BOOK REVIEWS


McNutt provides a careful and well-balanced synthesis of recent reconstructions of the social and cultural contexts, including a helpful overview of the social and political institutions and organizations of ancient Israel from its earliest origin (the settlement period) to the Persian period. She employs theories and models from such disciplines as anthropology, sociology, and social history to interpret the latest archeological information and the recent findings on demography and settlement patterns to reconstruct the society of ancient Israel. M. uses biblical and extrabiblical literary sources cautiously and sparingly, arguing that they are primarily “mythic” in nature and that they “yield very selective kinds of information, are often ambivalent, sometimes making conflicting claims, and are sometimes simply unbelievable” (10). Surprisingly, however, she still uses the chronological scheme of the Hebrew Bible to organize her book: namely, the conquest and settlement in Joshua (chap. 2: “Iron Age I: the Origin of Ancient ‘Israel’”), the period of the judges in Judges (chap. 3: “Iron Age IA and B: The ‘Tribal’ Period”), the triumph of the Davidic monarchy in the book of Samuel (chap. 4: “Iron Age IC: The Rise of Monarchy”), the rule of the Davidic dynasty in the book of Kings (chap. 5: “Iron Age II: The Period of the Monarchy”), the exile and the Persian dominance in Chronicles-Ezra-Nehemiah (chap. 6: “The Babylonian and Persian Periods”). She does not explore other possible schemes (periodizations) that might fit the ancient information better.

One of the shortcomings of the book is the space given to the issue of religion—a scant 11 pages. Given that the religious institution often played a significant role in ancient societies, a reconstruction of ancient Israelite society that does not give enough attention to religion is a serious drawback.

In 1986 J. Maxwell Miller’s and John H. Hayes’s A History of Ancient Israel and Judah appeared. At the annual meeting of the Society of Biblical Literature that November, a panel of scholars discussed it; the proceedings appeared in the Journal for the Study of the Old Testament 39 (1987) 3–63. One of the strongest criticisms leveled at Miller and Hayes was their lack of attention to sociological and anthropological methods in their reconstruction of Israel’s history. M. was one of the panelists.

It is, therefore, encouraging to see that M. has produced a work that takes seriously the call for using social-scientific approaches in the reconstruction of ancient Israelite society. Since the current standard histories of ancient Israel (e.g., Noth, Bright, Miller-Hayes, Soggin, and Ahlström) are almost entirely focused on political history, M.’s volume serves as an im-

In this important work, Dale Patrick draws on the speech act theories of J. L. Austin to argue for a fresh understanding of the biblical view of revelation. For P., the Bible’s divine utterances are actions by which God does something rather than merely informational statements about God’s nature. Moving beyond Austin’s dominant illocutionary focus, P. further sees biblical speech acts as “transactions” that mandate specific obligations and attitudes for both speaker and addressee. As such, “the knowledge of God divulged in revelations would be of the divine party to the relationship and of [the people] as a party under God’s authority” (16). For P., the transactional character of these divine utterances requires an attention to their rhetoric, which he sees as the “means by which a text establishes and manages its relationship to its audience in order to achieve a particular effect” (6).

The body of the book is devoted to an analysis of the performative characteristics and rhetorical arguments of some of the most significant biblical passages of divine revelation. These include the call of Moses, the revelation on Mount Sinai (with a separate chapter on the implications of the first commandment), and an example of judgment prophecy (Amos). The revelation that takes place in these texts occurs in the divine speech acts of promising, commanding, and judging that are found there. While God has the power to perform such actions, the latter become completely effective only when their addressees acknowledge the claims they make on their lives. It is in this transaction that revelation occurs, and it is to the establishment of this transactional relationship that these texts employ their considerable rhetorical skills.

Much of P.’s analysis is a consideration of the way divine utterances function as speech acts “within” his chosen texts—that is to say, in the literary context of the relationships between the characters. In this part of his work, P. provides the reader with informed and theologically sensitive treatments of the texts in question, especially those of a narrative nature, such as the call of Moses and the theophany on Mount Sinai. P., however, moves beyond this intratextual analysis to a consideration of the ways in which these texts’ divine utterances function as performative speech acts for their audience. This aspect of P.’s work is especially noteworthy, since it is here that he argues most directly for the text’s continuing ability to function as revelation.
In P.’s view, it is the performative aspects of the Exodus account (especially the mandated use of the divine name in Exodus 3:15 and the similarly mandated ritual reenactment of the Passover in Exodus 12–13) that work to incorporate the audience into “the people whose Lord is a God of promise” (40). In a similar way, the text’s audience is addressed by the Ten Commandments and brought into the exclusive relationship with God stipulated by the first commandment. In the case of Amos, the oracles that delivered a guilty verdict to the prophet’s original addressees have now become a call to repentance for a later audience situated between the judgment Amos predicted (and the more complete exile that followed) and a future restoration.

In all of this, P. has clearly opened up significant new territory that will need to be explored at length by other scholars and, one hopes, by the author himself. The need for further exploration is perhaps especially keen in the case of the prophetic material. P. has noted that his analysis of Amos differs from his analysis of other texts in that the performative relationship between the world of this text and that of its later audience is not as clearly specified in the text. One may also note that, while P. works with the final form of the biblical text throughout his chapters on the narrative and legal material, he works mostly with what he isolates as the original prophetic oracles in his chapter on Amos. How judgment oracles directed to an original audience now function in a prophetic book’s final form would seem to be even more of an issue for other prophetic books that are less uniformly judgment oriented than Amos.

P. concludes his work with a penultimate chapter that briefly analyzes the collective laments over the exile and a final chapter that examines the larger implications of his textual analysis. While certainly suggestive, the former chapter is too abbreviated to do more than hint at future possibilities. In the latter chapter, P. nicely engages such authors as Wolterstorff, Evans, and Kierkegaard to argue in a more theoretical way for his proposed model of revelation.

This book’s particular strength lies in its ability to maintain a fruitful dialogue between the specifics of particular biblical texts and more general philosophical and hermeneutical perspectives. It deserves a wide audience among both biblical scholars and theologians interested in fundamental questions of revelation.

Fordham University, New York

HARRY P. NASUTI


As one of the world’s foremost biblical scholars, Schüssler Fiorenza needs no introduction. Few scholars match the breadth of her interests or the depth of her analysis. Vital hermeneutical and methodological interests and concerns, raised by ideology criticism and feminist theory, infuse her
work. Distinctive to this book, however, is the direct ethical question she raises in relation to how biblical scholars do their job. “I propose,” she writes, “a fundamental change in how we understand and employ the biblical text, based on a critical understanding of language as a form of power. I ask readers to re-envision biblical studies as a theory and practice of justice. I ask biblical scholars to contribute, as critical transformative intellectuals, to claiming the power of the word for those engaged in global struggles for justice and well-being” (ix).

The book’s genesis, according to the author, was her presidential address (“The Ethics of Biblical Interpretation: Decentering Biblical Scholarship”) to the Society of Biblical Literature in 1987, published the following year in the *Journal of Biblical Literature* and reprinted as chapter 1 of this book. In a brilliant review of previously delivered presidential addresses calling for responsible public engagement, S. urged the guild to become a “significant participant in the global discourse seeking justice and well-being for all” (30). But the paradigm shift S. argued for then—from “scientistic”-positivist to rhetorical-ethical—has gained little ground over the past ten years. Chapter 2 on “Changing the Paradigms: The Ethos of Biblical Studies” persuasively explains why the old paradigm retains its power while neglecting what Krister Stendahl called the “public health” aspect of biblical interpretation. In one of the best chapters of the book, S. elaborates on a complex interactive model of a critical interpretation for liberation involving at least six “moves” or “turns” beginning with a hermeneutics of experience and social location. What becomes clear as S. unfolds six hermeneutical “turns” is how inviting, engaging, and liberating the process of interpreting biblical texts can be—in contrast to what she names as either a dogmatist, historical-scientistic or culturally relativist paradigm.

S. continues her argument for a paradigm shift in biblical studies by addressing in chapter 3 the particular challenges posed to traditional scholarship by hermeneutic theory, politics as the exercise of power, ideology criticism, ethics, and, most importantly, the feminist ethic of inquiry. She concludes by outlining eight rhetorical principles and strategies necessary for reconceptualizing biblical studies as a critical practice that can speak to issues of domination and freedom in a cosmopolitan world (80–81). Further analysis of a rhetoric of inquiry appears in chapter 4 with an especially insightful discussion of “a feminist rhetoric” in relation to rhetorical criticism’s “half-turn” and concludes part 1 on “Theoretical Explorations.”

Part 2 on “Rhetorical Practices” consists of four more chapters, all papers presented at conferences or published previously that use rhetorical analysis to focus on Pauline texts and theology. None presents a close reading of texts. Rather they engage broadly the exegetical work of other biblical scholars—sometimes to contest their reading of her own writings—in order to advance the cause of a paradigm shift she sees as dramatically changing or “decentering” biblical scholarship. Chapter 5 discusses the rhetorical situation and historical reconstruction of 1 Corinthians while chapter 7 reconsiders Galatians 3:28. Chapter 6 is a defense of feminist efforts to write women back into history by analyzing the rhetorical nature
of all historical knowledge (e.g., through the dualistic formulations of Paul’s theology). The final chapter proposes that biblical theology be developed as a theological rhetoric of inquiry and a politics of meaning. “Theology,” she writes, “is best understood not as a system but as a rhetorical practice that does not conceive of language merely as signification and transmission, but rather as a form of action and power that affects actual people and situations” (176). An appendix offers 13 theses on the ethics of interpretation (195–98).

Nothing written in this book is trivial or incidental. One would hope that it would generate heated discussions, vigorous debates, and lively exchanges among biblical scholars everywhere. Much remains to be said and worked out, but here at least is a carefully argued, courageous, and sustained call for biblical scholars to take a long, hard look at themselves, at what they do and why, and ask whether they are facing up to their ethical responsibilities in today’s world.

Seattle University

Karen A. Barta


Of notable treatments of the social history of early Christianity, none have the breadth and detail of this volume. The work surveys the socio-economic aspects of the movement associated with Jesus in the land of Israel and the urban communities of Christ-confessors outside of Israel in the first century C.E. The Stegemann brothers use a social scientific approach: at a macro-level they use Lenski’s model of “advanced agrarian societies” (2–3); at a micro-level, they use social scientific models to address specific issues, typically by presenting the ancient evidence first and then considering which sociological model best interprets the evidence.

The material is organized into four independent but related parts. Part 1 presents an overview of the economy and social structures of the first century C.E. Roman Empire. Chapter 1 analyzes the empire as an advanced agrarian society. Chapter 2 offers specific data on the most vital information about the economy of the empire—often with helpful tables. Chapter 3 divides Roman society into an upper and lower stratum with gradations in each: the upper includes the ordines and ruling families, the wealthy, and their retainers; the lower incorporates the relatively and the absolutely poor.

Part 2 applies these constructs to the Jesus movement within Israel. Chapters 4–6 describe in turn the conditions in Israel by sketching the economy, the social developments in the upper and lower strata throughout the Hellenistic and Roman periods, and the religious perspectives. Deviant theory then situates religious groups within the social strata of Israel. The treatment is an excellent overview of recent analyses of move-
ments within Second Temple Judaism. Chapters 7 and 8 explore the Jesus
movement in three segments: the movement proper, the Jerusalem Church,
and the Messianic churches after 70 C.E. The authors cogently argue that
the Jesus movement was a deviant group within Judaism that sprang from
the lower rural stratum. After the death of Jesus the charisma that charac-
terized his movement became depersonalized and eventually institution-
alized. The later communities are then sketched on the basis of Matthew
and John by arguing—implausibly—that the Sitz im Leben for these Gos-
pels was Israel (223–27).

Part 3 covers the Christ-confessing communities in the cities of the em-
pire. The authors suggest that these communities deserve separate treat-
ment because they differ from the Jesus movement in Israel in numerous
ways, especially in their relationships to non-Jews. Chapter 9 explores the
nature and characteristics of the communities as urban ecclesiae. The as-
sumption, that members of Christ-confessing communities in the Diaspora
had unrestricted access to non-Jews while those in Israel did not, is invalid.
It may have been true for Jerusalem, but not for Caesarea. Chapter 10
surveys the social level of early Christians in these communities and con-
cludes that the membership consisted mostly of members from the “better
placed urban lower stratum” (314), a few local elites, and a significant
number of retainers from the upper stratum. Chapter 11 tackles the issue
of conflicts, employing deviance theory to explain the conflicts with Gen-
tiles and conflict theory to explain the conflicts with Diaspora synagogues.
This analysis is particularly helpful for its sensitivity to both the historical
data and Jewish-Christian relations.

Part 4 takes up the place of women in the movement. The decision to
include women is not simply a bow to contemporary concerns; gender was
(and remains) a critical factor in social status. However, one wonders why
there is not a corresponding section on slaves. The analysis is far from
complete, but fair in a survey. Chapter 12 reliably situates women in their
spheres and social strata. For example, the authors correctly point out that
the roles of women in public were not uniform throughout the Mediterra-
nean basin. Chapter 13 examines the evidence for women who were asso-
ciated with Jesus in Israel, and Chapter 14 summarizes the evidence for
their roles in the urban Christian communities outside Israel.

This work demonstrates how social theory and historical investigation
can be combined. The success of the work is due largely to the astute
application of the inductive approach: the argument runs from data to
theories. Readers should not expect to agree on individual points—even
some that are important—in a work of this scope. Readers should also not
expect to discover new material: the work is a synthesis of current scholar-
ship and, as such, succeeds well. I will recommend it to advanced stu-
dents, confident that it will give them a reliable introduction to the field
from a centrist perspective. The work deserves wide reading.

Hebrew University of Jerusalem

GREGORY E. STERLING
Henn, professor of ecclesiology at the Pontifical Gregorian University, describes his book as a “brief history” or a “historical overview” of the relationship between the pope and the bishops. The first question one might ask is how does this differ from a history of the papacy such as Klaus Schatz’s Papal Primacy: From Its Origins to the Present? The latter shows that one can hardly write a history of the papacy without its being also a history of the relationship between the pope and the bishops. In an earlier volume of this series, Papal Primacy and the Episcopate: Towards a Relational Understanding, Michael Buckley argued that papal primacy and the episcopate both belong to the category of relation, and that they are essentially related to one another. A history of papal primacy will necessarily consist largely of the interplay between claims made by popes to authority over other bishops and the responses given by bishops to those claims.

In view of these facts, it is not surprising that, having read Schatz’s book, my first impression on reading H.’s book was that it is simply a briefer treatment of the same material. Inevitably, a great deal of the historical material is the same. However, a more careful reading has shown that H. has focussed his attention on the relationship between the pope and the bishops in such a way that he does make a unique contribution to the question.

In his discussion of the pre-Nicene period, H. rightly dwells on the complex relations between Cyprian of Carthage and the Roman bishop Stephen, who attempted to oblige other bishops to follow the Roman tradition of recognizing the validity of baptism conferred outside the Catholic Church. H. notes that while Cyprian insisted that baptism by heretics was invalid and strongly resisted the effort of Stephen to impose the Roman view, it is unclear to what extent they were formally out of communion before both met death by martyrdom. On the other hand, H. points out that letters written by Cyprian regarding problems in churches of Spain and Gaul show that he recognized that the bishop of Rome had a certain responsibility to intervene in the affairs of those churches.

In summing up his treatment of the relation between the bishops of Rome and the ecumenical councils of the first millennium, H. notes that it was in response to requests from the divided Eastern bishops that the bishops of Rome exercised their responsibility to promote unity. At the same time, he might have paid more attention to the fact that while the bishops at Ephesus, Chalcedon, Constantinople III, and Nicaea II welcomed the doctrinal judgments of the popes and eventually confirmed them, they insisted that they must first study them in the light of Scripture and tradition before coming to the conciliar decision that would settle the issue.

A development early in the second millennium that affected the relation
between popes and bishops, but to which H. pays surprisingly little attention, is the break between East and West, which meant that the West would lack the distinct kind of relationship that had existed between the popes and the Eastern bishops during centuries of communion between them. H. follows the ups and downs that characterized the relations between popes and Western bishops from the Gregorian Reform, through the crisis of conciliarism, the triumph of papalism, the Councils of Trent, Vatican I, and Vatican II. He takes special care to stress that the opinion that jurisdiction flowed from the pope to the bishops was never formally adopted as official Catholic doctrine by any of the Western councils.

In sum, while one does not find a great deal of history here that is not found in Schatz’s book, one does find a special focus that makes this book also worth reading.

Boston College

FRANCIS A. SULLIVAN, S.J.


Phillip Cary begins his fascinating study with a definition of the concept of inner self: “The inner space is a dimension or level of being belonging specifically to the soul, distinct from the being of God above it (and within it) and from the world of bodies outside it (and below it). It . . . can contain things: things are found and seen there, as well as lost and hidden there” (4). He argues that, although building blocks of Augustine’s construction were drawn from Plato, Cicero, and Plotinus, the concept of a private inner space was invented by Augustine. The book’s aim is to “watch the concept of private inner self as it is under construction: to discern its Platonist philosophical foundations, its Christian theological connections, its memorable metaphorical texture, and the motives that led to its being constructed in the first place” (3). The problem that prompted Augustine’s construction was “how to locate God within the soul without affirming the divinity of the soul” (140). His solution was to adapt Plotinus’s advocacy of interiority by adding to the inward turn a turn upward—“in, then up” (39).

C. destabilizes several standard interpretations of Augustine that will initially make Augustine scholars uneasy. Working primarily with Augustine’s early writings, for example, C. emphasizes Augustine’s “idiosyncratic commitment to divine intelligibility,” a commitment that makes him “the last [Christian] in West or East to believe that the substance of God is intelligible” (55). Charles Norris Cochrane’s justly famous demonstration that Augustine subtly but decisively undermined classical loyalty to reason in favor of the will as the voice of thought and feeling will need some revision if C.’s thesis convinces. Moreover, working with Augustine’s writings before c. 400 C.E., C. insists that “Augustine’s Platonism grew in tandem with his Christian orthodoxy,” so that the familiar picture of the early dialogues as influenced by a Neoplatonism progressively outgrown as
Augustine’s theology developed is historically misinformed. Indeed, C. states, we “find far more Neoplatonism in the Confessions than in the Cassiciacum dialogues” (35). Finally, those who think of Neoplatonism and Christianity as radically dissonant will not be reassured by C.’s demonstration of the increasing sophistication of Augustine’s understanding of Plotinus at the same time that his knowledge of Scripture and loyalty to the teachings of the Church also advanced.

Readers of this book are best served by keeping firmly in mind that C. does not attempt to analyze the mature Augustine’s writings. Never clearly stated, this is easy to forget. To read the mature Augustine for his emphases and the quality of his attention rather than primarily for proof texts is to grasp his increasing affection for Christ’s flesh as well as for human bodies in all their touching vulnerability and beauty. Book 22 of the City of God carries Augustine’s esteem for body to the point of asserting that in the resurrection the bodily eyes will see God. Even within the Confessions, however, Augustine offers two epistemologies for gaining knowledge of God. The alternative to the inward turn for the one who seeks knowledge of God is to seek, in the beauty of God’s creation, evidence of the “beauty so old and so new” (Confessions 10.6, 27). In his later works Augustine describes an inductive process by which a person can gather evidence of God from visible objects—mountains, fields, houses, and people’s faces. After gathering evidence from “this good and that good; take away this and that, and see good itself, if you can; thus you will see God who is good not by another good, but is the good of every good” (De Trinitate 7.3.4, my emphases).

C.’s book is engagingly written, well-documented, and persuasively argued. The excessively small print—for which the author cannot be blamed—fatigues the eyes despite the mind’s eagerness to read on.

Though C. professes from the first that he intends to caution readers against accepting Augustine’s turn to the inner (on grounds that it neglects the strong implications for Christians of Christ’s flesh), he treats his texts carefully and respectfully, without the animus of an antagonist. He communicates to the reader his fascination with how it worked rather than with criticizing it. The book is a must read for students of Augustine, for it provides an appropriate increment of complexity to the interpretation of a very complex human being and author.

Graduate Theological Union, Berkeley

MARGARET R. MILES


In this important study Berman challenges the traditional understanding of the growth of the Cistercian order in 12th-century France, namely, that the monastery of Citeaux was founded in 1098 with Stephen Harding
among its first members; in 1109 Harding became abbot; Bernard entered Citeaux with other members of his family in 1113, only to leave two years later to found a daughter house at Clairvaux; in 1119 Pope Callistus II confirmed the order’s fundamental document, the Carta Caritatis; in 1132 Pope Innocent II granted the order a privilege exempting it from paying tithes on labor and livestock; in 1134 Stephen Harding died and the order made its first collection of statutes. These developments took place in Burgundy, but by the time of Harding’s death the order had spread to other parts of France, and by the time of Bernard’s death in 1153 there were more than 300 Cistercian houses.

B. denies virtually all of this. Her thesis is simple to state but strenuous to work out. Basically, in the late 12th century the Cistercians created an early history for themselves, partly through a misunderstanding of earlier documents and events and partly through deliberate forgeries. This “invention” of the order was necessary to give the order a pedigree to use against its critics and to justify the order’s frequent overriding of earlier practices in houses that affiliated with it. The invented account claimed that saintly monks spread Cistercian values, and that houses grew up at a rate that only divine support could explain. B. criticizes more than the early Cistercians; she holds modern historians responsible for not examining the medieval documents more carefully.

Much of the book consists of B.’s reevaluation of the sources. These naturally include the documents which she reads with a different historiographical eye, but they also include the manuscripts of the documents, some of which she redates, and the remains of the earliest monasteries, at least those that survived the French Revolution and subsequent disuse. This is clearly the strength of the book.

Basically B. achieves two goals. First, she proves that the documents support a later date for Cistercian expansion—not during the decades when Bernard was still alive but in the second half of the 12th century. She achieves this with paleographical, linguistic, and source analysis. Occasionally she must resort to “it seems likely” or “there is no reason not to think,” but she does not push the evidence too far. She offers many examples that she pursues in depth, such as tracing how a particular family made a donation to a particular monastery. At the end of the book she offers a new chronology, placed side by side with the traditional one.

Second, she demonstrates from the documents that many French houses, especially in the south, became Cistercian because the order offered a variety of very specific benefits—better organization, more effective management (thus greater revenues), and protection against the encroachment of the local bishop. Again, she is careful to support her claims.

Her approach in reaching this goal, however, is precisely what weakens the book. She never treats the spiritual concerns of the monks, neither of the Cistercians nor of those in the houses that affiliated with them. All the monks appear one dimensional, interested only in efficiency and in the secular welfare and power of the abbey. Was there no spiritual attraction? Did not Cistercian spirituality explain any of the order’s appeal? The
reader—or at least the reader who believes that monks take the spiritual life seriously—comes away wondering why these monks even entered religious life.

In her Preface, Berman says that her research offended some contemporary Cistercians, and she feels obliged to include this rather tasteless statement: “It is a testimony to the security of academic tenure that a significant rethinking of a major twelfth-century institution was possible in the face of increasing dismay of current-day Trappists and Cistercians, who have found this study both puzzling and threatening” (xvi). Is the reader seriously supposed to believe that the Cistercians could intimidate a tenured professor who teaches at a public institution? Where was an editor to excise this superfluous bit of academic bravado?

Annoying as that is, it should not detract from this book’s considerable achievement.

John Carroll University, Cleveland

JOSEPH F. KELLY


This splendid volume is the product of years of study of Luther’s writings, of thoughtful engagement with the field of Luther studies, and of the historian’s careful contextualization of theological ideas. Without overturning the traditional view of the reformer’s theology Lohse offers insights and evaluations that draw the reader into fresh critical engagement with Luther’s thought.

Rather than opting for either an historical-genetic or systematic analysis of Luther’s theology, L. offers both and demonstrates forcefully how indispensable they are to each other. So, for example, attempts to differentiate sharply between the “young” and the “old” Luther founder on the “considerable consistency and continuity” (8) of thought revealed by his theology as a whole. At the same time one encounters considerable development precipitated by the various conflicts of Luther’s career. L. views Luther through a dual lens: as the polemical pastor immersed in the daily battle of opinions and as a critical theologian whose public engagements emerged from convictions carefully and systematically formulated. On numerous occasions L. reminds the reader to consider the polemical exigencies of the moment in weighing Luther’s (over)statements. Simultaneously, L. insists that, although Luther published no dogmatics like those of Melanchthon or Calvin, he did produce in his various writings a dogmatics in outline. This L. then analyzes and develops in Part 3.

In Part 1, L. presents his methodological reflections and briefly describes the historical developments of import for Luther’s formation as a theologian. These reflections serve as introduction to Part 2 on the historical development of Luther’s thought and are in themselves an invaluable con-
tribution to Luther studies. Beginning with the earliest writings (the Marginal Notes on Augustine and Peter Lombard, the First Psalms Lecture, the Lectures on Romans, Galatians, and Hebrews) L. astutely identifies the distinctive shifts Luther was already making within the theology he inherited. L. then moves through Luther’s career, from the public outbreak of the indulgences controversy and the Peasants’ War to the disputes with Erasmus, Zwingli, the radical reformers, and the antinomians, analyzing the import of each for Luther’s theological development. He notes the sharp articulation in the heat of conflict of themes already present in Luther’s writings. For example, with regard to Luther’s reaction to the Wittenberg radicals, L. cites passages from 1521 to show that “Luther’s view of the authorities was thus not merely a reaction to developments at Wittenberg, but conversely, his attitude toward the Wittenberg reformers not least resulted from a view of the authorities that had already been fixed in its features” (149). At the same time, L. lifts up the crucial changes Luther made in reaction to his experiences. For example, again in reference to developments in Wittenberg, L. writes: In Luther’s “1521 exposition of the Magnificat he could say: ‘No one can correctly understand God or His Word unless he has received such understanding immediately from the Holy Spirit. But no one can receive it from the Holy Spirit without experiencing, proving, and feeling it....’ After his experiences with the Wittenberg reformers Luther was more cautious on the subject. Now he accentuated the necessity of the external Word, as found in Scripture, and which must be preached ever anew” (148). In both his historical and systematic analyses L. is sensitive to the big picture as well as to nuances and occasional motifs. He allows the reader to trace when the concept of law and gospel became dominant for Luther, to appreciate the shift in emphasis from the universal priesthood to the office of ministry, and to interpret these and other doctrines within the indispensable framework of Luther’s eschatology and view of God.

L. forthrightly addresses the most disturbing, indeed notorious, episodes of Luther’s career and their historical legacy. On the charged issues of the Jews and the two-kingdoms doctrine, he emphasizes the particular historical contexts in which Luther acted and wrote. He is scrupulous in judging Luther as a man of his time, recognizing the faults and shortcomings for which he can be held accountable while rejecting ahistorical criticism that disregards the underlying assumptions and limitations of Reformation societies.

This book is an outstanding demonstration of the historical theologian’s craft. It will be of value to a wide audience. Those conversant with Luther studies will be interested to read L.’s evaluation of various interpretive proposals in the field as well as his own judgments on debated questions. Teachers of Reformation history and theology can draw upon its material to suit courses from introductory to advanced levels.

*Pacific Lutheran Theological Seminary, Berkeley*  
*JANE E. STROHL*

Historical theologian John Dillenberger explores the status of religious art amidst the Protestant and Catholic theological debates and conflicts of 16th-century northern and southern Europe. He divides his period of discussion into three parts: 1500 to 1517 (the stirrings of reform to Luther’s Ninety-five Theses); 1517 to 1525/30 (during which time reforming issues such as indulgences, the role of saints, and justification by faith and the Word were debated but still within the context of the Catholic Church); and 1530 to 1570 (the emergence of movements outside the Catholic Church and reform within the Catholic Church).

D. restricts lengthy discussion of artists to seven individuals: six German artists (Matthias Grünewald, Albrecht Dürer, Lucas Cranach the Elder, Hans Holbein the Younger, Hans Baldung-Grien, and Albrecht Altdorfer) represent the artistic-theological developments north of the Alps; but only one artist, Michelangelo, who worked primarily in his native Florence and in Rome, is chosen to represent those same developments south of the Alps. With the complexities of religion, politics, and art in the major regions of 16th-century Italy, inclusion of other artists at work in northern Italian cities such as Venice and Milan would have been helpful.

The chapter on Cranach best displays D.’s considerable grasp of the religious, political, and artistic complexities in 16th-century Germany. He states that Cranach “found his way into the dominating intellectual, cultural, and political elite of his time” (85). Friend of Luther and Melanchthon, court painter to the Elector Frederick the Wise (who was sympathetic to the reformers for both theological and political reasons), and portraitist of Cardinal Albrecht of Brandenburg (a promoter of relics and indulgences), Cranach found himself working in both the world of the Protestant reformers and, until the late 1520s, the world of Catholic patronage. Beginning in the late 1520s, under the growing influence of Luther, Cranach frequently represented the Protestant theme of “Law and Gospel” in his art.

In the final chapter, D. does what the book’s subtitle suggests—he offers a well-articulated survey view of art in the context of the theological debates in 16th-century Europe, as he discusses the differing climates in Germany, France, Switzerland, Italy, England, Scotland, the Netherlands, and Scandinavia. This is a particularly useful chapter for scholars needing a general framework within which to understand the attitudes toward religious art during the Reformation period.

D. concludes by noting that the “wounds of the reformations” continue into the present time. “We are taught to hear, to read, and to think. But with respect to seeing, it is still possible to like what one likes, without having been taught to see. . . . What is needed is a disciplined theory of images, one that like all our sensibilities belongs to our creation and needs to be learned and cultivated” (191). These are valuable insights by one of
the great historical theologians of the Protestant Reformation and one of the pioneering scholars in the area of art and religion.

Saint Louis University

TERRENCE DEMPSEY, S.J.


As his subtitle suggests, McDermott’s topic has two dimensions. The first regards Edwards’s interaction with “Deism,” the 17th- and 18th-century movement to make abstract reason the guardian and arbiter of religious doctrines, claims, and morality. Many have noted Edwards’s sustained criticism of “arminianism,” but few have noted and developed, as M. has, Edwards’s parallel charges against Deism. M.’s thesis here is that Deism posed a more basic threat than Arminianism to Edwards’s understanding of Christian orthodoxy. The “deists were more consistent in their use of the abstract principles that inspired arminians” and others, M. argues. The Arminians used the principles of rationality “to question traditional claims deriving from Scripture, but only the deists attacked the validity of Scripture itself” (19). Interestingly enough, Edwards’s response to Deism is not to reassert the validity of Scripture, or to weed out, à la Barth, supposedly alien concepts from the distinctive Christian witness. Rather, he takes Deism to task for its inadequate portrayal of the rationality and religious impulses of persons unaided by grace. In doing so, Edwards assumes a posture of “critical appropriation” of the Enlightenment; that is, he “adapted Enlightenment presuppositions and spoke in terms best understood by other disciples of the Enlightenment” (10). M.’s summary of this response is concise and powerful. His assessment of Edwards’s estimation of God’s general revelation to unregenerate human nature fills in gaps left uncovered in Norman Fiering’s work of comparative moral philosophy, Jonathan Edwards’s Moral Thought and Its British Context (1981).

The second dimension details the “elaborate scheme” Edwards developed for non-Christian religions on the basis of his understanding of general revelation contra deism, namely, Classical and Chinese philosophy, Judaism, and Islam. Particularly regarding Judaism, M. shows that leading Deists portrayed Judaism as “essentially pagan, unspiritual, unnecessary to Christianity, and in fact the source of all that was wrong with traditional Christianity” (149). Edwards, however, insisted that Judaism “was true religion, if under a veil” (154). Drawing in part on his own Puritan background in covenant theology, Edwards asserted that continuity existed between Judaism and Christianity. The Jewish people had a clear purchase on the truth of God, even if they had committed, in Edwards’s opinion, the “cardinal sin” of denying Jesus’ messianic identity (164). While Edwards was not above private moments of anti-Semitism, and clearly believed in the Christian supersession of Judaism, he “declined the invitation of the
intellectual elites to minimize Christianity’s debt to Judaism.” For, if “Christianity was the logical end to Judaism, its meaning could be found only through Judaism” (165). M.’s evaluation of Edwards’s treatment of Judaism, as well as of the other religions, manages to be at points both sympathetic and unsparing.

Typically, scholarship on Edwards takes three basic approaches. One approach examines the Edwards corpus, looking for passages where he speaks to contested points of doctrine in Reformed theology. Examples of this approach are the works (and respective doctrines) of Conrad Cherry (covenant theology) and Anri Morimoto (soteriology). Another approach interprets Edwards’s writings in the light of current issues in philosophical theology—for example, the works (and respective problematics) of Roland Delattre (esthetics), Sang Hyun Lee (process theology), and Stephen Daniel (postmodernism). Finally, a third approach explores Edwards’s place in history, either in terms of anticipations or in terms of the significance of Edwards’s thought on later generations—for example, the works (and respective focus) of Norman Fiering (historical anticipations) and Joseph Conforti (subsequent cultural significance).

Given this typology, it is hard to place M.’s work on Edwards’s attitude toward “Enlightenment Religion” and “Non-Christian Faiths.” His general topic lies outside those usually covered in the first approach. His treatment of Edwards, which is historical rather than critical or constructive, puts him outside the second approach. And yet, while clearly historical, M.’s study falls outside the normal confines of the third approach and devotes little space to the historical anticipation or significance of Edwards’s thought concerning what is now known as the field of comparative religion. As M. notes, in the colonies, comparative religion was not a burning topic of conversation. This having been said, M.’s book is one of the finest, most sensitive, and well-written works on Edwards available in recent years. Indeed, one gets the impression that M. has gotten Edwards “right.” Edwards’s strength lies not in his ability to advance a theological project, or answer a long-standing philosophical issue, or synthesize and influence the vision of American Christianity—though he does all these. Rather, Edwards is an original and extraordinarily profound thinker whose thought has facets that defy categorization. Quite simply, M. proves that even in areas where we might expect little, Edwards rewards the careful reader richly.

University of the South, Sewanee, Tenn. WILLIAM J. DANAHER, JR.


This book concludes Vecsey’s trilogy on Native American Catholicism. Beginning with a history of church presence on the Pine Ridge Reservation, V. recounts how changing missiologies have generated new confu-
sions within the Native world. Anecdotally reported are the trials and tribulations of people who grapple with religious identity at a time when pressures exist to be Indian or Christian but not both. The final section “scrutinizes” the recent history of the “Tekakwitha Conference” and a series of discussions which took place between Lakota medicine men and Jesuit priests. Unfortunately, V.’s work uses hearsay (sometimes incorrect) information that does not do justice to his scholarly reputation. This review will show other weaknesses that fill the text.

Structurally, the first part is a rehash of topics treated more exhaustively in Ross Alexander Enochs’s *The Jesuit Mission to the Lakota Sioux*. Subsequent chapters appear to lack an organizing principle since they are not always logically ordered and come across as a collection of informational snippets on a variety of subjects. Prepublication readers could have been more discerning since the following examples illustrate flaws that appear to be a leitmotif of this work.

Contrary to what V. reports (39), Black Elk said nothing about a screech owl being his guardian animal. The source cited clearly identifies Ben Marrowbone telling this about someone other than Black Elk. V. also writes that Black Elk was buried with the two-roads map (39), but his source makes no such claim. Editorial oversight compounds this erroneous reportage when one page states that “[Black Elk] is buried with the [pictorial catechism].” Then, two pages later, there appears the redundancy that “Black is buried . . . with the pictorial catechism.”

Although V. suggests otherwise, DeMallie did not report that Black Elk “told one man” that “he had made a mistake in rejecting” his Lakota practices for Christianity (41). Rather significantly, Black Elk’s son, Ben, is the source of this quotation. Furthermore, my own work made it known that Wallace Black Elk was not related, biologically or ideologically, to his namesake. Nonetheless, despite his source even stating that their linkage was fancifully symbolic and not real, V. refers to Wallace as Black Elk’s “putative grandson” (65). Similarly, V.’s failure to bridge his distance from this religious culture is clear when he uses the malapropism of someone being “ordained” a nun (267).

Besides factual errors, readers should know that quotations are likewise questionable. When V. quotes sources, the words in quotation marks are likely to be V.’s reconstruction of statements made in casual conversation (which he notes as an “interview” with so-and-so). Except when he worked from tape recordings, V. relies on his memory of conversations, which he often put in quotation marks and without supplying their original contexts.

Since comments attributed to me bear no resemblance to thoughts I own, I concluded that it was V.’s inaccurate recollection that gave birth to his creative quotation. Thinking that his misrepresentation of me might be an exception, I consulted several others cited in the text, and found each reporting the same experience. V. did not check to see if his paraphrase accurately reflected their thinking.

Observations are unsatisfactory and conclusions unreliable as when, for example, V. writes that I and two others “are no longer to be found at Pine
Ridge—a comment upon the short-lived presence of Jesuit innovators” (56). He implies that our absence is related to innovative, but futile, efforts. He could have easily learned that we no longer work there for reasons that have nothing to do with what he suggests. Similarly, V. used without permission an unpublished biography of Father Francis Craft (present at the Wounded Knee massacre of 1890) and rendered a portrayal of Craft (267–69) that his biographer rejects.

This work does introduce readers to persons and events associated with Native American Catholicism and highlights missiological issues that beg for resolution, but it remains a surface description of the many virtuous Native and non-Native people who dwell within what V. presents as a very dissonant world. Readers do not really meet these people. Unless weaned at the same hearth, an outsider does not fully understand the bonds that tie siblings together during times of woe. V.’s book represents the effort of a nonfamily member making judgments that, because they are inaccurate, might have been better left unsaid.

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Michael F. Steltenkamp, S.J.


In an age when skepticism about truth and objectivity is so prevalent, this is a remarkable book. Marshall offers the hypothesis that for Christians truth and objectivity are basically grounded in their common belief in the doctrines of the Trinity and the Incarnation. He argues that traditional appeals to logical first principles or primitive experiences no longer hold up under careful scrutiny. What should be recognized is that the true foundation for the operation of rationality in human beings is a network of beliefs or a belief-system. For Christians, this belief-system is grounded in the basic presuppositions of the eucharistic liturgy and the sacramental life of the Church, both of which implicitly testify to Christian belief that Jesus is both divine and human and, therefore, that the one God exists as three persons, each with a distinctive role to play in the economy of salvation. This is not to say, of course, that all other beliefs, both religious and secular, are deducible from these two foundational beliefs of the Christian life, but only that all other beliefs cannot exist in blatant contradiction to them. That is, only if Christians someday find themselves in massive disagreement with non-Christian friends and neighbors in terms of their opposing worldviews, should they logically ask themselves whether their belief in the doctrines of the Trinity and the Incarnation is still justified. But, short of that compelling evidence to the contrary, Christians have a perfect
right to think in terms of a trinitarian and incarnational worldview, to organize their personal lives and dealings with others in terms of these two basic Christian beliefs.

By his own admission, M. depends heavily on the thought of George Lindbeck in *The Nature of Doctrine* and acknowledges the influence of Thomas Aquinas, especially of his commentary on the Gospel of John. At the same time, he distances himself from those Christians who seek to justify basic Christian beliefs in terms of modern secular notions of truth and epistemic justification since what results is, in his judgment, often “the worst of both worlds” (4), i.e., neither full compliance with secular standards of epistemic justification nor complete fidelity to traditional Christian belief and liturgical praxis. Appeals to personal religious experience (Friedrich Schleiermacher), for example, or to authoritative church teaching as the necessary “categorial” expression of “transcendental” religious experiences (Karl Rahner), or to universally valid rational criteria of truth (Schubert Ogden), all collapse under careful scrutiny by linguistic philosophers like Donald Davidson who claims that in the end “nothing can count as a reason for holding a belief except another belief” (88 n. 21). M.’s own position is, however, not simply a coherence theory of truth without reference to extramental reality. For, as he explains in chapters 8 and 9, the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, who ultimately guarantee for Christians the truth of their belief in Jesus Christ as both divine and human, will at the same time bring it about that nonreligious beliefs of Christians about the created world are likewise for the most part true. Otherwise, the network of beliefs constituting the Christian worldview would be seen as manifestly false in the eyes of believers and nonbelievers alike. Truth, then, for Christians is not only personal but a person, the person of Jesus Christ who is for them “the way, the truth and the life” (John 14:6).

To someone not well acquainted with the thought of W. V. Quine, Davidson, and Michael Dummett, the argument of this book is in many places difficult to follow. But summary paragraphs at strategic intervals were very helpful. What especially kept me reading, however, was the extraordinarily challenging character of the author’s basic hypothesis. There is, to be sure, a circularity of thinking at work here. But it may be a benign rather than a vicious circle. That is, perhaps the only way to avoid, on the one hand, foundationalism in one of its modern forms (see above) or, on the other hand, total skepticism with respect to truth claims is to admit from the start the basis of one’s thinking in a pregiven set of beliefs. Simply having such beliefs is, of course, no guarantee of their veracity. But, if they make sense in a world of competing belief-systems, one has seemingly every right to hold them as true until empirical evidence to the contrary becomes overwhelming. Yet, in matters such as this, where my own background knowledge and experience are so thin, I defer to the judgment of wiser heads than my own.

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JOSEPH A. BRACKEN, S. J.
This second and final volume of Robert Jenson’s systematic theology is the capstone of a distinguished career. It contains a number of themes that he has elaborated in previous works (e.g. Trinity, sacramental theology, Jonathan Edwards), but these are synthesized here in a stunning and sometimes provocative system. Volume 1 was devoted to the doctrine of God—“the telling of God’s own story” (v), including Christology and pneumatology in the “classic” development of theology. The heart of this volume, however—and the key to J.’s entire system—is the reality of God as trinitarian communion, as “a fugue, a conversation, a personal event” (35).

The present volume focuses on the works of God, that is, God’s action ad extra, flowing out of God’s loving, communal self, only to draw everything back into that dynamic, life giving, and harmonious communion: “the end is music,” are the volume’s final words (369). Volume 1 was divided into three parts; now J. continues with four more. Part 4 is about creation in general; part 5 is about creatures—human, animal, and material; part 6 is a reflection on the Christian Church; and part 7 focuses on the eschaton, that reality which is creation’s goal and of which the Church is sacrament.

For J., creation is not simply something that God makes or “works out.” Rather, creation is God making accommodation in the triune life for otherness: “In himself, he opens room, and that act is the event of creation” (25). Creation and creatures are other than God but made for divine communion. This is particularly true of human beings as made in God’s image, and is the foundation for human ethical life (85–90); to opt against communion is the essence of human sin (133–152). Of particular note in the two sections on creation is J.’s rather extensive reflection on the reality of “angelic witness,” which he describes as “God’s creative Word itself, insofar as it is a moving impulse within created nature.” The Holy Spirit, he says, “liberates creation to transcend itself, and so gives creation its angelic energy” (125, 126). Key here and elsewhere in the system is a strong sense of sacramentality. “Heaven” is not some other-worldly or wholly future reality; it is God’s triune presence impinging on and mediated by all time and space, “the presence in creation of earth’s final future.” Angels are only “the various aspects of this eschatological teleology” (126).

In his reflections on the Church J. reveals his strong ecumenical convictions as well as a certain affinity with Roman Catholic ecclesiology. His is a “high” ecclesiology. The Church is “above all and decisively communion with Christ and among her members” (211), and so a sacrament of communion with the triune God. Office in the Church, specifically local and universal episcopacy (i.e. papacy) exists to cultivate and safeguard that communion. J. even argues for Vatican I’s definition of papal primacy and infallibility. Though “one must tolerate a great deal of bombastic and legalistic language,” what the council said is ultimately “unproblematic and even tautologous, if the universal church is herself real” (242, 243). But such acceptance is not completely uncritical: “What of those in the univer-
sal church, but not in the diocese of Rome, who for theologically plausible reasons disagree with something he [the pope] then teaches? Do they thereby dissent from the universal pastor? It must be very easy for the papacy to think that they do. But precisely if the papacy is to fulfill its defining mission of unity, this temptation must be firmly resisted” (248).

The third and final section is significantly shorter than the previous three, but that is because eschatology plays a central role in the entire system. From the beginning trinitarian communion provided the vision of God’s nature and creation’s destiny. This section only sketches out the meaning of symbolic expressions such as “last judgement,” “vision of God,” and “resurrected body.” While J. would admit that “damnation is possible” (365), he leaves the reader with the impression that, in the end, it is pretty improbable. God’s triune, omnipotent love is all embracing.

This is a brilliant, thoughtful, and complex study. It is clearly the work of a mature and faith-filled mind (and heart). Seasoned theologians will profit the most from studying it, but it will no doubt enrich the thinking of thoughtful students as well. It is, however, probably one of the last of its kind. J.’s theological dialogue partners, as seen in his notes, are almost exclusively males, and although he does pay much more attention to Eastern and Orthodox theology than most Western theologians, there is little or no evidence of listening to the theological witness of women and men from the developing nations. He even shows some disdain for contemporary feminist theology and betrays some ignorance of it as well—speaking of mulierist instead of mujerista theology (6). In our age, authentic theology needs to listen to all the voices.

Nevertheless, to allude to his own musical imagery, J. gives a virtuoso performance. If his voice is to be listened to critically, it is also to be listened to carefully.

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STEPHEN BEVANS, S.V.D.


It is hard to deny that the mystery of the Ascension has been neglected both in theological reflection and in liturgical practice, making it something of an orphan feast, lost between Easter and Pentecost. In this important and, in many respects, groundbreaking study Farrow redresses the neglect and underscores the crucial significance of an appreciation of Christ’s Ascension not only for Christology, but for the Church’s own self-understanding and mission.

F.’s theological polestar is Ireneus of Lyons whom he calls “in a remarkably insightful and well-rounded way, a theologian of the ascension” (45). So clearly is Ireneus the “measuring rod,” that the post-Irenean theological tradition appears almost postlapsarian by comparison.
What especially recommends Irenaeus, in the face of gnosticisms ancient and modern, is his robust insistence that Christ has come in the flesh, has ascended in the flesh, and will return in the flesh. By contrast, much of the subsequent tradition from Origen through Augustine to Teilhard seems, on F.’s reading, infected by a platonizing virus that risks losing the particularity of Jesus and his history and substituting an abstract cosmic Christ figure. A universal “ascension of the mind” effectively replaces a quite particular ascension in the flesh, distorting an integral Christian vision and spirituality.

For either Resurrection and Ascension are conflated, leading to a radical curtailment of “Jesus history,” or Ascension is exegeted, in crypto-docetic fashion, as revelatory of the divinity of the Christ. In either case the New Testament’s eschatological force is blunted and the future parousia absorbed into a timeless present. As F. says in criticism of the theology of Barth (for whom he has generally high praise), “the effect is simply too much real presence” (250). Lost to view is the real absence of the ascended Jesus.

What often follows upon this implicit denial of Jesus’ real absence is an inflated doctrine of Church that fails to do justice to a scandalous twofold discontinuity. First, there is the discontinuity between the ascended head and the pilgrim members of Christ’s body that renders talk of Church as “continuing Incarnation” mere idle chatter. Second, there is also discontinuity between church and world, such that a view of the Church as “cosmos of the cosmos” (or in its post-Vatican II epiphany: “sacrament of the world”) runs the risk of prematurely canonizing the world and forfeiting the Church’s distinctive mission.

Positively, F.’s proposal draws upon two key resources to sustain the soul-expanding tension of experiencing both the real presence and absence of Christ. First, he accents the centrality of the Eucharist as eschatological sacrament, mediating the mystery of the ascended Lord to the community that witnesses to him and longs for his coming. Thus he insists, with Zizioulas, that “it is not the church which grounds the eucharist but the eucharist which grounds the church” (150).

Second, he highlights the role of the Holy Spirit, for in the Spirit the Church “actually meets with the one it remembers and for whom it hopes” (3). At the same time, in the face of a good deal of contemporary confusion, F. stoutly maintains the distinction between the risen and ascended Christ and the Holy Spirit. He writes provocatively: “It is the task of the Spirit to keep Jesus squarely in the centre of the picture in spite of his absence; . . . this is precisely not a Spirit Christology” (38 n. 95, italics in text).

So vast is the sweep of F.’s study that experts in particular periods or figures will, undoubtedly, take issue with some of his interpretations. There is a relentless quality to his critique of the tradition and his charge of neglect of the Ascension that, at times, borders on the tedious. One even senses, in his treatment of several figures (Augustine, for instance), that the hermeneutics of suspicion may be operating in overdrive. Surely, there is
more than one legitimate conceptuality for articulating the mystery he passionately desires to defend. Nonetheless, over one thousand, often substantive footnotes, stand as a formidable array of references and arguments marshaled in support of his claims. (God bless Eerdmans for printing them at the bottom of the page!)

I regret that F.’s preoccupation with indicting the negligence of the tradition in regard to the Ascension and its baneful implications for ecclesiology leaves less space for developing his own views at length. However, he speaks of the present work as “a programmatic essay calling for substantial change” (x) and promises a fuller treatment of certain issues “in a subsequent work” (268 n. 47). Judging from the rich feast this book sets out, I await with eager expectation the sequel.

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ROBERT P. IMBELL


It is a wise theologian who hesitates to embark on so thorny a subject as God and human suffering. Such wisdom is evident in the very first words of Thomas Weinandy’s study. “I did not want to write this book.” Convinced by his faith and previous theological research (Does God Change?) that God is unchanging, Weinandy wondered how to write a book defending divine impassibility, even in the face of Auschwitz and other untold human suffering, that would be “not only academically sound, but also . . . emotionally compelling” (viii). He has found a way.

His goal is to provide “as complete as possible a theology of the Christian understanding of God and suffering” by refuting “the often erroneous arguments and assumptions that support the notion of a suffering God” while offering “a positive Christian view of God and of his relationship to humankind” (viii–ix). He begins with a clear, complete, fair, and systematic review of the case for divine suffering which includes copious references to contemporary literature on the subject (chapter 1). A crisp presentation of his theological method (chapter 2) is followed by a sustained argument for divine impassibility which carefully reviews the important scriptural, theological, and philosophical issues (chapters 2–9). Finally, some very apt perspectives are offered for understanding human suffering in the light of the mystery of Christ (chapter 10).

The methodological discussion sets the tone for the work by moving the question of divine suffering from the realm of problem-solving to that of mystery. The business of theology is not to solve problems but to illumine mysteries that become all the more mysterious when so illumined. Although the apparent “problem” of reconciling divine love and impassibility can easily be “solved” by denying the attribute of impassibility, the utter
mystery of God is illumined only when the two attributes are shown to be not contradictory but complementary. W. therefore seeks to show “not that despite God’s impassibility he is nonetheless loving and kind, but rather precisely because he is impassible . . . he is loving and kind” (37).

A penetrating account of divine transcendence and immanence in the Old and New Testaments leads to the conclusion that divine immutability is not in conflict with divine compassion but is the very reason for affirming that God “in his holiness, truly does ‘react’ to sin, and in his mercy, he does ‘respond to repentance’” (61).

Addressing the issue of an uncritical hellenization of the gospel by patristic writers, W. makes a convincing case that “on the whole . . . the Fathers, in their account of the impassibility of God, were more influenced by and more faithful to biblical revelation than those contemporary theologians who champion God’s passibility” (84). In what he describes as “the heart of this study” (114), W. uses Aquinas to provide a clear account of how God’s nature as actus purus both requires impassibility and explains God’s most intimate involvement or “actual relation” (136 n. 69) with each creature.

Somewhat puzzling is the fact that, after so clearly showing how “philosophically and theologically disastrous” it is to ascribe suffering to God (158), W. then argues that attributes such as “grief” and “sorrow” are not simply metaphorical but “are truly and really facets of God’s fully actualized love” (164). Surely grief and sorrow are modes of suffering. How are they then affirmed while suffering is denied? Perhaps a kind of “conceptual surgery” is needed here similar to what Aquinas performed in showing what aspects of the notion of compassion may and may not be said of God (Summa theologiae 1, q. 21, a. 3).

Through an insightful analysis of the notion of the “communication of idioms,” W. first shows the relation of divine impassibility to the Incarnation and redemptive suffering of the Son, then uses the notion of the “body of Christ” to explain the meaning of human suffering in relation to Christ. W. is ambiguous (perhaps unavoidably) in his account of how the sufferings of Christians are to be attributed to the risen Christ. Part of the problem here may be the sharp distinction W. draws between “their experience” and “his experience” (252 n. 18) as if these were two different realities, rather than the single reality of human suffering which may nonetheless belong to head and members in different ways.

This theologically erudite and pastorally sensitive study is an essential work for any theologian concerned with the question of divine suffering. It closes with a brief meditation on the Christian saint and Jewish Holocaust victim, Edith Stein, highlighting in a single example the central concern of the whole work to manifest “the pure radiance of God’s love for all who suffer” (287).

*Dominican School of Philosophy
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MICHAEL J. DODDS, O. P.
The relationship of Church, doctrine, and theology has not been convincingly reconceptualized in modern times. Reinhard Hütter takes up this challenge in an erudite (87 pages of notes), carefully constructed argument which seeks to avoid a self-enclosed neo-orthodoxy (foundationalism) on the one hand and a self-defeating accommodation to political-cultural trends on the other. He first shows the consequences of neglecting, or denying, the intrinsic connection among Church, doctrine, and theology—not the least of which is the loss of the Church’s public character. Then, in critical dialogue with major theological voices (George Lindbeck, Oswald Bayer, Erik Peterson, Karl Barth), he presents his own view of how these elements should be understood and related.

The linchpin of H.’s position is the notion of pathos. As used in the title and throughout the book, pathos refers to the suffering, the reception, the being-affected-by divine things. This is the irreducible a priori for understanding Church, doctrine, and theology. It declares the givenness of Christian faith before any recipient does anything about it. Viewed from the perspective of the Church and its theologians, pathos has a passive receptive quality. Viewed from the perspective of God, pathos is the sign of a gracious, already active divine Other bringing creation to its salvific completion. This active dimension is especially the work of the Holy Spirit and is properly described as divine poiesis which “produces” the Church by constituting its core practices and doctrine of faith, the latter being the self-binding promises of God to the world.

When members of the Church engage in these practices and affirm this doctrine, they are not merely engaging in a cultural-linguistic experience of the faith, they are actually participating in the poietic pathos of the divine, saving activity of the Trinity manifested in the Church. It is in this sense that H. understands theology as church practice, distinguishing it from the otherwise insightful understandings of theology proposed by George Lindbeck and Oswald Bayer on the one hand, and from the pneumatologically deficient view of Erik Peterson and the restrictive view of Karl Barth on the other.

H.’s understanding of theology as a core practice of the Church participating in the poietic pathos of the Trinity leads him to the communion ecclesiology of Eastern Orthodox theology. The strong emphasis on the relational unity of the Trinity as pathically constituted (i.e., each divine Person receives its identity from the other two) reinforces and clarifies how the Church receives its identity from the salvific work of the Trinity and how its core practices (including theology) and doctrine are related in a common pathos, enhypostatically in the Spirit. Moreover, since the role of the Spirit is to draw all creation into the communion of trinitarian life this pneumatological ecclesiology gives the Church an inherently public char-
acter, and within the context of its soteriological purpose it gives theology a threefold mission as church practice.

Theology is first of all an argumentative discursive practice that accompanies divine doctrine and unfolds the already given truth it proclaims. Theology is also a practice of perception and judgment responding to the cluster of problems and conditions that accompany the life of the Church and the actualization of the Spirit’s poiemata at various times and in various places. Finally, theology is a presentative-communicative practice that introduces and then mediates to members of the Church the pathos of divine things. Although distinct from one another all three of these aspects of theology are oriented to and imply the others.

H. has staked out a precise and highly nuanced role for theology as a church practice. By situating it within the pathos of the Church, he has affirmed the indispensable ground which gives theology its identity and connection to doctrine. By preserving a pneumatological emphasis, he has provided a theological rationale for the public character of the Church and its theology. By identifying theology as a core practice of the Church, he has focused attention on concrete activity rather than on abstractions, and on the interrelationship of Church, doctrine, and theology rather than on their isolated and conflicting claims. The argument might have been strengthened by a specific example of how theology, doctrine, and Church interact in their common pathos or by offering a few criteria to discern when a given theological reflection remains within the poietic pathos of the Spirit. But H. has provided more than enough substance, insight, and suggestions to warrant a repeated reading of his work.

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ROBERT L. KINAST


In this post-Holocaust world, much that passes for philosophical analysis of the problem of evil seems beside the point, if not culpably irrelevant. It is to Adams’s great credit that in her often insightful discussion of the issue, she puts the emphasis where it belongs: on the victims’ point of view. The problem of evil is not whether or not an all-good God can have reasons for allowing the existence of evil, but whether from the victims’ perspective sufficient sense can be made of their suffering to defeat the evil they experience.

A. makes a real attempt to take seriously the horrendousness of the evil human beings are sometimes capable of inflicting on one another. She defines horrendous evils as “evils the participation in which (that is, the doing or suffering of which) constitutes prima facie reason to doubt whether the participant’s life could (given their inclusion in it) be a great good to him/her on the whole” (26). Moreover generic approaches à la Pike or
Plantinga, for instance, that seek to justify God’s permitting evil by an appeal to some variation on creating the best possible world or creating a world that gives opportunity for “soul making” or “responsibility,” leave the individual victim with the status of a mere means to the moral development of others. A. clearly avoids this pitfall: “[W]e can explain the posibility of God and evil (even the evils of entrenched horrors) if we can offer a (logically possible) scenario in which God is good to each created person, by ensuring each a life that is a great good to him/her on the whole, and by defeating his/her participation in horrors within the context, not merely of the world as a whole, but of that individual’s life” (55).

How is this to be done? First A. tries to establish the incommensurability between God and created persons, and then she tries to use that incommensurability to establish God’s power to defeat even horrendous evils. The problem with appealing to such a concept is that it is by its nature impossible to spell out. Nor does it seem to answer the present cry of anguish of the victim. A. appeals to the redemptive love of God expressed in Jesus’ sacrificial death as a way to connect the victims of horrendous evils to participation in the life of God, and at a certain level this may work for some. But what of the innocent child incapable of reflection? How does A. answer Ivan Karamazov’s complaint, “But then there are the children, and what am I to do about them? . . . Listen! If all must suffer to pay for eternal harmony, what have children to do with it? Tell me, please. It’s beyond all comprehension why they should suffer and why they should pay for the harmony.”

One weakness in A.’s analysis is that she seems to limit herself to the kind of evil that is the product (either witting or unwitting) of human decision and human action. What of so-called “natural evil”—the West-African child wasting away with the tail of a guinea worm protruding from its belly; the six children of a Honduran mother swallowed up in a mudslide caused by Hurricane Mitch? There is an element of mindlessness and caprice in these events that highlights their apparent pointlessness, thereby making their horror more palpable. How is God good to created persons by providing them with a world in which such things are possible? In particular, how is God good to these individual children?

Horrendous evils disrupt the conceptual schemes within which we frame our experience, but A. wants to hold out “the hope that even horrors could be given a dimension of positive meaning,” such that “participants would be brought to the point of accepting them and so no longer retrospectively wishing to erase them from their life stories” (203). As she says, “[M]y position is that horrors smash Humpty Dumpty so badly that only God can put him back together again. Because God can, however, the occurrence of horrors and their entrenchment in human nature neither permanently frustrates participants’ attempts to make sense of their lives nor philosophers’ attempts to solve the logical problem of (horrendous) evil” (205).

This provocative book raises many questions that still beg answers, not the least of which is how one relates philosophy and theology in dealing with this question. On one point, however, it is absolutely on the mark: a
God who is good to created persons must be able to defeat the evil that they experience in their individual lives, if salvation is to have any meaning at all.

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T. MICHAEL McNULTY, S.J.


Greene-McCreight analyzes feminist scholarship in relation to the narrative theology of the Yale School, particularly that of Hans Frei. Taking her cue from Alvin Kimel and George Lindbeck’s view that Christian feminist theology is weakened by its failure to affirm the narrative identification of God, G. makes her own assessment of feminist theology by exploring its approach to four key doctrines: Scripture, sin, Christology, and the Trinity. She concludes that “mainline” feminists, for whom a non-narrative interpretation of Scripture predominates, tend to occupy a mediating position but “would probably find themselves quite close ideologically and theologically, if they were consistently and courageously honest, to Mary Daly and Daphne Hampson” (132). I cannot agree with this conclusion, yet found this book of interest.

G.’s study considers a wide range of Protestant and Roman Catholic feminist theologies. Her primary conversation partners are Elisabeth Schüssler Fiorenza, Rosemary Radford Ruether, and Elizabeth Johnson; secondary interlocutors include Rita Nakashima Brock, Sallie McFague, Delores Williams, and Carter Hayward. G. distinguishes “biblical feminists” from “mainline feminists.” The former trust the Bible as an inspired witness to God’s grace and believe that it can produce and support a feminist vision. They also tend to assume a significant division between gospel and culture. Mainline feminists, usually members of mainline Protestant denominations or the Roman Catholic Church, do not deny the Bible’s witness to revelation but operate with a strong hermeneutic of suspicion that seeks to uncover how Scripture serves as a vehicle for the furtherance of patriarchy. Mainline feminist theology, characterized as non-narrative or extratextual, is the focus of G.’s analysis and appraisal.

According to G., mainline feminist theology is indebted to Feuerbach, Kant, Schleiermacher, and Bultmann and thus shares many of the problems associated with modern theology and the Enlightenment, particularly its hermeneutic of suspicion. This reading of feminist theology as a type of modern theology, however, needs to be supplemented by a recognition that many feminist theologians, some of whom understand their context as postmodern, would not locate their own theological sources and methods strictly within the larger narrative of academic modern theology. Moreover, although G. is very attuned to the influence of the ordination issue on the shape of Roman Catholic feminist arguments, she gives no attention to...
how developments in 20th century Catholic theology, especially in liberation theology, have shaped feminist theological consciousness.

In keeping with her understanding of feminist theology as a subset of modern theology, G. criticizes feminist theology’s focus on what she describes as apologetics rather than dogmatics. I question whether the two tasks can be separated so neatly. Contemporary epistemologies and hermeneutics suggest that one’s “apologetic” aims, even if unstated or unconscious, influence one’s “dogmatics.” There is a dialectical aspect in both the creation of a narrative and its reading that G.’s approach does not adequately consider. In her dichotomizing of narrative and non-narrative reading, she overlooks the function of experience as an element in the creation of a narrative and a lens through which it is read.

A strength of this work is its careful attention to the implicit practices and governing doctrines of feminist theologies. In her chapters on feminist Christologies, G. contends that feminist Christologies, despite their professed eschewal of the Jesus of history/Christ of faith dichotomy, opt for the Christ of faith, presenting Jesus as an allegorical pointer (an idea or metaphor) rather than as a character in a narrative. This is one example of what G. sees as the conflict between theory and practice within feminist theology. Feminist Christologies claim to be contextual, yet in fact “abstract from the particularity of the Christian story” (129). Although I am not satisfied with G.’s invocation of eschatology to resolve difficult christological issues (such as the significance of Jesus’ maleness) and I do not believe her charge fits as many feminist projects as she suggests, her challenge to the abstractness of some feminist Christologies is worth considering.

G. concludes her book, which is essentially a critique of non-narrative feminist theologies, with the question of what a truly narrative feminist theology would look like and suggests this work as a future project. Given the thorny issues raised by her current study and the growing influence of narrative theology, this would be an intriguing endeavor. The present book, while it has shortcomings, is thought-provoking for those interested in the relationship between feminist and narrative approaches to theology.

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DONNA TEEVAN


The Catholic Moral Tradition Today is an excellent survey of moral method in the post-Vatican II Catholic Church. Aimed at a slightly less introductory level than Timothy O’Connell’s Principles for a Catholic Morality, Curran’s book is nevertheless accessible to upper division undergraduates and to knowledgeable laity as well as of interest to moral theologians.
C. includes chapters on themes expected in an introductory text: stance, model, person, virtues, conscience, principles, and church teaching. But he begins with a chapter on the ecclesial context of moral theology which introduces a major theme of the book: the need to overcome a pervasive individualism in Western culture, an individualism which runs counter to the basic direction of Catholic moral thought. By his final chapters on conscience and church teaching, C. has clarified that the need to place moral theology within an ecclesial context does not and should not entail acceptance of conscience as a deductive process based on syllogism, leading to reflex acceptance of and obedience to any and all statements of the ecclesial magisterium. A compelling aspect of Curran’s argument for the ecclesial context of moral theology is that it comes from one with great experience of dangers in the ecclesial context. At the same time, the chapters on principles, conscience, and church teaching are all clearly informed by this history.

Chapter 6, “Principles,” views the hierarchical magisterium from a perspective now familiar to most American and European students of Catholic teaching. It discerns two different methods at work, one in social teaching and another on issues in sexuality, reproduction, and dissent from church teaching. C. describes church teaching on these latter issues as legalist, and suggests that despite John Paul II’s—and indeed, the post-Vatican II Church’s—much vaunted personalism, the latter’s influence has been limited to some linguistic tokens: “In short, papal teaching on sexuality has recently employed more personalistic terminology, but the present papal sexual teaching is still grounded in the nature of the sexual faculty and its act” (146), rather than subordinating the sexual faculty to the person. A major piece of this chapter is C.’s treatment of John Paul II’s Veritatis splendor. He quotes John Paul II’s appeal to Jesus’ teaching on divorce: “To call into question the permanent structural elements of man which are connected with his own bodily dimension would not only conflict with common experience, but would render meaningless Jesus’ reference to the ‘beginning,’ precisely where the social and cultural context of the time had distorted the primordial meaning and role of certain moral norms” (147).

C. responds by reviewing the development of historical consciousness within papal social teaching (including some contributions by John Paul II himself) in which a static view of human nature has gradually given way to a more dynamic one affected by the signs of the times (148–49). Even in what C. describes as the hierarchical documents with a more legalist, deductive approach one finds an erosion in the understanding of basic human nature. For example, until the 1975 “Declaration on Certain Questions in Sexual Ethics” human nature was described as unambiguously heterosexual, so that homosexuals were understood as perversely rejecting natural sexual desire. But the Declaration accepted that for some homosexuals, same-sex orientation may not be chosen and therefore cannot be sinful. The limits on erosion in the static, highly determined view of human nature in hierarchical teaching have been set, as C. points out, on conclusions about acts. The hierarchical magisterium is unwilling to carry over newer
understandings of the person into new conclusions about acts. Thus the inconsistency of the magisterium’s acknowledging that homosexual orientation cannot be sinful when it is not chosen, but insisting both that the acts natural to that orientation are sinful and that therefore the orientation itself should be regarded as “seriously disordered”—language that has traditionally indicated sinfulness. The obvious implication is that homosexual orientation is objectively sinful even when subjectively not sinful—but this is not said, because it would be difficult to explain how an involuntary condition can be objectively sinful.

C.’s final chapter addresses what the pope called the “genuine crisis” in moral theology in the Church which prompted Veritatis splendor (1998). C. deals with the issue by placing the papal magisterium within the context of its last two centuries of development. This chapter adds tremendously to the current debate and helps make C.’s study more than the simple synthesis it modestly claims to be.

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CHRISTINE E. GUDORF


In the 1980s two works—Albert Jonsen and Stephen Toulmin’s Abuse of Casuistry and John Mahoney’s The Making of Moral Theology—turned to historical research to engage constructively the agenda of contemporary ethics. Their investigations of the past in an attempt to influence the method, content, and context of today’s ethics were highly successful. Now a full generation later, Porter has surpassed these landmark works in her magisterial study of natural law and sets a new standard for research in Christian ethics.

P.’s investigation of the Scholastic usage of the natural law begins by endorsing James Gustafson’s insight that nature is a theological category. Contrary to a variety of assertions that generally insist on the nontheological context and content of natural law. P. demonstrates convincingly that, from the 12th century on, Scholastics presumed the natural law to be embedded in the world of theology. This theology was certainly Scripture based. The Scholastics turned to revelation in the pursuit of natural law in three ways: they justify their appeals to the natural law on scriptural grounds; they derive much of the concrete moral content of the natural law from Scripture; and they employ their overall concept of the natural law as a framework for interpreting Scripture as a moral document.

With a historian’s suspicion of natural tendencies to bias research with contemporary categories, P. helps us to see that the Scholastics of the 12th through 14th centuries were not at all harnessed by the need to compartmentalize sources of moral insight. While they did differentiate between the conventional and the natural, before modern romanticism, like others, they saw no incompatibility between moral data emanating from rational insight or the natural order. Nor did they consider any difference between
the rational and the prerational as more than one of degree. Rather, Scholastics recognized an affinity among rational reflection, the natural world, and the light of Scripture. Likewise, they did not exclude other sources of moral insight, for example, from other religious and civil traditions; nor did they view their own findings as exclusively for Christians. Finally, they would not understand contemporary tendencies to bracket natural law theories from virtue ethics inasmuch as they understood the virtues as themselves the right realization of natural inclinations.

Still, their “intensely practical process of reflection” (34) was not a random hodge-podge. The Scholastics’ work was built on long-held, fundamental presuppositions that had animated Christian thought for centuries before Scholasticism. P. makes the case that two overriding interests were equality and nonmaleficence. Holding that “the test of any moral concept lies in its application” (187), she brings these interests into view by specifically examining Scholastic natural law claims about both marriage and sexual ethics and social ethics. Here she not only brings to light the method, context, and content of their arguments, but persuasively argues for the contemporary relevance of the method, context, and content. In the light of present standards of hermeneutics and historiography, P.’s research is very impressive.

Guided by the earlier studies by Odon Lottin and Rudolf Weigand, P. wisely presents a broad selection of illuminating texts and then leads the reader carefully through the Scylla and Charybdis of our contemporary biases, helping us to see, for instance, that the Scholastics were primarily concerned with providing a basis not for moral dialogue within a context of cultural pluralism, but rather “for understanding and rationalizing the laws and customs of their communities.” Still, P. continues that these approaches to natural law are not mutually exclusive. Here the interested reader will have to pursue the meaning of this assertion and others in P.’s own work, but we should notice how her careful sense of historical context and her sensitive approach to usually boundaried categories of thought provides us with a genuine insight into the natural law.

Subsequent discussion will no doubt develop from this brilliant work. Let me register two concerns that I hope will be addressed. First, while P. captures the importance of 12th-century concerns with validating, interpreting, and explaining social relations and institutions, the 12th century also marks, as Bernard McGinn claims, a turning point in the history of Christian spirituality. While P. gives a polite nod to this turning point, further research needs to be done about the influence of the pursuit of Christian “perfection” on Scholastic usage and interpretations of the natural law. Second, following from this point, P. fails to give satisfactory teleological goals to the anthropological content of the natural law. What did the Scholastics understand the Christian communities to be aiming at? P. posits an “ideal of equality.” But fairness or parity cannot sufficiently explain the drive for human flourishing. From William Frankena to Paul Ricoeur, we have learned the insufficiency of justice as explanatory for human excellence: beneficence, the pursuit of the good, must be a funda-
mental component of the dynamic structures of ethical systems. Thus, P.’s defense of nonmaleficence without any equal interest in beneficence strikes me again as problematic. But challenging P.’s claims here will require a mastery of historical research and contemporary debate that P. herself has established as a realizable, necessary, and very worthy standard.

*Weston Jesuit School of Theology*  
JAMES F. KEENAN, S.J.

**TERROR IN THE MIND OF GOD: THE GLOBAL RISE OF RELIGIOUS VIOLENCE.**  

Juergensmeyer’s book is most timely since it throws enormous light on the crucial problem of religious terrorism, a world-wide phenomenon today. The merit and special contribution of this book lie in J.’s multi-disciplinary analysis of terrorism and the unique data garnered from his in-depth interviews of some of the most dreaded global terrorists. His methodology provides the reader a ready access to the very center of the mind-set of terrorists. Further, it enables the reader to enter the culture of violence and understand its logic even while disagreeing with the brutal tactics and gory outcomes of terrorist operations.

J.’s depiction of the cultures of violence as a “cosmic war” (145) is particularly relevant, since it indicates the power of religious myths to drive some fundamentalist believers to kill, maim, or destroy people and property. Also, since the talk is about war, violence takes on the character of a public “performance” (122), complete with cast, plot, stage, and frequently a global audience. But this is serious business. As J. says, “In speaking of terrorism as ‘performance’, I am not suggesting that such acts are undertaken lightly or capriciously. Rather, like religious ritual or street theater, they are dramas designed to have impact on the several audiences that they affect” (124). In addition, J. points to a fascinating linkage between religion and violence. It is not only religion and its myths that drive some to violence, but “violent conflicts have [also] cried out for religious validation” (161).

This odd attraction between religion and violence seems undergirded by a struggle for and sometimes a loss of power among the various actors who make religious claims. As J. says, “The syndrome [loss of power] begins with the perception that the public world has gone awry, and the suspicion that behind this social confusion lies a great spiritual and moral conflict. . . . Such a conflict is understandably violent” (224). Hence, players in every major religion work out a justification for violence, as chapters 2 to 6 amply demonstrate. But one should also bear in mind that violence can at times create a positive fallout for religion by empowering it. As J. says in the final chapter, “This is one of history’s ironies, that although religion has been used to justify violence, violence can also empower religion” (242).
Because of J.’s excellent analysis of violence, one would have hoped for an equally excellent analysis of an antidote to religious violence. To his credit J. discusses five outcome scenarios (229 ff.) of the cosmic war but none in sufficient depth. The fifth scenario seems most promising. J. thinks that “when secular authorities embrace moral values, including those associated with religion” (238), the possibilities for peace seem at their best. Indeed, present-day efforts of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa, the peace movements of Northern Ireland, the Sant’Egidio religious community in Mozambique, Algeria, and Uganda, all demonstrate that religion can be a major player in contributing to world peace. Further, religion’s moral resources of “forgiveness and reconciliation” can go a long way toward undermining the culture of violence and replacing it with a culture of reconciliation and tolerance. The burgeoning literature on societal forgiveness as well as the field experiences of peacemakers seem to affirm the role religion is playing in reducing conflict and violence in the world. Forgiveness, religion’s underutilized weapon, needs to be brandished with greater vigor and determination in the fight against violence.

J.’s book is thought provoking and provides a wealth of excellent information to social scientists, theologians, and practitioners of the art of peacemaking.

Weston Jesuit School of Theology

ANTHONY DA SILVA, S.J.


In this tightly argued book, Traina develops several intersecting lines of thought significant to fundamental moral theology. Those who work their way through her intricate analyses will be richly rewarded by her thorough and evenhanded treatment of an impressive and divergent array of ethical thinkers and movements.

Her most important contribution is her exposition of the mutually fruitful partnership between feminist and natural law ethics. Though perhaps still startling to some, the claim that such a partnership is possible is not new, but her exhaustive continuation of work begun by other Catholic feminist ethicists is most welcome.

Once the social construction of both gendered experience and the body is recognized, T. explains, most feminists are left with no solid ground on which to base the particular moral judgments their general commitment to liberation entails. Deconstruction can only clear the way for full human, indeed cosmic, flourishing. It cannot illumine the normative foundation on which projects congruent with such a liberating vision might be based. “The passage from the feminist critique to a feminist ethic or from the feminist vision of integral flourishing to a coherent meaning of life in a particular place and time requires more than formal boundaries and negative crite-
ria” (315). After every revolution, the victorious must wrestle with questions about how to govern.

T. makes it clear that feminism needs an ally, not merely for strategic but for substantive purposes. Yet she admits it is not unreasonable to view the natural law tradition as an unlikely candidate for such a partnership. Cognizant of the many points of deep divergence between them, T. concedes, “Thomas is plainly not a feminist” (85), though she is careful not to let the reader mistakenly identify as “Thomistic” the rigid, deductive “later inventions of neoscholastic theology” (86). T. demonstrates that, far from being broken by them, the natural law tradition at its core willingly yields to and is enriched by the critical analyses of feminism. Once “‘women’s ways’ of seeing, knowing, thinking, acting and flourishing” (152) are recognized as human ways, the only way natural law ethics can be faithful to its own defining foundation in normative anthropology is to correct the androcentrism that distorts its core. This fundamental correction produces “richer, more self-critical descriptions of human flourishing and moral reasoning” and “changes in the way moral reasoning is understood” (159).

Obviously, then, T.’s retrieval of the natural law tradition is critical, but she does not rest there. She illumines how this tradition can be a valuable resource for feminist ethics. Beginning with Thomas’s grounding of the moral life in an exitus-reditus theology, T. tracks variations of this telic anthropology through its subsequent permutations in casuistry, personalism, Catholic social justice, and liberation theology. Her analysis discloses two primary ways feminists might profit from a feminist ethics/natural law partnership. First, the natural law tradition with its emphasis on inductive, analogical reasoning through case studies provides a method of practical moral discernment that enables feminists to keep their working principles flexible and responsive to developing sources of wisdom. Second, the vision of an integral telos, in which temporal and transcendent ends are linked, provides feminists with a way out of the foundational deadend created by Enlightenment liberalism and the relentless critique of postmodernism. T. excels at demonstrating how this framework can be accommodated, indeed was perhaps even anticipated, by certain strains within feminism. She is not clear enough, however, about its incompatibility with those feminists who simply do not view life as purposeful in this sense.

T. notes the remarkable consensus among natural law feminists about the goods basic to human flourishing and points out what distinguishes these accounts as feminist. These telic visions (1) emphasize the integral, interdependent nature of flourishing and (2) recognize the inevitable tensions among goods produced by their irreducibility and existential incoherence. In its feminist rendition, the natural law does not require conformity to a fixed nature; instead the moral task is “to discern” in each place and age, which ways of life, guidelines, and ways of moral discernment seem best to respect and promote the integral good of particular people” (160).

Having identified “the criteria of a genuinely feminist rendition of natural law ethics” (161), T. tests both their validity and applicability on the
work of three prominent theologians: Josef Fuchs, Richard McCormick, and Gustavo Gutiérrez. Her summary evaluation of each man’s corpus is comprehensive and fair. Her assessment of their projects is profitable. Most importantly, her analysis clears the way for the further integration of natural law feminism into the mainstream of Catholic moral theology.

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PATRICIA BEATTIE JUNG


To review a book on postmodernism is to enter a minefield. One reason for the minefield is the fierce passion and entrenched bias often accompanying discussions of postmodernism and its conjoined fraternal twin, modernism, and another is the absence of helpful definitions and distinctions in many of these discussions. Luckily, Meynell here provides us with a clear, careful, and almost always fair-minded consideration of one set of questions, those about our abilities to judge truthfully in matters of fact and value, inseparable from the discussions.

In his preface, M. states that he regards a writer as a postmodernist “so far as she repudiates the norms of cognition and evaluation that were propounded and applied by thinkers of the Old Enlightenment, and inveighs against the abuses to which they may be supposed to have given rise” (xi). Old Enlightenment does duty here for what many of these writers may call modernism or the enlightenment mentality and so on. M. believes that the postmodernists have had many good reasons to be critical of the modernists: they tended to reduce the realm of objectivity to sensory experience and its logical analysis, to separate completely the realms of fact and value, to make nature simply the passive object of human manipulation, and to affirm hierarchies seemingly based on reason but in reality growing out of prejudice. However, the postmodernist reaction has often been to move in the direction of skepticism in philosophy, in religion, in science, in ethics, and in life generally. M. resists this movement and proposes as an alternative the “New Enlightenment,” “represented above all by the work of Bernard Lonergan, which clarifies, modifies, justifies, and applies these norms in such a way that the objections of the postmodernists to enlightenment rationality are to some extent corroborated, to some extent undercut” (xi). Above all, the New Enlightenment “rejects the nihilism and relativism to which postmodernism tends” (xi).

Just as Descartes often gets tagged, rightly or wrongly, as the father of modernism, a term he almost certainly never heard or used, Nietzsche gets fatherhood rights to postmodernism despite having died at least 70 years before it began appearing in philosophical and literary discourse. M. devotes his first chapter to Nietzsche, indeed to two possible readings of Nietzsche, presented under the Meynellian nicknames of “Naetzsche” and “Noetsche.” He tries to save Naetzsche, the critic of all that was and
remains blinding, stultifying, and suffocating about the Old Enlightenment, from Noeztsche, the harbinger of the self-destructive sides of postmodernism. Having distinguished these two interpretations of the “father of postmodernism,” M. lays out the method of the New Enlightenment. In short, it involves recognizing how all of our successful thinking involves being “attentive to sensation or feeling . . . intelligent in envisaging possible explanations . . . and reasonable in revising, rejecting or reaffirming our opinions” (19). If we conduct ourselves well in thinking, we come in the ideal condition to truth and reality. To deny that we can get to truth and reality is to make all inquiry, all debate, all life impossible.

M. applies his method sequentially to sorting out the wisdom and foolishness of Foucault and Derrida, Lyotard and Rorty with other thinkers appearing on the way. I mentioned above that M. is almost always fair in his presentations and criticisms. The “almost” signals my belief that Derrida deserves more credit as a philosopher in the final chapter. John Caputo’s Deconstruction in a Nutshell (1997) might provide a reasonable companion piece to the present book in that regard.

To judge M.’s strength as an interpreter and critic of postmodernism, the reader must enter the minefield herself. For a better understanding of the New Enlightenment, I would recommend his excellent Introduction to the Philosophy of Bernard Lonergan and Redirecting Philosophy. One final comment: Meynell shows the extent to which the Old Enlightenment has influenced him (and the reviewer) by his preoccupation with issues of epistemology, only one side of the postmodernist development, something evident to everyone making his or her way past the mines.

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Michael J. Kerlin


Thatcher’s work is a classic attempt to update Christian thinking by responding to contemporary concerns. Like the liberal theologians of the 19th century who responded to modernism by rethinking Christian ideas about science and Scripture, T. believes that his task is to accept the valid criticisms of his age while holding fast to the core of the faith. His book is provocative and timely, and it will likely be as controversial as the writings of the liberal theologians who preceded him. T. is thoroughly aware of postmodern criticisms of Christian theologies of marriage and fully knowledgeable about recent developments in those theologies in Britain and America. His research is extensive. There are very few contemporary theologians writing on marriage who are not treated in some depth in this book. As a scholarly review and analysis, the book can hardly be faulted. Moreover, the book’s constructive proposals deserve serious consideration.
However, despite the fact that T.’s method of listening to postmodern critics, mining the Christian tradition, listening to the voices of practicing Christians, and patching together proposals that are responsive to the multiple loyalties of a postmodern Christian is sound, some will surely argue that his proposals stray too far from the core of the Christian tradition in an attempt to embrace popular postmodern practices.

On less controversial issues (the promotion of equal partnership between men and women, the legitimacy of artificial birth control, and the acknowledgment of children as but one of the primary ends of marriage), T. provides a valuable service, laying out the standard liberal arguments and responding in innovative ways to key conservative challenges. Here he makes his case that postmodern Christians need not stray from the core of the faith in order to hold these positions. His arguments for encouraging betrothal and allowing divorce, however, seem to rest on shakier ground.

On betrothal, T. wants to take a seriously postmodern society (Great Britain) in which a majority of couples live together before they marry, and virtually no one enters marriage as a virgin. However, he wants to avoid approving cohabitation simply because it is widespread, and this is why he turns to the Christian tradition. At the core of his argument is a claim that since betrothal in premodern times was often accompanied by sex and cohabitation, and only sometimes followed by a church wedding, postmodern Christians need not embrace the idea that marriage, sex, and cohabitation begin with a wedding. Instead, they ought to realize that cohabitating couples provide the Church with an important reminder that marriage is a process.

While T. is surely right to point out that church wedding ceremonies were not a requirement until the 16th century, he seems to make light of the distinction between betrothal and marriage in Christian theology. It is certainly true that for the first 1500 years of its life, the Church did not require a Christian wedding ceremony (though blessings of marriages by clergy began early and gradually became more common). The traditional wedding ceremonies of various cultures were recognized as valid. As T. argues, sex and cohabitation were approved of after wedding vows were made, regardless of whether or not the couple was blessed by a priest. It is quite possible, as some research reviewed by T. suggests, that sex and cohabitation during betrothal (but before wedding vows of any kind) were common. However, it is not clear that sex and cohabitation during betrothal were sanctioned by the Church. It seems too simple to assert (as T. does) that the Church only came to emphasize the necessity of abstaining from sex and cohabitation before the wedding ceremony out of respect for the social customs of the modern upper classes. It seems more likely that a growing recognition of the importance of marriage in Christian life brought together the previously separated vows and blessing. Despite the contrary practice of Christians past and present, the contemporary view that full union between a Christian man and a woman makes sense only after ultimate vows are made and blessed seems somewhat central to a Christian theology of marriage.
Though some Christian theologians have argued for the allowance of preceremonial sex for engaged couples on marriage-as-process grounds (and made important ethical distinctions between preceremonial sex and uncommitted sex), the novelty of T.’s proposal is the suggestion that betrothal can be retrieved and applied to cohabitating couples. However, his proposal seems to overlook important developments in Christian theology over the past several centuries while emphasizing the practices of premodern and postmodern Christians. While the willingness to listen to all voices inside and outside the tradition is important to T.’s dialogue with postmodernity, it leaves him open to the criticism that he is bending the tradition to fit the practice.

Similar criticism can be made of T.’s proposal regarding divorce. Legitimate concern for women trapped in difficult marriages leads him to reconsider difficult scriptural texts on divorce. He ends up embracing what seems to be speculative biblical criticism that Jesus did not teach indissolubility. He then argues that divorce and remarriage must be legitimate possibilities for Christians, not only in hard cases of abuse and adultery but whenever relationships break down. While some Christian theologians have argued for exceptions to an absolute prohibition of divorce, T. goes further, and seems less concerned about a long history of official affirmation of indissolubility (in most cases). Here again, T’s proposal makes him vulnerable to the charge that postmodern practice carries more weight than Scripture or tradition.

Moreover, T.’s own theology of liberation for children (to which he devotes a whole chapter) seems not to influence his support for divorce at a time in which many mainstream theologians (who are aware of the research on the effects of divorce on children) are moving toward more conservative positions. One might also argue (as did Thomas Aquinas) that a concern for children’s well-being lends further justification to a restriction on preceremonial sex between partners who have not yet made their final vows to each other. T.’s focus on the practice and well-being of adults evidently prevents consideration of these views.

In sum, T.’s book is strong in its use of multiple resources (postmodern, modern, and premodern) to ground its somewhat radical proposals. It summarizes a wealth of modern scholarship in an increasingly important area of theology. Some will judge it too postmodern in its assumptions and conclusions. Others will, no doubt, dismiss it as not postmodern enough. Still, for graduate students and theologians interested in Christian marriage, it would be hard to find a more stimulating and informative read.

*St. Louis University*  
*Julie Hanlon Rubio*

The central insight of sociology might well be that we come to know ourselves through the eyes of “the other.” Zöller is the chair of political sociology and director of the Center of American Studies at Bayreuth University. He is an especially well-read “other” and brings the analytical strengths of social science to his ambitious but readable one-volume social history of American Roman Catholicism that stretches from Columbus to the mid-1990s. Z.’s narrative energy comes from his sharing of Santayana’s puzzlement over how this “ancient, metaphysical, poetic, elaborate, ascetic, autocratic, and intolerant” faith survives and even flourishes among the “cheerfully American.” Z.’s book will not replace Charles R. Morris’s *American Catholic* (1997) as a teacher’s one-volume friendly choice for nonspecialist Catholic historical literacy, but his explicit social science condensation of history into analytical concepts makes it a helpful supplement. Use Morris for essay questions and Z. for fill-in-the-blanks.

First, Z.’s comprehensiveness. His early chapters succinctly cover the growth of Catholicism from its initially statistically slight (1%) American presence through its three major waves of immigration (Irish, German, Italian) and the early external “cultural wars” sparked by these largely proletarian immigrants.

Z. sketches as well the internal “cultural wars” dividing the “Americanists,” “Irish Conservative,” and “German” wings of the hierarchy over separate Catholic schools, ethnic parishes, and trusteeship. Z. includes all the big names and big issues (Hughes, Brownson, Hecker, Ireland, O’Connell, Spalding, Kean, Corrigan, McQuaid, the Abbelein Memorandum, the Lucerne Memorial, McGlynn, Gibbons, the three Baltimore Councils, *Testem benevolentiae*). He is shrewd and knowing about the gap between appearance and reality. He points out that the hierarchy were always united in their American pragmatism which produced shifting coalitions rather than sharply defined ideological-theological camps. The American bishops were mostly interested in managing the enormous transition from national confessional churches to American pluralism and achieving whatever protective consolidation they could muster. The decisive cultural issue was not *whether* but *what* degree of adaptation egalitarian American society required in order for the Church to become acculturated yet distinct. He calculates that only about 10% of the bishops participated in these controversies in any explicitly intellectual way. The messy process, he writes, “did not proceed like a Greek tragedy in which everything moves relentlessly toward a clarification,” as all of the contenders “kept at least one eye on Rome” with the result not of the “victory of one side and the defeat of the other” but in “the movement of the problems to another level” (111). I suspect any future church historian could conclude with the same sentence.

The second half of the book begins, ironically, with Pius X’s *Sapienti consilio* which terminated America’s missionary status, and ends in the 1990s when some dioceses began to import priests from Africa and India to maintain their expected middle-class Sunday mass schedules.

Z. chronicles the steady 20th-century growth (strongly implying infla-
tion) and then the sudden deflation of Catholic cultural confidence. The growth was anchored by C.E.O-ish “brick laying” bishops and Catholic war-proven patriotism. Among the defining and shaping moments of the Catholic journey to the American center—his key theme—Z. includes the National Catholic Welfare Council/National Conference of Catholic Bishops, Senator Joe McCarthy, JFK, John Courtney Murray, and the “earthquake” of Vatican II. Z. ties the material together by the analytical point that in the post-Vatican era the earlier priority of unity over internal dispute ended and the issue of Americanization increasingly arose internally as a laity experienced with democracy increasingly expressed themselves as religiously competent.

To account for the survival of the “cultural improbability” of American Catholicism, Z. employs the sociological concepts of “social capital,” which he especially locates in the Catholic school system, and Catholicism’s “institutional differentiations” and “institutional learning,” which yield “capacities” for a unity amid tensions lacking to Protestantism whose inevitable tensions tend toward ideological polarization and organizational segmentation. Z., like Morris, concludes that the endless “balancing act” between the noun Catholic and the adjective American “depends chiefly on the skill of the shepherds.” Z. is also sanguine. “European bishops,” he continues, “would be delighted to have the American problems of religious individualism” (245).

Not all readers of a work of such scope will find all of their own judgments always aligned with Z.’s. For my part, I found him close to unappreciative of the bishops’ important transformative efforts in such pastorals as The Challenge of Peace (1983) and Economic Justice for All (1986), too sanguine about the priest crisis, and too uninterested in the Church’s prophetic responsibilities within America’s global hegemony, to use still more of sociology’s crystallizing terms. It struck me as at least an esthetic failure that Z.’s last pages dealing with the contemporary American Church had the same sense of calm and balance as the earlier chapters. Probably living alertly in any time produces some sense of crisis, but perhaps one has to live there to really feel it.

Fordham University, New York

JAMES R. KELLY

This is a carefully thought-out, painstakingly researched, and original contribution to our understanding of Lamentations and its afterlife. The focus is on both the past and the ongoing effort to come up with strategies for surviving the horror of the images that assault us so relentlessly. Our sanity urges us to set some limits to images that invite despair, and L., while recognizing that our literature of survival is immense, has wisely given attention to works growing out of the 20th century’s greatest tragedy, the Holocaust. It is hard to imagine
any sensitive person poring over Lamentations today without fast-forwarding to this almost incomprehensible event. L. acknowledges his debt to a longstanding exegetical tradition which he uses effectively. His main focus is on the figure of Zion in chapters 1 and 2. Building on the exegetical studies of Westermann, Provan, Hillers, etc., L. focuses on the figure of the woman Zion in Lamentations 1 and 2, explaining the inner dynamics of these chapters and the rhetorical force they continue to exert. L. also argues that support for his focus can be found in a long history of precritical Jewish interpretation, pre-dating the rise of modern biblical scholarship.

Chapter 3 takes up the biblical aftermath of Lamentations in Second Isaiah where Zion’s children survive and return. Lamentations ends with the absence of God as well as of survivors. But the cry for survival is insistent and L., helped by a brilliant insight of Carol Newsome, shows how Second Isaiah answers that cry especially with the restoration of Zion’s children, hope of the restored community.

I would suggest, finally, that L. has caught the striking insight of Seamus Heaney, expressed in his 1995 Nobel Lecture, that great poetry “satisfies the contradictory needs which consciousness experiences at times of extreme crisis, the need on the one hand for a truth-telling that will be hard and retributive, and on the other hand, the need not to harden the mind to a point where it denies its own yearnings for sweetness and trust.”

Fred L. Moriarty, S.J.
Boston College


The fact that this very scholarly book was favorably reviewed both in the New York Times and in the Los Angeles Times attests to the fact that it is not only an impressive work of erudition but also a very good read. McKenzie, a professor of Hebrew Bible possessed of a delightfully colloquial style replete with contemporary allusions, presents his research in the form of a detective story. M. tackles all of the well-known aspects and events of David’s life—was David ever a shepherd boy, David vs. Goliath, David and the Philistines, David’s kingship, etc.—and asks in each case what could be the real history, if any, behind them. He pursues not only internal biblical evidence but also Near Eastern history and anthropology in general, sometimes in search of facts, sometimes just to limn the plausible. His most interesting methodological assumption is that when the author(s) protest too much that David is this or that, they are probably dealing with some uncomfortable historical facticity to which they need to give a positive spin. For example, is David’s elaborate lament for Saul’s and Jonathan’s deaths just a bit much?

He is at his best with the story of Abigail, David, and Nabal, a murder mystery whodunit, where the reader is led through a series of suggestive clues. Perhaps his weakest detective work is with the relationship between David and Jonathan. Here his major argument that there was no intimacy in their interplay beyond palace intrigue is that it would have been “unthinkable.”

The not terribly flattering picture of David that emerges from all this is, of course, only credible and not certain, but one can only be grateful for such a convincing quest to uncover it.

William J. Fulco, S.J.
Loyola Marymount University, Los Angeles


John Pilch, one of the leading practitioners of the social-scientific approach to biblical texts, gathers under one cover six previously published articles along with some new material. Readers
interested in that approach will welcome this volume. P. argues that because sickness and health are common human experiences, interpreters are prone to project their own ethnocentric understanding of these realities upon biblical accounts. As a prophylactic to such projections, he prescribes application of insights from both medical and Mediterranean anthropology. Chapters 1–3 introduce anthropological terminology, concepts, and models useful for reading healing narratives. Unfortunately, the previously published articles were not sufficiently revised for their re-contextualization here. The repetitiousness that results gives the impression of disorganization and makes for an unnecessarily strenuous read.

In chapters 4–6 P. applies the health care system model to each Synoptic Gospel “to determine whether there are distinctive aspects in the individual evangelist’s system” (xii). Readers cognizant of the complex tradition history of the Gospels, however, will likely query, in what sense is it appropriate to speak of an evangelist’s “health care system”? Moreover, the application of the anthropological material to the Gospels is disappointing in its results. In the conclusions to these chapters, observations regarding healing in the particular Gospel are conspicuously few, and curiously, the model of interaction with a healer is not applied. The new material on John (chap. 7), however, stands out for the way it relates the healing accounts to the Johannine themes of light and life.

Despite its editorial shortcomings, this book equips the persevering reader with models to apply to biblical healing accounts. P. has broken new ground in bringing social-science perspectives to bear upon them, with promise of future harvest as others take up the anthropological tools he provides and join the effort. One hopes that the labors will yield a comprehensive study that, by incorporating a variety of perspectives and methods including the social-scientific, does justice to the healing narratives in their socio-cultural, historical, and literary contexts and, in so doing, affords deeper appreciation of their theological and pastoral significance.

SUSAN A. CALEF
Creighton University, Omaha

SERVE THE COMMUNITY OF THE CHURCH: CHRISTIANS AS LEADERS AND MINISTERS.

This is a welcome addition to an excellent series. Clarke offers the reader a fine study of first-century Christian leadership and ministry within the cultural milieu of early Christianity. The first part of the book analyzes specific cultural contexts of leadership: Greco-Roman cities, Roman colonies and urban areas, voluntary associations, family and household, and Jewish synagogues. It studies the social, political, and religious dimensions of leadership in each of these contexts, including the economic implications of honor and distinctions among social classes. This section of the book is carefully documented and exhibits judicious criticism.

The second part on leadership in the early Christian communities responds to those scholars who characterize the leaders of these communities in terms common to the pagan Greco-Roman world. In their opinion, Paul was typically authoritarian and manipulative. In reply, C. distinguishes between the concept of leadership embraced by the first converts on the one hand and Paul’s theory and practice on the other. The earliest converts, such as those supporting various factions in the Corinthian community, displayed a Greco-Roman idea of leadership, marked by an intense love of honor, prestige, and power. Paul, however, understood that authority is a service for the common good of the community. He exercised the authority of an apostle and father with humility, following the model of the crucified Lord, in order to lead others to recognize the glory of God.

C.’s argumentation regarding Paul’s notion of leadership is well-founded and convincing. It is striking, however, that he does not cite 1 Corinthians 12, a par-
particularly relevant text. Nor does C. explain why he gives no consideration to the discussion of leadership in the Pastoral Letters.

However, these are minor omissions and do not seriously diminish the value of this book. As a whole it is an excellent contribution to the study of Paul’s leadership, and it has strong ecumenical implications, since its best chapters are those dedicated to leadership in Jewish synagogues and to Pauline ministry within the Christian community. C.’s book can be highly recommended for courses on Pauline literature and ecclesiology.

ENRIQUE NARDONI
University of Dallas


Digeser seeks to answer the mystery of how the Roman Empire changed from persecution of Christianity to toleration in six short years (305–311). The solution was not simply a change in emperors but also a change in the ideology of government. D. suggests that Diocletian’s tetrarchy was bolstered by the philosophical monotheism of Porphyry, the Nicomedian court favorite. When Constantine dismantled the tetrarchy, he used Lactantius’s works to show that solo leadership was more in line with tradition than a tetrarchy.

D.’s hypothesis is attractive but vulnerable. Lactantius did not appeal for toleration of the Christian minority but for concord, the gradual incorporation of nonbelievers into the one true faith. If this had been Constantine’s agenda, D. cannot explain the harassment of traditional religions. If one believes Pierre Chuvin (A Chronicle of the Last Pagans), suppression of outward forms of non-Christian religiosity were nowhere near as benign as D. thinks, nor is the silence of authors prejudicial toward Christianity cogent evidence.

If D.’s intent is simply to find Lactantius a source for the period of transition from the tetrarchy to Constantine (ix-xi), she does indeed present reasons to reconsider him. She is at her best in tracing the parallels between Porphyry’s attack on Christianity, Constantine’s rhetoric of support, and the text of Lactantius’s *Divine Institutes*. Her text sparkles as she demonstrates how different versions of monotheism—whether those of Porphyry or of Lactantius—could be used in support of not only different theologies but also different modes of civil governance.

Her introductory general comments on the sources for each chapter form a helpful bibliography for the period of transition; her chapter on Lactantius’s appeal to contemporary philosophers is a mini-course on Porphyry and his circle; her book as well as the massive bibliography, by Jackson Bryce, at http://www.acad.carleton.edu/curricular/CLAS/lactantius/biblio.htm, bode well for a new look at Lactantius.

MAUREEN A. TILLEY
University of Dayton


Baudry’s prevailing hypothesis posits a Jewish Vorlage for the treatises which the ancient Church produced on the two ways, that is, the way of life and virtue divinely rewarded in the hereafter with happiness, as opposed to the way of death and vice leading to final divine retribution. B. usefully widens the question of the sources of these texts. He persuasively situates the two ways of the Bible, Jewish intertestamental literature, and early Christian writings and baptismal practice in the context of the wide diffusion of this theme in the moral, religious, and metaphysical texts of the ancient Egyptians, Persians, Greeks, and Romans. B. thus provides good evidence for a conscious choice by Greek-speaking Jewish and Christian communities to use the theme as one already familiar to the Hellenistic culture in which they found themselves. B. correctly notes the tension between ethical and ontological dualisms, both
of which the two-ways theme can convey. He rightly prefers, though without much argument, the former's stress on human freedom over the latter's often fatalistic explanation of the struggle between good and evil. But if wisdom circles influenced by Persian thought gave birth to two-ways theorization in Israel (52, 56), how can Jer. 21:8 be the first explicit biblical formulation of the two-ways theory and Deut. 30:15–20 the founding scriptural text of that theory (48–49)? His explanation of why Christians would have become disaffected from two-ways doctrine starting in the third century (103–105) depends on an unconvincing interpretation of the doctrine in the Apostolic Constitutions and neglects documentary evidence of the two ways from the fourth through the eleventh centuries. B. provides solid documentation that should interest students of the history of ideas in morality, human nature, and eschatology, as well as those researching the ancient church order literature which contains several versions of the two ways doctrine.

JOSEPH G. MUELLER, S.J.
Marquette University, Milwaukee


This volume is part of the series on medieval thinkers edited by Brian Davies in which experts in specific medieval authors provide substantial introductions to their lives, thought, and works, along with reflections on their contemporary significance. The volumes are written for college and university students who have no previous knowledge of medieval philosophy and theology.

In addition to her books on Gregory the Great, Ansehn, and Alan of Lille, Evans had already written, The Mind of St. Bernard of Clairvaux and translated selections of Bernard’s works for Paulist’s Classics of Western Spirituality series.

With chapters on Bernard’s life, monastic and academic theology, medieval exegesis, positive theology, contemporary controversies, moral theology, and political theology, E. here introduces the reader to the nature and modalities of monastic theology, as well as to the tensions between the academic theology of the universities and the affective theology pursued in monasteries. She concludes that Bernard was promoted too high too soon (entered the monastery at 22, abbot by mid-20s). He possessed great persuasive powers but had problems controlling a violent temper. He himself engaged in an active life that he would have discouraged in other monks. Overconscientious, he needed the moderating influence of William of St. Thierry. Like others of his age Bernard had no difficulty carrying inferences across the boundary of the natural and the supernatural, although he did not blur the distinction. He stands in the tradition of Augustine’s intellectual spirituality, though Bernard has an intellectual affect. In exegesis he, like everyone of his day, thought that Scripture had more than one meaning, thus he mistrusted an overly explicit interpretation. In theology he was shy of anything novel which might injure the trust of the simple faithful in Church teaching. His theological assumptions were, therefore, completely conventional. He became involved in theological controversy only when he was told it was his duty. Without malicious intent, Bernard hounded the Roman Curia where Abelard intended to seek refuge. E. presents Bernard as not only a spiritual writer but also a theologian of Church and ministry.

This highly competent book is sometimes overly technical for its intended audience, and its style is not engaging. Though written for beginners it is also useful for more advanced students as a quick reference.

KILIAN MCDONNELL, O.S.B.
Institute for Ecumenical and Cultural Research, Collegeville, Minn.

Despite Maria Maddalena de’ Pazzi’s status as both a recognized mystic and a canonized saint, until very recently there were no English translations of her works. Armando Maggi has now remedied this with a recent volume in Paulist’s Classics of Western Spirituality series, while the work here reviewed offers a sophisticated analysis of de’ Pazzi’s linguistic production and is best read as a commentary rather than as a freestanding monograph. This important contribution brings de’ Pazzi into conversation with some of the most significant postmodern theorists of language and the self, such as Lacan, Barthes, de Certeau, and Deleuze.

De’ Pazzi is unusual in that she neither wrote nor dictated the texts attributed to her; rather, words and actions she performed while in a state of rapture were recorded by others. Allegedly, when she learned of the existence of some of these texts, she burned them. M. interprets de’ Pazzi as obsessed with the desire to evoke and bring to presence the absent Word of God. In thus attempting to perform the biography of the void, her own “I” fell into that void. Finally, her most strenuous efforts only tortured her with a conviction that her poor words were participation in the betrayal of the Word. Even worse, in her view, were the mangled translations of her performances written down by her observers. In sum, her texts provide an exceedingly rich field for reflection on topics such as performance, orality, authorship, suffering, and identity—all in the context of an unusually intense manifestation of mystical experience.

M. is thoroughly immersed in the world of postmodern literary analysis, and he makes expert use of its unique vocabulary and conceptual structure to explore these topics. The book is marred somewhat by a surprising number of grammatical oddities and typographical errors. Nevertheless, this is an important study for those with an interest in the developing interpretation of mystical experience and language within postmodern thought.

MARY FROHLICHI
Catholic Theological Union, Chicago


Did Pope Pius XII speak out sufficiently during World War II regarding the Jews and other victims of Nazism? What is the role of the religious leader in time of moral crisis? With Rolf Hochhuth’s 1963 play The Deputy, these became volatile questions. In 1964, Pope Paul VI commissioned four Jesuit church historians to do direct research in the Vatican Archives. The result is twelve volumes titled Actes et documents du Saint Siège relatifs à la Seconde Guerre Mondiale (ADSS). The narrative is in French, although the documents are in their original languages.

Pierre Blet, the one surviving editor of the monumental project, has written this volume-by-volume summary in one relatively brief book, published in French in 1997. It describes Vatican diplomacy during the war, particularly in Germany, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, France, and Italy. It is clear that Pius XII made multiple efforts to use diplomatic channels to try to bring about peace. From the abundance of correspondence it is evident that he was not “silent.” He understood the Vatican’s position not as one of neutrality, which could be interpreted as indifference, “but rather of impartiality, which judges things according to truth and justice” (282).

Reading excerpts from the letters is fascinating but frustrating due to lack of documentation. There is only one footnote at the beginning of each chapter; it cites the volumes of ADSS the author is summarizing, plus a few other general works offering complementary material. Locating quotations in the original volumes is extraordinarily difficult even for scholarly readers.

B.’s benign interpretation of Pius XII is evident throughout. The pope agonized over the war and aided when he could, but his questionable actions (or lack of actions) are often rationalized by the author. The evidence suggests, for example, that Pius’s impartiality was...
less than complete, as he begged Churchill and Roosevelt not to bomb Rome but kept silent at the time of the London blitz.

In contrast to John Cornwell’s Hitler’s Pope, this volume is substantiated with intriguing primary material that illustrates the complexity of both the pope and the period. But one is still left asking: What is the role of the religious leader in time of moral crisis? Some wished for more from this leader.

MARY CHRISTINE ATHANS, B.V.M.
University of St. Thomas, Minnesota


Professors and their graduate students will find this book an engaging choice for a reading group. Based on Hodgson’s reflection on his lifetime of teaching and from an “ecumenical Reformed Christian theological perspective” (vi), the contents will help all to look at their teaching in a new light. Paideia, as defined by Horace Bushnell, is “the Lord’s way of education.” H. argues that as multidimensional critical thinking paideia leads to sophia through three fundamental elements: “critical thinking, heightened imagination, and liberating practice” (114). His wide reading of John Dewey, William Perry, Howard Gardner, and Elizabeth Johnson, among others, gives the book a breadth of insight and dialogue partners.

A bit more imagination and a bit less critical thinking, however, could improve this intriguing volume. The abstractness which at times intrudes itself in the text seems to make the book more about intelligence than wisdom, though clearly this is not H.’s intention. He intends to show how Athens with its Greek ideal of wisdom and Berlin with its Wissenschaft can enable one another, but in doing so he leaves Jerusalem behind. This is not to say that Jesus of Nazareth does not appear as a model, but as the discussion continues and becomes more abstract H. leaves Jesus behind. Feminist theologians may also find the linear use of Johnson’s sophia imagery a bit disconcerting.

Despite these drawbacks this book offers much to engage the mind and heart of both the scholarly pedagogue and the young pedagogue learning what teaching is all about.

GAILE M. POHLHAUS
Villanova University, Villanova, Pa.


Harrod, a professor of ethics and religious studies, presents an interesting glimpse of the relationships between humans and animals held by the Northern Plains Indians—Blackfeet, Crow, Cheyenne, Arapaho, Pawnee, Lakota (Sioux), Cree, Assiniboine, Mandan, Hidatsa, and Arikara—during the period of 1750–1850. Aware of the problems of deriving this image from an incomplete and flawed ethnological record, H. describes and interprets hunting practices as well as myths and rituals related to animals and human-animal interaction to explicate these peoples’ essentially religious and kinship-based relationships to the natural world.

Although sometimes falling into jargon, H. is adept at relating and interpreting this material. He suggests that our understanding of this sacred moral relationship between animals and humans can act as a subversive counter image (122) which might inspire the modern world to reevaluate and transform its now alienated relationship with nature and animal food sources. He avoids the simplistic solution of “let’s all be Indians” to sidestep the pitfalls of New Age eclecticism, naive romanticism, and cultural imperialism. The work unfortunately provides little practical advice in how this might actually be accomplished, given that America’s current population, unlike the smaller societies of the Northern Plains under examination, is religiously (and secularly) heterogeneous, predominantly urban, internally differentiated in terms of access to wealth and education, and at a
vastly greater population level than the peoples of whom H. writes. Although he does attempt to head off this problem, the work may contribute to the popular image of Natives simply (or more appropriately or gloriously) as a past people. Nevertheless, the author provides an intriguing paradigm that may inspire readers to eschew a utilitarian view of nature for one based on reciprocity through the appreciation of the thought-world of other cultures.

RAYMOND A. BUCKO, S.J.
Creighton University, Omaha


This book by a disciple of Grisez and Finnis is an articulate and trenchant defense of their philosophy. Although George succinctly and clearly summarizes pertinent parts of their thought, his book is not a secondary-source introduction. Rather, it is a first-rate extension of the Grisez-Finnis philosophy to several currently raging debates in moral, legal, and political theory by a scholar who is at ease in all three arenas.

Philosophers—lacking any sort of magisterium to decree right and wrong—try to convince one another publicly through word and print. Thus, many of the 18 essays reprinted in this volume are careful analyses of recent publications by others. G. incisively evaluates arguments by Goldsworthy on objective value; Weinreb, Hittinger, and Veatch on natural law; Wright on incommensurability; Macedo and Sullivan on homosexuality; Rawls on political liberalism; Guttman and Thompson on public disagreement; MacIntyre on relativism; Perry on human flourishing; Posner on sex; and Feinberg on legal moralism. Throughout, G. argues clearly and intelligently, seriously considering the arguments of others but also self-critically weighing his own arguments.

G. presents himself as a traditionalist who fiercely disagrees with much of the contemporary liberal agenda. He examines hot spot issues such as abortion, pornography, procreation, sodomy, and homosexual marriages. But he also argues insightfully on lofty though hardly esoteric issues such as the origin and function of law, practical and public reason, the nature of the good, free choice, self-evidence, absolute moral norms, the common good, and international government.

Advocates for Grisez-Finnis should be pleased with the astute defense G. gives against those who attack their revisionist natural-law theory. Advocates should be even more pleased with the way G. takes this philosophy beyond the usual, intrachurch debates and uses it to engage some of the finest legal, political, and philosophical minds of the English-speaking Western world. Critics too will find themselves challenged by G.’s arguments. Nevertheless, critics, like this reviewer, probably will still disagree with this approach to natural law, particularly on topics such as the nature of emotion, the meaning of “good,” incommensurability, the priority of persons over basic goods, integrity, reasonableness, free choice, the meaning of marriage and of sexual intercourse, the significance of pleasure, the compellingness of standard pro-life arguments, and the absoluteness of certain prohibitions.

EDWARD COLLINS VACEK, S.J.
Weston Jesuit School of Theology


In a postmodern world that is suspicious of normative thinking in general and moral absolutes in particular, what role can Scripture play for believers? Jersild takes seriously the challenge of contemporary historicism and the emphasis on particularity and context over against modern ideals of universal rational ethics. Biblical normative thinking makes a continuing claim on the community of believers not at the level of moral absolutes (material norms) but universal ideals (formal norms) that capture the imagination and inspire appropriate behavior. In a balanced “hermeneutics of engagement” J. insists that biblical and traditional ideals require
dialogue with contemporary culture and close attention to the context of action.

J. brings a Lutheran theological and Christocentric perspective to his Spirit ethics, showing the continuing validity of concerns about rigid legalism, justification by grace, and the centrality of the role of Spirit over letter. Accordingly, J. gives priority to biblical exhortations and imperatives over commandments, principles, and paradigms (although the latter seem to play a considerable role in his own moral reflections). Combining deontological limits and teleological goals in a community of discernment, J. argues that Scripture aims at forming the identity and character of believers. Material from Paul, with some reference to Luke and John, grounds this approach. A more generous purchase on the Synoptics might have given more content to the normative reflection inspired by the Spirit of Jesus. Finally, J. judiciously tests his method on three neuralgic issues: physician assisted suicide, homosexuality, and the potential applications of progress in human genetics. This carefully written work will bring the best of Lutheran theology to upper division undergraduates and seminary students.

WILLIAM C. SPOHN
Santa Clara University


The New Testament includes many texts that seem to be offensive or just plain wrong on the issues of sexuality and gender. Watson addresses three of the most controversial texts and proposes to find the kernel of truth in each. His method is to devote one chapter to contemporary authors in order to tease out problems in our current thinking, and then to return to one of the controversial scriptural texts for a better view. Although he is a New Testament scholar, W. tends to discount conflicting scriptural texts as well as the theological views that build on those texts. He hopes to show that the scriptural text itself, “despite its manifest intentions” (7), contributes to a healthy sexual ethic.

As a foil for 1 Corinthians 11, W. develops the ambivalence of Virginia Woolf over whether women should choose to be critical outsiders or engaged participants. For W. the veil imposed on women in the Corinthian assembly resolves this ambivalence. The veil is actually a symbol of women’s authority because it enables them to speak without being turned into an object of the male gaze.

As a foil for Romans 7, W. develops the ambivalence of Freud over whether sex is good and to be encouraged or whether it is a force to be controlled and repressed. Against a one-sided celebration of sexual love, W. claims that the negative counterpart of the love commandment must be Paul’s “You shall not desire” (185).

As a foil for Ephesians 5, W. presents both Luce Irigaray’s protest that women lose themselves through sex and her vision that in eros humanity is divinized and divinity is incarnated (184). To the contrary, for W., “behind the facade of an order” in which wives are to be subordinate to their husband’s headship, the Pauline substance is mutual love (246) and the creatureliness of eros. W.’s failure to analyze the terms “agape” and “eros” creates a certain fuzziness. Often his arguments are not persuasive, and the points he tries to make are sometimes obscure. Nevertheless, he makes his case that these three “bad” texts in the New Testament still contain some truth useful for sexual ethics.

EDWARD COLLINS VACEK, S.J.
Weston Jesuit School of Theology


This scholarly book, about the philosophy of diagnosis, sets out to prove that the strict separation between fact and value in medicine is no longer defensible. All scientific facts have a value component and interrelate in medical diagnosis. The key to understanding this
interaction of fact and value in diagnosis is a new form of realism called “value-dependent realism” which “tries to mediate between the scientism of some types of scientific realism and the relativism of pure social constructivism” (5). This metaphysical theory about the nature of disease and diagnosis examines how value judgments can be foundational in determining a diagnosis without losing the sense that diseases are real entities. Stempsey argues that, when physicians make a diagnosis, they are dealing not only with pure facts but also with four levels of values embedded in the biomedical problem they are trying to diagnose. These four levels of values are foundational values of scientific theories, the conceptual values of the concept of disease, the nosological values of the classification of disease, and the diagnostic values of the process of diagnosis. S. makes a strong argument for value realism, that certain values are objective values and ought to be held by everyone. Therefore, medical facts, even though they are built upon values, can reflect an objective reality. For the value-dependent realist, agreement on facts depends on agreement about the underlying values.

One strength of this book is that it gives a concise survey and evaluation of various theories and positions—-theories of value justification, metaphysics of disease, history of illness, etc. S. also incorporates various medical examples to make salient points. The issue of “diagnostic dogmatism” plays a key role throughout the book. The concepts of disease and diagnosis are value laden. Values permeate the medical world. The problem is that our medical schools are training future physicians to rely on scientific method alone. Physicians need to be aware of the values and also the biases they bring to the practice of medicine. S.’s evaluation of history-taking, physical diagnosis, and laboratory testing is right on the mark. A physician’s interpretation of the history of an illness, physical findings, and diagnostic tests involves values. The criticism of physicians for the unnecessary amount of diagnostic testing being done on patients today, which S. refers to as the “glut of data,” is also very accurate. However, he fails to mention the physician’s fear of litigation. In this age of litigation, failure to perform a test may result in a charge of malpractice.

This is an important book for physicians, philosophers, and clinical ethicists. Making these individuals aware of the interrelationship between facts and values, and making the four levels of values that reside in diagnosis more explicit and precise can only make the science of diagnosis more precise as well as prognosis and treatment more effective. This is in the best interest of all parties.

PETER A. CLARK, S.J. Saint Joseph’s University, Philadelphia


Concise, reliable, comprehensive histories of a field of study require a breadth of knowledge which is usually the result of a life’s work in that field. Such is this work which begins with the Hippocratic tradition, includes the development of medical ethics in India and China, and concludes with the empirically based discipline we now call bioethics. Jonsen describes major figures and texts, but what is most helpful is the story of the changing context of medical ethics that then shapes the various emphases on the character of a good physician, on duties and codes that should govern the practice of medicine, and on broader issues of justice and the physician’s role in society.

As all good narratives, this history is made lively by the competing responses to the changes that demand new or further definitions of health and medicine. These changes include the separation of literate medicine from faith healing, the development of institutions to care for the poor, professionalization (beginning with medieval guilds), the power of church and state to set and enforce standards, the challenge of care in the midst of plagues, and the advent of new medical procedures and technologies (for example, surgical anesthesia; undertaking, empirical, medical experiments; organ transplants; life-sustaining technologies;
and in vitro fertilization). Altogether these changes moved medical ethics away from a primary concern with decorum and the good physician toward concern with weighing conflicting consequences and so with who will benefit and who should decide. Thus respect for the autonomy of the patient and questions of social justice mark contemporary bioethics.

This book is to be highly recommended for those working in bioethics, for courses in bioethics, and, more broadly, for those concerned with how a professional ethic is actually formed and constructively developed. In considering the study and development of other professional ethics—such as clergy ethics—this masterful text points to what is required.

TIMOTHY F. SEDGWICK
Virginia Theological Seminary, Alexandria, Va.


Gregg presents in eight chapters a careful study of modern Roman Catholic social teaching and explores John Paul II's/Karol Wojtyla's contributions to this tradition. He addresses the complex question of development in these teachings and creatively analyzes how Wojtyla's own ideas, writings, and life experiences may have influenced such development. G. pursues a "comparative exegetical analysis" (21) of conciliar, encyclical, and other texts in an effort to identify key areas of theoretical development in official Church social pronouncements. G. examines landmark documents, among them Gaudium et spes, Rerum novarum, Populorum progressio, Sollicitudo rei socialis, Laborem exercens, Centesimus annus, and others. He also explores Wojtyla's writings before his election as pope, including The Acting Person, Sign of Contradiction, Love and Responsibility, and lesser known selections from his poetry. G.'s excellent analysis of the Roman Catholic documents and of Wojtyla's writings deepens our understanding of this literature.

The book focuses on economic and business issues and identifies three topics (industrial relations, capitalism, and relations between developed and developing nations) to test its central thesis, that John Paul II has indeed developed Catholic social teaching "via a dialogue with the modern world" (221) and contributes greater depth to its "moral-anthropological" (219) vision of the human person in society. G. contends that Wojtyla's life experiences and writings prior to his election as pope have influenced this development, which envisions the human person as gifted with great moral freedom and responsibility in social life. G. sees him influencing the encyclical Laborem exercens in an "almost systematic" way (225). G.'s discussions of capitalism, entrepreneurship, and solidarity are nuanced and insightful, but he is less successful in his critiques of leading Catholic social thinkers (e.g. Gregory Baum) because of inadequate substantiation or development.

This book shows signs of its origins as a doctoral dissertation: many direct quotations from original sources, restatements of arguments, and a technical style. The unusual bullet-points might distract some readers, but G. has written a very sound book about a complex and important subject. G.'s study and extensive bibliography will assist scholars, graduate students, and others interested in John Paul II's thought and the rich, yet still developing, Roman Catholic social tradition.

FRANCIS T. HANNAFEY, S.J.
Fairfield University, Connecticut


Weaving together Michael Novak's neoliberalism, Emmanuel Mounier's incarnational personalism, and Martin Weitzman's notions of profit-sharing
More of a critique of Catholic social thought than a commentary on Christian social ethics, B.’s text begins by revealing how Catholic social teaching has promoted a particular paternalist, authoritarian welfare system throughout the 20th century. This system, he maintains is defective because it is based on a moral theory devoid of robust economic evidence and experience. He shows how economic evidence actually refutes certain notions of the economy commonly held by church leaders and recommends (in part 3), a different trajectory for the Church: a blend of Christian personalism and the profit-sharing capitalism that took hold in many parts of the U.S. in the 1990s.

In part 2, B. nicely describes the salient points of John Rawls’s *A Theory of Justice*, Michael Walzer’s *Spheres of Justice*, and Robert Nozick’s *Anarchy, State, and Utopia*. He tersely and insightfully evaluates each of these works, mainly to establish his own recommended synthesis of Christian personalism and profit-sharing capitalism, which he explains clearly and convincingly in part 3.

This provocative work challenges certain aspects of Catholic social teaching on the economy. Although part 2’s political philosophy and part 3’s heavy emphasis on economics will test nonacademicians, the text is accessible to a wide audience. In the end, readers will likely find that this book advances moral theology’s understanding of complex socio-economic issues.

**Martin Calkins, S.J.**
Santa Clara University

**Gary Macy**
University of San Diego

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Rarely does a scholar take the trouble to place a medieval writer’s thought in the context of both its historical and theological settings. This study is a delightful exception. William of St. Thierry was one of the greatest of the 12th-century monastic theologians and made major contributions to the theology of the Eucharist. Yet his theology cannot be understood, as is true for most monastic theologians, apart from his larger purpose of detailing the mystical journey of humans into the inner life of the Trinity. Rougé carefully and thoughtfully presents William’s theology within the context that William intended. The result is a depiction of his theology as a serious and successful attempt to preserve a true sacramental approach dependent on both Origen and Augustine. While insisting on the real presence of the body and blood of Christ in the Eucharist, William understood that this corporeal presence, as indeed all bodily presence, is a necessary door that opens to the more important spiritual state that even our bodies will one day share with God in heaven. It is the latter, always, which is the permanent res of the former ephemeral sacramentum (to use William’s terminology).

R. elicits this theology by leading the reader through William’s work from three separate standpoints. First, he studies the references to the Eucharist in each of his works; next he teases out the indirect eucharistic symbolism contained in these works; and finally he attempts to uncover how the Eucharist fits into William’s overall presentation of the mystical journey which is salvation. This method makes for a thorough, if sometimes redundant, presentation.

This excellent work would be much enhanced if the notes had provided William’s original Latin rather than French translations.

**Gary Macy**
University of San Diego


Wilson-Kastner has chosen drama as root-metaphor for interpretation of the eucharistic liturgy (12ff.) and presumed that readers will recognize spirituality to be at the center of religious experience.
In a sense there is nothing new in this slender book which draws from a range of authors to present an ecumenically agreed-upon understanding of the Church’s eucharistic celebration. Nevertheless, how communities express a liturgical spirituality is challenged by the author’s humorous analysis of very human assemblies and the sharing of pastoral strategies to develop inclusivity and justice.

For whom is this engaging book, by a former professor of preaching at a leading Episcopalian seminary, written? It may be intended for colleagues in pulpits and students in courses; examples are drawn chiefly from Episcopalian and Church of Christ liturgies. The final chapter is the finest. Isak Dinesen’s “Babette’s Feast” and Pierre Teilhard de Chardin’s “Mass on the World” convey in images the cosmic and eschatological content of the Church’s feast.

Besides the drama metaphor, readers might well query how anamnesis “renews” the “event of redemption” (46) and how a sermon is prayer (64, 73). More stimulating is the rehearsal of the meaning of sacrifice and the Church’s sacrificial meal (89 ff.). Amidst minor typographical lapses, Debuyst is misspelled (141 n. 38) and “intussusception” (10) is an addition to the reviewer’s vocabulary.

MARY M. SCHAEFER
Atlantic School of Theology, Halifax


Raposa admits that boredom is not a sufficiently inclusive term to identify his subject: Boredom, desolation, and dryness in prayer can be part of the “dark night” that leads to mystical union, but the same state resembles the acedia that was considered a capital sin. Likewise a sense of “nothing matters” can be a moment of religious insight (the vanity of all things), but it can also indicate a boredom close to despair. Repetitious phrases in prayer can free the mind to rise to new heights, but the same repetition can induce a numbing stupor. In any case, endless stimulation leads to an overload, and the person who avoids all boredom drowns in meaningless diversions.

R. treats boredom as a failure of the imagination, and he introduces elements from the psychology of Peirce (subject of an earlier work by R.) to claim that imagination is involved in all perception, that is, the object is never simply “given.” The religious imagination is one that can recognize the emptiness of its own images; it has been brought to emptiness and silence and must proceed from there. One can then recognize the “sign” of God’s will in future experience.

Boredom/acedia was once a subject of great religious interest, but recent generations have ignored it. Not only does R. do well in bringing it to our attention, but he would seem to be the first to unite considerations of it from many spiritual traditions. A familiarity with Peirce would help in understanding R.’s conclusions and some additional examples would clarify his meaning. Still, this remains a highly original and seminal work in a neglected field.

THOMAS M. KING, S.J.
Georgetown University, D.C.


Rosanvallon brings remarkable historical and philosophical knowledge to this study of the welfare state in France and, to some extent, the United States. It is especially timely since in 2001 Con-
gress is to reauthorize the 1996 welfare reform act, which greatly needs reform.

R. recognizes, as does Nathan Glazer in his introduction, both the differences between social assistance in France and the U.S. and some similarities in problems both face. I believe more should have been made of the differences, since France is a well developed welfare state in comparison with the U.S. The former, for example, has much lower poverty rates, much broader health care coverage and greater equity in income distribution than the U.S. (see the Luxembourg Income Study, http://www.lis.ceps).

In R.’s judgment, as a liberal seeking to renew the left in France, the welfare state is no longer viable. Social programs such as unemployment insurance, health insurance, and retirement pensions are becoming too expensive because of increasing life expectancy, declining birth rates, and high unemployment—the latter, an ongoing problem in France.

Philosophically, R. takes a social contract approach to social policy, but girds it with an emphasis on solidarity (his translation of fraternité). This emphasis upholds a value stressed by John Paul II but not much emphasized in the U.S. R. believes social assistance reform today should: (1) respect the law of 1793 which stated that “Every man has the right to his subsistence by labor if he is able-bodied; by gratuitous aid if he is unable to work” (69); (2) treat people as unique individuals with their distinctive life trajectories, while avoiding “transforming the welfare state into the management and supervision of behaviors” (102); and (3) maintain solidarity, including recipients of social assistance in the community. The challenge is to develop social policies that aim at the social impact of individual behavior and not moral correction. This is a very difficult balance to achieve!

EDWARD J. RYLE
Arizona Catholic Conference, Phoenix


Elford successfully argues that theology always arises out of a pastoral concern. The real task of theology is to create within a wider context “local theologies which bring the liberating power of the gospel to bear on the actual circumstances of people’s lives” (6).

E. skillfully traces the pastoral concerns of Augustine, Luther, and Barth: for Augustine, the collapse of the Roman Empire and the accusations against Christianity of undermining the state; for Luther, a new anthropocentric learning of the Renaissance which evoked an openness of spirit and inquiry unfettered by ecclesiastical or institutional control; and for Barth, the outbreak of World War I and the manifesto of German intellectuals who identified themselves with the war policies of Kaiser Wilhelm II. In each case these “pastors” created a new theological synthesis to respond to the urgent need of caring for souls.

Here E. limits himself to the major Protestant strands and might have broadened his claims by examining the pastoral nature of the theological investigations of Catholic “pastors,” such as Karl Rahner and Johannes Baptist Metz. He does, however, engage a very broad and convincing dialogue with Hinduism, Islam, and Buddhism by describing, in each case, their view of the human person, society, and the world.

In subsequent chapters, E. also shows how the biblical tradition, theological conversation with contemporary culture, the social dimension of human welfare, and morality are all an integral aspect of pastoral care.

This text has profound implications for all of theology and should not be relegated to the periphery nor to the realm of applied theology. It releases theology from its, at times, hothouse environment and reengages it in the murky, incarnate, fleshy reality of all human life before God.

PATRICK J. HOWELL, S.J.
Seattle University

THE PASTORAL NATURE OF THEOLOGY:
AN UPHOLDING PRESENCE. By R. John

THEOLOGICAL STUDIES