Since the publication of The Bible in Human Transformation in 1973 a growing number of biblical scholars has come to accept Walter Wink’s thesis that historical criticism does not serve the interests of most readers of Sacred Scripture. However, there is no agreement on what to do about this situation, which is surely one reason why historical criticism retains a virtual monopoly in academic circles.

Fowl’s highly articulate presentation might be called neoorthodox. On the one hand, he rejects the position held by both traditional orthodoxy and historical criticism that “biblical texts have a meaning,” and that “such meaning can be uncovered through the application of some set of interpretive procedures” (33–34). He believes that Paul’s “counter-conventional pattern of interpretation” (133) still has a place in the Church today. Using the analogy of the early Church’s acceptance of uncircumcised Gentiles, he sees the possibility of a move away from Christianity’s traditional condemnation of homosexual practices.

However, F. is quite traditional in his view that the Bible is the Church’s book and can only be appropriately interpreted by Christian communities as “part of their ongoing struggle to worship and live faithfully before the triune God” (178). Ad hoc use of the results of historical criticism can be made on the analogy of the plundering of the Egyptians (Exodus 12:35–36), and F. concedes that the guild “still does a much better job of forming its members to read in particular ways than the church currently seems to do” (189). However, “[s]cripture simply cannot be understood apart from a community’s ongoing struggle to embody its interpretation in the aid of faithful, obedient living” (152).

Apart from a critique of deconstruction, F. shows little awareness of the influence of modern literary criticism on biblical interpretation. Where reader-response criticism speaks of “stories of reading,” F.’s second chapter is entitled “Stories of Interpretation.” I miss any sense of the dynamics of the reading process. Engaging Scripture does not deal with how Scripture engages us. F. states flatly that “the authority of scripture is not a property of the biblical texts” (203). Consequently, counter-conventional interpretations “always rely on the authority of the interpreter” (144), or, in psychological terms, the ego. The Galatians’ experience of the Spirit had to be “interpreted by Paul” (134).

F. recognizes the problem with his refusal to treat textuality “as if it were an agent.” “[H]ave I not . . . simply reduced biblical interpretation to its theological, ecclesiological, social and institutional determinants? Have I not really eradicated the possibility that interpreting the biblical text might
transform individuals and communities in ways that the social contexts of those interpreters could not have anticipated?" (60)

F. also recognizes that his ecclesial approach runs up against not only historical criticism but also "a general cultural disposition that religious belief is a private individual matter" (201). The Canadian writer Timothy Findley has said, "Books, like dreams, are essentially private realms. Nothing should be allowed to detract from each person's right to read a book privately and to interpret it freely in the light of what each person has experienced and knows of life."

There is no obvious reason why the Bible should be exempted from this generalization. Private interpretation became an option with the invention of the printing press and the spread of literacy, and it received a powerful, if unintended, boost from the Protestant Reformation. Edward Edinger has stated, "The numinous reality of the psyche will no longer be carried by religious communities—the church, the synagogue or the mosque—but instead it will be carried by conscious individuals." This shift will have to be taken into account if the Bible continues to be read in the Age of Aquarius.

St. Michael's College, Toronto


This book presents twelve separate essays, commenting eight texts from the Pentateuch, the Prophets, Wisdom, and Psalms, written in dialogue by two French leaders in biblical and hermeneutical research. We are treated to an utterly honest example of two approaches to the Bible, in direct comparison one to the other: (1) an exegetical approach in which a profusion of juxtaposed ideas, images, symbols, and the many forms of injunctions are explored in their wealth and confusion, with all the multiple interrelations between their parts, enabling us to read the text with a new awareness and feeling and to perceive through its ancient words an otherwise ineffable mystery; and (2) a philosophical approach in which one hones a wealth of images down to sets of precise and univocal concepts in order finally to lay bare those intersections of human understanding and divine mystery that have generated both the text and subsequent recognition of its truth.

The authors presuppose the traditional conclusions of historical-critical research into the Old Testament, and they expect readers to be somewhat familiar with that material. Their discussions are frequently structured on debates with relevant scholars, mostly exegetes and rabbis for Lacocque, often thinkers like Kant, Hegel, Freud, and Levinas in Ricoeur's case. The authors have read each other's text, and have made their diverse reflections reflect each other. A substantial preface presents the argument for taking Wirkungsgeschichte into account in the following studies, and in part for the use of reader-response interpretation theory.
The first section is presented as dealing with Genesis 2-3, but eventually deals with beginnings throughout the Bible, and with the capacity of human reason and of revelation to reach out to God through such concepts. The second section focuses on the commandment “Thou shalt not kill,” but both authors immediately place it in the context of the attempted murder of Isaac at God’s command in Genesis 22, and from this platform they jump into explorations of the forms and nature of law, especially of the first commandment, and other related biblical contexts, and they dissect with a fine scalpel the implications of divine/human love and of loving even one’s enemy.

A third section studies the vision of the bones in Ezekiel 37. Lacocque presents that vision in the context of a very penetrating and variegated study of the whole book and theology of Ezekiel (for example, when life comes to the bones it will not be resurrection or restoration, since Israel, in Ezekiel’s description of it, has never really been alive; rather it will be a beginning of a real salvation history), while Ricoeur offers a precise hermeneutical analysis of time and of affirmation in prophetic oracles versus time and affirmation in eschatological discourse, and of the symbolisms of life and death. A similar treatment is then given to Psalm 22, occasioning a rich study of the problem of evil throughout the Bible.

Next, the Song of Songs is discussed. Lacocque reads it as a provocative text which is derisory of those biblical traditions that make love a metaphor for the relation between God and Israel, Ricoeur engages in a detailed discussion of this position, in terms of the wide theory of interpretation. In this section R. leans heavily on the work of other exegetes, particularly Paul Beauchamp and Anne-Marie Pelletier. He first establishes the predominance of literary meaning in the Song (characterized by indeterminateness—the constant movement, the non-identification of persons throughout, the shifts from dream to reality, from metaphor to physical body) over the historical meaning of its author (which he characterizes as narrative coherence and narrow univocal meaning). Then he provides a very searching study of allegorical interpretation, both patristic and modern, and intertextual interpretation, which he describes as “intersecting readings.” Readers familiar with French philosophers will enjoy this more. R. proceeds as though the words and metaphors of Scripture (rather than its affirmations and effects) were inspired, and hence were to be compared and contrasted within a systematic conceptual framework so that new thoughts might arise and objects created about which the authors may well never have thought. Thus theology develops on the basis of reading texts, rather than on the basis of life experience and the whole range of theological resources. The diverse affirmations of scriptural texts and the unique revelation that each can occasion risk being lost in this approach.

There follows a joint study of Exodus 3:14 (“I am that I am”) and two further essays by Lacocque dealing with Genesis 44 (the Joseph Story) and Zechariah 12:10 (“et aspicient ad me quem transfixerunt”). Finally there are indexes of passages and authors.

This is, then, a series of studies of particularly rewarding Old Testament
passages, following a methodical procedure that includes everything from minute textual work to the most subtle philosophical analysis and leads to a very rich mix of results. It is brilliantly done. By its strategic choice of texts and by the breadth of discussion around each of them, this book provides a satisfactory and challenging introduction to the Old Testament, which could be useful for graduate students. If one regrets anything about this book, it would be that no chapter was added in which conclusions were drawn. Is this to be read as a demonstration of some things that can be done with biblical texts? Or is it intended to be a statement about a right way of approaching the Bible?

Concordia University, Montreal

SEAN MCEVENUE


The trial to which the title of this book refers is not the test which God gave Abraham, but the scholarly judicial process to which Delaney submits the Abraham story. She allies herself with those interested in dismantling patriarchy and so takes the most “patriarchal” story of Western civilization to demonstrate that it is based upon cultural constructs which are reflective, not of natural roles, but of misunderstood biology. The story exemplifies and legitimates a hierarchical structure of authority and consequently must be examined closely. D. believes that she has undermined the religious “defenses” of the story “by showing that all of them rest on similar assumptions about paternity and gender that, in turn, are integral to the theological meaning.”

D. does not present the chapters as a kind of sorites, but as facets of the same basic argument. This means that each chapter has a discrete existence: the case against Abraham; the reality of child sacrifice in the Bible; the theological defenses which Judaism, Islam, and Christianity mount; the unconvincing testimony of an unlikely amicus curiae, Sigmund Freud; and reflections on the social legacy of the Abraham myth. There is also a chapter on a case of a contemporary father who murdered his child in response to a supposed divine mandate. Each chapter presents imaginative and scholarly viewpoints to bolster the central argument of the book.

And what is that argument? First, that the story is really about gender, and that the focus should be on the theory of procreation which underlies the story. That is, the father’s seed is the child’s true source of life; the mother is simply a receptacle for the seed. In this theory, which D. calls monogenetic, the principle of creation is symbolically masculine. Now God, the symbolically masculine creator, demands obedience from Abraham, a surrender of his power over the life of Isaac, and Abraham as a result of his willingness, his passing the Isaac test, receives power back from God and male authority is for ever after invested with sacred powers. The story justifies a cosmological perspective which Judaism, Islam, and Christianity embrace and share; namely, their worlds are inherently patriarchal.
The argumentation is puzzling at times. For example, there is a whole chapter devoted to proving that most of the scholarly world is wrong about the reality of child sacrifice at the time the Abraham story took place. The evidence D. adduces does not seem convincing, but it does not matter, for “regardless of whether the story of Abraham represents the end of the practice of child sacrifice, religious interpreters have had to valorize Abraham’s willingness to offer up his child. For this is the theological point of the story” (107). Then the argument goes on to assert that child sacrifice should not be the context for interpreting the story anyway. Then why spend all these pages discussing it? This instance points up the questions of how myth or legend is related to historical reality in its birth and how to determine exactly what myth’s legacy is. D. uses the term “legitimizing” to connect the myth with social consequences. But juxtaposition of ideas is not proof of connection, and legitimacy and legacy are concepts too vague on which to hang a thesis.

In the concluding chapter D. sketches some of the connections between patriarchal power as epitomized in the Abraham story and the ways in which children are sacrificed today, for example, through physical and sexual abuse, poverty and the welfare system and war. She does not say that religion is essentially or primarily about abuse but rather about power and authority. But the abuse of that power, justified in some way by the Abraham story, is what patriarchy is all about.

Abraham on Trial is complex, sweeping, and, in this reviewer’s judgment, unsatisfactory. There are too many loose ends. D. has dealt with a myth which, she asserts, though not the cause of abuse and the poor treatment of women, nonetheless provides their justification. She claims that the chapters are not meant to form an argument built up layer upon layer, but she does heap up information, argument, and assertion in the expectation that it will elicit a guilty verdict for a sort of theological patriarchy. Alas, it adds up to a mistrial.

Boston College
Edward M. O'Flaherty, S.J.


The significance of Jesus’ teaching for the moral life of Christians remains a matter of dispute among contemporary scholars. While some maintain that his life and teaching have everything to do with Christian ethics, others argue that they are of little or no consequence. Aware of this dilemma, Spohn seeks a middle road, proposing that Jesus does play a normative role in Christian ethics because the story of his life serves as a paradigm for those who would follow him as disciples.

Making use of the New Testament, virtue ethics, and spirituality as the sources for his ethical project, S. views Jesus as the concrete universal of Christian ethics, by which he means that the particular life of Jesus has
universal meaning. Then, employing the categories of perception, disposition, and identity, he shows how Scripture, virtue ethics, and spirituality can be appropriated in the Christian life so that Jesus becomes the concrete universal for believers.

Inasmuch as it adopts an interdisciplinary approach, S.'s project differs from other books which try to define the relationship between Jesus and the moral life of believers. Moreover, its subtitle is somewhat misleading, since readers will not find here a descriptive account of Jesus' ethics, a summary of the Sermon on the Mount, or a discussion of Jesus and the Mosaic law. Rather, S. focuses upon Jesus' moral vision as revealed in his proclamation of the in-breaking kingdom of God.

However, the book's title, taken from the Parable of the Good Samaritan, provides an accurate description of S.'s purpose. Contemporary disciples who would follow Jesus must make use of the analogical imagination to discern the contemporary moral significance of the biblical text rather than slavishly imitate Jesus' actions. This may be good advice for mature believers who know how to employ the analogical imagination, but it does present problems for novices, and it leaves the door open to multiple interpretations of the same text without providing a way to adjudicate among them. Recognizing this difficulty, S. emphasizes the importance of classical spiritual practices such as lectio divina, meditation, and participation in the Eucharist for training believers in the moral life so that they will correctly exercise the analogical imagination.

S. rightly focuses upon the importance of the biblical narrative for the moral life of believers, especially the story of Jesus, and he makes an important contribution when he argues that there is a intimate relation between the narrative about Jesus and virtue ethics. It is somewhat surprising, then, that he does not deal more fully with the narratives of one or more of the Gospels. In my view, a discussion of Jesus and ethics must wrestle with the narratives of Jesus that each of the evangelists presents. Thus I would find contemporary research about the historical Jesus less helpful than S. does.

It is difficult to categorize this work, and perhaps this is an indication of its subtleness. Though well informed by contemporary biblical studies, especially research of the historical Jesus, it is not a book on New Testament ethics. Though written by someone who is an ethicist, it is not entirely a book about ethics. And though it has extensive discussion about spirituality, it is not simply a book about spirituality. Rather, its interdisciplinary approach shows how the moral vision of Jesus, virtue ethics, and traditional spiritual practices reinforce and depend upon each other, and how all three are necessary for understanding the relation between Jesus and ethics. S.'s work, then, is an exploratory essay that demonstrates how scholars can refresh their areas of specialization by crossing boundaries.

Catholic University of America, D.C.  
Frank J. Matera
Royalty addresses one well-focused question: How did the audience of the Apocalypse of John hear the abundant references to wealth in this work—the wealth of the risen Jesus, that of the heavenly court, that of the great city Babylon/Rome, and that of the New Jerusalem?

Investigating wealth motifs in the world of Revelation's audience, Greco-Roman literature and culture, R. finds that Revelation reflects the Stoic attitude toward wealth, i.e., rejecting not wealth as such but the attachment to wealth; that the depictions of the heavenly throne room parallel depictions of Hellenistic and Roman monarchs and courts; that commerce was held in low esteem, especially when compared to inherited and established, landed wealth; and that wealth motifs could function both in praise and blame in epideictic rhetoric about cities. In short, while the imagery of Revelation comes from the Hebrew prophets (especially in laments over commercially rich Tyre), the themes of the Apocalypse reflect the discourse of Greco-Roman culture.

Against that background, R. judges that the purpose of Revelation was to change the way Christians saw their social world: “As slaves of God, Christians are slaves of the most powerful and wealthiest monarch. Their God is not only wealthier than Caesar, but the wealth of heaven is superior to the wealth of Rome” (149).

How does this analysis of the world of the listeners illuminate the passages in Revelation where wealth imagery dominates the text? R. finds that the messages to the Smyrnans and the Laodiceans present Christ as a moral philosopher (Stoic) inviting the addressees to focus their hopes on the “true” wealth of the heavenly city. The portrayal of Babylon/Rome as a harlot and the description of the fallen city draw upon the Hebrew prophets' treatment of Babylon and Tyre as a thesaurus for his imagery, but the technique is a collage of invective, not pesher-type exegesis. Babylon/Rome is painted as loaded with evil wealth derived from commerce.

The vision of the New Jerusalem draws on biblical images of Jerusalem restored, especially Third Isaiah and Tobit, but endows it with an opulence far greater than the city has in that tradition. R. observes that it is a wealth untainted by commerce; rather it is the inheritance of those “slaves of God” who have suffered at the hands of Babylon/Rome because of their faithful witness.

All of this makes good sense. But R.'s thesis that John’s vision of the New Jerusalem is a real spatial city, rather than a symbol of the fullness of Christian community with God, fails to convince this reader. For the depiction of the city as bride of the Lamb only makes sense within the tradition of the people Israel as spouse of God. And the most opulent image of all, the city portrayed as an enormous golden cube (something like the Great Wall of China squared and as tall as 260 stacked Everests)
demands symbolic interpretation. That remarkable image becomes intelligible as an allusion to the one gold-lined cubicle in Scripture, the Holy of Holies (see, for example, 1 Kings 6:20). This understanding fits John’s description of the heavenly city as the dwelling of God with his covenant peoples (plural!) and the assertion that there is no temple in the city, “for its temple is the Lord God the Almighty and the Lamb” (Rev 21:22).

R. faults Eugene Boring for allowing his theological reading to filter out the strong ideology of the text (227) but he himself seems sometimes, as on this point, to be guilty of quite the opposite. Still, in its thorough survey of the wealth motifs of the Apocalypse’s rhetorical environment, this study makes an important contribution to our incremental explication of that document.

Creighton University, Omaha

DENNIS HAMM, S.J.


Keck’s impressive work examines the way in which belief in angels came to permeate medieval Christian society as deeply as belief in evolution steeped ours. K. observes ironically that the contemporary mind focuses on simians to understand human nature; the medieval mind focused on seraphic and cherubic angels. While most books overlook the social, professional, and pastoral contexts of this topic, K. ’s lucid, integrated “summa angelologiae” impressively fills this gap. Because Bonaventure not only synthesized but also deepened the scriptural, patristic, pastoral, and liturgical legacies he received, he is deftly employed as the heuristic figure around which K. integrates an astonishing amount of material.

K. shows that Scripture provided the basis for medieval angelology, especially when read anagogically. (I found his treatment of the parabolic and allegorical reading of Scripture [52–53] confusing.) Competing heretical beliefs and practices also spurred the desire for a deeper and orthodox penetration of angelic mystery. Both the nearly comprehensive Sentences of Peter the Lombard and pagan philosophy enabled the shift from the monastic to the Scholastic view of angels. The monks saw themselves in terms of the angels and studied them to lead a deeper spiritual life. The Scholastics also linked their speculations to the spiritual needs of the faithful, but did so with great theological precision and subtlety. For them, the angels are Stoics in affection (except during the crucifixion), Aristotelians in epistemology and metaphysics, and Neoplatonists in their hierarchy of being and illumination.

K. ’s exposition of the social-political consequences of angelology is fascinating. On the one hand, because of the atemporal, hierarchic nature of the angels, they became the ideal models of stability and harmony which should exist in society, religious orders, the Church, and the state. If Scripture teaches that the Church is to judge the angels and that angels are above secular rulers, then the Church is above secular rulers and can judge them. Moreover, against the attacks of the secular masters at Paris, both
Bonaventure and Aquinas used angelology to defend not only the legitimacy of their mendicant orders but also the validity of papal supremacy.

On the other hand, the historical role of the angels—especially of those found in the Book of Revelation—sometimes laid the ground for revolutionary ecclesiastical movements and even military activity. The Franciscans understood both Francis of Assisi and themselves in terms of the angels. This prompted them to ask if they were to lead the Church into the Joachite age of the Holy Spirit, into the age of seraphic contemplation, into an age of a transformed or even a replaced Church. The cult of the warrior-saint, Michael, helped to christianize the crusades and played a prominent role in the often violent conversion of the Nordic people. K. notes, too, that as emphasis shifted from St. Michael to the Virgin Mary, social values became more important than military ones. Theology and its concomitant practices do have consequences.

That the angels strengthen Christians in time of trial, illuminate their minds, and inflame their wills seems to K. to correspond to the threefold mystical path of purgation, illumination, and union. However, K. correctly sees that one rarely finds stories of angels directly assisting Christians along the mystical path. Still, the angelic hierarchies did provide some of the language and concepts used for expressing the mystics’ often intense and unmediated experiences of God.

K. may have overstated the role played by ambition in the great subtlety and precision of the angelology of the great Scholastics. I suspect that their holy love of learning—especially in the service of the faith—as well as the power of the Scholastic method itself account for their extraordinary theological acumen. Also, it would have been helpful if K. had provided more information about the Condemnation of 1277. He defends the Parisian theologians’ investigation of the minutiae of angelic existence because of their legitimate concern for the ministering role of angels in the economy of salvation. Thus Rabelais’s parody of the question “How many angels can dance on the head of a pin?” (never put that way by the Scholastics, as K. notes) was misplaced. However, I suggest that the Scholastics were also not adverse to asking questions for fun, an exercise similar to contemporary verbal play, e.g., the BBC’s “My Word.”

After reading this scholarly book, it astonishes me how much more meaningful the angelology in the sacraments I administer has become. If I were to recommend one book on angels, K.’s impressive “everything you wanted to know about angels but were afraid to ask” would be the one.

Boston College

Harvey D. Egan, S.J.


Fichtenau is an acclaimed Austrian medievalist whose work on the Carolingians and on the tenth century is well known. The present book is
perhaps more daring, since the matter of twelfth-century intellectual life has been hotly debated ever since Charles Homer Haskins's *The Renaissance of the Twelfth Century* (1927). R. W. Southern's *Scholastic Humanism and the Unification of Europe* (Blackwell, 1995) appeared too late to be included in this book. Whereas Southern sees the twelfth century as marked by a tendency towards clarity, F. appears to approach things with a keen eye for ambiguousness, as he wants to investigate the possible connection between the spread of popular heresy and the growing academic interests of the age. Despite his challenging task, F. rises to the occasion, and the result is a fine analysis of European culture in the period.

The initial title of the German book was *Ketzer und Professoren*. It reveals how the word for heretic (*Ketzer*) originates with the movement of the Cathars, an important heretical undercurrent in southern France. Their plight has tended to dominate the scholarly debate, which may be the reason why F. finds it necessary to discriminate carefully between non-Cathars on the one hand and Bogomils and Cathars on the other. His analysis is especially appealing, because he offers us a methodological discussion on heresy as well. In it he deconstructs the various conspiracy theories through which earlier scholars had tried to suggest (rather than prove) that latent Bogomil influence or hidden Manichaean traces contributed to the spread of the Cathar movement. F. shows instead how, starting from the eleventh century, the clergy came under ever closer scrutiny. One may connect this to the growing interest in the role of personal conscience. When the population found the clergy wanting in integrity, they would turn to the so-called *perfecti*, self-proclaimed teachers who appeared to offer a way of life in which the discrepancy between faith and practice was absent.

As F. demonstrates, the problems of twelfth-century intellectuals did not have much to do with heresy, even though Abelard and others were repeatedly accused of it. Chartrian authors such as William of Conches and Thierry of Chartres were interested primarily in grappling with the intellectual legacy of Platonic myth. Rather than offering myth as an alternative for orthodox doctrine, however, as the Cathars did, they tried to harmonize Plato's *Timaeus* with Christian doctrine. The creative thought of the Chartrians had a stimulating effect on twelfth-century culture, especially in the area of natural science, even though Plato would soon pass the mantle to Aristotle. The twelfth century saw an increase in religious spirituality as well, as can be demonstrated from such figures as Bernard of Clairvaux and Hildegard of Bingen.

"The ratiocinative mode of thought emerged slowly from the shadows of spirituality. There now arose a speculative theology, at home ever less in the monastic community and ever more in the academic one" (223). This points to the transition to Scholasticism, which is the subject of the book's final chapters. The focus here is on the division of academic theology into a speculative and a moral branch, tasks that were formerly subsumed under philosophy and poetry. In a so-called look ahead, F. ends with the development of 13th-century Scholasticism, which seemed to gain in analytical strength, even though it would lose in creative complexity. While Scholas-
ticism in the 13th century appeared to succeed, at least for a while, in closing the gap between orthodoxy and heresy, it did so at the risk of losing some of its former encyclopedic humanism as well.

The danger of heresy and the challenge of academia are the two aspects which make the period from 1000 to 1200 such an exciting period in the development of European culture. It is F.'s accomplishment not just to have studied them in tandem, but to have done so with the aid of sufficient scholarly skill and imagination to avoid simplification.

_Utrecht University, The Netherlands_  

_WILLEMIEN OTTEN_


When exegesis moved from the monastery to the university in the 13th century, the primary goal changed from spiritual inspiration to exposing the literal sense of Scripture as a basis for teaching theology and preaching the faith. The university exegetes were known as "Masters of the Sacred Page." Thus Aquinas's exegesis of the book of Job was a notable departure from the tradition originating with Gregory the Great's _Moralia._ Whereas Gregory and subsequent commentators on the Book of Job had focused on the central character as a model of patience, Aquinas's basic concern was to ground the doctrine of the providence of God in the meaning primarily intended by the words of the text. This meaning may be found either in the proper sense of these words or in a figurative usage. The suffering of a just man posed the problem of providence in an especially acute manner.

The present work is a clear, careful study of Aquinas's exposition. Chardonnens is a Discalced Carmelite engaged in works of theological and spiritual formation in Switzerland. Although the book is not explicitly identified as a doctoral dissertation, his expression of gratitude to a mentor at the University of Fribourg and the absence of evidence of any prior major work by him point to this.

C. situates the teaching of this commentary within the broader corpus of Thomistic theology and compares it with other works of Aquinas, notably the _Summa contra gentiles._ He first explains how Aquinas understood his twofold task as exegete and theologian and how these two aspects mutually complemented each other. He lays out Aquinas's general understanding of providence in the book of Job as the divine plan [ratio] ordering all things to the perfection of the universe and to God, the supreme good and last end of every being. Although human beings are all frail and beset with many sufferings, they are of special concern to divine providence. For they do not reach their last end in this life, but are destined to eternal life through the resurrection.

Moses Maimonides had interpreted the conversations between Job and
his friends as an exposition of different philosophical positions on the providence of God. Aquinas follows him at least to the extent of viewing Job as disputing with his friends from the standpoint of reason. Job, however, according to Aquinas, considers his own view as ultimately inspired by God and a datum of faith and wisdom.

In yielding to divine inspiration Job must acknowledge the inadequacy of what he had said earlier. God subjects Job to questioning so as to convince him of his ignorance. Then he leads him into the final truth of the matter. The presence of evil and suffering is connected with the work of Satan, the source of Job's sufferings and the source of human damnation. The final justification for the suffering of the innocent person is found in the resurrection from the dead.

Job's journey of faith leads him to a final encounter with God where he acknowledges his own weakness and ignorance in contrast to the power and omniscience of God. He no longer speaks foolishly but places himself before God as a humble petitioner, seeking, asking, and imploring. His sufferings and God's revelation have led him to a sphere beyond words, where he recognizes the inadequacy of the former knowledge he had of God through hearing, and humbly receives the deeper knowledge and communion with God through a kind of seeing.

C. makes clear that besides the contribution Aquinas makes to the particular question of the meaning of the book of Job, we should recognize the importance to the history of exegesis in his emphasis on the literal sense of Scripture and his use of all means available to him to discover that meaning. This is a major advance to which even contemporary theology and exegesis are indebted. The development of Aquinas's thought in this work also makes clear the degree to which he is always the theologian, even at his most metaphysical; he is always striving to understand the saving truth of the mystery of Christ.

Jesuit School of Theology, Berkeley

JOHN H. WRIGHT, S. J.


Brock here offers a study of the philosophy of action grounded in the writings of Aquinas and located within the context of contemporary analytic philosophy. This study is primarily a constructive theory of action, understanding "action" broadly to include the activities of nonrational creatures, and considering human action, or conduct, as a special case of action more generally understood. At the same time, B. also offers an interpretation of Aquinas's theory of action that draws on the full range of his writings, in the process clarifying some of the more obscure aspects of that theory.

Considered both as a philosophical study and as an interpretation of
Aquinas, this is a first-rate book. Aquinas's writings have already had some influence on the analytic philosophy of action, primarily through the work of Anthony Kenny and Alan Donagan, and thanks to their influence there are already some points of contact between Aquinas's theory of action and contemporary theories. These provide B. with starting points for a wide-ranging engagement with the leading philosophers in this area, including Ludwig Wittgenstein, Elizabeth Anscombe, Roderick Chisholm and Donald Davidson. The resulting account of causality and action offers a distinctive and worthwhile contribution to contemporary philosophy, as well as providing an illuminating reading of Aquinas.

B.'s central thesis, as the title suggests, is that we can only adequately understand human action if we see it as a particular case of action more generally understood. Action in the more inclusive sense, in turn, must be understood in terms of two aspects, efficacy and finality. Taking his starting point from Aristotle's analysis of agency in the *Physics*, and taking Aquinas as an interlocutor throughout his argument, B. develops a sophisticated analysis of an action as a principle of relationship between an agent of change and the object which undergoes change. On this view, actions cannot be understood apart from some consideration of their immediate effects in some patient distinct (logically, if not actually) from the agent. Moreover, as B. goes on to argue, this further implies that all actions, and not just human actions, must be understood in terms of some finality, that is to say, some aim which sets a criterion for determining whether a given action is complete and successful or not.

This line of analysis calls for a reconsideration of many widely held assumptions about both human action and processes of change in the physical order (and that, of course, is why it is so interesting philosophically). On the one hand, it implies that human actions cannot be understood in purely mental terms, which has important consequences for the ways in which we individuate and describe our acts, as well as implying that moral goodness cannot have itself as its own primary object. On the other hand, it also suggests an alternative to dominant accounts of causality as a purely mechanical process.

From the standpoint of a moral theologian, the last chapter on *praeter intentionem* is of particular interest. B.'s analysis and defense of the doctrine of double effect gives new interest to a doctrine that has been widely considered to be defunct, and his treatment of Aquinas's account of the kind of disorder involved in sin helps to clarify an important and difficult set of passages. His analysis of the involuntary will be particularly controversial, since on his view an involuntary (putative) action is not a complete human action at all. While this sounds paradoxical (as he admits), B. makes a good case for it.

It will be apparent from this summary that B.'s study is a contribution to the growing literature on analytic Thomism. But unlike some practitioners of this genre, B. is also a careful and faithful expositor of Aquinas's writings. His interpretations of Aquinas are grounded in a close reading of the texts, drawing extensively on Aquinas's Aristotle commentaries as well as
his theological writings. B. brings Aquinas into a dialectical conversation with contemporary thought, showing how Aquinas's writings suggest new and fruitful approaches to our own independently formulated concerns, even as current philosophy offers illuminating new perspectives on difficult aspects of Aquinas's thought. The result is philosophically informed interpretation at its best. There are of course limitations to this approach. B. does not attempt to place Aquinas's thought in its own intellectual context, and his remarks on related issues of moral theology are necessarily schematic and incomplete (as he acknowledges). However, this is not a criticism; no book can do everything, and B.'s lucid and illuminating analysis offers much of value to both intellectual historians and theologians, as well as to philosophers.

University of Notre Dame

JEAN PORTER


Admirers of Peter Ackroyd's earlier biographies—the brilliantly compelling Dickens, radiant Blake, and sympathetic T. S. Eliot—meet in his life of More a study somewhat different in tone. One might describe his voice in this new volume with words he selects to characterize More as a "perfect lawyer": "skilful yet detached, cautious as well as theatrical, persuasive and practical in equal measure" (56). More is the sober but vivid chronicle of a man whose nature and education required him to renounce secular glory in order to stand witness ("martyr") to the truth that the heavenly kingdom must be valued above earthly ones, and God and the Catholic Church above powerful but unruly kings. To analyze More's complex, sometimes paradoxical nature and the volatile Tudor world that tested it, A. appeals to many sources. (One recalls his remark about Dickens, that it "is very thoroughly researched. I have a kind of complex about discovering everything there is to know . . . probably because I realise just how much cannot be known.")

A.'s research yields the portrait of a man of integrity whose martyrdom became inevitable. More's passion for order, his adherence to the virtue of obedience, reverence for law and hierarchy, devotion to medieval culture, and intense personal piety ultimately disposed his willingness to die for "the unity and traditional authority" (332) of what was popularly called the old faith. More's canonization is noted in the last line of the book, but the reader comes to appreciate his special holiness early on as A. describes More's conduct of a mixed life of public service and private devotion. "To be effective in the world," A. speculates, "even while playing a part, is the mark of an unusually clever man. . . . It is likely that [More] was galvanised and excited by the affairs of the world even, or especially, when he realized their emptiness" (202). Earnestly assuming his role as Henry VIII's advisor, he would resign it with courage and wit when conscience demanded.
He was "wholly a courtier" (183), but one who once longed to be a monk, who memorized the *Imitation of Christ*, and secretly wore beneath the rich robes Holbein paints him in as Lord Chancellor, a painful hair shirt, first donned at eighteen as a cure for what he deemed unbridled sexuality. Robert Whittington's *Vulgaria* (1521) describes his character in lines familiar to us as modern playgoers: "a man of marvelous mirth and pastimes and sometimes of as sad gravity . . . [here Whittington quotes More's devoted friend Erasmus] a man for all seasons" (289).

A. is an earnest apologist for aspects of More's character that might now seem unappealing or less than saintly. He admits that More was "an ironical if not sarcastic husband" (145) but reminds us that he took the education of women seriously and considered them peers to men in native intelligence. He describes More's determination to cast out heresy and hunt down those who owned banned books. More approved of burning and A.'s descriptions of the victims's executions as "living books of heresy" (301) are properly horrifying. At the same time, he assures us that, in his era, More's actions "were not exceptional" (303) and indeed, there were few burnings at More's hand. Especially rewarding is A.'s vigorous literary analysis of More's attack on Martin Luther: the joyfully insulting, grossly scatological *Responsio ad Lutherum* which he was commanded to write and which was called "the greatest heap of nasty language . . . ever put together" (227). In the cause of Christian unity, the elegant author of *Utopia* could be violently impudent.

One misses in this biography the warmth and even tenderness of tone that Louis Martz's *Thomas More: The Search for the Inner Man* brings to a description of More's family life and the rhetorical *schola* More established to teach his beloved children. That curious detachment which A. attributes to More largely characterizes his book, even at the moment of More's martyrdom. Nevertheless, it significantly reveals his habit of mind: that of a medieval lawyer to whom both English and canon law were sacred and related. Once—ironically—designated Keeper of the King's Conscience, More died, A. argues, for what his king tried to deny: the divine origin of the papacy and, with it, an anciently established vision of order and truth.

*Georgetown University, D.C.*

JUDITH FARR


McClymond offers a strong work of interpretation that demonstrates a clear grasp not only of the theological and philosophical issues surrounding Edwards's thought but of the secondary critical literature on Edwards in the 20th century. Specifically, he considers Edwards an "apologist" whose primary interest was the articulation and defense of the unique "spiritual
perception" apprehended by the Christian believer. These two terms, how­ever, require further qualification to see M.'s point. By "apologist" he neither suggests the classical definition of someone who uses alien philo­sophical concepts to justify his or her faith, such as Justin Martyr, nor the more contemporaneous (vis-à-vis Edwards) understanding of someone who advances the claims of faith through logical and empirical proofs that fall within the acceptable bounds of rationality, such as Joseph Butler. Rather, Edwards was an "implicit" apologist in the sense of his concern to take on the "various intellectual disciplines of his day" and delving "back to their fundamental principles" in order to "reconstruct the very disciplines themselves so as to make them congruent with Christian truth as he understood it" (7). By "spiritual perception" M. understands not only the subjective experience of faith, but also the whole moral and theological vision. Therefore, Edwards's religious thought "constantly shuttles back and forth between a preoccupation with the experiential manifestation of God and an impulse toward cosmic integration centered on the idea of God" (5). Of these two themes, the first is more original, and (as M. asserts concerning Edwards but is perhaps more true of his own work) what he says about the theme of spiritual perceptions is "coopted" by the theme of apologetics (5).

While M. seems certainly right concerning the so-called apologetic ap­proach Edwards takes in several of his writings, there are points at which this interpretation appears somewhat problematic. There are at least two tests of an interpretation of an author's work: comprehensiveness and perspicacity. In terms of comprehensiveness, M. admits that his interpret­ation leaves aside Edwards's sermons, which in his opinion lack "sufficient scope," his ecclesiastical writings, which were "occasional works," and his Original Sin and Freedom of the Will, which were "not nearly so central to Edwards's lifelong intellectual concerns as is commonly thought" (5-6). The unwillingness to take account of these works is somewhat troubling, for one might ask whether the apologetic approach reflects Edwards's main concern. Moreover, the omission of these works affects the outcome of the test of perspicacity, for those works develop doctrines that could account for Edwards's approach equally as much as, if not more than, a supposed apologetic interest. Particularly in Chapter 4, M. suggests that Edwards's dissertation, Concerning the End for Which God Created the World (1765), presents a picture of God as having an "aristocratic demeanor" ultimately deriving from Aristotle's conception of a "great-souled" person that pro­vides the basis for the moral principles of noblesse oblige and proportionate reciprocity (61). This is provocative, but one wonders whether or not the more substantive point of interpretation might be from Edwards's doctrine of charity that he developed in a series of sermons entitled Charity and Its Fruits and preached in 1738.

Perhaps, given these questions concerning interpretation, it is best to remember that M. offers, as his title suggests, "an" approach to Edwards rather than "the" approach to Edwards. The approach he offers does pro-
vide an interesting and stimulating treatment of Edwards and the uniqueness of his theocentric vision.

Yale University

WILLIAM J. DANAHER, JR.


The thought of Mircea Eliade has received an increasing amount of attention especially since his death in 1986. Many of his ideas have been criticized for various reasons. However, in recent years several authors have responded to these criticisms, which Eliade himself never adequately addressed. Allen's work is a welcome contribution for those who seek a critical appreciation of Eliade's understanding of myth and religion. A. believes that Eliade's theory of myth must be viewed in the larger context of his theory of religion, which includes Eliade's notion of the sacred, his theory of symbolism, his views of history, etc. In addition, A. appraises some of the recent scholarship concerning Eliade and refers to biographical details of his life, each of which assists in providing a better understanding of Eliade's thought. Indeed, these elements combine to make this an excellent resource as an overview of Eliade's thought for those who are teaching or studying his corpus.

A. begins with an analysis of Eliade's "antireductionism." He argues convincingly that Eliade's sensitivity (or, in some cases, his oversensitivity) to theorists of religion who reduce the sacred to biological or psychological processes is fundamental to understanding Eliade's approach to myth and religion. Eliade is allergic to any endeavor to reduce the sacred to something else because for him the sacred is by nature irreducible. Eliade's position has provoked a considerable amount of criticism. A. is not uncritical of Eliade's antireductionism, but he allows the reader to view Eliade's vehement maintenance of the irreducibility of the sacred in a more sympathetic light. (This issue is pertinent for the theologian because, at least according to Eliade, the history of religions and theology share the common presupposition of the irreducibility of the sacred.)

In the main body of the text, A. provides us with an overview of the major themes in Eliade's corpus: the dialectic of the sacred, nature and cosmos, and symbolism. There is an interesting discussion of Eliade's attitude towards Christianity in A.'s discussion of nature and cosmos. In general, Eliade's attitude towards Christianity is ambiguous. It is commonly understood that he preferred non-Western religions and "archaic" religious forms. It should not be surprising that the "Christianity that most interests Eliade is the agricultural-based, nature-oriented, antihistorical 'cosmic Christianity' of eastern European peasants" (112). In other words, while certain aspects of Romanian Orthodox Christianity intrigued Eliade, he preferred the religious expression displayed by the Romanian peasants and their "cosmic Christianity."
It may seem odd that in a series on mythology the author does not address the topic of myth explicitly until Chapter 7. However, anyone who has studied Eliade knows that specific aspects of his theories are better understood in relation to the whole of his thought. Since many of Eliade’s insights are intuitive rather than systematic, A. states correctly that “one cannot understand Eliade’s theory of myth without understanding his general theory of symbolism” (180).

The study of myth is inextricably connected to Eliade’s presuppositions concerning history. A. spends two chapters surveying Eliade’s antihistorical attitudes and the primacy of nonhistorical structures. He remarks that Eliade had a personal angst and resistance to “historical time” and preferred sacred, mythic time. However, it is impossible to determine how much of Eliade’s partiality for nonhistorical time influenced his subsequent reflections on history. In any event, A. concludes that Eliade consistently makes “normative antihistorical judgments” throughout his work. He defends this tendency in Eliade by suggesting that there is a basis for an interaction between the historical and nonhistorical components in his thought. That is, A. has “tried to show that interpreters who simply classify Eliade’s approach as antihistorical do not appreciate the complexity of the historical-nonhistorical interaction in his interpretations” (260–61).

The final two chapters address Eliade’s thoughts on modernity. In particular, A. addresses Eliade’s thoughts on a cultural and spiritual renewal. The latter involves a political and philosophical renewal of Western culture of grand proportion, to be brought about almost exclusively by the history of religions. Wary of some of Eliade’s “ontological moves” at this point, A. concludes that some of his presuppositions are “too narrow and too limited” (322).

Regardless of whether or not one agrees with every aspect of A.’s critical overview of Eliade’s essential thought, the reader is left satisfied that his treatment has been careful and comprehensive.

Regis College, Toronto

JOHN D. DADOSKY


Volume 1 of this five-volume series narrates the preconciliar history (1959–1962) of the Second Vatican Council. The present volume takes the tale up to the opening session and through the first intersession, from October 11, 1962 to September 29, 1963. It is the work of eight authors, chiefly Italian and Flemish, but including the American Gerald P. Fogarty. Andrea Riccardi launches the project with a detailed recounting of the baroque ceremonial executed at the council’s opening. I was reminded of what an old Roman hand predicted to me in early 1961, that it would be a
“TV” council, all show and no substance. The eventuality, beginning with Pope John XXIII’s opening attack on the “prophets of doom” showed how wrong the Roman expert was, and these volumes spell that out in occasionally excruciating detail.

In the event, none of the previously planned council documents survived in their intended forms. They were set aside or redone in what the authors term the “second preparation,” during which theologians mainly from central Europe collaborated with a number of their bishops to fashion a new agenda. It began at the very opening session when Cardinal Achille Liénart called for postponement of elections to conciliar commissions until the Council Fathers were better acquainted with one another. Liénart’s proposal was accepted, unlike a similar request made in 1869 at the First Vatican Council by Archbishop Peter Richard Kenrick of St. Louis. There is a detailed description of the study groups that formed, their interactions and contributions. Bishops began to assume responsibility for the council, reflecting a consciously collegial understanding of the role of bishops in the life of the Church. It was very different from the understanding that had controlled the preparatory commissions and produced their schemata.

The authors have made good use of official records and private documentation. Among the latter are the often crude reminiscences of Monsignor Joseph C. Fenton of the Catholic University of America, an outspoken protagonist of Cardinal Alfredo Ottaviani, the chief opponent of the Central Europeans and their allies.

The agenda for both sides involved the schemata on liturgy, on revelation, and on the Church. During the period of second preparation major alterations were proposed in all those areas, and structural changes were made in the management of the council. There is no doubt that the authors’ sympathies are with the forces of change and progress, but their opponents are fairly represented. It is unfortunate, as Alberigo admits, that no German collaborators were obtained. They would have enriched an already splendid tapestry. But the work is still monumental, even without their participation.

Syracuse, New York

JAMES HENNESEY, S.J.


“Spirituality is in vogue today,” reads the opening sentence of Marmion’s study (xxxix), and with this vogue has come a plethora of literature on the subject and a great variety of interpretations of just what spirituality means, ranging from “new age” self-help therapies to very ancient Buddhist meditation techniques. M. narrows his focus to Christian spirituality and explains why, within this still quite broad spectrum, his specific focus
is the spirituality of Karl Rahner. He wants to rediscover the lost connection between spirituality and theology, a loss detrimental to both, and he contends that Rahner has made an invaluable contribution toward reestablishing this connection. To bolster this contention he sets out on a two-fold task: to ascertain what Rahner means by "spirituality," and to demonstrate the underlying unity of spirituality and theology in Rahner's thought. By and large he succeeds admirably.

How did spirituality and theology get disconnected in the first place? It was not always so in Christian tradition and M. gives a brief historical review of this tradition to explain how the disconnection came about. Anchoring this written tradition in Paul, he points out that the English word "spirituality" has been traced back to the Latin translations of the Pauline terms *pneuma* and *pneumatikos*. In Pauline theology these terms are contrasted with flesh (*sarx* or *caro*), but do not stand in opposition to body (*soma* or *corpus*). Spirit is that aspect of human nature that is open to God's Spirit, whereas flesh represents whatever opposes this influence. "The opposition is thus not between the incorporeal and the corporeal, but between two ways of life" (5). In Paul's view, the spiritual person is every believer who has personally appropriated the effects of the Christ-event, the event in and through which the Spirit has been "poured out" and summons the believer to action and to a new attitude.

M. details developments in subsequent centuries that were to change Paul's understanding in three important ways. First, with developments in the 12th and 13th centuries the spiritual came to be understood in opposition to the realm of the bodily and the material. Second, by the end of the 13th, theology and spirituality had become entirely dissociated. Third, by the end of the 17th century, spirituality had become altogether interiorized and privatized, signaling an elitist distinction between ordinary Christians and the life of perfection reserved for the few. Reversing these developments and returning to the original sources is the accomplishment of the present century, and it is M.'s thesis that Rahner made a major contribution to this undertaking.

The foundation of Rahner's spiritual thought and of his theology, as well as of the intrinsic interrelationship between the two, is the firm conviction that God is accessible to ordinary human experience. Experiential knowledge arises from "the direct reception of an impression from a reality (internal or external) which lies outside our free control" (112). It is contrasted with conceptual knowledge wherein the knower is an active agent, subjecting the object to critical investigation and discursive thought. The difference is readily apparent in the difference between experiencing love or fidelity in one's actual life and knowing their abstract definitions. These examples also make clear that experiential knowledge includes interpretation. But since God is not one entity among others or one object of knowledge among others, but is the "source" or the "horizon" of all finite realities, so the experience of God is mediated by the experience of these finite realities. It is, nonetheless, a genuine experience of God.

M. sees this emphasis on experiential knowledge as one of the major
influences of Ignatian spirituality on Rahner, and closely allied to experiential knowledge is Rahner’s use of the term “mysticism.” The mystic is the believer who has had an experience of the realities of which faith speaks and is not exclusively dependent on hearing about them from without. In this anti-elitist understanding every believer can and should be a mystic and, Rahner says, in the future will have to be.

There is, however, some ambiguity in M.’s treatment of this “mysticism of everyday things” which for Rahner is real mysticism. But M. distinguishes it from “a genuine mystical experience” (66); he speaks of gradations of religious experience, “ranging from ordinary experiences of grace to more mystical experiences” (122); he speaks of “an experience of transcendence” and “higher ‘mystical’ forms of infused contemplation” (226). The terminology is inconsistent, and M.’s use of the term “return to self” to explain an explicit experience of transcendence (67) is confusing. It is a technical Thomistic term (reditio completa in seipsum) and accompanies all knowledge; it does not mean “going inwards” in the sense of “introspection” (185). But these are minor terminological problems in an otherwise fine study of Rahner’s spirituality.

Fordham University, New York William V. Dych, S.J.


All roads in theology either converge upon or take their departure from the topos of revelation. So central is that concept that it is probably the main reason why theology has become an orphan in the secular academy. For nearly all scholarly inquiry presupposes a naturalistic worldview, whereby every event in nature is caused by nature. Yet the concept of revelation challenges that assumption root and branch. It not only presupposes a God who can (must?) be known through channels other than that provided by the natural world; it also assumes a particular act of God inside the context of nature and history—which means that some tribes, groups, cultures are vouchsafed this revelation while others, presumably, are not. Nature by definition is universal, but revelation is not.

So ever since the Enlightenment, thinkers of a universalistic cast of mind have taken exception to the concept of revelation, explicitly labeling it both superstitious, because it violates the seamless web of nature’s cause-effect nexus, and obscurantist, because it assumes God’s partiality favoring one ethnic group over another. These objections have now become so prevalent that they have given birth to a shorthand term for this problem, “the scandal of particularity.” And insofar as particularity is a scandal, revelation is called into doubt.

For these reasons, no Christian theologian can afford to ignore this theme, least of all Balthasar, whose entire thought can be viewed, at least
from one perspective, as an attempt to answer the scandal of particularity. The scholarly world is therefore singularly fortunate to have Chapp's fine monograph summarizing all of the major themes of Balthasar's theology touching on the concept of revelation.

Although C. does not cover the last part of Balthasar's trilogy *Theologik*, he covers the rest of Balthasar's writings pertaining to this theme in a manner both manageable and insightful. C. rightly stresses Part 1 of the trilogy, the seven-volume theological esthetics, because here Balthasar directly takes issue with the scandal of particularity, trying to resolve it using explicitly esthetic terms.

C. correctly calls "illegitimate and ill-conceived" any Christian theology that "sees in the historical particularity of revelation a stumbling block to universality" (111). But how is that the case? If the Enlightenment wrongly presupposed a conflict between universality and particularity, how can that be shown? Because, as esthetics rightly teaches, "form, especially in its higher spiritual levels, always expresses more than what goes into the thing formed itself" (122). No one denies, for example, that Shakespeare needed to draw upon predecessors and materials already popular in the culture in crafting his own dramas. But theatergoers tend to prefer the more finished product of Shakespeare's craft than those plays he might have drawn upon (e.g. Thomas Kyd's). Somehow Shakespeare makes his plays look like the "end in view" toward which the other materials were heading, however unbeknown to themselves. And that insight affords Balthasar the opening for resolving the scandal of particularity, as C. describes it in perhaps the most important passage of his monograph: "Part of the enjoyment of aesthetic perception is precisely understanding each of the antecedent causes in its own individual telos and to see the genius involved in weaving together disparate antecedent 'components' into a new whole—a whole which forces no 'part' to violate its own inner integrity while it is being 'taken up' and 'used' in a higher synthesis. The 'indissolubility' of form can, therefore, be synonymously expressed as its nonreducibility" (119).

Correlative to the scandal of particularity (mostly an Enlightenment issue), a more internal issue also animates any theology of revelation: the tension between positive and negative theology. Here too Balthasar's esthetic theology can point the way toward the resolution of this tension. Readers will not be surprised to learn that for Balthasar negative theology cannot be used like Penelope unweaving her shawl each evening to undo what positive theology has just said about God, for that would be to follow the same move made by the Enlightenment scoffers at Christian revelation. As C. rightly points out, there is often an exaggeration of the apophatic aspects of theology in a misguided attempt to develop a theology of world religions that reduces all revelation to unfathomable mystery. "This leads to a diminution of the role of the positive and particular aspects of revelation and eventually turns all revelation-based religion into glorified religious philosophy" (17).

C. has written a lucid and fluent work of analytical prowess and abundant insight. He has read deeply in Balthasar's works and knows the issues
to highlight and the right quotes to cite. There are some minor misprints and stylistic infelicities, and C. tends to put too many terms, usually perfectly ordinary ones used in ordinary ways, in quotation marks. Occasionally certain clichés of the Balthasar secondary literature creep in, such as the assertion that Balthasar has adopted a “from above” Christology, or that his philosophy is “neo-Platonic.” These are common criticisms or observations in the secondary literature, but I do not believe they can be justified by the texts; in fact many texts directly refute these unthinking assertions.

More puzzling is C.’s conclusion which seems to accept Rahner’s criticism of Balthasar’s “esotericism,” presumably a shorthand term for Balthasar’s famous reliance on the mystical insights of the Swiss physician Adrienne von Speyr. But early in the work C. gives a vigorous defense against these same charges and later quotes Balthasar on the necessary esoteric moment in all Christian theology worthy of the name. But for a clean and pleasant exposition of this most important theme in Balthasar’s theology, C.’s work cannot be bettered; it will take its place as an essential holding in theological and research libraries.

Regis University, Denver

EDWARD T. OAKES, S.J.


If only for the methodological turn he represents, Küng is one of the most important Catholic theologians of this century. And Härting has written the most important book on him to date. That he could do so is due in no small measure to the fact that he has read virtually everything Küng has ever written and was at his side when Küng wrote some of his most pivotal books. H. was Küng’s assistant at Tübingen for some ten years, before becoming professor of systematic theology at the Catholic University of Nijmegen in the Netherlands. He admits candidly that he owes his academic career to Küng. He is sympathetic in his reading of Küng, but not uncritical. The same candor compels me to acknowledge that Küng was my Doktorvater at Tübingen, and that H. sat in on my final oral examination (the rigosom) to monitor and guarantee the fairness of my examiners, a task he discharged most conscientiously. The same conscientious concern for fairness imbues this book.

For reasons I cannot fathom, the publisher decided to omit the word “boundaries” in the translation of the original German title. His thesis is that Küng’s entire theological enterprise has been one of breaking through boundaries: first between the churches, then between believers and non-believers, and for the last 20 years, between religions. He does not simply summarize the oeuvre Küng has produced these last 40 years; he singles out the problems and discusses the hermeneutical and methodological points
which have proved decisive in the development of Künig’s theology. Except for a brief discussion of the 1979 withdrawal of Künig’s missio canonica, this is a book of theology, not biography.

Despite its volume and the variety of topics it has engaged, Künig’s theology exhibits a consistency that goes back to his ground-breaking work on Karl Barth and justification. Künig’s theology is preeminently ecumenical, by which H. means: capable of dialogue (as opposed to debate, and therefore open to self-criticism); intent on change (reform of the churches); and responsible for reconciliation (overcoming the schisms between the churches and the hostility between religions). As in his book on Barth, Künig follows up careful reading and analysis with probing questions—not reproaches which invite counterattack, but questions which invite self-appraisal. H. suggests that part of the “tragedy” of Künig’s career is that his “principle of enquiry” and the self-appraisal, which are by now second-nature to him, are often misunderstood as attacks inviting counterattacks. H. invites suspicions of being disingenuous when he suggests that perhaps self-criticism “asks too much of some people” (59).

H. is not always so indirect. He can be quite explicit in his criticism of Joseph Ratzinger (for seeing Künig as symptomatic of an emergency in theology, endangering the faith) and Walter Kasper (whom he accuses of not doing his homework on the nature of hermeneutics). H. joins Künig in accusing Kasper of methodological inconsistency in trying to do an ontological Christology “from above” at the same time as a Christology “from below.” For both the author and his mentor, one cannot proceed in two ways at the same time.

H. recognizes that Künig can be a polemical and impatient critic, and perhaps too often a visionary who simplifies too much. But those are not the faults that have caused Künig his difficulties, in H.’s opinion. Künig’s problems lie rather in his view of revelation (the person of Jesus, not propositions) and his dialogical (not static) concept of truth: look for the truth in the other’s error, and look for the error in your own truth. At the core of Künig’s theology are not timeless statements or formulae (with their Hellenistic or medieval stamp) but the Gospels and their “dangerous memory” of Jesus, the “canon before the canon.” For Künig, unlike Luther, there is no one article of faith by which the Church stands or falls; being a Christian is defined not by a doctrine (not even justification by faith) but by discipleship.

The theses Künig honed in On Being Christian and Does God Exist? he now tests in his dialogues with the world religions. Doing so, he transcends the Hellenistic and medieval paradigms of the past and attempts to forge a Christian theology responsive to a postmodern world still dangerously riven by religious strife.

This is more than a book about Hans Künig. It is about Catholic theology in the last decades of the second millennium, with its interplay and clash of two theological worldviews. Künig, like it or not, has come to represent one of those worldviews and Ratzinger the other. H. writes as an insider who
knows both protagonists and the issues well. I only wish the publisher had graced this valuable book with an index.

Saint Louis University


Gunton’s study turns on three basic themes: creation as object of faith, creation out of nothing, and creation as the work of the Trinity. Christian faith in creation is not “one instance of a general belief in creation” (8) but a distinct “revolutionary” (9) understanding of God’s free and loving action. If there is a basic mistake in the history of creation theology, G. argues, it is the constant linkage of Christian faith to Greek cosmology, which would make creation faith somehow accessible to human reason. It is this mistake that has obscured the specifically Christian doctrine of creation out of nothing and leads to either pantheism or dualism. In addition, this mistake leads ultimately to conflicts between theology and science. The only way to avoid such a mistake is to profess a trinitarian origin of creation. The authentic Christian doctrine of creation, therefore, holds that God freely and lovingly creates through the incarnational dynamic of the Son and the patient, perfecting power of the Spirit.

In the “conversation between two different but interacting worlds” (24)—Christian faith and Greek philosophy—that makes up the history of creation theology, Irenaeus emerges as a “model theologian” (2) who, in his struggle against Gnosticism, most nearly captures the Christian notion of a good creation, created out of nothing, through the mediation of God’s “two hands, the Son and the Spirit” (54). For most of the history of Christian theology, however, the trinitarian understanding of God’s creative activity has been held in a kind of “Babylonian captivity” (116). While it emerged with some vigor in Luther and Calvin, its full retrieval after the Reformation was begun only by Barth, and continues today in the work of Pannenberg, Jensen, and G. himself. G. treats a range of topics from this rather provocative historical perspective: creation out of nothing, the creation of time, theology and science, divine providence, humanity as the image of God, and Christian ethical obligations in a created world. G.’s theology of creation is a vision of a thoroughly good creation misdirected by sin but under the constant influence of God’s redemptive activity in Christ and the perfecting activity of the Spirit. To be human is ultimately to be drawn into relationship with God through God’s “two hands,” and to live by an ethic “according to which human life is ordered appropriately to both the personal and the non-personal creation” (210).

This is a lucid, comprehensive, and learned book, and the reader will find it filled with wisdom. G. is right to remind theologians of the trinitarian—and thus uniquely Christian—foundation of the theology of creation and
indeed of all theology. His discussions on religion and science, providence, the image of God, and ecology are all greatly enriching. From a Catholic perspective, however, some objection might be raised to the suspicion of analogical thinking that runs through the entire work. In addition, some of G.'s characterizations seem to be a bit unfair. He speaks, for example, of a "pantheist undertow" (120) in Aquinas's thought. And he accuses medieval theology of neglecting the trinitarian dimension of creation but makes no mention of Bonaventure's thoroughly christological and indeed trinitarian thought. Yet, despite some reservations, Catholics will discover an engaging dialogue partner in this author and this work.

Catholic Theological Union, Chicago

STEPHEN B. BEVANS, S.V.D.


The problem of evil is a paradigm of the Enlightenment challenge to religion, and David Hume's discussion of the problem in the Dialogues concerning Natural Religion has provided the framework within which a great deal of the modern discussion among analytic philosophers of religion has taken place. For this reason, O'Connor can refer to the "standard debate" with considerable confidence that those of his readers acquainted with the field will understand the broader context of his discussion.

The upshot of O.'s careful and highly technical analysis of the challenge that the existence of evil presents to "orthodox theism" is a deflating call for detente: "[I]n the last analysis, theism and atheism are rival Weltanschauungen, mutually inconsistent at a deep level, with neither one capable of either refuting the other or seriously undermining it. If I am right about this, then, overall, the Hume-inspired, bilevel argument in this book has been, in its essence, an argument for that intellectually tolerant, live-and-let-live view" (236). And given O.'s starting point in the standard debate, such a conclusion should not surprise anyone. Perhaps what it should do is raise serious questions about the presumptions of the discussion in the first place.

O. distinguishes between the logical problem of evil and the empirical problem. The former proposes a logical inconsistency between the existence of evil (or at least a certain kind of evil) and the existence of God. The latter's more modest claim is that the presence of evil in the world counts against the existence of God. His own approach proposes a "reformed" logical problem of evil, differing from the standard formulation (attributed to J. L. Mackie) in a number of ways. His use of the term "reformed" suggests a relationship between his discussion and the "reformed epistemology" introduced into the philosophy of religion by Plantinga and others, but if O. means to suggest such a relationship, he does not spell it out.
Orthodox theism, the target of O.'s formulation of the problem of evil, is described as the cognitive core of belief in God. It consists not only of the bare claim that God exists, but a good deal about God's relation to creatures and the purpose of creation. The author is to be commended for his recognition that there is a difference between orthodox theism and belief in God, although his characterization of the relationship between the two is contentious: that the former is implied by the latter, although the converse is not true. It is here that the vulnerabilities of the standard discussion begin to manifest themselves. For orthodox theism, as O. formulates it, is a series of putatively factual claims that have, singularly and in conjunction, definite truth values. This begs all kinds of questions about the reference of God-language and the meaningfulness of dispassionate discussion of religious claims.

After granting that some natural evil must be present in any world that can produce beings capable of moral development, much of the discussion revolves around whether a particular type of evil, designated "natural evil inconsistent with God" (11), is present in the world. This in turn requires extended discussion of possible worlds with its attendant problems of their ontological status. One particular difficulty, which O. does not discuss, is the coherence of comparing worlds in which God exists with worlds in which God does not exist. This problem is a consequence of the presuppositions of the standard debate and, since O. accepts those presuppositions, it is perhaps unfair to chastise him for this lack.

The book is uncompromising in its demands on the reader. There are at least seven different concepts of natural evil introduced, each with its own acronym. The reader's work would have been considerably simplified had the publisher provided somewhere in the book a list of abbreviations and acronyms, but in the absence of such a list the reader is forced over and over to page back through pages already read to verify that the understanding of a particular usage is correct. But O. has also provided us with a remarkable amount of material in compressed format, something that will well serve readers who want a compact discussion of a dominant strand in contemporary analytic philosophy of religion and are not afraid of some hard work.

Marquette University, Milwaukee

T. Michael McNulty, S.J.


This tightly argued volume may prove to be a very influential work of moral philosophy. Although the topic of moral justification (what makes an act morally right or wrong and why) has been thoroughly explored in recent decades, Scanlon presents some original lines of argumentation from a contractualist perspective. The key to his viewpoint on moral evaluations is the ability to justify our judgments to others. Can we present our
arguments to others in terms that they could not reasonably reject? If so, then our judgments about actions (whether omissions or commissions) are right and necessary, and therefore constitute part of "what we owe to each other."

If the reader detects shades of Kant's categorical imperative here, it is no accident. S. at once acknowledges a great debt to the Kantian tradition and distinguishes his "reasonable acceptance" standard from Kant's criterion of the "conditions of rational agency." To the Kantians' charge that he has lapsed into heteronomy, S. pleads guilty, justifying his chosen course on the attractive grounds that "other aspects of our lives and relations with others" (6) call for a broader view of moral requirements. Succeeding chapters illustrate how agreements among people (promises, responsibilities, common projects that generate loyalties) serve to underlie morality, rather than resting upon a preexistent morality.

S. is not unaware of the tangle of issues knit around this avoidance of metaphysical claims in establishing the basis for morality. In an insightful final chapter that constitutes a worthy capstone to his enterprise, he stakes out a nuanced position in the debate between relativists and universalists. While he distances himself from any simple relativism that would flatly deny the applicability of a single standard for appraising moral activity, he maintains that his brand of contractualism must allow for a healthy pluralism of standards. In a move reminiscent of Michael Walzer's moral theory, S. acknowledges the existence of a central core of moral requirements that come inevitably to be interpreted in various ways in diverse societies and cultures. He stands up for the authority of ideals because "there are certain judgments of right and wrong that hold everywhere," including arguments that "people in any society could reasonably reject" (348).

Most readers of this journal would take issue with S. for rejecting the theist's claim that what is right and wrong is independent of what people (individually or collectively) accept. A subsequent and worthwhile debate might well proceed over the question of how values (whether articulated in terms of desirable states of affairs such as human well-being or respect for centers of value such as obedience to God's will) properly ground our moral activity and principles. Although S. rarely mentions arguments derived from belief in God, his middle chapters are a fine place to start a dialogue between contractualists and their theistic interlocutors. Indeed, S. supplies us with a thoughtful discussion of some sources of disagreement (the distortions caused by excessive loyalties and self-interest) and reflects insightfully on the nature of the persistence of disagreements in our evaluations of reasons for acting.

Catholic readers will likely find affinity with S.'s challenges to utilitarian and consequentialist arguments. S. finds it objectionable that so much of contemporary moral theory uncritically accepts "desires" as the principal motivating force in human behavior, as if desire alone supplies us with sufficient reasons for acting as we do. It is refreshing to see his exploration of the role of reason within a larger and compelling account of rationality,
motivation and justification, even if several of his claims invite rejoinder and demand further nuance.

This would be a more helpful book if S. were a bit more frank about the debts he owes to his predecessors. There is a lot more Hume, Kant, Habermas, and Derek Parfit in these pages than is explicitly acknowledged, and more frequent reference to their writings would clarify the treatment of numerous issues encountered in the course of S.'s main argument. Despite displaying much welcome originality, S. is not creating a new landscape but following the contours of a well-mapped terrain. Bernard Williams emerges as the primary opponent of S., and it is perhaps wise that S. segregates into an appendix a long response to Williams's claims about subjective conditions rather than external reasons accounting for all of our moral judgments.

For a serious work of moral philosophy, this volume is quite user-friendly, employing frequent insightful illustrations and colorful examples and a minimum of technical jargon. S. is conscientious in presenting a clear roadmap that guides us through each chapter, and the destination justifies the expedition.

Weston Jesuit School of Theology

THOMAS MASSARO, S.J.


"Blessed are you poor, for yours is the kingdom of God" does not mean that it is a good thing to be poor. Neither does it mean that the poor are somehow more virtuous than the rich. The poor in some romanticized or idealized sense do not exist. But it does mean that God wants to change those situations that create the oppression of the poor. The question is: What is God doing (theopraxis)? or, What is God doing in Christ (Christopraxis)? The problem is that contemporary theology has reached an impasse because of its unconscious repression of the God who became poor in Christ. Theologians are "blind guides" to the extent that they ignore or repress Jesus' own identity as the "other."

In developing this theme, Rieger employs as a "conceptual framework" the insights of Jacques Lacan, a French philosopher and psychoanalyst, to provide "an analytic perspective, a mirror, in which we can observe structures of authority and power at play" (9). To maintain a clear contextual distinction between the issues of North and South, he cites extensively the works of Frederick Herzog to represent North America (southern U.S.) and Gustavo Gutiérrez to represent Latin America (Peru). These three authors provide "the backbone of this book" (xii), whose "main objective" with the help of their analyses and insights "is to think through the impasse in mainline theological options in the Americas in the light of those who are excluded, and to identify and further establish those theological trails that are already being blazed into a different future" (xi).
Part 1 deals with the impasse, Part 2 proposes the missing link in searching for the real, and Part 3 draws out the implications for a new paradigm in theology. Using Lacan’s notion of imaginary and symbolic orders, Part 1 identifies the impasse in terms of an opposition between the modern self (imaginary) and traditional texts (symbolic). In mainline Protestant North America, liberal theology invests primary authority in the voice of the modern self whereas neorthodoxy places it in the text as the word of the “wholly Other.” Both effectively shut out the voice of the “other” on the underside of history and thus leave intact modern structures of power. Key here is the recognition of the interaction of authority and power. To be able to determine the identity and interests of another (authority) is to exercise a societal control that produces obedience (power). A similar analysis applies to Latin American Roman Catholic theology, although here the turn is from the authoritative texts guarded by the magisterium to the authority and power of the modern self.

The binary relationships of God and self or God and text are broken in Part 2 through Lacan’s notion of the real as applied to the repressed underside. Uncovering the location of the real other and recognizing with Lacan that “I is an other” (85) sets limits to the excessive powers of both self and text and calls for a transformation that will redistribute authority and power. This takes place in specific social locations with people who have particular names and stories to tell. Hence, there follows an account of the new encounters and new vistas that this opens up in the works of Herzog and Gutiérrez respectively.

In drawing together the most important elements of a new paradigm in Part 3, the key is the inseparable connection between the human other as limited but open and the divine Other as the only absolute. If there is an “eruption” of the Church of the poor in history, there is also an “irruption” of the poor Christ in the Church. “The new theology grows out of an attempt to rethink Christian spirituality in relation to the praxis of both God and the church at the underside of history” (211). Thus authority and power are reshaped in a theological vision cured of its blindness.

The U.S. is a country surrounded by mirrors. We look but only see ourselves. However, if we see the real other and recognize that this repressed other is part of ourselves, we can break the unreal mirror-image. R. offers a significant step in that direction.

**Gonzaga University, Spokane**

MICHAEL L. COOK, S.J.


Song plugs a gap in theological scholarship and we owe him a great debt of gratitude. This is perhaps the best recent book-length evaluation of liberal political thought from a Christian theological perspective, at least in English. It comes along at an opportune time, just as Christians are con-
fronting the necessity of constructing a new general social theology in the absence of a credible socialist alternative to neoliberal economic approaches.

S. spreads most of his original insights into the theological significance of Western liberalism over the course of two introductory and two concluding chapters. A phenomenological reading of the characteristics of liberal practices appears early in the volume. This sketch of liberalism is particularly worthy of praise, as it assists the theological reader in coming to grips with the legacy of Locke, Kant, Mill, Hobhouse, and Hayek—five figures in the liberal canon who, more than anyone else, defined the dominant political ideology of modernity. To his credit, S. avoids overblown claims that liberalism has an easily identifiable essence or core, but felicitously chooses to speak of “a family resemblance of beliefs” (14) among the distinctive varieties of liberalism.

As the foci of his central chapters, S. selects three 20th-century Christian critics of liberalism—figures who embrace the core features of liberalism even as they distance themselves from some of its aspects. The first is Reinhold Niebuhr, a towering figure in whose long shadow practically all American religious political reflection still proceeds. The chapter on Niebuhr is accurate and insightful, presenting an appreciation of his considerable accomplishments along with some well-founded criticisms of the relation between his theology and his political views. This presentation suffers somewhat from a deficit of directness and clarity. Resisting the temptation to circle around the huge topic of Niebuhr’s contribution would have allowed S. to offer a more vivid and compelling portrayal of the positions Niebuhr staked out regarding the liberal order in America and elsewhere.

The second figure is George Parkin Grant (1918–1988), an Anglican born into the Canadian ruling class. Largely unknown to most theologians, Grant wrote extensively on the interplay between technology, modernity, and liberalism, promoting an intriguing appropriation of John Rawls’ theory of justice. His account of modernity highlights the dangers of the hegemony of technology. Our age desperately needs his reminder that science is more than a neutral engine of progress, but also tends to act against many human values, threatening “a dreary monism of the religion of progress” (93). This is a special case of Grant’s more general reservation about the tendency of modernity to separate fact and value. S. does us a great service in exposing readers previously unfamiliar with Grant to his call to retrieve the lost value of reverence alongside the freedom so vaunted in our liberal order.

The third sketch is devoted to Jacques Maritain’s vision of a new Christendom, one that is “secular and liberal rather than sacral and intolerant” (4). S.’s descriptions of Maritain’s carefully nuanced judgments about the proper role of political authority within society are superb, as is the way S. places current Maritain scholarship within the context of the contemporary debate between communitarians and liberals. S. correctly identifies the sources of Maritain’s antimodernist temperament in several deeply held
theological positions regarding the human will and the divine purpose in creation. Consequently, he penetrates the darkness that so often shrouds other treatments of Maritain's opposition to several typically liberal notions (an instrumental reading of the common good, popular consent, the neutral state).

In the concluding chapters, S. assesses the potential Christian contribution to a general theory of public rationality, that is, what constitutes a desirable approach to common public reason within a pluralistic society. It may come as no surprise that Augustine emerges here as something of a hero, for his philosophy of history supplies a remedy for the frequent excessive reliance on Thomistic views of politics and progress. Even if this portion of the book seems somewhat artificially tacked on, these reflections on the central problems of liberal constitutional theory afford a fine opportunity for S. to extend his analysis to several contemporary legal controversies and to invoke several valuable and relevant resources from the writings of Ronald Dworkin and John Finnis, among others. The selection of issues (mostly from the context of British jurisprudence) employed as case studies may not prove satisfying to all audiences. Indeed, opting to explore economic and social policy considerations might have shed more ultimate light than S.'s choice of legal and constitutional matters. Nevertheless, S. deserves high praise for this volume which will serve as a fine guide for advanced audiences studying the relationship between Christianity and liberalism.

Weston Jesuit School of Theology


In his Specters of Marx: The State of Debt, the Work of Mourning, and the New International (1993), Derrida makes a play on the opening words of Marx and Engels in The Communist Manifesto (1848), "A specter is haunting Europe—the specter of communism." Derrida, who would never list himself among the Marxists, wishes in his book to confront the "specters of Marx" after the fall of institutional communism, to acknowledge the intellectual and moral debt he thinks we owe to Marx in this very time when people and peoples are bound together in a new international situation of dependence and possibility by the chains of financial debt. In his turn, now at least two steps removed from Marx and Engels, Matuštík attends to the "specters of liberation" evoked by "great refusals" in "the new world order" of global capitalism. One part of the irony of his reaching back to the Communist Manifesto for a way to criticize the reigning economic order is that he himself fled from communist Czechoslovakia in 1977 and that he is now a U.S. citizen teaching philosophy at an American university.

M.'s principal foils here are Francis Fukuyama's The End of History and
the Last Man (1992) and Samuel Huntington’s The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (1996). Against Fukuyama, he maintains that it remains possible, indeed necessary, to challenge liberalism and capitalism even after their apparent triumph in 1989–1991. History, in the sense of the struggle about and among great socioeconomic ideas and systems, is not over. Against Huntington, he argues that we have possibilities other than the confrontation of irreconcilable realms of thought and commitment like the West and Islam. Liberation means neither the dissolution of all communities into isolated and autonomous individuals nor the absorption of everyone into a series of discrete and impenetrable social groupings. Recognizing human beings as free and unique is compatible with recognizing their many ties to each other.

Many authors and texts contribute to the positive side of M.’s argument. In his opening chapter on “The Need for Recognition,” he draws from Habermas the politics of procedural justice and from Charles Taylor the politics of authentic group difference. Then he appeals to Kierkegaard on “radical self-choice” to insist on the importance of “dissenting individuals” for the richest of political systems. Elements from Kant and Hegel in the past and from Marcuse and Foucault in the present play into his discussion of the “great refusals” and of “communities of resistance.” And, while refusal and resistance are serious and sometimes deadly matters, M.’s experience in Czechoslovakia leads him to see the clown’s face as sometimes more effective than the gun or the bomb. Through irony and humor, he hopes that “a new social consciousness may be crafted out of radical dissent and waged for the sake of inclusive democracy.”

The preceding paragraph gives only the smallest hint of the abundant literature M. integrates in this study. His learning and synthetic power are really amazing. In reading the book, though, I came to wish he would cover fewer authors and texts since they often appeared in dizzying conjunction, sometimes contributing four or five names like Derrida and Foucauld or adjectives like Derridean and Foucauldian to a sentence. For me, his greatest talent is his joining rather abstract discussions with lively accounts of current history and of his own experience. I might have been a happier reader had he reflected directly on this history and experience without the mediation of so much literature. Finally, although I share many of M.’s worries and goals, I want to understand better the strategies and institutions that would take us beyond the “new world order.” The specters need to take on flesh and blood.

La Salle University, Philadelphia

MICHAEL J. KERLIN


This is the first volume in an ambitious trilogy. In the first half, Petrinovich reviews a number of basic principles emerging from current under-
standings of evolutionary theory, neurophysiology, and cognitive science and attempts to show how they can be used to establish a factual or descriptive basis on which to ground a set of naturalistic bioethical principles. In the second half, he tries to show how these bioethical principles can, in turn, be helpful in guiding both individuals and public-policy makers in making morally defensible choices regarding human reproductive issues. The issues he examines are contraception, abortion, infanticide, the use of artificial reproductive technologies, and fetal tissue research.

This said, the term "review" in the preceding paragraph is used deliberately. P. is not only using a multidisciplinary approach to his subject, which at times can give a "broad but shallow" feel to the book, he is also addressing at least two audiences. In doing so, he may be attempting too much. Indeed, he is aware of this. He states in the "Preface" that he intends to provoke a community of scholars" with the work (my emphasis) and leave it to specialists to "straighten out the problematic details later" (viii). In any case, he is addressing scientists who might be interested in exploring what, in his view, are the largely unexamined ethical presuppositions on which much of their work is based (he is particularly concerned about the experimental use of animals). And he is addressing moral philosophers who typically treat these ethical concerns, but who—again, in P.'s view (quoting Karl Lashley)—are said to be remarkably "unreliable observers" of human nature and relations. So, while he is decidedly more sure-footed when discussing the biological sciences, our question is whether his careful but nonetheless nonexpert treatment of moral philosophy is sufficiently developed to merit attention by his stated audiences and even, perhaps, by moral theologians. Guardedly, I conclude that it is.

Philosophers, scientists, and their graduate students who are interested in exploring naturalistic ethics may find P.'s review of basic evolutionary mechanisms and their relation to the evolution of human behavior and sociality a helpful summary. I found the review intuitively compelling. His discussions of the evolutionary bases of language and culture are particularly interesting. Nevertheless, philosophers and moral theologians will want to read the book carefully, particularly those sections that discuss the relation of evolutionary theory to morality.

For instance, P. treats the "naturalistic fallacy" in a mere 12 pages, early in the book. He argues that a naturalistic bioethics can avoid the fallacy if one can grant that humans "have evolved tendencies that enhance the community good," which he regards as "the basis of the highest moral good" (26), and one does not commit oneself to a particular view of that good. Also, he may move a bit too quickly as he develops an evolutionary basis for a moral theory that is consequentialist in structure when he observes that "all evolutionary systems can be conceived to operate at the level of the type of cost-benefit trade-offs involved in consequentialism." Also his self-conscious and, I might add, somewhat surprising anthropocentrism may need some clarification. It would have been helpful if he had distinguished between what others have discussed as an anthropocentric "approach" to the nature of value, in which an object has absolutely no
value unless humans attribute to value it, and an anthropocentric “per­spective” when justifying particular value judgments, in which human inter­ests “trump” those of other species. My reading would suggest that P. is committed to the latter on evolutionary grounds, but that it is unclear whether he is also committed to the former.

Finally, its naturalism notwithstanding, moral theologians might find this book of interest if they were persuaded to take the role of evolutionary principles seriously in developing, say, a scientifically informed natural law or theological approach to ethics. For instance, if they concluded that our knowledge of God and of God’s purposes for creation is not exhausted by Scripture and tradition, they would need to consider the relevance of other possible “sources” of this knowledge. And if they consider these other sources, they will want to engage them deeply enough to develop a coherent understanding of the role they might play in developing a theologically grounded ethics and, perhaps more interestingly, a view of God that tries to incorporate the findings of evolutionary theory, neurophysiology, and cognitive science.

Center for Ethics in Health Care, Atlanta

JAN C. HELLER


Is sexual freedom the key to achieving true equality? Cornell’s book attempts to make that case. In sharp contrast to the positions of many feminists, C. insists that the struggle for women’s freedom must begin with a rejection of gender comparison as the ideal of equality. She argues that formal equality, as defined by political and legal custom, is inherently confining, exclusionary, and unjust, because it is based on culturally imposed notions of what it means to be a man or a woman. As an alternative, C. proposes sexual freedom as the foundation for a new concept of social equality, one that considers the lived experiences of women, gays and lesbians, and other sexual minorities. In articulating the parameters for a new postegalitarian feminism, C. maintains that “We do not want sexual freedom to replace social equality; we want social equality redefined so as to serve freedom” (xii).

Despite the radical tenor of her project, C.’s feminism is firmly rooted in Kantian political philosophy, Dworkin’s rights-based legal theory, and the proceduralist ethic of Rawls. The first chapter draws these components together and introduces an important innovation for contemporary theories of justice. C. argues that redefining social equality requires rethinking sexual difference among free and equal persons through a heuristic device called “the imaginary domain”—a psychic and moral space in which men and women freely explore sources of happiness in matters of love, sex, and family life. Within this utopian field, state controls on sexual lifestyles,
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cognitive science.

Center for Ethics in Health Care, Atlanta

JAN C. HELLER

AT THE HEART OF FREEDOM: FEMINISM, SEX, AND EQUALITY. By Drucilla
$14.95.

Is sexual freedom the key to achieving true equality? Cornell's book
attempts to make that case. In sharp contrast to the positions of many
feminists, C. insists that the struggle for women's freedom must begin with
a rejection of gender comparison as the ideal of equality. She argues that
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sexual difference among free and equal persons through a heuristic device
called "the imaginary domain"—a psychic and moral space in which men
and women freely explore sources of happiness in matters of love, sex, and
family life. Within this utopian field, state controls on sexual lifestyles,
imposed social roles, and traditional sexual norms no longer hold, thus opening up new possibilities for persons to craft their own sexual identities and personal life plans.

For C., the purpose of the imaginary domain is not only to explore sources of happiness and selfhood in an unencumbered way; it also serves to broaden the Kantian category of “free and equal persons” so that all sexual beings (not just white heterosexual males) are included in the moral community prior to developing principles of justice. In C.’s view, “the question of who we are as sexed creatures must be asked at the beginning of every theory of justice” (6). The imaginary domain thus becomes an essential right of selfhood that must be recognized, protected, and implemented in society; otherwise, “the moral procedure will be unfair, and the public culture will lack a legitimate overlapping consensus” (15).

Claiming the imaginary domain as an essential right of personality is provocative enough; suggesting that it is essential to the establishment of justice is a controversial claim that requires justification. C. attempts to provide it in subsequent chapters through applying the imaginary domain to important social issues, such as prostitution, gay and lesbian marriage, adoption, reproductive rights, the father’s movement, and human rights. Her final chapter discusses why the imaginary domain is a necessary social mechanism for sustaining the utopian dream of equality.

In applying the imaginary domain to concrete issues, C.’s goal is to maximize freedom and minimize state interference. She argues that most societies impose a conception of “good” or normal sexuality as a mandated way of life, thus refusing citizens the freedom to personalize their own sexuality. But in C.’s view the right to self-represent one’s own sexual being takes precedence over state controls and culturally imposed judgments about what is good. In privileging the right over the good, C. calls for the legitimacy of same-sex marriage and adoptions, as well as single parent families. Some other measures include the right to abortion, the unionization of prostitutes and porn workers, and building international consensus against female genital mutilation.

This is a provocative and thoughtful study that promises to spark much discussion and debate among feminists and social theorists of every stripe. But does C. make her case for sexual freedom and the imaginary domain? Clearly her demand for prior evaluation of sexual difference introduces a new and promising basis for developing theories of justice that recognize the full humanity of women and other sexual minorities. Moreover, many of her suggestions for reform are perceptive, innovative, and highly persuasive. Nevertheless, C.’s radical promotion of personal freedom at the expense of the common good is problematic. What happens to society when the free play of ideas goes terribly wrong? Should the state protect the sexual freedom of citizens without considering the moral and social costs involved? Are we willing, for example, to subsidize out-of-wedlock children because some women decide that single parenthood is a “personality-defining decision”? Ultimately, the disconnection C. engineers among sexual freedom, personal responsibility, and the common good are too
extreme for long-term social stability. If justice is truly to flourish, then the
right and the good, freedom and responsibility must be brought into con­
stuctive dialogue before exploring the fundamental possibilities offered by
the imaginary domain.

Carroll College, Helena, Mont. LINDA M. MACCAMMON

ARCHITECTURE IN COMMUNION: IMPLEMENTING THE SECOND VATICAN
COUNCIL THROUGH LITURGY AND ARCHITECTURE. By Steven J. Schloeder.

Schloeder here examines the documentation of Vatican II, in order to
find there what he calls "continuity in tradition" and then apply traditional
principles in creating guidelines for the design of church buildings today.
He hopes to present arrangements and plans for churches that are gov­
erned by the spirit of the council. He is motivated by his judgment that
most recent Catholic churches are "banal, uninspiring, and frequently li­
turgically bizarre."

S. considers the 20th century devoid of great Catholic churches.
Churches built during this century lack the "language" of Catholicism, that
is, they have not sprung out of a process rooted in Catholic thought and
values. Most of this architecture is vitiated by the misunderstandings and
oversights of modern liturgists, theologians, and pastors. In particular, S.
questions the distinctions that are drawn between "the house of God" and
"the house of God's people" and between Eucharist as sacrifice and Eu­
charist as meal. He finds in the writings of liturgists and theologians an
erosion of the distinction between the ministerial priesthood and the priest­
hood of all the people. Yet he wishes to make it clear that he is not
advocating a return to a previous style of Catholic architecture. Rather the
focal points of his book are "the sanctification of believers, the building of
communities of love and service, and the true humanizing of the indi­
vidual."

In the major portion of the book S. develops the issues of the architec­
tural response to Vatican II, the relationship among theology, art, and
architecture, the kind of architecture required by the nature of the Mass,
the concrete details of the furnishings for the sanctuary, the architectural
requirements of the other sacraments, the parish community, sacred im­
ages in the church, and the church as an icon. For anyone acquainted with
the history of church architecture there is little that is new here. Nor would
this be a good book to recommend to someone who wishes an introduction
to the history of church architecture, because it adopts such a strong and
one-sided advocacy position.

S. is guided by his presuppositions to interpret facts in a certain way. For
instance, from a few examples of liturgical distortions he generalizes to the
confusion of all modern liturgy. Some of his claims are simply not true. For
example, he asserts that modern liturgists have adopted the notion of the
People of God to the exclusion of that of the Body of Christ. He finds such
a dichotomy unwarranted. In fact, S. introduces his own dichotomy when he says that the liturgy is primarily about the worship of God and not about the gathering of the people. S.'s tone is condescending at times, as when he remarks that the barrenness of contemporary church buildings reflects the barrenness of contemporary theology. He sees his task to be that of rediscovering the true message about church buildings found in Vatican II, a message allegedly distorted by modern liturgists.

S.'s final chapter gives in broad outline what he conceives to be the requirements for Catholic architecture in the third millennium. The church building cannot look like the other buildings around it because it is an icon of the house of God and of the Body of Christ. He means by this that a church must work as a place for liturgy, must look like a church, and must express its interior arrangement in its external structure. He gives some examples of what he means; they are buildings that most liturgists would find acceptable. But S. excludes other possible designs because of his ideological stance, which demands that the building “look like a church.” In this he opts for some kind of transcultural form which, while open to some variation throughout the ages, remains in fact the same. This form looks suspiciously like the romanesque, medieval, and renaissance churches of the past.

S. concludes that church architecture must be in communion with the Church's self-understanding as articulated by Vatican II. Few would disagree with that. What makes his argument frequently misleading and tendentious is that his conclusions flow from a unremitting hierarchical ecclesiology, an otherworldly spirituality, and an animosity toward the contemporary liturgical movement.

San Antonio, Texas

JAMES L. EMPEREUR, S.J.


Can the Bible be an authoritative guide for faith and life in the contemporary world? In these 1995 Hein/Fry Lectures, church historian Froehlich stresses the continuities of the intra-ecclesial understanding and interpretation, while biblical scholar Fretheim stresses the discontinuities created by indeterminacy of meaning and differing interpretations. The authors agree about “the Bible’s unique capacity to mediate God’s judgment and grace” (82, 127) and the importance of entering into a community “where the Word of God is preached and taught and we are invited into an ongoing conversation with the biblical witness” (126–27). They differ on the intrinsic importance of the contemporary world in determining the rules of the hermeneutical game.

Froehlich offers a very fine historical review of the Word of God as inspired, incarnate, and creative. He emphasizes the Lutheran view that God is speaking through the ages, and is clearly indebted to Lindbeck and Frei for his communitarian and narrative views. He objects to Fretheim’s “unabashed Christian apologetics” (129). “Apologetic zeal gives in too quickly to the instincts of contemporary mentalities without allowing room for their critique by the biblical witness” (131).
Fretheim questions whether the biblical portrayal of God is always trustworthy and so distinguishes the real God from the textual God while recognizing a relationship between them. The Bible's complicity in violence cannot be ignored. Abraham and Moses converse and even argue with God, which offers an innerbiblical warrant for doing the same with the Word of God. Rather than resort to a spiritual reading of certain problematic texts, the churches must recognize that some texts will not fit a unified portrayal of the kind of God we can believe in. The ongoing struggle with theological differences and even dissonance leads to new ways of imagining God. This book is a compelling exploration of alternative strategies.

MICHAEL L. COOK, S.J.
Gonzaga University, Spokane


How should Scripture be appropriated for theology? To aid theologians and scholars in the passage from Scripture to theology, and to avoid the use of biblical and extrabiblical texts in a selective and tendentious manner, the authors propose ten guiding principles. The Scriptures must first of all be engaged by representatives of a faith community who participate in its tradition, creeds, and worship. The canonical Scriptures in their entirety are queried, not just certain passages, and convergences from different parts of Scripture are sought as evidence. Metathemes and metanarratives running throughout Scripture are used in the construction of an overall theology. One is aware of discontinuities within continuity, such as the shift from the earthly Jesus to the Risen Lord. Analysis is conducted in light of the consensus of centrist exegesis, with an awareness that the consensus is open to change.

The authors test these principles on a number of important contemporary issues pertaining to the divinity of Jesus, the Trinity, church structure, and the translation of texts. Their application affirms the fundamental integrity of the theological tradition. Rather than being a self-validating exercise, however, we are reminded that eschatological provisionality applies to all theological expressions, and the dialogue with philosophy and the quest for inculturation will ensure a greater clarity and depth of expression of the Church's theological tradition that will meet the needs of the contemporary world. The authors discuss a number of criticisms of the proposed ten principles in a final section. Some of the principles may seem self-evident, but articulating them in such a concise and programmatic fashion makes this book a very useful tool in the search for a coherent method for the theological appropriation of Scripture and a good point of departure for further discussion and refinement.

SCOTT M. LEWIS, S.J.
Regis College, Toronto


Here is a refreshing narratological reading of the Joseph narrative. The title points to the underlying motifs that characterize Green's focus throughout: What purpose lies behind the several peripeties of falling and rising from a pit? How do we read and interpret the events into which the characters are thrown? Remembering and reading the dreams and events surrounding them is a constant motif within the narrative. Remembering and reading (along with forgetting and misreading) are hermeneutical tools for our own interpretation of the narrative and even our lives.

A rather dense but helpful methodological introduction sets forth the basic tools of narratology that G. employs: the diverse polarities within plot, characterization, discourse. A somewhat daring personal exhortation of reading and interpreting one's life in light of the Joseph narrative concludes the work. But a wealth of particulars and fresh angles of perception reside in her detailed reading of the text in light of macroquestions.
There are many possible readings of the text. A good reading constantly comes back to motifs and their transformations and revises perspectives within the larger framework. Readers will find horizons open as G. explores both text and scholarly interpretation. Her reading is not exhaustive and does not intend to be. A reader can still find significant motif transformations where her analysis does not venture. Clothing is a case in point. As G. explains, clothing is a text within the narrative that is a powerful signifier. Receiving and losing clothing has serious consequences. When Joseph sends off the brothers to fetch their father Jacob, he gives each a set of garments, but to Benjamin he gives five sets of garments (Genesis 45:22). He gives to his brothers that which they stripped from him.

Michael Kolarcik, S.J.
Regis College, Toronto


In two previous works (Jesus and His Jewish Parables [1989] and Jesus the Jewish Theologian [1995]) Young attempted to root the life and teaching of Jesus firmly in the world of Judaism. The new focus here is the contrast with what he claims are Christian interpretations of the parables and their true meanings in the context of Jewish methods of instruction. Jesus’ parables and Jewish parables are juxtaposed under five major themes: Jewish prayer and the parables of Jesus; parables of grace in the Gospels and their theological foundations in Ancient Judaism; theology of reconciliation between God and humanity; the disciples’ call; Torah learning and God’s reign. Y.’s method is normally to present a specific Christian interpretation of a particular parable, and most often to show how a better knowledge of Jewish teaching challenges this interpretation.

Young offers rich insight on aspects of rabbinic theology, and interesting suggestions on particular parables of Jesus, such as the interpretation of the Unjust Steward (Luke 16:1–13) as an attack on Essene sectarianism, expressed in their practice of communal possessions. Yet the book embodies many questionable assumptions, such as the priority of the Gospel of Luke, a Semitic “undertext” of the Gospels, and Hebrew as the original language of the parables. Also Y. works with an implicit concept of normative first-century Judaism that then develops into Rabbinic Judaism, thus ignoring much recent research about the diverse forms of first-century Judaism. Often, later material such as a parable on a father and his lost son from the Midrash on Deuteronomy is compared with a parable of Jesus (Luke 15:11–32). Christian interpretations, when contrasted to the authentic Jewish Jesus, are frequently not representative, but selective and dated.

Despite these reservations the work contains a great number of Jewish parables that, even when later than Jesus, show that the imaginative world of Jesus is firmly fixed in Judaism—a healthy antidote to much contemporary Jesus research.

John R. Donahue, S.J.
Jesuit School of Theology, Berkeley


Kittredge’s opening review of earlier studies of obedience in Paul rightly notes the biases of the interpreters. A rather brief study of the semantic field of the verbs hypakouein and hypotassethai is followed by alternative readings of Philippians and Ephesians based on rhetorical criticism and historical reconstruction. K.’s argument that the rhetoric of partnership and obedience in Philippians promotes unity with Paul himself and with the male leaders associated with him is only partially convincing as she emphasizes too much the male-female dichotomy. The disunity seems somewhat broader as the entire community is addressed in Philippians 2:1–5.

K.’s hypothesis that Euodia and Syn-
tyche (Phil 4:2) are addressed by Paul not because they are at odds with one another but because they stand together against Paul is intriguing, but she is vague on the nature of the disagreement. She argues well that the anonymous author of Ephesians attempts to persuade his audience to shift from an egalitarian ecclesiology to one based on social subordination though obedience. As in the case of Philippians, material which affirms a new vision of equality is adapted to serve the cause of obedience and subjection.

This is an important work for both its exegesis and its methodological discussions, although the comprehensive nature of the investigation will inevitably lead to disputes over specific points. K. is most thorough and convincing in her overall rhetorical analysis of each letter. Her primary weakness is her inattention to the sociohistorical context. For example, her three pages on Philippi lead her to make unsubstantiated (although not incorrect) assumptions about the nature of the early Christian community there. Nevertheless, this is a worthwhile resource for those interested in Paul’s letters, rhetorical criticism, and feminist interpretation.

Richard S. Ascough
Queen’s Theological College,
Kingston, Ontario


The study of Western medieval Latin liturgy in the English-speaking world has been greatly assisted in recent years by the excellent translation of Cyrille Vogel’s classic standard French work, Medieval Liturgy: An Introduction to the Sources (Pastoral Press, 1986), and now by the translation of Palazzo’s A History of Liturgical Books.

Although much of P.’s work summarizes succinctly in a more readable and easily accessible manner material already contained in Vogel’s study of the sacramentaries, ordines, lectionaries, and pontificals, P. also adds several elements that Vogel does not include (e.g., medieval books such as customaries, ordinaries, and processional as well as sections dealing with manuscript illuminations and the historical context of the various eras under consideration). In addition, I am most pleased with P.’s brief essays on “The Science of Liturgy” (1–6) and “Studies on Liturgical Books” (7–18), in which he provides historical treatment of the developing discipline of liturgiology from the 17th century to the present, especially as that discipline has impacted the study of medieval Latin liturgy.

Of special interest to teachers and students of liturgy, art historians, and medievalists in general, I highly recommend this book not as a replacement for Vogel’s work, but as a most welcome introductory complement. Thanks to Beaumont’s translation, P. is already becoming “required reading” in graduate liturgical studies programs in the U.S. Since the terminus of his study is the Fourth Lateran Council of 1215, however, one would hope for another volume surveying the later Middle Ages through the liturgical products of the Protestant Reformation and the Council of Trent. And, for that matter, a similar detailed study of other Western liturgical traditions (Gallican, Mozarabic, Ambrosian) would also be welcome.

Maxwell E. Johnson
University of Notre Dame


The title seems to indicate a modest publication, a collection of 36 Prefaces from canon-law codices and books from 385 to 1245. They are presented in five sections representing distinct periods in the history of canon law: late antiquity, early Middle Ages, the era dominated by Gregory VII, the age of “canonical scholasticism,” and finally the time of Decretals from the late twelfth into the first part of the thirteenth century. A
concise introduction before each section places the individual Prefaces in their historical and doctrinal environment. The texts come from a variety of sources: they represent a diversity of "authorities" such as popes and bishops, compilers and iurisprudentes, zealous reformers and keepers of the tradition. The translators have rendered the original Latin in smooth and lucid English—not a mean feat, as anyone who had to struggle with ancient and medieval canonical sources knows.

On closer attention, these modest Prefaces turn into rich sources of information. They are like windows, providing scattered but substantial views into the history of the Church through the development of canon law. As the Christian community expanded in the earlier centuries, the "canons" aimed at a good balance between unity and diversity; in the Carolingian age the law emerged as an instrument of reform; during the investiture struggle it became an aggressive force for the liberation of the Church from secular dominance; in the intellectual Renaissance of the twelfth century the learned and reflective monk Gratian created concordance among discordant canons and produced a manual for order in the Church, an order that subsequent papal Decretals consolidated, completed, and developed in the following centuries.

This is a significant, elegantly presented contribution to the field of theology, cultural history, and canon law.

LADISLAS ORSY, S.J.
Georgetown University, D.C.


Flowing from Kaelber's research for his doctoral dissertation, this study of medieval religious communities merges sociological analysis with historical inquiry. The point of departure is the sociological insights of Max Weber regarding a religion's potential to be an ordering, rationalizing force in society through the ascetical conduct of its adherents. Through this Weberian framework, K. explores and analyzes various forms and directions that asceticism took in both orthodox and heterodox medieval religious groups. He is particularly interested in the relationship between the ideology and social organization of religious groups and the form of asceticism that emerges.

Part 1 first explores various theoretical aspects of religion, asceticism, and rationalism and then analyzes these elements in orthodox monastic and lay groups of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. K. also studies the role of magic as an impediment to rationalized action and as a substitute for asceticism among the laity. Part 2 focuses on the Waldensians and the Cathars, the two largest and most influential heretical groups in the High Middle Ages. I found these chapters the most interesting and informative. Basing his analysis on primary sources, particularly records of the Inquisition, K. carefully explores both the doctrinal and ethical foundations of these groups as well as their organizational and institutional resources in different geographical locations and at different stages of their development. He argues that they met with success because of their ascetical witness and their organizational structures.

K. has a firm grasp of his material and carefully analyzes his sources. Some of his conclusions may be contested, but they are always worthy of serious consideration. The writing is closely packed and somewhat heavy, requiring careful reading. The book can be particularly recommended for those with an interest in medieval religious groups from a sociological perspective.

CHARLES J. HEALEY, S.J.
Pope John XXIII Seminary, Weston, Mass.


In recent years, numerous books and articles have been published on medieval Jewish-Christian relations, some of
which have focused on individual Christian authors (e.g. Aquinas, Nicholas of Lyra, and Bernardino of Siena). The publication of this English version of Dahan's study is timely, because he presents a remarkable review of what was happening in the field of Christian polemical literature and a guide for situating individual authors in their historical, social, and theological contexts.

D. succinctly describes the content and tone of major polemical works, insightfully classifying them into testimonia, dialogues, and treatises, and shows the connection between them. His key insights include the fact that authority (sacred texts) was relied on more than reason, even with the development of common sense arguments and dialectics; that the discovery of rabbinical literature changed the content of the debate, since Christians now attempted to use this literature to prove Christian truth claims; and that a more aggressive, conversionary attitude prevailed from the 13th century onwards.

Two limitations are detected, both of which D. expressly recognizes. Chapter 5, which outlines the themes of the polemic, needs to be filled out especially for those interested in the theology of the polemic. Another limitation is the small number of works cited in the footnotes. Dahan has admittedly favored works in French, but there are a number of major works in English with which a student of polemical literature should be familiar, such as John Hood's book on Thomas Aquinas and Anna Sapir Abulafia's work on the twelfth century. Nonetheless, the book is a major contribution to the study of medieval Jewish-Christian relations and Christian anti-Jewish polemical literature.

STEVEN J. McMICHAEI, O.F.M. CONV.
St. Louis University


Halverson charts a significant reorientation in late medieval Scholastic theology of predestination. To facilitate his account, he refers to three basic positions that were held by the middle of the 14th century. In single particular election (SPE), God in eternity chooses some individuals for eternal life without regard for their merits, simply in accordance with God's desire; all other humans earn hell through their sins. In double particular election (DPE), there is a greater symmetry: going to heaven and going to hell each depends on God's causal will. In general election (GE), on the other hand, God is not concerned with individuals, but with classes of people: God wills the salvation of all and offers grace to all; those who do not put an obstacle before grace are the "predestined"; those who do place an obstacle are reprobate, thereby deserving the punishment of hell.

In H.'s telling, SPE was the consensus opinion by the 13th century, advanced by such leading theologians as Aquinas and Giles of Rome. But by the mid-14th century, especially through the efforts of Peter Aureol, GE enjoyed a certain vogue at both Paris and Oxford, the leading theological centers; SPE no longer went unquestioned. Peter's pioneering efforts in developing GE were grounded in his insights on the semantics of the divine attributes and simplicity and of the divine will. As a consequence of his analysis the space for the human contribution to the salvific process was considerably enlarged.

While on the whole successful in clarifying 14th-century discussions of predestination, the book has its faults. H. is basically content to assert SPE as the 13th-century consensus position, thereby highlighting Peter's supposed novelty. But the picture is more complex. For example, Aquinas in his Scriptum on the Lombard's Sentences explained conversion in terms that seem to bespeak a de facto acceptance of a GE account of predestination (his analysis in the later Summa is quite different). Moreover, positions on predestination reflect basic ideas not only about God but also about the human person. H. should have added a chapter on the human person as moral agent and as cause, to underscore anew the distance between Peter and his great
13th-century predecessors. In this way, it would become clearer why Aquinas would have found misplaced Peter's suspicion that SPE entails determinism.

JOSEPH WAWRYKOW
University of Notre Dame


To the culturally uninitiated, processions with statues of weeping Virgins and bloodied Christs accompanied by self-flagellating penitents are a pagan spectacle. This excellent study of Spanish penitential processions, especially in 16th- and 17th-century Seville, defuses charges of idolatry with the well-documented claim that procession sculpture was, and remains today, a channel for spiritual transformation.

The opening chapters lay the foundation for this claim with an engrossing examination of the penitential confraternities that sponsored images, the unique features of procession sculpture, including their moveable parts, and the increasing realism and complexity of both costumes and scenography. Equally informative are descriptions of the making of statues and construction of the portable stages where elaborate scenes of the Passion were represented.

Important for building the argument in support of imagery as a conduit for spiritual transformation is the relationship between liturgical drama and processions. Originally part of the Easter dramas enacted within churches, by the 16th century processions of sculpture had moved out into the streets where, in conjunction with plays, they created a "fluid conception of the performance" (149). This fluidity does not erace the belief that in its spiritual function procession takes precedence over drama, for the representation of sacred things images were considered to be more fitting than professional actors of questionable moral character. With the last two chapters the study deepens conceptually as theological arguments for and against imagery come center stage. The writings of John of the Cross, among others, are featured to demonstrate that theology as well as public opinion ascribed to imagery the power to move spectators to devotion. When the sculpture was activated in a procession that moved in the time/space of the spectators, the images made possible communication with the divine. In the hearts of viewers they provoked emotions, contrition, compassion, and finally devotion, which specifically meant prayer; and on God's part they channeled his grace to the devout.

Webster's study is thoroughly engaging and in its own way provocative. The reader may be moved to inquire further into popular religion in Golden-Age Spain and, as a spectator, may look upon procession sculpture with the new understanding that its highest purpose is to create a numinous atmosphere conducive to collective communication with the divine.

MARY E. GILES
California State University, Sacramento


Markham here attempts to demonstrate that critical realism depends on theism, developing within a contemporary prism the traditional Augustinian argument from truth to God. He concludes that anybody who thinks it is possible to describe the world in better or worse ways ought logically to believe in God. To focus the issue, he stresses that religion is not a claim about an object in reality, however strange or important, but a life-transforming, all-embracing world perspective concerning the assumptions underlying one's view of reality.

M. affirms that world perspectives are attempts to make sense of reality as experienced, where reality is the ultimate control on the legitimacy of truth claims and certain world perspectives are better than the alternatives. He contends that communication and related activi-
ties, such as translation, are only intelligible if one assumes that language constructs emerge as an attempt to explain reality. Successful communication requires a shared set of logical categories, which are embedded in language and seem to fit the world. For logic to be legitimate, reality must be stable, coherent, and intelligible.

M. then develops a cosmological argument for the existence of God akin to the third way of Aquinas, which seeks to justify the confidence that the world is intelligible. The argument explains the assumption of order which is implied in truth. The intelligibility of each particular event assumes an overall coherence that requires belief in a self-explanatory being, whose activity of creation involves decision and purpose. Following Alasdair Maclntyre, M. insists that the methodology of such an argument is opposed to the “tradition-transcendent” assumptions of modernity and teases out the explanatory power of the Christian tradition.

For M., those who continue to explain the world without believing in God operate with an unjustifiable rationality that is always vulnerable to relativism and nihilism. Either God and rationality go or God and rationality stay, either Nietzsche or Aquinas. In what amounts to a sketch of a program, M. boldly confronts some of the most hotly contested issues in the current intellectual debate. His confidence in the resources of the Christian tradition is refreshing and summons its members to raise their voices courageously to contribute insights ever-old and ever-new to the growth pangs of a postmodern age.

DAVID J. CASEY, S.J.
Fordham University, New York


Korsmeyer briefly and lucidly recounts the story of the evolving of the pulsating universe, our planet, and ourselves and expands our horizons through eons of time and the vastness of interstellar space (100 billion galaxies), a healthy antidote to theological myopia. To provide a theology with a better fit for our evolutionary heritage, he turns to process theology and pits it against classical theism, the usual foil. But there is here, perhaps, a case of mistaken identity. What is taken to be classical theism resembles more 17th-century theism. Classical theism is also confused with Greek metaphysics. Moreover, process theology tows in its wake its own raft of difficulties, and it does so here. It too facilely diminishes the epistemic distance between God and us, melts analogy into univocity, and arrives at almost mathematical clarity about what God can do, does, and cannot do, this God with hopes, but at the mercy of chance.

As for original sin, K. furnishes a fine, if cursory, overview of the doctrine’s emergence, though his presentation of the personalist and situationist axes of modern interpretations begs nuance. Rightly regretting the new Catechism’s precritical reiteration of the traditional doctrine, he aims “to propose a new viewpoint on original sin” (114). In this, however, he falls short. Basically, K. endorses postconciliar approaches to the doctrine, which he summarizes well. The one very welcome novum he adds is reminiscent of M. Suchocki’s recent contribution: our long evolution has left physiologically and culturally encoded in us a proclivity to self interest and survival, frequently pursued at the expense of others. Disembodied moral agents we are not; we are born selfish. But Darwin also recognized in us another evolutionary legacy, a steady undertow of instincts to sociality, cooperation, sympathy, without which creative advance would not be. Yet sociality is by no means an unmixed blessing. It leads us to interactions of all kinds, hostile as well as friendly. The point is that the psychology of motive is not monistic. The result is, among other things, conflicting motives and an anthropology of ambiguity.

In its attempt to advance theological anthropology in light of evolutionary perspectives K.’s compact, clearly written book makes a worthy contribution to the interface between science and theology. It challenges us to take a
longer view and a more humble, nonexclusive approach in all areas of theology, especially in christology, ecclesiology, and eschatology, which must now be viewed within a vastly expanded horizon. The stage is far larger than we thought, the drama more complex.

STEPHEN J. DUFFY
Loyola University, New Orleans


Brooke and Cantor aim to “show how new ways of understanding past science can be used to suggest fresh approaches to the science-religion domain” (xi). They set themselves against “popular accounts that have routinely constrained discussion by imposing master-narratives on historical data” (8). Among the master-narratives they criticize are the view that religion is necessarily the enemy of science, the opinion that Judeo-Christian doctrine of creation is the foundation of Western science, the scientism of Auguste Comte, the New Age holism of Fritjof Capra and Paul Davies, the discontinuity thesis of Thomas Kuhn, the myth of Galileo as a martyr for science, and triumphalistic arguments from design inspired by William Paley. Because they are “suspicious of reductionist claims and of the master-narratives that reflect them” (17), their own approach is deliberately disjointed: “We have many stories to tell and we hope that some at least will be instructive” (25).

In place of an overarching thesis about religion and science, the authors adopt a historical method that pays attention to context, functional issues, rhetoric, biography, and practice. They embrace a “non-judgmental attitude” (58) and attempt to “stand far enough back” so that one may appreciate the protagonists and the contexts in which they operated” (68). From this “irenic, liberal position,” they hope to reveal “richness and diversity of science-religion relations throughout history” (69). For the most part, B. and C. achieve their goal of telling interesting and thought-provoking stories, especially about Victorian England and the early spectrum of religious responses to Darwinism. The mask of impartiality slips from time to time, as when they conclude that the “downwards-influence model” adopted by Capra is “disastrously wrong” (100) or when they portray the leaders of the Catholic Church as “powerful Mafiosi” (262).

MARTIN X. MOLESKI, S.J.
Canisius College, Buffalo, N.Y.


Partly because most Asian theologians write in English, their writings are accessible to English-speaking readers. Since this is not the case, however, for Francophones, Fédou’s book fills a real need.

F. organizes his presentation of Asian christologies according to countries: India, Sri Lanka, Philippines, Korea, Taiwan, and Japan. Theologians discussed include R. Panikkar, S. Samartha, M. Amaladoss, M. Thomas, S. Kappen, G. Soares-Prabhu, A. Pieris, C. Abesamis, E. de la Torre, L. Dingayan, Byung-Mu Ahn, Chung Hyun Kyung, A. Chang Ch’un-shen, Choaon-Seng Song, K. Koyama, T. Kuribyashi, S. Yagi, and J. Kadowaki. Two Westerners, Y. Raguin and W. Johnston, are also discussed because of their long residence in Asia and their significant contributions to the Asian christology. F.’s presentations are clear, informative, up to date, and sympathetic. Where lack of knowledge of the local languages prevents direct access to original sources, he makes good use of secondary materials. F. carefully distinguishes the two trends in Asian christologies, the cultural-religious and the liberationist, especially in India. He follows up his exposition with careful critical reflections on the issues at stake in the various christologies, their contributions to new understanding of the person and work of Jesus, and their con-
formity or lack of it to biblical and church teachings. F. applauds Asian theologians' project of constructing christologies from their own cultural and religious resources and for their own distinctive contexts. He highlights their profound sense of mystery which prevents them from succumbing to an exclusivist christology, their insistence on Jesus' humanity which enables them to stress the necessity of struggling for justice, and their use of certain neglected or unfamiliar images of Jesus.

On the other hand, he cautions with deep humility that inculturation without conversion, liberation without the hope given by the revelation of God's love on the cross, and interreligious dialogue without affirming the "uniqueness" of Jesus Christ would run the risk of betraying the substance of the Christian faith. One cannot but whole-heartedly agree with F.'s final appeal for a mutual collaboration and enrichment between Asian and Western theologians. F.'s book is itself a precious contribution to this much-needed collaboration.

**Peter C. Phan**
Catholic University of America, D.C.


The editors of this volume seek to challenge a view of divine revelation that is both ahistorical and positivist by providing documentary evidence of the historical fact of doctrinal change in the Roman Catholic tradition. Each of the 18 chapters addresses an issue that has undergone considerable change in church teaching (e.g. infallibility, theological dissent, usury, slavery). Each chapter consists of a brief, one-paragraph introduction followed by a chronologically ordered set of excerpts from official magisterial documents intended to demonstrate the fact of doctrinal change. Occasionally, a particular text will be followed by a sentence or two of contextualization. Each chapter concludes with a three-to-six-page commentary by an independent scholar and a set of discussion questions.

The volume is intended for a more popular readership. While the editors should be applauded for making accessible to a larger public documentation supporting the reality of doctrinal change in the Church, the volume is compromised by a number of factors. First, given that the volume is intended for a broader audience, the introductions and brief contextualizations are inadequate to provide a fair historical context for reading these texts. Second, the accompanying commentaries are uneven. Most of the scholars handle their assigned topic quite ably (e.g. Curran, Gudorf, Hayes, McCormick, Tavard), but others seem to have a less firm mastery of their topic.

Finally, the editors clearly intend the volume to further the reformist agenda associated with their Quixote Center. While there is much to commend in that agenda, the polemical tone sustained by the editors may lead some readers to question the objectivity of the volume's presentation. It would be regrettable indeed if this editorial tone were to undermine the very goal of the project, namely, to provide to a wide readership a more historically informed grasp of the reality of doctrinal change and the possibilities which that fact suggests for the future of the Church.

**Richard R. Gaillardetz**
University of St. Thomas, Houston


These critical and constructive reflections emerge from the recent ecclesiology and ethics study process of the World Council of Churches. The search for a proper connection between church and ethics has permeated the council's entire history, controverted by the question of the WCC's ecclesial status and by struggles over ethical perspectives.
Mudge seeks to offer a bridge between the two in the image "household of life," which has appeared in earlier council discussions by Philip Potter, Konrad Raiser, and Geiko Müller-Fahrenholz. With this image he hopes to combat the overly insulated "ecclesiocentrism" he sees in the work of Stanley Hauerwas and others without falling into superficial pragmatism or liberal reformism. While M. appreciates the need for an ecclesiologically formed life of "principled moral coherence" (70), he does not want to lose sight of a sociological realism that adequately grasps our formation and action in a larger, non-Christian world.

The household concept, rooted in the multivalent Greek term oikos, resonates well with feminist theology, ecological and economic concerns, and the search for a realistic tie between private and public ethics. It relates the ecumenical movement symbolically to its worldly context (the oikoumene). M. wants to see this churchly householding as a transitional image to the eschatological goal of citizenship in God's city, but there is some ambiguity in his effort to relate these civic and "oikonomic" terms, an ambiguity rooted in Augustine's authoritarian collapse of the two and in the later privatization of religion.

At this point both M. and WCC theologians are trying to rework basic images for ecclesiology and ethics. The structural consequences of images like household, communion, forum, and hospitable space have not yet emerged, but this is an extremely helpful entrée into both the discussion and the future prospects of these basic changes in the ecumenical movement.

WILLIAM JOHNSON EVERETT
Andover Newton Theological School


This book is like a child prodigy—startlingly brilliant in one area, surprisingly naïve in others. Throughout, it is vintage Comblin. With typical frankness he states that activists are in retreat, that base communities are stagnant, and that revolutionary movements lack mass followings.

Yet C. insists that the Marxist critique of capitalism is still useful, and that the life of the poor is actually worse. "Social apartheid" is his term for the fact that armed camps of the wealthy have abandoned the cities to the destitute victims of violence, corruption, and pollution. The only triumph of the Latin American Church has been to situate itself physically with the poor, and that is the sole test of their rhetoric. That Church still has a role to play in transforming "inhabitants into citizens" (123). This means encouraging them to enter labor unions, school boards, and neighborhood associations in order to learn how to rebuild the cities in which they live. When the poor experience some control over their lives, this is the beginning of freedom, and freedom is the lingua franca of postmodernity. A call to freedom is the only way to understand faith, that is, to do theology today. C.'s biblical theology of freedom is brilliant.

But C.'s critique of Pentecostals, charismatics, and popular religion is naïve. Mexico City is the most urbanized area of the world, and devotion to Guadalupe there is vigorous. Recent studies have shown Pentecostals and charismatics to be much more politically and economically astute than previously suspected. They must all be included in transforming cities, and in a theology that is freedom seeking understanding.

KENNETH G. DAVIS, O.F.M., CONV.
St. Meinrad School of Theology, Indiana


Harvesting 50 years of studying American philosophy, Roth here offers noteworthy evidence that the evolution-based pragmatists Peirce, James, and Dewey, though contributing valuably to
philosophy, "did not penetrate radically and deeply enough" (148). James's *Radical Empiricism* borrowed heavily from the British empiricists yet found them not radical enough to discover experience's bonds and relations. R., in turn, borrows heavily from these American pragmatists yet finds them not radical enough to discover the non-evolutionary elements in the hypotheses generating their pragmatism. In these hypotheses lay the "generals" and ideals upon which they built their logic, epistemology, and ethics without intuiting their further significance. For these "generals" and ideals, along with the "intuitions" whereby thinkers grasp them, transcend space-time relations and every sensory mark.

R. shows that by admixing psychology with their epistemologies, Peirce, James, and especially Dewey rendered their accounts of the origin of hypotheses ambiguous. As for ethics, when these pragmatists propose consequences as their test for moral obligation, they fail to explain the unconditional character of the moral ought as experienced. By avoiding the dilemma of "either immanence or transcendence" and using approaches offered by Lonergan and Teilhard, R. discovers in self-reflective thought a "transcendence and immanence." He declares, "The connatural identity between mind and nature is thus moved a step beyond the biological processes of evolution to the dynamism of a spiritual mind within these processes as an explanatory principle" (149). The pragmatists "overlooked a deeper dimension, namely, the interiority of the self capable of reflective self-awareness and self-possession, capable too of making a unique contribution to the meaning of person" (153).

R.'s thesis will jar naturalists, but his evidence for the human person's "duality without dualism" is well documented. This book, well worth careful study, calls gainsayers to the deep reflective experience upon which it is based. It unites the best in American pragmatism, Teilhard, and Lonerganian Thomism.


In the early 90s Al Gore's *Earth in the Balance* offered a wide-ranging interdisciplinary argument that modern society's addictive patterns of consumption were threatening to unravel the ecological balance of our planetary home. Wilshire's brief but equally sprawling volume contends that it is the loss of our rightful place in the simultaneously wild and nurturing habitat of nature which has unleashed the demonic appetites of our personal and corporate addictions. According to W.'s embodied ecospirituality, these disordered and insatiable hungers are not sufficiently explained by either A.A.'s disease concept or contemporary medical models, but spring instead from modern humanity's exile from the generative and regenerative cycles of the natural wilderness in and for which our body-selves were fashioned over countless millennia.

W.'s approach is intuitive and imaginative, mixing medical and scientific reports with the insights of Thoreau, James, Dewey, Muir, and St. Paul, and he is most persuasive when describing the alienating disaffections of dualism, patriarchy, and a scientism which places inordinate faith in technology. It makes sense that separation from our body-selves and the holistic matrix of our natural environment could frustrate our hunger for ecstatic communion and trigger addictive responses that only deepen our isolation. And it seems reasonable that we surrender the connective tissue of our ancient myths and rituals, as well as the sense of place, time, and the sacred which they provide at our peril. Still, to make his case W. needs a less elastic understanding of addictions (one more grounded in the lived experience of addicts) and a more concrete discussion of some of his proposed remedies (i.e. smoking, art, walking). In both of these areas the contributions of authors within the field of addiction studies could have put more meat on the bones of an intriguing theory.

Patrick T. McCormick
Gonzaga University, Spokane

Beaudoin is a Generation Xer born in 1969, a latch-key kid raised on MTV and technologically adept; he is more or less Catholic, his religious formation coming from the sacraments, pop-culture, synagogues, Baptist preachers, and Harvard Divinity School. He argues that there is much religiosity in the contemporary generation, a subject he researched as a high-school teacher and years of interviews.

Generation Xers live much of their day in cyberspace and accordingly develop a religion which is not quite authentic nor completely false. Their "reality" was formed by dysfunctional families, bytes of news and "nanotunes" (bits of music) that leave them ungrounded anywhere. B.'s argument centers on four elements that he finds in the religion of generation X: distrust of institutions, trust in personal experience, belief that pain has a religious dimension, and ambiguous affirmation of faith. Much of this outlook has come from affluence and from hours with TV, computer games, and web sites. Exploring these, B. finds religious meaning in body piercing, grunge, gothic dress, R.E.M., and Madonna.

Having quoted the lyrics of contemporary pop-music with its heresies and blasphemies, B. cites Cardinal Newman to the effect that blasphemy can occur only if there is something positive to blaspheme, and then Rudolf Otto to the effect that the "holy" can include the horrible and revolting. Likewise, passages of Rahner, Metz, Kierkegaard, and Tillich are mixed with pop anticulture in a lively style that resembles the texts of his mentor, Harvey Cox. One is hardly expected to agree with most of B.'s statements, but for traditional theologians he offers an approach to a new generation. Not all Generation Xers are like the people of whom B. writes, but most could identify with what he says. Though B. overdraws his case, at least he inculturates aging baby-boomers into young America.

Thomas M. King, S.J.
Georgetown University, D.C.


Writing mainly for the spiritual directors of gay/lesbian Christians, Empereur hopes also to assist homosexuals in their spiritual pursuits (xi). Homosexuals, like all other people, are "epiphanies of God," but E. believes that gays/lesbians have been chosen to reveal something about God that heterosexuals do not, and that "authentic and successful" spiritual direction with homosexuals depends upon acceptance of the premise that "homosexuality is one of God's most significant gifts to humanity" (1).

For E., the difference between "becoming holy" and "becoming more fully human" is rooted in a "mental distinction" (30); thus, "spiritual growth cannot be so easily separated from psychological growth" (16). Still, there is a difference between psychological counseling and spiritual direction in that the directee must eventually work on more than private issues and become sensitive to "larger areas of church life such as matters of social justice" (16-17).

E.'s description of the role of directors is provocative, but possibly debatable. For him, since directors do not represent the Church as priests do, they are not to intrude in directees' lives by issuing instructions or passing judgment on their sexual activity, but should help them clarify the meaning of such activity in their lives and its compatibility with, and contribution to, their movement toward God. Directors who believe they may insist that gay directees act according to the directors' moral norms "should not engage in spiritual direction with homosexuals" (15).

There is much to learn from E.'s
work: he identifies the experience unique to homosexuals' spiritual life, suggests that spiritual growth requires homosexuals to be doubly countercultural by challenging much of both Western middle-class society and the gay subculture, and nicely articulates how embodied liturgical worship has the power to move people beyond their more narcissistic concerns "to the experience of being the body of Christ" (108).

VINCENT J. GENOVESI, S.J.
St. Joseph's University, Philadelphia


This book is a valuable collection of 14 essays (ten of which were published previously) by one of the preeminent modern interpreters of the Chinese philosophical thought to Western audiences. The previously published essays cover a period from 1973 to 1996 and the last three chapters incorporate revisions of five papers given in the last decade. Taken together the book represents a most helpful compendium of Cua's creative and lucid interpretation of a tradition that has for far too long remained inscrutable and opaque to non-Asians.

While C.'s work has been justly valued for a generation by sinologists, this collection would also serve as a very handy and readable introduction for the nonspecialist interested in many of the major strains of Chinese philosophy, especially Confucianism. C. does not explicitly undertake comparative philosophy, yet his presentation is always aware of a larger audience that may be grounded in a different philosophical approach and therefore find Confucianism difficult to understand. He strikes an admirable balance between scholarship that will stimulate both those well-grounded in the Chinese classics and those who might have little background in the field. Particularly helpful are his distinctions between the more abstract theoretical approach ("rationality") of Western ethics and the more concrete "reasonableness" of the Confucian moral vision.

Major topics treated include both Taoist and Confucian classics, as well as the principal ethical concepts of human nature, morality and moral agency, moral education, harmony and the role of moral exemplars (the sage and the "paradigmatic individual"), judgment, self-deception, and views of the world. This is an excellent volume.

JAMES T. BRETZKE, S.J.
Jesuit School of Theology, Berkeley


Clooney has established himself as an important interpreter of Hindu religious traditions. He has done this through a series of well-received monographs that offer detailed scholarly analyses of such major traditions as the Mīmāṃsā, Vedānta and Vaiśṇavism. This book marks something of a departure in being aimed not at the scholar but at the general reader, and specifically at the Christian reader who wishes to better understand the spiritual wisdom to be gleaned from India's religious traditions.

Most of the bases covered in traditional surveys of Hinduism are covered here. There are chapters on Vedanta, Krishna, Shiva, and the Goddess, as well as a chapter on modern religious leaders, Mohandas K. Gandhi and the Bengali activist, Mahasweta Devi. C. makes no attempt to survey the traditions in the manner of an introductory textbook but rather focuses on a select number of representative texts. This is an effective method, given his goal, which is to reflect, and encourage the reader to reflect, upon the spiritual value of these texts and traditions for the modern Christian seeker. Indeed, this book is as much about interreligious
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understanding as it is about Hinduism *per se*. Discussions of Hindu texts are frequently supplemented by citations from the Christian Scriptures, sometimes to highlight similarities, sometimes differences. To this are added frequent observations, somewhat homiletic in tone, on the lessons to be drawn from these texts, lessons that transcend the boundaries that separate Hindu and Christian.

One interested in the study of Hindu ideas and practices considered in their own religious contexts will be better served by C.'s earlier works, and by the many scholarly surveys of the tradition now available. But for the Christian seeking a more personal mode of entry into the spiritual riches of the Hindu religious traditions this book will provide a reliable point of departure.

DAVID CARPENTER
St. Joseph's University, Philadelphia


Steinmetz's extensive background includes 20 years of service as a missionary, some of the earliest work done in interreligious dialogue on reservations, and higher studies in ethnology and history of religions. His unabashedly apologetic thesis is that there is an essential relation between the sacred pipe and the Cosmic Christ. He bases this thesis on Eliade's cosmic religion phenomenology, Jung's archetypes, and Rahner's transcendental methodology. The opening chapters consist mostly of great blocks of texts from those three authors with brief running commentary, and another chapter is devoted to "intuitive identifications" based on those positions. An interesting summary chapter covers the ethnology of the pipe tradition, and a final chapter argues for "the pipe" as an image of Christ.

S. is to be commended for his courage and creativity in a much disputed area. But some questions arise. First, is it not an unwarranted universalization to speak of *the* sacred pipe? There are in fact many ceremonial pipes with various symbolic values. Second, is it not risky to insert one's own bracketed comments into quotes from others such as Rahner (168–69)?

S. concludes with a personal testimony, inviting readers to make their own journeys. I might recommend a journey that shares S.'s bold quest for human commonality but leaves conclusions to native persons themselves, as in the educational methods of Paulo Freire. Yet S. does courageously address the complex context of aboriginal Christians today who often ask how they can be true both to their own cultures and to Christianity. His book will be helpful reading for anyone concerned with the relationship between Christianity and aboriginal spirituality.

CARL F. STARKLOFF, S.J.
Regis College, Toronto

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