BOOK REVIEWS


The Douay version of the New Testament has been revised many times, but never since its appearance in 1582 has there been a new English translation from the Vulgate. At the request of the Hierarchy of England and Wales the Right Reverend Monsignor Ronald A. Knox set to work on a new version in 1939; five years later the results of his labors were privately printed in a "trial edition" and circulated in some nine thousand copies. Sheed and Ward has now published this work in the United States in an attractive well-bound edition, printed in large, clear type on excellent paper.

Monsignor Knox proposed to make an entirely new translation, not a revision of the Douay Version. His rendering is not literal but literary. His aim was to use what he calls "timeless English," and by that he means "the use of no word, no phrase, and as far as possible no turn of sentence, which would not have passed as decent literary English in the seventeenth century, and would not pass as decent literary English today." The basic text was the Clementine Vulgate, and no attempt was made to go beyond it, except when (1) it makes nonsense; (2) it admits of two different interpretations; (3) the Latin "gives a weak equivalent for a colorful word in the original"; and (4) it was necessary "to restore, here and there, more plausible tenses to verbs when the Latin comes, directly or indirectly, from the Hebrew." Such are the general principles which guided the translator.

This reviewer thinks that Monsignor Knox has done a brilliant piece of work, and has put the whole English-speaking Catholic world in his debt. He has removed—partially, and he will have done it entirely when he will have translated the Old Testament, as he proposes to do—a long standing reproach, that we Catholics had an inferior version of the Scriptures from the standpoint of literary excellence. Converts, who were readers of the Authorized Version, need no longer pine nostalgically for the majestic phrases of the King James, as did Frederick William Faber, who wrote: "It lives on the ear like music, like the sound of church bells..." It is a joy to read the Knox version; it is so clear and so beautiful. Perhaps it does fall below the Authorized Version in majesty and solemnity, but no one can reproach it with a lack of literary excellence or clarity.

This new translation is very much in the nature of a paraphrase, but there can be no serious objection to that as long as the meaning of the original is
accurately and clearly expressed. There are passages in which the Monsignor has succeeded far beyond any previous version, Catholic or non-Catholic, in bringing out the meaning. For example:

Mt. 1:25: He had not known her when she bore a son, her first-born.
Mt. 5:32: Setting aside the matter of unfaithfulness (excepta causa fornicationis).
Lk. 19:8: Here and now, Lord, I give half of what I have to the poor (Ecce, dimidium bonorum meorum, Domine, do pauperibus).
Rom. 2:14: Carry out the precepts of the law unbidden (naturaliter ea, quae legis sunt, faciunt).
Rom. 7:8: With the law's ban for a foothold (occasione autem accepta per mandatum).
Rom. 14:23: Wherever there is bad conscience, there is sin (Omne quod non est ex fide, peccatum est).
Eph. 1:10: To give history its fulfilment (in dispensatione plenitudinis temporis).
Heb. 11:1: What is faith? It is that which gives substance to our hope, which convinces us of things we cannot see (Est autem fides sperandarum substantia rerum, argumentum non apparentium).

Similar examples could be cited from practically every chapter of every book.

Among instances of passages where the Latin is abandoned or at least interpreted in the light of the Greek, we cite the following:

Mt. 11:17: Beat the breast (πανταξτιστεἰ: ἐκθωμάθεσθε).
Mt. 19:25: Were thrown into great bewilderment (μιράμεθα: κτείρονται).
Mt. 25:36: Cared for me (κατακλεῖσθε: ἐκθραμβεύσατε).
Lk. 2:17: Discovered the truth (κωιδώνοι: κειμένοι).
Lk. 6:16: Judas who turned traitor (καὶ ἦν ἐγένετο προδότης).
Jn. 8:25: What, that I should be speaking to you at all? (Principium, qui et loquor vobis: τὴν ἁρχήν ὡς τι καὶ λαλῶ ὑμῖν).
Gal. 5:12: Should lose their manhood (ἀποκόψαται).
Jas. 1:11: All his enterprises (ἐκεῖνα: ἐπερεαίς).

As we have already said, the translator handles his text with the utmost freedom; no one can accuse him of being slavishly literal. Let us cite a few examples:

Mt. 19:12: Take this in, you whose hearts are large enough for it (Qui potest capere, capiat).
Mk. 2:28: The Son of Man has even the sabbath at his disposal (Dominus est filius hominis, etiam sabbati).
Mk. 6:20: Followed his advice in many things (multa faciebat).
Lk. 12:33: A purse that time cannot wear a hole in (sacculos qui non veterascent).
Jn. 8:44: He is all false and it was he who gave falsehood its birth (Mendax est, et pater ejus).
Jn. 13:10: Wash the stains from his feet (pedes lavet).
Acts 5:9: Even now I hear at the door the footsteps (Ecce pedes... ad ostium).
Rom. 1:5: All over the world men must be taught to honor his name by paying him the homage of their faith (ad obedientium fidei in omnibus gentibus pro nomine ejus).

The foregoing examples, only a few of hundreds which could be cited, are sufficient to show with what freedom Monsignor Knox handles his text.

Those who are familiar with the New Testament in any hitherto commonly read version will miss certain familiar expressions which we have grown accustomed to associate with biblical language. For example, the word “scandal” becomes “a stone in my path” (Mt. 16:23), “a discouragement” (I Cor. 1:23), “a boulder to catch them unawares” (petram scandali, Rom. 9:33), “all that give offence” (omnia scandala, Mt. 13:41), “entangle a brother’s conscience” (fratri scandalum, Rom. 14:13), “no fear of stumbling haunts him” (scandalum in eo non est, I Jn. 2:10). The verb scandalisare is rendered: “an occasion of falling” (Mt. 5:29, et ah), “lose confidence in” (Mt. 11:6), “took it amiss” (Mt. 15:21), “try your faith” (Jn. 6:62), “lose courage” or “lose heart” (Mt. 26:31; Mt. 24:10, et ah).

Another familiar expression that has given place to modern phrasing is Amen dico vobis. It is rendered: “Believe me” (Mt. 5:18, and frequently), “I promise you” (Mt. 17:19, et ah.), “I tell you truthfully” (Mt. 10:15, et al.). These renderings are certainly more intelligible to the reader who is unfamiliar with biblical language, yet those who have been reading the New Testament in English all their lives will regret their absence. Perhaps it is best they should go, if their meaning is no longer understood by a new generation.

Similarly, the word justitia, a technical expression in St. Paul’s Epistles which has a definite meaning, is variously translated as “holiness,” “right,” “right doing,” “acquittal,” “virtue,” “innocence.” The verb justificare is also variously rendered as “be justified,” “attain justification,” “impair holiness,” “become acceptable,” etc. There can be no reasonable objection to such variations, provided they are warranted by the context and express the meaning. They do, however, make comparison of passages where the same Greek or Latin word is used very difficult, if not impossible, for those
who are unfamiliar with Greek and Latin and do not have the Greek or Latin text at hand.

There is certainly a great advantage in having one translator do the entire New Testament, in that this assures consistency and uniformity of style throughout. But where paraphrase is so generously used, as in this version, there is the disadvantage that the variety of style between one author and another is largely suppressed in the translation. The style of the Gospels, of St. Paul, and of all the rest of the New Testament books becomes the style of Monsignor Knox. Anacoluthic constructions and abruptness, so characteristic of St. Paul, the Semitic phrasing, so prominent in certain passages of the Gospels and Acts, are all equally removed. Is the advantage in clarity and smoothness of style sufficient to compensate for this loss of individuality in the different New Testament authors?

It seems at times to us that the vigor and force of certain passages is considerably diminished by Monsignor Knox's phrasing. For example, compare the following:

Knox: No servant can be in the employment of two masters at once (Mt. 6:24).
Douay: No man can serve two masters.
Knox: Separated from me you have no power to do anything (Jn. 15:5).
Douay: Without me you can do nothing.
Knox: They do not know what it is they are doing (Lk. 23:34).
Douay: They know not what they do.
Knox: I came upon an errand from my Father, and now I am sending you out in my turn (Jn. 20:21).
Douay: As the Father has sent me, so I also send you.
Knox: Simon, dost thou care for me more than these others? (Jn. 21:15).
Douay: Simon, dost thou love me more than these do?

While the diction and sentence structure are generally superb, there are a few words and phrases which do not appeal to this reviewer. The word "errand" is a favorite with the translator to express the mission either of our Lord or of the Apostles (as in Jn. 20:21; Rom. 10:15, et al.). "Impulse" is used not infrequently to express doing or not doing something of one's own volition (as in Jn. 5:30; Jn. 16:13). The word "tale" (Mt. 22:10; Rom. 11:25), i.e., the complete number, is rather unusual, at least in the United States. Other expressions which strike this reviewer as odd or clumsy include the following: "As he came straight up out of the water" (Mt. 3:16); "Could not bring him close to, because of..." (Mk. 2:4); "death he was to achieve" (Lk. 17:7); "A proclamation had been written up over him" (Lk. 23:38); "They kept still" (i.e., kept the sabbath rest; Lk. 23:56); "They run
hot foot” (Rom. 3:14); “Exploits of God” (I Pet. 2:9); “It was this same Moses, the man whom they had disowned, and asked him Who made thee a ruler and a judge over us? that God sent to be their ruler and their deliverer, helped by an angel whom he saw there at the bush” (Acts 7:35).

The foregoing examples, however, are simply matters of taste, and, if they are defects at all, they are very minor. What is of paramount importance in a translation or a paraphrase is accuracy. In general, Monsignor Knox has, we think, been quite successful in expressing faithfully the sense of the Vulgate or of the Greek behind the Vulgate. There are places, however, where he has undoubtedly made his version stronger than the original warrants. For example, Mt. 13:13 “videntes non vident” is rendered: “Though they have eyes, they cannot see.” Lk. 1:35 “Quomodo fiet istud” becomes: “How can this be.” Mary does not question the possibility of her conceiving; she merely seeks information as to the manner in which it is to be brought about. Jn. 8:21 “moriemini” is strengthened into: “You will have to die.” Jn. 9:41 “peccatum vestrum manet” is rendered: “You cannot be rid of your guilt.”

There are other passages where Monsignor Knox seems to miss the sense of the original. In Mt. 20:15, where the expression “oculus nequam” occurs, the idea of envy, which the expression certainly contains, is hardly conveyed by the rendering “sour looks.” The translation of “signum cui contradicetur” (Lk. 2:34) certainly expresses active opposition to our Lord, but that is hardly found in Monsignor Knox’s: “A sign which men will refuse to recognize.” In Eph. 1:4, “In caritate” is rendered: “For love of him”; the meaning is rather that charity is the means by which the Christians are to be blameless and “saints in his sight,” or the expression designates the love of God by which He has eternally chosen us. “The Father has within him the gift of life” is not an accurate rendering of: “Pater habet vitam in semetipso” (Jn. 5:30). Jn. 5:37, “Neque vocem ejus unquam audistis, neque speciem ejus vidistis,” is not correctly rendered by: “You have always been deaf to his voice, blind to the vision of him.” This implies that God had spoken directly to the Jews and that the vision of the Deity was available to them; but our Lord’s meaning is rather that the Jews have neither seen nor heard God the Father, and therefore they are not equipped with any evidence against Jesus, who had both seen and heard the Father, and had come directly from Him, as His works clearly testify. Jn. 8:42, “Ego enim ex Deo processi,” is, it seems to us, incorrectly rendered: “It was from God I took my origin.” This refers our Lord’s statement to His eternal generation, whereas it is of His coming into the world in the incarnation that Jesus is speaking. “It is because I hope as Israel hopes” (Acts 28:20) does not seem...
Monsignor Knox sometimes take the liberty of inserting a word or phrase which has nothing corresponding to it either in the Latin or Greek text. For example (we italicize the inserted word or phrase): Mt. 10:10: "No spare shoes"; Jn. 6:29: "The Man whom he has sent"; Jn. 8:38: "Your actions, it seems, are what you have learned in the school of your Father (quae vidistis apud patrem vestrum facitis)"; Acts 1:18: "And afterwards, when he fell from a height, and his belly burst open, so that he was disembowelled (suspensus crepuit medius; et diffusa sunt omnia viscera ejus)"; Eph. 1:15: "Well then, I too play my part (propterea et ego)."

Sometimes these insertions are of a serious doctrinal character; for example, "Pater major me est" (Jn. 14:28) is rendered: "My Father has greater power than I." Rom. 9:5 ("qui est super omnia Deus"), one of the most direct assertions of the divinity of our Lord in the New Testament, is weakened in the translation into: "Who rules as God over all things." Gal. 3:28 ("Omnes enim vos unum estis in Christo Jesu") is rendered: "You are all one person in Christ Jesus." While Monsignor Knox was adding a word to the unum of the Vulgate in order to indicate that the Greek has the masculine gender, I wish that he had gone a little farther and added another word, making the passage read: "You are all one moral person in Christ Jesus."

In the fourth chapter of Romans, where St. Paul proves from the case of Abraham that it is faith which leads to justification, the text, "Credidit Abraham Deo, et reputatum est illi ad justitiam," is repeatedly rendered: "Abraham put his faith in God, and it was reckoned virtue in him." Thus to render justitia in this passage would seem to undermine the whole argument of St. Paul, that Abraham's faith led to his justification.

Apart from these exceptions and others which space does not allow us to list, and apart from not a few passages whose rendering is open to challenge for accuracy, we think that Monsignor Knox has given to the English-speaking Catholic world a rendering that is superb in style and diction, and that it will do immense good in bringing a deeper insight into the meaning of the inspired message of the New Testament. After emendations and corrections, it will deserve to become as "timeless" as the English in which the learned translator has sought to express God's inspired word.

Catholic University of America

JOSEPH L. LILLY, C.M.


This book consists of the Croall Lectures, seven in number, which were
accurately to represent the Vulgate's, "propter spem Israel," which is the Messias.

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JOSEPH L. LILLY, C.M.


This book consists of the Croall Lectures, seven in number, which were
delivered at the University of Edinburgh in 1943. In spite of the encomiums heaped upon it by non-Catholic reviewers who call it "an illuminating volume," "profound theology," "a valuable representation of the central Christian doctrine," the book from a Catholic and even a Christian point of view arrives exactly nowhere. Or perhaps it would be more exact to say that in its affirmative conclusions it arrives at a point where it would have really begun; for these conclusions merely state that the Christian doctrine of the Holy Trinity proclaims that there are three Persons in God, distinct from, but equal to one another—a doctrine which is mysterious but not irrational. Beyond this the author does not go except to criticise the traditional explanations of the inner life of the Godhead and to find them all wanting. The Fathers of the Church in general, St. Augustine in particular, St. Thomas, and John Calvin are mildly taken to task for their inconsistencies, which, very generously, the author attributes to their defective philosophy. Strangely enough, Dr. Hodgson has nothing to offer in place of the rejected explanations in spite of his belief in the great advance of modern philosophical thought. He is quite sure that "if St. Augustine, St. Thomas and Calvin were alive today they would be glad . . . to revise what they have written" (p. 157). These writers are thought to be guilty of subordinationism because, in an attempt to maintain the unity of God, they hold the traditional doctrine that the Father is the principium in the Trinity. The root of the evil, however, seems to be that they all had a mathematical conception of unity. It is quite evident that Dr. Hodgson confuses mathematical unity with mathematical simplicity, for, apropos of Calvin's phrase "simplex Dei unitas," he writes: "It is just this notion that unity is a simple thing which is exploded by the empirical evidence which is the basis of the doctrine of the Trinity" (p. 173). And his next sentence is far from enlightening: "If we grasp the implications of this evidence, and think of the unity as unifying the three persons [italics ours] of whom none is afore or after another, we have no further need of the doctrine of the principium of the Father."

This is all Dr. Hodgson's more advanced philosophy has to tell us of the inner constitution of the Trinity. The three persons are one God because there is a unity which unifies them. He says this in different ways, it is true, but he adds not one iota to a fuller grasp of the mystery. At times he almost outdistances the repetitions of Gertrude Stein, as for example, when he describes the type of unity he envisages in the Trinity. It is "the unity of a being whose unity consists in nothing else than the unifying activity which unifies the component elements" (p. 94). While rejecting, in general, the metaphysics of the idealists, he acknowledges his indebtedness to them be-
cause they "have encouraged us to believe in the reasonableness of the idea of a personal life which in its experience unifies the experience of its internally constitutive persons" (p. 132). And the author adds that "it is in the inner being of God that the Christian revelation teaches us to find a unity of this kind" (p. 133). This appears to be his nearest philosophical (or theological) approach to a penetration of the unity of the Trinity; it is some kind of constitutive unity of which a vague glimpse is given us by a philosophical system (idealism) which, as a whole, must be thrown into the discard. And, in explicit words, he offers no apology for not saying any more on the nature of the divine unity, but suspends his judgment on the real mode of reconciling the unity of God with the Trinity. It is for this reason that we have said that beyond repeating the fact that there are three Persons in one God, the author in this treatise on the sublime mystery of the Trinity has arrived exactly nowhere.

Obviously it would be of little worth to refute all the statements which run contrary to Catholic theology in a book of such profound modernist hue, but some attention should be given to three preoccupations of the author to which he returns time and time again. These are: the nature of revelation, the empirical method on which he prides himself, and the necessary (?) rejection of the doctrine that the Father is the prinicipium in the Trinity. In the author's mind these points are closely connected, and it is because of errors or a lack of consistency in their handling that Christian scholars have gone awry in their speculations upon the Trinity.

Revelation, Dr. Hodgson assures us frequently, was not given to man in the form of propositions to be believed. That would be revelation in words, while it was actually given in deeds, and consists of the whole history of God's dealings with mankind. It is only from our experience of this divine action that we deduce what is to be believed; and thus we arrive at the inner content of revelation by a method which is truly empirical. Specifically, a knowledge of the Trinity comes to us from what Christ has told us about His relations to the Father and the Spirit in His human life and from the fact that these same relations are duplicated in the life of the Christian. According to Dr. Hodgson, "The doctrine of the Trinity is thus an inference to the nature of God drawn from what we believe to be the empirical evidence given by God in His revelation of Himself in the history of the world" (p. 140). It is difficult to see how such knowledge can truly be called empirical. We have to accept Christ's word that these relations do exist and thus, ultimately, we must admit some kind of revelation in words. Thoroughly rationalistic and modernist in outlook, the author holds that the human Christ came to the knowledge of these relations by experience. It would
have been interesting, to say the least, if Dr. Hodgson had thrown some light on the manner in which Christians experience the truth that they have been "adopted to share His [Christ's] sonship to the Father in the Spirit" (p. 61).

From his so-called empirical evidence Dr. Hodgson "arrives" at the doctrine of the Trinity by "the projection into eternity of that relationship between Christ and the Father which was revealed in the Incarnation" (p. 121), and by "thinking away those elements in the Incarnate life of Christ and the temporal mission of the Spirit which are incidental to the historical revelation in time and space" (p. 156). This requires "a unity wherein no one of the persons has any metaphysical priority over another" (p. 156), and therefore the traditional doctrine that the Father is the *principium* must be cast aside. (Quite obviously Dr. Hodgson, in spite of his reading St. Thomas, has never grasped the meaning of that doctrine). Hence, too, we must think away the notions of filiation and procession, although the author confesses that he has not "the least idea of what is meant by filiation and procession in respect to the divine being" (p. 144). We might ask Dr. Hodgson why he stops here; why he is not logical enough to "think away" the whole doctrine of the Trinity.

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**DESMOND A. SCHMAL, S.J.**


In this latest work, Dr. Hocking endeavors to show the necessity of admitting the existence of God because of the failure of science to explain the whole of reality, or to satisfy that yearning of the heart which cannot rest until it rests in an infinite object of love. He studies in succession the efforts of Logical Positivism and the physical sciences, of psychology and psychiatry, and of sociology and religious humanism to get along without God, and shows how each in turn fails to establish sufficiently the objective meaningfulness of the world, to furnish a standard of validity for our appreciation of values, and to give us a source of assurance and stability in individual and social life. He concludes that there is a cosmic demand for the existence of an infinite God who can be a law of normal mental life and a real object for the emotional structure of our minds.

Dr. Hocking develops his thesis by what he calls "the law of dialectical experiment." This method is an appeal to experience in a negative fashion, and is based on the assumption that false theories always eventually arrive at self-cancelling conclusions. Just as Gilson in *The Unity of Philosophical Experience* tried to give a negative argument for Scholasticism by showing that other systems of philosophy had historically and by an inner necessity
come to a dead end, so Hocking endeavors to show that all the attempts of various sciences to get along without God have broken down because they do not and cannot explain all the facts of human experience. Hocking makes clear why he adopts this method: he still accepts as valid the Kantian position that all the usual positive proofs for God’s existence necessarily involve one in an insoluble antimony—since God has an intelligible relation to events in the world as its cause, designer, etc., He must be a part of the world; and on the other hand, as God, He is supposed to be outside the world and independent of it. Like Kant, Hocking thus accepts contingent being as the type of all being.

While admitting that the idea of God must be redefined, Hocking spurns any redefinition which empties the word of its meaning by making God a synonym for nature, or the laws of nature, as, for example, Spinoza does. God must have something to do with the meaning, the value of things, as distinct from the mere fact of their orderly behavior. However, he will not allow God the least causal activity in the world for the Kantian reason that this would make God a member in a series of finite causes, and would also reintroduce miracles into science. God must be a “non-competitor” with finite causal activity. God becomes, therefore, the element of objectivity in the order of values, thus giving the world objective meaningfulness, without in any way interfering with the workings of nature.

Hocking finally tries to establish the truth of God’s existence through a personal experience of Him in sensation, analogous to the direct contact with God as an immediate presence which, he holds, the mystics feel. The sense-data may be accepted either as a subjective self-enjoyment or as a summons to think. The former leads to solipsism and precludes science; the latter, to life of the individual and of science. Now, man ought to interpret sense-data, to accept them as something given. This obligation, at the base of all science and mental life, implies a source of obligation in the “something beyond me” which gives the datum; “and only a living self can be such a source.” The activity of God is “the primary and universal and incessant presentation of the stuff of being” which is given us in sensation, and this presentation is according to a total world pattern which shows purpose throughout. Yet, God’s activity is not causal but is like “the light which projects a motion picture onto a screen.” Consciousness of this joint action, by which God presents the stuff of sensation and man interprets it to discover the divine plan, may afford a “silent and perpetual conversation” between God and man, and in that infinite personal God man can find a real object of his love.

Just what this divine activity is remains very vague. It resembles some-
what the illumination of the intellect by God in St. Augustine's doctrine, but is without the necessary complementary theses regarding the exemplary and creative nature of the divine ideas. As a result, the nature of God Himself remains obscure. He is not a Creator, nor has He any control of reality, since He is absolutely without causality in the world; He is not a foundation for a real moral law, for there seems to be no real virtue or vice in Hocking's doctrine; and there is no apparent reason why God guarantees personal immortality or eternal happiness. Hocking seems to make Him a personal, infinite, living God, instead of a mere impersonal law which is immanent in things, because man yearns for a being who will give "objective meaning" to the universe. This appears to be little more than a pragmatic acceptance of God because God is useful to man.

Although the book adds little to our knowledge either of God's existence or of His nature, it is not without real value. Hocking's criticism of the efforts of various sciences to get along without God are well put and telling. His delineation of the psychiatrist's attitude toward matters of conscience is excellent, and affords a good example of how little some psychiatrists understand the real nature of priestly confession. His insistence throughout the book that our standard of values determines the meaningfulness, goal, and worth of our thought and actions, even in science, might furnish a seed-thought even for Scholastics. Finally, the revelation of Hocking's own state of mind is a confirmation of St. Augustine's penetrating psychological insight that the heart of every sincere man hungers for an object of its love that stands above the finitude and cheapness of perishable things.

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Christianity is a highly systematized religion, touching human life at almost every angle. It is a harmonious integration of a creed, a code, and a cult. With decisive finality it proposes a comprehensive body of revealed truths to be accepted by intellectual assent. It prescribes a very definite rule of conduct to be observed with exactness, while the richness and magnificence of its ritual and ceremonial have never failed to appeal to human hearts. If we deny or overlook one of these three, we no longer have the true religion of Christ.

In order to awaken keener interest in Christian worship and a more intelligent appreciation of the same, the author of the present work laudably undertakes to expound and to interpret the role of the sacraments in Christian life. We entirely agree with him when, at the outset, he writes:
"It is not too much to say that the Protestant Churches, on the whole, have regarded preaching as of preeminent importance, and have obscured the place of the sacraments" (p. 7), though he fails to trace such neglect to its real source. Every student of history knows that it emerges from the upheaval of the pseudo-reformation in its rejection of the Catholic doctrine of justification and the efficacy of the sacraments. At all events, the author's endeavor is most heartening and timely, and his book bears unmistakable marks of reverence, fairness, and sincerity.

In the early portion of his work, the writer appropriately discusses the problems of the nature and of the number of the sacraments. While intimating varying and conflicting opinions relative to their nature, the author inclines to that of Calvin. The sacraments are signs or symbols, established by Christ to animate and nurture faith. They exercise no further efficacy. Justification in the Protestant sense, or the mere external imputation of the justness of Christ, is to be ascribed to faith. In attempting to clarify the Catholic position, and while retaining the accepted formula, "ex opere operato," Dr. Kerr is neither lucid nor happy. Furthermore, he adheres to the prevalent Protestant teaching that there are but two sacraments, baptism and the Lord's Supper. Familiar with the Catholic doctrine of seven sacraments, he even goes to the length of adducing scriptural support for it, only to arrive at the unwarranted conclusion: "Such New Testament references, however, are insufficient to lift these actions into sacramental significance. . . . The practice of the apostolic Church points to the fact that only baptism and the Lord's Supper had sacramental value to the early Christians" (p. 51).

A similar superficiality characterizes his judgment on the trinitarian form of baptism. It is not correct to maintain, as Dr. Kerr does, that it is the outcome of later theological development, nor can we subscribe to his belief that in earliest Christian times baptism was administered "in the name of Jesus." Pursuing to some extent the problem of pedobaptism, the writer strives to present accurately both sides of the controversy. Those opposed to infant baptism—"And the Churches so believing number their membership in the millions" (p. 62)—base their contention on the necessity of actual faith prior to baptism, they feel very keenly on the subject, and even suggest that the practice of infant baptism be surrendered in the interest of the ecumenical Christian movement. It is conceded, however, that the majority of Christians administer the sacrament to infants, and our author sincerely tries to discover encouragement for their claim in the New Testament. Unfortunately, his findings are not sufficiently conclusive, not because such evidences are not to be found there. He simply overlooked
the convincing argument which removes all doubt about the value of pe­
dobaptism. No wonder, then, that he appears willing to allow that the
eyrly Church might have been mistaken in its authorization of infant
baptism. It is a pleasure to observe that he upholds baptism, not only by
immersion, but by ablation of any sort.

Going on to his study of the Lord's Supper, the classical passages of the
New Testament are set down at length, because they "contain all that we
really need as to the meaning and significance of this holy ordinance" (p. 82).
But whereas in ordinary human intercourse we accept words at their face
value, the eucharistic words of the New Testament "mean something other
than they say.... It is the language of symbolism" (p. 84). The bread
and wine are symbols; the Real Presence is ruled out, and the struggle to
displace the obvious sense of Christ's comforting words ends in disappoint­
ment, dissatisfaction, and unscholarly obscurity. The same is also true of
the author's treatment of the eucharistic sacrifice. And consistently so.
If Christ's words mean something other than they say, certainly there is no
eucharistic sacrifice, and Christ is to blame for centuries of idolatry. And
so we hear the author state: "A portion of the bread is placed in the ta­
bernacle to be worshiped and adored. This is the reservation of the sacra­
ment, and it is to this the people kneel in adoration" (p. 95).

The concluding chapters are devoted to preaching on the sacraments and
and the possibility of Inter-Communion. Under this latter caption we are
 supplied with a questionnaire submitted to the Protestant Churches of this
country and Canada, and with a frank digest of the replies. From a perusal
of these comments it is manifest that there is a very sharp division rooted in
the conflicting beliefs of different Churches. Unity postulates an underlying
principle, and the Protestant Churches owe their existence to the repudia­
tion of any such source of unity. The author rightly deplores the insuffi­
ciency of sacramental doctrine in the pulpit and in Protestant manuals of
theology. And while he sincerely pleads for a change for the better, and
labels his book "A Source Book for Ministers," neither the general reader nor
the professional theologian will be greatly helped. There is a lack of in­
cisive thinking and of straightforward exposition all along the lines of sac­
ramental theology. Good will and honest endeavor are in evidence
throughout, but the errors emanating from Zwingli, Calvin, Luther and their
followers have left their stamp on the book, and thoroughly explain the
current disregard of the sacraments which our author zealously combats.

Woodstock College

D. J. M. CALLAHAN, S.J.

In the midst of the confused and confusing ideas prevalent in philosophy today, it is refreshing to discover a book which presents in an interesting manner the objective and satisfying metaphysics of Thomas Aquinas. A Realistic Philosophy by Kurth Reinhardt does just that. In general the book is good. It is well written, and says much that is important. It is, professedly, a brief compendium of the philosophy of the Angelic Doctor, and it might well be called a general essay in Thomistic philosophy. I should like to congratulate Dr. Reinhardt on this work—his first venture, as far as I am aware, in the field of Thomistic thought—and express the hope that he will continue what he has so well begun.

There are, unfortunately, certain defects and inaccuracies which mar the excellence of the book and considerably diminish its value. In the first place, one might well ask what the purpose of the book is, and for whom it is intended. It seems to me that in his endeavor to cover in 268 pages the whole of metaphysics and its various applications in the philosophy of nature, of man, and of God, together with treatises on ethics, political and economic philosophy, Dr. Reinhardt has not been able to make much of the book sufficiently understandable to one not already proficient in this subject. On the other hand, the average student of Scholastic philosophy would probably find it too brief and too obvious to derive much profit from it.

Be that as it may, the book has, I believe, a certain lack of unity. Because of the enormous amount of matter it covers and the variety of the diverse questions it treats without indication of their intimate connection, one may easily overlook the respective interdependence of its parts. Consequently, the essential unity of the problems, the constant integration of the proposed solutions are not clearly set forth, and the magnificent edifice of Thomistic philosophy, whose most manifest quality is its cogent unity, is not properly established. Contributing notably to this lack of unity is the arrangement of its contents, which, at times, recalls Wolfian methodology rather than Thomistic sequence. The first part, for example, does not present the fundamental problem of the one and the many and the development of the act and potency theory. This is proposed later in connection with the explanation of the predicament action, and in the treatise on causes. The book begins with the consideration of the abstraction and predication of the concept of being. Moreover, we are surprised to discover that the question of the distinction between essence and "to be," the keystone of Thomism—as Father d’Alès so aptly remarks—is not studied till the predicaments have
been disposed of. Clearly, then, the essential sequence of thought necessary to integral unity cannot be expected.

Finally, the greatest weakness of the book consists in a number of ambiguous and misleading propositions which are probably due to a lack of exactitude in the technical use of philosophical language. No doubt Dr. Reinhardt is trying to present Thomas's thought; but what he says occasionally seems quite different from that thought. I should like to indicate a few of these statements, in the hope that they may be eradicated or amended in the next edition.

To begin with, I suggest that the definition of being given on page 28 as that "which is not nothing" has a strong flavor of Ockamism. Thomas states that being is "that whose act is the 'to be'" (id cuius actus est esse), a phrase which fundamentally expresses the solution of the problem of the one and the many, and prepares the way for the analogy of proportionality. If, on the contrary, we begin our analysis of being with a purely negative definition, we cannot hope to obtain any light on the difficult problem of the predication of being. True, the author asserts that this predication is had by analogy, but the analogy which he proceeds to explain has all the earmarks of the univocal predication of a reality which varies in intensity but remains unchanged in its essential concept. "Thus," he explains (p. 31), "we speak of a red rose, of a red nose, of a red flag. The common term is red, and all the things so designated share in it but not in the same manner and degree. The concept of being is of this type; it is analogous." Here Dr. Reinhardt evidently confuses philosophical analogy with quantitative differentiation, which is not founded on a ratio, or proportional similitude, but on the quantitative or qualitative measurement of a definite perfection. To intensify or increase a given perfection, even indefinitely, in no way changes the fact that its predication is univocal. As St. Thomas points out, the predication of a definite perfection according to various degrees of quantitative measurement makes for imperfect similitude, but in no possible way for philosophical analogy. Philosophical analogy does not indicate varying degrees of the same generic or specific perfection, it indicates a certain similarity resulting from the ratio of an essence to its "to be."

To say, therefore, that the concept of being is predicated of God and of creatures in the same manner as red is said of nose and rose, is to assert that the predication of being is univocal, and consequently to destroy the true concept of God.

Again, on page 32, the author states that the fundamental principles of contradiction, identity, sufficient reason, and the like, which "precede in time or in nature the reality which flows from them... are both principles in the
logical order and in the ontological." In my opinion such a statement seems considerably closer to idealism than to the realistic philosophy which Dr. Reinhardt professes to teach. Does he mean to say that these principles are distinct realities out of which other distinct realities really flow? That is what he seems to say, and that is certainly idealism. Perhaps what he has in mind is that these principles which are in the logical order, the order of thought, and not in the ontological, the order of existence, are the foundation for certain and absolute truths.

On page 42 Dr. Reinhardt writes: "Substance may be defined as a being independent of the subject in which it inheres." What, it may be asked, is the subject in which a substance inheres, and of which it is independent? Is it another substance? No doubt, for it could hardly be an accident. But being a substance, it too, must inhere in another, and the same must be said of that other and so on, without end. Of course, Dr. Reinhardt has no intention of proposing such absurdities; in fact, I am convinced that he means just the opposite, namely, that substance does not inhere in another subject of which it is independent, but, as St. Thomas clearly expresses it: substance is the subject. This erroneous definition of substance, it would appear, is due to the Wolfian definition of accident which the author proposes on the same page. Accidents, he declares, are beings "which cannot be termed realities independent of a subject in which they inhere." If we leave out the not of cannot, we have Dr. Reinhardt's definition of substance. It would assuredly be better, especially for definitions, if writers who endeavor to explain Thomistic philosophy would go to the Angelic Doctor himself. "Substance," St. Thomas says, "is the subject; it is that to whose quiddity is due a 'to be,' not in another."

In conclusion, I should like to repeat that, despite its faults, *A Realistic Philosophy* has many valuable features. The last chapters on political and economic philosophy are excellent.

*St. Louis University*  
HENRI RENARD, S.J.

**ALFRED LOISY.** His Religious Significance. By M. D. Petre. Cambridge University Press, 1944. Pages xi + 129. $2.00.

Modernism in the Catholic Church has been dead these last thirty years. True, some Modernists kept on writing, notably Loisy; but by 1910 even he realized that the movement was a lost cause. When Miss Petre, his British press agent, published *Modernism, Its Failure and Its Fruits* (1918), Loisy wrote to her: "All books on Modernism, even good ones, affect me like a funeral oration, and it is as though my ashes were being raked." In her second last book, *My Way of Faith* (1937), Miss Petre herself wrote: "I find
nothing more painful and distasteful than to go back to those days. The
people I cared for most are gone; all cohesion has disappeared; I feel myself,
as I have often said, a solitary, a marooned being on a deserted island.”

Loisy died in 1940 at the age of eighty-three; Miss Petre died in her eightieth
year in December, 1942. The book under review, written during air raids
and at intervals between fire-watching and nursery work or care for refugees,
was completed shortly before her death. A frontispiece shows Loisy sitting
at his desk, the only photo I have ever seen of him. James A. Walker pre­
mises a sketch of Miss Petre’s life, an abridgment of his article in the Hibbert
Journal, July, 1943. An Appendix contains some twenty excerpts from
Loisy’s correspondence with her.

The body of the book is not a biography of Loisy, but, as the subtitle says,
an account of his religious significance; for Miss Petre believed to the end
that he “had a message of religious significance to deliver to mankind from
which Christianity, and even Catholicism, can draw profit” (p. 1). Hence
she has tried “to present the leading characteristics of his work and teaching
from the religious point of view” (p. 3).

There is little that is new. The booklet is divided into two parts, and
each part into six chapters. Though the headings promise some progress of
thought, or at least differentiation of matter, the same old ideas, those of
Loisy’s modernism, are stressed throughout, and if there is progress or dif­
ferentiation, it is purely accidental. Miss Petre relies on and quotes ex­
tensively from Loisy’s Mémoirs, published in 1930–31. But she likes par­
ticularly a Livre inédit, an apologetics of a sort, which Loisy planned and
began to compose as a young professor, when he still had visions of putting
Catholic theology on a new basis and thus becoming a Father of the Church.
Loisy never published it and mostly repudiated it later, though he could not
refrain from synopsizing it in his Mémoirs and quoting long portions from it.
Miss Petre calls it “a very genuine Christian apology” (p. 109) and thinks
that it was inspired by “what we may almost call a discovery,” viz., that the
教学 of the Church was not grounded on, proved”, and supported by the
Scriptures, but that “the New Testament Scriptures had their origin within
and not without the Church,” that “the Church did not depend on them for
her truth and her life, but they on her” (p. 63). Loisy indeed sought to re­
move all future quarrels between faith and history (or science, as he and Miss
Petre always call it) by denying any community of interest between them.
Theology, according to him, was one thing; history, something wholly un­
connected with it.

Miss Petre does not feel qualified to speak about Loisy’s exegetical works
which led to his condemnation by Rome. But she heartily endorses what he
wrote about religion in general, notably in his later books *La religion, La morale humaine, Religion et humanité*. It is there that she finds his religious significance revealed, namely, of being a pioneer or the standard-bearer of the religion of humanity, in which humanity takes the place of God. Of course, *humanité* does not mean humanity; it means the French incarnation of humanity; and the religion of humanity means in its last analysis that the patriotism of Frenchmen is the only religion (p. 111). Strange to say, Miss Petre believes that Fr. Teilhard de Chardin, the famous anthropologist, agrees with Loisy (pp. 97, 98); but then she was never strong on fine distinctions. Loisy once wrote to her: “The religion that you defend is more like the religion of humanity than real authentic Catholicism” (p. 101).

Though excommunicated in the diocese of Southwark where she resided, Miss Petre considered herself a Catholic to her death. But Loisy was excommunicated by Rome and had no illusions about it. While Baron von Hügel held out the hope that excommunication would not cut him off from the “spiritual body” of the Church, Loisy knew better. “I have told him,” he wrote then, “of the interior process of my thought, and of how I realised in advance that the decision would put me outside the Church.” In spite of what Loisy said or did not say, Miss Petre believes that the excommunication was a bitter pill for him, “that there must have been periods of deep desolation, and of a bitter sense of homelessness” (p. 56). She narrates that a friend of theirs once found him at the gate of the Abbey at Pontigny, listening to the chant of the Mass in the Abbey church. What a model for a modern Leonardo da Vinci!

*Weston College*  
A. C. Cotter, S.J.


It is the object of this brief study “to point out the significance of the Church Fathers and their educational principles as molders of the medieval mind.” In two introductory chapters the author sketches the history, aims, and methods of Roman education, discusses the impact of Christianity on Western civilization, considers the pedagogical principles of Christ and the teaching authority of the Church, and examines the beginnings of Christian education in the catechumenal and catechetical schools. The body of the book is made up of short biographical notices of the individual Fathers and outlines of their more important writings. There is a final chapter on the patristic attitude toward pagan learning.

The book is possibly intended as collateral reading for a course in the his-
tory of education and, as such, is not without value for students who might otherwise remain unacquainted with the subject matter of patrology. However, it must be observed that the work does not live up to the promise of its title nor to the author's declaration of intent quoted above. The biographical and bibliographical material which it contains is readily available in numerous manuals, and it is disappointing to discover that the book progresses so little beyond mere data. There are hardly a dozen pages which deal with this familiar material in its relation to the medieval period; just what it was that the Fathers contributed to Scholasticism is never really made clear. It is as though one were to set out to prove that Descartes is the father of modern philosophy and then limit one's composition to a few biographical details and a statement of the contents of his principal works. One does not interpret a relationship by discussing its terminus a quo. Nor is the expressed purpose of the book seriously advanced by such occasional assertions as this: the De officiis of St. Ambrose, "because of its practical purpose in relation to the religious and moral life of man, became a mirror of conduct for succeeding generations and was of influence throughout the Middle Ages" (p. 121). Obiter dicta of this kind, scattered through the book, leave us knowing little more than we might have suspected to be true when we began reading it: because the Fathers lived and wrote before the Scholastics, they must have influenced them. In only a few instances is the argument more explicit than this, for example, in the section on St. John Chrysostom (originally published in the Catholic Educational Review, March, 1942), and in paragraphs on St. Jerome, St. Augustine, and the Pseudo-Areopagite. But even here the treatment of questions intrinsically interesting and important is not altogether satisfactory. What purpose is served by the unsupported declaration that the ontological argument of St. Anselm "is one of many indications of the tendency of his mind to take the Augustinian view of philosophical method" (p. 157)? The careful development of just such a point as this is what we have a right to expect in a book which proposes to study the influence of the Church Fathers on the medieval mind.

Among minor defects which occasionally prove distracting we may note the following: (1) lapses from the plain style of the book in such expressions as "the very palladium of national power" (p. 24), and "these worthies," in reference to Tacitus, Juvenal, and Pliny (p. 15); (2) imperfect proof reading, e.g., Phocalia for Philocalia (p. 55); also, if Origen was born in 185–186 A.D. and became head of the catechetical school at Alexandria at the age of eighteen (p. 52), then it is impossible that Clement remained head of the school until 213 A.D. (p. 48); (3) assertions which may or may not be correct
but which are offered, without proof, as correct. For example, scholars are not all agreed that Tertullian was a priest (assumed as true on p. 102), nor that there are only seven books of the *Stromata* of Clement of Alexandria (p. 48).

However, it would be unfair to leave the impression that this book is a careless piece of work. It contains much useful information, compactly presented, after the manner of an article in a good encyclopedia. Its great defect is its failure to come to grips with the problem which it promises to examine, a dangerous defect if an inadequate study of this kind should be taken as representing serious Catholic research on the Fathers of the Church as molders of the medieval mind.

*West Baden College*  
**WILLIAM LE-SAINT, S.J.**


"Presumably...the first general textbook for collegiate use" in the field of liturgy when it first appeared in 1933, this book is still unique in its comprehensive treatment of its subject. Now in its fourth printing, it has been revised and enlarged, and supplemented by a Teacher's Manual.

Its author, Professor of Liturgy in the St. Louis University School of Divinity, is well known for his outstanding contributions to the liturgical movement. In this book he proposes to make a formal study of the "Mystical Body as mirrored in corporate worship," and his purpose has led to the writing of a book that is a one-volume encyclopedia on the liturgy of the Church.

In dealing with the Mass he treats of man's natural impulse for social worship, the notion of sacrifice and sacrificial banquet, the Church's sacrificial calendar, the evolution of rites, and the genesis of the altar, sacred vessels, and vestments. A new chapter, "The Mass: New Times, New Modes," describes the progress made in this country in the increased use of the missal by the faithful, the Dialogue Mass, the restoration of plainsong, and the more frequent reception of Holy Communion. The author reprints with annotations the whole of the Ordinary of the Mass. There are chapters devoted to the theology and symbolism of each of the sacraments, and the text of the ritual is included in each case. Even the rationale of sacramentals and all kinds of blessings is dealt with.

The author's purpose, however, gives all this matter a definite unity. He prefaces it with a treatment of the Mystical Body of Christ, a study of grace
as the Christ-Life of the Body, and a description of the priestly function of Christ as the Head of the Body. After laying this theological groundwork of corporate Catholicism, he proceeds to study its expression in corporate worship.

The chief feature of the revision which this edition represents is to be found in a rewriting and rearrangement of the first three chapters, which deal with the Mystical Body and grace. The revision of these chapters which formerly "most pupils and many teachers found... unmanageable" has definitely improved the work. In particular, placing the chapter on grace after the exposition of the Mystical Body, instead of before, as formerly, makes for clarity. The doctrine of the Mystical Body acquaints us with the large fact of our mysterious collective union with Christ, and the explanation of grace in the light of this union, under the title, "God-Life Shared with Man," becomes an illuminating concrete presentation of this too often abstract subject.

There is another major change in this edition. For the source readings at the ends of chapters, which in earlier printings were taken exclusively from primitive Christian times, the author has substituted documentation running through the centuries down to our own times. Moreover, the book is much more attractively printed and bound than in former printings, and line-drawings by Adé de Bethune, substituted for photographs formerly used, give its format an artistic unity.

Perhaps the reviewer is yielding to a personal crotchet when he remarks that Christian Life and Worship is so all-embracing that it would prove unwieldy as a textbook, at least if it has to be integrated into the current sharply articulated college curriculum. Despite the author's attempt to hold all of his matter together by repeated insistence on his theme, the fact remains that the book, ranging as it does over the fields of theology, history, and ritual, is hard to classify. Its matter is not all of one piece, and it lacks unity of impact. This makes it difficult to incorporate into an already existing syllabus. But where religion courses are in process of formation there is no reason why a course could not be built around it, and its matter carried over into one or two additional terms. At any rate, it is only just to remark that though the author seems to have encountered production "bugs" in the organization of his matter, his conception and plan are original and pioneer, and when a better college book on liturgy is written it will be a streamlining of this one.

Despite the above strictures, which, perhaps, many will not share, this book commands great respect. College religion teachers find in it a comprehensive, inspiring, and authoritative treatment of the liturgy. For this as
well as his many other contributions to the study of the liturgy, we can only be grateful to its distinguished author.

Georgetown University  
EUGENE GALLAGHER, S.J.


This book is an abridgment of the second volume of Doctor Steinmueller's Companion to Scripture Studies. Its purpose, in the authors' words, is "to reach instructed and educated Catholics, and by omitting or briefly treating the obvious to increase their knowledge of the Sacred Scriptures." The first chapter contains a brief general introduction to the New Testament and treats of inspiration and the history of the canon, text, and versions. The authors then discuss briefly each of the four Gospels from the aspects of authorship, purpose, and characteristics. A brief exposition of the messianic prophecies is followed by a relatively extended synthesis of the Gospel teaching and a short chapter on the priesthood and kingship of Christ. A chapter on the Apostolic Church contains a historical outline of the Acts of the Apostles and a brief exposition of the contents of each of the Catholic Epistles. In the first of two chapters on St. Paul, the authors sketch his life and outline each of the letters in the order in which the Apostle first visited each of the destinatary Churches. The second chapter offers a systematic exposition of the doctrine of the Pauline Epistles. A chapter is devoted to the Epistles and general teaching of St. John, another to a surprisingly long exposition of the Apocalypse—almost one-sixth of the book. All controversial questions are relegated to the final chapter: chronology, theories of sources, and rationalistic objections to the historicity of the Gospels. An extended bibliography of works in English on the New Testament is especially strong in recent periodical literature. The analytical index is of the same type employed in the large Companion.

The work is much more than the large Companion sheared of its footnotes. The most notable new features of the book, and the most meritorious, are the systematic expositions of the doctrine of the Gospels and the Pauline Epistles. The separation of disputed questions from the body of the text allows the exposition to proceed unimpeded, and delivers the book from that polemic tone so common in Catholic works which sometimes leaves readers under the impression that biblical study is nothing but unsatisfactory answers to obscure difficulties. Footnotes have been almost too ruthlessly refused, and those who wish authorities for the authors' statements must consult the large Companion or other more technical works. It is not within
the compass of a professedly popular work to settle unsettled questions, and one cannot quarrel with the authors for adopting one opinion rather than another in such instances; but the reviewer feels that such questions should not be dismissed in a cavalier fashion without any mention of opinions other than that adopted by the authors.

All who teach Scripture are aware of the need of popular works in English on the subject, and will ask whether the present work fills that need. In such a matter it is difficult to pass judgment; but the reviewer is of the opinion that there will still be room for other works which will be better suited to popular audiences. In the hands of a capable teacher this book will furnish a basic text for a college course in the New Testament; but it makes rather dry and unattractive reading. Nor do the authors seem very certain of what to presume as known to their readers. They do not, for instance, presume a knowledge of Latin; yet they make casual allusions to events of ecclesiastical or secular history or to points of theological doctrine which are rarely familiar to instructed and educated Catholics. Some portions of the book—including the chapter on the messianic prophecies and the brief section on the Apostolic Fathers—are too superficial to be of much use. They might, in the opinion of the reviewer, be replaced by an outline of the Gospels similar to that found in the large Companion. The arrangement of the Pauline Epistles seems confusing, and a chronological treatment would be preferable.

That faults will be found in the book is inevitable; it is easier to find fault with such a book than it is to write one. We should be no less grateful to Doctor Steinmueller and his collaboratrix for the courage and industry with which they have taken positive action towards diffusing the knowledge of the Scriptures. The book will serve an immediate useful purpose, and other works of a similar character will be in its debt.

West Baden College

JOHN L. McKENZIE, S.J.


The title would be accurate if the adverb “liturgically” were added, since the author states that “the hope of this book is to lead the reader more deeply into the treasures of the Liturgy.” That hope has been more than substantially realized. Addressed to the laity, the book contains solid doctrine, simply and clearly expressed with many felicitous illustrations (even from golf!), and a wise restraint too often lacking in the treatment of matters
liturgical. It would do a great deal to promote liturgical praying and living in Christ, in fact, to integrate the whole of the layman’s life into the liturgy.

Part One sinks a dogmatic foundation in a well-knit series of chapters on God, creation, the fall, the incarnation, the redemption, and the Church as the Mystical Body of Christ. One wonders where the author got her firm grasp of theology. A sample of her style: “This Divine Person became man when Our Lady consented to the Incarnation. He who from all eternity exists in His Divine Nature, took a human nature as well, at a definite moment in time. This human nature has no human “I,” no human personality. Its Person, the source of all its actions, its “Who” is a Divine Person, the Son of the living God.” Each chapter is followed by an “elevation,” an appropriate prayer from the liturgy. The practical conclusion of this part is that “the whole purpose of our lives is to acquire the art of the Love of God, become one with the Love of God in Christ Our Lord as His members.”

In Part Two the author builds the superstructure of liturgical life, carefully describing “the life of the Church and its relation to our own lives in Christ,” and persuasively showing how the purpose of life mentioned above may be achieved, no matter what one’s circumstances may be. The sacraments—in this order, baptism, confirmation, extreme unction, orders, marriage, penance, and the Holy Eucharist—are explained with judicious balance, the sacrificial and communion aspects of the Eucharist receiving most attention. Then come the liturgical year, the Divine Office, the rosary (!), and the sacramentals. Abundant excerpts from the liturgical prayers are interpersed throughout this part, and the stress is naturally on the ex opere operato or quasi ex opere operato element of Catholic worship.

Perhaps a few more distinctions inserted here and there would have made the doctrine still more satisfying to the professional theologian, and perhaps the use of words is sometimes strained, as when atonement is described as “at-one-ment.” References are given for the liturgical texts, but not for those from Scripture or other sources, which I think should have been done for the lay reader. But these are only minor flaws in a good piece of work.

Since the author has told us how to pray socially, it is to be hoped that she will now tell us more thoroughly how to pray personally, and how to prepare for all prayer by a wholesome, but indispensable, asceticism. In other words, what is merely touched on in the latter part of Chapter Sixteen should be expanded to book size. Then we shall have a complete treatise on ordinary prayer that will certainly appeal not only to layfolk, but to religious, priests, and even bishops.

St. Mary’s College

Augustine Klaas, S.J.

Recent years have seen a great advance in American Church historiography. The general theme, with perhaps special emphasis on Protestantism, is being surveyed under Sweet at the University of Chicago. More particularly, worthwhile studies in Catholic Church history have appeared; Bolton led an upsurge of interest in the Spanish colonies; an Institute of Jesuit History was founded at Loyola, Chicago; and some specialized studies have appeared, such as Garraghan’s The Jesuits of the Middle United States.

The History of the Archdiocese of Boston is the latest addition to this body of learned productions. Scholarly, well written, and authoritative, it is a valued contribution. The issuance of such a detailed and complete history without the aid of many preliminary monographs is a special achievement.

Two sections of this scholarly work are particularly impressive: the reign of Bishop Cheverus by John E. Sexton, and the reign of Bishop Fenwick by Robert H. Lord. They are both carefully worked and clearly presented. Father Lord’s work on the burning of the Charlestown convent is well known. This completion of the picture of mid-nineteenth-century Catholic Boston is splendidly done. The work is original and done with scholarly thoroughness, and the simple style is in harmony with the narrative. This is the outstanding section of the three volumes.

Unfortunately, the work is of uneven value. To begin with, it starts off poorly with a thesis that colors too much the selection of early evidence. Then, too, the Indian situation is so presented that a sense of confusion results. It is not until the treatment of Bishop Cheverus’ time that the history attains great success. His successor, Bishop Fenwick, also fares well at the hands of the historian. Archbishop Fitzpatrick is not so fortunate; the treatment of this section is not at all up to the standard previously established. Finally, the volume on Cardinal O’Connell’s reign suffers somewhat from being too close to the times.

Perhaps the greatest general criticism to be made against the work is the lack of proper critical evaluation of the people and achievements involved in the history of Catholic Boston. The few attempts at criticism are so severely tempered that one wonders if Church historians are not laboring under the disadvantage of being unable to criticize. With so little honest evaluation of the past, there is too little hope of progress for the present. The lack of institutions of higher learning for lay people in present-day Boston is hardly noticed. The whole archdiocese, of over one million Catholics,
has only three colleges; while St. Louis, for example, with less than half a million Catholics, has seventeen such institutions.

Finally, too much space is devoted to a mere catalogue of churches and pastors, all of which could well have been relegated to an appendix.

The scholarship on which this work is founded will be useful to all. It completes the history of the archdiocese of Boston, and it will stimulate, we hope, other dioceses to follow such a scholarly example.

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To the Editor:

Father Ford’s scholarly study, “The Morality of Obliteration Bombing” (Theological Studies, V (1944), 261–309), is, in its main contention, unanswerable. The wholesale obliteration of a city outside the combat zone by means of a blanket attack which makes no distinction between industrial and residential areas, cannot ordinarily be justified. Even if it does not involve an immoral attack on the rights of the innocent (and, after digesting Father Ford’s impressive array of arguments, I am now inclined to admit that it ordinarily does), it seems to me in any case to involve an excessive use of violence, beyond the reasonably estimated requirements of legitimate self-defence.

My purpose in writing, therefore, is not to criticize Father Ford’s conclusion, but rather to clear up certain misapprehensions to which an article on “Reprisals,” emanating from my pen, seems to have given rise. I think it necessary to do so because my views, by being quoted and weighed attentively in Father Ford’s widely publicized article, have been given a semblance of importance which they could not otherwise claim; for, although I teach moral theology, I am far from being an authority on the subject at issue.

I should explain, in the first place, that I approached the problem of aerial attack on enemy cities from a viewpoint somewhat different from that of Father Ford. In January, 1941, when, at the invitation of the Clergy Review, I undertook to express a second opinion on the problem of reprisals, the principal towns of England were being subjected to a “blitz” which made little distinction between civilian and military objectives. Our exasperated people were clamouring for reprisals as the only effective deterrent against such attacks (which, admittedly, they are not), and our government had promised that reprisals would be taken. My problem was a practical one of conscience: could an airman who had been ordered to bomb the heart of an enemy city in the way that the heart of London, Coventry, Manchester, etc., had been bombed, execute his orders? It is a viewpoint which encourages one to be indulgent, as Father Ford himself admits (art. cit., p. 281); and, of set purpose, I was as indulgent as possible to my conscientious airman.

But although, from the coldly objective point of view, I may have been unduly liberal in my interpretation of moral principles as applied to treatment of the enemy (and it is difficult to be coldly objective in the middle of a “blitz”), I certainly did not mean to warrant the “appalling insinuations”
which Father Ford has detected in my article. I began with the point that, in this modern “total” warfare which harnesses as much as possible of the adult population to the aggression or to its repelling (Mr. Bevin claims to have mobilized more than half the population of England), it is becoming increasingly difficult to determine who precisely, in addition to the children, can be counted as “innocent” in the literal sense of the word. The vast majority of the German people was, and is, cooperating in varying degree in the aggression, just as the majority of our population is now cooperating in repelling it. But because I stressed this fact, it does not follow that I want to scrap the traditional theological distinction between nocentes and innocentes as inapplicable to modern war. The term nocentes was, of course, never understood literally. It was never meant to apply to all who cooperated in any way in an aggression, but only to those whose cooperation was such as to justify their violent repression; and, as Father Ford shows, there are still many in every aggressor nation whose cooperation falls short of that mark. Like Father Ford, I want to see their immunity respected by the scrupulous observance of those international pacts which seek accurately to define them; but once these pacts have broken down, I find it difficult to determine on natural grounds, with any degree of certainty, who precisely, under modern circumstances, are to be excluded from the category of the immune.

To take the class about which there is most dispute, munition workers. Modern war with its automatic weapons requiring gigantic quantities of shells and endless processions of vehicles to move and supply them, is essentially a warfare of munitions, in a sense which could hardly be said to apply to the campaigns of a century ago, and munition workers are consequently reckoned to be almost as integral a part of the nation’s war potential as its front line troops, being exempted from conscription to the armed forces (though not from conscription altogether) precisely for that reason. One may add that, with the advent of the aerial torpedo and the rocket shell which can be launched on their lethal mission almost from the very assembly lines, many munition workers have moved, for all practical purposes, into the combat zone.

It is at least arguable, therefore, that munition workers, apart from any international pact to the contrary which still retains its validity, fall into the category of nocentes, i.e., of those whose cooperation in the aggression is such as to warrant violent measures of repression. I would prefer to see them exempted, if only because their inclusion involves a disproportionate amount of innocent people in their danger; but I could hardly blame my worried airman if, following the lead of his superior officers, he took the opposite view, and regarded war-factory areas, with their industrial population, as a
legitimate object of attack. At any rate, until I could draw the line between right and wrong with greater certainty and accuracy, I felt bound to refrain from condemning him outright.

I took the precaution of stressing the ancillary principle of the *moderamen inculpatae tutela*, i.e., the moral obligation of using no more violence than is really necessary to legitimate self-defence, not because I wanted to scrap the traditional distinction between *nocentes* and *innocentes*, but because I feared that the vagueness of the dividing line between them might be used as an excuse for the unrestrained violence that we are witnessing today.

I was careful indeed to point out that, even in the changed circumstances of modern war, it is still unlawful directly to intend to kill or wound the innocent. I may now add that after reading Father Ford's article, I am prepared to concede that the majority of the civilian population comes within this category, at least in the sense that their cooperation in the war is not such as to justify direct attack on their lives. In so far as my article was vague on this point, Father Ford may be excused for crying alarm at its "appalling insinuations."

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BOOKS RECEIVED

The Blessed Martin Guild, New York, N. Y.: With Blessed Martin de Porres, compiled by Norbert Georges, O.P. (pp. 231, $1.00).

Bruce Publishing Company, Milwaukee, Wis.: Christian Life and Worship, by Gerald Ellard, S.J. (pp. xxi + 401, $3.00); Teacher's Manual for the above (pp. 114, $1.00); Christianity in the Market-Place, by Michael de la Bedoyère (pp. 137, $2.00); The Mystery of Iniquity, by Paul Hanly Furfey (pp. 192, $2.00); A Realistic Philosophy, by K. F. Reinhardt, Ph.D. (pp. 280, $2.75).


Grune & Stratton, New York, N. Y.: Personal Mental Hygiene, by Dom Thomas V. Moore (pp. 331, $4.00).

P. J. Kenedy and Sons, New York, N. Y.: Inner Laws of Society, by Don Luigi Sturzo (pp. 350, $3.50).

International University Press, New York, N. Y.: Vladimir Solovyev on Godmanhood, by Peter P. Zouboff (pp. 226, $3.75).

La Librairie Dominicaine, Montreal, P.Q.: Les bontés de Marie, by Hyacinthe Couture, O.P. (pp. 316, $1.00); Catholiques d'aujourd'hui, by Marcel-Marie Desmarais, O.P. (pp. 229, $1.00); Dans 300 ans, by Marcel-Marie Desmarais, O.P. (pp. 224, $1.00); De la joie d'aimer Dieu selon l'esprit de sainte Thérèse de l'Enfant Jésus, by Antonin Mortier, O.P. (pp. 120, $0.60); Les nouvelles mamans, by Madame Georges Boudrias, S.F.(pp. 105, $1.00); Projections, by M.-L. Lamarche, O.P. (pp. 208, $1.00).

The Macmillan Company, New York, N. Y.: The Cross and the Eternal Order, by Henry William Clark (pp. 332, $2.50); Down Peacock's Feathers, by D. R. Davis (pp. 199, $1.75).

St. Francis Mission Press, Mahlabathini, Zululand: *Can We Harmonize the Bible with Science?* by F. James, Ph.D. (pp. 95, $1.50), available in the U. S. A. at the Grail Book Service, St. Meinrad’s Abbey, St. Meinrad, Ind. The Standard Press, Marion, Ind.: *The Holy Spirit*, by J. A. Huffman (pp. 231, $1.50).