BOOK REVIEWS


This remarkable book goes far beyond what its title suggests. If it had been available earlier, I would have assigned it to all my students as an almost ideal introduction into the mysteries of how the Bible was written, how its traditions were developed and modified over the centuries, and how it should be read and understood. In pursuing the personality of David as he is portrayed in the often contrasting layers of the traditions, Steussy uses methodologies suitable for virtually any study of Scripture.

S. writes with charm and clarity. By using analogies to art, from stained-glass windows to Picasso murals, she makes the interrelationships among the biblical books with their diverse preoccupations and styles easy to grasp. Her opening chapters, which discuss various approaches to the Bible both from confessional stances and from contemporary critical standpoints, constitute a tidy summary of what is happening in biblical scholarship today. Her explanation of the various types of modern criticism is especially helpful. Here, as throughout the book, she offers as much to the biblical neophyte as to the specialist.

S. is obviously aware of the historical-critical and archeological issues that have dominated much of contemporary biblical research, and this awareness is most in evidence in her discussions of the evolution of attitudes toward monarchy and the Davidic dynasty in Israel. But her approach is primarily literary. She is interested in why the ancient authors portrayed David as a complex person and why the several characterizations are not in total agreement, but her preoccupation is with ferreting out the subtleties of those characterizations rather than with what motivated them. Through this process readers are led to draw their own conclusions regarding the historical situations that underlie the texts. This is one of the best contributions of this book. Even if one approached this study with a simplistic understanding of Israel’s history and spiritual pilgrimage, one leaves with a new sense of their richly textured dimensions, and hence of Scripture itself.

S. describes David in three strands of the Old Testament: the Samuel and Kings narratives, Chronicles, and Psalms. In Samuel (and to a lesser degree in Kings, where the picture of David is more consistently positive) she perceives a highly complex David, a very likeable person who nonetheless has a dark side. His motives are often ambiguous, “nor is he an unmixed blessing for his people, as we see in his treatment of women, the bloody denouement of his failed fathering, the seventy thousand plague deaths [2 Samuel 24], and the assassinations he orders on his deathbed” (82). Indeed, when one contrasts David and Saul on a host of issues, the common per-
ception that David was an innocent hero and Saul a wretch proves false, and there is much about Saul that is praiseworthy and appealing. And how mysterious the obvious theme that God loves David and “would so embrace a fallible human” (91).

The portrayal of David in Chronicles is colored by the perspective of the Second Temple period. S. stresses the continuity of the preexilic community with Yehud, the community of the return, and presents David and his times as necessary models of worship, governance, and community organization. For this reason David is not the private, personal David, but the public man, representative of a nation trying to recapture the structures of its past. For this purpose the foibles of his domestic life are not relevant. Chronicles presents David to the postexilic community “as an ideal to which they can aspire rather than as a historical problem for them to ponder” (10–11). Chronicles’ David is “paradigmatic rather than unique—a quintessential Israelite in solidarity with all worthy Israelite leaders” (125).

Finally S. turns to the Psalms, where the associations with David are often artificial and abstract. The Psalms are diverse, but in general David becomes more and more divorced from historical incident, becoming the “symbolic voice of a congregation united in joyful worship” (186). In this S. sees a resemblance to the worship-organizing king she discerned in Chronicles.

Throughout the book there are brief analyses of other Old Testament books, especially Ezra and Nehemiah. The book concludes with extensive notes, a lengthy bibliography, and indexes of scripture passages, Hebrew word, and topic. This is a splendid contribution to biblical studies, accessible on many levels.

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WILLIAM J. FULCO, S.J.


The Hebrew Scripture story of the pious widow, Judith, who performs an act of faith and courage to save God’s people, has had an extraordinary legacy beyond the boundaries of religious narrative. Stocker has attempted to trace and to interpret the topos of Judith as one of what the author identifies as the “enduring cultural myth[s] in Western society” in some throughgoing analyses of literary, artistic, cinematic and popular culture sources. The primary motif/guise by which she identifies Judith is as a spectacular murderer—“a gorgeous gorgon.” As with other scriptural women like Susanna and Bathsheba, Judith waxes and wanes in popularity in Western cultural consciousness. S. attempts to interpret the relationship between image and culture by identifying the critical historical moments in which Judith reigned initially as heroine and ultimately as femme fatale. She suggests that her study of this topos of the “threatening woman”
reveals how Western culture has successfully marginalized women and preserved the primacy of masculinity.

In her investigation of the periodic re-emergences of Judith, S. fuses a vast diversity of possibilities from the aristocratic female supporters of the Reformation to Nazi mythmakers to the cinematic characters of *Thelma and Louise*. Through this “abundance of interpretations,” she argues we can consider how Judith raises and/or illuminates the central concerns of the Western psyche: sex, death, violence, politics, beliefs, identity, psychology, and perversion. She concludes that an informed reading of this imagery reveals that—to paraphrase the Florentine Senate—Judith is not a death-bearing sign but rather a path toward liberation from the bonds of patriarchy.

The book is well written, carefully researched, and cogently argued. From its very title, one recognizes that the author intends to provide us with a provocative book. Provocative books—especially when they are successful like Marina Warner’s now classic *Alone of All Her Sex*—become more than classic books; they become the source from which new thinking emerges, new patterns of interpretation arise, new methodologies surface, and perhaps more importantly for an academic book, one from which a thousand dissertations spring. As good a book as this may be, it is not provocative.

As anyone who has attempted or even succeeded to study the evolution of the iconology of any figure—male or female—from the Hebrew and Christian Scriptures will recognize, the primary materials that have been studied to date only scratch the surface of what exist. In the last twenty years, the work of feminist scholars, among whom I would include Natalie Zemon Davis, Linda Nochlin, and Lois Banner, have shown us that the images and motifs relating to “the marginalized” are central elements of “missing history”—of our common human history. As a result, more attention has been paid by contemporary scholars to the study of the images and motifs found in the arts as essential documentary evidence in the study of history, and by feminists scholars in religious studies, like Margaret Miles, as keys to understanding religious attitudes and gender perceptions. The point here is that each of these styles and forms of scholarship brings with it a pair of blinders and unasked limitation, so that even though new evidence is found, investigated, weighed, and interpreted, that interpretation is skewed in some way. The ultimate selection of what to include and what to reject in the writing of a study such as this one makes clear not simply the innovative and exhilarating aspects of this investigation but also the limitations and weaknesses of any author’s perspective.

As exciting and stimulating as S.’s work is to read, what is left out is telling. Clearly, her forte is the literary world and so she is to be congratulated for her in-depth study of the image of Judith in Western art history and cinema. Obviously, she is both a feminist and a scholar interested in the psychological dimensions of what she studies. Without doubt, she is not to be criticized for these predispositions, but the topos of Judith is wider than S.’s treatment indicates.
S.’s subject, objectively considered, is not simply “Saint Judith of Liberation”—Judith is much more. To note just a few of the crucial missing elements in this study: the transformations of her story in the first four centuries of western Christianity and those effects on modern western consciousness; the question of the relationship between the parity of the Western Christian images of Judith and David, and the ensuing question of what this implies for the Western Christian perception of gender and sex; and a discussion of the issue of faith and doubt, especially with regard to the gender identity of the characters during those historical epochs when Judith waxes. The possibilities are endless and the reality is that every author needs to make choices. Unfortunately, S.’s choices tip the balance of the scales of scholarly discourse in favor of political rhetoric.

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Diane Apostolos-Cappadona


Excellent modern translations notwithstanding, the writings of the New Testament remain ancient texts written originally in a foreign language and shaped by an alien culture. As biblical scholar Marla Selvidge insists, when it comes to the New Testament, we are all “strangers in a strange land.” Neyrey never allows his readers to stray far from that truth as he reads Matthew’s Gospel through the lens of honor and shame as characteristic of traditional Mediterranean cultures. Those with little or no acquaintance with recent research using socioscientific methods in biblical studies will find N. an able and enthusiastic tutor who finds Matthew a rich source for illustration.

N. arranges his work in three major parts. Part 1 presents seven aspects of the cultural concept of honor as identified by modern anthropologists (etic) and well attested by ancient writers (emic). This provides the framework for spotting texts in Matthew which N. argues “take on fresh and culturally correct meaning” when read in terms of honor and shame. Parts 2 and 3 focus on specific sections of Matthew’s Gospel.

Part 2 studies “Matthew and the Rhetoric of Praise.” An introductory chapter lays out both the general rules for epideictic rhetoric and those for composing the encomium, a literary form designed to bestow praise, glory, and honor on its recipient. Next, N. reads Matthew’s stories of “Jesus’ origins, birth, nurture and training” as encomia, though he admits that “Matthew totally ignores Jesus’ nurture and training” (103) in contrast to Luke (2:46–47). When Matthew 1–2 is read properly, however, its purpose becomes clear: “to praise and acknowledge Jesus as worthy and honorable Savior and Lord” (105). N. goes on to single out Jesus’ accomplishments and deeds in terms of “the soul” and then to treat deeds of the body, meaning external qualities such as wealth, power, friends, and fortune. Matthew’s passion narrative is read as an encomium for Jesus’ noble death.
In conclusion N. reminds his readers of how Matthew portrays Jesus as one who “deserves our highest praise” (162).

Not all readers may find this conclusion worth waiting for, but Part 3 is. Here N. takes the reader to the heart of Jesus’ teaching as presented by Matthew in the Sermon on the Mount. Individual chapters focus first on the beatitudes in Matt 5:3–12, then on the antitheses in Matthew 5:21–48, and finally on traditional religious practices of Matthew 6:1–18. In every case Matthew’s Jesus turns the honor-shame code on its head. The beatitudes become “How honorable are you poor in spirit (who are destitute and begging), How honorable those who mourn (for the dead),” etc. Jesus honors those whom the system dishonors.

N. approaches the antitheses of Matthew 5:21–48 as Jesus’ “calling off the honor game.” Since honor was largely a public, male concern, those addressed are men. Thus he interprets the first antithesis as Jesus requiring “his disciples to withdraw completely from certain forms of aggressive behavior” (191) which defending one’s honor required through the cultural norm of challenge and riposte. In a final chapter, a cultural interpretation of Matthew’s instructions on piety found in 6:1–18 puts disciples at risk because they can no longer play the honor game by the usual rules. N. concludes that we “cannot emphasize enough how bitter and difficult an experience this would be. Following Jesus can lead to a wretched fate according to worldly standards” (228). Reflection on that statement alone is worth the price of the book.

An extensive bibliography and indexes of Scripture and ancient sources and of subjects and ancient authors are included, but not a final summary. All the more reason to be sure to read the book to the end.

Seattle University

Karen A. Barta

Jesus as a Figure in History: How Modern Historians View the Man from Galilee. By Mark Allan Powell. Louisville: Westminster/Knox, 1998. Pp. 238. $22.95.

Powell gives us a very helpful introduction to the present state of the “quest for the historical Jesus,” i.e., the ongoing scholarly inquiry into what can be known about Jesus of Nazareth by the methodologies of modern historical study. In an upbeat and relevant introduction he spells out very clearly the difference between history and theology. He tells us what can and what cannot be studied and evaluated by the modern historian, and what must remain in the realm of theological inquiry.

P. explains the background for the quest’s most recent studies in an all-too-brief opening chapter, where in a mere ten pages he moves from the Enlightenment’s very first questions about what actually happened in the life of Jesus to the most recent or “third quest for the historical Jesus.”
Sadly, in the whole book the great *oeuvre* of Raymond Brown on historical questions is mentioned only in a footnote. The rich period from Bultmann through the “second quest” really needs more coverage for a proper introduction to the field. Interestingly, however, P. ends this treatment with an exposition of three important historians who see a great discontinuity between the New Testament record and the real life and teaching of Jesus. These scholars are treated very fairly and the importance of their challenge to scholars and believers alike is taken seriously. P. frankly states that “it will no longer do in an academic setting to summarize what the Gospels say about Jesus and present this as an historical record” (30).

A second chapter deals with the sources used in the quest, i.e., the ancient documents claimed as relevant to inquiry about the life of Jesus. P. then succinctly outlines the criteria usually employed by historians to decide whether or not some saying or action attributed to Jesus should be claimed as authentic. In this discussion, he is generally quite astute, e.g., in his discussion of the historical value of the Gospel of Mark and the so-called Q document. He does not mention, however, the usual negative use of the criterion of dissimilarity, namely, to exclude some things attributed to Jesus that are not coherent with the positive findings of the criterion of dissimilarity itself.

Then comes the bulk and the really excellent part of this book: a chapter each on the publications of six of the most important recent contributors to the quest: the Jesus Seminar, J. D. Crossan, M. J. Borg, E. P. Sanders, J. P. Meier, and N. T. Wright. In each chapter P. skillfully lays out the general approach of each author or group. For example, he is particularly careful to explain how the Jesus Seminar works with its system of individual scholars voting by means of a color code, and he shows how the results can sometimes be misleading. Further, he meticulously explains the main approach and presuppositions of each of the six. There is an excellent delineation of Sanders’s two main tenets of “convenantal nomism” and “restoration eschatology.” And P. explains Meier’s important distinction between the “historical Jesus” and the “real Jesus” perhaps even better than Meier himself.

P. describes the methodology of each author in detail, gives the major objections of scholars to their conclusions, and finishes with a very fair response from the writer’s point of view. Always careful to point out which theories and conclusions have and have not been widely accepted, he indicates the further questions they raise and the specific objections of many important scholars.

Reading P.’s final chapter is very rewarding. Here he gives his own view of the success of this most recent “quest” with regard to the methodologies employed. He tackles the relation of Jesus to Judaism, to eschatology, politics, and “the supernatural” itself, and summarizes the views of each writer on Jesus’ self-consciousness. In a final “Now What?” he shows how historical-Jesus study can affect theology and even faith itself. What is contained in this clear, well-written book should be required reading for all...
seminarians. It gives excellent analysis of recent historical inquiry into the life of Jesus for the initiated reader.

Saint Vincent Seminary, Latrobe, Pa. ELLIOTT C. MALONEY, O.S.B.


This is the best study on Julian since Colledge and Walsh’s 1978 critical edition of Showings, even though Bauerschmidt’s interpretation of Julian is quite different from and at times critical of theirs. While they situated Julian’s theology in continuity with the Western Christian tradition of the past, B. projects Julian’s text into the future, presenting it as a source with rich potential, not only for the development of theology but for a renewed ecclesiology. He reads Julian’s text as a resource for dialogue between theology and social theory and practice, describing Julian as “one who theologically imagines the political” (3), a startling claim to make about a medieval female recluse. He succeeds admirably in supporting his thesis.

B. uses John Milbank’s theory about the interpenetration of politics and theology to lay the groundwork for his “political” reading of Julian. He then identifies the two prominent political mythoi of Julian’s day: the metaphysic of organic ordering represented by the passing feudal society, and the metaphysic of freedom, the newly emergent notion of nonrational power, represented by nominalism. B. believes that Julian offers an alternative to these which he names the “mystical body politic of Christ.” The contrast among these three ways of regarding the exercise of power, along with the understanding of the divine nature which undergirds each, is a constant theme throughout the text.

In handling the nature of Julian’s “bodily sight” and her theological method, B. views her experience as neither affective devotion nor imageless contemplation, but rather a “participatory” mode of knowing which gradually formed her as a fellow sufferer with Christ through the “wound of compassion.” His reading of Julian admits of no separation among visionary experience, theological interpretation, and lived “performance,” somewhat akin, I think, to liberation theology’s notion of praxis. B. then draws Julian’s political mythos from the two most significant images of her visionary experience: the crucified body of Jesus and the exemplum of lord and servant.

B.’s treatment of Julian’s bodily sight of the Crucified is a stunning tour de force of imaginative scholarship. He reads Julian’s image of the suffering Jesus through the lens of Bakhtin’s notion of the “grotesque body,” spelling out its potential for imagining church and society in contrast to the “smooth body” of late medieval Christendom with its carefully policed
boundaries. As a grotesque body, Christ’s body is “not a closed, completed unit; it is unfinished, outgrows itself, transgresses its own limits” (72), thus it is generative and fecund. What might it mean to dwell within such a body? In answer B. treats Julian’s ecclesiology and the hint at universal salvation present in the promise “all will be well.” The body politic that emerges from the grotesque body of the Crucified is finally interpreted as “the deformation of the persecuting society” (119) of late medieval Christendom, founded upon the God of compassionate love.

The most overtly political image in Julian’s text is the exemplum of lord and servant. B. uses its two levels of meaning, the literal and the mystical, as the organizing principle around which he discusses Julian’s preservation of the tension between the historical and the eternal, human judgment and God’s judgment, human “sensuality” and “substance.” Reading the exemplum as an allegory might suggest the abandonment of the literal meaning once the higher meaning is grasped, but Julian preserves their tension. B. suggests reading the story as “theodrama” in Balthasar’s sense, in order to preserve its dramatic tension. This works well, although I think the insistence of most contemporary Julian scholars to call the story a “parable” shows a similar awareness on their part. From the exemplum of lord and servant, B. also develops Julian’s understanding of the inner life of the Trinity as asymmetrical, reciprocal self-donation in love. This becomes the paradigm for her view of the body politic; neither feudal stability nor modern liberty is its foundation, but trinitarian love.

Julian remarks at the end of Showings that her book was begun by God’s grace, but is not yet “performed.” The story it tells of God’s interaction with humanity is a “drama without footlights,” understood only by those who participate in it. As is the case with Julian’s text, the conclusion to B.’s book invites its readers to act in the drama by creating a body politic consistent with Julian’s inspiration. B. cites Dorothy Day’s Catholic Worker Movement as the embodiment of a “theology of divine love revealed in the cross of Christ” (198) that is very similar to Julian’s vision. He also quotes Day’s comment that “love in practice is a harsh and dreadful thing” to emphasize the demanding nature of the task.

I have nothing but praise for this uniformly excellent book; depth of insight into Julian and her theology are evident on every page. Yet something crucial is missing. Some attention to Julian’s pneumatology or theology of grace is needed to balance B.’s treatment of her Christology. This is especially true if the transition from appreciation of Julian’s image to its performance is to take place. The body politic of Christ cannot be formed without its Spirit. To be sure, love is a “harsh and dreadful thing.” But it is not impossible, doomed to ultimate frustration, because Christian faith believes that Love is given to us, and it is the same Love whereby Father and Son love each other. Julian develops this, though more obliquely than she does her insights into Christ’s Passion. Without some attention to the Spirit, B.’s book is incomplete.

John Carroll University, Cleveland

JOAN M. NUTH

This beautifully produced volume represents a major contribution to study of the famous Franciscan preacher Bernardino of Siena (1380–1444). It is likewise a substantial addition to the literature on Renaissance Italy and its popular religiosity. After his doctoral dissertation on Bernardino’s sermons as literature, Mormando now turns to investigate their broader historical context. He argues that the content of the sermons, plus the effect they had upon public opinion, ecclesiastical policy, and secular law, reveal the attitude of early modern Italians toward their “social underworld.”

In the first chapter, M. provides background information not just on Bernardino, his preaching, and society at large, but also on the basic outline of late medieval culture and its complex historiography. Each of the remaining three chapters is devoted to examining Bernardino’s preaching on one of three key social issues: what to do about the witchcraft, the sodomy, and the Judaism that challenged the moral norms of 15th-century Italy. He examines both Bernardino’s statements and additional contemporary sources, such as trial and police records, that reveal what M. considers the friar’s devastating influence. He considers Bernardino a “one man campaign” in favor of “an insidious wave” of violence that reached far beyond the confines of the Italian towns that heard his preaching, even beyond the borders of Italy, as he fanned the “fanaticism” of the age (53). M. believes that the contemporary society Bernardino revealed was corporative, penitential, fearful, and quite unlike the rosy picture of north central Italy in the 15th century that most still associate with the term “Renaissance.” All this M. lays out in elegant, persuasive prose studded with eminently readable new translations of key passages from the friar’s vernacular sermons.

I suspect that M.’s work will generate some heated debate. Opponents will find inferences to criticize in each of the topical chapters. At the conclusion of his chapter on witchcraft, M. suggests that Bernardino’s sermons raised the crescendo of witch trials that continued for two centuries, although he relies there heavily upon the records of only one trial in Rome during 1426. In the chapter on sodomy and sodomites, M. spends considerable space contemplating possibly repressed homoerotic tendencies in Bernardino himself, while admitting that his suggestions are not demonstrable, no more so than psychosexual analyses of other early-modern characters such as Luther or Loyola. M.’s treatment of Bernardino as one who turned up the volume of urban anti-sodomy sentiment is undercut by the legislation against such behavior that existed in Siena years before the friar’s denunciations. Punishments for sodomy in 13th-century Siena were notoriously harsh, even grisly. To his credit, M. corrects the frequent inaccurate claim that Jews were one of Bernardino’s primary targets; but in the same chapter, M. decided not to emphasize the anti-Judaic nature of the preacher’s very limited criticism, and opted instead to characterize it as anti-Semitism. This is no small difference.
M.’s title is apt. The demons he isolated from Bernardino’s preaching—witchcraft, sodomy, and Judaism—were indeed the friar’s own. M. correctly points out that these practices were demonic to Bernardino because he perceived pride as their common root. Pride for him, like for all members of religious institutes who consider true humility an especially desirable goal, was to be rejected in the harshest possible terms. Contrary to the assertion of one dustjacket tease, M. seems to have rendered here a thoroughly negative assessment of Bernardino. He keeps the friar, not the broader context, at center stage, regularly using value-laden terms like “injurious,” “pernicious,” and “rabid” to describe Bernardino and his influence. In the conclusion, M. sounds positively relieved that the papacy and many secular governments ignored much of what the preacher said, preferring not even to enforce existing statutes that would have addressed the problems he so vehemently decried. M.’s isolation of the three demons in Bernardino’s preaching that would best resonate with contemporary readers is brilliant. The same demons are among those most frequently denounced by fanatical voices today as the fear filled, neo-apocalyptic, neofascist late 20th century has drawn to a close. It is surely proper to hold Bernardino partly responsible for the escalation of intolerance in his own time, treating him as a reflection of the larger society whose members rushed to soak in his every word, but to do so while retaining such steady use of 20th-century pejoratives is less than judicious.

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WILLIAM V. HUDON


There are some books that seem to tell the reader as much about the writer as about the subject matter. This may be one. Marius has written a major study on the life and thought of Luther, and it has much to teach. Emeritus at Harvard, the author has had a long and distinguished career as a novelist as well as a biographer of Thomas More. Both his abundant literary and biographical skills are apparent in this text. Like the book on More some 20 years ago, this volume is exhaustively researched and beautifully written. But there all similarity comes to an end.

As one of the editors of More’s works, M. was part of a long tradition of More biography and was able to draw on those new materials to bring that work to a new and critical expression. With this book, however, he decisively crosses against the stream of 20th-century Luther scholarship, often explicitly rejecting later for earlier interpretation. Whereas recent accounts have tended to stress Luther’s middle and later years, M. confines his examination to the reformer’s early career. Whereas recent biographical historiography has tended to see an individual life as an expression of a larger social history, M., following Erikson’s example of psychological interpretation, concentrates almost exclusively on his subject as an indi-
vidual whose decisions and actions shape his age and ours. And whereas recent accounts have interpreted Luther as a thoroughly medieval figure, M. interprets Luther as a man defined by a very modern struggle with doubt about God’s very existence.

The subtitle of the book, therefore, tells the tale of M.’s interpretation: in a play on the title of Oberman’s biography he construes Luther as the “Christian between God and death.” For as M. sees it, the reformer was “a man deeply afraid of death” for whom “radical doubt was akin to blasphemy, a sin to be purged from the human heart by vehement assertion and hateful insult.” Thus, while recent work on Luther has tended to be produced by church historians and to be ecumenical in character, M.’s is the product of a secular scholar and is partisan from beginning to end. He likes and admires More, he writes repeatedly in pointed comparison, but he loathes Luther. For this Protestant who demonized doubt, he insists, “represents a catastrophe in the history of western civilization.”

Now, what are we to make of this? It is often said that the biographer must have a certain sympathy for his or her subject to understand and depict that life properly. But does this mean that contempt prevents any understanding at all? I for one am not sure that is always the case. For all we learn of the late Roman empire and of patristic and medieval Christianity from the great ecclesiastical historians of church and theology, don’t we learn something from a writer like Gibbon as well? In that light, it seems to me that M.’s depiction of Luther has much to commend it.

By concentrating on Luther’s early life, he brings to these years of Luther’s formation an intensity of examination that has seldom been matched. Let others paint the broad canvas, M. will concentrate fully on the figure of the child, the student, the monk, the professor, and the reformer—always probing at the inner disposition of his subject and constantly reflecting on the enduring results of his beliefs and actions. It may well be that many of us are now less certain than M. of the kind of psychological traditions on which he draws and of the priority of individual act over social trend; it is nevertheless the case that he forces us to focus on the man Martin Luther with an intensity that is both challenging and rewarding, raising as it does a host of questions.

But not all those questions are about Luther. One cannot overlook the fact that despite M.’s championing of Erikson, his categories for interpreting Luther are as much theological as psychological: fear of death and the question of God’s existence. That these have long been the obsessions of modern skepticism is clear; that these were medieval concerns, let alone Luther’s concerns, is not. The medieval—and Luther’s—concern with death, rather, is only understandable in terms of the certainty of God’s existence and of facing God’s judgement after death. This book raises, therefore, profound questions about not just its subject but about its author as well. “Vehement assertion and hateful insult in the face of death” sums up M.’s estimation of his subject. The question is: Of whom is he writing? Of a medieval monk born some 500 years ago or of a modern professor at the close of a skeptical century approaching the end of a busy career? In
more than one sense, one suspects, there is much to learn from this book. Certain to be controversial, it should be widely read and discussed.

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The first eight chapters of this book are devoted to the four popes studied: Gregory XVI, Pius IX, Leo XIII, and Pius X. The last third of the volume deals in thematic chapters with nationality and religion in Tyrol, Poland, Spain, and Portugal, religious orders, Catholic universities, the idea of reunion, and canonizations. (The editors indicate that the history of the Church in the British Isles and in non-European countries is treated elsewhere in the series.)

The book rests less on original scholarship than on a wide reading of work already published, so that where this is detailed and of high quality this book is useful; selective and unevenly annotated bibliographies notify the reader of other places to go for fuller accounts. For those already familiar with the general story and its particular incidents, the chief merit of the volume is Chadwick’s balance in treating and assessing the issues in a series of dramatic confrontations and the character, strengths, and limitations of the popes and many of the other protagonists. If the focus is on large political engagements and transformations, their revolutionary implications for the faith and practice of the Catholic religion are never lost from view. If C. is convinced that the popes sometimes made disastrous choices, he is also not inclined to idolize the movements or the people they had to contend with.

Pius IX receives more attention than the other three popes combined, an imbalance more understandable in the cases of Gregory XVI and Pius X than in that of Leo XIII and perhaps to be explained by the fact that on Pius IX C. could draw upon the three large works of Giacomo Martina, whom he credits and cites frequently. The biographical portrait of Leo XIII is the least successful. Roughly equal amounts of space are given to the modernist crisis and to Pius X’s efforts at reform, introduced by the statement that he “affected popular practice more than most of his predecessors; perhaps more than any of his predecessors” (359).

If there is a single thread to be picked out, it is the difficulty all four popes experienced in dealing with the rise of the autonomous lay and democratic state. Gregory XVI’s repudiation of Lamennais’s liberal Catholicism; Pius IX’s brief flirtation with liberalism, followed by nearly 30 years of intransigence (obstinate defense of the Papal States; the Syllabus of Errors; the repudiation of the Law of Guarantees of 1866, which anticipated the eventual solution of the Lateran Treaty; the non expedit). Leo
XIII’s systematic defense of the ideal of the Catholic state, his belated and unsuccessful attempt to rally French Catholics to support the Republic, and Pius X’s reaction to the French Law of Separation (1905) are all reviewed. Their consequences for the spiritual history of the Catholic Church are frequently noted, not least of all the phenomenal growth in a piety directed toward the person of the pope and in the growth of centralization. For this, C. argues, “the loss of the temporal power by Italian piracy was of more advantage than anything the bishops did at the [First] Vatican Council. . . . A big part of the rise in the Pope’s authority as a churchman was connected with the collapse of his authority as a politician” (246-47).

Theologians may be disappointed that the intellectual challenges of the period are given so little attention. There are occasional brief references to Hermes, Rosmini, Newman, Döllinger, and Duchesne, but many others are not noticed, and in particular the Tübingen school receives short shift. Vatican I’s *Dei Filius* is largely ignored. Leo XIII’s Thomist restoration receives three pages. Modernism and its brutal repression are treated in balanced fashion although rather rapidly. The discussion of Catholic universities is largely institutional, with an only occasional comment that increases one’s regret that an opportunity for a thematic treatment of developments in Catholic thought and papal responses to them was not taken by a historian uniquely qualified to offer it.

This is not a book for beginners. It begins and ends abruptly, without preface and without epilogue. The style is so flat and dry that by comparison Hemingway’s style might be found ornate. There is no master-narrative, no plot to follow, no thesis to comprehend or debate. Some obscure figures and incidents are identified and explained, while others are not; references are supplied for some but not for all of the often vivid quotations; relatively trivial matters, such as the four groups of Vatican guards, receive more attention and space than important moments such as Pius X’s condemnation of Le Sillon. One might have expected more in a book published by so prestigious a press. It is, of course, absurdly over-priced.

*Catholic University of America, D.C.*

**Joseph A. Komonchak**


Thoroughly conversant not only with the most important scholarship on Nietzsche but with a mass of work from religious studies, the philosophical tradition, and contemporary postmodernism, Roberts is well qualified to bring the most disparate trends in each field into dialogue. This revision of his Harvard dissertation marks a real advance in Nietzsche studies.
Moving beyond the “old Nietzsche” of the existentialists earlier in the century (such as Walter Kaufmann and Karl Jaspers, who were fixated on the death of God as Nietzsche’s deepest insight into the religious impulse), R. asks how the “new Nietzsche” of the postmoderns (e.g. Deleuze, Derrida, and Foucault), by calling into question the subject and the fundamental categories of human knowledge, can reorient and renew our thinking about the very nature of religious and philosophical practice. Moving systematically through Nietzsche’s critique of religion (both its strengths and its assumptions and limitations), his understanding of spirit, asceticism, mysticism, and ecstasy, R. reveals the resources Nietzsche has to offer for reimagining the subject and nature of religious experience as a knowing and passionate affirmation of human existence with all its inherent evils. While rightly assuming that Christianity provides the natural model for examining his critique of religion, R. never confuses Nietzsche’s position with any school of religious thought and explicitly denies any effort to view Nietzsche as Christian or Christianity (even in its most radical forms) as Nietzschean. This clarity of purpose helps him avoid many of the pitfalls inherent in religious approaches to Nietzsche’s philosophy.

Unfortunately, this effort to bring Nietzsche and religious studies into dialogue is at times limited by the quality and character of the latter. Hence many readers will be frustrated at different points of the argument. For example, as one trained in philosophy I found the discussion on Nietzsche’s attitude toward mysticism at times almost unintelligible because of R.’s desire to speak the language of contemporary studies of mysticism. I am sure others will find the discussion on ecstasy impenetrable, unless they are familiar with at least some contemporary continental philosophy. R. would have been better served to force a more consistent vocabulary and tenor upon the entire book, but that is an understandable minor flaw, given the book’s breadth and ambition. A more serious criticism is that the book’s intended audience is unclear. R.’s picture of Nietzsche is probably far too Christian (in sympathy if not in fact) for many Nietzscheans, while the understanding of religion underlying his discussion is quite distant from that of most religious persons.

At the heart of this criticism is the fact that the book (appropriately, perhaps) is decentered and deeply postmodern in the way it brings the two fields into dialogue. There is no unified perspective from which to assimilate and evaluate the value of the work. The Nietzsche it brings to bear on religion greatly illuminates the latter but not the former; likewise, the concept of religion it applies to Nietzsche deepens our appreciation of his accomplishments but not necessarily of religion. The book never finds an integrating framework, which is perhaps unavoidable, given the topic. It may be most valuable to those who, like myself, approach it with certain strong preconceptions of what Nietzsche means for religion and vice-versa, as it will challenge these assumptions with intelligence, wit, and passion.

Conception Seminary College, Missouri

LANCE BRYON RICHEY

The first French edition of this work appeared in 1981 (no title or publisher given), the second (revised and expanded) edition appeared in 1996 (Geneva: Ad Solem), but this impressive English translation, correcting some errors in the second edition, is “the definitive one.” Borella, a former professor of philosophy at the University of Nancy, is a committed Platonist who laments the introduction of Aristotelianism into Catholic thought, hankers after the pre-Vatican II liturgy, and takes as his starting point the intuitions of the Eastern rites. His abstract thought, style, and vocabulary (sprinkled with neologisms) suggest an erudite audience.

B.’s argument might have considerable merit, except that he confounds his admirable, announced agendum (to open readers to their innate “sense of the supernatural”) with a polemical one: to expose the historical origins of the false pathways taken by Roman Catholic theology after the Vatican’s condemnation of traditionalism and ontologism at the beginning of the 19th century, “two movements of thought which, alone, had taken the true measure of what Kantian rationalism and revolutionary ideology implies. The result was the explosion of Modernism at century’s end for want of doctrines able to offer a truly profound response to the questions posed by the evolving sciences and philosophies”; thus the “dominant scientifico-philosophical thinking” of the modern world took Aristotelian naturalism to its logical end, “rejecting the supernaturalism of the intelligible forms,” thereby “closing nature in upon itself” and “rendering it impermeable to grace by ontological self-sufficiency” (x).

The Church still had the means to counter Aristotelianism, but Vatican II gave away the store. It was “in reality only the unfolding of . . . Loisy’s L’Evangile et l’Eglise.” Despite its condemnation in 1907, “Modernism continued to exist in a latent state” and “spread throughout the Church.” It then entered an active phase and “invaded Christian society: both priests and laity . . . both the teaching and the learning Church, including members of the hierarchy at every level” (20–21). Evidence that “Modernism” held sway at Vatican II is the 1970 liturgical “reform” which tampered with essentials, Latin and the liturgical calendar—“without doubt one of the more serious [errors] committed by the magisterium in the twentieth century” (63–64).

Ordinarily, conjoining historical with systematic method is sound and necessary. But bad history (one of many examples: treating Pius X’s description of Modernism as a historically valid reading of “modernist” thought) leads to insupportable systematics. That is the case here, which is unfortunate, because much of B.’s argument on modernity’s eclipsing of the “sense of the supernatural” and his metaphysics of the Body of Christ and of deification is noteworthy. Even here, however, B.’s lack of authentic historical sense leads him into esotericism and just the sort of fanciful mind game that drove Luther to renounce Scholastic philosophy.
B.'s ideological conviction against Luther—he blames him for that "most terrible error" of modernity, the "divorce of nature and grace" (146)—leads him to reject ecumenism: "it is not reunification but conversion that matters. Protestantism is not a portion of the unique Christian Church. . . . If Protestantism does not become Catholic, Catholicism will become Protestant." They are mutually incompatible forms. Luther's "justification by faith . . . not only represents a heresy for theology, but even for philosophy" (149). B. would have to conclude, therefore, that the recent signing of the Lutheran–Catholic Joint Declaration on the Doctrine of Justification casts the entire Church into heresy.

Creighton University, Omaha

DAVID G. SCHULTENOVER, S.J.


American Catholics came of age after World War II. Emerging from the ghetto, they embraced mainstream American culture and values as thoroughly compatible with their faith. The century's end, however, found Catholic identity religiously compromised. How this happened and the rich irony it entailed, in the sense of religious irony advanced by Reinhold Niebuhr, forms the central motif of Massa's superb study of the transformation of American Catholicism between 1945 and 1968.

M. selects nine episodes involving major figures and groups to propose the countervailing forces tugging at the postwar Church. His whimsical title names some. The reader also encounters Leonard Feeney, Thomas Merton, Joseph McCarthy, John Kennedy, the Immaculate Heart nuns battling Cardinal James Francis McIntyre, and ordinary Catholics attending Mass in the wake of Vatican II. Each chapter is enriched by methodologies drawn from the social sciences. For example, Merton's appeal for the post-war generation is analyzed in terms of Erikson's "great individual" hypothesis. Geertz's theory of religion as a cultural system is used to explain McCarthy's attraction for many Catholics as well as the repudiation of his anticommunism campaign by other Catholics. Turner's models of social organization clarifies the challenge that Dorothy Day's vision of Christian community posited for Catholics.

M. proposes Day as "the most American of all Catholics" (111), but he opens with the story of Feeney, the Jesuit poet, preacher, and convert-maker in Cambridge, Mass. Feeney set boundaries for Catholic identity. The doctrine he taught, with increasing stridency, condemned those outside the Church to hell. By 1949 Boston's Archbishop Richard Cushing had had enough. Rome ultimately excommunicated Feeney, chiefly on disciplinary grounds; but, M. argues, the resolution of his celebrated case sig-
Merton’s spirituality and Sheen’s television presence smoothed Protestant acceptance of Catholics. His weekly program subtly emphasized the congruence between Catholic Thomistic philosophy and the values espoused by the founding fathers. M.’s analysis of Catholic reaction to Sheen deftly utilizes H. Richard Niebuhr’s models of the relationship between Christianity and culture to argue that 1950s Catholics moved from a “Christ above culture” to a “Christ of culture” model, “an essentially accommodationist, therapeutic understanding of Christianity” (87) that Sheen himself would have repudiated.

Kennedy’s election completed Catholic acceptance. M. focuses on his campaign talk to Protestant ministers in Houston. Echoing contemporary criticisms, he complains that Kennedy privatized his faith by declaring it irrelevant to the conduct of his office. Thus, in order to get elected, the first Catholic president secularized the presidency. M. tells the Houston story well, but unfortunately he omits the sequel that challenges his conclusion. As Robert Bellah has argued, Kennedy’s inaugural address brilliantly asserted his and the nation’s ultimate responsibility to God. Far from secularizing the bully pulpit, Kennedy demonstrated that a Catholic president could articulate America’s civil religion better than most of his predecessors.

The final three chapters treat the aftermath of Vatican II. Altering the way Catholics worshiped God changed their theology and self-understanding as Church in ways the council never expected. Nor did the bishops anticipate the havoc let loose in religious orders intent on following the directives to reclaim their founders’ charisms. Though dependent largely on newspaper accounts, the chapter on Los Angeles’s Immaculate Heart community is the best treatment available of that crisis. Max Weber’s analysis of charisma as potentially anti-authoritarian and deconstructuralizing supplies a useful interpretive model; but M. might also have explored the impact of psychologist Carl Rogers’s workshops in assertiveness training for the IHMs. I would also challenge M.’s characterization of McIntyre as “no more conservative than many or even most of” (194) the bishops at the council.

Drawing upon Andrew Greeley’s perspective that Catholics form an ethnic group within American society, M. uses Notre Dame’s football team to exemplify Catholic ethnicity in the 1960s. John O’Hara and Knute Rockne, All American laid the foundation earlier in Mary’s grotto and the stadium. Theodore Hesburgh completed the work with his vision of a university that would be academically excellent, thoroughly Catholic, and still play football. M.’s sympathies lie here, in maintaining a distinct religious identity. In his conclusion, he returns to Nieburhrian irony to explain this “story of grace” (232), the passage of America’s Catholics from enthusiastic accommodation to a more realistic, tentative appraisal of their place in American culture.

Scholars in the last decade have produced some admirable studies of our recent past. Massa’s book is among the best. It deserves wide readership
and would make a fine assignment for students of contemporary Catholicism.

Jesuit School of Theology, Berkeley

THOMAS E. BUCKLEY, S.J.


Cavanaugh here studies the Church in Chile under the military dictatorship of General Augusto Pinochet Ugarte, 1973–90. His fundamental thesis is that the Church’s ability and/or inability to resist the terror of the regime was due to its New Christendom ecclesiology which assumes the distinction of planes between the spiritual and the temporal realms. This ecclesiology, traceable to the Catholic Action encouraged by Pius XI and the immense influence of Jacques Maritain in Chile from the 1930s through the 1960s, led the Church to identify all “politics” with party activity and hence to confine its activity to the “social” sphere. When confronted with a regime that wanted total control over the body politic, the Church was unprepared to act directly as a body in the political sphere; it could only act through the laity as individuals.

C. begins with a narrative of the systematic use of torture by the Pinochet regime as a form of discipline to control society. “[T]orture is a kind of perverted liturgy, a ritual act which organizes bodies in the society into a collective performance, not of true community, but of an atomized aggregate of mutually suspicious individuals. . . . torture is not a merely physical assault on bodies but a formation of a social imagination” (12). It is part of the “regime’s strategy to fragment the society, to disarticulate all intermediate social bodies between the individuals and the state—parties, unions, professional organizations—which would challenge the regime’s desire to have all depend only on it. . . . Wherever two or three are gathered, there is subversion in their midst” (38). As with all totalitarian states, the aim is to destroy civil society and leave nothing between the isolated individual and the state apparatus. Torture has this effect.

In order to resist such a regime, the Church must be able “to constitute itself as a disciplined social body capable of countering the discipline of the state” (22). In the early years right after the coup, the Church was unable to do this because it understood itself as caring for the soul while ceding control of the body to the state. “It was assumed that [Chilean] society constituted an organic whole in which it was the church’s duty to act as conscience or soul, exhorting the body, the state, to act for the common good” (74). C. contends that this amounts to the disappearance of the Church itself as a visible, social, body unable to resist the fragmentation and disappearance produced by torture. This New Christendom ecclesiology made the Church initially incapable of responding to the regime.

Only gradually did a shift take place. It began “when people began to
knock at the Cardinal’s [Silva] door” (87). At first the Church formed a “Committee of Cooperation for Peace in Chile” to help the unemployed, the families of those in prison, or those fleeing the police, but it was reluctant to challenge the state publicly. Only in 1976, after Pinochet forced the cardinal to disband that committee, did he form the Vicariate of Solidarity, giving visibility to the Church as a social body. By 1980, seven bishops excommunicated anyone having anything to do with torture, but it was not until December 1983, that the whole episcopal conference did so. This movement of ecclesiology did not necessarily involve all the bishops, nor was it uniform chronologically: “there was no neat march from less prophetic to more prophetic” (119).

C. is very clear that he is not seeking to “rebuild the Old Christendom on the ruins of the New,” but, if it is to resist a totalitarian state, the Church must see itself as a social body with its “own disciplinary resources—Eucharist, penance, virtue, works of mercy, martyrdom . . . which produce actions, practices, habits that are visible in the world” (197). In short it must be a contrast society. This is where the Eucharist comes in. C. claims that “the Eucharist is the Church’s ‘counter-politics’ to the politics of torture. [He wants] to do more than suggest symbolic connections between the ritual and what happened in the ‘real world.’ [He wants] to explore nothing less than the actual and potential impact of the Eucharist on the dictatorship” (205).

At this point, C.’s argument is weakened by overstatement: “Torture creates fearful and isolated bodies, bodies docile to the purposes of the regime; the Eucharist effects the body of Christ, a body marked by resistance to worldly power. Torture creates victims; Eucharist creates witnesses, martyrs. . . . Whereas New Christendom ecclesiology would cordon off the Kingdom of God into a space outside of time, in the Eucharist the Kingdom irrupts into time and ‘confuses’ the spiritual and the temporal. The Eucharist thus realizes a body which is neither purely ‘mystical’ nor simply analogous to the modern state: the true body of Christ” (206). This seems to be an idealistic and romantic view of the Eucharist, expecting it to effect more than it can. C. says that his intention is “to develop a politics embedded in the liturgy—that is, accomplished by Christ in the Eucharist, and not by the church’s imitation of the empire, or its reassertion of authority over the state. . . . The body of Christ is liturgically enacted, not institutionally guaranteed. . . . and Eucharistic resistance to the state must abolish the idea of the temporal and the spiritual as two distinct spaces and recover the eschatological dimension of time” (221). Ideally and theoretically, this may sound fine, but it is politically and socially naive. And, while it may be true that the Christian imagination is intrinsically eschatological and that in the Eucharist Christ becomes present in time, that eucharistic presence of itself is not sufficient to resist a regime that is terrorizing its populace here and now, in this time and place. C. has an exaggerated expectation of the liturgy. By placing so much burden on the Eucharist, the original referent for corpus mysticum, he winds up with an ecclesiology as
least as ethereal and unable to resist a dictatorship as that New Christen-
dom ecclesiology he faults at the beginning.

The book is thought-provoking and well worth reading, but in the end his
argument leads not to a contrast society but to a disjunction between
church and world that we thought was overcome at Vatican II.

T. HOWLAND SANKS, S.J.

RITUAL AND RELIGION IN THE MAKING OF HUMANITY. By Roy A. Rappa-
Cambridge University, 1999. Pp. xxiii + 535. $64.95; $19.95.

Rappaport, whose death occurred shortly after this manuscript was fin-
ished, had long grappled with the issues that are entailed in writing on the
anthropology of religion. In previous books and essays, he focused on the
nature of ritual and its relationship to belief and myth. The present work
continues to explore the constructive power of ritual and locates the mak-
ing of humanity within that power. The assumptions of this anthropological
inquiry are exclusively naturalistic, but R. attempts “not only to grasp what
is true of all religions but what is true in all religions, that is, the special
character of the truths that it is in the nature of all religions to claim” (2).

In elaborating a generalized theory of ritual, R. covers the Maring of
New Guinea’s Central Highlands, Judaism, Islam, and Christianity with
their recorded histories and many other religious traditions as well. His
theory’s strength and weakness are disclosed by this inclusive stretch,
which relentlessly seeks the “human” in ritual but at the same time opens
up areas of questioning that even a book of this size cannot adequately
address. Any description of ritual that leads to the questions “What do
people think they’re doing in the ritual?” and “What meaning does it have
for them?” naturally becomes problematic when dealing with thousands
of years of tradition. But it is difficult to determine how even one group
understands its ritual at any given point in time. It is to R.’s credit that he
maintains a level of definition and discourse that makes generalized sense
of rituals so disparate from one another in time and space.

What is ritual, then? R. states that ritual denotes the performance of
more or less invariant sequences of formal acts and utterances not entirely
encoded by the performers. “Not entirely encoded by the performers”
means that the performers of rituals do not specify all the acts and utter-
ances constituting their own performances. Ritual in this sense, of course,
could describe more than what is commonly understood as religious ritual.
But R. takes from the definition the establishment of convention, which
creates the social dimension of religious life. The description of ritual form
and of the enactment of meaning which is ritual provides a rich discussion
of it as a system of meaning. One of the many brilliant features of the
discussion is the way in which R. reformulates old questions in a new
context.
The old question “Which comes first, ritual or belief (or myth)?” is recast in a new way, one in which the formality of creed or liturgy are distinguished but not separated so that the temporal priority of one over the other does not become the main focus. Rather the question becomes how meaning is conveyed, and it is the conveying of meaning which has priority. It is true that for R. ritual conveys the deeper meaning more fully than creed or formulas can. His answer to the priority question involves revisiting basic definitions such as “sacred” and explicating epistemological presuppositions, which R. calls “ultimate sacred postulates.” Sanctity is defined as “the quality of unquestionableness imputed by congregations to postulates in their nature objectively unverifiable and absolutely unfalsifiable” (281). For R., sanctity is a property of religious discourse and not of the objects signified in that discourse. So, humans understand the reality of the symbolically contingent elements of the world differently from physically contingent elements. The observation that this latter distinction between the symbolic and the physical does not hold sway in all peoples studied does not vitiate R.’s analysis, for his perspective is anthropological, not theological.

R. has been criticized for not dealing with the origins of ritual, as Durkheim did in his Elementary Forms. Rather he eschews creating mythic origins in order to concentrate on prospects for the future of religion and ritual. This facet of the book is less satisfying since his or anyone’s generalized theory of religion has a difficult challenge to compete with concrete religions in their particularity unless it abandons its own naturalistic assumptions which level all religions. Few people die for a theory, even if they claim to live for one.

The theologian and the liturgist, as well as the anthropologist, should have this book at hand, for any discussion of ritual in the future will have to deal with this comprehensive and provocative study of how ritual and religion shape human beings.

Edward M. O’Flaherty, S.J.


Evolution continues to stir controversy in North America. Last August, the Kansas board of education decreed that biological evolution could be taught in schools but that questions on it would not be included in a new state test designed to measure student achievement in science. In this the Kansas Catholic bishops concurred, in spite of the fact that Pope John Paul II has declared evolution to be “more than a hypothesis.”

Pennock, a philosophy professor at the University of Texas at Austin, has written a powerful rebuttal of the anti-evolutionary outlook, loosely
covered by the term “creationist.” Creationists come in many colors, including the vociferous biblical literalists who reject evolution as contrary to their interpretation of Genesis, proclaiming a world of only 10,000 years, the separate and instantaneous creation of each species, the Flood as the prime source of geological transformation, and the origin of all languages at the Tower of Babel.

Refutation of all this lies properly within science itself. P. is more vitally concerned with the distortion that results from such a forcing of science into a fundamentalist mold, the very nature of science being thereby falsely positioned. Science is a worthy field of study with its own criteria of truthfulness, irrespective of the existence or not of God; in this sense, science is exactly like mathematics. With few exceptions, scientists today are not ontological naturalists (as creationists would have them) but methodological naturalists, dealing in approximate and tentative truths, compelled by their integrity to adopt provisionally any potentially revisable theory that covers the known facts. In biology, that theory is known as evolution.

Creationists, on the other hand, view science as now publicly taught as a metaphysics of godless dogma, responsible for moral disintegration, skepticism, and atheism. P. maintains that evolutionary theory is “neither theistic nor atheistic in the ontological sense, but is agnostic, leaving God as a possibility that is outside the boundary of its methods of investigation” (337). Christians will concede that their belief in God is for reasons other than strictly scientific. By the same token, says P., a scientist like Richard Dawkins may be happy with his atheism, but again it must be for reasons other than scientific. Indeed, Walter Kasper avers that, in the final analysis, it is impossible to prove God’s existence from some authority external to Him; He must show himself. Kasper is thinking of a metaphysics of being, but if it is true of metaphysics, it is even more true of science.

P. casts his net wide and attacks the whole concept of Intelligent Design, as distinct from lower-case intelligible design. Science is committed to ordering the stunning complexity of nature into a schema that is intelligible. One of his targets is Michael Behe, who has popularly explained, as an example of biochemical complexity, the blood-clotting system. This is a cascade of reactions that involves a score of proteins and a similar number of exquisitely interlocking reactions which are immediately called into play when a wound is inflicted on animal skin. If only one of the proteins is missing or any one of the instantaneous reactions is deficient, the whole system breaks down, resulting in death. No scientist can but marvel at the intelligible design that underlies such a schema—a schema, moreover, that the scientist expects to find. Whether one then makes the leap to an Intelligent Designer is a matter of transcendental belief, not of science; but it remains a belief which is consistent with the facts. Should one ask for more?

Biological evolution is relatively recent compared with the Big Bang (also quaintly outlawed from Kansas questionnaires), when the four forces on which all subsequent development has hinged were of such exactness that, if one of them had deviated in value by a few parts per billion, the
world would have been lifeless rubble, not this glorious planet which teems with life, consciousness, and intellect. This is no scientific proof of God’s existence, but it lies at the base of Einstein’s belief in a superior reasoning power, revealed in a comprehensible universe.

As P. points out repeatedly in this thorough work, the creationists set up a false dichotomy: Darwinism versus creation-science. There are other possibilities. John Henry Newman probably had it right when, in the very first years of evolutionary theory, he declared that “Mr. Darwin’s theory need not be atheistical, be it true or not; it may simply be suggesting a larger idea of Divine Prescience and Skill.” To deny that God could imbue matter at the moment of creation with all the properties necessary for the formation of living creatures in the fullness of time is to limit the power of God.

Concordia University, Montreal

MARK DOUGHTY


Schwarz offers a volume remarkably well informed in New Testament scholarship and historical theology. He wishes to steer a course between reductionism and fideism, defending an essentially classic Christology in dialogue with Jesus research and secular skepticism. Thus he constructs a Christology “from below,” exploring the old, new, and third-wave quests, offering a helpful close reading of the major authors. Jesus-of-history research, he insists, cannot be ignored by theology, lest it fall into ahistorcial docetism. Yet the historical Jesus cannot be truly known apart from the Christ of faith.

S. believes that a rationally defensible theology of Jesus as the Christ, as divine and human, must be able to show a convincing continuity between Jesus himself, his own intentions and self-awareness, and the classical creedal statements about him. Having sorted through and weighed many schools of biblical scholarship, he reaches relatively positive conclusions about the accuracy of the NT portrait of Jesus, and builds upon a quite optimistic assessment of our knowledge of Jesus’ self-interpretation. He asserts that Jesus knew himself to be in a unique relationship as Son to God the Father, knew himself to be Son of Man, Servant, and Messiah, knew the meaning of his death, and proclaimed it in his Last Supper. Jesus Christ is indeed the Incarnation of God’s Word, the “human face of God.” In an old argument familiar from C. S. Lewis and others, S. contends that we are confronted with a trilemma: Jesus was a deliberate fraud, or he was deluded, or he was truly divine (230).

S. expounds the classic christological doctrines, providing useful information about patristic controversies, formation of the creeds, and doctrinal
development from ancient, through medieval, Reformation, and modern times. He explores virtually every area of Christology: Jesus’ virginal conception, baptism, healing and teaching ministry, death, descent into hell, Resurrection, Ascension, and return. Classic doctrines of atonement are discussed. He defends the historic tradition with an understanding nod to modern skeptical questions; sometimes in response to them he deliteralizes, modifies, or leaves open certain questions (e.g. the virginal conception as historical fact). However, he declares that the Resurrection of Jesus and the empty tomb can and must be affirmed as factual, and that the Resurrection is central and foundational for Christian faith in Jesus Christ.

One must appreciate S.’s resistance to mindless fideism and his serious wrestling with the challenges of critical scholarship. He presents, I think, a possible position about Jesus’ self-awareness and identity. Yet perhaps he rests too much upon the powers of historical and theological reasoning. When he claims that “there can be no doubt” about the “historical fact” (242), one is aware that many critics would disagree, especially about Jesus’ words, self-understanding, and the doctrines built upon them. I admire his attempt to do a Christology from below, bringing together historical-Jesus research and the Christ of faith. To begin Christology by tracing the origin and development of faith in Jesus to its roots, rather than with ready-made dogmas “from above” seems appropriate. But the effort to build such a Christology needs to begin, I suggest, not with a reconstruction of the life and ministry of Jesus, but with the Resurrection. And can the Resurrection be known apart from faith in Jesus? S. perhaps underestimates the degree to which the Gospel stories about Jesus’ words and deeds reflect the Church’s post-Resurrection faith.

Many 20th-century theologians are discussed: Barth, Bultmann, Tillich, Cobb, Griffin, Teilhard de Chardin, Rahner, Moltmann, and others are commented upon insightfully. Some feminist Christologies are discussed critically, but appreciatively (e.g. Heyward, McFague, Ruether, Brock) though S. omits any mention of Christ-centered feminists who would be more congenial to his own stance (e.g. Johnson, LaCugna, Russell). Pluralists (Hick and Knitter) are vigorously criticized, though their legitimate concerns about Christian imperialism are acknowledged. A gaping omission is the whole genre of liberation Christology. The major contributions of Gutiérrez, Boff, Segundo, Miguez Bonino, Sobrino are never mentioned, nor are the Africans or the Koreans. Thus the political, economic and ecological dimensions and implications of Christology are not well developed.

Whether or not one agrees with S.’s christological stances, this moderately large and readable volume contains an abundance of information and argumentative discussion. Despite its omissions, it has high educational value for second-level basic-degree theological students focusing on Christology and is profitable reading for anyone struggling for clarity about the identity and mission of Jesus.

Emmanuel College, Toronto

HAROLD WELLS

For one without a fairly sophisticated knowledge of the American pragmatic tradition in philosophy this is a dense and complicated book, but it holds together and offers a coherent approach to a theology of the beautiful. It does this by entering into conversation with a number of partners such as Balthasar, Peirce, Royce, and Mukarovsky. García-Rivera seeks to integrate the key insights of Latino theology with the tradition of European and American thought. He arrives at a consistent synthesis. He calls his work a theological esthetics. Since it is largely founded on philosophical considerations, I wonder if it is not more properly a subset of the philosophy of religion. I mention this because that would contrast his approach with one of his key conversation partners, Balthasar.

G.’s project seems to have been largely inspired by reading Balthasar’s theological esthetics. He is impressed with the Swiss theologian’s accent upon form. As is well known, Balthasar focuses his esthetics on Christ as the form of divine beauty. The other focus is on ecstasy, the act of faith by which the believer is drawn into the form by God’s grace. While attracted to this perspective, G. wonders whether Balthasar gives enough philosophical underpinnings to his project. He finds a surer footing in the thought of Peirce and Royce.

G. does not refer to the last part of Balthasar’s trilogy, the three volumes of the divine logic. I doubt whether he would find Balthasar’s approach adequate, but in this last part Balthasar does attempt something like the justification that G. desires. One key difference between them is that Balthasar’s focus is almost exclusively christological. The Incarnation and the Pascal Mystery are the definitive instances of divine beauty which Balthasar seeks to highlight.

Very frequently G. points to differences between Balthasar and himself. He says that Balthasar is interested chiefly in the difference between God and creatures, between Being and beings. He analyzes Balthasar’s exposition and defense of the analogy of being with reference to the thought of Przywara, noting that Balthasar gives less attention to the difference among the creatures. While not denying this point, I think that Balthasar’s chief interest is not the analogy of being; he always seeks to situate the analogy of being within the analogy of faith. Although respecting the ever greater difference between God and creatures, Balthasar’s real interest is the astounding fact for faith that the Word became flesh, thus bridging the gap between God and the world; his real interest is christological.

One of Balthasar’s major contributions was to rediscover and seek to illumine mutually the great transcendentals of being: the beautiful, the true, and the good. This desire explains the three parts of Balthasar’s multivolume trilogy. G. has a similar interest and intent. He begins with the
logic of Peirce, where Peirce develops a logic of signs which is always triadic. There is the sign and the signified, but these require a third, the interpreter himself. Peirce’s cosmos is a world of interrelated signs. Peirce’s vision highlights the differences between creatures and the relational dimension of all beings.

Peirce’s thought leads to another question: What is the relation of the knowledge of truth to the will? Knowledge does not take place in a vacuum. Rather we know in the garden of good and evil. The question of truth is thus linked to the question of the good. Here G. points to the help given by Josiah Royce. One can only adequately interpret the signs through the ethical act of loyalty by which interpreters sacrifice their own point of view and open themselves up to the other. Full interpretation requires that one place oneself at the disposition of the whole human community. So logic leads to redemptive at-one-ment with the community.

But how does this lead to esthetics? The key is difference. Beings are related to each other. Individuals are different from one another. Sometimes this takes the form of negations, e.g., white is not black. But often it is a question of obverses: one thing does not negate the other but is different from it. Negation in this sense becomes asymmetrical. Recognizing the difference brings with it the quality of higher and lower. Jan Mukarovsky brought out the esthetic dimension of these asymmetrical relations by developing the notion of foregrounding. Foregrounding lifts a being from its background and highlights it. One sees the value of a being by placing it in relationship to other beings as well as to Being itself. The whole universe is thus seen as a series of relations and differences. The Creator lets the world be in its particularity and differences. The Creator created this world, which is different from some other world. The Creator rejoices in this particular world with all its richness, which is different from every other conceivable world he could have created. The human task is to develop the imagination in such a way that we human beings recognize the differences in their relation to each other and the Creator and in seeing the differences (analogous to Balthasar’s seeing the form) learn to praise the Creator. Such an imagination G. calls the anagogical imagination, that is, an imagination developed in the capacity to praise.

The vision of theological esthetics presented in this volume is an alternative to Balthasar’s but not in contradiction to it. Whereas Balthasar focuses on the christological, G. focuses on the rich variegation of creatures in relation to their Creator. His vision reminds us of Ignatius of Loyola’s contemplation to obtain divine love, where the saint invites the retreatant to contemplate how all blessings and gifts descend from above. G. tries to develop the underpinnings that could ground such a vision. Following him in his quest is challenging, but the results are rewarding, particularly for those with a philosophical disposition of mind.
McIntosh gives us a superbly crafted brief argument for the reintegration of spirituality and theology. The task is formidable. Not only does the split go back deep into the history of theology, but we have been living in its wake for so long that we have difficulty imagining any other arrangement. Indeed, one often gets the impression that the presupposition and starting point for all theology pursued nowadays in an academic setting is precisely the idea that theology must keep itself at arm’s length from anything smacking of piety if it is to be scientific and academically respectable. M. believes that this presupposition becomes especially dominating if one also accepts the obsession with epistemology that marks modern philosophy in contrast with other, more metaphysical ages.

Paralleling the epistemological obsessions of post-Cartesian philosophy, poetry, especially in England, also moves from the public and civic-minded declamations of Dryden and Pope to the more private and vatic cultivations of personal experience in the Romantics, so that lyric rather than epic poetry becomes the mode for poets and mystics as well. Following the analysis of Balthasar, whom he quotes here, M. shows how the confluence of all these factors has led to the present-day impasse: “The saints, intimidated by the conceptual entanglements drawn round the gospel truth, no longer dare to collaborate in the necessary work of exposition of doctrine, or think themselves qualified to do so. They leave dogma to the prosaic work of the Schools, and become lyric poets. But just as poetry has developed from an objective art interpreting reality . . . to a subjective art describing inner states, . . . so too have the saints come to speak a religious language which is not dogmatic.” The result is that the saints in modern times—however unwillingly and perhaps even unconsciously—describe their experience of God in such a way that the accent regularly falls “on experience rather than on God” (11).

M.’s work is not purely historical and archeological, however, let alone a captious attack on academic theology; his analysis of the historical roots takes up only the first two chapters. What makes his work a real advance are his constructive proposals, which will no doubt gain a wide hearing because of the M.’s essentially irectemperament. Readers might have expected M. to develop his constructive proposals along the lines of Balthasar’s theology, not only because he has previously written a well-regarded monograph on Balthasar’s Christology, but also because his historical analysis differs in no essential way from Balthasar’s. But such is not the case. M. speaks in propria persona and offers solutions of his own that move beyond Balthasar’s in interesting ways.

One problem with Balthasar’s thought is that his critique of Rahner can too easily lead, at least among his followers, to a hasty dismissal of epistemological issues, precisely because Rahner’s transcendental Thomism devotes so much attention to them. This danger M. entirely avoids. Indeed,
in a chapter that is worth the price of the book, he brings Balthasar and Rahner into a constructive dialogue so insightful that it is bound to be cited often. What I most appreciated was M.’s assertion that the often noted tension between Rahner and Balthasar is also a tension that lurks within the thought of these two men themselves.

No doubt, as M. rightly points out, “for Rahner, we come into fully personal being through our interior transcendental apprehension of being and drive towards mystery, [while] for von Balthasar, we only really become fully the persons God has created us to be insofar as we discover our true mission through participation in the mission of Christ” (93). But things are not that simple. One often encounters the claim that Rahner’s stress on mystery leads to an apophatic emphasis on God’s incomprehensibility, while Balthasar’s stress on concretion is more rooted in the Incarnation. But as M. points out, one of the most consistent themes of Balthasar’s theology, no less than Rahner’s, is God’s incomprehensibility, whereas in Rahner there is a tension between attributing this incomprehensibility either to “an infinite formlessness” or to God’s “infinite trinitarian expressivity which undergirds and transfigures all forms” (100). This sounds remarkably Balthasarian.

M.’s ability to bring these two theologians, often regarded as rivals, into fruitful dialogue is just one example of his capacity to develop a holistic vision that can resolve a whole range of theological issues, from biblical hermeneutics to the self-understanding of Jesus. In reading these latter chapters, one gets an inkling of how debates surrounding historical criticism or the messianic consciousness of Jesus still continue to take place in a world of false binary opposition (historical criticism is simply “good” or “bad” for the Church, etc.). But there is another point of view, one that comes from going back into the history of theology and seeing how these false “digital” alternatives first came to be formulated, and then proposing a fresh new perspective for their resolution.

For that reason above all, but also because of his command of the literature and his pleasing, irenic style, M.’s book will continue to influence the conversation for many years to come.

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EDWARD T. OAKES, S.J.


Ecclesiology is very much “in” as a theological topic these days. In the consortium of which my seminary is a member, six courses and seminars will be offered this semester on ecclesiology. Why all this fuss about Church right now? Ecumenically, we continue to be confronted with issues of whether, for example, the historic episcopate is necessary to further church unity. Pastorally, we know that older forms of Christian community have broken down with nothing really compelling to take their place. In
this context of contestation and ferment, Lathrop’s book seems very timely, offering a distinctive response to those perennially thorny questions about what builds, sustains, and defines those communities of faith that we call Church.

L.’s alternative to discussions that continue to be preoccupied with forms of governance and ministry is to ground his understanding of Church differently, namely, in those common actions of baptism, word, and the Lord’s Supper—practices that shape our lives together as believers. That is, if we want to find Church these days, we should go to those gatherings of Christians who have assembled around word, baptism, and the Supper. Not only will we find a meeting but also a mission and a vocation as well—being in communion with other believers and bearing the gifts of the Triune God’s grace to the world. These are the hallmarks of Church in the best sense of the word. L.’s current work builds on his earlier book, *Holy Things: A Liturgical Theology*. These holy things—baptism, word, and table—now fashion a holy people who bear witness and act in loving service to the world.

The strength of this book lies in its commitment to ground ecclesiological reflection liturgically. L. offers a way to move beyond seemingly intractable arguments about tradition, structure, and leadership, presenting instead a refreshingly different vision of what Church might be—one that is more dynamic, historical, and pastoral. His revisioning is more than mere optimism, however. It is also hardheadedly realistic. He writes of our being tentatively present in worship, “hanging back, skeptical with part of our hearts” (94). There is our religious individualism, our consumer preferences, our ethnocentrism. Yet our encounter with the word and the Lord’s Supper is claimed to be an encounter with the Resurrection as well and a discovery of “that great cloak of God’s life-giving mercy” (ibid.).

Ironically, the great strength of this book might also be its great weakness. L.’s understanding of liturgical theology as “spoken and written discourse that attempts to find words for the experience of liturgy” (7) raises the question: Whose experience? Similarly, we find throughout the book, such expressions as “the liturgy,” “the meaning of the liturgy.” Again, questions arise: Whose liturgy? Whose meaning?

Such grand claims for what occurs or is supposed to occur in the Church’s worship illustrate, I believe, one of the enduring problems of what is called “liturgical theology.” Is liturgical theology primarily about what worship should be? Is it perhaps more concerned with the “theology” in a liturgical event itself? Or, is liturgical theology, as L. avers in his Introduction, something that seeks to unfold our experience of God in worship?

Since “liturgy” is always done by someone, somewhere, at some time, in some place, I would suggest, therefore, that liturgical theology, and by extension a liturgical ecclesiology, would be concerned explicitly with worshipers’ experience of God and their relationship with God to which they give expression in worship. In addition, such experiential investigations should also be intentionally located within an interpretive framework—one
which would enable us to understand what kind of people we are as believers and what kind of things it is that we do. Discourse and interpretation that purport to be “ecumenical” sometimes run the risk of overlooking or ignoring the local and the particular, those pieties which are our lived experiences and our existential frameworks.

Years ago Edward J. Kilmartin observed that liturgical theology still tended to reside on the level of “proclamation,” which is to say that it inclined more toward assertion than toward interpretation. If liturgical theology seeks to move more toward interpretation, however, then its task remains fundamentally hermeneutical. It should seek, therefore, to unfold the liturgical experiences of our believing communities in light of what our theological and ecclesiological traditions have claimed to understand. And, as L. reminds us, these traditions will continue to challenge our felt experience and reality as well.


In Ross’s opinion, sacramental and liturgical theology has not only failed to address gender and the significance of human bodiliness, it has operated “out of an implicit, and sometimes quite explicit, set of conceptions that assumes an ‘essential’ and ‘natural’ quality to gender” (11). She seeks to overcome the dualisms of soul/body, sacred/secular, spiritual/material, and male/female by emphasizing the significance of ambiguity, the cultural/historical dimension, and the experience of women.

A significant contribution of this study is R.’s category of ambiguity (following David Tracy). She uses the term “ambiguity” to refer to the nondualistic, multivalent understanding of God and the world in a dynamic relationship. The emphasis is on multiple meanings, diversity, change, development, and permeable boundaries rather than on clearly delimited roles, clarity, coherence, and definitions. Within a context of ambiguity one’s view of sacramentality expands; once narrowly focused on seven sacraments, it now encompasses multiple life experiences and the natural world. However, ambiguity does more than merely broaden a notion of the sacramental, for R. wonders whether there ought to be any boundaries at all or whether there is “any difference between a shared Eucharist among an intentional community of women and a traditional Mass in a parish” (226). Are there limits to ambiguity? R. does not give any. Her presentation of ambiguity offers an insight into some of the conflict between feminist theology and Vatican documents such as “Some Questions Regarding Collaboration of Nonordained Faithful in Priests’ Sacred Ministry.” The desire for clear delimitation of roles in the latter is on a collision course with the ambiguity of the former.

R. offers a helpful resolution of the vexed question of gender represen-
tation wherein “Christ (or the priest, or the hierarchy) always initiates and the church (or the laity) always responds” by situating gender identity within the family rather than in the more narrow and sexually defined spousal relationship of husband and wife. The family as the embodied context for sacramentality is multidimensional, nonhierarchical, more inclusive of the nonmarried, and affords a greater complexity of roles than the marital model. It includes not only intercourse, but also “maternal and paternal sexuality, embodied development in biological life passages, nurturing and caring roles, and social relations” (131). Such a move also challenges interpretations of the natural law predicated upon mere physicality with implications for a theological reflection on contraceptive practices.

R.’s analysis of the role of gender within sacramentality moves the discussion about women’s ordination away from a mere analysis of asymmetrical power relationships within the Church. Her review of postmodern psychoanalytic theories about language and symbol tentatively suggests that “concern for women’s full participation in the symbolic, and in religious rituals, especially those tied to a language of sacrifice, encounter deeply entrenched psychological processes that will not lend themselves easily to rational arguments about equality” (155). These theories explain why women in positions as preachers, as liturgical presiders, and as public leaders seem to be literally and symbolically “out of place.” R. does not offer a solution other than to question the premise of these theories that sacraments invoke the presence of the absent God. Sacraments rather “intensify the ambiguous presence of God with the immediate, concrete, and particular” (167). Psychoanalytic theories are insufficient for explaining the significance of eucharistic sacrifice, which requires a more biblically based analysis of an understanding of paschal sacrifice.

Finally R. addresses the ethical dimension of a feminist sacramentality by returning to a consideration of the family. Such an ethic takes the basic values of affection, relationship, and embodiment and extends them from a private context to the public arena of the world. She argues for fluid boundaries between private domestic life and the public sphere, between the sacred and the secular.

There are two areas that R. needs to explore further. First, her discussion of feminist sacramentality is limited to gender roles within sacramental relationships, resulting in an emphasis first, on ordination, and second, on the Eucharist, but primarily in terms of the presider. A feminist sacramental theology more broadly inclusive of all the sacraments still lies ahead of her. Second, R.’s feminist sacramentality needs a more comprehensive ecclesiology, as is evident in her statement that “the criterion for authentic Eucharist ought not so much to be location or whether there is an ‘official’ presider but rather to what extent the Eucharist ‘effects what it signifies’—that is, unity, community, a sense of radical inclusion, a concern for feeding our many hungers and thirsts, a living out of the real presence of Christ in the midst of human life” (226). Her operative ecclesiology is local and particular, one might say even immanent. Missing is a sense of the communion among eucharistic communities, continuity with apostolic tradi-
tion, and the role of the “official” presider in symbolizing and facilitating both of these communions.

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SUSAN K. WOOD


Freedom and responsibility are not easy topics. One has only to think of Ricoeur’s philosophy of the will to realize that a systematic reconstruction of the problem would require confrontation with many different thinkers besides the challenge of adding something seriously new to the insights and understanding of previous philosophical attempts. Indeed, Bok honestly refrains from false promises on the extent of her metaphysical inquiry. From the very first lines, the reader realizes that she is less concerned with the meaning of freedom and responsibility per se than with arguments against a libertarian account of them. In this way the reader’s expectations are kept in check against any unruly desire to go beyond the limits and the terms defined by the so-called “free-will debate.” Within it, the polarity of libertarianism and compatibilism can ultimately be construed as one of alternative strategies in coping with the challenge posed by mechanism. On the one hand, libertarianism regards freedom and mechanism as incompatible; on the other, compatibilist theories hold that it is possible to regard mechanism as true and nonetheless be morally responsible for our actions.

B. sides with the latter position. Actually, her “accounts of these issues do not differ greatly from standard compatibilist accounts” (6) on whose literature she relies heavily in the articulation of her own argument. Her reflection unfolds smoothly along two main fronts. First, she provides a revised notion of compatibilism that rescues mechanism from its negative implications by showing that to explain our actions and choices mechanistically does not entail that we are not free. Second, she works out an account of human agency that is credible though different from that presupposed by libertarianism.

B. sets off to articulate the nature of the problem of the freedom of the will by arguing that libertarianism depends on a particular formulation of it, namely, as a theoretical problem about the causes of our choices and actions. We are free because we cause our choices to take the form they do, and because we are not caused to do so by the external world. However, if the problem of the freedom of the will is formulated as a problem about the causes of our choices and actions, it cannot be solved. Indeed, it cannot because we immediately assume that the kind of determination in question in the problem of freedom is causal. The consequences of such a position are fatal for compatibilism no less than libertarianism.

The evidence of an aporetic conclusion in the theoretical account of freedom prepares the ground for the important distinction between theoretical and practical reasoning. Whereas the former is concerned with the
causes of events, the latter deals with grounds on the basis of which we choose to act as we do. In other words, practical reasoning terminates with the attestation of agency and the recognition that freedom and responsibility cannot be explained as theoretical concepts but only as practical ones. For this reason, B. shows that the truth or falsity of mechanism or determinism does not bear on our understanding of freedom as a practical concept, on the possibility of holding ourselves responsible for our actions, and the possibility of holding others responsible. Indeed, when we engage in practical reasoning, we can regard ourselves as free and responsible agents without having to postulate the falsity or truth of mechanism.

One can clearly recognize B.’s debt to the Kantian interpretation of the distinction between theoretical and practical reasoning, not only because she admits it, but especially because she leaves no doubts about her deep assimilation of the Kantian position. The risk of borrowing the split anthropological phenomenal and noumenal selves together with that epistemological distinction, however, may be one of the problems entailed by the Kantian solution.

The book, though clear and even witty, is not easy to read. The persistent reader, however, will find the effort rewarding in the end, because B.’s position has to be reckoned with as an important theoretical contribution to the free-will debate.

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ROBERTO DELL’ORO


This intricately crafted, intellectually exhilarating work of philosophy presses some of the most important topics challenging the method and content of contemporary theology: language and narrativity, memory (individual and social), presence and absence, alterity and subjectivity, judgment and responsibility, hope and community. Wyschogrod’s definition of the “historian” as anyone speaking of the past through narrative or image invites a wide range of readers into this nonfoundational, poststructuralist tour de force. For W., the historian’s work is a vocation. The “heterological historian” receives her call, with its ethical dimension of responsibility, from the voiceless dead others, for whom she promises to speak.

To be a historian is to undertake the paradoxical work of eliciting the past from one’s situatedness in a present context. The context for W. is twofold. First, there is the “nadir point of recent history,” this century’s mass exterminations of peoples that W. conceptualizes as the “cataclysm,” a name purposely chosen for its “cosmological dimensions” (xiii). While by no means the only subject nor even the prolegomenon for every contemporary work, the cataclysm constitutes the “non-place from which the heterological historian writes” (41), requiring that alterity cut into any histori-
cal narrative in a manner comparable to (yet different from) Levinas’s *il y a*. The second governing condition of the modern context is the emergence of the culture of image and information, wherein object has become disconnected from materiality, resulting in a volatilizing of images in a hyperreality that the historian cannot escape and must, therefore, engage negatively from within. This double perspective places the heterological historian in the quandary of how she can speak, as she feels she must, for the dead others, a problem W. undertakes through a series of chapters exploring questions about time, memory, and social existence that have riddled Western intellectual thought from its pre-Socratic inceptions.

Western theories about language and image have through the centuries been characterized by the fundamental category mistake of representation. In the history of philosophy W. also apprehends, however, the persistence of narrative as constitutive of truth. W.’s critical appreciation of Kant’s theory of the sign leads nonetheless to the recognition that the sign has been obliterated in a culture of innumerable visual stimuli. She thus moves on, with the help of Hegel and others, to the image, which in its uncontrollability has been ever threatening to Western thought.

While the characteristics of the cataclysm obstruct its functioning as either sign or image, its reduction of all persons to objects nonetheless requires those who would remember genuinely to treat the other as other, not “another myself” (127). W. perceives the enhancement of this possibility in the culture of spectacle and information, as anticipated by the Hegelian Absolute of appearances, a “world of objects that possess a cunning of their own” (126). The singularity of an historical event, however, requires not only visual marker(s) but also narrative that attests to the alterity of its content which, in its resistance to “linguistic captivity,” indicates the “paradox of historical presentation: what cannot be shown or said must be shown or said” (141).

In its relentless speeding up of images, however, the culture of information compels the heterological historian to construct a theory of temporality. W.’s nuanced exploration of the ethical implications of a bifurcated interpretation of time, of time as both stretched (flowing) and punctiform (marked by discreet events), provides strategies for theologians to engage questions that, as she herself notes, Christianity has long avoided but which, I might note, have come to the fore in recent decades: time’s reality or unreality (and thus its urgency for Metz); the irreducible importance of contingency; and the desire for presence despite the stalwart resistance of absence (the sacramental theologies of Chauvet and Power). W.’s contribution is to argue that the past is “always already hyperreal,” so that it can only be presented in word and image, an “unsurpassable negation that breaks into the materiality of the world and volatilizes it” (166). Learning from Heidegger that every past moment had its own futurity, the historian’s works of remembrance must address possibilities that might have been, as well as assert what could never have been the case. The latter is the “non-event” that grounds her claims on behalf of the dead, providing a “fallible certainty” to those attestations (173).
Futurity is also the key to W.’s vision for the “gift” of nonviolent communities in the wake of the cataclysm, wherein people find hope and joy in assuming responsibility for others, dead and alive, with “intemperate generosity” (248). These last phrases indicate the messianic and prophetic momentum of W.’s conclusions and welcome theological consideration and application of her profound insights.

Boston College

Bruce T. Morrill, S.J.


Posner is Chief Justice of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 7th Circuit and a senior lecturer at the University of Chicago Law School. In this latest book he makes an important contribution to the jurisprudential debate on the legal theory in general and the role of moral reasoning in particular.

P. sets out to demystify the law by freeing it from moral theory. In doing so, he heavily relies on the legal pragmatism of Oliver Wendell Holmes. However, as in much of his earlier work, he also applies the analysis of the law and economics school of jurisprudence. In essence, his aim is not so much to build a legal theory as it is to remove moral reasoning and related theory from the law. He is candid about being a moral relativist (ix). Consequently he targets a wide spectrum of legal philosophers who have relied on moral reasoning in making legal argument. His cross hairs aim at such diverse thinkers as Rawls, Dworkin, Raz, and Finnis, to mention but a few.

Because of his critique of moral theory and judges who rely on some aspect of it, P. advances an argument for judicial restraint. Implicit in this argument is the notion that scientific (i.e. economic) approaches to the law might justify removal of such restraints. He completes his thesis in four sections. The first is a critique of moral theory and reasoning. The next evaluates the role of these moral themes in legal theory. The third examines comparatively those members of the legal profession who rely on moral theory and scientific [economic] theory. He concludes by arguing that moral theory fails and a pragmatism based on data collection and evaluation wins the day.

At the core of P.’s work is the assumption that developing a theory which enables the user to distinguish between good and bad, right and wrong is faulty. He believes that the correct decision is made by data collection and evaluation. Proper legal decisions are distinguished from the improper ones not on the basis of developing and applying moral norms but by seeing what empirical data supports.

Throughout P. displays his familiarity with contemporary and traditional moral perspectives ranging from the religious and transcendental to the contemporary and secular. His grasp of these positions is deep. Moreover, he demonstrates familiarity with a world in which the Holocaust and Gulag
are realities. Yet the response he gives to such matters and associated legal
issues is not grounded in moral reasoning but in what the economic and
other empirical data suggest.

P. believes that moral reasoning presents a peril of uniformity. Yet he
does not take account of how rendering each person his or her due (be it
reward or punishment or a combination thereof) actually avoids uniform
solutions. His recommendation of scientific pragmatism looks less at
people and more at the condition or status of their economic position.
What appears to be most important for the individual is not whether he or
she flourishes in relation with others but what the balance sheet states. P.
here examines some of the great public issues debated today such as abor-
tion and euthanasia. However, their relationship with the law is not viewed
from the perspective of whether they are right or wrong, good or bad, but
whether an economic analysis can justify their existence or not.

Legal decision-making is improved by the application of professional
scientific reasoning, not because this is ideal, but because it is pragmatic. P.
views the human issues that emerge in the law not in the context of per-
sonal but of economic relationship. He examines the law through the lens
of data collection and evaluation rather than from the efforts to reconcile
the differences which place people in conflict. While he cautions that quan-
titative analysis is not the only worthwhile empiricism that is needed by the
law, he asserts that the judgments and policies made through the law must
be based on facts and consequences that are data reliant.

In support of his thesis, P. notes that the profession of law is becoming
more like a business, and legal education more like a graduate school that
relies on interdisciplinary scientific studies. And therein lies the problem
with the pragmatism P. advocates here.

**Gonzaga University, Spokane**

**Robert John Araujo, S.J.**

**Darwinian Dominion: Animal Welfare and Human Interests.** By

Petrinovich here offers the third installment of a trilogy that also in-
cludes *Human Evolution, Reproduction, and Morality* (1995) and *Living
and Dying Well* (1996). All three books attempt to identify, address, and
resolve moral issues generated by the specifically biological stratum of
human existence.

P.’s title is taken from Dylan Thomas’s poem “And Death Shall Have No
Dominion.” Perhaps not exactly in the spirit of the poet, P. believes that
this “dominion” can be credited to Darwinism in a twofold sense: both as
a “powerful disciplinary entity” and as a source of “outstanding power to
understand all organic systems” (viii). His position is thus thoroughly evolu-
tionary and naturalistic. “I fervently believe,” he states, “the Darwinian
perspective is the vehicle that will move us toward an understanding of life’s
processes viewed from the rich context of the basics of organismic exist-
tence that any moral system must be framed to respect” (394).
P. develops his moral argument in two parts, the first primarily descriptive and the second primarily normative in intent. Part 1, “Basic Principles,” provides a rehearsal of basic evolutionary theory, an account of primate species and of some distinctive traits of hunter-gatherer societies, a review of background issues in moral philosophy, including the status of rights and utility, an account of the research methods relevant to this study and of the aims of science, a description of the development of sensing and acting in human neonates, and a discussion of key issues concerning cognition, speech, language, and mind. Part 2, “Animal Issues,” offers a well-organized analysis of the animal-rights debate, the ethical arguments generated by and over the animal liberation movement, the ethical criticism of, rationale for, and limits to scientific research on animals and the human consumption of animals, and our responsibility to care for and preserve other species. The first part thus offers a general view of our biological nature and context, while the second part provides a thorough and careful analysis of how we ought to act with regard to other biological organisms who also dwell in that context.

P. addresses our ethical responsibilities in light of a balanced anthropological awareness of both our own evolved commonalities with other animals and our undeniable and striking differences from them, especially cognitive. He rejects the views of those who hold that all animals have “equal inherent worth” and are therefore entitled to “equal respect.” Animals have “interests” but not “rights,” because they lack the moral, affective, and cognitive capacities for relationality that mark personal life. They should not be harmed unnecessarily, but they are not to be accorded the immunities associated with personhood. Substantively, P. offers a mitigated anthropocentrism: the interests of members of our species ought to prevail over comparable interests of members of other species, but the interests of other species do register genuine and significant moral claims that we have an obligation to acknowledge in our moral deliberation.

P. believes that our tendency to invoke “rights” is socially useful but not ontologically meaningful. “Rights” are simply conferred legally; they do not exist in any sense prior to political recognition. He argues from a fairly nuanced philosophical pluralism that is primarily but not exclusively grounded in utilitarian cost-benefit analysis. Animals may not be moral agents, but they are moral patients and have moral standing because they can feel pain. We thus ought to avoid cruelty to animals and ought to ban current methods of factory farming because the practices involved in raising, transporting, and killing these animals are often cruel. Yet it is not wrong in principle to eat meat, he argues, so we ought to work for the improvement of the conditions in which these animals are reared, transported, and dispatched rather than for the elimination of their consumption altogether. Carefully reviewing the disgraceful processing of poultry, veal, and swine, he argues quite reasonably that current laws that “regulate the legal status of and set standards for treatment of animals are inconsistent, illogical, and badly in need of revision” (351).

The same kind of middle-of-the-road argument is found in his discussion
of the use of animals in scientific research. Animals can legitimately be objects of biomedical research, e.g., for identifying the characteristics and locus of receptor sites for drugs, as long as the potential benefits for humans are significant. P. recognizes the importance of safeguards to prevent wasteful and illegitimate research conducted on animals. Not just any trivial benefit to humans justifies any amount of pain inflicted on animals, as in some particularly egregious cases of cosmetics testing. Yet what is needed, he argues sensibly, is not the complete abolition of all such research but the replacement of experimentation on animals when possible, the refinement of procedures to minimize the amount of pain inflicted on them, and the reduction of the numbers of animals used in such testing.

This book is wide ranging, fair minded, and clearly written. It avoids the sappy sentimentality, alarmist exaggeration, and ad-hominem argumentation generated by the worst kind of ecological polemics, yet at the same time it communicates a quiet passion for natural ties between species, a heightened moral sensitivity to the plight of animals, and a serious sense of our moral responsibility for their proper treatment. P. eschews an all-or-nothing absolutism—either no holds barred “speciesism” or absolute moral equality of all organisms—in favor of a balanced and sensitive grading of moral responsibilities. Thus, though his utilitarianism has its own shortcomings, he offers a thoughtful and learned view of animal welfare and human interests. In this he constitutes a helpful dialogue partner for theologians committed to exploring this important area of ethics, and ought to be read and studied carefully, if critically.

Boston College


One approach to Conn’s rich and complex thought-world is to ponder how to resolve the tension between the ancient ascetical principle of self-denial and the modern urge toward self-fulfillment. Recognizing that “the nature of the self has proven more elusive than the nature of steel” (2), and wanting to produce a book both theoretical and practical, C. succeeds in designing “several bridges: between psychology and theology, between the self and transcendence, between development and conversion, between pastoral counseling and spiritual direction” (ibid.).

C. opens and closes with the case of Mary from Fowler’s Stages of Faith (1981); he also focuses on the life of Trappist monk Thomas Merton, whose writings and personal journey provide concrete illustrations of the various stages and phases charted by C. Most of C.’s essay, however, is a dense, tightly reasoned philosophical reflection on the nature of the self, inter-
interpreted from a multitude of perspectives. An early chapter traces American preachers’ and thinkers’ views from 17th-century self-denial on through self-love to self-culture, self-mastery, and 20th-century self-realization. Four proponents of the pastoral counseling movement—Seward Hiltner, Carroll Wise, Paul Johnson, and Wayne Oates—speak next for the psychospiritual integrationist perspective. Dipping back into early Christian thought, C. traces the evolution of concepts from person to self to ego, and he proposes the important distinction between the conscious “I” (self-as-subject) and “me” (self-as-object) of human knowing, feeling, activity, etc.

He then surveys Freud and post-Freudian contributors to psychoanalytic theory from the object-relations, ego-psychology, and self-psychology schools. Ideas from these traditions are not merely listed; they ground the “bridges” C. is constructing.

A disciple of Bernard Lonergan, C. proposes his conception of the “dynamic, embodied, dipolar self (‘I’ and ‘me’) fundamentally desiring to be a self and to move beyond the self in relationship” (70). The true self exercises genuine self-love in loving relationships with others and with God. Such self-transcending love frees one from selfishness.

Of course such maturation needs a lifetime to accomplish, and in order to explicate this human unfolding, C. cites six developmental theorists: Piaget for cognitive development, Erikson for affective growth, Kegan for the underlying self, Kohlberg for moral development, Fowler for faith development, and Lonergan for religious conversion. As before, C. does not merely list these authors side by side, but moving through the life-cycle, he pauses at each major milestone to explain and interpret each theorist’s contribution to understanding the achievement of our human desire for love and genuine transcendence. The architectonic structure of C.’s thought would provide genuine intellectual excitement to readers accustomed to the usual parallel summaries of these writers.

Having explained his theoretical perspective, C. moves into dialogue with spiritual directors, whose challenge is to assist their clients toward conversion, the radical transformation of the self during its ongoing development. To do so, he integrates Lonergan’s multidimensional approach to conversion (cognitive, moral, affective, and religious) within the lifespan context previously elaborated. An appendix connects self-transcendence with two well-known models in counselor education, those of Egan and Corey. C. concludes his work with a final tour de force: an eclectic inclusion of the techniques of the major counseling theorists within his framework.

Someone reading this review and not C.’s book might be tempted to say, “It all sounds too neat, too good to be true.” But working one’s way through C.’s masterful argumentation will convince even a skeptical critic of the strength and validity of his vision of the human as a “desiring self.”

Loyola College, Baltimore

William J. Sneck, S.J.
SHORTER NOTICES


This is a fine and unusual book. In relatively short compass, Roetzel presents, analyzes, and judiciously assesses a vast amount of ancient and more recent material, and he provides resources for further study. Taking what he judges to be the less commonly studied aspects of Paul and inviting readers to use their historical imagination to fill in the inevitable gaps, R. aims at historical reconstruction of the following areas: the early Paul’s formative influences, positions, and attitudes, his status as Apostle to the Gentiles and his letter-writing activities, Paul as “the theologizer” and “the model ascetic,” Paul as portrayed in later apocryphal works. Although historical considerations are paramount, the book is essentially pastoral: it presumes that a fuller knowledge of the Pauline tradition will enhance readers’ understanding of their own Christian lives. Particularly striking examples include the Corinthians’ need to revalue their own gifts and appreciate those of others, Paul’s determination in Romans 9–11 to find language in which to express the possibility of difference without otherness, the extreme difficulty of this task, and the meaning of freedom in a Christian context. R. also warns of the distorting effects of reading into an ancient document anachronistic views of individualism, race, class, gender, and the separation of religion from the rest of life.

Most interesting is the evidence of ecumenical convergence R. provides. He reaches many conclusions approximating positions held (sometimes long held) by those who do not read Paul “through Reformation lenses” (153). For example, R. values Romans highly but relieves it of bearing the whole weight of Pauline theology; he takes very seriously Paul’s asceticism; and he gives many convincing examples of the continuity between Paul’s words and their development in later tradition as circumstances and needs changed.

By demonstrating that our predecessors from early centuries were faithful to the biblical text and yet able to adapt it for ongoing construction of their world, R. equips present-day readers to go and do likewise. We are in his debt.

PATRICIA M. MCDONALD, S.H.C.J.
Mt. St. Mary’s College, Emmitsburg


Lambrecht’s commentary presents a carefully considered and balanced understanding of Paul’s Second Letter to the Corinthians. A helpful overview of the history of Christianity in Corinth and Paul’s relationship with the Christians there stops short of identifying the nature of the conflict reflected in 2 Corinthians. L. astutely looks beyond the clues to the situation in Paul’s remarks to find deeper, christological motivation for the conflict. He also refrains from tying himself to one or other theory about the opponents’ identity. He notes their Jerusalem connections and also their sophistic rhetorical skill, but admits that more exact identification of them is probably impossible and seems unnecessary to understand Paul’s main concern which is to win back his wayward followers. I wonder whether a fuller characterization of Paul’s sophistic opponents, such as that more recently offered by Bruce Winter in Philo and Paul among the Sophists, might have enabled L. to focus on words and phrases which reflect a specific situation and trace a line of thought through the letter. On the other hand, L. carefully discusses and ultimately dismisses inadequate hypotheses such as Georgi’s of a pre-Pauline midrashic source text behind Chapter 3.

On the question of the letter’s literary integrity L.’s assessment of the hypotheses of letter fragments leads him to favor the unity of the letter. He rightly calls attention to the lack of manuscript evidence for fragments, the unconvincing hypothetical reconstructions for
post-Pauline composition, the perhaps unreasonable modern requirement of consistency from Paul. He also notes the verbal, stylistic, and thematic relationships across the presumed fragments and Paul’s familiar habit of breaking off a topic only to return to it later in his letters.

L.’s close analyses of units in the letter trace the structure of the flow of thought, often in the a|b|a pattern. In other passages Paul is shown to follow free association of words and to bind his thoughts by catchwords rather than syllogisms. L.’s focus on the theology of the letter is consistent and illuminating. The “actualization” sections are mixed in their impact on the contemporary readers. Some, such as those on 4:1–6 and 6:11–7:4 express the passages’ relationship to the original context at Corinth, while others, such as those on 8:1–24, 11:1–15, 12:1–10, appeal directly to the modern reader. On the whole, the reader will find this commentary informative and will come away with an appreciation of the complexities of the letter grounded in thorough research and judicious reflection.

Benjamin Fiore S.J.
Canisius College, Buffalo, N.Y.


Macky’s thesis is that Paul uses different symbol systems as windows on the gospel. While he views each of these myths as important and mutually corrective, his focus here is on the cosmic-war myth. M. constructs a complete “military narrative” from the Hebrew Scriptures and the literature of early Judaism. He argues that this cosmic-war myth would have been part of Paul’s worldview, but that Paul would have rejected both a literal and an allegorical interpretation of this myth. The literal interpretation would suggest that Satan and the various “principalities and powers” (Eph 3:10; Col 2:15; Rom 8:38) actually exist as separate entities. The allegorical interpretation would understand them as symbols of the structures of society. Paul would have viewed these as true myths: while Satan and the principalities and powers do not exist as separate entities, they do symbolize the “transcendent powers . . . corrupted in the human collective” (251).

While the book is well written, it is not without problems. The use of Scripture is at times uncritical; M. fails to place texts into their proper social and historical context. The cosmic-war myth that he artificially constructs comes from texts that have very different historical and social settings. He often fails to make any distinctions between the Pauline and deutero-Pauline literature. M. is influenced by J. Christiaan Beker (Paul the Apostle: The Triumph of God in Life and Thought. Philadelphia: Fortress, 1980) to find the coherent vision that underlies Paul’s gospel. He fails, however, to take seriously the other pole of Beker’s hermeneutic, the contingency of this gospel. While the book claims to build on Beker, it lacks both his theological depth and his hermeneutical sophistication.

James P. Scullion, O.F.M.
Washington Theological Union, D.C.


This timely book provides an overview of the many apocalyptic beliefs in the Western world over the last 2000 years. After a brief introduction, Weber relates apocalypses (that deal with judgments and the end times) with millenialsms (that deal with new beginnings). Then he takes up the various apocalyptic views throughout the centuries and shows how the early Christian centuries, the Middle Ages, the Renaissance, and the Enlightenment all proved to be fertile ground for beliefs about the imminent end of the world. Even the rise of modern science and secularism did not bring to an end belief in the impending apocalypse.

The information W. provides is encyclopedic; he includes views from the
early commentators of the Bible to those of contemporary cults such as the Branch Davidians and Heaven’s Gate. But W. rarely goes beyond the listing of names, dates, and different opinions about the disastrous end of the world. Moreover, there is no theoretical framework underlying the endless and often tiresome descriptions or brief mention of apocalyptic views. Though W. refers several times to the common link that historians and sociologists make between apocalyptic views and political crises, social change, and natural disasters, he does not think that this connection is informative (32) and stresses that “apocalyptic and millenarian beliefs should not be attributed to the oppressed and disinherited only” (234).

But W. proposes no alternative theory to explain their rise and persistence and the important role such beliefs have played in the history of the West. In his own words this book “is like a travel book.” “It offers more narrative than interpretation, more description than explanation” (5). Admittedly it is intended not for scholars, who will find it disappointing rather than enlightening.

JOHN A. SALIBA, S.J.
University of Detroit Mercy


Buell explores the ways in which Clement of Alexandria used metaphors of procreation and kinship polemically to assert his authority over his opponents and to gain legitimacy for his own version of Christianity. In the tradition of Averl Cameron’s Christianity and the Rhetoric of Empire, she is interested in the rhetorical strategies that ancient Christians used in their efforts to form a kind of “totalizing discourse” that eventually swallowed and transformed classical culture. Her study reveals especially well the foreignness of ancient Christian rhetoric and reminds us not to assume an easy overlap between the ancient past and modern present.

As an assessment of Clement’s theology, however, the study is less successful. On the one hand, this is not surprising since B.’s purpose is to expose his rhetorical strategies, not the coherence of his thought. However, in outlining Clement’s use of procreative metaphors to shore up his own position, B. points out that his opponents used the same metaphors and strategies. From this she suggests that Clement had no basis upon which to rest his claim to a more “orthodox” understanding of Christianity. This line of reasoning suggests that if methodology and rhetorical strategy remain constant, there is no basis for evaluating the superiority of one position over another. Ultimately B. wants to stand with those who argue for a diverse and open-ended early Christianity and against those who argue that there is a discernable “orthodox” stream within the complex world of emerging Christianity. However, in order to make these arguments, it seems to me, one must take account of theological ideas and not just rhetorical strategies. It is quite possible to use the same method to arrive at a very different conclusion.

Despite these conceptual problems, students of the early Christian world and of Clement of Alexandria will find that B.’s detailed explication of kinship metaphors is reason enough to read the book. It is carefully researched, well documented, and clearly written.

JOHN J. O’KEEFE
Creighton University, Omaha


John, a sixth-century bishop of Scythopolis in Palestine, was an active participant in the christological debates of his time, advocating the neo-Chalcedonian position, and a worthy opponent of Severus of Antioch. John is perhaps better known as the earliest defender of the writings of Dionysius the Areopagite, which had only recently appeared. John’s defense took the form of a Prologue and Scholia or marginal
annotations to the Dionysian text. Subsequently, the annotations of Maximus the Confessor and others were conflated with those of John.

Recently, Beate Regina Suchla has sought to reconstitute John’s original text, and has already published the *Scholia on The Divine Names*. Rorem, of Princeton Theological Seminary, and Lamoreaux, a doctoral student at Duke University, have provisionally identified the comments of John on the rest of the works of Dionysius. They have produced a “selected translation” of John’s *Prologue* and *Scholia*, which constitute about two-thirds of the material. The translation is preceded by a number of expository chapters. One chapter is devoted to John’s use of biblical, patristic, liturgical, and non-Christian sources in providing a context for Dionysius’s teaching and how they should be interpreted. Another analyzes John’s defense of the Dionysian writings against various charges of heresy, by using more precise trinitarian and christological formulas and distinctions.

This work is helpful in shedding light on the earliest stage of the acceptance of the Dionysian writings, and in providing further insights regarding the christological disputes in the Middle East of the sixth century. While there are phrases in the Dionysian writings that reflect the formulas being used in the doctrinal debates, it is unlikely that the author of the Dionysian corpus, who had created the conceit of being a first-century writer of spirituality, wanted to be involved with the christological and trinitarian controversies of 500 years in the future.

**Seely Beggiani**
Catholic University of America, D.C.


Bireley has produced a fine new survey of the history of Catholicism in the early modern period. He targets his reassessment of the “Counter-Reforma-

**William V. Hudon**
Bloomsburg University, Pennsylvania
eager for the task, but among the sizeable group of English who had joined the Jesuits by 1580 he was the best known because of his brilliant career at St. John’s College, Oxford where he lived and worked from 1557 to 1570. In that year he left England in order to sort out his religious position. After some time in Ireland and the Low Countries he was reconciled to the Catholic Church.

He went on to Rome where he joined the considerable contingent of Englishmen in the Society of Jesus. Like those who went before him he was content to be a schoolmaster in Central Europe. There was some resentment on his part that the future Cardinal Allen chose him to return to England. There was no effort to keep “the Jesuit Invasion” secret, and English seaport officials were alerted long before their arrival in June of 1580.

Campion did good work in the home counties and to the North in Lancashire. He also wrote his “Brag” which he addressed to the Queen’s Privy Council and “Ten Reasons” in Latin for the scholars of England. Holleran’s volume concentrates on the arguments on religion between Campion and the Protestant divines who debated religion with him in prison in August and September of 1581. Campion and his fellows were convicted on the charge of plotting the assassination of the Queen. They were hanged, drawn, and quartered on December 1, 1581.

THOMAS CLANCY, S.J.
New Orleans Jesuit Archives


This collection of 14 sermons has been prepared by three leading Edwards scholars, who are also involved in the Yale Works series, three volumes of which (covering the period from 1720 to 1733) are dedicated to the more than 1250 sermons of Edwards. Before the critical editions provided by the Yale series, only 70 of the sermons had been published. The sermons project, therefore, represents a major step in the advancement of Edwards scholarship, and this present selection provides a handy introduction to this vast work.

These sermons have been chosen to give a wide range of E.’s preaching, from his first experiences as a 19-year old in New York to his last years as missionary pastor to the Indians at Stockbridge. They include both the great classics, such as “Sinners in the Hands of an Angry God” or “A Divine and Supernatural Light,” and five sermons from the 1740s and 1750s never before published. An excellent introduction examines the sermon as a literary form and E.’s particular artistry in that form, as well as the social and cultural context of E.’s sermons, and the contents of the selected sermons and their theological thrust.

As pointed out in the Introduction, most scholars have concentrated on E.’s major treatises, and yet the sermons were his favored literary form, his most time-consuming activity, his testing ground for the argumentation of everything else. They sometimes show a new side of E., for example, as “the first major Reformed thinker since the Reformation era to place such a high premium on the doctrine of union Christi” (xlv), and as one who emphasizes recognizing Christ’s presence in the poor as one of the most effective ways to grow in that union.

CHRISTOPHER J. VISCARDI, S.J.
Spring Hill College, Mobile


Gutjahr’s engaging study of the history of the Bible in 19th-century American print culture argues that the rise of the American Bible Society and its mass publication of an inexpensive text led other publishers to introduce “different English translations, commentaries, illustrations, and bindings” (3) that invariably “helped to erode the timeless,
changeless aura surrounding ‘the Book’ by making it ‘the books’ “ (4). G.’s thesis successfully exposes the presumption that the supremacy of the Authorized King James Version (1611) in America through the end of the 19th century resulted in a relatively standardized text. The evidence he assembles reveals that any edition of the Bible used by a theologian or layperson during the 19th century was actually one of many competing versions and formats.

G. sets as his temporal boundaries the appearance of the first edition of the English New Testament in 1777 and the arrival of the Revised Version in 1881, the first widely accepted textual revision in the United States. Along the way, he gives us an informative and visually stimulating account of the Bible’s production that not only tells the stories of the pivotal publishers and events in American Bible printing history (such as Robert Aitken, Mathew Carey, and the Protestant-Catholic tensions in the East during the 1840s and 1850s) but also offers insightful analysis of how the publishers’ incorporation of diverse textual features to enhance its marketability inevitably fashioned an ideological interpretation of Scripture.

When one considers the monumental re-visioning of American Bible history that G. undertakes, it is not surprising that several vital issues are left largely unexplored (e.g. the critical role of non-English American Bible editions). Nevertheless, students of both American history and the history of biblical reception will find in this groundbreaking work a delightful secondary source that could meaningfully inform a variety of graduate or upper-division undergraduate religion or history courses.
THE RELIGIOUS ART OF ANDY WARHOL.

Since pop artist Warhol first appeared as a major player in the art world in the early 1960s, his apparent deadpan renderings of consumerism in which celebrities and supermarket products were treated equally was interpreted by many as the art of someone who criticized nothing and accepted everything. He seemed the least likely artist to possess a “spiritual” or “religious” sensibility. Yet Dillenberger asserts that Warhol was a deeply religious person; that this fascination with religion was a life-long interest, though he kept it hidden from the public for most of his life; and that it manifested itself most overtly in the art of his final seven years. D. ’s approach to Warhol is generous and sympathetic. This handsome volume supports her case convincingly through the splendid integration of text and well-chosen images of Warhol ’s art. It also includes photographs of the artist ’s youth and his boyhood as a member of a Catholic Byzantine Church in a working-class neighborhood in Pittsburgh, his volunteer work in a New York soup kitchen, and his New York bedroom, which had the ritual orderliness of a private sacred space.

D. uses the term “religious art” to refer to art with Christian themes and recognizable Christian symbols and subject matter. While Warhol’s first works to contain overtly Christian iconography were the large Cross paintings of the early 1980s, he had previously offered his own modern version of the “memento mori,” a favorite theme in European Christian art of the last 600 years. This theme appeared as early as the 1960s with his Disasters and Suicides series that featured car crashes, suicides, and the electric chair (D. likens the latter to a modern cross of the crucifixion). In the mid 1970s Warhol made a series of works in which the skull was the central image. His obsession with death grew in intensity after a near-death experience in 1968.

Warhol also produced art that included references to religious works by Raphael, Uccello, and Piero della Francesca, all of which are represented in D. ’s book. His largest series of art using overtly Christian images was the Last Supper series based on Leonardo’s painting, which Warhol worked on for the last three years of his life. D. devotes her final two chapters to the more than 100 works in this series and reveals how Warhol revived an image that had become moribund through its kitsch representations, as he brought it into a dialogue with some of his own personal issues as well as with the realities of the contemporary world in general. This volume will have to be considered seriously by any future scholar writing on Warhol, as it offers a new insight into the man known as the “pope of pop.”

TERRENCE E. DEMPSEY, S.J.
Saint Louis University


Interest in the interface between science and religion has been heating up recently, not only because our age is an age of science but also because Sir John Templeton has provided substantial financial stimulus. Sometimes such money is well spent. McGrath’s book is a happy example. M. comes to this work with all the background necessary. His undergraduate study was in quantum chemistry, his doctorate in molecular biophysics, his postdoctoral concentration in theology. His only limitation is a tight restriction to the Oxford–Cambridge scene.

M. provides a splendid survey of the entire field of the interaction between science and religion for readers who have little background in either. He begins with an examination of three of the major moments in the intellectual history of the subject, the revolutions associated with Copernicus, Newton, and Darwin. Strangely enough, relativity and quantum theory are not treated in this first go through but are handled in individual passages later, although Heisenberg never makes it explicitly. After the historical overtone M. looks at the
Almost every word of importance in this book is carefully explained when it first appears; I found only the term “dispensationalism” used without explanation. Every major author is introduced and evaluated. All classical controversies are well treated (except, as mentioned, the principle of uncertainty and whatever implications it may or may not have for religion). The book has a fair number of trivial misprints but only one obvious factual mistake. The discoverer of Ceres is given, not as the Sicilian Father Giuseppe Piazzi, but as J. E. Bode. Bode’s law did predict a planet in the asteroid belt for reasons still not understood, but Bode did not observe it. This is a superb text for an introductory course in this subject in an undergraduate or beginning graduate curriculum in theology or the history of ideas.

FRANK R. HAIG, S.J.
Loyola College in Maryland


In his first book, Morale de la Foi et Morale Autonome (1995), Gaziaux argued for a particular kind of moral autonomy represented more by Philippe Delhaye’s Scripture-based ethics than by Josef Fuchs’s more universal and less sectarian claims of a reason-as-natural-law ethics. In this book, G. provides a prequel to his earlier one by validating the philosophical and theological claims of the foundational concept of moral autonomy.

His argument is in two stages. In the first he presents the contributions of three writers: Kant, Steinbüchel, and Auer. He provides extensive commentary on each, though his attention concerning the latter two focuses almost exclusively on their respective works Die philosophische Grundlegung der katholischen Sittenlehre (1951) and Autonome Moral und christlicher Glaube (1984). These pages offer an illuminating, though verbose explanation of the historical evolution of the concept of autonomy in contemporary European moral theology.

In the second stage, G. demonstrates autonomy’s validity through the lens of critical contemporary philosophical and theological perspectives. From the former, after a Hegelian critique of Kant, he proposes an autonomy that appreciates the problem of evil. From the latter, he studies the concept’s relevance for faith and freedom, human creation and destiny, and sin and redemption, by presenting a fourfold theological evolution of autonomy as created, called, wounded, and freed. This remarkably profound work overlooks, unfortunately, the work of contemporary European moralists who have amended their support of Auer by insisting that the self-understanding of the autonomous Christian must always be constitutively relational. G. simply argues that freedom is the heart of the gospel message (685). Thus, the reader awaits a dynamic, though hopefully briefer sequel where love finds a place in G.’s autonomy agenda.

JAMES F. KEENAN, S.J.
Weston Jesuit School of Theology


Character, choices, and community could be given short shrift as the three C’s that function as indicators of contemporary society. Instead, they are scrutinized not only as inextricable from a whole body of Christian theology but also as critical to an individual’s moral life. Connors and McCormick, respected teachers of moral theology, have structured this book with the undergraduate student in mind. The chapters begin with vignettes that contain moral dimensions followed by thought-provoking questions; each chapter ends with a summary and several discussion questions. This approach successfully links the reader’s personal experience to the content of the text.
Character, choices, and community are analyzed individually in the opening chapters. However, references to all three are woven throughout the remaining chapters as well. This is the book’s strength because by this approach the authors consistently highlight how morality is not merely a matter of following rules and performing acts but a complex developmental process involving all of a person’s resources (imagination, reasoning, and emotions) as well as the full contextual content of the act. They also illustrate the strong interplay between the community and personal decision making. Although the community is necessary to help form and direct the individual, the individual should never be subsumed into the community. Instead, the individual must critically examine the structures of the community.

The authors display a broad knowledge of the moral life, including its psychological component. Interspersed throughout the text are excerpts from the works of many prominent theologians, scriptural passages, and excerpts from novels and other artistic works. The scope of information presented is impressive, but readers may get lost in the details. Nevertheless, with a skilled teacher/facilitator this book can serve as a valuable foundational work for a better understanding and greater appreciation of what is involved in moral living.

Marilyn Martone
St. John’s Univ., Jamaica, N.Y.


Berkowitz makes a plausible and well-documented case for a surprising conclusion: that the fathers of modern liberalism recognized virtue and character to be indispensable categories in political theory. However much Hobbes, Locke, Kant, and Mill preferred to emphasize freedom and liberty to the exclusion of a perfectionistic approach like that of the Aristotelian tradition, their attempts to expel the mistrusted concept of virtue invariably led to its readmission through some conceptual side door.

B. makes clear that he has one eye solidly trained upon the contemporary vicissitudes of the liberal order and its ambivalence toward virtue talk. His insight that liberals cannot avoid speaking about character (however much they might wish to avoid the subject) applies as much to the present as it does to earlier centuries. The freedom and equality cherished by liberals turn out to depend upon a citizenry that possesses particular qualities of mind and character: self-restraint, tolerance, the ability to cooperate. B. insightfully indicates how these character traits, while dealing with more mundane aspects of the good life than Aristotle’s description of the pursuit of the highest good, nevertheless require a theoretical defense of virtue talk.

Consistently fair-minded in tone, B. offers detailed analyses of relevant texts from four well-chosen political philosophers. Aspects of their writings that are often overlooked or brushed aside as idiosyncratic are here brought into more revealing focus. Without distortion or polemic, B. dissolves false dichotomies and corrects caricatures, especially regarding the moral psychologies of Kant and Mill. Recent debates about the public role of morality, character, and civil society witness to the perennial truth that virtue is a permanent concern of every regime, even avowedly liberal governments. In establishing that Hobbes, Locke, Kant, or Mill did not intend to do away with virtue or make questions of character obsolete, B. contributes to constructive conversation about both the means and ends of political life.

Thomas J. Massaro, S.J.
Weston Jesuit School of Theology


Rankka addresses a significant problem in the feminist critique of the Christian tradition, the relationship between Christian interpretations of human suf-
ferring as meaningful or redemptive and the oppression of women. Traditional interpretations are considered oppressive of women because faith-inspired endurance in the face of suffering is often construed as a distinctively feminine virtue, which can serve to reinforce women’s passivity in the presence of harm caused by patriarchal injustice. Christian theodicies are problematic for many feminists insofar as they link suffering to sin, because the female is often construed by this tradition as a source of sin or temptation.

R. carefully summarizes a wide variety of approaches to pain and suffering, theodicy, and feminist/womanist theological reflection on unmeritted suffering. Her own constructive proposal is dependent upon Wendy Farley’s understanding of the “tragic structure of reality.” Suffering, in this perspective, is not linked with human guilt but is viewed as the fundamental human condition requiring resistance and liberation. This, R. suggests, can generate a spirituality of suffering congenial to feminist insights that is both political and mystical. The political dimension is characterized by protest and resistance, while the spiritual aspect acknowledges dependence upon God’s delivering action in the inscrutable experience of suffering.

While R.’s development of categories suggested by Farley, Tiina Allik, and others has great potential for a theology of suffering, there are still some concerns that require further reflection. One concern is the potential for the two dimensions of her spirituality to be in conflict with each other: might protest and resistance, for example, generate a concern for autonomy that might undermine God’s mysterious, yet liberating role in the experience of suffering? Some attention to feminist views on suffering and eschatology might be helpful as well. R. delivers on her promises to lay the groundwork for a feminist theological retrieval of the religious significance of suffering. It is to be hoped that she and others will continue to build on these foundations.

BRIAN F. LINNANE, S.J.
College of the Holy Cross,

EMBRACING TRAVAIL: RETRIEVING THE CROSS TODAY. By Cynthia S. W. Crys-

Probing the mystery of the Cross can be forbidding. But Crysdale uses stories and examples (such as a horse trainer in Dublin) to situate the mystery of suffering within experience and thus permits readers to address the enigma experientially. Meanwhile she addresses assumptions about the value of the Cross. Rather than repeating the thesis of the Crucified One’s being slaughtered for humans, she poses the crucifixion as a symbol of human alienation from God. That alienation manifests itself in individuals’ lives, perhaps in sexual harassment, in society’s exploitation of the weak, or in bellicose peoples’ subduing of peaceful communities.

Every such “travail” or suffering prejudices the victims, even those who are believers, against the Good News of humans’ reconciliation with God. Thus victimized believers need to be culturally transformed so that they may appreciate the transforming grace that is given to victims of travail. C. uses Lon-ergan’s language of conversion in an effort to lead the reader to appreciate the metanoia that one can experience as a consequence of the grace that is given to those who suffer. Rather she proposes that the Cross symbolizes the integration of limitations and values that victims might be able to adopt as a response to that grace.

Some may consider C.’s use of examples and stories as the most signifi- cant value in this book, and may find the analytical sections more distant than the examples and stories. Nonetheless C. has achieved a degree of integration in her approach to suffering: she uses both her right brain in fashioning images and her left brain in analyzing experience. Many will appreciate that balanced approach.

DANIEL LIDERBACH, S.J.
Canisius College, Buffalo, N.Y.

Over the past century, Luke argues, advanced capitalist societies have evolved in destructive ways. With agendas dictated by those who control information and technology, they undermine democracy by lulling citizens into passive acceptance of consumer goods and government programs. Reliance on megatechnologies leads to profligate wastes of energy and resources, dangerous threats to the ecological balance of nature. Populist movements offer our best hope for reversing these developments by seeking to restore personal self-reliance, local community action, and environmentally sensitive, smaller-scale technologies.

Where Marx proposed a now outdated class division between capitalists and proletariat, L. highlights a new basic class division: populist groups versus a “new class,” the professional-technical experts who determine and control policies in government and in the global economy. But he offers little evidence for his claim that the activism of new populist movements “defines” class conflict today, at least if these movements are viewed as having broad enough political support to reverse current alignments of power.

L. draws most heavily on ecological populists for his critique of the prevailing dominant system and for his proposed populist alternative. Surprisingly he includes a chapter on the Unabomber, Ted Kaczynski, whose manifesto he believes contains many valid criticisms. In contrast, he views less favorably, as reflecting the bureaucratic polyarchy he opposes, the environmental studies by Albert Gore and by the World Watch Institute’s State of the World. His concluding chapters spell out a populist alternative, emphasizing voluntary simplicity and scaled-down technologies that respect the environment. L.’s critique contains very legitimate concerns, but his work seems aimed at a limited group of intellectuals who may already share his dire views of society.


Sheldrake’s latest contribution to the study of Christian spirituality is extraordinarily important and a helpful map of the current debates on the relationship between spirituality and theology. His central thesis is that “who God is and how God is disclosed are questions that lie at the heart of Christian faith” (3) and as a result at the heart of both theology and spirituality. S. examines the cultural challenges postmodernity makes to Christian spirituality related to these issues. He makes the point that the doctrines of the Trinity and of the humanity and divinity of Christ are central to Christian spirituality and cannot be bypassed. Building on contemporary theological reflection on the practical implications of trinitarian faith for believers, he shows both the importance of this doctrine for spirituality and the importance of spirituality for theology—how it is we speak about God.

S. also offers a history of the split between spirituality and theology up through the contemporary period. This section will be helpful to scholars entering the field of spirituality as a discipline but also to theologians who persist in dismissing the relevance of spirituality to theology. The final theoretical chapter joins the debate by representing the current positions of dominant European and American scholars in the field of spirituality and of a similar group of theologians who have engaged the question. S. argues to a necessary positive relationship between these two disciplines and the need to constantly consider the role of culture and context as well.

The remainder of the book consists of case studies on Julian of Norwich’s theology of the Trinity, an unusual comparison of spiritual freedom in Ignatius of Loyola and George Herbert, and the
role of “place” in human identity. Each of these studies illustrates S.’s thesis on the reciprocal relationship between spirituality and theology. Each example is carefully elucidated in its historical context and in relationship to the implications for living one’s faith. Like S.’s earlier volume, *Spirituality and History*, this one will hopefully shape the teaching of both theology and spirituality into the future.

JANET K. RUFFING, R.S.M.
Fordham University, New York


Modern pastoral theology and pastoral care have frequently been accused of substituting a psychological for a theological anthropology. Louw confronts this criticism by articulating a pastoral anthropology that focuses on the human person as a spiritual being (or charismatic person) responding to God’s saving Spirit. One of the strengths of his presentation is that this spiritual dimension is never separated from the other dimensions of being human, which the psychological and social sciences have so richly elaborated.

Another advantage of this pneumato logical approach is that it retains the dynamic quality of being human without succumbing to some form of “human potentiality” thinking. Rather, in L.’s view, the dynamism of being human is oriented toward a mature faith which has strong soteriological and eschatological implications. L. keeps both of these in a communal, cultural context to offset the impression that spirituality and salvation are private, wholly internal experiences. Cultivating such a mature faith is the goal of pastoral care and counseling. L. rightly identifies this as a complex hermeneutical task and describes several methods for making a pastoral diagnosis of a person’s image of God which respects the indetermination of that image and moves toward an experience of God as “soul friend” and “partner for life.”

While the majority of L.’s references are understandably European, the organization of the material is clear and comprehensive. Perhaps the biggest difference from an American style of presentation is the absence of case studies or clinical illustrations. However, as a theoretical exposition of the foundations of pastoral care and counseling, this is a solid contribution which leaves no doubt that pastoral theology is truly theological.

ROBERT L. KINAST
Center for Theological Reflection
Indian Rocks Beach, Florida


Welch utilizes a whole array of sources (jazz music to voodoo religion) to create an ethic that has stability but is open ended, one that does not base itself upon the exclusion of others as “bad” or the labeling of the self as “good.” She does, however, make moral judgments about behavior and, while eschewing absolutes, seems to absolutize her own judgments about sexism or racism. She sees multicultural education as the vehicle for her “process” of forming moral sensibilities in people.

Like all postmodernists, W. is acutely aware of the ambiguity and limits of reason. She is a “master” at naming and pointing toward the ambiguous in life and leaving us sit meditatively with such. The book is sympathetic to this thought: “goodness . . . is not a final or definitive resolution of some conflict, not obtaining or honoring a natural order, but rather an aesthetic of seeing and responding to conflict, chaos and ambiguity” (50).

Throughout the book W. states her desire not to judge per se but simply to help people “see” better through multicultural education. Ultimately her goal is the articulation of what she calls an ethic without virtue. In this ethic we simply come to appreciate life as finite and ambiguous. We strive to be “de-
cent” to one another in the face of evil, and no religion or ideology can assure us that injustice will ever be overcome. W. concludes by rooting her ethic in “joy.” This book represents a postmodern feminist voice that critiques not only feminist thought but also any philosophy that tries to lodge itself in an enduring rule, tradition, or nature.

JAMES KEATING
Pontifical College Josephinum


Gross, who describes herself as a radical feminist Buddhist mid-Western farm girl, is the author of the influential Buddhism after Patriarchy. She has also been a leading figure in the Society for Buddhist-Christian Studies and other interreligious dialogue groups. Now she has published a collection of essays given at different times and places over the last ten years.

The first section, “Becoming a Feminist Buddhist Scholar-Practitioner,” has to do with the autobiographical dimension of feminist method, its ramifications for the feminist critique of Buddhism, and the study of Buddhism in American universities. The second series of essays, “Soaring and Settling,” addresses social issues from the perspective of “engaged Buddhism.” G. writes about authority structures within Buddhism, environmentalism, natalism (she is “deeply suspicious of people who need and long to reproduce biologically”), consumerism, and children’s rights. The final set of essays has to do with the development of a Buddhist “theology” as an alternative to the religious-studies approach to Buddhism entrenched in American universities.

Christian readers should be aware that G. has not written an introduction to Buddhism and should look elsewhere for insight into basic Buddhist teachings. Her essays, however, are grounded in her personal appropriation of the Dharma and her practice of Tibetan Buddhism. In addition, these essays are not representative of either Asian or Western Buddhists. Much of what she says will trouble or offend mainline Buddhists. These comments notwithstanding, G. is an important example of an emerging Buddhist “theology” that is constructive, critical, and correlationist. Her essays will be of importance to anyone interested in seeing feminist method at work within a religious tradition other than Christianity.

JAMES FREDERICKS
Loyola Marymount University, L.A.


During the patristic era, both liturgical rites and the realities they symbolized were referred to as mysteria. By selecting this title for a collection of previously published and unpublished pieces, Lutheran scholar Senn indicates that pastors and liturgists must attend to both the inner and outer dimensions of church ceremony.

The chapters are gathered into four sections devoted to the spoken word, liturgical actions, communion practices, and the implications of stewardship. In successive chapters, S. argues that an important dimension of Christian preaching is cultural transformation, that the Easter season is ideal for sermons on the sacraments, that sacred meals and sacrifices have more in common than is commonly realized, that the liturgical presentation of gifts needs serious attention, that communion policies present significant but different challenges to Protestants and Catholics, that churches practicing infant baptism need to examine the possibility of infant communion, and that Protestants need to develop greater sensitivity with regard to the care of eucharistic elements outside of liturgy.

S.’s approach is deliberately ecumenical and not heavily theological. He respects Catholic, Lutheran, and other Protestant practices, asking only that the various traditions be both honest and self-critical about the justification of their church practices. He avoids the mistake, common before Vatican II, of...
taking a confessional position and judging the practices of other denominations accordingly. For the most part, however, he also avoids questioning what churches usually do at worship from the perspective of a nonliturgical theology. Perhaps it is too much to ask a liturgical scholar to criticize the theological assumptions behind institutional practices. For those concerned with understanding liturgical history and current practice, however, S. offers much that is informative and insightful.

JOSEPH MARTOS
Spalding University, Louisville


This collection of previously published and slightly revised essays by a “philosopher of religion” makes a sustained argument not only for the independence of the scientific study of religion from theological and religious concerns, but also against any legitimacy for theology in religious studies in the secular university: “[T]heology, when it commits itself to the existence of the Ultimate, constitutes a form of religious thought which cannot complement the academic study of religion but can only ‘infect’ it” (155). W. repeatedly claims that the theological control of religious studies in the North American academy has obstructed the development of a truly objective and scientific discipline, the “Science of Religion.” He also argues that even the “humanistic” approach dominant in the American Academy of Religion does not serve “the objective, scientific study of religion” (272), a study that should generate “genuine explanations of religious phenomena” (292).

If the only way to study religion were to explain (away) as no more than the effect of nonreligious causes (to the exclusion of “understanding” religious phenomena hermeneutically, humanistically, or theologically), if the only form of knowledge were scientific knowledge, if the only kind of university there could be were the rationalist “Enlightenment” university, if all “religio-theological concerns” could be purged from all study of religion, if all advocacy could and should be expunged from the university, if we could be certain that nothing beyond the realm of science could ever contribute to understanding religious phenomena, then W.’s normative arguments that the science of religion should be the methodology in religious studies would be more persuasive than they are.

W. represents well an important “minority view” in religious studies. The book belongs in library collections that support advanced study in religious studies and theology.

TERRENCE W. TILLEY
University of Dayton, Ohio

BOOKS RECEIVED

SCRIPTURAL STUDIES


Dictionary of Judaism in the Biblical Period.


HISTORICAL


De Ribas, A. History of the Triumphs of Our


SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY


Burch, S. Collective Absolute Presuppositions: Tectonic Plates for Churches. N.Y.: Lang, 1999. Pp. 120. $34.95.


MORALITY AND LAW


Curran, C. Moral Theology at the End of the
BOOKS RECEIVED


PASTORAL, SPIRITUAL, AND LITURGICAL

Bloch, J. New Spirituality, Self, and Belong-


PHILOSOPHY, OTHER DISCIPLINES


