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Pleins undertakes an in-depth study of justice in the Hebrew Bible. Embarking on a far-reaching sociological analysis of the biblical texts, this ambitious project aims to illuminate the various codes of social ethics resident there and uphold them as a defensible forum for the appropriation of Scripture in current debates on issues of social justice.

Chapter 1 delineates elaborate contours for this program. Beginning with a text from Jeremiah as a case study, P. ably clarifies the familiar warrant to examine institution, social location, and the editing/transmission process in decoding social ethics within a given text. With this procedure in mind, he crafts a most comprehensive approach for an integrated sociological reading. He proposes archeology, social scientific analysis, source criticism, feminist and liberation criticisms as anchors for his exploration. He even accents the value of postmodern exegetical strategies particularly in regard to how they make audible other, even conflictual voices in the texts. However, the different voices he identifies are primarily those of different sources. Moreover, the application of these different aspects of his methodological mosaic is uneven and varies from text to text.

In chapter 2, P. takes up a primarily tradition-historical study of the legal traditions—the Ten Commandments, the Covenant Code, the legal material in Deuteronomy, and the Priestly Code. His analysis aptly demonstrates both the differences across these materials as well as their long-standing kinship with Mesopotamian legal traditions. These four traditions, demonstrating a concern for the poor that stems from the people’s persistent identification with and submission to the Exodus God, frame his conclusion.

Chapters 3, 4, and 5 take up the narrative embodiment of these legal traditions. Chapter 3’s assessment that Genesis, Kings, and Chronicles reveal little concern for the socially disenfranchised primarily grows out of a study of the language. Rather, P. argues, issues of political power and leadership, national sin, proper worship, and national survival are at the forefront. However, the numerous stories of day laborers, members of the servant classes, and overtaxed peasants on whose backs monarchy is constructed are unattended. Though their stories might well constitute the “other voices” and expose an utter lack of social ethics, they receive no investigation.

Chapter 4 demonstrates that the Exodus narrative shows a pronounced concern for these individuals. However, here, instead of a historical or sociological study, the investigation grows out of attempts to wrestle with the Exodus conundrum in concert with the Third World poor and the Palestinian question by appealing to such key thinkers as Gustavo Gutiér-
rez and Naim Ateek. These recent assessments are set alongside a too-brief historical exposé that reads Exodus not as the manifesto of the ancient poor in their struggle against oppression, but rather as the mythic recasting of Israel’s ruling elite as resisters to foreign domination. Next, chapter 5’s sweeping treatment of Ezra, Nehemiah, Esther, Ruth, and Daniel leads to an overgeneralization that each of these works speaks to the challenges and struggles of building a just society.

The third section on the prophets devotes whole chapters to Isaiah, Jeremiah, and Ezekiel and a fourth chapter to the material in Hosea-Malachi. Given the history and compositional complexity of these works, P.’s analysis necessarily rests on a sampling of texts. His assessment yields no surprises. The prophets manifest vast and persistent concern for the poor. However, the diversity and particularity of these concerns that P. aims to disclose are all but obscured by the scope of what he attempts.

The final section focuses on poetry and wisdom literature. In chapter 10, the Psalms, Song of Songs, and Lamentations all raise questions about poverty and justice. Chapter 11 on Proverbs wrestles persuasively with the apparent allegation of the poor as morally moronic or socially inferior and finds here an indictment not of the impoverished individual but of a classist society. While P.’s contention of solidarity with the poor is on sure ground in Job, Qoheleth’s stance eludes him, his investigation conjuring up only compelling ambiguity on the matter.

In the final chapter, P. wrestles with the big question of appropriation. In what sense does the biblical text apply to contemporary discussions? Rejecting any semblance of prescription, P. crafts a persuasive prospectus whereby the Scriptures function as a point of departure. With their own polyvalent character and diversity of discourse, they can catalyze contemporary debates and wide-ranging discussions for continuous “remembering communities” who themselves must wrestle with these questions in each new era and each new context while always trying to be faithful to Yahweh.

P. finds a persistent concern for the poor across most of the traditions. Often it is at the expense of taking seriously the diversity across traditions and the particularity of their circumstances, a matter he recognizes as problematic. To be fair, the scope of this project makes it easy to object because of all the texts not considered. Still, P.’s serious willingness to grapple with the complex problem of the social ethics of the biblical tradition is reason enough to recommend this book.

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GINA HENS-PIAZZA


Kraus notes that neither the language nor the style of 2 Peter has received much attention, and that the evaluations of its style are extremely
diverse, from “Baboo Greek” to “ein gehobenes literarisches Griechisch.” K. therefore wants to correct this inattention. The book contains chapters on syntax, “Wortbildungsparadigmata,” lexicology, and semantics predominantly focused on hapax legomena. Finally, K. discusses literary relationships, literary form, provenance, and date.

K.’s main contribution is the thorough description of the language, supported by impressive documentation. The dominant chapter on syntax discusses the article, prepositions, pronouns, and the verb. This analysis leads to the conclusion that the author of 2 Peter is a conscious and careful writer. Stylistically, he is oriented to literary models, and, K. suggests, the language tends rather towards the classical than late koiné.

Here, a more general discussion of the alternatives would have been helpful. Even though the description of the language is meticulous, the analysis leaves questions. Some factors observed do not receive due attention. For example, it is remarkable that such a careful writer would have several anakolutha (1:3–4; 1:17; 2:4–7), lack of congruence (3:1, 6), and several asyndeta (2:1b, 9, 14–15, 22; 3:9). Syndeton is carefully observed in classical as well as in Hellenistic prose. To call 2 Peter “sprachlich korrekt” (362), therefore, seems overstated.

As for the style it seems likely that 2 Peter shows signs of some literary ambition. K. rightly states that the language is not easy to understand (362), suggesting that the author puts “hohe Ansprüche” on his readership. However, while this difficulty could mean that 2 Peter is sophisticated, perhaps the opposite is the case. Passages like 2:12–14 (unclear alignment), 3:2 (ambiguity, cf. the clear Jude 17), and 2:8 are ambiguous. In the latter reference, the active basanizō causes confusion, as already the Vulgate notes. This ambiguity, together with the noted grammatical mistakes perhaps indicates more of a wish to write with flair than the ability to do so. 2 Peter is far less sophisticated than, for example, the more literary Josephus, Plutarch, or Dio. Nor is the variation of clausal constructions (cf. 272) very marked compared with literary texts. But K.’s discussion of the hapax legomena of 2 Peter will remain a most valuable source of information.

In the last chapter, K. brings his analyses to bear on an evaluation of 2 Peter. The discussion of the historischer Ort is a development of his dissertation on language and style, although he devotes comparatively little space to this complicated issue. He dates the letter to the first third of the second century, 110–130, but makes no conclusions as to provenance. The suggestion that 2 Peter tends toward classical style (368) is problematic for two reasons: (1) there is, as noted, some evidence against that, and (2) it is complex indeed to discern what is classical, “Hellenistic,” or classicist. At this point a more thorough discussion could have been helpful, but K.’s observations on the relationships between 2 Peter and Matthew and traditions behind the Synoptics are intriguing. Regarding the relationship between 2 Peter and Jude, K. argues that Jude is older, a position that he could have more rigorously challenged by counter-arguments—for example, that Jude 10–13 could just as well be clarifying the thicket in 2 Peter
2:10–17, or that Jude changed seirai in 2 Peter 2:4 to the clearer desmoi (Jude 6). Major problems like the place of apocalyptic and “pagan Hellenistic” as well as “Jewish (Hellenistic)” (411) in 2 Peter deserved a deeper analysis in a book which has a salient interest in the letter’s historic setting. The interesting relationship to 1–2 Clement could also have been given greater place. But the fine discussion of Petrine pseudepigrapha convincingly shows that the Apocalypse of Peter is dependent on 2 Peter and thus is a reliable ante quem for the dating. However, a testament form is difficult to establish in 2 Peter (405), at least if it refers to the one described by von Nordheim (409 n. 160). The topics addressed in this chapter, such as theology, intertextuality, cultural background, and historical matters each deserves its own treatment.

These criticisms aside, it is rare to find a New Testament text discussed in such a linguistically thorough manner. K.’s numerous observations are rewarding in themselves and will be of great value to scholars interested in the language and historical setting of 2 Peter.

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ANDERS GERDMAR


Bruce Winter attempts to answer the question, What happened when Paul left Corinth? This intriguing question is difficult to answer with precision. Toward that end, however, W. gathers relevant cultural information from literary, nonliterary, and archeological sources and depicts Corinth as a Roman city whose cultural features caused some of the problems that beset the Christian communities after Paul had left them.

W. claims novelty in this endeavor, but his approach is not new. Almost 20 years ago, with a similar goal in mind, Jerome Murphy-O’Connor collected literary and archeological sources in his St. Paul’s Corinth (1983). True, W. does include nonliterary epigraphic and papyrological evidence, but the literary sources dominate (in his index of sources, five and a half pages for the latter, one and a half for the former). Also, since the appearance of Wayne Meeks’s ground-breaking social description of Pauline Christianity (The First Urban Christians, 1983), many others have mined the Pauline letters to understand them in the light of the society and culture of the churches that received them.

It should be noted, too, that W. has here incorporated much of his two earlier books, Seek the Welfare of the City (1994) and Philo and Paul among the Sophists (1997). Building on his previous work, he proposes that since Corinth was a thoroughly Roman city, its Romanitas, appropriated by the elite Christians, was responsible for problems that resulted after Paul left. W. catalogues those problems in part 1, where he examines the influence of
secular ethics on Corinthian Christians. So, for example, the problem of factionalism described in 1 Corinthians 1–4 reflects the secular, sophist educational mores of Corinth which Christians replicated, replete with competitiveness among teachers. In part 2, he looks at how social change affected the Corinthian Christians’ views on such issues as marriage (1 Cor 7) and eating meat offered to idols (1 Cor 8:1–10:28).

W. presents an imaginative reconstruction of what happened after Paul left Corinth. The collection of literary, nonliterary, and archeological sources showing interesting aspects of Corinth as a Roman colony is the book’s most important contribution. As for what happened to the Christian churches Paul left behind, W.’s answers are inconclusive and uneven.

Much of W.’s highly speculative reconstruction rests on arguments from silence. He describes himself as an ancient historian rather than an exegete. Understandably then, his work lacks a rigorous exegesis of 1 Corinthians, a lack that renders his arguments largely unpersuasive. As many commentators have shown, the social makeup of Corinth was mixed, with few Christians coming from the Roman social elite (1 Cor 1:26). W. would have done well to heed Meeks’s caution about the “depth of Romanization” at Corinth in Paul’s day (First Urban Christians, 47–48).

Peter Marshall (Enmity in Corinth, 1987), among others, has shown how Paul’s rejection of a monetary gift offered by elite Christians placed them in enmity with him. Elsewhere I have argued that when Paul befriended lower status Corinthians (1 Cor 4:10 and 9:22), upper status individuals, observing the conventions of enmity, took deliberate action against them—for example, initiating nuisance lawsuits to promote their enmity with Paul (1 Cor 6:1–11). W. and I continue to disagree over the status of the litigants in Corinth, but we now agree that Paul’s solution to the problem is extrajudicial arbitration [67; see my “Rich and Poor in the Courts of Corinth: Litigiousness and Status in 1 Corinthians 6.1–11.” New Testament Studies 39 (1993) 568, 586]. Still W. is mistaken to think that the problems in Corinth resulted from the Romanitas of the social elite alone.

This book could be better edited. The examples of a complaint in Nero’s time (62) and of Seneca’s account of an upper status person challenging a lower status person to court (63) contradict the stated principle (60) that under Roman law a person of lower rank could not bring charges against a person of higher rank. Also, note 31 (86) is puzzling. There W. revisits his criticism of the use of “rich” and “poor” in the title of my article, whereas he himself uses the same terms at least seven times (22, 53, 63, 74, 143, 147, 194) to refer to the status of Corinthians.

New Testament scholars will be grateful for W.’s collection of source material relative to the life of Corinth in Paul’s day. They will also debate his reconstruction of the Christianity that arose after Paul left Corinth. The occasion for further conversation is a welcome contribution of this book.

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ALAN C. MITCHELL
Exercising Gregory of Nyssa’s usage of the Greek term *dunamis* (power), Michel René Barnes offers a novel argument about the significant role of technical Greek philosophical ideas and terminology in Gregory’s trinitarian theology. B. contests the simplistic charge that Gregory was a “Hellenizer” whose thought was more nearly philosophical and Greek than theological and Christian. He also contests the standard alternative to this perspective that attempts to exonerate Gregory by arguing that, although he extensively used Greek philosophy, he somehow completely transcended it and created a purely theological trinitarianism and Christian mysticism. Neither viewpoint, B. suggests, does justice to the historical and intellectual context in which Gregory developed his trinitarian and mystical theology. This context was one in which the polemical use of technical Greek philosophical terminology in Christian theology was commonplace (20). Failure to recognize this fact prevents scholars of patristic theology from fully understanding its conceptual and rhetorical complexities. More specifically, B. argues (1) that analyzing in detail Gregory’s understanding and use of *dunamis* is indispensable for achieving an adequate understanding of both Gregory’s arguments against his theological opponents and the innovative character of his own trinitarian theology; and (2) that carrying out this detailed analysis requires an exploration of pre-Platonic and Platonic uses of *dunamis*, as well as the ways in which Christian authors applied this term in their own theological arguments.

The most hermeneutically fruitful insights of B.’s study emerge from his analysis of the “technical” sense of *dunamis* in pre-Platonic medical thought. He argues that the Hippocratic school understood *dunamis* as “the distinctive affective capacity (or capacities) of any specific existent, that is, those causal capacities that belong to an object because it is specifically what it is: the hot (heat) is the *dunamis* of fire, for example, and anything which lacks the *dunamis* of the hot is not fire” (28–29). This way of thinking allowed the ancient medical authors to closely unite the meanings of power and nature. Working with the results of recent Platonic scholarship, B. contends that Plato developed this Hippocratic understanding of the unity of power and nature by using it “to describe immaterial causes: virtues in the soul, faculties of knowledge in the mind, and the Good” (9). This development, B. maintains, allowed Plato to transform the technical term *dunamis*, which in Hippocratic medical thought referred only to material reality, into a theological term that described the causal relationships between immaterial realities (92–93). In chapters 3 and 4, B. explicates the myriad ways in which Plato’s understanding of *dunamis* influenced both pagan and Christian theologians in the first three centuries after Christ. These chapters contain fascinating and original studies of Tertullian, Hippolytus, Origen, Eusebius, Athanasius, Hilary, and Ambrose. B.’s primary interest, however, is in how Plato’s transformation of
dunamis influenced fourth-century trinitarian theology in general, and Gregory’s theology in particular.

Privileging texts that he believes have been neglected by scholars of post-Nicene theology, particularly Gregory’s Against Eunomius, B. turns his attention in his final three chapters to pro-Nicene debates about “divine productivity” and the unity of nature and power in the Trinity. Interestingly, he reads both Eunomius and Gregory as members of a mainstream Christian consensus on the use of Plato’s notion of power in trinitarian theology (218).

B.’s interpretation of Gregory’s polemical and conceptually innovative arguments from within the parameters of this consensus are intended to challenge many of the basic assumptions of giants in the field of Gregory scholarship, such as Balthasar, Danie l’ou, and Lossky (220). The gist of his claim is that reading Gregory as essentially a Platonist in his use of dunamis in trinitarian theology allows us to avoid projecting the dichotomies of philosophy vs. theology, cosmology vs. soteriology, and dogma vs. mysticism into his thought (259). Moreover, reading Gregory in this way allows us to fully understand the creative ways in which he rhetorically synthesized the New Testament’s terminology of power (specifically 1 Cor. 1:24) with Platonic assumptions in his arguments for the common nature of the trinitarian Persons (11–12, 291–92). Part of B.’s agenda in making this case is to challenge interpreters who anachronistically and mistakenly read Gregory as a proponent of Scholastic versions of an Aristotelian doctrine of activities or operations (energeia) (306).

Given the sweeping and provocative nature of B.’s obviously brilliant argument, a concluding chapter spelling out the implications of his thesis for trinitarian theology would have been welcome. Its absence, however, in no way undermines the achievement of his argument. It has the potential to recast not only the scholarly field of patristic trinitarian theology but also current debates about the possibility and/or desirability of rehabilitating classical trinitarian orthodoxy in contemporary theology.

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KEVIN MONGRAIN


The last 30 to 40 years have produced a number of significant works on Jewish-Christian and Muslim-Christian relations in the Middle Ages. These works have either presented a survey of these relations or they have developed a particular subject matter—a theme, group of people, or geographical area. Scholars presenting works with a more specific focus have usually criticized surveys on the grounds that they do not do justice to the complexity of medieval Jewish-Christian and Muslim-Christian relations. In other words, so much more work needs to be done on particular geo-
graphical areas and primary sources before surveys should be attempted. Berend’s study escapes this criticism. Her work is focused on a particular place and the various minority groups there, including Jews, Muslims, “pagans,” thus avoiding the many problems associated with surveys.

B.’s main contribution to the field lies in her focus on medieval Hungary which lay on the frontier of Christendom with its intersection of Turkish-nomad, Byzantine, and Roman Christian cultures. B.’s extensive knowledge of Hungary’s medieval history and social context is evident throughout her work, and her careful scholarship is manifest in her understanding of medieval Hungary’s uniqueness in Christendom and the limitation of the sources, especially the scarcity of documentation and the mute nature of non-Christian groups.

The book’s strength lies in its presentation of each minority group (Jews, Muslims, and Cumans or “pagans”) in its own unique situation, each considered according to the sources available. As B. argues (against certain other studies), all minority groups must be studied according to the categories of integration and exclusion, and not by the more popular categories of tolerance and intolerance (e.g., “persecuting society”), and all factors of life—social, economic, legal, and ecclesial—must be considered.

B. underscores Hungary’s unique situation by comparing the Jewish community living there since the middle of the tenth century with the Muslim community whose arrival is more difficult to date. On the one hand, her research indicates that, while church law intended to segregate Christians from Jews throughout medieval Europe, there is very little evidence that this policy was realized in Hungary. In fact, Jews were able to hold public office, were treated as a group with its own privileges, and their persons and religious observance were protected from harm by Christians. Muslims, on the other hand, from the eleventh century on, were targets of Christian missionizing and aggressive legislation aimed at their eradication, even though they also enjoyed their own special privileges. B. points out that a very difficult problem was not necessarily in the conversion of Muslims and Cumans but in forcing their conversions.

This valuable contribution to missiology challenges traditional ideas about what medieval scholars have termed a “frontier society” in the Middle Ages. It also shows the complexity of medieval church-state relations and the approaches to non-Christians that government and church leaders took toward Jews, Muslims, and “pagans.” Furthermore, the work challenges what we know about medieval missionizing and shows that missiology is a much more complex subject than has been previously thought. Lastly, the study shows that one must be aware of the unique characteristics of each period of history when dealing with a country such as Hungary with its numerous policy shifts by government and church leaders.

B.’s clear writing and organization allow the reader easily to follow the many points she develops. Very helpful is the separate treatment of each minority group in terms of their status in relation to the Hungarian government and Church, economics, and legal issues. The bibliography of
primary and secondary sources on all aspects of medieval society in general and on Hungary in particular is extensive and up to date. It is especially important for those interested in medieval interreligious relations among the Abrahamic faiths. The name and subject indexes allow easy tracing of figures and topics. The book is a model for future studies of Jewish-Christian and Muslim-Christian relations in the Middle Ages.

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STEVEN J. McMICHAEL, O.F.M.


The problem addressed in this book afforded philosophical theologians of the medieval period ample opportunity to meditate on the compatibility of God’s perfection with genuine human freedom. A contingent cause is one that does not always cause and when it does cause, does not always bring about the same effect. Rather, a range of possibilities is open to the contingent cause, which opts for one or another through a motion of the will. Does God know the contingent effects of the human will? To be more pointed, does God know our future, what humans will bring about through their will? But, if God does know our future, does not that eliminate the contingency? After all, a perfect God cannot be mistaken; and so in knowing determinately what humans will choose, would God not impose necessity on this choosing? On the other hand, to deny to God a knowledge of what will be brought about through the human will would render imperfect God’s knowing.

Trading on Boethius’s ideas about eternity, Aquinas had argued that God is not subject to time but is outside of it. And, he added, while sequential, time is present to God in an eternal now. Thus, what is past or present or future for us, is eternally present to God: God truly knows what we do in fact choose or will choose, as present to God. Eschewing Thomas’s stress on God’s eternity to relieve the tension between God as knower and humans as agents, Scotus insisted instead on God himself as a contingent cause. God knows future contingents by knowing God’s own determinations. The contingency of what God wills flows from God’s own contingency: in the instant of eternity, God retains the capacity to will, and hence know, the opposite of what God does in fact will.

But it was not simply the great thinkers who took on this issue. As Schabel reminds us, even lesser lights such as Peter Auriol, a Franciscan active at the University of Paris in the second decade of the 14th century, subjected the topic to close scrutiny. Several ingredients go into the making of Peter’s position, consciously worked out in opposition to Scotus’s perceived determinism while modifying in profound ways Aquinas’s proposal.
S. devotes a chapter (3–6) to each of the following. First, God does not know the future as future; since God is immutable, and immutability is the same as necessity; if God did know the future as future, the future would happen necessarily. Second, God knows the future as “indistant” to God (99–102), here pursuing, albeit in different terms, a point dear to Thomas. Although Peter has difficulty explaining exactly what is involved in “indistance” (105), he seems to be engaging in a form of negative theology, denying to God what is inappropriate, while ascribing to God the fullness of knowledge. God is not subject to tense or found in the succession of time, and it would be wrong to say that God has an expectative knowledge of what, for us, lies in the future. Thus, as for what is future to us, this is indistant to God, as are the past and our present; God simply grasps such, knowing how God’s being can be participated, while abstracting from futurition, presentiality, and preterition. Third, in agreement with Aristotle, Peter insists that singular propositions about the future are neither true nor false. Finally, for Peter it is important to distinguish between God’s intrinsic and extrinsic willing. By the former, the will of complacency, God wills toward both sides of the contradiction equally, and is equally pleased by what is actualized. In extrinsic willing, on the other hand, God’s will is efficacious of what God wills, as in the very creating of all things. It is the will of complacency, not God’s extrinsic willing, that is involved in God’s knowledge of contingents.

The book ends up making an important contribution to the literature not least because it takes the account beyond Peter. Well over half of the book is given to the reception of Peter’s teaching at both Paris and Oxford in the years immediately after his death (1322). Most of his successors doubted the value of Peter’s innovations; S. renderstheir objectionswith the same concern for detail and accuracy as he had Peter’s own position.

The book, however, is not without flaw. More than simple description is required. Positions on this topic reflect a whole web of convictions on what might be called a theologian’s worldview: ideas about God, the world, and how the world’s dependence on God is to be most faithfully construed. Such issues receive insufficient explicit consideration in the book. Moreover, such broader judgments that are expressed tend to be more worrisome than helpful—one can point in this regard to the claim that Peter’s is the “God of the philosophers,” who stands in contrast to the more anthropomorphic God of Scripture and the common, Christian man (131).

University of Notre Dame

JOSEPH WAWRYKOW


This is the first book-length study of Ignatius of Loyola by a Protestant theologian since Heinrich Boehmer’s classic (1914). Gottfried Maron, who occupies a chair of history at the University of Kiel, has for years been
interested in the Catholic side of the 16th century—unusual for somebody in his position. As he says in his Vorwort, his interest in Ignatius goes back to 1956, the 400th anniversary of the saint’s death, when he promised to write something substantial about him. In the meantime he has followed the development of scholarship that has flourished especially since the 1990–91 celebrations of the anniversaries of Ignatius’s birth and the founding of the Society of Jesus. M. participated, for instance, in the international conference at Bilbao/Loyola celebrating the anniversaries, where I had the privilege of meeting him.

M.’s background, therefore, is impeccable. He has carefully studied and reflected on the work of Hugo Rahner and even some of the pertinent writings of Karl, but he moves right along from them up to the present, with heavy emphasis on works in German or translated into it, a now considerable quantity. Most importantly, he has perceptively and critically studied the primary documents. This is a work of serious scholarship. In eight chapters it deals with eight general topics: Ignatius and Scripture, Ignatius the mystic, Ignatius and theology, Ignatius and the Church, Ignatius and the Society of Jesus, the man, reform, Ignatius in Protestant (Lutheran) perspective.

Until the last chapter M. tries to examine Ignatius without explicitly applying Protestant norms, but the horizon is inevitably Lutheran, with occasionally explicit comparisons of Ignatius and Luther. This horizon and these comparisons make the book especially interesting and clarifying. In making the comparisons, M. consistently hits the nail on the head. For instance, in chapter 1 he makes the important point that Ignatius, unlike Luther, had no theological interest in Scripture. Ferdinand and Isabella had forbidden the vernacular Bible in Spain, so that the Jesus whom Ignatius knew was the Jesus of the Life of Christ; through it his subsequent approach to the New Testament would be filtered. Ignatius was interested in the Gestalt Jesu, not the Word. As M. says about the Spiritual Exercises, “the Word” in its theological relevance appears not once. For Ignatius, the Bible confirms his experience and provides material for meditation and preaching. Luther was the exegete and herald, Ignatius the spiritual guide and pastoral leader. The latter’s leitmotif, “the help of souls” (17).

The vexing question for a theological approach to Ignatius is whether he was a theologian at all. He was clearly not a professional theologian the way Aquinas, Luther, and Suárez were. He would be closer to the patristic or medieval model, as with Ambrose or Bernard, but even that does not fit him. M. presents him as a “lay theologian,” with three basic elements as the foundation for his approach: (1) a piety-centered theology (Frömmigkeits-theologie), Jesus-centered, in the tradition of Ludolf of Saxony; (2) an experience-centered theology (Erfahrungstheologie) in the tradition of Bernard, Gerson, and Dionysius the Carthusian, with emphasis on discernment and consolation; (3) a mystical theology, based on his conviction that he was “taught by God.” Curiously, M. fails to mention at this point Ignatius’s pastoral orientation, “the help of souls,” most certainly because he is

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taking it for granted. As he says later, Ignatius is the founder of Catholic “practical theology” (123).

Is Ignatius and Ignatian spirituality Pelagian? The Exercises advertise themselves as providing a method for “conquering oneself and regulating one’s life,” which is just what Pelagius seems to have thought Christianity was all about. This is an old question, but a question surely of great interest to somebody studying Ignatius from evangelische Sicht. M. is astute enough to see how underneath some Pelagian-sounding statements the operation of grace is presumed. Nonetheless, he speaks of the Exercises as imbued with a “Christian Stoicism”—not a bad designation. He sees this as the point where Ignatius and Luther are at great, perhaps the greatest distance from one another (206–8).

What does this very rich book contribute to our understanding of Ignatius? For those who have closely followed the scholarship on the issues M. raises, it does not essentially challenge the direction that scholarship has been moving in the past 50 years. This is reassuring, for the scholarship has been done within an often quite narrow Catholic framework. The book’s achievement is twofold: It is a judicious synthesis of that scholarship, not available elsewhere, and it sharpens the portrait of Ignatius by using a different lens. This is a sympathetic, even-handed, learned, and judicious book. In the conclusion M. calls for Catholic and Protestant scholars to try to learn from one another, as he has learned from Ignatius. One way for Catholics to begin to respond would be for somebody to translate this excellent book into English.

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JOHN W. O’MALLEY, S.J.


Despite the vogue for contextualizing intellectual history in economic, social, and political settings rather than just in terms of a learned tradition, examples of such contextualizations in a more than superficial fashion are not legion. Perhaps this work on the possible ideological biases of three prominent Tübingen theologians of the first half of the 19th century shows why such studies so often disappoint. Here we have an exception, but one that tends to prove the rule. That is, here we have a critical study of the role of ideology in theology that carefully sets out the relevant social contexts. The hypothesis being tested is that an author’s position in a class struggle may be responsible for some false theological moves of which the author need not be aware. Franz Anton Staudenmaier (1800–1856), the victim (perpetrator?) in this case, provides evidence even in the highest reaches of
his systematic thought, his “doctrine of ideas,” of ideological distortions in the negative Marxist sense.

Why did the editors of the prestigious Tübingen series consider an un-revised dissertation from 1986 worthy of translation and publication in the year 2000? No doubt because in its meticulous thoroughness, it illuminates shadowy regions of the famed succession of Catholic Tübingers—and is not likely to be repeated or superceded in the foreseeable future. Another reason would be that van Harskamp’s case for a method of ideology-critique is exhaustively argued. He also makes a contribution to the historiography of Roman Catholic authoritarianism and integralism avant la lettre. Moreover, Staudenmaier is a more representative figure of mid-century German Catholicism than I, for example, had realized. This is a further justification for dedicating so much attention and energy to his voluminous writings.

H.’s aim is to test a method in theology: social analysis with a focus on the critique of ideology inspired by Marx. The issue presented itself in Latin American liberation theology (with particular appreciation for Clodovis Boff) and in Edward Schillebeeckx’s late work in Nijmegen, where H. conducted his research. Bernard Lonergan’s Method in Theology (1972) is nowhere mentioned, though the project seems to me to exemplify the functional specialty of dialectics. This is at least the case of the culminating chapter, where the hypothesis is confirmed that what tipped the balance between theological reasoning and social-status concern was Staudenmaier’s fear of and opposition to the secular state’s interference in church affairs. What have church-state relations got to do with class conflict? It requires a couple of preliminary chapters, but H. shows how the fears and prejudices of Catholics in the traditional middle classes (not yet “bourgeois”) found expression in the resistance to post-Napoleonic German states that exercised bureaucratic control over bishops and clergy.

Thus the bulk of the book presents evidence and argumentation from the social and political history of Catholicism. On the now prevailing assumption that theologians too are conditioned by their cultural and social setting, such research is necessary to provide a well-founded knowledge of the actually pertinent contexts. Moreover, this material is meant to demonstrate that a solid social and political contextualization of a chapter in the history of theology as an intellectual pursuit is possible. This case, including attention to class conflict as a source of ideological distortions, is convincingly if laboriously made. It would seem that such contextualization at the desirable level of adequacy is a daunting and difficult task. Perhaps it is most often to be approached only as a more or less distant ideal. Others should not, however, be put off from the task by the realization that they might reach only tentative and provisional conclusions.

In finding ideological scotosis thus infecting Staudenmaier’s theological system, H. avoids determinism and relativism. He regards the search for ideological effects only as one method among others, without buying into Marx’s philosophy or social theory. He does not discount or reject all of Staudenmaier’s thought, but distinguishes painstakingly what is responsible
theologizing for a thinker of his time from the incoherences and *ipse dixit*
produced by his fear and loathing of specified adverse forces. This book
stands out within the contextualizing trend by its thoroughness and con-
sistency of method. Whether it becomes a standard and indispensable
work, I hesitate to say. All the same, it would be foolhardy of any scholar
wishing to make a contribution to the understanding of the early Catholic
Tübingen theologians to dismiss it out of hand. I certainly recommend it
also to students of 19th-century Catholicism more broadly considered.

Marquette University, Milwaukee

PAUL MISNER

EDWARD SORIN. By Marvin R. O’Connell. Notre Dame: University of

O’Connell’s biography of Edward Sorin—zealous leader of a small band
of French missionaries bound for America, a land they believed was in-
habited by “savages, infidels, and Protestants” (1841), the founder of a
religious work in northern Indiana (1842) that became the University of
Notre Dame, and third superior general of the Congregation of Holy Cross
(1868–1893)—is a thoroughly researched, lengthy but elegantly written,
commissioned work dedicated to “Theodore Martin Hesburgh of the Con-
gregation of Holy Cross, Second Founder of Notre Dame.” O. begins with
a description of the physical and social landscapes of that part of France
where Sorin was born. He provides readers with insights into the terribly
confused state of religious affairs that the Revolutionary and Napoleonic
regimes had visited upon the region. In some towns and villages, majorities
of the population were pious; in others, they were indifferent or even
hostile to religion. Sorin, younger son of a comfortable rural proprietor,
grew up in a more pious region.

In his parents’ modest but solid manor house was formed Sorin’s simple,
vigorous, and relatively unnuanced faith, sensitively described by O.
throughout the book. At 14 Sorin, with parental approval, decided to be-
come a priest; he studied at local seminaries and was ordained in 1838. As
a young priest, he was attracted to a new religious society founded by
Basile Moreau in Le Mans in 1837; it eventually became the Congregation
of Holy Cross.

In that year, Moreau, a perfervid Ultramontane serving under a strong
Gallican bishop, had managed to bring two existing but separate associa-
tions of brothers and priests into a union under himself as common su-
perior; members of each separate association enjoyed equal constitutional
rights. According to his “grand plan,” Moreau wanted to expand his society
of brothers and priests to include a separate association of religious
women. To that end, again with himself as superior, in Le Mans in 1841, he
founded a small group of religious women called the Marianite Sisters of
Sainte-Croix.
Denied approval by both the bishop of Le Mans and Rome for inclusion of the sisters in his proposed union, Moreau found himself in late 1841 as the superior of a small religious society composed of brothers and priests and also as superior of a separate religious society of women. It was this society of brothers and priests allied with a society of religious women in Le Mans that Sorin joined in 1840. In so doing, he embraced Moreau's theological and organizational ideas and vowed obedience under him. Thus began, in an extraordinary spirit of fraternity and loyalty, the long and often tortuous relationship between Moreau and Sorin, between a theoretician and a pragmatist.

Sorin's pragmatism appears to have been a function of his unfailing self-confidence derived mainly from an almost childlike belief that he had a special relationship with God. In a letter of 1841 to the Bishop of Vincennes Sorin stated that Our Lord “loves me in a very special manner as has been told me many times.” Persons thus constituted and driven frequently become superb leaders, but they also tend to be the worst subordinates. In a nutshell, that is the story of Sorin’s life.

O., as have other writers, focuses on that view of Sorin as an interpretive key. It helps explain his extraordinary self-confidence, unfailing optimism, ruthless pursuit of goals, intuitive sense of virtually any moment’s need, and constant readiness to consider a problem and quickly decide the most practical way of dealing with it. As a matter of fact, O. cites or refers to the passage quoted above at least four times (52, 129, 540–541, 595).

O. retells the story of Moreau’s response to appeals from two bishops of Vincennes for missionaries and of his selection of Sorin to lead a party of six brothers to work in Indiana. O.’s account of the party’s journey from Le Mans to Vincennes, their brief time at Black Oak Ridge, Sorin’s immediate and continuing conflicts with Bishop Hailendiere, and the fortuitous move to South Bend treats most of the highlights of that heroic adventure and adds significant new material for our understanding of it. The extremely difficult early years of what became the University of Notre Dame and Sorin’s leadership in developing and sustaining it is a complicated tale well told against a historical background of revolution in France, war in Europe, and the American Civil War.

After Sorin became superior general in 1868, his active role in University affairs was much diminished. Thereafter O. quite correctly focuses on him as savior, if not second founder, of the Congregation of Holy Cross. In all of this, some very controversial ground is traversed. On the very delicate question of Sorin’s role in the deposition of Basile Moreau as superior general, O. provides important factual details about this event and then tells this convoluted story as objectively as anyone so far has done. At the end of the day, however, O. comes off as a Sorinite.

This is a great book, extremely well written, about a great man who made an enormous difference.

University of Notre Dame

Robert E. Burns

Gilkey’s study is a critical exposition and interpretation of the thought of one eminent theologian by another. It offers mature and authoritative rendering of the familiar Niebuhrian themes of human nature and history, sacrificial and mutual love, original sin and original righteousness, anxiety and faith, rejection of God and injustice toward the neighbor, relativity and ambiguity, reason and revelation, and transcendence and immanence. It is also the theological journey of a youthful intellectual whose moral certainty and agnosticism were shattered and then reshaped by Niebuhr’s preaching and writing—reading *Nature and Destiny of Man* (1941–43) in a Japanese internment camp during World War II sustained G. (reminiscent of J. Moltmann’s reading of the same work under more supportive conditions as a British prisoner of war). G. went on to develop his own distinguished career as a Niebuhrian theologian in the University of Chicago Divinity School, where he is Shailer Mathews Professor of Theology (emeritus). Now in his 80s, he still reads Niebuhr as one who gives assurance of God’s reality beyond the projections of human imaging and God’s intention and power to gather up the creations and failures of human history in an eternity of meaning that humans must trust but can neither forecast nor control.

The two dimensions of the book are not divergent. Both deal intellectually and existentially with the collapse of liberal and Marxist hopes for history that sustained thought and action in the wake of Enlightenment rationalism, suspicion, and relativity. Both show Niebuhr exploring the resultant problems of meaning and of the difficulty of maintaining the energy of justice when hope for future historical deliverance has been discarded. Both address answers of “Biblical Faith” (the inferred message of the whole Bible) to these problems, and demonstrate its necessity to the right interpretation of evidence drawn from human experience. Both issue in the affirmation of a synergistic *theonomous self*, maintaining and exercising its own freedom and creativity while realizing selfhood only through faith in God (allowing G. to speak of Niebuhr’s “true Arminianism”).

G.’s account of Niebuhr’s wrestling with problems issuing from historical crises includes an impressive inquiry into his theological methods and concepts. However, he does not seem to force Niebuhr’s scheme to the limits of its viability. For example, G.’s treatment of Niebuhr’s understanding of myth is insightful and clarifying, as is his distinction between biblical symbols understood as myths and as actual historical events. But why not push Niebuhr harder on the sustainability of some of the biblical symbols when understood only as myth and not also as actual events in history—especially in view of Niebuhr’s own musing that taking the biblical symbols seriously but not literally might be on the way to not taking them seriously at all? And does Niebuhr really help Christian believers by translating eschatological symbols into “general principles of history”? 

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It is legitimate for one theologian to investigate the thought of another as his own intellectual enterprise, but would not Niebuhr have been explained and tested more thoroughly by engaging his more recent critics? Feminist theologians object to Niebuhr’s emphasizing the “masculine” sin of pride over the “feminine” sin of sensuality (the “sin of hiding,” as Susan Nelson Dunfee put it). G. declines to discuss Niebuhr’s view of sin as sensuality, and therefore does not enter this argument. Also, he does not deal with feminist concerns over the ethic of sacrificial love in his really fine treatment of that topic. G. states rightly that “in contrast to what the eschatological theologians charge,” Niebuhr’s “vertically transcendent God does not ‘bless the present’ nor create a private as opposed to a public theology” (21). Why not test that claim directly against liberationist criticisms of Niebuhr’s anti-utopianism, charges that Niebuhr’s Christian realism has become the ideology of the powerful, and dismissals of Niebuhr’s “relevance” and “responsibility” as human efforts to control history?

The concluding reflective chapter is a masterful analysis of Niebuhr’s acceptance of modern assumptions concerning historicity, relativity, and science. G. shows also that Niebuhr moves beyond these assumptions with a synthesis of modernity (read as Renaissance or Enlightenment) and classical Christian symbols, especially as affirmed in the Reformation—a possible transition into discussion with postmodernism. Those of us old enough to have heard Reinhold Niebuhr preach and lecture will applaud this learned and elegantly written book both for its restatement of powerful and faithful arguments and for its reminder of times and troubles through which we have lived with the aid of Niebuhr’s wisdom. Those who have come later are invited to meet this great theologian. They are also put on notice that if they want to do serious theology, they must encounter Niebuhr and neither ignore nor circumvent him.

_Emory University, Atlanta_  

**Theodore R. Weber**


Coffey’s work exhibits the intellectual energy and even esthetic appeal of which the Thomistic tradition is capable.

Employing Lonergan’s cognitional theory, C. argues that trinitarian theological and doctrinal thinking moves from a first apprehension of the functional God of the Bible (= Lonergan’s “experience”), to the patristic ontological articulation of the immanent Trinity (= “understanding”), then back to the Scriptures, but now affirmed, in the light of the deepened understanding of the second step, to be an expression of the economic Trinity (= Lonergan’s “judgment”). C. refines the usual two-step process (from the economic to the immanent Trinity), for the “economic Trinity” is really only articulated after the first two moves above.

Chapter 2 sketches the procession and “return” (earlier called “be-
stowal”) models of the immanent Trinity. The Johannine, descending scheme (Son and Spirit going out from the Father) of East (monopatrism) and West (filioquism) spurs the procession model, while the Synoptic, ascending scheme sparks the “return” model. Though complementary, the latter is the more comprehensive, presupposing the former. Not a simple reversion of the procession model, the return model offers a more differentiated articulation of the economic Trinity, that is, the unique missions of the Spirit and of Jesus, and our own consequent, Spirit-grounded return with the Son to the Father (= C.’s view of soteriology). The taxis here: Father > Holy Spirit > Son > Holy Spirit > Father. C. is freshly amplifying Augustine and Richard of St. Victor.

Chapters 3 and 4 refine. The Spirit is presented as the “objectivization” (or “personalization”) standing “over against” Father and Son, “spirated” by their mutual love. Whether this representation silences charges of evaporating the Spirit into Father and Son will likely be the most contested aspect of this book. C. offers one of the best studies of the notion of “person” available. Following Cajetan, Lonergan, and others, he argues that God be thought of as one absolute person/subjectivity (subsistent relation) and three relative persons/subjects. C. recognizes that the dogmatic tradition leaves open the issue of whether to give the priority to the unity or to the threeness. He is Western in opting for the former. He thinks this reflects the movement of Scripture from Old to New Testament, as well as God’s simple unity. The concept of “perichoresis” is perhaps an equivalent manner (offering a third model?) of articulating the unity in threeness, which some would argue avoids elevating either unity or threeness over each other (Thomas Torrance, for example, unnoted by C.). This may have some advantages over C.’s giving the primacy to unity. He brings up the notion once, only to drop it, for “we have no experience of the interaction among the persons of the immanent Trinity” (20). Perhaps no direct experience, but does not the response model help us grasp that we are truly brought into the life of the Trinity in a quite alert way? C. largely regards the psychological analogy as unhelpful in penetrating through to an adequate theological conceptuality (criticizing Rahner and Lonergan here), consigning it to spirituality. Does this criticism indicate that C. regards spirituality as mere devotionalism, rather than as theology’s source and even nature in some sense? At the same time, the view of God as one absolute consciousness would seem to imply the possibility of some integration of the psychological analogy within the response model.

God’s loving personhood leads C. into an impressive critique of process theology (chap. 5); the Neo-Thomist conclusion—that God is immutable in himself and mutable in his creaturely relations—is not likely to convince the undisposed. In a discussion of paschal soteriologies (Moltmann, Jüngel, Mühlent, and Balthasar: chaps. 6–7), C. rejects these thinkers’ panentheistic interpretations of the immanent Trinity, along with their varied forms of penal substitution thinking, although he finds a nonpenal substitution theory rooted in Paul to be acceptable (with Karl Lehmann’s help). (Is his own response model his complementary suggestion?) He says he learned
from Balthasar that penal substitution predates Luther and is a Catholic, German tradition extending back to Nicholas of Cusa. Inasmuch as it is found in the new Catholic Catechism and John Paul II’s writings, it has become something of a larger “Catholic” tradition, it seems.

I have tried to present only the challenging muscles of C.’s argument. The book’s rich fare offers further challenging observations on topics such as feminist trinitarian analysis, Eastern and especially Palamite thought (which he awards a qualified approval), and reconciling East-West differences over the Filioque, along with rich biblical exegesis. The challenges of late/postmodern thinkers, however, still await their inclusion in C.’s dialogue. All in all, a very rewarding study.

Duquesne University, Pittsburgh WILLIAM THOMPSON-UBERUAGA


Powell tells a complex story. At the most obvious level, he offers an account of the career of trinitarian thought in German Protestant theology from Luther and Melanchthon (chap. 1) to the contemporary theology of Moltmann and Pannenberg (chap. 6). At another level he recounts the vicissitudes of trinitarian language with special attention to how and why trinitarian thought and language got marginalized. Both of these stories are worth telling. Either is difficult to tell briefly. That P. manages to provide at least the basic outlines of both stories within the covers of a single book is admirable.

Of course, the condition of the possibility of telling these stories is that the author is aware of the broadness of his strokes, and that he has hit upon an organizational scheme that will focus a mass of material. Revelation, self-consciousness, and history are the three central categories that enable P. to tell his story. How these categories are understood in particular theologies, and which category tends to dominate, will dictate the kind of trinitarian thought embraced and how trinitarian language functions, whether centrally or peripherally. P. finds that the central category for Luther and Melanchthon was revelation which, by and large, is identified with Scripture. This identification is not without consequence for trinitarian thought, for, on the one hand, revelation brings into question the centrality of the Trinity and, on the other, encourages the restriction of trinitarian language to the economic Trinity. Similarly, the category of self-consciousness encourages reflection on an ontological Trinity, even as it disturbs the classical view of three persons and one essence by insinuating a single field of subjectivity. Interestingly, for P., the archetypal instance of this model is not, as one might expect, Hegel, but rather Leibniz (87–102). Again, when the dominant category is history, to the degree to which trinitarian language is permitted, it tends to be restricted to the economic Trinity. Lessing, of course, provides the classic example of the dominance of this category (80–87).
To both aspects of P.’s story Hegel’s thought is central (chap. 4). Hegel stands out in modern Protestant thought for his unqualified assertion of the centrality of the Trinity. More importantly, it is Hegel’s specific understanding of the categories of revelation, self-consciousness, and history, and his particular ordering and integration of these categories, that set the basic terms of the contemporary trinitarian debate in Protestantism (discussed in chap. 6). Hegel’s understanding of revelation as pertaining to the divine itself rather than Christ or the biblical text, his view of history as not simply being the manifold where truth gets exhibited but where truth is enacted, and his understanding of the divine as a single subjectivity that constitutes itself through revelation and history have set challenges that theologians such as Barth, Moltmann, and Pannenberg have attempted to meet. The value of P.’s method is evident in the chapter on Hegel. His organizational scheme produces a coherent account of both Hegel’s trinitarian achievement and the difficulties he bequeaths to posterity.

The final chapter (6) which deals with the complex Hegelian inheritance is not only the longest in the book, but arguably also the best. For here P. sifts through what modern theologians such as Barth, Moltmann, and Pannenberg owe to Hegel’s trinitarian thought, even as they resist his interpretation of each of the three major categories and contest his relative prioritization of the category of self-consciousness. P. convincingly argues that in large part the distinct tendencies of each of these versions of modern trinitarian thought is a function both of their recollection of Hegel’s parsing of the three categories and of particular strategies of resistance the categories bring to bear on the Hegelian deposit.

The book succeeds admirably in its two main aims. In so doing, it is forced to sacrifice both breadth and depth of analysis. Still, it demonstrates more than the virtue of economy. Its treatment of Luther and Melanchthon (chap. 1) captures well their ambivalence regarding trinitarian language. In addition, P. successfully challenges the dominant view that Schleiermacher effectively marginalizes trinitarian thought in his dogmatics, and reads him instead as more nearly espousing an economic restriction of trinitarian thought (88–102). In the end, however, the whole is more than the sum of its parts. P. does not break new ground on any of the thinkers he discusses. The most salient virtue of the lucid and reader-friendly text is that it provides an eminently useful map for reading modern Protestant thought in general, and modern trinitarian thought in particular.

University of Notre Dame

Cyril O’Regan
Sesboüé, in a firm but gentle manner, faces most of the problems concerning the magisterium, problems that occupy the professional theologians and puzzle the faithful. He is meticulous in gathering historical data, insightful in interpreting them, critical in handling hypotheses, and balanced in his judgment.

The characteristics of the magisterium are, says S., grandeur and servitude. Grandeur (no English word can tell it so well) because it has the capacity of being the ultimate witness to the evangelical message entrusted to “a people kept infallible in the faith by pure grace.” Servitude (which is the condition of an esclave, a slave), because it exists only as far as it is “in the service of the faith and the truth of the Gospel” (7). The measure of authority is obedience to tradition.

The power, however, is contained in earthen vessels. It is not immune to the temptation of “affirming its authority beyond what is necessary and to extend ceaselessly the borders of its domain.” The result is, then, “dogmatic inflation,” which is precisely what has happened after Vatican Council I: “[The magisterium] has proclaimed the fundamental freedom of research in matters of faith, but it has also given a mixed image of authoritarianism and of tutiorism through an excessive fear of the results of research in theology, history, or natural sciences” (8).

The first and historical part of the book is by far the longest (17–184). The chapter on “the reception of the councils, from Nicaea to Constantinople II” contains ample lessons for our times about the delicate interplay between the councils, the see of Rome, and the people. The one on “the doctrine of religious freedom” illustrates the crooked lines of doctrinal development. Another, under the interesting heading, “the magisterium of the Church and the magisterium of history,” paves the way toward a better distinction between infallibility and indefectibility.

The issue of the relationship between historical data and magisterial documents returns in part 2 which is focused on the contemporary operation of the magisterium (185–280). Here, S. examines for historical accuracy some recent pronouncements of the Congregation for the Doctrine of Faith and some statements by the International Theological Commission. He gives his findings under telling subtitles: “ambivalent and regrettable silences” (199), “forcing a text beyond its intended meaning” (201), and “the normative character of a pleasant status quo hastily asserted” (204). He takes a critical look at the state of collegiality and concludes: “The theoretical conversion of the Catholic Church to the doctrine of collegiality and synodality has been accomplished. . . . But as we observe the events, we must admit that this conversion has never brought results in deeds” (258).

To turn to part 3 (281–311) is like moving from a somber landscape into a clearing full of light: it describes a “new type of magisterium,” une nouvelle figure demanded by our age. “For a long time, the ecclesiastical magisterium addressed itself to the Christian people as an adult speaks to a child. . . . Today and tomorrow the magisterium must speak to adults who are capable of reflecting and judging, in a climate of trust and mutual good
“faith” (294). John Paul II sensed this when in his Encyclical Ut unum sint he appealed for help to find a new way of exercising papal primacy. Of course, if such a “conversion” is desirable in the highest office, a fortiori it is needed in subordinate offices.

S. has helped us to advance in understanding the magisterium, but no true scholar in theology would ever pretend to have uttered the final word about an institution so rooted in mystery. Good studies open up new vistas and prompt new questions. Let me, therefore, point to some connected problems worthy of attention. We respect the magisterium because it is sustained by the Spirit of God, but what is the precise nature of this assistance? Does it extend to administrative offices? Further, what are the moral duties of the magisterium to consult God’s people, to listen to the Spirit through the people? If such duties exist, should the Church create some constitutional norms and structures to facilitate the necessary communications? Again, as new and difficult questions are emerging especially in the field of morality, could the Church ever say “We do not know” and provide only prudent guidance and no “definitive” statement, pending further study and reflection? Could the pilgrim Church serve the truth in such a manner? There is still a broad field to be explored.

The Church is an organic body; it lives and grows by the mutual exchanges of gifts and services among the members. In this book, S. brings forth and offers a well-informed and thoughtfully composed “intelligence of faith” concerning the magisterium. It has the potential to enrich the Church and the magisterium itself.

Georgetown University Law Center, Washington  LADISLAS ORSY, S.J.


The book is a follow-up to Dupuis’s Towards A Christian Theology of Religious Pluralism (1977). It aims to offer a more popular presentation of his reflections on the same themes. However, it takes into account the many critical reviews of the earlier book as well as the document Dominus Iesus and the Notification (on his book) published by the Vatican Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith. D. explains in a postscript that, although he was not here formally responding to these documents—he had finished writing this book before their publication—nevertheless their concerns were very much on his mind, since he was at that time dialoguing with the Congregation on the same ideas.

The book is a good presentation of D.’s theology of religious pluralism. After a positive section on the theology of religions in the New Testament, he moves to the Second Vatican Council and the teaching of the magisterium, particularly that of John Paul II, as well as to contemporary theological research. He then presents his own theology by reflecting on the
salvific plan of God, the role of the different religions in salvation, the unique place of Jesus Christ, and the sacramental function of the Church. Two chapters on the practice of interreligious dialogue and interreligious prayer conclude the book.

D. takes a clear stand on three key issues in the theology of religions. He insists that the other religions have a positive role in the salvific plan of God—they are not merely stepping stones fulfilled and superseded by Christianity. Second, the action of the Word of God in the world is distinct, though not separate, from the action of Jesus Christ, the incarnate Word. This is true, not only before and after, but also during the presence of Jesus on this earth. Finally, the Spirit of God is also an independent source of action, though related to the Father and the Word in trinitarian communion. These clarifications are welcome, even though D. does not draw out their implications for a new understanding of ecclesiology, Christology, and Trinity. As a matter of fact he falls back on traditional formulations.

One wonders then why the Congregation was apprehensive of D.’s theology. Perhaps the Congregation suspected that these positions would eventually lead further than D. himself wants to go. That may be why it warned him, without condemning him.

Let us look at D.’s Christology. He distinguishes, without separating, the Word from its incarnate manifestation. Panikkar and other Asian theologians had earlier done the same. But D. keeps on repeating that Jesus Christ is the constitutive mediator of salvation, distinguishing “constitutive” from “absolute” and “relative.” God alone is absolute. Jesus Christ is not relative to any other mediator, since all other mediation is participative. The constitutive role of Jesus then boils down to Jesus and his paschal mystery being the instrumental efficient cause of the salvation of all human beings (312, 391). The members of other religions are saved by Jesus Christ even without their knowing and acknowledging him. Rahner had said this long ago. This is very traditional teaching. For D., the action of the Word and the role of the Spirit do not really qualify or change this fundamental affirmation.

D. makes no effort to explain how Jesus Christ relates to the members of other religions. In the beginning of the book he refers to two ways of theologizing: from above and from below. While he starts from below, at a certain stage he jumps up and comes from above (297). One would have expected a dialectic correlation rather than a jump. The Johannine reflection was, after all, from below, and one could still engage in conversation with John.

The participative mediation of other religions is explained as their necessary role in human salvation due to the bodily and social nature of human beings. Rahner had also said this much earlier. But then in what does the “ordination” of the other religions to the Church consist? Is it simply in the mind or will of God? Is it not enough to relate the other religions to the kingdom? D. opts for an inclusive pluralism: pluralism insofar as the religions have a role in the salvific plan of God; inclusive insofar as Jesus is the
constitutive mediator and the religions are ordained to the Church. This vision is more inclusive than pluralistic.

However, the distinction between the Word and the Word incarnate is pregnant with new possibilities in the theology of religions.

Institute for Dialogue with Cultures and Religions, Chennai, India
MICHAEL AMALADOSS, S.J.


As the subtitle indicates, the essays in this volume respond to Pope John Paul II’s surprising invitation in his encyclical Ut unum sint to a “patient and fraternal” dialogue about the ways his office might better serve the Church and its visible unity. The authors enter the conversation from rather diverse traditions, including Anglican, Roman Catholic, Lutheran, Methodist, and Evangelical. The pope’s invitation leads not simply to suggestions for the reform of papal primacy but impel several of the authors to subject their own traditions to critical scrutiny.

From an Anglican perspective, Stephen Sykes exposes and examines the skittishness of theologians to face the issue of authority head-on. He argues that to use “service” as a substitute for “authority” represents “a dangerous form of disguise” (69). The exercise of power and authority, by whatever name, will be exercised and therefore need to be carefully delimited. Within the Anglican communion, Sykes points out, there is an increasing recognition of the more specific need, in carefully circumscribed situations and conditions, to make binding decisions regarding matters of faith, polity, and ethics. At the same time, he argues that Rome needs to be equally forthcoming by using sociological tools to assess the bureaucracy which the exercise of papal primacy involves. From a Methodist perspective, Geoffrey Wainwright goes even further by entertaining the paradox of the possibility that a Roman institution may be needed to preserve Protestant communions. A Roman magisterium, he suggests, may be “the best safeguard against the dissolution of our own Protestant tradition(s)” (93).

The most far-reaching and profound explorations—both critical and constructive—are presented in the Lutheran contribution to this volume. David Yeago focuses on the often neglected missionary dimension that pervades Ut unum sint. He suggests that if Lutheran communions are to consider papal primacy seriously, they would have to recover a biblical sense of witness. This would in turn require a recovery of a robust notion of truth, which has been eroded, he argues, by a preoccupation with confessional identity. The fixation on identity transforms the Church from a witness to truth into an agency for the consolation of the faithful or simply into a service provider. Moreover, he suggests that we translate Vatican II’s
affirmation of real but imperfect communion into a practical “real but imperfect pastoral relationship” (122) involving the papacy. Appealing to the U.S. Lutheran-Catholic dialogue, which raised the possibility of “magisterial mutuality,” Yeago proposes that, on weighty matters of faith and practice, Lutheran communions make it a regular practice to seek “the advice and counsel of the Holy See” (121). Providing the historical framework for these essays, Brian Daley presents a fine survey of the development of the papacy, on the basis of which he raises critical questions about areas of papal primacy that need reform. From an entirely different perspective, Richard Mouw offers thought-provoking Evangelical reflections on the theme. He points to the interesting phenomenon that “Evangelicals have always had more affinity with Catholic views of authority than with the perspective of liberal Protestantism” (129). While objecting to liberalism’s reductionism, however, Evangelicals continue to be wary of what might be called Roman Catholic expansionism, as articulated in the Marian dogmas. Furthermore, Mouw voices Evangelical concerns about the tendency in ecumenical discourse to allow ecclesiology to overshadow, if not displace, other theological questions.

Ironically, the more “fraternal” the relationship, the more difficult “patient” dialogue becomes. George Weigel gives the reader a sample of intra-Roman Catholic polemics by taking issue with Archbishop John Quinn’s call for reform of the papacy. As often happens in polemics, here too the critic claims the theological high ground for his position, while denigrating the proposals of the “opponent.” In this case Weigel presents himself as the defender of the essentially sacramental structure of the Church and relegates Quinn’s proposals to the realm of the political. Quinn’s insightful reflections on papal reform deserve a far more patient hearing.

While even the sample of intra-Catholic polemics is illuminating, the principal value of this volume lies in the ways in which the question of primacy engenders, among and within diverse traditions, penetrating discussions concerning the interrelated issues of authority, truth, unity, and mission.

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GEORGE VANDERVELDE


Eberhard Jüngel has always been, on this side of the Atlantic at any rate, the least known of the contemporary triumvirate of German Protestant theologians. In contrast to Moltmann and Pannenbger, his steadfast refusal of any engagement with English-language scholarship combined with his difficult prose and forbidding scholarship have given him a more distant and lofty profile. Fortunately, the steady work of interpreters and transla-
tors (of whom John Webster, who introduces the volume under review, is unquestionably the most distinguished) has over time brought English-speaking readers a little closer to this Gelehrter of the old school. But the most striking circumstance affecting J.’s reception has been his relative silence since the late seventies, especially in the light of the large-scale and important dogmatic productions of Moltmann and Pannenberg.

Against this background the appearance of a work of some 300 pages on justification calls for comment. First of all, we do not have here the first installment of the long-awaited systematic opus. Written on a more popular level, the book is explicitly intended for the pastor or thoughtful layperson, though not surprisingly no concessions are made to the uneducated or intellectually lazy. Second, its emergence is the result of a conjunction of events in German ecumenical discussion—a story outlined in the various prefaces of the three editions of the book (which have appeared in very quick succession). Basically, a much-anticipated joint declaration on justification published by the Lutheran World Alliance and the Vatican called forth from J. a dismayed response (entitled, tellingly, “For God’s Sake—Clarity!” [1997]). This indictment of what he saw as the strategic ambiguities and dangerous concessions of the document touched off a very public debate in Germany, with defenders and detractors of the joint declaration producing a stream of articles both scholarly and popular, ecclesiastical and secular. The first edition of Justification appeared in 1998. It was intended not as a rehash of the debate but as an attempt to reassert once and for all the central place occupied by the doctrine of justification as understood by the reformers (especially Luther) and to defend this centrality from various Catholic and Protestant misunderstandings.

The reader familiar with the author’s previous work will not find much new here, but he or she will find a highly intriguing synthesis of J.’s soteriological reflections laid before a broad audience with passion and precision. He rescues very well the doctrine of justification from more one-sided interpretations that have hindered its proper reception, such as those who suggest a crudely “legalistic” or “forensic” reduction of soteriology, or those who give the doctrine an excessively psychological orientation that isolates it from its basic trinitarian and christological roots. In so doing, he strives to show the theological rationale behind the original concepts used by the Reformers even as he rephrases their language with concepts informed by recent trinitarian theology and theological anthropology.

In this recasting of the original Reformation positions the book is most successful. The treatment of the “exclusive” articles (by faith alone, by grace alone, etc.) is particularly exhilarating, as it weaves them together into one complex clarification of the doctrine’s import. The understanding of justification as a kind of “meta-doctrine” designed to shape and determine all other loci is a helpful understanding of its centrality. And J.’s suggestive reflections on relationality as the master concept for understanding God, humanity, sin, and salvation brilliantly extend a motif at the heart of his theology. Also helpful is the acute analysis of recent arguments that either question the centrality of the doctrine or assert its basic com-
patibility with official Catholic definitions. J. devotes considerable effort to clarifying just where the differences still remain between official Catholic dogma and where they may be safely laid aside; the results are both fascinating and genuinely ecumenical in their fairness and earnestness. But he correctly states that the all-too-clear condemnations emerging directly out of the 16th-century disputes and fixed at Trent still weigh heavily on the recent, more conciliatory positions of many Roman theologians.

Overall, the strengths of the book are what one might expect from a work by J. It is richly informed by the primary literature and the classical traditions of theology. Heuristic philosophical concepts appear but, as befits a more popular effort, are introduced judiciously and with a light touch. One never fails to catch the powerful theological mind at work. The weaknesses, too, are not unexpected. If a work is not in Latin or German, do not expect to find reference to it. The organization of the book is less than helpful, resulting in some meandering and repetition. The book is perhaps better seen as a collection of treatises than as a single monograph. But anyone interested in the contemporary ecumenical discussion of justification or in the contemporary relevance of the doctrine must reckon with this book: it is, if not the last word, an undeniably important intervention in the discussion.

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PAUL DEHART


The book’s title led me to expect a treatment of the individual mysteries of the life of Christ in Rahner’s theology. Batlogg’s goal, however, is different and no less valid, namely, to show the place that the mysteries of Christ’s life have in Rahner’s systematic theology. In this sense the book is an exercise in fundamental theology.

The book has many strengths. It gives important background to the development of Rahner’s theology, showing, for example, the influences of his teachers on him and situating him within the context of some of the controversies of his youth. Reading this book in conjunction with Karl Neufeld’s biography of the Rahner brothers (Die Brüder Rahner, 1994) provides very helpful background for understanding Rahner’s thought. One of the principal aims of the present study is to show the influences of Ignatius of Loyola’s Spiritual Exercises on Rahner. B. argues that Rahner’s systematic theology is an attempt to draw out the theological implications of the Exercises. Rahner’s theology is, pace some of his critics, highly christological, and this quality fits the pattern of the Exercises where the second, third, and fourth weeks are devoted to the mysteries of Christ’s life.

Just as Ignatius trusted the experience of the exercitant, so Rahner wanted a theology based in experience. Toward the end of his life he wrote,
“Of fundamental importance for me and my theology is the givenness of a genuine, original experience of God and of his Spirit. This logically, even if not temporally, precedes all theological reflection and verbalization and is never overtaken adequately by such reflection” (108). One thinks here of how Ignatius in the annotations to the Exercises (no. 15) argues that God deals directly with each person. Rahner translates this direct dealing in terms of a graced transcendence as the presupposition for all discernment.

B. shows how Rahner as early as 1939 planned a new type of dogmatics inspired by the Exercises. In Theological Investigations, volume 1, he returns to this proposal with an outline for a future dogmatics. Even if Rahner never actually wrote his dogmatics, the inspiration of the Exercises is powerfully felt in such resources as Lexikon fur Theologie und Kirche (LThK) as well as Mysterium Salutis. In LThK, Rahner asserts five fundamental principles for a theology of the mysteries of Christ’s life: (1) all events of Jesus’ life are mysteries; (2) his entire life is directed to and united in his death and Resurrection; (3) Jesus accepted his life with its lowness, worldliness, and finitude as given by the Father; (4) the clearest expression of the dimension of mystery is found in the paschal mystery; (5) precisely in the concrete and contingent events of his life Jesus reveals himself as the pattern of our human existence.

A particularly interesting part of the book is the historical exposition of the renewal of the liturgy by the Benedictine school headed by Odo Casels. The central concept here is the “mysteries.” B. explains the conflict between the Benedictine and the Jesuit schools of thought, the Jesuits favoring the God of history, the Benedictines the exalted Christ, Christ worshipped in the Spirit in the liturgy. Rahner himself, however, was sympathetic to Casels.

The central point that emerges in this study is that for Rahner the events of Christ’s life are our access to the divine. They are mysteries in the strict sense of embodying the Mystery; they are essentially theophanous. By entering into them we are led into the mystery of God. Christian faith is fundamentally surrender to Christ. The Christian finds in the life of Christ the definitive experience of God in history. The Christian surrenders to these mysteries in faith and is led into the depths of the divine. Human beings are a graced openness to God, but human transcendence finds its historical correlate in the mysteries of Christ’s life. Rahner is at pains to show that these mysteries are not just moral examples, the subject of pious meditation. They are the foundation of Christian existence. The Christian embodies in his or her life the mysteries of Christ’s life. Christ is the archetype or Urbild; we are the image or Abbild.

I found much to be learned in this text. B. shows beyond doubt how one cannot do justice to Rahner’s theology without situating it within the context of his religious order in general and Ignatian spirituality in particular.

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JOHN O’DONNELL, S.J.
This is the first volume of what is planned as a series of theological dictionaries that will make available in English the contents of the third edition of the *Lexikon für Theologie und Kirche*. Each volume will contain the articles that pertain to a specific theme. The first half of the present volume consists of the *Lexikon*’s biographical entries on the popes and antipopes; the second half contains articles on the theological, canonical, and institutional aspects of the papacy.

Perhaps the best way to comment on the first half of this volume is to compare it with the *Oxford Dictionary of Popes* (1988) by J. N. D. Kelly. The biographical entries translated from the *Lexikon* are generally quite brief, and give the basic facts in rather dry fashion. Kelly’s entries are usually two or three times as long, and are written in a narrative style that makes them quite readable as brief biographies. The bibliographies in the volume being reviewed are more detailed and up to date than Kelly’s; in fact they have been updated for this dictionary, with the addition of important books and articles published since the appearance of the third edition of the *Lexikon*. This factor will make this new *Dictionary of Popes* more useful than Kelly’s for scholarly consultation.

In commenting on the second half of the Dictionary, I shall limit myself to some articles that will be of greater interest to readers of this journal. The section of the article, “Council, Ecumenical” that treats historical development is written by the foremost authority on the question, Hermann Josef Sieben. In his article, “Infallibility,” Wolfgang Beinert follows the development of belief in papal infallibility that led to its definition at Vatican I, and then observes that a process of “creeping infallibility” began after that council and has continued after Vatican II. He offers the following explanation of the recent development whereby the pope “confirms” a doctrine as taught infallibly by the ordinary universal magisterium. “The pope does not possess an ‘infallible’ ordinary magisterium; if, however, he proclaims a doctrine with the intention to define it and meets no objection on the part of the bishops, the impression can arise that the episcopacy agrees with the contents of the doctrine and with its definitive quality, considering it to belong to their own ordinary magisterium—such a doctrine would de facto count as infallible, and the pope would only need to confirm that this was the case” (202). I have two observations: (1) I think that the phrase, “with the intention to define it,” should read: “with the intention of speaking definitively.” (2) I do not think that the mere lack of objection by the bishops to a statement made by the pope would satisfy the conditions laid down by Vatican II for the infallible teaching of the ordinary universal magisterium.

Beinert also wrote the article on the power of the keys, which he explains as a metaphor for the spiritual authority that comes from Christ to the community of faith. While this power usually refers to the authority of
office-bearers, he says that “the members of the Church share in the power of the keys to the extent that this is necessary on the basis of their link to Christ; hence in certain circumstances those who are not office-bearers may have this power, in order to impart spiritual consolation” (207).

The article “Papacy, Pope” is a brief history of the papacy written by three church historians: Klaus Schatz (“Concept and Origin,” “Ancient Church”), Bernard Schimmelpfennig (“Middle Ages”), and Georg Schwaiger (“Modern Period”). Another volume of this series will have the articles of the Lexikon that treat specific phases of this history.

The article on the primacy consists of four parts: “History of Theology” and “Systematic Theology” both by Beinert; “Canon Law” by Peter Krämer, and “Ecumenical Perspectives” by representatives of four other churches: Peter Plank (Orthodox), Harding Meyer (Lutheran), Alan Falconer (Reformed), and Christopher Hill (Anglican). In his treatment of the systematic theology of primacy, Beinert builds on the notion of the Petrine ministry, on which he also contributed the article in this volume. Here he accents the structural identity between the Petrine ministry and its realization in the historical primacy, seeing the former as the criterion against which the exercise of the latter is to be judged. He also insists that the primacy must promote not only unity but also catholicity, which means the principles of collegiality, subsidiarity, and the plurality of forms of theological thought.

The volume contains one article that is not in the Lexikon but was written for the English version of this Dictionary: “Vatican-U.S. Relations” by Gerald P. Fogarty.

I have found one misprint: on p. 258 “his in sacris Pastor” should read “his in terris Pastor.”

In general, the articles in this part of the Dictionary are of the quality that scholars have come to expect from the Lexikon für Theologie und Kirche. Some readers may still prefer to consult the second edition of the Lexikon, where one can read the articles on the same topics mentioned here, written by H. Jedin, A. Lang, H. Vorgrimler, K. Rahner, and J. Ratzinger. However, the second edition does not reflect the developments that took place at Vatican II or in its aftermath, nor does it have the up-to-date bibliographies that contribute so much to the value of this Dictionary. The new Encyclopedia of Theology and Church should prove very useful.

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Francis A. Sullivan, S.J.


The burgeoning field of virtue theory has, in the last two decades, revitalized theological ethics and led to a recasting of many traditional catego-
ries and concepts. It has reinvigorated debates about the nature of the good, has reemphasized the significance of moral character, and has reestablished community as an important moral category. Yet in all these discussions, as Langston emphasizes, conscience is seriously neglected. In fact, his assessment is that the modern concept of conscience has in effect been relegated to the realm of fiction and cut off from all discussions of virtue ethics. One of the aims of his study, then, is to reintroduce the concept of conscience to the field of virtue ethics and to argue for both its necessity and appropriateness within this approach.

L.’s concern, however, goes beyond the neglect of conscience in virtue ethics. He rightly draws attention to the fact that discussions about conscience have been virtually absent from philosophical discourse in the 20th century. Indeed this contemporary dismissal of conscience is the interesting focus of his part 2. Having mapped in the earlier chapters the developments that led to the tendency to regard conscience as a faculty, L. argues, quite convincingly, that it is primarily this identification of conscience as a faculty that has led to its neglect. L. is aware, however, that other concepts such as will, intellect, and memory, which also were regarded as distinct faculties, survived beyond the demise of the concept of faculty. So, although L. retains his conviction that the abandonment of the analytic usefulness of faculty psychology laid the ground for the subsequent neglect of conscience, he also looks elsewhere to explain why conscience is ignored.

Part 1 is undoubtedly the highlight of the book. Here L.’s concern is far more than historical. Through his engagement with particular historical texts he begins to build an understanding of conscience that is firmly situated within the virtue tradition. Particularly in the chapters devoted to medieval theologians he argues for an account of conscience as relational and dynamic, one that draws on both the intellectual and affective aspects of the person and one that enjoys a special, although not fully delineated relationship, with practical reason. In an engaging excursus through ancient and medieval scholarship, L. retrieves aspects of the thought especially of Aristotle, Bonaventure, Scotus, and Ockham in the pursuit of an adequate account of conscience. Of particular significance for the later part of his work is his assertion that, especially in the ethical theories he discusses, the role of conscience is inextricably linked with the virtues. The precise nature of this link, however, he does not fully discuss. At times he seems to suggest that the development of conscience and the development of the virtues can be regarded as analogous. At other times he suggests that they are interdependent “entities.”

Having discussed the fracturing of the fragile connection between conscience and the virtues in part 2, L. attempts to retrieve and enhance this connection in part 3. However, if I have a criticism of this otherwise excellent book, it is with L.’s failure to advance these connections substantially. Instead of developing the interesting thesis he has built in the earlier parts, L. shifts his attention to an evaluation of virtue ethics in general. His assessment of virtue ethics is astute. In particular, the chapter, “Conscience Among Virtue Ethicists,” advances many aspects of the scholarly debates
about virtue. But his criticisms of virtue ethics, although contributing significantly to the debates, do not themselves make the case for the reapropriation of conscience. One suspects that competing but related interests have led L. to focus on discussions that, while important, do little to develop his central concern.

The book’s intriguing title whets our appetite. In the early section of the book, with perceptive historical analysis, L. argues convincingly for a special affinity between conscience and virtue ethics. He also identifies themes within some medieval accounts of conscience and of the virtues that may be important in the articulation of a renewed account of conscience. But we must await a further work from L. to see this insightful and original thesis fully developed.

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LINDA HOGAN


It is both an extraordinary privilege and a horrible burden to live through the middle of a theological maelstrom, to be caught up in the vortex of ecclesiastical debate as the Church struggles to discern the mind of Christ on a particular issue. All of us in one way and another are affected by the Catholic Church’s internal deliberations around issues of sexuality—we may be the subjects of those discussions or they impact upon us because they influence public policy and governance. As Jung notes in her introduction the Church needs help in how to discern genuine developments of moral theology during this process.

This volume certainly provides such a help. It consists of an excellent collection of essays all of which adopt the impeccably Catholic methodology of bringing “the tradition”—in this case recent magisterial teaching on sexuality and, more specifically, homosexuality—into dialogue with other sources of knowledge. James P. Hanigan clearly articulates the magisterium’s position on the inseparable link between the unitive and procreative in sexual relationships and the literal non-sense that this makes of homosexual relationships. Many of the other essays demonstrate, sometimes consciously and sometimes not, how hopelessly modern and unrooted in tradition the Vatican’s theology of sexuality is. Susan A. Ross argues that Pope John Paul II’s development of a nuptial anthropology bears little resemblance to the use of the same imagery in the ancient tradition. Whereas the pope uses it to undergird his theology of complementarity which relies on essential differences between the sexes, ancient theologians in fact used it to emphasise the fluidity of gender. Jung exposes the Vatican’s desire to establish the original meaning of certain biblical passages as part of the Enlightenment quest, and a number of prominent biblical scholars demonstrate the dangers of applying biblical teaching that assumes an
embedded, social self existing in a hierarchically ordered cosmos to a Western contemporary context that constructs the self, the universe, and gender very differently.

In many respects this book covers a lot of old ground, but it does so in a comprehensive and sober manner that will make it a valuable resource to students of Catholic moral theology. It is useful to have in one volume an excellent discussion of the debate on homosexuality in the behavioral sciences, Cristina Traina’s reflections on her own experience of marriage in relation to Vatican teaching, and scholarly reflection on the biblical basis of church documents.

What I found frustrating was that only one essay, that by David T. Ozar, suggested that perhaps one of the causes of the stalemate between the Vatican and liberals within the Catholic Church might be the fact that they are both using categories of sexual identity that have no basis in the Christian tradition. Homosexuality and heterosexuality are not “Catholic” concepts, and perhaps that has something to do with the fact that in Christ there is no male or female, that gender has no ultimate value. Foucault and Butler are strangely absent as dialogue partners in this volume, which is odd considering Foucault’s work on the ascetic self. Both conservatives and liberals have lost sight of a tradition that regarded gender as fluid and desire as ultimately oriented to the divine. This tradition might have something exciting and radical to teach us and the wider world that would propel us all out of the scotosis and scotoma that Longeran diagnosed and that Jon Nilson explores in this volume.

It is easy to get bored with the endless discussion of sexuality in the Church, but while men and women are murdered for being gay and raped and marginalized and discriminated against, we cannot give up the theological struggle. We have to keep wrestling with the issues and in charity with each other. This book contains some of the best wrestling I have read in a long time.

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ELIZABETH STUART


The book’s central claim is that the original “gospel” of Jesus was the prophetic announcement of a religion of pure immediacy, or what Cupitt has for some time been referring to as “kingdom religion.” The narrative tale here is one of the constant contest of this kingdom religion against the dark and imposing metaphorical tower of “ecclesiastical religion,” a battle which has been unsuccessful from the kingdom perspective because of the progressive consolidation of power by “orthodoxy.” The more powerful this institutional form of religion becomes, the more dishonest and paranoid it becomes with itself and with its own resentment, resulting in an
ultimately self-deceptive “phobic moralism” (3). “Church Christianity’s” time is up, and its long-called-for recognition of its provisional role as making way for the spontaneous, intuitive religion of “life” is well past due. No longer can Christianity be taken seriously if its central imperative is to “work quietly and unobtrusively” [sic], but only if it reappears in the form of the kingdom exhortation to “Go the whole hog: be conspicuous” (55).

Much of this argument will not be new to C.’s readers, and he develops themes he has been expounding in his last several books. Indeed, much of this argument is not new at all in the history of philosophy and theology over the last several centuries (as C. is aware). Nonetheless, the familiar notion of return to an original pure essence of Christianity is at once called for (10) and disclaimed (3). Thus C. has allied himself theologically and institutionally to the Protestant liberalism of Robert Funk and John Shelby Spong (Reforming Christianity is offered by Polebridge Press, the publishing arm of Funk’s Westar Institute, the sponsoring body of the Jesus Seminar). Despite being “in many ways very close” to these figures, C. criticizes them for assuming that all that is to be done is to “replace a lot of untrue and morally objectionable doctrines with a smaller set of true and morally edifying doctrines” (73). No, C. replies, we are finished with doctrine altogether.

Of course, the reader is constantly bombarded with a fusillade of generalizations and oversimplifications, which are never quite spelled out, particularly C.’s central metaphor “life,” which for him is the religious object. The refusal to give flesh to his terms is at once the deliberate persuasive modus behind C.’s rhetorical strategy and its liability. Perhaps the most conspicuous example of this is C.’s use of “Jesus,” who appears throughout the book as the synecdochic canonization of liberal society. Despite this attempt to “save Jesus,” one is still left, not with the non-divine “historical Jesus,” but with C.’s apolitical, lifeless “man who might be right” (135). In the end, there is only a picture.

Little could be said about this book that has not already been said about C.’s previous works. His rhetoric is powerful and seductive, sometimes irritating and belligerent, occasionally witty and compelling, always passionate and often quite personal. His writing is motivated by the urgent imperative that if “Christianity” is going to survive, it must, paradoxically, become truly evangelical: it must abdicate its position as “salvation machine” (123), and finally allow the eschatological arrival of the kingdom of immanence. However, we are left with a vision of a religion of immediacy, itself mediated through mythological constructions and renarrations of the past which we can never wholly escape.

The suggestion throughout is that kingdom religion is the truly scriptural form of Christianity (34, 75), thus duplicating a kind of Protestant literalism that C. claims to be overcoming. Indeed, the “site” of the kingdom is no longer the Church, but the state, which is far more capable of realizing Jesus’ prophetic message of immanent, immediate, intuitive, visionary, beliefless, egalitarian, ecumenical, and global presence. “Why,” he asks, “is
God pictured as helping a few miraculously, but not as helping all routinely in the way the state does?” (67). Thus C. locates the most authentic, though partial, realization of the “kingdom” not in ecclesiastical Christianity, but in “America.”

This latter is defined not in terms of “puritanism and pietism,” but as “a beacon land that is not only post-ecclesiastical, but therewith is also ‘pentecostal’ and post-national; a new kind of society, built on the idea of freedom” (116). C.’s America is a utopian dreamland of liberalism. But how true a picture is this? Cannot this representation be described as a “myth invented by the powerful by way of consolidating and extending their power” (3)? The presumptuous fiction of its eschatological arrival cannot pretend to be innocent of a particular kind of political libido. For even “America,” whatever it may have to recommend it in C.’s account, is an idea, and even a polity that has yet to be realized.

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PETER CANDLER


The volume’s 14 essays showcase specialized research of art historians, historians, American studies and religious studies scholars, and museum curators. All contributors participated in a three-year collaborative project exploring “visual culture of American religion.” The multi-year collaboration, funded through the Henry Luce Foundation, sought appropriate methodologies for addressing an overarching question: “How does religion happen materially?” (16). Of principal concern is dislodging “visual culture” from the historical category of illustration to that of primary evidence. The methodologies of cultural studies and social and art history dominate in the essays’ “critical analysis and interpretation of religious images, objects, and buildings embedded in the social practices of public and private life” (17).

Three categories—“public identity,” “construction of meaning,” and “American modernity”—organize the analyses of “religious visual culture.” Topics include Protestant visual culture in text books, Bibles, and paintings, spatial presences of the National Shrine of the Immaculate Conception and a Presbyterian urban church, contemporary reconfiguring of Catholic icons, Jewish New Year postcard illustrations, New Mexican santos in mass consumer culture, Sioux Sun Dance paintings, the hermetic tradition, Enlightenment renderings of oracular deceptions, and African American religious imaging of railroads. The diversity of these essays confirms religious visual culture as evidentiary resource for a variety of academic disciplines.

Certain authors prove more adept at maintaining the visual as the central focus of their analysis. David Morgan deftly analyzes common-school
reader illustrations in the complex connections between literacy and Protestant republican ideology in the national period. Building upon Jenny Franchot’s work and borrowing from ritual studies, John Davis examines the interplay between Protestant visual depictions of Catholic scenes and the public exhibition of that art as Protestant forays into the alluring and repulsive Catholic world. Illustrations on Jewish New Year postcards provide Ellen Smith with visual evidence of “an emerging modern American Judaism” (248) and women’s ambiguous role in that emergence. In John Giggie’s engaging essay, the railroad emerges as multivalent vision of site, means, and even sound of racial oppression and emancipation, redemptive possibilities and dangers in African American religious practice after 1865.

A particularly suggestive essay is Claire Farago’s on the interchange between mass produced religious items and regionally produced New Mexican santos. She nuances the interaction of multiple cultures in the religious lives of the laity. Yet, this essay, like Tom Tweed’s on the National Shrine of the Immaculate Conception among others, introduces topics too broad for an essay-length treatment and therefore proves less than satisfactory in its critical analysis. A few, such as Stewart Hoover’s lone essay on television, provide little more than narrowly focused descriptions.

Noticeably missing in the interdisciplinary interchange are essays with explicitly theological frameworks. Two that touch upon the theological are Erika Doss’s consideration of Robert Gober’s reconfiguration of familiar Marian iconography to challenge Catholic exclusions of gays and Leigh Schmit’s consideration of Elihu Vedder’s visual renderings of God’s silence in the wake of Enlightenment rationality. None use sacramental or analogical approaches to consider “How does religion happen materially?” (16). Of course, as the text’s introduction suggests, recognizing religion, let alone theology, as a significant source for scholarly inquiry, introduces a novel element within many of these academic disciplines.

The other lingering methodological question centers on the instability of the visual in the multivalent worlds of religious practices. Even in these essays, a scholar’s words sometime overtake the visual, or the author’s methodologically informed view intermittently overshadows those of the viewers whom the author is considering. The visual’s evanescence and its power to shape the religious certainly make it a source of endless fascination and of methodological challenge. This collection provides one of the more notable contributions in defining this new field of studies.

Several other features commend this book. Each essay includes black and white reproductions of the visual culture discussed. Key color reproductions appear in a center insertion. Copious endnotes (nearly a quarter of the text) ensure identification of those references of interest. A selected bibliography and listing of important collections of religious visual culture offer ample resources to those interested in further research.

This publication, supported through a separate Lilly Foundation grant, serves the project’s broader aim to provide innovative resources for research and teaching in classroom and museum settings. Selected essays could enhance upper level or graduate courses in American religion or

To risk a terse introductory summation of the present work, three citations of Endean’s own words will serve: (1) “God is transcendent, but must also somehow remain in the believer’s sight” (97). (2) “Ignatian discernment seeks to discover God’s will. It thus represents an epistemology, a theory of knowledge” (154). (3) “For Rahner the truth of Christianity involves our ongoing transformation . . . the unity of being and knowing” (251).

The book, a revised doctoral dissertation, unfolds around such ideas. Following a helpful (because not well-known) narrative about Rahner’s life and development, E. discusses Rahner’s concern with “the unthematic experience” of God and his intricate theory of knowledge dealing with how a person can be actually aware of transcendence. There follows another dense chapter discussing the experience of grace from perspectives based on the thought of four figures who deeply influenced Rahner—Ignatius Loyola, Thomas Aquinas, Immanuel Kant, and Joseph Maréchal. Here we meet the famous (and felicitous) idea of “quasi-formal causality,” created by Rahner himself to designate God’s gift of self as uncreated grace to the believer, and his equally famous “supernatural existential.” A chapter on Jerome Nadal in the thought of both Karl and Hugo Rahner further develops an exposition about the transcendent and the thematic in human experience. A chapter entitled “Transcendence Becoming Thematic” seeks to elucidate “the key Ignatian moment”—transcendence as the focus of awareness in the contemplation of the humanity of Christ (with a fitting tribute to Karl Barth for his contribution to this theme). In another chapter E. focuses on “Immediacy, Mediation, and Grounding,” where he interprets the relation of the transcendental to the categorical and wrestles with Rahner’s argument that the non-conceptual does not mean “non-linguistic”—a point that E. concedes is “highly problematic.” The Ignatian “Standard of Christ” is the subject of a chapter emphasizing that there must be something more than the immediate experience of God, and that something is the mediation of Jesus Christ as well as of the Church. This linking of Christology to ecclesiology is important both to Rahner and to Ignatius, and has been articulated by Rahner in some very “Rahnerese” language! Two chapters on decision and faith further develop the transcendent/thematic discussion. The final chapter, “Ignatius, Rahner, and Theology,” is a refreshingly simple essay compared to the rest of the book, and can stand on its own as a summary article—useful for those lacking time to read the whole volume. Finally, there is an appendix discussing the work of
Peter Knauer on Rahner, followed by an extensive bibliography. One further quote from E. himself can summarize the book: “On a Rahnerian reading of the Exercises, the Ignatian choice happens when a particular option stimulates a person or a group to appropriate more fully their identity as creatures of God and temples of grace” (232).

This volume certainly deserves a place in both Rahnerian and Ignatian scholarship for its deep probing of Rahner’s intellectual and spiritual contribution to theology and to the apostolate of the Ignatian Exercises. The emphasis, however, is definitely on scholarship: one might suggest that both the strength and the weakness of the book is that it synthesizes so much of Rahner’s theology with his study of Ignatius. That is, the book has immense value for scholars (who are no doubt E.’s intended readership), but only implied value for spiritual directors more concerned with mediating Ignatian spirituality to exercitants. Thus E. has left to others (or to himself?) a further challenge: to accurately popularize Rahner’s interpretation of Ignatius—a consummation devoutly to be wished, and not out of the realm of the possible. As E. himself notes, Rahner implicitly accomplished some of this directly spiritual work in such writings as Encounters with Silence (1964).

Institute of Jesuit Sources, St. Louis

CARL F. STARKLOFF, S.J.


When asked to name some of the greatest samples of Islamic mystical (Sufi) poetry, most people in the English-speaking world who know something about the subject are likely to point to Persian poets such as Rumi or Hafez. One of the few samples of Arabic Sufi poetry that has been well known in translation is Ibn al-‘Arabi’s Tarjuman al-ashwaq. That particular volume has recently been revived through a masterful translation of Michael Sells, published as Stations of Desire (2000). Now, thanks to the masterful translation of Th. Emil Homerin, we possess an English translation of another masterpiece of Arabic Sufi poetry, the works of Ibn al-Fārid (d. 632/1235).

H. had already established his scholarship on Ibn al-Fārid with the publication of From Arab Poet to Muslim Saint: Ibn al-Fārid, His Verse, and His Shrine (1994). That volume was a valuable study of Ibn al-Fārid’s poetics as well as the construction of his legacy, whereas the present volume is primarily a translation of Ibn al-Fārid’s most important works.

The volume features a short preface by the ever-insightful Michael Sells, followed by a 30-page introduction by H. This has been one of the characteristic features of Paulist’s Classics of Western Spirituality series, which allows scholars an opportunity to properly contextualize the life and writings of the figures at hand. The publisher is to be greatly complimented for
supplying text and context. In his introduction, H. establishes how Ibn al-Fārīd is rooted in both the Arabic poetic tradition and Islamic mystical teachings. While one could proceed to the translations directly, even informed scholars come away with new insights after this reading.

There follows translations of three works. The first two are by Ibn al-Fārīd himself, while the third is by his grandson. The first work is the *al-Khamriyah* (Wine Ode). H. astutely makes the connections between the imagery of intoxication here and the constant motif of *dhikr* (remembrance) of the beloved which is evident in many lines (1, 5–6, 11, 24) of the poem. As with many other Sufi poems that use the imagery of intoxication, the symbolism is made all the more potent when one recalls the injunctions against drinking wine in Islam.

The second work translated is the long *Nazm al-suluk* (Poem of the Sufi Way). The work is also referred to as *al-Ta‘iyyah al-kubra*, which H. nicely translates as “Ode in T Major.” A most welcome component of this translation is the facing page commentary provided by H. The notes are exceptionally helpful, pointing to insights that would be missed by the reader who does not have access to the Arabic original. This poem is one of the longest in Arabic poetry and surely worthy of the title “classic.”

The last treatise in the volume belongs not to Ibn al-Fārīd but rather to his maternal grandson, ‘Ali Sibt Ibn al-Fārīd. This work, titled *Dibajat al-Diwan* (Adorned Proem to the Diwan) is a clear attempt by the grandson of the poet to recast his ancestor as a Sufi saint by detailing Ibn al-Fārīd’s miracles, dreams of the Prophet Muhammad, and encounters with other Sufis. As H. documents, the later generations have often read Ibn al-Fārīd’s poetry in the light of this hagiography.

Overall H.’s translation is clear, lucid, even inspiring. Translating Sufi poetry is notoriously difficult, yet H. has managed to do great justice to Ibn al-Fārīd by offering us a rigorous and accurate translation that stands on its own apart from the Arabic original. Like all other volumes in the Classics of Western Spirituality series, the aim here has been to make the literature accessible primarily to an audience that does not read the original language. This, and so much more, H. gracefully accomplishes. All scholars of Islamic studies, Sufism, and Arabic literature are greatly indebted to him for this work.

The book, elegantly produced and very reasonably priced, is recommended for purchase by all research libraries, and could easily be used in a number of courses ranging from Islam, Sufism, Arabic literature, comparative mysticism, and comparative literature.

Apart from the individual merits of this particular volume, Paulist Press is to be congratulated on its ongoing commitment to producing scholarly yet accessible translations that bring together the mystical literature of the Islamic, Christian, and Jewish traditions under one umbrella. In today’s political climate where simplistic dichotomies of “Islam vs. West” are heard from people ranging from Usama bin Laden to Samuel Huntington, this exploration of the profound connections among various traditions (without
belittling the individual contexts and variations) is surely a most timely and much needed contribution.

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OMID SAFI


As a philosophical position, naturalism is associated especially with North American intellectual history, particularly with thinkers like John Dewey, Ernest Nagel, Sidney Hook, and (more recently) W. V. O. Quine. Nielsen situates himself within this tradition, although taking a critical stance toward some aspects of it. The purpose of the present work is twofold: (1) to lay out a consistent, nonscientific form of naturalism (“social naturalism”) that excludes reliance on supernatural or spiritual entities such as God, disembodied spirits, or souls; (2) to show that naturalism thus conceived provides a better alternative than religion to the understanding and valuing of human life and society.

There is much to recommend in N.’s pursuit of answers to the first question. In the first place, he rejects the claim that naturalism must be value-free. He likewise rejects the claim that “natural” is synonymous with “revealed by the methods of the natural sciences.” Moral and other kinds of values are for him supervenient on facts (i.e., there can be no moral difference without a factual difference), but they are not thereby reducible to facts. A consistent naturalism, however, must be atheistic: “Religions, whether theisms or not, are belief systems (though this is not all they are) that involve belief in spiritual realities. . . . A naturalist, if she is consistent, will not be an agnostic, but will be an atheist arguing, or at least presupposing, that theism is either false or incoherent or in some other way unbelievable” (30). Naturalistic arguments are enough to establish beyond any but nominal doubt the unreasonableness of religion.

There are problems that N. must deal with along the way. One, of course, is what he means by “nature” and “natural.” Given the intractability of this issue, the best he seems able to do is a negative characterization: nature does not include God, disembodied souls, purely mental phenomena, etc. This limitation is, however, not necessarily a bad thing, for N. is acutely aware that talk of “reality” without contextualization or limitation (the “really real”) is incoherent: “There is on such an account no one true description of the world, no one way we must look at the world or one way the world must look or one correct account of the world. . . . There are various accounts embedded in different practices answering to different interests and needs none of which are ‘closer to reality’ or more of a telling it like it is than the others” (443). Social naturalism, it seems, gives more than lip service to the complexity of human life and human relationships.

It is a bit difficult to reconcile this relaxed view of reality with N.’s unrelenting hostility toward religion, which he characterizes as incoherent
and irrational. On the one hand, he seems sensitive to the warnings of Wittgenstein and others about the danger of “super-concepts,” while at the same time insisting that there are straightforward context-free meanings to ideas such as “logical coherence,” “cognitive content,” and “metaphysics.” He continually, for example, accuses religion of being metaphysical, without giving any content to the term or even explaining why it should be a philosophical curse-word. He accuses religion of not being fallibilistic (acknowledging that future investigation might prove it wrong—a trait he claims for his own naturalistic atheism), without recognizing that to say that religious claims do not make such an acknowledgment is to make what Wittgenstein called a “grammatical remark”: it is the logical nature of such claims not to admit revisability on the basis of future experience. Truth and justification are not philosophical superconcepts either.

There is much to learn from this book. In spite of a good deal of repetition and a convoluted style (signs of a too-light editorial hand on material that has diverse sources, some of it previously published), it is an articulate and challenging statement of what a truly secular worldview would be like. Believers, at least those associated with mainline theologically sophisticated Christianity, may experience moments of unreality as they read the book. N. professes to find it “mind-boggling” (392) that there are sophisticated, scientifically literate, intelligent people who believe in God. Believers may find his boggled mind equally incomprehensible. But as N. realizes, mind-boggling aside, there are more important issues: “What is it to live a human life? What significance (if any) can there be to our lives? What sense (if any) does life have? How are we to live our lives together? . . . Can we . . . find, sustain, or create the social bonds to help keep our lives from being fragmented and alienating—from being just one damn thing after another? . . . [These] are the issues that we believers and secularists alike should be discussing” (400–401). To this believers can only respond, Amen!

Marquette University, Milwaukee

T. Michael McNulty, S.J.

Dever is unquestionably one of the most articulate American exponents of the relationship between modern archeological discoveries and the biblical texts. Because of his reputation and because the issue “does archaeology disprove the Bible” is more and more taken up in even the popular media (e.g., Harpers, March 2002: “False Testament: Archaeology Refutes Bible’s Claim to History”), this book is receiving wide publicity. Even if it cannot be enthusiastically recommended, it deserves to be considered here.

Readers will not be disappointed if they hope to find a helpful synthesis of recent archeological work and how it throws light on the books of the Bible, especially in the chapter, “Daily Life in Israel in the Time of the United Monarchy.” Scholars will on occasion note that some of D.’s scholarship needs up-
dating, as in his treatment of Asherah and Yahweh, but in general D. controls a remarkable amount of detailed data.

What renders the book difficult for the non-archeologist reader, however, is the constant polemic on those whom D. deems “revisionists.” So constant is this drumbeat attack on such noted archeologists as Israel Finkelstein that unless one has been party to the ongoing debate and is familiar with the personalities involved, the reader will be bewildered by the nasty diatribe that permeates most of this book. If the reader is able to dismiss the *ad hominem* rhetoric and stick to the meat of this study, there is much to offer, and there is nothing else on the market right now which pulls together so much material. The book is lavishly and very helpfully illustrated.

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Wong examines the theological concepts underlying Ezekiel’s messages of divine punishment and blessing. He disagrees with Klaus Koch and others who posit that in ancient Jewish thought there was such an automatic connection between deed and consequence that God did not have to be said to judge each incident. In his rebuttal W. asserts that Ezekiel was consistent in convicting his listeners for their sinful deeds and in exhorting them to see that God was just in his judgments of them. W. shows how Ezekiel relied on covenant principles (especially Sinai), on the complex spiritual logic of purity regulations in the Pentateuch, and on elementary poetic justice (appropriate punishments) as he outlined God’s ongoing struggles with his chosen people.

W. is especially effective in analyzing Ezekiel’s use of the purification theology in Leviticus and elsewhere. He lists every verbal parallel between Ezekiel and Leviticus 26, and shows the prophet’s insistence that moral impurity (involving sex, violence, or idolatry) defiles the Temple, the land, and the nation. Such defilement demands a resolution: its source must be cleansed or removed. The many references to someone being “cut off” imply either human or divine retribution. In fact there is a continuum between ritual and moral impurity. Some violations in each realm are contagious, so offenders need to be isolated, cut off, or exiled to prevent further defilement. The people can be morally reoriented only by God’s cleansing and moving of hearts (e.g., Ezek 9 and 36).

In analyzing passages that speak more simply of punishments fitting the crime (e.g., chaps. 5, 6, and 16) W. notes that in each case Ezekiel has God choose a specific course of retribution from possible alternatives. Thus the prophet’s audience has no prior certainty about the final punishment. This too demonstrates that the hypothesis of automatic consequences is inadequate.

W.’s frequent use of Hebrew and German will challenge general readers, but he is very clear in his analyses, explanations, cross-references, and summaries. He effectively advances our understanding of Ezekiel’s strong faith in God’s justice and mercy.

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This book is not a commentary on, but a study of, Paul’s letter to the Philippians from a sociological composition of the city of Philippi at the time of Paul. Oakes first builds a model of the social makeup both of the city and of the Church, modifying Bruce Malina’s model of the preindustrial city and making it fit the Greco-Roman city. This hy-

The authors represented in this volume seek to strengthen our contemporary reflection on children by examining concepts within the scope of Christian thought. Their research leads them to perceive that behind what appear to be stereotypical approaches to children as either inherently sinful or naturally good, or as having the potential for both good and evil, lie diverse and nuanced positions. These perspectives lead the authors to reevaluate broader Christian topics such as the nature of original sin, the meaning of baptism, and models of faith in relation to care for children. The authors also discover that child advocacy is not only a contemporary notion; it is central to Christian life from the beginning. The description of obligations of parents to their children and of the responsibilities of church, state, and community, as expressed in the New Testament and by theologians from John Chrysostom to contemporary feminist Bonnie Miller-McLemore, clearly represents a core model for all of Christian living.

Beyond this central purpose, the book takes readers on an enlightening journey. We meet and hear familiar favorite Thomas Aquinas struggle with infancy as the greatest challenge to his Aristotelian-Augustinian synthesis. We also encounter the equally complex struggle of the less known Menno Simons whose theology of children was poignantly developed at a time when their parents’ martyrdom rendered many Mennonite children orphans. We learn that in 18th-century Germany, Pietism’s August Francke promoted the education of all children as part of living out Christian love of neighbor.

One interesting, but disturbing, exploration presented is the encounter between Jesuit and Ursuline missionaries and the indigenous peoples of Eastern Canada. The missionaries found Native Americans indulgent to the point of neglect. Yet, by now-accepted principles of child psychology they were exceptionally perceptive about children’s needs. Since this major contribution to Christian thought about children is only one of two Catholic viewpoints (the other is Karl Rahner’s), it could possibly leave readers with a one-sided understanding of the Catholic tradition’s understanding of the child.
Altogether, this volume is indispensable reading for those wishing to expand their perceptions of the wide range of Christian thought. Each chapter is both informative and clearly written. The book should appeal to a wide audience.

JULIE DEJAGER WARD
DePaul University, Chicago


Lai and Brück’s original Buddhismus und Christentum: Geschichte, Konfrontation, Dialog (1997) is a monumental work of scholarship that reduces most other works in the nascent field of Buddhist-Christian studies to the status of undergraduate term papers. Orbis provides English-speaking readers with a tantalizing introduction. Only the foreword by Hans Küng, the largely historical Part A, and most of the conclusion of Part C (“Historical Difficulties [Hintergründe] and Hermeneutical Perspectives”), representing 307 of the 672 pages of the German, are translated. The editorial savagery of this abridgment is indicated only in the publication data on the flyleaf, and the reasons for it are never discussed. Küng’s foreword mystifies the translation’s reader by referring to sections on theory and paradigm analysis that have been omitted.

The book is of such high quality, however, that even the remainder is invaluable. Every major event, movement, and personality in relation to the dialogue as it has occurred in the selected regions of India, Sri Lanka, China, Japan, Germany, and the U.S. is mentioned. This reviewer (who—as an indication of what is left out—is cited seven times in the German original but only once in the abridged translation) mischievously looked for omissions of detail but found none of any significance. The translated section is not just a history, as the English title indicates; it is a Geschichte-analysis integrated with the chronology. We not only learn what happened, who did what, or said or wrote what, but we are also made aware of the social and political contexts of the events and personalities, and of doctrinal, theoretical, and practical consequences. Some of the material, especially on the U.S., a country the authors identify as “the showplace of Buddhist-Christian dialogue” (193), is already well known, but it is presented with important hermeneutical insights. Other material, such as that on China, has hardly been studied at all and will be quite new to most Western readers.

The volume can serve as an excellent course book, although the professor would need to compile an English-language bibliography. Serious scholars will consult the German, or the recently published complete translation into French.

ROGER CORLESS
Duke University, Durham, N.C.


What T.'s book adds to the literature on Griffiths, especially to its nearest predecessor, Wayne Teasdale’s Toward a Christian Vedanta (1987), are a satisfying explication of Griffiths’s notion and use of symbol and a well-considered application to him of Karl Joachim Weintraub’s idea of a “culture bearer” (8). T. shows how Griffiths appropri-
ated from Jacques and Raïssa Maritain “Faith as a Way of Knowing” (chap. 5), and applied their notion of symbol to experiencing “God through the Symbols of Bible, Liturgy, and Prayer” (chap. 6). Then Karl Rahner’s profound teaching of “real symbol” leads Griffiths to “God beyond the Symbols of the Religions” (chap. 9). And, as one of many examples of Griffiths’s self-awareness as “culture bearer,” T. explains how seriously Griffiths kept laboring to prove the coherence of his Hindu-influenced Christian nondualism to Western “new scientists” K. Wilber, F. Capra, and R. Sheldrake.

But beyond usual discourse, T. shows how Griffiths’s recurrent epistemological agony between reason and intuition was resolved ultimately only by his first, massive stroke, in which, as he said, “the Mother” whacked him in the head and stilled his left brain’s tumultuous babble (2–3). Somehow, that endears Griffiths.

As to shortcomings, T.’s conclusion might have pressed the questions of Griffiths’s critics harder. Also, is disagreement a sufficient reason for the rarity of Griffiths’s dialogue with Hindus in his later years? Finally, T. could have profitably moved into the main text his footnote on Panikkar’s view that Griffiths was not the greatest scholar.

Overall, however, this is the finest book yet written on Bede Griffiths. I recommend it for those involved in dialogue, and for courses on Eastern and Western culture and religion.

JAMES D. REDINGTON, S.J. WOODSTOCK THEOLOGICAL CENTER, WASHINGTON


In the century that the laity have been accounted worthy to be both subject and object of theological reflection, conservatives and liberals alike have agreed that the laity’s distinctive characteristic is their secularity. But few have done serious work on the implications of this observation. Claire Wolfteich’s outstanding book explores the borders between theology, spirituality, and cultural studies, seeking a picture of how the laity can and should develop a style of theological reflection appropriate to their secular reality—family, public life, work, and the specifically lay sense of vocation.

W. begins with a history of American lay movements before Vatican II, and ends with a set of theological and pastoral reflections. Sandwiched between, and the strongest part of the work, is a close analysis of a series of public figures for whom balancing public and private life has been particularly challenging. Her studies of John F. Kennedy, Cesar Chavez, Mario Cuomo, and Geraldine Ferraro are particularly thoughtful. If W. is a little harsh on the politician’s quick recourse to a convenient separation between personal religious conviction and public responsibilities, she is right to focus her concerns here. Most Catholic lay people do not face quite the intensity of the challenge that public figures must meet, but the elements are much the same. Being a lay Catholic who is also a responsible citizen of a pluralistic society means coming to terms with how faith and the public forum meet. W.’s view is that there must be a continuum between faith and worldly responsibility, and that “practical reasoning is part of the faithful life.” At the same time, the theological analysis needs to be pressed further. To say that “secular work does not earn salvation” but “is part of the calling of the faithful person” (163) seems still to be a little too close to the harsher forms of Luther’s two kingdoms theology that W. claims to want to avoid. A theology of the world empowered by Catholic theological impulses, while it certainly should eschew any language about “earning” salvation, needs to stress that it is secular life, and not some other life, that is the place where salvation is offered and received.

PAUL LAKELAND
Fairfield University, Conn.

Collins aims to discover the level of agreement between Zizioulas’s conception of the Trinity as “an event of communion” and Barth’s theology of the Trinity in Church Dogmatics. According to C., the word “event” in Zizioulas’s catch phrase is explained in terms of the Father’s free production of the Son and Holy Spirit, while “communion” refers to the fellowship of the three that is constitutive of the divine substance. For Barth too the Trinity is event, as he has abandoned the “static” traditional metaphysics in favor of a post-Enlightenment, dynamic conception of reality, in which, also, the production of the Son and the Holy Spirit is an exercise of freedom. The latter is not, as with Zizioulas, the act of the Father, but the threefold “repetition” of the one God. It is, however, an act of love, and therefore of communion. Thus a high degree of correspondence between Zizioulas and Barth is established.

There are, however, differences. In gravitating to their respective positions, Zizioulas shows his indebtedness to the Cappadocians, while Barth reveals his to Augustine and to German Idealism. Further, these facts explain Zizioulas’s emphasis on the monarchy of the Father, and Barth’s on the one divine essence. In pursuance of his aim, C. presents a systematic account of Barth’s trinitarian theology in general. The writing is dense, tight, and subtle, the argumentation balanced and fair. The positions of Barth’s critics are accurately represented.

The book is, as it claims, an ecumenical exercise, in that a neo-Barthian reaches out to an Orthodox theologian. It remains to be seen, however, whether Zizioulas’s theology will ultimately be accepted in his own communion [C. himself notes that according to A. J. Torrance, “Gregory Nazianzen, Athanasius, and Cyril of Alexandria all challenge the concept of the paternal arché, certainly in the way Zizioulas presents it” (197 n.)].

Catholic theology is largely absent. Some unquestioned issues remain to be opened up for a rapprochement with Catholic theology: Barth’s rejection of the analogy of being; the validity of the post-Enlightenment swing against “substance” metaphysics; a certain anti-Augustinianism; and whether the inner-trinitarian productions are free acts as distinct from acts of “nature” (as in Athanasius and the Fides Damasi). The book’s merit lies in its service to mature students of Barth’s theology.

DAVID COFFEY
Marquette University, Milwaukee


Can criticism and faith coexist in postmodern times? Henriksen argues that religion can hold its appeal against the Enlightenment only as a subjectively reconstructed truth. With Lessing’s emphasis on rational and moral autonomy, religion contributes to the flourishing of humanity. Religious truth emerges from the convergence between practices of the heart and an open-ended discourse of human community. As particular traditions and humanity evolve, they learn to coexist as regulative ideals of a more rational and just world. Kierkegaard ironically distances himself from cultural Christendom yet inwardly strives to become a single individual. A subjectively self-appropriated Christian does not lean on doctrines or rational truths but beholds an objective uncertainty of faith. Nietzsche unmasks Christianity in its ruse of self-deceptive morality. Even Lessing’s anticipation of Habermasian discourse ethics falls prey to the inability of language to access the true and the good. A postsecular prophet of the godless age, Nietzsche announces the transvaluation of humanity and a deconstruction of religion. Freed from the normative straitjacket of unifying rationality and authoritarian God, Nietzsche embraces self-creating, earth-bound, proto-postmodern spirituality.

H.’s reconstruction is symptomatic of an intensified disenchantment of the post/modern world. Faith becomes ob-
jectively unstable. Criticism and faith live “unreconciled” (196). But does H. concede too much to Camus’s absurd? “Reflection on religion goes on, as a Sisyphean work. There are enough mountains to climb and stones to carry” (199). H. saves religion by limiting it to reconstructions of its failed cultural forms. Can spiritual activity proceed through rational reconstructions of religious traditions? H. restricts religious subjectivity to the existential-ethical domain of Socratic irony (194–99). Maybe that is all some expect from the postmodern reconstructions of the religious promise (e.g., the messianic or the gift in Derrida). Kierkegaard could never hold in his name that “the form most adequate for stating a religious position is that of irony (mediateness)” (127). Religious humor supervenes on reflective irony. How else are we to explain that Kierkegaard (Nietzsche also, I believe) holds out for the possibility of living without anxious concern, free of despair. It is the virtue of H.’s work to raise stakes for a renewed dialogue between faith and reason.

MARTIN BECK MATUŠIK
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Over the last 30 years scholarly writing on the problem of inspiration has been disappointing. The usual fare has been more or less adequate synopses of the history of inspiration as a theological problem that generally conclude with half-hearted attempts to look “beyond” the problem rather than to resolve it. Law attempts to break new ground. This alone makes the book noteworthy.

Unfortunately, in his assessment of the problem, L. remains bound to recent scholarly tradition, so that he does not appreciably further the discussion. Instead of constructing a new understanding of inspiration, L. devotes almost two-thirds of his book to rehearsing the history of the debate. His proposed division of theories of inspiration into “word-centered” and “non-verbal” replicates the basic structures of earlier accounts (e.g., David Gnuse’s The Authority of the Bible, 1985) without shedding new light.

When L. finally attempts a positive theory of inspiration (I am reluctant to call it a theology, given its pointedly non-denominational character), his over-ready acceptance of Karl Jasper’s existentialist anthropology is disappointing. L.’s characterization of the Bible as a “cipher” that allows human beings to reorient themselves toward the transcendent that is always receding yet ever present reveals a limited awareness of the existentialist philosophical tradition. The final product is a vaguely Christian history of the problem with an attempted resolution within a framework unacceptable to many of those interested in the debate.

As an introduction to the history of the problem of inspiration, the book’s value is limited especially for those seeking a specifically Christian resolution. Despite these criticisms, the magnitude of the problem L. addresses and the failure of the theological community to provide a more constructive resolution make the book important by default. If it spurs a single reader more seriously to reflect on and theologize about the nature of inspiration in a more theologically concrete manner, its publication will have been justified.

LANCE BYRON RICHEY
Conception Seminary College, Conception, Mo.


Does God’s interaction with the unsaved count as grace? This is the question that the doctrine of common grace considers, and it is a traditional favorite topic of Calvinist theologians. Mouw’s book on this theme may seem at first glance to be without any audience outside the Dutch Calvinist community. However, using pertinent illustrations from daily life, M. proves again and again that this topic is well worth another look for many who wish theologically to engage our culture.
Originally presented as the 2000 Stob Lectures at Calvin College and Calvin Theological Seminary, the book moves quickly through the topics, the importance of common grace as a resource for theologians today, how God relates to the unelect, the impact of the debate between infralapsarian and supralapsarian positions, and finally the common good and how theories of common grace might profitably be updated. For those new to this territory, M.’s writing is gloriously clear, and the book can serve as a fine primer.

Far more than a primer, however, the work provides a vision of theology’s impact in the public sphere. For those who might wonder about the effect of seemingly obscure theological doctrines upon the engagement with the wider culture, M.’s account of the necessity of Christian care for those outside the Christian community, linked expressly to the nature of God and God’s purposes, is enormously powerful. My one critique is that I find unconvincing M.’s interior connections between infralapsarianism and common grace. I would argue that common grace doctrines may be pursued by those who have abandoned the speculation inherent in that question. The book offers insight to the wider public, while inspiring more conversant theologians to push these themes further.

R. WARD HOLDER
St. Anselm College, Manchester


The editors seek to bring into dialogue the voices of African American and Hispanic/Latino/a theologians on issues affecting “historically marginalized” people of faith in the United States. Authors of the essays successfully present overviews of areas critical to Christian theological discourse as they develop differing methodologies rooted in historical and cultural contexts interpreted through a liberating lens. However, the essays often differ widely in approach, exposition, and content requiring the reader to stretch to find common ground. Greater correlation in terms of how particular topics were addressed would have been helpful. As the editors conclude, the book does not represent a true dialogue. Rather, it presents individual and communal perspectives that overlap but also depart from each other regarding context, sources, and appropriation of Scripture and tradition.

Despite these problems, the work is a welcome effort to bring the two largest “minorities” in U.S. Christianity into a shared discourse that is increasingly critical for the development of ways in which these and other faith-based communities, separated by race and ethnicity but sharing a common faith, can work together. The most successful section is that of Black and Hispanic/ Latina women who reveal how much they share in terms of their multiple oppressions of race, class, and gender. Valuable insight is provided into how they “do” theology as it emerges from their particular history, culture, and popular religiosity.

This work, one hopes, will encourage further dialogue, especially from within an ecumenical perspective, as more Protestant Hispanic/Latino/a voices emerge and join Black Roman Catholics as growing communities bearing the additional burden of a religious affiliation often seen as contrary to their particular community.

This is a welcome text for courses in U.S. liberation theology, especially on the graduate level. It shows the possibilities of an open sharing of faith across racial and ethnic boundaries that too often fracture Christian community when they could, instead, serve as avenues of healing and community building.

DIANA L. HAYES
Georgetown University


Rees argues convincingly that doubt may play a constructive role in the life
of faith. In the modern era, according to R., discussions of faith became subject to the quest for certainty in all areas of human knowledge, and faith became identified with belief in or intellectual assent to propositions about God. Within this understanding of faith, doubt can be seen only as a threat, and the task of theology becomes to show how faith excludes doubt. R.'s argument begins with a review of three responses to this modern problematic: Newman's understanding of faith as assent, Barth's understanding of faith as created by God's Word, and Tillich's understanding of the dynamics of faith. Tillich emerges as the leading light because he saw the important part doubt plays in the structure of faith, keeping our religious symbols honest in their finite role of mediating the transcendent. R. wisely puts flesh on Tillich's insight by providing two life-stories that show how doubt can play a positive role in leading individuals from a constricted religiosity into a deeper relationship with God. R.'s constructive proposal is that we see faith as a part of conversation with God, rather than as intellectual assent. In the Scriptures we find a God who invites us into an ongoing conversation in which questions are asked not only by God to humans, but also by humans to God. From this perspective, doubts and questions are not viewed as threats to be excluded, but rather as vital parts of a lively conversation.

The dissatisfaction for the reader of R.'s fine book is that even a very good discussion of the modern problematic of faith and doubt turns out to be a rather bloodless affair. As many a reformer would have noted, the modern discussion of faith as belief is a matter of mere historical faith. This is dead faith. The reformers were interested in saving faith, which is primarily a matter of trust in God's benevolence toward us. R. has done well to open up the modern discussion of faith to include a constructive role for doubt, but the question remains whether doubt has also a positive role to play in relationship to the saving faith which trusts in God's promises.

Joseph S. Pagano
St. Paul's Episcopal Church, Milwaukee


For 40 years Princeton law professor Richard Falk has advocated for a more just international order. Here he explores the potential of world religions to reform economic globalization, with its widening inequality, poverty, and de-moralization. He criticizes inhumane global governance of diminished support for public goods, a downsized U.N., weakened political influence of unions, and routine use of military power against perceived threats.

F. advocates instead a “globalization from below” revealing new possibilities for cooperation, nonviolent liberation from exploitation, and respect for the environment and for traditional cultures. Such grassroots globalization is “strengthened by religious commitments and by support from important sectors of the organized religious community” (25). F. observes that religions are sensitive to human suffering, encourage solidarity, preach the transformative capacities of faith, recognize human limits, and encourage reconciliation.

F. laments that mainstream religious communities have often passively supported the migration of power from the state to the market. But he finds hope in Gandhi’s inclusivist religious politics, in Latin American liberation theology, in the nonviolent revolutions of Poland and the Philippines, and in various international citizen movements. He calls upon the moral eminence of religious leaders to confront social problems and defuse deadly conflicts.

While rejecting the dilution of religion, F. commends a “more socially and politically responsible form of globalization” (75) based on the golden rule and the prescription to treat all other persons humanely. He urges people of faith to resist consumerism and being “autonomous beneficiaries of electronic empowerment” and instead to participate in a “reinvention of democracy” that holds business leaders accountable and invites “initiatives of women, indigenous peoples, human rights activists, environmentalists, antinuclearists and others” to strengthen global civil so-
ciety (162). F. offers both hope and challenges to all religious people.

MICHAEL K. DUFFEY Marquette University, Milwaukee


Eighteen articles presented in three parts: Scripture as the ground of ethics; approaches to ethics (natural law; virtue, liberation, feminist ethics; and ethics through interreligious dialogue); and important issues (war, arms trade, social justice, ecology, business, family trends, and medicine). The articles “provide a fairly comprehensive introduction to Christian ethics that is both authoritative and up to date.” Each is presented by an author with a “proven track record of balanced, comprehensive and comprehensible writing” (xii).

The essays are very fine. Some are particularly good (Stephen Pope on natural law, Jean Porter on virtue, Duncan Forrester on social justice, and Ronald Green on Jewish perspective on Christian ethics). Whether the collection is a sufficient companion is very questionable. Most authors, either from the U.S. or from the U.K., note contributions only from their own country. Max Stackhouse, for instance, refers us to 74 works on business ethics, 67 from the U.S. and five from the U.K. John Rogerson on Old Testament ethics cites one U.S. contributor. Timothy Jackson’s work on the Gospels notes an African writer (Teresa Okure) but no one from the U.K. The result is that, for the most part, the essays are companions to topics as they are discussed differently on different sides of the Atlantic.

Some essays provide only scant references. Rowan Williams and Gareth Jones each refers to only three writers. R. John Elford refers to no work on war published after 1989. The omissions are striking. I found only three African writers mentioned—Okure, Desmond Tutu, and J. Mbiti—but not Laurenti Magesa, John Mary Waligo, Charles Nyamiti, or Benezet Bujo. The only Asian cited was Aloysius Pieris. The scriptural essays made no reference to Frank Matera, Eduard Lohse, Thomas Ogletree, Pheme Perkins, Ceslas Spicq, Wolfgang Schrage, Allen Verhey, or Amos Wilder. None of the 18 essays refers to Charles Curran, Klaus Demmer, Margaret Farley, Josef Fuchs, Gerald Kelly, Richard McCormick, Enda McDonagh, H. Richard Niebuhr, or Jon Sobrino. Who, then, are our companions to Christian ethics?

JAMES F. KEENAN, S.J. Weston Jesuit School of Theology


This thoughtfully designed volume presents an overview of the issues surrounding human embryonic stem cell research. As the title promises, scientific, ethical, and public policy perspectives are represented. The book begins with scientific essays from two proponents of human embryonic stem cell research. These essays are dense, and not all of the scientific terms deployed can be found in the glossary, which is otherwise useful. A deeper issue is that the volume does not include free-standing scientific papers on alternatives to human embryonic stem cell research, such as research on human embryonic germ cells, which are derived from fetal tissue, adult stem cells, and stem cells derived from umbilical cord blood and placentas. These alternatives are mentioned in other essays.

The lack of sustained explorations of alternatives might be explained by the volume’s focus on human embryonic stem cell research. However, religious objections to human embryonic stem cell research rely on the identification of less ethically controversial alternatives, such as research on adult stem cells and on stem cells from umbilical cord blood and human placentas. Moreover, understanding the pros and cons of all forms of stem cell research is crucial for informed public policy decisions. Conse-

After John Paul II in *Veritatis splendor* denounced proportionalism, the term itself became less widely used. Still, most proportionalists either were not convinced by the pope’s objections or held that the pope rejected ideas they had not proposed.

Because proportionalism addressed fundamental issues arising in a post-modern world, it has not withered away. Students who want to understand both proportionalism and its critics could hardly do better than to read this collection of texts. Kaczor, who is currently polishing his own book on proportionalism, brings together key essays by Knauer, Fuchs, Janssens, Schuller, McCormick, Walter, and Vacek, with critiques by Quay, Grisez, Connery, Finnis, Kiely, and himself. All his selections, except those by K. and Vacek, are classics from 1967–91.

The debate chronicled through these pro and con essays admirably testifies to how moral theologians can take one another seriously. The debate recorded here also shows how certain commitments (largely, over the existence or nonexistence of incommensurable goods or intrinsic evil acts) make it nearly impossible for proportionalists and their critics to understand, let alone agree with, one another. Even K.’s fascinating attempt to show how proportionalists, on their own terms, must condemn contraception, fails to persuade because he turns a set of heuristic guides into absolute rules.

K. helpfully provides one text from Aquinas that has been a focal point for the debate. He might well have added *Veritatis splendor* and some of the reactions it provoked, but his intention seems to have been to stay with the classics. These reprints can instruct younger theologians and remind older theologians of two types of revisionist thinking that once dominated moral theology.

EDWARD VACEK, S.J.
Weston Jesuit School of Theology


McFague urges North American Christians to think in ethical terms and take responsibility for sustaining planetary life, a message schematized under “God and World,” “Christ and Salvation,” and “Life in the Spirit.” “First principles” are the environmental crisis itself. Urgent action requires resistance to the West’s economic structure and consumerism. The combination has generated a planetary crisis, fostered social injustice, damaged the land, and altered the climate. Christians should adopt an alternative planetary theology. M.’s model engages ethicists and theologians in a chicken-or-egg debate: Does ethical response to the planet’s crisis compel a different theology? Or does redescription of God’s relation to humanity and cosmos result in a planetary ethic?

This theology vs. ethics argument revolves around two sections. Chapter 4...
critiques market capitalism, a consumerist society, and “the post-Enlightenment concept of expressive individualism.” A planetary ethic rejects the modern economic theory that society is the sum of individual wants, and markets automatically guide individual behavior to the common good. The opposite dynamic in chapter 5, “The Ecological Economic Model and Worldview,” outlines an ethic of distributive justice and abundant life for all. M.’s introduction narrates four personal conversions which account for her focus on planetary concerns since 1980. The closing “Manifesto,” summarizes her argument. Notes and index serve the scholar.

M.’s statistics are familiar: 15% of the earth’s population consumes 85% of its resources. She does not dialogue with ecofeminists or note that the West’s economic theory encodes male lordship. Scripture is neither the problem nor a resource, though the “cosmological setting is the oldest one in both the Hebrew and Christian traditions” (35). Christian mystics are not cited as contributors to the overall project of planetary theology. M. implies that the spiritual quest, allegedly preoccupied with individual experience of God, lacks the power to impel action on behalf of the planet and the common good.

While M. accounts for her social location, there is an odd inattention to the effect of the theological categories themselves. Is the culprit the consumerist economic model, not the theological frame? Is this discourse “strategic sexlessness” within the academy, or simply the conceptual bondage effected by the trinitarian frame itself?

ELOISE ROSENBLATT, R.S.M.
Lincoln Law School of San Jose


Reichley presents a learned investigation into the preconditions for the establishment of a free society, i.e., one which adequately respects individual human rights and achieves a sufficient measure of social responsibility. His meandering argument eventually leads to the familiar claim that maintaining a vital public role for religion is essential for the health of a democracy, with the sound corollary that wise policy-makers steer away from strict separationist positions that threaten to marginalize and privatize religion under modern constitutions.

The most original aspect of R.’s work is the introduction of a typology of seven “value system families” that aspire to provide moral foundations for a free society: egoism, collectivism, monism, absolutism, ecstasism, civil humanism, and transcendent idealism. Although R. uses these terms somewhat idiosyncratically, he presents rich and clear analysis of the pedigree, merits, and cultural manifestations of each of the denominated moral orientations. The final quarter of the volume identifies the seventh alternative, transcendent idealism, with the Judeo-Christian cultural tradition (particularly its Augustinian subbranch) and argues that it supplies the remedy for the key challenges of modernity, especially secularism and relativism. It turns out to be no mere accident that the American system of government, with its cultural roots in a Scripture-based Calvinism and in Enlightenment natural law thinking, displays the ability to balance the individual and the social, liberty and authority, the particular and the universal.

R.’s use of the typology renders this volume more panoramic and compendious than is desirable. Although the six rejected options emerge as somewhat more than straw men, the long chapters explicating their history and manifestations in art, philosophy, literature, and social arrangements distract the reader from following the thread of the central argument to its cogent conclusion. Further, the book’s intended audience remains obscure; some passages will challenge even experts in political philosophy, while other sections explain in excessive detail elementary and familiar historical developments. Nonetheless, R. has traced a novel path to perceptive and timely conclusions about the role of religion in contemporary public life.

THOMAS MASSARO, S.J.
Weston Jesuit School of Theology
An eco-morality based on an eco-vision of the cosmos challenges the reader to examine his or her own morality of physical experience. Toolan traces the development of economic growth that has paid little heed to environmental consequences. Very recent environmentalists’ cautions have failed to reverse Western culture’s drive to fashion an economy that opens ever-expanding conveniences.

Yet economic growth is not the only human issue. A primary issue is the reverence and reserve that nature demands. Some hold that nature’s resources are unlimited; others, that nature has unsurpassable limits. Further, first world economies grow with resources seized from third world cultures. Individuals within these cultures despise the nations that expropriate their resources. (One cannot but wonder whether such despising may underlie the September 11, 2001 disaster.)

For his part, Toolan proposes a paradigm shift in valuing creation. Perhaps the Creator is so responsive to human growth that nature will increasingly provide what economic growth demands. That is a possible hope, perhaps even a likely hope, i.e., that nature will provide abundantly. Perhaps nature lives, buzzes, and regulates herself according to humans’ demands. Nonetheless, Toolan challenges humans to listen to the cosmos’s call that they develop a personal relationship with her who responds so generously to them.

Such a vision of the cosmos as personally developmental bears the mark of process theology: nature is neither static nor inert, but partner in a mysterious interrelating. Yet only those who live with postmodernism’s symbolism can nestle with such a cosmos and live with its hope.

Two appendixes develop support for that eco-morality.

Daniel Liderbach, S.J.
Canisius College, Buffalo

This book is far too small, for a lifetime of the authors’ lived spirituality comes pouring out in bursts of sentences and paragraphs that beg, because of their richness, to be expanded but remain confined within these few pages. Indicative of the challenge is the proposal to treat both liturgy and spirituality in their modern developments. There is more than enough in either topic to fill several volumes but, as the authors lament, the renewal movements of liturgy and spirituality unfolded in parallel tracks during the last hundred years in a way that hindered mutual enrichment, and both were the poorer for it.

Jesus is presented here as “the intersection of two worlds: into our history comes a kingdom that is not of this world.” The coming of Jesus, the fruit of “God’s secret decision to give the Godhead away, his decision to free us from death, guilt, and lovelessness,” is the heart of a Christian spirituality that, in the earliest days of the Church’s life, was embodied in the all-embracing spirituality carried by liturgical celebration. The early Church grasped liturgy’s focus on the sanctification of the community as a whole. But as the liturgy became more and more a clerical event, with the people sometimes but not always in attendance, a gap widened between popular spirituality and the liturgical treasure. Popular piety was not much united with liturgical piety.

The authors’ hope is that genuine Gospel spirituality, whose particular emphasis focuses on the coming and mission of Jesus as unearned gift to the world, not the fruit of human endeavor, will shine forth ever more clearly in the community celebration of liturgical prayer and thus overcome the distance between these two forms of piety. Eucharist in particular offers with joy the message of good news to all who face “their guilt, their inability to love, their anxiety, their dread of death.” Eucharist, in celebrating the paschal mystery,
delivers the risen Christ and new creation.

JOHN GALLEN, S.J.
America House, New York City


This practical and well-written book on prayer flows from Collins’s conviction that prayer lies at the heart of religion and spirituality, and that “there will be no genuine revival or lasting renewal in the churches without it” (10). C., an Irish Vincentian priest who has long been involved in the charismatic and ecumenical movements, brings to these pages his many years of experience as a teacher, writer, and retreat director. His approach is practical, experiential, and biblical. His main focus is on those methods of prayer accessible to “ordinary” Christians who seek to deepen their relationship with God, rather than on contemplative and mystical forms.

C.’s understanding of prayer has been strongly influenced by what he describes as a spirituality that emphasizes the role of the Holy Spirit. It is a spirituality that “tends to be heart-centered, focuses on right experience and expects people to enjoy a conscious sense of the presence, attributes and guidance of the Lord” (29). Although C. is somewhat eclectic in the sources he uses, special influences are those of St. Vincent de Paul and St. Ignatius of Loyola.

The twelve chapters cover such areas as religion and prayer, the prayer of Jesus, prayer as self-disclosure to God, prayer as self-forgetful attention to God, seeking God’s will in prayer, prayer as petition, the prayer of command, praying to Mary and the saints, the prayer of appreciation, growth in prayer, and prayer and praxis. Each chapter is informative and displays good command of traditional sources and contemporary writers. C. develops his main ideas through the sharing of personal experiences and by drawing examples and illustrations from various sources, particularly Scripture.

C. accomplishes his goal. This practical, biblically oriented treatment of prayer will be helpful for all who seek to deepen their understanding of prayer and their personal relationship with the Lord.

CHARLES J. HEALY, S.J.
Blessed John XXIII Seminary, Weston, Mass.


Starkloff collects 21 writings by Peter-Hans Kolvenbach, S.J., Superior General of the Society of Jesus; 17 are reprints, mostly of talks, originally translated and appearing in CIS, a journal published by the Rome-based Jesuit Center for Ignatian Spirituality; three are translated by S. from a 1998 French volume on Ignatian spirituality. As is often the case with translations, the style is frequently awkward and the meaning not always clear.

The writings are somewhat arbitrarily grouped under three headings: contemplation, analysis of Ignatian spirituality, and the “praxis” of “contemplation in action.” The book’s title is based on Ignatius’s 1537 vision at La Storta near Rome, in which God the Father places Ignatius at the side of his Son bearing the cross, thus confirming Ignatius’s identification with the suffering Christ in the service of the Church.

For Kolvenbach, all Ignatian spirituality is geared toward contemplation in action, i.e., living in the presence of the Trinity while engaging with Christ in the work of human salvation. Kolvenbach displays an understanding of Ignatian spirituality that could only have come from long study and a deeply spiritual penetration of Ignatius’s thought. What is produced are finer spiritual and analytical dimensions, especially of the Spiritual Exercises, not normally found in Ignatian studies.

Certain essays are compelling, such as “Fools for Christ’s Sake,” where Kolvenbach asserts that for Ignatius one
cannot be a companion of Christ without “sharing the foolishness of Christ” and renouncing the wisdom of the world (90). Other essays are esoteric, such as the one on Ignatius’s use of loquela in the Spiritual Diary. Kolvenbach often seeks to correct misunderstandings in Ignatian spirituality, such as the lack of a communitarian dimension in the Spiritual Exercises. While insisting on the error of separating social justice from faith, and admitting that both John Paul II and Pedro Arrupe stressed the inadequacy of promoting justice without love, he fails to explain why emphasis should be put on social justice rather than on the more comprehensive realities of faith and love.

MARTIN R. TRIPOLI, S.J.
Saint Joseph’s University, Philadelphia


Dorothee Soelle’s overriding concern is the democratization of mysticism, reopening “the mystic sensibility that’s within all of us” (301). Closely connected is her goal of demonstrating the relationship between mystical encounters and the repudiation of dehumanizing values within cultures.

In part 1 (“What Is Mysticism?”) S. displays the breadth of her research, drawing on Sufi, Jewish, and Christian mystics. She shares Rahner’s belief that “Christianity of the third millennium will be mystical or not at all” (108). This “silent cry” at the heart of all religion is the longing for God, one that breaks open the self’s seclusion from God, humanity, and creation. Subsequently, S. suggests, mystics’ ethical awareness often led to conflict within their socio-historical context and to a passion “to change death-oriented reality” (93). She illustrates this in her critical analysis of such areas as mystical language and the classic three ways.

Part 2 (“Places of Mystical Experience”) roots mystical experience in human experiences accessible to all: nature, eroticism, suffering, community, and joy. S.’s feminist, ecological, and liberationist foundations are evident in her explorations. Within the mystical writings examined, she highlights patterns of overcoming historic dualisms and the inherent connections between experiences of God and neighbor.

In part 3 (“Mysticism Is Resistance”) S. delivers a passionate plea for a revisionist rereading of mystical sources. She debunks the image of mystical flight from the world, arguing that real contemplation gave rise to just actions, actions that confronted life threatening power, whether in Church or society. Rejecting the inadequate—what falls short of the reign of God—is mystical activity. S.’s approach to subjects addressed in this part (e.g., possessions, violence, and liberation) offers a challenging lens through which to view classic texts. Mysticism is not a “new vision of God but a different relationship to the world” (293).

One’s theological and political stance will determine one’s judgment on the value of this book’s contribution.

JOY MILOS, C.S.J.
Gonzaga University, Spokane


William James names Buddhism and Christianity as probably the best of the world’s religious systems. Whether such a ranking is advisable, throughout America Buddhism and Christianity are engaged in a syncretism with implications for religious history as profound as the encounter between Judaism and Zoroastrianism in Babylon or between Buddhism and Taoism in China. Coleman’s work is among the most notable contemporary efforts to profile the background and implications of that encounter.

Working with extensive interviews, C. creates a smooth narrative from what might have become a disjointed collage of research and quotations. His observations of the American Buddhist scene form some of the book’s truest and most profound passages. His command of the
subject and fifteen years’ experience in Buddhist practice enable him to write with confidence and subdued passion. C. advises those familiar with the “sweeping panorama of Buddhist history . . . to skip” his chapter summarizing it, but he excels at condensation, and though informed readers might know much of this history, no other study has so broadly and cogently summed it up. C. missteps, however, in downplaying the influence of Asian texts and philosophies on Emerson, Whitman, and Thoreau and giving place of prominence to World War II’s exposure of thousands of servicemen to Asian ways of being. Those writers were enormously influential in preparing 20th-century Americans to receive Buddhist teachings, whether encountered in the Pacific wars or in a Manhattan zendo.

In the book’s closing chapter C. presents convincingly his theory that better-educated, more prosperous Americans are drawn to Buddhism’s denial of self because we are searching for liberation from the national myth that we single-handedly construct and maintain our identities. “The more difficult society makes it to establish a strong sense of self . . . the more attractive the teachings of no-self” (214) he argues. His thought-provoking analysis reveals crucial differences between Asian and Western perceptions of the relationship between individuals and their communities, but too often analysis takes a back seat to reporting—even though (as he acknowledges) his results are anecdotal and not statistically significant.

What this sociologist’s book most lacks is sociology. I had hoped for a deep analysis along the lines of Harold Bloom’s The American Religion (1992), a delving into the symbiotic relationship between the American character, our geography and history, and our fascination with Asian religions. C.’s study is an eminently worthy foundation for that more penetrating and comprehensive undertaking.

Fenton Johnson
University of Arizona, Tucson

BOOKS RECEIVED

SCRIPTURAL STUDIES


BOOKS RECEIVED


HISTORICAL


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MORALITY AND LAW


**PASTORAL, SPIRITUAL, AND LITURGICAL**


**PHILOSOPHY AND OTHER DISCIPLINES**


