BOOK REVIEWS


Balentine brings together several new approaches to the study of the Pentateuch but combines them in ways unusual for biblical specialists. He argues for a postexilic shaping of the Torah, when the hegemony of the Persian Empire significantly affected the form and content of this text. Torah’s faith traditions, though internally generated, represent the imposition of an external program, but B. searches for clues of internal resistance to external pressures. The present text of Torah, B. argues, results from such a compromise: in codifying laws and rebuilding the Jerusalem Temple, Persian pressure on the province of Yehud proved effective, so that interpreters might expect details of the Torah to conform substantially to the demands of the status quo in the political situation in the Persian era.

Concurrently, B. argues that the Torah preserves a vision that is not ultimately defined by political realities, as some would fear. Rather, God’s ultimate designs have imprinted themselves in the pattern of cosmic creation celebrated in Genesis 1:1–2:4a. For B., worship in Israel draws from this patterned liturgy of creation, rejoicing in it and finding its social vision manifest in it.

Since religious rituals can be seen as symbolic acts of social construction, one can use these ritual actions as another means of doing exegesis, of reflecting on the meaning of a text. To accomplish this strategy, B. moves away from standard questions of historical critics in order to learn how to read ritual texts, discerning their worldview and grasping what they proclaim about the relationship between God and humankind. B. sketches an alternative path to the Protestant, antipriestly bias he finds in the tradition of Wellhausen, and works to reclaim the riches of the Priestly tradition, especially in worship-oriented texts such as Genesis 1:1–2:4. In this liturgy of creation B. discerns more attention to order than to origins, since God’s actions in this section pertain more to separating and distinguishing, leading to the notion that the cosmos has certain divisions and boundaries which need to be maintained if order is to continue (86). Here B. shifts to ethics, claiming that the cosmic order corresponds to social-ethical order in this worldview, so that “creational demands” point the direction to righteousness and order as characteristic of the community that worships in this way. The seventh day becomes the focus of worship, serves as the pattern for Sabbath observance, and keeps worship centered on the cosmos created by God.

A major contribution is B.’s argument for the theological sophistication of priestly ritual texts, demonstrating that ritual is a “primary means for a community of faith to do theology” (90). For him these rituals are not empty performances but serve as a form of communication between God...
and humankind. Finally, B. argues that the long ritual texts, especially in Leviticus, cannot be treated as useless by Christians who would claim to relate in a mutually respectful stance with Jewish people.

A major objective of this study is to show that major worship emphases embedded in Israel’s history were later incorporated into an aggregate vision still active in the Persian world. Bypassed texts suddenly call for attention, such as Genesis 8:20–22, where Noah steps out of the ark, builds an altar, and offers a sacrifice. B. calls this the first explicit act of worship. It mediates between the reversal of creation (the Flood) and the renewal of creation (in the covenant with Noah). Thus worship is the best context for enacting and restoring the cosmic covenant. B. will demonstrate later how a series of covenants (Noah, Abraham, Moses) do serve to maintain God’s designs at creation.

B. deftly narrows the gap between covenant and creation traditions, demonstrating how they correspond to each other. Even the covenant liturgy at Sinai, with its heptadic pattern (in the seventh week after the Exodus, parallel to the creation liturgy, focused on the seventh day), mirrors God’s creational designs. In Exodus 32–34, Moses models the kind of prayer necessary for covenantal ministry: after the covenant had been broken, he cried out to God for this people in a lament (32:7–14), which ultimately resulted in God’s renewal of the covenant. Here and elsewhere, B. makes use of his excellent study, Prayer in the Hebrew Bible: The Drama of Divine-Human Dialogue (1993).

B. plumbs the potential of ritual texts to disclose theological discernments and notices traces of worship practices in surprising locations. He binds together creation and covenant concerns (in ways surprising for biblical scholars trained to read the history of God’s mighty acts as locus for biblical theology) into a clarion call for observance of justice in the community that holds fast to the Torah. In all these ways, B. invites church professionals and biblical scholars to rethink not only their views of the Torah/Pentateuch, but also how their ministry relates to and grows out of their understanding of worship in these seminal texts.

Jesuit School of Theology at Berkeley

JOHN C. ENDRES, S.J.


Whatever else one may say about Qohelet, he was a great poet. Lines like “vanity of vanities, all is vanity,” “a time to be born, a time to die,” and “the pitcher broken at the fountain,” grip the heart and reverberate in the mind long afterwards. Fox lovingly and with great erudition has pored over every word of the Hebrew text of Ecclesiastes and produced an exciting commentary. Almost half the book consists of introductory remarks on issues addressed by Qohelet (such as contradictions, vanity, justice, wis-
dom, toil, pleasure) and on contemporary discussions of meaning and genre. The commentary itself is a penetrating and comprehensive discussion with many other writers’ attempts to plumb the mysteries of Qohelet’s thought. The end product is very satisfactory, although questions linger.

F. describes the consternation of the ancient rabbis about Qohelet’s call to “follow your heart and the sight of your eyes” as leading to licentiousness, and his complaint about the uselessness of “toil” to include study of the Torah. They accepted his work as Scripture because it was set in an orthodox framework of praise and “fear” of God (1:3; 12:13). Yet the contradictions one finds in Qohelet are the result, not of his incompetence, but of his unflinchingly honest grappling with the inconsistencies of his intellectual world. In the face of death, which is final, what is one to do? F. argues convincingly that 12:7 (“the spirit returns to God”) does not imply an afterlife and “is actually more pessimistic than 3:21” (332). His exegesis of the final poem on death (12:1–7) masterfully integrates the issues of literal, symbolic, and allegorical interpretation: Each has something valuable to contribute.

In his preface, F. critiques the basic attitudes of some recent commentators on Qohelet: Norbert Lohfink is too quick to see repudiated ideas as quotations and as not owned by Qohelet; James Crenshaw’s picture of life as determined by chance is too grim; Roland Murphy is not sufficiently aware of the crisis that contradiction and the collapse of meaning had for Qohelet. But perhaps F. himself overstates the case and emphasizes the polarities in Qohelet’s work to the extreme. In seeing affinities between Albert Camus and Qohelet, especially in their “sensitivity to the absurd” (9), F. acknowledges certain differences. However, although he admits that for Qohelet “God’s control extends to the human heart (2:26; 3:11, 14)” (9), he still raises the specter of practical atheism. Lohfink’s limitation of the similarity to existential philosophy in general is more on the mark. F. defends his radical contrasts by indicating that Qohelet is consistent in pointing them out, and that “the contradictions may reside in the world itself” (26).

One disappointment in this great work is its brief treatment of God. F. limits himself to a short section (“Qohelet’s God”) and sporadic comments. He describes Qohelet’s God as “hard and mostly indifferent but not hostile” (137), one to whom no one turns for comfort. If pleasure is God’s gift (2:25; 3:13), that merely means that God allows us to enjoy it, and we should enjoy it while we can. It is brief enough. Carpe diem! Qoh 3:21 takes up the Hellenistic speculation about the soul’s return to God, but Qohelet is unsure. F. paraphrases: “Since man is ignorant of what lies ahead, nothing remains but to enjoy the present” (215).

This commentary began as a revision of F.’s Qohelet and His Contradictions (1987), but F.’s continuing struggle to come to grips with the conundrums of the ancient thinker has created a new book, still consistent with the basic message of the older one, but enriched by expanded exegesis, refined definitions of key words, and new insights. The result is a profound meditation not only on Qohelet and his world, but on the deepest issues of
living wisely in an age surprisingly similar to that one. I recommend this work very highly. It is well written and, despite a liberal use of Hebrew, accessible to most readers.

Washington Theological Union, D.C.

JOSEPH F. WIMMER, O.S.A.


Instead of asking how Greco-Roman culture impinged on the Jesus tradition and altered it, Snyder attempts to demonstrate how the Jesus tradition modified both Jewish and Roman cultures. The work is constructed in two uneven sections: part 1, “Inculturation in the New Testament,” has three chapters dealing with the Synoptics, Paul, and John; part 3, “Trajectories of Inculturation,” has nine chapters, treating of symbols, representation art, architecture, inscriptions, calendar, food and meals, gender meaning and roles, health and medicine, and the Jesus tradition in the formation of Christian culture. These are separated by part 2, a brief chapter on the second Christian generation in which S. articulates his “Theories of Transformation.”

In part 1, S. first analyzes the major New Testament materials, theorizing how the Synoptic Gospels used Jesus to undermine some cultural values, then points out how he believes Paul used the same tradition to suspend cultural expressions. S. argues that, although Paul supported “the present age” (governmental authorities, family and sexual matters, even class distinctions), he devalued it and asked his congregations to make their own legal decisions, insisting on gender and ethnic equality, thereby mobilizing the inculturation of the Jesus tradition in Mediterranean society. Finally, S. suggests how the Fourth Gospel universalized Jesus by deculturizing him and making him available to any culture.

In part 2 on developments in the second century, S. details how he thinks modern, chiefly Protestant, scholars have perceived the transforming impact of Jewish and Roman culture on the nascent Jesus movement from the first to the third centuries, resulting in a Church “quite different from the ‘original’” in purity (59). The modification of ecclesial perspective due to the delayed parousia, waning eschatological enthusiasm, and assimilation of Hellenism can be grasped through a series of antithetical positions identified by various scholars: e.g., from eschatology to incarnation, historicization, ecclesiasticism, sacramentalism; from Spirit to Law; from faith to dogma; from the human Jesus to the divine Christ; from psychosomatic unity to Hellenistic dualism; from charisma to cultic society; from simplicity to complexity.

S. argues from a wide range of scholarly literature and non-literary data that the Jesus tradition infiltrated Jewish and Roman cultures—evidenced in, e.g., symbols, inscriptions, calendar, commensality, gender, and health care. At this juncture, the focal point toward which S. has been building, his
theses and arguments seem less than cogent, as they are built on generalizations difficult to verify—e.g., regarding architecture: “The square building stresses neither dancing nor marching, but perfection of the human community where sacred boundaries exist. The sides of the meeting place are even, and the boundaries of the community are clear. Human considerations (often confused with divine law) determine how one leaves the state of perfection and how one enters it. Meeting places such as the synagogue or the house church tended to be square. To oversimplify: circular foundations stress a heavenly reality; longitudinal foundations stress an end-time vision; and square foundations stress a present reality or realized eschatology” (107).

Tensions in this pivotal part derive from S.’s indecisiveness about certain issues remarked earlier. In chapter 1 (18–19), S. leaves open the Jesus Seminar’s view that Jesus was a Cynic philosopher, while noting that apocalyptic strains are strong elements in the Jesus tradition, thus necessarily concluding that both of these features left their imprint on the Jesus tradition. Later, when speaking of Jesus’ attitude to the calendar, S. notes ambivalently that “Cynics wore clothing inappropriate to the season, ignored night and day, and carried out activities at unusual times. For them the calendar was enslaving. We cannot determine here whether, and to what extent, Jesus might have been a Cynic or have been influenced by the Cynics” (121–122). All that S. can securely postulate, then, are possible church attitudes toward the calendar. Because the book is about the “Jesus tradition,” its subtitle might more properly be “the impact of the Church (rather than Jesus) on Jewish and Roman cultures.”

S.’s longest and most important chapter deals with food and meals (129–174). He argues that the Christian meal, comprised of fish, bread, and wine, represented foodstuffs accessible to rich and poor alike, and that seating arrangements as specified by the Jesus tradition (taking the lowest place and disciples desiring to act as servants) undermined the Roman tradition of seating. The early Christian agape-meal also incorporated solicitude for the poor, represented by the basket holding the leftover loaves. Together these features of the Jesus tradition caused an upheaval in the Mediterranean culture of the day. It is a provocative thesis, but the data adduced may not persuade many.

For those unfamiliar with issues in the current New Testament debate, S.’s work will be a difficult read; and for those unacquainted with Greek, Hebrew, and Latin, it will be frustrating for lack of translations. I find the study flawed, as well, in its interpretation of John and in its viewpoint on Jesus’ stance on issues [e.g., toward the Gentiles (21)]. Still, S. offers his readers a thought-provoking argument well worth engaging.

Archdiocese of Halifax, Nova Scotia

TERRENCE PRENDERGAST, S.J.

This is the second collection of essays Moltmann has published in the last decade. In it we see him doing what he does best: passionately articulating a contemporary public theology that is both scholarly and deeply pastoral. The previous set of essays addressed trinitarian theology; here the topic is the very character of Christian theology and its place in contemporary society. Although the papers gathered in this volume were delivered over the past seven years at various locations, M. maintains a consistent thesis throughout. He contends that Christian theology is properly public theology, i.e., “political theology” carried out hopefully in Christ and in the kingdom of God, and in the name of the poor and marginalized. Moreover, he argues that such a theology is implicit in modernity itself, only awaiting our explicit thematization of it.

What sets this collection apart from his last set of essays, however, is not just its theme but also its stated intent. For in these essays M. seeks to repudiate what he perceives as recent developments in the theological discipline that threaten the kind of public theology he champions. He identifies those developments with the emergence of talk about contemporary society as “postmodern” which leads to a kind of theologizing that, despairing of universal reason, begins not with “public” but “private” discourse and ends with the theologian too often alienated from the public struggle of the social world he or she inhabits. This results in what M. calls the “new lachrymosity of some theologians, who have fallen into the snare of self-pity” (2). It is to that mood and that snare that he implicitly and explicitly addresses himself in this volume.

The collection consists of thirteen essays divided into three groups, with each group representing one aspect of his argument. The first division contains three papers. The first deals with “Theology and Politics”; the second argues M.’s case that modernity has from the first harbored an implicit Christian theology, and that contemporary theologians must therefore champion modernity even as they struggle to bring its Christian themes to social realization in the face of modern society’s own resistance to doing so; the third turns from the early to the more recent period of modern history and sketches the rise and contours of a political theology of liberation that is both implicitly presupposed by the modern social world and explicitly demanded by it.

The second group of five essays is titled “Theology in the Changing Values of the Modern World.” Here M. acknowledges that modernity is undergoing a crisis that he defines in terms of the criticisms of the other major world cultures with which the West has come into close contact in the modern period—what he calls the “dreaded ‘clash of civilizations’” (73). He seeks not to defend Western civilization but to identify which modern Western values are rooted in Judaism and Christianity, and to examine each as a source of enlightenment in this time of a crisis of values in the West. He treats such issues as history, ecology, human rights, pluralism, and conflict between the economic and humane valuation of human life in hopes that the West can rediscover its own root values and renew their realization in society.
Finally, the third division, titled “Theology and Religion,” consists of five essays on the role of religion in contemporary society. Besides discussing Jewish and Christian theology after Auschwitz and the continuing role of Protestantism as the “Religion of Freedom,” they propose a way beyond Liberalism and Fundamentalism, a new conception of Christian mission, and a positive function of Christian theology in the modern university.

This collection demonstrates why M. is arguably the most influential Protestant theologian of his generation. Indeed, it would make an excellent introduction to his approach to theology in general. His theological vision here is clear, consistent, and to the point without being simplistic or facile. He addresses himself not just to the tractable but to the seemingly intractable questions that bedevil contemporary church and society, consistently offering illuminating insights and helpful solutions deeply grounded in the biblical and theological traditions. He claims that modernity and a political theology of liberation demand each other. Even those who believe that the crisis of modernity is a function not simply of the external challenge of other cultures but also of the internal collapse of its own foundational claims and that the role of Christianity in shaping modernity is much more ambiguous than M. allows, have much to learn here. For, as M. suggests, even those who believe that we live in an intellectual world best described as “postmodern” and in a social world that is rapidly becoming “post-Christian” must be reminded ever and again that all theology deserving the name Christian must address itself in hope to its social world in a manner that is public, political, and liberating, and with no room for self pity.

Marquette University, Milwaukee

D. Lyle Dabney


Books on the proper relation between religion and science have proliferated in recent years. Michael Barnes offers here one of the more provocative hypotheses to come out of this intellectual ferment. He suggests that, instead of systematic theology and natural science operating from different premises and eventually arriving at significantly different conclusions, they have actually coevolved along similar lines, implicitly following a pattern already set forth years ago by Jean Piaget in his study of individual cognitive development. That is, just as a child, an adolescent, and a young adult progressively master more difficult cognitive skills, so entire cultures first master easier cognitive skills and then harder ones. Working from this presupposition, B. first outlines Piaget’s stages of individual cognitive development and then indicates how both natural science and theology (as systematic reflection on religious experience) coevolved in line with these same stages.
Piaget’s first stage in individual cognitive development occurs between the ages of two and seven for a child and is labeled “preoperational.” At this primitive stage, the one at which “magic” plays a key role in cognitive development, the child has difficulty distinguishing fantasy from reality. Similarly, in primitive cultures magical explanations for natural phenomena abound, whereas more advanced “archaic” cultures have moved beyond mere animism to polytheism and rites of worship to placate the gods.

The second stage in an individual’s cognitive development occurs around the age of seven and is called “concrete operational” thought or common sense: “hard facts and specific stories are the forms for ideas about reality” (21). Similarly, within late archaic cultures epic stories emerged to explain the origin of the world and the density of human beings. The next stage for Piaget is “formal operational thought,” beginning for the child at about the age of twelve when theory and abstract reflection become possible. This stage corresponds roughly to the so-called “axial age” of human history during which different civilizations around the globe (e.g., Greece, India, China) began to search for a systematic explanation of reality in terms of first principles or transcendent causes. At this stage of human cultural development, physics and metaphysics emerged. Furthermore, even though by late antiquity in the West formal operational thinking was supplanted by a renewed emphasis on myth and supernatural explanations for unusual events, it achieved a renaissance in the High Middle Ages with Scholastic thought and in the early modern period with the differentiation of the various natural sciences. Finally, in the fourth and last stage of individual cognitive development, Piaget notes how the individual begins to see the limits of theory for the understanding of reality: “Theories are recognized to be models and images that must be consistently and carefully checked against all relevant experiences to test their ongoing adequacy” (23). This “late formal operational thought” B. sees to be characteristic of contemporary natural science. Moreover, in his view, theologians must likewise adjust to late formal operational modes of thought, first, by accepting the provisionality of their theories and, second, by submitting those same theories to rational critique and, as far as possible, to empirical verification in line with the accepted methodology of the natural sciences.

I applaud B.’s efforts to challenge those who in the name of fideism or deconstructionism seek to disengage theology from science in the realm of public discourse. Systematic theology, in my judgment, should be pursued with as much rigor and logical exactitude as research programs within the natural sciences. On the other hand, I believe that systematic theology will be unduly hampered in its scope and effectiveness if it becomes preoccupied with issues of empirical verification. Here I agree with Wentzell van Huyssteen in The Shaping of Rationality (1999) that interpreted experience is at the base of theories in both theology and natural science (190). Hence, both kinds of theories must be intersubjectively tested and approved, albeit in different ways. Furthermore, while Alfred North Whitehead may be right in his assertion that it is more important that a proposition be interesting than that it be true, once it is known to be false, it ceases to be
interesting. Hence, theologians should feel free to speculate about issues, such as the God-world relationship, that cannot be empirically verified but that are still pertinent for the interpretation of religious experience.

Xavier University, Cincinnati

JOSEPH A. BRACKEN, S.J.


This is the first volume of a new series that endeavors to offer a fresh perspective on traditional doctrines by bringing them into critical dialogue with the contemporary secular context of a pluralist world. Ford presents not so much a systematic treatise on salvation as a “journey of intensification,” a series of suggestive, interwoven conversations and meditations on the many different dimensions of the transformation of the self before God. The chief dialogue partners are Levinas, Ricoeur, Jüngel, Thérèse of Lisieux, and Bonhoeffer. F. correctly notes that soteriology is at the heart of all the main themes of theology and is not simply a discrete subdiscipline alongside the others. His reflections are wide-ranging. What holds them together, as a kind of heuristic focus or lens, is the central image of facing.

Guided by this image, part 1 ("Dialogues") opens up the question about salvation of selves (and opens up the imagination of the reader) by attending to the truly complex nature of human selfhood, a selfhood that resists reductionist definition. Levinas (“appeal in the face of the other”) and Ricoeur (“oneself as another”) are chosen as contemporary, critical philosophical voices that develop Husserlian phenomenology in ways both congenial to and provocative for Judaism and Christianity. Jüngel (“the non-idolatrous self” that allows Jesus Christ to be there for me) provides a more explicitly theological approach to the ideas of self and salvation that emerge in F.’s interpretation of Levinas and Ricoeur.

F.’s own reflections are driven by the conviction that for Christians, the face of God is revealed in the face of Christ, and salvation of the self entails its becoming “christomorphic” in its facing of him and “being transformed from glory to glory” (214). Jesus’ facing of God and his facing of others become the fundamental form for Christian life. F. goes on to explore “facing” from the perspective of two other notions of central significance to soteriology and the theology of grace: abundance and substitution. Abundance is linked with the gratuity of God’s saving love and the joy, praise, and feasting to which it gives rise. Substitution is linked with the sacrificial character of God’s saving love and the responsibility, obligation, and being-for-others that it calls forth and empowers in Christian life.

Part 2 ("Flourishings") continues the journey with essays that focus on basic dimensions of faith-filled life: word, sacrament, the ministry of Jesus, and his death and Resurrection. Love marked by joy and substitutionary responsibility is, of course, deeply eucharistic, and it comes as no surprise
that F.’s reflections converge upon worship of God “as the celebratory ecology in which this love flourishes” (99). The soundings made and the sensibilities sharpened are brought to a reflection on two lives singled out by the striking visibility and conjunction of abundant joy and self-forgetful love for the other: Thérèse of Lisieux and Dietrich Bonhoeffer. The saints are the selves in which extreme joy and extreme responsibility converge.

The book concludes with a lovely meditation on feasting, stimulated by a contemplation of Raphael’s “The Ecstasy of St. Cecilia with Sts. Paul, John the Evangelist, Augustine, and Mary Magdalene.” The saints witness to the hope and vocation of every believer: being called to the sharing and celebrating of the feast of the kingdom of God.

While this is a work filled with insight and imagination, I missed the kind of engagement with the secular context and the pluralist world I had expected from the description of the book and the series it inaugurates. It is a difficult, though rewarding, read. F.’s remarkable command of his material is exemplified both in his presentations of Levinas, Jüngel, and Ricoeur and in the way he brings them into dialogue with each other. These initial chapters, however, are very, very dense (as the author warns in his introduction). Those familiar with these thinkers will find sensitive interpretations; others may find the reading quite difficult. In each of these chapters, one finds ideas that are truly illuminating and engaging. Several are particularly worth highlighting. First, F. calls our attention to the movement in a biblically rooted ethics beyond obligation as divine command to what in some sense might be called the compelling or enjoining force of being loved and delighted in (chapters 4 and 11). Then, an extraordinary meditation on Ephesians 5 directs our attention to the transformative power of language (and the image of the “singing self”) in a refreshing way that one rarely finds in theology today. Finally, chapter 6 offers splendid insights into the nature of the community constituted by baptism and Eucharist, seen as the place of incorporation and apprenticing in the mystery of Christ.

Weston Jesuit School of Theology

JOHN R. SACHS, S.J.


The title of this book is misleading. It might be more aptly named “A Survey of American Religious Thought: Deism, Unitarianism, Transcendentalism, and Pragmatism.” The bulk of the work consists of chapters summarizing the religious thought of Benjamin Franklin, militant Deism, Unitarianism, Ralph Waldo Emerson, Theodore Parker, Orestes Brownson, Francis Ellingwood Abbott, Charles Sanders Peirce, and Josiah Royce. Most of the book is historical and descriptive rather than critical and constructive, and is based largely on major secondary studies along
with some reading of primary sources. However, only the preface and conclusion deal in some depth with the constructive issue Gelpi wishes to pose, namely, how the tradition of American religious thought, especially as represented by Brownson, Peirce, and Royce, addresses the challenges posed by postmodernist deconstruction.

G. is convinced that these thinkers embody a kind of “constructive postmodernism” through their rejection of Enlightenment nominalism and individualism and their embrace of realist (as opposed to nominalist) metaphysics. “Enlightenment modernism,” writes G., “rested on a number of questionable philosophical assumptions, among them conceptual nominalism, epistemological atomism, subjectivism, dualism, and social atomism” (130). In contrast, “Peirce and Royce laid sound philosophical foundations for a constructive postmodernism which responds to the least tenable aspects of deconstructionalist postmodernism and which offers new metaphysical and epistemological foundations for contemporary theological thinking” (338). In G.’s analysis, transcendentalism fares better than Enlightenment thought, but Emerson failed “to overcome the subjectivism of Enlightenment modernism” and only compounded his failure with “the dualistic caste of his modified Platonism” (131). Ranking even lower are the “therapeutic individualism” of William James (vi) and the “pragmatic instrumentalism” of John Dewey (xi), two figures who receive passing mention.

Oddly, G. weakens his own position at the outset when he refers to “postmodernism” as a “weasel word” that has “so many meanings that one finds oneself hard put to identify the word’s real referent” (v). The ambiguity is never quite resolved, since the term “postmodernism” encompasses both the deconstructionism that G. repudiates and the 19th-century thinkers he champions.

This book is not easy reading. The prose is often cumbersome and laden with technical terms whose precise meaning becomes apparent only as one progresses. The reader would have benefited from a thorough discussion of terminology at the outset: “postmodernism,” “deconstructionism,” “Enlightenment,” “dualism,” “nominalism,” “individualism,” “pragmatic,” “therapeutic,” and “fundamentalist” (applied in an unusual sense to Theodore Parker). Certainly the “individualism” of the Enlightenment differs from that of Emerson, James, or Dewey, yet G.’s argument at times suggests that the same critique covers these disparate cases. Parker is said to have been born in 1820 rather than 1810 (136), and to have “sanctioned” the Catholic Church where the context would seem to require a word such as “censured” (144).

In the midst of expounding his chosen thinkers, G. occasionally injects his evaluations without adequately preparing the reader. Thus the Enlightenment and Christian faith are no more alike than “kangaroos and cockatoos” (71), Kant is guilty of “fallacies” (172), and, with a passing reference to Wayne Proudfoot’s critique, both Parker and Schleiermacher are hastily dismissed for thinking “fallaciously” (148). Brownson by contrast “towers above . . . any of his contemporaries” (191), while Peirce is depicted almost
hagiographically as one who through “humiliation, and failure distilled...a profound wisdom” (232). Throughout the book one finds good guys and bad guys. Virtually absent, however, is Jonathan Edwards, who is briefly contrasted with Benjamin Franklin (14–15) but might have served as a conceptual bridge between the Enlightenment and 19th-century pragmatism. Also noteworthy is that G. does not extend his exposition of American thinkers past Royce in the early 20th century. While he cannot be faulted for limiting his field of investigation, he might have indicated whether the “constructive postmodernism” of Peirce and Royce has any representatives on the American scene from the 1920s to the present. It is not clear whether G. is attempting to resurrect a forgotten tradition or to redirect an existing one.

G.’s thesis regarding a possible relationship between 19th-century American religious thought and contemporary postmodernism is intriguing. Unfortunately he limited his argument largely to his preface and conclusion and hindered it by unclear terminology and a tendency to categorical judgment. The book is unsuitable for most undergraduate readers, but graduate students and professors may find it useful as a guide to some major American religious thinkers of the 18th and 19th centuries. On the book’s larger claim for a “constructive postmodernism” adumbrated or anticipated in 19th-century America, however, the verdict would seem to be: Non liquet.

Saint Louis University

MICHAEL J. MCCLYMOND


This work is a sequel to Guder’s Be My Witnesses: The Church’s Mission, Messenger, and Messengers (1985), which sought to overcome the Lutheran and Reformed concentration on the personal benefits of Christ (justification) at the expense of the personal and collective mission of the Church to “be my witnesses” (Acts 1:8) in being, doing, and saying. G.’s solution: recover the neglected incarnational character of the Church as the prolongation of the body of Christ in the world, set forth within a salvation history framework. The recurring problem is that the Church falls short of its mandate by saying too much or too little about the gospel. As a result, “the first form of the incarnational witness of the church is its constant testimony to its forgiveness, and its need for continuing forgiveness” (31). Here is the linchpin for the book under review.

This new work further promotes the recent recovery of the universal Christian call to witness to the gospel in everyday life and the “missional” character of all theology. G.’s previous incarnational and salvation history orientation is now set in relation to the trinitarian doctrine of the missio Dei as source and context. Especially significant is his endorsement, on the one hand, of the mandate to translate the gospel into every culture and, on
the other, of the need for ongoing conversion of the Church, and the connection he establishes between these two claims. “All human cultures, marked as they are by the tension of being simul creatus et peccator, . . . are honored by God as potential receivers of Christ and his calling” (84). “Every particular culture’s translation of the gospel contributes a witness that corrects, expands, and challenges all other forms of witness in the worldwide church” (90). Thus, all cultural forms of Christianity are complementary; none is normative for all cultures; and because all such forms are both authentic and sinful they offer mutual affirmation, correction, and challenge often through ecumenical interaction. The mission to witness requires a pentecostal translation into the diversity of cultures that will call forth ongoing conversion to a deeper obedience to the fullness of the gospel. The perennial threat of the cultural captivity of the gospel, a reductionism wherein one cultural form seeks to take control as a binding norm, necessitates the ongoing conversion of the Church.

What G. includes in mission merits further clarification. His later treatment of liturgy is commendable, but it is not integrated into his delineation of the comprehensive character of mission. Likewise admirable is his acknowledgment that churches need to move beyond the perceived dichotomy between evangelism on the one hand and social service and work for social justice on the other. However, G. gives little to no attention to how social service and work for justice contribute to the mission of the Church, and to how integrating faith, service, and work for justice might be achieved. Also troubling is that interreligious dialogue has no place in G.’s articulation of mission. His prophetic posture toward “post-Christendom” culture is valuable, but his underlying critique of the Enlightenment—in contrast to authors such as José Casanova—suffers from an undifferentiated approach to secularization and the public role of religion. Moreover, he invokes a salvation history paradigm without discussing its liabilities and whether it too needs to be purified or jettisoned as a part of the ongoing conversion of the Church. The deeper question is whether his adoption of the missio Dei argument can be successfully advanced without more sustained attention to the work of God the parental Source, the Spirit, and the trinitarian character of ecclesiology at every level: proclamation, liturgy, ministry, social action, and interreligious dialogue.

The strong implication of this book is that the Church brings Christ to a people and a culture through proclamation. No doubt this is true, but the doctrine of simul creatus et peccator gives insufficient attention to how the Triune God, Source of all that is, the Word made flesh and risen Lord, and life-giving Spirit, as a dynamic communion of persons, is already active in these cultures. It is also striking—but not surprising, given G.’s basic commitment to a predominantly christocentric ecclesiology—that there is no mention of communion ecclesiology, funded by trinitarian convictions, which has become common currency in ecumenical circles and which could have served effectively to advance his arguments.
In this challenging work, Hopkins develops a constructive and systematic Black theology by drawing upon five sources that he defined in earlier works—slave religion, Black women’s experience, politics, folk culture, and social analysis and social vision. He critically examines the origins, norms, and foundation of the first source, slave religion, as formational of both American Protestantism and American culture. He explores in depth and contrasts two parallel themes, first, the arrival of the Pilgrims in 1620 and the subsequent effort by colonists who saw themselves “on a divine mission to proclaim the Christian European way of thinking, believing, feeling, and acting unto the far corners of the earth” (94) to create a new people, African Americans, as a “submissive phenomenon” based on distorted interpretations of Christianity which stressed the “natural” inferiority of the African people. The second theme addresses the arrival in 1619 in Jamestown, Virginia, of kidnapped Africans, the first of many, who resisted their situation and accompanying dehumanization and, in so doing, were able to “co-constitute” a Black Self. They were thereby able to develop a “second layer within Protestantism and American culture” by “seizing sacred domains, actualizing the divine right to resist, and institutionalizing a syncretistic religion” (147).

In part 1, the historical foundations of the religious formation of race in American culture are laid. Upon this foundation, Hopkins relates the emergence of two faces of Protestantism, one White, one Black; one oppressive, one liberative. In part 2, H. clearly breaks new ground, elaborating on his understanding of a constructive Black theology, which he sees as the Spirit of Liberation. In three chapters, he presents God as the Spirit of total liberation for African Americans, Jesus as the Spirit of total liberation with African Americans, and lastly, Human Purpose as the Spirit of total liberation in African Americans. These chapters, therefore, reveal how African Americans were given the grace and courage by their Creator and Savior to see themselves in a radically new light in total opposition to the deliberately dehumanizing ways they were viewed by White Christians.

H. argues that this Spirit of Liberation dwelling within African Americans manifests itself on four levels—macro, micro, language, and racial-cultural identity—which flow from the five sources earlier mentioned. These levels serve as “disciplines of creativity” for the emergence of a new individual and community, a New Self and “Common Wealth.” H. intends to build on this critical analysis of slave religion in future works that will focus on the remainder of the five sources.

Although H. at times lapses into a jarring form of postmodern rhetoric that could be confusing to the average reader, on the whole, the book is accessible and serves as a critical contribution to the ongoing development of contemporary Black liberation theology. The work is rooted in the Black Protestant experience although with passing reference to the earlier arrival
of African Catholics, slave and free, and their participation in slave religion.

This first step towards a constructive (or systematic) Black liberation theology presents a valuable critical argument for recognizing the glaringly different ways in which Christianity was interpreted at the beginning of this nation’s history by Whites and Blacks in order to construct Protestantism and American culture in ways which still too often today present opposing and antagonistic worldviews.

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**DIANA L. HAYES**


Pesch is internationally known for his writings on Thomas Aquinas, Luther, and their intersection in contemporary ecumenism. The recent Vatican declaration on justification owes a great deal to his work during the 1960s that began with a thousand page study comparing Luther and Aquinas on *Rechtfertigung*. Here the theologian, professor emeritus at the University of Hamburg, emerges in a different role, a gentle and clever but also instructive satirist of modern theological genres.

P. tells this “Theologians’ Red Riding Hood” story 12 times—versions drawn from areas of theology and religious studies ranging from a general academic essay (replete with footnotes) to systematic theology, New Testament studies, feminist theology, ecumenism, and a bishop’s pastoral. An opening chapter describes how P. came to write the book, while an epilogue in heaven records a conversation between the young woman in the red hood, the two Princes of the Apostles, and Jesus.

For graduate courses introducing theology and theological method the book has particular value, because the language, perspective, and genre of each of the areas of theology stand out through P.’s retelling of the story. At the same time, through his knowledge of theology and its specializations, P. has fashioned a work of considerable sophistication. In a few lines he summons up through the figures of Little Red Riding Hood or the wolf immediately recognizable styles and goals of the subgenres of theology and religion.

The first paragraphs of each section say it all. In the Old Testament approach we learn, “For a long time scholarship took for granted that the story was only a midrash . . . to clarify a theological truth. . . . More recent research, however, has shown that the narrative in all probability rests on an etiological legend. Just as Genesis 3 . . . attempts to explain the ‘cause’ (aitia) of the unusual revulsion humanity has toward snakes, likewise the story of Little Red Riding Hood elucidated the cause of the particular hostility between humans and wolves” (19). Missiology then announces its own, quite different research: “The Little Red Riding Hood parable had its
roots and probably a historical core as well in events that took place in the seventeenth century (according to the Christian calendar), in the upper reaches of the Indian subcontinent, a region heavily influenced by Buddhism. . . . Expert Olaf Seeland has concluded that ‘Riding Hood’ is a Europeanization, and probably the color ‘red’ is a typical case of Eurocentric imperialism” (27). Nor is the reader disappointed by the shift to canon law’s mindset: “Little Red Riding Hood was born into a mixed marriage, and, as one can only say with regret in the post-conciliar period, she was born in a period still subject to the marital law of the Codex iuris Canonici (CIC) of 1917. She was thus involved in problems that would have been easier to resolve under the new CIC of 1983. . . . With a heavy heart the Lutheran mother submitted to the regulation of canon 1061 . . . and let her child be baptized in the Catholic Church. . . . Because of her baptism Little Red Riding Hood was subject to the provisions of canon 87, that is, she was . . . ‘established as a person in the Church of Christ’. . . . At the period when the well-known events took place . . . Little Red Riding Hood . . . could and should have already been to first confession and communion. Of course that was out of the question. On the contrary, it must have been as a demonstration of anti-Roman feelings that Little Red Riding Hood went into the forest to her grandmother at the very time when she should have been preparing for confession and first communion” (35–36).

The reader watches as the sick grandmother passes through a colorful hermeneutical metamorphosis. Feminist scholars point out that she is the maternal grandmother, while ecumenists begin from the fact that she is Lutheran and Red Riding Hood’s father is Catholic. For systematicians, grandmother and granddaughter “are paradigmatic figures representing the totality of human meaning transcending time and history, in which death and life, pain and joy, death and resurrection, action and reception, freedom and grace, kerygma and myth, existence and essence, individuality and sociality are dialectically mediated and yet paradoxically identical” (9). The bishop’s pastoral never wanders far from vacuous and pious generalities not clearly connected to the adventures of Red Riding Hood or to the lives of people in his diocese.

Satire is ultimately about some reality and is drawn forth by something of importance touched by some exaggeration or banality. Did the author intend more than amusement? P. writes: “If the study of the history of theology is not powerful enough, if the sight of all the theological theories that have landed in the rubbish heap of history does not make enough of an impression, perhaps one should try derision, friendly derision, of course” (4). One finishes this entertaining and ingenious book with a little discomfort about what academic modernity has made of the words of eternal life. P. reduces the areas of theology to their now rather tired methodologies and academic clichés. His use of a fairy tale is itself significant, for we are, amid the collapse of liberal Protestantism and the trivialization of religious studies, at the end of two centuries of reducing revelation to myth, symbol, story, or literary form. Is Little Red Riding Hood any less profound than some of the Hellenistic myths thought not many
decades ago to be the sources of the Gospels? Or are the applications of ecclesiastical law to Little Red Riding Hood and her grandmother any more out of place than their automatic application to the members of an abused family?

Ultimately “Little Red Riding Hood” is a fairy tale, and the exploration of variations, contexts, and parallels make the book humorous. Through the humor, however, P. also unobtrusively tells of what happens when the sublime becomes too much the academic.

University of Notre Dame

THOMAS F. O’MEARA, O.P.


In the preface to this new study of Bonaventure’s theology, Ewert Cousins (who directed the Fordham dissertation on which this study is based) notes a revival of interest in the Franciscan intellectual tradition during the last three decades. Delio’s basic claim is deceptively simple: the Crucified Christ becomes over time the organizing principle of Bonaventure’s entire theological enterprise. Here is a theology that views the Word as the center of the Trinity and the center for all creation, a center become incarnate in Jesus the Christ, poor, humble, and crucified, the supreme expression of divine identity as self-giving love. Using the happy metaphor of Bonaventure’s ideas as “interwoven into a cosmic quilt” (125), D. demonstrates considerable mastery of the varied materials (systematic, hagiographical, mystical) in the corpus of Bonaventure’s theological writings.

In the introduction, D. states: “As we approach the dawn of the twenty-first century, I believe that Bonaventure’s Christocentric vision will find its place at the center of Christian theology” (xxiii). An explanation of that Christocentric theology, its structure and relevance organize the eight chapters of the work, with a helpful appendix on pre-Bonaventurean mysticism. A brief introduction to Francis of Assisi helps to ground the reader in the tradition that formed Bonaventure’s own basic spiritual formation. A puzzle needing resolution here is the assertion that “little evidence of concentration on the humanity of Christ” (3) can be found in Francis’s own writings—in seeming contradiction to a later statement that an examination of “the context of the humanity of Christ in his writings” shows us that “it is precisely Christ’s humanity that enables us to understand what contemplation is for Francis” (14).

Along with Joseph Ratzinger, D. claims that Bonaventure’s theology, starting with a retreat in 1259, takes a decided turn toward the experience of Francis (specifically his stigmata), and toward the image of the Crucified Christ. This turn amounts to the building of a theology on a contemporary’s biography: Bonaventure “theologizes” the experience of Francis, and later writes the Life of the saint to illustrate that theology. On this point D.
might also have noted that the Franciscan order’s official adoption of his *Major Life* of Francis entailed the destruction of earlier texts about the saint, leaving subsequent centuries with a uniquely Bonaventurean view of the Poverello.

Using two classic texts, “The Soul’s Journey into God” (*Itinerarium mentis in Deum*) and “The Tree of Life” (*Lignum vitae*), D. lucidly explains Bonaventure’s complex view of the created world, the human person, and the Triune God, all with the Word at their center. Worth further exploration is her description, echoing Cousins, of “the structure of opposites that characterizes the very nature of God” (58). Might this serve as a basis within the tradition for contemporary Christian participation in interreligious dialogue?

The remarks on positive contributions of this christocentric theology to understanding humanity’s relationship to the material world could well be extended to address questions of theology and science. The ten pages devoted to Bonaventure and postmodern spirituality (152–162) barely allow enough space to indicate quickly some intriguing points of contact and possible dialogue: these too deserve further attention, perhaps a study of their own.

As the conclusion argues, Bonaventure made an original contribution to the Christian theological tradition in his own day. D.’s work moves that tradition a step forward by making his christocentric theology more accessible to an English-language readership involved in the contemporary theological conversation.

Franciscan School of Theology, Berkeley      WILLIAM J. SHORT, O.F.M.


Were this volume only a translation of Posthumus Meyjes’s 1963 award-winning dissertation, *Jean Gerson: Zijn kerkpolitiek en ecclesiologie*, it would represent a significant contribution to the literature on the Parisian chancellor. Since its appearance, that dissertation, published contemporaneously under the same title, has been obligatory reading for Gerson scholars. Unfortunately, as the author himself concedes, its availability only in Dutch was restricting, and many of those citing the work seem to have used it more for its footnotes than its substance. Now, however, the author and his publisher have seen fit not only to alleviate the linguistic obstacle to this important work, but have presented a revised and expanded version, addressing critics of both the original and the scholarship appearing in the interim.

The book is divided into two approximately equal parts. The first, under the rubric of Gerson’s church politics, provides a historical context for the
second, devoted to Gerson’s ecclesiology, by charting the chancellor’s course through the Great Schism, from advocate of *via cessionis* and opponent of *substractio oboedientiae* to eloquent proponent of *auctoritas concilii*. The careful narrative allows development of the theme of church unity as Gerson’s constant and preeminent value, engendering a corresponding abhorrence of *per tinacia* as all that lay between schism and heresy. This chronological review of Gerson’s career and writings also permits the author to correct various misapprehensions stemming from the uneven editorial work of Glorieux, such as the inclusion in his edition of Gerson’s works of *Tractatus pro unione Ecclesiae*, a 1392 treatise ascribable to Gilles Deschamps. This inclusion, however, has led some researchers to misconstrue Gerson’s views regarding the function of church doctors, if not to falsely attribute to him premature recognition of the *via concilii*.

It is regrettable that P. devoted so little attention to Gerson’s efficacy. With the exception of a discussion of the restorative consequences of Gerson’s sermon *Ambulate* following the disconcerting flight of John XXIII to Schaffhausen after the second session of the Council of Constance, P. is clearly more concerned with how events influenced Gerson than with how Gerson influenced events. Granted that this volume is an intellectual history, perhaps it is still venial to lament lost opportunity to rebut Howard Kaminsky’s characterization of the chancellor as an “ineffective natterer.”

Part 2 represents the most thorough investigation of Gerson’s ecclesiology available, including the most detailed analysis of *De potestate ecclesiastica*, since Schwab’s 1858 study. What emerges is Gerson’s understanding of the Church as a divinely ordained, and thus immutable, hierarchy, an *ecclesia docens*, instituted to transmit salvation to the *ecclesia audiens*. This *corpus mysticum* represented a pseudo-Dionysian *hierarchia subcoelestis*, preserved through its essence, a semen, that held it immutable. While the Church, like any body, demanded a head, should the pope, the *caput secundarium*, be disabled, God through Christ, the *caput primarium*, would send forth the Holy Spirit and by such *influxus* provide whatever the Church lacked.

Consistent with this view, Gerson rejected notions (to use Tierney’s terminology) of personification and delegation for a conciliar theory of mimesis. For him it was axiomatic that a council represented as a microcosm, the macrocosm of the actual hierarchy, for which reason its inerrancy was assured. This emphasis on the hierarchy distinguishes Gerson’s perspective both from the Marsiglian *congregatio fidelium* and the Ockhamist *ecclesia universalis*. The desire to maintain the integrity of that hierarchy as totality, according to P., also leads to the less than logically satisfying consequence of Gerson’s attempts to consider that hierarchy in a distributive (*supremitas*) and collective (*latitudo*) sense simultaneously. Gerson, however, emphasized the latter, an inclination that P. traces particularly to the influence of Henry of Ghent, and that, with decentralizing, anti-absolutist consequences, I find analogous to the medieval doctrine of *merum imperium*.

The least satisfying analysis is P.’s discussion of law, particularly *epikie*. 
For Gerson, *epikie* and *aequitas* were synonymous, and any attempt to distinguish between them is futile. More important, and as the author ultimately concedes, for the chancellor, *epikie*, or *aequitas*, represented a rule of interpretation, not of abrogation. He realized that all human law was subject to the contingencies of time, place, and person, but equally regarded law from a functional standpoint that invites historical or even comparative analysis. It is not insignificant that in the 16th century, Charles du Moulin, discussing law, equity, and the legislator, supported his method of interpretation not with citations from Bartolus and Baldus, but from Gerson.

Despite these observations and occasional editorial lapses resulting in confusing changes of type-face and misspellings, the appearance of this well-documented volume assures that P. will remain mandatory reading for Gerson scholars for the foreseeable future.

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*Scott L. Taylor*

**Reconstructing Nature: The Engagement of Science and Religion.**  

Employing recent methods of historical analysis, Brooke and Cantor conclude that the relationship between monotheistic religions and the natural sciences during the 17th to 19th centuries defies a simplistic master narrative like “conflict” or “harmony.” The authors are historians of science who value their discipline’s mandate to disclose the past accurately, and they extended their 1995–96 Gifford Lectures to produce ten illuminating chapters grouped into four sections in which they examine religion-science topics through the lens of philosophical, linguistic, biographical, and sociological tools used today in sub-specialties of history. Their findings indicate a highly complex interaction with evidence of complementary reflection and practice by individuals and groups.

In section 1, B. and C. point to the many diverse stories of scientists and theologians that counter the “over-arching schemata” (8) that have been superimposed on selective facts by writers to drive their own agendas. The authors of this book join other historians in eschewing myopic and skewed approaches to the religion-science relationship and argue for a scholarly approach that taps the insights and methods of contemporary historians. Attention turns to the importance of language, and the terms “science” and “religion” are examined using 19th-century “scriptural geologists” and Comte’s Religion of Humanity as examples. Similarities and differences in the use of these terms surface and prompt the authors to underscore the benefits of analyzing language when investigating religion-science topics.

The need to approach data from a non-judgmental perspective is stressed in section 2. Popular renditions of the history of science by Capra and other “New Age” scientists are criticized for having overlooked his-
torians’ findings and having proffered characterizations of the science-religion engagement that do not coincide with the data as shaped by practice, society, technology, and politics. Events surrounding the trial of Galileo serve as a case study of these factors, and the popular myth that Galileo was condemned by the Church for having found “the truth” is dispelled through a litany of findings already made familiar by historians. B. and C. here show how Galileo’s biographers reconstructed history to suit their political purposes.

Section 3 explores natural theology in various historical contexts with emphasis on the literary styles of early scientists. Discovered in the natural theologies of Christian, Jewish, and Muslim scientists are their intentions to promote their religious faiths by turning knowledge about the world into arguments for its having been designed by God. The rhetoric of Newton, Ray, Paley, and others who, from scientific findings, reflected on God’s relation to the world suggests that they were aiming to persuade the wider public to acknowledge God’s presence in their lives and to fulfill moral as well as intellectual purposes. A philosophical analysis of scientists’ progressions from the elegance and beauty of the world to theological discourse demonstrates how their faith prompted them to investigate the world, yielding brilliant results with enduring significance. The complementarity of religion and science resonates throughout this section.

Biographical and sociological approaches to the engagement of religion and science are applied in section 4. The lives of four 19th-century scientists are charted to discern how they worked out religion-science issues within the contexts of their times. The value of this approach shines as B. and C. identify several ways in which these individuals related their theological discourse and practice to their scientific endeavors as the circumstances of their lives changed. A flag of caution is raised against attributing definitive stereotypes to an individual’s way of relating the disciplines. Focus turns to the Quakers who exemplify a somewhat systematic approach to relating theology and science through their openness to many avenues to truth, attraction to scientific fields, and contributions to the Royal Society of London.

The final chapter presents chilling ramifications for the future. Snapshots of Boyle, Priestly, and other chemists disclose their enthusiastic thinking about improving upon nature as a way of collaborating with God. B. and C. observe parallel rhetoric today among genetic engineers who insist that they are collaborating with and not violating nature. Among contemporary theologians are some who envision human beings as God’s co-creators in need of principles to guide their interventionist technologies (340). B. and C. argue that moral theologians can play a crucial role in identifying these principles in cooperation with scientists and secular ethicists, a conclusion I wholeheartedly endorse.

Embellishing this fruitful demonstration of historians’ scholarly methods are detailed illustrations of natural phenomena by early scientists, natural theologians, and philosophers. Endnotes packed with citations of primary and secondary sources should facilitate further research. While this study is
eminently appropriate for history of science courses, theology professors may find it valuable as a teaching text on the complexities of the theology-science engagement and the religious faith of early scientists.

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*JAME SCHAEFER*


When authors negotiate with publishers about producing their books, they do not always have the last say about the chosen title. I wonder whether this book’s title and subtitle were actually Wills’s personal choice. His numerous documents of recent popes—whatever one thinks about their appropriateness and long-range utility—are hardly examples of “sin” and “deceit.” Errors of judgment, misguided interventions, perhaps, but not sins or deceit. A titillating, lurid description, to be sure, to catch the buyer’s eye but not quite accurate. W.’s book is not a theological treatise, but more of a *cri de coeur* by an angry, yet practicing Catholic, disillusioned about an array of mistakes he perceives in texts or actions by popes from Pius IX to John Paul II.

The recent “sins” enumerated are first of all papal neglect to challenge Nazi persecution of Jews and especially the “final solution.” The author then enumerates other examples: condemnation of artificial contraception (in *Humanae vitae*), failure to address women’s role in the Church, including their possible access to ordained ministry, insistence on clerical celibacy, failure to reconceive clerical lifestyle and formation, duplicitous coverups about priests charged with sexual molestation, silent tolerance of sexually active gay priests, annulment procedures in failed marriages, insistence that an embryo is a person from conception, and even failure to rein in bizarre Marian devotions.

W. has had a distinguished career writing on topics both ecclesial and political. His *Bare Ruined Choirs* (1972) objected to changes that resulted from Vatican II. His recent *Saint Augustine* (1999) is a splendid fresh retelling of the Bishop of Hippo’s gifts to the Church universal. His *Nixon Agonistes* (1970), *Reagan’s America* (1987), and *Lincoln at Gettysburg* (1992)—for which he received the Pulitzer Prize in 1993—are all substantial works. The present book reflects much reading, but mostly in secondary sources and newspaper accounts, and personal experience. The work is not as well researched as his other works and shows a number of factual errors, possibly due to speed in composition or high emotion in the narrative. He seems reluctant to suggest that what one author has written about a topic (such as the “Hidden Encyclical” of Pius XI) may not accurately convey the whole story. Some of W.’s statistics on priestly sexuality, for instance, are based on rather thin surveys. His convictions about the shortcomings of papal documents may echo those of a not insignificant number of Catholics across the globe, especially theologians. Some of these
persons will be surprised that W. is now so palpably sympathetic to their unease at these leadership styles and procedures.

Somehow, in the final analysis, the book is not completely convincing because it is too one-sided. Besides publishing flawed texts, many of these same popes have taught eloquently by gestures more memorable than pronouncements. I think of Pope Paul VI’s kissing the feet of Metropolitan Meliton, personal representative of the Ecumenical Patriarch, or John Paul II’s interfaith prayer at Assisi, his meditation at Jerusalem’s Western Wall, or his invitation in Ut unum sint to suggest ways to restructure the papacy in order to promote Christian unity.

W. may be correct in seeing some papal writings as driven by an obsession with consistency (98). But he needs also to lay some blame at the feet of the faithful who fail to apply a nuanced hermeneutic for interpreting encyclicals and other texts, and who exaggerate the force of certain directives. He is slow to criticize pusillanimous bishops who keep silent out of a misguided sense of solidarity with headquarters. He could have shown that obsequium religiosum for official teachings does not exclude the legitimacy of holding views that are complementary and more inclusive. A more theological analysis of the ecclesiological situation would have highlighted the small print of Vatican I’s teaching on primacy and infallibility, the limits of papal authority, the importance of “reception,” the notion of sensus fidelium, and even episcopal collegiality. The late German theologian Wilhelm de Vries used to decry the fact that modern popes seem to claim their own Kompetenz der Kompetenz, that is, their own personal competence to determine their legitimate, jurisdictional, and doctrinal authority to formulate decisions. Another missing element in the present book is the author’s failure to bemoan the faithful’s dearth of parrhesia (free expression) which could contribute to the vigor of tradition.

I do not deny that W. has correctly identified certain neuralgic weaknesses in the teaching style of the modern popes. Even Vatican II said that those who exercise pastoral oversight in the Church need to learn to listen. Pastors at every level in the Church need to remember what Cyprian of Carthage said many centuries ago, namely, that the best teachers are those who are continually learning. Unfortunately, the book’s tone and method may limit its usefulness.

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Michael A. Fahey, S.J.

THE GROUND BENEATH THE CROSS: THE THEOLOGY OF IGNACIO ELLACURÍA.

Kevin Burke has written a fine comprehensive introduction to the theology of Ignacio Ellacuria, outspoken rector of the Central American University in El Salvador, who was killed along with five Jesuit colleagues and two laywomen by Salvadoran soldiers in 1989.
Born in Vizcaya, Spain, in 1930, Ellacuría came to El Salvador as a novice in 1949. He studied humanities in Ecuador and theology in Austria before completing doctoral studies in Spain under fellow-Basque philosopher Xavier Zubiri, with whom he visited and collaborated closely until the latter’s death in 1983.

While Ellacuría’s chief expertise was philosophy, the political crisis of Central America and the challenge it presented to the Church led him to write more political analysis and theology than philosophy during the 1970s and 1980s. Although some theological essays were collected in two volumes, *Teología política* (1973; E.T. *Freedom Made Flesh*) and *Conversión de la Iglesia al reino de Dios* (1984), most were published separately, many posthumously in more or less polished form. As a result, comparatively few people have been able to appreciate the depth, scope, and systematic character of Ellacuría’s theology. Fortunately, his complete theological corpus is now being published; two lengthy volumes have appeared, and a third will follow. Several monographs on Ellacuría have also recently appeared, among them B.’s overview.

After situating Ellacuría theologically and summarizing his life, B. dedicates two chapters to his philosophy. Though at times cumbersome, this complex exposition is necessary and richly rewarding. Most liberation theology has lacked an explicit philosophical grounding. While some Latin American theologians appeal to Emmanuel Levinas’s phenomenology, Zubiri—and philosopher Ellacuría—probably provide the more comprehensive foundation for theology from the perspective of the victims.

For Zubiri, the human being is the “reality animal” (in Burke’s congenial translation of *animal de realidades*). Humans find themselves first of all in reality, among things and persons—not sense data, consciousness, or being, first of all. Zubirians presently divide into a more phenomenological strain and the intramundane-metaphysical current to which Ellacuría belongs. Zubiri welcomed Ellacuría’s creative extension of his thought. For Ellacuría, reality is, above all, *historical reality*, and it is *praxis* (properly human activity) that distinguishes humans from other animals. Ellacuría understands “praxis” broadly—all human activity, including prayer, reflection, and contemplation, are different forms of praxis. Praxis creates and actualizes new possibilities in history. Ellacuría’s philosophy of liberation is a kind of process philosophy, a critically realistic materialism open to transcendence.

This philosophy profoundly affects theological method, as B. shows. First, historicity implies the need to *historicize* (contextualize) and de-ideologize concepts and symbols. More importantly, theology reflects not on texts in the first place, but on historical reality—human reality with its suffering, longings, and struggles, and embracing nature. B. calls this “the ground beneath the cross.” Ellacuría considers the cross—of Christ and all victims of injustice—to be the center of historical reality. In their own way, the crucified peoples constitute a decisive *locus theologicus*. In fact, to do theology well one must stand with them.

This conclusion follows in part from the way Ellacuría develops what
many consider Zubiri’s greatest insight, that human intelligence is sentient intelligence: From beginning to end intelligence is a biological phenomenon, just as human sensibility is always intelligent sensing-and-feeling. Therefore, to grasp reality one must, as Ellacuría puts it, “realize the weight of reality” (hacerse cargo de la realidad), “shoulder the weight of reality” (cargar con la realidad), and “take charge of the weight of reality” (encargarse de la realidad). Roughly, one must attend to, appreciate ethically, and respond to reality. Ellacuría associates these moments with intelligence, feeling, and volition, respectively. B.’s close identification of the second moment with “opting for a place” within reality seems strained, however.

B. correctly stresses Ellacuría’s chief theological concern, historicizing the notion of salvation: The reign of God occurs in history and includes liberation from structural sin. There are not two histories, one secular and one sacred; only one. Western dualisms are rooted in the split between sensibility and intelligence.

Like his colleague Jon Sobrino, Ellacuría represents the “second wave” of liberation theology that stresses the centrality of Jesus of Nazareth and of discipleship. B. ably develops other central themes: the crucified people as Servant of Yahweh, the Church of the poor as historical sacrament of liberation, and the dynamic interplay of “prophetism” and utopia.

B. demonstrates how Ellacuría’s philosophical sophistication allows him to critically explicate faith formulations (a lack in some liberation theologies) without voiding their transcendent reference.

Occasional imprecise translation and repetition detract little from this fine overview of a theologian who deserves much more attention. B. provides an excellent Ellacuría bibliography.

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La teología histórica de Ignacio ellacuría. By José Sols Lucia.

The tenth anniversary of the assassination of Ignacio Ellacuría at the hands of the Salvadoran military has seen the publication of a number of books and articles honoring his work. Sols’s book is a comprehensive overview of the theological labors of this Jesuit theologian, philosopher, and university president, complementing the parallel text by Kevin Burke, S.J. (The Ground beneath the Cross, 1999). Its origins lie in a doctoral dissertation at the Centre Sèvres in Paris. While the resulting text has been pared down (omitting, for example, more technical chapters on Ellacuría’s use of the philosophy of Xavier Zubiri), the editorial decisions have produced a very readable book. This is no mean feat. The Basque Jesuit’s preferred genre was the essay, and his many interests and commitments resulted in a dizzying array of texts on everything from Maurice Blondel on miracles to
neoliberal economics. The pressures of time also meant that Ellacuría often wrote quickly, and the resulting prose, while precise and dauntingly rigorous, is extremely difficult, even for someone fluent in Spanish. S. is able to bring clarity and readability and a greater degree of structure to Ellacuría’s thought, without sacrificing its breadth of concern or its conceptual density. Since he nonetheless quotes liberally and at length from Ellacuría’s own writing (some unpublished, even in Spanish), and supplies copious notes and bibliographies, this is a valuable research tool.

After a chapter that places Ellacuría’s work biographically and historically, S. proceeds by taking up terminological dyads that represent the discursive worlds of theology and the social sciences (particularly in their foundational-philosophical dimensions): “liberation” and “salvation,” or “praxis” and “discipleship” (seguido). S. shows how Ellacuría developed these pairs in a mutually enriching relationship without one side collapsing into the other. Thus, for example, theological language about sin can and must develop in tandem with political and economic analyses of injustice, in order both to remain faithful to the former’s scriptural roots and to portray accurately the full, scandalous depths of the modern situation. One advantage to this approach is that key terms in Ellacuría’s thought are explored in depth, so that a reader interested in, say, Ellacuría’s appropriation of the philosophical tradition surrounding “praxis” can go directly to the pertinent chapter.

Perhaps the most interesting chapter is the sixth, which elaborates and defends Ellacuría’s usage of the phrase “crucified people” to talk about the world’s poor. S. ably traces the complex weave of allusions and references: to the passion narratives, to the Suffering Servant Songs in Second Isaiah, and above all to the excruciating economic and political conditions of the poor in places like El Salvador. He shows how Ellacuría uses Scripture in a fashion reminiscent of the great patristic commentators, not just identifying the surface meaning, “according to the letter,” but attempting to unleash the “spiritual senses” of the text, to illumine, to inspire, and ultimately to challenge us with the light that the gospel sheds on our current situation. He demonstrates furthermore how in this usage Ellacuría was as self-consciously and rigorously dependent on modern philosophical currents in hermeneutics, phenomenology, and critical theory as the Fathers were on the metaphysics and hermeneutics of Late Antiquity.

S. succeeds admirably in showing the consistency and power of Ellacuría’s theology, one deeply rooted in Latin American historical reality, which nonetheless has much to say to us in the United States. However, he claims that it is more, that it constitutes a universally relevant fundamental theology by which theologians in quite different contexts can craft theologies adequate to their own historical realities, be it El Salvador, Spain, or the United States. On this count a reader already sympathetic to liberation theology will come away persuaded; the more skeptical will be left wanting a broader Auseinandersetzung with contemporary theologies that take up the issue of the relationship between theology and social theory. To be sure, S. engages the by now familiar critiques contained in the two
instructions of the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith or in the report of the International Theological Commission. Fair enough, since this was the state of the critique during Ellacuría’s own lifetime, and defined to some extent the counterpositions against which he constructed his theology. Yet, other theological schools (e.g., so-called “radical orthodoxy”) have continued to develop those counterpositions. A contemporary assertion of the fundamental insights of liberation theology that Ellacuría did so much to articulate must continue the same critical conversations that he himself engaged during his career. Perhaps, then, S.’s book can be read as marking the end of the decisive and pioneering work of the first generation of liberation theologians, and limning a complex and fruitful agenda for the next. It is to be praised on both counts.

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J. MATTHEW ASHLEY


In 1982, I and a group of other young physicians, residents in Internal Medicine, chuckled nervously over the description of a young gay man with *Pneumocystis carinii* pneumonia and Kaposi’s sarcoma as suffering from W.O.G.—wrath of God syndrome. Stupid, grossly insensitive jokes were only the tip of the iceberg in reactions to the epidemic of AIDS that began in the early 1980s.

Allen explores the roots of intolerance manifested in reactions to individuals with AIDS by examining Western cultural attitudes to a variety of maladies from the Middle Ages to the present day. His thesis is that callous judgmental attitudes have deep roots in this culture, roots entwined with Christianity. By linking morality with disease, individuals afflicted with various conditions have been stigmatized, treated horribly, prevented from receiving what was, in that time, considered a reasonable medical treatment, and felt, in some way, to have received what they deserved. Efforts at prevention have been limited by narrowly focusing on avoiding what has been judged as sinful by religious authorities.

A. looks at five different conditions where sin and disease were perceived as a central issue: lovesickness and leprosy in the Middle Ages, the epidemic of syphilis in the Renaissance, bubonic plague in early 17th-century England, and masturbation during the 18th and 19th centuries. Lovesickness was a syndrome with a variety of symptoms, its cause was thought to be inadequate sexual activity, and its cure—not esteemed by Church authorities—was thought to be intercourse. A. links the opposition of church leaders to “therapeutic” intercourse recommended by physicians, with the opposition of contemporary religious leaders faced with HIV and AIDS to explicit safe-sex prevention programs and distribution of condoms. Leprosy and plague were looked upon as God’s scourge upon the wicked, a way to cleanse sinful humanity. The syphilis epidemic of the
Renaissance is the most similar to the AIDS epidemic—a virulent sexually transmitted disease with disfiguring, painful features swept Europe. Those who contracted the disease were blamed for lustful behavior. Early modern concerns with masturbation viewed this activity as responsible for a variety of physical, mental, and character problems. Both religious and scientific leaders considered the behavior not only wicked, but having drastic consequences. A. sees these examples of attitudes that link disease with sin, especially sexual sin, as evidence of an intolerance and self-righteousness that is counter to any morality. He is particularly struck by the cruelty of those who view themselves as healthy and morally sound, a cruelty that showed itself by horrible punishments of individuals with leprosy and plague and that has been seen more recently in ostracization and banishment of people with AIDS.

A.’s examination of Western culture shows Christianity as a major force in the shaping of attitudes about sin, sex, and disease. He professes a respect for Christian ideals of charity and compassion, catalogues examples of Christians exhibiting heroism in the care of individuals with disease, and is clear that religion has been a powerful force in the humane treatment of the sick. But he also suggests that Christianity is overly concerned with sex and “by condemning sex so vehemently, [Christians] make it far more important than it ought to be. . . . To condemn people to suffer for their sexual behavior is irrational, immoral, and inhumane.” Viewing disease as an agent of God’s wrath and thus blaming the sick person is “appallingly presumptuous: who can know the mind of God?” (159).

This is an engaging book that provokes an examination of how attitudes about sin, sex, and disease have been responsible for awful treatment of individuals who suffer. But it is also sometimes frustrating for the topics it does not address and the issues that are conflated. Fear of contagion and illness are also forces that lead people to behave with cruelty toward the sick, and this fear can make nonreligious people, as well as religious people, behave inappropriately. Fear of sickness and death is larger than Western culture. Likewise, human cruelty can transcend particular cultures; finding that it is part of the West and infects Christianity is a disappointment, not a surprise. And although A. suggests that some make sex more important than it ought to be, how does one address the importance of sexuality and sexual expression, not as a potential agent of disease, but as a key part of what it means to be human? In forcing a consideration of how Western culture and Christianity have, however, been entwined with cruel and inhuman treatment of the sick, A. provides a stimulus for a deeper reflection on care of the sick, prevention of illness, and sexual behavior.

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MYLES N. SHEEHAN, S.J., M.D.

Chance and change or contingency and fortune initially strike us as absolutely contrary to the strong universalist natural law ethics of Thomas Aquinas, so this book’s title alone sparks an initial interest that is generally well sustained throughout. Chapter 1 begins the treatment of virtue by centering on how virtue (e.g., courage) helps overcome difficulty in achieving the good, especially the difficulties arising from what Bowlin terms the “contingency” of passions and desire. Virtue aids us in dealing with these contingencies. Chapter 2 opens with B.’s central thesis that Thomas considers the human good to be “contingent, and it is this contingency, this difficulty, that the prudent and the just must address if they are to avoid moral failure and will true goods with constancy” (54).

While B.’s treatment of prudence is quite insightful, the precise meaning of “contingency” as used by Thomas and as it relates to morality is ambiguous at best. Initially B. defines this term as “the states of affairs in the world and in ourselves that fortune can alter” (6). However, his definition lacks sufficient precision to guide a close reading of a wide variety of texts from Thomas, and B. admits that he often describes “Aquinas’s views in language that is not his own” (18). This linguistic adaptation may be especially problematic with regard to contingency as evidenced by the 71 columns in the Index Thomisticus for various forms of contingo, coupled with the wide variety of lexical usages, not to mention the nettlesome translation issues that arise in trying to capture consistently any single meaning in contemporary English. I was not persuaded that even throughout Thomas’s opera omnia the term enjoys a strongly unified meaning and valence consistent enough to support adequately B.’s thesis, exegesis, and analysis. For example, within a single paragraph B. states, “The good is contingent and therefore difficult to know,” and “Our contingent passions distract our reason and distort our judgments about the good” (125). Is contingency the same here functionally and essentially?

The strongest part of the book is chapter 3 which looks at natural law in the light of contingency’s limits, even if one does not necessarily agree completely with B’s thesis that Thomas did not construe natural law as designed to provide moral guidance, but rather meant to describe human agency in the light of God’s creation and ongoing providence. B.’s critical analysis of the Grisez-Finnis-Boyle school is particularly well done.

In chapter 4, B. grapples admirably with the vexing debate over the nature of virtue: is virtue valued for its functionality, or is virtue in fact its own reward? In a lucid exposition B. shows that for Thomas it is not an either/or proposition but very much both/and: “The virtuous seek the good first. If, as often happens, difficulties must be overcome in order to achieve it, then the intrinsic goodness of their actions and habits is established and enhanced” (157).

Chapter 5 on fortune and virtue provides some interesting clues to what probably were Thomas’s working assumptions about the interrelation of these two notions. Fortune neither predicts nor precludes virtue, since the goods governed by fortune are instrumental goods, and their lack actually can create opportunities for virtue to develop and flourish through prac-
tice. Nevertheless, the modern reader may not be entirely satisfied with Thomas on this point. Part of the difficulty may lie in what counts as “fortune.” This term could refer to being struck by lightening or finding a buried treasure, but it has also been used for centuries to rationalize unjust social structures. Perhaps a fundamental weakness in Thomas’s own position in this area lies in his construal and acceptance of a notion of “fortune” and its whims that often masks social sin and impedes efforts to deal effectively with this reality. Certainly critical social ethicists might probe a bit more deeply into the presumptions and implications that lie behind this notion, and although B. briefly hints at some of these issues, it would have been more helpful if he had at least outlined these unresolved questions in Thomas a bit more explicity.

Despite some misgivings over B.’s central argument and his use of contingency as a central term for Thomas, the book is well worth reading for those already familiar with Thomas’s thought. Relative newcomers, however, would probably find the arguments and textual analysis less easy to track.

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JAMES T. BRETZKE, S.J.


This book is important for at least two reasons. First, it is a comprehensive examination of ethical questions and issues raised by genetic research, experimentation, and medicine. Second, it is a thoughtful exploration of the role of religious voices in bioethics. In recent years many in the field of bioethics, especially religious ethicists, have struggled over their role. Chapman provides helpful suggestions.

Bioethics emerged over the last 30 years as a field of reflection and inquiry. As the field emerged, distinct from traditional medical (physician) ethics, many of the voices that helped to define the field were those of theologians—thinkers such as Paul Ramsey, Joseph Fletcher, and Richard McCormick. One has only to examine the literature of the field to see the role religious ethicists played in shaping the field as it emerged from traditional medical (physician) ethics. Long before the cloning of Dolly, religious ethicists were raising questions about cloning. However, as the field developed these voices have been less and less influential, as those of legal and philosophical scholars have come to dominate. As the Director of the Program of Dialogue on Science, Ethics, and Religion at the American Association for the Advancement of Science, C. brings a unique background to these issues and questions.

C. explores how religious thinkers and communities have responded to the challenges and opportunities of genetic research and genetic medicine
and assesses the contribution in content and method of religious ethics at
the frontiers of genetic science and medicine. She argues that many tech-
nological innovations have theological import, as they raise fundamental
questions about human nature and what it means to be human, about the
limits of human freedom, and the responsibility for the common good.

C. observes that we live in an era when science and technology are
conferring powers of life and death, yet secular societies like the United
States seem incapable of reflecting on the meaning of these powers. Ameri-
can society, the focus of her examination, is unable to talk about the goals
to be pursued and the limits on the uses of technology.

Religious communities, C. points out, have long traditions of examining
these foundational questions that are so important for genetic medicine,
and many have responded to recent developments in genetic medicine and
research. In her examination of cloning, the patenting of life, and the
relationship of genetics to human nature, for example, she finds that many
of the statements and position papers have been less than coherent, well-
reasoned documents. Often produced by committees, they tend to speak in
very general terms, and so the theological grounding of these papers tends
to be perfunctory. They often lack a theological character altogether, or
they use theological formulas without developing their implications—for
example, with respect to stewardship or justice. This lack of development,
C. finds, impedes substantive discussion of these issues.

C. also examines a number of individual authors as well as official church
statements. While she identifies some authors as making important contri-
butions, she points out that their contributions are often limited because
the principles are not worked out or used to fully analyze specific issues.
What is needed, she contends, is solid work that incorporates the norma-
tive dimensions of theological insights.

Many of the contributions of religious thinkers challenge the ethical
horizons of both the religious and secular publics and raise moral issues.
But C. urges religious thinkers to go beyond stimulating moral imagination
and to work hard to bring fundamental theological insights into the dis-
cussions of genetic medicine, to broaden the discussions, and to develop
normative guidance.

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KEVIN W. WILDES, S.J.

THE SILENCE OF SODOM: HOMOSEXUALITY IN MODERN CATHOLICISM. By

In his previous study of ten medieval texts, The Invention of Sodomy in
Christian Theology (1997), Jordan exposed the inherent incoherence of
Church teaching on sodomy. He concluded his investigation by demon-
strating that the tradition’s incoherence eventually translated sodomy into
an exotic, but unspeakable, vice. In this challenging new work, J. dreams of
schools for new speech about sexual desires and Catholicism in order to put
an end to the silence about sodomy.
To realize his dream, he narrows the scope of his own contribution. He restricts his interests solely to men who desire men, refusing to practice ventriloquism by speaking for women who are attracted to other women. Furthermore, in the light of the Church’s tradition and its silence, he maintains that we are not ready for “full Catholic teachings about same-sex love.”

Rather than a comprehensive work, he proposes instead a “rudimentary vocabulary, a first dictionary, of the unexpectedly varied expressions of Catholic gayness” (16). He initiates this dictionary with “fragments,” “scraps of speech” (15) that serve as considerations for the three divisions of his book: the way the Church speaks, lives, and dreams.

In part 1, J. examines the rhetoric of Church teaching on homosexuality in episcopal and Vatican curial documents. He launches the first of many critiques against those who construe “development” in Church teaching and also charges that those who rebut these documents inevitably lend some intellectual credibility to the documents and their categorical assertions about homosexuality. He rightly proposes, instead, an examination of the relation of power to teaching and studies the rhetorical exercises of bureaucratic morals. Studying the devices of “tedium” and “flattening,” he convincingly illustrates the prevailing “rhetoric of moral management” instead of an ethical “rhetoric of rich moral description or sustained moral education” (74). Here again he criticizes those moral theologians who, while criticizing the inconsistencies of their predecessors, fail to recognize the need for a new speech in describing the homoerotic lives of Catholics and the prior need of a community to articulate that speech.

In part 2, he studies church lives, particularly the clergy’s: “you will not understand modern homosexuality unless you understand Catholic homosexuality, and you cannot understand Catholic homosexuality unless you begin with the clergy” (8). Here he discusses the hysteria surrounding statistics regarding gay clergy, about sexual relations among gay clergy, and about the ridicule of clergy as gay. He also discusses practices of social control designed to reinforce the hysteria. Finally, he examines a variety of patterns of clerical accommodation and denial ranging from “dandies” to the unnamed predatory spiritual directors of seminarians. In all of these, he acknowledges the conflicted clerical conformity of one sort or another, while noting that the most closeted are also among the most vociferous proponents of the Church’s homophobic stances.

Despite all this negativity, he recognizes that gay clergy are not, as some claim, a new phenomenon, that seminaries can provide a first place in which a young gay man can fall in love and that “Catholicism has created all-male institutions that attracted and even tacitly tolerated high percentages of men who desire men.” These institutions, J. claims, “permitted men the opportunity to live outside the confining norms of secular masculinity... The most traditional Catholic institutions, the priesthood and the religious orders, have asserted the possibility of a different—that is, a queer—masculinity” (211–12). Unfortunately, despite this important claim, J. spends in this second part almost all his efforts on the darker side of gay
priests’ lives, offering little light and even less to commend them. Moreover, he agitates the prevailing hysteria with stereotypical images that those who ridicule gay clergy have often used. Indeed, his anecdotes may well be used to validate the very claims of those who would (if they could) rid the Church of gays and especially gay clergy.

In his final part, J. dreams of establishing a radically new speech not in any way associated with the rhetorical agenda of the condemning theologians and bishops. Here he makes a particularly compelling critique of the “homosexual” nomenclature as itself a reductive and oppressive practice. Turning to a hope for new communities from which this speech might arise, he criticizes those in Dignity who wait for better days or those in the Metropolitan Community churches who lose the richness of Catholicism. He advocates something both more queer and more Catholic.

Like his previous work, the tone here is prosecutorial. J. is powerfully and unapologetically committed to his position as both gay and Catholic. He does not hesitate to criticize anyone with whom he does not fully agree, and they are many. As he makes his case, then, occasional utterances look like “over-the-top” indictments: “The Catholic clergy comprises a huge number of competing groups unified at most by the police powers of a set of international bureaucracies” (88). “Every time we look at the hierarchy, we can’t help but see closeted gay men who are consumed by their unhappiness” (225). While these remarks are not grounds for dismissing his argument, like the overall negativity of part 2, they put the otherwise important claims of parts 1 and 3 in jeopardy.

Part of J.’s difficulty is that the hysteria that he so well describes does not yield any reliable data to substantiate or dismiss his claims. Necessarily he turns to hypothesis, conjecture, and anecdotes, especially in part 2. But those anecdotes could have been more illuminating and delivered with less animus.

J. prophetically recognizes and decries deep and long-held patterns of bias and intolerance interconnected with profoundly conflicted self-understanding. In his liberating dream he proposes that gay Catholics recognize their natural and grace-filled affinity with their own very sacramental Church and that they insist both on their baptismal vocation as a right work of God and on their loving as an invitation to working out that vocation. Along the way, he could have provided us with some idea of what such a life would (or does) look like.
status of health care access in the U.S. context must be reformed. Lavastida presents this text as a defense of the common good theory of the Catholic tradition for health care reform in the U.S., which “can only be accomplished if a societal obligation to provide just health care is recognized” (2) and guaranteed like other rights (e.g., housing and education) by the government.

L. considers that the common good and distributive justice are the two key principles of a Catholic theory of justice. These principles guide deliberations over community welfare in respect of a fundamental understanding of persons and their fulfillment based upon the *bonum honestum* and *summum bonum* of human flourishing. L. reminds the reader that the common good enjoys a long history in Western ethics from Plato through the Scholastics to the social encyclicals and bishops’ pastorals, and the Catholic tradition has capitalized on this principle “to emphasize the social dimension of the human condition” (171). Distributive justice enjoys a similarly long history and ensures that the social conditions of human flourishing, represented in the benefits and burdens distributed to individual persons, is secured “in the community according to proportional equality” (197). This theory of justice recognizes a definitive societal obligation as well as an individual right to a just distribution of the goods and the cost of those goods contributing to the *bonum honestum* of human flourishing.

A Catholic theory of justice, if it is to be true to this common good tradition of social solidarity, can provide the philosophical foundations that L. recognizes are lacking in the U.S. debate on universal access to health care. In order to set up the common good argument for universal access, L. offers a brief history of formal health care in the U.S. This history shows the increasing fragmentation of U.S. society due to its move from communal relations among social groups and distributive justice mechanisms for meeting needs, to the market mentality of associative relations and commutative justice arrangements on a fee-for-service basis. The first generation of hospitals provided lodging for the poor, quarantine for the sick, safe haven for the mentally ill, and training for medical apprentices. The second generation witnessed the institutionalized development of large urban health care centers. These hospitals provided not only a place for the burgeoning immigrant poor but also active curative treatment plans with the advances wrought in medical and surgical sciences. With the formal institutionalization of hospital services, physicians became professionals with an entourage of professionally trained nurses and science-technicians that “made hospitals acceptable to all people and not just the poor” (17).

Few post-M*A*S*H viewers would be surprised by the influence of war upon medical practice. However, few recognize the subsequent influence of military health service benefits upon veteran patient expectations. These benefits led to widespread development of pensions, disability programs, health insurance plans, and Medicare legislation—the third party payer system. Even as the federal government increasingly subsidized hospitals and third party plans, this history conceals a capitalist bias of market supply
and demand in the U.S. health care context extending to the contemporary debate against a socialized program of universal access.

From history, L. ventures into the ethical theories and principles most popularly informing U.S. health care policy. This overview of rights, utilitarian, and Rawlsian maximin theories directs the discussion of rationing care in contradistinction to the commodification of health care. Further, lacking “the full grammar of cooperative living” (97), much debate on universal access becomes anathema to U.S. legislators. Nevertheless, recognition of access injustices has occasioned proposals for tax reform, national health plans, health insurance partnerships, and physician support of universal access. L. likewise challenges aversion to universal access and a single-payer system attentive to local needs with recourse to a social understanding of the person, the common good, and distributive justice according to need.

Many will agree with L. that access to health care in the United States is woefully inadequate (40 million un/underinsured) and that a common good/distributive justice approach to understanding the problems of access would go far in relieving the popular creeds of autonomy and choice. The specialist in health care ethics and those sympathetic with the Catholic tradition will appreciate this effort. However, L.’s argument lacks the force of continuity. The four divisions of the text read independently of the thesis to provide an ethical alternative to the current status of managed competition in health care and, unfortunately, many of the chapters summarize their content so broadly as to provide only the most general of outlines to the reader. The text could be used as a survey of trends in U.S. health policies and, from Aquinas to Centesimus annus, of Catholic support for universal access to health care.

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American bioethics literature pays, in general, only scant attention to the European discussion on different ethical issues. Although much is known about the Netherlands’ reflection on euthanasia and assisted suicide, there is virtually no mention of the French literature on the topic. Maret’s inclusive book provides a careful reconstruction of the debate in European French-speaking countries (France, Switzerland, and Belgium) and offers insightful analyses on the different aspects entailed in the moral question of euthanasia.

The account is complete and detailed in relation not only to the different positions on the issue but also to the roots of the problem which M. addresses from a variety of perspectives. As a theologian, M. is interested in pushing the question beyond the limits of a purely ethical analysis and to
articulate the resources of meaning offered by Christian revelation. He does so in a subtle way, driven by the basic methodological assumption that “what is being claimed in the name of God ought to be justified also from the point of view of man” (11). Although the book devotes an entire chapter to documenting the position of the Catholic Church, it ultimately challenges the plausibility of euthanasia as an adequate solution (une solution boîteuse) to the existential issues raised by suffering and death. To this goal, M. convincingly shows that ethical arguments do not exist in a vacuum, but rather as articulations of more fundamental anthropological insights concerning the meaning of human dignity, respect, and freedom in the face of death.

In part 1, M. guides the reader through a rich historical reconstruction of the problem of euthanasia. The hypothesis underlying this genetic reconstruction is that euthanasia represents the wrong answer to the difficult questions raised by a threefold revolution (triple bouleversement) within society. Those changes concern, respectively, people’s attitudes toward death, the health care institution, and the advent of aggressive medical technology.

This threefold revolution, however, can lead to euthanasia only through the mediation of a particular ideological option. In chapter 4, M. addresses the paradoxical features of this ideology of freedom and self-determination as it expresses itself in various manifestations of the movement pro euthanasia in French-speaking countries. The case of French oncologist Leon Schwartzenberg, the spread of associations for the right to die with dignity (Associations pour le Droit de Mourir dans la Dignité), and the legislative attempt to de-penalize the voluntary euthanasia of terminally ill patients (Motion Ruffy) are discussed at length, together with the broad implications of sanctioning the legality of euthanasia.

The arguments against euthanasia come to full light in the final three chapters. M.’s strategy is to critically assume the position of those arguing in favor of euthanasia and to show its anthropological inconsistency from within. If the dignity of the human person, respect for human life, and freedom are the values driving our culture in its request for euthanasia and assisted suicide, then the task of ethical analysis is to ultimately show that “the justification of those acts expresses a conception of values as well as an anthropology which are debatable, even destructive and dangerous” (137). Only a reconstruction of the true meaning of those very values can prepare the ground for framing and solving ethical conflicts in the care of dying patients.

The book is insightful and profound. M. is particularly adept at unpacking the different layers of the social context which triggers the demand for euthanasia and at organizing their systematic connection in a balanced synthesis. Although he limits his analysis to the French-speaking world, he shows a deep understanding of the status questionis and of the position of foreign ethicists (A. Pieper, H. Küng, D. Mieth, L. Sowle Cahill). From a more critical point of view, one could argue that M. could have more deeply elaborated on the Kantian position by showing that the notion of
autonomy does not exclude, but rather opens up the possibility of a trans-
cendent foundation of human dignity. If it is true that Sartre’s absoluti-
zation of human freedom stands in the effectual history of Kant, it is no less 
true that a different reading of Kant has been attempted by philosophers 
(from Maréchal to Schwartländer) who have, in turn, influenced Catholic 
thought.

M. remains at a rather general level in dealing with the clinical aspects of 
death and dying. A more nuanced phenomenology of cases that may justify 
exceptions to the general prohibition of euthanasia remains beyond M.’s 
scope, but the ability to deal with extreme situations represents the true 
test of an ethical argument. Indeed, the anthropological framework repres-
ts only a necessary condition for the articulation of normative solutions, 
but not a sufficient one. These observations notwithstanding, the book is 
beautifully written and worth reading. It is a serious contribution to the 
debate.

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xvi + 366. $27.50.

In what sense is it accurate to say that the ability to survive is a substan-
tive human freedom? This question is at the heart of Sen’s extensive writ-
ing in moral philosophy and development economics. How one answers 
this question will govern to a great extent one’s assessment of this book 
which argues that freedom properly understood is the appropriate norma-
tive framework by which to understand global issues of development.

The winner of the 1998 Nobel Prize in economics, S. writes in the tra-
dition of economics as part of moral philosophy. Many of his books com-
bine rigorous, quantitative analysis with philosophical reflection. The phi-
losophy articulates what the numbers show. Thus, for instance, S. links a 
concept like “functionings” to Aristotle and to vectors and n-tuples. S. also, 
however, often leaves out more arcane economic references and writes in 
a philosophical manner mixed with less rigorous policy analysis. This book 
stands in that style of writing. As such, it provides an excellent introduction 
to his moral philosophy or, in another way of putting it, to the more 
philosophical side of his economics.

S. is not alone in arguing that development must be assessed by more 
humane standards than, for instance, the GNP and per capita income. In 
fact, he has been at the forefront of efforts in the last decades at the United 
Nations to use measures that more accurately reflect the real human costs 
of underdevelopment. S. also is not alone in advocating freedom as the key 
to an ethic of development. Libertarians and neoliberals the world over 
have likewise invoked freedom as the indispensable norm of progress for 
poor nations. But S. is rare in saying both that freedom is the overarching 
norm of development and that freedom is first manifest in the ability to 
live; the libertarians and neoliberals reject the broad normative impli-
cations of the latter.
Beyond this basic assumption about freedom, there are three key steps to S.’s argument. The first step links the notion of development to the notion of substantive freedom. As S. puts it: “The removal of substantial unfreedoms . . . is constitutive of development” [author’s emphasis] (xii). What are the substantive freedoms? They begin with the ability to live and move out from there: From freedom to satisfy hunger, to the opportunity to be sheltered, to the liberty of political participation. The success of development must be assessed by the achievement of such freedoms. In fact, development is a result of the exercise of these freedoms.

The second key step in S.’s argument is the claim that substantive freedoms are supported by instrumental freedoms. “The effectiveness of freedom as an instrument,” S. says, “lies in the fact that different kinds of freedom interrelate with one another, and freedom of one type may greatly help in advancing freedom of other types” (37). Among these instrumental freedoms are economic opportunities to use resources; political choices about laws; social questions about arrangements of health care; transparency guarantees (for example, adequate disclosure in business dealings); and the security of a social safety net. For S., a liberal, instrumental political freedoms take on particular importance. Throughout the book, he examines the major social, economic, and political institutions in the light of this broad interaction of freedoms.

The third step spells out the connection between the first two. “Individual freedom,” S. argues, is a “social commitment” (282). By this he means that the possibility of substantive freedom is “extremely contingent on personal, social, and environmental circumstances” (284). He also means that the exercise of such freedoms is inseparably linked to social economic, and political institutions. However, he strongly affirms responsibility in the face of these social influences. Responsibility is the apex of substantive freedom.

But this affirmation brings us back to freedom as the ability to survive. This is the crucial assumption behind the entire argument: The close link between freedom and life establishes the value on which is based the overall framework of development as freedom. Unfortunately, S. does not explicate with enough clarity how freedom is this ability to survive (or, for that matter, how the absence of this ability is an “unfreedom”). He lacks an anthropology in which to ground freedom in a more plausible human context.

S. may be less well known to theological ethicists than philosophers like John Rawls and Martha Nussbaum. And his rich conceptual mix of social choice theory, Adam Smith, Aristotle, and hard-core economics may not offer theologians in search of philosophical dialogue the same ready points of contact as either Rawls’s use of Kant or Nussbaum’s use of Aristotle. But S.’s technically sophisticated and philosophically cogent work warrants wider theological scrutiny. This book is a good place to start.

Boston College

DAVID E. DECOSSE
DECONSTRUCTION, FEMINIST THEOLOGY, AND THE PROBLEM OF DIFFER-ENCE: SUBVERTING THE RACE/GENDER DIVIDE. By Ellen T. Armour. Chi-

This book, one of a series on Religion and Post-Modernism edited by
Mark C. Taylor, focuses on a critique of the concepts of woman and gender
in feminist theology and theory of the last 25 years. Armour’s thesis is that
feminist theologians have not been able to do justice to racial difference
because of a concept of woman inherited from metaphysical humanism’s
concept of “man” as a univocal “essence.” Challenged by womanist theo-
ologists and Black feminist writers, “whitefeminists” (as A. calls them) have
earnestly striven to incorporate racial difference, but have failed because
they have perceived Black women as the “other” of racial difference
among women, but have neglected to recognize themselves as racially
marked “White.” White women are treated as an unmarked category,
simply as “women.” “Difference” among women arises only in the pres-
ence of Black women.

A. describes only two “whitefeminist” theologians, Mary Daly and Rose-
mary Ruether, and then goes on to discuss a number of feminists theorists,
such as Mary McClintock Fulkerson, Elizabeth Spelman, Judith Butler,
Donna Haraway, and Elizabeth Grosz, to illustrate this problem. A. uses
selected works of Jacques Derrida and Luce Irigaray in her quest for ways
of thinking beyond the univocal “subject,” the White male, to recognize
gender and race “outside the text.” Derrida recognizes gender and race
outside the text, but not both at the same time, while Irigaray seeks to think
from the place of women outside the text of male normativity and ignores
racial difference among women.

A. is most creative in her unpacking of these two French theorists, de-
fending Derrida against nihilism and Irigaray against “essentialism.” It is
unclear, however, that her long excursion through Derrida and Irigaray
helps overcome the gender/race divide in “whitefeminist” thought, other
than to insist that African American literature be recognized as the voice
of Black women’s experience, and that whitefeminists recognize them-
selves as racially marked. The univocal subject, whether “man” or
“woman,” seems to remain fixed, with difference always at the margins of
the “text.”

A.’s treatment of Mary Daly and myself as representative “whitefemi-
nist” theologians is particularly unsatisfactory. She fails to situate Daly and
myself in the context of feminist theology of the 1970s. Many feminist
theologians, such as Letty Russell, Beverly Harrison, and myself started
our work in the context of the Civil Rights movement and the New Left.
Race and class analysis was basic to the thought of those movements, but
gender was ignored. We sought to insert gender within the categories of
race and class. We did not start with a univocal “woman” and then seek to
add race and class difference. Our work uses race, class, and gender as
interconnected structures that create multiple differences. Daly, by con-
trast, was in Europe in the 1960s and missed this critical era. She started with gender difference and has never comfortably included race and class.

A. uses whiteness as the racial mark that whitefeminists need to acknowledge, no longer treating their own group as unmarked and so, by implication, as normative “woman.” This is an important insight, but she fails to critique the concept of “White.” She acts as if it were a univocal “racial” identity. But “white” is a linguistic construct that erases difference among Euro-Americans, signaling inclusion in racial and class privilege. In the colonial period “White” stood for English Protestants. Irish and French Catholics were not included. It has gradually expanded its borders to include Catholics and Jews, Southern and Eastern Europeans, as these groups assimilated into U.S. middle class culture, but this expansion only erases their distinct identities. For example, a Greek who comes directly from Greece might be called “White,” while an Argentinean of Italian ancestry “a person of color.” “White” sets up the binary opposition, “Black,” which codes good/bad, and being/non-being. The question is not the embrace of “White” as a racial identity, but its continued use as a mark of racial privilege that erases plurality among Euro-Americans and marginalizes all others.

A. uses African American women’s literature to identify White women as the plantation mistresses in the Black women’s story. But very few “White” women have ancestresses that were plantation mistresses. Irish, Polish, and Jewish women have different stories of mothers or grandmothers who worked in sweatshops and as maids in affluent households. A. seems stuck in the conundrum of a univocal subject to be deconstructed by difference, but unable to really embrace difference except as “others” that leave the normative center intact. This is a significant problem in Western thought and linguistic structure. But is the solution the denial of any common humanity that all humans share? Difference without commonality could easily lead to new justifications of denial of “human rights” to women or other races on the grounds of cultural difference. We need to reconstruct the concept of “human nature” so that it is defined in and through plurality of cultures and social locations, rather than through one hegemonic center, while keeping an affirmation of a human commonality that grounds solidarity and equivalent rights.

Garrett-Evangelical Theological Seminary, Evanston, Ill. ROSEMARY RADFORD RUETHER


Contrary to many media images, religious traditions and organizations can be, have been, and will be indispensable to the formation of peace. Appleby, in this richly researched and wide-ranging book, has assembled
both the empirical data and a provisional framework for grasping this truth. As a historian, he directs our attention at the formation of actors who can transform situations of conflict into forums of nonviolent adjudication. The crude determinisms of economics, geography, or macropolitical analysis yield to an open-ended inquiry into the ways religion has and has not produced action for peaceful transformation of societies. These classic social “forces” become contexts within which A. examines the crucial factors of the formation of religious leadership and the establishment of religious institutions able to act with some independence from other institutions, groups, and movements.

A.’s wide-ranging exploration of Christian, Jewish, Muslim, Hindu, and Buddhist history argues that each tradition contains seeds for violent coercion as well as peaceable persuasion. Each tradition is in fact an argument among perennial options contained in its origins. Each tradition is internally pluralistic. While aware of psychological, anthropological, and sociological explanations for this ambiguity, A. develops a religious framework. He finds it in Rudolph Otto’s famous exposition of the “mysterium tremendum” at the heart of every religious experience. The profoundly mystical experience of the “Holy Other” yields both the anxieties that promote fear, hatred, and violence and also the sense of enveloping peace that yields a principled peacemaking grounded in an awareness of the unity of all life. Such a claim means that the study of the inner dynamics of religion itself must be a part of political and social science studies and investigations into peacemaking. Other disciplines might provide other and more detailed theological answers, but at least theology and religion become full partners in conversations about the conditions of peace.

A.’s volume is clearly a key text for the emerging study of peacemaking and conflict transformation. His historian’s temper leads him to the exposition of numerous case studies from the Balkans, Israel/Palestine, South Africa, India, Southeast Asia, Central and South America, and Eastern Europe. Each is handled with attention to specific actors, organizations, and religious traditions—a far cry from Samuel Huntington’s generalizations about civilizational clashes. At many points A.’s extensive earlier work with Martin Marty and others on religious fundamentalism enriches his comparisons among various extremist movements.

Working from his theological view of religion’s ambivalence, A. then introduces a tentative framework for ordering these historical data. This frame of analysis and interpretation revolves around the formation of religious leadership grounded in the peacemaking values of a religious tradition and the creation of sufficient autonomy for religious organizations so that they can act independently of political, ethnic, tribal, or economic institutions. Leadership and autonomous organization are, of course, key ingredients in the construction of a civil society that has an open public composed of a large number of voluntary associations, professions, unions, and interest groups. Thus, the way in which religion feeds into societal violence or societal peacemaking depends not only on how its leaders interpret its theological roots but also on its means for cultivating informed
leadership and institutional autonomy. At this point A. tends to argue that the institutional form of religion as a voluntary organization in a civil society is the form that most adequately promotes the peacemaking elements in a religion. In short, the more communal a religion, and the more it seeks to suffuse all of social life, the more it will create feared and hated outsiders. That is, the more it tries to be internally monolithic, the more violence it creates. Contrariwise, the more the religion becomes one institution among many in a society, the more likely it is to reinforce a civil society in which power is dispersed, conflicts are localized, and competing groups seek compromises through peaceful political processes.

This rough schema leaves much room for theoretical debate, both theological and political-cultural. On some points, such as A.’s discussion of human rights, the clash between humanistic human rights theories and religious particularism almost capsizes his search for religious legitimation of nonviolent civic orders. Some may want to contest his terminology at points (“extremists” and “nonviolent militants”) and others may want to focus on psychological dynamics, rituals (such as René Girard’s work on religious violence), or the role of military constraint and coercion. What A. has done in this finely nuanced inquiry is to assemble an impressive array of documentation, both historical and bibliographical, along with a preliminary means of sorting out key variables. Students, teachers, and people seeking to develop religious engagement in programs of conflict transformation are all in his debt.

Andover Newton Theological School, Mass. WILLIAM JOHNSON EVERETT


Ever since the theological reflections of basic Christian communities in Latin America began impacting the theological world over 30 years ago, there has been a steady interest in and appreciation for this source of theological wisdom. James Cochrane contributes to this development in two significant ways.

First, he writes from the context of South Africa, more specifically from the experience of the Base Ecclesial Community (BEC) of Amawoti, an “urban-fringe shack community” in the vicinity of Durban. This environment adds a distinct and less well-known voice to the more familiar liberation theologies coming from Latin America, the Pacific Rim, and other parts of Africa. More important is C.’s way of sharing the wisdom of this community. Although he cites three pivotal experiences—a health care project, a Bible study group, and two Good Friday/Easter marches—he does not describe these events in straightforward, documentary-style reporting. Consistent with the main argument of his book, he is well aware that such presumed objectivity is at best deficient, at worst self-serving, and always skewed. Rather he lets the people speak for themselves, retaining
the rough edges, pointing out the tensions, and honoring the indigenous forms of expression and insight which he calls an “incipient theology.”

An incipient theology is not guided by an explicit method or informed by trained theologians, but is a genuine faith reflection by a community on its experience and social situation. C. consistently honors the insights and life experience of the Amawoti community without accepting them uncritically or tidying them up to fit smoothly into the received tradition. He repeatedly acknowledges the pre-thematic character of their reflection and yet he continuously accords them respect as coequal dialogue partners.

Second, while other advocates of community-based theological reflection make a similar claim for its validity and importance, C. constructs a careful, critical argument to support such an assertion. Central to this more theoretical reflection is an appreciation for the dynamics of communication, interpretation, and action. On these points C. draws heavily upon theorists like Hans Georg Gadamer, Paul Ricoeur, Jürgen Habermas, and Michel Foucault. He is keenly sensitive to the way power relationships structure human experience and overly determine “acceptable” expressions of that experience. The received and normative Christian tradition is not immune from this hegemonic prejudice and needs to be balanced by incipient theologies that “begin in Galilee” with a commitment to marginalized people and a choice for hopefulness rather than fatedness.

Perhaps the most insightful and challenging aspects of C.’s advocacy of incipient theology are his appreciation for the voices of the other, the linking of local theologies with the generic theology of the Church, and the intrinsic connection between communication and action. Listening to the voice of the other is an essential but extremely difficult task because it lays a claim on the listener that the listener cannot control and may find unwelcome. The typical defenses of speaking at or speaking for the other must give way to a critical collaboration of speaking with the other in giving testimony to a possibility for living together not yet realized.

The value and validity of incipient theology cannot remain confined to the local community. Both as theology and as human communication it belongs to a public discourse about life. Making this transition into the public realm of both the Church and society is never automatic. It must be worked out consistently and painstakingly, and yet it is clear that for C. incipient theology fails its purpose if it does not become public.

At the same time communication that aims at public life is necessarily action- or telos-oriented. Praxis is not an optional addendum to theological reflection. But because the praxis theological reflection calls for is often initially opposed to status quo practices, there is both a protest and a therapeutic/liberating dimension that goes beyond the mere act of reflecting.

C. summarizes these key themes and his assertive defense of the theology of ordinary people by calling for a “gestalt of theology,” a holistic approach that takes account of the different levels where theology occurs and gives as much importance to the incipient theologies of ordinary believers as to the erudite formulations of trained theologians. There is no
doubt that C. operates out of such a gestalt and his account of what this means makes it an appealing, if challenging and at times daunting, invitation to anyone engaged in theological reflection.

Center for Theological Reflection, Largo, Florida Robert L. Kinast


Among the tried and true topics of Muslim-Christian dialogue, a perennial favorite is the Islamic understanding of Jesus. This contribution to the extensive bibliography is very useful. Leirvik, a Norwegian Lutheran minister with extensive experience in various forms of Muslim-Christian interaction, has produced exactly what he promises: a solid bibliographic introduction, keyed to the concerns of religious polemic and apologetic and of interreligious dialogue. This work offers an extensive review of secondary literature in Western languages and of primary sources to the extent that these are available in published translation from the Arabic, Persian, and Urdu originals. The frequent and judicious use of quotations from these sources supplements good summaries of the major books and articles. L.’s work is in handbook form with all of the numerical apparatus of headings and subheadings beloved of European scholarship. English and German scholarship receives more attention than French; the latter is cited but not summarized.

After a brief introduction, L. divides his bibliographic survey into seven sections. The first four cover various representations and understandings of Jesus in the major areas canvassed. Starting with the Qur’ān and the canonical collections of hadith, L. goes on to explore the vast repository of qur’ānic commentary or at least that small portion of it that is accessible in translation. As is the case with other prophetic narratives that have woven themselves into a plethora of Muslim sources, some of the more interesting and/or outlandish material can be found in histories and in that class of works commonly called qisas al-anbiya’, the tales of the prophets. Again, L. must content himself with what is available in translation, but what he presents is representative. A very brief section on Shi’ite understandings of Jesus precedes a longer consideration of the much expanded understanding of Jesus that can be gleaned from various Sufi authors.

Having offered this assemblage of Jesus images, drawn largely from classical and medieval sources, L. changes direction in the second half of his book. In the next three sections his attention is captured by the way the Jesus figure has developed in Muslim literature of polemic and apologetic and by the way it functions in dialogue.

To situate his readers L. offers background information on medieval polemics and apologetics, both Muslim and Christian, and on some of the
major issues engaged. These include the Muslim charge of scriptural alteration and the abhorrence expressed at Christian notions of God’s “paternity.” Of particular interest is the attention that L. draws to recent work on the image of Paul in medieval Islam and on the centuries-long controversy surrounding the so-called “Gospel of Barnabas.” From this background, L. moves squarely into the 20th century and concentrates the rest of his handbook on the contributions of Egyptian and Indo-Pakistani prose works and a broader range of poetical works. He pays particular attention to Egyptian writer Khālid Muhammad Khālid and translates relevant short passages.

The final section raises the theological questions. Here again K. M. Khālid and his call for a conscience-based ethics emerges as a leading voice. The appeal of Jesus, for some Egyptian modernists, is the way he represents resistance to legalism and taqlīd, the uncritical acceptance of traditional interpretation. L. sees in this and similar views an opening to a conscience-based dialogue between Muslims and Christians, understanding conscience as both an individual and a social reality and recognizing that theology and ethics are inextricably linked. As in so much contemporary reflection on interreligious relations, more questions are posed than positions stated. L. seeks a serious reinsertion of christological concerns into the current dialogue but, adhering to the irenic model that presently holds sway, his efforts remain tentative and open to reorientation.

This is a very useful volume for anyone seriously engaged in Muslim-Christian understanding or dialogue. The few inaccuracies and bibliographic omissions are minor relative to L.’s achievement. My one less minor concern is his undifferentiated use of the terms “Jesus” and “Christ” and their combinations. His usage may present no problem for Christians, but it seriously skews the Islamic reception of the Jesus figure. The most common Qur’ānic name for Jesus is Ḥasan b. Maryam, Jesus the son of Mary, or simply Ibn Maryam. While the title “Messiah (al-maṣṭḥ)” is used, it certainly does not carry the theological weight of its equivalent within the Christian tradition.

Notwithstanding this concern, I repeat my recommendation. It deserves much broader dissemination than it is likely to receive from its current publishing house.

Georgetown University

Jane Dammen McAuliffe


This book reflects the labors of an intensive study of a formative period in the development of the history of religions. For this reason alone it is worthy of consideration by anyone seeking to become more familiar with some of the major players who have contributed to the modern study of religion.
Wasserstrom’s scope is comprehensive yet concise. It is comprehensive in its survey of three very different thinkers: Gershom Scholem (1897–1982), the famous expert on the Kabbalah; Mircea Eliade (1907–1986), the recognized authority on “archaic” and Eastern religions; and the enigmatic Henry Corbin (1903–1978), the renowned scholar of Islam. And the study is concise in that W. limits it to the years of these scholars’ collaboration in the Eranos conferences (1949–1976) which, inspired by Carl Jung, were held annually in Ascona, Switzerland. Many of the lectures delivered at the conferences were published in the Eranos-Jahrbuch.

By the phrase, “religion after religion,” W. refers to the “overarching theory” that these three thinkers held in common, namely, “a non-religious religiosity” (ix). True as this may be, the book’s title is somewhat misleading, for W. is interested more in these scholars’ formative influences on culture rather than in their contributions as religious thinkers: “I have chosen to study these three great scholars not as specialists . . . but rather as cultural giants” (11). W. then delivers a subtle and extended critique, especially of Eliade and Corbin, from the perspective of the sociopolitical implications of their thought.

The text consists of a series of essays that address a range of topics and attempts to tie together themes common to these thinkers. The topics include symbolism, esthetics, coincidentia oppositorum, and myth and history, to name a few. W. critiques those aspects of each scholar’s thought that de-ethicize the history of religions (225). For example, implications of coincidentia oppositorum, the myth of the androgyne, and a nonhistorical mythic world (all of which speak of a reality without distinctions) can be disastrous—as in the Nazis’ attempt to eradicate ethnic diversity (78). W. sees the subtle influence of Nietzsche in these notions insofar as the absence of distinctions is beyond good and evil—hence de-ethicized. Similarly, W. is uneasy with the method of epoche as used in the phenomenology of religion because those who advocate this method often do not adequately distinguish between a “scientific” and an ethical suspension of judgment.

Along with his critique of the three scholars, W. also faults the spirit of Eranos for espousing a “mystocentric” conception of religion, that is, a conception that the essence of religion is “to be found in religious [mystical] experience” (239). Such an emphasis, he finds, promotes an esoteric elitism where a select few gain access to the divine. Again, this observation reflects W.’s critical thesis that these theorists contribute to a mythic gnosticism that in its extreme form can fuel a “kind of philosophical anti-Judaism” (177). He all but links Corbin directly to fascist thought: “While I would not claim that Corbin was fascist, I am saying that he cannot be understood historically unless he is seen in light of such contemporaneous themes in fascist thought” (155). W. does not explicitly indict Eliade, but he seems to assume that Eliade was sympathetic to anti-Jewish sentiment because of his association with the Romanian nationalist movement (132). I cannot speak for Corbin, but I have read the majority of the primary and secondary literature pertaining to Eliade. While his political affiliations
during World War II have come under recent scrutiny. I am wary of scholars who take it for granted that Eliade was a Nazi sympathizer. Certainly Eliade was pro-Romanian, but the question remains open regarding whether he was pro-Nazi. The issue is complex, and the evidence will have to be closely studied as it becomes available.

In the last analysis, W.’s work is a weighty piece of research that challenges the school of thought in contemporary religious studies that assumes the essence of religion to be rooted in mystical/religious experience at the expense of its connection with social-political-cultural structures. While W. should be recognized for the breadth of his knowledge, at times he overburdens his text with quotations, and his arguments do not always cohere. Still, the text remains a fruitful read for anyone wanting a critical perspective on these three significant religious scholars.

Regis College/Lonergan Research Institute, Toronto  
JOHN D. DADOSKY
SHORTER NOTICES


New Testament scholars argue over the genre of Luke-Acts. Is it best understood as a form of history, or biography, or novel? None of the above, answers Bonz: Luke’s two-volume work should be read as a prose epic of Christian beginnings, and its literary antecedent is Virgil’s Latin epic of the first century BCE, the Aeneid. It is a hard case to argue, especially since Luke gives no indication of knowing Latin, and Bonz must suppose acquaintance through a Latin prose translation by Polybius. The argument must therefore proceed by means of assembling those stylistic, structural, and thematic elements found in the respective writings that tend to suggest influence.

The book has the feel of an adapted dissertation (see the technical appendices in 195–205), and unfolds in typical dissertation fashion: a review of scholarship showing how the question of genre is still open (1–29), a presentation of the Aeneid, with particular attention to its structural elements and the themes of fate and prophecy (31–60), a consideration of the development of epic in the period between Virgil and Luke (61–86), a reading of Acts 2 as the heart of Luke’s narrative and a place for showing the presence of Virgilian motifs (87–128), a very broad and mainly descriptive review of Luke’s story-line with special attention to structural elements (129–89), leading to the conclusion that these are best explained by regarding Luke-Acts as a prose epic (189–93).

B. has an eye for the literary features of texts and writes with clarity and grace. She provides NT scholarship with a strong reading of the Aeneid within its historical and literary context, making a good case for the importance of divine mission and prophecy in that epic. The main thesis of her book, however, falls considerably short of demonstration. She needs to show that the elements of structure and theme shared by Luke-Acts and the Aeneid are either exclusive to them or absent from other genres in a similar degree. In fact, all the elements cited (especially the test-case of the sea voyage and shipwreck) are found abundantly in histories, biographies, and novels of the period. The apologetic history (which, like all narrative, inevitably contains fictional invention and elaboration), remains the best category within which to understand Luké-Acts.

LUKE TIMOTHY JOHNSON
Emory University, Atlanta

This collection of fifteen studies comprises the first volume of a project entitled “Luke the Interpreter of Israel.” The first four—by L. Alexander, D. Schmidt, V. Robbins, and Moessner—examine the prologues of Luke and Acts and agree that the Gospel’s prologue is an introduction to the larger two-volume story of Jesus as Israel’s heritage, though they differ as to how the prologue relates to the succeeding text. R. Pervo challenges the growing contemporary consensus that Luke and Acts should be read as a unified work. W. Kurz, C. Holladay, and G. Sterling find parallels in Hellenistic Jewish narrative that throw fresh light on the shape and purpose of Luke’s volumes. In this comparison, Luke emerges looking like a Hellenistic Jew who renews the coin of Hellenistic Jewish narrative.

Four essays explore how Luke-Acts relates to Greco-Roman prototypes, particularly in Luke’s use of Hellenistic conventions regarding speeches, sea voyages, and endings. D. Balch and E. Pluemacher find the speeches in Acts working just as Dionysius of Halicarnassus describes the function of speeches in the writing of history, i.e., to illuminate cause and effect relations in events. So understood, the speeches show Luke to be writing history, not biography or a novel, C. Talbert and J. Hayes survey sea voyages in Greco-Roman literature; against this background, they read the storm story of Luke 8 and the shipwreck of Acts 27 as similar demonstrations of how God’s plan is carried out. Regarding the unresolved ending of Acts, D. Marguerat argues that, as in the narrative suspension of Homer and Heroditus, the end of Acts is deliberately open-ended, inviting the reader to join the unfinished business of finding the “salvation of God” in the Church recruited among Jews and Gentiles and holding that God’s promise of fidelity to Israel is not annulled.

The three final articles—by M. Wolter, R. Tannehill, and H. Marshall—treat the relationship between Luke-Acts and the story of Israel. All agree that Luke presents Jesus as the Messiah of Israel, whose heritage is now claimed by the (largely Gentile) Church, but whose future is still open.


Complete with full indexes of ancient sources and modern authors, this collection is a comprehensive and competent reflection of the “sea change” that has occurred in Luke-Acts study during the last quarter of the 20th century.

DENNIS HAMM, S.J.
Creighton University, Omaha


That Christians and Jews have misread Paul’s statements about the Law and the fate of Israel for nearly 2000 years is the bold claim of this book. To establish this claim Gager first details the origins and persistence of the misreading. The crux of the interpretive problem is Paul’s seemingly contradictory statements, summarized thus: “Circumcision is of great value; it counts for nothing. The law is holy; it places its followers under a curse and cannot justify them before God. All Israel will be saved; they are the enemies of God and have failed to fulfill their own law” (7). Traditionally, interpreters, by subordinating the “pro-Israel” passages to the “anti-Israel,” concluded that Jews, the old people of God, along with the old Law, have been rejected by God and replaced by a new people, and that faith in Christ, not the Law and old covenant, is the sole path of salvation. Paul, on this reading, becomes the spokesman for the rejection-replacement view of Judaism and the father of anti-Judaism.
Against this subordinationist solution G. proposes what could be termed a "contextualist" solution. It reads Paul's statements in relation to three contexts: his standing within the literary and religious culture of Greco-Roman Judaism; his mission to the Gentiles and the opposition to that mission from within the Jesus-movement; and his use of Greco-Roman rhetoric in addressing his communities. From G.'s re-reading of Galatians and Romans emerges not the father of anti-Judaism but the self-described Apostle to the Gentiles who neither repudiated Judaism and its Law nor conceived of Israel's redemption in terms of Jesus Christ. The Apostle's negative assertions, that the Law had been a curse resulting in enslavement and that the Law and circumcision had been transcended by Christ, were developed in response to opponents of Paul's Law-free gospel for Gentiles in Galatia and address the role of the Law solely in relation to Gentiles, not Jews. This interpretation suggests the possibility of two paths of salvation: through Christ for Gentiles and through the Law for Israel.  
Sure to stimulate discussion and response, this lucidly written and provocative study is a must-read for New Testament scholars, especially Pauline, and for those interested in interfaith dialogue.

SUSAN A. CALEF  
Creighton University, Omaha


This posthumous work is based on ten weekly lectures delivered by the late Edward Edinger, a leading Jungian analyst residing in Los Angeles. The dominance of the apocalyptic thinking that accompanied the beginnings of Christianity is reappearing today. This is hardly surprising in view of the threat of AIDS and nuclear and ecological disaster, not to mention the arrival of a new millennium. These anxieties are amply reflected in the dreams of E.'s clients. But what E. means by this vision of the shattering of the world as it has been, followed by its reconstitution, is...
momentous event of the coming of the Self into conscious realization” (5). David Koresh (a.k.a. Vernon Howell) is a prime example of what can happen when raw unmediated energies of the apocalypse archetype flow through a kind of “hole” in the psyche (183).

E.’s psychological reflections are grafted onto a commentary on the Apocalypse (or Revelation), handsomely illustrated by medieval illuminations and water colors of William Blake. While E. employs both Jung’s Answer to Job and J. Massyberde Ford’s volume in the Anchor Bible, I have to question whether such a commentary serves the author’s psychological preoccupation with the need for a “transformation of the God-image” (177).

For Jung the archetypes are unknowable in themselves but come to consciousness through certain persistent universal motifs. The Book of Revelation is filled with archetypal symbols. But just as symbols in a dream need to be interpreted in the personal context of the dreamer, so too the apocalyptic symbols of Revelation acquire power (whether transformative or destructive) only in the reading experience of the individual.

Jung’s analytical psychology, of which E. was a skillful practitioner, has been of great value for many people in personal therapy. I am much less sure of its usefulness in diagnosing and curing the world’s ills. E. is confident of a positive outcome “because one person, Jung, has already realized what is going on” (177). This statement has a confessional ring, and I am reminded that E. was brought up as a Jehovah’s Witness (xiv).

SCHUYLER BROWN  
St. Michael’s College, Toronto


This small volume presents a densely argued social-scientific interpretation of the New Jerusalem and its marriage to the Lamb in the Book of Revelation. Observations concerning the variety of presuppositions that may inform the reading process and recognition of the gulf between contemporary and ancient social systems, institutions, and concepts establish the role for social-scientific inquiry as a guide for a respectful contemporary reading of ancient texts. Ascribing to Revelation the genre of a Mediterranean astronomical/astrological document (20) situates Revelation firmly within the traditions of Israel while recognizing its relationship to a much larger body of first-century astronomical literature. A detailed discussion of first-century cities develops the New Jerusalem as the focal cosmic reality for all humankind (62). Identification of the Lamb with the constellation Aries and investigation of its role in contemporary creation accounts permit an interpretation of the wedding of the Lamb to the New Jerusalem as a celestial conjunction of Aries and God’s sky city which marks the beginning of a new Creation.

This work presents an excellent overview of the presuppositions of the social-scientific approach and demonstrates its utility in interpreting key elements of Revelation. The proposed genre provides a coherent basis for integrating the book’s pervasive use of Israelite Scriptures and its extensive astronomical imagery. The careful description of first-century cities raises a number of significant points about the New Jerusalem and has implications for the use of “city” elsewhere in the New Testament. The argument for viewing the marriage of the Lamb and the New Jerusalem as a conjunction of celestial entities is intriguing and potentially quite useful but does not provide adequate justification or explanation to convince this reader. The density of the discussion, which frequently approaches a summary of very detailed results from the referenced sources, may prove problematic for those lacking an introduction to the social-scientific approach. However, readers having some familiarity with this method will welcome its insightful use of primary and secondary sources, extensive bibliography, and genuine contribution to the study of Revelation.

PAUL DANOVE  
Villanova University, Penn.
MARIA REPRESENTATIONS IN THE 
MIRACLE TALES OF THIRTEENTH-
CENTURY SPAIN AND FRANCE. By David 
A. Flory. Washington: Catholic Univer-
$49.95.

Flory offers an interesting analysis of 
the Marian miracle tales found in five 
collections: Gonzalo de Berceo’s Mili-
gros de Nuestra Señora, Gautier de Co-
inci’s Miracles de Nostre Dame, Jacques 
de Vitry’s sermonic exempes, Rute-
beuf’s poetic work, and King Alfonso 
X’s Cantigas de Sancta Maria. Guiding 
F.’s approach is his announced determi-
nation to eschew a structuralist or psy-
chological interpretation of his material 
in favor of sociohistorical interpreta-
tion. This approach is productive. His 
examination of Jacques de Vitry’s exem-
pla, for example, argues persuasively 
that the conservative cardinal chose and 
presented his tales as he did in order to 
bring Marian piety firmly into the or-
thodox doctrinal fold, protecting and 
bolstering an institutional Church 
threatened by a rising tide of popular 
religious feeling.

Another strength of F.’s work derives 
from the parallel consideration of such 
different Marian collections, making 
possible illuminating comparisons. For 
example, Rutebeuf and de Vitry tell the 
same tale of a sinning cleric and an err-
ing wife saved by Mary’s miraculous in-
tervention, but Rutebeuf not only de-
picts the Virgin with a lyrical power and 
an emotional intensity alien to de Vitry, 
he also offers a criticism of clerical abuses 
that the cardinal carefully avoids.

There remain disturbing flaws, such 
as the absence from the bibliography of 
many works cited in the footnotes. More serious is the lack of significant 
guidance to the historical literature on 
the medieval Church and medieval the-
ology. Innocent III has attracted a great 
deal of serious scholarship, yet his re-
form activities are documented with ref-
erence to an updated version of a Health Problems pamphlet (3, n. 4). 
And the reader told to find a “detailed 
history of the immaculate Conception 
controversy” (15, n. 21) in a work of 
popularization devoid of scholarly ap-
paratus may well feel dissatisfied.

This said, the work accomplishes 
what it set out to do: it offers worth-
while insights into 13th-century litera-
ture and religious sentiment.

DOUGLASS TABER, JR.
Wayne State College, Wayne, Nebr.

ALPHONSUS DE LIGUORI: SELECTED 
WRITINGS. Edited by Frederick M. 
Jones, C.Ss.R. with the collaboration of 
Brendan McConvery et al. Consultants, 
Sean O’Riordan and Carl Hoegerl. 
Preface by Sean O’Riordan. The Clas-
sics of Western Spirituality. New York: 

This collection is a welcome addition 
to Paulist Press’s series, Classics of 
Western Spirituality. True to Alphon-
sus’s lifelong concerns as theologian 
and pastor, this work provides a solid 
resource to scholars of Christian spiritu-
ality and to anyone committed to deep-
ing his or her relationship with God. 
Newly translated (from Italian) excerpts 
of A.’s writings are grouped under six 
headings: spiritual writings, spiritual di-
rection, devotional writings, prayer, 
moral theology, advice for priests who 
minister to those condemned to death, 
and letters. With his concise and excel-
ent general introduction to A.’s spiritu-
ality and brief presentations of the se-
lected writings, Jones puts these 18th-
century texts into context for our 21st-
century minds and hearts. A.”s “style 
was simple, ‘popular’ in the best sense, 
conversational, reflecting the mentality 
of the ordinary man or woman” (44). 
His genius was in addressing theological 
issues and shaping the minds and hearts 
of the faithful through his spiritual 
works, particularly against the Jansenist 
tendencies in other spiritualities of his 
day. One may question one or other 
theological view or pastoral directive, 
yet what crosses time and culture are 
A.’s profound love for God and for the 
people he served and his desire that all 
come to know God’s love for them and 
respond in kind. Readers of this work 
will find food for their own spiritual 
nourishment and a substantive intro-
duction to the man whom John Paul II 
referred to as “the teacher of the Catho-
lic soul of the West” (51).

KEVIN J. O’NEIL, C.SS.R.
Washington Theological Union, D.C.

No Anglican writer in recent decades has contributed more to the study of the 16th-century theologian Richard Hooker (1554–1600) than John Booty. Hooker holds a place in Anglican theology not unlike that of Thomas Aquinas in Western Catholicism, and his writings were greatly influenced by Aquinas. Hooker set out a systematic and comprehensive theology of the Christian tradition in the context of the historical reality of the Church during the latter part of the century of the Reformation.

This context is important for understanding Hooker's significance. He aimed to define the theological position of the English Church as a via media between Rome and the Calvinist Reformed tradition. His major work, The Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity (5 vols.) defined Anglicanism's theological method. As he discussed every major aspect of Christian theology, Hooker established clear lines of distinction with both Rome and Geneva, and at the same time wrote as an irenic theologian who acknowledged the substantial common ground which Anglicanism shares with both of those traditions.

The subtitle of B.'s book indicates his goal to demonstrate to contemporary readers how this theologian of the late-16th century speaks to issues facing the Church today. In earlier publications, B. already contributed greatly to the systematic study of Hooker's thought. In the present work, he places the fruit of that earlier work within a kind of theological mosaic in which he draws together material from the writings of poets, dramatists, philosophers, and theologians into a kind of dialogue with Hooker on major issues of our time. In doing so, B. introduces readers to Hooker's thought not as a historical relic but in its significance for our own time and place.

LOUIS WEIL
Church Divinity School of the Pacific,
Berkeley


In this slim volume Moloney presents an insightful history of the vexing question of Jesus Christ's own knowledge while on earth, along with an original, constructive proposal. His useful survey includes biblical and patristic evidence, the medieval period (Bonaventure, Aquinas, Scotus), Protestant thought (Schleiermacher, kenotic and process theology), Catholic thought (Rahner, Balthasar, Lonergan), and the modern magisterium. Throughout this narrative M. helpfully underscores the all-important shift in understanding "person" from the basically ontological classical idea to contemporary emphasis on consciousness and freedom.

M.'s own account, while attending to the New Testament, notes the ambivalence of its data insofar as Scripture shows Jesus to be both limited in knowledge and possessed of unwavering certainty about the nearness of God's kingdom. Instead, M. takes his stand on the only "absolutely certain" point of church teaching regarding unity and duality in Christ. Operating within the perspective of transcendental theology, M. draws fruitfully from Lonergan's proposal, especially his distinction between consciousness and knowledge, to present neither an adoptionist Christ (self-doubting rabbi not knowing what he was doing), nor a docetic Christ (timeless omniscient being engaged in a pedagogy of pretense), but a human Christ possessed non-thematically but knowledgeably of the vision of God.

Besides the usefulness of so much historical material assembled in one place, the value of this monograph lies in its clear writing, which helps the reader through dense philosophical thickets, and in the transparent way the author builds his own position, inviting the reader to do likewise. On the debit side, its neglect of relationship and sociality in defining personhood sidelines it from much contemporary theology critical of
transcendental thought on just this point. Use of biblical scholarship to analyze the historical Jesus’ preaching could also be more critical. But on balance this is a serviceable, substantial treatment of a perennial issue.

ELIZABETH JOHNSON
Fordham University, New York


Roland Chia explores Balthasar’s theological esthetics in the light of contemporary epistemological concerns. He argues that Balthasar’s theology integrates the beauty and wonder of creation into a christological poetics, interpreting their objectivity and concreteness as manifestations of God’s glory. As C. discusses in his conclusion, Balthasar understands the analogy between God and creation as always already “catalogical”—shaped by God’s christological descent into the realm of created being—so that the objectivity and form of the world participate in God’s glory. The world’s objectivity and form thus become aspects of God’s revelation—and of human knowledge of God—through God’s taking on form and objectivity in the Incarnation, Crucifixion, and Resurrection of Christ. To turn an Athanasian phrase, God becomes esthetic so that esthetics may become divine, developing our knowledge of God through creation’s objective participation in the drama of God’s self-manifestation.

For those interested in the debate over natural theology, the book provides a clear and sympathetic view of Balthasar’s contribution, and C. persuasively protects Balthasar from Barth’s criticisms. C.’s discussion of both Barth and Balthasar is fair, accurate, and careful. He provides a middle way between a natural theology that reduces God to a first principle of the world (a view that C. wrongly associates with Aquinas) and Barth’s emphasis on revelation; C. rightly recognizes the expansive possibilities for knowledge of God contained in Balthasar’s christocentric interpretation of the analogy of being. In this light, one wishes that the conclusion moved beyond the response to Barth’s criticism into the more constructive aspects of Balthasar’s theology. More broadly, in the light of Barth’s and Balthasar’s challenges to the modern focus on epistemology, C.’s reading of esthetics as a branch of theological epistemology remains puzzling. Nonetheless, for those interested in questions of esthetics and epistemology in contemporary thought, and how a christocentric theology can move into the world via esthetics, this book provides a thoughtful and coherent argument for Balthasar’s approach.

WILLIAM YOUNG
Loyola College in Maryland


Cowdell traces how the Christian God became a remote God and opens up ways of thinking about God in dynamic relationship with the world. Understanding atheism as the shadow of the remote God, C. moves from an analysis of classical theism, through the Enlightenment, and on to a discussion of contemporary models of God. He supports a panentheist view and the recovery of a trinitarian theology of God. I found his argument clear and useful, although I have reservations about the widespread use of the concept of the “remote” God of “classical theism.” As C. acknowledges, classical theologians like Aquinas held that God is intimately interior to creatures. I agree, however, with his challenge to the patriarchal bias of the tradition and its theology of divine immutability.

The book’s second half is a scientifically informed and helpful discussion of the difficult and all-important question of divine action. After surveying ancient and recent discussion, C. turns to Aquinas’s notion of primary and secondary causality, and Austin Farrer’s retrieval of this in terms of “double agency.” He appeals to two analogies—the Christian experience of acting freely while aware of being an instrument of
God, and the human experience of being an embodied agent—and shows that both analogies can assist understanding of God’s action in, with, and under the processes of nature.

C. argues, however, that God’s action is not to be seen as simply general and uniform. There are special and particular divine acts—in providence and in response to prayers—that occur only through natural processes and are limited by God’s respect for the proper freedom of other persons and for the proper autonomy of natural processes. Thus C. offers a view that thoughtfully combines the idea of God’s self-limitation with the possibility of special divine acts in appropriate circumstances.

DENIS EDWARDS
Flinders University, Adelaide, Australia


A charitable description of Eberhard Jüngel’s œuvre would have him executing the philosophical theology which Karl Barth explicitly eschewed. Where Barth preferred to amplify the Christian narrative in a fashion which confronted philosophical pieties, Jüngel feels compelled to offer a “philosophical reconstruction” of the God whom Jesus reveals, so that moderns will better apprehend that God, Barth would find that description oxymoronic, of course, for any such “reconstruction” will mescapably reflect presumptions from modernity alien to the God of revelation. As if to confirm Barth’s fears, the author describes how “Jüngel’s own path out of the cul-de-sac of the metaphysical death of God involves a reconstruction of that divine absoluteness and simplicity: questioning the way in which an abstractly conceived divine essence is allowed to dictate the terms of divine existence. The proper way of conceiving the simplicity of God’s being will in turn allow God’s existence to call decisively into question the absoluteness of God’s essence” (67).

Critical scrutiny of the key terms of that description will quickly reveal the baroque displacement of key medieval terms, but Jüngel eschews retrieval to pursue a reconstruction along the lines suggested by Barth’s understanding of God’s triunity: “God’s trinitarian being is understood as a free, loving self-affirmation: God’s ‘Yes’ to God’s self; [while] God’s creative act (grounded in the eternal covenant) is understood as a free, loving affirmation of human being: God’s ‘Yes’ to us” (102–3). Yet, as if to anticipate Barth’s objections to the ensuing “philosophical” assistance, as well as this reviewer’s dissatisfaction, the author acknowledges that Jüngel’s “treatment offers a mixture of very abstract theorizing and highly metaphorical . . . language” (108). The resulting mixture offers shaky support for a construction.

DAVID B. BURRELL, C.S.C.
University of Notre Dame


The leitmotiv of Laats’s argument is that, in the theological debates over the filioque, things are always “more complicated” than they seem (11), because the differences in trinitarian language between Eastern and Western Christianity are only the surface manifestation of fundamental theological differences in pneumatology, christology, revelation, soteriology, grace, creation, and worship. L. suggests that these theological differences are themselves rooted in different religious sensibilities; the Eastern sensibility he labels “ascetical” and the Western “communional” (164). L. prudently refrains from attempting to demonstrate this comprehensive suggestion. Instead he focuses on presenting a technical sketch of two “typical” “representatives” of Eastern and Western trinitarian theologies: the Russian
Orthodox theologian Vladimir Lossky and the Swiss Reformed theologian Karl Barth. The first two parts of the book offer precise and technical analyses of the “intrinsic logic” in Lossky’s and Barth’s respective trinitarian theologies. He succeeds in showing how their theological commitments work in the service of and underlying religious sensibility, even when the price of this service is incoherence and/or inconsistency (68–72; 129–30). In part 3, he offers a detailed comparison of Lossky and Barth, concluding that their doc trines of trinitarian relations reflect “fundamentally different” views of divine and human “personhood,” which in turn illustrate a difference between the “ascetical” and “communal” religious sensibility (152, 156).

Although L.‘s analyses of these authors sparkle with nuanced insights and scholarly sophistication, his binary typology of ascetical and communal risks oversimplifying a complex issue. Seemingly aware of this danger, he qualifies his project accordingly. He frames his study as a general heuristic that helps us avoid common “stereotypes” about the differences between East and West while also allowing us to take “a small step to mutual understanding between the two branches of Christianity” (12–13).

KEVIN MONGRAIN
St. Mary’s University, San Antonio


This is an important book. It goes straight to the heart of the “one quest,” soul-making, the spiritual domain John Hick recently called the fifth dimension. Salvation, redemption—soul-making, in other words—is God’s work, and if we can sometimes feel the transcendent, beyond our cognition and volition to master, it would be impossible to overvalue this experience. It is the meaning and value, the truth and worth, of human life. R. is right on the mark to affirm the affective nature of the feeling of transcendence.


Sherwin’s latest contribution to Jewish ethics consists of eight chapters (plus extensive bibliography) covering key moral questions of our day. Topics range from medical ethics, euthanasia, parent-child relations, cloning and reproductive biotechnology, social welfare, and moral rehabilitation through repentance. As a rabbi/scholar from Judaism’s conservative wing, S. roots his moral perspective in classical Jewish sources, but he is aware of important secular and non-Jewish religious war-
rants for ethical behavior and draws upon them throughout the volume. S.’s tenure as Vice President for Academic Affairs at Chicago’s Spertus Institute of Jewish Studies has always been marked by an irenic spirit. That is visible here.

S. grounds his perspective on particular issues in his understanding of divine revelation. For him understanding God determines how we understand ourselves and our responsibilities as God’s creatures. Theology thus shapes anthropology. S. rejects the view that ethics depends only on individual subjective human criteria. For him, Jewish ethics ultimately rests on four theological assumptions, including God’s existence and the human person’s creation in the image of God. The latter revelation forces us to conclude that certain actions against another person are morally wrong because in the end they constitute an affront to God’s will and God’s person.

Christian ethicists will find this book very useful even if they disagree with some of S.’s judgments on, for example, cloning and euthanasia and his occasional comparative observations about Jewish and Christian ethics. With the increased emphasis on the bonding between Judaism and Christianity during the papacy of John Paul II there is a sense in which Jewish ethics assumes a kind of “internal” resource for Christian ethics. In addition, many of the issues addressed in this book are public issues that cannot be addressed without a measure of interreligious interchange.

S.’s willingness to open some possibilities for a moral evaluation of abortion, cloning, and gene therapy will raise some eyebrows in Catholic circles. But his views must be considered, since they are all based on classical Jewish thought. His contention that messianism makes Jewish and Christian ethics quite distinct (especially his application of this thesis to the bishops’ Pastoral on the Economy) deserves a stiff challenge, but overall this an important and well-written volume that deserves serious attention from Christian ethicists.

JOHN T. PAWLIKOWSKI, O.S.M.
Catholic Theological Union, Washington


This volume is a unique and timely contribution to some well combed-over territory. While there are already numerous accounts, from left and right wings, of how markets enact or fail to achieve Christian principles such as liberty and social responsibility, S. chooses to evaluate the effects of markets primarily in terms of theological anthropology. His major concern is to trace the challenges to human identity that arise within the context of a market society such as our current globalized order.

The initial question, “Who are we now?” leads S. to investigate the topics of “consumption, paid employment, the relationships of trading in the market and the global economy” as “the four elements which define human identity today in the market world” (4). His middle chapters take up each of these phenomena in turn. Each treatment is reliable and occasionally original in its insights, but readers might find the sweeping reviews of the relevant literature somewhat belabored.

More likely to raise eyebrows are S.’s opening and closing chapters. Beginning the volume with an 80-page essay mining the work of Habermas on the shape of the human condition in late modernity is less than completely helpful, as subsequent parts of the book seldom re-engage this material. S. rightly decides to include some material documenting the response of Christian churches to contemporary market realities, but the final chapter devoted to this task is unsatisfying. Although this chapter consists primarily of an appreciative analysis of Vatican and U.S. Catholic bishops’ documents during the interval 1985–1991, it goes only part of the way toward correcting a tendency in this volume unduly to emphasize the contributions of British figures and commentators.

Despite its several flaws, this work is valuable in holding up a balanced and original set of concerns that readers may use in conducting their own evalu-

Vatican II’s assertion that the eucharistic presence of Christ inheres in the proclaimed word as well as in the sacramental elements is by now fairly common knowledge among educated Catholics. Nevertheless, how Christ’s “presence in word expresses itself and how our actions at the table or font fulfill its proclamation remain ambiguous for most of us” (xiv).

Janowiak seeks to elucidate the sacramentality of proclamation by exploring an understanding of “proclamation and preaching as an event rather than a closed text” (xiv). He argues throughout that proclamation must be understood as essentially ecclesial, relational, and dynamic. After reviewing the contributions of Semmelroth, Rahner, and Schillebeeckx to Vatican II’s ecclesial understanding of sacraments, J. moves his discussion beyond “comfortable theological boundaries” (17) with a turn to contemporary literary theory.

Insights derived from the “New Historicism” and from reader-response criticism occupy the core of the book and constitute its most original contribution. The concepts and methods of postmodern literary theory, however, are difficult to digest in condensed, summary form despite the considerable skill of the author. Still, he makes a persuasive case for the usefulness of such theory as a dialogue partner with theology. Particularly exciting is the suggestion that the tension between proclamation as a here-and-now “cultural production” and the “mysteriously enduring capacity of texts” to move contemporary audiences” (105) is a locus for the operation of grace. “The solidity of the pulpit and the normativity of the book within the liturgical celebration furnish an acceptable boundary to play [in the cultural production which is proclamation] with new configurations of ecclesial structure and meaning” (114).

This is a dense and ambitious work which covers much challenging ground despite its brevity. Its primary audience will be professional liturgists and theologians of the word, but even they might find it challenging. It is, however, rich and thought-provoking as it highlights and makes great strides toward accounting for the mysterious transformative power of the word.

DANIEL M. RUFF, S.J.
Loyola College in Maryland


Senn, a leading Lutheran liturgical scholar, takes his cue from Alexander Schmemann and regards the liturgical ordo, that is, the unchanging basic structure common to Christian liturgy through the centuries, as normative for the Church’s faith. Simply put, lex orandi is lex credendi. Because for S. the liturgies of almost all Christian denominations share a common structure and so a common underlying faith, there is but one Church, and it is visible as Church only in its liturgical assemblies (44–45), each of which celebrates the faith within its particular historical tradition as its own enculturated manner of living the Christian life (e.g., Roman rite, Lutheran rite, etc.) (8). Accordingly, S. sets out to convey “a sense of how liturgy expresses meanings” about God, Christ, Christian community, creation, the unredeemed world, and worship (xiv). He applies insights drawn from these areas to liturgical hospitality, culture, evangelism, and prayer and ends with reflections on liturgy’s relationship to life.

Convinced that the liturgy is the sole source of theology (6), S. is wonderfully ecumenical, opening the reader’s mind and heart to God’s revelation in liturgical practices across all the major Christian traditions. At the same time, given that liturgy as “primary theology” is typological and symbolic, more suggestive
than probative, this reviewer—in line with Maxwell Johnson’s 1993 critique of Schmemann—fails to see how liturgy could ever be interpreted adequately independent of other denominational expressions of faith. S. himself seems to recognize the existence of ecclesial manifestations outside the liturgy (e.g., “the bishop serves as the personal embodiment of the church’s unity,” 56).

New Creation throughout is a work of broad scholarly erudition and deep pastoral concern. Its analysis of the roles of music and silence in the liturgy, its plea for traditional liturgy in the face of a rootless culture, and its recommendations for an architecture that best serves the liturgical assembly are especially outstanding. I highly recommend it for anyone interested in Christian liturgy and ecumenism.

John D. Laurance, S.J.
Marquette University, Milwaukee


On Holy Saturday the Church keeps vigil, waiting in hope for the dawn of new life through its risen Lord. Zagano’s aptly titled work addresses a Church waiting in hope for a renewed vision and understanding of ordained ministry for women. This carefully researched, well documented, and clearly written work presents a persuasive argument for the restoration of the female diaconate in the Catholic Church.

Part 1 establishes the purpose of the work as an “attempt to expand what Pope John Paul II has called for: a deeper and more meaningful ‘feminine participation in every way in [the Church’s] internal life’” (1). Pointing to the contemporary experience of the Church in which both hierarchy and laity have ratified the ministry of women, Z. contends that women must be formally integrated into public ministry and that therefore the Church must formalize their ministry.

Part 2 addresses the issues attendant to the restoration of the female diaconate. The seriousness of Z.’s work is seen in her discerning use of the best scholarship as well as in her ability to bring these disciplines into dialogue with one another. Her careful tracing of the tradition of diaconal service rendered by women throughout the Church’s history makes the work required reading for anyone interested in the development of ecclesial ministry.

Following upon Z.’s comprehensive argument, part 3 focuses on the ordination of women from within the ecumenical context, demonstrating that the hierarchical Church already implicitly recognizes the validity of diaconal ordination of women in the Eastern Churches. She concludes that as the ordination of women was once possible, so it is possible again based on the needs of the whole Church.

By eschewing the question of presbyteral ordination and focusing on diaconal ordination, Z. both furthers the discussion of the ministry of women in the Church and makes a valuable contribution to our understanding of the permanent diaconate (for men and women). Thus she provides an essential piece of the ministry puzzle being worked out in the Church today. Her study invites further research into the restoration of the female diaconate and continued discussion on every level of Church life.

Joseph E. Weiss, S.J.
Institute for Church Life, University of Notre Dame


A number of excellent books about the ministry of spiritual direction are presently available, but Ruffing’s subtitle suggests what makes her book significantly different. Some of the chapters offer topics that one encounters in these other publications (e.g., “sorting out our desires,” “resistance”), but the level at which R. approaches these themes will assist directors who are trying to accompany seekers of God who are beyond the initial steps in their re-
relationship with the holy Mystery. The chapters that treat love mysticism and mutuality between God and the individual, however, offer the most salient help to directors relating to directees whom God is inviting to profound relationship in which God’s longing for the individual is absolutely primary.

R. draws on psychology, feminist thought, and pre-Reformation mysticism to explore the mutual indwelling of God and the person, with good attention to possible gender differences. A particularly fine contribution is the highlighting, with the aid of theologians such as Rahner, Schillebeeckx, and Dreyer, of major theological themes that can arise in direction. The author intends thereby to offset the overly narrow focus on experience in some approaches to this ministry.

This slim volume ought to be read by anyone seriously engaged in the ministry of spiritual direction. The overall effect is to alert the reader to the kind of growth God brings about in persons who for a number of years have dedicated themselves to prayer and prayerful cooperation with the God who labors in our world. R. shows how directors might be missing clues in the narratives the directee is sharing because of the director’s own ambivalences and hesitations about deep intimacy with the all-holy God.

BRIAN O. MCDERMOTT, S.J.
Georgetown University


Although Benz, an astrophysicist at the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology, writes a book of theological reflections about the origin and end of the cosmos, in places it has the character of a literary work. His main thesis is that science and theology are independent but cover the same reality. “I proceed in this book from the assumption that faith and science are two different approaches to experiencing reality” (15). Using Kierkegaardian language, he proposes that science perceives reality with measurements and observations; by contrast religion uses “mystical perception” and participatory knowing.

In suggesting that the book often has a literary thrust, I do not want to give the impression that it contains little of value for the general reader. I learned much from B.’s accessible yet sophisticated scientific accounts of the evolution of the cosmos, his scientific scenarios of the demise of the universe, and his fresh account of evolutionary biology. Here B. is clearly comfortable with this material. But when he moves to theological reflections, his theories become slippery at best. He sees “patterns” of similarity between the death and Resurrection of Christ and the death and emergence of new forms of life in the evolutionary process. The book contains some wonderful and creative re-readings of well-known biblical passages. For example, B. crafts a long and elegant variation of Psalm 19 in the language of modern astrophysics. Read for its poetic meditation, the book is inspiring and creative. But I do not recommend it to those looking for a rigorous analysis of theology and modern astrophysics and biological evolution. They would do better to consult works by John Polkinghorne, Arthur Peacocke, and Robert John Russell. I do, however, recommend the book to those looking for some creative and poetic meditations on the Christ event and the evolution of the cosmos and life.

EUGENE E. SELK
Creighton University, Omaha


“I have argued that meaning-making is the first priority of the cortex. It works like a factory that combines several cognitive systems and programs to make sense of the world each person encounters” (45). Thus the first line of chapter 4, “Religious Education as Model Building.” From these sentences one can correctly infer that the episte-
mology Larsen subscribes to is both Aristotelian/Thomistic and mechanistic, relying heavily on Piaget and Jaynes. It is not until chapter 7. “Metaphor and Understanding,” that L. moves from using the history of humankind’s learning about the divine to examining how people today learn about God.

L.’s citations and bibliography indicate a broad range of reading and studying different systems of epistemology. His biological references are books of the 1980’s, and his theological and religious education references are to Protestant authors who are authorities in their fields. He uses a pilgrimage model to show how this theory of education fits into an understanding of God (142-47).

Useful throughout the text are the many charts (over 25) and line drawings which explicate his ideas. In fact, one might do well to concentrate on these and read the text when something in the chart is not immediately clear. His emphasis in the second half of the book is on mutuality, friends, and teams as vehicles for learning about God and for enhancing congregational life. Throughout the book L. emphasizes the relation between image and sight and the context of each.

It was not clear to this reader who the intended audience was. Without an experiential knowledge of parish or congregation the reader might not see the depths of insight expressed in the text. Without the interest in the biological backdrop to learning the reader might not make it through the first 5 chapters. Some might find a factory model offensive (although the model does work, given L.’s anthropological assumptions). The book is not a textbook but a reflection on what the author has learned and experienced through 30 years of pastoral ministry. This in itself should make it useful to workers in both the classroom and the ministry.

GAILE M. POHLHAUS
Villanova University, Villanova, Penn.

BOOKS RECEIVED

SCRIPTURAL STUDIES


**HISTORICAL**


Keller, Rosemary Skinner, and Rosemary


Oommen, T. K., and Hunter P. Mabry. *The


SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY


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