individualistic to be a self-sufficient model. It should be integrated into a social or communitarian kingdom perspective proclaimed by Jesus himself.

S.’s book does not make for easy reading—students could easily get lost in the surveys of other scholars’ views and long footnotes. But the patient reader cannot fail to learn from this rich, complex report on 20th-century eschatologies.

University of Fribourg

BENEDICT THOMAS VIVIANO, O.P.


In the wake of the Vatican document Dominus Iesus (August 6, 2000), Edoardo Scognamilio attempts to present both a hermeneutical and theological program for interreligious dialogue, together with an almost exhaustive application of this approach to Eastern and Western religions up to and including New Age. He insists on the need for a theological approach to dialogue based on an investigation of the “face” of God as it appears concretely in the religions. It is an ambitious project and contains a wealth of information.

The face, as the expression of the totality of the other, is what gives concrete access to the transcendent other in both its difference and uniqueness. In chapter 1, S. expounds and justifies his use of the image of the face as what gives immediate access to the other. To engage the face of the other presupposes the work of cultural, social, and historical contextualization as the essential dimensions of the revelation of the other. Here S. largely relies on the work of Levinas, but dialogues with many other modern philosophers and interpretation theory from Hegel to Buber to Habermas.

Chapter 2 argues that the possibility of the human experience of God, like all others, is available only as manifest in particular time and space, that is, through the face. Religions are thus the face of God in a particular culture and history. Relying primarily on the work of Kahlil Gibran, S.
presents religion as the natural human activity in the concrete, everyday experience of living, while faith has to do with the experience of totality in the human quest for transcendence. In this context, each religion carries a trace of God revealed in and through the particularities of worldly existence. While allowing that religion proposes an absolute, infinite God, this God is available only through the particularity of the face which is manifested and received, and thus is relative. Based on this premise, S. argues that openness to “worldliness” is the condition for authentic theological interreligious dialogue. His argument then turns to a theology of religious dialogue with an extensive analysis of conciliar and postconciliar teaching, as well as theological approaches from Balthasar through Dupuis, concluding that the phenomenological, theological, and revelational approach to dialogue is the way of the future.

Chapters 3 through 5 demonstrate this approach. Specifically, S. examines the images or faces of God represented in Judaism, Christianity, Islam, and Asian religions, providing descriptions of the divinity who reveals itself according to the mode of revelation, the divinity’s relation to humans and the specific world it enters, its involvement in history and the task given to humans from this involvement, and finally the offer of salvation to which the divine mystery points. Along the way, S. points out parallels and contradictions, theological commonalities as well as exclusive categories that allow one to establish theological threads among the many diverse models of revelation in these world religions.

Central to this discussion is the nature of Christ in terms of both revelation and salvation. S. is conversant with the various approaches to these questions. He arrives at the following formula in the context of his analysis of the New Testament: The Father is in the religions; the religions are in the Son; the Holy Spirit is with the religions (331). He argues that God is the origin of every path of transcendence while at the same time remaining larger that the horizons of this world. Thus, the Father is in the religions as the origin of every religious movement. As the face of God, Jesus is the center and fullness of salvation to which all religions tend for completion and final salvation, affirming that “the symbolic face of Christ is not given to annul differences but to admit new relations with God through the faces of humans and the world, of nature and cultures, of languages and religious experiences” (239). Thus religions are in Christ. After Pentecost, relationship with Jesus Christ is possible only through the Spirit who is the space between the revelation of Jesus and the understanding of that revelation. The Spirit is available in history as the transcultural principle that allows the religions to be an expression of inculturation and historical, social contextualization of the divine. Hence the Spirit is with the religions. This trinitarian approach to the religions touches on the specific contribution of S.’s position; it deserves more systematic treatment.

There are in reality two books here, one theoretical and methodological, and the other describing the face of God revealed in the major religions of the world. The ambitious nature of S.’s project is at the same time its weakness. S. summarizes and engages a vast amount of material, but at
times the reader can be unclear about S.’s own position on the topic at hand. A concluding summary of the “common theological threads” would have been helpful. Without a more coherent synthesis of his theological arguments, the book is promising but its usefulness is diminished.

St. Bonaventure University, St. Bonaventure, N.Y. MICHAEL W. BLASTIC, O.F.M. CONV.


This well-written book stands as a significant contribution to liberation theology. In five parts, Tombs chronologically and contextually situates the development and maturation of the discipline in a way that allows students to access and appropriate it. The work is synthetic in that it integrates the sociological, political, historical, and economic realities of Latin America into a survey of both theological and philosophical developments. Two bonuses for the teacher-scholar are the extensive footnotes and excellent bibliography.

Part 1, “Power and Privilege: 1492–1959,” explores the history and reality of the Catholic Church as it sided with the privileged in the exploration, oppression, and eventual domination of the New World. Some individuals in the Church, such as Bartolome de Las Casas, are cited as opposing certain policies of the Conquistadores, but T. emphasizes that the institutional Church solidly supported colonization and its consequences. Of particular interest is T.’s articulation of the legacy of colonialism. Contemporary realities related to work (who works and who does not), personal industry vs. native exploitation, the view of Latin America as at the service of European conquerors, and the pattern of land distribution emerging from the latifundios and haciendas are developed clearly and effectively. Throughout this section, T.’s masterful interweaving of the social, economic, historical, political, theological, and philosophical realities provides a deeper understanding of the history of Latin America.

Part 2, “Engaging the World: 1960–1969,” articulates the political, social, and theological developments that provided the conditions for the possibility of liberation theology. The Cold War, the effects of the Cuban Revolution, and a brief history of Catholic social thought all serve to contextualize the emergence of a new way of thinking. The material on Vatican II is solid, with an emphasis on the importance of Lumen gentium and its theological link to Gaudium et spes. This section shows the Church responding to the world in a very particular way. It also shows the rise of liberation as a category for action and reflection. Paulo Freire, Dom Hélder Câmara, Medellín, comunidades de base, and Paul VI’s Populorum progressio represent steady developments in the way the Church engaged the world. The Church’s engagement, T. argues, is key to the development of liberation theology: it developed from the way the Church ministered to
a world torn by violence, hunger, and affliction of every kind. T. is correct in asserting the primacy of praxis in the development of “liberation” as a new way of doing theology.

In part 3, “The Preferential Option for the Poor: 1970–1979,” T. provides an excellent overview of the theology and work of Gustavo Gutiérrez and, to a lesser degree, Leonardo Boff and Jon Sobrino. The section is nuanced and informative especially on the relation of liberation theology to socialism, Marxism, and violence. T. knows the issues and the debates and discusses them comprehensively. Chapter 8 directly addresses both the persecution of the Church in Latin America and the importance of ecclesial base communities. These would form a solid basis in popular culture and thought for liberation theology and are critical for its ongoing existence. T. emphasizes the centrality of “church” for doing liberation theology in a way that critics of liberation theology often overlook. It was out of concrete communities of ministry and how they engaged Scripture that a commitment to the liberation of the poor emerged and grew.

Part 4, “The God of Life: 1980–1989,” surveys challenges to liberation theology. The economic and political developments of the 1980s required adjustments of expectations and a greater emphasis on spirituality. The magisterium’s suspicion of liberation theology represented by Cardinal Ratzinger’s personal animosity toward the movement has also defined this era. Finally, the feminist challenge represents a failure of liberation theology to adequately address the origins and consequences of patriarchy in Latin America.

The final part, “Crisis of Hope: The 1990s,” summarizes perceptions and developments in a post-Cold War world. The perceived failure of communism and the triumph of the free market stood as challenges to the agenda of liberation theologians who embraced socialism as a more humane way to organize the social and economic resources available to a given population. Ultimately, the ability of liberation theology to adapt and apply its methodology in a changing world is the lasting contribution of a movement that simply refuses to die.

Creighton University, Omaha

Thomas M. Kelly


After touching on the “morning” and “evening” knowledge of the angels, Cessario makes an important methodological decision in his discussion of *habitus*, of which virtue is a species. By immediately introducing the seven gifts of the Holy Spirit, C. follows Aquinas’s methodology in the *Secunda secundae*, matching those gifts to the seven cardinal theological and moral virtues. Thus both Aquinas and C. have a rubric for explicating the rich interplay between grace and nature in Christian anthropology.
Faith, for example, is served by the gifts of understanding and knowledge, which prepare people to “confess the ‘treasure of revelation’” (19, quoting Dei verbum), and Christian love is served by wisdom, a certain “connaturality” with divine things. C. is especially insightful in his revelation of how “Fear of the Lord” can inform theological hope (53).

C. is not as strong in his discussion of charity. First, though he mentions friendship as—according to Aquinas—the realization of charity, he chooses family as “the basic analogate for speaking about divine charity” (63). This choice misses how the Gospel relativizes family to the following of Christ. It further creates a theological problem in explaining the equality of Persons in the Trinity, since, as C. observes, there is a natural hierarchy in the family (145). Finally, such a model (as well as other methodological commitments) prevents C. from discussing the distinctive Christian love of enemy. In his discussion of the virtue of fortitude, he devotes one clause to the nonviolence of the early Church—and of Jesus—before he turns to his preferred model for fortitude: warfare (168–69).

C.‘s discussion of justice is the most brilliant and helpful in this work. Observing that justice involves an “active commitment to the other, the neighbor” (128), C. shows—without mentioning the Gospel’s expansion of that notion—how important the Scholastic understanding of the purely objective foundation of justice is to the consideration of “right” as something “essentially inherent in a subject, not posited by legislative will or customary agreement” (129). This understanding underwrites the central Christian ethical stance on the dignity of the person (135). It allows C. to expand on the important distinction between restitution and satisfaction (142). Further, the objective foundation of justice also means that justice must be done, regardless of how well or badly it conforms to the character of the one from whom it is required (133). C.‘s early commitment to the interweaving of grace and nature serves him well in the congruency he sees between natural law and ius gentium, uniting them especially through a shared vision of the common good.

It is problematic, as Diana Cates points out, that Aquinas does not consider the virtue (perhaps nonviolence) that could order revolutionary anger—anger against oppression within an unjust political or ecclesiastical system [“Taking Women’s Experience Seriously,” Aquinas and Empowerment (1996), pp. 47–88]. Surely such a passion was characteristic of Jesus in the New Testament. In following Aquinas so closely, C. encounters the same difficulty. For example, in discussing the virtue of dulia, he uncritically offers as an example Paul’s injunction for slaves to obey their masters (146).

C. does not arrive at the discussion of passions until three quarters of the way through the book. This is a significant methodological departure from Aquinas. Aquinas precedes his discussion of habitus—which in turn precedes his discussion of virtue—with his treatise on the passions, the longest treatise in the Summa. That is because Aquinas wanted to adopt the classical model of virtue and still retain the Christian sense that holiness depends primarily on God’s action. By beginning with the passions—those
dimensions of our souls by which we are moved—Aquinas ensures that his discussion of virtue will be grounded in that Christian awareness of the primacy of God’s action, and only secondarily in the efforts of the individual. C.’s departure from that strategy and his choice to begin instead with a consideration of knowledge and wisdom give an intellective cast to his discussion of virtue. Or he submits, for example, that the passions are neutral, and “receive their true moral character from our personal determinations” (164). Aquinas says that passions are already, by virtue of creation by God, ordered to reason (cf. Summa theologiae 1–2, q. 24, a.1, ad 2; q. 50, a. 3, ad 1; q. 34, a. 1). Such Thomistic presuppositions require a richer understanding of the role of virtue’s relationship to the passions than that they are “ordered to be controlled and directed by reason” (159).

C. begins and ends his work with explicit references to Mary, mother of Jesus. Throughout his book, C. thinks of her as the exemplar of Christian virtue. As we read his rigorous analysis and observe his devotion to Mary, we see that C. himself is demonstrating the virtues of knowledge and piety in his theological reflection.

New York, N.Y.

G. Simon Harak, S.J.


This volume is a work of advocacy developed under the auspices of the Religious Consultation on Population, Reproductive Health, and Ethics. It contains an editor’s introduction, eleven chapters on the different religious traditions, a twelfth chapter detailing an emerging consensus on the central issues, a conclusion, and an appendix. As a work of advocacy, it is fueled by a passion for global social justice, with explicit attention to the status of women, the environment, and more equitable distribution of the world’s goods. As Maguire states: “Family planning means contraception with access to safe abortion as an option when necessary.” But when understood holistically, family planning “involves a lot more than condoms; it is an issue of social and distributive justice. If this is not recognized, it will not achieve its goals” (10).

The theme of social justice is carried admirably through each of the essays. In order are treated Judaism, Roman Catholicism, Protestant Christianity, Islam, Hinduism, Thai Buddhism, the Yoruba of Nigeria, Native American traditions, Chinese teaching in the late imperial period, Tao and Confucian approaches, and Jainism. M. has added a brief note on Japanese Buddhism. The most notable omission is the tradition of Orthodoxy.

The aim of the book, expressed in the concluding essay, is to overturn the prevailing stereotype in the secular, scientific world that all religions are opposed to family planning, contraception, and abortion in principle and practice. On the contrary, it is argued, these religious traditions are
capable of supporting what M. calls “the human right and obligation to bring moral planning to our biological power to reproduce. We support what should be the obvious right to contraception. But we do not shy away in this book from the moral right to an abortion” (5).

Each chapter gives some account of the sources the religious tradition under consideration calls upon, the methods by which discussion and argument proceed, and the variety of positions held on the issues at stake. Several authors readily acknowledge the minority status of their own positions and the difficulty in overcoming opposing positions in their traditions, especially in regard to abortion.

Not being an expert on these traditions, I cannot adequately assess how accurately and comprehensively each tradition is presented. I found the chapter on Catholicism peculiar in that it never acknowledged the theological claims made for the official magisterium and seemed to give the opinion of theologians equal weight with the judgments of the magisterium. I also found the variety of ways in which the different religious traditions weigh the claims of fetal life thought-provoking.

Three points stood out as common to all the chapters:

(1) Despite the claim that the book seeks to bring the resources of religion to bear on the questions of family planning, there is very little theological engagement. It is taken for granted that, if one shows how present-day teaching opposed to contraception and/or abortion was articulated at a time and a place, now past, that may have made sense of it then, the teaching falls. The requirements of social justice under the changed circumstances of the modern world, it is claimed, mandate a change in that teaching.

(2) The problematic character of abortion is paid lip service. Almost all the authors say they agree that abortion should be rare, should not be the ordinary form of birth control, that the decision to abort should never be made lightly, that abortion represents a social and personal failure of some kind. At the same time they all advocate in practice a public policy of abortion on demand with no limits on the individual woman’s right to choose, and public support of medically safe abortions. The expectation seems to be that with increased education, wider availability of contraceptive means, and the support of religion, there will be fewer unwanted pregnancies, hence fewer abortions.

(3) The conviction that what the authors advocate is already, or at least soon will be, the emerging world consensus in both theory and practice. Based on the data presented in the book and the movements of history as depicted here, one wonders why the authors thought the book was even necessary. As one author pointed out, people in the past and still today, to judge by their actual practice, do not seem to have paid much attention to the restrictions their religions put on sexual behavior, contraception, and abortion. There is little reason to think that they will be much influenced one way or the other by a change in that teaching.

The book is an interesting read and provides material for reflection and examination. Whether one finds the argument of the book persuasive may
well depend on the extent to which one already shares the authors' convictions.

_James P. Hanigan_
highlighted by essays that seek to ground forgiveness and reconciliation in victim-centered psychologies. Essays by D. Hicks, E. Worthington, and E. Staub and L. Pearlman intimate that victim identity-loss and emotional disturbance complicate the replication of a Christian pattern that presumes a willing and able forgiver. Patterns, then, give way to flexible processes that conduce to healing and the emotional achievement of forgiveness. But processes without patterns can, in fact, become too flexible. In Worthington’s essay, for example, that pursuit of justice is subordinated to the aim of reducing “unforgiveness,” which ostensibly precedes forgiveness. Such models deny us the capacity to judge that a person who withholds “forgiveness” once justice has been restored is simply acting unjustly. More seriously, they contravene traditional Christian notions of forgiveness that stress its gratuitous character and its importance for effecting the repentance and conversion that reconciliation requires.

It is crucial to ask whether such contravention is simply required by the project of developing an account of forgiveness and reconciliation that operates outside of Christian contexts. This question begs the further one of the relation between nature and grace. Although the volume does not address this question directly, the practical studies in part 4 confirm that Christian insights about forgiveness and reconciliation do find an echo in the human heart. A. Chapman’s essay on South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission, for example, shows that complaints about the Commission’s Christian biases actually reveal a desire for a process that is more thoroughly consistent with a Christian approach. Likewise, O. Botcharova’s contribution of a seven-step model, developed from her work with multi-ethnic groups in the Balkans, signals the desirability and practicality of an approach that honors the unconditional nature of forgiveness and maintains a reintegrating focus for justice.

These studies suggest that the way forward is to be found in the dialectical encounter between the experience of those who pursue political peace and Christianity’s own best insights into forgiveness and reconciliation. Of necessity, that dialectic must cut across history to discover anew old arenas of reconciliation. It is noteworthy, in this regard, that Harakas’s study of the sacrament of reconciliation offers one of the volume’s most comprehensive and psychologically compelling accounts of the dynamics of reconciliation. Perhaps the contemporary narrative that heavily informs the text and that regards such older theologies as irrelevant to forgiveness’s new day is ripe for overcoming. As the volume shows, that narrative backs theology into an apologetic mode precisely at a time when we need a deepening of our discourse. By becoming more confidently creative in its engagement with the world and its own history, theology may well light upon a discourse—such as that exemplified in G. Smyth’s compelling essay about Northern Ireland—that helps people discover more fully the interpenetration of their lives and the gospel of reconciliation.

Loyola College in Maryland

Stephen D. Miles

Editor Rodney L. Petersen, executive director of the Boston Theological Institute, describes this collection of 21 essays as an invitation to join in a conversation about what “constitutes theological literacy” that has been going on among members of BTI with a view “toward the renewal of the churches and the human community” (x). The scope of the essays, however, would be clearer and their importance left undiminished, if the work were titled “Education for” Theological Literacy, because the authors are chiefly interested in the goals and methods of the theology curriculum in university divinity schools, schools of theology, and seminaries.

P. groups the essays under five headings and provides a short introduction to each part. He explains that the essays in part 1 explore “the real thing” that theology seeks to communicate and to whom it is trying to communicate it. David Tracy of the University of Chicago's Divinity School outlines the context of the conversation. Many students, he says, come to a university with a religious tradition “in the hope of finding... a community that unites thought and action to help one find some coherent way to both a ‘reflective life’ and an ethically and religiously informed ‘lived life’.” Three “fatal separations,” however, inhibit their ability to reflect on the relation between education and culture: the separations of feeling and thought, form and content, and theory and practice (15). In spite of many obstacles Tracy finds that theological education holds great promise for joining these separations.

Part 2, “Theology and Institutional Expression,” confronts the alienation of many from the Church and the public character of theological education in dealing with ethical and cultural issues. Raymond Helmick, professor of ecumenical theology at Boston College, writes the lead essay, “Where Catholicism Has Been, and Where It Is Going.” The articles in part 3, “Hermeneutics: How We Understand and Interpret the Bible,” argue that cultural pluralism calls for a new approach to the understanding and interpretation of Christian Scriptures. Notable among the essays in this part is Francis Clooney’s “Reading the World Religiously: Literate Christianity in a World of Many Religions.” The six essays of part 4, “The Rhetoric of Theology,” deal with challenges that confront preaching and teaching. The two essays in the final part, “Theological Literacy in Seminary and University,” add little to what other authors had already said.

P.’s introduction to each part is “designed to tie together articles that move in significant and, at times, different directions” (xx). The introductions highlight the theme(s) in each essay and helpfully identify each author’s perspective, but they do not succeed in showing how the authors are in conversation with one another. The essays are self-contained and only loosely stitched together by a common concern for theological education, but most are substantive and a few provocative.

In one of the more substantive articles Robert Cummings Neville, dean
of the School of Theology at Boston University, explores “The Complexity of Theological Literacy.” He singles out four problem areas in constructing a manageable curriculum: theological identity, theological expression, theological truth, and theological engagement. With regard to the first, he exposes the inherent limitation in approaching theology through church history. “For some of us,” he writes, the historical trajectory went pretty straight from Jerusalem, through Antioch, Constantinople/Athens, Rome, and Berlin en route to Boston. “For others,” there were important detours through Geneva, Amsterdam, or Canterbury. But this Jerusalem-Europe-Boston trajectory passed over the voices of women, Nestorian Christianity in Persia, Coptic Christianity in Africa, missionary activity in the Far East, and the indigenization of Christianity in Latin America. Theological literacy, he concludes, “requires a far broader understanding of Christian histories than that of one’s denomination” (43).

Among the more provocative essays is “A Prophetic Religious Education for Y2K and Beyond: And Black Boys Shall See Visions” by Fred Douglas Smith, Jr., of Pittsburgh Theological Seminary. The questions he addresses to Black youth about self-identity and life-goals must be answered by White youth and their mentors.

Thomas Groome of Boston College, in his “Wisdom for Life: The Horizon of Theological Literacy,” chides the editors for understating the most pervasive challenge. “The pressing question is not,” he writes, “in what should people be theologically informed?—literate—but rather why is there so little public interest in theology?” (353) I find that Groome’s assessment is a fair criticism of the collection as a whole. This cavil notwithstanding, theological educators should find many if not all the essays worth their time.

Catholic University of America, Washington BERARD L. MARTHALER, O.F.M.Conv.


“There are more things in heaven and earth, Horatio, Than are dreamt of in your philosophy.” Hamlet 1.5.166–67.

Harvard professor of psychology Daniel Wegner has authored a comprehensive, challenging, and amusingly written book that will be appreciated not only by psychologists, but by philosophers of science, and indeed by all readers interested in the latest thinking and exploration concerning that age-old riddle, freedom vs. determinism. The book is comprehensive because W. reviews most relevant scientific research in experimental psychology and in philosophical speculation on mind and will. The book is challenging because it presents profound arguments cleverly and wittily against the notion that free will even exists, and for the position that the experience of conscious will is illusory or imaginary.
A scientific behaviorist and philosophical determinist, W., in his ninth and final chapter, attempts fairly to register points in favor of his opponents’ stance, but without the energy, enthusiasm, and detail of the first eight. There he covers situations where feelings of involuntariness accompany behaviors like hypnosis, table-turning séances, Ouija board spelling, automatic writing, spirit possession, dissociative identity disorder, and trance channeling. More relevant still for demonstrating the separation of will from behavior is W.’s review of neurological studies of brain structure and function from which he concludes that “it is not clear that any studies of the sense of effort in movement can isolate the anatomical source of the experience of conscious will” (44).

Example after example and argument after argument pound humorously away against the day-to-day sense everyone has that one is in control of one’s life-decisions, major and minor. W. traces the experience of conscious will to three key sources: the priority, consistency, and exclusivity of the thought about the action; i.e., a thought must occur before the action (priority), be consistent with the action (consistency), and not be accompanied by other potential causes (exclusivity). Absent or incorrect information in one or more of these realms would challenge the felt/perceived link between intention and action, and contribute to the illusory and imaginary nature of free will.

I try here to present an objective report of W.’s thought, but now I admit my own philosophical perspective as existential-phenomenological in the tradition of Husserl and Merleau-Ponty. This school, rather than viewing will as an illusion, sees freedom as a central defining characteristic of the human person. But the debate is not merely between competing philosophies. W.’s claim that “free will is regularly left out of psychological theory” (324) ignores the extensive tradition of humanistic-existential psychologists from Jung through Rogers, Maslow, May, and beyond.

Rather than matching experts tit for tat, however, one might wonder why W. and his tradition strive so passionately century after century (from at least the time of David Hume) to convince their readers that conscious will is an illusion. I first taught psychology during the Vietnam War, and was surprised at how eagerly my students had embraced the deterministic position. In retrospect I am no longer puzzled that many young men, caught between being drafted and conscientious objection, desperately grasped at the doctrine that they were, at bottom, unfree. (Existentialists would interpret their reaction as inauthentic, but this carries us afield.)

Later, during the sexual revolution of the 1960s and 70s, I returned to the freedom vs. determinism debate and again found students favoring determinism as a justification—rationalization?—for their questionable morals. Counseling addictions-sufferers, I again met arguments like W.’s (though without the latter’s finesse and footnotes) to explain the inability to stop substance-abuse.

I do not, however, want to accuse W. and friends of either inauthenticity or rationalization, but rather of what might be called the “Horatian” fallacy—see the quotation at the top of this review. Behaviorists and deter-
minists are so wedded to their reductionistic modes of thinking that they miss much of what goes on “in heaven and earth.” One’s epistemological starting point determines whatever follows.

For example, W. frequently speaks of the will as an “inference,” an illogical conclusion about the sources of behavior, instead of preserving the phenomenological richness of the word experience. Who but philosophers or psychologists would ever think that “inference” accurately captures the reality of the experience of will? W.’s kindest efforts at rescuing will to safeguard morality, personal responsibility, and the legal system occur in his last chapter where he dubs conscious will the “mind’s compass,” one’s “authorship emotion.” Indeed, venturing forth from his behaviorist enclave, he writes almost like a phenomenologist about the experience of human will before concluding with his sworn allegiance to behavioristic determinism.

Perhaps the ultimate decision between free will and determinism is not a matter of philosophy, but resembles religious faith. Just as Aquinas’s proofs for the existence of God “work” only for believers, W.’s well-reasoned logic and broad research can sway only skeptical scientists, while Hamlet and his dreamer friends remain unconvinced.

Loyola College, Columbia, Md. WILLIAM J. SNECK, S.J.


This splendid book is identified in Louis Dupre’s appreciation as “the mature fruit of a lifetime of reflection by a genuine philosopher [which] may count as the most insightful treatise on Aristotelian-Thomist metaphysics to appear since Lonergan’s Insight.” If we recall that Insight appeared nearly 50 years ago, it seems about time for a fresh “reconstruction of a Thomistically-inspired metaphysics” (as Norris Clarke puts it), so let us first take its measure in relation to Insight, and then suggest why and how theologians might avail themselves of its treasure.

Blanchette displays his indebtedness to Lonergan when he insists that “metaphysics can proceed only through reflection on an actual exercise of judgment” (75). He moves into a fresh mode, as he elaborates in practice the heuristic and dialectical structure of that reflection, relying here on his critical appreciation of Heidegger (63). Yet the act of judgment remains the key to his metaphysics, as the relation between understanding and judgment mirrors the distinction of essence from existence in created being, and so offers a way to move to the source of that being. B. utilizes the history of philosophy from Parmenides on, including key figures like Suárez and Kant, to illuminate his steps. But the book remains intent on helping readers take those steps: the practice of philosophy is paramount.

The key chapters are those on the logic of being (3) and the analogy of
being (4), where B.’s manner of reflecting on judgment emerges perspicuously. He persuades us effectively of the primacy of analogous discourse, employing human being (reflecting Heidegger) as the primary analogate of being. Moreover, in introducing the “transcendentals” as “properties of being” so as to elucidate the being he has exposed, he adds “being as active” and “being as universe,” where the first underscores the activity of transcendental unity, and the second introduces the orderly diversity of beings. Part 4, “The Structure of Being,” fairly summarizes Thomistic metaphysics, culminating in chapter 14 on “Be as the Act of Determinate Being.”

B. excels, however, in the final two parts: “The Communication of Being” and “The Summit of Being.” The final chapter (17) of “Communication of Being” speaks to the order of things: “the universe as order of nature and history.” In parsing the order of nature, B. employs his primary analogate—human being—effectively to show how reductive accounts must omit crucial dimensions of the complex order of natural things, moving then to the man-made order of history. Here one misses any hint of Aquinas’s stern observation that the order of nature cannot but display more good than evil, whereas the human order manifests the complete inverse!

The chapters of most interest to theologians, expounding “The Summit of Being” (part 6), offer a sterling example of negotiating the paradoxes of transcendence/immanence, and especially those elucidating creation: it “terminates in the esse or act of being of creatures. But this does not give us any purchase on the act of creation as it flows from the Creator. It is said only from the standpoint of an act as received, that is, as limited by its essence, an essence that cannot be understood as given or even as concretely possible without its act of being” (537). So “the thought of merely possible essences or merely possible worlds does not properly enter the thought of creation as a radical ontological dependence . . . since such a “thought” is not only purely abstract, and hence removed from being in act, but also presupposes that we can rise to the standpoint of the Creator” (538).

So metaphysics culminates in theology, but of a radically negative sort. Yet carefully so, as B. moves us astutely beyond both Kant and Hegel to “affirm a totally transcendent universal first Cause of being and the idea of creation that follows from it.” Yet “in coming to this affirmation we come to understand that we cannot possibly understand what we have yet to understand in affirming a Creator” (544). This astute conclusion respects the limits of metaphysics as it also reminds theologians of the work required to explore the creation which Abrahamic believers affirm. Indeed, this hands-on inquiry reminds us again and again that there are no shortcuts.

A lingering worry remains: we are presented here with a lifetime of reflection enriched by decades of teaching, and readers are always addressed respectfully, but the dialectic endemic to philosophy is limited to classical and towering figures. Perhaps that is best, however, as a plethora
of footnotes could easily have impeded the dialogue between author and readers. I would heartily recommend that students of theology focus on the chapters noted, to glimpse the inescapably torturous ascent to “the summit of being.”

University of Notre Dame

DAVID BURRELL, C.S.C.


Against the presumption that Neoplatonism was fundamentally escapist, O’Meara argues convincingly for the existence of Neoplatonic political philosophies. Following a historical survey of the major figures in Neoplatonism, he undertakes a summary reconstruction of Neoplatonic theories of politics which nevertheless does justice to their complexity. Surprisingly, he takes divinization as the dominant metaphor for Neoplatonic political theory and shows that assimilation to divinity is the aim of politics for Plotinus, Porphyry, and Iamblichus, among others (part 1). O’M. also describes “the divinization of the state” (part 2), by way of demonstrating how the various Neoplatonic programs conform to Plato’s writings. In this context, O’M. shows that the Neoplatonists regarded a good political order as prerequisite for the successful divinization of its members. Following from this, he then briefly describes the impact of Neoplatonic political thought on Christian and Islamic writers—especially Eusebius, Augustine, Pseudo-Dionysius, and al-Farabi (part 3).

O’M.’s presentation of the material is readily accessible and his arguments are clearly structured. Even less advanced students could read the book with profit, but because the study is pioneering in many ways, advanced students and scholars will also find it noteworthy. One of the most interesting topics discussed will serve as an example. O’M. takes Plato’s Myth of the Cave as the locus classicus for Neoplatonic reflection on the need for political leaders who have already been largely assimilated to divinity. He notes the tension inherent in all forms of Neoplatonic political thought deriving from the paradoxical expectation that the leaders would have ascended to reality, but then return to the realm of illusions in order to benefit other people. Addressing this paradox gives O’M. the occasion to explore a variety of important points, such as Julian’s self-effacement vis-à-vis the traditionally high estimation of what is needed for a Platonic philosopher-king; and the conventional expectation that the Good tends to overflow into benevolence. The abundance of such fascinating and learned discussion, coupled with the breadth of material analyzed, makes this study most impressive.

It is fair to say, however, that the book is exploratory rather than conclusive. This is not a deprecatory observation. Quite simply, O’M. has opted for certain limitations from the outset; consequently several important topics are discussed either superficially or not at all. For instance,
although the book is arranged chronologically and benefits from a helpful overview of Neoplatonism, it rarely addresses in a detailed way topics of historical interest. Owing to this limitation, O’M. says little about how the authors whose works he exposits so deftly were related to one another, and therefore he says little about the development of Neoplatonic political philosophy.

Another example: readers who are unexpectedly pleased to find that divinization figures so prominently into O’M.’s assessment will likely be disappointed by the marginal treatment of Neoplatonic religion and theology. By and by he does discuss the place of religion in the divinized society, and he offers perceptive remarks about Iamblichean theurgy and prayer and makes a fascinating correlation of the Areopagite’s ecclesiastical hierarchy to the standard Neoplatonic order for a divinized society. But these illuminating asides come rather late in the book. Piety and theology were manifestly important to the figures who recur in the book—one thinks particularly of Proclus and Julian the Emperor, not to mention Plato himself. So one would think that their decision to talk of “assimilation to god” or “deification” as an ideal for society calls for serious comment. In the absence of such discussion, the preferred term “divinization” begins to seem merely like an upscale synonym for “improvement” or even “improvement in virtue,” which is surely only partially representative of the meaning of “deification.” On a related note, when O’M. turns to Augustine, he allows himself such a limited scope as to give the reader the impression of skating through the Louvre. This is regrettable because no one has previously connected Augustine’s thinking about deification with his thinking about society. Yet it would be churlish to criticize a groundbreaking study for failing to erect cathedrals. There is more than enough in this book for readers to be deeply grateful to O’M.

University of Durham

AUGUSTINE CASIDAY


How, according to Heidegger, must philosophy understand atheism? And within the historical alterations and attempted recuperations of this understanding (Heidegger’s journey), what place, if any, lies open for faith in a Christian God? This question is also Heidegger’s, but it is far more central in Hemming’s study.

H.’s analyses drive an insightful wedge between, on the one hand, those possible gods made available—though equally unviable—by Heidegger’s thinking through of the history of Being and, on the other hand, the Christian God of faith made existentially, even apocalyptically relevant through Heidegger’s construal of the human situation.

In his important study, H. utilizes two resources extensively. One is
essential: Heidegger’s own texts. These H. parses with consistent thoughtfulness and intelligence. The other is more optional and parasitical: secondary sources. H.’s use of them more often than not unnecessarily delays, if not obstructs, the searching conclusions he reaches. In short, the secondary material is seldom on a par with H.’s own exegetical insights and endorsements of Heidegger’s own texts. These insights, however, are well worth the expository delay.

Rightly H. argues that a typically unthematized, “Christianized” philosophy has served as the regrettable, because confused, locus of subsequent theological discourse in the West. One might think that because already so Christianized, such a philosophical foundation would serve the Christian faith well. But what Heidegger spent much of his career patiently showing, as H. clearly demonstrates, is that this amalgam does a disservice to both philosophy and Christian faith.

Heidegger understands philosophy through Aristotle—H.’s reading of Heidegger on the Greeks is consistently prescient—and thereby separates philosophy from theology, except in terms of Aristotle’s own pre-Christian conception of the latter. Through this separation, philosophically speaking, atheism becomes unavoidable. This atheism, however, is less a denial or negation than the demarcation of a space approached best and, in fact, only by other, decidedly non-philosophical means.

Central to H.’s account is a very close reading of the controversial “turn” (Kehre) in Heidegger’s thought. Though not specifically mentioned in H.’s exposition, Habermas’s hostile reading of Heidegger’s turn as in part an abdication of responsibility for his problematically collaborative relationship with Nazism cannot but hover in most readers’ minds. Did Heidegger’s philosophical path, obfuscatingly sacralized and ontologized, get transmuted into an account of a now separated, autonomous, and epochal History of Being? For many it has been hard not to see the Heideggerian turn as at least an abandonment of the centrality of Dasein and perhaps as an abdication and exit from philosophical thinking altogether. Altogether insightfully, H. shows that this is by no means the case. Dasein, and especially its temporality, remain central to Heidegger throughout.

H.’s concern is clearly not political, but what is best called philosophico-spiritual. Working in a more fundamental way than that of political biography, he seeks to contextualize an ongoing theological concern with atheism within an understanding of “the authentic voice of Dasein.” On this reading—correct, I believe—the political is founded, but is not fundamental. And H.’s textual analyses are convincing—because of which his critical use of Karl Löwith as a foil is unnecessary.

The turn (Kehre) is the saying of the event (das Ereignis), otherwise understood as the “moment” (Augenblick). But what is “event” to mean? And how is our understanding of our human situation connected with “occurrence”? Answers to each of these questions involve us in circumstances behind and beyond Greek metaphysics. H. articulates this circumstance convincingly. In Being and Time Heidegger worked toward an intensification of the human situation, on the basis of which not only could
the human be radically personalized and made more responsive, but Being itself would be more perspicuously revealed. Some, of course, have thereby contrasted the earlier and later Heidegger, existentializing the former and making the later Heidegger a politically evasive sycophant for an ontologically ineffable Being. H., however, makes a most persuasive case—a major strength of his book—for the continuity of the earlier and later Heidegger. He argues forcefully, yet also subtly, that rather than signaling a departure from the project of *Being and Time*, the later Heidegger provides a more original and insightful means of engaging with *Being and Time*'s problematic: the cultivation of the authentic voice of *Dasein* in and through its “calling” (ambiguity intended).

H. has written an important work. It transcends the alternative interpretations that serve as its foils. It deserves serious attention from anyone who would closely explore Heidegger's religious views.

*Pomona College, Claremont, Calif.*

Stephen A. Erickson
SHORTER NOTICES


This is a rather peculiar book. The reader familiar with the wide range of opinions in contemporary biblical scholarship, especially the sometimes esoteric field of hermeneutics, would probably find the book challenging and refreshing. The less trained reader might have a rough time of it, especially since the study’s approach is primarily anthropological rather than theological or even biblical. Lang, a distinguished scholar, rarely makes a distinction in this book between well established positions in the field and controversial minority opinions. What is more, there is an unusual mix of basic matter with the most obscure and theoretical. Nonetheless there is much in the book to recommend.

The study’s structure is based on the many works of the anthropologist Georges Dumézil (d. 1986) who analyzed the social, religious, and institutional dimensions of early polytheistic Indo-European cultures under three interlocking, broad categories: wisdom-rulers, victory-warriors, life-fertility. L. expands the third of these to give five categories in all, and applies them as hermeneutic tools for understanding the Hebrew God: Lord of wisdom, Lord of war, Lord of the animals, Lord of the individual (the “personal God”), and Lord of the harvest.

The strength of this approach is that these classifications often yield fresh insights into the Hebrew perception of the divine, and situates Yahweh more closely within the wider understanding of the divine in antecedent (and even subsequent) Near Eastern and European cultures. Particularly useful are the studies of the attributes of Near Eastern divinities absorbed into the Yahweh cult. The weakness of this approach is in its artificiality. L. often seems to tell the Old Testament authors what they really mean when they describe their God, rather than paying adequate attention to what they are actually saying. Nor does he really analyze the characterizations of God within Israel’s social structures. Some of L.’s conclusions seem forced and oversimplified, especially when he ventures into the New Testament.

WILLIAM J. FULCO, S.J.
Loyola Marymount University, Los Angeles

A BIBLICAL THEOLOGY OF EXILE. By Daniel L. Smith-Christopher. Overtures
This book deserves a place on the bookshelves of biblical scholars, social ethicists, and ecclesiologists alike. Published 23 years after Ralph Klein’s *Israel in Exile* (1979), it is the second volume on exile in the Overtures to Biblical Theology series. S.-C.’s fresh contribution rejects an antiquarian understanding of biblical theology as merely a matter of excavating what ancient Israelites thought and believed, and offers an approach that incorporates insights from culture studies, diaspora studies, and postcolonial criticism.

S.-C. draws on the work of John Howard Yoder, Stanley Hauerwas, and Walter Brueggemann to propose a diasporic paradigm for Christian theology for our times, when what Yoder called the Constantinian paradigm is crumbling. As S.-C. notes, “The easy identification of church, society, and nation that has served Western Christians for centuries is becoming increasingly difficult in the modern secular society. Much of the present identity crisis boils down to a loss of power and influence—a loss of moral power because of a history of compromise, and thus a loss of authority behind most attempts at persuasion” (191). S.-C. argues convincingly that now is the time “to end the colonization of Christian biblical theology by the Davidic state with its nostalgia for power and see a future of ‘critical localism’ or ‘creative diasporic existence’ in Babylon” (198).

S.-C. constructs his argument on a solid foundation of historical research on the Babylonian Exile. He builds on his earlier works—*The Religion of the Landless* (1989) and other studies presented here in expanded form, including the reassessment of the historical and sociohistorical impact of the Babylonian Exile that now appears as chapter 2 (27–73)—and incorporates an interpretation of the prophet Ezekiel’s strange behavior in the light of trauma studies and post-traumatic stress disorder (75–104). C.-S.’s careful reading of diasporic biblical texts that range from the Deuteronomistic History to Daniel is influenced by the insights of James Scott’s *Domination and the Arts of Resistance* (1990).

The book includes an index of biblical passages but lacks author and subject indexes, tools that would have made this excellent book even more useful. This quibble, however, does not diminish S.-C.’s contribution.

JEAN-PIERRE RUIZ
St. John’s University, Jamaica, N.Y.

How does gender function in Hebrew Bible narratives about women, and what are implications for women seeking to navigate the murky waters of sexual politics today? These questions drive Lillian Klein’s stimulating literary-critical analysis of female characterization of selected figures (Deborah and Jael, Hannah, Bathsheba, Michal) who appear in several books (Judges, Esther, Job).

Male need for power and control together with male fear of female power emerge as dominant, though sometimes subtle, factors in how female characters are portrayed. K. discovers that biblical men desire women who are intelligent and display initiative—as long as they do so within the constraints of patriarchal mores. She discerns an amazing resilience in the female characters, an ability to live meaningful lives within male-imposed restrictions and sometimes to expand the boundaries delineating male and female gender roles. The stories of these women, she concludes, remain inherently relevant for contemporary life.

K. employs sociological, psychological, and ethnological methodologies to supplement her literary analyses. This broadening of method is both a strength and a limitation of the book. For example, while opening new horizons of interpretation, the grid she uses to read Esther seems to impose on the text a tighter structure than the text itself sug-
gests. The same is true of her reading of Bathsheba as a temptress, Hannah as a socially marginalized victim of verbal attacks, and Michal as responsible for her barrenness. K. freely imputes emotions and motivations to characters, sometimes beyond what the biblical texts imply. Her primarily literary analysis of the characterization of Job’s wife and of womb imagery in the book is excellent in its attention to the form of the text and its language.

This readable book will be a valuable resource for clergy, seminary students, and laity interested in understanding and navigating biblical and contemporary worlds of sexual politics.

GWEN SAYLER
Wartburg Theological Seminary, Dubuque


Augustine’s understanding of the pilgrim’s spiritual life is best embodied in his *cor inquietum*, an image that has played a central role in Western theological and philosophical thought. Martin’s book surveys the importance of Augustine’s religious vision from late antiquity up to our own day. M.’s work stands apart from other such introductions by focusing on the rule of Augustine, arguing that it is this single work that played a constant role in the West’s religious revivals in a way that his other more specialized writings did not. Mindful of the textual problems associated with the rule, Martin nonetheless traces how this guide to Christian living “strove to make holiness real, where [Augustine’s] theology showed itself not as a theory for public disputation but as a practice for living in love” (56).

Historically we come to see how the rule was responsible for not only the Augustinian revival and the spread of the Victorines in the 12th century but also the 13th century Hermits of Augustine and the “Augustinian Revival” of the later Middle Ages. Both sides of the 16th century also relied on the Bishop of Hippo. Calvin and Luther stressed the indispensable role of grace, while such Catholic Reformers as Jerome Seripando used Augustine’s rule and its legacy in trying to hold his own monasteries together. The final chapter turns to the use of Augustine in modernity and postmodernity. Obviously the rule is not so much in question here, but from the Jansenist controversy, to Descartes, to Derrida, it is clear that Augustine has remained a living voice, giving expression to the wondering mind and the restless heart.

DAVID VINCENT MECONI, S.J.
Oxford University


A brilliant achievement that will continue to enlighten, this compact book is the only (and lively) English translation of a work that Chenu first published in 1959. C. was especially noted for applying the historical method to texts of Aquinas and for interpreting those texts against the foreground of various contemporary questions of his day. Why this reinsertion of C.’s voice into today’s discussions about Aquinas’s theology? Not simply for archival purposes, though it is helpful to remember that the historical method in Thomistic studies is itself the product of books such as this. Rather, C.’s method of mining has tapped some rich veins in Aquinas’s thought that yield precious theological metal still able to be admired.

Here we find Aquinas the studious friar preacher and master in sacred theology, who heralded a new postfeudal Christianity in dialogue with a multireligious world. C. touches upon many of the most crucial elements for situating Aquinas and his theology: monasticism amidst a fading feudal society, the new universities and mendicant orders, Islamic thought and culture, and the struggle between conservative Augustinians and radical Aristotelians to win over the best minds of the new social order. He emphasizes that Aquinas, while solidly rooted in a contemplative
spirituality, also played a vital role in the raucous and free-wheeling discourse of his day.

C. provides a series of intellectually stimulating insights, including his treatment of why religious mendicancy was such a threat to the feudal world; the idea that Aquinas’s spirituality rests on the sanctity of intelligence and the holiness of truth; and Aquinas’s distinction between the nature of religion, with its highly ramified network of social expectations, and the loving freedom of the contemplative, together with his argument for the “mixed” life as the highest form of devotion to God. One of Aquinas’s most profound theological achievements, well described by C., is his magisterial treatment of the nature/grace problematic, in which he establishes that human reality, in all its secular self-consistency, is both distinct from and also desirous of grace.

GREGORY ROCCA, O.P.
Dominican School of Philosophy and Theology, Berkeley


This useful volume focuses on Vincenzo Querini (1479–1514), a Venetian patrician who enjoyed early success as a diplomat representing the Republic at the important court of Burgundy and undertaking missions to Spain and the imperial court. In 1512, however, he entered the monastery at Camaldoli with a view to reforming the order and the Church, only to die at Rome in 1514. Sharing the spotlight are two other patrician friends, Tommaso Giustiniani (1476–1528) and the later cardinal, Gasparo Contarini (1483–1542). The three of them initially formed the heart of a student group at the University of Padua in the 1490s that later gathered regularly to study Scripture and the Fathers.

B. nicely sketches the historical context especially of the Italian wars that began with the French invasion in 1494 and created a crisis for Venice; he then describes in detail the process by which Querini and Giustiniani eventually decided to take up the eremetical life, while Contarini opted for a Christian life in the world. The three friends frequently discussed the relative merits of the active and the contemplative life and the proper attitude toward humanist study. B.’s later chapters discuss their ideas about church reform formulated especially in the Libellum ad Leonem X drawn up by Querini and Giustiniani for the Fifth Lateran Council that opened in 1512.

B. argues persuasively for a continuity in thought about reform before and after 1517 and from well before the Fifth Lateran Council to the Council of Trent, and he supports an emerging more positive evaluation of religious life and especially of monasticism in Italy on the eve of the Reformation. The book also contributes to the upgrading of the seriousness and importance of Lateran V advanced by Nelson Minnich and others. Finally, B. argues against a sharp division of the later Italian Catholic reformers into the spirituali and intransigenti, contending convincingly, as have other recent scholars, that their differences have been exaggerated.

ROBERT BIRELEY, S.J.
Loyola University, Chicago


These ground-breaking works on England are quite different. Each has its worth if read with a discerning eye.

Rory McEntegart persuasively revises the conventional wisdom among scholars that Henry VIII’s negotiations with the League of Schmalkalden were a mere reflection of his diplomatic interests in Europe. By carefully follow-
ing the negotiations recorded in archives in Europe and in England, M. substantiates that not only was Henry willing to join the League, but he was sincerely committed to theological interchange with the Germans to guide his own policies toward the Church of England. In particular, Henry wanted a dialogue in England with Philipp Melanchthon. The Germans, however, insisted on conformity to the Augsburg Confession, refused to send Melanchthon to England, and dragged their feet in dispatching a competent team for theological discussion with Henry that the Evangelical party in England hoped would influence Henry toward greater reform. As a result, England never joined the League; the evangelicals lost out for a time to a more conservative faction in England; Henry decapitated his loyal servant, Thomas Cromwell; and wrote his Act of Six Articles affirming private masses, communion in one kind, vows of chastity, priestly celibacy, and the necessity of auricular confession (1539). Cromwell was inclined toward Lutheranism (136), had corresponded clandestinely with the Germans, and had encouraged Henry’s marriage to the supposedly unattractive Anne of Cleves. Cromwell was no Sacramentarian (134).

Both books are lively and captivating, but they differ in various ways: M. deals with the highest echelons of society, the king and the circle around him, Norman Jones studies a spectrum of individuals chosen from a cross section of literate society; M. considers the Continent, J. confines his study to England; M. uses archival sources, J. relies more on printed works; finally, M. appears to be sympathetic to the evangelical faction in England, J. has his hesitations about the religious and cultural changes brought by the Reformation.

Using vignettes of Englishmen and women such as John Donne, J. argues that English religious and cultural adaptations to the Reformation were difficult, often unwelcome, and occurred over a three- to four-generational period that left members of English families in different religious camps. In accord with the views of recent scholars such as Eamon Duffy and Christopher Haigh, J. argues that Catholic practices were deep-rooted and lingered long. Although there was a hardening attitude toward recusants, labeled papists, during the reign of Elizabeth I (1558–1603), royal policies were mitigated by local magistrates who effectively ruled England. There was a relatively broad acceptance of beliefs and practices, and English society avoided civil war. A flip side of this broad church attitude was that with no sure authority on what to believe and do, people were thrown back onto conscience for ethical decision-making and rationalized their behavior, especially in the financial and economic sphere. Blasphemy, drinking, and sport on Sunday loomed large as errors replacing more significant issues. As for shortcomings in these books, there is little to complain of in M.’s careful and persuasive analysis. He could have pointed out that Martin Luther supported auricular confession and confessed regularly. J. appears too little cognizant of the impact of the Continent on England. Instead of faulting indigenous forces, he could have clarified the influence of Geneva’s discipline on England’s growing control of drunkenness, blasphemy, and lax church attendance. Both books provoke thought and are well worth reading.

JEANNINE E. OLSON
Rhode Island College, Providence


This important entry to the ambitious series, The Other Voice in Early Modern Europe, presents selected writings of Jacqueline Pascal (1625–1661), eternally linked—where she is known at all—with her better-known older brother, Blaise. Born third and last in her upper-class Parisian family, Jacqueline entered the Port-Royal convent in 1652 against her parents’ wishes. She died nine years later as Soeur Jacqueline de Sainte Euphémie, a novice mis-
tress whose novices had been turned out by ecclesiastical authority.

P.’s life in Port-Royal spans the angriest years of official responses to Jansenism. Her own beliefs shine mixed oil and water: they may display Jansenism, but they also clearly present a woman who thought for herself. She taught by example and exemplified what she taught.

John Conley’s selections from P.’s works trace her life against a 17th-century backdrop guarded by men. He presents clear translations of her early poetry—she was known in polite society as a child prodigy—and of her treatise “On the Mystery of the Death of Our Lord Jesus Christ,” written before she entered Port-Royal. The autobiographical “Report” to her prioress details P.’s determination to break the connection between dowry and religious profession, a necessity in her case as her family refused to relinquish her portion of her father’s estate to her dowry. P.’s humiliation underscores Port-Royal’s efforts to allow women to live religious vocations independent of family approval.

P.’s “Rule for Children” details students’ horaria, clearly aimed at development of their interior lives. As Port-Royal came under increasing scrutiny, her “Interrogation” by Monsieur Louis Bail, a cleric imposed as convent superintendent by Louis XIV, belayed his fears as quickly as it belied her intelligence. Other letters and memoirs round out the collection of pieces that display the wiles and will of a woman intent on living her own life.

One flaw may be shared by the other books of the series: the typeface is too small to allow easy reading of a masterful translation of a mistress of the intellect.

Phyllis Zagano
Hofstra University, Hempstead, N.Y.


The tercentenary of Wesley’s birth sparked the publication of several new biographies. Among these, Lord Hattersley’s has drawn the most fanfare.

H. brings a unique perspective and set of gifts to this volume. He is a former British politician who turned to journalism, with a focus on cultural criticism. While he is self-avowedly agnostic, he has an appreciation for the impact that religion has made upon British culture. Thus he approaches Wesley as an interested outsider, not as an apologist. He also approaches Wesley very much as one shaped by 20th-century culture.

The greatest strength of the volume is its style. H. writes with an ease and a narrative freshness surpassing those of any other major biography of Wesley. Moreover, he focuses attention on the kinds of issues modern readers are likely to raise about prominent leaders. In particular, he gives more extended—and candid—treatment of Wesley’s bumbling relationships with women than any prior study. He also offers perceptive analyses of the political dynamics of Wesley’s struggle to control the growing Methodist movement.

But these strengths are counterbalanced by limitations in H.’s qualifications and perspective. In the first place, he draws only haphazardly on more recent scholarship on Wesley and ends up reproducing several of the inaccuracies of earlier treatments. Second, his admitted lack of knowledge of the history of theology often leads him to misunderstand Wesley’s stance, or to attribute to Wesley as an innovation stances well established in the tradition (see 263 and 383). Third, he shares the modern tendency to “explain” spirituality in terms that essentially reduce it to psychological or sociological dynamics—for example, his comments on Wesley’s letters of spiritual advice to women (296–97).

In short, the book will be helpful to readers seeking another perspective to enrich their understanding of the dynamics of Wesley’s life and ministry, but it is not reliable for either summarizing the current state of Wesley scholarship or providing guidance about the theological dimensions of Wesley’s work.

Randy L. Maddox
Seattle Pacific University, Seattle
Ivan Gagarin (1814–1882) is hardly a household name in Catholic circles today. Yet this Orthodox Russian émigré, scion of a distinguished and politically powerful family, who moved to Paris at age 24, became a notable presence in 1842, when—much to the rage of his family and compatriots—he converted to Catholicism and two years later became a Jesuit. His unceasing dream was to reunite Russian Orthodoxy to Roman Catholicism, but only on the most "unionist" of terms. To achieve this goal, he argued that Russia needed to admit its own religious and cultural backwardness, and, confessing its errors, return to the Mother Church and absorb the cultural superiority of Catholic Western Europe. To promote this mission, he founded in 1856, with two other Jesuits, the journal Études de théologie, de philosophie, et d'histoire, the predecessor of today's highly regarded Études.

The model of church union he proposed was doomed from the start, since it was a thinly veiled form of proselytism, charged with antipathy for Orthodoxy and for Russian spiritual and cultural values. Gagarin's apostolate was further hindered by his acerbic personality and brusque dealings with others, including his fellow Jesuits.

Beshoner’s fascinating and thoroughly researched study includes an account of Polish and Russian reactions to Gagarin’s initiatives. It shows also how Gagarin, for better or worse, influenced persons such as Pope Pius IX and Vladimir Soloviev. The Russian ecclesiologist Alexei Khomiakov was driven to compose his famous treatise on sobornost in reaction to Gagarin. B. provides additional chapters that discuss the convent’s activities in the Middle East, among the Bulgarians and Byzantine Catholics. The concluding chapter outlines Gagarin’s blunt suggestions for the reform of the Russian clergy.

The volume is a valuable resource for understanding some misguided approaches of Catholicism toward Orthodoxy. It also sheds light on reasons for the slow pace of ecumenism within the Slavic sphere of influence and why even today the Moscow Patriarchate is unwilling to welcome the pope to Russia.

Michael A. Fahey, S.J.
Marquette University, Milwaukee


Few English speakers know the life and writings of Alfred Delp, S.J., as only a small portion of his works and letters has been translated from the original German, and not much about him has appeared in English. To her credit Mary Frances Coady has reproduced interesting and important selections from the time of Delp’s imprisonment in Berlin to help remedy that problem.

Perhaps the book’s most important contribution is its witness to Delp, among others, who actively resisted National Socialism. While this book may not put to rest the question of whether the Roman Catholic Church, particularly its hierarchy, did enough to combat national socialism, it shows, at least, the commitment and determination of Catholics and Protestants alike, who paid with their lives to try to bring about a new social order.

The book, however, is not without its problems. C. was hampered in her project by an apparent lack of facility in German, little or no familiarity with the entire corpus of Delp’s writings, and an unawareness of the inner workings of the Society of Jesus, especially in Germany during World War II. Consequently, her presentation of Delp lacks context, depth, and nuance, resulting in a distorted portrait.

Sections of the book appear to have been fictionalized for effect, notably the account of Delp’s arrest. Mistranslations of the German sometimes render the exact opposite meaning of Delp’s words. Factual errors appear throughout, and there are scurrilous speculations—all undocumented—about his personal life and psychological health.
The simple truth and irony of Delp’s life are compelling and dramatic enough to capture the reader’s imagination without the added fanciful features. Had C. been more accurate and straightforward, this could have been a more important book than it actually is.

ALAN C. MITCHELL
Georgetown University, Washington


The volume is the product of a collaborative study undertaken by the Program for the Analysis of Religion among Latinos/as in the United States and the Department of Socio-Religious Studies of the Center for Psychological and Sociological Research in Cuba. The essays analyze Pope John Paul II’s historic 1998 visit to the island in the context of the sociohistorical development of Cuban religion, including Catholicism, Evangelicalism, religious expressions of African origin, and Catholicism among Cuban-Americans.

The great value of the collection lies in the breadth of its approach. By treating the papal visit as a key moment—yet only one moment—in the rich, variegated history of Cuban religiosity, the authors have given us a volume that could serve as a fine introduction to the particular features of Cuban religiosity, especially Cuban Catholicism, and the changing role of religion in Cuban society over the years.

At the same time, the essays focus on the dramatic impact that the papal visit has had as a catalyst for spiritual renewal in Cuba and for reconciliation between resident Cubans and Cuban-Americans. That both of these recent phenomena are still at a fragile point in their development only underscores the importance of fostering a deeper, more nuanced understanding of Cuban religiosity and Cuban society as the inevitability of a post-Castro Cuba grows ever nearer. With an eye toward that future, the essays also include insightful observations about the obstacles, challenges, and possibilities that lie ahead, if the processes of spiritual renewal and reconciliation are to develop further.

ROBERTO S. GOIZUETA
Boston College


Anyone who thinks that the issue of the source, or the sources, of episcopal power is a mere theoretical question with no practical consequences should read this book. So should all others who are interested in the impact that theological positions can have on people’s daily lives. When the bishop’s charism was seen—in the first millennium—as an indivisible gift conferred in toto by the sacrament, the local churches enjoyed a fair autonomy. When it was perceived—mainly from the twelfth century—as a composite of two elements coming from distinct sources, that is, the power to consecrate from the sacrament and the power to govern (jurisdiction) from the pope, the trend toward centralization gained a mighty ideological support.

The Second Vatican Council restored the ancient and holistic vision of the unique source of the episcopal power: the Holy Spirit gives it in its entirety in the act of ordination. The practical consequences of this fresh assertion of our old tradition are again far-reaching: the task of the pope is not to grant power but to insert persons vested with power in the Spirit into the organic body of the Church; the bishops are accountable first to the Spirit and then to the pope; a theological bond in the Spirit among the bishops is real and existing before any juridical framework for “collegiality” is installed. There is a good foundation for a healthy interaction between primacy and episcopacy.

The task of creating (and restoring) structures, norms, and policies according to this classical and modern vision is likely to be arduous, lengthy, and not without resistance. But historically well-
grounded studies and balanced propositions—as we find them in Villemin’s study—will be of great help in recovering our heritage and fulfilling the council’s intent.

LADISLAS ORSY, S.J.
Georgetown University Law Center, Washington


This interesting volume allows readers a glimpse into the world of conservative evangelical thought perhaps unfamiliar to many readers of this journal. The references do not include many of the contemporary names associated with the trinitarian controversies that attempt to reconcile the Nicene tradition of the relations between God the Father and the Logos with the current situation of Christian women. Giles bases his argument on retrieval and refinement of the ancient trinitarian tradition to show that the lack of subordination between Father and Son provides a basis for a nonhierarchical, complementary interpretation of the relation between contemporary Christian men and women. He thus argues for an “egalitarian-complementarian” reading of Scripture.

To bolster his case, G. uses the slavery tradition of the Bible itself and shows that some evangelicals (uncomfortably) believe that the Bible legitimates slavery, while others hold that it merely regulates an institution already in place. He claims that everyone today rightly rejects slavery and uses the parallel biblical exhortations to slaves and women to be subordinate to demonstrate that the Bible must be interpreted for our time, that is, historically—a reading, he argues, that is not “eisegesis” but genuine exegesis. G. posits a new rule for the correct theological reading of Scripture on the man-woman relation: “All texts that speak of the equality of the sexes speak of God’s ultimate eschatological ideal; all texts that speak of the subordination of women are culturally limited, time bound, practical advice to women living in a culture that took for granted the subordination of women. They do not apply in our age” (268).

In Appendix C, G. takes up the test case of homosexuality, insisting that culture should not determine theology but should only be taken into consideration—a consideration that makes theology a never-ending task. Further, G. sees a huge difference between the issue of the equality and freedom of women as women—a matter of justice and equity—and the primarily ethical question of same-sex relations. Here G. emphasizes the distinction between homosexual orientation and homosexual acts. He holds that nowhere does the Bible, whose emphasis is on justice, dignity, and freedom, condone such acts.

G.’s perspective is not very different from the conservative Catholic views that perpetuate the culture wars of today.

ANNE CARR
University of Chicago


The book synthesizes a great deal of recent scholarship in ecclesiology in a clear and succinct way, covering many topics but offering a focused vision of the Church as a community whose essence is proclaiming and living the kingdom of Christ. Fuellenbach, professor of theology at the Gregorian University, begins with New Testament data about Christ’s stress on the mission of the faith community, discusses Vatican II’s ecclesial ideas, and evaluates various models of the Church. His lengthy section on the institutional model dwells on the imperative need of the hierarchy to recognize again today the prophetic and charismatic elements of the faith community.

Perhaps the most informative section of the book is the 40-page chapter on “Two Models for the Future Church”: the Basic Ecclesial Communities and
what F. calls a “Contrast Society.” In discussing the BECs he offers useful information on the workings and successes of these communities in not only Latin America but also Africa and Asia. His evaluative comments on them reflect the same thoughtful and centrist standpoint characteristic of the book as a whole.

But F. especially urges that the Church from here on should be a contrast society, presenting to a world marred by violence and oppression God’s own alternative, namely, a worshipping community that really lives the very different values of justice and compassion. This contrast society should not and need not have an exclusive and elitist character. It would have been interesting had F. made some comment on the burgeoning new Catholic movements like the controversial Neo-Catechumenate, which seem to have a great deal of vitality in some respects but show fundamentalist traits in other ways. The book presents a very clear, intelligent, and scholarly discussion of many current ecclesiological issues.

RICHARD F. COSTIGAN, S.J.
Loyola University, Chicago


Luke Gormally’s collection of 22 essays is the product of an international conference sponsored by the Linacre Centre to examine the significance of John Paul II’s encyclical Evangelium vitae (1995) for healthcare ethics. The majority of the essays examine the intersection of social ethics and bioethics in terms of the influence of culture, political theory, and legislation on the valuing of life, but they rarely relate these topics to healthcare ethics in particular. The authors represent a variety of disciplines, including theology, philosophy, law, and medicine, but the essays tend not to reflect the interdisciplinary dialogue that presumably occurred at such a conference.

In contrast with Kevin Wildes and Alan Mitchell’s Choosing Life: A Dialogue on Evangelium Vitae (1997) in which symposium participants analyzed specific aspects of the encyclical, G.’s book uses the encyclical as a source for themes to develop. John Finnis defends the papal claim that secularism is the root of the culture of death. Robert George critically engages the arguments of John Rawls and Ronald Dworkin to argue that “contemporary liberalism is the political theory of the culture of death” (49). Dermot Fenlon and Kateryna Fedoryka Cuddeback echo John Paul II’s disapproval of population control, with the former focusing on the influence of 19th-century England and the latter focusing on 20th-century developments.

Abortion is the bioethical issue that receives the most attention, whether in relationship to political theory and action (including both legislation and active resistance) or to a proposed pastoral response to post-abortive women, which could benefit from Theresa Burke’s insights in Forbidden Grief: The Unspoken Pain of Abortion (2002). Two physicians with extensive experience practicing medicine in sub-Saharan Africa helpfully draw attention to the devastating effects of pregnancy complications and AIDS in their context. Robert Walley’s essay in particular presents two case studies that could serve as a basis for theological and ethical analysis of the impact of poverty, gender, and culture on health.

ANGELA SENANDER
Boston College


Noting that moral theology has tended to become arid and lifeless whenever it has neglected Scripture, and that biblical exegesis risks “falling into antiquarianism and irrelevancy” (13) when it becomes disconnected from other theological disciplines, this
book heeds the call of Vatican Council II to develop a more biblically informed moral theology. By collaborating, Harrington and Keenan bring together their respective specialties in New Testament studies (H.) and moral theology (K.), effectively making the medium part of the message.

The authors argue that virtue ethics can be the “bridge” between New Testament studies and moral theology precisely because “virtue language naturally arises from the Bible” (197), and their book can be read as an extended argument in support of this claim. The meaning and power of Scripture’s moral vision is found, they argue, not in action-guiding rules and principles but through the paradigmatic models of virtuous characters we meet in the Bible. “Jesus is himself the lesson we seek to know: we seek virtues so as to be more like him” (69). Similarly, the moral standard for Paul is to be found “not in particular types of actions but rather in particular types of persons, Christ-bearers” that Paul urges his readers to become (70).

A real strength of the book is its demonstration of the concrete difference a biblically-informed virtue ethic can make to discussions of contemporary moral issues, such as marriage and divorce, homosexuality, celibacy, abortion, environmental ethics, and economic justice. Given the collaborative intent and structure of the book, however, it is somewhat disappointing that H. and K. do not engage each other more directly than they do. They are clear, however, that the book is but an initial step toward the goal of a biblically based moral theology—not the final word. They have made a significant contribution toward that end.

JAMES P. BAILEY
Duquesne University, Pittsburgh


This volume gathers 17 previously published and subsequently revised essays. They span a wide range of topics, including the relation of theology and science, time and creation in the light of modern physics and cosmology, theology and extraterrestrial life, resurrection and science, and a variety of ethical issues—challenges posed by genetic developments, cloning, the use of embryonic stem cells, designer children, germ-line intervention, and the disposal of hazardous waste.

Taken individually and as a whole, the essays represent a dialogue between science and theology, illustrating Peter’s view of a revolution in the science-theology relationship. What he calls “hypothetical consonance” entails not only mutual respect between the disciplines, but also a mutual engagement in the search for truth. Each should contribute to the other and, together, enhance our understanding of one reality. While not all will agree with P.’s analyses, they are intriguing, and P.’s project is necessary and critical to the future of theology.

P.’s treatment of the ethical issues is less satisfying. While those discussions are highly informative, the ethical analyses are inadequate. P. generally identifies the ethical challenges well, but he ultimately resolves them in favor of beneficence, choice, and the hope of a better future, the latter highly influenced by his own view of creation and eschatology. “Our ethical vision cannot acquiesce with present reality; it must press on to a still better future and employ human creativity with its accompanying genetic technology to move us toward that end” (216). His approach seems overly optimistic. It places too much hope in science and the future, too easily dismisses present and past insights and wisdom, and does not take sufficient account of the effects of sin.

Most of P.’s ethical positions differ from those of the Catholic tradition (his critique of the commodification of children being one exception). This is not, however, a reason for not studying this volume. The book is informative and thought provoking. Like science and the scientists of which he speaks, P. is a dialogue partner in the search for truth.

RONALD P. HAMEL
The Catholic Health Association, St. Louis

Wadell has written an interesting and, in many respects, timely book, primarily because it explores Christian worship and friendship in the contemporary American scene driven by consumerism, individualism, and a fast-paced culture (21, 41, 44, 47–49). W. probes deeply the obstacles to a practice of “true friendship” and “intimacy” with God, communities, and friends and suggests ways of forging more “rigorous” forms of discipleship that are transformative and long-lasting (12, 15, 53, 65, 78–95). He describes how this “friendship” bears the potential and the promise for “a new identity” and “a new way of life” (21). The book’s thesis is that “it is through the rituals and practices of Christian worship that we discern the shape of the Christian life and begin to acquire the virtues and dispositions that are essential to that life” (11).

Although the bounds of worship are taken up with care in all eight chapters, W. never seems to develop his central idea. It is evident, for example, to state that we become friends of God “in worship and liturgy,” especially “when we listen to the Word of God, open our lives to receive it, and learn from one another what it means to live that Word faithfully” (25). It is important to articulate this practice of Christian love, especially its capacity to challenge and transform how we relate to others and ourselves, and how we understand God’s call for discipleship and justice, but to belabor this idea throughout is not particularly useful for the overall development of the various ideas broached in the book.

W.’s use of classical figures in Christian thought and moral philosophy could be valuable, but he does not build on their ideas. He simply uses them to make different points about friendship and worship in Christian life. He also draws from literature, but again his examples do not advance his argument. His illustrations clarify his points, but his main ideas are not especially difficult. Despite these limitations, the book is a good introduction for undergraduates exploring issues of love, friendship, and justice in the history of moral philosophy and classical ethics.

MIGUEL A. SEGOVIA
Brown University, Providence, R.I.


This small book is by the Director of the Office of Theology for the Canadian Bishops’ Conference, who is also a stained glass artist. He points out that our culture has generally belittled imagination by confining it to the entertainment world and marginal groups like artists and poets. The Church too has seen imagination as unreliable, and has failed to heed imaginal experience of its members in areas of originality, passion, nonrational thought, theopoiesis, creativity, and playfulness. Côté argues that imagination is a constitutive dimension of faith itself, enticing one to faith, hope, and love by calling us beyond the seen to the possible. Reason informs the intellect and forces assent, imagination opens to the unseen and invites or hinders commitment. It respects freedom. Lazarus is a symbol of “boundary crossing”—what imagination does best. The resurrection of the Christian imagination is “long overdue.”

Part 1 of the book deals with our everyday experience of imagination and of its demise from the Church today in liturgy, language and communication, and sacred art. Part 2 treats imagination itself and its gift of connecting individual and context, past, present, and future, reason and imagination, and many other polarities. It is grounded in geography and earth but opens to spirit. Part 3 makes applications to images of evil past and present, to our present day “gods,” and to the need for a “polytheistic imagination” in dealing with the complex world of today. The book concludes with an image of our day as a desert crossing, a wilderness where what is needed is flexibility and creativity more than a return to tried and true.
forms. We need imagination that “creates the future.”

C. identifies and explains well what is increasingly apparent today—our reliance on story and experience rather than on abstract thought. He does not give principles of discernment, but expands the mind-set of student and professor alike, and makes many helpful suggestions for further reading.

ROBERT T. SEARS, S.J.
Loyola University, Chicago


Novelist Barbara Kingsolver loves the places where she writes. She observes: “Whether we are leaving it or coming into it, it’s here that matters, it is place. . . . Our greatest and smallest explanations of ourselves grow from place, as surely as carrots grow in the dirt” (Small Wonder [2002], pp. 39–40).

The significance of place to our increasingly rootless society also provokes Philip Sheldrake’s wide-ranging theological reflection. Place, however, is hardly a straightforward concept. It is not merely geography, even when imbued with particular meaning. Rather, place is a cultural category, subject to multiple interpretations, and includes the notion of person as embodied and therefore located. Places form landscapes, which S. defines as “sets of relational spaces each embodying (literally and metaphorically) emotions, memories and associations derived from personal and interpersonal shared experience” (4–5). Hence the interrelationship between place, memory, and identity acknowledged in the subtitle.

S. first surveys Christian theology’s ambiguous record with respect to place, moving quickly beyond literal to metaphorical understandings. He then probes Trinity, Incarnation, and especially Eucharist as grounds for a Christian understanding of place, memory, and identity. At the same time, he acknowledges the strong tendencies pulling Christian imagination away from particular places to seek the God who also transcends the material. S.’s treatment of the ambiguous Reformation understandings of place, while too brief, does underscore his commitment to holding in tension with the sacramental, the estranged, flawed, and damaged in material existence. S. rightly insists that treatments of place include an ethical dimension.

The second half of the book is comprised of “practices of place” (ix). S.’s treatment of mysticism effectively focuses on its boundary-breaking character, while his provocative concluding chapter, “Re-Placing the City?” provides an urgently needed call to reflect theologically on our built environments. This topic can only grow more pressing as increasingly greater numbers of the human population dwell, more or less well, in urban centers.

In S.’s competent hands, place offers a locus for deepening our understanding of both religious experience and identity.

ELIZABETH LIEBERT
San Francisco Theological Seminary, San Anselmo, Calif.


During a period when the word “matrix” has inspired a variety of images from a movie metaphor to the name of a foreign car, a book comes along that uses “matrix” as a way of bridging the world of psychology and theology. In this integrative text Schreurs presents the notion of matrix as a foundational and formational means for theology to speak more creatively to psychology.

Organizing her text into four parts, S. invites the attentive reader to engage the book’s insights on the clinical level as well as on the existential and relational levels. Rich with vignettes, this intriguing work may speak to both believers and nonbelievers. The sketches in part 1 show how clinical encounters can raise complex issues as suggested by the titles of several subsections: “Psycho-
logical or Spiritual Trauma,” “Visions or Hallucinations,” “Depression or Spiritual Darkness,” “Narcissism or Misdirected Worship.” In positing these and other psychospiritual polarities, S. asks the reader to examine his or her countertransferential impulses toward such tensions.

In part 2, “A Grammar of Western Consciousness,” S. brings together a vast interdisciplinary literature, much of it European, to show how cultural, psychological, and spiritual metaphors are interconnected. Placing her analysis within the group therapy context, she argues that a “formational matrix” emerges from the various assumptions and beliefs held by individuals in a group. The interplay of these personal meanings in turn can create a formational matrix of meanings.

Viewing spirituality from its existential and cognitive aspects in part 3, S. shows how psychotherapy involves a process of change in one’s relationships with self and others and often with God. In this respect, such psychological concerns as guilt, revenge, sadness, and shame can have spiritual implications. The value of the book for theologians becomes especially clear in part 4 where S. discusses how theological understandings can foster spiritual growth within the therapeutic relationship. At the same time, she demonstrates how theology can hurt and do violence to one’s relationship to self and others.

The book, rich with bibliography and endnotes, will prove valuable to graduate students in psychology and theology alike.

C. KEVIN GILLESPIE, S.J.
Loyola College in Maryland

MATURE GRIEF: WHEN A PARENT DIES.

Schaper’s work is a welcome contribution toward understanding the thoughts and feelings one experiences on the death of a parent. Especially important is the fact that S. emphasizes the experiences rather of grieving adults than of grieving children. The death of a loved one, especially a parent, is generally painful, but an adult experiences the grieving process much differently than a child. While a child may feel abandoned in the death of a parent, an adult may have unresolved feelings such as anger or bitterness or perhaps indifference or coldness. S.’s book is one of the few in the marketplace that deals exclusively with adults and their grieving process.

Throughout, S. emphasizes the importance of forgiveness as a path to spiritual healing. Actively forgiving one’s parent after death allows the surviving children to transcend the negative emotions that they may feel toward their parent. Negative emotions that are allowed to fester and go unchecked usually prevent healthy grieving and a positive resolution.

One salient point that S. could have explored is the role of ritual in grief work. She briefly mentions the place of rituals, but stops short of fully exploring important events such as visiting the gravesite and personal and communal prayer. These ritual and symbolic actions provide survivors the context, vocabulary, and images to fully express their emotions and feelings toward God and toward their deceased parent.

The book would be a helpful text for courses in pastoral theology and counseling.

WILLIAM C. MILLS
Union Institute and University, Cincinnati

THE UNFORGETTABLE AND THE UNHOPED FOR.

This is the first English translation of a work by philosopher Jean-Louis Chrétien. It comprises four dense meditations on time as forgetting and remembering, as both gain and loss: “The Immemorial and Recollection,” “The Reserve of Forgetting,” “The Unforgettable,” and “The Sudden and the Unhoped For,” preceded by a new preface and followed by a review (“Retrospec-
tion”) of C.’s other works. The translation is excellent and the translator’s introduction very helpful, associating C.’s “theological turn” with Marion, Ricoeur, Henry, Courtine, and others. As a mutual rethinking of phenomenology and theology, this turn may require some readers to suspend disbelief in order to appreciate it, but to do so is well worth the effort.

The book can be read with real delight, not only for its many quotations (which constitute neither proof nor argument) but also for C.’s evocative and poetic style. Some of the language, reminiscent of Levinas’s, risks hyperbole in such expressions as “a past never present” (immemorial) or a forgetting of what was never known.

We are to marvel that something more is meant than earth’s billions of years of evolution before consciousness. But why does C. forget to mention Alzheimer’s or neuroscience, or affection and volition, as though all forgetting were cognitive? And should we notice that our inability to forget (or remember) at will parallels a truth about all consciousness, namely, that no kind of consciousness is reducible to another, nor can one be mastered by another (e.g., to promise to understand quantum physics or to love with fidelity)?

After Blondel we ask how our doing can sometimes exceed our being, for though we ought to promise to know and love, doing so exceeds our warrant. But while this “excess” recalls Rahner’s Vorgriff and Aquinas’s excessus (both more than cognitive), and reveals something called spirit, parsimony requires us to explore emergentism and science from below before recourse to divine excess. If neither chance nor grace explains why we sometimes forget and sometimes cannot (sometimes understand and sometimes cannot), what does? This gem of a book raises good questions.

ANDREW TALLON
Marquette University, Milwaukee


HISTORICAL


Hamm, Berndt. The Reformation of Faith in the Context of Late Medieval Theology and


Pius II. Commentaries. Ed. Margaret Meserve and Marcello Simonetta. The I


SYSTEMATIC


**MORALITY AND LAW**

Administrative Committee of the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops. *Faithful Citizenship: A Catholic Call to Po-

PASTORAL, SPIRITUAL, AND LITURGICAL

Nessan, Craig L. Many Members Yet One Body: Committed Same-Gender Relation-

PHILOSOPHY AND OTHER DISCIPLINES