
There is no easy way to go through a book like Proverbs where the repetition of sayings one after another can have “a benumbing effect on the unwary reader” (xix). It is often judged to be of limited value and application, unable to sustain the reader’s interest, and overshadowed by the challenging content of such wisdom books as Job and Qoheleth. To study this biblical book successfully, one needs a careful and informative road-map. This Murphy provides with skill and insight throughout his analysis, encouraging sensitivity to the sometimes hidden perspectives and truths of the sayings.

The commentary is well organized. The essential background knowledge for this book (authorship, literary forms, Egyptian and Mesopotamian influences, and such) is presented in a short “Introduction,” followed by the exposition of and commentary on the text. Special issues are presented more thematically and in greater depth at the end of the commentary in nine “Excursuses.” Another helpful feature is the inclusion of a full translation of Proverbs after the “Introduction.” This is in addition to the smaller portions of text included with each section of the exposition. Thus the reader always has the fuller context of passages available and can easily explore other references in the biblical text. A “Bibliography” of current scholarship precedes the exposition of the texts, followed by four sections that provide varying levels of information. “Notes” discusses textual issues, while “Form/Structure/Setting” presents formal literary characteristics. “Comment” gives a verse-by-verse (or verse-group by verse-group) analysis of meaning, and the concluding “Explanation” summarizes the section in a more thematic way.

In effect, the volume is a collection of collections. M. concurs with general scholarly opinion that the short sayings (chaps. 10–29) are, for the most part, of pre-exilic origin, while the first nine chapters, composed as an introduction to the sayings, come from the post-exilic period. For these reasons Solomon cannot be considered the author of the book, but beyond that the question of authorship cannot be determined. As for the origins of the collections of sayings themselves, oral tradition was surely operative, but so was literary activity, as is clearly evident in certain sections (e.g., the poems on Wisdom in chaps. 1 and 9, and the acrostic poem on the wife, 31:10–31). The question whether schools or family circles had more influence on the process of the transmission and composition of the sayings is still an open one. There is no hard archeological evidence for schools in ancient Israel, and M. “locates” the lessons of the book as being taught in a family setting—parents to children.

One of the more distinguishing and very useful features of this commen-
tary is its striking translation, which makes clear the dramatic juxtaposition of words, and phrases characteristic of the sayings, what M. calls ‘the staccato effect of the Hebrew’ (xxiv). The impact and force of the sayings, their rich ambiguity, and their paradoxes and concrete imagery, are all captured in this translation, something often lost in more formal English translations. Proverbs 17:27 is a simple example. Compare these three translations:

A knowledgeable man is sparing with his words;  
A man of understanding is reticent. (JPS)  
One who spares words is knowledgeable;  
One who is cool in spirit has understanding. (NRSV)  
Whoever moderates his words, a knowing person,  
And the cool of spirit, an understanding person. (Murphy)

The actual juxtaposition of the phrases in Hebrew is brought out more clearly in M.’s version. The identification of subject and predicate is actually less clear in the Hebrew. The biblical text is more ambiguous and challenging. M.’s command of the complexities of the Hebrew enlivens our appreciation of the power and allusive quality of the sayings.

In his exposition of the sayings M. lays to rest the idea that there are few if any pertinent insights from Proverbs. It is true that no one proverb says it all; it is not the nature of proverbial language. Even though the truths expressed are limited in scope, they are meant to challenge our thinking. The many, seemingly unconnected sayings, represent the myriad decisions about living the virtuous life that call for reflection, response, and action. In Proverbs wisdom is a “dialogue with God that takes place essentially through human experience and creation” (272).

This commentary is well worth studying. It presents the broad spectrum of scholarship on Proverbs, appreciates the expressive style of the sayings, and limns the contours of the theological insights they contain.

Dominican House of Studies, Washington  
THOMAS P. MCCREEESH, O.P.


Clearly echoing the contents and perspectives of earlier and much lauded editions of his Understanding the Old Testament, Anderson has taken a 1982 course outline from his teaching days at Princeton Theological Seminary and expanded the material into this full length summary of his thought dedicated to his late colleague, George Ernest Wright.

As a sign of his awareness of contemporary debates, A. initiates the work
with an explanation for his choice of the term “Old Testament” in the book’s title, since all proposed alternatives remain ultimately unsatisfactory in his mind, and moreover, his personal perspective throughout the book is that of a Christian believer. References to events or personages of the New Testament are introduced far more frequently than would have been the case in the popular Understanding. Nevertheless, A. works to allow Israel’s faith to speak in its own voice, and therefore ultimately affirms that the Old Testament is “validated” (337), but not fulfilled in the New.

A. also recognizes that his thought has developed against a background of his discipline’s methodological uncertainty in the field of biblical theology, and thus terms his work “an experiment” (28) based on his “laboratory tests” in the classroom since 1968. After all these years, however, I suspect that the proposed tentative character of such a description is no longer accurate, at least not in the sense suggested.

Review of the book’s major sections will demonstrate the familiarity of its contents and the virtual predictability of its treatment. Thus, after briefly addressing some methodological questions, A. affirms Yahweh as the Holy One of Israel, and then moves to a concise yet comprehensive description of the three classical covenants, namely the Abrahamic together with its extension into the priestly theology of a Divine Tabernacle Presence and its theology of sacrificial atonement, the Mosaic theology of covenant together with its Deuteronomic vision of obligation, and finally the Davidic covenant with its theology of Divine cosmic rule in Zion. Each section concludes with a brief treatment of the prophetic voices traditionally associated with that theological tradition. I found those sections eminently clear and useful for anyone seeking an understanding of the major theological traditions of Israel’s faith and sacred writings. These summaries were enjoyable and very smoothly written. Historical development is recognized, but without preoccupation with such questions. The influence of A.’s mentor Muilenburg is evident.

The final section briefly acknowledges the crisis of covenantal theologies caused by Israel’s suffering and the radical doubt regarding the ongoing Divine Presence resulting from the successive victories of Assyria and Babylon, followed by the description of Israel’s movement from torah to wisdom and from prophecy to apocalyptic. The work concludes with a presentation of the apocalyptic triumph of Jesus Christ. This final section illustrates A.’s conviction that the Old Testament merely possesses “relative independence” and exists in a partial discontinuity whose chasm can only be bridged by the Petrine confession of Mark 8:27–30. This Christian perspective is also evidenced by the manner in which the work is spiced with regular references to popular Christian hymns.

Those familiar with recent writings in the field will be interested in A.’s critique of Brueggemann’s Theology of the Old Testament (1997), highlighting the limitations of a method à la Ricoeur that is restricted to the text rather than the reality behind it, of any sociological approach that is unable
to claim a revelatory character for such a text, and of a literary/rhetorical
treatment that “brackets out all questions of historicity” (22–27).
Perhaps the surprise of the book is the fact that there are very few
surprises for anyone familiar with A.’s work over the decades. With the
exception of a few references to contemporary issues such as homosexu-
ality, support for feminist efforts to introduce inclusive language as an
antidote to biblical patriarchalism, and the repeated citation of Jon Lev-
enson’s Sinai and Zion to recognize professedly Jewish scholarship, the
bibliographical citations form a list of recognized scholars from earlier
decades.
The reference to the works of Joshua through 2 Kings as the “Latter
Prophets” (137) must be a typographical error. The index of subjects is
limited to a half page. The work ends with a tribute to Wright entitled “The
Relevance of Archaeology to Biblical Theology” (Appendix 2) that rec-
ommends revisiting the theory behind “the God who acts” and affirms the
inescapability of the fundamental historical dimension of Israel’s faith.
Without any disrespect to a major figure of scholarship over the past 40
years, the work is a fine summary of the work of its era.

Archdiocese of Milwaukee

THE CONCEPT OF BIBLICAL THEOLOGY: AN OLD TESTAMENT PERSPECTIVE.

The precision, scope, and competence of previous publications by Barr
lead us to expect a work of great quality. This is such a work, presented as
a text book, written in exceptionally readable English and organized in a
form that makes consultation easy. The title suggests an a priori, philo-
sophical approach to the subject. The book begins with three chapters
establishing categories, definitions, and types, but draws its materials from
publications of biblical scholars examined in minute detail and in different
contexts, in order to argue to an accurate evaluative history of biblical
theology. B. includes a 41-page bibliography and shows extensive inside
knowledge of Protestant theology, theologians, and seminaries. Catholic
scholars will find this a thorough introduction to the world of Protestant
theology.

Chapter 4 makes the point that biblical theology must have a wider
definition than one drawn from works purporting to present the Old Test-
ament in one or two volumes. Such works comprehend too vast a reality
and are constrained to narrow their focus. Chapter 5 discusses the key
distinction between theology and biblical theology. B.’s own view in 1988
was that biblical theology is not theology at all since it is essentially an
organizing of biblical material, whereas theology consists of “the construc-
tion, criticism and refining of our concepts of God in Christ and in the
Church” (73). Characteristically of this book, the author cites even his own
view in the context of the history of thought: i.e., his support of Barthian
dialectical theology at that time, whereas he is now critical of Barth. Against Barth he argues that the “two aspects, reasoned support and criticism, which are the opposite ends of the same axis, would have helped to make a meaningful distance between biblical and doctrinal theology. The former would explicate the connections within the biblical material, its coherence and its basis in the theological thinking of biblical times. Doctrinal theology on the other hand would make clear how far the biblical material is believed to correspond to the external, extra-biblical, reality which is the real object of faith” (74, emphasis added). This important distinction parallels one, more traditional in Catholic authors, between “theology in obliquo” and “theology in recto,” where the former is founded on scholarship and the latter on personal conversion. B. goes on to assert that “The source [of the Bible] is a theological tradition which preceded the bible and accompanied it, guiding and influencing its utterances, as well as following it. Precisely its ability to identify and describe this tradition, or at least its aspiration to do so, is the justification and meaning of biblical theology.”

We are then treated to a focused history of discussions in the past half-century dealing with the place of historical thinking: first, the notion of evolution of thought, and second, the vexed conflict between theological method and the history of religions. For the second alone he cites positions of 69 different authors, maintaining in the text a clear line of argument and critical evaluation. He presents extensively and favorably the position of Rainer Albertz and, here as elsewhere, shows deference for the thought of Brevard Childs, not only by returning to his work frequently but also by contesting his positions more searchingly than others. He takes care to clarify the role of critical history within a faith-informed theology.

There follow 13 chapters, each of which discusses Old Testament theology in relation to some other cluster of concepts (e.g., natural theology, historical theology, systematic thought, story, Judaism). Finally, 13 chapters evaluate the positions of specific current authors or special problems. In all of this, each operative concept (biblical, theology, historical, truth, faith, systematic, etc.) has numerous legitimate definitions, and B. exploits these to critique various authors. The meaning of such words is subtly determined and modified by its relations to surrounding concepts. For example, even a simple concrete phrase such as “New Testament” sometimes denotes a specific book, and at other times denotes a canon; a reader who inadvertently slips from one to the other moves the discussion a couple of centuries and thus distorts the logic of that paragraph. One would have welcomed a fixed grid of interrelated definitions so that the reader might confidently relate each phase of discussion to the general topic and to other phases. That may not be possible in a book faithful to historical precision, describing a respected tradition by presenting a variety of authors and schools, using their words and concepts as they occur, and critiquing them in their own terms. B. gives us critical history, not system. In so doing he meets the need he identified as early as 1961: “What was necessary as I saw it, was not a new method (for biblical theology), but a
correction of aberrations which had crept unnoticed into existing method” (236). Still, because of his lucidity and concern to report accurately, the reader is able to grasp with ever increased clarity B.’s own concept of biblical theology situated in its intellectual context. This book does for the canon of modern biblical scholars something close to what its author would have biblical theology do for the Bible.

Concordia University, Montreal

SEAN MCEVENUE


This book is the serious, thoughtful, and mature work of a serious and mature scholar. It is, as always the case with Clark’s work, wonderfully written, thoroughly researched, tightly yet creatively conceptualized. It is a major contribution to research on and general thinking about early Christian asceticism and Scripture and a complex of related topics and issues. The book will surely be well received and will be much discussed and drawn upon by scholars in religious and theological studies in general (especially those interested in religion and culture, religion and theory), and by those who study early Christianity in particular (especially early Christian asceticism).

C.’s critical command of and balanced judgments about the complex and vast scope of primary and secondary interpretive literature and theoretics are most impressive. The book reflects her erudition and critical acumen, but without the all-too-typical attendant pedantry. The writing is for the most part clear and crisp; reading it is a most pleasant esthetic experience.

The book adds much to patristic scholarship in general and ongoing studies in early Christian asceticism in particular yet also challenges, stretches, and modifies such studies, making them even more complex. The volume reflects both continuity with a tradition of scholarship and in some respects a dramatic break from such tradition. It models the best of patristic scholarship even as it models to some degree an important turn away from it—from philological and historical-theological methods and their agenda to an open if measured embrace of critical sociohistorical and literary-rhetorical theory and power analysis.

The very conceptualization of the book—a reading of the readings—represents a critical turn. For too long studies in asceticism have been fairly flat readings, viz., they have been about the pursuit of the (historical-theological) “facts,” seemingly oblivious to the artful, sometimes veiled power strategies employed in order to define and win the (social-theological-political-discursive) battles. C. is not the first scholar to signify in this regard, but her book, as far as I can determine, is the first fully comprehensive single-book treatment of the phenomenon with focus upon asceticism and Scripture. With its appearance no serious student of early
Christian asceticism can avoid addressing the issue of the politics and the rhetorical-exegetical artfulness involved in the construction of late ancient Christian ascetic theologies, ideologies, and institutions.

After surveying the history of the study of asceticism and the history of reading for asceticism, C. discusses the exegetical and hermeneutical strategies employed by a number of patristic authors in their readings of selected Old Testament and New Testament texts, primarily those associated with Paul and his school. These reading strategies reflect different ascetic ideologies and orientations, focused mainly upon celibacy. C.’s reading of the late ancient Christian authors’ readings—creatively informed by a number of modern and contemporary reading theories—opens a window onto facets and dynamics of early Christian life. Her sensitivity to the power and politics of rhetorical formations is sharp and sharply worded and makes her book all the more honest and poignant. She is also rather convincing on all the major arguments.

Although C. makes it clear that her primary focus in the book is asceticism and how ascetic ideologies are constructed, the nonetheless double focus upon asceticism and Scripture makes the book most fascinating and, for further work on the issues, most promising. The double focus represents an attempt to illuminate the one complex phenomenon through attention to the other. This approach seemed to promise the possibility of pushing the thinking about each phenomenon onto a higher level of sophistication and self-reflexivity, far beyond the usual interminable angst over or settling for rather simple definitions. Here these two rather complex phenomena are explained not in frozen isolation, but in relationship to each other, the one opening windows onto aspects of the dynamics of the other. The ascetic politics and orientations of certain individuals and groups in a certain cultural context are explained in relationship to certain “scripturalizing” practices, ideologies, and politics, including the privileging of certain texts and stories; the phenomenon of Scripture is explained in terms of certain ascetic practices, ideologies, and politics. Although not consistently balanced throughout the book—there were discussions that seemed to take for granted the meaning and politics of references to “the Scriptures”—this double focus on the whole was brilliantly argued and, I predict, will make a significant impact on the way we think about the invention of asceticism and the Scriptures.

Union Theological Seminary, New York

VINCENT L. WIMBUSH


Osiek translates Whittaker’s critical text of the Shepherd of Hermas and bases her commentary upon it. Her translation is clear and accurate, and her commentary masterful. O. rejects the recent theories of multiple au-
Authorship advanced separately by Giet and Coleborne and agrees with Brox. She holds the single authorship of the work and maintains it was composed in several stages and redactions in the order in which the parts are now arranged. She argues that the literary genre of the *Shepherd of Hermas* is an apocalypse in the sense in which John J. Collins and David Hellholm define the term. The apocalyptic character of the work is clearest in the *Visions*. However, otherworldly messages and eschatological warnings continue throughout the *Mandates* and even into the third part, the *Similitudes*, which is structured around images interpreted allegorically. Yet the third section of the work is filled with commandments, and many of the *Similitudes* end with prescriptive teaching. Hermas’s goal in this apocalyptic writing is to reshape the Church by bringing listeners to the point of openheartedness in which they can change.

The underlying oral patterns present in the original use of the text account for its loose structure. Alert to the research of Jack Goody, Mary Beard, and Joanna Daly, O.’s commentary sensitively reflects a new understanding of the oral use of texts in early Christianity. Only a small percentage of the population—mainly males—was literate. Christian texts were dictated orally and proclaimed orally to a group of people. Rarely would the written text be changed, but there would be interaction between the written version and the oral presentation, so that eventually additions were made to the written text. These additions reflect the characteristics of oral style, e.g., additive rather than subordinative structure, redundancy, and practicality of examples. After careful argument O. concludes that the work is of Roman origin and developed over a period of 60 years stretching from the last decade of the first century to the middle of the second century.

The *Shepherd of Hermas* reflects the social context of Roman Christianity during the period of its composition. The Roman church community was widely diverse both ethnically and theoretically, heavily influenced by a strong Jewish component, predominantly Greek-speaking and belonging to the nonelite classes of the great city. Hermas, the author of the work is a freedman, and his writing is a mixture of biography and literary reflection, so that his family becomes a mirror of the whole community. O. convincingly argues that there is no direct relationship between the *Shepherd* and *Barnabas, Didache*, the *Doctrina Apostolorum*, or the teachings of Elchasai.

O.’s major contribution is her placing the theology of the *Shepherd* in its proper historical context. She sees the work as reflecting popular religiosity while underscoring the role of orality in the early Christian tradition. Three brief examples will suffice to show this.

Throughout the commentary O. uses the word *conversion* to translate the Greek term *metanoia*. She does so to emphasize that the text cannot be used to establish the beginning of a church discipline of penitence. The attitude of repentance is a fundamental Jewish and Christian value. The change that Hermas wants to inculcate is not a ritual or repetitive action but a fundamental personal change in the sinning Christian.
Second, O. holds that the *Shepherd of Hermas* does not clearly distinguish between the Son of God and the Holy Spirit. In the parable of the fifth *Similitude* and its interpretation there is an awareness of a triad of Father, Spirit, and Son. They are quite distinct characters with different roles to play. Yet, according to the parable, the Holy Spirit is God’s original son, the one later called Son of God, the son subsequently becoming the Spirit’s brother by an act of God. In the *Shepherd* pneumatology is more prominent than Christology, and clearly its author’s goal is not to build a speculative or systematic Christology. In the *Shepherd* Christology serves the parenetic purpose of building up the Church. It is a very undeveloped adoptionist Christology, or more accurately, a monotheistic theology with roles for a preexistent but not necessarily divine spirit and the exalted Son of God.

Third, O. insists that the two aspects of the Church, the heavenly or ideal and the earthly or imperfect, are not presented in distinctly different parts of the *Shepherd*. It is precisely the point and particular insight of the *Shepherd* to see that both aspects of the Church are represented throughout the ecclesial images. The Church is both ideal and real at the same time. While the Church is an eschatological mystery it is also a communion of people both living and dead, of mixed spiritual quality, with need for improvement. In the ninth *Similitude* the associations made of woman, tower, Church, Holy Spirit, and Son of God bring together the transcendent and historical aspects of the Church.

Hermas is instructed by the woman Church who in the process is both heavenly revealer and the one rejuvenated through conversion. He is therefore taught not by the ideal, heavenly Church in an isolated sense, but by the converting Church, in the process and on the way. Hermas learns as much from the historical, imperfect Church as from its idealized form, and he learns through its sufferings as well as its triumphs.

The tower, the cosmic willow tree, and the twelve mountains are the three principal images of the Church in the *Shepherd*. Each image serves as a symbol with its own integrity, yet each points in the same direction. Different kinds of people, more and less holy, inhabit the Church. Their interdependence is made clearest in the predominant image of the tower. Only acceptable stones can go into the construction of the tower because the quality of each stone affects the whole. Thus, the central message of the *Shepherd* is conversion, a call to communal, ecclesial examination of conscience. Though there is no ecclesiastical discipline of penance, conversion is situated in an ecclesial context. There is no conversion except in the Church, and no Church except of those on the way to conversion.

O.’s command of the literature, balance of judgment, and clarity of exposition make this volume a worthy contribution to the scholarly Hermeneia series.

*Loyola Marymount University, Los Angeles*  
HERBERT J. RYAN, S.J.
Schneider has taken on the formidable task of tracing developments in early extra- and post-biblical Christian thinking about the resurrection of the dead. The genesis of her work was a dissertation defended within the Catholic Theological Faculty at the University of Bonn. Noting that one must overcome considerable difficulties in order to draw definitive conclusions from a rich trove of sources, she proceeds by distinguishing intramural, extramural, and also chronological development. The first part of her work studies development “within the Church.” It analyzes the letter from the Roman church known as 1 Clement, the Didache, the epistles of Ignatius of Antioch and of Polycarp, the Epistle of Barnabas, and the so-called 2 Clement. The second part treats developments that emerged in the course of “evangelization and missions” to the non-Christian Hellenistic world. It investigates the writings of selected Apologists, including Aristides, Justin Martyr, Tatian, Athenagoras, and Theophilus, and the treatises on resurrection attributed to (Pseudo?) Justin and to (Pseudo?) Athenagoras.

S.’s analysis of the first group of texts, representing an internal understanding within the Church, finds that faith in the resurrection of the dead stands in the shadow of the most important dictum of faith, the Resurrection of Christ and his salvific activity. Individual works do, however, invoke various other secondary grounds, such as nature or apocalyptic signs. No direct or definitive answers are provided for questions about how the resurrection of the dead will take place, and who will raise up the dead (whether “God the Father” or Christ). There is attention to the role of ethical living and ecclesial discipline, and to judgment beyond death. All of these texts are said to presume an “intermediate state” before the parousia. S. further maintains that, by contrast with Paul’s Epistles, the Gospels, and the later Apologists, the class who will be resurrected from the dead is narrowed to persons who stand fast in the faith. It might be argued, however, that this conclusion requires more development and appraisal of the contrasting evidence. Some further reflection about the use and meaning of the terms “body” and “flesh” in these writings would likewise be desirable.

In the second part of her work, S. chronicles the developments arising out of the debate or dialogue with the nonbelieving Hellenistic world. On her reading, the proclamation of the resurrection was transformed when the Church went out to proclaim. The conceptual understanding of the resurrection of the dead would now be driven by the need to respond in a situation of unfriendly challenges and objections. S. argues that an initial silence reflected uncertainty about how to reply to the questions raised by Gnostic negativity regarding the body, by the Platonic teaching about the migration of the soul, the immortality of the soul, and the notion of cyclical return, and by assertions that God could not reconstruct decayed bodies and that the resurrection of the dead was contrary to reason and nature. A daring first step was taken by Justin and Tatian who found a connecting
point for defending the truth of the resurrection of the dead in the Platonic teaching about the immortality of the soul. S. raises the question, however, whether this move did not endanger the Church’s teaching of the substantial identity of earthly and resurrected human beings.

S.’s analysis of the apologetic writings documents how the need for a firmer foundation for rational argumentation then led to the development of arguments focused on God’s omnipotence and on the teaching that creatio ex nihilo is grounded in God’s sovereign creative will.

Her major and valuable contribution highlights the crucial step in developing the decisive argument for the reasonableness of the resurrection of the dead, namely, that God’s will for creation was inextricably linked to God’s will for the ultimate fulfillment and salvation of humanity. Given that God willed to bring humans into existence in order to reflect God’s image and likeness within creation, it was fitting that God bring humans to ultimate fulfillment by raising them from the dead into eternal union with God. The fulfillment of humanity is what God is about, and in that regard God is not bound to the laws of nature as the Hellenistic critics claimed.

Although it is not her primary focus, the author also offers valuable insight into the beginnings of the long and complex process whereby the Platonic concept of the soul was adopted and christianized—and thereby radically modified. She makes clear that at the beginning this process required a purging of unacceptable elements. Understanding that process is important for the present debate about the concept of “a resurrection in death.”

Villanova University, Philadelphia

BERNARD P. PRUSAK


This expanded version of Fiorenza’s 1987 presidential address to the Society of Biblical Literature, as first woman president of a society that has had women members since 1889, continues her current hermeneutical agenda, urging a transfer from a “scientistic” biblical interpretation to a rhetorical-ethical one. This new method, she argues, can reclaim the role that biblical scholarship should play, and critique the role that it sometimes does play, in the political-social construction of reality. It can do this only by letting go of the claims of value-neutrality and scientific accuracy that traditional historical criticism has claimed. The cause of feminism will also be better served by this shift, since a rhetorical interpretation is more open to the ambiguities of political reality and more willing to engage them.

Part 1 is entitled “Theoretical Explanations.” Previous presidential addresses in the Society of Biblical Literature have urged critical analysis of political and rhetorical strategies and engagement in critical reflection on the public and ethical dimensions of biblical scholarship. Others have proposed the need for a “public health department” in biblical studies (Krister Stendahl). F. sees her proposals, therefore, as very much in accord with an
established tradition. She argues that there are now four major paradigms functioning in biblical studies: the doctrinal-fundamentalist paradigm that subjects biblical interpretation to doctrine; the “scientific” positivist paradigm that claims empirical accuracy; the “(post-) modern” cultural paradigm which is inadequate to deal with ethical imperatives of inequality and liberation; and the rhetorical-emancipatory paradigm emerging all over the world in postcolonial and feminist environments.

Four aspects or “turns” comprise this fourth kind of biblical interpretation: the hermeneutical turn, which provides understanding within a reflective process that engages all parties; the political turn that provides a discourse of citizenship and power; the ideology critical turn, which unmasks the distortion and mystification of ideology; and the ethical turn that produces a theory and vision of human well-being through reflection on moral theology and principles. Both feminism and religion need to be brought forward more firmly into the hermeneutical process. Both have been marginalized because religion has been classified as feminine and therefore, with feminism, excluded as “unscientific.” The existing new directions of social-science and socio-rhetorical criticism are inadequate because they still build on a “scientistic” base such as a concept of “Mediterranean culture,” as if this were a fact rather than a modern construct.

A “critical feminist theory of rhetoric” can contribute four important insights. First, androcentric language is regulative and constructive, not descriptive of reality. Second, language is not only performative but political: it not only reflects but shapes thinking and interests. Third, critical textual analysis is inadequate unless accompanied by systemic analysis of structures of domination and exclusion. Fourth, language and knowledge are political, articulated by particular persons for particular strategic ends. Such a critical rhetorical method invites biblical studies to let go of its fear of becoming “unscientific” or of being cast as “feminine” in order to become involved in the politics of the global village.

Part 2, “Rhetorical Practices,” consists of four essays revised from earlier papers, articles, or talks on aspects of Pauline theology. In the first essay, on the rhetorical situation of 1 Corinthians, F. argues that Paul, not the Corinthians, construes their difference of opinion as divisive; Paul introduces kyriarchal subordination in order to assert his own patriarchal authority. The second essay is more consciously methodological and shows how claims of “objective” historical or social-science reading as the only legitimate readings obscure the rhetorical ambivalence of a situation. The third essay, on Galatians 3:28, explores various interpretations of that famous text rather than try to impose a definitive meaning, but also calls attention to how a rhetoric of inequality continues to allow elite white males to dominate females and people of color throughout the world. The final essay demonstrates how Paul’s arguments are usually constructed in dualistic terms of right/wrong, orthodox/false and how gender is especially dualized.

F. continues to be recognized as one of the foremost feminist theologians today. Here she combines her previously voiced feminist concerns with the
broader picture of the present and future direction of biblical studies, in which she has also been involved for some time. She is certainly not alone in urging this direction in biblical studies. It is already taking shape especially in the newer scholarly traditions of Asia, Africa, and Latin America. A new world is coming to shape in biblical studies, and this book makes a significant contribution to its articulation.

*Catholic Theological Union, Chicago*

**CAROLYN OSIEK, R.S.C.J.**


In times past questions of systematic theology dominated the field of patristics. The result was the production of scores of dissertations, books, and articles with titles following the formula, “systematic theme” in “patristic author.” While many of these were excellent studies, they have been largely replaced by works influenced by social history of by a more broadly conceived sense of the scope of the theological project. McLeod’s book proves that there is still a place in patristic studies for the traditional monograph.

M. explores Antiochene exegetical method, the intellectual influences upon Antiochene theology, and the Antiochene perspective on the image of God in the human. He also devotes an entire chapter to the Antiochene understanding of women and their ability to image God. The thought of Diodore of Tarsus, Theodore of Mopsuestia, John Chrysostom, Nestorius, and Theodoret of Cyrus figure prominently in this study, but M. also considers the lesser-known authors Nemesius and Narsai, relying on the former’s work “On Human Nature” to fill in the blanks of the fragmentary record of Diodore and Theodore.

The core of M.’s assessment of Antiochene theological anthropology can be discerned in the following statement from his conclusion: “the Antiochenes fall within the camp of those who include the body as essential within the notion of the ‘image.’ In fact, they strongly opposed the opinion of those who maintained that ‘image’ was simply a spiritual reality” (235). Hence, according to the Antiochenes, Adam images God “in the sense that he serves in creation as a concrete, living, and visible symbol that points to the existence of God” (236). Antiochene theologians were mixed in their assessment of how women imaged God. While all agreed that women shared a human nature with men, they saw the image of God as being more fully expressed in Adam than in Eve. Hence, Diodore, Chrysostom, and Theodoret tended to say that women were not created in God’s image because they saw that Adam alone shared fully in “God’s domimative power.” Theodore, on the other hand, tended to see both men and women as images of God because they shared the common human ability to unite the physical and the spiritual realms. M. traces these attitudes to the pa-
triarchal context and explains very well how social context influenced these attitudes.

Much of this study is interesting and helpful, but some significant issues are not considered. M. has a basic confidence in standard assessments of Antiochene thought. Hence he accepts without question the view that Antiochene exegesis is literal in the sense of historical, even though numerous studies in recent years have called this conclusion into question. He also attempts to link a particular understanding of Antiochene Christology with his study of the image, and claims that the Antiochene’s tendency to emphasize Christ’s humanity over his divinity is the reason that they insisted upon the importance of the body in conceiving how humanity images God. Here too M. does not attend to recent discussion by Frances Young and others suggesting that the need to protect divine impassibility may have been more significant in the formulation of Antiochene Christology than a deep reverence for things historical and human.

Also lacking is any sustained consideration of the role that resistance to and rejection of Origen played in the development of the Antiochene theology of image. M. wants to situate Antiochene theologians as heirs to the theology of Irenaeus, which is, at least by implication, a claim that they are not heirs to Origen. Nevertheless, omitting Origen from the discussion leaves the reader with the impression that all Alexandrian theologians were allegorizers who had no appreciation for the body and for the human either in their Christology or in their theological anthropology. This is simply not the case; they too resisted many Origenist claims and often reached similar conclusions.

Despite these shortcomings, the book is worth reading. M. does an excellent job managing the evidence, which is at times very skimpy, and he resists lumping all Antiochene theologians together. Theirs was a complex, multifaceted tradition with numerous players who, while sharing a common vision, often disagreed. M.’s study will be of significant benefit to anyone who has ever pondered and puzzled over the meaning of the claim that humans are made in the image and likeness of God.

Creighton University, Omaha

John J. O’Keeffe


The authors, both of whom teach at the École Biblique in Jerusalem, provide a new account of Christian origins. They begin not from the person of Jesus or from an original Christian message, but from two institutions, baptism and Eucharist. This approach through ritual practice should make the book of interest to liturgists as well as to New Testament scholars and historians.

While the volume defies easy summary, the results are stated simply in the Preface: “the environment from which Christianity emerged was close
to the Essenes” (vii) from whose communal ritual both institutions came. Baptism and Eucharist bear signs of Essene sectarian provenance, even in the greatly changed milieu of the Gentile mission. Christianity is “une secte éclatée”—a sect burst open—as the subtitle of the French version puts it.

This hypothetical Essene connection is not new, but Nodet and Taylor’s exposition of it is distinctive. The assumptions, rather than the execution, will lead to the most serious disagreements with this book. M.-É. Boismard’s source analysis of Acts is assumed, meaning that a reconstructed Western Text of Acts is preferred, along with the priority of Matthew. These presuppositions and the Essene connection are presented as mutually supportive. If circularity is evident here, other approaches of course sometimes work similarly.

N. and T. see Christian writings as “private notes” (11), capable of variation well into the second century, before canonization and hence before publication. This makes them comparable with Rabbinic and Essene literatures which are also understood as grounded in private oral teaching (in contrast with the more public works of Philo or Josephus). In fact, eventually all three traditions are linked, at times seeming to allow N. and T. to use Christian and Rabbinic evidence for Essenism, and Qumran for Christianity.

Both institutions of baptism and Eucharist are understood in terms of Essene practice. It is not especially remarkable (if also not proven) to link John the Baptist and his ritual with Essenism. Clearly Christianity is related somehow to John’s mission. Links between the Eucharist and Essene practice have been suggested before, but here the argument is more detailed and emphasizes the distinctive combination of ritual washing and communal meal in both groups. While this point is not easily to be dismissed, the details N. and T. explore are not compelling as a basis for this identification of very specific milieu. Neither the persistence of ritual beyond particular theologies (vii), nor even the supposed close common sectarian ancestry of these traditions can really justify, say, mining the much later Talmuds for the minutiae of a first-century Jewish meal practice. Lack of attention to the broader Greco-Roman setting (particularly important for meals) seems deliberate here, but no more convincing for that.

The authors try to establish a history behind their hypothesis. Treating Galilee from the Exile to the Mishnah, they present this marginal region as a place of religious and political ferment, arguing that specific cultural factors have been underestimated in most previous studies. A key move links even Rabbinic Judaism, or at least the haburoth (“brotherhoods,” taken here to be sectarian in character) of the Mishnah, with the Essenes. This is less convincing and depends on interpreting formal similarities as signs of derivation. This involves attributing an almost embarrassingly wide sphere of influence and virtually all the evidence for Palestinian Judaism to what is supposed to be a marginal group.

The historical account then presents the interesting notion of the “exploded” sect, Essene in origin but transformed by (a reconstructed) Pen-
tecost from a Jewish Messianism to the new missionary movement. The last chapter is a suggestive discussion of Passover and Pentecost in Jewish and Christian practice, touching on matters as diverse as church order and the symbolism of the cross.

This book deserves to be read with both appreciation and skepticism. While N. and T. use the language of detective work for their quest, the book is itself as much a puzzle as a document for solving one. Without much by way of chapter transitions or summaries, only at the end does the whole clearly appear. The authors bring an impressive array of evidence to the task, showering fragments onto the page from Acts, all the Gospels, Qumran, and Rabbinic literature. If the meticulous approach evident in some respects encourages us to believe that careful critical judgments are at play in the employment of these texts, this is not always transparent. Patient readers will find some profit in suggestive parts and an impressive whole, but will find too many gaps that cannot be filled plausibly. The Essene hypothesis for Christian origins has found a fresh voice. It does not, however, seem likely to move in from the scholarly margins.


Andrew B. McGowan


Theissen has spent his scholarly career examining various aspects of the social and psychological dimensions of early Christianity in the New Testament period. But in this, his most recent work, he provides a comprehensive study of the origins and religion of primitive Christianity. This is the kind of book that most scholars dream of writing but only the boldest attempt.

Viewing the essence of religion as a cultural sign system, T. studies the religion of earliest Christianity in the light of its myth, ethics, and ritual, all three of which, he maintains, are deeply rooted in the faith of Israel, though they have been changed and transformed by the faith of the earliest churches. Thus, the originating myth is Jesus’ preaching of the kingdom of God. The ethics are the expression of this myth in love of neighbor and the renunciation of status. The ritual reenactment of the myth is effected by the sacraments of baptism and Eucharist which receive their deepest meaning in reference to Jesus’ death. Making use of these three concepts, T. explains how the religion of the earliest churches became the autonomous sign system we call Christianity.

According to T., one can trace how Christianity gradually became an autonomous sign-world by examining its major writings. For example, the Gospel of Mark replaced the ritual of the Temple with baptism and Eucharist, the Gospel of Luke provided early Christianity with the fullest
expression of its narrative myth, and the Gospel of Matthew with the fullest expression of its ethics. It is with the Gospel of John, however, that the internal autonomy of the new religion came to its greatest self-awareness.

The new religion, however, was threatened by three crises. The first was the Judaistic crisis of the first century that put into question the cultic sign language of the new religion which had set aside Jewish cultic practices. The second was the Gnostic crisis of the second century which challenged Christianity’s narrative myth with a new myth that called into question the God of Israel, and so the God of Jesus Christ. The third was the prophetic crisis of the first and second centuries that took issue with the ethics of the earliest churches and insisted on a new rigorism.

If, at this point, things seem a bit contrived, they probably are. For example, can the Gospel of Mark account for the ritual demarcation of early Christianity from Judaism? Or was the Judaistic crisis simply concerned with ritual matters? I do not think so. And yet, there is something compelling in T.’s overall proposal of viewing early Christianity in terms of its myth, ethics, and ritual.

The most stimulating aspect of this work, however, is its account of the canon, which is often downplayed or ignored by contemporary scholarship. T. begins by noting that there were four basic currents in early Christianity that eventually coalesced into the Catholic Church, each represented by progressive and conservative wings: Pauline, Jewish, Synoptic, and Johannine Christianity. Faced with this plurality of expression, and threatened by the radical prophetic and Gnostic movements of the second century, the Church employed the canon to put an end to the plurality of primitive Christianity. In doing so, it definitively separated itself from Judaism. However, even though the canon is an external norm, T. convincingly argues that it is the expression of an internal norm that can be identified in terms of two axioms (monotheism and belief in Jesus Christ as a redeemer), as well as a number of basic motifs which flow from these axioms.

Because T. works with a model of religion that focuses on myth, ethics, and ritual as its essential concepts, there is something artificial and formulaic about his work. Nonetheless, the final product remains a tour de force that provides a reasonable account of the rise of Christianity as an autonomous religion or, as T. would say, a sign system. Moreover, unlike other works of this kind, which are often hostile to their subject matter, T. writes with a sense of commitment and attachment to the religion he investigates.

T. states that his book is not a work of New Testament theology. For, rather than giving theological explanations for the rise and origin of early Christianity, he provides explanations that are decidedly historical and social in nature. Nonetheless, his work serves as a kind of prolegomenon to the work of theology, and it is as such that I strongly recommend it to the readers of this journal.

Catholic University of America, D.C. FRANK J. MATERA

This close reading of the Catholic preacher François Le Picart’s sermons primarily aims at proving one point: at least up until Le Picart’s death in 1556, we find evidence in 16th-century Paris of a widespread mentality of optimism, hope and, above all, human freedom. In so periodizing the century, Taylor’s primary target is Denis Crouzet’s landmark Les guerriers de Dieu (1990). In the tradition of Durkheim and Bloch, Crouzet interpreted religious 16th-century violence as the “inexorable” expression of a “collective mentality.” For him, this popular apocalyptic vision of the imminent “end of time” pervaded the whole of that century and necessitated the purging and purifying of God’s enemies. T. wants to counter that the century cannot be taken as a whole and that a deterministic “apocalyptic anguish” was not hegemonic. It competed with a mentality of hope and human choice. Before 1557, one finds a conceptual cosmos—traditional Catholicism—which held that human beings are free. The cosmos did not predetermine violence.

Each author’s conclusions follow from their sources. Crouzet’s work relied heavily on the 16th-century proliferation of astrological predictions and almanacs. T. recalls a poignant vignette: after the king’s freak death in a jousting accident in 1559, Catherine of Medici “gave free rein to her astrological interests,” inviting Nostradamus to come to court and “predict the fate of the royal children” (204). For those consulting almanacs, the stars foretold imminent destruction.

By contrast, those attending sermons were offered an open future. T.’s sources in support of a free will mentality come from Le Picart’s pulpit, the sermon being by definition a rhetorical genre designed to move one’s congregation to choose. In contrast with the Lutherans who “searched the stars intensely for clues to the end”—having theologically “eliminated the field of human action as a basis for justification”—Le Picart’s own “disinterest in astrology” was based on “his firm and unwavering belief in free will” (202–3). Thus, T. considers Crouzet’s proposed hegemonic mentality of “inexorable progress into violence and chaos” as “little more than a retrospective view of history.” She asks that we instead “let the sources,” in this case the sermons, “speak for themselves.”

The strength of T.’s book lies in having given a human voice back to these long-forgotten sermons. She has provided theologians and historians with both an abundance of scarce and previously untranslated texts, as well as an 85-page appendix of Le Picart’s writings in the original French. The reader will hear a preacher hammering hard on heretics, sanctioning both torture and burning at the stake, yet also echoing the first Jesuits’ Renaissance humanistic emphasis on the goodness of God and creation, as well as their disinterest in apocalyptic thinking, and finally exhorting all to choose freely “a plan of reform for both clergy and laity” (157). In short, Le
Picart's sermons “are not characterized by anguish or eschatological imminence” as Crouzet asserts. On the contrary, “they are filled with reassurances of God's love and a call for amendment that was very closely tied to continuing earthly existence” (212).

Crouzet's book was a landmark precisely because, in contrast to Marxist and Weberian historiography of the 1960s, it put religion back into the Wars of Religion. It avoided economic or political reductionism by means of postulating a Durkheimian “collective mentality.” T.'s work nuances Crouzet's, demonstrating that such a mentality cannot be thought of as hegemonic in France, at least prior to 1557.

T. leaves aside Crouzet's challenge: What does religious rhetoric as a historical source tell us? Can religious texts speak for themselves? Or are they language talking about something else? For example, T. acknowledges that the king's persecution of the Sorbonne Catholic preachers in 1534 was “closely tied to events on the international stage, as Francis was willing to do anything that would annoy Charles V” (60). Again, the later dispute between king and pope over the Council of Trent “centered almost entirely on political and military issues” (154). Or again, the violence against the Calvinists on the rue Saint-Jacques erupted “only a week after” the military defeat of 27 August 1557 and ensuing (“apocalyptic”?) fears of a Habsburg occupation of Paris (189). In each case, religious rhetoric is somehow linked with political, military, and social concerns. Questions remain: Linked how and why? Why the violence? A religious fear of heresy? A military fear of occupation? An anthropological fear of infection? A hybridization of all three?

Both theologians and historians will find T.'s correction of Crouzet's generalizations valuable. Crouzet's central concerns, however, remain: Why do human beings compose religious language in the first place? And once composed, how should historians of religious culture interpret it?

*Boston College*  
**Stephen Schloesser, S.J.**


For more than a half of a millennium she stands immortal, tragic, and glorious against the vault of heaven, and this after a dazzling flash on the historical record as brief as it was surprising: 28 months from the mystery of recognition at Chinon, through the solemn majesty of the anointing at Rheims, to the horror of the marketplace in Rouen. The details of Joan of Arc's very short life—she died at “nineteen or thereabout” as she answered in the course of her trial—are better known than those of any other human being before her time and afterwards. She has been the subject of more books than any other historical figure including Napoleon (who
comes in second) but excluding Jesus. In the last two years alone over 100 have appeared, including, preeminently, these two.

Pernoud is arguably the greatest medieval historian of the 20th century; Clin, director of the Museum of the History of Medicine in Paris, is a leading connoisseur of the period. Their volume is an all-purpose, wonderful book which explains much about the Maid (Joan’s preferred appellation for herself): her name (it was never d’Arc in her lifetime), the rumor of her royal bastardy (no proof whatsoever), her language (French with a Lorraine accent), her armor (it keeps being “rediscovered” and dismissed about every 20 years, most recently in the spring of 1996), her sword (three, perhaps four), on to a filmography beginning with Georges Hatot’s Jeanne d’Arc (1898) through Ingrid Bergman’s portrayal (1948), Gina Newson’s documentary by Marina Warner (1985), and ending with Jacques Rivette’s masterpiece Jeanne la Pucelle (1993). The work of P. and C. is a treasure that no systematic theologian or medievalist can afford to ignore.

The volume reveals the workings of the medieval mindset, as do apparitions and dreams, folklore, hallucinations and ghosts, legends, magic, marvels and miracles, myths, wild animals and witchcraft, visions and violence, spirits, signs, potions, and portents. It was a mentality in which kingship was not a political but a spiritual matter, and supernatural was the right order of politics. It was a world in which Joan’s surprising military career was not at all mysterious. Victory on the battlefield owed less to military strength than to God’s favor.

But in 1429 not everyone was convinced that the Maid enjoyed God’s favor. Certainly not the English—in Shakespeare much later she is an ugly and treacherous woman of ill repute—nor some Dominicans, even French, for whom she was “a woman of exceptional cruelty,” “sullied with blood and fire and the murder of innocent Christians.” Her wearing of male attire left Jean de Gerson, doctor christianissimus and the leading theologian of the day, uncertain and wondering about her.

In the other book, Fraioli, professor of French at Simmons College, examines how contemporary theologians brought their principles for the discernment of spirits to the Maid’s claims. To my knowledge, F. is the first author to do this. Pulling together all available evidence, she carefully investigates the records of Joan’s “trials” at Chinon and Poitiers, and she analyzes pertinent and surviving documentation. She also deals with the major 15th-century literary texts about the Maid, especially two poems: Christine de Pizan’s Ditié de Jehanne d’Arc (1429) and Martin LeFranc’s Le Champion des Dames (1442). There can be no doubt; Joan was the object of intense theological debate and in the end the approbation of her was religious. Between Joan’s first meeting with Robert de Baudricourt in Vaucouleurs in 1428 to her burning at the stake in Rouen in 1431, Joan was examined, guarded, and watched as few other people have been in history.

She was watched by a growing retinue of attendant women, sometimes numbering as many as 34. She was guarded by courtiers, nobles, military officers, and eventually by jailers who left her alone not an instant. She was cross-examined on three occasions: by some dozen canonists and theolo-
gians (including four bishops) at Chinon; by a court in Poitiers presided over by the archbishop of Rheims and made up of 18 ecclesiastics ("the finest clergy in unoccupied France") and as many lay canonists and civil lawyers; and finally by Pierre Cauchon’s inquisitorial court at Rouen where there were present at least four dozen doctors of theology, of canon law and civil law, and of both (uteriusque juris). An unlettered girl in her late teens, she stood them all off by her clear and uncomplicated faith.

She was a human being, they decided, neither an angel nor a devil. But it remained a mystery how a simple shepherdess who was younger by far than the men, could act as an experienced military officer; or again how never having been on a horse before she could ride into battle, win it, leave 1000 dead, and manage never to kill anyone herself. Of course, one of her voices was that of Saint Michael, the head of the heavenly host. She showed no evil, though she had left her family, shaved her head, and dressed like a man. She was obviously "a good and faithful Christian," "devout, sober, temperate, and chaste." Of course, another of her voices was that of Saint Margaret, who had herself fled her father’s house disguised as a man in order to escape a forced marriage. She was not guilty of heresy. Alone, without counsel or theological advice, she had answered properly to every learned question so that even Cauchon’s court, determined to destroy her with 70 charges against her, could find no grounds for a single one of them. Her third voice was that of Saint Catherine of Alexandria, patroness of young women and renowned for her confounding of philosophers.

Could a woman be a prophet? Deborah, Judith, Esther had been. Joan not only prophesied but was herself prophesied. The ninth-century legend stated “that France lost by a woman shall be saved by a maiden from the marshes of Lorraine.” Could a woman visionary be from God? Saint Bridget was and had helped bring the pope back to Rome. So had Catherine of Siena. Joan brought the Dauphin to Rheims. Clearly she was of God, though the issue of her male clothing sustained the debate at each trial. In Rouen, her resuming male attire “proved” her “relapsed” and therefore deserving of death. At rehabilitation in 1456 the judgment jammed on this issue. Nullity was decreed because of procedural flaws. No matter; by then Joan of Arc was galloping into glorious song and story.

She was described as a tragic heroine in the 16th century by the Jesuit Fronton du Duc, and in 1801 as a miraculous Romantic ideal by Friedrich Schiller. Major works—paintings, plays, poems, sculptures, pageants—exalted her virtues. To the Restoration she was a military hero antidotal to Bonaparte; to nationalists she embodied the soul of la patrie; to socialists she represented the oppressed rising against injustice. In 1869, the liberal Bishop Dupanloup of Orleans proposed her beatification and in 1875 Emile Frémiot unveiled his gilt equestrian statue of her near the Louvre (later replicated on the waterfront in New Orleans). After another three generations of bad and bourgeois taste, her image was found on boxes of cheese, packets of green beans, and coffee sacks. During World War I she was a pledge of victory or an angel of comfort to the dying on the battlefield. After World War II she had given her name to 28 parishes in the U.S.
(12 in Canada, proportionately twice as many as in the U.S.). Now thanks in part to the authors of these two separate volumes she continues to provide contemporary relevance.

*Canadian Institute of Jesuit Studies, Toronto*  
**Jacques Monet, S.J.**


In recent years, two developments have emerged in publishing of works by and about Weil, the French social philosopher, spiritual writer, and political activist: contributors have shifted from the hagiographic mode with its mistaken characterization of Weil’s contribution; and Weil scholars are effectively locating her in a larger discourse. For many years Weil commentators wrote of her as a woman who achieved distinctiveness for either her astute socioeconomic analysis of modernity or her purity of spirit and the beauty of her expression of Christian spirituality; others offered the idea that Weil radically shifted her sights and efforts from the political to the mystical. These attempts to come to an understanding of a complex thinker wrongly divide her biography and thought. Finch never did this and to his merit held these elements of her short life together with unusual clarity. Particularly characteristic of F.’s approach to Weil is his recognition of her significance with respect to other modern philosophers (e.g., Kierkegaard, Wittgenstein, and Heidegger) and in the current efforts to discover parallels between different faith traditions (Buddhism, Hinduism) and movement politics (ecology).

In May 2000 the American Weil Society celebrated its 20th year of annual meetings. It was as a founding member of the Society and a frequent contributor to its meetings that many of these essays were first presented. When F. died in the summer of 1997 he had been working on their publication and entrusted the final selection and editing to Martin Andic. Having been involved with the Society since its inception and having listened to many of these pieces, I am impressed with the editor’s discernment regarding the volume’s scope and content.

A. has organized twelve essays into three parts representing categories of Weil’s contribution: religious and ethical epistemology; commentary on her political-cultural thinking; and facets of her spiritual journey and the merit of her contemplative reflections. Each cluster indicates how well F. understood the depth of Weil’s thought. Although she died in her mid-thirties during the Second World War, her daunting capacity to “read” her culture, critique the prevailing theories of polity and economic inequity, and search for spiritual truth continue to attest to her exceptional intellect and religious witness. F. found her example compelling and dedicated much of his professional life to the study of her thought.

Three essays illustrate something of the importance of F.’s encounter with Weil’s contribution and how helpful A.’s organization of the book is
to both the seasoned and novice reader of Weil’s works. Each essay is derived from one of the three sections.

The first, “Intellect as Grace” (Chapter 3), refers to F.’s phrase, the “epistemology of grace.” Truth is the core concern in this theory of knowledge, unquestionably the point of departure in all Weil’s thought and action. Attention and loving action are fundamental to the quest for truth, but God’s initiative is requisite in turning each of us away from the shadows that we take as reality. F. explores the shape of the epistemological search for truth, acknowledging the Platonic roots of Weil’s thinking but develops his essay to reflect her attachment to Christianity and the understanding of meaning in this world as dependent upon the supernatural. In effect, Weil provides three levels of reality, distinguishing the human imaginary from the natural world of necessity and the “impossibility” of supernatural truth. Knowing on the human level of existence is illusory and connected to false aspirations (power and prestige). Necessity, the second level, entails obstacles that cannot be removed or mitigated (e.g., death); limits and obedience are thematic here. Finally, the third level attests to the supernatural realm which is Good and True and from which we receive glimpses of the Good and True through grace. F.’s discussion of this intricate arrangement indicates that Weil’s recasting of Platonic notions of the real and illusory has to be appreciated in the light of the technological and scientific excesses of modernity. Weil wrote of the need for a new genius, not tied to naturally gifted persons or to an elect class of thinkers; the new genius sees reality by effort, a veritable apprenticeship in attention. It is a seeing that cannot be efficacious so long as it is hasty, derivative, or dependent upon false motive or assumptions that the means is an end.

In the second cluster of chapters, a rich offering of F.’s studies of the subject is provided which invites the reader to discover parallels with T. E. Lawrence, Marx, and Heidegger. I am impressed with the selection on “Marx, Oppression, and Liberty” (Chapter 6). The assumption that Weil shifted her concerns away from economic injustices and the viability of Marx’s theories is mistaken, according to F. However, in her later writings, Weil pressed the question of the historical destiny of the proletariat as inevitable victors and criticized Marx’s failure to elaborate a theory of oppression that identified the ruthless transformation of persons into things and the consequences for solidarity and revolution. Oppression, according to Weil, destroys the soul and adds to the flight from the real. F. here asserts that history does not offer evidence that the fruits of triumph will be shared by other than the professional class of emancipators. In this fine essay, F. encourages us to meet an astute critic of the optimistic Marx and shows us that a model for a renewed social order based upon freedom of thought and spiritual labors, rather than class war and radical redistribution of property, provide a modicum of hope. F. understands the radicality of Weil’s thought and avoids reducing it to an ideological rationale for liberalism, socialism, or conservatism.

In the last set of chapters that reflect the editor’s focus, spiritual and religious traditions are clustered with concerns that F. had for humanism
and multifaith conversation. The reader will find the chapter entitled “The Life and Death of Simone Weil” illuminating. Building on Weil’s well-known letter to Father Perrin written as she was leaving her homeland and identified as her “spiritual autobiography,” F. examines three features of that communication. In doing so, he notes that Weil had unusual self-understanding (a striking quality when we realize the relative youth of the correspondent). In effect, F.’s analysis answers some of the confusion about Weil’s decisions regarding Catholicism and religious identity. He reviews the content of the letter indicating that Weil’s choice to remain an “outsider” and to refuse baptism was neither casual nor reactive. The distinction between the collective “we” and the individual goes to the heart of the matter and the intimacy of the spiritual moment. Finally, F. comments on Weil’s prayer and her inscription of what many critics find to be an horrific self-abnegating prayer and concludes his balanced discussion with a reminder that Weil could not advance a contemplative practice devoid of practical engagement in the world of necessity.

This book of essays is a must for those who have yet to read the writings of the subject, as well as for those who have a long-standing involvement in Weil’s thought. F. conveys his appreciation of her brilliance and accessibility. He is ever the teacher, clarifying elusive points and suggesting places of ambiguity that require further thought.

Starr King School for Ministry, GTU, Berkeley

CLARE B. FISCHER


For contemporary Christians, the 16th and 17th centuries are among the most painful and confusing times in ecclesiastical history. In this turbulent era persons who considered themselves the most devout followers of Christ killed each other over the interpretation and consequences of God’s love for humanity incarnate in the person of Jesus. Who did the killing, why the killings occurred, and how they were recorded for posterity, who was killed and, most importantly, how the modern reader is to understand these events and people, is the subject of this study.

Gregory’s work proceeds in a clear and organized fashion. The medieval concept of dying well, the Ars moriendi, is considered as the important spiritual “training ground” for martyrs’ ability to imitate the Man of Sorrows, the suffering Jesus unjustly killed for following God’s will. The next two chapters analyze why government and religious leaders were willing to kill and why martyrs were willing to die. G. explains that although murder as a response to religious dissent may pain the modern reader, it must be viewed in the context of early modern European society where such a response was the logical extension of control, especially for those who held spiritual and temporal authority. Since the rhetoric and actions of the
martyrs could, and did, convert others to the essential truths of their respective faiths, opposing religious and civic authorities firmly believed that heretics offended God’s majesty by these contrary beliefs and, because they drew others into their errors, deserved death themselves. The willingness to die, on the other hand, can only be understood as the full response to faith in Christ, as each martyr understood this fidelity, since such a response was essential to eternal life. *The Art of Dying Well,* an esteemed and rehearsed devotion, trained and encouraged the martyrs to follow and imitate Christ in his sufferings in this life so as to be with him in the next. The three main confessional categories of martyrs, those belonging to the Protestant, Anabaptist and Catholic traditions, are thoroughly analyzed in individual chapters. The study concludes by examining how various confessional groups understood the actions of martyrs in other faiths, particularly the need to explain the bravery and resolve that martyrs professed before and during their horrible deaths.

The work opens with an important organizational principle, a desire “to analyze early modern martyrdom without recasting or judging the convictions, attitudes, or actions of the protagonists through theories or values that distort them” (15). G. argues that the application of modern critical techniques to the accounts of martyrs’ death (martyrologies, songs, dramas, or paintings) jeopardizes our correct understanding of martyrdom in the early modern period. Such a reading, he contends, renders the phenomenon of martyrdom incomprehensible to those involved and hence lacks methodological justification. Instead of offering explanations rooted in modern critical theory or psychoanalysis, G. identifies the cause of the martyr’s resolve as a faith in Christ rooted in the Scriptures as understood by the martyr’s community of believers. What may appear at first as a relentless barrage of scriptural quotes actually succeeds in impressing the reader that these martyrs were neither psychotic nor manipulated but instead were responding to what they perceived as the logical consequence of their faith.

G.’s scriptural and ecclesial hermeneutic to understand the martyr’s choice may seem naïve to some, but I found his defense and methodology appropriate and refreshing. Modern critical theory and psychoanalysis may answer questions pertinent to the disciples of literary theory and psychology, but in the case of martyrs these approaches do not satisfy the historian. G.’s massive research has emphasized how Protestant, Anabaptist, and Catholic martyrs rooted their actions in their understanding of Scripture, a basis which by no means should be construed as a kind of neo-conservative reaction to modern methodologies. His use of Scripture is sound, and his conclusions are valid. Other sources briefly mentioned deserve future study, such as the role of drama. Plays performed in the seminary colleges in Rome often dealt with the consequences of vice and virtue as lived by martyrs of early Christian history. For some seminarians these plays were rehearsals for a future drama played out in England and are valuable sources both for creating martyrs and for preserving their stories.
Certainly the modern reader, in our ecumenical age, is repulsed by the concept that men and women could read the same gospel and kill each other over its interpretation. This lack of comprehension, however, is a modern problem, one that those pursuing historical theology cannot ignore. Here G.’s study returns us to the fundamental issues that both supported and created the early modern martyr and the subsequent martyrologies of the age. Any historian who wishes to understand the complex mentalities of the early modern period would benefit from this study.

Saint Louis University

MICHAEL W. MAHER, S.J.


This collaborative work between two professors at the University of St. Andrews, Scotland, one in New Testament, the other in divinity, offers a reinterpretation of Christian eschatological hope for the postmodern age weighed down by hopelessness. It contrasts two kinds of hope: the hope in the immanent possibilities kindled and sustained by modernity’s myth of progress, and the hope in the transcendent possibilities that God brought about in Jesus of Nazareth by the power of the Holy Spirit.

The book opens with an evaluation of the disastrous impact of modernity’s myth of progress on contemporary life. Modernity’s attempt to control the “horror” and the “terror” of history by means of the myth of humanity’s steady progress toward perfection produced at the end of the 20th century a pervasive sense of fear and hopelessness as embodied in postmodernity’s rejection of metanarratives of any kind. The challenge for Christian theologians is to show how in this climate of “incredulity towards meta-narratives” (Jean-François Lyotard), the story of God’s involvement in the world—creation, redemption, and sanctification—and within this story, the story of the end of the world (eschatology) not only makes sense but is the only effective antidote to despair and agnosticism.

The first step, according to the authors, is for Christian theologians to abandon their legitimation of modernity by claiming that its ideology of liberal progressivism and technological projects are based on Christian premises. On the contrary, it must be frankly recognized that the myth of progress as championed by the Enlightenment has led to a loss of transcendence and the reduction of eschatology to the immanent goal of human history. The next step is to make what the authors call “the wager on transcendence,” that is, to show that the Christian hope in the God of the resurrection does better than modernity at eliminating the horror and terror of history.

The most interesting parts of the book are chapters 4 and 5 where the authors argue that the canonical literature on Christian hope (the “rhetoric of the unsayable”) lies between the genres of the “marvelous” and the “fantastic,” the former creating totally alternative worlds and the latter
introducing discontinuities into this world. What the authors keep repeating is that the new world for which Christians hope is neither another *creatio ex nihilo* nor a prolongation of the immanent potentialities of this world but a *transformation* of this world by God’s power. As the authors put it, “as Christians, our hope is not invested in a repristination of or a set of adjustments to the here-and-now, but in a complete overhaul from the foundations up, an overhaul which will result in a decisively new and different order of existence” (79–80). To illustrate this point, they examine the images of eschatological hope presented by Scripture and Christian tradition: Antichrist, the parousia, resurrection, new creation, the millennium, the last judgment, the garden of God and the city of God, Sabbath rest and marriage banquet, the kingdom of God, and the vision of God. The last chapter argues that Christian hope thus understood, far from neglecting this-worldly progress, commits Christians to projects that bring it about.

*Hope Against Hope* is a powerful apologia for the Christian hope in the transcendent fulfillment of history by the God of Jesus. I am not sure, however, that as a book on eschatology, it will convince modern readers to whom it is directed, of the claim that Christian hope will succeed in overcoming the horror and terror of history, since not a few horrific and terrible events of history occurred because of Christians’ complicity. It is also strange that a book on eschatology devotes little, if any, reflection on the one event that shatters all hopes, namely, death and dying. Finally, the book could have been greatly enriched by a dialogue with some Catholic theologians such as Karl Rahner and Hans Urs von Balthasar in whose writings most of the ideas contained in this book have been discussed extensively.

*Catholic University of America, D.C.*

**Peter C. Phan**


The surprising title of an early chapter, “Darwin’s Gift to Theology,” reflects Haught’s belief that certain theoretical difficulties of the Christian tradition can be made much clearer as a result of the changes made necessary by evolution. He makes this case persuasively, especially about our understanding of the place of evil and suffering in the world. The God who emerges from the study of Darwinian biology has elements different from the more familiar emphasis on God’s power. In the latter view, God’s will is so inescapable that sin and suffering approach incomprehensibility, and human freedom seems close to impossible. As a result, reconciling (or not being able to reconcile) grace, human freedom, and predestination have been an intellectual conundrum and a divisive, burning issue not only in Christian history, but elsewhere in the Western tradition. Because of advances in science, however, an understanding of God is emerging which
makes evil more understandable and human freedom more possible. So confident is he of his ground here that H. is willing to limit his understanding of evolution to the neo-Darwinian ideas of interpreters such as Richard Dawkins and Daniel Dennett, who both believe that Darwin is “dangerous” to religious traditions. Evolution, they think, makes arguments from design impossible and the very idea of God unnecessary. Engaging them is an important part of H.’s timeliness.

It is God who interests H. not design. Regarding evil, he defends the understanding of God in New Testament texts which portray a God who divests divine power in order to participate in creation even in its anguish. This God is made manifest at the hour of Jesus’ glorification, i.e. his death. In recent decades this idea has been emphasized in discussion by Rahner, Schillebeeckx, and Jüngel. A striking appropriation of the Daoist understandings of the ultimate—“non-interfering effectiveness” or “active inaction”—is one of the most original and enlightening moves H. makes to emphasize the unexpected familiarity of this “kenotic” idea. Similarly, he is able to engage the post-Holocaust reflections of Hans Jonas in a thoughtful way. The other main idea that Darwin enables us to see more clearly, H. contends, is freedom. The randomness and the sense of waste that we see in evolution are evidence that the universe is set free from the control of its Creator, who calls it into an open future promising both to be with us now and to await us then. The appropriation of Pannenberg and Peters here is compelling. In particular, the place of Jesus takes on a different resonance than is found in some other attempts to reconcile Christianity and evolution.

Because H. agrees with Dennett that science does not seem to need the “life force” spoken of by Bergson, he is willing to ignore related aspects of Teilhard de Chardin’s vision. This seems to be the price to be paid presently for the emphasis on kenosis. H. seems right to emphasize this latter, more unfamiliar, idea. Only after dealing with the greatest pressure points in terms of scientific investigation does he turn to such large issues as tragedy and cosmic purpose, and there an updated version of some of Teilhard’s ideas reappears, particularly as supplemented by Whitehead. The universe’s mysterious directionality toward beauty and complexity, along with the “anthropic” patterns that make all sorts of things, including human life, possible is a source of wonder and of hope. These esthetic and anthropic ideas become the key to H.’s understandings of morality and original sin. H.’s strongest scientific datum is the presence of information throughout the universe. Information is found everywhere—e.g., in genetic codes, which are basic bits of matter like everything else but also much more. Information is important evidence of the presence of something like mind or intelligence throughout the universe.

Many such points will need considerable further development. We can imagine a Whiteheadian understanding which makes beauty the secret content of the moral impulse, such is the message of some small scale religions like that of the Navaho. Actually to see that idea through, however, will require a thorough rethinking of many concepts deeply embed-
ded in our common life. Likewise, the ideas of God that H. proposes will have to be much further developed. Below the surface of his argument we can see the beginning ripples of deep impact. So thorough a rethinking of the lynchpin from which all depends seems likely to make dramatic changes everywhere. The Dao seems very different from the God addressed in the eucharistic prayer. Original sin is another area where H.’s analysis will need further work.

Despite leaving us with a sense that much more needs to be done, H. has made a quantum leap in bringing together the depth of the Catholic tradition with evolutionary science in a bold new way. Throughout the book we sense the importance of beginning a new conversation, rather than a sense that final answers have already been found. H.’s basic belief that Darwin brings not only challenge but also gift seems right. Imaginative rethinking and reevaluation are examples of the adaptation and growth which we see throughout the universe. They are signs of life and creativity in an evolutionary world. H. is up to the challenge; his important book is filled with fresh ideas.

California State University, Long Beach

ANTHONY BATTAGLIA


McGrath is an accomplished molecular biologist as well as theologian. This book is designed to be “the first of . . . a series of works which aim to explore the relationship of the natural sciences and religions from a variety of standpoints—historical, philosophical, scientific, and theological” (1).

Although M. intends to “establish the foundations for dialogue in science and religion by exploring the critically important area of methodology” (29), he deliberately avoids adopting any “precise model” for “the relation of the religions and the natural sciences” (33). Instead, he surveys numerous approaches others have taken to the philosophy of science. He identifies himself most closely with the agenda set out by Torrance in his 1969 work Theological Science. M. therefore aligns himself with “critical realism” both in science and in theology. As in science, “theology is under an obligation to give a faithful account of the reality which requires description” and must “remain faithful to what is, or can be, known about that God” (157). Both disciplines depend upon “the correct use of analogies” which “possess an ability to illuminate when used rightly, and to confuse and perplex when not” (176).

M. sees himself as part of the “grand tradition” in Christian theology, “rooted in the Christian Bible” and associated with thinkers like Augustine, Anselm, Aquinas, Calvin, Barth, and Rahner. Within this tradition, the reality, order, intelligibility, and beauty of the world are all “related to the doctrine of creation” (65). In contrast to the early Barth, M. affirms “the idea of a natural theology as a mediating principle between science
and religion” (98). Although the knowledge of God derived from observation of the world is only partial, M. believes that “the natural order beckons us onward to discover its creator” (209) and that the traditional Thomist and Reformed approaches to natural theology can answer the charge formulated by Feuerbach that “God is essentially a human construction” (156).

For M., science and religion diverge because of the difference between “experimentation and revelation” (87). Christians cannot investigate the Trinity or the Incarnation in the same way that scientists can explore the mysteries of quantum behavior, which can be reproduced at will in any suitably equipped laboratory. Theology based on revelation does resemble science in the sense that “equally abstract and bewildering concepts emerge” from the steady effort to do justice to the phenomena, “preserving rather than reducing them” (88). The history of 20th-century developments in physics shows that scientists face exactly the same kind of quandaries that theologians do in attempting to articulate their view of reality.

This work is admirable in its command of hundreds of sources. It could be a useful starting-point for those who wish to determine the status of various questions in the history of the dialogue between religion and science. But at times the book shows the weaknesses of a literature survey. It is not necessary or helpful to list four references to back up the idea that creation is “one of the most foundational of religious ideas” or eleven references to assert that “the theme of ‘God as creator’ is of major importance within the Old Testament” (41). In his summary exposition of others’ ideas, it is difficult to see what new contribution M. makes to the conversation between religion and science. He himself is conscious that he “perhaps makes less of a contribution to that dialogue than might be desired” (208).

The method actually employed here, though not critically examined or justified, is to find out what most people think. M.’s magisterium is “a consensual classic Christian understanding of revelation” (84). In his defense of realism as a philosophy of science and as a foundation for theology, he claims that “a sufficiently significant section of both communities adopts some form of ‘critical realism’ to make a genuine convergence of views possible in a number of key areas” (205). M. argues that there is a clear parallel between the wave-particle duality in quantum mechanics and the doctrine of two natures in Christ. Although he is aware that this observation is a departure from the “grand tradition,” he takes solace in knowing that “[a] number of modern writers have argued that it is not necessary to draw such ontological conclusions” and “it is quite possible to rest content with the assertion that Jesus behaves in divine and human ways” (204). In my opinion, applying the model of duality in this way to the doctrine of one person in two natures destroys the classic Christian tradition rather than illuminates it.

_Canisius College, Buffalo, N.Y._

MARTIN X. MOLESKI, S.J.
Like many authors today Viladesau is inspired by the theological esthetics of Hans Urs von Balthasar. Balthasar approaches esthetics from within systematic theology. He always presupposes the perspective of Christian faith. His method is classically one “from above.” He begins from revelation, seeing Christ as the form of divine beauty. Though offering a specifically Catholic approach, Balthasar has a kinship with Karl Barth’s Christocentrism. Balthasar centers his theology on the cross as the supreme unveiling of divine beauty. The cross is beautiful, for it is the paradigmatic act of divine-human love.

Although V. very much admires Balthasar’s contribution, he moves in a different direction. He offers us esthetics from the perspective of fundamental theology. He also adopts a method “from below.” How can we ground a theology of divine beauty in human experience? One can see immediately a radical difference in approach from that of Barth and Balthasar.

V. is inspired principally by authors such as Rahner and Lonergan. He seeks a transcendental openness to divine beauty in the human limit experience of the beautiful. In all finite experiences of beauty, God is confirmed as the Ground of Beauty. God is the Ultimate Beauty at the heart of all esthetic joy. V. recognizes that analogy plays a key role here. He goes on to consider key questions in esthetic theology: How can the religions and faith make use of beautiful works of art to bring people to the divine? How can any finite reality be the bearer of the divine? V.’s answer, like Rahner’s, is grounded in the human being as imago Dei. Since the human as such is openness to God, if God wishes to communicate God’s self, it will be through the human.

V. correctly wants to steer a course between agnosticism and idolatry. God as God and as Ultimate Mystery must remain ineffable and, to that extent, unknown. Nonetheless the finite can point us in the direction of God. At the same time we must beware lest we get trapped in the finite and mistake the finite for God. This temptation is especially powerful when we are dealing with experiences of the beautiful.

To avoid this danger, V. appeals to Lonergan’s idea of conversion. Lonergan spoke of intellectual, moral, and religious conversion. V. adds esthetic conversion. One has to learn to move beyond objects of beauty as those which merely give pleasure or delight, and ultimately come to see God as the Supreme Beauty who is in accord with the deepest desires of the human heart. Affirming God as Supreme Beauty is not immediately obvious, but one can be led through conversion to this insight. A theology of the cross would fit in here. Like Balthasar, V. sees the cross not as beautiful in itself (indeed it is ugly), but the cross reveals the act of divine love in the flesh. Following Lonergan’s approach, V. wishes to lead us back
to the unity of the transcendentals. Through an esthetics from below, we affirm God as Supreme Beauty, but we link Absolute Beauty to Truth and Goodness as well. For the beautiful is not merely the ground of subjective pleasure but is intrinsically related to the goodness of God and creatures. Beauty points to the contemplative value of being which is there to be seen and appreciated by the person who has eyes to see.

V. offers a well-reasoned approach to theological esthetics by using a transcendental approach. To be sure, he argues his case differently than Balthasar does. Nonetheless it is a valid and cogent one, and perhaps one that is more open to discussion in the academy than is Balthasar’s strictly faith-based approach.

Weston Jesuit School of Theology  
John O'Donnell, S.J.


This 1997 Gregorian University dissertation by a Dutch priest, deeply committed to ecumenism, regrets the new obstacle to Anglican-Roman Catholic reconciliation arising from the Anglican decision to ordain women. For him, “the ordination of women has wrecked the ecumenical future of both Anglicans and Catholics” (432). His guiding question is “whether the understanding of authority by ARCIC [the Anglican-Roman Catholic International Commission] has been received in some degree within both communions dealing with an important issue [i.e., the ordination of women]” (21). He maintains that ARCIC’s two principles of authority, providential history and collegiality, are most faithfully followed in the Roman Catholic Church, not the Anglican Communion. He asserts: “The Catholic Church possesses the authority structure to implement what is agreed . . . [but] the Anglican Communion is deprived of that structure” (20).

His argument for these claims unfolds in three parts: first, a review of ARCIC’s understanding of authority; second, a detailed survey of the Anglican debates, mainly within the Church of England; and third, an account of the Catholic debate, in which he highlights Ordinatio sacerdotalis (1994) and the Responsuum ad dubium (1995) of the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith. Although he is not as familiar with the North American scene as he is with the European discussions, W. is conversant with the main trajectories of the debates; indeed, his bibliography runs to 29 pages! He reports fairly and accurately the main positions, including those with which he disagrees. As such, his work is a valuable resource and guide to the issues, even with the repetitiveness that marks the genre of a dissertation.
The problems with his analyses and conclusions stem from a single factor. The signals received by W.’s theological antennae seem to have been “jammed” by *Ordinatio sacerdotalis* and the *Responsum*. Thus, although he reports them fairly enough, he does not understand accurately or weigh theologically the reasons for the Anglican decision. Perhaps he sees no need to do so since W. thinks that *Ordinatio sacerdotalis* and the *Responsum* have truly resolved the issues. Perhaps, too, like the authors of the Vatican response to ARCIC’s *Final Report* as described by Henry Chadwick, W. is simply unfamiliar with real live Anglicans.

In any case, the jamming results in a caricature of both Communions. For example, having reported their debates fairly, he characterizes the Anglicans’ decision to ordain women as infidelity to Scripture and Tradition (296, 315) and capitulation to the demands of contemporary culture (407, 443, 465). In W.’s version of Anglicanism, “all authority is arbitrary” (296). On the Catholic side, he acknowledges some of the difficulties involved in the claim that the teaching of *Ordinatio sacerdotalis* is a teaching of the ordinary universal magisterium (420, 458). He argues that John Paul II’s letter missed an opportunity to make collegiality more visible (428). Yet he does not see why it was impossible to do so. As his own account shows, there was not then and there is not now a consensus on this issue within the Catholic Church.

Nonetheless, he still maintains, “it was the decisive voice of the pope that closed the discussion” (460), such that even “that desire to continue the discussion must be held definitively as something incompatible with the faithfulness to revelation” (400). This conclusion flies in the face of John Paul II’s repeated exhortations to work to overcome every obstacle to Christian unity. It also overlooks the pope’s own view, expressed after he had issued his apostolic letter, that the ordination of women showed the need for joint Anglican-Roman Catholic discernment about how to interpret tradition.

For W., reconciliation and unity can come only by way of Anglican acceptance of the official Roman Catholic position. Of course, this would constitute an Anglican admission that W. is right, and that its long, painstaking discernment was so flawed in both process and result that the Communion has been fundamentally unfaithful to Christ’s clear will for his Church. The logic of this position is tantamount to the discredited “ecumenism of return,” as well as incongruent with Vatican II’s understanding of the ecumenical effort and of theologians’ role within it.

W.’s heart is certainly in the right place. In his work, however, “Roma locuta, cause finita est” trumps completely all theological reasoning at variance with the official position, no matter how serious and loyal it might be. That such a methodology was approved at one of the flagship theological institutions of the Catholic Church, the Gregorian University, is troubling indeed.

*Loyola University Chicago*  
**Jon Nilson**

It is the foolish society that leaves to plebiscite the determination of what is ultimately true and valuable. While Miller knows well that we wisely refrain from the pretense of voting on articles of truth, he also dares to consult the empirical data on public opinion surveys in the interest of gauging and interpreting the popular consensus on the fairness of various distributive practices. For a book with such a normative-sounding title to adopt a methodology that takes seriously empirical evidence about social attitudes is practically unprecedented. At the risk of falling prey to the heteronomy toward which generations of Kantians have expressed disdain, M. makes a substantial contribution to the field of justice theory.

As recently as a generation ago, it would have been considered a fool’s errand to attempt to split the difference between utilitarian public choice theory, the regnant approach toward justice within public policy circles, and Kantian constructivism, as exemplified by John Rawls and other strictly principle-based moral philosophers. But in the last twenty years, through the efforts of voices as diverse as Jennifer Hochschild, Stephen Hart, Sidney Verba, and Alan Wolfe, political philosophers have begun to take seriously the insight that public opinion has relevance. If a given theory of justice has any hope of actually affecting the practice of public institutions, then principles of social justice must be understood contextually, with sensitivity to empirical data and the various patterns of actual human association. This process of hybridization possesses the added benefit of opening up a dialogue between normative moral philosophy and the social sciences, a project to which M.’s substantial contribution bestows renewed legitimacy through its demonstration of the interdependence of these two fields of endeavor.

Survey data from many nations reveal that popular conceptions of justice include significant roles for the principles of desert, merit, and equality. These three are often combined in revealingly pragmatic ways. To reflect this multidimensionality, and in conscious contrast to single-principle approaches such as radical egalitarianism and crass meritocracy, M. offers a theory featuring an authentic complexity in the interplay of principles of justice. His nuanced and illuminating treatment of the concepts of desert and merit present very welcome alternatives to the usual poverty of arguments that aspire to attack or defend controversial policies for the fair allocation of scarce goods, from medical care to college admissions, through affirmative action, quotas, or even lottery. Without sacrificing the distinctions between justification and acceptance, or between procedures and outcomes, M. probes in insightful and original ways the complementary relationship between normative accounts of justice and the beliefs of ordinary people.

His finding, for example, that most people support the establishment of an “income floor” as a response to threats of severe deprivation extends a
significant challenge to the difference principle of Rawls (80). Supporters of the prevailing free-market orthodoxy are similarly confronted by empirical evidence from several parts of the world that “most people when asked to comment on prevailing inequalities appear to believe that greater equality in distribution would be fairer” (230). The popular consensus that economic inequalities, in order to be legitimate, must be somehow deserved, and that “they must correspond to real differences in social contribution” (259), should be factored in to all our judgments about the contemporary casino-like market economy.

One shortcoming of this work is that M. shies away from offering a comprehensive or definitive description of just institutions and practices. Rather than fashioning a precise articulation of what his research supports, he enumerates a list of five conditions within which market-based economies generate a range of allowable inequalities (248–49). This venture may be judged somewhat unsatisfying, but it is emblematic of M.’s larger project of moving beyond a simple report of popular beliefs to the task of assessing the philosophical coherence and cohesiveness of a given set of principles of social justice. M. embarks on this task not from the all too common stance of skepticism about the possibilities of defining and achieving social justice, but rather from a refreshingly hopeful perspective. This viewpoint includes a wager that, as members of entities called nations and even humankind, we share enough bonds of solidarity and common understanding that a generalized “grammar of justice” is possible.

While he may be accused of unwarranted confidence in his claim that people have an adequate intuitive grasp of their relationship as citizens and fellow humans, M. supplies us with numerous warrants for opposing the distressing drift in recent decades toward increasing levels of income inequality and disinterest in the well-being of our neighbors. This clearly written and tightly argued work is a welcome contribution to the field of social justice theory.

Weston Jesuit School of Theology

THOMAS MASSARO, S.J.


Among the various criticisms of Kant’s ethics, few have been more damaging than the claim that his proposal constitutes an abstract formalism that undermines considerations of moral character and its formation. Here Munzel aspires to refute this charge, arguing that Kant “not only . . . has a very rich notion of moral character, but also that it is a conception of systematic importance for his thought, linking the formal moral with the critical, aesthetic, anthropological, and biological aspects of his philosophy” (1). To make her case, M. undertakes an extensive historical and
exegetical study and interpretation of the philosopher’s corpus, giving special attention to his works on anthropology and judgment, subjects typically overlooked by interpreters of Kant’s morals. The result is a lucid and convincing presentation of the nature and development of Kant’s oft-neglected but compelling account of moral character.

M.’s constructive proposal—that moral character is the overarching concept that links Kant’s work in morals, anthropology, and esthetics—builds around two central foci: (1) Kant’s mature definition of moral character as practical, resolute “conduct of thought” in accordance with invariable maxims; and (2) his efforts, in the wake of his critical turn, to explicate how objective practical reason can become subjectively practical in his moral agent and thus actualized in the world. In her investigation of the first of these foci, M. asserts that Kant’s definition of moral character constitutes an original contribution. Whereas the ancients, she maintains, conceived of character primarily in terms of virtuous inclinations, Kant’s account takes as its central term (and problem) the conduct of thought of the moral agent. In her development of this idea, M. demonstrates that Kant’s work cannot so easily be dismissed as abstract formalism and mere deontology. Indeed, Kant explicitly derides the passive use of reason in the application of a priori principles, calling instead for the cultivation of maturity of thought—the essential form of which the moral law expresses—through the cooperative and consistent efforts of the capacities of reason, reflective judgment, and understanding.

With respect to the second focus M.’s distinctive contribution emerges most clearly. Through a meticulous investigation of the relationship between moral character, on the one hand, and human sensibilities, aptitudes, and aesthetic feeling, on the other, M. illuminates Kant’s basic understanding of the establishment and exercise of character in the world. Central to her argument is the claim that Kant’s anthropological writings suggest a cooperative relationship between reason, in its causal capacity, and human nature. While it is well known that our sensibilities and aptitudes do not inform the content of reason’s laws, M. finds that they are, for Kant, ordained by nature to receive the form of the law and to incline us in the direction of its pursuit. Nature, even in its perverted state, is not essentially at odds with freedom so much as it is open to being elevated that it might serve reason as a mediator of its causality in the world. These insights allow M. to recognize the significance for Kant of the cultivation of moral character through social moral pedagogy which entails, among other things, the establishment of a just civil constitution. Additional analysis of Kant’s esthetics reveals that our natural tastes for the beautiful and the sublime—tastes that can likewise be cultivated—corroborate in the process of moral formation. In the light of M.’s rendering, then, the alleged odiousness of Kantian duty gives way to a satisfaction that is born of the self’s unified response to the moral law. Character in its full sense denotes this very unity.

M. is careful to flag disagreements with her interpretation of Kant, as well as the major objections to the philosopher’s own work. Among the
latter is the objection from theology to Kant’s treatment of conversion and grace in *Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone*. There Kant insists that the internal revolution from moral perversity to moral goodness must be the agent’s own doing; if grace is involved, the agent must first make himself worthy to receive it. M. suggests a way around the critiques of these claims by positing that Kant’s is a secular ethic, albeit one guided by principles of rational faith. Indeed, in several places, she cautions strongly against reading Kant as a religious thinker. These characterizations may be on the mark, in which case Kant’s universalism, it seems, is not universal enough, inasmuch as it excludes the religious. And yet we are confronted with Kant’s own assertion that the person who pursues his rational morality cannot help but conform to the ethics of Scripture as well. It is possible to conclude that Kant was simply wrong in that assertion. The more constructive route, however, is to explicate more precisely the extent to which he was right. While M. does not, understandably, attend to this labor, she nevertheless aids that enterprise by providing as clear and comprehensive an account of Kant’s conception of the moral life as can be found in the current generation of Kantian scholarship. Moreover, she succeeds in showing that if we wish today to recover the significance of character for the moral life, we may benefit greatly from a rigorous study of Kant’s thought. For this, philosophers and theologians alike are very much in her debt.

*Loyola College in Maryland*  
*Stephen D. Miles*


Schneewind presents here a valuable analysis of the history of moral philosophy as it leads to the thought of Immanuel Kant. He began work on this massive work in order to understand better the context of Kant’s ethics, which, he shows, must be grasped not only as a response to the positions of predecessors like Hume, Rousseau, Wolff, and Crusius but also to the entire history of modern moral philosophy that preceded him. A superb historian of ideas, S. is particularly adept at communicating the distinctive specificity of Kant’s precursors through introducing the reader to their own vocabularies, arguments, and philosophical premises.

S. has a constructive agenda running subtly throughout his analysis. He believes that the Kantian conception of morality as autonomy provides the best starting point for a contemporary moral philosophy. He does not provide a justification for this Kantian starting point, but presumably has done so in his earlier writings. Readers searching for a detailed constructive presentation of the relevance of Kant’s ethics for contemporary moral philosophy have to read Christine M. Korsgaard, Onora O’Neill, or Allen W. Wood. In any case, this book employs historical analysis of the course of modern moral philosophy in order to identify which elements and ten-
dencies in Kant’s theory are of contemporary interest and to isolate them from those that were a response to historical debates that are no longer of concern or relevance. S.’s own secular temper clearly if subtly shapes the way he reads the history of modern moral philosophy, but his analysis is insightful, fair-minded, and cogently presented.

The broad sweep of the book is roughly chronological. After a helpful introductory chapter, it is organized around four major sections. It begins with the modern rejection of medieval teleology, natural law, and what S. takes to be its ethics of obedience to authority and then moves to examine its replacement with various theories of morality as self-governance. The book could have been entitled “From Heteronomy to Autonomy.”

Part 1 deals with the rise and fall of modern natural law from Suárez and Grotius through Locke and Thomasius, the last of the major advocates of the Grotian view of natural law. This section documents the gradual emergence of the voluntaristic moral philosophy that paves the way, first, toward the permutation of natural law in its modern incarnations and then, inevitably, its utter abandonment.

Part 2 examines the main 17th-century alternative to modern natural-law theory, a focus on the moral perfection of the individual rather than on the maintenance of social order and obedience to moral conventions. The perfectionists held that since the human mind has the capacity to grasp moral truth and the will to implement the moral directives recognized by the mind, we can contribute to our self-governance by increasing our knowledge and/or strengthening our wills. This movement began with the Christianization of Stoicism and included the attempt to create a rationalist ethical theory in the writings of Herbert, Descartes, Spinoza, Malebranche, and Leibniz. In S.’s view, both the natural lawyers and the perfectionists were highly adept at demonstrating the weaknesses of one another’s positions but neither were able to answer their own calls for a rational ethic fully adequate to the moral needs of their day.

Part 3 traces modern efforts to construct an ethic without any reference to a providential, intervening God or an otherworldly doctrine of salvation. Here S. traces the rise of Deism at the end of the 17th century and the gradual emergence of atheism in the 18th. Even pious and orthodox religious thinkers came to accept the view that morality does not require God’s direct operation in history and nature, another step on the way to morality as self-governance.

S.’s examination of the emergence of autonomy as a moral ideal culminates in Part 4, which begins with a discussion of Wolff and Crusius, the two most original German philosophers between Leibniz and Kant, and then moves to Rousseau and his well known influence on Kant’s egalitarian view of human dignity.

S. admires Kant as the most radical and thorough exponent of morality as self-governance. Thinkers early in the 18th century had already begun to work on the morality of self-governance as a radical alternative to Christian morality. By the end of the century, they had come to believe, in contrast to philosophers a century earlier, that all normal individuals are
equally able to see the demands of morality for themselves and equally able to act accordingly. This conception coheres with a view of society that gives individuals liberty from interference by social elites. (Where that actually leaves individuals in the modern world is not examined by S.) He places Kant, along with Reid and Bentham, precisely in the line of late 18th-century thinkers who attempted to advocate a normative egalitarian affirmation of the dignity and worth of the individual that they believed was not defended sufficiently by competing moral philosophies.

Kant, S. argues, was the revolutionary figure in the invention (not discovery) of autonomy. In Kant’s view, we are self-governing because we are autonomous, that is, because we legislate the moral law to ourselves. As the first advocate for a strong notion of autonomy, Kant held that we are under the moral law only because the legislative action of our own will puts us there. S. traces in some detail Kant’s attempt to identify a rational principle clear enough to be grasped and applied by everyone and bearing an inherent motivational force that can stand on its own without needing to be supplemented with extrinsic rewards of any kind.

This book is a substantial and carefully researched work that ought to be read and studied by theologians, philosophers, and ethicists. Though with very significant differences, it stands with Charles Taylor’s Sources of the Self and Alasdair MacIntyre’s After Virtue as another major interpretation of modern conceptions of human agency and their relation to moral philosophy. S.’s is certainly the most positive appreciation of the morality of autonomy. It will be subject to criticism from specialists; e.g., scholars of Kant may criticize S. for not balancing his emphasis on autonomy with the more communal “kingdom of ends,” or his view of the role of religion, etc. Certainly utilitarians, neo-Aristotelians, Thomists, deconstructionists, and others will interpret these texts, and their relation to one another and their surrounding historical contexts in ways that would challenge S. Yet all will admire the book as a model of clear writing, careful thinking, and detailed, patient, scholarly argumentation.

Boston College

Stephen J. Pope


Practical theology is a traditional discipline that has undergone a major reorientation in the past few decades. Instead of being understood as the application of theory to pastoral situations or the equipping of pastors with ministerial skills, practical theology is now understood as critical reflection on the praxis of the Church in society. Heitink has been a regular contributor to this reorientation, and in this book, originally published in Dutch in 1993, he brings together his knowledge and convictions about practical theology.
For H. practical theology is a theological theory of action. The action he envisions is a twofold praxis: the mediation of the Christian faith (1) on individual, communal, and public/political levels, and (2) in the context of modern society. It is the ambiguous, problematic nature of modern society stemming from the 19th-century Enlightenment that has provoked the reorientation of practical theology. H. traces this history rather narrowly (from Kant through Marx) concentrating only on German philosophical influences. The theological response (from Schleiermacher to Schillebeeckx) is equally narrow, including only German and Dutch authors. The overall character of practical theology in this slice of history is that of an urgent reaction to a societal crisis. This not only distinguishes practical theology from pastoral theology but tends to minimize the role of practical theology in the less crisis-oriented aspects of faith formation and development within the Church. Despite the narrow focus of H.’s historical-interpretive section of the book, his general point is persuasively asserted: practical theology cannot mediate the Christian faith without taking full and constant account of its societal context.

Defining practical theology as the mediation of the Christian faith in modern society leads H. to a nuanced description of practical theology as communicative action in the service of the gospel. For the theoretical basis of this view, he relies on Jürgen Habermas and Paul Ricoeur. H. clearly asserts that a theological theory of action must not only provide a description/explanation of social situations, it must also seek to change those situations in accord with the gospel. However, he offers no special theological criteria for verifying such change, invoking only Habermas’s validity claims of truth, fairness, and genuineness, as well as Ricoeur’s four criteria for meaningful action.

H. rightly and convincingly insists on the constant, reciprocal interaction of theory and praxis, and he elaborates the notion of a theory of action from hermeneutical, strategic, and empirical perspectives. The first situates practical theology in the realm of interpretation and suggests a creative connection with pneumatology. The second stresses the goal of change in practical theology and touches upon the theme of conversion. The third reaffirms the importance of the actual context for practical theology and calls for accurate research.

Since the end result of practical theology is action, H. describes three action domains, corresponding to the three levels of faith mediation: humanity and religion (the level of the human subject), Church and faith (the level of communal organization), and religion and society (the level of political and public life). Along with insightful comments about each domain, H. lists the appropriate subdisciplines that would form a practical theology curriculum—a bonus for those engaged in theological education.

H.’s book is not so much a straightforward argument as a list of topics and a review of sources pertinent to his concept of practical theology as a theory of action. The detailed numbering of each section and subsection gives the book the character of reference tool, while the lack of concrete cases gives it a formal, abstract quality more suitable for professors and
theorists than for practitioners of ministerial action. It is a valuable addition to the continuing development of practical theology.

Center for Theological Reflection, Indian Rocks Beach, Fla. ROBERT L. KINAST


The work of Enrico Mazza continues to bear witness to an Italian renaissance in liturgical scholarship. This current study synthesizes much of his previous writing on the eucharistic prayer (The Eucharistic Prayers of the Roman Rite, ET 1984; The Origins of the Eucharistic Prayer, ET 1995) as well as on patristic methods of interpreting the liturgy (Mystagogy, ET 1988). More than in the previous works, however, M. charts the fortunes of interpreting the Eucharist through the Middle Ages up to the Missal of Pope Paul VI (1969).

M.’s basic thesis is as follows: “The Eucharist is an imitation of the Last Supper, and the latter in turn is a figure and announcement of the passion” (xiii). Thus he finds a kind of ontological correspondence between the Eucharist as now celebrated and the Last Supper of Jesus in the Upper Room, even as he shows how the rite of the Eucharist has developed from that of the Last Supper especially in the early Church.

Much of the book attempts to reunify the traditionally fractured treatises on the Eucharist. In the course of the Middle Ages, the Eucharist came to be treated under the titles of sacrament (presence), sacrifice, and communion, and so they remained in the decrees of the Council of Trent and up to the 20th century. The problem can be simply stated: The medieval treatises understood the eucharistic sacrifice on the basis of eucharistic presence. The Fathers, on the other hand, understood presence based on eucharistic sacrifice. M. seeks to heal that breach through his treatment of the typological or figural understanding of the Eucharist and thus present a more coherent understanding of eucharistic practice. He remains confident that contemporary persons can benefit from the typological or figural interpretation of the Fathers, shaped by a Platonic world view.

In the course of his analysis M. repeats much of what he had written earlier on the development of the eucharistic prayer. For him the tradition began with a “paleoanaphora” that consisted of two strophes of thanksgiving followed by one of petition. This tradition later developed, as first seen in the eucharistic prayer found in the Apostolic Tradition, into the now familiar shape that includes an institution narrative (of the Last Supper), a memorial of God’s saving deeds in Christ (anamnesis), and an invocation of the Holy Spirit (epiclesis). The introduction of material from the paschal homilies of the second century accounts for this development.
As M. deals with the tradition of interpretation of the Eucharist, the two heroes who stand out are Paul who in 1 Corinthians 10 and 11 is responsible for the developed sacramentality of the Eucharist (“the liturgy is the liturgy because it corresponds ontologically to the type which Jesus established” 85), and Augustine (“the most important heir to the Pauline conception of the Eucharist as sacrament of unity” 157).

The second half of the book traces the dissolution of the figurative/typological method in the course of the Middle Ages. The culprit is clearly the philosophical inability to hold together the concepts of symbol (figura) and reality (veritas). In the course of his treatment M. analyzes the approaches of Aquinas and Bonaventure who can be contrasted with regard to their treatment of “what the mouse eats” when it consumes the reserved sacrament. The final chapters of the book deal with the recovery of the theology of Eucharist as sacrament of unity in the Missal of Pope Paul VI.

This is an ambitious book that presents a coherent, if not ultimately convincing, argument for a patristic typological understanding of the Eucharist. I find myself much more sympathetic to Gregory Dix’s view of the Last Supper as the “dress rehearsal for the passion” rather than an ontological model that somehow figures that Passion. By putting so much stress on the Last Supper, M. is able to ignore the multiple origins of eucharistic practice that have been argued recently by Bruce Chilton, among others. In addition, this work would have been helped by the recent studies on the history of the eucharistic prayer by John Fenwick (St. Basil and St. James), Maxwell Johnson (Sarapion) and Geoffrey Cuming (St. Mark) not to mention Robert Taft’s distinction between the Alexandrian and Antiochene traditions of interpretation. Ultimately, the challenge posed by this analysis is quite a serious one. Is it any longer possible to recover the patristic appreciation of the Eucharist without a thoroughly critical reappraisal of Platonism in theology? I think not. But given the intricacy of M.’s argument, not to mention his erudition, it will be difficult for scholars not to take this book seriously.

Weston Jesuit School of Theology


This is an important book for anyone interested in Jesuit spirituality or the relationship between psychology and spirituality. Meissner is a distinguished scholar of psychoanalysis and an authority on Sigmund Freud, as well as a life-long student of Ignatius of Loyola and Jesuit spirituality. The book builds on his study of Ignatius, Ignatius of Loyola: The Psychology of a Saint (Yale, 1992). The earlier book was a ground-breaking study of the lineaments of Ignatius’s personality and the psychodynamic dimensions of his life history and mind. It explored the combination of psychic determi-
nants and processes that undergirded Ignatius’s remarkable life experiences and career.

This volume presumes M.’s understanding of the psychology of Ignatius and seeks to apply it further, “to understand what role that psychology might have played in the development and form of his profoundly influential spiritual heritage” (xi). He describes the book as “fundamentally a psychoanalytic study of a profoundly meaningful spiritual subject matter” (ix). It seeks a deeper understanding of Ignatian spirituality in psychoanalytic perspectives.

M. begins with a brief review of Ignatius’s life, highlighting the psychological insights that he had explored in the earlier book. He proceeds to psychological analyses of the Spiritual Exercises, the Constitutions and obedience, the psychology of obedience, and asceticism and mysticism. Understandably, about twice as much development is given to the Spiritual Exercises as to the other topics. These topics, in turn, are enriched by references to his treatment of the Exercises, which are regarded as the master key to understanding Ignatius’s character. M.’s study of the Exercises attempts to read them through a psychoanalytic lens and to translate Ignatius’s document for spiritual change into psychoanalytic terms as far as is possible.

Of special interest are his treatment of some of the more controversial aspects of Ignatian spirituality and governance, such as obedience, authority, and authoritarianism. M. approaches these issues carefully, and from multiple points of view. Thus, for example he treats the “Rules for Thinking with the Church” (second week of the Exercises), identifying them as late additions to the document, peripheral to its main drift. He insists that they have reference not only to the concrete Church in the Rome of his time, but rather to the community of followers gathered around the banner of Christ. They are to be read in the light of the Meditation on the Kingdom in the same second week; they refer not primarily to the canonical codes and disciplinary structure of the Church, but more to the way of personal discipleship. They were written in a context of intense strife in the Church, under the conditions of the Reformation and Counter Reformation, yet Ignatius’s attitude is less one of abject submission or mindless conformity, more a sense of mission and dedication to the service of the king. Yet the Rules “breathe a spirit of authoritarian control and the suppression of freedom of thought” (301). They share with Ignatius’s letters and directives concerning absolute and blind obedience and expression of Ignatius’s own authoritarian characteristics and conflicts. M. references and reviews his interpretations of these in his treatment of obedience in the Constitutions, as well as in his extended treatment of the psychology of obedience.

Another area of great value is M.’s thorough, clinical (yet reverent) analysis of Ignatius’s mysticism, especially the final chapter (“Mysticism—A Psychoanalytic Perspective”) with its emphasis on transformation and transvaluation in Christ. Ignatius’s initial emphasis on imitating the behavior and manner of the life of Christ gradually evolved into a more
spiritually meaningful and mature internalization of the spiritual values. This, according to M., enabled him to integrate the derivatives of his powerful narcissism, his stifled and conflicted aggression, and his repressed but rebellious sexual and libidinal drives in a way that was consistent with his ego ideal and formed the basis for the articulation of his saintly and spiritual identity.

This is an important book. We will not soon have another scholar who combines M.’s masterly knowledge of Freud and the later psychoanalytic literature with his almost half-century of study of Ignatian spirituality and lived experience as a Jesuit priest. M. is the first to admit that he is not the easiest or the most graceful of writers. But his mine is rich: his patient, astute application brings forth a multi-faceted work well worth the reader’s patient and persevering study.

Georgetown University Medical Center, D.C. Jon J. O’Brien, S.J., D.O.

As the title suggests, this provocative work uncovers profound implications within expressions of the Law that extend from Sinai to the Mount of Beatitudes. As a seasoned exegete, Beauchamp moves effortlessly from one mountain to another, including along the way other heights such as Eden, Sion, and Golgotha. B. provides a fascinating example of just how biblical interpretation may engulf Scripture in its totality. The result is a woven tapestry of exegetical precision, psychological insight, and spiritual depth. I am reminded of Northrop Frye (The Great Code, 1982) who lamented the fragmentation of biblical scholarship and promoted a holistic reading of the Bible which reads lines of typologies from beginning to end.

B.’s first section concentrates on the decalogue where he begins to explore the transpositions of the Law with a study of the story of the rich young man of Mark 10:17–22. With this single example, the reader observes the style and scope of B.’s reading. Comparisons and contrasts of the laws enumerated in Mark with those of the decalogue flow into interpretations of the laws in other parts of Scripture. Both what is said and what is left unsaid become equally important. The plurality of positions within Scripture itself is taken seriously within the scope of finding common lines of thought. The decalogue of Deuteronomy 5:6–21 is explored with its complementing sections in the Torah. The first commandment is reviewed in the light of Exodus 20, Genesis 1:1–2:4, and Ezekiel 23:37–39. The Leviticus Code is used to focus on the love of neighbor (Leviticus 19, Matthew 22:39). Through Psalm 115 and Wisdom 13–15, B. explores the critique of idolatry.

His second section explores the significance of the Law in the teaching of Jesus. The Beatitudes are explored in all their complexity, originality, complementarity, and challenging dimension. The plurality of positions toward the Law in Matthew, Paul, and James are held in tension with one another. Finally, the work concludes with a quasi-mystical meditation on the significance of the teaching of Jesus in the light of Golgotha.

This book is not easy to read, but it is well worth the effort. B. provides an honest and fresh look at significant perspectives of Christian hope.

MICHAEL KOLARCIK, S.J.
Regis College, Toronto

The focus of this work is “to trace the backgrounds, origin and development of early Jewish and Christian speculations on what the heavenly realm actually looks like and whether or not humans can go there” (viii). Hence Wright presents a survey of the views of ancient Egypt, Mesopotamia, and early Israel, and summarizes the traditions of the Persian, Greek, and Roman periods.

One of W.’s primary concerns is to show the development and persistence of the biblical and Near Eastern notions through the history of the Second Temple period. It is well known that the ancient cosmos was conceived as tripartite: heaven, earth, and netherworld (sheol). The history of the elaboration of this cosmos is presented conveniently here, as W. has put together the variations (e.g., from one to seven heavens) on this structure, illustrated by several drawings and accompanied by copious references, especially to secondary literature. There are over 60 pages of endnotes, and an extensive bibliography.

Among the figures (96) is a misleading drawing of “an israelite image of the divine throne room.” No iconographical source is indicated; it seems merely to be the result of the imagination of the artist.

The multiple views reflected in the historical sources vary considerably, and theologians will be challenged to distinguish between mythology and theology (see the summary on 199–202). W. offers us an informed sketch of the history of this interesting topic.

Roland E. Murphy, O. Carm.
Whitefriars Hall, Washington, D.C.


Prior’s doctoral dissertation surveys the place of the historical-critical method in Catholic exegesis in four general periods: in patristic and medieval literature; in church documents of the 19th and 20th centuries, specifically Providentissimus Deus, the decrees of the Pontifical Biblical Commission from 1905 to 1915, Spiritus Paraclitus, and Divino afflante Spiritu; in Vatican II era documents, Sancta Mater Ecclesia and Dei Verbum; and finally in the 20th-century debates preceding and following the Biblical Commission’s 1993 publication of Interpretation of the Bible in the Church.

Characterizing the use of the historical-critical method in Catholic exegesis as “necessary but limited,” P. defines the method as “a compilation of several individual critical disciplines that seeks to determine the literal sense of the passages it studies” (291). Although the “literal sense” has been understood variously as the author’s intended meaning, the “obvious sense” (Providentissimus), and “that which has been expressed by the inspired human authors” (Interpretation), Catholic exegetes must utilize diachronic approaches (the historical-critical method) in pursuit of the literal sense, because the text is historically conditioned. Catholic exegetes are also bound to uncover the “more-than-literal” or “spiritual” sense, since, by its nature, the historical-critical method is limited. P.’s greatest contribution in this study is his careful delineation of its limitations.

The method is limited primarily because its hermeneutical foundation, the necessary determination of the literal sense of the text, requires the complementarity of approaches designed to yield the more-than-literal sense. Also, the presuppositions of exegetes employing the method may be tainted by epistemologies hostile to the dialogue of faith and reason. Finally, the sole use of the historical-critical method, without the benefit of synchronic approaches, minimizes the interplay of text and reader, exegete and faith community, and diminishes the resultant actualization, inculturation, and understanding of the text’s history of effects.

This volume will be of special interest to Catholic biblical scholars who place their work in the context of the Catholic faith.

Laura A. Weber
Creighton University, Omaha

In Discordance with the Scriptures: American Protestant Battles over

Thuesen’s volume marks a significant contribution to the study of the Bible in North America for its attention to the manner in which theological presuppositions distinctly shaped biblical translations and inflated textual incongruities in the 19th and 20th centuries. T.’s history of the controversies surrounding the Protestant English Bible translations in the U.S. argues that theological and institutional dissension, not textual criticism, has driven the debate over disparate versions of the Scriptures. Furthermore, heavily indebted to the writings of Hans Frei, T. proposes that both “liberal” and “conservative” Bible translators shared “peculiarly modern modes of authority and interpretation” (5) that led both “liberal” and “conservative” translators to privilege historical reference over literary sense.

After briefly recounting the roots of the English Bible in the anti-Catholic iconoclasm of Tyndale and the seemingly unassailable Authorized (“King James”) Version (KJV) (1611), the heart of T.’s work begins with the American contribution, through formidable scholars such as Mercersburg’s Philip Schaff, to the Revised Version (1881), a work that for the first time raised a specter of suspicion over the veracity and authority of the Authorized Version. Moreover, T. offers an extensive treatment of the heated controversy surrounding the publication of the Revised Standard Version (RSV) (1952), capably weaving together a significant body of literature from the archives of the RSV committee papers. Throughout each stage of this history, T.’s work maintains notable continuity by highlighting different translations of contested Scriptures, such as Isaiah 7:14 (“Behold, a virgin shall conceive, and bear a son” in the KJV; “virgin changed to “young woman” in the RSV).

Many readers will find that T.’s use of obscure labels such as “liberal” and “conservative” to identify theological positions on biblical inerrancy distract from this otherwise precise historical account (in fact, these are problematic by T.’s own admission), but with copious notes and a well-written index that incorporates Scripture references alphabetically both graduate students and historians of American religion will find T.’s work readable and well documented.

Jeffrey W. Barbeau
Marquette University, Milwaukee


This study of the role that the doctrine of creatio ex nihilo plays in Augustine’s anti-Manichean polemic and its broader implications for his thought constitutes a fine introduction to the central ideas of Augustine’s theology of creation. Though plodding at times in its repetition of obvious details, it nevertheless succeeds in providing a meticulous account of the biblical and neo-Platonic groundings of Augustine’s rejection of Manichean dualism. T. contextualizes the study of Augustine’s doctrine of creatio ex nihilo against the background of patristic thought and Manichean cosmogony. He then examines the development of this doctrine in Augustine’s thought from two perspectives: his scriptural commentaries on the opening chapter of Genesis, and his critique of Manichean cosmogony in three of his anti-Manichean works. On the basis of this analysis, T. concludes that Augustine’s mature doctrine of creatio ex nihilo entails the simultaneous creation of form and matter. Thus construed, Augustine’s doctrine of creation shapes his understanding of divine nature, human finitude, the problem of evil, human freedom and salvation, and divine sovereignty.

Despite its overall excellence, there are two weaknesses to this study. First, T. is unable to base his account of Manichean cosmogony on the actual sources that Augustine used in refuting the Manicheans. Instead, he relies upon two later texts (67–68). Second, T.’s sketch of the implications of the doctrine of creatio ex nihilo for the Pelagian crisis
is just that, a sketch that lacks sufficient sensitivity to the development of Augustine’s ideas (e.g., his definition of divine predestination in 428/9) and an adequate awareness of the nuances of his use of language (e.g., phrases such as “do not sin of necessity” or “an inherent tendency to sinfulness”) (246). The first problem is excusable given the difficulty of access to Augustine’s sources, the latter less so given the potential for misunderstanding Augustine’s texts.

MARIANNE DJUTH
Canisius College, Buffalo, N.Y.


No student of modern history can deny the religious influence of Pierre Bayle (1647–1706). His massive Dictionnaire historique et critique became the most widely read philosophical work of the 18th century and ushered in the Enlightenment vogue of the ideological encyclopedia. His religious creed, however, has long remained an enigma. Various critics have interpreted him as a Protestant, a pseudo-Jesuit, a skeptic, a rationalist, a fideist, or an eccentric antiquarian who collected theological ideas the way other people collect porcelain.

Lennon’s study does not resolve the enigma. L. focuses rather upon several traits of Bayle’s critique: intellectual integrity, suspicion of authority, support for civic toleration, and opposition to idolatry. He convincingly demonstrates how Bayle’s passionate commitment to religious tolerance stands on more than pragmatic grounds. It springs from a refusal of both the Catholic and the Calvinist accounts of religious authority and from an opposition to idolatry that transcends the usual Protestant distaste for Catholic mummery.

On occasion L.’s breezy style of exposition deteriorates into revery. Digressions on Molière, Bakhtin, and Dostoevsky overwhelm the treatment of Baylean integrity in Chapter 2. Despite the occasional fog, this monograph illustrates how one architect of modernity based civil tolerance on human fallibility and divine impenetrability rather than on political compromise.

JOHN J. CONLEY, S.J.
Fordham University, New York


O’Malley is the author of many outstanding contributions to early modern history. The volume under review, a study of the historiographic controversy that has swirled around names used to characterize Catholicism in the 16th and 17th centuries, is surely one of his finest. His concise presentation is required reading for all who are interested in the history of Christianity.

O. originally presented the ideas contained in this study through a series of lectures at Oxford in 1993. He covered “Catholic Reform,” “Counter-Reformation,” “Age of Confessionalization,” and the dozen or so other names that have been devised in the past 50 years to characterize the Catholic side of early modern Christian history. He begins by explaining his own conversion to the problem of naming Catholicism in the early modern period. He once considered all such names inherently incomplete, but came to recognize that, for many, they too frequently become history itself. He identifies the varying political, ideological, philosophical, and hermeneutical contexts for each of the terms that historians have proposed in the name game. He argues persuasively that still another term might be useful, “early modern Catholicism,” but cautiously—and correctly—does not suggest it as a replacement that shall end this long debate.

In the conclusion O. correctly identifies the real cause of disagreement over the naming of early modern Catholicism: the notion, which has taken on the status of received truth for historians on all sides, that Catholicism was in essence monolithic. Historians will arrive at a clearer, fuller, more human view of Catholicism in that era when their histories—under whatever name
or title—fully illustrate the creativity, negotiation, and compromise that were pervasive in early modern Catholic religiosity.

WILLIAM V. HUDON
Bloomsburg University of Pennsylvania


Kärkkäinen here presents an in-depth analysis of the fourth phase (1990–1995) of the international dialogue between Roman Catholics and Pentecostals. By way of background he briefly mentions the earlier phases of dialogue: the first (1972–1976), covering the phenomenon of Pentecostalism; the second (1977–1982), dealing with several theological topics, such as speaking in tongues, healing, and hermeneutics; the third (1985–1989), on the communion of saints. Then he takes up the fourth phase (1990–1997), dealing with the Roman Catholic and Pentecostal views on mission, evangelization, and social issues, examining in some detail the final reports of this phase and drawing some conclusions regarding the similarities and differences between Catholics and Pentecostals. He stresses throughout that the goals of this dialogue were unique since it dwelt on spiritual, rather than organic or structural matters.

One of the best features of this study is that K. specifies clearly where both parties agree and disagree on various theological issues, all of which are systematically listed in the conclusion. Thus, to point out just a few examples, while both agreed that evangelization consisted in the proclamation of Jesus Christ leading to conversion (of individuals or cultures), the role of the Spirit and eschatology remained areas of contention. And again, while there was agreement on “the biblical foundation of mission, mission as missio Dei of the Triune God, salvation as liberation from sin and oppression of powers, and integral relationship between koinonia and mission” (130), salvation outside the Church was a major theological stumbling block. The insistence by Pentecostals on signs and wonders, such as speaking in tongues, met with some uneasy reactions from the Catholic side, even though the charismatic movement has made these outward phenomena more familiar to many Catholics.

This book makes a substantial contribution to the study of ecumenism. It is well documented and contains an excellent bibliography.

JOHN A. SALIBA, S.J.
University of Detroit Mercy


McGrath calls Torrance “the most significant British academic theologian” (xi) and “one of the most productive, creative and important theologians” (107) of the 20th century. This important book supports these assessments, presenting an “intellectual biography” which introduces key themes that should provoke further research into Torrance’s impressive theology. It succeeds admirably in presenting Torrance’s background, development, and theological achievements. Because of Torrance’s ecumenical activities and deep theological insights on such important themes as the atonement, the Trinity, natural theology, and the relationship between theology and natural science, his work certainly merits the attention of contemporary theologians, especially Roman Catholics, who generally are not very familiar with his writings.

M. details Torrance’s birth in China of missionary parents, his studies with H. R. Mackintosh and D. Lamont in Edinburgh, an arrest and death sentence in Iraq for spying (which he escaped after proving he was a student), and his life as a pastor and chaplain. Torrance wrote his dissertation under Barth and was instrumental in bringing Barth’s theology to English-speaking audiences both as a theologian (who was not uncritical of Barth) and as a translator and editor of the Church
Dogmatics. In 1948 he was cofounder of the famous and influential Scottish Journal of Theology. The two most difficult decisions in his life were not to accept a position at Princeton University in 1939 and not to succeed Barth at Basel in 1961. He remained at New College, Edinburgh from 1950–1979 when he retired, a year after receiving the prestigious Templeton Prize. Because he could not lecture on the Trinity at New College, his major works on that doctrine awaited his extraordinarily active retirement, during which he continued to lecture and publish extensively.

M. believes that one of Torrance’s most important contributions to contemporary theology is that he restored natural theology to its traditional place in Reformed theology, showing how and why theology and natural science worked within a common (unitary) frame of knowledge. This enabled him to argue, following Athanasius, for scientific theology, i.e., a nondualist knowledge that takes place under the constraint of its unique object; Einstein’s method and some of Polanyi’s categories helped him develop his position.

While Torrance is correct to argue that natural theology should not function independently of revelation, the question left unresolved is how and why such a transformed understanding could still be called natural theology. Since natural theology must operate in subordination to what is known by faith and grace from revelation, it would seem that Torrance’s reconstructed natural theology is more a theology of nature than knowledge of God from nature.

PAUL D. MOLNAR
St. John’s University, Jamaica, N.Y.


Peter Berger thus described the trilemma of contemporary Christians: one can retreat into world-denying fundamentalism, one can embrace science and thoroughly demythify religion, or one can attempt some sort of compromise position. It is clear that Spong rejects the first option and tends toward the second. Episcopal bishop and prolific author, S. presents here a summation of his nondogmatic, nontheistic faith. He advocates belief in a nonpersonal, non-interventionist God, a belief unsupported by revelation and tradition as these have been understood in the mainline churches through the centuries. Relying heavily on the later exegetical work of J. A. T. Robinson, S. rejects the language and the categories of theism as products of a now untenable world view. Traditional religious language (images of God, miraculous works of Jesus, intercessory prayer, etc.) are “utter nonsense” (151, where traditional religious ethics are dismissed as the tribal prejudices of primitives), yet S. is interested in the religious experience of the ancient authors. Having lost the experience of a personal God in prayer (136), S. embraces the experience of the absence of God.

Some readers will wonder about his generalizations, e.g., that the Church always condemned stealing, even if it were a last resort to feed one’s starving family (207), and his observations, e.g., that prayers for healing act directly between persons as a sort of psychic energy transfer (145). Perhaps most controversial is his contention that Jesus of Nazareth was neither God nor redeemer but rather a God bearer, a “spirit person” who revealed to Christians that God is the Ground of Being, the transcendent reality that can be found in the heart of human life through love.

This book of popularized theological ideas may appeal to refugees from mainstream Christianity and to students of postmodern theology.

PAUL J. FITZGERALD, S.J.
Santa Clara University, Calif.


This engaging, richly detailed volume tells the story of one of the nation’s best known churches, Chicago’s Fourth Presbyterian, and offers a plausible challenge to the “strict-church thesis,” according to which liberal values have
led to mainline church decline. Sensitive to issues of race, class, gender, and the dynamics of change, Wellman effectively uses H. Richard Niebuhr’s taxonomic account of the relationship between Christ and culture to review the tenures of four remarkable, long-time pastors. Here, the Christ-and-culture question is especially crucial. An architectural gem, a stone’s throw from Nike Town and the towering John Hancock Building, Fourth Presbyterian is also but a mile from Cabrini-Green, a public housing development emblematic of Chicago’s “second ghetto.”

John Timothy Stone (1908–1928), representing a “Christ of culture” model, sought to baptize “the social and symbolic forms of the Protestant establishment in the name of Jesus Christ” (200). Harrison Ray Anderson (1928–1961) was more the Puritan prophet railing against liquor and other evils; his pastorate thus recalls “Christ and culture in tension.” Elam Davies (1961–1984) distrusted do-gooders right and left, and yet with his “Christ and culture in paradox” model pushed a strong social service agenda. John Buchanan (1985–present) represents the “Christ transforming culture” pattern, with a heavy emphasis on human agency, such that “theodicy” becomes a “sociodicy of good fortune” (185). Wealthy people are called to aid others and change the world.

How, unlike many mainline churches, has Fourth Presbyterian survived and thrived during a century of cultural upheaval? W.’s reply: a thriving upper-middle-class neighborhood, a strong institutional identity, and forceful pastors expert at negotiating conflict. These answers along with W.’s insightful analysis of boundaries, theological and other, and his critical yet obviously sympathetic assessment of today’s “lay liberalism” (long on social outreach, short on theological and moral uniformity), provide solid grist for theologians, historians, sociologists, and other students of religion in America.

WILLIAM P. GEORGE
Dominican University, River Forest, Ill.


Philosopher and religious scholar Brockelman successfully describes here the commonalities inherent in science and religion. The first and most clearly written part of the book would serve as a good basic text for an introductory course in science and religion; the chapter on “the new cosmology” is especially good in this regard. B. demonstrates a familiarity with the most significant writers in the field of cosmology and the new science. He uses those resources well, and in his positive approach to God, “the miracle of being,” he breathes a refreshing versatility into the notion of Ultimate Reality.

B.’s interpretation of the spiritual significance of contemporary cosmology is clear and coherent. Several topics of interest to theologians, however, are not addressed directly, and this could be frustrating for some readers. For example, the reality of sin and evil receive almost no attention. Similarly, B. does not provide a clear answer to the question why one should be good. While he seems to assume that people will discover their own reasons for living a moral life, and he implies that they will be sufficient, he does not adequately explain his reasons for optimism.

Nor does B. address directly the notion of how one might pray to the “miracle of being,” although he hints that it might be feasible. Some of the questions posed and answered by theologians will need more attention if an adequate rapprochement is to occur between theology and science. That, however, is not B.’s goal. Since he does not conceive of God as a personal entity and leaves many questions unanswered, the bridge connecting science and at least some forms of religion does not appear to be nearing completion.

MONI MCINTYRE
Duquesne University, Pittsburgh


Building on the earlier work of David Tracy in The Analogical Imagination
his own Religion as Poetry (1995), Greeley here presents a series of reflections on Catholics’ tendency to imagine themselves as living in an “enchanted world” in which physical artifacts and human stories reveal the presence of an immanent God. G. and Tracy find that by contrast Protestant Christians tend to think of a transcendent God as absent from the material universe, a tendency they call the dialectical imagination.

With this basic paradigm in mind, G. sharply focuses this “extended essay” on the two Western branches of Christianity in their many diverse cultural manifestations. He does not compare Christian artistic creations to those of other religious traditions, nor does he tease out a potentially overwhelming list of ethnic variations. He does, however, examine a broad range of art works from many eras and cultures, from the cathedral of Cologne to James T. Farrell’s Studs Lonigan, from Verdi’s La Traviata to Scorsese’s Mean Streets, and he concludes that Catholic artists, regardless of their cultural context and personal beliefs, have a characteristically earthly or analogical way of expressing sublime realities.

The Catholic Imagination is vintage G., at his most thought-provoking, insightful, charming, and readable. As a skilled novelist, he leads his reader through personal anecdotes and lively descriptions of the works of art to a series of interpretations that point to an identifiably Catholic way of looking at the world. As a trained sociologist, he turns these observations into hypotheses and tests them against the statistical data that he and others have gathered from examining the attitudes of ordinary, everyday Catholics. G. finds a remarkable consistency between sensibilities revealed in works of high art, popular art, and the lived experience of Catholics that he calls appropriately the Catholic imagination.

Richard A. Blake, S.J.
Boston College


His recent installation as the Director of the Center for Barth Studies at Princeton Theological Seminary marks the culmination of Hunsinger’s emergence over the last two decades as one of the foremost Barth scholars in the U.S. His interpretative appropriations of Barth have been both deeply rooted in the American context and radically oriented toward global ecumenical discussion. Without exception, the 15 essays collected here are rigorously researched and well argued. Students new to Barth will find cogent summaries of his dominant motifs, and lifelong scholars of Barth will discover new dimensions of the fecundity of his work.

The chapters in the section on “Political Theology” bring Barth into dialogue with several important thinkers who have shaped the contemporary discussion, including Girard, Gutiérrez, and Yoder. H. also examines ways in which Barth’s theological leadership in the Barmen Declaration might inform the response of the confessing church in North America today. The section on “Doctrinal Theology” includes essays on Barth’s Christology, pneumatology, trinitarian doctrine of God, methodology, and eschatology. Throughout these essays, H. is at pains to emphasize, with his great mentor, the centrality of the cross of Christ for Christian theology. The section devoted to “Ecumenical Theology” begins with two chapters that outline the progress and remaining challenges in the ecumenical dialogue between Reformed theology (represented by Barth) and Roman Catholicism and Lutheranism. The last three chapters treat the “postliberal” nature of Barth’s program vis-à-vis Lindbeck, Harnackian liberalism, and evangelicals of the Carl Henry type.

In the Introduction, H. explains that his concern is to resist the forced option to choose between the ideals of “progressive politics” and “traditional faith.” Some may disagree with his particular construal of the tradition, and others may debate his political assumptions and proposals, but for those who share his desire to maintain both of
these ideals, this book is a welcome resource.

F. LeRon Shults
Bethel Theological Seminary, Minn.


As its content and style suggest, this book derives from Shults’s 1998 doctoral dissertation at Princeton. Its publication should bring it the wider scholarly readership that it deserves.

Drawing heavily on the work of his mentor, J. Wentzel van Huyssteen, S. proposes a “postfoundationalist” model of reason that seeks a middle way between the absolutism of Enlightenment foundationalism and the frequent relativism and fideism of contemporary nonfoundationalism. Through a clear and insightful analysis of Pannenberg’s theological method in the light of this “postfoundationalist” model, S. argues compellingly against a reading of Pannenberg as a “foundationalist.” He concludes that Pannenberg’s conception of a dynamic unity between “fundamental” and “systematic” moments in theology can provide a rich resource for contemporary methodology, provided that a more explicit concern for postmodern themes and language is added. Students of Roman Catholic theology of the last half-century have found similar resources in thinkers like Rahner, Lonergan, and Schillebeeckx, and some may indeed wonder how “new” S.’s model of theological rationality really is. However, S.’s discussion is valuable for its fine summary presentation of the current discussion in Protestant Anglo-American theology, for his trenchant critique of many varieties of nonfoundationalism, and for his convincing argument that the very terms of the debate are inadequate.

Although the book does not entirely transcend the limitations of the dissertation genre, theologians and advanced students interested in theological method will find S.’s first two chapters profitable reading. The later chapters will be of interest primarily to students of Pannenberg’s work, although they probably presuppose too much to serve as an introduction to it for beginners.

Richard Viladesau
Fordham University, New York


In a classic scene from Woody Allen’s Crimes and Misdemeanors, the profound and inspiring philosopher, Dr. Levy, commits suicide. The final words left for posterity by the brilliant thinker are: “I’ve gone out the window.” The meaninglessness and absurdity of suicide eclipse a life marked by profundity. On Suicide is a collection of five thoughtful essays originally broadcast on radio in 1976 between Améry’s attempted and successful suicide; these essays seek to develop what we might label an “ontology of a suicidal,” to enable those who perceive suicide as an absurdity to understand.

A. defends the decision to commit suicide or, the phrase he prefers, voluntary death, as a distinctly human decision that reflects one’s profound dignity, freedom, and humanity. Rather than approaching the subject from psychology, sociology, or suicidology, which are based on external reflections on the internal mind of the suicidal, A. becomes, as it were, part of the internal darkness of the suicidal. This darkness he associates with the French term échec—an impending fear of failure or defeat. “Échec stands as a threat in the background of everyone’s existence” (42) and is at the root of what A. refers to as “an inclination towards death” (74). It is the suicidal who acts with total freedom and integrity in acting on this inclination.

While A.’s style is poetic and insightful, his reflections confound at times rather than clarify. And while his desire to understand the suicidal and his call to respect and lament “those who departed from us in freedom” (153) demonstrate empathy and compassion, his reflections seem too narrowly focused.
He fails to move beyond the internal darkness of a suicidal to give a reasonable or persuasive account or analysis of the relational dimension of the act of voluntary death. Though he resists delving into ethics for fear of being “taken into custody as an outsider” (103), his reflections move beyond compassion in the face of a tragic event to advocate an extreme individualism and ethical relativism on behalf of a suicidal which is neither adequately defended nor inherently convincing.

TODD SALZMAN
Creighton University, Omaha


Bilgrien conducts a study of the concept of solidarity as treated in church documents. It may surprise many readers that the term was rarely used in Catholic social teaching until the most recent decades. Indeed, B. describes in great detail the distinctive contributions of John Paul II in shaping the discourse surrounding this concept.

B.’s thesis is that solidarity is best understood as a virtue, as opposed to the previous and simpler models of solidarity as a principle, attitude, or duty. In situating the virtue of solidarity in relation to the virtues of justice and charity, B. fills a gap in existing scholarship, and does so with the assistance of texts from Aquinas and several prominent neo-Thomists.

The strongest sections of this book unpack the constitutive parts of solidarity: interdependence, mutuality, and respect for human rights and the common good. Less convincing are B.’s somewhat sketchy forays into social analysis, designed to demonstrate that solidarity is the key virtue necessary for today’s world. We still await a cogent statement of that important argument. When it does appear, the case will surely be built from a base of solid research into global socioeconomic realities, not from the type of theological reasoning that usually dominates papal encyclicals and addresses. Nevertheless, B. makes the solid if modest contribution of bringing together (even at the risk of taxing the patience of the reader) everything that has been said about solidarity in Vatican circles.

THOMAS MASSARO, S.J.
Weston Jesuit School of Theology


Continuing his longstanding efforts to demonstrate the importance of the just-war tradition today, Johnson addresses the changing face of warfare in the 90s. Warfare confronting people today is no longer a matter of nuclear holocaust but the limited type as seen in the African problems from Rwanda to Zaire/Congo or the European problems from Bosnia to Kosovo. Today’s issues involve humanitarian justification for military intervention due to the now typical warring on noncombatants and subsequent needs for both criminal tribunals and the rebuilding of a peaceful social fabric. In light of these issues, just-war thinkers consider the ways in which reinterpretations or new applications of just-war concepts and principles keep alive the tradition and display its necessity today.

J. selected as dialogue partners, first, the pair of Ramsey and Walzer, and second, the U.S. Catholic bishops. But through it all, the insight and influence of Augustine sets the overall orientation and leads to criticisms of the realism of Niebuhr and Morgenthau. Also instructive and constructive is J.’s cross-cultural analysis of the analogically similar limits to war found in the Islamic tradition of jihad. He corrects the usual associations of jihad with holy war to its more general meaning, to “strive in the path of God.”

The final substantive chapter addresses the apparent mutually exclusive ends of punishing those who sanction or commit war crimes and of establishing a peace with reconciliation between opponents (Bosnia). J. insightfully mentions the medieval church practice of requiring penance of all soldiers on both sides after the battle or war. Thus he
highlights the limitations of his own emphasis on the need for retribution through war crime tribunals to the detriment of seeing the necessary role of forgiveness of sins if a new common society is to be recreated. This is a most excellent work.

JOHN R. POPIDEN
Loyola Marymount University, L.A.


This slim volume consists of ten essays previously published mainly in English journals. The first four offer concise and clear snapshots of various patristic, medieval, Reformation and early modern approaches to the Eucharist. The next two summarize the teaching of Vatican II and of the present pope on the same subject. Eucharistic presence and social justice are discussed in the two following essays; the final two treat John Macquarrie’s theology of the Eucharist and offer practical applications to parish life of modern thought on the Eucharist.

Taken as a whole, these contributions provide a thoughtful and insightful introduction to the present state of ecumenical discussions concerning the Eucharist. C. has a strong sense of the importance of history in evaluating the present state of the sacrament. Although also of interest to academics, parish ministers will find this book invaluable for the great amount of material presented in a manageable format. The last essay would be particularly helpful at the parish level.

Only rarely does the occasional nature of the essays shine through. Why, for instance, include the theology of Macquarrie rather than that of one of several other contemporary theologians whose work has been devoted to the Eucharist? Would not essays on the ecclesial nature of the Eucharist or on sacrifice in the sacrament balance the discussions of presence and social action, as C. himself admits? If not all the necessary aspects of the Eucharist are discussed in this collection, what C. does treat, he treats very well. Making these essays available to a wider readership is in itself a real gift.

GARY MACY
University of San Diego


In this well written study, Cunningham begins with a recap of Thomas Merton’s famous autobiography, The Seven Storey Mountain (1948). He manages to hold the attention of the proficient Merton scholar, as well as those who have read only one or two of Merton’s published works. Once readers are on the same page, as it were, C. successfully examines significant aspects of Thomas Merton’s spiritual development beyond the 1940s. He fittingly places this maturation in context. When addressing Merton’s study of John of the Cross for The Ascent to Truth (1951) C. deftly interweaves Merton’s then current understanding of mysticism with a growing affinity with his 16th century mentor. Both understood “that mystical prayer should not be confused with extraordinary phenomenena” (39). Likewise, Merton’s early desire for and initial writings on solitude are situated within a greatly overcrowded Gethsemani, which boasted some 200 monks by 1950. Add to this C.’s perceptive comments on the polarity of Merton’s own leanings: for solitude on the one hand and for travel and engagement in conferences on the other (116). In such ways one is led to greater awareness of both the genius and the complexity of Merton’s development.

The author’s assessment of Merton’s individual works is enlightening as well as refreshing. His comments on The New Man, an understudied text (81), is a case in point. C.’s comments delineate the riches of this slim volume, which is scripturally informed and also serves as a critique of the Marxist claim to build a (godless) new man. The transformation in Christ, often described by Merton as movement from the false to the true self, is fittingly noted as a contemporary rephrasing of the Pauline putting on Christ.

Monastic theologian, prophet, open to others—these are but three of the ways that the author portrays Merton.
His most fitting portrayal of Merton is as monk for twenty-seven years, one who with largesse lived the monastic rule with its rich tradition of asceticism, spirituality, and prayer. As Cunningham quotes Merton in chapter seven: “Without contemplation we remain small, limited, divided, partial; ... we betray Christ” (209).

I find this volume a solid, well researched study of the many-faceted Cistercian monk. The bibliographic chapter is a fine essay. My single regret is that Merton sources, whether analyzed or quoted, lack precise documentation (page references to standard editions would prove most helpful). However, I realize that this may have been the call of the publisher rather than that of the author.

BRIGID O' SHEA MERRIMAN, O.S.F.
Mount Angel Seminary, St. Benedict, Oreg.


Anyone interested in and critical of popular writing about the omnipresent topic of spirituality will discover a rare gift in Rolheiser’s work. He offers an intelligent, clearly articulated, and theologically rooted reflection on contemporary Christian spirituality. First, he answers the question “What is spirituality?” by proposing that it is about “what we do with desire” (7) or how we channel our fire or eros. His explanation of that thesis and subsequent chapters confront the dualistic approaches of past understandings of spirituality with the concreteness of the Incarnation and its implications.

Part 2 presents what R. believes to be nonnegotiable components of a specifically Christian spirituality. Amidst the pluralism of fragmented choices offered in our contemporary context, he aims for “substance and balance,” selecting four essentials, none of which is adequate by itself: private prayer and morality, social justice, meekliness of heart and spirit, and community. His goal is integration of such past dichotomies as personal versus communal, private versus social, and ethereal versus embodied images of spirituality. His arguments for and explanation of each are convincing. Part 3 focuses on Christ and the Incarnation as the basis of spirituality. In these chapters his stories and human situations vividly illustrate the theological proposal that Incarnation is always experienced in concrete human situations. R.’s range of scriptural and literary allusions gracefully enriches his writing.

Spiritualities within Christian spirituality structure the final part, which includes such areas as ecclesiology, justice and peacemaking, and sexuality. Although rooted in Catholic tradition, the book is inclusive of a reading audience beyond those boundaries. R. presents a challenging and enduring text that many audiences will appreciate.

JOY MILOS, C.S.J.
Gonzaga University, Spokane

BOOKS RECEIVED

SCRIPTURAL STUDIES


HISTORICAL


**SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY**


**MORALITY AND LAW**


Catholic Ethicists on HIV/AIDS Prevention.
BOOKS RECEIVED


PASTORAL, SPIRITUAL, AND LITURGICAL


**PHILOSOPHY, OTHER DISCIPLINES**


