
Contemporary Markan scholarship has frequently noted the indications of fear, anomaly, and uncertainty in the Gospel. Geyer’s book, however, does not so much take part in this ongoing conversation as provide, in great detail, the biblical and especially Greco-Roman historical and cultural contexts of these and related terms in Mark 4:35–6:53. In this regard, a sentence from the Preface better indicates the book’s contents than does its title: “I hope that this book saves time for future students of the Gospel of Mark, especially those who are interested in what can be ascertained of the historical and cultural context of the Gospel. It is truly worthwhile to learn how to use a well-stocked theological library and the primary sources buried therein, and to marshal these various resources into a coherent argument” (xi).

G.’s opening chapter, “Mark and Violent Death: Crucifixion as Horror and Riddle,” argues that the nature of the crucifixion is foreshadowed especially in “Mark 4:35–6:56, a literary cycle that focuses on anomaly, uncertainty, indeterminacy, impurity, violence, revenge, the demonic, fear, and loss of place and community” (4). G. calls this aspect of Mark “the anomalous frightful,” and his goal is to portray comparable references to the anomalous frightful in ancient historical and literary works. To indicate the scale of G.’s work, I note that there are 165 entries in his “Ancient Author and Title Index.” As a Markan scholar, I was intrigued by G.’s early comment that “Mark 4:35–6:56 is notable for the absence of explanations of what Jesus does or asks others to do in the stories” (6), but G. does not develop this observation in relation to Mark’s overall narrative; rather he focuses on “comparing Mark to other sources” (11).

In a second introductory chapter, “The Anomalous Frightful: What It Is and What It Means,” G. analyzes various aspects of this reality, including anomalies and strange events, fear and danger, divine benefaction or not, and indeterminate perception and uncertainty, all of which he exemplifies with material drawn from the ancient world. He explicitly acknowledges that the “contextual accuracy” of the term “the anomalous frightful” for Mark’s time “is of extremely high value” to himself (19).

However, since the narrative of Mark is of extremely high value to me, I was more intrigued by G.’s third introductory chapter, “Not Having the Answer Is the Answer: How to Read Mark, to See Why.” Here G. first groups under three headings examples of “How We Usually Read Mark” (wrongly): encryption (Belo and Aichele, as well as Wrede and Schreiber), verisimilar narrative, and myth (Mack and Malbon). Then he suggests that
“Meagher [on clumsiness in Mark] and Kermode [on secrecy], through emphases on syntax and semantics respectively, make room for indeterminacy” (79). This, according to G., is a step in the right direction, but by his work he seeks “to complement, if not to contradict,” the long history of Markan interpretation that tries to ascertain “what the Gospel of Mark means” (79). G. regards his concern as semantic, but his brief discussion of Mark 4:35–6:56 that preludes the main body of the book illustrates that his approach is basically lexical, as it attends to particular words in Mark that relate to fear, anomaly, or uncertainty and then presents a stream of examples of these and other related words in the ancient world.

In chapters 4–10, the largest portion of the book—one chapter on each pericope in Mark 4:35–6:56—G. actually says little about Mark. Nor does he engage in conversation with Markan narrative or literary critics and reader response critics who have dealt with fear, anomaly, and uncertainty in Mark. Nor does he usually discuss how a particular Markan passage works in its larger frame in Mark. What G. presents is an extensive description of various ancient uses of certain words in Mark. He even provides a “Greek, Latin, and Other Terms Index” with 97 entries.

In addition to detailed examples in the text itself and copious footnotes, the book provides eleven appendixes on topics such as gynecological health, tree and water, and mythographic geography. In certain ways, G.’s work is encyclopedic and, as such, is better read for reference than straight through. Yet, even though the book offers the most complete set of references to fear, anomaly, and uncertainty in the ancient world that I have come across, many of them have been pointed out by Markan scholars who are more focused on the text of Mark. Thus I did not find here startling revelations that bring the reader new insight into Mark’s Gospel.

Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, Blacksburg

Elizabeth Struthers Malbon


Already well known for his interpretation of the work and message of Jesus in terms of opposition to powers of domination, Walter Wink here extends his explication into the realm of the human psyche and spirit. The focus is on Jesus’ self-designation as “the son of the man” (his deliberate reproduction of the awkwardness of the Greek phrase). To oversimplify a complex argument, W. is saying that, in Jesus, we find the working out of a significant shift in the archetypes of both humanity and divinity, a shift that still challenges humanity here and now.

The book draws its issues and methods from biblical studies and Jungian depth psychology. W. finds the origins of “the son of the man” theme in Ezekiel, arguing that, contrary to the use of the phrase in later Christian
theology, it refers not to Ezekiel’s humanity, but to his intimate connection with God, who is described in Ezekiel’s throne-chariot vision as having human form. After a survey of other references pre-dating 100 C.E., there follows an extended treatment of “the son of the man” sayings in the Synoptic Gospels, distinguishing between those referring to the pre-Easter Jesus and those with eschatological or apocalyptic reference. (W. particularly questions the originality of the apocalyptic element.) Brief treatments of the motif as found in Revelation, the Gospel of John, and the Pauline school and more extended discussions of Jewish mysticism and Gnosticism conclude the study.

As a biblical scholar, W. shows himself a careful reader and stimulating interpreter of the texts. While he disclaims any intention of trying to get “behind” the texts, he nonetheless offers us the image of a Jesus in profound conversation with Ezekiel—an image that should be taken seriously by students of the “historical Jesus.” The book reflects a lively conversation with two centuries of scholarship on the phrase “son of man.”

If the book is a work of biblical scholarship in terms of method and organization, it is still more a work of Jungian psychology in terms of the energy that drives it. W. is profoundly distressed by the failure of many Christians to take active roles in opposing oppression in our world. He argues that the social and political dimensions of the gospel that he stressed in earlier works must come to fruition through personal transformation. Some readers will see this as a movement to spirituality. Whether W. would like that term or not, his work stands as an example of powerful engagement with the message of the biblical text, in contrast to scholarship that is content be a purely dispassionate, intellectual endeavor without acknowledging its personal implications.

For better or worse, however, W. describes this personal transformation almost exclusively in terms drawn from Jungian psychology. Some will find this move quite satisfactory. Those who are not altogether persuaded by Jung and his followers will probably find it a hindrance. Jungian perspectives can indeed help to stimulate awareness of spiritual issues, but they also channel the discussion of them in rather definite ways that seem inadequate and perhaps also overconfident to some of us.

W. seems little aware of the broad range of Christian spiritual tradition and somewhat sketchily informed about classic Christian theology. This would not necessarily be a fault in this work except that he has adopted an attitude of hostility rather than indifference toward them. This results in a dismissive stance that does not do him or the subject justice. He draws a sharp contrast between the doctrine of the Incarnation and his own understanding of Jesus’ incarnating God as the truly Human One. Without denying that the classic doctrine can be and has been interpreted in the oppressive ways he notes, I question whether it inevitably implies such perspectives. Indeed, recent trends in Christian theology suggest that W. has created a false opposition here.

To disagree with W. in this regard is not to dismiss his work. He promotes conversation between disciplines that do not always acknowledge
each other and shows that attention to spiritual issues may actually enhance the insights of biblical scholarship. He writes with personal engagement and passion as well as scholarly attention and care. If the present reviewer were to express a single wish, it would be that his style become less hostile and more inviting.

The Church Divinity School of the Pacific, Berkeley

L. William Countryman


This Uppsala dissertation challenges a “Judaism-Hellenism” distinction popular among exegetes since F. C. Baur and seeks to reverse interpretations of Jude and especially of 2 Peter that have been contaminated by the application of this flawed distinction. Dismissing the popular “Judaism-Hellenism dichotomy” as useless and distorting (1–29), Gerdmar examines Jude and 2 Peter in regard to their syntax, vocabulary, and style, which, he finds, show strong “semitic linguistic influence” (30–63). Their epistolary genre (92–123), heavy use of Israelite Scripture and “apocalyptic” tradition (124–60), their cosmology and eschatology (161–206), and their similar ethos, soteriology, and anthropology (207–43) also relate both these compositions to a common “apocalyptic Christian Jewish current” of the Jesus movement in Palestine (278–323). In opposition to the prevailing view of 2 Peter, G. views this writing as a “twin” of Jude, not as the most Hellenistic composition of the New Testament, and not produced in and for believers of the Diaspora. It rather was written and circulated in the same Palestinian area as Jude and, like Jude, exudes the breath of “Jewish Christian apocalyptic thought,” as de Wette had postulated two centuries ago (338). In regard to the notorious exegetical crux of 2 Peter 1:4 (“partakers of the divine nature”), G. makes the plausible suggestion that clarity about the author’s cosmology (consonant with that of Israelite “apocalyptic” writings like 1 Enoch, 2 Baruch, 4 Ezra) is essential for grasping the thrust of this expression. The phrase speaks not of becoming “divine” but of entering that cosmological “grey zone” (as he calls it) where the boundaries demarcating the human, earthly sphere from the heavenly sphere of God are blurred, and where extraordinary humans (like Enoch, Moses, Elijah) enjoy privileged proximity to God (230–43).

On the whole, G.’s discussion of Jude accords with, but adds nothing new to, the scholarly consensus. The treatment of 2 Peter, on the other hand, is deficient and unpersuasive in several respects. G.’s attempt to challenge the consensus that a later 2 Peter appropriated and expanded on an earlier Jude (116–23) is too brief and unconvincing. In his preoccupation with 2
Peter’s “Jewish” [sic] features, he has failed to appreciate the ingenious manner in which this most Hellenistic of NT writings addressed the situation of moral laxity and doubt concerning the coming of the Lord, final judgment, and postmortem existence with a resounding chorus of “Gimme that old-time (Israelite end-time) religion” with all its ethical seriousness (see J. H. Elliott, “Peter, Second Epistle of,” Anchor Bible Dictionary 5 [1992] 282–87).

As to the broader theoretical issue of the “Judaism-Hellenism” straitjacket, we can only welcome G.’s observation that this and related popular distinctions (“Palestinian Judaism” vs. “Hellenistic Judaism,” “particularist” vs. “universalist,” “Petrine” vs. Pauline) presumed a Hegel-Baur model, were ideologically driven and deficient in historical support. But this observation is not news—at least to those scholars, who for over four decades have been stressing the presence of ideological bias on the part of all scholars, and hence the need for the acknowledgment and clarification of conceptual models. When G. speaks of “model,” in most cases he should have said “metaphor.” His alleged “models” (“dichotomic model,” “varnish model,” “fusion model,” “patchwork model,” “currents,” “networks”) are hardly developed as conceptual vehicles for articulating and testing social scientific theory designed to explain social structures, relations, and processes—the standard definition of “model” (see J. H Elliott, What Is Social-Scientific Criticism [1993] 40–48). They are rather impressionistic metaphors that G. uses superficially to characterize group traits or modes of cultural interrelation. They are useless for a precise analysis and explanation of the complex social-cultural reality to which he directs attention. He is laudably concerned about ideology but appears to regard “ideology” as a mere synonym for idea or concept (philosophical or theological) instead of as the marshaling of ideas and other artifacts by specific groups in specific situations to legitimate and advance specific group interests (see 124–206, 332–37).

Rather than analyzing Jude and 2 Peter along these lines, he writes: “That 2 Peter has ‘good Greek’ is regarded ‘Hellenistic’ and may imply certain ideology, at least undermines an ideological stance” [sic] (336). Or: “However, certainly language and ideology may coincide but there is no automatism between them” (sic, 336). (These quotations also exemplify how, in too many instances, G.’s study is marred by grammatically incorrect or confusing English.)

I share G.’s conviction that the formative matrix of the Jesus movement was the House of Israel, wherever members of that community found themselves. I do not think, however, that this study, given its superficial treatment of the key elements of this question, has contributed much to the discussion. Much of the study rehearses long-known information, and its discussion of a genuine problem is muddled and provides no adequate treatment or solution.

University of San Francisco                        JOHN H. ELLIOTT
Ansgar Wucherpfennig, S.J., completed this dissertation at Würzburg under the supervision of Hans-Josef Klauck. Its extensive analysis of both patristic and Coptic gnostic sources in the original, judicious summary of the scholarly discussion, and clarity of argument would lead one to think it the work of a mature scholar. No one working in second-century Christian history, early Christian exegesis and theology, or gnostic studies should fail to study this volume. It calls for a major rethinking of how we understand Heracleon and the second-century theological shift from largely Jewish and narrative categories to a philosophical, mythic, and philological discussion of an emerging New Testament canon. Like most dissertations in the field, this one has a set of “big picture” bookends that promises resolution to the classic problem of the Fourth Gospel and Gnosticism. While W. makes interesting suggestions on that score—including defending Harnack’s emphasis on the hellenizing of Christianity—an adequate argument would require another book.

Scholars engaged in the study of gnostic texts from the Nag Hammadi collection have been debating the appropriateness of understanding and classifying those materials according to the schemata of the heresiologists. However, we have tended to assume that the fragments of Heracleon’s commentary on John preserved by Origen reflect the elaborately developed Valentinian myth and theology described in Sagnard’s 1947 treatment. We have then used this framework to interpret the new texts. W.’s results put that whole enterprise in question.

W. argues that scholars have misread Heracleon’s views that derive from Origen himself. Origen probably received a copy of Heracleon’s work on John from his patron Ambrosius who had developed an interest in Gnostic speculation. Eusebius considers Ambrosius to have been a member of a Valentinian group. Therefore, Origen received the text and undertook its refutation in the context of a more developed school of Valentinian speculation than Heracleon’s own circles in mid-second-century Rome. For Origen, Valentinians have a complex myth of origins in support of what is seen as a deterministic classification of humanity into three categories: spiritual, psychic, and earthly. Only those born with the spiritual seed experience the saving illumination of the gnostic redeemer. Origen read this scheme into Heracleon’s exegesis of the Samaritan woman (spiritual), the royal official’s son (psychic), and the Jews, children of the devil in John 8 (earthly).

Most of W.’s book comprises a detailed analysis of what Origen reports to be Heracleon’s opinion on these sections of John, as well as on the Temple cleansing in John 2, the Baptist material in John 1, and the Prologue. W. proceeds on the assumption that Heracleon is not forcing the Gospel into a previously established theological mold. Rather, he should be considered representative of a Christian appropriation of the learned
methods of textual analysis current among literary critics and philosophers in the second century. Instead of looking for every bit of gnostic dualism, Valentinian mythology, and deterministic anthropology, W. looks for examples of correcting the text, glossing words or phrases, clarifying genealogy, topography, chronological order, or other facts in a narrative. Not only do Heracleon's comments show a concern for such details, they also address differences between the Fourth Gospel and Synoptic versions of the same material. In part, Heracleon demonstrates the same concern for a single account of the Savior's mission that led Tatian to produce the *Diatesseron*.

However, Heracleon does not seek to produce a narrative "life of Jesus." His reading of the Johannine Prologue shows a familiarity with Middle Platonic categories and interest in the vertical relationship between the divine and material realm already evident in Philo's exegesis of Genesis. W. makes a compelling case against the view that Heracleon is a radical dualist. Unlike his contemporary, Marcion, Heracleon does not posit a complete break between the God whose salvation became present in Jesus and the demiurgic creator of the material world, who is also "god of the Jews." Like the demiurge of Plato's *Timaeus*, Heracleon's Demiurge reflects the necessary weakness and ignorance that goes with the material world. However, the Word is able to descend into that world to illuminate, save, and rectify those elements of the divine that have become lost there. Is this depiction of salvation gnostic? W. would agree that it stands at the beginning of the more elaborate speculative systems found in Valentinian schools of the late second and third centuries. But within the context of mid-second-century Rome, distinctions between Christian sects are less easily drawn. He prefers to read Heracleon as evidence for a dynamic period in which Christians are just beginning to seek out intellectual categories for understanding their faith. He points out that Heracleon already has a sense of the New Testament canon of four Gospels and Pauline letters. He is not using such apocryphal "gnostic Gospels" so much in fashion on the scholarly left today. Though one might quibble over detailed points, W. provides a welcome new perspective on this facet of early Christian exegesis.

*Boston College*  
*Pheme Perkins*


The central question of Baum's five-part study is whether writings falsely attributed to an author can be part of the NT canon. Chapter A defines what constitutes Pseudepigrapha. It differentiates between writings incor-
rectly attributed to an author and those written with the intent to deceive. Chapter B surveys the various ways Pseudepigrapha were produced in late antiquity, including the use of secretaries and schools of philosophical thought. B. concludes that if a literary work claimed to be that of a particular author, but in fact was not, it was rejected as an attempt to deceive. Chapter C. endeavors to demonstrate that the Church Fathers (Tertullian to Jerome) rejected literature known to be or suspected of being pseudonymous. Chapter D. acknowledges that this practice was widespread in the first and second centuries in Jewish and Christian circles. However, B. argues, because Paul and others rejected lying and the Bible is the Word of God, such writings could not be included in the canon (164). With an eye to modern canonical theory, chapter E sums up the results, concluding that Pseudepigrapha cannot be a part of the canon.

While B.’s attempt to address a problem that has vexed NT scholarship for 200 years is laudable, there are intrinsic difficulties with his methodology and conclusions. First, the study is based on canonical theory rather than on an objective survey of pseudepigraphical literature. B. seems to assume that all NT epistles are genuine productions of the authors to whom they are attributed. It is from this point he begins to build his case. Second, he does not address the content of these epistles nor the arguments surrounding vocabulary and theme shifts that scholars often point to when concluding that an epistle was written pseudonymously. Third, he deals insufficiently with Jude 14 which quotes 1 Enoch 1:9, a work recognized by scholars as pseudepigraphical. There is no indication that B. has considered what effect the acceptance of a pseudonymous writing by a NT author might have on canonical theory or that this acceptance is in any way inconsistent with his initial assumption about canonicity (84–86). Fourth, his concept of canon is limited to a Western/Protestant understanding. While the Western Church eventually rejected what is commonly recognized as Pseudepigrapha, the Eastern Church retained some of these writings—for example, 1 Enoch in the Coptic canon. Finally, B.’s conclusion, that there cannot be any Pseudepigrapha in the NT canon because the Church would not accept false writings (i.e., those that make false claims about their authorship), is tenuous. Even if B.’s conclusion were correct, it does not consider the possibility that the Church might have made some wrong decisions. If, as B. acknowledges, pseudonymously written Christian literature was circulating as early as the late first century, how can one be sure that the early Church did not miss the evidence of its pseudonymous character in spite of good intentions and serious attempts to segregate such writings? Modern scholars agree that Paul did not write the Letter to the Hebrews, but because Pauline authorship was strongly assumed by the early Church, the letter was ultimately included in the canon. While Hebrews is not pseudepigraphical, its placement within the canon is the result of an incorrect assumption about its authorship. Could not the same have happened to other letters that not only “sounded” Pauline (or Petrine) but also made a claim (albeit falsely) to apostolic authorship?

Overall this book adds little to the discussion of Pseudepigrapha in the
The evidence B. has gathered is helpful for understanding the nature and development of pseudonymous writings, but his presuppositions about the nature of the Bible and canonical theory cloud his conclusions. The book seems to be an apology for including the disputed Pauline letters in the NT; those who agree with this view will undoubtedly find support in B.’s arguments. The target audience is perhaps the German Protestant churches where issues of historicity and authenticity continue to be a focus of discussion.

An appendix offers a selection of bilingual texts to complement B.’s arguments and allows readers the luxury of not having to scour primary sources for themselves. This is complemented by a comprehensive bibliography and helpful indexes. B.’s straightforward style and the book’s clear layout make for easy reading.

University of Durham

John Byron


As its title implies, the book presents John Chrysostom’s ecclesiology as drawn from Paul’s Letter to the Ephesians and primarily articulated in 24 homilies thereon. Since there is no critical edition of these homilies, Kohlgraf relies on the Greek text reproduced in Migne (PG 62, essentially de Montfaucon’s edition of 1655), controlled by the less accessible text F. Field published in 1852.

In the first of two main parts, K. lays out the historical and methodological context of the homilies. He spends considerable space reviewing theories on their place and date of composition, but ultimately leaves the issue open: “393 or later,” probably at Antioch (44), since he does not consider that a theological investigation (such as his) of the homilies requires an exact date. He does not discuss the manuscript tradition at all, save for a passing advertence (2) to the investigations of R. E. Carter. He also attempts to identify the heretical or suspect groups Chrysostom has in mind, the nature of his audience (some of K.’s remarks in this regard will add to the studies by Pauline Allen and Wendy Mayer), and how Chrysostom’s biblical interpretation was influenced by his monastic background, views on martyrdom, assessment of pagan thought and practices, view of “the world,” thoughts on Judaism, and notion of the domestic church.

As to method, in general Chrysostom discusses Ephesians verse by verse, and sometimes builds a homily on the one immediately preceding. Moving from the general to the particular, he follows what he thinks is the method of Paul (whose authorship of Ephesians he does not question) and the Epistle’s construction. He refers to pagan (classical) sources, but infre-
sequently. He employs typology sparingly and carefully: Old Testament personalities are moral rather than christological Vorbilder. All the words of the Bible have a meaning, yet the meaning of some passages is unclear because the divine message was filtered through human language. Thus concepts that might have made sense in Paul’s time now require explanation. Sometimes he presents an imaginary dialogue between Paul and the Ephesians, or carries on his own with his congregation (or selected components of it), or with Paul himself, or he engages in diatribe with contemporary pagans or heretics. Fundamental to all his biblical commentary is the praise of God, inspired by wonder that the pagans have been saved (a theme Chrysostom considers basic to Ephesians). Sometimes he addresses his audience directly, which suggests that he is not working from a prepared text.

Part 2, on focal points of interpretation, takes up the remaining three quarters of the book. K. highlights the four main ecclesiological themes he finds in the homilies. The treatment of each begins with biblical references (Old Testament–New Testament–Paul–Ephesians) from the perspective of modern exegesis, then moves to the patristic discussion (developed by K. for only two of the themes), finally examining Chrysostom’s treatment of each theme. (1) To that of the Church as drawn from Jews and Gentiles, Chrysostom brings emphases on the significance of ancient Israel, salvation as present in the Church, virtue as expressing the Christian’s existence, and the Church as rooted in the saints of the Old Testament. As K. reads Ephesians, the call of the Gentiles was always part of God’s plan; Israel fulfilled its task of preparing the Messiah’s coming, and Jews have taken first place in his Church. Not so for Chrysostom who, though he differentiates between Jews and pagans, also distinguishes converted from unconverted Jews. (2) As home and temple of God, the Church possesses the four marks of unity, holiness, catholicity, and apostolicity. Here K. underscores Chrysostom’s emphasis on the soteriological principle of “synergism” between God’s grace and human responsibility (195–200). (3) The theme of the Church as Christ’s body engages the issues of divinization, sanctification, rebirth, new creation, resurrection, illumination, and the connection between living and dead. (4) The image of the Church as bride of Christ in Ephesians necessarily evokes the paradigm of human marriage, with the attendant issues of conjugal love, women’s subordination, and their symbolic value as the Church (but only in the case of virgins).

Unfortunately, aside from the occasional word or phrase, K. does not reproduce any Greek text, but mediates Chrysostom through his own German translation. He also relies heavily on the ample secondary literature listed in his bibliography, and is sometimes too confident in his “take” on what Chrysostom might actually have intended. Notwithstanding, his book casts light on the issue of Paul’s reception in the fourth century, on John’s understanding of Deutero-Paul, and on the emphases he places and methods he employs to make his “Paul” understandable to his audience.

Saint Paul University, Ottawa

J. Kevin Coyle
This first modern study of Thomas Aquinas on Christ’s passions succeeds admirably in offering a thorough exegesis. It combines a detailed analysis of texts with careful attention to historical background. The first two chapters present Aquinas’s christological and anthropological sources. Gondreau’s treatment, impressive in both breadth and depth, is especially interesting on Hilary of Poitier’s account of Christ as capable of physical but not psychical suffering; on how John Damascene’s rejection of this anesthetized view of Christ’s passions influenced Aquinas; and on Aquinas’s integration and development of Aristotle in terms of patristic and Scholastic thought.

G. then lucidly summarizes Aquinas’s general Christology around five fundamental principles: (1) the dignity of Christ’s humanity, (2) the fullness and integrity of Christ’s human nature, (3) Christ’s sinlessness, (4) Christ’s defects and perfections in relation to the economy of salvation, and (5) the fittingness of Christ’s human weaknesses. This chapter could stand on its own as a useful introduction to Aquinas’s Christology.

Next, regarding Christ’s human appetites in relation to the ontology of his soul, G. explains Thomas’s philosophical analysis of the intellectual and sensitive appetites and the relation of specific passions to each faculty of Christ’s soul. This sets the stage for chapter 5 on the moral quality of Christ’s passions. G. shows how Aquinas’s commitment to the unity of reason and sensibility leads him to view the passions as an integral part of attaining human happiness. For Thomas the passions represent the proper “matter” of the moral virtues which perfect human nature (264–69). This optimistic view of the passions, in contrast to the views of theologians such as Bonaventure, allows Aquinas to assign them a more integral role in Christ’s moral life (317–24). G. concludes by examining specific passions that raise problems in Christology: e.g., sensible pain, sorrow, fear, wonder, anger.

While G.’s work is well reasoned and erudite, two points seem problematic. First, in discussing Christ’s sinlessness, G. treats the claim that Christ was free from original sin, actual sin, and inclination to sin, but he neglects to note that Christ was also incapable of sinning (157–65 and 301–25). This last claim follows from (1) the grace of union, (2) Christ’s fullness of habitual grace, and (3) Christ’s possession of the beatific vision (see Summa theologicae 1–2, q. 4, a. 4; also 1-2, q. 5, a. 4 and q. 10, a. 2, and Denzinger 434). While one might want to hold that Aquinas was ambiguous on this point, the issue should be explicitly treated in a study of this kind.

Second, G. questions Thomas’s view that Christ’s passions were compatible with his alleged experience of the beatific vision while on the cross (442–43). Here G. follows Jean-Pierre Torrell, arguing that Aquinas’s
Deepest insights concerning the passions follow from the close connection he sees between the intellect and the senses. Ordinarily experiencing the beatific vision entails a “redounding” (redundantia) of glory from the soul to the body, rendering the body impassible and immortal. But Aquinas claims that there was a divine “dispensation” in Christ’s case that prevented the glory of his mind from suppressing the ability to suffer in body and soul (445). Following Torrell, G. claims that we should jettison the claim that Christ experienced the beatific vision and hold instead that his knowledge of God was similar to the knowledge of the prophets.

Aquinas thought that if Christ were to be the cause of our attaining the beatific vision, he would had to have had the beatific vision throughout his mortal life. Thomas based this argument on the principle that any perfection in an effect must exist in its cause (444, 179–80; see also ST 3, q. 9, a. 2). G. suggests that the causal requirement is satisfied by Christ’s possessing the beatific vision in his resurrected, rather than in his earthly state (451). This restriction, however, seems inadequate. Aquinas argued that our salvation is caused by both Christ’s death and Resurrection, albeit in different ways. Yet, our salvation is caused by way of merit not by Christ’s Resurrection, but by his crucifixion (see Compendium theologiae, 239 and ST 3, q. 9, a. 2). Hence, if Christ did not have the beatific vision during the crucifixion, we would have to say that this event cannot cause our meriting that vision. G.’s position, therefore, does not seem to square with Aquinas’s Christology.

Nevertheless, G.’s study deserves serious consideration from Aquinas scholars. The entire work is impressively rigorous in its historical methodology and theological argument, and it highlights an overlooked aspect of Thomas’s Christology.

St. Jerome’s University, Waterloo, Ontario

J. L. A. West


The revival interest in the theological work of Hugo Grotius (1583-1645) was given a boost by the publication in 1988 of a hitherto unknown treatise, Meletius, of 1611 which presents the strong ecumenical convictions characteristic of G.’s subsequent career. This was shortly followed by the first in a new series of critical editions, with translations and commentary, of the major works from the second decade of the 17th century, during which G. was deeply involved in the Remonstrant Controversy as a senior figure in the government of Holland. Pride of place was properly given to the De satisfactione Christi of 1617, G.’s only truly doctrinal work, which appeared in Edwin Rabbie’s edition in 1990. Rabbie followed this up in 1995 with the Ordinum pietas of 1613, an angry tract defending the government’s handling of the heresy allegations against Conrad Vorstius.
This third contribution from Harm-Jan van Dam is larger than either of its predecessors. He complains that a treatise written in eight months should have occupied him eight years, but what he has achieved in that time suggests a Grotian level of industry. De imperio ("The Government of Religious Affairs by Sovereigns") is the expansive and learned work by which G. hoped to redeem the controversy by refocusing it from the issue of predestination onto the rights of government in religious policy. This was, in fact, a hopeless cause. Holland’s insistence on the sovereign right to determine its own liberal religious policy united an insuperable array of forces against it: the Staatshouder, Maurice of Orange, who had an interest in a united Netherlands; other member-states of the United Provinces, who had an interest in controlling their strongest partner; the predominantly supralapsarian leadership of the Reformed Church, which wanted a synod to enforce its peculiar conception of orthodoxy; and finally, though initially sympathetic, King James of Scotland and England, who had an interest in keeping the Netherlands quiet. De imperio was overtaken by the disastrous denouement, and the work was still unpublished when G. was imprisoned on the eve of the Synod of Dordt (1618).

So this magisterial statement of Erastian principle—meat too strong even for the Supreme Governor of the Church of England—survived the crisis of its author’s career only in a handful of manuscript copies that had been sent out to supposed sympathizers. The story of how G. later recovered the copy he had sent to a reluctant Lancelot Andrewes, who had passed it on to John Overall, from whose remains it was extracted and restored by John Cosin, is just one of the fascinating elements in the gripping narrative Introduction. Once settled in Paris, G. was irresolute about publishing the work, fearing, perhaps, that it might prejudice his eventual return to Rotterdam or align him too strongly with factions in the French court. Van Dam’s painstakingly thorough work on the manuscript tradition establishes inter alia that no autograph survived, but only copies with the author’s annotations. The claim of the first (posthumous) printed edition to be based on autograph was simple deceit, like its claim to be published in Paris. Now van Dam has given us a text based on two of the manuscripts that G. corrected and approved. But he has done more: extensive new manuscript evidence—documents, notes, letters—has shed much new light on the detailed history of the period. An ambitious Appendix of supporting documentation includes the rediscovered text of a preparatory sketch for the work, the short Tractatus de iure magistratuum (1614).

The editor’s fine and exhaustive work in verifying the text and placing it in historical context is not, I am afraid, equalled by the quality of the translation, though it is serviceable enough for anyone who can check it against the Latin text opposite. The problems are not limited to the occasional infelicity betraying the hand of a nonnative speaker, but extend to a degree of carelessness about important technical and conceptual terms. Imperium has usually been rendered as “authority,” but sometimes, confusingly, “power.” Neither is correct. The term “government” would make a number of passages more intelligible. Another unfortunate decision was
to render *debita* and *illicita* as “compulsory” and “forbidden,” obscuring G.’s point that actions may be “obligatory” or “impermissible” in natural law without anyone commanding or prohibiting them. In *specialis iustitia* the editor has failed to recognize the Aristotelian category of “particular justice,” a matter of some importance for the interpretation of G.’s developing thought, since he makes use of this category up to and including the *Jurisprudence of Holland* (1620), but abandons it in the *De iure belli ac pacis* (1625).

These misjudgments reflect a weakness already evident in previous volumes in the series with regard to G. as a thinker. That van Dam has not attempted a theoretical assessment is hardly a criticism in the light of what he has achieved in laying a secure foundation for those who will in the future attempt it. But it is a pity that he belittles the task, and so underestimates G.’s abiding interest as a source of political-theological reflection. He is “not a philosopher in our sense of the word,” van Dam tells us, “and not interested in building a complete, consistent philosophical system. . . . Any systematic view of G.’s ideas risks being unhistorical” (5–6). G. himself would have been deeply wounded by such an assessment, for the great ambition of all his major works was to transcend occasional polemics by unfolding the inherent logic of their subject-matter comprehensively as a science derived from axiomatic first principles. And if we can rid ourselves of suppositions about the connection of philosophy with “systems,” we will find in his attempts to confront the challenges of his day a deeply philosophical mind grappling in a sustained and consistent way with the perennial questions of politics and theology.

What we have in the *De imperio* is the definitive statement of a non-Calvinist Protestant theory of church government—superior in many ways (though not as a work of art) to Hooker’s *Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity*, curiously one of the few related works that G. had not read. The argument, exhaustively buttressed by his vast learning, is that the role assigned by Protestants to the civil magistrate is perfectly compatible with Scripture and goes back arguably to Constantine, certainly to Charlemagne, preceding the doubtful qualifications introduced by the Hildebrandine Reform. Marsilius of Padua is the guiding spirit of an account that attempts a virtuoso combination of contrasting emphases: on the one hand, a thorough authoritarianism that denies both the contractarian foundation of government and the right of popular recourse against it, even at its most perverted; on the other hand, a deeply principled conception of government under the constraints of divine law, natural and revealed, which constitutes the sole ground of its validity, whether in the religious or secular field. Sovereign governments are at once unchallengeable from below and perilously exposed to judgment from above, a judgment that takes the form of ineffectiveness in creating obligation. “Even a judge . . . is not bound to obey . . . against justice and right, no, he is bound not to obey . . . On the other hand, it is lawful . . . to suffer ills . . . ; it is even necessary to suffer them” (237–39).

Balancing the account of civil government is a strongly anti-juridical
account of the Church’s own authority, uncoercive, pedagogic, and consensual. There is no attempt at a complete ecclesiology, but there is a very detailed theology of ministry. Prophecy, lay eldership, ordination, and episcopacy are all explored in an impressively nuanced way that will offer the best possible point of reconciliation between Rome and Geneva. For although G.’s aims within the small theatre of the Netherlands are polemical, his strategy for European Christianity is irenic and ecumenical.

The great desideratum in Grotius studies (apart from the continuation of this groundbreaking series to include the *De veritate* and the late biblical Commentaries) is a really sensitive history of the development of G.’s mind between 1604 and his mature masterpiece, the *De iure belli ac pacis* of 1625. Van Dam rightly deplores the habit of discussing G. only out of the latter, without attention to his theological works. But he does little to suggest how our reading of it could be enriched and clarified by the *De imperio*. Much of the theoretical framework was in place in 1618, and yet there were emphases that would have to be adjusted when G. was faced with questions of international law. He would not be so receptive, for instance, to Bodin’s assertion that sovereignty alone confers unity on a political society. Now that the familiar canards about G. as a rationalist secularizer have been pensioned off (and none too soon), it is the more urgent to get a commanding view of what this profoundly theistic, profoundly Protestant, profoundly universalist, early-modern political theologian really looks like. A theological thinker of very considerable stature, more unlike us and more unlike his immediate successors and admirers than we, or they, ever dreamed, he is capable of providing us with distinctive help as political theology comes onto the agenda again.

Christ Church, Oxford

OLIVER O’DONOVAN


The two volumes attempt a comparative and analytical study of religion on the grand scale not commonly pursued by modern scholars. Magnani’s perspective is largely historical and phenomenological. Volume 1 begins with a statement on the analogical nature of the religious phenomenon. It clarifies the meaning of “monolatry” (*monolatria*) and “monotheism”; the former being belief in a tribal God who is considered a supreme, transcendent creator, without excluding the possibility of other tribal gods; the latter, belief in one universal God to the exclusion of all others. After making some methodological reflections on the comparative method, M. considers the theories of the evolution of religion in the context of Darwin’s general theory of evolution and the contributions of archeology to our understanding of the early religious life of humankind and of the universality of religion.
Lengthy discussions of various forms of belief in some sacred power dominate this first volume. The treatment of pantheism and panentheism, devotional movements, polytheism, dualism, ancient Hebrew religion, tribal religions, and finally the monotheism of the major Israelite prophets is thorough, though somewhat ponderous. M. takes every care to make clear distinctions and classifications among the various types of beliefs. Thus, for example, he distinguishes between religious and philosophical dualism and finds two types of the former, namely, moderate and radical dualism. He provides examples from different religions, past and present, to illustrate the complexity and variety of religious phenomena in the religious history of the human race. From a theological point of view, his treatment of early Hebrew religion (333 ff.) is among the more interesting sections. M. considers the early Hebrew religions to be a form of monolatry rather than of monotheism.

Volume 2 deals with monotheism in the strict sense and covers the three great Abrahamic religions: Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. M. surveys modern Judaism (l'Ebraismo moderno) that includes developments in Judaism from rabbinical times to the contemporary divisions among Jews. He then treats Christianity and considers at some length the Christian belief in the Trinity as expressed in revelation, biblical theology, and conciliar definitions. Finally, he briefly treats monotheism in Islam. He concludes by reflecting on the typology of monotheism and on the morphology and common content of all religions.

One of the difficulties with any comprehensive and inclusive treatment of all religions is that many of the historical trends described and distinctions made seem somewhat artificial. To cite one example, I wonder how helpful it is to distinguish between tendencies toward a cosmic type of religiosity and an ethical-personal type of religiosity. On a popular level, gods and goddesses in all religions seem to be worshiped as personal beings whom worshipers can address. Some of these deities are even designated as creators of the universe and as the givers and guardians of morality. I am also reluctant to endorse the apparently evolutionary scheme adopted by M., namely, that in the recent history of religions there has been a development from monolatry to monotheism. Many of the secondary or inferior gods and/or goddesses may perform the function of intermediaries, and their status could be compared with that of angels, saints, or ancestors in other religions that are monotheistic in the sense adopted by M. Many Hindus, for example, see their deities as aspects of one reality and would not hesitate to describe themselves as monotheists, even though Hinduism is frequently listed as a polytheistic religion in many books on world religions.

M. provides an index of names in each volume, but no general index. Both volumes contain an extensive table of contents (Indice-Sommario) that provides some information about the themes dealt with in each chapter and that functions as a quasi subject index. However, it remains difficult to trace all the places where M. treats individual religions, such as Hinduism. The chapters are heavily footnoted with references to books and
articles in different languages and by authors well-known in their respective disciplines (sociology, anthropology, history of religions).

This erudite book makes a substantial contribution to the history of religion. It is not a book for beginners, since it does not present a simple exposition of the various world religions. The reader without some background knowledge of religions and philosophy would have great difficulty following M.'s carefully constructed and meticulous treatment of the subject.

University of Detroit Mercy

JOHN A. SALIBA, S.J.


God, or at least the transcendent, continues to bother us, as no one escapes the question of meaning and of existence, even in the West, which now describes itself as post-Christian on the one hand and, on the other, as post-atheist. That both of these terms can be perceived as describing reality at the same time suggests the pluralism, confusion, and fragmentation of our age.

Professor of ecumenical theology at the University of Utrecht, Houtepen’s point of departure is this present condition of aporia and agnosis in Europe. He concerns himself at length with the reality of secularization and theodicy. His focus is wide; he examines the traditional and contemporary loci in which God and discourse about God are found. Here his focus is on history, philosophy, experience, the emotions, revelation, the holy, the Trinity, interreligious dialogue, culminating in a discussion of the very possibility of “a God who allows Himself to be thought” (255).

The holy, understood in the past as binding divine authority, is no longer given. “What remains, now that God is no longer the one who is addressed or the one who addresses, is reciprocal conversation between human beings, and the most important bridge to truth and consensus is criticism, contradiction, the palaver” (113). This point, H. avers, poses the problem. If everything is up for discussion, criticism, chat of all kind, whence do the conversation partners get value or meaning? Is life nothing more than conversation, at least for those who have the leisure to engage in it? In a critique of Habermas’s consensus theory H. rightly asks how those who have no say in society would be integrated in such discourse and decisions. In striving for consensus, there will always be losers. This, indeed, is only too evident in present-day globalization, which works so well for many in the “first” world and not at all for a great many more in the developing world. Thus H. makes an important plea for the presence of the “new holy” in our lives, which is inviolable and demands respect by all: care for the environment, truthfulness, communication, democracy, justice, human rights, peace, freedom, gender equality, tenderness, concern for health, the development of the imagination. In these cares glimpses of God can be found.
In his lengthy reflection on the Trinity, H. attends to the fact that in speaking of God we can use female and male attributes. Referring to God as Father and Son led to a reduced view of a male God; “it would have been better had males themselves exposed this heresy and had not needed to wait for twentieth-century feminist theologians” to challenge and balance these views (164). Yes! However, while H. is clearly aware and in favor of theological issues raised by female theologians, his engagement with theology by women could have been more pronounced. The impressive name index includes some female thinkers, but their voices remain peripheral. Given, moreover, that H. challenges the view of God as exclusively male, one wonders why his own references to God often remain in that mode. Perhaps this in itself shows the difficulty and awkwardness in truly enlarging our conception and language of the divine.

H. elucidates how theologians nowadays often need to converse with those who do not, or do no longer, or do not yet believe. In this discussion he includes the thought of contemporary philosophers such as Jean-Luc Marion, Louis-Marie Chauvet, and Emmanuel Levinas. While his presentation of their thought is certainly relevant to his whole thesis, he might have conversed with them more extensively in his conclusion.

Despite the book’s wide-ranging discussion, there are, naturally, omissions. Besides the already noted lack of engagement with the theological contribution of women on the perception of God, there is practically no recognition of the rapid renaissance of theological esthetics over the last 20 years. There is no discussion of the fact that, for many, the arts and/or nature are sources in which the divine can be glimpsed, and which in turn have fueled theological engagement.

These criticisms aside, it is a remarkable, very readable work. It is one of the rare books that will be of interest to a wide circle from professional theologians and philosophers to students and the general reader. The copious endnotes as well as H.’s ease of integrating a wide variety of thinkers evidence his erudition. Finally, it is a book of hope, as it asserts that in the midst of, and despite, our aporia and doubts, traces of God continue to be found in this world.

Milltown Institute of Theology and Philosophy, Dublin

GESÁ ELSBETH THIESEN


Stanley Grenz, recently listed as one of five Canadian “Theological Trailblazers,” states that his goal in this series of studies is to articulate the central motifs of Christian doctrine in a manner that brings them into conversation with contemporary cultural currents, in particular, postmodernism. There is no question of a grand theological summa; Christian doc-
trinal constructions, he suggests, are better viewed as a web or mosaic rather than as an epistemological house built on an assailable foundation. Hence the title of the series. On the other hand, G. acknowledges his indebtedness to Karl Barth’s trinitarian theology and recognizes that the Christian belief mosaic reflects a trinitarian design.

The projected six volumes in the series are devoted to the central foci of systematic theology: theology (proper), anthropology, Christology, Pneumatology, ecclesiology, and eschatology. Anthropology is the focus of this first volume, *The Social God and the Relational Self*. Here, as a response to the dissipation of the self of modernity, G. seeks to develop a social or communal understanding of the concept of the *imago Dei*, “a renewal of the Christian communally constituted soul out of the ashes of the demise of the centered self” (3).

In part 1, “The Context: Trinitarian Theology and the Self,” G. sketches the development of trinitarian theology from Hegel to LaCugna. He notes the revival of a particular model of the Trinity—the social analogy—with its roots in the patristic era, and a commensurate rethinking of the notion of person. In tandem with that survey, he maps the postmodern (loss of) “self.” Here he traces two trajectories: one from Augustine’s “turn inward” to the self-sufficient, self-constructing “therapeutic self” of modern psychology, as exemplified by Abraham Maslow; and one that resulted in the destabilization and ultimately the demise of the self, exemplified by Nietzsche, wherein the modern ideal of the stable unitary self has been replaced by the decentered fleeting “self.”

In response to this demise of the self, in part 2, “The Texts: The Imago Dei in Trinitarian Perspective,” G. explores a theological anthropology of the self, based on the notion of the *imago Dei*. He surveys three major interpretations of the *imago Dei*, wherein it is understood (1) to consist of certain attributes or capabilities within the person (the substantial or structural interpretation), or (2) to reside in a relationship between the creature and the Creator (the relational view), or (3) as the divinely given goal or destiny awaiting humankind in the eschatological future and to which humans are directed. G. then turns to an exegesis of the texts that use the language of the *imago Dei*, beginning with the story of the creation of humankind in the divine image, in Genesis 1. In the light of the new humanity inaugurated by Jesus Christ, G. moves from a creatiocentric to a Christocentric anthropology for the fuller meaning of the *imago Dei* as the *imago Christi*.

The originality and creativity of Grenz’s approach emerges in part 3, “The Application: The Social Imago and the Postmodern (Loss of) Self,” where he seeks to construct an eschatologically determined, social, indeed ecclesial conception of the image of God. Here G. discusses the question as to whether the *imago Dei* is linked to human relationality in the form of sexuality, and explores the connection between divine relationality and the relational human “self.” The *imago Dei* emerges as relational self, a sexual self, an ecclesial self, and ultimately a theocentric self, via participation in the divine life through union with Christ in the Holy Spirit.
It is not surprising that bringing the social model of the Trinity to bear on anthropology results in a focus on relationality, both human and divine. What is interesting and thought-provoking in G.’s work is the distinctly eschatological and ecclesiological perspective that he brings to the concept of *imago Dei*. Indeed he argues that the image of God is ultimately an eschatological concept—it is our divinely given human calling and our divine destiny—and as such has crucial implications for Christian thought and practice, and particularly for our understanding of the nature and role of the Church.

G. brings a vast array of resources—from theology, exegesis, psychology, and philosophy—to this impressive and useful study. Attention to the medieval theological contribution, however, is relatively slight, and exploration of contemporary approaches to the psychological analogy, such as those offered by Karl Rahner and Bernard Lonergan, would have further enriched the study. A bibliography, rather than just footnotes, would also have been helpful.

*Australian Catholic University, Ballarat, Vic.*

Anne Hunt


This collection represents the fruit of a 1998 meeting at Marquette University that brought together an impressive group of scholars to discuss “the current state of research into Pneumatology” (11). Biblical, historical, and philosophical resources are interrogated first, followed by chapters on current theological questions in the discipline of Pneumatology, the intersection of Spirit Christology and Trinity, and the role of the Spirit in ecclesiology and practical theology. Overall, the volume is organized according to the meeting’s seminar format of papers and responses.

In the earlier part of the collection, Philip Clayton builds a strong case for a panentheistic account of the God/world relation that is adequate to “the idea ‘in’ human consciousness of an Infinite Ground ‘in’ which consciousness itself lives and moves and has its being” (197). Clayton’s philosophical approach requires a careful and conscious embrace of the anthropomorphism that characterizes theological language. Still to be clarified is how this understanding of Spirit, while dynamic and relational, is fully trinitarian. Elizabeth Dreyer’s retrieval of medieval sources would be a good conversation partner here, particularly her work on Catherine of Siena.

Essays by Lyle Dabney and Bradford Hinze are particularly good examples of the “state of the question” model, both of which represent promising avenues for future work. Dabney’s constructive “theology of the third article” takes as its starting point not the monarchial Father or the
God-with-us Son, but an inductive “emergent ‘common’ ” (254). Hinze’s survey of the role Pneumatology has played in recent ecclesiology paves the way for his analysis of current discussions about catholicity, communion and identity, and communicative action. In a complementary fashion, Jürgen Moltmann and David Coffey’s essays on the question of “Spirit Christology” represent well-developed positions on the trinitarian basis for the person of the Spirit, sharpened by respondent Ralph Del Colle’s careful delineation of the question of the Spirit in the taxis of the economy.

Questions arise as Anselm Kyongsuk Min puts forward the model of solidarity rather than communion, so as to highlight his practical and ethical claim that theology should be done by “Others together” rather than “with Others.” The gains of serving these claims, however, seem to come at the price of a problematic anthropomorphism, as Min, recognizing that we cannot allow the common notion of “person” to confine revelation, calls us to “stretch our notion of person to fit the theological data” (433). A similar tendency is found as Min notes the “sexism” of traditional language about God, but continues it, arguing that using the feminine pronoun for the Holy Spirit “balances” the masculine and feminine references. It does not.

That such an ambitious undertaking would have omissions is understandable. Nonetheless, omissions are worth noting as they provide a sense of the discipline’s current self-understanding. The editors lament the lack of the voices of feminism, Orthodox theology, and Pentecostal Christianity, but these voices offer claims that should not be compartmentalized. For example, the symposium was not only lacking an explicitly feminist critique but consistently sidestepped the obvious gender models that underscore accepted treatments of “persons” and “relations” and “Father and Son,” terms that appear in almost every essay. Indeed, Nancy Victorin-Vangerud warns of romanticizing familial metaphors in the easy embrace of Trinitarian communio. Michael Fahey’s response adds the important concern that Pneumatology not be considered apart from liturgical theology and, most importantly, the recent ecumenical work of the World Council of Churches.

As presented, the collection reads somewhat more as a “proceedings” volume than the introduction to “the state of the question” advertised. The responses are often directed more to the essays’ authors than to the texts themselves. While readers familiar with the terrain will fill in the subtext, others will find some of the responses overly schematic. For example, responses to William Tabbernee’s careful reexamination of the characteristics attributed to Montanism and Dreyer’s richly textured retrieval of medieval images for the Spirit seem to be less than fully realized (Frederick Norris on Tabernee) or not directly a “response” (Wanda Zemler-Cizewski on Dreyer). But these minor concerns are offset by the range and depth of the material presented in this collection, a collection that will be of value to systematic theologians across the board and will likely appear on the syllabus of every graduate course on the topic of the Holy Spirit.

Fairfield University, Conn. Nancy A. Dallavalle
Lane studies eight 20th-century texts of Catholic-Protestant dialogue on justification, from H. Küng’s constructed dialogue between Trent and K. Barth in _Rechtfertigung_ (1957) to the Lutheran-Catholic _Joint Declaration on the Doctrine of Justification_ (1999). First, an informative 70-page chapter on Calvin, the Regensburg Colloquy of 1541, and Trent’s _Decree of early 1547_ takes the reader into the heart of the Reformation controversy, with ample accounts of present-day interpretation of 16th-century views of God’s saving work of justifying sinners by grace through faith in Christ. In the modern dialogues, L. recognizes the importance of the U.S. Lutheran-Catholic consensus in _Justification by Faith_ (1983) and of _The Condemnations of the Reformation Era_ from the German Ecumenical Working Group (1986). Working papers from the latter project were published in _Justification by Faith_, edited by K. Lehmann and W. Pannenberg (1997). L. offers a substantial study of 15 key issues in the exchanges, aiming to state the extent to which agreement has been shown and to locate and weigh the remaining differences. Study of the issues leads to numerous affirmations that the doctrines in dialogue have been shown to be not mutually exclusive, e.g., because a term like “faith” has in fact different objects of reference. Thus, the doctrines do relate to each other as diverse, but in reconciled diversity. A nine-page conclusion centers on the claim in the _Joint Declaration_ of a Lutheran-Catholic “consensus in basic truths” concerning justification, judging that beyond the common starting point in the Western Augustinian heritage, the agreement has been shown, especially in passages of the _Joint Declaration_ that are common confessions of faith. Important for L. is the 1999 Annex of the _Joint Declaration_ with its positively nuanced Catholic appreciation of the realities indicated by the Lutheran formulae _simul iustus et peccator_ and _justification sola fide_. L. heightens the usefulness of his work by an Appendix containing the Regensburg article on justification, the _Joint Declaration_ with its Annex, and a set of evaluated further readings.

L. informs his reader well on the documents presented. His Evangelical perspective is refreshing, for example, in puzzlement over the Lutheran claim that justification-doctrine has a primary criteriological role in assessing all other teaching and all church life. He is perceptive in locating the central difference as not being between God’s declaring or making just, but in the ongoing ground (“just why?”) of the believer’s being righteous before God: Is it _extra nos_ in Christ but imputed to us, or is it the new life imparted by the Holy Spirit? The answer to this question has consequences for personal religiosity of prayer, confidence in a saving God, and the value of good works. Again, L. locates a significant agreement on the recompense of good works in the _Joint Declaration_ Annex: “Any reward is a reward of grace, on which we have no claim.” Emblematic of those who lived this affirmation is Thérèse of Lisieux, whose sense of ever needing
mercy now prominently concludes the doctrine of merit in the *Catechism of the Catholic Church*, no. 2011.

I am more aware than L. seems to be of the confessionally obligated character of Lutheran theology in dialogue exchanges, and of the Lutheran reading of Scripture with a theocentric perspective on God’s truly coming into the world in both Word and sacrament, especially in sacrament, so that God by the gospel does impact broadly on human life. No place here for *finitum non capax infiniti*!

In framing the path to the reconciliation of diversity, I would suggest a sharper expression of the questions about deeper concerns and fears. The identification of one side’s deeper concern (*Anliegen*) does not lead to asking whether the teaching of the other side professes and teaches what one values, but whether it honors the concern by non-exclusion. Similarly, the dialogues examine the fears one side has regarding the other teaching, to see whether upon examination the fear, often based on short-formula accounts, is in fact verified and grounded by what is taught and done across the way. Such questions have been instrumental in making possible the new relationship of reconciled diversity.

A dialogue document omitted but deserving consideration is the 1990 Reformed-Catholic text *Toward a Common Understanding of the Church*, which includes a joint confession of God’s work in Christ, of justification by grace and through faith, and of the Church’s calling to serve God’s saving economy. After L.’s book went to press, the view that the *simul iustus et peccator* is not divisive has been further supported by a new study of the German Ecumenical Working Group, *Gerecht und Sünder zugleich? Ökumenische Klärungen*, edited by T. Schneider and G. Wenz (2001). But L.’s book treats a complex doctrinal and theological development in a manner that can serve theology students quite well.

*Gregorian University, Rome*

JARED WICKS, S.J.


The best hermeneutical instrument for the understanding and interpretation of Vatican Council II is probably the evangelical parable “A sower went out to sow his seed…” (Lk 8:5). It was a pastoral council called to spread the redeeming Word in a troubled world. The seed, of course, needed time to unfold its potential and to yield fruit a hundredfold.

Forty years after the council, in this book we have a good demonstration that the understanding of the council’s teaching is maturing and the desire for its implementation in the practical order is increasing. The book contains the “Acts of a colloque” held in March 2000 at Évry, France, to honor Guy Herbulot, the bishop of the diocese, on the 25th anniversary of his episcopal ordination.
The thème of the encounter was the ministry of the bishop both in his diocese and in the universal Church—a topic around which many debates revolved at Vatican II. The chosen venue of the meeting was the local cathedral because there is no better symbol of bishop’s pastoral mission. The participants—virtually all of them well known for their knowledge and understanding of the council—came from the fields of history, theology, canon law, and pastoral practice: the work had to be interdisciplinary. In their expositions and discussions they moved easily between theory and practice; the témoignages of bishops kept balancing and validating the insights of scholars.

They approached the main topic through three issues. The first was the intent of the council in its work for the renewal of the episcopal office. Giuseppe Alberigo, Gilles Routhier, Laurent Villemin, and Gustave Martelet responded; in their papers we have a good blend of historical information and theological analysis. The second issue was the reception of the council’s teaching. Jean Passicos showed how far the 1983 Code of Canon Law succeeded in translating the council’s insights into practice; Bernard Sesboüé examined some recent documents of the Holy See and found them falling short of the conciliar vision. Maurice Vidal spoke on the persistent effort of the French bishops to implement the council. The third issue was the “figure” (the theological ‘persona’) of the bishop. René Rémond showed how in French society the role of the bishop has changed in the 20th century; then four bishops (including Fortunado Baldelli, the Nuncio to France) narrated their own pastoral experiences and reflected on them; finally Hervé Legrand gave a precise and detailed account of the current state of the question with a series of well thought-out directions for further research.

The editors—fittingly—completed the “Acts” by adding to them two talks delivered in the diocese of Évry, one by Christoph Theobald on the salient achievements of the council, another by Bishop Guy Herbulot on his own episcopal life. Herbulot concluded his talk with a plea for a better practice of collegiality.

“The ministry of bishops,” the topic of the colloquium, dominated the council’s “determinations”; the right development of this ministry in practice is crucial for the Church of the future. The participants did what was needed: they took their inspiration from the seminal words of the council and carried its message forward. In their explorations, there was faith seeking understanding, and—importantly—faith seeking life-giving norms of action.

No major council in the history of the Church had an unqualified and immediate acceptance. The story of the aftermath of Vatican II is no different. In his time, Blessed John XXIII was opposed by the “prophets of doom” (his words); today the resistance to his council may come in the form of a subtle reinterpretation of its teaching, a reinterpretation that effectively “nullifies” the intent of the Fathers. Or it may consist in a silent refusal to implement in the practical order the council’s directions. In
either way, such an attitude is a loud dissent from the highest magisterium of the Church, no matter how it is disguised.

Yet, the colloque of Evry was a living testimony that the seed sown by the council Fathers has fallen onto good soil; it has taken root. Provided that there will be similar encounters the world over to protect and nourish it, it will continue to grow and yield fruit a hundredfold.

Georgetown University Law Center, Washington LADISLAS ORSY, S.J.


To study and intelligently use Catholic social teaching documents, one need not be an economist, but it helps. This is, in part, the message of Barrera’s praiseworthy volume. By no means intended to serve as an introduction to Catholic social teaching, the work fills at least the following three gaps in the scholarship of modern Vatican social documents.

First, in his investigation of the stances assumed in Catholic social documents regarding the workings of economic markets, B. brings a fine analytic eye to the unfolding of this tradition of ethical reflection. In particular, he offers considerable insight about the transition from Scholastic to early modern approaches to the topics of fair wages and just prices. To some extent, B. merely tells the familiar story of the evolution from an era of medieval feudal institutions through the onset of the industrial revolution and eventually to our contemporary globalized, knowledge-based economy. But by tracing with rich insight the history of economic thought regarding social justice in succeeding eras, B. superbly links several disciplines on these weighty matters. His analysis of the development of key notions of distributive and commutative justice is consistently sensitive to the division of labor between religious commitments (which tend to lead Christian theologians of practically all stripes to emphasize the goal of equity) and a strictly economic calculus (most often favoring efficiency and the maximization of output). B.’s resulting critique of utilitarianism dovetails nicely with the interdisciplinary perspective of the social encyclicals themselves.

Second, B. is not satisfied merely to describe how Catholic social documents derived their critique of laissez-faire capitalist practices, but dares to point the way to the future dialogue between liberal economics and Catholic ethical thought. Part 4 of the volume, entitled “Postindustrial Social Questions,” contains noteworthy chapters on two key principles in the social encyclicals, namely, the insistence upon universal access to material goods and the sharing of superfluous income. In a quite original and persuasive way, B. suggests substantial refinements of these principles to adjust them to the new social and economic conditions of our information age. He ultimately proposes a new standard of “participatory egalitarian-
ism” as a worthy extrapolation of the Catholic ethical tradition that will be adequate to the unprecedented challenges of the new knowledge economy. Sweeping changes in the nature of property and social relations necessitate this ambitious project of aggiornamento in social teaching. Other social ethicists have occasionally hinted at the need for such an agenda; this volume, for perhaps the first time, advocates it in a full-throated way as the inescapable future contribution of Catholic social teaching.

Third, B. takes up a challenge that few commentators on Vatican social documents dare to tackle. The fifth and final part of the volume proposes a “conceptual synthesis” of the principles and ethical directives contained in the dozen or so most important documents of the Catholic Church’s social teaching. B. provides a clear chart (258) of the interrelated parts of this schema and devotes his final three chapters to explaining the first-order and second-order principles he identifies. While it may not be the final word on how to organize this unwieldy body of material, B. does great service by offering us this synthetic picture. He summarizes the contents of Catholic social thought as a mosaic of six main pieces, each of them developed in service of human dignity and integral human development in tension with the multifaceted demands of the common good. These six elements are: the primacy of labor, subsidiarity, universal access, stewardship, solidarity, and socialization. The first two fall under the rubric of “gift of self,” the middle two comprise “gift of the earth,” and the final two are “gift of each other.” Despite perhaps forcing some of these concepts into these categories for the sake of symmetry, B. resists the common temptation to oversimplify this complex heritage or to twist its features in support of a rigid, predetermined agenda.

B. is not a great stylist, and theologically minded readers may find that the book suffers from overuse of the jargon of economics. The chapters are quite uneven in length and importance, giving the book a choppiness that is partially explained by the fact (mentioned in the preface) that four of the 14 chapters were originally published elsewhere. Nevertheless, in his search for intelligible patterns in the economic ethic of official Catholic social documents, B.’s work is most original, quite balanced, and very well researched.

Weston Jesuit School of Theology

THOMAS MASSARO, S.J.


This year marks the 50th anniversary of the discovery of the chemical structure of DNA that launched the genetics revolution. Exciting discoveries in genetics and the great promise of stem cell research may hold significant potential to expand medical knowledge and clinical therapies, and bring relief from much human suffering. Yet these revolutionary sci-
Scientific accomplishments also present humanity with unprecedented ethical challenges and serious dangers. Burley and Harris have edited an outstanding and timely reference collection that brings together the scholarship of 37 leading international contributors to the complex ethical debates in genetics. This comprehensive and carefully designed volume includes 34 essays that examine topics such as stem cell biology, informed consent in genetic experimentation, cloning and public policy, race and genetics, biotechnology patenting, autonomy and privacy, prenatal diagnosis, and many other important subjects. The book is organized in five major parts: an introduction to genetic science, genetic research, gene manipulation and gene selection, genotype and justice issues, and a concluding section that considers implications for ethics, law, and public policy.

The collection is multidisciplinary and wide-ranging. A number of essays effectively treat the complex and controversial subject of the moral status of the human embryo, particularly regarding the use of embryonic stem cells (ES cells) for research and potential medical therapies. The international background of the contributors sheds needed light on some of the significant legal and policy differences between the U.S. and Great Britain (where extensive genetic research is underway) and other countries. A number of authors (e.g., Søren Holm and Madison Powers) carefully address concerns about informed consent and the possible misuse of genetic information. There is also insightful consideration (e.g., by Ruch Chadwick and Adam Hedgecoe) of the serious potential for exploitation and commercialization of human genetic material. H. in his essay, “The Ethical Use of Human Embryonic Stem Cells in Research and Therapy,” allows for the “use of embryonic and fetal organs and tissue including ES cells . . . if it is for a serious beneficial purpose” (170) in a way that seems to accept the moral risks too easily. Many moral thinkers continue to judge that the medical and moral complexity of such use demands further analysis and serious debate. H., a member of the United Kingdom Human Genetics Commission, describes U.S. federal laws regulating embryonic stem cell research as incoherent (166) as they place strict limits on the use of federal funds.

While there is some treatment of religious perspectives, more coverage would add to the already diverse balance of views expressed in this collection. In an excellent and thoughtful essay, “Religion and Gene Therapy: The End of One Debate, the Beginning of Another,” Gerald McKenny is correct that, generally speaking, religious traditions have not forbidden in principle gene therapy research. Yet his judgment that this part of “the religion and gene therapy debate is over” (287) does not seem easily supportable. It is more likely that continuing discoveries and increasing religious understanding of these complex procedures will move theologians and ethicists to consider new questions about both the means employed in this research and also fundamental questions of moral principle about these prospective technologies. In “Cloning and Public Policy,” Ruth Macklin’s provocative critique of human dignity arguments against cloning (e.g., 212) does not convince me. According to her, human dignity is a “fuzzy con-
cept” and she suggests that there is no evidence it is “threatened by the prospect of cloning” (212).

Many ethicists and other scholars consistently maintain that moral arguments regarding human dignity are and must remain central to the cloning debate.

Overall, the volume includes a diversity of opinions and moral positions. The writing is evenly clear and direct—a notable achievement considering the size of the book and the complexity of the subject matter. Each essay is well referenced and includes a generous and current list of suggestions for further reading. The reference lists at the end of each essay direct the reader to additional leading research. The book also includes a detailed and useful index. In the Afterword, Sir David Weatherall cites the need, when studying problems of modern genetics, “to distinguish between the important questions and those that are futuristically frivolous” (466). B. and H. and the contributors to this important volume have made the distinction admirably. They have offered us a book that serves as an excellent introduction and dependable reference for students, scholars, and medical professionals alike.

*Fairfield University, Conn.*

**Francis T. Hannafey, S.J.**


Rabbi Marc Gopin has extensive experience in conflict resolution training. He has also anguished over the breakdown of the 1993 Oslo peace process and unrelenting violence throughout the Occupied Territories and Israel since the *intifada* of 2000. Here he argues for other initiatives to sustain a peace process. Paralleling diplomatic efforts, these initiatives would spring from the religious values of Jews and Muslims.

G. explores the religious inheritance of the Jewish and Muslim offspring of Abraham, examining the rituals, myths, and metaphors that have connected Jews and Muslims in past and present conflicts but can also further Israeli-Palestinian peacemaking. Surveying traditional Rabbinic and Islamic interpretations of the story of Hagar and Ishmael, he argues that the descendents of Isaac and Ishmael ought not to be locked in “an intense but troubled and murderous family myth” (8). While the story of the exile of Hagar and Ishmael has inspired enmity and violence, it is open to new interpretation and “pro-social development”: The Genesis record that, when Ishmael was “gathered unto his people” at his death, can be read to mean that he was reunited with his estranged family.

G. encourages more religious actors to participate at all levels of the conflict resolution process, bringing the richness of their Jewish and Islamic values with them. (He laments that Israeli reduction of value to the holi-
ness of the land of Israel becomes an idolatry to which all other values were sacrificed.) He presents midrashic and sermonic thinking of coexistence in the West Bank fostered by people like Rabbi Menachem Frohman. G. describes the interfaith “Jerusalem Initiative” (1999) as a “model of simultaneous diversity and overarching unity” fostering “intermythic conversation” (53–54), and demonstrates how past constructs of “othering” can be turned toward “benign objectives and peaceful forms of othering.” Arthur Waskow, for example, has reworked the temple mythology in form of a Hasidic tale in which the Rebbe’s vision of a rebuilt temple has the Dome of the Rock at its center. There the sacrifice that God desires takes place in the burnt offerings of hatreds and weapons.

G. reveals his deep pain for the suffering of both Israelis and Palestinians. He knows well what extremists on both sides have done to deepen fears. He recalls the advice, “Remove fear and everything else is possible” (57), and repeatedly insists that peace requires “persistent relationships.” Neither side appreciates the depth of the other’s perception of great asymmetry of power. Both sides must get close enough to feel each other’s losses and to find means of transforming relationships. How can people work through the death of loved ones? How can loss of homes and land be overcome? How can the strong memories of injuries be used to reach common ground? In this connection, G. discusses Rabbinic, Qur’anic, and Sufi teachings and rituals as possible avenues to repentance and forgiveness. He encourages more interpretations and amplifications of the Muslim and Jewish formal processes of reversing harm and repentance, *sulh* and *teshuvah*, *selihah* and *kapparah* (185).

Rather than allowing the “official dialogue to hold everyone captive,” G. urges group encounters—the smaller the better—between members of professions and religious groups. “It is time for Israelis, Palestinians, Jews, Christians, and Muslims of the region to acknowledge what they owe each other” (179). He describes several programs undertaken and gestures extended to bridge the gap between Jews and Palestinians, and proposes a host of ways that both citizens and leaders among Israelis and Palestinians, as well as third parties, can contribute to “cross cultural de-escalation.” He explores how religious ritual can respond to the losses of life, land, and holy places. He extols the power of listening to one another’s pain in order to honor and value the other, and examines both Arab and Jewish sensibilities that must be respected for relationship-building to succeed. His own cross-cultural sensibilities suggest that his concrete advice on how to effect these possibilities is especially worthy of study and application. On the one hand, G.’s familiarity with the depth of the conflict makes him aware of the immensity of the peacemaking task. On the other hand, his breadth of experience in conflict resolution makes him sensitive to possibilities for collaborating and finding common ground.

G.’s passion for peacemaking has produced a gift to all who yearn for an end to the cycle of destructiveness in Israel and Palestine. He invites everyone to “help evoke peace processes that resonate at the most profound
level of human consciousness and experience” and blaze new paths to peace and justice (228).

Marquette University, Milwaukee

Michael Duffey


This “study in political penitence” (xvii) brings together insights of Christian theologians, policy analysts, psychologists, social theorists, and conflict mediators who variously strive to make a case for forgiveness and reconciliation within the arena of public policy. The editors describe this growing emphasis in terms of a horizon shift: if forgiveness and reconciliation were formerly conceived against the background of the confessional, they are now being considered with a view to the much wider world of public policy. Accordingly, Helmick and Petersen have assembled essays that primarily give voice to what the new “discoverers” of forgiveness and reconciliation are saying about these ideas. That interest is complemented by a secondary concern to bring these voices into conversation with traditional theologies of forgiveness.

The text is limited by a diffuse focus, inconsistent quality, and excessive contemporaneousness. Nevertheless, the work fills a void by attempting to unite streams that have yet to sufficiently interact. Several constructive proposals emerge.

A first comes from the volume’s theologians, who address in turn the ontological ground of forgiveness and reconciliation (Petersen), the order and dynamics of reconciliation within an economy of grace (M. Volf), and the sacramental dimensions of forgiveness in the light of trinitarian theology (S. Harakas). Their chapters stand as a kind of operational thesis that Christian reconciliation is distinctive and cannot be generalized, as such, into a broader social ethic. Nevertheless, because the significance of the claims of Christian theology extends beyond Christian practice, the attitudes and modalities of Christian reconciliation ought to supply the pattern for approaches in other contexts.

A second constructive proposal emerges from essays that address reconciliation from the standpoint of political theory. J. Montville and D. Johnston contend that modern political society depends upon the leavening influence of religious values and principles in order to attain its own ends. This insight underwrites the text’s recurring call for an integrated approach to peace-building, wherein official governmental efforts are complemented with “track two diplomacy.” While these authors nearly instrumentalize religions, their proposals properly differentiate political society so as to open up a public venue for religiously inspired practices of reconciliation.
The need for the engagement that these proposals imply is indirectly highlighted by essays that seek to ground forgiveness and reconciliation in victim-centered psychologies. Essays by D. Hicks, E. Worthington, and E. Staub and L. Pearlman intimate that victim identity-loss and emotional disturbance complicate the replication of a Christian pattern that presumes a willing and able forgiver. Patterns, then, give way to flexible processes that conduce to healing and the emotional achievement of forgiveness. But processes without patterns can, in fact, become too flexible. In Worthington’s essay, for example, the pursuit of justice is subordinated to the aim of reducing “unforgiveness,” which ostensibly precedes forgiveness. Such models deny us the capacity to judge that a person who withholds “forgiveness” once justice has been restored is simply acting unjustly. More seriously, they contravene traditional Christian notions of forgiveness that stress its gratuitous character and its importance for effecting the repentance and conversion that reconciliation requires.

It is crucial to ask whether such contravention is simply required by the project of developing an account of forgiveness and reconciliation that operates outside of Christian contexts. This question begs the further one of the relation between nature and grace. Although the volume does not address this question directly, the practical studies in its important part 4 confirm that Christian insights about forgiveness and reconciliation do find an echo in the human heart. A. Chapman’s essay on South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission, for example, shows that complaints about the Commission’s Christian biases actually reveal a desire for a process that is more thoroughly consistent with a Christian approach. Likewise, O. Botcharova’s contribution of a seven-step model, which developed from her work with multi-ethnic groups in the Balkans, signals the desirability and practicality of an approach that honors the unconditional nature of forgiveness and maintains a reintegrating focus for justice.

These studies suggest that the way forward is to be found in the dialectical encounter between the experience of those who pursue political peace and Christianity’s own best insights into forgiveness and reconciliation. Of necessity, that dialectic must cut across history to discover anew old arenas of reconciliation. It is noteworthy, in this regard, that Harakas’s study of the sacrament of reconciliation offers one of the volume’s most comprehensive and psychologically compelling accounts of the dynamics of reconciliation. Perhaps the contemporary narrative—which heavily informs this book—that regards such older theologies as irrelevant to forgiveness’s new day is ripe for overcoming. As this volume displays, that narrative backs theology into an apologetic mode precisely at a time when we need a deepening of our discourse. By becoming more confidently creative in its engagement with the world and its own history, theology may well alight upon a discourse—such as that exemplified in G. Smyth’s compelling essay about Northern Ireland—that helps people discover more fully the interpenetration of their lives and the gospel of reconciliation.

Marshall makes important contributions to biblical and ethical scholarship on criminal justice issues in particular and on peace and justice issues in general. Asserting biblical warrant for restorative justice as an alternative to the dominant legal paradigm of retributive justice, he writes that “the first Christians experienced in Christ and lived out in their faith communities an understanding of justice as a power that heals, restores, and reconciles rather than hurts, punishes, and kills, and that this reality ought to shape and direct a Christian contribution to the criminal justice debate today” (33). M. acknowledges methodological problems in taking distinctively Christian ethical teaching into the public arena. He assumes that a Christian perspective on any ethical issue ought to be firmly rooted in Scripture, but not to the exclusion of other sources of moral wisdom, such as philosophy and empirical data, which he uses to varying degrees.

In highly readable style, M. first examines how the justice of God is understood in the Pauline corpus and in the Gospels. Both Paul and Jesus were rooted in the Hebrew tradition that understood divine justice not so much as the reflection of a vengeful God who wrought destruction on Israel’s enemies as “principally in terms of God’s redemptive power intervening in situations of suffering and need to deliver the oppressed. . . . The accent was on God’s justice as a redemptive and reconstructive action more than a retributive or punitive one” (257). In his theology of atonement, Paul understood the Cross and Resurrection as the paradigm of God’s justice, an occasion of reconciliation and restoration, not of substitutionary punishment. The Evangelists saw Jesus as exemplifying divine justice and portrayed him as a practitioner of forgiveness and nonretaliation who fostered a community of like-minded disciples.

M. points out, however, that divine justice does not exclude the need to punish. Drawing on legal and political philosophy, he combines discussion of the more common rehabilitative, deterrent, and retributive models of punishment with a critical eye toward rationales for the state use of power, and finds limited New Testament sanction for all of them. However, he finds no instance in New Testament texts where divine or human punishment is retributive rather than reparative or redemptive. Core Christian values are best reflected, then, in “restorative punishment” that offers offenders opportunity to take responsibility for their actions, and emphasizes the dignity of the victim and the moral agency of the perpetrator. In arguing against capital punishment in particular, M. uses outdated statistics to demonstrate the death penalty’s racial bias, and he takes insufficient account of recent public opposition to the death penalty in the U.S. over concerns that is arbitrary and error-prone. More current data would strengthen M.’s already substantial argument.

A passionate, persuasive reflection on Christian forgiveness and its restorative potential in the public realm concludes the book. M. defines
forgiveness as a dynamic process in which victims do not seek reparation from their offenders but cultivate reconciliation. While forgiveness is “a matter about which Christians have something special to say,” M. emphasizes that it is also common to human experience, “accessible to different traditions and indispensable to the proper functioning of all human relationships” (262–63). Forgiveness can serve as the heart of a reformed system of criminal justice that embraces practices of restorative justice rather than merely retributive measures. While M. notes that traditional Western theological conceptions of justice are rooted in “an abstract moral order in which imbalances must be righted” (43), he could usefully incorporate a theory of virtue to undergird his description of forgiveness as a discipline to be acquired and mastered through lifelong practice.

A hallmark of the book is the connection it makes between criminal justice issues and the painful (and painstaking) process of rebuilding societies after massive internal violence. M. illustrates the process with the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC). While noting its limitations, reflective of the always incomplete nature of forgiveness and justice, M. sees the TRC as emblematic of the restoration of moral and social order that promises peaceful coexistence among former enemies. The TRC’s work illumines both the tensions and the points of convergence between the Christian ideals of love of enemies and forgiveness and the demands of justice for the common good—an illustration that is all the more compelling and crucial, given the events of September 11, 2001.

In discussing forgiveness last, M. properly reflects a caution not to talk of forgiveness prematurely. In the face of vicious criminals (or terrorists), moral outrage must have its day. Like the New Testament vision of justice, M.’s thick description of restorative justice does not diminish the reality of evil, deny the culpability of the guilty, nor minimize the pain of victims, but it looks beyond retribution toward the defeat of evil, the healing of victims, repentance, forgiveness, and the restoration of peace and hope for all.

Boston College
THOMAS P. BOLAND, JR.


It is one thing to acknowledge that ideas have consequences. It is another thing—and not a very Catholic thing—to hold that ideas all but determine the will. George Weigel, in this neoconservative call-to-arms response to the sexual abuse crisis in the American Catholic Church, avows the former point but in fact adheres to the latter. This idealist mistake skews the book from the start, both leading W. to a formalized analysis of the crisis and undermining his otherwise insightful claim that at the root of the scandal is a failure of fidelity.

For W., abusive priests and malfeasant bishops are certainly culprits in the crisis, but hardly less so are the Catholic intellectuals who constituted
a post-*Humanae vitae* “culture of dissent.” As W. says, “The crisis was caused in no small part by confusions and ambiguities about the truths that make the Church what it is” (44). W.’s causal argument goes like this. Catholic intellectuals’ doubt about the universal truth of aspects of Catholic teaching on sexual morality engendered a climate of skepticism and self-deception in rectories, seminaries, and chanceries. This climate not only engendered an intellectual dispute; it also affected belief and morality. Indeed, the climate of questioning church teaching wrenched fidelity (which for W. is akin to faith) away from “its true, ecclesial meaning” (67). Moreover, gathering self-deception eventually dulled enough consciences that abusive priests felt no hindrance to act, and bishops failed to hold abusers accountable.

Not infrequently, W. wields a welcome, common sense spirit of accountability. In his central argument about a culture of dissent, however, he falters. Clearly, his argument depends on a number of controversial assumptions. One pertains to the more or less straight line that he draws between the nuanced proportionalist criticism of a document like *Humanae vitae*, the onset of ethical relativism in Church and culture, and the occurrence of sexual abuse. This linkage is not only a manifestly inaccurate charge to lay at the feet of many fine and holy thinkers; it is also a charge that can stick only in an idealist world. W. wrongly attributes controlling power to ideas, concepts, truth, form. Allegedly bad ideas like the proportionalists’ are the sufficient cause of the abuse mess. The way out of the crisis is at root to think rightly: To believe with “sufficient life-transforming power . . . [in] the truth of what the Catholic Church teaches” (96). In all of W.’s formulations—whether of cause or cure—there is almost no distinct and positive role for will, freedom, love, the good. For W., these realities are more or less functions of the intellect. And other problems follow from this preference for formality. One is that W. renders sexual abuse itself more as a sin against truth than as a violation of justice. Another is that, oddly, abused men and women play almost no role in the book. It is as if the abstraction of truth more than the reality of persons was violated in the scandal.

For W., fidelity is the virtue that apprehends the universal truth of church teaching and recognizes the identity of that truth with Christ. This perspective of faith is the strongest aspect of the book. Nonetheless, it is instructive to consider more closely what W. means by fidelity. The Catholic philosopher Gabriel Marcel, in his essay “On the Ontological Mystery,” cautioned against understanding fidelity in a formal sense as meaning merely the recognition of a permanent law or principle. Rather, he said, fidelity “refers invariably to a presence, or to something which can be maintained within us and before us as a presence, but which, *ipso facto*, can be just as well ignored, forgotten, and obliterated.” W. would likely say that his notion of fidelity combines recognition of truth, law, and Christ’s presence. But in fact presence—divine, incarnate, or human—plays a minimal role in the book. And it is only by attention to the existential and ontological implications of such presence that the central Christian reality of the
abuse crisis comes into view—to wit, the many boys and girls who were abused and as such "ignored, forgotten, and obliterated." Moreover, for Marcel, fidelity is inherently creative because of its attentiveness to presence. To say this is not, of course, to justify this or that specific change in the Church in response to the abuse crisis. But it challenges W.'s view of fidelity as inherently preservative. And it is a more hopeful reminder than W. can muster that the perspective of faith points to unforeseen possibilities for personal and ecclesial renewal amid the wreckage of the last years. We should expect no less from the God who makes all things new.

Santa Clara University, Calif. David E. DeCosse


Given the human record of making and breaking images, one can be forgiven for supposing that humans feel ambivalent toward images. The essays collected here prove that supposition false. We humans take images very seriously indeed—why bother breaking something that does not matter?

Iconoclash—a combination academic collection and catalogue for an exhibit at the Center for New Art and Media, Karlsruhe, Germany—carefully and successfully addresses the tension in human affairs introduced by images. Almost every culture destroys images—the better known clashes in the West range from the eponymous iconoclasts of the eighth century, to the Protestant Reformers in the 16th, to the Taliban in our own day. While Iconoclash addresses the breaking, its focus rests on the images.

Each of the 15 sections of this massive and richly illustrated volume follows a similar structure, with a long situating essay (historical or philosophical in nature) accompanied by shorter commentaries on events or works of art. Because the works of art are "recovered," that is, rescued or shown damaged or reproduced or repaired, the commentaries serve an educational purpose, explaining particular works and the circumstances of their creation, destruction, and rehabilitation.

As a whole, the collection provides a comprehensive history of image breaking, a phenomenon that appears across the world on a regular basis, spurred on by religious, political, and even artistic motivations. The history surprises at times. Most of us know something about the religious image breaking in Europe; fewer, about attacks on political images; perhaps fewer still, about attacks on Buddhist art in China or on the mosques in Mali. Some groups—the Melanesians of New Ireland, for example—create art works specifically in order to destroy them; others—the Baga of Guinea, under the influence of Islam—have destroyed one set of ritual objects only
to recreate them in other contexts. We return to more familiar ground with the Dadaists, whose rejection of past art led them to destroy it in the creation of something new.

The more philosophical essays, which certainly repay those who come to them from the perspective of theology and culture, investigate the nature of images, the human penchant to represent the world, the inherent falsity of images, and the resulting discomfort with the limitations of images. Though rooted in art, such questions cut across human experience, as the example of the epistemological struggle over visualization in science shows. This debate echoes in many ways the same struggle over representation in religion. *Iconoclasm* makes the debate even more relevant by extending it from three-dimensional objects to photography, film, and even music. While “iconoclasm” primarily applies analogically in these areas, the underlying concern for the status of symbolic meaning remains constant.

The book’s section headings provide a sense of the theoretical issues it addresses: What is iconoclasm? Why do images trigger so much furor? Why are images so ambiguous? Why do gods object to images? The unbearable image. The unbearable sound. The unbearable movement. How can an image represent anything? Why is destruction necessary for construction? Are there limits to iconoclasm? Can the gods cohabitate? But there is no image anymore anyway! Can we go beyond the image wars? Has critique ended? What has happened to modern art?

All of these topics raise vitally important questions for us who live in an image culture and especially for us who have a concern for religious and theological investigation. We would do well to follow the contributors to *Iconoclasm* in reflecting on the power of images, on the comfort they bring to us, and on their intimate role in religious practice. Even more, we would benefit from thinking more explicitly about a largely unconscious or implicit aspect of iconoclasm: the recognition that the form of expression (the image, for example) affects the content of that expression.

Having provided a wonderful stimulus for thought, *Iconoclasm*, though it does not address this topic, invites one final reflection: How do we negotiate the transition from representation by images to representation in language?

*Santa Clara University, Calif.*

**Paul A. Soukup, S.J.**


This book is a weighty companion to Edmund Husserl’s *Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy. First Book: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology (Ideas I)* (German original, 1913). If Husserl is the “father of phenomenology,” then *Ideas I* represents his principal, initial endeavor to forge the foundations of that
discipline. As Brainard remarks: “Ideas I is not only the first full-fledged (published) work of transcendental phenomenology, but the only one in which Husserl lays out his whole system” (29). B. effectively produces a detailed road map for those who want to navigate the dense and profound terrain of Ideas I.

Throughout his text, B. quotes from Husserl extensively but does not attempt to interpret him. Wading through Husserl’s argument as it goes forward, one is reminded of the precision and depth of his thought. B.’s work brings to light the genius of Husserl’s rigorous method and his acute theoretical distinctions, such as that between the full noema, “the complex of noematic moments,” and the noematic core, “a singular, identical moment” of the noema (138). Similarly acute is his distinction between the noetic core, the ray of regard emanating from the pure ego, and the full noesis, “the full range of that ray’s ideal possibilities of movement” (139).

What Husserl means by belief is “not primarily religious belief, not faith, but one more fundamental than such belief.” The neutralization of belief “is not equivalent to unbelief . . . [it] is not negation, but annihilation, ex-punction” (31). Husserl’s principle of all principles posits a fundamental givenness of the world grasped by intuition (54). There are various patterns and differentiations of consciousness which Husserl calls attitudes. Most common is the natural attitude. In Lonergan’s terms, one could say that the natural attitude comprises the world mediated by meaning as the world of common sense. In the natural attitude the “world” is what is believed: “The thesis is the posit of or belief in the existence of the world (Weltglaube)” (60). The use of epoché enables one to “neutralize” the world: “it is our belief in the existence of the world that is annihilated insofar as it is neutralized” (69). Whether or not one accepts Husserl’s epistemological presuppositions or phenomenological method, B. reminds us that his endeavors must be understood in the context of trying to negotiate two philosophical extremes: the Scylla of dogmatism (empiricist naturalism) and the Charybdis of scepticism (49–50).

Subsequent developments in phenomenology (e.g., Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty) have diverged from Husserl’s position. Many of his students were suspicious of the emphasis he placed on epoché and transcendental reduction (221). The rift between Husserl and subsequent phenomenologists widened to such an extent that Husserl eventually wrote, “I am quite alone,” his dream of a “community of investigators” unrealized (221). Hence, B. views his own task as not just to render Husserl’s philosophic position accurately but more broadly to “rescue Husserlian thought from oblivion” (225). From the very outset, Husserl’s thought has been threatened with extinction. One recalls the dramatic rescue of Husserl’s archives from Nazi Germany by the Belgian scholar and Franciscan priest, Herman van Breda. Although the latter’s historic rescue may be unrelated to the threat of oblivion to which B. refers, one wonders why Husserl’s influence is continually overlooked, ignored, or threatened with oblivion? Is it because he challenged the philosophical community to observe a “radical honesty” (221), to “describe faithfully what is given just as it is given”
(138)? Or is it because Husserl defies what Michael Polanyi describes as
the doctrine of doubt and goes against the scepticism of his day? Even
today, in a context of postmodern approaches that deconstruct truth, any-
one attempting to articulate a ground for truth encounters similar resis-
tance. Even if one disagrees with Husserl, he is to be applauded for his
courage and innovation. Those subsequent phenomenologists who eschew
his thought simply bite the hand that feeds them.

Finally, the suspicious attitude towards phenomenological epoché carries
over into theological reflection. Hans Urs von Balthasar warned against its
use in theology (as it is invoked by the phenomenologist of religion, Gerard-
dus van der Leeuw) because he feared that the suspension of belief would
lead to its eclipse. However, perhaps one can view the development of
epoché as Husserl’s attempt to achieve what Lonergan describes as a me-
diated return to immediacy. For Lonergan, this refers, in one of its forms, to
the experience of the mystic whose context of prayer and/or meditation can
mediate an encounter with the transcendent. In this way, Husserl’s epoché
could make a significant contribution to a mystical theology. Such appli-
cations of Husserlian thought in theology might contribute further to res-
cuing his ideas from oblivion.

Regis College, Toronto

JOHN D. DADOSKY

ALTRUISM AND ALTRUISTIC LOVE: SCIENCE, PHILOSOPHY, AND RELIGION IN
DIALOGUE. Edited by Stephen G. Post, Lynn G. Underwood, Jeffrey P.
xvi + 500. $65.

This comprehensive and important volume originated in a conference on
“Empathy, Altruism, and Agape: Perspectives on Love in Science and
Religion” in October 1999. The volume gathers important contributions
from a wide spectrum of disciplines—evolutionary biology, sociobiology,
sociology, psychology, philosophy, and theology. The result is a wide-
ranging and thorough-going exploration of the rich complexities of altrui-
sm. The volume is well organized with introductory and concluding edito-
torial statements for each of five sections: definitional issues, psychological
and motivational problems, evolutionary biology, neurobiological aspects
and the question of altruistic behaviors among animals, and finally religious
considerations. The discussions are comprehensive, and if they fall short of
drawing definite conclusions, it is because of the complexity and relative
uncertainty of the issues rather than for any lack of effort or interest. As a
stimulus to further research, the volume includes an extensive annotated
research bibliography of nearly 90 close-printed pages.

There is little disagreement among the contributors that altruism is a
good thing, that it is worthy of a good deal more study, and that it should
be fostered and encouraged in whatever way possible. As the editors note,
“An altruist intends and acts for the other’s sake as an end in itself rather
than as a means to public recognition or internal well-being, although such
benefits to self need not be resisted” (3). This definition opens more doors
than it closes. One primary problem is that of “tribal altruism”—the good
I do to my friends and neighbors may not be good to outsiders or strangers.
The dynamics of group adherence and antipathy—ingroup vs. outgroup—
has worked its mischief throughout human history and still does.

From the point of view of evolutionary biology, the role of altruistic
attitudes and behaviors in advancing survival and reproductive fitness is
generally accepted and supported by biological studies. The discussion
becomes entangled in another paradox, namely, that such evolutionarily
suitable behavior may have nothing to do with attitudes of benevolence or
intentionality to help another. There is a gap, therefore, between biologi-
cally based observations and philosophically based conclusions drawn from
the human experience of altruistic affects and actions. One of the tensions—
unresolved, as far as I can see—affecting even the definitional starting
point of the discussion, is that different disciplines are operating with dif-
ferent evidential frameworks and different perspectives on what is altruism
and what is not.

Of special interest to philosophers and theologians are the discussions of
the relation of altruistic love to Christian agape. The argument encom-
passes elements of psychological altruism, psychological egoism, and he-
donism. The debate hinges on whether humans have authentic altruistic
motivation that is autonomously functioning in its own right and not as a
defense against or transformation of basically egoistic or hedonistic under-
pinnings. A further question has to do with the issue of whether altruism is
sufficiently accounted for by altruistic intentions, or whether altruistic ac-
tions are necessarily involved. Elliott Sober’s chapter valiantly attempts to
sort out these issues. I would also call attention to Stephen Pope’s reflec-
tion on the relation of agape to altruism. It would seem to be naïve or
simplistic to think that humans would be blessed only with altruistic mo-
tives without a goodly admixture of egoistic components. The problem
persists as to whether egoistic concerns are or need be opposed to altruistic
motives, and correspondingly whether agape as traditionally conceived
necessarily transcends or operates independently from self-interest.

One of the disappointments for me was the omission of any consider-
ation of a psychoanalytic perspective. The analytic discussions of the ten-
sions and integrations between narcissism (which provides the substratum
for egoism and self-interest) and object love (as potentially related to
altruism) embrace the scope and complexity of the issues addressed in this
volume. For example, Freud’s objections to the love commandment (“Love
your neighbors as yourself”) touch on many of the same conflictual issues
and uncertainties found in the present pages (see his Group Psychology
and the Analysis of the Ego, 1922, and Civilization and Its Discontents,
1930). Additional questions can be addressed to the problem of the con-
nection between agape and altruism, questions that reflect the definitional
gap noted previously: Can an action be altruistic without involving love,
even agape? Can altruistic actions be motivated by other sources of moti-
vation than love? Can the resuer who saves another’s life out of a sense of duty be said to be acting out of love or not? Is the action altruistic or not?

This comprehensive overview of current research and thinking about altruism as a vital ethical concern in human affairs is must reading and valuable source material for serious students of these problems.

Boston College

W. W. MEISSNER, S.J., M.D.


The title, Man Made God, has an obvious ambiguity. Does it mean that man has been made God or that man has made God? The French title, L’Homme-Dieu (1996), once the reader knows that the book is not in the realm of Christology, suggests that we read it primarily in the first way. The subtitle, The Meaning of Life, presented as an equation in French with ou le sens de la vie, tells us that understanding how man has been made God will also reveal the significance of our lives. Luc Ferry was a professor of philosophy at the Sorbonne and at the University of Caen when the French original appeared, and he has been a controversial Minister of Youth, National Education, and Research in the French government during the time between the publication of the English translation and the writing of this review. The book has, then, a public significance rare for a work of philosophy, and the style of writing makes it clear that F. intended the book to reach and affect a wide audience.

F. opens with a discussion of the problem of meaning and of giving life meaning. His way of addressing the problem actually works better in French than in English. He sets up a dialogue in which we ask, What does that mean? Or in French, Qu’est-ce que ça veut dire? What does it wish to say? It is a question that can only be formulated in terms of an asker, a point of reference, and an intender and that consequently can be intelligible only in human terms. If life is to have meaning, people must find it so, and they must be able to give it a point of reference. Consequently, it cannot be imposed by authority from the outside or in terms of something in itself unintelligible to us. F. then rules out any divinely revealed and authoritatively mandated schema of meaning. He rules it out as much by sociological as by philosophical analysis: that is, he appeals as much to reigning attitudes as to a consideration of the problem of meaning itself. Similarly, he judges that the old utopian schemes of liberalism, communism, and fascism have lost their appeal for us. We thus live in a secular world that appears disenchanted.

Many thinkers have worried that the fading of traditional religion and of this-worldly eschatology may mean the decline of ethical and civic commitment in contemporary society. F. enters into this worry, but he is con-
vinced that our age presents us also with the possibility of grounding moral seriousness in new ways. Along with the “humanization of the divine” has come a significant “divinization of the human.” People do, in fact, have values, values that center around the sacredness of human beings. This sense of sacredness comes out in the willingness to work for the welfare of others and in the admiration of those who do such work. What justifies us in speaking of the sacred is that people will make sacrifices, even ultimate sacrifices, for other people. Although F. acknowledges the ambiguities in modern philanthropy, he cites groups like Doctors without Borders and the respect they command as evidence for this new sense of the sacred. These activities are extragovernmental, and the realities that move people most readily are personal and familial. Perhaps, though, politics can have its own re-enchantment if the values of friendship and of intimacy carry over to a concern for universal justice.

At several points in the book, John Paul II and his encyclical Veritatis splendor (1993) serve to illustrate the appeal to authority and to supernatural transcendence. My sense is that F. has only a superficial knowledge of the pope as either a philosopher or theologian. Surely John Paul II would dispute the way secularism becomes our taken-for-granted condition on the level of both sociology and philosophy, but he would just as surely accept that even revealed religion can have a moral purchase on us only through an appeal to intelligence and conscience. So psychologically heteronomy requires autonomy. It would be a mistake, however, to think that F. is mainly arguing against John Paul II or any other religious figure. A knowledge of his role in French society and of his other writings makes it evident that this book is really an argument with philosophers and other thinkers who deny that there can be discourse in terms of goods we do not “just make up.” It is an argument against subjectivism, relativism, and nihilism. F. and John Paul II turn out, on investigation, to be allies.

La Salle University, Philadelphia  
MICHAEL J. KERLIN


Walter Ong, S.J., has been one of the most significant American intellectuals to address the challenges and opportunities posed by the revolutions in education and communication of our times. He typically suggests ways to get beyond the shock or obstacles posed by cultural change by recasting what we know about our imagined past.

O. reached his 90th birthday last November; he remains Emeritus Professor of Humanities at St. Louis University, which has been his academic home since the 1940s. His scholarly fame rests chiefly upon his work on Peter Ramus, the 16th-century French philosopher and logician. O. showed how Ramus’s shift from an oral to a visual bias mediated the transition
from early medieval to Renaissance sensibilities. But that is only one strand of a complex tapestry of historical, cultural, and linguistic elements; and the fun of reading O. is following his urbane account of the complexity lying beneath so many areas of the humanities that we thought we understood.

O.’s lifelong fascination has been with the oral-aural matrix for language, literature, and culture. He stresses the complementarity of Hebrew ideas of knowing (that lead us to say, “I hear you”) and Greek ideas (that lead us to say, “I see”). Most medieval learning was done in an oral-aural context. Even the writings of the 12th- and 13th-century Scholastics were records of oral disputations. Then Ramus’s tables of dichotomies pushed learning toward spatial analogies, “placing” knowledge in “locations” on charts. The technology of printing reinforced this late-medieval shift from the audible to the visual, from dialectic as an interplay of personalities to reading/writing as an activity carried on in the privacy of one’s own head.

“At the end of this shift, by the eighteenth century, God will become in the minds of many curiously mute, and by that fact depersonalized, a mere mechanic, a celestial architect, a mason, whose laws concern not the human consciousness but the ranging of objects in space” (234).

As O. shows us, very few “Scholastics” were theologians. “All in all, perhaps three fourths of the scholasticism of the Middle Ages and Renaissance was studied in the arts faculty . . . [and] was almost entirely logic and physics” (211). “We think of the Renaissance as a revolution, but our first-hand knowledge of what the revolution took place against is close to zero and has been since the Renaissance itself” (213).

O. insists upon the symbolic depth of words. Words and thoughts are not the same. Yet thought is impossible without some kind of verbal context. “How can I tell what I mean until I hear what I say?” (375) Thoughts formulate themselves in words and come to utterance in language. And, of course, languages are all in the sound. “Sound shows us that something is going on . . . power is being used” (377), as in the Hebrew word “Dabar” which signifies God’s word, but also God’s action of breaking into history. But silence is part of our speech as well. “Often a silence after an utterance is where we achieve understanding of the words that went before it. . . . Our memory, in its depths, works in silence” (379). Speech is a transaction between sound and silence.

The 28 chapters of this reader, taken from periodicals or proceedings of learned societies, parallel the major works of O.’s career. He stresses often, as do editors Farrell and Soukup, the theme of the reader’s subtitle, “Challenges for Further Inquiry.” Some principal themes are these: the writer’s audience as a “fiction,” the place of outsiders inside society, the “agonistic” base of abstract scientific thought, and the impact on literacy of technological developments. O.’s great contribution is his ability to evoke and explain the oral mindset that underlies the cultural layers of writing, printing, electronic data processing, and televisual media, and that still continues as an “oral residue” in the midst of our present cultural productions. He is convinced that speech makes us human, and he never tires of showing how that oral-aural matrix is a clue to a deeper humanity.
O.’s scholarly standing is historic. In 1972, he was elected to the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. In 1978, he was elected president of the Modern Language Association, the largest professional association of scholars in the world. He has held distinguished lectureships at Yale, Cornell, and the University of Toronto. This reader is a worthy tribute to his lavishly rich career and a port of entry for those unfamiliar with his scholarship.

Aquinas Institute of Theology, St. Louis

PAUL PHILIBERT, O.P.
SHORTER NOTICES


To read this book on Adam and Eve is nothing short of an adventure into intricate interpretations of Genesis. Many of these interpretations, which over the centuries were woven from gaps within the Bible story, have become unknown to modern readers. Anderson, a biblical scholar, has condensed considerable material on Adam and Eve from Apocryphal, Rabbinic, and Christian sources as well as from poetry, art, and iconography. By retrieving myriad readings of Genesis 2–3, the book significantly broadens the horizons of contemporary interpretations of the creation story. Perhaps some readers would prefer a number of these legends to remain hidden or even relegated to the dustbins of history. But the range of interpretations is impressive.

The methodology digresses significantly from more typical exegetical approaches. At the outset A. clearly explains his key principle of interpretation as identifying the end of a story (the telos) in the very beginning (8–13). This principle allows him to scan the centuries to bring texts, interpretations, and different media together. For Jews, Adam and Eve are understood in the light of the Torah and the Promised Land. For Christians, Adam and Eve are seen in the light of Christ and Mary. Only by viewing the beginnings in the light of the end may significant nuances of the original story make sense to readers.

Various interpretations of Genesis 2–3 arose precisely to fill in the gaps in the biblical narrative itself. The creation story is irritatingly short for constructing a cohesive narrative of creation. A. focuses on the stories that arose from the very gaps in the text. At times Rabbinic and Christian interpretations are surprisingly similar, and at other times they are expectedly different. In response to each gap, A. traverses the positions of the rabbis and several Church Fathers, notably Ephrem and Augustine. Significant references are made to Michelangelo’s frescoes, to iconography, and to Milton’s Paradise Lost. One aspect that remains unfinished in the book is theological assessment of the various interpretations that have been paraded before our imagination. The book concludes with several helpful appendices, including a glossary, an annotated translation of Genesis 2–3, and two Apocryphal texts, Life of Adam and Eve and Gospel of Nicodemus.

MICHAEL KOLARCIK, S.J.
Regis College, Toronto


Satoko Yamaguchi presents “a feminist re-visioning of Martha and Mary in the Johannine gospel from a Japanese feminist perspective” (1). Much of the book aims to shape in the reader a historical imagination more inclusive of the social world of Christian origins, and it does so admirably. Part 1 (chaps.
Part 1 (chaps. 1–7) surveys the daily lives of Jewish women and men in the first century; deities and religious leadership in the Greco-Roman world; prophecy and "I Am" revelation; healing and sign-working; story-telling and tradition-making; persecution and patriarchalization.

Part 2 (chaps. 8–10) seeks to enable readers to hear the story of Mary and Martha in John 11:1–2:8 “with new ears.” To that end, Y. analyzes the story and its characters (chap. 8), then the text’s construction of ethnicity, class, and gender (chap. 9). Jesus is presented as the nonpatriarchal messiah (so-designated by women), who sits at a table where a woman presides, and who later follows a woman’s service model of discipleship. Mary and Martha play leading roles in making faith confessions and in modeling discipleship, roles not assigned to male characters. The portrayal of women is not entirely unproblematic for women, however, as Y. also detects a tendency to downplay their prophetic and ministerial leadership. The final chapter moves from the story to the community that told the story. Y. concludes, “the Johannine communities practiced . . . kyriocentric egalitarianism. That is, placing Jesus at the center, they created alternative communities of equals” (139).

Because much of the material in part 1 will be familiar to those following or working in feminist biblical interpretation, some will perhaps be disappointed that far less space is devoted to Mary and Martha (chaps. 8–9). Nevertheless, this book, informed by a wealth of recent feminist scholarship and unencumbered by its more technical and theoretical aspects (for some perhaps, its weakness), can be recommended as a highly readable and accessible introduction to feminist biblical interpretation and to women in the world of Jesus. It will likely fulfill Y.’s hope “to encourage women of all colors . . . to become familiar with the results of feminist scholarship” (1). The substantial bibliography Y. provides will serve them well.

SUSAN A. CALEF
Creighton University, Omaha

This expanded version of Malina’s 1999 Rauschenbusch Lectures invites readers to see Jesus’ proclamation of the kingdom of God in a “new, refreshing, and unconventional way” (xi). M. notes that access to the social world of the New Testament world is blocked by “widespread belief that Jesus and his program were about religion” (10), not realizing that religion in the New Testament era “was embedded in politics and kinship, as was economics” (11).

Chapter 1, “Why Proclaim the Kingdom of God?” grounds five other chapters, locating Jesus within the Roman Empire where power “shared by local elites made cruelty and extortion part of daily living” (34). For “the nonelite people of Israel” betrayal by aristocratic families meant a collapse of the political economy that could only be rescued by “divine patronage” (35).

Subsequent chapters address violence in the Mediterranean world (“The best analogy for imagining the macrosystem called the Roman Empire is the social institution prevailing in southern Italy . . . ‘organized crime’” [29]) and explore the social world and political economy to understand the “self-denying followers” of Jesus and the social gospel (“Jesus organized his group because he was not satisfied with the social situation” [148–149]).

M.’s work is demanding for those unfamiliar with the social sciences. There are tables contrasting types of society (ruralized, rural, urban depot, etc. [20–22]); models of violence and vigilantism (44); political-social interaction (77–78); embedded economics and religion (89); models of self distinguishing collectivist and individualist cultures (130) and group formation (Jesus, Jesus-Messiah, Messianic-Jesus and Resurrected-Jesus groups [157–158]).

M. situates biblical texts in their own world, drawing attention to social dimensions overlooked by some exegetes. However, social science reconstructions
would benefit from being juxtaposed with other views of Galilee in the first century—such as archeological evidence confirming the Jewishness of Galilee against claims of its hellenization or evidence discounting the degree of absentee landlords and extent of over-taxation.

TERRANCE PRENDERGAST, S.J.
Archdiocese of Halifax,
Halifax, Nova Scotia


Planned as a revision of the author’s published doctoral dissertation, The Origin of Paul’s Gospel (1984), this book rather became a sequel to it, due to the amount of new material that had to be added. Hence, the book’s subtitle and the inclusion of five new essays (chaps. 1–5). The remaining three chapters are reprints of earlier published essays. Kim changed the project to address several developments in Pauline studies, notably the rise of the New Perspective School of interpreting Paul.

Among the first six chapters, three directly engage the New Perspective School (chaps. 1, 2, 4). Three do so indirectly (chaps. 3, 6, 7). It should be noted that, whereas K. uses the term New Perspective to refer to scholars who follow E. P. Sanders’s view of Second Temple Judaism as a covenantal nomism, the approaches of New Perspective interpreters should not be reduced simply to that one aspect of the New Perspective viewpoint. Indeed, there are variations of interpretations among the proponents of that approach.

K.’s principal dialogue partner in this venture is James D. G. Dunn, with whom he has serious disagreements over the origin of Paul’s teaching on justification by faith. The disagreements are, naturally, mutual. In K.’s view, Dunn divorces that teaching from its origin in Paul’s Damascus experience and sunders it from its necessary christological moorings. Ostensibly, K.’s purpose is not only to defend himself against Dunn, but also to reassert an understanding of the development of Paul’s teaching on justification that is closer to the traditional Reformation view.

This serious, scholarly response to Dunn and others of the New Perspective School remains an installment in a larger, future conversation. To that end, this book ought not to be viewed as the last word on the subject.

ALAN C. MITCHELL
Georgetown University, Washington


Building on his earlier publications that already centered on the mythical qualities of the New Testament, Burton Mack now offers an overview of Christian origins that attempts to overthrow the prevailing paradigm. His (at times deliberately) provocative book calls attention to social theory as indispensable for biblical and theological analyses. Still, many of the conclusions from his social analysis either rest on unproven hypotheses or are reductionistic.

M. argues that we cannot get back to the historical Jesus and that the earliest New Testament sources already reveal innovative mythmaking. Thus, scholars ought to redescribe Christian origins, not presupposing the usual link to Jesus, but using humanistic social theory to account for New Testament myths as the way communities created themselves. M.’s hypothesis about history in the Gospels will certainly meet resistance from more confident historical Jesus researchers—their disagreements on the history does not prove no history—and those, for instance, who reject claims that Paul (or others) invented Christianity.

Even if one were to grant M.’s claim that we do not get any Jesus of history in the Gospels—a large concession, indeed—there are still problems with his restrictive definition of myth and his reduction of theology to social analysis. For M. myths are only for social con-
struction and legitimation. But why can they not also speak sometimes about transcendent realities as the actual referents? For M. New Testament myths show varied ways and varied stages in which communities redefined themselves out of Judaism and in reaction to the power of the Roman Empire. Faith, miracles, the Resurrection, even the kingdom of God are pressed into the logic of the social interest of early Christian groups, but have no relation to a “real” Jesus. Why cannot distinctive Christian claims be subjected to this capable social analysis without being reduced to it? This subjection would not eliminate M.’s legitimate, though overstated criticism of the legacy of the prevailing view of Christian origins, namely, that it established a Western culture too monolithic and autocratic for the 21st century.

ANTHONY J. TAMBASCO
Georgetown University, Washington


Presented as a sequel to Albert Nolan’s Jesus Before Christianity (1976; rev. 1992), Howard-Brook’s work seeks out the earliest expressions of Christian community (ekklesiа) and presses the reader to reflect on their significance for contemporary life and faith. Its guiding supposition is that the earliest disciple-ship communities and today’s Christians alike are faced with “the effort to remain faithful to the vision of Jesus living in cities amidst the powerful countervailing forces of empire” (11). As a result, H.-B. insists that authentic community (both in the history of Israel and in the early Church) resided in small, localized groups often in conscious reaction to more centralized models of religio-political authority.

Specific chapters discuss the roots of ekklesiа in Israel, Greece, and Rome, prayer and worship, kinship and economic relationships (including the idea of “jubilee”), ministry within the ekklesiа, and mission to the world. A concluding chapter offers for reflection some contemporary opportunities and attempts to give expression to the ideas of ekklesiа sketched in the book. To illustrate the fundamental ideas of community with which the earliest Christian communities were working, H.-B. surveys relevant ideas and terminology from the Hebrew Bible as well as from the New Testament.

H.-B. admits that the texts he examines shed light on both “what the church was and what it should be when it is faithful to its call” (12). If at times the line between the “experience” of the early ekklesiа and its “hope” becomes blurred, and if the distinction is not always clearly presented in the book, this is due more to the vagaries of the source material than to any fault of the author. In fact, H.-B. deals ably and carefully with both the linguistic data and with the cultural, economic, and religious ideas of urban Greco-Roman society. In a few instances, the reader may disagree with this or that exegetical or historical point, but not to any great detriment of the overall presentation. Written for a popular audience, the book will be a helpful, thought-provoking resource for study groups and seminary classrooms.

DANIEL A. SMITH
Tyndale Seminary, Toronto


Like its predecessor in the series, Margaret Gibson’s The Bible in the Latin West (1993), Lesley Smith’s book houses a splendid collection of reproductions and detailed descriptions of seminal manuscript texts in medieval theology—in this instance, nonbiblical texts that represent the miscellany of literary genres with which a Bonaventure or Thomas Aquinas would have been at home reading: the Ordinary Gloss on the Bible (the glossa ordinaria), Augustine’s De doctrina christiana, Victorine
literature, *summae*, condensed Bibles, tools for preachers, and other pastoral material. (A third volume, extending to the 15th century, is planned.) Each text is painstakingly described as to its author, genre, historical context, current and past location of the manuscript (when known), its origin, dating, and physical constitution, and other works to be found in it. S. gives helpful insights to notes and marginalia, and then transcribes the medieval script for a portion of the text, with English translation. The facing page reproduces the manuscript page in black and white (unfortunately not in color, which would have been cost-prohibitive).

S., however, is no mere paleographer and cataloger of medieval theological texts; she is an expert historical theologian of the Middle Ages—as evidenced in her splendid Introduction (1–34), which deftly describes the span of medieval theological literature and the evolving social and ecclesiastical institutions that helped create it. Simply put, while the beautiful crafting of the book and the natural allure of its manuscript reproductions will draw the eye, the highly useful Introduction will catch the mind, especially of teachers. This work is an essential acquisition for serious theological libraries, and a highly recommended resource for teachers of medieval theology, especially for in-class use.

MARK JOHNSON
Marquette University, Milwaukee

Bruce Milem’s study concentrates on just four of Meister Eckhart’s evocative sermons to illustrate that this mystic’s daring ways of expressing himself are thoroughly consistent with the views that he is known to have taken in his formal theological works. Of particular concern is Eckhart’s insistence on the point that the nature of God can never be adequately spoken about in human language.

Paradoxically, the effort to explain this point requires human language, and so the language must be carefully guided by the rules of negative theology. What Eckhart tries to do with the categories and concepts of medieval Scholasticism in his technical treatises, he attempts to explain in his sermons using wordplay and bold imagery. In what seem to be open contradictions, Eckhart insists that God must be seen as both *distinct* from ordinary things (including the soul) and at the same time *indistinct* from them. This juxtaposition of perspectives is often dizzying.

From M.’s careful analysis of these four sermons, one can see both what made Eckhart so frustrating to the authorities and so winning to many an audience. M.’s sympathetic handling of these materials puts a charitable construction on Eckhart’s texts. Knowing God, we learn, involves coming to appreciate our own dependence on God for existing at all and for continuing to exist every moment of our lives. Yet, for Eckhart, this appreciation requires that we shift our concern from achieving eternal salvation to acknowledging our simple and ongoing dependence on God for everything.

In the accumulating literature on Eckhart, this volume is likely to have a lasting place of importance for its clarity of exposition and balanced judgment.

JOSEPH W. KOTERSKI, S.J.
Fordham University, New York

This is the second of a seven-volume work, the first volume of which (*Gnostic Return in Modernity*) was published by SUNY Press in 2001. One could be forgiven for thinking that the author of such an ambitious account of gnostic thought might harbor sympathies for his subject, but O’Regan makes it clear that his overall assessment of gnostic influence on modernity is negative. On the other hand, his approach has to be distinguished from that of someone like
Eric Voegelin, who not only overuses the term *gnostic* but uses it in a purely pejorative way. *Gnostic Apocalypse* focuses on the thought of the 17th-century mystic Jacob Boehme, who exercised a decisive influence on the German Idealist philosophers and their intellectual heirs. Boehme’s influence on Idealism was first and most famously put forward by Ferdinand Christian Baur in his *Die christliche Gnosis* (1835).

O’R. is the modern successor to Baur, seeking to unveil currents of gnosticism within modern thought. Although he follows in Baur’s footsteps, he is not dependent upon Baur’s approach. In fact, he can be seen as “redoing” Baur’s project using a new and bolder approach. He is well aware of the pitfalls involved in defining gnosticism, for it is a much abused term. One of the virtues of this volume and its predecessor is the attention it devotes to the precise, conceptual analysis of “gnosticism.” O’R. invents his own technical vocabulary to lay bare the nature of gnostic thought and how it is woven into the intricacies of Boehme’s mysticism.

O’R.’s use of terminology necessitates a very careful and attentive reading of his text. His prose is difficult. But even when he is sometimes less than clear, there is a quality of exuberance to his writing. This is a magisterial piece of scholarship that pulsates with enthusiasm for its subject matter. All later studies will take O’R.’s work as their point of departure.

GLENN A. MAGEE
Georgia State University, Atlanta


Brandt’s is the most recent of several attempts over the years to make Friedrich Schleiermacher better known to theology and the Church as a Christian theological ethicist. It is overall the best of its class.

Two chapters offer an able overview of Schleiermacher’s career. The sketch aids those with little familiarity with Schleiermacher and his early 19th-century context. It also sets the stage for the expository strategy that distinguishes this introduction from its predecessors: the artful correlation of Schleiermacher’s life-involvements and defining characteristics of his ethical thought.

B. focuses on incidents relating to Schleiermacher’s roles as a Pietist-bred youth coming of age in revolutionary times, university professor, local church pastor, theologian, and activist for social and political reform. The stories illustrate and illumine corresponding features of Schleiermacher’s Christian ethics: its foundational communal piety, its handling of philosophy and theology, its church connectedness, and its thrust toward cultural transformation. Explanation of these features touches on the structure, cardinal concerns, and contents of Schleiermacher’s presentation of Christian moral doctrine (*christliche Sittenlehre*), which is quite aptly termed at once an ecclesial ethics of piety and a theology of culture. The concluding chapter reflects on the Reformed-Church identity of Schleiermacher’s ethics.

B.’s account of Schleiermacher extends rather than redirects main lines of interpretation in specialized studies of recent decades. Particularly evident are the spirit and guidance of Brian Gerish, B.’s *Doktorvater*, who provides a characteristically lapidary preface. These connections enhance the book’s value. B. goes farther than anyone before him in recovering Schleiermacher’s commitment to a transformationist Christian theological ethics from mischaracterizations such as that of H. Richard Niebuhr, who consigned Schleiermacher to the “Christ of culture” category.

This recovery of Schleiermacher’s ethical commitments, long overdue, makes this study of value beyond today’s Schleiermacher circles. It is a valuable resource for studies of the history of theology, ethics, and the Reformed tradition.

JAMES O. DUKE
Brite Divinity School, Fort Worth

Hodder intends to provide a fuller reconstruction and analysis of Thoreau’s religious thought and experience than have been available elsewhere. Previous studies focus on the literary, political, or historical value of Thoreau’s writings. Yet these interpretations, H. contends, are incomplete if we do not recognize the extent to which religious themes and questions dominate Thoreau’s writings. The reason why these themes have been so often overlooked is not that spirituality is peripheral to Thoreau’s concerns, but that previous studies have viewed Thoreau’s writings through the lens of mainstream religious thought.

As a transcendentalist, Thoreau was no friend of organized religion, and much of his work sought to deconstruct the Christianity of his forebears, even its user-friendly Unitarian form. Yet throughout his writings, Thoreau reflected on the nature of ecstasy, which he defined as a decentering experience of forces and values greater than himself. In his earlier writings, these forces were more recognizably theistic, and he tried to see through particular instances of friendship and beauty into deeper-lying reality. As he matured, however, his idealism developed into naturalism, and the nature of his ecstasy became more earthbound. Despite this transition, he consistently drew inspiration from various religions to aid his contemplation, and throughout his writings he maintained a deep sense of ambiguity concerning humanity’s capacity for recognizing the true value and beauty of what surrounds it.

Essentially, H. retells Thoreau’s intellectual biography. As such, his strategy is descriptive, not analytical. There is little analysis, however, of what this perspective on Thoreau offers to wider interpretations of American religious history. Further, while H. demonstrates that religious themes are present in Thoreau’s writings, he does not indicate what these themes mean or evaluate them. Given that Thoreau departs from mainstream religious thought, could it be that he views religion as largely instrumental, as a mere device that can help one get in touch with what is lasting and real? Nonetheless, H. offers a helpful reading of Thoreau that will benefit students of American religious history.

WILLIAM DANAHER
University of the South,
Sewanee, Tenn.


The problematic issue for this book is given in the title. In the interpretation of revelation, Christian or non-Christian, divine authorial intention cannot be determined directly. How can we really know what God intends to communicate? Revelation is here understood as the “text” taken by a religious community as intended by a divinity to bring about acts of understanding in an audience (30). It is thus propositional. But to seek what God means is not to argue that a divinity’s “authorial” intention can be clearly gleaned in an objective way. Still, G. wants to break through the “vicious” hermeneutical circle of some Christian theology, where the act of interpretation presumes what it understands.

G. tries to break the circle by making a distinction between “meaning” interpretations and “relational” interpretations. Meaning interpretations are propositional; they look at discrete words for an author’s intention. As applied to revelation, this search leads to an impasse because the divine author works indirectly through instrumental writers, and so we remain inside the circle. Relational interpretations break the circle by bringing something else into play with the text. But even here there are problems. Literary interpretations are finally inadequate to interpreting revelation because they do not pertain to the phenomena that characterize
revelation; they only describe it. Sociological interpretations can overtake the propositional character of revelation. They can be used, but only along with theological interpretations. "God means what he ought to mean" (134) because the interpretation is not only epistemic (depending on a knowledge of a theology per se) but ontological: theological principles brought into play with the revelatory text unfold what God intends for persons precisely as believers. Revelatory texts thus require theological principles for an adequate interpretation. This way of proceeding creates room for definitive interpretations and a minimum of relativism.

The book is solid, clear, and useful. Yet some readers might find G.'s philosophical construal of theology to be itself a problematic issue. One wonders whether the hermeneutical circle has finally been broken, or whether indeed it can be.

PAUL CROWLEY, S.J.
Weston Jesuit School of Theology, Cambridge, Mass.


Burns tries earnestly to incorporate postmodern concerns and psychological theories into a new Christology. She argues that, while the "intuitions" of the creeds and Christological definitions are correct, their symbolic language needs to be recast in a way that will correlate with human experience.

Jesus is unique, but with qualifications. The universe itself and human beings in particular are "hard-wired" for incarnation, understood as God's "participating in the cognitive and affective lifeworlds of others" (11). While we cannot actually be Jesus any more than we can be Mother Teresa, we can be like Jesus in his essential relation to God and, as a result, experience a kind of deification. B. calls this human-divine relation "participation," but we are far from a Scholastic metaphysics here. Participation involves "entrainment," the synchrony between persons observed in infants as they relate to their environment. Attunement is an intentional matching of emotional states in the interest of communication. These two factors together contribute to sympathy, an experience of the emotions of others as if they were our own. Empathy describes our response to others, which, while passionate, is also marked by a conscious differentiation between persons.

B. applies these markers to the relation between Jesus and God. From the human standpoint, Jesus' relation with God can be described as a kind of entainment. From the divine standpoint, God's empathy is a mode of participation in the human. In Jesus, both modes of participation, divine and human, are at work in Jesus' "asymptotic longing" for God and in God's pathos for him. B. claims support for this approach in the searching Christology of Karl Rahner and in his theology of symbol, described as "up to now little-known" (116). But B.'s reading of Rahner raises questions.

Those looking for a reframing of Chalcedonian faith in a way that maintains the classical understandings of God, nature, and hypostatic union will not find that here. The value of the book lies in its presentation of a type of low Christology that is well-received in many circles today and, for that reason, is worth knowing.

PAUL CROWLEY, S.J.
Weston Jesuit School of Theology, Cambridge, Mass.


In this abbreviated doctoral dissertation, Arguti, influenced by the Italian philosopher Don Italo Mancini (1925–93), attempts to rediscover, in the light of contemporary insights from the philosophy of religion, a certain validity in what has usually come to be described
as the “irrelevant character” (19) of Karl Barth’s stance regarding the function of hermeneutics in the Christian act of faith and in systematic reflection on it.

With this aim, A. adroitly offers data from Barth’s major writings, to show that he rightly eschewed what at present is called “dissociation.” That is, the often irremediable abyss between the symbolic proliferations of a reality and the reality itself to which they correspond: “Despite the rhetoric of opposition which at certain points afflicts Barthian theology, his intention seems to be precisely that of avoiding the error that the testimonial structure of theological knowing, and of knowing in general, be weakened by a form of ‘reference’ which never captures the intended object, since the latter possesses its own indefinable transcendence. In other words, Barth faces the problem of the truth of interpretation” (285). Clearly, A. rereads Barth, just as Mancini had done in such writings as Novecento teologico: Bonhoeffer, Bultmann, Barth (1977), in order to confront modern Christians, perplexed by rival secular ideologies, with his thoroughly paradoxical approach to God.

A. presents a methodologically correct, but decidedly abstract, treatment of Barthian hermeneutics. It adheres to the rigorous logic of Mancini regarding the complex relationship between philosophia and kerygma, while it lacks Barth’s concomitant moral plea that jurisprudence be inextricably bound to moral values. As Barth quipped about the wise theologian who held the Bible in one hand and the newspaper in the other, one could advise that A.’s book should be read along with Mancini’s Diritto e società (1993), which calls on all practitioners of hermeneutics to foster in people “the daily dream of a pacified society.”

PHILIP J. ROSATO, S.J.
Pontifical Gregorian University, Rome


After Jesuit theologian Waldenfels published Faszination des Buddhismus (1982), the now emeritus professor of world religions at the University of Bonn was importuned to write something similar on Christianity. The book under review is an update of his 1994 response to that request. Before addressing the question in his final chapter, W. first places Christianity today within the context of postmodern Western European and North American culture. Being a Christian today, he argues, requires finding one’s place between secularity and competing world religions, between fundamentalism and syncretism.

W.’s references are all German, but he has a sure command of the global religious landscape. He does not treat inner-Christian, ecumenical issues but writes rather from the perspective of a Europe newly dotted by mosques. If Descartes’s subjective cogito marked modernity, the challenge of postmodernity is to acknowledge differences honestly and respect the “Other” as an equal partner in dialogue. W. devotes whole chapters to Judaism, Islam, and the Asian religions, and is especially insightful on the implications of Islam’s absolute claims as “God’s final word” vis-à-vis similar claims raised by Christianity. He argues against labeling such claims “fundamentalist,” a term he dismisses as inherently polemical. He finds holding on to fundamentals preferable to an “anything goes” syncretism.

Within this pluralistic landscape, what makes Christianity (or better, being a Christian) fascinating is the person of Jesus and his revelation of a Deus semper minor in solidarity with humanity. W. calls Christians to let the Jesus “story” (not ideas) guide their lives and address the Other as Jesus did, with respect for differences and a sense of a common humanity.

The only serious failing of this little book is its lack of an index. W. writes on issues that are decidedly pertinent. He has been translated into Italian, Polish, and Czech. He deserves an English translator and readership as well.

RONALD MODRAS
Saint Louis University

Paul Knitter has written this volume for those who consider themselves laity with respect to the subject rather than theologians. He does not, therefore, argue for theological positions but instead presents a clear and concise overview of the extant theologies of religion. Not unlike the way Avery Dulles set out models for understanding ecclesiology, K. sets out four models for understanding the theologies of the world religions.

The volume is divided according to the models with three chapters elaborating each model. The first, the replacement model, outlines ways in which Christ and Christianity are seen as replacements of any other faith. The fulfillment model K. finds in many theologians like Karl Rahner and in conciliar deliberations. Section 3 surveys the mutuality model, placing under its rubric those whose apriori is that we have much to learn from one another. K. sees three bridges over which this dialogue is proceeding: the philosophical-historical, the mystical-prophetic, and the ethical-practical bridge. The fourth model is called the acceptance model, because its tone accepts religious pluralism as a given, and it makes peace with the radical differences that the various religions represent. No model gets off free without some of the questions K. asks them to pursue to prove their adequacy.

There is much to recommend in this even-handed book. It underscores two challenges: (1) to promote and proclaim the uniqueness of Jesus but with a Christology that does not preempt the dialogue with the world’s religions; (2) to pursue a dialogue in which both parties are open to changing. K. is aware that changes will not be met without a deepening of both pneumatology and eschatology. What keeps Christian pneumatology from fantasy and imaginary utopias is the word of God as embodied by Jesus Christ. Finally, the reign of God functions as a freeing heuristic in any dialogue with the world’s religions. In a postscript K. suggests that Christian ecumenism needs to look beyond its own intra-ecclesial dialogues to become more catholicly interreligious. (A complaint about the editing: there is an enormous difference between mediation and meditation.)

JOHN C. HAUGHEY, S.J.
Loyola University, Chicago


Rico has made an important and timely contribution to the issue of religious freedom in general and to the understanding of Vatican II’s Dignitatis humanae (DH) in particular. Without doubt, no future discussion of DH will be complete without taking account of R.’s work. In this well-researched and documented investigation, R. considers DH in three “moments”: the departure from “established Catholicism,” the Church in its struggle with the Communist world, and the contemporary era characterized by the challenges of secularism and relativism. He also explains the declaration in the contexts of various schools of thought within the Church. The most significant contextual examination is R.’s treatment of John Courtney Murray.

The core of R.’s investigation is how DH has been appropriated during the pontificate of John Paul II. R. skillfully traces the Pope’s understanding of this appropriation in the three moments identified earlier in his book. He reminds the reader that John Paul II has experienced the status of the Church in diverse times of persecution and in the exercise of authority. Therefore, the Pope’s interest in and protection of religious freedom must be considered from his personal perspectives as layman, seminarian, priest, bishop, and pope.

R. expends considerable energy in examining the contemporary tension between those who emphasize freedom and those who are most concerned with the search for truth as an objective, transcendent moral order. He tends to suggest that those, including John Paul II, who emphasize the latter could profit
from the contributions of those who emphasize freedom. Dialogue is the necessary vehicle. It is imperative to acknowledge that those who seek God’s truth must be free to do so. R. acknowledges that the Pope is serious about dialogue, but at issue is whether the alliance of secularism and relativism is equally serious about it. The pursuit of freedom that disregards God’s truth leads deeper into the relativism characteristic of contemporary secular culture. R.’s examination is a significant contribution to comprehend better this dilemma of the present day.

ROBERT JOHN ARAUJO, S.J.
Gonzaga University, Spokane


There are a number of fine books on justice available today. This is another, but with several distinctive and appealing features. The first and last chapters provide seven dilemmas of justice that launch and conclude the project. The dilemmas display—intentionally—the experience of middle-class Christians: concern over urban homelessness or complicity in structural injustice are examples. Such acknowledgment of social location is part of Elsbernd’s and Bieringer’s guiding principles, and though it risks analysis that is “too small,” the acknowledgement gives the work a refreshing credibility.

This is a theological analysis of justice from an explicitly Catholic perspective. After the opening dilemmas, E. and B. analyze the experience and theological motivations of 51 “justice practitioners.” Three overview chapters follow: “Justice in the Scriptures,” “Justice in Catholic Social Teaching,” and “Classical Contemporary Theories of Justice.” These have some of the limitations of surveys; teachers may want to supplement them with primary texts. That said, the chapters are valuable and have distinctive features, such as an emphasis on the Gospel of John and an analysis of an interesting array of contemporary theories of justice, such as those of Reinhold Niebuhr, John Rawls, Robert Nozick, Alasdair MacIntyre, and Michael Walzer.

Chapters 6 and 7 are the authors’ constructive proposal about participation as the centerpiece of a theology of justice. The following statement captures well their theological vision of justice: “Because human persons are essentially social, inclusion in the human community and participation are necessary for authentic human living. In other words, engaged membership and active participation are basic requirements of justice.” (166). Weaving together theological themes such as relationality, embodiment, and sacramentality with a fine account of both substantive and procedural aspects of justice, the authors’ proposal, while not altogether new, is attractive and compelling.

The book is well organized, clearly written, and contains ample footnotes. Those looking for a text for graduate students or upper-level undergraduates would do well to consider this fine work.

RUSSELL B. CONNORS, JR.
The College of St. Catherine, St. Paul, Minn.


Those who have only a cursory knowledge of Singer’s work or know him only by reputation will find this book a worthwhile investment. Helga Kuhse has compiled 24 of S.’s essays that illuminate the philosophical roots of his work, and make clear the unity of thought that underlies the diversity of topics he has addressed.

S. is at his best when arguing to expand the scope of moral concern beyond the human race to include all sentient beings. One particularly strong essay (“The Great Ape Project,” co-authored with Paola Cavalieri) marshals evidence of the existence of self-awareness (and thus an ability not only to feel pain but to suffer) in chimpanzees and other animals. S.’s impartialist ethic (developed thoroughly in other es-
says) dictates that we must give equal moral consideration to all beings with a capacity for suffering. To do otherwise is morally akin to racism.

This same logic leads S. to question the moral wisdom of seeking always to preserve the lives of humans who are suffering but lack any capacity for self-awareness (e.g., severely disabled infants). S. argues that moral norms against such killing rely on Christian doctrines of immortality and original sin that “hardly anyone now accepts” (230).

Six essays are devoted to “unsanctifying human life.” Theologians will be disappointed to find that S. largely ignores their work in these pages (only Aquinas, John Noonan, and Paul Ramsey are seriously engaged). This approach yields a philosophically sophisticated monologue, but leaves the reader unconvinced of the demise of the doctrine of the sanctity of human life and wondering how S. might have dealt with theology written within the last 20 years.

Another disappointment lies in the organization of the bibliography. Works are grouped on the basis of the type of publication in which they appeared. This organization frustrates efforts to find other works by S. on a given topic as well as attempts to get a sense of the overall chronological progression of his work. Despite some shortcomings, this volume has many strong essays and provides an excellent overview of S.’s philosophy.

CHRISTOPHER P. VOGT
St. John’s University, Jamaica, N.Y.


This manual does what its preface describes as its aim: it provides a “handy reference” for members of ethics committees working in Catholic health facilities. However, it presents one but certainly not the only legitimate Catholic perspective on the issues addressed. Its overall approach clearly reflects a traditional Catholic natural law methodology. Thus, many of the contributing authors argue the correctness of their positions on some rather controversial issues by claiming that their conclusions are self-evidently reasonable. Unfortunately, they do not address the source of the controversy, which is, of course, that many credible Catholic theologians and clinical experts alike find the authors’ conclusions unreasonable and, in some cases, bad medicine.

There is a mistaken assumption voiced by Cataldo early in the text that would and should cause consternation among many people who serve on ethics committees in Catholic facilities. The assumption is this: “A Catholic health care ethics committee is, among other things, responsible for moral decisions made about patient care” (chap. 2, p. 4). While ethics committees have a vital and important role to play in establishing the ethical parameters and environment within which care is rendered, they are not responsible for the actual decisions made. But the assumption seems to serve the overall objectives of this manual quite well. Among those objectives is a clear desire to return to an approach to moral decision-making that relies heavily on norms and principles arrived at deductively and eschews a more inductive experiential and historically sensitive approach.

This manual should indeed be available to ethics committee members and others working in Catholic health care. But it should be one resource among many, if committee members are to be able to engage effectively in dialogue and discernment about the many and complex ethical issues that arise in health care today.

JEAN DEBLOIS, C.S.J.
Aquinas Institute of Theology, St. Louis


Drawing on renewed interest in the use of Scripture in worship, Power pro-
poses helpful perspectives implied in what it means to hear the word of the Lord. P. attempts to further “our understanding of how scriptural texts are chosen, proclaimed, interpreted, and received” (vii) in a liturgical setting.

With several examples, P. reminds us how taking a section from the Bible for use in liturgy introduces additional levels of meaning as one reading relates to the other readings of the day and to the life of the church community that receives the word. Attending to these elaborations of meaning helps homilists fulfill their task of interpretation.

P. then describes what he calls “the life of a text.” Tracing the use of a text through the centuries, he concludes that “it has to be said that no text of the Judeo-Christian tradition can be called sacred in the sense that it has a once-and-for-all determined meaning” (45). So much would depend on where, when, and how it is used. P.’s examples help clarify this principle of interpretation.

Not that a given text in a liturgical setting could not be misused. “There are a number of . . . examples of how ethical validation calls the liturgical proclamation of certain texts into question. Homophobia is fostered by the public reading of some passages about sexual morality. The proclamation of the household codes in some of the New Testament letters usually serves to enhance the subjection of women in societies dominated by patriarchal symbolism” (69). Alertness to the ethical consequences of a text’s use can provide the necessary corrective.

In the final section of the book, P. reflects on how Scripture carries over into liturgical prayer. The relationship of what he calls the “root metaphors” of Scripture to the present experience of the worshipping community assures the proper formation of that community praying with and through the word of the Lord.

J. Leo Klein, S.J.
Xavier University, Cincinnati


A first version of this book (Les Mains vides) appeared in 1972 as a summary of de Meester’s Dynamique de la confiance (1969) (The Thrust of Assurance) which was issued originally in Dutch and French and translated into English, Spanish, Japanese, Italian, Indonesian, Croatian, Korean, and Swedish. This new edition has been revised and amplified in the light of recent research on Thérèse, including publication of the critical edition of The Complete Works of Thérèse of Lisieux (1992).

D., a Belgian Discalced Carmelite, has written a book that crystallizes the fruit of a lifetime of study and reflection on the works of Thérèse of Lisieux, saint and doctor of the Church. The book is organized chronologically, following the development of Thérèse’s spirituality throughout her life. A major motif is her movement from the desire and effort to become a saint to the realization that surrender to God’s mercy was to be at the center of her “little way.” The text reads like a loving, poetic meditation on the major themes and metaphors used by this 19th-century French Carmelite—abandonment, mission, fidelity, illness and suffering, sand and desert, elevator, the “face” of God. D. adds his own metaphors—empty hands, bridge, flight into space, and climbing from summit to summit—to illumine the heart of Thérèse’s spiritual life.

D. is especially attentive to the theological and psychological aspects of Thérèse’s work, responding to criticisms with openness and care. He highlights Thérèse’s focus on God as merciful Father; on Christ as constant companion and spouse; on the human person as little child; and on the virtues of poverty, humility, trust, love, hope, and faith. Recommended for persons seeking to learn about Thérèse’s spirituality from someone who obviously knows, loves, and respects her life and is eminently qualified to communicate the wisdom of this “little way.”

Elizabeth A. Dreyer
Fairfield University, Conn.

This conversation with journalist Peter Seewald is a sequel to their previous best-selling book, Salt of the Earth (1997). Because of that interview, Seewald returned to the Church. The present book addresses typical questions of our age concerning Catholic Christian faith. Ratzinger responds more as a knowledgeable and sensitive pastor than as a technical theologian.

R. begins with faith. Can one believe that the infinite God could become a small human being? Many Asian theologians say that God is far too inclusive to be incarnated in single human; we must be more humble than to think that. R. admits the rationality of this claim, but goes on to say that it would be prideful to forbid God the freedom to show love precisely by becoming human. Christian faith believes just such an impossible love. Similarly, new age believers say faith has to be grounded in personal experience. Yes, R. replies, but what warrants that my experience accurately portrays God, since experience comes and goes and is limited by my smallness?

With a similar approach of recognizing a difficulty, then raising the perspective of faith, R. considers questions about God, creation, evil, the Old and New Testaments, Jesus and redemption, Mary, the Church, the sacraments, and the future. R. does not address these questions in technical detail as he does in his theological papers. But for one actively struggling with these questions, he opens enlightening perspectives. He speaks not just as a theologian, but as a man of faith drawing the seeker into a spiritual journey and resolving perplexing issues along the way.

The book is for seekers and for those who teach them. It is not merely for reading, but for pondering. It offers not just answers, but an invitation to mystery.

ROBERT T. SEARS, S.J.
Loyola University, Chicago


I read this book about a postmodern Christian ethics of preaching during the first week of the March 2003 invasion of Iraq—when an estimated 47 percent of American Christians were not hearing homiletic reflection on the war from their churches’ pulpits. I was sympathetic to McClure’s call for a “commitment to exiting the biblical, theological, social, experiential, and cultural hegemonies that exist within and beyond the churches . . . [with] the risk that comes from beginning to break ranks with the status quo” (133–34). What indeed will it take for preachers, irrespective of political persuasion, to risk giving gospel witness to “an absolute obligation toward compassion, resistance, justice, and hope” (134)?

M. traces the expansive literature of American homiletics with an analysis of virtually every homiletician in the past 50 years, while delineating the influences of postmodern philosophy on emerging homiletic theory. His question has to do with healing the rift in modernity between fact and value (as between science and religion) exacerbated in part by a pre-1970s homiletic approach of deduction from ontological and scriptural first principles. From Fred B. Craddock to David Buttrick to Ronald J. Allen, M. traces the movement of a new homiletic into inductive, phenomenological, and process approaches. Postmodern influences of Emmanuel Levinas and other philosophers and critics are explored in detail.

M., president of the North American Academy of Homiletics and Professor of Homiletics at Louisville Presbyterian Theological Seminary, is the most erudite student of the influences of philosophy on preaching. His writing, dense and directed to the scholarly academy, is brilliant. As a scholar of postmodernism, he progressively deconstructs the homiletic relationship to Scripture, tradition, experience, and reason—as he proposes a homiletic that “others” itself in affinity and commitment to those who are other, whether in our midst or
in Iraq, and to the glory of the Infinite in them.

GREGORY HEILLE, O.P.
Aquinas Institute of Theology,
St. Louis


Based on two sound premises, this book unfolds very creatively. The first premise is that religious language does not speak to many people today, so we need to help them recognize and mine pre-religious experiences that pave the way to faith. The second premise is that even this recognition is difficult, because modern life has us out of touch with our own depths. So Gallagher tries to awaken the imagination, chiefly through story. He focuses on five common human experiences: (1) We seek relationships. (2) We fall below our best hopes. (3) We are painfully aware of the world’s pain. (4) We spend much time alone. (5) We live in daily routines. He creates five lively dialogues, in which he has Jane Austen and D. H. Lawrence, Flannery O’Connor and George Eliot, Oscar Romero and Shakespeare, Thérèse of Lisieux and Nietzsche, Rahner and Rilke do what they do best: plumb the depths of those experiences, showing their fecundity for faith. Besides the dialogues, G. regales us with bons mots from a plethora of other philosophers, artists, and spiritual writers, to the same end.

Would the book bring an agnostic to faith? Probably not by itself. Familiarity with an abundant literature seems prerequisite, and even with that, the brief summaries given here can hardly be sufficiently moving. But G. at least highlights the right areas and whets our appetite for fuller encounters with those who have illumined them.

For me, the quality of lively engagement slips a little in the last two chapters. A dialogue between Jesus and the reader lacks the freshness of the earlier exchanges. And G.’s effort to show how Christian faith answers the hungers and hopes that great literature raises, employs much of that religious language, particularly a very classical Christology, which he said does not speak to people today.

But the book’s merits far outweigh its limitations. Creative in conception, well written, and pleasantly economical, it makes for enjoyable reflective reading.

THOMAS HART
Seattle

BOOKS RECEIVED

SCRIPTURAL STUDIES


Izquerido, Antonio. Scrittura ispirata: Atti del simposio internazionale sull’ispirazione-


HISTORICAL


BOOKS RECEIVED


Roth, Norman. *Conversos, Inquisition, and


Hancock, Curtis L., and Brendan Sweetman, ed. *Faith and the Life of the Intellect: Ex-


MORALITY AND LAW


PASTORAL, SPIRITUAL, AND LITURGICAL


Callahan, Sidney C. Women Who Hear Voices: The Challenge of Religious Exper-


Matovina, Timothy M., and Gary Riebe-Estrella, ed. Horizons of the Sacred: Mexican Traditions in U.S. Catholicism. Cushwa Center Studies of Catholicism in Twentieth-


