

RECOVERING THE GIFTS OF THE HOLY SPIRIT IN MORAL THEOLOGY

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[The gifts of the Holy Spirit played a major role in the moral theology of Thomas Aquinas. For a variety of theological and ecclesial reasons, they were largely ignored after the Council of Trent. A review of theological and literary interest in the gifts in the first half of the 20th century shows that they are essential to an adequate moral anthropology and that they provide a corrective to excessively rational and naturalistic approaches to the moral life.]

A QUICK GLANCE AT the *Summa theologiae* reveals that the seven gifts of the Holy Spirit play a major role in Aquinas's understanding of the moral life. He treats the gifts (*sapientia, intellectus, consilium, fortitudo, scientia, pietas, timor Domini*) in question 68 of the *Prima secundae* (followed by questions 69 and 70 on the fruits of the Spirit and the Beatitudes) and again in the *Secunda secundae*, or special moral, where he allies each of the gifts with one of the virtues. John of St. Thomas (1589–1644) in his famous commentary brought further clarity and precision in the 17th century to Aquinas's thought on the gifts. There was little systematic thought on the gifts in the 18th and 19th centuries, and tracts that did appear were under the rubric of spiritual theology. They tended to be derivative and lacking in theological sophistication.¹

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¹ Speaking of the 18th and 19th centuries, André Rayez notes: "Peu à peu cependant la notion des dons se vulgarise. A côté des manuels qui répètent avec plus ou moins de prolixité et de bonheur les controverses et les conclusions des théologiens, nous recontrons de petits ouvrages de piété qui monnayent la doctrine. . . . Au 19e siècle, quelques ouvrages de piété paraissent qui ne voudraient traiter que des dons. Leur doctrine, lorsqu'elle ne répète pas celle des devanciers, est souvent pauvre" ("Dons du Saint Esprit," *Dictionnaire de spiritualité* [Paris: Desclée, 1957] vol. 3, cols. 1579–1641, at 1609).

In the 20th century, Ambroise Gardeil with his historical survey in the *Dictionnaire de théologie catholique* inaugurated a new period of theological reflection on the gifts. This remains perhaps the most comprehensive work available on the subject.² Gardeil's work sparked other important studies by a number of scholars.³ These investigations were followed by a remarkable number of more popular treatments of the gifts. Many were authored by Dominicans and were published either as retreat materials or as monographs intended to be spiritual reading for well-educated Catholics.⁴ More recently, Cistercian Thomas Keating has published a popular volume on the gifts and fruits of the Holy Spirit.⁵

Despite this significant body of literature, the role of the Holy Spirit generally continued to decline in theology.⁶ When the Spirit's role was treated, as in the studies I have cited, it was generally considered part of

² Ambroise Gardeil, "Dons du Saint Esprit," *Dictionnaire de théologie catholique* (Paris: Letouzey, 1939) vol. 4, cols. 1728–81.

³ See, for example, Dominicans Reginald Garrigou Lagrange, *Perfection chrétienne et contemplation* (Paris: Desclée, 1923); "Dons du Saint-Esprit," *Dictionnaire de spiritualité* vol. 3, cols. 1579–1642, especially M. Michel Labourdette's essay, "St. Thomas et la théologie thomiste" cols. 1610–35; Jesuit Jacques de Blic, "Pour l'histoire de la théologie des dons avant saint Thomas," *Revue d'ascétique et de mystique* 22 (1946) 117–79; Benedictine Odon Lottin, "Les dons du Saint-Esprit du XII siècle à l'époque de Saint Thomas d'Aquin," in *Psychologie et morale au XIIIe et XIIIe siècles* (Louvain: Duculot, 1942) vol. 3, 330–456; Karl Boeckl, *Die sieben Gaben des Heiligen Geistes in ihrer Bedeutung für die Mystik nach der Theologie des 13. und 14. Jahrhunderts* (Freiburg im Breisgau, 1931).

⁴ See Ambroise Gardeil, O. P., *The Holy Spirit in Christian Life*, trans. from the French edition of 1923 (St. Louis: Herder, 1954) and his *The Gifts of the Holy Ghost in the Dominican Saints*, trans. Anselm Townsend (Milwaukee: Bruce, 1937); Edward Leen, *The Holy Ghost and His Work in Souls* (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1937); Walter Farrell, O.P., and Dominic Hughes, O.P., *Swift Victory: Essays on the Gifts of the Holy Spirit* (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1955); J. A. O'Driscoll, *The Holy Spirit and the Art of Living* (St. Louis: B. Herder, 1959); Bernard J. Kelly, *The Seven Gifts: Thoughts on the Gifts of the Holy Ghost* (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1941); and Hugh Francis Blunt, *Life with the Holy Ghost: Thoughts on the Gifts of the Holy Ghost* (Milwaukee: Bruce, 1943).

⁵ Thomas Keating, *Fruits and Gifts of the Spirit* (New York: Lantern, 2000).

⁶ Writing in 1937 in his introduction to Ambroise Gardeil's *The Gifts of the Holy Spirit in the Dominican Saints*, Anselm Townsend refers to the Holy Spirit as "the forgotten God." He was probably alluding to Maurice Landrieux's book, *Le divin méconnu* (Paris: Beauchesne, 1921) translated into English by E. Leahy as *The Forgotten Paraclete* (New York: Benziger Brothers, 1924). More than 50 years later, Kilian McDonnell, O.S.B., who has devoted much of his scholarly life to theology of the Holy Spirit, notes that "the Spirit historically has had difficulty winning recognition as a full person. We think we know what a Father is, and a Son, but what is a Spirit?" He wonders whether a "pneumatological affirmative action" might be necessary to redress the lack of ontological equality, equality in significance and in mission ("Pneumatological Overview: Trinitarian Guidelines for

ascetical, mystical, or spiritual theology. The important role it had played in moral theology and its connection with the virtues were lost entirely as was the integral connection between morality and spirituality.

In this article I attempt to restore the gifts to their proper place by reviewing 20th-century literature. I begin with an element of theological autobiography that describes two important insights that helped me see the importance of the gifts of the Holy Spirit in the moral life. I then describe a series of historical factors which led to the diminishment of the gifts. In the third section, I outline some of the most important themes in the theological tradition in regard to the gifts, and I try to suggest how they could reintegrate morality and spirituality. Because the gifts of the Holy Spirit have been an important element of the Dominican approach to the moral life, I give special attention to Dominican writers of the period.

PERSONAL DISCOVERIES

The Intellectualistic Fallacy

My first revelatory moment came while I was reading an article by Daniel C. Maguire entitled “*Ratio Practica* and the Intellectualistic Fallacy.”⁷ It caught my eye because I had been doing research on *ratio practica* and the virtue of prudence in Aquinas. Maguire described how practical moral reasoning, when rightly understood, involves far more than just the intellect. He rejected the assumption “that morality becomes intelligible in the same way that mathematics and logic do,”⁸ an assumption that underlies what he describes as “the intellectualistic fallacy.” This fallacy “finds broad and frequent expression in a narrowly and nudely rationalist, analytic and intellectualistic approach to ethics, ignores the animating affective mold of moral cognition. It represents an epistemology of ethics that is at once reductionist, simplistic, and jejune. Such an approach leaves untouched the mystical and contemplative dimensions of moral consciousness.”⁹

Maguire then went on to demonstrate how affectivity permeates Aquinas’s discussions of prudence, wisdom, the gifts of the Holy Spirit, delight, and even faith itself. He wrote: “The conclusion is that there are many elements in the epistemology of Thomas Aquinas that lead reason, both practical and speculative, beyond a narrow and nude intellectualism

Speaking About the Holy Spirit,” *Catholic Theological Society of America, Proceedings* 51 [1996] 188–98, at 190–91).

⁷ Daniel C. Maguire, “*Ratio Practica* and the Intellectualistic Fallacy,” *Journal of Religious Ethics* 10 (1982) 22–39.

⁸ *Ibid.* 31.

⁹ *Ibid.* 22.

toward a holistic conception of knowledge that embodies affective appreciation. . . . [A] narrow viewing of *ratio practica* in Thomas that does not touch down on these other bases of his thought would be reductionistic.”¹⁰

Although a great deal has been written since then on the subject of the emotions, affectivity, and imagination in the moral life,¹¹ the heart of Maguire’s thesis was new to me. His article helped me to see that a moral life based only upon syllogisms and propositions neglects key dimensions of human experience and personhood, and makes it impossible to link morality with the spiritual life in any meaningful way.¹² I realized that mature moral decision-making must involve not only reason, but also emotions and intuition.

Grace as the Principle of the Moral Life

My second revelatory moment came years later while reading Thomas O’Meara’s article entitled “Virtues in the Theology of Thomas Aquinas”¹³ where he described recent interest in virtue ethics but lamented that most writers had missed the main point of this teaching. O’Meara identified his purpose as “to locate Aquinas’s thought on the virtues within his distinctive theology (a theology of personality and grace where, using Aristotelian terms, grace is depicted as a special quasi-nature whose capabilities are virtues and their acts) . . . [and] to argue further for grace as the context of the virtues.” He sets out to show that for Aquinas grace is a “special life principle” of the virtues rather than merely a “topping” or “supplement” to

¹⁰ Ibid. 29.

¹¹ See, for example, Sidney Callahan, “The Role of the Emotions in Moral Decision Making,” *Hastings Center Report* (June/July 1988) 9–16; Paul Lauritzen, “Emotions and Religious Ethics,” *Journal of Religious Ethics* 16 (Fall 1988) 307–23; Michael P. Morrissey, “Reason and Emotion: Modern and Classical Views on Religious Knowing,” *Horizons* 16 (1989) 275–91; Philip Keane, *Christian Ethics and Imagination* (New York: Paulist, 1984). Recent writing on “emotional intelligence” takes up the same issue from a more scientific perspective.

¹² A distinction between morality and spirituality was unknown to Augustine or Aquinas. Servais Pinckaers notes that “Augustine does not give the slightest evidence of any distinction between morality and spirituality. . . . To speak of a spiritual journey as if it were something external to the moral life would be a betrayal of Augustine” (*Sources of Christian Ethics*, trans. Mary T. Noble [Washington: Catholic University of America, 1999] 154). However, Redemptorist Dennis Billy critiques Pinckaers’s approach. He notes in particular the limitations of Aquinas’s ecclesial context which fails to ask how the Spirit might work in groups or persons outside the Church (“The Person of the Holy Spirit as the Source of the Christian Moral Life,” *Studia moralia* 36 [1998] 325–59, at 332).

¹³ Thomas F. O’Meara, O.P., “Virtues in the Theology of Thomas Aquinas,” *Theological Studies* 58 (1997) 254–85.

them.¹⁴ In this view, grace “is not only a new relationship or a divine acceptance, but a divine reality in the creature: not a transitory divine help, but a principle for people living in and toward a special destiny.”¹⁵

I was shocked to realize that I had fallen into the very misconception that O’Meara was describing: an approach to the moral life rooted in a highly naturalistic understanding of the virtues or based, at best, on a Baroque theology of transitory or actual graces where the gifts of the Holy Spirit functioned as “extraordinary or transient charisms.”¹⁶ I had drunk deeply of Aquinas’s natural law theory, but had never met Aquinas the theologian of grace.

These two articles led me to explore the gifts of the Holy Spirit which are the convergence between the affective dimension of the moral life, a fully graced and therefore *theological* morality, and the spiritual life.

THE LOSS OF THE HOLY SPIRIT’S INFLUENCE IN MORAL THEOLOGY

The strong emphasis on the role of the Holy Spirit in scriptural, patristic, and medieval sources was gradually weakened by many different influences including pastoral need, ecclesial authority, and philosophy. Let me summarize a few of these.

A Bias for the Pastoral

Because of the need for concrete practical solutions, there has been a tendency to bypass or to short-circuit serious theology for the sake of pastoral expediency. This was true in the early Middle Ages when various kinds of pastoral manuals provided guidance to confessors and spiritual directors. Leonard Boyle showed how Aquinas set out to create an integrated theology for beginners that would avoid the fragmentation and preoccupation with individual moral cases that had characterized previous generations. The result was the *Summa theologiae* in which “moral theology” was firmly contextualized in the midst of Aquinas’s treatments of God, creation, and Jesus Christ.

Boyle noted however that “the dogged effort on the part of Thomas to give a full theological direction to the pastoral preparation of Dominicans seems to have gone over the head of the generality of his brethren. Even

¹⁴ Ibid. 258.

¹⁵ Ibid. 260. O’Meara describes what he sees as deficient views (256–57).

¹⁶ Ibid. 269, 271. See also O’Meara’s *Thomas Aquinas Theologian* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame, 1997) 160–67 in which he describes Baroque Thomism more fully, as well as his *Theology of Ministry*, rev. ed. (New York: Paulist, 1999) 114–23 where he describes how this theology affected the Baroque understanding of ministry.

after his canonization in 1323 and the withdrawal of the ban of 1277 on Aquinas at the University of Paris, the *Summa* never became a part of the curriculum of the priory schools which . . . really occasioned it. . . . Practical theology in the old mould [e.g., in the form of the ‘*summa de casibus*,’ or moral case studies] continued to dominate the curriculum.”¹⁷

Boyle stated that young medieval Dominicans, like students everywhere, tended to go for the bottom line, extracting the “moral” part of the *Summa* from the whole. “Where Thomas had striven to provide an integral theology for his brethren in their dedication to the *cura animarum*, the *Secunda secundae*, and a gutted *Secunda secundae* at that, was now through the *Summa confessorum* of John of Freiburg irretrievably adrift from the other parts of the *Summa*, especially from the first and third, to which St. Thomas had so carefully moored it.”¹⁸ Admirable though this pastoral focus of the early Dominicans was, it had the effect of marginalizing important theological concerns such as grace, the treatise on happiness, and the role of the Holy Spirit.

Nominalism

Several authors, including Servais Pinckaers, O.P., cite the nominalism of William of Ockham, with its emphasis on radical freedom and individual acts, as a significant factor in the process of disintegration. He describes nominalism as an “atomic explosion” that broke down the moral life into discrete acts that had no relation to one another:

For Ockham all moral reality was concentrated in free choice The free act springs forth instantaneously from a decision that has no other cause than the power of self-determination enjoyed by the will Human actions would then be made up of a succession of free decisions or independent acts—cases of conscience as they would later be called—having only superficial relation to one another. An act performed under the impulse of a *habitus* seemed less free than if it had proceeded from a purely voluntary decision.¹⁹

¹⁷ Leonard E. Boyle “The Setting of the *Summa Theologica* of Thomas,” in *Facing History: A Different Thomas Aquinas*, ed. Leonard E. Boyle (Louvain-La-Neuve: Fédération internationale des Instituts d’Études Médiévales, 2000) 65–92, at 86.

¹⁸ *Ibid.* 90.

¹⁹ Pinckaers, *Sources of Christian Ethics* 243–46 and 337: “If freedom consisted wholly in a choice between contraries and was possessed sovereignly by our will alone, then each of our actions was held fixed in the instant of choice and separated from all the actions preceding or following it. . . . We could not allow our past actions to determine an action of the present moment, nor could the latter have any bearing upon what we might do in the future.” John Mahoney, S.J., describes the influence of nominalism in a similar way. See his *Making of Moral Theology: A Study of the Roman Catholic Tradition* (New York: Oxford University, 1987) 183–84 and 225–26. See also Dennis J. Billy and James F. Keating, *Conscience and*

This emphasis on radical freedom and individual acts did not readily accommodate the continuity or habitual influence that characterize the virtues or the gifts of the Holy Spirit. It also provided a philosophical basis for a legalistic morality based solely upon our obligation to obey God's will.

The Seminaries and Auricular Confession

The emergence of a seminary system after the Council of Trent and the requirement of regular auricular confession (strengthening the directives of the Fourth Lateran Council in 1215) are two additional factors. John Mahoney has argued that these two developments helped shape an entirely new discipline that would be known as "moral theology." Even though described as theology, it was oriented to training confessors. Largely canonical in nature, it was devoid of systematic theology and spirituality. It was oriented primarily to hearing confessions. Thus, it reflected "a preoccupation with sin, a concentration on the individual and an obsession with the law."²⁰ Eventually, the requirement of an "integral" confession (a complete account of the number and kinds of sins) led to an approach to the moral life as discontinuous, "freezing the film in a succession of individual stills to be analyzed and ignoring the plot. Continuity [in the moral life] was discounted or seen only as a circumstance."²¹

Baroque Theologies of Grace

Despite the heavy emphasis the Dominican school had placed both on virtue theory and on the attendant action of grace and the Holy Spirit, the negative influences of an emerging "Baroque" theology of grace, as O'Meara has argued, contributed to the individualization of the moral life: "A separation of moral theology from the rest of theology, a loosening of the moral virtues from the habit of grace now treated apart in dogmatic theology, a view of the Christian life as natural virtuous habits sparked by actual grace. The strongly supernatural character of the graced personality was diminished by the Baroque figures of transitory graces, heroic human efforts and threatening sins."²²

The key term here is "sparked." Rather than seeing grace as pervasive of

Prayer: The Spirit of Catholic Moral Theology (Collegeville: Liturgical, 2001) 17–18. They note Ockham's idea of radical singular entities and his emphasis on the will and observe: "Once this occurred, it naturally followed that conscience, now viewed as the rational assessment of one's responsibilities before the law, would have little, if anything, to do with an individual's prayer and devotional life."

²⁰ Ibid. 27.

²¹ Ibid. 31. See also John Gallagher, *Time Past, Time Future* (New York: Paulist, 1990) esp. chap. 2, "The Emergence of the Manuals of Moral Theology."

²² O'Meara, "Virtues in the Theology of Thomas Aquinas" 271.

human life and interacting with human nature and capacities in an organic way, these Baroque theologies of grace had a much more mechanistic appearance which fit nicely with an equally mechanistic theology of sacramental efficacy which was emerging at the same time. These tendencies have not only survived into the present age, but are currently enjoying a revival in various restorationist movements in the Catholic Church.

The Shift from Virtue to Obligation

It would be difficult to understand the gifts of the Holy Spirit apart from the virtues. These two elements are tightly bound and may be the most distinctive elements of Catholic, particularly Thomistic, moral theology. Virtues and gifts are both habits or enduring qualities. One set of habits is relatively natural, the other divine in origin. They go hand in hand.

The factors that I have cited conspired in the diminishment of virtue as the basis for morality in favor of a more individualistic, atomized understanding of the moral life which was more rooted in obligation than happiness. Whereas for Aquinas the primary question had been, "What ought I to do achieve happiness?" for post-Tridentine moral theologians the primary question became "What does the law require?" As Pinckaers notes: "The study of the virtues lost its pride of place in basic moral teaching. . . . In place of the virtues, basic moral theory dealt with laws and sins, and it divided specialized moral theory according to the commandments. The study of the virtues was in reality conceived as an examination of the obligations imposed by each virtue and cases of conscience that might arise therefrom. It was no longer a question of [a search for happiness] and a moral theory of the virtues, but rather of legal obligation."²³

In the light of the long history of this tradition with its "attention to specific actions to determine their possible sinfulness," James Hanigan concludes that "it is no wonder that no significant place was accorded to the Holy Spirit. The all too human quality of such complex judgments seemed more than evidence and appeal to the guidance of inspiration of the Holy Spirit settled nothing whatsoever."²⁴

Ecclesial Considerations

In addition to these pastoral, philosophical, and theological considerations, other factors included fears of a more political cast. Servais Pinckaers notes that the "neglect of the Gifts of the Spirit [lay] in the fears

²³ *Sources of Christian Ethics* 231.

²⁴ James P. Hanigan, "Conscience and the Holy Spirit," *Catholic Theological Society of America, Proceedings* 51 (1996) 227-46, at 244.

of rationalism concerning the instinctive and mystical in religion.”²⁵ Elizabeth Dreyer, writing about spirituality, points to the fear of apocalypticism of spiritualists such as Joachim of Fiore, and the fear of allowing believers access to truth in an unmediated fashion since “the Holy Spirit has been named as the source of visions, direct divine inspiration and insight into the Scriptures and tradition by those without formal learning.”²⁶

This general suspicion of the Spirit may have been exacerbated by the fact that some medieval women such as Hildegard of Bingen, Guglielma of Milan, and Maifreda of Pirovano, invoked the Spirit in novel or unorthodox ways, and that in the 14th century the Holy Spirit was sometimes portrayed iconographically as a woman or a girl.²⁷ Dreyer notes that although some of these movements and activities were considered completely orthodox, others were not: “On the heterodox side, the Spirit was also claimed by fervent Christians who spoke out against the status quo, condemned abuses in Church and society and offered a variety of alternatives that ranged from solid to silly.”²⁸

A final factor may have been the “Protestant trust in the Spirit’s empowerment of the laity,” a fear that is still at play today.²⁹ The result was, according to Joseph Chinnici, that “The Holy Spirit became associated with forces of anarchy. He also notes that the rise of science with its effects on epistemology removed the Holy Spirit from the language field into the realm of the ‘unknowable,’ the ‘mysterious,’ the ‘emotional,’ and the ‘en-

²⁵ Pinckaers, “L’Instinct et l’Esprit au coeur de l’éthique chrétienne,” in *Novitas et veritas vitae: Aux sources du renouveau de la morale chrétienne*, ed. C.-J. Pinto de Oliveira (Fribourg: Editions universitaires, 1991) 213–23, at 213–14 (quoted by O’Meara, “Virtues in the Theology of Thomas Aquinas” in his n. 59).

²⁶ Elizabeth Dreyer, “Narratives of the Spirit,” *Catholic Theological Society of America, Proceedings* 51 (1996) 86. Hanigan notes that such approaches invite a “reading of Scripture that is not ecclesial but idiosyncratic . . . [and] assumes a radically unmediated experience of the Holy Spirit. As a result, it strongly encourages a morality that is both highly subjectivistic and individualistic” (“Conscience and the Holy Spirit” 230).

²⁷ See, for example, the portrayal of the Trinity in Barbara Newman’s book *From Virile Woman to womanChrist: Studies in Medieval Religion and Literature* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania, 1995) 199. The Spirit appears to be a young girl who shares the trunk of her body with the Father and the Son. Newman notes, “In spite of its marginal status, this alternative version of the Trinity turns out to be as old or older than the conventional version.”

²⁸ Dreyer, “Narratives of the Spirit” 86.

²⁹ *Ibid.* 87. See the Vatican’s “Instruction on Certain Questions Regarding the Collaboration of the Non-Ordained Faithful in the Sacred Ministry of Priests” (Washington: USCC, 1998), an attempt to moderate or suppress evolving, non-ordained ministerial roles. The historical devolution to a lay/clerical dichotomy is well described in O’Meara’s *Theology of Ministry*, esp. chap. 6, “Sources of Ministry.”

thusiastic.’ ”³⁰ This would hardly square with an increasingly juridical and codified understanding of moral theology that came to be aligned more with canon law than with spirituality.³¹ Overall, a gradual process of institutionalization marginalized the Holy Spirit. As Billy and Keating note: “As the magisterium became more and more centralized, it consolidated its hold over what it considered the ‘authentic’ utterings of the Spirit and helped to create an atmosphere in which theologians, with but few exceptions, were constrained to pursue their goals within the parameters of increasingly limited notions of rationality.”³²

Spiritual Elitism

The separation of morality and spirituality created a two-class system. Morality applied to the majority of Christians upon whom the Church did not wish to impose too severe moral burdens. They were called to the minimum of the moral life as articulated by the Ten Commandments and the Church’s moral regulations. The counsels—the call to spiritual perfection—and the gifts of the Holy Spirit were increasingly the domain of priests and religious who had the leisure and resources to pursue this higher call. Pinckaers resists such a separation, noting that because of the close connection between the virtues and the gifts of the Spirit in Aquinas, “it is clear that the Gifts are not reserved to an elite, nor do they depend on a particular mystical knowledge as we would later believe. In fact, for St. Thomas, the Gifts are not optional, but are necessary for salvation.”³³

By the early-20th century, the result of these historical distortions was

³⁰ Dreyer, “Narratives of the Spirit” 88, quoting Joseph Chinnici, “Have You Seen the One Whom My Heart Loves?”

³¹ The journal *Periodica de re morali, canonica et liturgica* was published under that title until 1990. Subsequently the title was changed to *Periodica de re canonica*, thereby acknowledging the autonomy and method of liturgy and moral theology. Gallagher describes the emergence of moral theology as a new genre having the following characteristics: “[The manuals] were seminary texts for the preparation of men for sacramental ministry. . . . They were concerned with systematic theology and theoretical issues only to the extent that these were necessary for the resolution of specific cases. . . . The canon law of the sacraments continued to be an essential element” (*Times Past* 35).

³² Billy and Keating, *Conscience and Prayer* 26. The authors also note that a “respiritualized reason” need not ignore or disdain the magisterium. “On the contrary, a reintegration of Spirit and reason should bring about an even closer working relationship between theologians . . . and the magisterium. A close working relationship between them will provide helpful correctives against the extremes of over-rationalization and pseudo-mysticism” (30).

³³ The necessity of the gifts for salvation is clearly articulated by Aquinas (*ST* 1–2, q. 68, 2) as well as by his primary commentator on the matter, John of St. Thomas. The latter notes that these gifts are present even in children; although they

that the activity of the Holy Spirit had been displaced from moral theology to ascetical or spiritual theology. Hanigan's survey of dozens of manuals and contemporary textbooks reveals that "simple references to the Holy Spirit, to say nothing of lengthy or substantive discussions of the activity of the Spirit, are noteworthy by their absence."³⁴ Although the *Catechism of the Catholic Church* contains several paragraphs on the role of Holy Spirit in the moral life, these references are clearly subordinated to the overall structure of the section on the moral life which is built around the Decalogue and therefore oriented to obligation.

THEMES OBSCURED IN THE TRADITION OF THE GIFTS

What was lost in this process? I cite a few of the most prominent recurring themes of the tradition rehabilitated by scholars in the first-half of the 20th century.

Gifts as Connatural, Intuitive, and Instinctive Knowing

Perhaps the most constant element of the inherited tradition on the gifts of the Holy Spirit is that they involve something other than intellectual or rational knowledge. They are rooted in something that is variously described as connatural, intuitive, or instinctive knowing.³⁵ Connatural knowledge can be described as the difference between merely *knowing about* and *having*. One can know all about morality or religion, for example, but live an immoral or faithless life. Connatural means that knowledge is not only intellectual, but has become "second nature" to us, much as the skill of an athlete who can perform remarkable, graceful moves with no apparent effort, or the musician who can produce beautiful music quite naturally. Their skillful knowledge has become so much a part of them that they would be hard pressed to explain it step by step, but they truly possess it in the depths of their being. Similarly, the virtues are connatural because they are "moral skills" that enable ready and skillful production of good acts.

Because we are created "into the image of God" (*ad imaginem Dei*, as Aquinas wrote), we live in a "supernatural order destined for a supernatu-

may not be used, they are still there (John of St. Thomas, *The Gifts of the Holy Ghost*, trans. Dominic Hughes [New York: Sheed and Ward, 1951] II. 40, p. 62).

³⁴ Hanigan, "Conscience and the Holy Spirit" 229.

³⁵ Labourdette's discussion of the gifts in the *Dictionnaire de spiritualité* (see n. 1 above) argues that John of St. Thomas's most important contribution was "son analyse de la connaissance par connaturalité affective et la place qu'il donne à cette notion dans la théorie générale des dons" (vol. 3, col. 1632).

ral end for which natural virtues are no help.”³⁶ That supernatural destiny has a corresponding connaturality. It is “natural” for us as persons, in a way it is not for birds or trees, to be drawn into union with God. We cannot achieve this on our own, since our “purely rational mode of operation is insufficiently supple, intuitive, instinctive . . . to enable [us] to respond completely to the Transcendent Personal Mystery communicated [to us].”³⁷ John of St. Thomas remarked that the gifts are supernatural habits because they enable us to operate with a certain connaturality “toward things divine,” and that we can be rendered connatural to divine things only if we are “properly disposed by a permanent and habitual inclination.”³⁸ Therefore, the gifts of the Holy Spirit are habitual possessions that prepare us to know the mystery of God in a way that cannot be achieved by natural capacities alone, but which are nonetheless “natural” to us as persons.

The language that is used to describe this connatural or instinctive grasp of God is remarkable for its concreteness. Keating, discussing the gift of wisdom, illustrates that the word “wisdom” comes from “sapientia” which actually means “tasting knowledge . . . knowledge that is delightful and not merely notional or abstract.” He continues: “[I]s it really possible to taste God? The answer is yes, but we cannot bring it about by our own efforts we can only prepare ourselves for it.”³⁹ Other writers emphasize the non-visual aspect of the moral and spiritual life, noting that with the gifts “it becomes a more tactile theology, allowing for a kind of feeling, touching and tasting of the divine. . . . Are we too slow to follow up upon the Thomistic theology of the gifts and attempt to express man’s vital relationship to God in other than visual or aural categories? Is there any room for feeling, touching, tasting the reality of God?”⁴⁰ Maguire uses visceral language to describe how we know affectively: “Affective knowledge is less like seeing and more like ‘tasting,’ ‘touching,’ ‘sensing.’ That which is loved is ‘inviscerated’ within the knower and experienced as united to the knower with a new and distinct proportion and congeniality.”⁴¹

³⁶ Farrell, “Tranquil Violence: The Gift of Fortitude,” in *Swift Victory* 179.

³⁷ Anthony J. Kelly, C.S.S.R., “The Gifts of the Spirit: Aquinas and the Modern Context,” *The Thomist* 38 (April 1974) 193–231, at 200.

³⁸ John of St. Thomas, *The Gifts of the Holy Ghost* II. 10, pp. 45–46.

³⁹ Keating, *Fruits and Gifts of the Holy Spirit* 108. In a similar vein, John of St. Thomas observes that the gifts “proceed from a savour, a taste, and a connaturality to supernatural things” (*Gifts of the Holy Ghost* II. 15, p. 49). Farrell and Hughes describe the gifts as “taste of heaven, a participation, a sharing of something divine. That we might be able to act divinely, omnipotence elevates our every active capacity by the infusion, along with grace, of divinely perfect virtues” *Swift Victory* 181.

⁴⁰ Kelly, “Gifts of the Holy Spirit” 229–30.

⁴¹ Maguire, “*Ratio practica* and the Intellectualistic Fallacy” 30.

Instinct is another common term for expressing the kind of knowledge that the gifts impart. Pinckaers observes that in the writings of Aquinas the word *instinctus* appears 298 times of which 51 instances refer to the “instinct of the Holy Spirit.” Aquinas used this language more in his later works than in his early ones, so it was not an idea he toyed with and then abandoned.⁴² O’Meara has shown that this is a typical emphasis of the Dominican school of moral theology, which “did not end with an ascetically developed set of virtues with a high degree of will power or rational discussion, but with a familiarity with the divine that is intuitive and instinctive.”⁴³ Despite the centrality of this idea, many theologians remained uncomfortable with it and some even translated it as “impulse” or “prompting”⁴⁴ rather than instinct to soften its impact. Apparently these theologians agree with Pinckaers who asked whether it might be “subversive to put instinct at the heart of Christian ethics?”⁴⁵

A Clear Vision of Our Own Sinfulness

One of the most important aspects of the gifts, especially the gift of understanding, is that it purifies our vision so that we can let our illusions die and see our own sinfulness and need for God’s grace. This is movingly portrayed in two short stories by American writer Flannery O’Connor. In “The Artificial Nigger,” she describes the treachery of a simple country man, Mr. Head, who betrays his grandson Nelson after Nelson has embarrassed him by running into a woman and causing her to drop her bags of groceries. The moment comes when Mr. Head realizes what he has done:

Mr. Head stood very still and felt the action of mercy touch him again but this time he knew that there were no words in the world that could name it. . . . He stood appalled, judging himself with the thoroughness of God, while the action of mercy covered his pride like a flame and consumed it. He had never thought himself a great sinner before but he saw now that his true depravity had been hidden from him lest it cause him despair. . . . He saw that no sin was too monstrous for him to

⁴² Pinckaers, “L’Instinct et l’Esprit” 213–23, at 213–15.

⁴³ O’Meara, “Virtues” 276. Similarly, “Aquinas’s theology does not begin with human virtues nor end with them. It proceeds from two vital sources, the total human personality and divine grace, and it ends in the instinctual gifts of the Spirit” (279).

⁴⁴ Edward O’Connor, C.S.C., admits the frequent use of “instinct” by Aquinas and acknowledges its association with animal or natural instinct. However, he translates it as “prompting.” “[C]learly Thomas refers to that which is today called instinct; but it would be a mistake to suppose that his word *instinctus* means the same thing as our word instinct, which has come to denote specifically a drive that is natural or innate” (“‘Instinctus’ and ‘Inspiratio,’” in *Summa theologiae* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1973) vol. 24, appendix 5, p. 137.

⁴⁵ Pinckaers, “L’Instinct et l’Esprit” 213.

claim as his own, and since God loved in proportion as He forgave, he felt ready at that instant to enter Paradise."⁴⁶

In "The Enduring Chill," O'Connor describes a young man, Asbury, who has returned to his Southern home to die. He asks his mother to find a priest, preferably a Jesuit, with whom Asbury hopes he can have an intelligent conversation. Instead a priest arrives who is deaf in one ear and blind in one eye. To Asbury's dismay he inquires about Asbury's morning prayers, his purity, and his grasp of the Catechism. He tells Asbury to ask God to send the Holy Ghost.

"The Holy Ghost," [Asbury] said, "is the last thing I'm looking for!" "And He may be the last thing you get," the priest said. . . . "How can the Holy Ghost fill your soul when it's full of trash?" the priest roared. "The Holy Ghost will not come until you see yourself as you are a lazy ignorant conceited youth!"

Later, at the approach of death Asbury has a mystical experience:

The old life in him was exhausted. He awaited the coming of new. It was then that he felt the beginning of a chill, a chill so peculiar, so light, that it was like a warm ripple across a sea of cold. His breath came short. The fierce bird which through the years of his childhood and the days of his illness had been poised over his head, waiting mysteriously, appeared all at once to be in motion. Asbury blanched and the last film of illusion was torn as if by a whirlwind from his eyes. He saw that for the rest of his days, frail, racked, but enduring, he would live in the face of a purifying terror. A feeble cry, a last impossible protest escaped him. But the Holy Ghost, emblazoned in ice instead of fire, continued, implacable, to descend.⁴⁷

In these passages, O'Connor skillfully uses traditional images of heat, flame, cold, wind, and, of course, a bird to show how the gift of understanding helps us to see ourselves and our weakness with piercing clarity. O'Connor's literary description is confirmed by Yves Congar: "The Holy Spirit acts within us or penetrates into us like an anointing. He makes us conscious of the sovereign attraction of the absolute and of our own wretchedness and of the untruth and selfishness that fills our lives. We are conscious of being judged, but at the same time we are forestalled by forgiveness and grace, with the result that our false excuses, our self-justifying mechanisms and the selfish structure of our lives break down."⁴⁸

Thomas Keating notes in a similar vein, "Whether it [the gift of understanding] comes through terrible suffering or develops gradually, it makes

⁴⁶ Flannery O'Connor, *The Complete Stories* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1946-1971) 269-70.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.* 376-77, 382.

⁴⁸ *I Believe in the Holy Spirit*, 3 vols., trans. David Smith (New York: Seabury, 1983) 2.123, quoted in Mark Ginter, "The Holy Spirit and Morality: A Dynamic Alliance," *Catholic Theological Society of America, Proceedings* 51 (1996) 165-79, at 178.

us aware that we are capable of any evil and that only God is our strength.”⁴⁹ This is not a morbid meditation upon our own sinfulness, but a process of awakening to the realization that “we are not all that we should be and with God’s grace could be.”⁵⁰

The implication is that the first result of the action of the gifts of the Holy Spirit may not be entirely pleasant. It will strip us of our illusions, and force us to see the not-so-beautiful aspects of our own personalities. Like the “dark night,” the lack of consolation that accompanies authentic growth in the moral and spiritual life, it is a hard process.

Assistance with Complex or Difficult Moral Situations

Years ago when computers were in their infancy, I was particularly pleased to have gotten a monitor that had a new and exciting feature. Instead of the green or amber characters that had been used on the earliest models, this one could actually display monochrome images in “264 shades of gray.” After describing this to a friend, she wryly remarked, “I’ll bet as a moral theologian you really love that.”

Unlike mathematics and other speculative sciences, where there is “a clarity of procession coupled with an independence from reality that results in even the most remote conclusions possessing the same quality of shining truth as the principles from which are derived,”⁵¹ morality has lots of “gray areas”—questions that, because of their complexity, do not readily admit of clear solutions. As life has become more complicated, especially in areas of social justice, warfare, and health care ethics, these problems have become more common.

One way in which the Church has tried to deal with this phenomenon is through the principle of double effect which reasons that sometimes an action has two effects, one good and intended, the other bad and unintended. Such actions are permissible as long as the bad effect is not a means to the good one. Thus, one could legitimately choose a radical surgery (with the unintended bad effect of disfigurement) because it also had the good, and intended effect of therapy or cure.

Although this principle has helped us achieve clarity of a sort, we are still dealing with judgments about proportionality—is the desired effect *good enough* to warrant the bad one? There is no mathematical formula that will

⁴⁹ Keating, *Fruits and Gifts of the Spirit* 101.

⁵⁰ Ginter, “The Holy Spirit and Morality” 178, quoting Congar in “The Call to Ecumenism and the Work of the Holy Spirit” 104.

⁵¹ John Mahoney, “The Spirit and Community Discernment in Aquinas,” in *Seeking the Spirit: Essays in Moral and Pastoral Theology* (Denville, N.J.: Dimension Books, 1981) 81–96, at 87.

enable us to arrive at an absolutely certain judgment. Philip Keane notes that grasping true proportionality in these situations is more an art than a science, and describes his dissatisfaction “with the lack of a spiritual foundation for a double effect thinking.” He writes that a stronger link between pneumatology and moral theology might “help us move beyond the impasse which marks much of today’s double effects debate.”⁵²

Moral theologian Brian Johnstone makes a similar point in comments about the conjoined twins Mary and Jodie, who were surgically separated in Manchester, England, in November 2000. The twins were anatomically fused at the abdomen and shared some critical organs. The moral dilemma was whether it was morally permissible to try to save one, knowing the other would die. For the parents, journalist John Allen writes, “it was a stark ‘Sophie’s Choice’—mark one of your children to die or they both perish.” The parents, apparently relying on a moral analysis that held that one child could be saved only by intending the death of the other as a means, declined the surgery necessary to separate them. Moral theologians and bishops were divided on the case. Commenting on the case, Johnstone asked, “The question is, can we accept that the intention is to remove from Jodie a burden on her heart and lungs that, if not removed, will bring about her death? If we can, then double effect applies.” Still, he acknowledged that the “moral calculus is so murky” he would let the parents decide. “You reach a point at which logic can’t take you any further,” he said.⁵³

It is precisely at this point—when logic cannot take us any further—that the gifts of the Spirit take over. They do not replace our own moral due diligence. We should always try to go as far as logic will take us. But in complicated cases where there is disagreement, the Spirit’s gift of counsel can help us sort through the complexity and arrive at a confident, free decision. Rather than replacing our own efforts, the gifts of the Spirit perfect them. As Dominican spiritual writer Christopher Kiesling noted: “The acquired virtue of prudence and its perfection by grace . . . facilitate this reasonable free choice and its consequent imperative to ourselves that we should act or not act, act this way or that way. What the Holy Spirit contributes . . . is a perfecting of this whole process of decision making. The

⁵² “The Role of the Holy Spirit in Contemporary Moral Theology,” *Catholic Theological Society of America, Proceedings* 51 (1996) 102, 107–8.

⁵³ John L. Allen, Jr., “Sophie’s Choice,” *Second Opinion* no. 3 (December 2000) 26–35, at 26; Johnstone’s comments at 31–32. Also, Philip Keane makes a similar point: “In all . . . descriptions of moral knowing, there is an effort to understand [it] as touching a level in our humanity which goes beyond logical categories, a level in which the human person is ultimately seeking to find God in the very core of human moral decisions” (“The Role of the Holy Spirit in Contemporary Moral Theology” 107). On the moral dilemma, see M. Cathleen Kaveny, “The Case of Conjoined Twins,” *Theological Studies* 62 (2001) 753–86.

Spirit does not substitute her activity for ours, but complements and perfects ours.”⁵⁴

Spontaneity and Immediacy

Another constant element in the tradition of the gifts illustrates that while much of our moral life is slow and plodding, the Spirit assists us by speeding up the process, by providing a “fluid mobility” to our moral actions.⁵⁵ On this O’Meara has observed: “Because human beings do not live only rationally and methodically, but exuberantly and spontaneously, Aquinas described beyond virtue a particular and heightened dimension of grace . . . the Gifts of the Holy Spirit. These contacts by the Spirit are not transitory actual graces, but special, divinely infused dispositions. Virtues and Gifts are two different modes of grace. The first is frequent, deliberate, thoughtful. The second is intuitive, prompt, supra-deliberative.”⁵⁶

John of St. Thomas, in his commentary on Aquinas’s theology of the gifts, used a nautical image to describe this: “For example, although the forward progress of a ship may be the same, there is a vast difference in its being moved by the laborious rowing of oarsmen and its being moved by sails filled with a strong breeze.”⁵⁷

Continuity and Consistency

I have already noted the fragmenting and disintegrating influence of auricular confession and the diminishment of virtue on the moral life. The gifts of the Holy Spirit smooth the “rough edges” of the moral life by

⁵⁴ Christopher Kiesling, “The Seven Quiet Gifts of the Holy Spirit,” *The Living Light* 23 (1986) 137–46, at 143. See also Mahoney: “Rather than concentrating on the written law and the enlightenment of the Spirit as two distinct sources of moral knowledge we should consider them as two complementary ways in which the one Spirit influences the Christian intellect. . . . The necessarily general and universal way in which the [moral] law is formulated requires that it be applied in particular situations, and it is in the process of individualization and determination of the law that the direct influence of the Spirit on the Christian’s intellect is seen” (“The Spirit and Moral Discernment,” in *Seeking the Spirit* 63–80, at 74).

⁵⁵ Hughes and Farrell, *Swift Victory* 181.

⁵⁶ O’Meara, *Thomas Aquinas Theologian* 25. See also Kelly, “The virtue is conceived as disposing us to act as habitually moved by rational faculties. The accent is on reasoned judgment, deliberative choice, the categorical action, selected scope and definite horizon; but by the Gifts we are rendered capable of being inspired by God to share in the divine spontaneity in a way that goes beyond a deliberative mode. Here the accent is on incalculable action, inspired insight, instinctive grasp” (“Gifts of the Holy Spirit” 196–97).

⁵⁷ John of St. Thomas, *The Gifts of the Holy Ghost*, II, 29, p. 56.

providing constancy and continuity. As one popular book on Dominican spirituality noted in the 1930s: "The Gifts of the Holy Spirit are not actual interventions [in the sense of relating to individual acts] in our life, but habitual dispositions placed in our soul which lead it easily to consent to his inspirations. Through these God shines freely across the Christian's whole moral and supernatural life, initially illumined by the calm light of the virtues."⁵⁸ The authors of another popular spiritual book in the 1950s argue that the gift of counsel "provides the soul with a selective constancy that is both artistic and instinctive."⁵⁹ Another writer notes that "the doctrine of St. Thomas Aquinas and the coordination of the Gifts and the virtues . . . indicate to us that the spiritual instinct that forms in us the Gifts does not operate intermittently by sudden impulses, but constantly, sustaining the long patience that exercise and progress in the virtues requires."⁶⁰

Continuity in the moral life is not so important for young persons who have yet to develop a consistent pattern of behavior. But for adults, this continuity is extremely important. It reminds us that there is a difference between telling a lie and becoming a liar, between doing one good act and becoming a charitable and just person. The gifts of the Spirit are intended to prompt adult Christians to examine their lives more closely for signs of incongruity, and to work to establish an overall direction or goal for their moral and spiritual formation. Indeed, rather than dealing with one dilemma after another, spiritual directors and moral advisers aim to help adult advisees to discern these patterns, purify them, and intentionally cultivate them. As one grows older, the main moral question should be not just "What ought I to do?" but "Who ought I to become?" When one's attention turns in that direction, one is then prepared to hear the Spirit's promptings and experience the fruits that are evidence of the Spirit's activity. This is obviously the central experience of both the moral and spiritual life.

RECOVERING THE GIFTS

For a number of reasons, a renewed pneumatology would enrich moral theology. The first and most important reason is that the Holy Spirit can help make morality *theological*, by linking it more closely to systematic and trinitarian theology and also to spirituality which has become a distinct discipline. Denise Lardner Carmody has shown that the doctrine of the Holy Spirit is not just a speculative idea but a real presence. She suggests how the doctrine might affect the way we think of sexual love in marriage:

⁵⁸ Gardeil, *The Gifts of the Holy Ghost in the Dominican Saints*, 31, 20.

⁵⁹ Farrell and Hughes, *Swift Victory* 119.

⁶⁰ S. Pinckaers, "L'Instinct et l'Esprit" 220; translation mine.

“When we make love, the love of Father, Son and Holy Spirit circulate, come into play. . . . Can it be that the Spirit is the kindly light in which we are attractive to one another, the soft repose in which we give one another renewal as well as rest?”⁶¹

Secondly, the gifts provide a renewed scriptural basis for moral theology. Although Catholic moral theology was notorious, especially during the age of manuals, for using Scripture as proof texts to bolster arguments derived from the natural law, a more prominent role for the gifts of the Spirit would lead us back to the rich scriptural tradition on the gifts. The gifts are enumerated in Isaiah 11 and are at the heart of the Gospel of John and the letters of Paul who invokes them not only in the service of individual moral growth in Christ, but in the service of the growing ecclesial community. In addition, many treatments of the gifts, including that by Aquinas, link each of the gifts to one of the Beatitudes.⁶² This has the advantage of bringing Scripture to bear where it is useful, not at the level of particular moral norms and categorical acts, but at the level of character and attitude formation.

An enhanced role for the Holy Spirit would also result in a fuller Christian anthropology. Hanigan notes that given the theological anthropology out of which manualist writers worked, their concern for objectivity and the practical interest of their inquiries, “they were quite right to omit any appeals or references to the Holy Spirit in their moral discussions.”⁶³ What the Church ultimately ended up with, however, was a very stripped-down understanding of the human person, nudely rationalistic or intuitionistic at best and lacking in an operative understanding of the role of grace and the Holy Spirit. This resulted in an almost childish approach to the moral life based on obligation, a “do it because I said so” approach, and a lack of

⁶¹ Denise Lardner Carmody, “Doing Sexual Ethics in a Post-Permissive Society,” *The Way* 28 (July 1988) 244–53, at 250. The article on the gifts of the Holy Spirit in the *Dictionnaire de spiritualité* written by Labourdette at a very different time and in a different idiom has similar language that refers to the contemplative life: “La vie contemplative chrétienne est ainsi marquée du signe de la Trinité, elle est l’épanouissement, compatible avec les conditions de la vie présente, de son Image en nous, le commerce intime avec les trois personnes divine” (vol. 3, col. 1631).

⁶² Beatitude is the last end of human life. . . . One moves towards it and draws near to it through the activity of the virtues, and more especially through the activity of the gifts, if we are speaking of eternal beatitude” (*ST* 1–2, 69, 2). Congar notes, “Since [Thomas] regarded the beatitudes as the perfect action of the virtues and the gifts, he also tried to make one gift of the Spirit and one of the beatitudes correspond to each of the virtues. He even attempted to attribute to each virtue, with its gift and its corresponding beatitude, one or other of the ‘fruits’ of the Spirit mentioned by Paul” (*I Believe in the Holy Spirit* 3.137). Gardeil follows a similar pattern in his *The Holy Spirit in Christian Life*.

⁶³ Hanigan, “Conscience and the Holy Spirit” 229.

awareness that the moral life had anything to do with spirituality, liturgy, or theology itself. It is true that the Catholic moral tradition is intellectualistic in the sense that it is based on understanding of a goal or purpose and intelligent pursuit of it. However, in moral matters, "intellect" must also involve other kinds of knowing that are not purely rational. This involves a circular relationship between spirit and reason whereby "the insights of one complement the scope and competence of the other in such a way that, when taken together, their interaction generates a field of understanding unique to themselves, and which neither would be fully capable of penetrating on its own."⁶⁴

On a pastoral level, a revitalized theology of the gifts would enrich spiritual direction by linking it more closely with moral advising. Even though spiritual direction often involves moral questions, some directors avoid them because they fear that morality involves judging, criticizing, or imposing external norms. Directors must first help people to *think* as clearly as possible. They must then ready people for these supernatural promptings that take root as instincts and intuitions. They must help people acquire "a taste of God." Together, these two aspects of moral knowing help avoid equally deficient extremes of excessive rationalism, on the one hand, and anti-intellectualism, intuitionism, or voluntarism, on the other hand.

My article has been an attempt to reopen the discussion of the gifts of the Holy Spirit in the moral life. Much remains to be done. First of all, theologians must continue to develop a fuller pneumatology in trinitarian theology generally. This is well under way thanks to the work of William Hill, Kilian McDonnell, Catherine LaCugna, and Yves Congar.⁶⁵ Second, there needs to be an updated discussion of the specific nature and contribution of each gift, which I have not done here. Third, there needs to be further exploration of the relationship among the gifts, the infused and moral virtues, and the Beatitudes and the New Law.⁶⁶ This relationship was a consistent concern of all the main commentators. Finally, theologians need to find ways to integrate this important but neglected dimension of the moral life into spiritual direction and moral catechesis.

⁶⁴ Billy and Keating, *Conscience and Prayer* 29.

⁶⁵ See Dennis Billy's "Person of the Holy Spirit" for a review of the Church's classical pneumatological formulation as well as three alternate models, viz., Thomistic, ecumenical, and feminist.

⁶⁶ See Servais Pinckaers, "The Recovery of the New Law in Moral Theology," *Irish Theological Quarterly* 64 (1999) 3–15.