BOOK REVIEWS


The Book of Proverbs is generally not considered to be a prime biblical source for theology. At one time Prov 8:32 was a pivotal text in the Arian controversy, but the book itself fell into the benign neglect of the Old Testament Wisdom Literature. Job and Qoheleth have been the preferred books, apparently because they challenged God and the status quo. In contrast, Proverbs seems like a dreary repetition that wisdom (virtue) will triumph and folly (sin) will self-destruct. Clifford’s commentary gives the lie to this. The Book of Proverbs can be exciting and also theologically fruitful. Wisdom has now become a hot item in OT research, and its utilization in theology is only beginning. One thinks of the following topics: formation of moral character, the symbolism of Woman Wisdom, and the enlarged understanding of Jesus as wisdom teacher. In these and in other areas, wisdom will have its day.

Among his important achievements is C’s ability to show the pertinence and liveliness of proverbial wisdom. There is a telling admission in the preface: “If a verse seemed banal, I knew I had not understood it, and so I returned to it” (vii). That sense of discovery pervades the commentary. The sayings open the modern reader to a way of thinking about life, especially about formation of character. In a sense, specialists in ethics may have the most to gain, because the sages approached the puzzles of life and attempted to weigh values. No single saying exhausts its chosen topic, but the sayings bounce off of each other to provide a perspective into a holistic style of acting. They do not “moralize” so much as they offer provocative observations. The saying reflects more a way of thinking than a nugget of thought, as the several “contradictions” demonstrate (24:5–6, whether to answer a fool or not). Thus C. remarks, “Proverbs is concerned with wisdom as a fundamental option in life rather than with specific wise actions . . . the quest for wisdom is depicted as a drama that is charged with conflict” (32). And this drama is heightened by the basic realization that to be truly wise is a slippery affair. “Do you see someone wise in his own eyes? There’s more hope for a fool than for him” (Prov 26:12).

The Bible is filled with literary personifications, none of them more extensive than the figure of personified Wisdom, which runs through Proverbs, Sirach, and Wisdom of Solomon, to form a background to the “Word” of the Gospel of John. C. catches all the nuances of Woman Wisdom. He remarks of the important text 8:30–34: “As wisdom delights in God ‘daily’ in v. 30b, so the disciple is to wait upon her ‘daily’ in v. 34. The relationship between Wisdom and her disciples on earth in vv. 32–34 mirrors the relationship between Wisdom and Yahweh in heaven” (97). Paradoxically, this Wisdom, which is said to be a gift from the Lord (Prov 2:6), is also some-
thing to be learned from life, and especially in the proverbial sayings that derived from both the family and more sophisticated circles, such as the court. The mysterious balance between divine initiative and human activity is the area explored by wisdom.

Sayings are the most humble part of the book; they do not stir the emotions as the presentation of Woman Wisdom does with her call and promise of life, and her passionate conflict with Woman Folly. C.’s comment on the bridge between chaps. 1–9 and 10–29 points to one of the themes underlying the book: “Like a red thread through the collection, the domestic sayings [in 10–29] keep before the reader the theme of building or founding a household. Metaphorically, founding a house and choosing and being faithful to a life partner is the project of any serious seeker after wisdom . . . . [10:1–3] introduce the reader to the full dimensions of wisdom,” the sapiential, the ethical, and the religious (111–12).

The famous numerical saying in 30:18–19 is explained well by C. The proverb itself registers the sage’s astonishment at simple mysteries in the created world. The way into the saying is to note the fourfold repetition of the word “way.” It has a literal meaning in the way of the eagle, the serpent, and the ship, through air and earth and water. The metaphorical meaning appears in the fourth example, the “way” of a man with a woman: “their course is toward each other” (266). Thus the mysterious and providential (more than sexual in the narrow sense) attraction of man and woman is captured here, as also in the Song of Songs. The famous mulier fortis of Latin tradition is translated as “capable wife” (Prov 31:10), and the portrait is interpreted as “an ideal wife (of a great house) and, on a metaphorical level, a portrait of Woman Wisdom and what she accomplishes for those who come to her house as disciples and friends . . . . The portrait has two levels, as do the portraits of the two women in chaps. 1–9. A good wife, who is a gift of God, builds her house” (274).

The view that “a proverb in a collection is dead” (because the original meaning may no longer be attainable) is proved wrong. If this commentary did nothing else (and it does a lot!) it makes the reading of the biblical text a challenge. Eight collections can be discerned within Proverbs 10–31. If each is read attentively, the commentary will stimulate a reader to think the sayings through. Nothing better could be hoped for.

Washington, D.C. Roland E. Murphy, O.Carm.


The recent renewed interest in ecological issues has inspired theologians to reexamine the way creation has been understood and valued. Relevant studies in this area have been done in most of the major theological disciplines. This is particularly true as regards biblical studies. From the be-
ginning, attention has been given to the role played by the natural world. However, recent research has taken an entirely different focus. The longstanding claim that the basis of biblical theology is history and religion, while concern for nature belongs to the primitive religions or simply serves the purposes of history, is currently under serious scrutiny. Several comprehensive studies of the issue have appeared in the recent past, each in its own way linking the cosmos with elements of religious culture. While Brown applauds the insights that such works provide, he is not satisfied with their findings. He believes that there is a more fundamental connection than has been drawn. He bases his work on the premise that ancient Near Eastern cosmologies presumed a seamless connection between cosmos and society. From this he concludes that the way creation is perceived (its mythos) influenced the way the society understood itself and the moral responsibility that flowed from this perception (its ethos).

B.’s interests have been influenced by the work of scientists, cultural anthropologists, systematic theologians, and ethicists, but his approach is basically biblical. In his investigation, he skillfully employs both historical and literary-critical methods. Much of what he uncovers will be familiar to many readers. However, it is not so much what he finds in the texts as what he does with his findings that make this an interesting book. Concerned with the impact of the environment on the moral character of the people of Israel, he takes his findings a step further than most writers, in order to uncover the moral imagination that directed the thinking of the people. In many ways he makes ecological issues explicit where before they may have been only implicit or actually overlooked. He examines five different creation traditions in order to discover the values enshrined within them: the Priestly account and its connection to the cosmic sanctuary, the Yahwist’s version with its strong royal connotations, the concept of a new creation preached by Second Isaiah, the report of Wisdom’s participation in creation as depicted in Proverbs, and the description of the animals in the story of Job.

B. treats many of the major themes of each of the five traditions: the blessings of creation itself, the Flood, the Sinai covenant with its insistence on holiness, and the tabernacle in the Priestly tradition; family and land relations in the Yahwistic tradition; the new creation as a sign of salvation and restoration in the postexilic prophet Second Isaiah; Wisdom as established both in the cosmos and on earth as portrayed in Proverbs; the misfortune of Job and the way he struggled for understanding. However, B. brings a new ethical perspective to each investigation. He believes that in the Priestly tradition creation is characterized by boundedness which provides the context for life of all forms to survive and thrive. The limits that this sets are enshrined in the various law codes which Israel cherished. The ethos of the Yahwist is revealed in the questions that deal with community and its breakdown, the meaning and significance of culture, kinship with the land, and the exercise of power. Second Isaiah’s vision of a new creation springs from the concept of God’s own righteousness and truth which is the basis of the ethical program of the nation. Since Wisdom is the
ordering principle that combats any form of chaos, she was eventually identified with the law itself. Finally, torn from the ethos of patriarchy, Job is catapulted into the chaos of the wilderness where the animals, all of which were somehow beyond the control of human beings, acclaim an order that Job himself cannot discern, but must trust nonetheless.

B.’s Conclusion contains concise sketches of the ecological insights he has drawn from each of the creation traditions treated. In addition to this, he shows how several of the themes he has treated, such as new creation, community, and cosmic victory are also found in the New Testament. Though B. has not explored the New Testament understanding of these issues, his insights equip readers with the tools they need to continue the exploration he has begun. This is a very readable book, carefully researched and well documented. Those acquainted with the biblical material treated will appreciate the new perspective it provides; novices to biblical study will find this both a fine introduction and an insightful interpretation.

Catholic Theological Union, Chicago Dianne Bergant, C.S.A.


A resurgence of interest in Josephus as an interpreter of the Bible began in the 1970s with the publication of dissertations by Harold Attridge and Thomas Franxman. In 1976 Feldman published a study of Josephus’s portrait of Solomon, followed by numerous similar studies. In this impressive monograph he synthesizes those studies in a comprehensive description of Josephus’s range and method in interpreting biblical texts, and then analyzes 12 of Josephus’s biblical portraits that he considers most important, those of Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, Joseph, Moses, Joshua, Samson, Samuel, Saul, David, Solomon, and Daniel.

F. first considers Josephus’s historiographical predecessors, especially the Greeks, arguing that he was a “creative and consistent historian” (xv), and compares Josephus’s work with that of other authors who rewrote parts of the Bible. He offers a status quaestionis on the Bible available to Josephus (languages, versions, his attitude to the text, affinities with other text-traditions). He surveys recent Qumran and Septuagintal studies, and takes an approach that is appropriately cautious (that Josephus probably used Hebrew, Greek, and Aramaic texts) and critical (that his historian’s sensibilities led to more alterations of the text than his prologue would suggest).

F. synthesizes qualities which Josephus stressed in his rewriting of the biblical narratives: antiquity and good genealogy, wealth, and the four cardinal virtues—wisdom, courage, temperance/modesty, and justice—as well as piety. He demonstrates Josephus’s debt to Greek and Latin writers, as he employed their categories—a strategy that greatly served his goals as
an apologist to non-Jews and also to Jews. F. treats the major anti-Jewish objections of the Romans contemporary with Josephus and demonstrates the historian’s skillful crafting of biblical portraits with pro-Jewish apologetics. F. discerns the historian’s defense of Jews in his depiction of characters: he cited non-Jewish historical witnesses to Jews, many of them favorable, and explained their resistance to intermarriage as a caution against submitting to passions.

Tables I and II (75–81) list all the major biblical characters and compare the amount of space each received in Josephus, the Septuagint, and the Hebrew Bible. These lists, and their references, prove especially valuable because they provide information about the numerous personages not treated in F.’s second part. A chapter on “stylistic and other changes” summarizes F.’s years of research on biblical portraits. The catalogue of Josephus’s specific techniques in rewriting biblical accounts includes: resolving difficulties and contradictions, Hellenizations, dramatic motifs, romantic motifs, appeals to social interests (Josephus’s misogyny) and philosophical interests, psychologizing accounts (looking for true motives) and detheologizing many accounts (by removing active agency of God). This last point, deemphasis on the divine role, leads F. to argue that Josephus approached the Bible as history rather than as theology or religious interpretation of their history.

F.’s chapter on David contains some telling observations: compared to the Bible, Josephus’s presentation of David is sparse. F. argues that the historian carefully avoided even hints of a messianic portrait of David, never referring to David as christos (anointed), whereas Pseudo-Philo does refer to David as sanctus christus, a holy anointed one/messiah. Of the virtues, David excelled in piety. F. suggests that Josephus opposed any idea of an independent Jewish state, and that he may have wished to downplay the importance of David for Christians in his time.

The portrait of Solomon, on the other hand, illustrates a primary way to defend Jews against their enemies. Contrary to rabbinic portraits of Solomon, which emphasized his wisdom and viewed him as a type of pre-talmudic sage, Josephus claimed that Solomon was the most illustrious, outstanding in understanding and wealth, and most beloved by God of all the rulers of the Hebrews. In Josephus’s portrait of Solomon F. argues for strong influence of the character of Oedipus, as depicted in dramas of Sophocles, which would have been standard educational fare in the Hellenistic world. F. also claims that Josephus’s description of the Temple and of particular ceremonies derives nicely from his own experience as a priest. The chapter on Solomon shows F. at his best, moving carefully from biblical text to various parabiblical witnesses and classical allusions, pinpointing the historian’s skill in each category of changes.

This book is a masterpiece of organization and presentation. Indexes covering 125 pages follow the text, allowing easy access to specific persons or references. Each chapter is packed with references and closes with an excellent summary. The mass of detail included probably precludes straight reading of this text, but this work needs to be in every theological reference
library or collection, and teachers of New Testament and Second Temple Judaism will wish to own it. Those who consult it will find themselves greatly enriched, not only by the mass of F.’s information, but also by his clear and inviting style.

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**JOHN C. ENDRÉS, S.J.**


Allison has here resurrected the apocalyptic Jesus discovered by A. Schweitzer 90 years ago, Jesus as a millenarian prophet or an eschatological prophet with an apocalyptic scenario. As a millenarian prophet, Jesus predicted the completion on the renewed earth where the distinction between heaven and earth is blurred. As an eschatological prophet, Jesus announced the consummation of the ages, the resurrection of the dead, and the last judgment. He made these prophecies relevant to his own time by linking them to himself or to persons around him. He talked erroneously about the imminent completion and understood apocalyptic imagery literally, as did his contemporaries and, much later, Muhammad, Xhosa of South Africa, and others. Luke 19:11 indicates an attempt to exonerate Jesus and to attribute his misunderstanding to the disciples. Just as later sects reinterpreted the prophecy of their leader in light of the nonfulfilment, so did the disciples of Jesus (168).

As E. P. Sanders before him, A. doubts that it is possible to work back from the sayings source to the historical Jesus. In particular, he takes issue with Dominic Crossan’s methodology. He shows the weaknesses of the criterion of dissimilarity, the conjectural nature of his dating of extracanonical books and of using them as primary witnesses, and the arbitrariness of his stratification of the data. He scores good points against Crossan, but unnecessarily blocks himself by introducing a fictional Faustina, an early Christian prophetess who concocted a number of sayings and placed them on the lips of Jesus. These sayings then got into the Gospels and received multiple attestation. With this move, A. prevents any reasonable attempt at getting back to the historical Jesus. In fact he makes it impossible for any historian to get back to the sources. But in doing this he goes against his own rule that pure possibility is not yet probability. If there is no trace of Faustina’s presence in the transmission of the tradition, why postulate her presence, and this at the exact time and place that crucially influenced the Jesus tradition?

Like Sanders in *Jesus and Judaism*, A. begins with the image of Jesus that the Jesus tradition portrays. He selects 17 themes (Sanders has 18 facts), such as the kingdom of God, future reward, future judgment, suffering/persecution, victory over evil powers, John the Baptist, the Son of Man, God as Father, loving/serving/forgiving others, regard for the unfortunates, intention as what matters most, wealth, extraordinary requests,
conflict with religious authorities, disciples as students and helpers, Jesus the miracle worker. He then introduces Jesus the millenarian prophet as the convenient summation of these themes.

There is much to recommend this approach, but why stop at these themes? The documents, after all, speak also of Jesus as the Son of God, of his death and Resurrection, of his conception by the Holy Spirit, of his being more than any prophet and greater than John the Baptist, of the disciples’ worshiping him. By selecting only these themes A. showed his personal bias, just as Crossan did in his own way. Instead of Jesus a Cynic wise man, we now have Jesus a Jewish millenarian prophet.

While A.’s book rightly restores Jesus the Jew, the Jesus of his reconstruction is not allowed to stand out of his surrounding or among the figures of comparative religion. He is not the Christ of the Gospels and Pauline Letters but the Jesus of popular perception (Mark 8:28). He is not the Jesus the disciples worship in the Gospels of Matthew, Luke, or John. At best he resembles John the Baptist. For A., he is just another millenarian prophet like Wovoka, Mambu, or Birsa (217). And that is theologically and historically scarcely acceptable.

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JOSEPH PLEVNIK, S.J.


Undoubtedly, the 20th century will be remembered as a period of intense scholarly interest in the person and work of Jesus Christ. Many christological issues have shared the spotlight during the past century of theological research: among others, the reinterpretation of the teaching of Chalcedon, the retrieval of Jesus’ authentic human nature, and the rethinking of Anselm’s theory of satisfaction, along with the universal scope of Christ’s saving work. One of the common threads in this tapestry of scholarship is the Christology of the New Testament. Because the NT canon constitutes the Church’s explicit inspired and inerrant testimony to Jesus Christ, this collection of sacred texts establishes a standard to which later Christologies must be held accountable.

In this superb volume, Matera takes up a familiar topic, and treats it in a fresh, appealing way. Instead of the predictable focusing on the latest quest for the historical Jesus, the development of Christology in the early Christian community, and the christological titles ascribed to Jesus, M. employs a narrative approach. By analyzing the explicit and implicit stories of Christ in the NT, he attempts first to uncover its diverse Christologies and then to identify the overarching concepts that hold these Christologies together in a creative tension.

One of the many attractive features of this book is M.’s lucid summaries of the stories of Christ. M. describes and analyzes with precision the particular story of Christ that is told in each biblical book he surveys. In some
cases, he provides a rearrangement of word order or an “amplified version” of a given text to clarify the meaning of a story. At other times, he engages in an intriguing comparison of various translations of key words loaded with christological meaning, such as eikon (“image” or “representative”) and morphe theou (“form of God”). A fussy critic might lament a lack of sustained attention to the Jewish matrix of Jesus’ life and public ministry, although most of the pertinent material is present in his discussion of Jesus’ messiahship. For the novice in biblical hermeneutics, M. provides exegetical analysis that is meticulous without being overly esoteric or tedious.

M. wades confidently into the waters of doctrinal issues. For example, he makes a very persuasive case for the theological argument that the faith of Christ is the ground for the believer’s justification by faith in Christ. Consistently rendering the phrase dia pisteos Christou in Galatians 2:16, Romans 3:22, and Philippians 3:9 as “through the faith of Christ,” he maintains that the faith of Christ is not a virtue by which one holds beliefs or assents to truths. Rather the faith of Christ is manifest in the faithful obedience of the Son of God on the cross. This voluntary self-surrender of Christ mediates God’s righteousness to those who have faith in Christ. On other doctrinal matters, M. amply illustrates how various NT texts either intimate or explicitly affirm the preexistence of Christ as well as the unique sonship of Jesus Christ. In an era when the definitiveness and finality of the christic revelation of God have been called into question, M. lends biblical support to traditional truth claims about Jesus Christ.

The crown jewel of this volume is the last chapter in which M. resists the temptation to harmonize the various biblical stories about Christ. Instead he proposes with admirable clarity five claims that the NT stories make about Jesus. These unifying claims revolve around Jesus’ unique relationships to Israel, the Church, the world, the human predicament, and God. This final chapter serves as a reliable bridge from a biblical theology to a systematic theology on Jesus Christ. Suitable for a graduate course in Christology and featuring helpful endnotes and an extensive bibliography, this book will serve the cause of theological scholarship well into the next century.

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PAUL E. RITT


Since close study of the Didache, an early “proto-church order” of 16 relatively short chapters, remains of paramount importance for New Testament, early Church, and liturgical scholars and students, it is nothing short of sheer delight to have Niederwimmer’s commentary now available for a much wider audience. Maloney’s English translation is excellent.
There is no question but that this commentary will rapidly become the standard English text and beginning point for further and ongoing study. Together with the most helpful organization of the materials (under the subheadings of “analysis” and “comment” in most chapters), four features in particular stand out. First, the translation of each chapter of the Greek text is superb. Although several portions of the Greek text also appear in the commentary, one wishes that the entire Greek version had been supplied in a parallel column at the beginning of each chapter. The complete text of the Didache itself is certainly short enough to have made this possible. Second, N.’s introduction clearly details the several complex problems in the textual and manuscript history of the document, the “didachist’s” sources (the Jewish-Christian “Two Ways” document, archaic liturgical traditions, a tradition about the reception of itinerant “charismatics,” and a brief apocalypse), as well as the final redaction into what ultimately became the document known as the Didache. Against previously held theories about its development (e.g., Audet’s), N. posits a Christian author or redactor, at the beginning of the second century, who organized this book of rules from the available written and oral sources at his disposal into a “compilation.” As scholars have long held, the Didache is not, thus, a complete work “written” by a single author but a composite text in which various layers or strata can be discerned. Third, while N. assumes that the document in its current form can still be dated at the beginning of the second century, wisely, in this reviewer’s opinion, he does not offer a conclusion as to its provenance. Although not ruling out Egypt as a possibility, he suggests that Syria remains a likely candidate. Fourth, one of the great values of this commentary are surely the various excursuses N. offers throughout (e.g., on “types of water,” and on “Jewish fasting practice”), which serve to contextualize the material.

As one whose primary interest in the Didache is as a liturgical source, I find N.’s treatment of baptism (125–30) and Eucharist (139–67) to be of solid critical scholarship and generally compelling. I am not fully convinced, however, that the so-called baptismal “formula” in Didache 7:1 is a liturgical formula “to be spoken during the baptism.” And I wish that N. had done more to attempt a resolution of the long scholarly debate over whether the “eucharistic” prayers in Didache 9 are for a sacramental Eucharist or another type (agape?) of community meal. N. seems to favor the commonly held opinion that the prayers of Didache 9 are intended for this community meal and those of Didache 10 for the sacramental Eucharist, and it is probably unfair to expect a “commentary” to do more than lay out various options or possibilities rather than provide firm conclusions. Similarly, while N.’s scholarship is impeccable and clearly demonstrates a command of the scholarly literature, I wish he had incorporated more of the work of Thomas Talley (e.g., the English version of his “From Berakah to Eucharistia” should have been listed in the bibliography), John Riggs (e.g., his earlier study of the meal prayers in the Didache is not included), and, especially, the more recent work of Enrico Mazza on the origins of the eucharistic prayer, for whom the meal prayers of Didache 9 and 10 figure
so prominently in his attempt at interpreting early Christian anaphoral construction in general.

Finally, this is an excellent piece of work which draws together in one place a veritable wealth of scholarship on the Didache, together with abundant text-critical notes, numerous parallels or use of the Didache in other early Christian literature, a sizeable bibliography in various languages, and most helpful indices. I highly recommend the purchase and use of this commentary.

University of Notre Dame                      Maxwell E. Johnson


The intense interest in the papacy stimulated by John Paul II’s forceful leadership has prompted publication of a wide range of works in recent years. La Due’s volume is among the most valuable and significant, for by seeking “to trace the considerable evolution of [the papal office]” (xi) over nearly 20 centuries he provides an informed historical framework for envisioning future possibilities. This study is particularly important for the dialogue invited by John Paul II in the encyclical Ut unum sint, which acknowledges that “the Catholic Church’s conviction that in the ministry of the Bishop of Rome she has preserved the visible sign and guarantor of unity” (no. 88) presents a major stumbling block for Christian unity. Both Catholic and other Christian scholars would benefit from revisiting familiar ground through the lens of this historical analysis.

L.’s approach pursues a middle ground between the familiar routes that focus on either individual pontiffs or eras or on ideological models of the papal office. By taking into account the secular and ecclesiological contingencies of the unfolding epochs, as well as the qualities and character of particular popes, he creates a clear, reasoned framework that allows him to identify the changing roles exercised by the Bishop of Rome. Effective use of documentary evidence, tempered by the scholarly judgment of recognized specialists, provides a crisp, insightful assessment of the matrix of factors that have promoted or curbed papal power and influence.

Readers familiar with the terrain of papal history will value L.’s skill and nuance in pinpointing the stages in the unfolding of the papal role. His cogent discussion of the context, as well as the personalities, involved in the extension of papal power by Leo I, Gregory I, Gregory VII, and Innocent III is especially clear and instructive. Both ecclesial and external factors are identified, allowing the reader to recognize and evaluate their relative significance. Similar keen analysis is given to the exigencies that challenged papal dominance from the stormy reign of Boniface VIII (1294–1303) until the end of the Council of Trent and the pontificate of Pius V (1566–1572).

L. devotes nearly 60 pages, one-fifth of the text, to the period he labels “the installation of the absolutist model, 1869 to the present.” He reasons
that the conciliar definitions of papal primacy and infallibility by Vatican I in 1869 “left the Church with an extremely papalist tilt” (295). With one or two exceptions, he perceives that “tilt” continuing through the 20th century, despite the more balanced ecclesiology promoted by Vatican II. While the special focus on the recent century is surely important, there seems to be less historical perspective, nuance, and balance here than in the earlier parts of his work.

The value of the study is enhanced by appendices that focus on the varying papal role in the ecumenical councils, on the progressive strains that led to the separation between the Eastern and Western churches, on the disastrous Western Schism (1378-1415), and the tensions between the Protestant Reformers and the papacy. Source notes that appear at the end of the book would be more easily accessible as footnotes within the chapters. A well-selected bibliography, a glossary of terms, and a useful index complete the volume.

Anyone seriously interested in understanding the papal role as it has evolved historically will profit from L.’s clarity and insight. Ecumenists searching for fruitful avenues for dialogue on possible forms for the Petrine ministry in the future will find this book a rich resource.

King’s College, Wilkes-Barre, Pa. DONALD J. GRIMES, C.S.C.


Christian conversion in the ancient world was often high drama. The case of Augustine comes to mind; but in the heady days of the late-fourth century, the conversion that made headlines was that of Augustine’s contemporary, Paulinus of Nola (c. 352–431). Born to spectacular wealth and vast lands in Spain, Aquitaine, and Italy, Paulinus was an aristocrat, a vir clarissimus, who served as governor of Campania and who should have gone on to enjoy an illustrious career among the senatorial elite of the Roman Empire. Suddenly, in 394, after meeting Martin of Tours, Paulinus renounced “the world”—career, rank, property. A few months later, he accepted priestly ordination in Barcelona. Soon after, he retreated to Nola (not far from modern Naples) where he spent the rest of his career, becoming its bishop sometime between 408 and 413. In the wake of his conversion, Paulinus styled himself a “monk” and emerged as a spokesman for the new ascetic movement sweeping the Latin West. Paulinus was also a gifted and erudite poet, a true man of letters—and letters in the most literal sense—for he carried on a far-flung correspondence with Christian notables around the Empire, with Jerome, Augustine, and many others.

Trout’s new biography of Paulinus offers a valuable port-of-entry into this intricately self-conscious world of letters from late antiquity. T.’s task as biographer was not an easy one. Paulinus’s contemporaries idealized
him, creating verbal icons that smoothed over the tensions and ambiguities of his life and conversion. Paulinus’s own writings come largely from a limited period, from 395 to 408, and offer nothing like the sustained narrative of Augustine’s *Confessions*. T. had to reconstruct things from Paulinus’s dense and highly mannered poems and correspondence. Despite these strictures, he skilfully teases out Paulinus’s “experiments in self-portraiture” (17) and helps the reader step behind the icon and see Paulinus’s “unruly, many-sided self” (22).

The early chapters reconstruct Paulinus’s secular career and aristocratic milieu and detail the great renunciation by which he sought “‘to purchase heaven and Christ for the price of brittle riches’” (92). T. then situates Paulinus within the emerging and varied ascetical experiments in the Latin West and shows that Paulinus contributed not by writing monastic rules or ascetical treatises, but by his poetic skill in creating “a series of vivid, rhetorically charged individual portraits” (130). T. also explores Paulinus’s “salvation economics” (133), that is, his nuanced theory and practice of property renunciation.

Paulinus was one of the great pioneers and propagandists of the emerging cult of the saints. He embraced Nola’s third-century martyr, St. Felix, as his personal patron and honored Felix’s wonder-working relics by building a magnificent complex of chapels, courtyards, and cloisters. Paulinus also lavished his poetic talents on Felix, composing *natalicia* (“birthday poems”) to honor the saint each year on his feast. In his analysis of Paulinus, the birthday-poet and shrine-builder, T. takes up themes sketched some years ago in Peter Brown’s classic *Cult of the Saints* and gives them fresh precision and detail. He shows how Paulinus, despite his protestations and self-deprecation, subtly appointed himself “impresario” of the cult of St. Felix and situated himself as “special friend” of Christ’s “special friend,” and in so doing created a new “chain of favors and patronage linking heaven and the region of Nola” (194).

Toward the end of the book, T. surveys Paulinus’s relationship with the larger world of Latin Christian culture in a packed 50-page chapter. First, he outlines Paulinus’s theory of Christian friendship; next he charts Paulinus’s long-standing friendship with Sulpicius Severus; he then explores how Paulinus skillfully maintained his equilibrium when his close literary friends came to verbal blows in the bitter Origenist and Pelagian controversies; finally, he traces out Paulinus’s 25-year correspondence with Augustine, a relationship that survived both the Pelagian crisis and Augustine’s critique of Paulinus’s most heartfelt views on the cult of the saints. This is a lot to pack into one chapter, but T.’s handling of this wide-ranging material is nuanced and balanced. If there is a problem here, it is that this material deserved more space, for it showed Paulinus on the world stage.

This is a fine book. T. displays a masterful command of both original texts and a vast secondary literature. His prose can be dense, but is also lush and poetic and full of fine turns of phrase. One comes away with a fresh view of things. The great age of Augustine, with its epic personalities and struggles, seems a remarkably different landscape when viewed from
the gentler foothills of Nola. It is a vantage point that could reconfigure how we assess that age. It is one that no student of early Christianity should miss.

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William Harmless, S.J.


Although he was not a major figure in the fourth century, Marcellus of Ancyra became well known, and even notorious in the 50 years following the Council of Nicaea because of the mostly negative reaction to his teaching. His extant authentic writings are few in number, but many writers who were, or thought themselves to be orthodox, felt compelled to refute and condemn him. As a result he stands in history as a shadowy figure of dubious reputation, who was often used as a symbol of error and heresy. Lienhard has performed a major service for both Marcellus and scholars of Christian history and theology by presenting this study of the man, his life and works, his thought, and especially his opponents.

In his discussion of the life and works of Marcellus, L. makes use of both primary sources and relevant scholarship from Socrates and Sozomen in the fourth century to Gerhard Feige, Klaus Seibt, and Wolfgang Gericke in the last decade of the twentieth. He sets Marcellus in his historical context and indicates which of the extant works appear to be authentic. L. does not frame his study of the theology of Marcellus in traditional, basically political, categories of opposition such as “Nicene and Arian” or “Antiochene and Alexandrian”; instead he views it as reflecting a conflict between two theological traditions which he calls dyohypostatic and miahypostatic. At issue is the Greek word *hypostasis*, which the Nicene Creed made equivalent to *ousia*, which itself referred to the divine substance or essence, the Godhead.

Marcellus was primarily concerned with the preservation of monotheism and so remained faithful to this Nicene usage, steadfastly refusing to speak of more than one *hypostasis* in the Trinity. It appeared therefore that he did not consider the Word of God to be a subsistent part of a Trinity, but that he was a Sabellian who believed that the Trinity was in reality a Monad, which only appeared at certain times to consist of three entities, Father, Son, and Spirit. His opponents, whose focus was on the reality of the Son as subsistent, spoke of two *hypostaseis* or *prosopa*, meaning persons; L. shows that they rejected the teachings condemned in the anathemas of Nicaea, but in their desire to preserve monotheism and avoid charges of ditheism, under the influence of Platonism and the idea of a chain of being, they tended to view the Son as subordinate to the Father.

L. analyzes the *Contra Asterium*, the major extant work of Marcellus, and studies his opponents in depth. In the theologically complex and cha-
otic years following the Council of Nicaea theology was influenced, and often distorted by personal, political, and linguistic controversies. One cannot, therefore, list, even in outline form, the people, the councils, the coalitions, and the arguments that L. details; but he draws a coherent picture of the controversy that swirled about Marcellus and comes to some surprising conclusions.

His analysis shows that the early dyohypostatic opposition, led by Eusebius of Caesarea, tried through individual attacks and conciliar statements to condemn Marcellus as a heretic. Later, Basil of Caesarea, employing his version of the evolving formula “one ousia and three hypostaseis,” also strives to condemn Marcellus. But it is clear that, even though his name became a synonym for Sabellianism to many orthodox writers, Marcellus was nevertheless considered orthodox by numerous contemporaries, including Athanasius, a renowned defender of orthodoxy, Julius, a bishop of Rome, and much of the Western church.

In the last chapter, L. discusses four tracts, one by Basil and three others whose authorship is uncertain, that oppose Marcellus in a more benign way than the Eusebians. They steer a middle path between Arius and the extreme opinions attributed to Marcellus, and although they are willing to speak of two hypostaseis or prosopa, they avoid subordinationism by declaring the eternal generation of the Son. The stress on the latter concept enables theology to trump politics and linguistics, for these writings support Marcellus’s concern for monotheism, while making clear their own belief in the reality of the three in one.

L. says that, as the history of doctrine in the fourth century is “rewritten and corrected,” [Marcellus’s] importance will be more clearly acknowledged” (241). It is clear, he states, that the formula “one ousia and three hypostaseis” clarified church doctrine. “But Marcellus may still say to the Church that the phrase remains in need of careful explanation and that there are other ways, too, of speaking about the mystery of God, One and Three” (244).

As sound history this book is a valuable contribution not only for the study of fourth-century church history and doctrine but also for the contemporary stages of an ongoing tradition.

St. John’s University, Jamaica, N.Y.  Gerard H. Ettlinger, S.J.


Any effort toward understanding and union between Christian Churches of the East and the West involves an objective examination of the central issues and theological concepts. Williams explores the main writings of two representative medieval thinkers and theological spokesmen whose image and method have generally been misinterpreted or misused, whether out of sincere ignorance or deliberate polemics. Conventional academic scholarship and ecumenical dialogue have sharply differentiated between the “Palamite” and “Scholastic” ways.
From an Orthodox perspective, it is improper that certain authors employ the term “heart” as a stick to brandish against the allegedly “rationalistic” West. Aquinas contrasts “cordis affectus” with “intellectus,” but it would be unfair to attribute to him a narrow use of “affectus.” Furthermore his use of “intellectus” implies the Greek “noesis,” which is certainly not identical with discursive reasoning. Whether the heart is or is not neglected in the West, it should not be used as an antonym for “reason.” The charge of “rationalism” leveled against Western theology, in contrast to the alleged “heartfulness” of Eastern theology, is as tenuous as it is paradoxical. Any simplistic condemnation or justification of one theological method over or against another will invariably reveal deeper complexities and essential exceptions.

W. obliges both Orthodox and Western theologians to review their critical attitude and apologetic approach toward one another’s methodology. She offers a sharp criticism of contemporary writers whose tone is negative, even “bitter,” often “determined to misread the texts and authors [they] purport to analyze” (14). She is even critical of “more nuanced and sophisticated [theologians, who are] no less hostile to what they suppose to be Western theological method” (18). She has read and researched numerous monographs and articles by modern theologians, and her access to more remote writers and publications is admirable.

W.’s purpose is to address in a comparative fashion, even to challenge “the charges of opposition of East and West in the doctrine of deification” (33). She has selected one or more major texts from each of her authors: the Summa theologiae of Aquinas, and the Triads and Capita physica of Palamas. Though aware of the dangers of a selective and narrow reading of patristic writings, she recognizes that the advantage of these works lies in their late composition and comprehensive focus. Two chapters explore the theology of Aquinas: “The God to Whom We Are Likened” and “The Manner of Our Likening,” and two subsequent chapters analyze the theology of Palamas: “Images of Deification” and “Theosis as Constituent of the Doctrine of God.”

W. is correct to claim that the issue at stake is “not only the nature of grace but the nature of all relations between God and humanity” (15). The doctrine of deification is both a general method and a particular doctrine. But it is unfortunate that she limits her study to the anthropological consequences of the doctrine of God and the concept of deification. In Eastern writers, especially in the Triads of Palamas (although perhaps less evident in his later writings such as the Capita), there is strong emphasis also on the cosmological effects of the divine energies. Two further minor defects are W.’s constant vague reference to “the Fathers” in general, without clarification or specification, and incorrect printing of Greek terms in the notes and throughout the main body of the work.

For Orthodox theologians, the crux of this comparative study lies in the discussion about the distinction between divine essence and divine energies (137–156). This distinction is considered a traditional doctrine by Orthodox, and a speculative innovation by Western theologians. W. is respectful
of the Orthodox approach, but perhaps dwells too long on whether this distinction deserves “dogmatic” status. The fact that Trembelas and Karmiris seldom refer to Palamas is not sufficient reason to undermine his importance and impact. Any “ambiguity in Orthodoxy” (149) merely reflects the unsystematic methodology and inconsistent terminology of patristic and contemporary Orthodox sources. As for the helpful distinction between conciliar intention and doctrinal terminology, Palamas himself is aware of such a possibility for reconciliation. In his comments at the Council of Constantinople (1351), long before the Geneva agreement of 1970, he drew a distinction between “the point of the controversy” and “a confession of faith.” No one, finally, would certainly disagree with W.’s conclusion that the essence-energies distinction “dissolves before the face of the One it describes and . . . ultimately serves” (156).

Holy Cross School of Theology, Mass.


Torrell here offers the reader an introduction to passages in the Summa theologiae that, in his judgment, theologians during the period of the Leonine Thomist revival were accustomed to pass over in favor of texts with more prima facie philosophical weight. Consider for example the large amount of early- and mid-20th-century commentary on the metaphysics of the Incarnation. T.’s book treats the large number of articles (Summa theologiae 3, qq. 27–59) where Aquinas explains the teaching of the canonical Scriptures on what the incarnate Son of God did and suffered for us. T. avoids speaking about “a life of Jesus,” not only because historical reductionism remains entirely foreign to the scientific temper of Aquinas, but also on account of a certain theological vision that he judges operative in the Tertia Pars. Aquinas treats all the mysteries of Christ as concrete instances of the more general instrumentality at work through his human nature. This outlook explains Aquinas’s adoption of a four-part division for his materials: ingressus, processus, exitus, exaltatio. In other words, the Marian, infancy, and post-Resurrection mysteries do not warrant special methodological handling.

Volume 1 covers ST 3, qq. 27–45, that is, from the sanctification of the Blessed Virgin, the first moment of God’s inbreaking (ingressus), through the Transfiguration, the last mystery that Aquinas includes under the unfolding (processus) of Christ’s life. Volume 2 will cover ST 3, qq. 46–59, that is, from Christ’s exitus, the Passion, Death, and Descent to his exaltatio, the Resurrection, Ascension, and the Sitting. An eventual English translation will want to avoid confusion with Dom Columba Marmion’s treatment of the same themes in Christ in His Mysteries.

There are several reasons why Thomists and others interested in what
Aquinas has to say about Christ will want to study this commentary. First, it is complete. T. brings the art of close reading to a new level of achievement. Recall that he served on the Leonine Commission, the official body charged with producing critical editions of all Aquinas’s works. His seriousness about texts is manifested, for instance, in the impressive cross-references to Aquinas’s other works, especially and understandably, the scriptural commentaries, but also in the comprehensive treatment of the secondary literature. With its meticulous and up-to-date scholarship, this volume is made for both reading now and reference later.

Second, it is bold. It would be difficult today to discover a more disputed question than how to interpret the Bible in the Church. What agreement exists on the place that historical studies of the canonical Scriptures hold in the larger theological project? The 1993 Pontifical Biblical Commission’s “The Interpretation of the Bible in the Church” offers some suggestions; for example: “The fathers of the Church teach to read the Bible theologically, within the heart of a living tradition, with an authentic Christian spirit” (III B 2). T. shows how certain 13th-century theologians followed this and other ecclesial norms, and so achieved a level of theological instruction that exhibits the natural unity, not an artificial disjunction, between saving doctrine and sacred narrative. At the same time he exhibits judiciousness when introducing the conclusions of the most recent historical critics.

Third, the text is opportune. Since the Second Vatican Council, research in Christology has followed many new avenues of investigation. Some observe that these initiatives have produced more pieces for the puzzle than pictures. What efforts at systematization do exist are often thwarted by divergent views about admissible data. What is the right hermeneutic for conciliar texts, how to evaluate the third moment in the quest for the historical Jesus, what rank does Christ hold among other mediators, how to assess the definitive and complete nature of Christ’s revelation? Since these are not his questions, T.’s reading of Aquinas on Christ does not answer each of them directly. Nevertheless, T. will serve as a trustworthy guide to what the Church must hold about the Savior of the world.

St. John’s Seminary, Brighton, Mass. Romanus Cessario, O.P.


The University of York hosted a conference on “Confession in Medieval Culture and Society” in March 1996. This scholarly volume contains the six papers presented at the conference, together with an additional paper, an edited text, and the 1996 York Quodlibet lecture. The papers are well documented from primary sources and also—especially Peter Biller’s in-
trodutory essay and Rob Meens's survey of the earlier period—provide references to much of the recent literature, particularly in English. The index is thorough and misprints are few.

What all the contents have in common is an effort to gain insight into the popular or “lived” religion of the Middle Ages, particularly in the 13th and 14th centuries. Lateran IV’s *Omnis utriusque sexus* mandating annual confession is a recurring point of reference, without itself being examined in detail. With one exception, the papers maintain a sympathetic objectivity as they describe ways in which confession entered into the lives of ordinary people.

The approach to penetrating the secrecy of confession is through an examination of *exempla* literature, manuals or instructions for confessors, and William of Auvergne’s treatises for literate laity. Confessors’ questions, generally organized according to the seven deadly sins, focus on social harmony and sins that affect one’s neighbor. They give attention to occupation, profession, rank, and similar social circumstances in a time of urban growth—the beginnings, from a negative perspective, of professional ethics. Overall, the Catholic system emerges as “relatively moderate and tolerant” (23) in comparison with the Waldensian, and more geared toward developing moral sensitivity than the Catharist. An analysis of the 14th-century *Memoriale presbiterorum* and an edited text of part of its interrogatories (both by Michael Haren) likewise show a concern with official corruption, both lay and clerical.

John W. Baldwin’s Quodlibet lecture takes another tack by examining vernacular literature for the nobility of the period. Baldwin sees a shift from external religiosity (typified by the prominence of the ordeal) to a more interiorized religion following Lateran IV (private confession becomes more prominent). The work of John Bossy and Mary Mansfield (which he does not discuss) would temper his sense of the revolutionary character of a shift introduced by Lateran IV.

Particularly interesting, since the history of the confessor is still to be written, is Alexander Murray’s exploration of the priest–lay relationship in his discussion of counseling in medieval confession. He shows the difficulties met by both, e.g., the instructed priest’s need to improvise from the minimal script provided, and the uninstructed layperson’s need to find a wise confessor, which often led to “shopping around” and turning to members of the new religious orders.

Although sexual sins received less attention in this period than later, they were by no means ignored. Although Jacqueline Murray leaves in the background the fact that manuals rarely distinguished between male and female, she does show that when manuals refer explicitly to women it is generally in terms of their sexual and reproductive functions—culturally to be expected, I would say, and not a basis for indicting clerical patriarchy solely. Ethicists will also find Peter Biller’s treatment of the avoidance of offspring at a time of population growth a helpful supplement and corrective to John Noonan’s classic history and an indication of how medicine and moral theology were converging.
The book will appeal primarily to specialists in medieval culture or sacramental history. They will find it valuable.

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JAMES DALLEN


Making these eight previously published essays available in one volume is already a service. Macy stresses diversity as our true tradition and “the central theological point” in all the essays (xiv, 30). He pleads for respect for the originality and diversity of the eucharistic theology of the period. On the historical level, he wants to “correct historical errors that have crept into the tradition” and introduce new sources to theologians and historians (xii). In this he succeeds admirably.

M. sharply critiques scholars whose “unconscious, or at least, inexplicit, dogmatic presuppositions” have limited and prejudiced their research (11–12). He especially criticizes restricting the focus of this period to real presence and the terminology of transubstantiation, failing to recognize a real theology of symbol, and making Thomas Aquinas the theologian of the times.

His treatment of the theological discussion of communion reception and of “the dogma of transubstantiation” illustrates well his method and his conclusions. On reception of communion, M. cites over ten theologians wrestling with the reality of Christ’s presence and the reception by a non-believer or, even worse, by some animal. If the Eucharist is a sign, then only those capable of understanding such a sign can be said to receive. But if there has been a substantial change, any reception of the accidents also includes reception of the Body and Blood (that was Thomas’s minority opinion, at least until the end of the 13th century). After much give and take, theologians, without denying the metaphysical presence of Christ in the sacrament, insisted that that presence was meaningless unless the recipient understood the signs pointing to it. Their discussion reveals rich diversity and tolerance and the presence of a theology of symbol often considered absent in this period.

M. notes that it is commonplace to consider Lateran IV as providing “a formal definition of the dogma of transubstantiation” (81). At that time, however, there were three views on eucharistic change: that the bread and wine remained present along with the Body and Blood; that the substance of the bread and wine were annihilated; and that the substance of the bread and wine were changed into the substance of the Body and Blood. To avoid post-Reformation terminology, M. prefers “co-existence,” “substitution,” and “transmutation” to describe these views. After carefully examining theologians and canonists, he concludes that the term “transubstantiation” included, in many minds at least, “substitution” and “transmutation.” Therefore Lateran IV did not define “transubstantiation” as we know it (i.e., the Thomistic position of “transmutation”).
Brevity forbids describing M.’s treatment of Berengar’s oath of 1059 and his reputation as a heresiarch, the “myth” of “the Church” in the Middle Ages, the period’s Mass commentaries, and Eucharist and popular religiosity. His approach in these matter is interesting and enlightening.

M.’s persistently positive interpretation of theories and practices of the period seems one sided at times. Did Lateran IV “limit” communion to once a year (157, 176), or did it insist on reception at least once a year (Canon 21)? Did the awareness that the Eucharist makes moral demands on the participant lead to infrequent communion, or was it a prior practice of infrequent reception that led to reflections on moral preparation? Was the stress on “spiritual communion” and on the attitudes of the recipient, good in itself, such an unmixed blessing in light of Jesus’ command to “take and eat”?

Still, M. remains true to his own theological premise that Christianity is an ongoing effort leading to various formulations of the faith in differing cultural settings. He invites us to respect this period for its diversity. He also whets one’s appetite for more, for example, for a study of Alexander of Hales’s theology of symbol. This book is a “must” for scholars interested in eucharistic theology and history.

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JOHN H. MCKENNA, C.M.


The subtitle announces a study of the response of Catholic controversialists to Martin Luther’s question about the visibility of the Church. However, this is much more than a historical study. Diez makes an important contribution in examining the 16th-century controversy in relationship to the contemporary ecumenical dialogue, with a view to bringing out how that controversy might help resolve contemporary differences between Reformation churches and the Catholic Church. Furthermore, he dedicates a substantial part of the book to illuminating the 16th-century controversy against the background of medieval thought and, ultimately, the thought of St. Augustine. As in many contemporary interpretations of the Reformation, D. traces the roots of the divisions of the Church to tensions that already existed in the undivided pre-Reformation Church.

Although in the polemical atmosphere of the 16th century the controversialists stressed the visibility of the Church in opposition to what was perceived to be Luther’s one-sided emphasis on the invisible, in reality both sides acknowledged both dimensions of the Church. As D. writes repeatedly, their differences lay in how they perceived the two dimensions to be related. He demonstrates that this is not a theme restricted to
ecclesiology, for the articulation of the relationship between the human and divine in the Church is founded on one's understanding of the relationship of the two natures in Christ, and ultimately, on the relationship between God and creatures.

D. limits himself to an examination of Luther among the Reformers, as the controversialists attacked him as the source of erroneous doctrine about the Church. D. has a good command of contemporary Luther studies, which he uses to show how complex the relationship between the hidden church and the visible church order is in Luther. Nevertheless, the Catholic controversialists had a clear-cut view of Luther, and from what they derived from his writings, believed that Luther did not attribute to the earthly, visible Church its true significance. D. selected for study a small number of controversialists who are representative of the different approaches and types of literature used in the controversy with Luther.

The Catholic writers treated by D. range from Thomas Murner, who in the first years of the Reformation used the image of the civitas platonica to describe Luther's understanding of the Church, to Robert Bellarmine, who represents the outcome of a trend among the controversialists toward an ever narrower conception of the Church and the reduction of the Church as the Body of Christ to the institution of the Roman Catholic Church. Some of the early controversialists, such as the Franciscan Schatzgeyer, used Scripture almost exclusively in their arguments and took positions on the Church that were open to reconciliation with Luther. However, especially after the Council of Trent, arguments became syllogistic, and the essence of the Church was equated with the concrete, visible church of Rome. D. brings out very well the preoccupation with certitude in doctrine that characterizes particularly post-Tridentine theology up to the eve of the Second Vatican Council. The emphasis on the institutional Church by controversialists also led to a juridic mentality and a loss of a sense of the Church as sacrament or mystery. In this connection, D. rightly criticizes the controversialists for the absence of a developed pneumatology.

Despite their shortcomings, however, D. sees the controversialists in a positive light and views his own work as an attempt to make them better known. D. reviews the unique contributions of the early Franciscan controversialists, the theologians of Louvain, the Thomistic School of Salamanca, and post-Tridentine theologians such as Bellarmine. A particularly interesting illustration of the differences between Catholics and Lutherans is the exposition of the debate between a former Lutheran, J. Pistorius Nidanus, and the Lutheran Jakob Heerbrand, whose exchange demonstrates that Catholics and Reformers did not understand each other's positions, a problem which D. argues holds true of the whole Reformation period. D. provides good summaries of the positions of the individual controversialists on the topic of the visibility of the Church, and brings out the great variety that existed among them in topics of interest and methodologies. Although D. acknowledges that differences in piety or spirituality influenced the differences between Catholics and Reformers, he could
have given much more attention to this topic and cited concrete examples of how this played out in both controversialists and Reformers.

D. devotes a whole chapter to Augustine’s ecclesiology since Catholics and Reformers alike appealed to him as the source of their positions, and comes to the not surprising conclusion that they drew on Augustine in order to prove positions they had already formulated. This chapter is not tightly integrated into the rest of the book, for it was not necessary to accomplish D.’s purpose. In his conclusion, D. shows that the 16th-century debate over the Church’s visibility is highly relevant to contemporary ecumenical discussion, for it is bound up with what it means to call the Church a “sacrament”; D. suggests that a solution lies in rethinking what the Scholastics called the sacramentum et res.

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PAUL J. LANGSFELD


The author of important works on the history of witch hunts in early modern Europe, Monter here turns his attention to another persecuted group, Protestants in 16th-century France. The fruit of much primary research in judicial archives, this book shows how secular courts punished “heresy” as a crime of sedition or treason. The parlements were the courts to which those condemned to death might appeal their sentences; more often than not, such appeals were poor strategy, as the parlements tended to be even more severe than lower courts. Fearing religious innovation or novelty as a path to public disorder, the parlements imposed death by burning or strangulation, as well as whippings, the cutting out of the tongue, and an array of lesser punishments. M. shows how such savagery was also practiced on those labeled heretics in Protestant England and in Catholic lands under Hapsburg control.

In France, the coronation oath committed the king to keeping his kingdom free of heretics. Highlighting the reigns of Francis I (1515–1547) and Henry II (1547–1559), M. shows how royal policy changed several times, ranging from a fairly mild approach to an all-out war on heresy. A 1534 incident in which placards were posted in Paris, attacking the Mass as idolatrous, prompted a period of particularly harsh royal policy. The lay judges who staffed the parlements were more consistent in their desire to rid France of what they frequently called Lutherans, even though other Reformers had far more influence in France than the one in Wittenberg ever did. While the king made the laws in Old Regime France, the parlements enjoyed great latitude in implementing or enforcing them. Moreover, there were few constraints or norms in sentencing; judicial discretion was virtually unlimited. In trials for heresy, such discretion rarely served the interest of defendants.
By the 1560s, as France moved into what would be some 30 years of civil war, the Queen Regent, Catherine de Medici, adopted a policy of limited toleration. Heretical beliefs were no longer criminalized, but the preaching of heresy remained so. Certain actions, especially iconoclasm, continued to be subject to the death penalty. Indeed, Calvinist destruction of images, stained glass, paintings, and statues, elicited far more Catholic hostility than doctrinal challenges ever did. Popular zeal in ridding France of Protestants, M. effectively shows, was largely a reaction against iconoclasm. At times, the crowds that gathered to watch the spectacle of an iconoclast’s public execution had to be prevented from lynching the condemned.

M. also examines adeptly the awkwardness of a Protestant cult of martyrs. On the one hand, reformers such as Calvin lambasted as idolatrous the Catholic devotion to the saints and their relics. On the other hand, French Calvinists wanted to preserve the memory of their martyrs. Jean Crespin’s martyrology, first published in 1554 in Geneva, solved the problem by focusing not on physical relics nor even on the lives the martyrs had lived, but on the last words of those that died for the Reformed faith: “The power of Crespin’s martyrs lies almost entirely in their words, rather than in their heroic actions; not even Michel Foucault can surpass Crespin’s paeans to the value and power of discourse” (180). However, executioners were sometimes instructed to prevent even the possibility of scaffold heresies by cutting out tongues beforehand.

Calvin appealed for his disciples in France either to flee to Geneva, as he had done, or to remain steadfast in public profession of the Reformed faith, no matter the consequences. Nicodemism, or secretive religion masked by public conformity, he condemned. M. offers important evidence that Calvin was heard and followed on these points. There was a considerable “brain drain” to Geneva, and many French Protestants were willing to risk death for the practice of their faith.

M. is careful to caution against attributing promotion of religious diversity, as we may know it today, to anyone in 16th-century Europe. Even as they were persecuted, French Protestants were hardly advocates of a general religious toleration. Calvin supported the execution of the Unitarian Michael Servetus; Lutherans and Calvinists were at least as savage as Catholics in the persecution of German Anabaptists. To the extent that toleration was allowed French Protestants, it was a limited toleration, dictated by political considerations, and revokable at the king’s will.

This book is valuable not only for historians of the French Reformation, but also for the Catholic Church today as it struggles to acknowledge past institutional sins. Some historians cite the Inquisition as one of the Church’s worst misdeeds. At least in the French context, M.’s study suggests that the State may have more to apologize for than the Church does.


The literature on the antislavery movement in antebellum America is vast. Since the publication of Gilbert Barnes's *The Anti-Slavery Impulse* in 1933, historical studies have regularly noted the link between evangelical Protestants and the abolition crusade in the Western Reserve of Ohio and the “burned-over district” of New York. Likewise, historians of religion, especially those with ties to the evangelical tradition, have emphasized the correlation between revivalist fervor and abolitionist concern, often with an eye to setting the record straight regarding the social conscience of American evangelicals.

Strong here places evangelicals at the center of one of the most innovative ventures in antislavery theory and practice. Attempting to recover “the lost story of ecclesiastical abolitionism” (11), he demonstrates the degree to which religious perfectionism, antislavery militancy, and evangelical separatism converged in the meteoric careers of the abolition sects and the Liberty Party in upstate New York. His narrative follows the course of ecclesiastical abolitionism from the secession of perfectionists from “Presbygational” churches in the 1830s to the formation of new abolition churches and the overtly Christian Liberty Party during the next decade. Central to his argument is the claim that these “comeouters” attempted to steer a middle course between the anarchism of William Lloyd Garrison, who opposed slavery from the high ground of anti-institutionalism, and the pragmatism of other American Protestants who sought to eliminate slavery through established denominations and traditional political parties.

This experiment in “ordered liberty” (21) gave structure to the quest for doctrinal freedom, democratic polity, moral purity, and informal ecumenism that drove many perfectionists to found alternative religious communities, such as the Francan Lutherans, the Wesleyan Methodists, and the Unionist churches. It also laid the foundation for the “perfectionist dilemma” (146). According to S., ecclesiastical abolitionists developed a distinctive doctrine of perfection that competed with popular options articulated by Nathaniel Taylor and Charles Finney. They applied their praxis of entire sanctification to both denominational organization and political change, imagining the abolition of slavery as only one dimension of a universal reform that would inaugurate God’s millennial reign in church and society. But as the “burned-over district” became the “burned-out district” due to outmigration and commercialization, the tension between extremism and effectiveness led to the fragmentation of the movement. By the late 1840s, abolitionists who sought results were turning to other parties, and perfectionists who craved sanctification were veering toward the subjectivism that would characterize the post-Civil War Holiness movement.

This book represents a significant addition to the historiography of American abolitionism. Its careful analysis of local history and voting pat-
terns supplies the hard data necessary for an informed reading of the
impact of evangelical perfectionists on antislavery agitation. Its nuanced
approach to rival perfectionisms in antebellum Christianity gives new
depth to scholarly understandings of 19th-century popular religion. While
the biographical portraits of the principal figures in the movement are
disappointingly thin and the assessment of radical abolitionism as a “mod-
erate viewpoint” (39) seems problematic, the book makes a unique con-
tribution to the history of reform by showing how new theologies of per-
fectionism and strategies of denominational separatism affected the moral
assumptions and political ambitions informing radical causes from antislav-
ery to women’s rights. By focusing on the theological dimension of evan-
gelical abolitionism and the marriage of religion and politics in Liberty
Party activism, S. sheds new light on the role of evangelicals in American
politics. Students of the Social Gospel, the Moral Majority, and the Chris-
tian Coalition would do well to see the tangled roots of these movements
in the perfectionist politics of the abolition churches.

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Peter A. Huff

Roman Catholicism in America. By Chester Gillis. Columbia Contem-
Pp. x + 365. $35.

Early in his perceptive guide to Catholicism in the U.S. at century’s end,
Gillis sagely cautions his reader that “there is no definitive portrait of
Roman Catholicism in America.” And he adds, with admirable understate-
ment: “Socially and politically, contemporary Catholics are more diverse
and less identifiable than their predecessors. There is also an increased
pluralism of belief among them religiously” (3).

If this were 1950, it would be incomparably simpler to profile the Ameri-
can Catholic experience. But this is 2000, and G. has essentially had to
present a snapshot of Catholicism in this country as a family of families,
sharing common roots, symbols, leadership, buildings and institutional
structures, but often torn by quarrels and variant sensibilities, ecclesiolo-
gies, and even cosmologies. Noting that one American parish bills itself as
“God’s People in Great Variety,” G. remarks that this “captures the es-
sence of American Catholicism” (280). Here is an observer who knows
reality when he sees it.

There is an added pressure for the author of such a work in that this is
a pilot text in the recently launched Contemporary American Religious
Series by the Columbia University Press. G. readily lives up to high ex-
pectations by writing well and by offering fair-minded analyses of a wide
spectrum of opinions within Catholicism in the U.S.

G. has approached his task systematically, beginning with an extensive
opening overview chapter, “Who Are American Catholics?” This blends
statistical data (including a listing of Catholic population percentage by
states) with reports on self-perceptions of Catholic identity and division. He enfolds into this section his typology of five types of modern U.S. Catholics. Writers who are considerably more conservative than G. may not have been so ready to include all of these (some being substantial dissenters from official thought) into the embrace of Mother Church.

There follow three chapters on the history of Catholic life in America that are well paced and manage to touch on practically all the major developments, movements, conflicts and personalities that fill hundreds of pages of weightier historical tomes. When a narrative moves at this pace, rewarding though it may be, errors inevitably seem to seep in. For example, the report that in the early-19th century "Latin replaced English for the liturgy" (58) suggests that the Eucharist had been offered regularly in English in the new nation. Archbishop John Carroll had once urged this, but it did not come to be the case in that era.

Two additional chapters cover "teachings and belief," tending to focus not so much on foundational beliefs that many Christians would share (though these are not neglected), but rather on those that are distinctly Catholic (papal infallibility, Mary, saints, certain sacraments, moral disputes). Subsequent chapters address institutions, roles, and organizations; Catholic popular culture; challenges, including such issues as women's role in the Church and the decline of priests and sisters; and the future. That future looks far from dismal for this "church with staying power" (274), but it is a future filled with benefits, dangers and transformations.

G. concludes with several helpful sections: select profiles of living American Catholics, a time line that is concise and almost always accurate (but Merton did not die in 1969), extensive notes, a glossary, an annotated reading list, a guide to electronic resources, and a serviceable index. Graphs, charts, and photographs are well chosen. Some of the photographs, in fact, are quite striking, even luminous, though a very few turn out dark and grainy.

Here is a book that will serve well as a thoughtful snapshot of Catholicism in the U.S. at the start of the twenty-first century. It will probably find a significant number of readers outside the Catholic community and will likely, and appropriately, find its way into general public libraries across the nation.

_Bellarmin College, Louisville_  
_CLYDE F. CREWS_


Most readers are familiar with Carlson from his 1991 translation of Jean-Luc Marion’s _God without Being_. Building on that work, C. now offers his own analysis of the God-question, as well as God-language, by establishing a dialogue between, primarily, Pseudo-Dionysius and Heidegger. This dia-
logue represents the “indiscretion” of the title, for postmodernism has generally thought little of the ontotheology allegedly haunting ancient Christian writers, while traditional thinkers normally shun as unintelligible the seemingly disjointed world of postmodernity.

C.’s thought moves briskly from Hegel to Heidegger, to Dionysius, and briefly to Marion and Derrida. Hegel is cast as the antagonist of the book, the philosopher best representing the triumph of Idealism, the hegemony of absolute subjectivity and the pinnacle of metaphysical ontotheology. The Hegelian interpretation of time, consciousness, and language seeks to annul temporality, to overcome finitude, and to exorcise the ineffable. Only such annulment, sublation, and exorcism allow for the dialectical unfolding of Absolute Spirit.

Hegel’s project is properly disclosed in his treatment of the representational form. Such form is a testament to the limitations of finitude. Only by overcoming the external, objective, and sensuous form, reconciling it with universal, internal, and spiritual consciousness, can speculative philosophy attain to a truly religious perspective. But this annulment of the singular represents at once an attempt to supersede the limitations of sensuous form and a desire to excise the apophatic imagination from theological ideas.

One can understand why Przywara long ago argued that Hegel’s erasure of the singular through the sublation of the finite was the speculative counterpart of Luther’s drive for religious assurance. And one can equally understand why Balthasar saved some of his most poisonous invective for Hegel in particular and speculative Idealism in general. Unlike Pascal and Kierkegaard, who, despite their defects, came face to face with the bloody form of the crucified Christ, Hegel subsumes this historical form into the dialectic of Absolute Spirit. The finite is marginalized by the ontologization of history to the extent that God’s unique act of love is no longer recognizable. This subsumption caused Barth to lament that Hegel, despite his kaleidoscopic brilliance, could never become the lodestar for Protestantism as Aquinas had been for Catholic theology.

As both counterpoint and remedy to the ontotheology of Hegel, C. offers the profoundly lethic philosophies of Heidegger and Dionysius. Together they form not opponents but uniquely ancient and postmodern voices desiring the “beyond” of language and experience. Heidegger offers *Dasein’s* irreducible finitude of life and thought, as well as a more primordial understanding of temporality, as a phenomenological antidote to Hegel’s annulment of finitude and his onto-theo-ego-logical ground. To Hegel’s apophatic erasure, Dionysius proleptically opposes an apophatic mysticism, a hyper-negation both recognizing and defending the gossamer character of names properly predicated to God. C. shows, then, that the postmodern and the premodern share a radical indeterminacy of thought and language allowing for an (indiscreet) marriage between the mystical and the deconstructive traditions.

At the same time, a legitimate question arises as to the extent to which Heidegger and Dionysius may be conjoined. Absence and unknowing in
Dionysius stem from an excessive presence, a fullness that overwhelms, while absence in Heidegger stems primarily from excessive privation. C. is acutely aware of this problem and tries to mitigate its force by noting that, despite differences, both Dionysius and Heidegger are blinded to a point of unknowing in which reflection and speech are similarly dissolved.

On completing this book, one is left with a variety of questions. One wonders, for example, if it takes sufficient account of the fact that Heidegger’s polemic against ontotheology necessarily encircles the deeply Proclan neo-Platonism of Dionysius. One wonders if it allows for a sufficiently drawn distinction between the correlative Dionysian and Heideggerian views of the absence beyond presence. And one wonders if C. is too coy in avoiding a critical judgment on one view or the other, a judgment that any correlation finally requires.

One also wonders, in a book of this sort, how the entire work of Aquinas, for whom Dionysius was a commanding source, is virtually ignored. Was not C. intrigued by how closely Aquinas follows Dionysius, clinging fast to his exacting reserve, but finding his agnosticism ultimately inapposite and tempering his thought by denying that God is *super omne esse*? C.’s reserve is especially unusual insofar as Aquinas has been exonerated from the charge of idolic ontotheology by Marion himself (a point very briefly noted in the text).

Notwithstanding the doubts it engenders, this book is an important and serious work, striking in its attempt to conjoin Dionysian mysticism with the legitimately astringent winds of postmodernism.

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**THOMAS GUARINO**


Martin’s essays on religious dialogue draw attention at the outset to the formidable difficulties in all talk about religion and to the almost inevitable wrangling that arises when public discussion of religion (like politics) occurs: “Religious discourse today bears all the symptoms of post-modernity” (22), virtually predestined to defeat and disaster. But despite the fragility and precariousness of religious discourse, M. maintains that the need for religious dialogue has never been greater than today. He proposes three principal ground rules—critical thinking, irony, and an irenic approach to opposition—for religious dialogue that should facilitate the achievement of constructive results, or at least amicable discourse.

To explore these elements of authentic discourse, M. studies the literary form of the dialogue, seeing in this “imitative genre” a particular relevance “to represent discourse on religious questions and issues” (26). He takes his cue from Horace’s statement in *The Art of Poetry* that “those who practice an ‘imitative art’ must ‘look to life and manners for a model, and draw from
thence living words’ ” (24). Hence the title. M.’s greatest strength is his copious examination of the numerous variations of the dialogue and his explication of the inherent difficulties in every turn of a conversation: from the dynamics of dialogical composition, cultural and linguistic differences among the speakers, misunderstandings and ambiguities to unfolding the complexities of the genre with its multiple levels of interaction among the characters in the discourse, the author, and readers of the text.

M.’s premise is that because literary dialogue displays such difficulties in interpretation it can make us aware both of the problems in our own everyday speech and of our own unstable footings in religious dialogue (taken in its broadest sense, when people simply talk with one other about “religious” matters) as we march into the outer limits of intelligibility and rationality, of “insight and disaster” (37), where words fail, ambiguities prevail, concepts dissolve. To navigate that terrain, he looks at three groups of writers, each embodying one of his major ground rules of authentic religious dialogue.

M. has collected his group of “classic dialogues” (41) from Western literary tradition for exploring rationality or criticism, irony, and the irenic. In Part 1, “Faith and Reason in Dialogue,” he engages Anselm of Canterbury (when he was still abbot at Bec) “securing and defending the rationality of religious discourse” (58). Anselm’s method supports M.’s premise that constructive dialogue must, above all, seek rational foundation, as it probes linguistic ambiguities and copes with complex agenda that too frequently tend to upset one’s deeply held religious beliefs. Denis Diderot offers a complementary rational, though obviously far more critical examination of religion, illustrating the value of the critique itself when applied to superstition and irrelevant religious institutions. And in much the same vein, he examines David Hume and, quite nicely, his Philo, the shifty, duplicitious, and skeptical interlocutor in Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, through whose agency it becomes clear, ironically, how only a cleansing of religious pretentiousness and hypocrisy can at last bring about civil discourse among the intolerant and self-deceived.

To concoct further his admixture of proper dialogic qualities, M. goes back to one of Hume’s inspirations, Lucian of Samosata and his seriocomic dialogues of the dead. Lucian’s ironic criticism consists of a shocking mockery and scathing exposure of often ludicrous religious practices and beliefs that overturn the settled world of the self-righteous and self-important. Desiderius Erasmus’s notable contribution is his irenicism, illustrated so well by The Godly Feast, a utopian banquet, where genteel, irenic discourse prevails; his writings hold out the hope of an ethic of discourse, or living dialogue—intelligible, rational, and civil. Yet Erasmus, like Plato, knows too well the intrinsic power of language to turn suddenly from good to evil. That, of course, is its true nature. Nonetheless, M.’s study of Plato’s Phaedrus follows Socrates’s critique of rhetoric to advance the idea of an ethic of discourse, or what is permissible in persuasion. And such indeed is crucial if civil discourse will prevail.

M.’s explorations into dialogue, if somewhat over-explored, offer
many interesting insights and salutary lessons. His observations about discourse in the realm of the marginal and the instability of footing there are well taken. To survive the precariousness of this linguistic and conceptual terrain, irony, linguistic and psychological honesty, curiosity, and a great sense of humor, would indeed seem the best provisions for plodding forth “in an awkward but still livable morass of shifting meaning and duplicitous interests” (177). Scholars, especially those engaged in religious dialogue, should find in M.’s work many helpful warnings and sound wisdom for navigating a most slippery terrain.

Smith College, Northampton, Mass. FREDERICK J. MCGINNESS


In this tightly written and impressively argued book Coffey offers a reconstructed doctrine of the immanent Trinity grounded in a Lonerganian epistemology that moves from the data to be known (the biblical witness to the Trinity) to our understanding of that data within our intellectual milieu (the immanent Trinity) and finally to an affirmation that what has thus been appropriated is the case (the economic Trinity). Utilizing a “return model” of the Trinity analogous to more recent Christologies from below to complement a “procession model” that is analogous to Christologies from above, C. proposes to overcome Roger Haight’s agnosticism and the list of weaknesses he sees in the positions of Rahner, Barth, Congar, Jüngel, Lonergan, Moltmann, Mühlen, and Balthasar—weaknesses that stem mainly from their failure to construct a “return model” of the Trinity.

This book represents a much needed counter-move to a number of celebrated recent presentations of the doctrine of the Trinity that have polemized against a doctrine of the immanent Trinity and have floundered because of their failure to understand the importance of this doctrine. There is much that is of value in this work. But, in my view, a number of odd presuppositions and a failure to consider a wider variety of contemporary trinitarian perspectives lead C. to compromise some of the most important insights of trinitarian doctrine that he intends to uphold.

First, C. adopts what has been labeled Rahner’s “degree Christology.” He states that “[t]he theological anthropology at work here is that of Karl Rahner, according to which the divinity of Christ is the supreme actualization of humanity under grace” (162). But such thinking fails to distinguish Christ’s divinity and humanity. It contends that “[t]he uniqueness of Jesus’ Sonship is evident in the utter radicality of this [the Father’s] bestowal of the Holy Spirit” (37) and that our relation to the Father “is essentially the same as for Christ, except that it lacks the radicality present in his case” (43). From such thinking follow a docetic understanding of the atonement (Jesus’ alienation “remained for him at the level of psychological and spiritual experience, not at the level of actual reality” [149] and a
conditional view of salvation ("personal sins are not forgiven until they [people] repent" [118]).

Second, despite C.'s explicit rejection of it (62), the appearance of adoptionism, which stems from C.'s insistence that there is no metaphysical incarnation in the New Testament (14), persists throughout: "In the synoptic theology the unique divine Sonship of Jesus is brought about by the bestowal of the Holy Spirit on him by the Father" (37), and "Jesus is brought into human existence as his [the Father's] beloved Son" (41). Further, "the Father's radical bestowal of the Holy Spirit on Jesus at the moment of his conception brings about his divine Sonship" (152), and there is "a progressive realization of divine Sonship in Jesus" (138).

C.'s questionable exegesis, which insists that there is only a "functional" and not an "ontological" conception of the Incarnation in the NT, seems to separate and confuse the divinity and humanity of Christ. Hence C. alleges that "John says that the Word became 'flesh' rather than 'human' because he thought of the Word as already and always a human" (13). He believes Christ's self-communication is his human love of neighbor and asserts in modalist fashion that "the Holy Spirit is Christ's human love of the Father" (64). He thus rejects Barth's Christology, arguing that the "acknowledgment" (of the Word) that Barth mentions also must be "an intellectual inference (without prejudice to the fact that it is also faith), and hence must represent a spiritual and intellectual ascent from the world to God" (19). Yet, for Barth, such an ascent from the world to God compromises faith, i.e., our needy acknowledgement of Jesus as the one who enables our understanding in this matter through the Holy Spirit.

C. criticizes Moltmann and process theology for endangering God's freedom. He claims that Barth compromised God's transcendence and espoused a form of Arian theology by introducing contingency into God. He believes that Barth held that the Son was generated only by the Father's will and not by nature, whereas Barth argued that since God's will was part of his nature, theologians could not play one off against the other in order to arrive at a proper understanding of God's freedom.

C.'s concept of analogy causes most of the problems. He believes our analogical concepts are true "insofar as God is the transcedent cause of corresponding qualities in creatures" (92). This thinking suggests that it is from our human experiences that God is understood and compromises the analogia fidei, namely, that Christ is the starting point and criterion for what is said about God and God's relations with us. Thus C. believes we should "expect divine persons to be subsistent relations because that is what human persons are" (81); he defines love of God by love of neighbor, and understands God and Christ from his own assumptions about natural theology and scriptural exegesis, not from the economic Trinitarian self-revelation.

C. believes that God's "personhood" is not to be found in his trinity. Rather, "[b]efore that, in his simple unity, God is already person in the absolute sense recognized by St. Thomas . . . ." (153). He thus distinguishes two stages of the Trinity, one in the process of becoming and the other
already constituted, arguing that this is a merely formal distinction employed to establish that the Holy Spirit is the Father’s love for the Son. However, when C. suggests (formally or not) that the Father’s self-love is not “his love for a Son who according to the taxis (and to put the matter cruelly) does not yet exist” (49), he disregards revelation and separates the Father and Son. C. thus suggests (contra Rahner) that “the Incarnation is the self-communication of the Father to Jesus . . . and not the expression of the Word” (64). But the only way this could be true is if the homoousion is first replaced with an adoptionist perspective.

C. opts for a modified version of Palamas’s distinction between God’s essence and energies, proposing that the energies are not different from God acting ad extra, and concludes that “God is nonrelational in his essence, relational in his energies” (169). This insight, however, compromises a proper doctrine of the immanent Trinity, which affirms that God is relational in his essence and that, because God’s being and act are one, we really meet and know God in his inner essence in Christ and the Spirit.

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Paul D. Molnar


Over the last 20 years Haight has been writing valuable books on key themes in theology: The Experience and Language of Grace (1979), An Alternative Vision: An Interpretation of Liberation Theology (1985), and The Dynamics of Theology (1990). Each of these texts feeds into the present tome, which is more than a text-book in Christology; it is a wide-ranging treatise on theology that pays particular attention to Jesus as mediator of God’s salvation in the world.

In the course of this new book H. develops a hermeneutical method of critical correlation, a theology of experience, symbol, and revelation which he then applies to the person and work of Jesus. The construction of the work is driven by attention to contemporary cultural realities: historical consciousness, religious pluralism, the necessary dialogue between Jesus and the world religions, and the search for salvation in a postmodern context.

The book is divided into four parts: questions of method, biblical sources, the classical tradition, and constructive Christology. H. covers all the major christological questions—historical research into the life of Jesus, the God of Jesus, the Resurrection, the pluralism of the New Testament, the symbolic character of Christology, classical soteriology, classical Christology, the meaning of Nicaea and Chalcedon, the movement from Schleiermacher and Barth to a postmodern context, Jesus as Savior, liberation theology and Christology, Jesus and the world religions, the divinity of Jesus, and the Trinity.

It is impossible to do justice to the richness of this new book on Christology in a short review. H. is extremely well read in his subject (960
footnotes), often creative, at times provocative, always engaging, and consistently seeks to be accountable to contemporary experience and the Christian tradition.

This book will prompt wide-ranging discussions among theologians. For example, H. claims throughout that Jesus is the subject of Christology. Some will wonder why more extensive treatment is not given to Jesus crucified and risen as part of the subject of Christology. A second point flows from this. H. claims to charter “a middle ground” between those who hold that the Resurrection is an interpretation of the ministry of Jesus and those who argue that the ministry of Jesus is not sufficient ground for the affirmation of the Resurrection. In articulating this middle ground in Chapter 5, H. relies largely on the memory of the ministry of Jesus and the impact of the person of Jesus on his followers as the basis of Resurrection, even though elsewhere in the book he talks about “the Easter experience.” If the Resurrection is grounded in the memory of Jesus, and this at times seems to be H.’s position, then what are we to say about Paul’s Resurrection-centred Christology. There does seem to be a tension between H.’s presentation of the Resurrection in Chapter 5 and the way he talks about Resurrection in the rest of the book.

A third area for further debate relates to his reinterpretation of Chalcedon. Is it possible simply to turn Chalcedon on its head and claim that Jesus is a human person/being (293–96)? Many theologians, along with H., seek to recover the consubstantiality of Jesus both in his humanity and in his human personhood with every human being. However, they also want at the same time to affirm the consubstantiality of Jesus with God in divinity and in divine personhood without offending the unity of the person of Jesus. This is one of the most contentious issues in contemporary Christology. H. has in dialogue with Nicaea and Chalcedon re-opened the question in a new way. Chalcedon sought to go beyond both Alexandrian and Antiochian Christologies. Yet H. gives the impression of wanting to retrieve only the Antiochian school. Laudable as this may be, it will merely provoke contemporary Alexandrians with a replay of fifth-century controversies.

A fourth area that will provoke debate concerns the dialogue between Jesus and the world religions. Some will be concerned that the salvation of God mediated by Jesus appears to be on a par with the offer of God’s salvation found in other religions. In this context H. claims that “Christians may regard Jesus as a normative revelation of God, while at the same time being convinced that God is also revealed normatively elsewhere” (395; see also 403)—a point of view that I suspect will command further conversations.

There are other areas where H. breaks new ground and makes a very positive contribution to the reconstruction of Christology for the 21st century. For instance, his emphasis on the primacy of soteriology within Christology is a most welcome development. His consistent concentration on the existential and historical need for salvation in the world today and how Jesus mediates this is significant. Secondly, the dialogue that H. opens up
between Jesus and the world religions is a landmark for future discussion. H. admits that more work needs to be done in this area. His chapter on “Jesus and the World Religions” puts down important markers for this dialogue. In addition, H.’s consistent differentiation of Jesus from God and his presentation of Jesus as the medium of God’s salvation and presence in the world is an important corrective to inflated Christologies “from above.” Finally, his reconstruction of Christology “from below” in the face of historical consciousness, religious pluralism, and postmodern culture is impressive.

This book is destined to become a standard reference text in future discussions of Christology and interfaith dialogue. The issues H. raises will not go away, especially in view of the increasing multicultural and global character of the world in which Christianity now exists. Though this book is not suitable as a textbook for undergraduate students, it could be used as a text for a guided graduate seminar or by doctoral students of theology doing comprehensive examinations. It must surely qualify as “required reading” for teachers of systematic theology and should be available in all libraries.

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DERMOT A. LANE


The question this scholarly book seeks to answer is whether, in a culture fragmented by the pluralism of postmodernity, “some form of intelligible, cross-disciplinary conversation between theology and the sciences” is still possible. Postmodernity, after all, brings with it a challenge to the very integrity of human rationality itself. In five skillfully argued chapters V. offers a timely and substantive address to this challenge. Moving beyond the absolutism of modern foundationalism and the relativism of nonfoundationalism, he develops a “postfoundational” notion of rationality characterized by a persistent quest for intelligibility, responsible judgment, progressive problem-solving and experiential adequacy. He wishes to embrace the critical concerns of postmodernity but without succumbing to its extremes. Importantly, his postfoundational understanding of rationality also aspires to avoid giving the impression of functioning as a new “metanarrative,” but instead intends to “unify and integrate interpreted experience without totalizing it.” In this project, scientific knowing will turn out to differ from theological knowing only as a matter of degree and emphasis.

V. thus proposes a way out of the naïve modernist pretensions to foundational, uncontextualized knowledge on the one side, and a nonfoundationalist relativism and nihilism on the other. His proposal is not an entirely new one, but it is expressed with a freshness and forcefulness of argument
that should give to this book an abiding significance among contemporary
discussions of the relationship of theological to scientific reason.

V. wants to rescue rationality from the jaws of fideism as well as the acids
of relativism. He rejects the modernist assumption that human rationality
emerges in its pure and privileged form only in the natural and social
sciences; and he convincingly uncloaks the theological isolationism and
Christian esotericism in the works of Ronald Thiemann and John Milbank.

V. argues that rationality, whether we explicitly notice it or not, is “per-
formatively present” in the wide array of human quests for intelligibility,
including theological inquiry. This rationality “can never be adequately
housed within any one specific reasoning strategy only” (5) but cuts across
all our conscious and ethical endeavors. By weighing the content of our
various modes of consciousness in terms of their consistency with the actual
performance of our rational self-awareness, V. argues that we may discover
an incontestable basis for entrusting ourselves to the search for meaning
and truth in an environment of rich plurality.

Though always socially shaped and historically conditioned, our ratio-
nality is not so bound by cultural limits that it cannot be liberated into a
confident pursuit of an understanding and truth that could be shared, at
least in some way, across cultures, disciplines, and faiths. Though our ex-
perience and understanding are inevitably locally interpreted, at the heart
of our rationality there nonetheless burns a “universal intent,” a passion
that turns us heuristically, and of course fallibly, toward the always elusive
real.

By reflecting upon our “self-awareness as rational agents,” that is, upon
the fact that our performative rationality and universal intent are transcen-
dently operative in a variety of cognitional and practical undertakings, we
shall be able to discover a deep and undeniably solid basis for relating the
discoveries of science to theological investigation. Indeed, our rationality’s
consistent performance across disciplinary boundaries provides sufficient
justification for interdisciplinary investigation of all kinds.

At a time when the intellectual world still consigns religion and theology
to the realm of opinion rather than knowledge, V.’s careful rehabilitation
of the rationality operative in theology (and other disciplines) is a happy
development. Demonstrating that one can look for theological truth con-
sonant with science—and without capitulating to “Cartesian anxiety”—his
book deserves careful study.

Many readers of this journal will recognize the Lonerganian and Pola-
nyian flavor of V.’s approach, though neither Bernard Lonergan nor Mi-
ichael Polanyi’s name appears in the index or bibliography. There is some-
thing here closely akin to the older transcendental quest for the invariant
structure and irrepressibly reality-seeking nature of intelligent subjectivity.
Additionally, V.’s method comes close to prescribing a dialectic of cogni-
tional performance and content in some ways reminiscent of Lonergan.
And although in this book the intelligent subject may be explicitly pictured
as more deeply enmeshed in the specifics of culture and interpreted expe-
perience, there is a vivid recognition of the dynamic orientation of human “rationality” toward a horizon of truth that lies beyond all local “truths.”

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John F. Haught


In the Declaration of Independence, Thomas Jefferson asserted as a self-evident truth that “all men are created equal.” Sexist language aside, law professors Coons and Brennan disagree. They find nothing self-evident about the existence of equality, and in this intriguing and sometimes uneven book they explore the often unexamined belief that people are in fact equal. Initially, they argue, equality is assumed and rarely proved; it is usually proffered as a basis for laws drafted to avoid favoritism or invidious discrimination. They contend that most who write about equality lapse into a fuzzy discussion of egalitarian norms and propose agendas for behavior rather than discuss the assumption that underlies the assertion that all people are fundamentally equal.

C. and B. cast aside nebulous thinking concerning equality in the opening chapters by facing the question straight on: “What could it mean to say that persons who are diverse in their readiness for life’s various races are in fact equal? In what respect are we to measure and compare them?” They maintain that if persons are equal, they must possess an innate quality that does not vary in degree or intensity. After dismissing false and trivial equalities, they train our mind on a nonmeasurable and therefore by definition unvarying ability, our power to strive to perfect ourselves morally. They assert that all rational persons have the same capacity to forge their own moral identity by honestly intending and seeking the good of others (they resurrect the word “obtensional” to describe this act). All rational actors are equal because all are capable to the same degree of entering into a relationship with the Other in which they seek the good of the Other. Success in this endeavor is not necessary. Even should actors innocently mistake their duty to the Other and diligently pursue the wrong goal, their good conscience will perfect them as human beings even if they injure the neighbor they intend to help. This good intention may not transform an evil act into a good one, but it may help transform actors into better persons. The rest of the book develops this argument in light of Enlightenment philosophy and theological perspectives from Augustine up to Vatican II.

The book’s discussions of Hobbes and Kant are vital and clear. Furthermore, the description of the phenomenology of moral decision making in relation to a striving for the common good is intriguing, as is the observation that our current emphasis on autonomy makes it difficult for contemporary people to believe that we have any obligation to others. However,
though the book strives for breadth rather than depth, there are difficulties. The work would have benefited by clarifying the distinction made in moral theology between goodness and badness (referring to the state of an individual’s conscience) and rightness and wrongness (referring to the correctness of a given action in particular circumstances). This confusion in language perplexes the reader on occasion.

Another part of the work that requires close attention is the contention that the only people who are equal are those capable of understanding rationally their obligations to the Other. C. and B. explain that the non-equal do not “slip to the level of animals” and certainly deserve protection on religious or other grounds, but they do not deserve to be considered the equal of the rational (54). Because they mention those not yet born as one possible group of nonequal beings, they invite the criticism that neither religious nor other grounds seem to offer much protection to nonequals who are aborted. Granted, the authors are dealing merely with defining equality, not with proposing a political system. Still, their argument must be applicable to real consequences to be worthwhile to ethics.

More importantly, the requirement that both the actor and the Other be rational may unnecessarily limit their position. For example, like C. and B., Levinas sees our moral duty as called forth by the Other whom we encounter. However, Levinas does not require that the Other be rational; he must simply be Other, one whose alterity we must respect and cannot grasp or categorize. Therefore, we are commanded to respect and treat equally both the rational and the irrational, the vocal and the voiceless. C. and B. could make a similar move with little or no damage to the rest of their position.

Despite these qualms, I believe they offer a provocative look at a premise unexamined in most political arguments. The book is designed to open a discussion; it meets that goal.

Weston Jesuit School of Theology

GREGORY J. O’MEARA, S.J.


Schweiker makes a case for endorsing a hermeneutical realism transformed by theological reflection. On the one hand, he acknowledges the important attempts of antirealists who proffer the search for power as a way to cast off the claims of traditional forebears who have stifled discourse and used their interpretations as artificial warrants for their own power. Antirealism, he notes, has been in the service of liberation. On the other hand, S. resists the antirealists’ inability to check the quest for power and observes that their claims remove us from the world in which we live. As opposed to the antirealists, he notes that Christians recognize their task as the quest not for power, but for the integrity of life. This integrity should
not be confused with an attempt for unity or conformity: S.’s interests are clearly liberating. Rather as we traverse through the diverse worlds in which we participate, we encounter the challenge to integrate our lives. Integrity recognizes the diversity of the real while also recognizing our own finitude. S. recognizes that finitude, a self-understanding which is also antithetical to the antirealists’ project, is the condition for the dialectical engagement of hermeneutical realism.

Constitutive of the hermeneutical process is self-interpretation. S. believes this action is common to all moral agents, contradicting here the communitarians, Stanley Hauerwas and Alasdair MacIntyre, who argue against any transcultural anthropological assumptions. In being responsible for ourselves, hermeneutics calls us as interpreters to mutually enhance our commitments and our perceptions and to find within the dynamics of understanding the connection between knowledge of self and the source of value, the divine.

For Christians, self-interpretation inevitably leads us, then, to understand ourselves in a reality already defined in relationship with God. Specifically, S. urges us further forward by insisting on a radical interpretation, what he calls “a hermeneutical account of conscience” (91). He defines radical interpretation as “the activity of self-criticism in which the values and norms a person or community endorses as important to her/his or its life are transformed by some idea, symbol or event that rightly claims to guide conduct because it enables an insight into what founds the moral life” (95). Here, in a challenge to Charles Taylor, S. argues that we must not only evaluate but also interpret ourselves, so as to render explicit what otherwise might remain inarticulate. This interpretive, self-critical, divinely-rooted reflection becomes then the engine for the realization of value through the responsible exercise of power.

This dense, ambitious, and demanding book rewards the reader abundantly. S. provides a sustained, dynamic method for shaping ourselves as we really are, that is, as persons called to be moral agents. Along the way, he furthers the ongoing work of sage ethicists who demonstrate the enormous promise that hermeneutics has for contemporary Christian ethics.

S.’s project parallels the important work of two Roman Catholic moral theologians, Klaus Demmer and his student Thomas Kopfensteiner. Like Demmer, S. appreciates the Augustinian insight that God is closer to us than we are to ourselves, and that therefore genuine theology which has God as its object leads to a fundamental change in our way of thinking. Like Kopfensteiner, S. insists that “as the work of love increases, so does the vision which then reflectively deepens the capacity to love” (68). Here S. would appreciate Kopfensteiner’s claim that the movement of hermeneutics is hardly circular. Rather, like a spiral, the act of radical interpretation moves us forward through the reality of human history. Moreover, when S. briefly discusses the relationship between metaphor and the structures of understanding (117–21), he could have profited from Kopfensteiner’s writings on the metaphorical structure of normativity.

If there is anything disappointing in this near brilliant work, it is S.’s
description of God. While his proposal is definitely rooted in our relatedness with God and while he briefly discusses the significance of Christology, still the concept of God and the relevance of that concept for ethics predominates over any personal, experiential expression of God. S. might have used the material of his eighth chapter, on the otherness of a God who loves, in order to transform his conceptual ideas of God.

S. provides us here with an extraordinarily important agenda that defines not only the task of contemporary Christian ethics but also its relevance for those lost in postmodernity. Anyone engaged in articulating the relationship between power and responsibility will profit from this work.

Weston Jesuit School of Theology

JAMES F. KEENAN, S.J.

The Chronicle of Higher Education for January 21, 2000, contained an article, “Archaeology vs. the Bible: A Reluctant Public Grapples with What Scholarship Reveals about the Old Testament’s Version of History,” which states that “just as Israelis have had to reconsider their recent past, in light of revisionist historical works, they also are finding themselves facing the myths of their antiquity with unprecedented intensity.” The crisis is gradually having an impact on some groups who perceive as well a theological intertwining of Christian fulfillment with the State of Israel’s fortunes.

This development in biblical and archeological studies gives special significance to the type of research undertaken by Schniedewind in his often difficult book. S. walks a fine line between the more traditional categories of biblical approaches that emphasized what lay behind the text itself (historical, source, and redaction criticisms, all of which relied heavily on philology, history, and archeology) and the newer methodologies that emphasize the reader of those texts, and which elucidate the social, political, religious, and historical circumstances not so much of the Bible, but of those who interpret it. But these circumstances are not static; they change depending on shifting historical situations. And just as there is an innerbiblical dialogue to be discerned in the Bible, there is a parallel diachronic conversation in those who interpret it within their life context. Hence “reception history,” an analysis of how exegetes have made use of the Bible within their particular Sitz im Leben.

S. pursues his study through one of the most central and politically foundational OT themes, the promise to David that his “house and kingdom shall be made sure forever,” and that God will “appoint a place for his people Israel... that they may live in their own place and be disturbed no more” (2 Sam 7:16, 10). S. ends his analysis with first-century C.E. Judaism, but establishes a methodology that has implications for much later eras.

WILLIAM J. FULCO, S.J.
Loyola Marymount Univ., L.A.


This is a welcome addition to an excellent series. After a brief discussion of the historical setting of Mark, Telford offers a lengthy discussion of the work’s theology, followed by a helpful chapter on the relation of Mark to other New Testament literature, and concludes with reflections on “Mark in the
church and in the world.” The work shows wide-ranging familiarity with secondary literature, contains helpful bibliography and indices, and is written in an engaging style.

While admitting that the question of provenance (Rome or Galilee) remains open, T. sees Mark as a creative theologian who adapts traditions to the needs of a community that “faces a common threat, is in tension with its Jewish heritage, is oppressed, possibly persecuted, is in need of moral guidance, sees Jesus as a paradigm for its faith and expects a speedy resolution of its problems” (17). In debt to the work of Norman Perrin, T. argues that Mark is concerned to correct a false Christology and spells out the implications of a true Christology for discipleship. He also follows Perrin in holding that Mark is responsible for much of the developing Son of Man tradition. In contrast to much contemporary scholarship, T. argues that Mark moves away from an “apocalyptic eschatology” to a stress on Christology and soteriology. T. interprets the negative view of the disciples and the omission of a Resurrection appearance to the Twelve as a rejection of the hegemony of the original Jerusalem Church, again a position that was current among Perrin and some of his followers.

In treating Mark’s relation to other NT documents, T. presents interesting (and debated) views, e.g., that Mark probably knew the Pauline writings and that John may have known Mark. The final chapter raises important issues for contemporary discussion of Mark: Mark and power; women and the Gospel of Mark; Mark’s anti-Jewish elements. While T’s work reflects scholarship mainly between 1970 and 1990, with little engagement with newer literary methods or examination of the cultural context, its clear exposition and argumentation make it an ideal text for a course in the Gospel of Mark. Teachers may wish to go beyond T.’s work, but critical dialogue with it is essential.

JOHN R. DONAHUE, S.J.
Jesuit School of Theology, Berkeley


Do not let the aggressively trendy title put you off this book completely, even though Rubenstein tells us it was his own idea. A professor of conflict resolution and public affairs at George Mason University, R. wrote this book out of sheer personal enthusiasm for the absorbing story of the Arian controversy. He freely admits his dependency on English-language secondary sources, especially T. D. Barnes, W. H. C. Frend’s The Rise of Christianity, R. P. C. Hanson, and—for what he thinks Arianism was about—Gregg and Groh’s Early Arianism: A View of Salvation.

While serious students of the Arian controversy should read those and other resources for themselves, R. has made the story come alive for people who never saw it as a saga about people and events rather than the interplay of documents. Two house guests who spotted the book in my living room and took it up to read in bed came back enthusiastic. Despite being free with facts and novelistic in his portrayal of events, R. maintains a good balance between the political and the ecclesiastical and between an Eastern and a Western perspective on the controversy. Even students of patristics can read this book with profit to see what new patterns may be revealed by R.’s twists of the kaleidoscope of history. It is worth putting up with the loose history and theological solecisms. Besides the title, one other example must suffice: Rubenstein says that, after the Council of Constantinople in 381, “[l]ed by Damasus, the Western bishops objected strongly to the new creed’s statement that the Holy Spirit ‘proceeds from the Father’ ” and insisted on adding the Filioque (227). But the Filioque appeared for the first time in Spain more than two centuries later. Apart from such howlers, my only regret is that R. does not direct us to healthier ways of resolving
conflicts than the ones described in his book.

MICHAEL SLUSSER
Duquesne University, Pittsburgh


This readable and engaging study of the tradition of women deacons in the Orthodox Church provides insight into recent Orthodox discussions of the re-institution of the diaconate for women that may be unfamiliar to many in the Western churches. It will be of interest to anyone concerned with the role and ministry of women in the Christian churches. FitzGerald initially offers an overview of women named as deacons in Orthodox tradition and the diverse ministries ascribed to them. More interesting and compelling, however, is her analysis of ordination rites for women. Expanding on the work of Evangelos Theodorou, to whom she gives credit, she disputes the claim that women deacons were merely appointed to minor orders rather than truly ordained to the major order of deacon. Through a close textual analysis of the rite in the Apostolic Constitution and the Byzantine ordination rite, F. postulates that women were ordained to major orders as deacons, just as were men. She does not draw from this an argument that women were ever ordained to priesthood, or should be now. In an Eastern ecclesiology that holds a less pyramidal understanding of church order than does the West, the diaconate is not viewed as a stepping stone to sacerdotal priesthood but as an integral and distinct order in itself. F. suspects that it was Western influence that led ultimately to the decline of women deacons in the East.

F. cites a number of recent initiatives in the Orthodox churches calling for the reestablishment of the order of deacons for women, notably the Rhodes Consultation of 1988. In her view, the pastoral necessity of the Church now requires action on these initiatives: the reestablishment of the ordained diaconate for women and an expansion of diaconal ministries in light of today’s pressing needs. Her work converges with other studies such as that of the Canon Law Society of America (1995) that also see the diaconate as a more immediate way to expand ministerial possibilities for women that sidesteps, at least for the moment, the discussion of priestly ordination.

MARY E. HINES
Emmanuel College, Boston


In a series already distinguished for its concise and expert introductions to classic figures of Christian spirituality, the present volume fully meets expectations. Hayes, a prominent commentator on Bonaventure, presents the spiritual theology of the saint within the contexts of his life, his theological project, and his major sources. The book does not offer a complete view of Bonaventure’s spiritual theology. Rather, once Bonaventure’s consuming concern for communion in God has been established, H. chooses his renowned mystical writing, The Journey of the Soul into God, and spends the rest of the book in analysis and commentary on it. Besides his judicious and aptly translated quotations from this work, H. weaves into his general exposition carefully selected passages from Bonaventure’s other mystical writings. Thus the focus on this one work deliberately includes many structuring insights of Bonaventure’s comprehensive spiritual vision.

By choosing to analyze The Journey, H. is able to demonstrate how Francis of Assisi exerted a profound influence upon Bonaventure’s thought. Bonaventure translated into theological meaning the life and values of Francis and particularly his ecstatic experience of transformative divine love on Mt. Alverna. Francis’s contemplative journey into God is so construed metaphorically and theologically that it becomes the para-
digm and guide for the search for God, a guide through the sensible world, through human interiority reformed by grace, into the trinitarian life of divine goodness, where through Christ crucified one passes into ecstatic loving communion.

Mindful of the need to interpret a medieval thinker for his contemporary audience, H. turns from time to time to modern scientists, philosophers, and theologians for comparative analyses. He devotes the book’s conclusion to the appropriateness and attractiveness of Bonaventure’s spiritual tradition for present-day believers. Composed by a specialist in a limpid, balanced, and nontechnical style, this book is highly recommended for general readers and professionals.

GABRIEL SCARFIA, O.F.M.
Christ the King Seminary,
East Aurora, N.Y.


This is an extensive account of astronomical work based on meridian instruments constructed in five European cathedrals, Santa Maria Novella and the Duomo in Florence, San Petronio in Bologna, Santa Maria degli Angeli in Rome, and Saint Sulpice in Paris. The devices were lines laid out from north to south on the cathedral floors, with a hole in a roof or high wall allowing light from the sun to be projected at various places along the line. Measurements of the resulting solar images were useful in establishing the Gregorian calendar in 1582, determining the sun’s orbit precisely, and using solar time to set mechanical clocks down to the 1830s. Scientists who participated in this work include Paolo Toscanelli, the Dominican Egnatio Danti, the Jesuits Christopher Clavius, Francesco Mario Grimaldi, Giambattista Riccioli, and Honoré Fabri, and finally Gian Domenico Cassini and his son Jacques. Done under the auspices of a Church in which Copernicus’s theory was still under interdict, the findings proved to be of subsequent value for astronomical research.

Heilbron’s account is detailed and heavily documented. Greatly amused by the perceived incongruity of the Church’s situation, he dissociates himself from its doctrine but gives full credit to its devoted sons for their scientific work. The book is beautifully produced and illustrated. Its style is discursive and entertaining, but the subject matter is difficult and requires a goodly knowledge of astronomy to be properly apprehended.

WILLIAM A. WALLACE, O.P.
Univ. of Maryland, College Park


With more experience in the field than most academic scholars can hope to attain, Bucko, a Jesuit priest and anthropologist, illuminates a ritual that is today universally practiced within the world of American Indian religion (achieving such widespread acceptance largely through the Lakota, a group referred to in earlier literature as the “Sioux”). Unfortunately, his book’s bland title reflects its origin as a doctoral dissertation, and initially will appeal just to specialists who seek a more in-depth historical, sociological, and theological understanding of a Native ceremony popularly referred to as a “sweat” (or “sweat lodge”). However, word-of-mouth should give this work the large audience that it richly deserves.

Although the first two chapters provide a historical analysis of the sweat lodge ritual, attention is throughout directed at a consideration of how the ceremony’s enactment today reflects its tradition as reported by “missionaries, civil servants, anthropologists, and popular chroniclers” (14). Early accounts show the roots of contemporary practice but there is, contrary to what many might assume, no “definitive formulation of tradition or rules for cer-
Use of rhetoric as a means of argumentation in two of his historical studies on French Catholic biblical interpretation in the 19th century. The last chapter draws upon literary approaches to autobiography, particularly Hayden White’s tropological analysis, to shed light on Loisy’s autobiographical work *Choses passées*.

These essays provide a challenge and require careful study. Most readers, I suspect, will not be familiar with the various literary and sociological theories T. draws from and briefly summarizes before making applications to selected Modernist texts. The careful reader, however, will be amply rewarded, for T. has a fine grasp of his material and offers a number of keen insights and observations. This study flows from his previous writings on Modernist texts and makes a solid contribution to studies on Roman Catholic Modernism.

CHARLES J. HEALEY, S.J. 
Pope John XXIII Sem., Weston, Mass.


Charles de Foucauld (1858–1916) has been the subject of many biographies in English. The broad contours of his life are well known: the dissolute soldier, the brave explorer in Saharan Africa, the convert who then tries his vocation with the Trappists both in France and Syria only to seek a more solitary life in the desert of North Africa where he was murdered. Only after his death did people take up the kind of life he had hoped for: contemplative groups who lived a life of adoration and witness among the poorest of the poor.

Antier’s biography has features that make it an obligatory read for anyone interested in this fascinating contemplative and mystic. First, A. has seen the dossier being compiled for the beatification process and, judging from the notes and bibliography, has acquainted himself with all of the pertinent literature available in French. As a result he...
gives us a fuller account of de Foucauld’s life as a Trappist and the subsequent evolution of his thinking about a new form of religious life which he envisioned for those who might follow his example. Furthermore, he gives us a more realistic picture of de Foucauld against the background of French colonial policy (he never wavered from his conviction that France had a mission civilitrice) during the period in question—a policy, alas, which has brought much sorrow to Algeria over the course of this century. Finally, A. shows how de Foucauld’s ideas about the relationship of Christianity to Islam matured over the years as he thought long about the value of simple presence and love for those who were resistant to direct evangelization. In sum, this biography fills out what is only alluded to or neglected in earlier works available in English. In passing A. also gives us some wonderful biographical portraits of such luminous figures as the famous spiritual director Henri Huvelin and the famous Arabist, Louis Massignon.

The book has some nice photos, some appendices (a chronology; a list of groups inspired by de Foucauld, etc.) and a useful index. Touchingly, A. dedicates his work to the six Trappists murdered in Algeria in 1996, fifty years after Charles de Foucauld died at the hands of a young tribal gunman. I have two criticisms of the book: first, the maps are very bad and in French to boot; second, the translator made no effort to supply an English-language bibliography, which in fact is a rather extensive one, including translations of some of the books cited in the French bibliography.

LAWRENCE S. CUNNINGHAM
University of Notre Dame


Jammer, professor of physics emeritus and former rector at Bar-Ilam University in Israel, was an acquaintance of Albert Einstein. Here he endeavors to provide a comprehensive, balanced view of Einstein’s religiosity, often taken out of context by believers and unbelievers alike to bolster their particular stance. His objective is to study not only how deeply religion affected Einstein and his work, but also how deeply Einstein’s work, and in particular his theory of relativity, affected theological thought. To accomplish this J. focuses on Einstein’s undogmatic and yet profound religiosity and his philosophy of religion. He asserts that throughout Einstein’s life religious sentiments and theological reflections played a role of much greater importance than any of his many biographers seems to have realized. In filling this lacuna J. has made an important contribution to the field of Einstein studies. By exposing the complexity and sources of Einstein’s religiosity he has enriched our understanding both of Einstein the man and of his science.

J. approaches his subject under three headings: Einstein’s religiosity and the role of religion in his private life, Einstein’s philosophy of religion, and Einstein’s physics and theology. The last heading is somewhat ambiguous; it is not about Einstein’s theology, but about the impact of his physics on theological thought. J.’s first section provides a balanced treatment of the positive religious experiences of Einstein’s formative years and the countervailing influences from his initiative into the physical sciences and into Kant. Already here J. sees that ambiguity which will characterize Einstein’s later relationship to religion, leading him to be claimed as their own by both atheists and religious groups. J.’s second section makes a valuable contribution by highlighting the central influence on Einstein of Spinoza’s thought, particularly his rejection of a personal God. This is at the root of so much of the contradictions in Einstein’s life, the soaring visions of human solidarity with a denial of personal accountability; it may also lie at the root of the contradictory personal relationships which have been examined in several recent works.

J.’s third section is much less successful. It attempts to show the influence of Einstein’s thought, especially the theory of relativity, on philosophy and theol-
ogy. In striving to be even handed J. presents a confusing smorgasbord of reflections and theories without apparent evaluation. For example, presenting the attempt to reconcile the six days of creation with the fifteen billion years of the universe by invoking Einstein's theory of relativity adds nothing to the understanding of Einstein and detracts from the solid contribution made by J. in the first two sections of this worthwhile book.

Timothy E. Toohig, S.J.
Boston College


Ulanov, a therapist and professor of psychiatry and religion at Union Theological Seminary since 1977, has lectured and written widely on the relation between Jung and Christian faith. This is a collection of essays written and delivered to different audiences over 20 years, yet they do not repeat one another. U. is one of many scholars who find Jung's psychology a striking context wherein to understand religious practices and mystical experience. Each essay has an original approach; e.g., Tillich's anxiety of being is considered together with Jung's accounts of patients' avoiding self-knowledge. She treats of prayer and Christian education, and she argues that Thérèse of Lisieux was not a masochist though she refused painkillers.

U. admits to a "strong bias" for Jung, but she also teaches alternative maps of the psyche. Her familiarity with Jung is profound and enables her to think original thoughts in his context. Yet she can criticize the master: whereas Jung took issue with Christians for dismissing evil as a privatio boni, U. maintains that he himself "did not recognize one of the greatest evils in history [the Holocaust] when it confronted him in its immeasurable brutality." This is treated as part of a stunning and original reflection on scapegoating.

Though U. never directly explains Jung, those not familiar with him can profit from the present work. Jung called himself a Christian and wrote studies of many religious texts; he claimed that among his patients over 35 none was healed without adopting a religious outlook. Yet many have questioned Jung's Christianity (God is both good and evil, etc.). U. does not deal with such controversies, but shows how easily Jung's psychology can be used by more orthodox Christians. She warns that the concreteness of Jesus stands boldly opposed to the ways we "make use of him for cause, party or platform as we abstract his particularity to illustrate our values." Those involved in spiritual direction or the relation of religion to psychology and society will find fresh insights in U.'s study.

Thomas M. King, S.J.
Georgetown University, D.C.


This book seeks to develop what Lalonde calls "a critical theory of religious insight." The greater part of the short text examines three religious thinkers for whom critical theory is important—Charles Davis, Helmut Peukert, and John Milbank—and Jürgen Habermas's vision of religion as beyond the pale of critical theory, yet a valuable assertion of the humane. L.'s discussion focuses on the question: To what degree for truly critical religious thought can theology any longer be "the logos of the theos"? Because the answer is negative, Habermas and Davis are preferred over Peukert and Milbank. Critical theory is affirmed and religion is not smuggled in to rescue it. But what must happen to both, if they are to speak to one another?

L.'s constructive proposal emerges in a final chapter, in which elements of Foucault, Levinas, and Charles Taylor are drawn together into something more redolent of pragmatism than critical theory. His position, only sketched out in a few pages, is that both critical theory and theology must be more open.
to one another’s worlds. Human beings often inhabit multiple social worlds simultaneously, and this does not negate their capacity to be critical. There is no radical separation between the secular and the religious, but both converge and are changed from their former relationships through attention to compassion, finally, then, to a particular kind of moral-practical reason.

This is a courageous and well-argued first stab at a project much too large for this short work, and one which may profitably irritate both critical theorists and theologians.

PAUL LAKELAND
Fairfield University, Connecticut


O’Collins has produced a clear and contemporary introductory-level presentation and defense of classical Thomistic trinitarian theology, complete with a glossary and bibliography. As contemporary, it takes a genetic approach to the development of the doctrine. A survey of the Old Testament focuses on the names and images of God as Father, Word, Wisdom, and Spirit available to the New Testament interpretations of Jesus’ significance. A chapter on the history of Jesus looks for hints of God’s tripersonal reality in Jesus’ virginal conception and baptism, in his experience of the Spirit and of special sonship, and in his conception of his mission. Two further chapters on NT authors eschew anachronism while grounding trinitarian discourse in the Pasch along with a strong reading of the preexistence texts.

The book’s middle section patiently leads the reader through major pre-Nicene authors, carefully noting each significant development at its point of origin, lays out the conciliar movement from Nicea to Constantinople I, and concludes with a sweep of theologians from Athanasius to Aquinas. At the end of this section, O. pauses to insist on the subordination of philosophy to biblical revelation and adverts to medieval popular and liturgical devotion.

Very brief considerations of the Reformation and Enlightenment combine with mention of such 20th-century influences as personalism and emancipatory movements to establish the modern setting in which O. addresses three special questions. First, biblical data secure the personal existence of the Holy Spirit. Next O. defends the usage of “person” for each member of the divine triad, to be understood analogously as three subjects of a single divine consciousness, and appeals to Aquinas to conceive the trinitarian actions ad extra as common in action but distinctive in term. Finally, after a critique of recent proposals for renaming the Trinity, he appeals to Jesus’ nonpatriarchal use of “Abba” to vindicate the traditional appellations while professing openness to non-male names as well. The last chapter of this serviceable if not adventurous dogmatic primer seeks to recapitulate the whole by scanning a number of trinitarian analogies and images, traditional and modern.

WILLIAM P. LOEWE
Catholic University of America, D.C.


Snook, professor emeritus of systematic theology at Luther Seminary, St. Paul, contends that Spirit and power, the sacred and the secular, are disconnected in Western culture. The Spirit is largely imagined as private, inward experience, while power is associated with the public sphere and with the ability through organization and direction to achieve palpable results in the social order. S. sets about developing anew the relationship between power and Spirit: the Spirit of God is the power of God at work in the world.

He begins the process of re-imaging the relationship in Trinitarian theology with a balanced focus upon scriptural considerations. Through a creative integration of resources that are theological as well as drawn from literary criticism,
S. suggests a variety of images that reflect ways in which people imagine power and thus organize their lives: order and unity, freedom and justice, beauty and love. In articulating his fresh perspectives S. draws upon trinitarian scholars such as Dunn, Moltmann, and Congar, and on the literary critics such as Northrop Frye. A basic theme in his argument is that the Spirit is the source of all power, although humanity in its sinfulness is capable of abusing that power. Yet the Spirit works at achieving reconciliation among people, liberation from domination, overcoming evil in all its forms. S. adopts the view of Daniel Day Williams in articulating love as the primary mode of the Spirit in bringing about harmony and unity.

Within the rich texture of reflection there do exist some observations that need refinement. S. appears wary of institutional authority and magisterial teaching. The role of tradition needs to have a broader place in his argument. In a chapter on discernment of the Spirit in the Church and in the world S. utilizes the traditional four notes of the Church effectively. Discernment can be further enriched by ecclesial resources which address the work of justice and peace, reconciliation and unity, ecology and moral responsibility.

JOHN F. RUSSELL, O.CARM.
Seton Hall University, N.J.


Engagingly written, this competent work in apologetics assumes a readership familiar with world religions, but it is mostly preoccupied with traditional Christian faith and disbelief. Stackhouse follows the Plantingas' advocacy of rationally grounded belief, in spite of encounters with apparently gratuitous evil. The expertise is philosophical, without reference to theological nuances. Concepts of good presuppose conceptions of evil, but no actual evil is necessary. The root evil is sin, conventionally considered without cross-reference to bad karma, cosmic disharmony, spirit possession or Greek tragedy. Job's story defines the issue of trust versus credulity or blind faith. God in Christ, not abstract theism, answers the title question sufficiently, without addressing every "Why me?" or philosophical conundrum.

In theodicy, S. offers a free-will defense backed by undemythologized belief in resurrection, agreeing with Hick that divine love never manipulates creaturely responses. Hindus and Buddhists, for whom heavenly bliss, since finite, could not count as eschatological verification, are met with the claim that Christianity takes history most seriously. S. hopes others are wrong because, on biblical grounds, he believes that Jesus alone is "Savior and Lord."

Try reading the Bible, praying before reading, even if unsure of God, is the concluding admonition. The argument is not pietistic but probabilistic, assuming that metaphysical beliefs and moral codes are ancillary. What is decisive is experience, especially among "genuine congregations. The main difficulty concerning saving knowledge is not God's absence but our lack of repentance. S.'s strength is to make Jesus' death and Resurrection central to critical Christian reflection on evil and hope. A weakness is that other religions are more mentioned than used in the project of faith seeking understanding.

PETER SLATER
Trinity College, Toronto


If expensive gifts come in small packages, a powerful theology can be conveyed in a small volume. In some 100 pages (excluding notes, bibliography, and index), Gerrish's book is one of the best contemporary works on the nature of Christian faith. Its scope is comprehensive, its scholarship wide and deep, and its style lucid and readable. Each chapter is prefaced by an epigraph that hints at G.'s theological position and
concludes with a concise statement of his thesis in italics.

The argument can be summarized as follows: Christian faith, which is saving faith, is a recognition of God’s benevolence (faith as fides or belief) and the consequent confidence in God (faith as fiducia or trust). Though distinctive, a saving faith is a particular instance of a generic concept of faith as meaning construction in which one discovers the meaning and purpose of one’s life through commitment to an object of ultimate loyalty. This generic faith can be called “secular” in the double sense of religious but non-Christian and not religious at all. This faith is not irrational but can be philosophically justified as “inevitable beliefs”; it also needs social affirmation by means of creeds and confessional theology. The latter should contain at least three parts corresponding to the contents of the Christian faith: elemental faith, creation faith, and redemption faith. Finally, contemporary dogmatic theology must deal with two challenges: relativism (attacking the unique role of Christ as savior) and skepticism (attacking our knowledge of the Jesus of history as described in the New Testament).

G. works out his definition of faith as recognition plus confidence by reviewing the teachings of the Bible, Aquinas, Luther, and Calvin. He develops his notion of secular faith as meaning construction by examining the works of psychologists such as Frankl and Fowler. He shows how faith is justified by appealing to Jacobi’s notion of the necessary belief in the world as order and Forberg’s concept of the necessary belief in the world as a moral order. The necessity of creed and confessional theology is argued from the social nature of faith, but for G. creeds are not tests for orthodoxy but “reminders” of the identity of the Christian faith, and confessional theology must be an open enterprise whose goal is to work toward formulating new confessions of faith. In developing his own position on faith and theology, G. is heavily indebted to his Reformed heritage, but precisely because of his fidelity to his Church, he does not restrict himself to sola scriptura but remains open to reason, tradition, and other religions. I strongly recommend his book for undergraduate courses on faith and revelation.

Peter C. Phan
Catholic University of America, D.C.


Encouraged by widespread favorable response to his 1996 lecture at Oxford University on the state of the Catholic Church, Archbishop Quinn offers here a much fuller discussion of the subject. It is an altogether excellent work, fully informed theologically and historically, with very sound ideas clearly articulated in an irenic and totally constructive spirit. His starting point is John Paul II’s 1995 encyclical Ut unum sint, in which the pope himself “raised and legitimized the question of reform and change in the papal office” (14) and actually asked for help from others in improving the Church. Q. notes correctly that progress toward a living, effective kind of Catholic Christianity will require some structural and pastoral changes in the Church, especially in the way authority is exercised by the Roman Curia. He explains at length the value and necessity for criticism, and the case for the legitimacy of criticism has never been more ably and persuasively made.

Similarly well grounded in church history and tradition are his chapter on the rise of the papal monarchy that replaced the more collegial modes of the first millennium, and his discussion of the rightful place of episcopal conferences in the ecclesiology of Vatican II. His own experience and perceptions as a bishop add a valuable dimension to his pointed comments about Rome’s way of appointing bishops in recent years. Also of great value is his concluding chapter on the reform of the Roman Curia; it combines genuine concern about the harm done by curial authoritarianism, which he describes very accurately and
justly, with carefully reasoned proposals for reform. This is a book of many real merits.

**Richard F. Costigan, S.J.**
Loyola University, Chicago


This volume makes a particular contribution to a growing body of English-language literature on church authority by approaching the question of authority in the Church from within an explicitly postmodern sensibility.

In the first half of the book Stagaman debunks two still influential myths bequeathed to us from the Enlightenment, that authority is opposed both to reason and to freedom/autonomy. S. contends rather that authentic authority binds a community together and helps it establish its identity. Consequently the function of authority within a community is analogous to that of freedom for the individual, it makes possible the formation of identity. Authority resides neither in an individual nor in some objective reality. It is a "practice," a quality of human interaction that binds people together. According to S., authority takes two distinctive and complementary forms: "an authority" (that form of authority grounded in the manifestation of virtues esteemed by the community) and "in authority" (that authority which is grounded in customs, regulations, or law). Authority binds the community with its past (a tradition) but also requires legitimate dissent for its continued vitality.

In the final two chapters and conclusion S. examines the history of authority as it has been exercised within the Church and considers whether his postmodern view of authority can be reconciled with a Catholic Christian account of authority. His conclusion is that in spite of considerable abuses, it is possible to construct a Catholic Christian account of authority as self-efficacing service, as mystical (grounded in God’s unbounded love), as eschatological (always in need of conversion), and as sacramental (disclosing its true reality in the proclamation of the word and the celebration of the eucharist) that can be reconciled with and enriched by the broader account of authority described in the earlier chapters.

S.’s project is probably too ambitious for so slim a volume, but it will nevertheless prove helpful to the nonspecialist and would serve as a good companion text for courses in ecclesiology and fundamental theology.

**Richard R. Gaillardetz**
University of St. Thomas, Houston


The “death” of the Church, as experienced in institutional decline in mainline Protestantism, is the starting point for theological reflection on the nature of the Church. Jinkins compares the “death” of the Church with the death-of-God experience in postwar Europe. Death in these contexts is only apparent, and serves to destroy certain “confessional and dogmatic cages” (103) in which these mysteries stand. For this reason, the postmodern concern with death serves an understanding of the Church. By facing the death of a current form of the Church, the Church, as a community of faith, has the opportunity to rethink its self-understanding, as it has done in previous crises. J. does not attempt a systematic understanding of the Church. He sees himself in the tradition of "occasional theologians" (90), who respond to issues, concerns, and situations that arise in a social context.

J. begins by asking how death raises for the Church questions of identity and responsibility. Through the lens of Derrida, Kierkegaard, Patocka, Heidegger, and Levinas he constructs the argument that by surviving many deaths, the Church has constructed itself. In subsequent chapters, he raises the problem of imagining the Church and argues that the Church as a syncretic reality continues to reveal God’s character. He surveys the use of analytical taxonomies to por-
tray the life and ministry of the Christian Church. He attempts to move beyond the paradigm of a Church from “above” and from “below,” arguing that the latter often falls into simply a phenomenological study. The result is a reduction of the Church to simply scientific, empirical, or historical terms (91).

I feel it is here that we get to the central concern of this text. Since death marks the boundary in ordinary life between historicity and eternity, it appears to this reader that J.’s concern is more with historicity than with death. His title is deceiving. Death is not the paradigm that captures the identity of the Church in this book; rather the question of the book is how historicity factors into the Church’s identity and continued development. J. argues that by taking historicity more seriously we can reframe previous understandings of the Church and gain insight into what form of the Church is emerging. He leads the reader through a theological reflection on the “death” of the Church institutionally, bringing to this question a rich resource of authors. It is an inquiry worth making.

JUDITH A. MERKLE
Niagara University, New York


In 18 chapters which are interviews with Gwendoline Jarzcyk, Geffré’s conversation is vibrant and vital, marked by original perspectives and directness of expression. In the opening section, looking out at Jerusalem, G. is struck by “the exteriorization of religion, by the intense will and commitment of so many individuals to affirm their personal religion” (13). Those diverse realizations of religion lead to a number of original insights about the Holy Land and its congestion of religious forces. The second section ponders the profession of being a theologian. G.’s interest in hermeneutics here emerges more simply in its applications to theology and dogma, to Thomas Aquinas, and to the present malaise which in recent decades has spread over the Catholic Church.

The third and fourth sections again go outside revelation and hermeneutics to the diversity of the world’s religions. The chapters on Christian claims to be a definitive incarnation of God’s presence and on the role of the Church as servant to that special presence have a dialectical maturity: they retain a traditional Catholic perspective but relate revelation and Church to a long history and wider world. G. speaks of the “fact that Jesus addresses himself to God like a Jew but also like no other Jew of that time” (236) but also of “historical Christianity taking into its worship and theology strange ideas, gestures, rites” (242). The contrast of Pentecost to Babel is not new, but the development of the theme of several Pentecosts and the Church’s presence as inevitably original and incipient is seminal. G.’s previous writings have at times remained within an austere discussion of theories of interpretation, but here, noting the shift in the audience and themes of fundamental theology from European atheisms to the religions of humanity, G. has composed a book remarkably concrete, fearlessly exploring the ecclesial themes of infallibility, the Church as sacrament, and the needed diversity among local churches. Final sections struggle to offer a new understanding of the Church existing within the variety of our terrestrial race as a force of wisdom for creating a better humanity.

This is an engaging, optimistic book. G. leads readers to a place apart from the narrow censures and purely disciplinary preoccupations of today’s church authorities to those theological perspectives which have empowered the Catholic Church for the past four decades and, in the ordinary members and ministers of the Church, continue to do so.

THOMAS F. O’MEARA, O.P.
University of Notre Dame
Byrne understands “the moral interpretation of religion,” in its broadest terms, to consist in the efforts of philosophers “to show that morality provides one sure route to belief in God” (1). He specifically focuses on what he terms Kantian and neo-Kantian forms of this interpretation, which he sees as representative of “a liberal stance toward religion, i.e., “one that places the ethics of religion before its doctrines and historical myths” (1). His goal is to reconstruct and defend a version of this neo-Kantian approach, which, he argues, functions as a program of “revisionary realism” (5) with respect to “a full blown metaphysical conception of God” (6). In so doing, he seeks to avoid what he considers to be the pitfalls of either noncognitivist or reductionist treatments of claims about the divine.

In the course of his discussion, B. usefully puts his own neo-Kantian interpretation in conversation with those of Ronald Green and Gordon Michalson, and also explores the affinities and differences it has with the work of Iris Murdoch and with positions articulated by the Wittgensteinians D. Z. Phillips and Stewart Sutherland. Two problematic features of B.’s discussion deserve notice. One is that his treatment of the Kantian postulates of God and immortality deliberately sets aside their relation to Kant’s account of freedom. This leads to a subtle misconstrual of their function by referencing them primarily to theoretical issues rather than to the practical one that seems to be Kant’s own main concern: What sustains moral agents for life-long moral endeavor? The other problematic feature is that B.’s revisionary realism does not seem able to overcome the deeply embedded modern picture that places God and the world—including the workings of human freedom in the moral life—in a relation to one another that is merely extrinsic.

Philip Rossi, S. J.
Marquette University, Milwaukee

We are having too many children, a crime the Catholic Church would probably be convicted of aiding and abetting. Schwarz examines this link between overpopulation and Catholic teaching on contraception, urging that the latter be reassessed in light of the former.

The Catholic option for life has accomplished much. It respects the dignity of human life everywhere; it promotes health and education standards among the poor both at home and abroad. But the stance of the Church toward contraception, particularly as seen in Humanae vitae, does not seem consistent with this cry for human dignity. The Vatican has addressed the evils of overconsumption in the West and its deplorable effects on poorer nations, but it has been reluctant to grant that data showing a relationship between overpopulation and poverty are valid. Theologically, contraception is seen as an intrinsic evil, a view that leaves little room for compassionate solutions to overpopulation. S. argues that a consistent ethic of life, following the insights of the late Cardinal Bernardin, should include contraception.

Since 1974, when Theological Studies dedicated an entire issue to the question of overpopulation, responsible Catholic scholars have shown their uneasiness with Catholic teaching on contraception and its relation to overpopulation. S. follows this tradition, responsibly questioning church teaching from within. He brings social data, historical perspective and clear moral persuasion to his writing.

As a Protestant who has lived in Latin America and seen its barrios of poverty, I find S.’s call for reassessment of Catholic teachings on contraception both reasonable and welcome. Overpopulation is a recognized problem there, the vast majority of the population is Catholic, and church teaching directly relates to the issue. I can think of no other moral issue over which the
If capitalist economic theories of competition regulate market industries effectively and if managed health care continues its drive toward capitalist management, we may soon expect not only first-class medical practice but also first-class delivery of that medical expertise. So optimistic that capitalist market forces will correct delivery concerns of medical over- or under-practices, Wong champions managed care as the most viable solution to the perceived motives of, and dis-ease with, managed health-care systems. He presents this reflection to remedy the paucity of discussion on the business of medicine from the perspective of organizational practices and policies in health care.

W. neglects any discussion on health-care financing. This neglect leads wrongly to the claim that ethical reflection has been lacking in matters of organizational practices and policies—arguably, the question of health-care reform is the question of delivery. Nevertheless, he offers compelling reasons for health-care systems to adopt a capitalist business model in order to manage responsibly their delivery of medical care.

The key concern for both health-care practitioners and their patients centers on whether business-model managed care optimizes patient care or profit shares. The argument for the business model depends on an “enlightened” approach to commercial activities. This approach develops a multi-fiduciary responsibility to stakeholders (shareholders, patients, practitioners, and society), whose combined interests require protections conceived in terms greater than profit maximization. W. places this enlightened business model in tension with a Rawlsian “original position” for determinations of justice and fair play to relieve the fears of patients and practitioners that the best interests of the patient are overridden by those of shareholders. From this perspective, capitalism (unconvincingly) challenges those fears and poorly managed systems by the invisible hand of the broader forces of competing products and market supplies.
writers whet the reader’s appetite for more. His selected bibliography includes the basic classical works and their translations. But if H. had included references to the more recent *New Dictionary of Catholic Spirituality* he could have enabled interested readers to pursue controversial issues more readily. And an index of subjects or at least major themes would have been a fine complement to his index of names.

Spirituality is enjoying a renaissance, if we judge by the increasing number of academic courses being offered and the extended space bookstores allot to its many forms. Teachers, however, lament that students lack basic knowledge of the tradition, while students complain that they are overwhelmed by the amount of material confronting them. The students to whom I recommended this basic guide found it a helpful, realistic textbook.

DOMINIC MARUCA, S.J.
St. Mary’s Seminary, Baltimore


With this book, Meyer, a Lutheran giant in the contemporary ecumenical movement, continues his distinguished service to the cause of church unity. To neophytes, he provides a lucid and reliable orientation to the complex wealth of ecumenical documents, conferences, agencies, and accomplishments since World War II. To specialists, he offers a diagnosis and remedy for today’s ecumenical malaise. With its recent stress on the churches’ mission to the world, he argues, the movement’s aims have become diffuse and ineffectual. Ecumenism’s traditional and unique goal, full visible Christian unity, has been sidelined. The result is a disastrous decline in ecumenical interest and urgency.

For M., the statement adopted by the World Council of Churches in New Delhi in 1961 is a benchmark because it articulated both unity and mission in their proper relation. As global environmental and social issues became more pressing through the next 30 years, the churches and the WCC responded by emphasizing their mission to the world. This trend separated the goals of visible unity and mission, replicated the prewar split between the “Faith and Order” and “Life and Work” movements, and reached a high point in the 1990 WCC Assembly in Seoul, “Justice, Peace, Integrity of Creation.” M. is troubled that even the WCC’s General Secretary, Konrad Raiser, has argued for a new mission-centered paradigm, which, in M’s view, constitutes a drastic reduction of ecumenism’s “multidimensional” goal.

In this reviewer’s opinion, Raiser makes a more persuasive case than M. allows, pointing to fundamentalism, postmodernity and the challenges of interreligious dialogue as evidence of the need for a new ecumenical paradigm. Yet M. is right to ask how ecumenism can be sustained with diffuse, ambiguous goals. Anyone who cares about the Church’s unity and mission to the world will learn much from this important book.

JON NILSON
Loyola University, Chicago

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