BOOK REVIEWS

THE TEMPLE OF JESUS’ BODY: THE TEMPLE THEME IN THE GOSPEL OF JOHN.

This is the fullest exploration of the Temple theme in the Fourth Gospel that I have encountered. New Zealand scholar Alan Kerr confirms and builds upon explorations of this theme already available in such major commentaries as those of R. E. Brown, C. K. Barrett, R. Schnackenburg, and F. J. Moloney. In many ways his study parallels the almost simultaneous work of Mary L. Coloe, whose 1998 Melbourne dissertation was published as God Dwells with Us (2001, reviewed in TS 63 [June 2002] 423). K. differs from Coloe in emphasis (his being christological, hers ecclesial) and in his development of Temple links with Sabbath in John 5, Passover in John 6, and the foot washing of John 13 as a purificatory entrance rite.

K. advances the scholarly exploration of John’s Temple theme on several fronts. He spells out the Exodus echoes in the Prologue. He resolves the textual crux of 7:37–38, understanding Jesus rather than the believer as the source of the flow of living water. He furthers our understanding of Johannine irony (e.g., hearing in 13:29, the reference to Judas “buying what is needed for the feast,” a reference to betraying Jesus, the Paschal Lamb; or taking the confusion about the identity of the high priest in 18:14, 19 as pointing to Jesus as the real high priest, much as he is implicitly the real judge in the interview with Pilate. K. deepens the discussion of the influence of the Temple festivals on John’s presentation of Jesus. Along with Passover, Tabernacles, and Dedication, he does well to include the Sabbath, the weekly Temple feast.

The most arresting part of K.’s study I find is the case he makes for the presence of the Temple theme in John 13–17. Without denying the meaning of Jesus’ washing of the disciples’ feet as an acting out of his service ethic and an interpretation of the imminent laying down of his life, K. argues that the washing is also linked to the ablutions that Jewish custom required before entering the Temple precincts. Like Coloe, K. reads 14:1–3 (about “my Father’s house[hold]” and preparing “a place”) as a promise not about the postmortem experience of heaven but about the post-Easter reality of the temple of his risen body. Finally, K.’s exposition of the prayer of John 17 spells out high-priestly allusions that make his treatment of other allusions to the Temple and its services all the more plausible. Especially illuminating are his grounding of unity language in the kind of Temple-centered unity celebrated in Psalm 133 and his rooting of “keeping” and bestowing “the name” in the classic Aaronic blessing, Numbers 6:24–27.

Throughout, K. is particularly alert to the resonance of Johannine diction with the language of the Septuagint, as for example in his treatment of
ego eimi as the “name” that Jesus receives from the Father and in which he “keeps” the disciples.

K.’s reluctance to include 1:51 (the allusion to Jacob’s ladder dream in Genesis 28) as an aspect of the Johannine Temple theme seems overly careful. Granted that there is no direct Temple reference in that verse, it is hard to imagine that the author of the Fourth Gospel did not hear in LXX Genesis 28, with its complex of “the place” (six times), “house of God,” “gate of heaven,” an anticipation of the mediatory function of the Temple that the glorified Jesus would fulfill.


These, however, are minor quibbles. K.’s work stands as a substantial contribution to the ongoing explication of a major theme in the Gospel of John. Indexes to sources and authors together with a representative bibliography on the Johannine Temple theme enhance this work as a research tool.

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DENNIS HAMM, S.J.


Only 15 women are named within the Gospel tradition. In this elegant volume, Richard Bauckham focuses primarily on eight: Tamar, Rahab, Ruth, Mary (Jesus’ mother), Anna, Joanna, Mary (wife of Clopas), and Salome. Timely and important, the book contributes to feminist biblical interpretation and a growing interest in individual characters within biblical narratives. Five of the book’s eight chapters were previously published over the last decade, with three entirely new: on Jesus’ mother Mary (chap. 3), Joanna (chap. 5), and the women at the tomb (chap. 8).

B. uses both historical and literary methods, especially vocalization (identifying the “voice” within a text) and intertextuality (reading various texts together). His engagement of feminist biblical criticism finds him both appreciative and critical, especially of a hermeneutics of suspicion that too readily dismisses the canon as hopelessly patriarchal. Instead, he wants readers to relish possibilities for counterbalancing the androcentrism of patriarchy within the canon by recognizing and valuing the female voice as exemplified in the Book of Ruth (chap. 1). Ironically, one of the best aspects of the work is that B. often takes his readers far afield from the canon into a rich array of intertestamental, apocryphal, gnostic, and patristic sources that will excite and entice many readers to read outside the canon. There is much to learn from this erudite book.
Chapter 2 focuses on the three named women in Matthew’s genealogy. The question posed is why these women were included in a patrilineal genealogy. B. concludes that by being Gentile the women best serve Matthew’s purpose in portraying Jesus’ mission as inclusive. Thus B. insightfully links the “Gentile foremothers” named in Matthew’s genealogy with the Syro-Phoenician woman of Matthew 15. But B. reaches this conclusion by arguing for “the best” interpretation rather than accepting that more than one interpretation may be valid. As a result he dismisses a feminist interpretation championing the women as taking initiative and acting on their own behalf because “the wife of Uriah” does not fit the pattern, she having been seduced by King David. Yet one can argue that Bathsheba took action when it mattered most, making sure her son Solomon succeeded David on the throne (1 Kings 1)—not unlike that bold Syro-Phoenician whose request won first Jesus’ rebuke and then his praise and response.

Chapter 3, titled “Elizabeth and Mary in Luke 1: Reading a Gynocentric Text Intertextually,” actually says little about Elizabeth. But it offers an intriguing and satisfying reading of Luke 1:5–80 that explores “Mary as Agent of God’s Salvation of Israel” and “Mary’s Lowly Status.” Chapter 4 presents B.’s painstaking historical research to track down the importance of the prophetess Anna as belonging to the northern tribe of Asher—outside the power center of Judea in the south. With this allusion, B. argues, Luke emphasizes Jesus’ inclusion of all Israel, north and south, exiles and inhabitants.

Chapter 5, the longest in the book, focuses on Joanna mentioned in Luke 8:1–3 and thereby repairs the neglect lamented by Elisabeth Moltmann-Wendel: “Hardly anyone knows Joanna. Theologians in their studies never meet her and they have ignored her in biblical studies” (109). Making the most of recent historical studies of lower Galilee, B. unravels what Joanna’s description as “the wife of Chuza, Herod’s steward” might mean. He further hypothesizes that Joanna reappears as Junia (her Roman name) in Romans 16:7 coupled with Andronicus (165–86). B. ends with a sketch of Joanna as an “exercise of historical imagination,” and further insights for “readers on the road with Joanna” (199–200).

Chapter 6 presents B.’s dogged pursuit of the identity of Mary of Clopas as Jesus’ aunt, while Chapter 7 distinguishes between Salome, sister of Jesus, and Salome, a disciple of Jesus (Mk 15:40 and 16:1) whose description by Morton Smith as “a controversial figure” B. disputes (247–56).

The final chapter gives the book a strong finish by raising the issue of women’s credibility as witnesses to the Resurrection. Related texts from Josephus and Pseudo-Philo illustrate the cultural bias that assumed only men received direct revelation from God (274). By assigning an essential role to women as witnesses to the Resurrection, the Gospels void that prejudice and empower women—a goal this book obviously shares.
The purpose of the book, a revised dissertation directed by Philip Esler at the University of St. Andrews, Scotland, is twofold. First, Nanos wants to undermine what he regards as the “consensus view” of the meaning of Galatians. In this view the letter is part of an intra-Christian controversy. Paul’s opponents are “judaizing” outsiders from the Christian communities of either Jerusalem or Antioch who seek to persuade the Galatian Christians that they must not only believe in Christ but also be circumcised and observe the Mosaic Law. Paul’s letter is then an attack on Jewish Christianity for trying to impose the observance the Mosaic Law on the Christian ideal of freedom in Christ that Paul preached (110–92).

Second, and more importantly, N. argues that Galatians should be understood as part of an intra-Jewish rather than an intra-Christian controversy. In making his argument, he distinguishes between two kinds of discourse. “Situational discourse” is the rhetoric directly addressed to Paul’s Galatian audience (Gal 1:1–9; 3:1–5; 4:12–28; 5:24–6:18); “narrative discourse” is the rhetoric Paul developed from material prior to or outside the Galatian controversy itself (Gal 1:13–2:21; 3:6–14, 15–22; 3:23–4:7; 4:8–10, 11, 22–30; 5:19–23). In addition, N. argues that it is the situational discourse that is crucial for establishing the contours of the actual controversy.

N. then distinguishes two groups: the Galatian believers in Christ and “influencers.” The former are righteous Gentiles within Jewish synagogue communities in Galatia who have not undergone proselyte conversion and so have not become full members of Jewish communities. The “influencers,” whose message Paul attacks, are not, in N.’s view, Christ-believers. Rather, they are members of the Galatian Jewish communities who are interested in facilitating conversions. They are involved in welcoming non-Jewish guests into full membership in the Jewish communities. Some of them may have themselves been Gentile converts. In the specific situation of Galatia, the influencers want to persuade the Gentile Christ-believers to undergo proselyte conversion and so become full members of the Jewish communities. While the influencers are not Christ-believers, neither are they opposed to belief in Christ. It is simply not their concern. Their motivation for this is twofold. First, they want to resolve the marginal or anomalous situation of these Gentile believers in Christ and so fully integrate them into the Jewish communities. Second, they may also have been responding to the objections by pagan civic leaders and others to the anomalous position of these Christ-believers in the Jewish communities.

Paul’s response in this situation was to try to dissuade these Gentile believers from undergoing such a proselyte conversion. At this point in his argument, N.’s understanding of Paul emerges most clearly. For N., Paul is a Law-abiding Jew, but he is also convinced that, in Christ, something new has happened for Gentiles. The Gentiles who have believed in Christ and have received the Spirit (Gal 3:1–5) have already attained a new status as
righteous ones among the people of God. Therefore they do not need to undergo proselyte conversion. In fact, to undergo such a conversion would subvert the very foundation of their faith in Christ. N. emphasizes that what he refers to as Paul’s “ironic rebuke” in Galatians is aimed specifically and only at Gentile believers in Christ. These Gentiles would be placing proselyte conversion on a level equal to the gospel of Christ and so would empty the death of Christ of its meaning for Gentiles.

While N.’s arguments against some versions of the “consensus view” are well made, his own interpretation of Galatians is ultimately unconvincing. He is right to maintain that Paul always regarded himself as a Jew, but it is not the case that Paul thought of Christ as central for Gentiles in a way that he was not for Jews. In addition, the logic of Paul’s arguments in Galatians 2–4 against circumcision and observance of the Law applies to Gentiles and Jews alike. In this context, it is worth noting that Paul himself, in his Letter to the Roman believers, revised significantly many of the harsh arguments he made in Galatians. It is also unlikely that the Jewish communities of Galatia would at the same time have accepted Gentile believers in Christ as full members of their communities through proselyte conversion and yet have been indifferent to those Gentiles’ continued belief in Christ. Belief in Christ would have been a central rather than a peripheral issue between them. Finally, the book could have used another thorough editing. It still reads too much like a dissertation.

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The theme of this impressive volume focuses on the meaning of “boasting” in Romans 2:17, 23; 4:2; 5:2, 11. Throughout, it argues that the so-called “New Perspective’s” approach to Paul is both unable to explain this terminology adequately and distorts Pauline theology in general.

What is at stake in Romans 2:17 and 2:23 when Paul speaks about the Jews boasting of their relation to God? Is such boasting based only on election, or is obedience to the Law involved as well? Supported by meticulous analysis of both Palestinian texts (e.g., the Dead Sea Scrolls, Psalms of Solomon) as well as documents from the Diaspora (e.g., Wisdom of Solomon, Testament of Job), G. concludes that Torah obedience is a key element for vindication at the eschaton during Second Temple Judaism. Thus Paul in Romans is arguing against a Jewish position which held that final salvation for the righteous was achieved on the basis of works. The “New Perspective” advocates, especially E. P. Sanders, James D. G. Dunn and N. T. Wright, misrepresent the evidence in several ways, not least of which by their extreme emphasis on the inclusion of Gentiles. To argue that Paul’s Jewish contemporaries merely had confidence in such things as
privilege and national status misrepresents the Apostle’s criticism of their captivity to sin, their lack of repentance, and a national boast that assumes a comprehensive obedience to Torah. Rather, for Paul, anyone who has not been transformed by Christ and the Spirit is unable to fulfill Torah. In sharp contrast to the view of the “New Perspective,” G. argues that everyone, Jew and Gentile alike, receive the righteousness of God independently of the Torah and only through faith. Israel’s error “was to expect God’s righteousness as a result of their obedience rather than simply to believe the promise” (228) and to focus “on the commandments at the expense of faith in the promises” (229).

Two different schemas are at work in Romans: a) works → justification → boast, and; b) faith → justification → obedience to the commandments. G. asks: “How can Paul talk of ‘boasting in God’ in 2:17, roundly exclude it in 3:27, and then reintroduce it in 5:11?” (252) The new basis for boasting in Romans 5:2–11 is the cross of Christ and the reconciliation that is possible through it; it is this that drives Paul’s rebuke in Romans 2. Since all, Jew and Gentile alike, are under sin, the Jewish boast over the Gentile is without foundation.

Some queries are in order: (1) The case against Dunn, namely, that “works of the law” refers primarily to the distinctiveness of Israel’s identity, might have been enhanced by a more detailed analysis of 4Q MMT C32 in relationship to the contradictory nature of the secondary literature. Although there is dialog with Martin Abegg, more specific reference to Dunn and Wright at this point would have been desirable. The great importance of this text is not only that it provides an exact parallel for the Pauline phrase but that it is used precisely in the same context as ḥdq (righteousness/uprightness) and uses the identical words of Genesis 15:6 that Paul cites about Abraham in Romans 4:3.

(2) There is a suggestion (e.g., 234) that the “doctrine of justification” is Paul’s invention. Here a more careful reflection on 1QS 11 and other parallel passages in the Dead Sea Scrolls would suggest that these texts may well have provided Paul with preformed theologoumena. Texts such as these will be increasingly prominent in future interpretations of Pauline thought.

(3) G. suggests that “Paul is operating with two somewhat distinct perspectives on justification” and that “the relationship between final justification (Rom 2:13) and present-day justification (Rom 4:3) has still not been satisfactorily discussed in the secondary literature on Paul” (265–66). G. recognizes the critical importance of this entire issue for an accurate understanding of Pauline theology in a way that transcends the hermeneutics of both traditional Lutheranism as well as the “New Perspective.” Two suggestions may be helpful: greater attention to the way Paul relates the theme of justification to those of sanctification and salvation; and broader inclusion and more detailed discussion of those articles and monographs that have already tackled this problem (e.g., my own 1976 article with bibliography, “Justification and Last Judgment in Paul,” now reprinted and expanded in Paul, Thessalonica, and Early Christianity [2002]).
G.’s weighty and provocative work steers scholarship into areas of signal importance, as well as toward achieving a more balanced understanding of Pauline theology within the context of the variegated Judaisms of the period. It enables us in substantial ways to transcend the often simplistic and polarized discussion of grace and works.

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One of the guiding lights of the Dutch Compendia Rerum Iudaicarum series has been the great Jewish scholar David Flusser. This massive study of the Didache was to sum up his half century of research into the Jewish roots of Christianity. His death in 2000 left the actual writing to Huub van de Sandt, who had studied with him in Jerusalem in 1973–75. They collaborated on the book from 1994 onward, and it is now published under both their names.

S. and F. offer a comprehensive reappraisal of the Didache, oriented around the special concerns of the Compendia series. Following “an ever-growing consensus,” they date its composition to the turn of the first century (41, 48–49). The anonymous author/compiler, known as “the Didachist,” drew on existing sources and organized them in four distinct sections: the moral teaching known as the “Two Ways” (chaps. 1–6, plus additions in 1:3b–2:1, the so-called “evangelical section,” and in 6:2–3); a liturgical treatise (chaps. 7–10); a church organization treatise (chaps. 11–15, with 11–13 being a later expansion); and an eschatological section (chap. 16). Despite its disparate origins, the resulting manual must be treated as a unity assembled by the Didachist to serve two distinct needs of his community: defusing internal tensions by accommodating its increasingly Gentile character—for example, by replacing with modified forms Jewish traditions and prayers that might have been operative at an earlier time—and protecting his community from external threats (31–35).

S. and F. devote the largest part of their book to the Two Ways section. They share the common view that the Didachist relied on a Jewish document as his basis. This hypothetical “Greek Two Ways Document” (GTW) lies behind the Didache, the Latin text called the Doctrina Apostolorum, which clearly has a literary connection with Didache 1–6, and other early Christian writings (chaps. 2 and 3). Against much modern opinion S. and F. also hold that the GTW underlies the Two Ways portion of the Letter of Barnabas (73). They offer an impressive reconstruction of the Greek text of the GTW, along with a commentary (122–39).

The heart of the book is chapters 5 (Jewish elements in the GTW) and 6 (comparison with Jesus’ attitude towards the Law in the Sermon on the
Mount). S. and F. explain that the parallels between the GTW and the Two Spirits section of the Qumran Manual of Discipline (1QS 3:13–4:26) stem from their origin in a common Jewish source (147–55). Other Jewish elements in the GTW include the double love commandment (of God and neighbor) and the Golden Rule, both of which could function as summaries of the entire Law (156–60), and the distinction between “light” and “weighty” sins and commandments (165–72). S. and F. connect the light/weighty distinction to the moral teaching of the Jewish Derekh Erets literature (167–79) to prove the existence of a broad Jewish tradition of moral teaching founded in humane and non-ritualistic principles and cultivated by pious Jewish hasidic groups. In their discussion of the Sermon on the Mount, S. and F. argue vigorously that Jesus himself should be located with these groups. The Two Ways portion of the book concludes with a rather unconvincing argument that Didache 6:2–3 was tacked onto the GTW and represents the legacy of a Torah-observant Jewish-Christian community (the “whole yoke of the Lord” in Didache 6:2 is the Law!), preserved unwittingly by the Didachist (238–70).

On other frequently controverted matters: S. and F. doubt the Didachist’s use of the canonical Gospels, even Matthew, though some scholars dispute this (49–50, 347–48, 352 and passim); they regard the trinitarian baptismal formula of Didache 7:1, 3 as a secondary adaptation to practices elsewhere, and a displacement of an older practice that was a blend of the baptism of John and of Jewish proselyte baptism (273–91); they forcefully argue that Didache 9–10 reflects a Christian Eucharist, whereas a significant body of opinion would consider these verses as prayers for a community meal, with the Eucharist proper not beginning until after the monitory summons in 10:6 (296–339); and S. and F. deny that the church order in Didache 11–15 reflects a “Catholicizing process” in which new local offices arose to compensate for the decline of itinerant charismatic leaders (340).

For user-friendliness this book compares poorly with Kurt Niederwimmer’s excellent commentary in the Fortress Press Hermeneia series (1998), to which I have sometimes resorted to recover the track of arguments that disappeared in the dense thickets of S. and F.’s quotations and redaction criticism. Nonetheless, their book is a valuable contribution because of its admirable impartiality, its high scholarly seriousness, and its rich deployment of a wide diversity of Jewish sources. The throw-away description of Eusebius of Caesarea as a “far better Stalinist than Marxist-Leninist” may be pardoned as a crudity out of keeping with the book as a whole (288).

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“This volume proposes a method of mystagogy for today’s Church based on the preaching of Ambrose of Milan” (xxiii). Written by an academic
who is also a Lutheran pastor, the work is a detailed analysis of Ambrose’s preaching to neophytes during Easter week aimed at helping them enter more deeply into the rite of initiation. Satterlee’s wider and, for him, more pressing objective is to provide a model for current mystagogical preaching—preaching that is “scripturally based, [which] takes place within a liturgical setting, is addressed exclusively to the Christian community and has as its goal the formation of Christians” (xxii). S. demonstrates how Ambrose’s sermons for the baptizati are “a second journey through the rites” in which he uses reflection and exploration to reexamine what they have just experienced during the Easter Vigil. Christian formation in this context is not achieved primarily through the language of information (i.e., language appealing primarily to the intellect) but through language intended to strike the senses and emotions by means of symbols, metaphors, stories, allusions, and other forms of concrete images.

For Ambrose, such an approach involves “a tireless ‘rumination’ of Scripture” (98) in which he is “more concerned with plumbing the depth of meaning of a text than with providing a unifying theme or systematic approach” (103). This tack, which modern readers often find excessively freewheeling and difficult to appreciate, is predicated on Ambrose’s belief that the sacred texts constitute a veritable sea of meaning, and that they can be applied to widely different contexts. S.’s study goes far in helping readers grasp the bishop’s intent and his exploration of “equally valid interpretations applicable to a variety of pastoral situations” (225).

Chapter 5, where S. takes the reader through the baptismal ritual itself, including the physical environment of the ceremony, is especially impressive. Although some of the details of the ritual necessarily remain speculative, the reader at least gets a strong sense of time, place, and circumstance in Ambrose’s preaching, and the documents that constitute the major source of his mystagogy (De sacramentis and De mysteriis) take on new life.

The central portions of the book are preceded by chapters on Ambrose’s life and times and on the character of his audience. Although interesting and informative, these chapters are not always obviously relevant to S.’s later analysis. Throughout the study, however, S. has an excellent command of the modern sources, and he is to be commended for citing the views of other scholars (e.g., Neil McLynn) who take a more critical view of Ambrose’s aims and motives.

The final chapter demonstrates how Ambrose’s methods can serve as a good model for modern preaching. S. finds in the bishop’s approach a worthy counterbalance to the contemporary emphasis on the historical-critical interpretation of Scripture, which he believes has produced “fragmentation, rendering Scripture unintelligible to anyone except trained experts . . . thereby distancing the Church from its Scriptures” (324). While recognizing the benefits of modern biblical criticism, S. contends that Ambrose’s way of reading Scripture (and the patristic approach in general) is more relevant to spiritual development and more indicative of the true significance of the sacred text. Whatever one thinks about this analysis and
whatever riches are to be found in Ambrose’s sermons, modern preachers are unlikely to turn to them regularly as a source for improving their efforts to explain the mysteries of the faith. Ambrose’s almost total lack of a historical-critical appreciation is, I think, a serious barrier, and what was appropriate for his time and circumstance seems poorly suited to our own. Nonetheless, the general principles enunciated by S. in the final chapter would serve the aims of preachers very well, despite the time and effort it would take to absorb them all.

This is a solid and useful study that serves more than academic interests. Its shortcomings spring largely from repetitiousness, an excessive focus on divisions (five ways, five method, three types, etc.) and a style that, while clear and precise, is insufficiently varied. All are marks of the work’s initial form as a dissertation. For the most part, however, the text moves swiftly and smoothly. Though probably not a vade mecum for contemporary preachers, the volume is worth having if only to learn how one successful Church Father educated and motivated his congregation.

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LOUIS J. SWIFT
analyses Luther’s understanding of *imago Dei* in its relation to education and theology. The third deals with Luther’s rejection of allegorical interpretation of Scripture and shows with many different examples where and why Luther still uses the medieval method. The fourth essay on Mary and late medieval piety shows how Mary became an example of faith, affliction, and the way to Christ. The fifth essay is a stimulating treatment of Luther’s use of rhetorical patterns; of special significance is the collection of examples that S. argues are key to Lutheran hermeneutics in general. Most of the essays discuss the reception, clarification, and purification of Luther’s ideas in the generations after his death.

Certainly one merit of the book is that it brings the themes of the title back into discussion and highlights them as major subjects of research. Nevertheless, I hesitate to go along completely with S.’s approach: In his introduction he observes that research on the history of Christian thought in the 17th century in general and on Lutheran Orthodoxy in particular are not highly esteemed; and that historical theology focuses on either the early Reformation or later developments like Pietism or theology during the Enlightenment. He argues that only thorough research into these mostly unknown sources of Lutheran Orthodoxy can lead to a serious interpretation of the later theological development. Even for the time of the Reformation and confessionalization, Orthodox theology, he contends, holds the key for understanding their terms, ideas, doctrines, and systematic presentations. S.’s focus on these themes is surely justified, but I read the book with a certain suspicion because even experienced researchers in this area do not entirely endorse S.’s thesis that Lutheran Orthodoxy lies at the hermeneutic center of Lutheran and Reformation theology and their developments in general.

This collection is of high quality and written in a stimulating manner, but its strong systematic approach lacks historical support. S. does not relate Luther’s ideas to earlier streams of thought such as humanistic theology, late medieval reform movements, and the return to the Church Fathers and other ancient texts. He does not even mention the great value of exempla for humanistic pedagogy and the huge collections of example stories, phrases, and quotations, which were not related only to Reformation thought. Nor does he discuss Luther’s growing knowledge of Origen and of Origen’s influence on Luther’s allegorical interpretation of Scripture. Nor does S. reflect on historical events that deeply influenced the development of Reformation theology. He mentions in passing that Reformation theology was worked out in great haste and under difficult circumstances, but this point needs to be developed, because it is foundational to his “greater thesis” that Lutheran Orthodoxy is the climax of Reformation theological thought.

I would not suggest that one read this book as an introduction to Luther’s theology, but I highly recommend it as a stimulating addition to traditional surveys on Reformation theology and Luther’s integral importance to it. The book contains much information that future research ought not overlook. S.’s complaint about too little research in the history of
Christian theology of the second half of the 16th and the whole 17th century is a point well taken—even though the “enemy” for him is the liberalism of Troeltsch and other “cultural Protestants,” just as for them the “enemy” was Lutheran Orthodoxy and baroque theology.

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In her introduction to this posthumous collection of essays written by Scribner over the last years of his life, Roper informs the reader that S. was working on a “new interpretation of the Reformation” of which only these essays remain. The book is structured around the themes that S. would have emphasized, beginning with popular piety, moving on to social, communal, and political issues, and concluding with a reassessment of the effects of the Protestant Reformation. Besides mourning the passing of S., the reader may rue the fact that he was unable to complete this work. This collection shows only a few traces of an overarching conception of the Reformation. Instead we see brilliant flashes of insight into particular aspects of late medieval and early modern society and religion. S. had a remarkable command of the historical sources and of the 19th- and 20th-century scholarship on Germany. That command enabled him to offer wide-ranging suggestions and tantalizing glimpses into the daily life of early modern Germans. In addition, he was fully conversant with anthropological theory and used aspects of it to elucidate the past.

Of particular importance are the essays in the section titled “Ways of Seeing.” Combining theological analysis with ethnographic description, S. shows how the importance of vision in apprehending the divine (“the sacramental gaze”) was transformed during the early modern period. As a result of the Protestant Reformation, he argued, the redefinition of the sacred by the clergy was complete. He was especially interested in using late medieval and early modern understandings of the nature of vision to explain why visual objects and the act of seeing itself were so problematic for the Reformers. These ideas, formulated in essays that only begin to ask the questions, offer suggestive lines for further research. For example, S. argued that on a popular level vision was still understood as a “form of direct personal contact with the viewed object.” He adds that, while the Reformers were unable fully to recast the role of images, they tended to use them didactically to prove a point of doctrine, not as a means of contemplation. The emotional engagement with devotional imagery, so familiar to the late Middle Ages and to baroque Catholicism, was relatively
unknown among Protestants. S. does recognize different attitudes among Protestants, the Reformed tradition being more hostile to imagery than the Lutheran. A more naturalistic representation that developed in the 16th century created a “cold gaze” that lessened its power and kept the viewer at an objective distance from the image. S. admits that the continued use of imagery in Protestantism needs further research. But he tends to overlook other forms of devotional piety in which the emotional remains important: the rich tradition of Protestant hymnody, the use by Jesuits and Capuchins of a highly evocative preaching style, and the emergence in the 17th century of a highly emotional pietistic literature. The sacred in its many forms would continue to resist easy definition by the clerical elite.

The final section includes some of S.’s conclusions about the role of magic in early modern Europe. Since Max Weber, it has been assumed that the Protestant Reformation effected a “desacralization” of the world, a new world view that abandoned the notion that the sacred permeated all of life. The most dramatic site of this desacralization was the reinterpretation of the Eucharist, but that was only a small part of a much larger process detected by Weber. S. calls all this into question, drawing on a wide variety of evidence from folklore, ethnology, and local history to show how Protestants continued to see a magical world around them. The witch hunt is the most obvious example. These observations were only part of what Roper says was to be a much broader reinterpretation of the effects of the Protestant Reformation.

S. was one of the most exciting, provocative, and insightful scholars of the German Reformation in the second half of the 20th century. His breadth of reading, both in secondary and archival sources was astounding, and he deftly marshaled that material to offer new ways of thinking about old questions. This volume, while it does not reflect a finished argument, deserves close attention. Its chief benefit may be its assemblage of essays that appeared in a wide range of publications. S. was especially good at exploring religion as a cultural artifact, at examining how underlying assumptions about the world and changes in those assumptions altered religious life. He was strongest in drawing connections and comparisons across the late medieval and early modern (Protestant) mindsets; he was less successful in bringing changes in early modern Catholicism into conversation with those mindsets.

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D. JONATHAN GRIEser


Newman scholars will long contend with Frank Turner’s unsympathetic account of Newman’s Anglican years. T.’s Newman appears manipulative, duplicitous, morose, and constrained by subconscious, narcissistic impulses. Exhaustive research guarantees T.’s revisionist interpretation a hearing
even from the many Newmanists who will rush to Newman’s defense. According to T., Newman’s eloquent, captivating, and undeniably successful self-defense enshrined in his *Apologia* was in fact deceitful, at least in part a result of his own inability to understand his real motivations, often rooted more in emotion than “considered thought” (357). Not fearing to hazard speculation about Newman’s unstated goals, T. explores subconscious motivations in the manner of a psychologist. Fascinating in part for the sheer risk inherent in such an enterprise, especially on the part of a historian, T.’s explanation of Newman’s odyssey as self-serving indulgence in deep psychological needs will set off renewed examination of Newman and the Tractarian experiment. T.’s psychological hypotheses seem sometimes plausible, sometimes reckless; in either case they very often appear to be reductionistic.

T. sees Newman’s opting to surround himself with an intimate “coterie” of younger celibate men dependent on his influence, together with a strong tendency to avoid women (T.’s case for the former is convincing, but the evidence for the latter seems underdeveloped) and unreasonably to criticize his clerical friends who married, as originating in his family life and as determinative of his religious journey and his rationalization of it. Newman let his unconscious desire to manipulate this monastic family in loyalty to him rule the direction he gave the Tractarian cause and lead him to make poor judgments, not least of which was the publication of the almost suicidal *Tract 90* (357, 364). In T.’s view, Newman even wrote his *Essay on Development*, to which T. imputes the idea of “ongoing revelation” (569), primarily to justify his monastic experiment! When Newman could no longer hold his “coterie” together in its outpost at Littlemore, in part because these men—unlike himself—held the Catholicity of the English Church in higher esteem than their communal life, he followed them to the Roman Catholic Church as the best way to salvage the loss his failure incurred. What Newman described “as a collapse of conviction in a *via media*” was really a collapse of “his fragile network of personal social relationships sustained by Catholic aspirations” (623), a conversion by default that exhibited the skepticism of “the typical pattern of Victorian loss of Protestant religious faith” (11).

Less controversial are T.’s properly historical conclusions. Principal among them is the claim that the “tactics of intransigence,” “ecclesiastical disruption,” “intemperance of spirit and violence of language,” and other means of provocation (2, 164) by which Newman and the Tractarians embroiled themselves in service of “their not inconsiderable personal ambitions” (66) targeted Evangelicals inside and outside the Church of England much more consistently than generally thought. Espousing the principle of private judgment, Evangelicals, too optimistic in their view of human nature for Newman and his associates (140), were in fact the liberals that the Tractarians despised (11).

T.’s explication of the contours of Evangelicalism and his description of elements of Newman’s Oxford are helpful. He asserts that in 1845 Newman “received a second set of three sharp blows, even more crushing than the
autobiographically more famous ones of 1841,” namely, “the aftermath of Ward’s case,” “Oakeley’s case,” and “a new bishop for Oxford” (529, 535, 548). Also noteworthy is T.’s detailed treatment of the Tractarians. Displaying disdain for what he portrays as their unswervingly disingenuous tactics, he underscores how their ecclesiology conveniently preserved clerical privilege (20) at a time when the Evangelicals’ “overwhelmingly laicized mode of religious life” (57) threatened it. Moreover, he repeatedly takes pains to suggest—without much evidence—that Newman’s financial concerns were a significant motivator for him.

Where Newman perceived Providence, T., as a historian, sees, if not a cover for Newman’s willfulness (357, 451), “contingency after contingency” (110). Newman’s “personally constructed conversion narrative” of the Apologia “imposed a structure of spiritual search on what in actuality had been a series of contingent events infused with enormous personal confusion, anger, despondency, and mixture of other motives” (337). T. takes no notice of Newman’s prayer life except insofar as it was related to Tractarian retrieval of things Catholic or asceticism, also a subject of psychological conjecture. Given that T. does not hesitate to venture into psychological speculation concerning Newman’s deepest motivations, and in the light of T.’s thoroughgoing predisposition always to reduce ostensibly good motives to self-serving, even narcissistic ones (533), T. ought in fairness to countenance from his readers defenses of Newman’s motives and decisions that would not hesitate to make appropriately tentative appeals beyond strictly circumscribed historical evidence and even—with due caution, of course—to Divine Providence.

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GERARD H. MCCARREN


Menke-Peitzmeyer shows how the fundamental theological concept of the self-revelation of God, which played an important role in 19th-century theology under the influence of Hegel, made a significant impression and had serious consequences for the development and structure of Karl Barth’s thought. Attending to the broad, current discussion of this issue, M.-P. formulates the question in terms of the nature of the relation between Absolute Subjectivity and the “self-interpretation” of God. He is critical of Barth’s development and use of this concept, arguing that Barth’s understanding of divine autonomy and sovereignty organizes his whole conception of self-revelation, resulting in a reconstrual of the idea that bequeathed serious problems to contemporary theology. The major con-
cern about Barth’s paradigm of God’s self-revelation is that his way of depicting divine subjectivity and self-interpretation fails to resolve the tension in the relation between divine and human freedom.

The book is divided into two parts: the first outlines the sources (or genesis) of Barth’s logic of revelation; the second explicates Barth’s new beginning, in which he attempts to integrate the concepts of the subjectivity of God, divine revelation, and the doctrine of the Trinity. Chapter 1 offers a careful analysis of Barth’s lifelong critical engagement with Schleiermacher’s *Glaubenslehre*, which shaped the logic of Barth’s *Church Dogmatics*. Barth wanted to help theology avoid collapsing into the “Logos” of modernity, a desire driven by his explicit and implicit argument with Schleiermacher who (Barth thought) opened the way to the anthropologizing of theology and the emergence of Feuerbach’s atheistic critique. If fighting Schleiermacher’s subjectivism was Barth’s negative impetus, argues M.-P., his positive concept of revelation is discovered in his dialogue with Anselm. Chapter 2 traces Barth’s reception of Anselm’s *fides quærens intellectum* and his belief that the latter provides a way to turn Schleiermacher’s subjectivism on its head, so that reflection on the subjectivity of human persons is derived from God’s subjectivity. Chapter 3 examines the influence of Barth’s reception of Hegel (especially his self-reflection logic) on the idea of revelation in the early parts of the *Church Dogmatics*. These sources are the genesis of Barth’s attempt to articulate theology in a way that overcomes the problems of early modernity.

Part 2 argues that Barth fails in this attempt. If part 1 provided a diachronic exposition of the genesis of Barth’s revelation-concept, part 2 offers a synchronic critique of it. In an introductory section, M.-P. examines some of Barth’s earlier writings and argues, following Pannenberg and others, that ultimately Barth’s concept of revelation and the human reception of it in faith does not maintain real human freedom, but is exclusively a result of divine predestination. The two chapters of part 2 expose this critique. Chapter 1 discusses Barth’s idea of the self-development of the triune God in history, and shows the significance of Barth’s way of linking the doctrines of revelation and the Trinity as expressed in the “prolegomena” of the *Church Dogmatics*. If the doctrine of the Trinity is simply an interpretation of the absolute self-determination of God, as M.-P. argues, then Hegel’s speculative idea of God (rather than the revelation of God in Jesus Christ) is really the ground of Barth’s concept of the self-interpretation of the triune God. Because if God (as subject) is “Lord,” and if this Lordship is inherently linked to divine predestination (of both God and creatures), then Barth’s desire to uphold both divine and human freedom fails.

The final chapter argues that, for Barth, God’s eternal predestination is the sum of the Gospel, and that this doctrine is in fact the key concept for the systematic development of his whole *Church Dogmatics*. This emphasis is problematic because Barth’s way of articulating the doctrine denies human freedom and seems to challenge divine freedom as well, since the economic Trinity appears to be simply a temporal outworking of what is
already decided in the immanent Trinity. The centrality accorded the doctrine of predestination makes it difficult for Barth to maintain some other emphases, such as God and humanity as real covenant partners. M.-P. provides an excellent summary of the critiques of Barth on this point over the last half century: Barth’s failure to coherently articulate an understanding of the God-world relation means that we must move beyond the forced alternative between Schleiermacher and Barth. M.-P. concludes that the theological task of clarifying this relation in a way that responds to the anthropological challenges of Feuerbach and others is still with us, and he commends the work of Thomas Pröpper as offering a good direction for a solution. I strongly recommend the book, especially for those who are not familiar with the critical discussion of Barth in Germany.

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F. Leron Shults


In Wright’s end is his beginning: during the 1990s, as “maze mania” swept across the U.S., labyrinths were revived as a “path to inner peace” and a “locus” on which to center the “quest for spiritual well-being.” (1; 271) This pacific image derives largely from a 19th-century imagination that romanticized “all that was medieval and Gothic,” including the “image of pious souls chanting prayers as they crept around a maze on bended knees” (210). But W. reveals this to be an “invented tradition” by uncovering the maze’s martial origins. Daedulus’s mythic labyrinth came to serve later Christianity well: the warrior Theseus’s mortal combat with the Minotaur was transformed into the Christ who would “undertake the Harrowing of Hell in the maze in the medieval church” (15).

Chapters 1 and 2 investigate architectural meanings. Chapter 1 traces the evolution of the labyrinth from its Hellenic source—an “arena for trial and ordeal, for confrontation and conquest” (15) filled with “fear, bravery, tenacity, bewilderment” and “a sense of evil” (10)—to its medieval Christian form, eleven imperfect tracks symbolizing “sin, dissonance, transition, and incompleteness” encompassed by a perfect circle (23). Chapter 2 examines in detail the patterns of medieval mazes. Their symmetry was hidden from the maze-walker: “No carefully crafted sequence of turns is felt experientially but, on the contrary, only disorder and confusion—‘amazement’ in the literal sense of the word” (echoes of Caroline Bynum). Seeing the pattern’s rhythmic beauty required a bird’s-eye view, suggesting that “while life on this earth may be full of unfathomable confusion, the higher realm of paradise is ruled by divine order” (65).

Chapters 3 and 4 gather together a treasure trove of religious metaphorical meanings spanning 15 centuries. Two especially intrigue the church historian: (1) The 12th-century appearance of the labyrinth on church
floors coincided with the “invention of Purgatory” (Jacques LeGoff) and its attendant questions: “Where was this zone of purgation? Who must abide there and for how long?” (79). (2) The “invention of private life” (Roger Chartier) catalyzed by the 15th-century printing press reverberated here: the maze migrated from the massive public sphere to the intimate private space of emblem books—“pocket volumes, usually no more than 8 by 10 centimeters, designed for personal edification and private meditation” (92). The Jesuit Herman Hugo’s *Pious Longings Made Emblematic* (1624), popular among both Catholics and Protestants, warned pilgrim souls: “If they follow nobody, they wander. Therefore, even those follow somebody: Christ himself” (96).

Chapter 5’s discussion of the bizarre Easter dance on the maze will intrigue historians of the liturgy. The game played with a ball transformed Lenten mourning into Easter joy by representing “the Fathers who were in Limbo” and released “by the triumph of the Cross.” In it, the archbishop and his clerics “each lead a choirboy by the hand” while “singing hymns of joy” and “dancing in the church.” A paper trail of legislation underscores anxieties: both sexes began dancing together; clerics danced “with other clerics dressed as women”; and the “reenactment of the shouting match between Christ and Satan” resulted in a cacophony of “insolence and opprobrium” (145–50).

In chapters 6, 7, and 9, W.’s expertise as a Yale University professor of musicology comes to the fore while analyzing labyrinthine representations in music. He relates the musical device of “retrogression”—i.e., the reversal of a musical line tonally and/or rhythmically—back to language representing the recursive nature of Christ’s journey found in hymns, sequences, and sermons: *reddo, redimo, redio, reduco, refero, regresso, remeo, revertio* (111). Investigating the most famous musical tradition of the *cantus firmus* age—Masses based on the popular tune *L’Homme armé* [*The Armed Man*]—W. interweaves textual and contrapuntal meanings around the “symbolic process of reversal” (162). Linguistically, the “armed man” could symbolize the warrior struggles of Hercules, David against Goliath, Christ’s Last Judgment, and the Crusaders; musically, the composer ordered “reversals by a variety of Latin terms” including *retrograditur, vice versa*, and *cantando revertere* (187–88; 202). Thus, music symbolically imitated “the most perfect form of the medieval church labyrinth” which possessed a “beautiful, double-retrograding rhythm” (162).

Chapter 8 traces the maze’s final transformation: its martial meanings passed into a postreligious existence as a pacific object of pleasure, game, and enjoyment. By the 17th century, “the shadow of Christ militant had all but withdrawn from the maze, leaving the solitary pilgrim to experience it in a way not originally foreseen by the medieval Roman Catholic Church” (215).

Insofar as the book treats a number of radically different subjects, it reads more like a collection of essays whose relationships sometimes seem tenuous. Readers will likely read chapters that interest them in a piecemeal way. However, the sprawling variety’s disadvantage is greatly outweighed
by being an exceptionally stimulating and surprising collection of discoveries. Finally, its overall contrasting image—the ancient and medieval Christian’s self-understanding as a warrior versus a modern bourgeois invented tradition of peaceful serenity—disturbs, lingers, and haunts.

Boston College


This type of book, with its interdisciplinary character, will not surprise readers familiar with these editors’ previous works: The Trinity (2002) and The Resurrection (1997). The book gathers essays by 16 specialists from the disciplines of theology, philosophy, biblical studies, ancient Christian and Jewish writers, literature, preaching, and the fine arts. It was Rahner who remarked that the two great mysteries of Christianity are the Trinity and the Incarnation, and it is not only important but stimulating to see these authors from different disciplines take on the major doctrine of the Incarnation. While the variety of topics and individual styles by specialists make for a rich mix, it is not necessarily a uniform or smooth one, though some succeeded better than others.

The most coherent of the four sections that structure the book was the second, “Biblical Witness,” because the authors used as the focal point the Council of Chalcedon. This section is a model of interdisciplinary thought. The first essay, Sarah Coakley’s “What Does Chalcedon Solve and What Does It Not?” studies the Chalcedonian “definition” and its genre, and focuses the topic neatly for the two succeeding essays. Reminding us that the group of bishops initially charged with producing a formula at the council were resistant to the Emperor’s pressure for greater precision, the question becomes what type of document, especially in the way the bishops used language, did they actually produce and why? Coakley illuminates the topic for further investigation.

Brian Daley’s excellent paper presented Leontius of Byzantium (ca. 540) as one who preserved and systematized crucial elements in earlier Greek philosophical and theological vocabulary to open promising ways of seeing as a continuous whole the Church’s mainstream doctrines and dogmas of Nicaea, Constantinople, and Chalcedon. As Leontius said, “The ‘mode of union’ rather than the intelligible structure (logos) of nature, contains the great mystery of our religion” (166). His analysis of the meanings of substance-, nature-, and hypostasis-language with reference to the great mysteries of Christ are taken up by Maximus the Confessor (seventh century) and the great systematician John of Damascus (eighth century).

An expression from the world of sports is appropriate for the third essay: “An amateur makes the easy plays look difficult; the professional makes
the difficult plays look easy." "Aquinas' Metaphysics of the Incarnation" by Eleonore Stump is an intellectual experience of grace and beauty. While her purpose is to present the continuity of Aquinas's metaphysics with Chalcedon's doctrine (and she succeeds convincingly), the grace and beauty of her explanation of Aquinas's metaphysics is itself a bonus, such that any teacher of Aquinas or of the tradition might use this essay in multiple ways in undergraduate or graduate courses.

These three articles succeed brilliantly as an integral section, where the sum enhances the very fine parts.

The book's first section, "Biblical Witness," investigates two areas: Jewish literature (two essays) on theophany, anthropomorphism, and the Imago Dei, and the writings of Philo on the soul, immortality, emanation, and divinization of such figures as Moses. The other three essays focus on the New Testament (two on Paul, one on Jesus' self-understanding). For the quality of articles and their working together, it is the second best section.

The fourth section, "The Incarnation Practised and Proclaimed," is the most daring in content and style. David Brown's lucid examination of the Incarnation in 20th-century art (painting and sculpture by nonliving artists) is an intriguing foray into an all-too-often neglected area for fertile study of theology, including religious symbols in secular art. This section is creative, insightful, and provocative in a distinctive, esthetic vein.

The third section, "Foundational and Systematic Issues" (it might more aptly be called "Philosophical Theology"), treated the rationality of the Incarnation, the kenosis, and timelessness in God. These topics by their nature are more abstract, and reading them is more challenging.

Though not every essay or even section is everyone's cup of tea, every essay in the volume is worth serious attention, if only to become acquainted with the approaches and questions from other disciplines. The book deserves high marks for a first attempt at an interdisciplinary treatment. It might also have benefited from an examination of other pertinent topics, such as reincarnation as seen by Hindu and Islamic contributors. While Rahner is correct in saying that the Incarnation is one of the two great mysteries of Christianity, it is also important to know what is divine Mystery and what is human mystery. This volume helps discern this distinction.

Saint Louis University

J. J. Mueller, S.J.


In 1987, after a study week at the papal summer residence in Castel Gandolfo involving theologians, philosophers, and scientists, John Paul II wrote to the director of the Vatican Observatory encouraging such dialogue and raising a series of striking questions on how the findings of
modern science might enrich our understanding of some Christian beliefs. What, for instance, are the implications of contemporary cosmology for faith in the life of the world to come? The book under review responds to this question by bringing together distinguished scientists and theologians to explore the belief in bodily resurrection in relation to the laws of nature.

Through a meeting in Heidelberg in 2001 and a series of conferences elsewhere, the three outstanding editors gathered a seminar team that included research and teaching faculty in physics, biology, neuroscience, Scripture, Egyptology, church history, philosophy, and systematic theology. The 18 contributors (ten from Germany, six from the U.S., and one each from England and South Africa) pursued the question: How should we assess the Resurrection of Christ and our own future resurrection religiously and scientifically?

One of the editors, Ted Peters, skillfully introduces the book by summarizing the issues to be handled in the coming chapters. He also provides an excellent conclusion by drawing together the conceptual challenges presented by faith in the resurrection: for example, the nature of the risen body and the preservation of personal identity in resurrection.

While the “Big Bang” cosmology seems to favor the biblical doctrine of the first creation, two major scientific scenarios for the future threaten the Easter promise of the new creation to come. In his masterly chapter, “Bodily Resurrection, Eschatology, and Scientific Cosmology,” Robert Russell faces the two scenarios for cosmic death: the universe will either freeze itself out of existence or collapse back into a dense fireball. We may not presume that the laws of nature that govern the past and the present will necessarily govern the future as well—still less effect the new creation. In the ongoing history of the cosmos, God is free to act in new ways and transform what he has created. Christian hope rests on something radically new, which we have already glimpsed through the Resurrection of Christ himself.

John Polkinghorne, familiar to many through his work on science and religion and his winning the Templeton Prize in 2002, shows how the eschatological hope of Christianity cannot be truly maintained by those who play down the empty tomb and bodily resurrection. That hope entails, along with a personal and spiritual continuity, some element of material continuity between the pre-Resurrection and the post-Resurrection Jesus. Those who disagree end up arguing for a “full” tomb, which means an “empty” Easter faith. They also have to reckon with the clear evidence that it was very important to all four Gospel writers that Jesus’ tomb was empty. In some real sense a genuine resurrection must be bodily. The message of the empty tomb reinforces a sense of a redemption that enjoys a cosmic scope.

Among the many fine chapters in the book are those by Brian Daley (on early Christian ways of articulating faith in the resurrection), Nancey Murphy (on the resurrection and personal identity), and Noreen Herzfeld. She demolishes as science fiction the thesis of cybernetic immortality that reduces the human self to mere information patterns. Many of the contribu-
tors succeed in unifying the book by helpfully relating their own essays to other chapters in this joint work and not leaving it to the editors to trace the links. It is a pity that the volume contains no name index, as many contributors, in developing their own approach, introduce a range of other authors whose positions they accept or refute.

All in all, this valuable dialogue between scientists and theologians sheds much contemporary light on the Christian hope that “the end of the world” will bring the healing and transformation of our personal history and the renewal of all things. The book is an outstanding production along the lines of earlier volumes published by the three editors and their colleagues. I rejoiced to see Peters quoting at the end the radiant lines of Rabindranath Tagore: “Death is not extinguishing the light; it is only putting out the lamp because the dawn has come.”

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GERALD O’COLLINS, S.J.


In Saward’s view, Christmas “contains everything Christendom needs . . . for spiritual restoration” (43). Perhaps any episode of Christ’s life could be linked to its other episodes and to fundamental dogmas. But more than most events, his human birth easily invites one to consider other topics: his mother, his prior birth in eternity, and the Trinity. His human birth also invites reflection on its overall purpose, namely, our salvation. The birth of Jesus is therefore an appropriate starting point for broader Christian teaching.

This is how S. uses Christmas—as a springboard for discussing many other theological topics. He has chapters on the theology of “The Mysteries of the Life of Jesus”; “The Two Births [human and eternal] of the One Person of Christ”; “The Ever-Virgin Mother of the Incarnate Son of God”; “The Purpose of the Temporal Birth of Christ”, namely, our deification; “The Time and Place of the Saviour’s Birth”; and “The Manifestation of the Newborn Christ” to Jewish shepherds and Gentile Magi. A description of Botticelli’s “Mystic Nativity,” which links the birth of Christ to heavenly happiness, concludes the book.

S. does not rely on modern exegesis. Instead, he aims to provide an “understanding, through the Wisdom of the Church’s Fathers and Doctors, of the human birth of the Only-Begotten Son of the Father” (43). By “understanding” S. means an accurate grasp of the Church’s theological tradition, as developed primarily by the Fathers and Thomas Aquinas, but also including Bonaventure, Pierre de Bérulle, the liturgy, thoughts of the saints, the magisterium, and many other sources. For modern authors S. often uses Matthias Scheeben, G. K. Chesterton, and Hans Urs von Balthasar.

Faithful to his sources, S. also does not try to develop them: “Although
no author of recent times has done what I am trying to do here, I make no claim to originality. Self-consciously original theology tends always to be heretical theology” (14). If S.’s book is not original, it is nevertheless impressive. He writes clearly and in a lively style that draws on his knowledge of art and literature. He documents very precisely from an enormous range of sources, and arranges his material in an orderly way. He calls his third chapter a “meditation” (171), but the term aptly describes the whole work. It is a theological meditation on the Catholic tradition concerning Christmas and related doctrines.

Thus the “book proposes the Christmas mystery as a treasury of truth for instruction and of grace for imitation” (43), and it accomplishes this purpose effectively. It provides good expositions of Catholic teaching on the two births of the Word (121–48), Mary’s virginity (184–229), the infused knowledge of Jesus (242–45), the date of Christmas (318–21), faith and reason (342–51), and the importance of children. Especially fine are the concluding descriptions of Botticelli’s “Mystical Nativity” (362–71) and of a happy family Christmas (371–74) as anticipations of heaven. Other readers might find other sections more engaging.

S.’s method (strict adherence to tradition), however, prevents a speculative exploration of tradition, that in some cases might provide better understanding. His brief description of real relation (125–28) is clear but does not make the term intelligible. Another example: S. describes the infused knowledge of Jesus (242–45) without ever explaining how it functions along with his experimental knowledge. One also wonders how the infant Jesus could be conscious of the beatific vision with only an infant’s power of awareness.

A third example, and the most problematic for me, is the topic of S.’s first chapter: the theology of the mysteries of Jesus’ life. According to Aquinas, Christ merited grace throughout his earthly life. Tradition goes further by calling the various stages of Christ’s earthly life “mysteries” that effect in us, especially through their liturgical commemoration (53), a corresponding special grace (82). Thus in Mediator Dei, Pius XII asserts: “each mystery brings its own special grace for our salvation” (68). This position obviously gives theoretical encouragement to S.’s meditation on the Christmas mystery. It also presents a theoretical difficulty: the stages of Jesus’ life are treated as discrete and quasi-permanent events, rather than as a continuum of moments that succeed one another in time. Thus, says Bérulle, though “He is no longer an infant, . . . there is something in this mystery which continues in heaven” (118). But what?

The theology of the mysteries needs more insight into the relations between ecclesial devotion, the present reality of Christ, and his earthly past. Lacking such conceptual clarity, this theology of the mysteries is perplexing. One hopes that S.’s future meditations on the Church’s tradition will contribute some needed clarity.

Canisius College, Buffalo

Daniel P. Jamros, S.J.
Scholl is not widely known in North America; his many publications have not been translated into English. But he has written a book comparable to Joseph Ratzinger’s *Introduction to Christianity* (1968) or Hans Küng’s *On Being a Christian* (1974), one whose scope, even more than these, deserves to be called encyclopedic.

Now emeritus, S. was professor of Catholic theology at the Pädagogische Hochschule in Heidelberg, where he taught future teachers of Catholic religion classes in Germany’s public school system. This book has all the earmarks of being drawn from his lecture notes, with chapters ranging from modern biblical criticism and church history to the creed, sacraments, and such often-neglected topics as angels and purgatory. The information is factually reliable, and the analysis is insightful.

S. describes theology (and implicitly this book) as essentially hermeneutic, a matter of translating and “bridge-building.” The Church Fathers and early councils did it by translating the Scriptures (the First and Second Testaments, S. calls them) from their Jewish historical and cultural framework into Hellenistic categories. Today theologians and church leaders operate in a totally different culture that requires new categories to understand the Christian message. The “enormous danger” is that they will simply parrot the traditional doctrinal statements without considering whether they address the experiences of people living at the “end of the Christian era” in the West (43).

A recent (2002), provocatively titled book by S. translates as “When Childhood Faith Is No Longer Enough.” In the same vein, this book, though S. never puts it so bluntly, reads like his answer to the *Catechism of the Catholic Church* (1994), which he cites respectfully but critically. S. compares Christian tradition to a structure with multiple rooms, old and new, some under renovation and others in need of it. In a chapter on creation and the “mystery” that is the human person, he reviews the latest findings of the natural sciences; into this framework he situates his discussion of the soul as it was introduced into Christian theology from Platonic philosophy. Equally current, he appraises the 2001 Vatican decree acknowledging the validity of the Eucharistic prayer of the Assyrian Church of the East, despite the fact that it lacks the words of institution. This decree would seem to confirm S.’s argument that the Lord’s Supper is not a substantive (consecrated bread and wine) so much as an event, the total action in which bread and wine are blessed, broken, and shared.

One cannot help but note how much theology S. cites from the 1970s and 80s that still speaks to questions today or remains to be seriously addressed by the magisterium: the work of Rahner on the meaning of trinitarian doctrine and grace; Schillebeeckx on ministry and priesthood; Küng on the Church and the historical relativity of doctrinal statements. S. also quotes from the early writings of two curial cardinals who may well prefer he not do so: Walter Kasper on infant baptism (“not the only and certainly not the
ideal form of baptism”) (261) and Josef Ratzinger on Jesus’ divine sonship (“not a biological matter” [99] which in no way precludes Jesus’ having an earthly father).

S. addresses the tri-theism of much popular Christianity with a consideration of the symbolic (qualitative, not quantitative) meaning of the number three (an “open unity”), bespeaking “God before us, God with us, and God in us” (185). S. stresses that creedal formulations like the doctrine of the Trinity and the two-natures Christology of Chalcedon must be interpreted in the framework of the political, social, and cultural conditions that gave rise to them—for example, the power struggle between the Eastern and Western churches that lay behind the “Filioque” controversy.

S. is a pastoral theologian more interested in people and their contemporary concerns than in statements of ecumenical accord. He faults the 1999 Catholic-Evangelical consensus on justification as answering yesterday’s questions with concepts (like vicarious atonement) that mean nothing to people today. The central ecumenical challenge to the churches in the West is not escaping God’s justice but experiencing God at all and rethinking the meaning of salvation within a context of interreligious encounter. S.’s pastoral bent comes out also in his consideration of sickness and suffering: instead of offering slogans or easy answers about God’s will or testing, better silence and solidarity.

If I have any criticism, it is that this book, though it contains indexes of biblical passages and authors cited, lacks what would have been a helpful index of concepts. Similarly, though S. devotes several pages to the concerns of African and Asian theologians, he acknowledges that he is doing “European” theology, so that, unfortunately but perhaps perforce, he does not give social justice issues the same emphasis and centrality they warrant and receive from biblical scholars and theologians who immerse themselves in the lives of the poor. But that is a failing, no doubt, for most of us.
tion and the broader stream of Christian theology (14). The book, a testament of Y.'s faith, reveals not only a great teacher, but a passionate believer. It also enriches the possibility of ecumenical dialogue with the Mennonite Church.

This introduction to theology distinguishes itself by insisting that theology does not exist in the abstract. Y. was interested in how theology gets done. The book historically reconstructs theological practices in the different periods of the Church's life. Since the Christ event is at the heart of Christian theological practice, Y. chose to interpret this practice by examining the emergence of theological method in the process of clarifying the Church’s confession of Jesus. Part 1 examines the initial theological responses embedded in the New Testament writings with a special emphasis on the “theology” of Paul, John, and the Letter to the Hebrews. Part 2 expands the investigation to include the postapostolic writings with a major focus on the development of credal and conciliar formulations up to and including the fifth century. Part 3 seeks to arrive at a systematic treatment of these Christological themes by way of the threefold ministries of Christ: king, priest, and prophet, in that order. These Christological ministries, as developed within Protestant orthodoxy, suggest to Y. a triadic structure for theology, namely, eschatology, atonement, and revelation. The triadic structure is not intended as a doctrinal structure; for Y. it is a pragmatic classification of material. Throughout, he resists the temptation to solidify theological practice into doctrine. In his view, Anabaptist theology is committed to retaining the liveliness of theological language and is wary of any attempt to harden it into creeds and formulae. Anabaptist theology resists establishing a Tradition while at the same time not neglecting the pivotal developments of the Christological tradition. As anyone who has taught theology can testify, it is difficult to keep alive the originary experiences from which faith has issued and not to harden the saying into the said.

Y. characterized our time as one in which “there is no longer any evident right answer” to theological questions (233). Without alluding to it, he is confronted with the dilemma of Kant’s transcendental illusions. Forced by the orthodoxy movements within the Christian traditions to relay the right cognitive answers to questions, Y. constantly alludes to and then skirts the desire for cognitive certainty. He is aware of the cognitive aporia—hence his pragmatic theoretical approach to issues of fact and interpretation—but theology, for him, must remain at the service of discipleship. Hence his resolve in part 3 to examine the Christological functions not theoretically but practically. Unfortunately, he frequently leaves this practical examination only at the level of intuition; he never fully succeeds in translating eschatology as an extension of the royal ministry of Christ, atonement as an extension of the priestly mission, and revelation as an extension of the prophetic mission, into an ethical framework, as he said he intended to do.

The introduction by Stanley Hauerwas and Alex Sider is particularly insightful. It historically locates the course, the text, and the singular contribution that Yoder has made to Anabaptist theology. The book evokes the testimony of a born theologian and a magisterial articulation of the

Mark Graham has produced a readable, interesting, and valuable work in this analysis of the thought of Josef Fuchs, S.J., on the natural law. Fuchs, long-time professor of moral theology at the Gregorian University in Rome, whose published works run from the late 1940s to the early 1990s, is one of the most influential Catholic moral theologians of the last century. Even his critics would agree with that. His thought—and especially, as G. argues, the change in his thought—is worth serious study.

G. recounts Fuchs’s appointment by Pope John XXIII in 1963 to the Pontifical Commission on Population, Family, and Birth—known commonly as “The Birth Control Commission.” G.’s thesis is that “during his three years of service on the pontifical commission Fuchs underwent a profound intellectual conversion that dramatically altered his notion of natural law and culminated in an explicit repudiation of most of his earlier positions” (2). The three chapters of part 1 analyze Fuchs’s “Preconversion Period” (1941–66), while the three chapters of part 2 focus on the “Postconversion Period” (1966–present).

I was initially skeptical of these seemingly overdramatic categories. Was the “intellectual conversion,” the “radical clarification” [Bernard Lonergan, Method in Theology (1972, 238)] really that clear, that dramatic? Students of Fuchs and other scholars may have their own views, but G.’s argument convinced me. The shifts in Fuchs’s thought in the light of his experience on the pontifical commission are not adequately captured by the word “development, with its implication of continuity through change” (105). Rather, G. argues, “the defining characteristic of Fuchs’s natural law theory during the papal birth control commission is discontinuity; from theological foundations to substantive content to practical conclusions, few aspects of Fuchs’s natural law theory remained unchanged” (105). As the reference to Lonergan’s work on conversion suggests, among the most interesting aspects of G.’s volume is the way it displays what an “intellectual conversion” sometimes “looks like”: both how such a conversion might be prompted, as well as how pervasive it can be not only in one’s mind but in the totality of one’s life.

Chapter 1 (“Confrontation with Situation Ethics”) and chapter 2 (“Fuller Account of Natural Law”) depict Fuchs’s “preconversion” thought. His “preconversion” understanding of the natural law is summarized as “an understanding...dominated by an exceedingly confident metaphysics of human nature...: the conviction that human nature yields...an ordered series of moral norms capable of determining what ought
to be done in any conceivable situation; a strong role for the magisterium, which by virtue of its superior insight into natural law enjoys privileged access to knowledge of right and wrong behavior . . . ; and finally a negligible role for the individual moral agent, who is exclusively responsible for forming her conscience according to received teaching to ensure that she is able to select the correct moral norm to be applied in her respective situation” (242).

Chapter 3 describes Fuchs’s experience on the papal commission. G. argues that it was Fuchs’s extensive exposure to “faithful and committed Catholic spouses” who had struggled with the “received teaching on birth control” (and whose married lives sometimes suffered as a result) that prompted his intellectual conversion (83–84).

Part 2 elaborates on the changes in Fuchs’s thought. With chapters on his espousal of Karl Rahner’s theological anthropology, the shift to “recta ratio” as the proximate norm of morality, and Fuchs’s new understanding of a more limited role of moral norms (and thereby of the magisterium), G.’s argument about Fuchs’s conversion is compelling. Following Rahner, Fuchs’s “turn to the subject” and his “turn to the concrete” led to a dramatically different approach to natural law: “reason reflecting on experience—not metaphysics—as the port of entry to natural law; . . . the potential disjunction between abstract, preformulated moral norms and concrete, integral human flourishing as grasped by recta ratio; . . . and the moral agent not as an applicator of received teaching, but as an active assessor of moral truth” (243).

G.’s work is a kind of “theological biography” that will interest many; the influence of Fuchs’s thought warrants this sort of investigation. But this is more than biography. Contemporary scholars of natural law theory will want to study G.’s substantive critique of Fuchs’s thought, both before and after his “conversion.” Graduate students and perhaps upper-level undergraduates may delve into this volume for another reason: the shift—“conversion”—in Fuchs’s thought is a microcosm of the changes in Catholic moral theology over the last 50 years.

College of St. Catherine, St. Paul, Minn. RUSSELL B. CONNORS, JR.


As Yves Simon argued in his magisterial study The Tradition of Natural Law (1965), the proponent of any natural law theory needs to take a stand on such questions as God, freedom, and nature. Some find the usual metaphysical commitments of natural law too heavy for this form of ethics ever to win public influence. For this reason it is no surprise that the New Natural Law theorists such as John Finnis and Germain Grisez have labored so diligently to articulate their approach to natural law in terms of
basic goods that are self-evident and incommensurable. Religion is counted a basic good, but there is no special need to rely on God or even on a detailed analysis of human nature to make one’s case. The burden shifts to drawing out the implications of our basic intuitions.

By contrast, Russell Hittinger insists on the need to return to the theological roots of natural law to understand its cogency as a theory and to illuminate its distinctive contribution even to such issues as constitutional law and judicial legitimacy. In the first section of the book H. examines the traditional doctrine that natural law is our human and rational participation in the eternal law of God and identifies certain misperceptions when this theological consideration is omitted in favor of treating natural law as a matter of propositions or precepts of practical reason. With care and scholarly sophistication he weaves a path through such classical figures as Aquinas and Suárez as well as through such modern thinkers as John Paul II and Clarence Thomas in the effort to treat the crucial question of the source of moral obligation in any law and the diverse ways in which one can legitimately claim to find natural law within positive laws.

One of the great merits of this book may well turn out to be its clarification of issues that are routinely confused in many debates over natural law. Some questions about natural law are properly philosophical, such as whether there really is such a thing as natural law. Others are more questions of general political theory, including how best to assign authority so as to bring about natural justice effectively in a given society. Yet other questions concern our own specific form of government, such as whether a judiciary that is supposed to be limited by written law may still make judicial use of natural law theory.

In the second half of the book H. takes up a variety of current controversies from a natural law perspective, including the debate over assisted suicide, the question of religious liberty, and the relation of liberalism and technology. The chapter on natural rights is particularly insightful in showing how the modern inclination to support all kinds of “rights claims” actually endangers the very idea of limited government. Students of the Bill of Rights will appreciate his command of political theory and case law in assessing this modern trend. In a similar way he analyzes the emphasis frequently given to the notion of privacy in modern legal culture as a disturbing readiness to elevate the individual to the status of a sovereign and to be forgetful of the legitimate claims of the common good.

Throughout the volume, H. is alert to the use made of natural law in ecclesial documents such as John Paul II’s *Veritatis splendor* (1993) and the various encyclicals that make up the tradition of Catholic social teaching. One of the most interesting theological discussions of the book comes in the chapter on the Vatican II document *Dignitatis humanae* and the subject of religious liberty. H. deftly handles some of the perplexing questions of how to interpret this document by detailing a number of possible models for the relation of church and state. He then analyzes various crucial passages in *Dignitatis humanae* that apply a natural law analysis to the Church’s comparatively new situation of living within a pervasively secular
world and that require a rather sober and demystified view of the powers of the modern state rather than naïve optimism about the myth of progress.


David Boonin, associate professor of philosophy at the University of Colorado, Boulder, claims to have found the holy grail of the anti-abortion debate, namely, the proof that every argument constructed to support a fetus’ right to life fails on its own terms. Furthermore, he asserts that even if a fetus were to have a right to life, abortion would still be morally permissible, again on the abortion critics’ own arguments.

While these are broad claims indeed, a close reading of the text shows that B. constructs two rules of engagement that will narrow the playing field considerably. First, he states that he is only “concerned in this book to examine those arguments which a critic of abortion can attempt to convince those not already committed to the thesis that abortion is morally impermissible” (54). Thus, if someone believes that abortion is morally wrong, then B. would be dispensed from proving his claim to demonstrate the fallacy of any anti-abortion arguments advanced by such people. This is an important prescription, since it allows B. to establish his next critical rule, namely, that only arguments that could be deemed persuasive are those that both sides of the abortion debate would accept in advance as being morally determinative. Therefore, if someone could advance argument “P” as an argument for the fetus’ right to life, such that both pro-abortion proponents and the undecided population could accept if the argument could be demonstrated, then, and only then, would this be a valid argument against abortion. Thus, if the pro-abortion side were to say that a certain argument is unpersuasive, then it could not be considered as having a morally determinative force. Following these two rules of engagement, B. does in fact consider quite a number of potential anti-abortion arguments. In each case, however, he simply concludes that these arguments fail to hold according to his rules of the debate.

One example of B.’s approach will illustrate his philosophical method and his two critical rules of engagement. For the sake of discussion he proposes the criterion of perceived fetal movement (i.e., “quickening”) as a potential argument for the right to life. While he acknowledges that this argument has a long historical tradition, he fails to mention that it was employed theologically by Thomas Aquinas and others to try to establish when the fetus would be ensouled. Presumably even if B. were aware of Thomas’s position, there would be no need to consider the claim further, since both sides of the debate would not likely accept having an immortal soul as a criterion for establishing the right to life, and therefore the ensoulment argument itself would be dismissed as out of order.
Instead, B. moves from a consideration of fetal movement to an argument that seems to have more potential for the pro-life side, namely, what he terms the brain criterion: that a “fetus acquires a right to life when it acquires a brain.” Yet B. quickly concludes that this argument also fails since it is “unacceptably imprecise” for three reasons: first, the brain possessed by adults and newborns is already functioning, whereas a zygote has no brain at all. Second, the brain is an organ with several functions, and therefore to use the brain criterion to establish the right to life would require us “to specify which parts of the brain we were taking to be morally relevant.” And third, the “brain taken as a whole, and the parts considered individually, are not simply acquired all at once” (99).

If this sort of argument convinces the potential reader, she or he will be delighted with the book as a whole. On the other hand, if the above approach seems insufficiently rigorous in terms of logic, philosophy, and/or theology, the book will likely be a disappointment. A more truthful book jacket blurb might be redrafted to state that B. has demonstrated that there is no pro-life/anti-abortion argument that will be accepted by both sides of the debate as morally persuasive. Of course such a publicity statement, while true, would probably not sell as many books.

University of San Francisco

JAMES T. BRETZKE, S.J.

A CALL TO FIDELITY. ON THE MORAL THEOLOGY OF CHARLES CURRAN.

In April 1967 the Catholic University of America voted not to renew Charles Curran’s contract as a teacher of moral theology. When contacted by his bishop, Fulton Sheen, Curran said he would be content working in a parish. This detail, recounted by Daniel McGuire at the outset of this Festschrift, testifies to the profound pastoral concern that has motivated Charles Curran as priest and moral theologian.

Unlike many Festschriften, this one constantly engages with the thought of the one it celebrates. McGuire’s opening chapter (“Catholic Theologian, Priest, Prophet”) reflects the experience of Curran’s allies over the years, defends the proper autonomy of the office of theologian, and laments the timidity of Catholic academe. Whereas in 1967 a threatened faculty strike led to Curran’s reinstatement, in 1986 the declaration by the Vatican’s Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith (CDF) that Curran was no longer “a Catholic theologian” met with little effective challenge. The closing chapter by Bryan Massingale accurately describes the polarized and politicized context in which today’s younger moral theologians struggle to combine ecclesial commitment and intellectual integrity.

Between these two historical reflections are twelve studies under the headings of fundamental moral theology, sexual and medical ethics, social
and political ethics, and dialogue. The book concludes with Curran’s bibliography (1961−2002). Most chapters provide a survey of their topic, note Curran’s contribution to it, and outline the agenda for the future. As a result, the book provides a highly useful overview of the current situation in moral theology, especially in the United States.

The authors will be well known to readers of this journal: Timothy O’Connell on the moral person, James Keenan on action and decision making, Kevin Kelly on divorce and remarriage, Lisa Cahill on sexual ethics, James Walter on medical ethics and genetics, Kenneth Himes on social teaching, Thomas Shannon on social ethics, James Gustafson on the ecumenical dimensions of Curran’s work, and Raphael Gallagher on Curran’s fundamental moral theology compared with that of contemporary European theologians. On some topics Curran has been more communicator than creative thinker, but the fact that his contributions can be noted under every heading explains why he has been such an important colleague and mentor to so many over the past 40 years.

In other chapters, Margaret Farley insightfully explores the graced self-doubt that “allows for epistemic humility, the basic condition for communal as well as individual moral discernment” (69); James Coriden grapples with the challenge of preserving academic freedom and Catholic identity in the light of *Ex corde ecclesiae*; and Bryan Hehir examines and develops Curran’s defense of Catholicism as a “big Church” to argue for the continuing role of Catholic institutions such as hospitals and schools.

Massingale argues that the condemnation of Curran was a more decisive event than *Veritatis splendor* because it was “a repudiation of the major trajectory of postconciliar moral theology” (261). Although Curran was never a “proportionalist” (Keenan, 44), his relational-responsibility model of moral reasoning led him to more radical conclusions, in particular to rejection of the “objectively grave-subjectively not culpable” pastoral solutions of traditional moralists. While the traditional solution is applicable and useful in many instances, it is problematic in others. Contemporary moral theology is still grappling with this pressing pastoral issue.

This is a work by scholars who are also friends or colleagues. While a celebratory tone is understandable in a Festschrift, a few courteous contributions from Curran’s critics would have enhanced this stimulating book. Sadly, the polarized state of Catholic moral theology may have precluded such a possibility. “Ecumenical” dialogue is urgently required within the community of Catholic scholars. An adequate debate about what constitutes Catholic moral theology should engage with *Veritatis splendor*, *Evangelium vitae*, and the teachings of John Paul II more generally. For this debate to be fruitful, both the CDF and all who think of themselves as Catholic scholars will need to foster a respectful, hospitable and, dare one say “Christian,” intellectual context that transcends the current ecclesiastical polarization.

Given the immense symbolic status of Charles Curran for allies and critics alike, this volume is valuable for the way it displays the intellectual breadth and depth of his work. Massingale argues that today’s moralists are
engaged in “faithful reconstruction” of a tradition they judge flawed by ambiguity and blind spots—he asks how theologians of the 1960s could have been so concerned with contraception, and so little concerned with racism. By contrast, Curran’s project was one of “creative fidelity” within a Catholic tradition to which he has always maintained his allegiance. Irrespective of the validity (and “Catholicity”) of his specific conclusions, Curran’s passionate engagement with the pastoral problems of the day sets an example for all Catholic moralists whatever their ecclesial stance.

Catholic Institute of Sydney, Australia

GERALD GLEESON


A book on the legacy of H. Richard Niebuhr in theological ethics invites skepticism. Surely the younger Niebuhr had an enormous influence, but a legacy? Skepticism grows when we hear whom Werpehowski includes in this legacy: James Gustafson, Stanley Hauerwas, Paul Ramsey, and Kathryn Tanner. Who, if anyone, is excluded from a legacy broad enough to include Gustafson and Hauerwas?

Our skepticism ebbs as W.’s summary of Niebuhr’s theological ethics yields a set of themes that proves remarkably fruitful for interpreting the other four authors. These themes include response to “the whole reality of God” as creator, preserver, and redeemer; the relation of particular Christian language and practice to the universality and transcendence of God; and the relation of the Church to the world. Like Niebuhr, W. focuses on the role of broad theological factors in shaping theological ethics, paying too little attention to the more technical aspects of ethical analysis. But again, like Niebuhr, W.’s analyses are accessible to first-time readers of these authors while also instructing seasoned insiders.

Do these superb interpretations vindicate the claim of a legacy? At a descriptive level the vindication is uneven. There are clear and profound engagements with Niebuhr, as in Gustafson’s theocentrism and his treatment of Christian particularism as a socio-historical reality to which one may consent. In other cases, Niebuhr is the catalyst for a project that develops along very different lines, as with Hauerwas on moral selfhood and agency and Ramsey on Christ transforming natural law. Finally, some cases, such as Tanner’s account of human and divine agency, involve overlap with Niebuhr without derivation from him. But W. does not aim at a scholarly account of Niebuhr’s influence. Instead, he defends and practices a Niebuhrian style of theological-ethical reflection, involving a “critical conversation” with and among the four authors and the themes noted above. In this context he addresses certain false impressions: that Ramsey’s later work is insufficiently informed by his theology, that for Hauerwas the integrity of Christian discourse and practice rules out engagement with
other discourses and practices, that Gustafson reduces God to nature as understood through the sciences. While deftly refuting these impressions W. shows how inattention to some aspect of the Niebuhrian legacy lends some validity to the misinterpretation. Ramsey and Hauerwas, for example, insufficiently attend to God as redeemer and creator, respectively, while Gustafson fails to secure the cognitive status of the Christian tradition. In these and other instances, W. engages his four authors and Niebuhr in a process of mutual correction. The Niebuhrian legacy becomes a living conversation with W. himself an active participant.

Through this critical conversation W. proposes a theological ethic grounded in the faith and practice of the Church, responsive to the whole reality of God’s work in the world, and relating Church to world in a complex dialectic of witness and service. Here the Niebuhrian legacy involves a “polar” method of mutual conversation and correction among apparently incompatible themes and voices leading to a constructive position.

Two problems with this approach also haunt Niebuhr’s own work. One is that the poles are often so far apart that to navigate between them is not itself to aim at a determinate destination. There are many ways to balance responses to God as creator and redeemer, Christian particularity and universal truth, or integrity of witness and service to the world. Was it not Niebuhr’s own indeterminacy that led Ramsey, Gustafson, and Hauerwas to their much more determinate positions on issues they inherited from him? The other problem is that, like Niebuhr, W. assumes that his critical conversation simply corrects imbalances among the conversation partners while preserving their best insights, when in fact it surreptitiously undermines them. Consider his proposal of a “practical pacifism” in which a just war stance is disciplined by practices of peace and reconciliation, vigorous criticism of ideologies that normalize war, and a strong presumption against war. W. presents this intriguing proposal as the result of a critical conversation that preserves the concerns of Ramsey and Hauerwas while eliminating certain blind spots. But while claiming to do justice to both Ramsey and Hauerwas, he does justice to neither. Practical pacifism repudiates both Ramsey’s primacy of the defense of the vulnerable neighbor and Hauerwas’s commitment to discipleship of a nonviolent Jesus.

Niebuhr’s legacy consists in the extraordinary power of a certain set of themes to generate diverse positions that are nevertheless capable of being brought into critical conversation with each other. W. brilliantly reconstructs this legacy in a profound engagement with contemporary theological ethics. Yet perhaps Niebuhr was at his best not when engaged in a mutual correction of, say, approaches to Christ and culture or of “unitarianisms” of the Father, Son, and Spirit but when arguing for the Church’s withdrawal or engagement in particular circumstances or for radical monotheism. His proposed practical pacifism suggests that this is so with W. as well: that his own substantive theological ethic is best heard as a distinct voice in the conversation he describes rather than through the din of mu-
tual corrections. If W. therefore still owes us an account of his substantive ethic, this book is nevertheless a very impressive down payment.

University of Notre Dame

GERALD P. MCKENNY


The intellectual climate represented by postmodernity challenges the most basic assumptions on which Christian theology has relied to express Christian self-understanding. Responses to that challenge can run the gamut from retreat into premodern constructions of reality to wholesale acceptance of postmodern ambiguity and, in the most extreme cases, its consequent nihilism. Since the mid-1990s, Leuven Encounters in Systematic Theology (LEST) has brought theologians and philosophers of religion together for biannual congresses to engage challenges posed by the postmodern context. The three volumes here reviewed contain 48 essays selected from the papers of the second biannual congress (LEST II) and the Junior Scholars Conference that immediately preceded it. The three volumes will be referenced below as SP, CS, and PT respectively.

The essays address from diverse perspectives different aspects of the congress’ theme, summarized in the title of the first collection: How can one legitimately think/speak of Sacramental Presence in a Postmodern Context? The distinctive title for each volume reflects thematic subcategories within the congress’ unifying theme. Each volume considers characteristics (not the nature) of the postmodern context and its implications for “sacramento-theology”—a term adopted by the LEST II organizers to signal the need to rethink all of theology in terms of sacramentality (SP 4, CS 7). Cardinal Godfried Danneels’ congress-opening address, identifying eleven challenges to sacramentology, Lieven Boeve’s introductory essay, and Georges De Schrijver’s “Postmodernity and the Withdrawal of the Divine: A Challenge for Theology” both ably sketch the pastoral, philosophical, theological, and ethical challenges of the postmodern context and map the terrain on which the contributors locate their specific concerns.

SP, containing 18 papers from senior scholars, is divided into two sec-
tions: “Main Papers” and “Offered Papers.” The first section of seven essays and five responses reflects a diversity of approaches and perspectives and provides an engaging and provocative entrée into current discussions of the theological implications of postmodern problematics. Paul Moyaert’s phenomenological analysis of symbols in relationship to the doctrine of transubstantiation, David Powers’s exploration of the ambivalence (but also necessity) of language and symbolic ritual in overcoming distortions in modernity, and Graham Ward’s deconstructive “archaeology of presence” (SP 28) arguing for the retrieval of an Augustinian notion of presence (a reflection of a larger Radical Orthodoxy trajectory), illustrate the range of approaches to the congress’ theme.

Louis-Marie Chauvet’s, “The Broken Bread as Theological Figure of Eucharistic Presence” bears special notice. To support his contention that eucharistic presence must be understood in terms not of the simple presence of being (esse) but in terms of “presence for” (ad-esse), Chauvet argues intriguingly that “the presence of Christ is indeed inscribed in the bread and wine” but “is not circumscribed there” (SP 259). (This same essay in its French original heads part one of CS, “The Sacramentology of Louis-Marie Chauvet.”) The seven “Offered Papers,” comprising the rest of SP, reflect a similar diversity and level of sophistication. As a whole, all the essays assembled here will be of interest to sacramentologists, systematic theologians, and philosophers of religion, particularly those in dialogue with the impact of Derrida, Levinas, and Heidegger on the postmodern context.

CS gathers 18 papers from both the LEST II congress and the Junior Scholars Conference and divides them into two main sections: “The Sacramentology of Louis-Marie Chauvet” and “Facets of Sacramentology”—the term “sacramentology” indicates a concentration (not exclusive) on the theology of “the sacraments” (especially Eucharist). The six contributions of part 1 examine Chauvet’s understanding of symbol, its relevance to intra-ecclesial and ecumenical discussions in a postmodern context, and its theoretical and practical adequacy. Of particular note is Daniel Franklin Pilario’s respectful but critical appraisal of Chauvet’s notion of “gift-exchange” as a remedy to the implied power dynamics of the “economic-exchange” understanding of sacraments. Pilario cautions readers that power dynamics are not unknown in the exchange of gifts and suggests the “contrast experience” (Schillebeeckx, Pierre Bordieu) as a more suitable framework for attaining Chauvet’s desired ends. Part 2 groups its contents under three subheadings of four essays each: “Discovering the Sacramentality of Sacraments,” “Exposing Eucharistic Faces,” and “Re-imag(in)ing Sacramental Contours.” These essays span a wide range from the ecumenical value of a relational approach to sacraments (Timothy Crutcher), to the legitimacy of the electronic mediation of the liturgy (Willem Marie Speelman), to ecological sacramental theology (Dorothy McDougall). Part 1 will have a natural appeal to those already familiar with Chauvet’s Symbol and Sacrament (1995), as his initial essay builds upon—and the subsequent contributions discuss—the argument presented there. The wider topical net cast
in part 2 will attract a broader spectrum of readers, but it makes the volume
as a whole less cohesive and less attractive as an individual purchase.

PT contains 16 papers presented by junior scholars. As its title suggests,
the contributions concern mainly the postmodern challenge to language
about the relationship of immanence to transcendence. Papers are grouped
under four headings. Section 1, “Approaching ‘Sacrament’ in a Postmodern
Age: Questions Concerning Method,” contains papers by two of the
conference organizers, Boeve and Jeffrey Bloechl. These sketch the meth-
odological terrain carved out for sacramental theology by postmodern sens-
bilities. Contributions to section 2, “Yesterday Revisited: Recovering the
Past in the Face of the Challenges of the Postmodern Age,” consider what
ante-postmodern theological approaches (Rahner, Schillebeeckx, Lind-
beck, Steiner) might contribute to present discussions. The essays of sec-
tion 3, “Today’s Imperative: Uncovering the Transforming Power of Sac-
rament in a Postmodern Age,” ask not only what challenges the postmod-
ern context poses to understanding and legitimating claims about
sacramental presence on a theoretical level. They also explore how a re-
appropriated understanding of sacraments and sacramental experience in
the light of postmodern problematics can address the valutational concerns
behind the postmodern critique of modernity. These papers bring the ethi-
cal implications of sacramental theology into sharp focus. Finally, the pa-
pers in section 4, “Tomorrow’s Possibilities: Discovering New Loci of Sac-
ramental Presence in a Postmodern Age,” explore how the “decentering”
impetus of the postmodern context shifts the place of sacramentality from
its (at least popularly imagined) exclusive domain within ecclesial action. In
addition to Peter De May’s contribution on the reception of sacramental
ecclesiology, papers by Daniël Louw, Gesa Thiessen, and Michele Saracino
explore respectively the African context, art, and the body as loci of sac-
ramental presence. As with CS, so also with PT, the breadth of scope offers
something for a wide range of interests.

On the whole, the three collections offer high-quality, intriguing, and
provocative discussions of important theological questions generated by
the postmodern context. Unfortunately, their presentation is marred by
numerous misspellings, grammatical errors, and unidiomatic uses of prepo-
sitions. While the range of topics and cost of the volumes (particularly of
SP) will limit the number of readers for whom any given volume is a “must
buy,” all three should be in libraries that serve graduate theology programs.

Saint Louis University  

JAMES K. VOISS, S.J.

The Church’s Liturgy. By Michael Kunzler. Translated from the Ger-
mian by Placed Murray, O.S.B., Henry O’Shea, O.S.B., Cilian Ó Sé, O.S.B.
Associazione Manuali di Teologia Cattolica, Handbooks of Catholic The-

This historical and theological study of every aspect of the Church’s
liturgy is the tenth in an international series of theological manuals, pub-
lished in German, English, Spanish, French, Italian, Polish, and Russian. The abbreviated title of the series is AMATECA. The work is divided into six sections. The first two are introductory and treat the liturgy as God’s descent to man (katabasis) and man’s ascent to God (anabasis). Section three deals with the celebration of the Eucharist, and section four with the other sacraments. The final two sections cover the sanctification of time, first in the Liturgy of the Hours and then in the liturgical year.

Kunzler’s book is impressive for the following reasons. First, he offers a thorough theological introduction to the mystery of worship that relies on the works of Dom Odo Casel and Jean Corbon. As Corbon aims to open up the mystery of the liturgy, so K. begins his study with the mystery of the liturgy, insisting on God’s initiative: the liturgy is God’s work, an invitation to share in his life. The liturgy is also, however, the work of the Church: in its liturgical celebrations the Church accepts God’s invitation and, in remembering the saving mysteries, makes God’s saving works present.

In section 2 on man’s ascent to God (anabasis) K. writes well about the visible form that this ascent takes (76–82). He deals with the understanding of symbol—“The Son of God made man is the quintessential model of symbol” (80)—and also reflects on the relationship of liturgy and culture (83–88). He concludes this section with an excellent treatment of active participation, which, he asserts, “means essentially the interiorization of the liturgical action by all who are taking part” (157).

A second important feature of the study is its thorough coverage of the current German periodical literature. Each section ends with a bibliography of mostly German works, although an appendix for the English edition adds a bibliography of works in other languages.

Third, K. treats every aspect of the Church’s liturgy briefly but thoroughly. An added feature are his sketches of corresponding rites of the Byzantine, Ambrosian, and, in some cases, Anglican liturgies. Fourth, because K. is writing some decades after the liturgical reforms initiated by Vatican II, he is able to touch on some aspects of the reform that have been criticized or need further discussion. He considers, for example, the misunderstanding of the sacrament of confirmation and how the Eastern Church’s theology of confirmation offers a corrective (266–68). He also takes up the question of the ordinary minister of the sacrament of the anointing of the sick, whether there might be “extraordinary ministers,” so that deacons and designated lay persons, such as acolytes and ministers of the Eucharist (290), might administer the sacrament.

The book is not easy to read, as frequent quotation of other authors interrupts the flow. K. writes best when he expresses his personal insight without quoting sources or footnoting his reflections. A few examples of such passages are his treatments of the tasks of liturgiology (88), God’s presence in his word (110), the meaning of active participation (157–58), and the multiplicity of Christ’s presence and its relationship to altar, ambo, and celebrant’s chair (208). Passages expressing K.’s personal understanding of aspects of the liturgy are all too rare. Nevertheless his study should serve well as a textbook or a reference book for upper division and graduate
survey courses. One hopes, however, that, should there be future editions, the editors will more carefully proofread the text (including the Index of Names and Topics) against errors and unclear and awkward expressions.

_Everett A. Diederich, S.J._

**ACCOUNTS OF HOPE: A PROBLEM OF METHOD IN POSTMODERN APOLOGIA.**

Scripture advises us to be ready to account for our hope. A theological account should be able to show the vitality of following Christ in different situations. Ivana Dolejšová has written a refreshing book focused on the philosophical tasks of fundamental theology and shows a keen eye for patterns of inquiry. The book addresses postmodernity, foundationalism, and epistemology, encompassing figures from Justin and Augustine to Francis, from Kant, Kierkegaard, and Hegel to Newman and Tyrrell, along a trajectory that finally mines the seminal work of Ludwig Wittgenstein. In her final chapter she is able to list epistemological rules for an apologia that wants to maintain historical continuity, keep its transcendent reference, and make sense in a postmodern world.

D. takes postmodernity as a serious part of our present context and so seeks a nonfoundationalist grounding of apologia that neither surrenders transcendental reference nor claims metaphysical absolutes. She wants “foundations upon which a dynamic postmodern apologia could rely, so that it does not plunge into apologetics based either on static certainties or on relativist ones which prevent apologetic discourse from being taken seriously” (142).

D. distinguishes two types of apology: one a closed, defensive commitment to past contexts and the other an open conversation that takes seriously the challenge of postmodernity (Derrida, Lyotard, and Levinas). For her, apologetic names the rational defense of Christian belief and practice within a certain system that takes itself as universally true and the norm to which others should “convert.” Apologetic is foundationalist. But postmodernity is a radical critique of any belief in stability, of fixed meanings, and universal claims rooted in unchangeable theories that tend to reduce “the other” to “the same.” Premodern conventions and the certainties of modern progressive optimism fall under the ax of postmodern critique. For D. apologia is where we show that Christian discipleship is neither stupid nor fearful but rather is a reflective vindication of the integrity of Christian belief and practice. Her problem is to find a foundation for apologia that is not foundationalist.

Conflicting religious epistemologies lie at the root of D.’s division between apologia and apologetics. Her critical confirmation of a postmodern critique and mining of the history of apologia lead to a third thread for weaving a nonfoundationalist apologia: a turn to self-consciousness about
how we know. Kant’s split of faith and reason, theology and philosophy raises questions of method and epistemology that find their best resolution in the praxis of Ludwig Wittgenstein’s practical linguistic turn. With Wittgenstein D. is able to sketch a referential practice that is not foundationalist. A Wittgensteinian sensitivity to differences brings an attention to social context and use that enables an open discourse in which language becomes referential through practice. D. rightly sees that Wittgenstein’s contribution to theological investigations lies not in his own remarks on religion but in his invitation to a linguistic tropism.

The book gets additional authority from the way D. locates her argument within her experience of the totalitarianism of the former Czechoslovakia. She cannot deny that the way we converse reflects the way we see the human person and political society. For her Christianity is something hopeful and liberating for the hearers, but is not any sort of religious ideology for the benefit of those who spread it. How can religious postulates be honestly validated? One’s rules for argument and authority are not just a matter of taste, but of communicative effectiveness and ethical commitment to human dignity. The integrity of human life and the character of academic argument are linked (284).

This book is mostly a tour of philosophical tools, and so it may be unfair to ask for more attention to theologians. Still, given her notion of the political nature of any intellectual enterprise, and given the book’s plea for anamnesis and praxis, I would think that the sympathetic work of Johann Baptist Metz would be more in evidence. D. also might have made good use of the compatible work of Terrence Tilley on religious commitment.

D. surveys the philosophical terrain in a clear style and addresses the pressing issues of foundations, apologia, epistemology and practice. She writes in the hope of providing a tool for the rediscovery of liberating, exciting, and credible accounts of Christian belief and practice. This book makes a good beginning.

*Gonzaga University, Spokane*  

**JOHN K. DOWNEY**
LAMENTATIONS AND THE TEARS OF GOD.

Aware of “the costly loss of lament,” in the phrase of Walter Brueggemann, her colleague at Columbia Theological Seminary, O’Connor concentrates on the suffering in Lamentations and on its relevance. Lamentations, five lyric poems mourning the destruction of Jerusalem in 586 B.C., poses a problem for readers and commentators. How does one interpret and respond to the relentless display of the pain of Woman Zion and the frustrations of the poet-narrator, and the fact that God does not respond? O’s solution is a narrative approach. Discovering the various voices of the poems, she allows each to work upon the reader as the poems progress. She sees strong continuity in the poems; the sentiments of one flow into the next. For example, the male narrator in the first poem initially blames “city Woman Zion” for her misery; her sins brought it on and she had best get used to it. His attitude changes, however, as he sits with her; her massive pain brings him to silence and then turns him into her ad-
vocate before God. Chapter 3, the center poem, contains the lone expression of hope. In a highly original move, O. renders Hebrew geber (literally, “man”) “the strongman,” responsible for the defense of women and children. Though the strongman finds no answer to the suffering and wavers, he manages a statement of hope: “It emerges without clear cause like grace, without explanation, in the midst of despair and at the point of least hope” (57). The comment is an example of O.’s exegetical style. The last two chapters are theological reflections, personal yet drawing on biblical scholars, poets, and writers.

The commentary and essay are the fruit of years of study and reflection, and are expressed in elegant prose. Always fresh, well versed in the scholarship of the poems, here and there highly personal, O.’s book is suitable for newcomers and stimulating to pastors and scholars.

RICHARD J. CLIFFORD, S.J.
Weston Jesuit School of Theology


Whether or not the Old Testament Apocrypha are regarded as canonical writings, they provide precious information about Second Temple Judaism and the world of the New Testament. David deSilva, a Protestant biblical scholar teaching at Ashland Theological Seminary in Ohio, and Baker Book House, a conservative Protestant publisher, have joined forces to produce an excellent introduction to all those books that the New Revised Standard Version prints under the title “The Apocryphal/Deuterocanonical Books of the Old Testament.”

After chapters on the value of the Apocrypha and their historical context, the volume presents chapters on each of the 16 books: Tobit (“better almsgiving with justice”), Judith (“hear me also, a widow”), Additions to Esther (“the aid of the all-seeing God and Savior”), and so forth. For each writing, deS. discusses structure and contents; textual transmission; author, date, and setting; genre, circumstances, and purpose; historical issues; formative influences; and influence in Judaism and Christianity.

While not regarding these books as canonical, deS. is appreciative of them and sympathetic to them not only as sources of Jewish history and culture but also for their teachings about God, ethics, and faithful living. He makes abundant use of ancient texts for comparative purposes and enters into conversation with the views of other modern scholars. He brings his special interest in honor/shame culture to bear on such topics as the morality of Judith’s behavior.

The volume can be used as a textbook for advanced students and as a reference work in libraries. It is comparable in quality, scope, and scholarly level to Robert H. Pfeiffer’s History of New Testament Times, with an Introduction to the Apocrypha (1949). Indeed, it deserves to be called “the new Pfeiffer.”

DANIEL J. HARRINGTON, S.J.
Weston Jesuit School of Theology


This book is a revision and expansion of the 1995 Read-Tuckwell lectures at the University of Bristol, in which Bremmer, Professor of the History and Science of Religion in Groningen, explores developments in Western thought concerning belief in the afterlife. As a classicist and historian of religion, he focuses on the Greek origins of the notion of an immortal soul (which he locates in Pythagoreanism and Orphism); the idea of resurrection (considered as a distinctive and decisive element of Christian faith in the context of Jewish tradition and Roman persecution); and the emergence of Christian conceptions of heaven and hell (focusing especially on the Passion of Perpetua) leading to the “birth” of purgatory in the twelfth century (seen against the rise of Catharism).

The original lectures concluded with a consideration of ancient necromancy, modern spiritualism, and near-death experiences—ancient, medieval and mod-
ern. In the book, B. offers brief appendices on the term “Christian” as a self-designation, the origin of the term “paradise,” and the image of God’s heavenly palace as a military court found in The Vision of Dorotheus. B.’s consistent method of considering ideas in connection with important contemporaneous historical developments frequently provides the reader with interesting, if at times very questionable speculations—for example, his theses that the emergence of the Pythagorean doctrine of reincarnation is due to the marginalization of the aristocracy more than anything else, and that the Catholic doctrine of purgatory was a response to Catharism. Nonetheless, B. is a sensitive and lucid expositor and this book provides a helpful, basic glimpse of how some ancient cultures confronted the mysteries of life and death.

JOHN R. SACHS, S.J.
Weston Jesuit School of Theology


The title of Glancy’s book is odd. It suggests a straightforward introduction to slavery in early Christian experience, yet the book has a much more ambitious aim. It seeks to show that most scholars of early Christianity overlooked the strong influence of slavery on the formation of the Christian Church. Further, its focus is limited largely to the sexual aspects of slavery, which G. somewhat faddishly refers to throughout as the “body.”

Many of the details of the treatment of slaves G. provides will not be new to historians or theologians familiar with the period. Additionally, that slavery often involved sexual vulnerability (and thus differently impacted men and women) is not a novel discovery. One conclusion of her argument—which she does not offer, however—is the evidence that Roman slavery was not benign, as is often thought, especially compared to slavery in the American South. G. thus confirms views propounded by, among others, David Brion Davis and Orlando Patterson. Slavery is usually nasty, as the slave typically has extremely limited means of resisting the abuses to which he or she may be subject.

Though studies in Christianity and slavery are necessary, G.’s book does not satisfy the need. Its intentions exceed its accomplishments. The book neither provides an adequate sense of the overall experience of slavery in early Christianity nor convinces that a focus on the sexual aspects of slavery is ultimately most revealing of this peculiar institution.

Haynes’s work, a study on the place of Genesis 9:20–27 (“Noah’s Curse”) in American justifications for the enslavement of black Africans, is more satisfying. It depends on Thomas V. Peterson’s Ham and Japheth in America (1978), which defended the central place of Noah’s Curse to the biblical justification of slavery, but broadens Peterson’s focus on the antebellum South. Thus, H. begins with rabbinic, early Christian, medieval, Reformation, and early modern reflections on the Curse. These ideas show the early associations of the Curse with slavery and Ham’s genealogical association with Africa. H. therefore expands Peterson’s scope by subjecting the legend of Nimrod (and the dispersion of the races) to the same methodology. Again, H.’s examination reveals certain associations that entrenched themselves in antebellum Southern culture.

H. intends to modify, or even refute, slavery scholar Eugene Genovese’s view that diminishes the place of the Curse (and thus, racism) in the antebellum scriptural justification of slavery (see, e.g., Genovese’s A Consuming Fire, 1998). According to H., Genovese argued that, after the Civil War, Southern theologians abandoned theological orthodoxy for secular ideologies, including scientific racism. Where Genovese thus untangles Scripture from rabid Southern racism and its connection to slavery and segregation, H. strives to show the connection between Scripture and racism both before and after the war. He focuses primarily on
the work of Benjamin Morgan Palmer, a leading Presbyterian divine whose long career (1850s to his death in 1902), provides counterevidence to both parts of Genovese’s argument. H. has written a careful and important book that deserves wide study. Gauging the success of his argument may have been easier, given comparisons to Palmer’s theological contemporaries and influences, like James Henley Thornwell and Robert Dabney. In addition to its historical interest and merit, H. sees his book as a morality lesson: we assume great risk if we ignore the relationship of religion to racism. If, however, Genovese rather than H. is right, we have reason to worry about the relationship of racism to cultural factors other than religion, including the latest science and ideology.

JOSEPH E. CAPIZZI
Catholic University of America, Washington


The Catholic Church is often blamed for its slow procedures, yet few of the international organizations are able to designate their chief executive officer as swiftly as the cardinals elect the pope. Behind such an efficiency, however, is a complex and turbulent history. Melloni, biographer of John XXIII and historian of Vatican II, recounts the vicissitudes of papal elections well and points reflectively to the conflicting forces driving its evolution—of which we have not seen the end.

The beginnings were devout and peaceful: the people and clergy of Rome gathered in a solemn liturgical act where testimonies were collected about suitable candidates. Once, however, the Church became a public corporation, the interest of secular powers was awakened: in good times they offered benign protection, in bad times they tried to destroy the integrity of the process. To restore and preserve its sacred character, in 1059 pope Nicholas II decreed that the right of choosing Peter’s successor is vested in the cardinal bishops, as heirs and successors of the apostolic college—or so he said. The rule was deceptively clear but not without problems: conflicts arose about the venue, times, and rules of the election, and often enough the cardinals’ college was hardly sacred in their manner. One pope after another kept refining the process and reforming the college, until an ordered and devout efficiency became the mark of modern conclaves. In 1995 John Paul II set aside an immemorial tradition that aimed for broad consensus (two third of the votes) and ruled that after 14 days (34 rounds of votes), a simple majority is enough to let someone take Peter’s chair. His rule will be operative at the next conclave, and then . . . well, we have not seen the end of this history.

M.’s study is timely, informative, and insightful: the English-speaking public would be well served by a competent translator.

LADISLAS ORSY, S.J.
Georgetown University Law Center


Pope Paul II (1464–1471) is best known for his attack on the Roman Academy or for collecting Roman antiquities. This volume in the series Repertorium Poenitentiarum Germanicum provides a different and welcome viewpoint on his reign. It casts light on the more routine work of the Roman Curia under the Venetian Paul II, born Pietro Barbo.

The Apostolic Penitentiary, a branch of the Roman Curia, disbursed spiritual “graces,” especially dispensations, and dealt with censures reserved to the Holy See. Just about any type of Christian can be found having recourse to Rome to smooth legal tangles, like the consanguinity impediment to a marriage or an accusation that a cleric was complicit in a theft. The graces inventoried as they
apply to German supplicants fall under these categories: *De matrimonialibus* (Concerning Marriages), *De diversis formis* (Concerning Different Forms—a catchall category), *De declaratoriis* (absolution for offenses reserved to the Holy See), *De defectu natalium* (Concerning Defect of Birth—illegitimacy), *De uberiori* (permitting promotion of the illegitimate to higher clerical ranks), *De promotis et promovendis* (Concerning Those Promoted or to Be Promoted—removing impediments to priestly ordination), *De sententiis generalibus* (Concerning General Sentences—permitting parish priests to absolve excommunications not reserved to Rome), and *De confessionalibus* (Concerning Confessions—permitting individuals to choose confessors other than their parish priests).

These graces are summarized in a shorthand explained in the Table of Dioceses and the Table of Abbreviations. Some of these actions were so routine (e.g., those under *De defectu natalium*) that 1,270 of them fill only 63 pages. Others, especially those listed as *De declaratoriis*, are explained at much greater length. The indexing of these registers is exhaustive. There is little a researcher might want to pursue that cannot be found by consulting them. Although challenging to use, the volumes of this series are valuable for the study of the Roman Curia in its relationship to ordinary lives of both clergy and laity.

THOMAS M. IZBICKI
Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore

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Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore


The fruit of 50 years of studying Eckhart, Bernard McGinn’s volume reviews and synthesizes the oddly diverse views of Eckhart promoted by recent scholarship. Where some scholars have dismissed Eckhart’s German sermons in favor of more Scholastic but drier Latin works, others have emphasized his evocative mystical homilies to the detriment of his technical treatises in philosophy and theology.

The book deftly combines the picture of a prophet of a remote God who can, strictly speaking, only be talked about in the mystifying terminology of radical negation and darkness with the portrait of an electrifying preacher who considered himself the messenger of Christ whom anyone could find deep within one’s own soul. M. argues that there is a profound unity to Eckhart’s project that ought not be divided any more than reason should be separated from faith or thought from practice.

The central idea that permits such unification that other Eckhart commentators have taken as divergent is the notion of “ground” (*Grunt*) as an explosive master metaphor. It recurs in both Eckhart’s homiletic and Scholastic texts as a way to explain where the human soul encounters the divine and where the “boiling” love of the Holy Trinity can be discovered in the flow of being that makes up the created world. M. shows Eckhart’s love of paradox and of startling phrases as a vehicle for attempting to express truths of Christian orthodoxy in the unusual language of Neoplatonism.

Eckhart’s stormy relations with the Church and with his own Dominican Order are taken as symptomatic of the difficulties of seeking firm ground on one’s personal faith in God amid the controversy that flowed from frequent misunderstanding about what Eckhart was struggling to articulate in new ways.

JOSEPH W. KOTERSKI, S.J.
Fordham University, New York


This biography raises from obscurity a man who merits long overdue attention. Unfortunately, the book’s title might not attract readers. Even specialists might overlook this work, since Craft is known only from footnotes relating to the Ghost Dance religion that ended at Wounded Knee in 1890.

Craft becomes larger than life when Foley recounts that he was also a physician, soldier, and convert to Catholicism. Notable, too, was Craft’s Mohawk descent. A Jesuit for six years, he later
became a priest for the Diocese of Omaha, and it was within this role that Craft stirred controversy.

Edified by Ghost Dancers whom the army was commanded to suppress, Craft earlier served as a priest among the “hostiles” and stopped at Wounded Knee. He was conversing with them when their camp turned into a killing field. Wounded, and uncertain if his wound would be fatal (it was not), he asked to be buried with the fallen Lakota who were placed in a mass burial grave. When asked who was at fault for the slaughter, Craft, unlike many later historians, expressed sympathy for both sides.

F. reveals a world of religious sectarianism that influenced the actions of many who converged upon Indian country. He also tells of an American Catholic Church that very much wanted association with Katharine Drexel’s charitable interests but no involvement with Craft’s founding of a devout, but destitute, congregation of Lakota nuns. A veteran of five wars and a missionary at several reservations, the priest lived out his years in the east as a pastor.

This is the portrait of a man who prompted some in his era to think he was mentally unstable. Contemporary readers might be less harsh and instead regard him as innovative and saintly. They will probably not evaluate this missionary to the Sioux as the strange character his Catholic opponents and non-Catholic detractors made him out to be, but rather admire him for being an evangelical giant whose funeral drew hundreds to mourn his loss.

MICHAEL F. STELTENKAMP, S.J.
Wheeling Jesuit University, Wheeling, W.V.


With broad strokes, church historian Mark Noll provides a clear way to approach the question, What is different about North American Christianity because of North America? The key to resolving the question, he deftly argues, is history. The religion of the United States is different because of four factors that have been part of the continuing story of America: geographic expansion, race and ethnicity, religious pluralism, and convictions regarding freedom. These, he believes, have combined to make realities of Old Religion virtually impossible in the New World. To bolster his case, he appeals to well-known religious and secular leaders from every generation and every religious confession who promoted religion in America. With magisterial grasp, N. succeeds in proving that these unique characteristics resulted in something quite distinctive about North American Christianity.

There are, however, drawbacks to making such a sweeping analysis. One of N.’s weaker arguments concerns ethnicity. His failure to emphasize the role played by the Irish-dominated Roman Catholic Church vis-à-vis the millions of Central, Eastern, and Southern European immigrants, especially during the years 1880–1920, ignores one of the most transforming elements that occurred within North American Christianity. Catholic leaders’ reaction to immigrants forever altered the complexion of U.S. Catholicism and totally changed the relationships previously existent among Christian denominations. In this regard, N. would have done better to consult ethnic historians who have noted and analyzed this trend over many years. In particular, they have argued that ethnic Catholics helped create U.S. Catholicism, thereby adding a significant richness to the Church that has rarely been appreciated by either Catholics or Protestants. This point aside, N. has once again provided a rich overview of the development of religion in the “New World of America.”

DOLORES LIPTAK, R.S.M.
Holy Apostles Seminary, Cromwell, Conn.


This collection of essays by established scholars is the latest work from the Seminar on Roman Catholic Mod-
ernism of the American Academy of Religion. A broad aim of the volume is to consider the moral dimensions of the lives of seven important figures caught up in the Modernist crisis as revealed in their autobiographical writings. Those studied are Alfred Loisy (H. Hill), Albert Houtin and Joseph Turmel (C. Talar), John R. Slattery and, through his autobiography, Denis J. O’Connell (W. Portier), Maude Petre (E. Leonard); the one opponent of Modernist tendencies included is Luis Martín, Superior General of the Jesuits from 1892 to 1906 (D. Schultenover).

The book is a valuable contribution to Modernist studies. The essays remind us of the diversity of the Modernists, their humanity, and the effects of the conflicts upon their lives. Here they are allowed to speak again through their autobiographies, though subject to certain conditions. One is that their writings be read in a common contemporary way. Autobiography, on this view, is to be seen as a distinct literary genre that is not to be confused with either history, though it can be a historical source, nor fiction, even though a deep work of imaginative selection and construction is always involved. Another condition is that autobiographies fall into distinct types—religious, feminist, and so on. This latter condition is a strong presence in this volume.

John Barbour’s Versions of Deconversion (1994) has exercised an important influence in the discussions that led up to the work under review. His fine introduction to the collection is an essential guide to important themes in what follows. But the use of his work also raises general questions about how much the theory of autobiography (or theories from the social sciences, as in Talar’s two essays) can deliver to the scholar working on particular autobiographies and individuals. The same question can also be raised about the role of moral theory. But I suspect that the book might have gained from an additional chapter discussing more generally the moral issues raised by personal faith and institutional commitments in Modernist times.

David W. Dockrill
University of Newcastle, N.S.W.


Deploiring the “disaffection” that afflicts the modern Church, Lawler seeks to provide a corrective to the polarizing trends of the last half-century that he believes have specialized in “scapegoating an imaginary enemy” (9), the papal/Vatican apparatus and its role in the modern world. According to L., many recent works of both critics (e.g., James Carroll, John Cornwell, Garry Wills, Susan Zuccotti) and “defenders” (e.g., Ralph McInerny and Margherita Marchione) are infected with serious “obfuscations and distortions” (9) in their portrayal of Catholicism. Thus L. proceeds to critique the “factual errors” and omissions and “errors in interpretation” (even bias) that he identifies (18).

The seven densely written chapters include extended critiques of “professional lapses” (63) in Zuccotti’s Under His Very Windows (2000) and Michael Phayer’s The Catholic Church and the Holocaust (2000) and an indictment of Wills’s Papal Sin (2000) for “self-imposed blinders which lead to a historically distorted vision of Catholicism” (72). Exacting though his standards may be, L. is not unreasonable, either in his examples of factual errors and omissions, or in his incisive analysis of some authors’ too frequent reliance on intuition or arguments from silence. His discussion of “The Pope and the Shoah” is balanced and insightful, but the topic’s complexity and the many levels of debate would seem to require more than the allotted 32 pages.

In the final three chapters, L. shifts emphasis to principles of “authentic reform” (10), personal and institutional, with an exposition of concepts found in Newman, Acton, Rosmini, Congar, and others. Here, too, one could wish for a more ample examination.

Church historians will find L.’s carefully balanced study provocative. The rich footnotes and index of names (but not subjects) enhance the book.

Donald J. Grimes, C.S.C.
King’s College, Wilkes-Barre, Penn.
This volume compares the respective evolutions of Thérèse and Bonhoeffer and argues that, for all their differences, they reached similar insights, especially toward the end of their spiritual journeys. The two main topics that D. selects are kenosis and alterity.

Part 1 shows how Bonhoeffer came to grips with the issues of subject/object, transcendence/immanence, and alterity. As early as 1931 this ecumenically minded Protestant discussed the views of the Jesuit Erich Przywara. In his Akt und Stein (1931) Bonhoeffer endeavored to distance himself from Kantian idealism in order to adopt a realist philosophy. His solution is a realist theology, based on the ontological movement from God to humanity. For Bonhoeffer, revelation is not a human discovery, but a God-given being-in-Christ. D. displays the pros and cons of such a position.

Part 2 examines Thérèse’s and Bonhoeffer’s understanding of kenosis. In Bonhoeffer, D. observes a transition from construing alterity as exteriority to construing it as interiority. Thérèse seems to have experienced alterity-interiority all along. Both Thérèse and Bonhoeffer represent faith as a receptivity to a communication of grace.

In part 3, D. discusses desire, faith operating through love, detachment, and surrender in Thérèse. He returns to kenosis according to Thérèse, looks at the theme of being-a-child in Bonhoeffer, and discusses Thérèse’s integration of suffering. Suffering and surrender are interestingly linked with being-for-others in Bonhoeffer, and again compared with Thérèse’s experience of surrender.

At times, D.’s thread is difficult to follow, because he intermingles the contributions of many authors into his development—not only Przywara, but Barth, Bultmann, Rahner, and numerous others. Gain in richness is offset by loss in clarity. These contributions might have been added elsewhere in the work.

D. is very attentive to the stages in Thérèse’s and Bonhoeffer’s spiritual journeys. The book is based on the best scholarship and contains an excellent bibliography. Unfortunately, the bibliography does not indicate the abbreviations used in the footnotes; thus they are not easy to correlate with cited titles.

LOUIS ROY, O.P.
Boston College


O’Meara’s study of the German Jesuit Erich Przywara (1889–1972) compels one to conclude that he must be counted as a major influence on the development of Catholic theology between the First and Second Vatican Councils. Both Karl Rahner and Hans Urs von Balthasar, for example, lauded Przywara and acknowledged his influence (133–48).

O. surveys Przywara’s studies of a host of figures from the Western intellectual tradition, but it seems that Aquinas’s theology of nature and grace and Ignatius of Loyola’s spiritual theology were the governing influences on his thought (62, 151–57). Przywara’s view that grace perfects nature indicates what O. considered the core theological point of his writings on the “analogy of being,” which was for him a way of expressing Catholicism’s fundamental “sensibility” (73–84). For Przywara, Catholicism is essentially a religion of dynamic “polarity” between Creator and creature, and its spiritual life is a rhythmic, oscillating “interplay between the human and the divine” in which the difference of both is affirmed (80).

Przywara’s writings were experiments in dialogue between this Catholic sensibility and modern German intellectual life. He had a particular interest in Husserl’s phenomenology (90–94) and was a strong proponent of Edith Stein’s Judeo-Christian interpretation of Husserl over against Heidegger’s monistic, secular interpretation (119–39).

This fact illustrates one of the several ways in which Przywara attempted to resist Nazism’s misappropriation of Germany’s intellectual heritage. As early as 1933 he was publicly debating
Nazi ideologues, and during the war he openly lectured on the central importance of the Jewish Scriptures for Christianity. Apparently his lectures on the Old Testament sufficiently disturbed the Nazis that they sent Heinrich Himmler to investigate (11). Granting that his opposition to Nazism was “modest” rather than heroic, abstract and cryptic rather than directly political (11), his gestures are nevertheless significant. They illustrate the complexity of Catholic intellectual life in Germany before and during the Third Reich.

Without denying the presence of anti-Semitic ideas among some German Catholic intellectuals, O.’s study of Przywara clearly shows that these currents were not the only or the most important ones in the Catholic stream.

Kevin Mongrain
St. Mary’s University, San Antonio

Hans Urs von Balthasar Begegnen.

The author of this compact book on the life and work of the Swiss theologian Hans Urs von Balthasar, Michael Schulz, is professor of dogmatics in Lugano, Switzerland. S. had published in the same series a similar presentation of Karl Rahner’s life and thoughts. Equal expertise in both poles of 20th-century Catholic theology adds attractiveness to S.’s study on Balthasar.

While the magisterial biography by Elio Guerriero, Hans Urs von Balthasar: Eine Monographie (1993) interweaves Balthasar’s life and work, S. successfully separates the two. This very much enhances clarity and comprehensibility. In the first half he treats Balthasar’s life as one in the service of God (11–86). Starting this section with a discussion of the term “Letzthaltung” (final, eschatological disposition) is felicitous. A consonance of all episodes of this theologian’s rich life with his vocation as priest, scholar, and spiritual director is thereby shown: vocation, the usual chores of a student pastor, Adrienne von Speyr, haste and concentration, a hell swept clean? and finally charism and office.

The second half of the book treats Balthasar’s stupendous literary and theological output (87–170). S. chose a most appropriate heading: Glorious Theology. The following central mysteries are addressed: truth’s meta- anthropology, the God of a possible revelation, the acting God’s “Greek” properties, the christological approach to trinitarian theology, world and redemption from within the Trinity, trinitarian reality, and, inseparably, Christ and Church. S. stresses that Balthasar succeeded in developing a radically trinitarian way of thinking that formed the whole of his theology and life. Balthasar’s thoughts evolved from personal encounters—which account for his principled trinitarian approach. Points of controversy, such as Balthasar’s understanding of apocatastasis and trinitarian inversion are not discussed. The text is preceded by an outline of Balthasar’s life and is concluded with a useful annotated bibliography. There the reader finds up-to-date suggestions for further reading. This is rounded off with numerous explanatory notes on the left or right hand sides of the text. These notes either refer to further readings or explain central terms such as filioque, Second Council of Constantinople, historical-critical method, etc.

Emery De Gaál
University of St. Mary of the Lake, Mundelein, Ill.


Carey’s “man for all seasons” approach to Tillich accomplishes three very different goals. First, the book collects brief essays on neglected aspects of Tillich’s thought: on Luther, Marx, politics, and biblical interpretation. C. attempts to show that Tillich’s “way” of approaching theological and cultural issues is still viable today (xi). Second, he gives representative examples of contemporary scholarly applications of Tillich’s work in areas such as sexuality, science and religion, and ethics. Third, C. provides personal evaluations about research possibilities at the Harvard and
Marburg archives and an update on the work and continuing development of the North American Paul Tillich Society.

This is not an introduction to Tillich’s thought; rather, the book responds to the claim that contemporary theology is “post-Tillichian” (91). C. is very balanced in his reply and understands that there are tensions in using Tillich today (87). He is fully aware that Tillich’s thought was guided by ontological/existential categories (modernism), and so is a product of its time and not able to be unalterably transferred to the postmodern context. But by highlighting select themes such as historical consciousness, ambiguity in knowledge, dialogical method, situational ethics, non-absoluteness of religion, and the brokenness of human existence, C. makes a good case that Tillich’s thought can transcend its context to some extent. Moreover, he argues, Tillich has concerns in common with postmodernism, particularly his sense of the uniqueness of each moment and his quest for the “God beyond theism” (56). The questions that this “boundary thinker” asks are always timely and his method of correlation still serves well in a context that values dialogue. Furthermore, his early political writings may be his legacy for the 21st century (demythologizing of ideologies) (45–46).

Despite C.’s best efforts, however, the overall project of Tillich remains bogged down in ontology and is bedeviled by questions about his personal life. Yet Tillich does successfully emerge as a good role model for the spirit of interdisciplinary theology. The book admirably bridges 20th- and 21st-century theologies.

CRAIG A. BARON
Duquesne University, Pittsburgh


The book presents a critical exposition of the theology of a well-known Orthodox monastic and author of the 20th century, Archimandrite Sophrony (1896–1993), by his grand nephew Nicholas Sakharov, who is a member of the Monastery of St. John the Baptist in Essex, England, founded by Sophrony. The book, a revised doctoral dissertation presented at the University of Oxford, explores the roots of Sophrony’s spiritual teaching, making use of a vast archive of literature and letters, as well as of spiritual addresses by the elder. S. considers the influence on Sophrony of 19th-century Russian philosophers such as Bulgakov and Berdiaev, of 20th-century theologians such as Lossky and Schmemann, but especially of the early patristic tradition, including such ascetics and mystics as the seventh-century John Climacus and Isaac of Syria. Sophrony was responsible for publishing the life and writing of Staretz Silouan, whom he knew on Mount Athos from 1930 until the death of the latter in 1938; in 1988 the Orthodox Church recognized Silouan as a saint.

After a brief biographical introduction to the personal and monastic formation of Sophrony, S. proceeds with an analysis of the fundamental principles of his theological thought: the human person, the concept of kenosis, image and likeness, deification and Godforsakenness, obedience, and mindfulness of death. Sophrony develops the notion of divine forsakenness (chap. 7) in a positive and profound manner, relating it to the experience of Christ on Gethsemane and on Golgotha. The concept is not unrelated also, as S. observes, to the “dark night of the soul” in John of the Cross. Moreover, the discipline of obedience and the practice of spiritual direction (chap. 8) are described as a sacrament of love and freedom.

While Sophrony’s formulation is sometimes difficult and dense, it is refreshing to witness a compelling example of a picture that is not the result simply of academic theory but of spiritual experience. One element missing from this exposition is the depiction of any personal or theological weakness in an otherwise exceptional spiritual director.

JOHN Chrysavgis
Brookline, Mass.

The impetus behind this book is summed up in a sentence: “It seems to me beyond dispute that, on the one hand, religion is real and universal and, on the other, God is unreal but has localized aficionados” (92). In the West only mystics like Eckhart got religion right, says Billington, by getting to the truly eternal. B. draws on his expertise in Eastern religions to give quick but deft analyses of nontheistic religious experience available in Advaita Vedanta, in some forms of Buddhism, and in Taoism. He argues that many experiences of art, nature, and other people are also at least implicitly religious. It is a book Rudolf Otto might have enjoyed.

A Rahnerian might also agree with B.’s emphasis on the utter transcendence of God. But B. thinks that the word “God” is best avoided entirely. He insists that all religious people should accustom themselves to a mystical relation to the eternal in place of worship of God. By the end of the book he has rejected not only the idea of a superperson called God, but also following other human beings such as Jesus, Moses, Buddha, or Muhammad as “religious icons,” treating specific texts as carriers of absolute truth, and basing morality on religion.

B. is uncertain whether union with the eternal is a union between the individual self and the ground of being, as in Western mysticism, or whether it is an experience of identity with a higher Self, as in Hindu thought. In any case, the experience of union is not a promise of individual immortality after death. It is an experience of the eternal now.

I may use this book in a class called “God and Atheism.” While there are plenty of primary sources on atheism without religion, B. offers a brief but adequate set of clear ideas on religion without God. His sometimes impatient scolding will provoke discussion.

MICHAEL H. BARNES
University of Dayton


Gathered here are the six papers of a colloquium held in October 2001 of exegetes and historical, dogmatic, and systematic theologians of the Jesuit faculty of the Centre Sévres in Paris. The participants spent several months examining ways of thinking about the uniqueness of Christ as God’s saving and revealing Son, while taking account of today’s context marked by globalization and religious pluralism. In a postscript, Jean-Marc Aveline, an invited outsider, helpfully points out where these scholars will have to work out the implications of the christological positions adumbrated here.

The arguments presented—in opposition to Anglo-American approaches of the last 20 years (John Cobb, John Hick, Paul Knitter, et al.)—depend on the notion of a single death for each person, which is the basis of the “once and for all” of Hebrews 7:27; 9:12, 26–28. These arguments also presuppose the notion of the world process as a linear progress necessarily directed by a unique God toward his revealing and saving identification with the single culmination of that process in Jesus. Because they think these two notions are essential to Christian identity, the Parisian scholars question perspectives influenced by Asian views on universality, reincarnation, cyclical world process, and the divine’s essentially plural manifestations (Michael Amaladoss, Raimundo Pannikar, Stanley Samartha). They then engage these perspectives by showing convincingly—for example, in Christoph Theobald’s contribution—how these supposed elements of the essential Christian identity conform eminently to abstract rules of intercultural dialogue inspired by the European Hans Georg Gadamer. The Christology presented in all the papers attempts to parry the charge of exclusivism by emphasizing that the unique divine sonship of the single human being, Jesus, is the condition of his saving relation with all people, in which he shares his unique filiation with them. Although these papers will hardly convince the scholars they criticize, they...
add a fresh voice to the debate on Christ’s uniqueness. This freshness stems largely from the convergence achieved by the Centre Sèvres faculty’s habitual cross-disciplinary method.

JOSEPH G. MUELLER, S.J.
Marquette University, Milwaukee


Kärkkäinen has authored an excellent survey of contemporary reflection on the theology of the Holy Spirit. His book provides a map of the discipline charted by a seasoned traveler and, as such, will be an asset to students embarking on the study of pneumatology. Even advanced students and professionals in the field may find helpful references in these pages. The book is clear and succinct without being simplistic, a notable accomplishment for surveys of this sort.

Following an overview of the biblical and historical development of the theology of the Holy Spirit, K. examines a variety of contemporary approaches to pneumatology. Two principles guide him: (1) pneumatological discourse must be ecumenical in character, for no Church has a monopoly on the Holy Spirit; (2) pneumatology must be contextual and culture-specific, for the Holy Spirit is no abstraction but the personal indwelling of God in believers and creation. K.’s treatment of the Roman Catholic, Eastern Orthodox, Lutheran, and Pentecostal/Charismatic traditions reflects the expertise of an ecumenical theologian with experience at the World Council of Churches. His overview of contemporary theologians of the Spirit highlights Zizioulas, Rahner, Pannenberg, Moltmann, Welker, and Pinnock, and his discussion of contextual pneumatologies includes process, liberation, ecological, feminist, and African theologies. His work is particularly informative in its discussion of the Pentecostal and Charismatic traditions, an area of K.’s expertise.

A limitation of the book is the absence of critical evaluation. K. repeatedly affirms the richness of the pneumatologies surveyed but without providing much discussion of their shortcomings. Moreover, as he rightly celebrates the diversity of confessional and contextual theologies, one wonders how the Christian community can respond to “various, even conflicting, testimonies” (9) of the Spirit. Is a synthesis of different pneumatologies possible? Can discernment guide us through the conflicts? Perhaps we will hear more from K. in this regard. “The end of our survey concerning the Spirit of God,” he concludes, “is also a beginning for new discoveries” (177).

ELIZABETH GROPPE
Xavier University, Cincinnati


This revised Boston College dissertation examines, under the tutelage of Thomas Aquinas, the main features of a Christian theology of salvation (2, 11).

Levering is sensitive to the historical dimensions of Aquinas’s account of salvation in the Summa theologiae. History itself falls into two principal states, in accordance with God’s salvific will—that of the Old and that of the New Law. Each state is oriented in its proper fashion to the state of glory in the next life; but in this life the earlier state is also ordained to later states. The relations between successive states are complex. Compared to the state that follows, an earlier state is imperfect but prepares for the next state; and that state stands to the earlier as its term and fulfillment.

Apart from chapter 6, on beatitude as fulfilling the New Law, L. focuses on the New Law viewed in relation to the Old. Is Aquinas’s teaching “supersessionist”? Not if this implies a revocation. God does call Israel into relation with God; God does not revoke that call (e.g., 8, 9, 22, 29, 30, 46). But the Old Law comes to its term and completion with the coming of Christ, who espe-
cially in his Passion gives to Torah and Temple their definitive meaning. L. accordingly insists that Aquinas intended to portray Christ’s work in terms of Israel’s threefold office of priest, prophet, and king, with the corresponding fulfillment of the three types of Old Law precept, the ceremonial, moral, and judicial (53; 66ff.). Although Christ transforms these offices in his exercise of them, his own work is explicable only when put into the context of God’s covenant with Israel (70).

L. may overstate the importance for Aquinas of the three offices (see 67–68 for an attempt to meet this objection). Otherwise, the summaries of questions in the Tertia Pars seem accurate enough; and the notes are replete with references to the works of the most important scholars of Aquinas. The book would make a suitable introduction to newcomers to Aquinas on salvation.

JOSEPH WAWRYKOW
University of Notre Dame


Singleton critically compares the theological methodologies of Juan Luis Segundo and James H. Cone in order to appropriate Segundo’s understanding of deideologization and synthesize it with Cone’s to create a new methodology, indigenous deideologization. For S., Cone’s theology is representative of one in “the process of deideologization” (xiv), revealing that any theological assertions “that justify human domination” are ideologies and must have their credibility destroyed (xiii).

The framework of Segundo’s “hermeneutic circle” is presented, followed by an exposition of Cone’s Black Theology. Cone’s ideological suspicion of dominant society and its theologizing has led him to a different way of doing theology, grounded in the particular experience of Blacks in the U.S. He thus creates a new hermeneutic, “blackness as the symbol of oppression and of the certainty of liberation” (91), thereby completing Segundo’s hermeneutical circle.

S. sees the methodologies of both Segundo and Cone as complementary, but Cone goes further to particularize Segundo’s more universal approach. S.’s synthesis of them into one of “indigenous deideologization,” seen as a means of unmasking “religio-political ideologies in theological reflection,” is significant, as it places responsibility for exposing religio-political ideologies in the hands of those negatively impacted by them, allowing them to bring their own historical experience, culture, and traditions to the forefront of any theologizing efforts.

Although J. Deotis Roberts and Elisabeth Schüssler Fiorenza are engaged in critiquing lapses in Segundo’s emphasis on biblical tradition, S. himself fails to fully critique or bring in voices critical of Cone’s methodology; he merely refers to them in a footnote. This is especially serious as the book, therefore, includes no critique of Cone’s failure to adequately address gender or class oppression.

The text is well written and its content clearly presented. While a fuller critique of Cone’s methodological weaknesses would have made for better balance, the work is an excellent resource for upper level and graduate students of theology.

DIANA L. HAYES
Georgetown University, Washington


This fine presentation of Ricoeur’s thought has three aims in mind. Stiver is most successful in tracing Ricoeur’s ongoing journey toward the “poetics” from his early Freedom and Nature (1966) to his Gifford Lectures (1991) published as Oneself as Another (1992). He wonderfully traces insights such as the hermeneutical arc or circle, the surplus of meaning, and the variability of human discourse. The journey of poetic expression is set forth from Ricoeur’s early work on the symbol to his realiza-
tion that even human activity and the human person exhibit the “surplus of meaning.”

S. is equally successful in drawing from Ricoeur insights that are both challenging and alluring to contemporary theology. Symbolic expression and the ability to explore the “fullness of text” is certainly a challenge to biblical studies. S. himself operates in an evangelical theological mode, and his grappling with Ricoeur is presented as suggestive, without yet naming theologians who have engaged Ricoeur in their work. S.’s work would have been more challenging had he offered the witness of some theologians who have already been theologizing “in the thought of Ricoeur.”

I am uncertain about S.’s final aim, namely to locate Ricoeur in the transit from modern to postmodern thought, both because he himself sees Ricoeur as “somewhat modern and somewhat postmodern,” and because I am not sure whether this aim is a contribution or a distraction. Ricoeur’s work is a challenge wherever it sits, be it modern, postmodern, or in between.

S.’s presentation of Ricoeur’s thought seems to focus on the surplus of meaning. Unlike standard methods of biblical criticism that look behind texts for their meaning, Ricoeur’s challenge is the fullness of the text. Anyone who does theology, whether they explore Scriptures, tradition, human activity, or human persons, will find that the challenge of “fullness” posed by Ricoeur awaits them. S.’s book is a splendid introduction to this challenge.

PETER E. FINK, S.J.
Weston Jesuit School of Theology


Over the past several years, Williams has published articles in Zygon on evolution, sociobiology, and Christian theology. Here, she presents a monograph-length apologia for a rapprochement between Christianity and science, focusing specifically on the doctrine of original sin. She correctly notes that the official teaching of the Catholic Church (and other Churches as well) is unintelligible for those who hold some version of evolutionary theory. Positively, while asserting the pervasive and persistent presence of sin, the *Catechism of the Catholic Church* (1994) puts the proper focus on the universal saving grace of God in Christ. Negatively, it seems to proffer a literal, historicizing interpretation of Genesis, despite an acknowledgment of its use of figurative language.

Catholic theologians, who have long noted how out of synchronicity this section of the *Catechism* is with contemporary biblical and theological scholarship, will sympathize with W.’s approach, but hardly be startled by it. They will certainly learn much from her clear presentation of relevant theories and findings of science.

The strength of W.’s book lies in the second half, where she develops an enlightening matrix of interconnections between the theological issues at stake in the doctrine of original sin, evolutionary theory, and sociobiology. Dialogue with thinkers like Schoonenberg, Rahner, Mooney, and Haught might have produced a more nuanced understanding, at least from a Catholic perspective, of the theological issues involved in an adequate understanding of human freedom, sin, and grace. Her critique of the doctrine of atonement is insightful and, in its basic thrust, within the parameters of Catholic theology.

While I am quite sympathetic to W.’s reflections on the problem of evil, I do not think that hers or anyone else’s constitutes a “solution” (176-79) to it. All in all, this is a fine book that teachers of undergraduate theology and those involved in adult education might well consider to stimulate a more coherent and integrated understanding of the doctrine in an evolutionary context.

JOHN R. SACHS, S.J.
Weston Jesuit School of Theology


Revisiting the perennial problem of evil, the Lille theologian Blaquart pro-
vides an original analysis of the various strategies by which cultures rationalize the suffering of the innocent. Cultural strategies include theologies of decree (accepting evil as part of God’s inscrutable will), of combat (crusading against evil as an anti-God), of retribution (ad- 
ducing evidence of God’s rewarding the just and punishing the unjust), of the Fall (interpreting all evil as the offspring of concupiscence), and of tragedy (evoking the nobility of the suffering hero doomed to failure). None of these strategies fully convince, since none suc-
cessfully defend both the omnipotence and the perfect goodness of God in the face of lacerating evil.

As a Christian response to the enigma of evil, B. explores how Christ’s suffer-
ing on the cross represents a via media between Adam’s passive fall and Job’s bitter revolt. He also argues that the forgiveness central to Christ’s passion and ministry opens the path to forgive-
ness by the disciples of Christ, who can face the power of evil with a graced re-
alism that neither denies nor surrenders to it. In his most controversial thesis, B. 
argues that the paschal path of pardon can ultimately free the Christian to for-
give God for the existence of the tena-
cious evil in which we must conduct our existence.

This theological reconfiguration of evil and pardon appears thin. Strangely absent are the eschatological resources of Christianity, such as the doctrines of the immortality of the soul, the resur-
rection of the dead, the particular judge-
ment, and the last judgment. In his ex-
cavation of the ideologies by which cul-
tures attempt to master evil, however, B. develops a penetrating description of how society energetically attempts to explain away a scandal that remains in-
explicable.

JOHN J. CONLEY, S.J.
Fordham University, New York

HITTING HOME: FEMINIST ETHICS, WOM-

One of the weaknesses of Catholic social teaching is that it still focuses on making sure that a living wage reaches the head of a household, but without offering much discussion about the economic framework needed within a household to support a living wage. Gloria Albrecht tackles this prob-
lem.

A. starts from what she terms a Chris-
tian liberative and materialist feminist perspective that views women’s social location as one of “asymmetric vulner-
ability,” and she takes as her over-
riding concern the effect of work on women and families. She stresses a need to reverse the current market logic, 
from an economics that dictates how women and families should function, to an approach in which women’s concerns play a pivotal role in dictating what constitutes a just economy. With meticu-
lous research, A. exposes the invisible economy, the work that most women do in the home and the price they pay not only by providing care-giving and other services without economic compen-
sation but also by postponing or forfeiting career development and in-
creased earning capacity. This expo-
sition leads A. to a deeper ethical ques-
tion: whether capitalism’s survival hinges on this invisible economy. Al-
though she hints at this problem she 
does not develop it. Her focus is to ar-
gue that women must be valued as full moral agents, and that they and their concerns must be fully incorporated into the political and social realm, thus changing that realm.

While A. takes context seriously and focuses on the world she knows best— 
the white, middle-class—she includes the perspective of women from diverse backgrounds. Other feminists have writ-
ten about many of the same issues pre-
sented here, but A.’s statistical ground-
ing of the socio-economic information gives this book its distinctive weight. Further, her case that social justice 
cannot be attained until the invisible economy and the value that women add to it are recognized makes this book a valuable addition to the growing litera-
ture on feminist social ethics.

Marilyn Martone
St. John’s University, Jamaica, N.Y.

A comparison of the entry on theodicy in The Concise Sacramentum Mundi with this consideration by Ivone Gebara illustrates a sea change in theological method. Unlike the treatise on theodicy, G. writes a geography of evil that moves the reader from India to Brazil, Chile, Mexico, African-America, the Near East, Guatemala, and back to India. This geography “characterizes the life of women, especially poor women, everywhere” (12). Surely dualism, retribution, and absence of real being are considered in the geography, but here they take on an urgency that betrays recourse to the triumph of love in suffering life’s crosses. G. locates dualism, for example, in now age-worn interpretations about the primacy of men over women; retribution in the fact of being female in a patriarchal world; nonbeing in the silencing of women and their stories that effectively erases their existence throughout history.

Yet G. is not preoccupied with exposing the evil perpetrated upon women by men. She focuses on the pervasive and ordinary presence of evil in the world as women in particular experience it. Systemic/universal evil has been considered ably by others (Seyla Benhabib, Mary Daly, Nel Noddings, Rosemary Radford Reuther, Elisabeth Schüssler Fiorenza); G. considers particular evils behind kitchen/bedroom/schoolhouse doors, in domestic and intimate relations between men and women, women and women, and women and children. She uses a phenomenological method that reveals specific testimony and witness to the concrete evils women suffer.

For example, a Black woman of São Paulo collects refuse from the streets to sell or trade for food for her children. “Evil for Carolina Maria de Jesus means people not throwing trash on the street. Evil is not having the garbage necessary for her livelihood and that of her children” (42–43). The specific evil of Carolina’s experience underscores the universal evils of poverty that demand immediate and distinct redress by those who speak of salvation; Carolina and her children, as others G. introduces, need the justice and mercy that is food, clothing, and shelter. Theodicy is writ large in this text; the world’s poor would do well as the academy recasts its treatise in such phenomenological terms.

MARY JO IOZZIO
Barry University, Miami Shores, Fla.

BIOÉTICA: UN DIALOGO PLURAL: HOMENAJE A JAVIER GAFO FERNÁNDEZ, S.J.

This tribute to Comillas’s celebrated professor of fundamental moral theology and bioethics, intended as a fest-schrift for his 65th birthday, became unfortunately a posthumous homage after Gafo’s unexpected death. The work is unparalleled: 52 essays by Spain’s most prominent moralists, bioethicists, and interested physicians.

After a profile of Gafo’s life and works and an essay by him surveying the field, the work is divided into eight parts. Beginning with an anthropological treatment of human life and its limits, it turns to a wide array of topics: relating bioethics to biotechnology, medicine, society, civil law, and religion. Among these parts is a brief segue into some philosophical foundations to bioethics.

The contributors themselves distinguish the work. Some look at issues related to theological anthropology: Madrid’s Marciano Vidal provides a contemplative look at death and the way it shapes bioethics from a variety of perspectives; Puerto Rico’s Jorge Ferrer explores an old alliance, medicine and spirituality, by reviewing the works of several authors, especially Henry Benson and Daniel Sulmasy. Some give a particular overview of recent developments in bioethics: Barcelona’s Francesc Abel (originally from Portugal) provides a fine introduction to the ethics of xenotransplants; Madrid’s Carlos Alonso Bedate offers a thorough bibliographical review of researchers’ at-
tempts to further their investigations into gene therapy. Finally, others look at the effect of theology on contemporary issues: Grenada’s López Azpitarte looks at the frequent casuistic revisiting of therapeutic abortion to ascertain that a new normative teaching on the subject is being universally acknowledged; Madrid’s talented and extraordinarily prolific Julio Martínez explores the role of moral theology in interdisciplinary debates within civic discourse, engaging the works of John Courtney Murray, David Hollenbach, and Marciano Vidal. No contemporary Catholic bioethicist should be without this phenomenal collection.

James F. Keenan, S.J.
Weston Jesuit School of Theology


Kaczor parses the fundamental points of divergence of proportionalism (in the voices of Peter Knauer, Richard McCormick, Louis Janssens, et al.) from Thomistic natural law (Aquinas via John Finnis, Germain Grisez, et al.). His account traces modern proportionalism from its roots in double-effect reasoning in Aquinas and late neo-Scholastic manualism (according to French Jesuit Jean Pierre Gury) and concludes that proportionalism “partially rejects, but fully presupposes” (209) the theology of the manuals (most notably in marginalizing the virtues) rather than representing a return to Thomas. K.’s attention to virtues leads to an interesting consideration of intrinsically evil acts (narrowed here to negative exceptionless material norms) in terms of Alasdair MacIntyre’s understanding of goods internal to practices. Doing evil to achieve good contradicts the virtues of justice and charity and thus cannot be reconciled with a Christian account of human finality.

K. explores important differences between proportionalist and Thomistic meanings of intention/foresight, proportionate reason, and the object of human action. His sympathies are strongly with the natural law school—he might have aptly titled this work “Natural Law Tradition versus Proportionalism”—which leads him at times to overplay the divisions between the two. He handles Thomas deftly, and endeavors to reflect the breadth of proportionalist thinking when he introduces it.

In his analysis and critique, however, K.’s target is often utilitarianism rather than proportionalism. For example, it is true that proportionalism is concerned with maximizing value. But where proportionalism takes into account such human values/virtues as justice, honesty, fidelity, etc., his charge that proportionalism is purely a matter of beneficial consequences that are external to the agent (151) does not stand. Sometimes K. mistakes the genus of proportionalism: indeed, proportionalism does not represent an adequate understanding of the human act. But (as K. quotes McCormick) proportionalism does not claim to do so. It is a tool or a type of analysis (terms range from criterion to fundamental principle) not a full-blown theory of human morality.

In sum, while K.’s declaration of the obsolescence of proportionalism seems premature, especially for applied ethics, his work indicates directions for further work at the methodological level.

Lisa Fullam
Jesuit School of Theology, Berkeley


Evil poses a problem about the world’s intelligibility. It challenges our ability to find meaning. It often threatens our understanding of God’s providence and agency. Joseph Kelly presents an interesting study about humanity’s understanding of evil from the books of Job and Revelation, through key Christian thinkers, to present scientific researchers.

K. makes a powerful case for taking the issue of evil as central to the history of theology, philosophy, and literature. The book covers authors as diverse as
By covering such a long history and so many positions, K. is clearly unable to go very deeply into any areas. As a survey of the problem of evil in the Western tradition, however, the book makes a good contribution. It offers some suggestions about the direction in which theories of evil will go in the future: Western views of evil will be influenced by non-Western cultures and religions, and the experience of marginalized groups will play an important role in our understanding of evil.

While the book is a helpful source of material on the issue of evil, it will not advance our understanding of the problem of evil. Meant as a historical survey, the book accomplishes its intention very well. Teachers will find it quite useful as a textbook.

Lucien J. Richard, O.M.I.
Boston University


Rist’s book is a brilliant and provocative essay on foundations in moral philosophy. His thesis is that if we are interested in rationally justifying our ethical beliefs, there are ultimately only two philosophical alternatives: that of a transcendental realism in which ethical beliefs are grounded in the divine nature as cause and guarantor of moral goodness, or that of various forms of antirealism on which no foundation for ethical beliefs can be established beyond our own determination of what is right and wrong. Only the first alternative, R. argues, embodied in the form of a revised Platonism, can adequately account for our fundamental conviction that what is right and wrong is not merely a creation of human self-interest but is based on the way things really are.

I highly recommend the book on several counts. First, R. presents a formidable and convincing interpretation of Plato, Augustine, and the subsequent Platonic tradition on ethical foundations. Second, R.’s critical appreciation of Aristotle (and ultimately of Aquinas) from this generally Platonic perspective will challenge theists (and nontheists) who consider themselves more Aristotelian than Platonist in their moral sympathies. Third, his analysis of a wide range of moral philosophers, especially contemporary Anglo-American thinkers and in particular the so-called New Natural Law Theorists, offers a fine, concise, and critical appreciation of the contemporary scene in ethical thinking.

For me, R.’s thesis itself is problematic. Some form of Platonic realism may indeed be the most rational of justifications for our ethical beliefs, but R. does not convince me that it is the only one. Various other forms of realism plausibly claim to ground ethical beliefs in natural dispositions; and even the antirealist can offer rational justification for ethical beliefs on, say, pragmatic grounds—for example, that while we do not all have the same philosophical beliefs about ourselves and the world, our need to live (and live well) together can be a rational enough justification for the rightness of those deeply held beliefs.

Thomas Sherman, S.J.
Loyola Marymount University, Los Angeles


Peter Singer has achieved considerable fame—in many circles, notoriety—for his views on animal rights, abortion, infanticide, and euthanasia. His Terry Lectures, presented at Yale University in 2000 and expanded here, concern a different set of ethical issues, those surrounding our global connectedness in the 21st century. His positions outlined here, although themselves controversial, may please some of the very people offended by his other books and essays. S. discusses our oneness in terms of four sets of actualities and possibilities: one atmosphere, one economy, one law, and one community. Under “one atmosphere” he focuses on the problem of global warming, under “one economy” on the World Trade Organization, un-
consider “one law” on the jurisdiction of an International Criminal Court, and under “one community” on the responsibilities of governments and individuals toward people only distantly related to them in terms of family or nation. Through each discussion he argues that “how well we come through the era of globalization (perhaps whether we come through at all) will depend on how we respond ethically to the idea that we live in one world” (13). The citizens of rich nations in particular have motives of moral rightness and self-interest to look beyond their own personal and national welfare.

The book’s task is threefold: to show how we are in fact linked together, to sketch a set of technological and institutional possibilities, and to advocate particular ethical responses. In the first regard, S. works in the realm of empirical ecology and economics with material that seems indisputable in its broadest terms. He links the ethical responses to particular technologies and institutions in ways that are inevitably more problematic.

Generally I am sympathetic to his conclusions, although I find the simple utilitarian weighing of matters unsatisfactory. He works methodically to figure out how to maximize the interests of humankind in a manner that is impressive and helpful. However, there is little sense of elemental passion, epistemological perplexity, metaphysical grounding, or religious inspiration, all no less dimensions of the “one world” and the debates and conflicts about it.

MICHAEL J. KERLIN
La Salle University, Philadelphia


This helpful work explains the emerging practice of socially responsible investment (SRI) with great lucidity and comprehension in three distinct parts. First, Sparkes explores SRI in general, providing its historical and philosophical roots in both the U.S. and the U.K. and outlining the specific modes of contemporary operation: exclusion of particular investments (untouchables like armaments and tobacco), engagement through dialogue of corporate executives, and finally actual shareholder activism. Profiling corporations, their issues, and the average SRI investor (well educated and probably working in a “care” profession), S. provides a fundamental credibility for the movement and establishes standards that can practically guide those potentially interested in SRI.

In part 2, S. descends with great detail into specific issues and opens the reader’s eyes to the enormous landscape of ethical questions in corporate investment. He exercises great prudence here. Beginning with the evident appeal to self-interest in a plethora of environmental concerns, he moves toward issues embedded in the global economic interdependence that affect us all and concludes with an implicit appeal to altruism by addressing human rights. He also attends to practices internal to corporate life: from actual governance policies and the recognition of the rights of corporate stakeholders to more neuralgic issues like executive pay.

The final part is an extensive narrative of SRI as a global revolution not only in the U.S. and the U.K. but also specifically in Canada and Australia. Though S. also glances at Japan and Scandinavia, one may ask why Anglo-Saxon cultures seem more interested in SRI than other cultures are. For anyone interested in the field, the work is indispensable, not only in providing foundational introductory material but by specifying the variety of ways that SRI can help promote the common good.

JAMES F. KEENAN, S.J.
Weston Jesuit School of Theology


This slender volume, consisting of two previously published articles, is of a divided mind. John Martin’s painstak-
ing essay reviews the arguments Scholastic theologians used to explain the exclusion of women from presiding at the Eucharist. The prefatory materials and Gary Macy’s essay are, in contrast, “advocacy scholarship.” This is not a criticism. In a project partly undertaken at the request of “Call to Action” and “WomenChurch” (v), advocacy of women priests is no fault. Sadly for those organizations and the series editors, however, the book provides little to forward the cause of women’s ordination. Macy demonstrates that the installation of porters, kings, abbesses, emperors, acolytes, deaconesses, etc., was called “ordination” before the 1200s. “Ordination” gave one a public function in the Church. He unearthed no example of women being “ordained” to preside at the Eucharist. As he concedes (18), his results neither “justify” nor “rule out” women’s ordination.

Martin’s article explicates the manifold ways medieval theologians attempted, with greater or lesser cogency, to make sense of the fact that there were “no ordinations of women to Holy Orders in this period” (31), that is to say, that no woman presided at a Eucharist. Occasional theologians thought this exclusion was from human canon law, but most from divine law. Some explained the exclusion by linking it to women’s de facto subordination, others argued from the nonpriestly status of the Blessed Virgin, to whom all possible graces were given. Such arguments will convince no one not already opposed to women priests; just as Macy’s detection of a wider use of the word ordination will seem relevant only to those favoring them.

One lacuna in Martin’s article: Contrary to his assertion (108), at least one medieval thinker, Hildegard of Bingen, did use the parallel of a male Christ (the priest) and a female Church (the congregation) to justify and explain the exclusion of women from priestly orders. Her arguments are analyzed in Augustine Thompson, “Hildegard of Bingen on Gender and the Priesthood,” Church History 63 (1994) 350–64.

James Puglisi’s magisterial study of ordination rites represents an invaluable contribution to a contemporary theology of ordained ministry. In this third volume he compares the Roman Pontifical of 1962, essentially the rite of 1596, with the rite of 1968, its first revision after the Second Vatican Council. Although he indicates the major changes in the 1990 editio typica altera, he unfortunately does not draw out the theological implications of those changes. He then examines the rituals of ordination of the Lutheran, Reformed, and Methodist churches. He concludes with an extensive analysis of a theology of ordination. End materials include a glossary of technical terms, a list of liturgies of ordination, a bibliography, and an index.

P.’s methodology is primarily comparative. He compares texts of different ecclesiastical traditions, but he also examines two texts in each series, the one in use today and the preceding version. He thus aims to evaluate the texts in their proper context and examine their evolution. Most importantly, this method enables him to distill a trenchant liturgical theology of ministry in his concluding chapter in which he critiques such ecclesial practices as the impoverished role of the laity in the selection of ordained ministers, the recent history of a theology of sacred powers at the expense of a theology of ministry, and individualist notions of vocation. He emphasizes that ordination is above all an ecclesial process that is at once communal, liturgical, juridical, and sacramental.

P.’s insights are essential for a renewed theology of ordained ministry: the purpose of ordination to build up the Church, the assembly as the subject of the epiclesis, the responsibility of the local church for apostolicity, the necessity of reconnecting priestly function and pastoral charge. Although translation costs undoubtedly dictated the
book’s expense, any subsequent study of ministry that does not take this work into account would be seriously deficient.

SUSAN K.WOOD
Saint John’s University, Collegeville


In his latest volume, ethicist John Haughey turns again to matters of spirituality and seeks to reenchant the concept of holiness that he thinks has fallen below the horizon of our conscious aspirations to realize the good and fulfill our deepest desires. He offers a lovely meditatio rooted in both his personal story and the larger ethical and Christian story in which we live. His vision is expansive: holiness constitutes choosing not just the good, but also relationship with God; not just an individual’s passionate quest and activity, but also something done in us, received, and accomplished by God; not just something that transpires between ourselves and God, but that also compels us to recognize our solidarities and compassionate social and environmental justice. Solidly connecting the moral good with our animating passions, H. retrieves in a remarkable way the role of the Holy Spirit in Jesus’ life and ours in a striking metaphor of the “truing” crafting of the carpenter.

Through his titular metaphor, “housing heaven’s fire,” H. links holiness with passion and offers a gem of a chapter on the Ignatian discernment of desires in relation to human purposes, seamlessly connecting the formative influence of the moral good with the transformative power of the Spirit. This process continues in the chapter on “Holy Stretching and the Glory of God.” The last two chapters on solidarity and social justice have the potential to draw many beyond an individualistic concept of holiness to a more robust spiritual life, as H. succinctly traces the postconciliar concept of “solidarity” in the social encyclicals, integrating this teaching with lived Christian life.

Only the reader can judge how well H. succeeds in his reenchantment project. The explicit Christology from below that undergirds his approach is appealing. But his underemphasis on the kadosh themes from the Hebrew Scriptures and the resulting purity codes in Judaism that Jesus challenged by subsuming them into compassion makes it difficult for the reader influenced by these themes to completely shift associations with holiness rooted in this tradition into the one H. proposes.

JANET K. RUFFING, R.S.M.
Fordham University, New York


With his 1966 book, Issues in Science and Religion, Ian Barbour pioneered the exploration of science-religion issues. He has published a stream of books ever since, and in 1999 was awarded the Templeton Prize for Progress in Religion.

The current book is limited to five issues, all of which Barbour has treated previously but not in such depth. While his earlier works tended to focus on the physical sciences, all five of the issues treated here center on the biological sciences.

The five issues are these: (1) whether evolutionary theory is compatible with God’s action in nature; (2) whether humans (and other animals) are genetically determined, and the closely connected issue of genetics and morality; (3) whether a distinctive notion of the human person can be retained in the light of contemporary neuroscience and artificial intelligence research; (4) whether the traditional notion of God (especially the attributes of all-powerful and all-knowing) is compatible with our contemporary understanding of nature; and (5) ethical problems raised by the scientific understanding of nature, especially care for the environment and population control.

The book represents a slight shift in Barbour’s views. Although he has long dallied with process thought, here for the first time he embraces it and uses it
to explore the above-noted issues. For example, on the fourth one, he adopts the position that process philosophy offers a view of the God-universe relationship that is much more compatible with the Judeo-Christian tradition than is classical theology. He especially emphasizes the notion that God self-limits God’s power and acts in the universe by persuasion and attraction rather than by coercive causality, and that God is affected by human experiences, especially human suffering.

Like all of his writing, this book displays a remarkable grasp of the literature—scientific, philosophical, and theological—on all of the issues addressed, and an ability to synthesize this vast reading into a coherent story. B.’s style is dryly academic, but it manifests an academism steeped in many decades of deep reflection on these issues.

EUGENE E. SELK
Creighton University, Omaha


In reading Bruce’s book I had a sense of déjà vu. As a student, I imbibed the received wisdom of a secularization thesis in sociology. From Max Weber to Peter Berger, most sociologists assumed an inevitable waning of religion in industrial societies. But with a recent religious revival around the globe, the majority of sociologists of religion have tended to bracket the secularization thesis. B. returns with a strong defense of it.

In brief, the paradigm looks like this. Modernization, urbanization, and industrialization undercut the vitality of religion. Structural differentiation erodes the ambient quality of religion which becomes compartmentalized and privatized. Modernization evokes pluralism and mobility, which make the plausibility of religious world views more precarious. Individualism begins to run rampant and, so, coherent religious world views fragment.

Nothing in the secularization thesis rules out occasional signs of revival. It merely argues that we can not expect sustained and widespread growth in places that were previously secular. The paradigm does not imply that changes are inevitable, only irreversible, once they occur. Nor does it assume an even trajectory. Rather it predicts the individualization of spirituality and the diminution of the social significance of religion.

B. amasses much interesting evidence from Britain. The U.S. also shows evidence for secularization: a greater emphasis on individual choice, a shift to this-worldly salvation, an increasing therapeutic orientation.

It is a shame that B. looks only at Britain and the U.S. Some of the data about a religious revival in former Communist lands would serve as counterfoil to his thesis. The telling question: why should we think of the “secular” as an irreversible constant and not itself, like religion, a variable? The rational-technical project of modernization is itself under siege in a globalizing world. Will the “secularism” after Islam look the same as that after Christianity? I would have to pronounce on B.’s interesting book the old Scotch verdict: not proven.

JOHN A. COLEMAN S.J.
Loyola Marymount University, Los Angeles


The work both demands and deserves careful reading; it will reward most readers with a new understanding of what is comprised by “philosophy of religion” in Lonergan’s thought. The term has both a generic and a specific meaning. The generic meaning refers to “the whole system of [Lonergan’s] philosophizing about God and religion” (148), including “religious experience, faith, belief, religious studies, and theology” (144). But that history itself leads to a specific or particular meaning, namely, Lonergan’s philosophy of religious stud-
ies, “a philosophical-methodological preoccupation with the individual methods by which the religious phenomenon is studied” (144). While these conclusions are announced from the beginning, it took the whole of K.'s careful work to persuade me that the distinction is correct. The difficulty is that the “particular” meaning is not what we expect “philosophy of religion” to mean. But K. shows that this indeed was Lonergan’s preferred meaning in his late writings.

Distinct from but related to both “philosophy of God” and “philosophy of religious studies” is Lonergan’s “model of religion,” a superstructural reflection, influenced by Christian texts, on the infrastructure of “religious experience.” Many would intuitively identify the “model” as Lonergan’s philosophy of religion, but K. argues persuasively that this is not the case. Religious experience, the infrastructure, is a “linchpin” (5) that joins the early philosophy of God and the late philosophy of religious studies. The model of religion is developed by applying generalized empirical method to religious experience, and it provides the starting point and a dimension of the basis especially for the dialectical component in the philosophy of religious studies.

K. follows a significant strand in Lonergan’s thought, from the philosophy of God in Insight (1957) through the Kehre of Philosophy of God, and Theology (1973) to the extraordinary subtlety of Lonergan’s post-Method (1972) papers, and helps us through these most profound reflections of the man who is arguably the 20th century’s greatest theologian. If one merit of a book is to teach even readers who are already familiar with the subject matter, then this book should be read by all interested in Lonergan’s work.

ROBERT M. DORAN, S.J.
Lonergan Research Institute, Toronto


In this highly original and idiosyncratic work, sociologist Richard Fenn brings together two worlds that have often been separated: the world of psychoanalytic theory and the world of religion. Though part of a series on “Theology and Religion in Interdisciplinary Perspective,” the book is more psychological than theological in content.

Drawing heavily on Freud’s writings on religion and dreams, F. reinterprets Christian narratives of the descent into hell using psychological categories. Arguing that texts like Dante’s *Inferno* have much to teach us about the primitive “excluded possibilities” of social life, he embarks on a Freudian analysis of patristic and medieval Christian depictions of hell. While sympathetically exploring the primal passions described by these Christian mystics, he rejects their “delusions and magical thinking” (105). Like Freud, F. depicts their visions as mere “projections of the unconscious” (65). For him, the “psychoanalytic tradition completes and corrects” (117) the Christian tradition. This “radical secularization of the Christian religion” is necessary to remove its “toxic” elements (121).

To his credit, F. (an ordained Episcopal priest and faculty member at Princeton Theological Seminary) lays his theological cards on the table, citing “Death of God” theologian Thomas J. J. Altizer as an influence. Arguing that human beings must look inward to solve their problems, F. criticizes Christian mystics’ reliance on “the agency of God” (70) as self-defeating.

Those sympathetic to Freudian psychology and secular theology will find much to admire in F.’s psychoanalytic reimagining of Christian experience. Those who find these approaches to religion overly reductionistic will find the same problems here. While F.’s interdisciplinary breadth is impressive, his dismissal of visionary religious experience as delusional limits his ability to build bridges between psychoanalysis and theology. Though it will not please everyone, F.’s work is an interesting application of Freudian thought to the history of Christian mysticism.

JOHN SCHMALZBAUER
College of the Holy Cross, Worcester

Simpson covers a wide range of issues in this short book: from the origin of critical social theory to Habermas’s discourse ethics, and from Paul Tillich’s theological engagement with critical theory to a constructive proposal on the prophetical role that congregations should exercise today.

S. divides the material into three basic sections. The first part traces the origins of critical theory in Max Horkheimer’s pathbreaking proposal at the establishment of the Institute of Social Research in Frankfurt. S. carefully differentiates Horkheimer’s understanding of the critical social theory not only from traditional empiricism and positivism, but also from the critical philosophies of Kant, Hegel, and Marx. This discrimination provides the backdrop for an analysis of Paul Tillich’s theological engagement with critical theory. Although this section pays close attention to the philosophical background of critical theory, it neglects the influence of Max Weber on the Frankfurt School’s reformulation of Marxism and to its understanding of modernity in terms of instrumental rationality.

The second section summarizes Jürgen Habermas’s early transformation of critical theory, then his development of a theory of communicative action, and finally his bringing of discourse ethics into relation with democracy theories, law, and civil society. This section, competently written, summarizes a lot of material, so much so that the differences between Habermas’s early and later work is mentioned but not discussed in great detail. In addition, S. does not touch on the several significant theological confrontations and dialogues with Habermas’s discourse ethic.

Instead, in the final section S. primarily offers his own constructive proposal that combines the “public companion metaphor” with that of a prophetic imagination within a servant model of the Church. The congregation should nurture the moral milieu of civic society in our postmodern pluralist society. These suggestions are briefly made, and one wishes that they were developed in more detail. As a concise introduction, however, S. has provided a guidebook to a considerable amount of philosophical critical social theory.

FRANCIS SCHÜSSLER FIorenza
Harvard Divinity School,
Cambridge, Mass.


Using the tools of theology, philosophy, education, and experience, Sullivan presents a work on the identity of Catholic education throughout the world that is provocative, informative, and insightful.

Given the religious diversity in today’s Catholic schools, S. hypothesizes “that the essential principles underlying a Catholic philosophy of education constitute a mode of distinctiveness with the power to be inclusive” (63). He proposes that, if Catholic schools stress the common beliefs and principles shared by all Christians, an environment can be created wherein both distinctiveness and inclusiveness are possible. While this focus may make Christians feel included—and that is doubtful—it does not resolve the dilemma of inclusiveness for non-Christians.

S. aims “to articulate the tension between two particular, apparently contrasting imperatives within Catholic education and then to suggest a way to reduce, if not entirely to resolve, the tension between them” (25). The danger in such a resolution may be the reduction of distinctiveness to a diluted form of Christian uniformity, and of inclusiveness to an amorphous homogeneity. Catholic schools have a responsibility to transmit the authentic message of the Church without compromising the internal integrity of that message. Balancing distinctiveness and inclusion within this context is precarious.

S. boldly asserts: “Our main priority should be to exhibit a constant openness to the activity of God rather than faith-
fulness to the tradition, even if we believe that this tradition articulates definitively our understanding of the nature and purpose of God’s ways” (137). He advocates a retrieval of tradition that welcomes “strange and unfamiliar meanings into our own awareness, perhaps to be shaken by them, but in no case to be left unchanged” (138). Only when a community considers and grapples with different perspectives can it arrive at an authentic understanding and acceptance of its own point of view (141). A point well taken.

This masterful and inspiring book contributes to an important dialogue within Catholic education. The questions that arise in no way diminish the book’s importance.

CAROL JEAN VALE, S.S.J.
Chestnut Hill College, Philadelphia

**BOOKS RECEIVED**

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HISTORICAL


MORALITY AND LAW


Wink, Walter. Jesus and Nonviolence: A


PASTORAL, SPIRITUAL, AND LITURGICAL


Wuthnow, Robert. All in Sync: How Music and Art Are Revitalizing American Reli-

**PHILOSOPHY AND OTHER DISCIPLINES**


