
Another landmark work in a remarkably prolific career only confirms Brown's unrivaled international stature among Roman Catholic biblical scholars. His *Introduction* is the first of this classical genre to come from an English-speaking Catholic author in the memory of anyone now alive. And a handsome, multiply appealing volume it is! It lays out a plush welcome mat for eager beginners in the study—neophytes at college, seminary, or discussion-club level, according to the foreword. With lucid prose that neither intimidates nor patronizes such guests, it guides them in exquisitely measured steps from the most basic information through topics of general introduction (canonicity, inspiration, senses of the text, etc.) and historical background, then on to the main fare of special introductions to each of the 27 books. Well crafted tables condense essential information in each of these phases, including a very helpful schema of historical persons and events up front, and a table of generally accepted background data together with the literary breakdown of each book. The characteristically exhaustive Brown-style bibliographies are scaled back to suit the customer: English-language material exclusively, books rather than articles, and, aside from acknowledged classics, items of more recent date and more ready availability. Even within these constraints, the lists are more than ample, and they are supplemented by a wide, occasionally bewildering, variety of more specialized contributions cited and evaluated in the footnotes. Two appendices, one offering a judicious appraisal of our *fin de siècle* "historical Jesus" industry, the other a survey of Jewish and Christian literature contiguous to the New Testament, fill out the considerable heft of nearly 900 pages.

Although B.'s brief survey of hermeneutical methods takes account of the synchronic literary approaches that are sometimes touted as replacements of historical criticism, he correctly accepts the latter as the enduring method of choice for writings considered normative in a Christian civilization so splendidly equipped to prosecute the method. On the other hand, rather than cause his reader to run the gauntlet of critical problems at the threshold of each special introduction, B. emphasizes the reading of the integral text as the essential first step, providing a general content analysis, or "walk-through," before major historical and theological issues are expounded. One can quibble over judgment calls in both the "walk-throughs" and the topical discussions, but one can only admire the conciseness and lucidity with which, say, a monumental issue like justification gets expounded in the perilous space of a page and a half!
As a teacher using this Introduction, I am mostly thankful for, but now and then bothered by, two trademark features of B.'s exposition: first, his studied “centrist” perspective; second, his determination never to rest with less than total coverage. In the first respect, I applaud the centrist’s resistance to such trendy agendas as the pursuit of non-christological Jesus traditions antecedent to the synoptic tradition, the overly fastidious profiling of the “Q” tradition and community, the allegation of Greco-Roman models that would relieve New Testament writings of their originality, the critical indictment of Paul as the hellenizing architect of “higher” Christology, and so on. I occasionally wonder, however, whether an unwavering “centrist” always makes the more insightful exegete. Does one adequately savor the uniqueness of a decidedly “non-centrist” voice like Paul’s, e.g., if one’s overriding commitment is to preserve the harmonies between him and Jesus, or Luke, or the Deutero-Pauline authors? B. airs the proposed contrasts, to be sure, but then holds to the center by immediately downplaying their importance. The actors’ features get blurred by all this caution, in my opinion; but then, the opinion costs me little since I am not the perennial target of the Catholic right that B. has been.

As for his passion for completeness, it occasionally burdens the discussion with a multiplicity of opinions which, in the absence of detailed evaluation, seem only to suggest to impressionable minds how otiose and centrifugal biblical criticism is (the sources and localization of Mark and the situating of many books other than Paul’s are cases in point). B. is less demanding of his readers in this respect. He ventures the suggestion that if they have time for detailed study of only one Pauline letter, it should be 1 Corinthians, definitely not Romans. I think my advice to such harried folks would be “don’t bother!” If you study Paul where he is restraining his enthusiasts (1 Corinthians) but cannot get to where he puts the goad to his backsliders (Galatians), will you not have a skewed picture of a naysaying Apostle who obstructed the very human aspirations which the Christ-event supposedly legitimized? Such is the caricature of Paul which is widely propagated by his latter-day detractors, most of whom abide in cheerful ignorance of all his letters. Not that B. would offer any support to that constituency; I just wonder if his one-letter plunge will make things any better.

B. does, in fact, preface the individual letter introductions with a thoughtful “appreciation of Paul,” intended to counteract the dryness and complexity of the material. True to the Catholic tradition, however, and to Luke-Acts, its fountainhead, the “appreciation” is more hagiographical than theological. Accordingly, we miss certain critical foci of Paul’s thought as B. leads us through the letters, e.g., the theology of the Cross in 1 Cor 1–2 and Gal 2–3, or the “eschatological reservation” in Rom 6:2–11. Those very sharp strictures on Christian religion may just not cut so deeply in the middle of the road.
My ungracious demurrals aside, this is a truly wonderful book. Use it and share it as generously as the author spent himself to produce it.

**Fordham University, New York**

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**Muhammad and Jesus: A Comparison of the Prophets and Their Teachings.** By William E. Phipps. New York: Continuum, 1996. Pp. xii + 304. $27.50

I wish this were a better book. Well-researched comparative studies of Muslim-Christian topics do not appear often, so I accepted the invitation to review this title with a sense of hope and anticipation. Reading it, however, left me disappointed with both the caliber of the scholarship and the quality of the analysis.

Phipps’s intentions are commendable. He seeks to emulate “the dominant contemporary approach of scholars” by giving “a sympathetic and judicious comparison of the prophets Jesus and Muhammad” (2). In ten chapters of disparate lengths he treats aspects of the lives and teachings of Muhammad and Jesus and provides indications of the way in which pious veneration of these founding figures marks a strong similarity among their respective followers despite the significant theological differences that separate them. The comparison promised in the subtitle varies. For some chapters it amounts to no more than a short concluding paragraph, while for others it constitutes the central organizing device.

The problems with this book, however, lie neither in its objective nor its organization, but in its contents. As a specialist in Islamic studies, I read this volume with particular sensitivity to the sources P. used in his portrayal of Muhammad. The experience was like entering an academic time-warp or being cast back half a century. It is not just that P. had to limit himself to sources in translation, a quite understandable restriction for a nonspecialist. Although his assertion that “most of the early accounts of Muhammad have now been translated into English” (13) vastly overstates the case, nevertheless there is material available in English and other Western languages from which a solid study aimed at a general audience could have been crafted. But a sophisticated and informed use of those sources would necessarily have taken account of the major historiographical debates that have reoriented the academic study of early Islam during the last 50 years. P. exhibits no awareness of this whatsoever and consequently leaves his readers with a naïve and elementary presentation of his subject matter.

Since detailing all of the difficulties that devolve from this unawareness would consume a great deal of space, let me restrict myself to a few representative examples. I will start with a relatively minor quibble. One of the most frequently cited sources for the biographical material on Muhammad is the translation that Alfred Guillaume published in 1955 of Muhammad Ibn Ishāq’s (d. 767) Sūrah rasūl Allāh as found in the recension of ‘Abd al-Malik Ibn Hishām (d. 833). Now the
name 'Ibn Ishāq' means 'son of Ishāq,' or 'Isaacson' to use an English cognate. Yet P. persists in referring to this author with a truncated 'Ishaq'. This is the onomastic equivalent of taking an author by the name of 'Isaacson' and arbitrarily referring to him as 'Isaac'. It not only grates irritatingly on the ears of the informed but it signals P.'s ignorance of such basic matters as how Arabic names are constructed.

More substantively, P. directs his concluding chapter to the "two major theological differences" between Islam and Christianity. These he finds in the Muslim rejection of Jesus' death by crucifixion and in the Muslim assertion of Qur'ānic inerrancy. While the latter is usefully linked to the understanding of Scripture held by certain Christian groups, no mention is made of the even more important theological conundrum created by the Muslim denial of the Incarnation and the Trinity. Nor does the Christian rejection of Muhammad's prophethood or of the Qur'ān as divine revelation find any place among the "major theological differences."

More insidiously, one finds reinforcement for stereotypical, prejudicial views in P.'s omissions and emphases. For example, contemporary Muslim reformulations of the doctrine of jihād, which offer a more comprehensive and less confrontational interpretation, are completely ignored. In comparing Jesus and Muhammad on gender relationships, P. lets length speak. Jesus on women is dispatched in two and a half pages, allowing P. to spend five times that amount of space lavishing attention on Muhammad's multiple marriages and imagined sensuality.

To conclude, let me provide a bit of bibliographic guidance to those who are interested in the topic this book attempts to address. For Muhammad, I would suggest beginning with the article by that title in the new edition of the Encyclopaedia of Islam and supplementing this with Michael Cook's Muhammad (Oxford, 1983). For the Islamic view of Jesus, the same encyclopaedia offers Georges Anawati's excellent article, and I also recommend Neal Robinson's Christ in Islam and Christianity (SUNY, 1991). With the background thus acquired, readers could then profit from Uri Rubin's The Eye of the Beholder: The Life of Muhammad as Viewed by the Early Muslims (Darwin, 1995).

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These two books deal with the same subject, but they differ greatly in concept, structure, and purpose. Both are up-to-date in their research, and they are in general agreement in their interpretation of the data. They emphasize the paucity of information about St. Peter's episcopacy in Rome and indeed about the early days of that local church.
They sing the praises of Gregory the Great and deplore Alexander VI. Both give full marks to Pius XII for the solid biblical, theological, and liturgical advances he fostered, but deal gingerly with his wartime policies. They praise John XXIII and appreciate the accomplishments of John Paul II, while having reservations about some of his approaches. Each author is a solid and committed Catholic scholar with substantial achievements to his name.

Duffy, a fellow of Magdalene College, Cambridge, is best known for his Stripping of the Altars: Traditional Religion in England 1400–1580 (Yale, 1992). Saints and Sinners is written as a continuing narrative, originally intended to accompany a six-part television series. It is advertised as “an outstanding work of popular scholarship,” and it is that. But lavishly illustrated and eminently readable, it is the product of a sure historical hand. It is an accurate, clear, and frank narrative of the papacy’s history. Inevitably there are minor errors here and there. That redoubtable champion of the 19th-century papacy, Louis Veuillot, is consistently called “Viuellot,” and the statement that John XXIII’s five-year pontificate was the shortest for two centuries (272) holds good only if one overlooks the brief reign (1829–1830) of Pius VIII. There is an ample bibliographical survey.

McBrien’s book is something else again. M. has already established his credentials with Catholicism (2 vols., Winston, 1980) and The Harpercollins Encyclopedia of Catholicism (Harper Collins, 1995). His is a papacy-by-papacy approach, following the style of Anglican Canon J. N. D. Kelly, The Oxford Dictionary of the Popes (Oxford, 1986). Among appendices are essays on how popes are elected and how they are removed, a brief summary of key papal encyclicals from 1740 to 1995, lists of papal “firsts” and “lasts” and “longests” and “shortests.” There is a useful glossary, but the bibliography is less extensive than D.’s.

In a somewhat breathtaking exercise in judgment, M. rates popes as “outstanding,” “good or average” and “worst.” Only two win the highest accolade: John XXIII, “the most beloved pope in history,” to whom the book is dedicated, and Gregory the Great. Paul VI makes the middle category, while Pius X rates among the worst because “his intemperate campaign against theologians and biblical scholars . . . created an atmosphere of fear and mean-spiritedness in the Church that set back the progress of Catholic scholarship for half a century.” In the pope-by-pope essays M. does not differ materially from the substantial judgments made by D., but his occasional editorial comments are sharper and more forthright.

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John Cassian, the late-fourth- and early-fifth-century monk and writer who moved so easily between East and West and who sparred
with both Augustine and Nestorius, seems to be enjoying a resurgence of interest of late. Recent years have seen the publication of an increasing number of scholarly and more popular articles on him; in 1997 his massive Conferences appeared in their entirety in a new annotated English translation (to be followed soon by the much slimmer Institutes); and this year has brought us Stewart's important study. But such interest should not seem surprising, after all: Cassian's spiritual writings, as distinct from his rather hapless treatise On the Incarnation of the Lord, are among the richest and most influential works of Christian antiquity, even though Cassian himself may for various reasons not always be counted in the front rank of the Church Fathers.

S. begins his book with an attempt to establish some data about Cassian’s life—opting, incidentally, for Scythia Minor, part of present-day Romania, as his birthplace. He then discusses Cassian as a writer and pedagogue and, finally, as a theologian, before actually entering into his theology.

At this point, and for the rest of his book, S. focuses on “the most central and distinctive aspects of Cassian’s monastic theology” (vii) rather than on, for instance, his contributions to the theology of the vices, his demonology, or his theology of friendship, all of which are of considerable significance. It is important that S. understands Cassian’s view of grace, particularly as expressed in the famous 13th conference, to be an integral part of the monastic theology that he is pursuing. He rightly observes that “Cassian’s major analyses of grace and human possibility are always in the context of teaching about chastity” (62), which is of course one of the great monastic virtues. Like a growing number of students of the “Semi-Pelagian” controversy, S. is highly sympathetic to Cassian’s representation of the workings of grace. S. sees that it makes sense, in particular, precisely because it was developed in the setting of monastic life, the thrust of which is ethical and practical rather than metaphysical (81). That sort of thrust allows for the emphasis on human initiative which is so characteristic of Cassian.

Cassian’s monastic theology, especially evident in The Conferences, is centered upon the acquisition of purity of heart through the practice of humility and discretion; purity of heart in this life leads to the eventual possession of the kingdom of heaven in the next. There is a foretaste of the kingdom in the practice of prayer, especially ecstatic prayer, of which Cassian was one of the first and greatest teachers, and so it is not inappropriate that the final three of S.’s seven chapters should be devoted to an extensive examination of Cassian’s doctrine of prayer.

This book must be judged from the perspective of S.’s goal which is to explore what is specific to Cassian’s monastic theology. It is not an attempt, in other words, to supplant Owen Chadwick’s John Cassian: A Study in Primitive Monasticism (2nd ed. 1968), which is far more
comprehensive in its approach than S.'s monograph, and which continues to be the classic that it has been. Within the limits that S. sets for himself, his book could hardly be improved, although without a doubt nearly every reader will wish that one or another theme had been given greater emphasis. In my own case the theme is that of discretion and the role of the elders (and tradition), which receives curiously little attention for all its centrality in Cassian's monastic thought. Despite that, however, and despite the occasional disagreement with some minor conclusions S. draws, one cannot read him without being impressed by his fine scholarship and good judgment. This is a book from which one may learn, a book not to supplant Chadwick's standard work but to complement it.

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At the center of den Bok's book is a proposition within modern trinitarian theology which he believes has yet to receive the systematic examination it deserves: God as a communion of persons-in-relation. B. questions whether today's theology, stressing as it does the "relational 'social' dimension in personhood" within the Trinity, is moving in the right direction (8). Because Richard of St. Victor is recognized as one of the medieval sources for these modern discussions of the inter-relational aspects of God's triune nature, B. has chosen him as a theologian worth exploring, one who may even offer some correctives to contemporary trinitarian analyses, once his writings have been more systematically explicated. "Personhood as conceived from a trinitarian perspective" (9), as elucidated by Richard, is B.'s subject.

Is God one person or three persons? B. begins by summarizing the range of answers to this question found in contemporary trinitarian theology. A spectrum fans out before the reader, with Barth, Rahner, and "monopersonal trinitarianism" at one end, and Moltmann, Pannenberg, Plantinga, Swinburne, and their "strong social trinitarianism" at the other, while Balthasar occupies a position somewhere in between. B.'s own sympathy, if not his uncritical accord, lies with Barth and Rahner. Having distilled the aspects of the concept of personhood which appear to him most problematic in modern trinitarian theology, B. turns his attention to Richard.

He sets out, first, to identify those concepts—will, relation, individuality, persona—and the epistemological methods within Richard's trinitarian thought that have made an appeal to modern theologians. Suggestive indications that contemporary analyses have not always done Richard justice are offered, which set the stage for B.'s own extended commentary on Richardian theology. After describing the Victorine milieu in which Richard was formed and in which he developed
his hermeneutics, his understanding of theological anthropology, and his view of the processes and limitations of human reason, B. devotes five chapters to a "systematic sounding of [Richard's] conception of personhood and trinity" (8).

A concluding summary and evaluation of Richard's position is followed by B.'s now more historically informed answer to his original question about the nature of the Trinity. He sums it up in the formula "One Person, three Personae." As the use of the Latin term hints, B. finds that he has reached many of the same conclusions as Richard had, that, where Richard was vague or mute or implicit rather than explicit, his own elaborations of Richard's doctrine in some ways have more in common with 13th-century developments outward from Victorine thought than they do with 20th-century theology. Ecumenism, too, he reflects, might find a new starting point in a trinitarian theology clarified through a similar systematic recourse to the past.

While one can only admire B.'s project, turning to an important medieval thinker in an effort to clarify a modern debate and perhaps thereby to move it beyond some of its stumbling blocks, the book is not an unqualified success. B. offers an explicit critique of the lack of clarity and terminological precision that has hampered discussion of trinitarian issues in the 20th-century, but he himself is not blessed with an instinct for lucid presentation. Perhaps too much a product of the theologizing of this century, he is often more opaque when offering his commentary-through-modern-eyes upon Richard than when he allows Richard to speak for himself. For one brought up to the historical study of medieval theology, the book does less to bridge the gap B. thinks he is bridging for the modernist.

There are some distracting quirks in B.'s prose. He employs italics and guillemets for emphasis, and parentheses for sotto voce elaborations, with such ubiquitousness that entire pages become a jumble of typographical signs and symbols one desperately tries to parse. This is a habit all the more damaging because there are areas within his discussion where B. relies on italics to make a distinction—between person and person, for example—a distinction critical to his argument, but whose significance is completely forgotten by the reader in the midst of so many other emphatic uses of punctuation. And there are simply too many instances where B.'s imperfect English compromises the text: the range is from (perhaps forgiveable) misspellings to malapropisms to missing words whose absence makes it difficult to follow the argument. The book also utilizes an unexplained smaller typeface for certain paragraphs. These, one realizes, are detailed asides, sometimes more, sometimes less integral to the text, and are probably to be identified with the "excursus" B. indicates in his Introduction he will occasionally insert into his discourse; but the convention is not made clear. Jargony phraseology and too large a roster of short-form terms with which B. intends critical clarifications of ambiguous terms—essential I vs. essential II, will I vs. will II—also hinder rather than
help the reader, the former by making the text on the whole less appealing to the nonspecialist, the latter by being unsuccessful as mnemonics in places that matter.

By all means read this book, because its message about rediscovering the Church's theological past and reapplying it within modern discourse is very worthwhile. Medievalists will even nod sagely when B. concludes that, in places, the medieval thinker showed greater mental agility and more terminological precision than his modern counterparts. But the patience this book asks of its readers will not be adequately repaid for all.

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M. Michèle Mulchahey


Worcester's work on Bishop Jean-Pierre Camus (1584–1652) is "a case study of episcopal preaching in France after the Council of Trent" (27), "a seventeenth-century cultural discourse" and a window onto "a religious culture and how a Catholic reformer sought to shape that culture" (242).

Consecrated bishop of Belley in 1609, Camus preached regularly in his small diocese, as well as on pilgrimages, at Paris, and in other towns. He also delivered sermons before the Estates General (1614–1615) to which he was a delegate. The result of his life's work is some 6,500 pages of sermons appearing in numerous printed editions that allow us to study French episcopal preaching after the reception of the Council of Trent in France (1615). Camus's sermons are the most frequently reprinted of any French preacher of this era.

W. situates Camus among those who took to heart Trent's admonition that preaching was the bishop's special duty (praecipuum munus). Like the cardinal-archbishop of Milan, Carlo Borromeo (d. 1585), Camus appears as the new model French bishop in his commitment to Tridentine reform. Herein lies the value of W.'s work. He catches Camus deftly adopting the methods and message of post-Tridentine homiletics—the insistence on brevity, simplicity, and directness in moving discourse, the use of minimal (though effective) "conceits," and above all the "correct" topics, which predominate in other countries of Catholic Europe as well. The widespread printing of Camus's works no doubt had a strong influence upon the religious culture of early-17th-century France, and we might assume changed it significantly.

W.'s study is essentially an inventory of the content of some 400 sermons Camus gave as bishop of Belley from 1609–1629. Though W. does not examine sermons and other homiletic literature in Spain, Italy, and Germany after Trent, he would find numerous topical and rhetorical parallels there. Camus is hardly alone in his discourses on the "model saints" of the Counter Reformation, such as Ignatius
Loyola, Carlo Borromeo, Mary Magdalene, the Apostles, Teresa of Avila. These saints—and especially those breaking the bonds of gender—are “safe” ones whose activities, loyalty, and obedience to the Church were impeccable and worthy of imitation. Camus’s words on “conversion” (i.e. a change of heart), “cooperating” with grace, the power of the sacraments for the acquisition of virtues (above all humility), the value of pilgrimages, relics and devotions, shunning the seven deadly sins, working for the glory of God, obedience, and instructing the faithful in the truths necessary for salvation—all are current and correct topics for the post-Tridentine preacher. Interestingly, too, Camus seems to find (or assert) that elusive balance between obedience, love, and loyalty for king and country, and the fidelity and obedience to the bishop of Rome. Camus’s themes and attitudes, in fact, fall squarely in line with the “new” post conciliar (Tridentine) Church which emphasized the importance of the frequent reception of the Eucharist and of increasing points of contact between the clergy and the laity. Camus also reflects the numerous directives to preachers, such as those regarding heresy, namely, that one might occasionally denounce heretics from the pulpit but consciously avoid correcting heretical errors there. Camus we learn, too, had his own favorite images when preaching to his people, above all the vivid and recurring “alimentary” images that probably reveal as much of Camus’s personality as they do of his concept of the Church and its preachers.

As a case study, W.’s work is also a critical review of recent scholarship on medieval and early-modern France. Using Camus’s sermons as an index of this era, W. tests (and finds faults) with the conclusions of many scholars, ranging from Jean Delumeau’s “interpretative framework on fear and security” (3) to Robert Bireley’s comment that “no significant anti-Machiavellian author was French” (191). W. is harshest on Delumeau’s conclusion that “fear and reassurance were at the heart of Camus’s agenda.” He contends that his own quantitative examination of Camus’s sermons does not support Delumeau’s statement: Camus’s preaching “sought to move his audiences beyond fear of hell and expectation of reward to a ‘pure’ love of God” (242).

W. sets forth his inventory of Camus’s sermons as a critical measure against which to evaluate contemporary scholarship on early-modern France. The method has merit, but one might question if it is adequate just to register a confirmation or none. That the conclusions of one scholar might not be confirmed by Camus’s sermon topics could perhaps tell us more about the innovative nature of Camus’s preaching in the unstable world of early-17th-century France, which only in 1615 adopted the decrees of the Council of Trent. W.’s useful inventory of Camus’s topics, it seems to me, reflects not only Camus’s own preaching material, but the agenda of European post-Tridentine Catholicism which was slowly on its way toward implementation in France. It therefore may be much more a measure of the gap between Camus’s own work and vision and the realities of the world in which he labored.
In this regard, Camus himself was arguably far ahead of his time, waiting and working for the French Church not just to adopt but fully to appropriate the program of the post-Tridentine Church.

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McGrath, an Australian Marist Brother, offers this work in response to C. S. Dessain's observation "that there exists no full study of Newman's understanding of revelation and its existence outside Christianity." Part 1 proceeds chronologically from Newman's theological beginnings through his Roman Catholic years. Part 2 contains four detached chapters on Newman's understanding of revelation in connection with evidences, development, mystery, and inspiration. This part summarizes areas much explored by Newman scholars, touching only occasionally on "universal revelation" in connection with natural religion, conscience, and mysteriousness. An epilogue relates Newman to "theologies of revelation" by Balthasar, Rahner, and H. R. Niebuhr, the antithetical position of Barth, and sympathetic themes of Vatican II, devoting less than a page to each of these large topics. The book's distinctive portion, and the one that closely fits its title, occupies only 70 pages, six chapters, of Part 1. I was left dissatisfied with M.'s observation that "for reason of length if no other, this study is expository rather than analytical."

As a young Evangelical, Newman acknowledged the validity only of explicitly Christian revelation and its prophetic anticipation in the Old Testament. Even his reading of Butler's Analogy at this time was strongly influenced by Daniel Wilson's introduction which rejected Butler's evaluation of natural religion. His early exclusivism softened by Oxford, Newman turned for theological sustenance to the Fathers. Reading them at first chronologically brought him shortly to Justin Martyr, and afterwards to Clement of Alexandria and Origen. Justin taught that seeds of divine reason had been sown among all peoples, and M. supposes but fails to demonstrate that this writer "first alerted [Newman] to the possibility of universal revelation." Newman leaves no doubt that Clement persuaded him that the best elements of paganism, especially under Platonic influence, furnished a preparation for the gospel. Clement's and Origen's "sacramental principle" fostered a deeper interpretation of Butler's parallels between natural and revealed religion, further reinforced by John Keble's publication of The Christian Year. M. is convinced that along with these patristic influences Newman's acceptance of the idea of universal revelation was encouraged and enriched by a conception of conscience which he derived from reading Butler's "Sermons upon Human Nature." Newman himself nowhere acknowledges that source, despite numerous refer-
ences both to Butler and to conscience. Although M. finds that in one sermon Newman's remarks on conscience "run parallel to Butler's," Newman's typical published accounts of the revelatory aspect of conscience do not closely resemble anything in Butler.

In between his account of influences that supposedly caused Newman to believe in universal revelation and his accounts of how he presented that belief first as an Anglican and then as Roman Catholic, M. devotes a chapter to Newman's conflict with Anglican liberalism. Although the idea of universal revelation does not come into this chapter, it serves the useful purpose of abolishing suspicion that Newman's acceptance of extrabiblical revelation involved any dalliance with rationalism or latitudinarianism. Newman elaborates his conception, derived from Alexandrian sources, of pagan participation in revelation, in his book on the Arians as "The Dispensation of Paganism." There he commends it as a basis for missionary accommodation, but also warns against blurring the crucial distinction between natural religion and the gospel. The intensified urgency of that warning throughout his remaining Anglican years is brought out by M.'s account of his reaction to the writings of Henry Milman's highly secular accounts of Jewish and Christian history. Newman's comments at that time reveal his uneasiness over foreseen abuses of German "higher criticism."

With his adoption of Roman Catholicism, Newman's dogmatism was secure, but narrowed and confined by an authoritarianism wary of all outside influences and of reason itself. In his essay on Development Newman had stressed the assimilationist capacity of living religion. M. shows him cautiously coping with this opposite extreme by advocating a university setting for theology, and, more cautiously still, discussing natural and revealed religion in the Grammar of Assent. In his final, most peaceful years as a Catholic, Newman's long-held views on universal revelation were discussed candidly and with gratifying ecumenical breadth.

M.'s book is a welcome contribution to an important aspect of Newman's theology and of his personal religion. It would be a better book if its first part were expanded and its latter portion omitted. M. is more persuasive in discussing Newman's conception and use of the doctrine than his derivation of it. A discussion of the connection between this idea and that "economy of truth" which Kingsley deplored as disingenuousness would be instructive. A more synthetic account of the idea itself, derived from so many brief and mostly incidental mentions, is still needed, and must precede any definitive critique. For what it is worth, I would suggest that Newman's most vivid presentation of the idea is conveyed in a book M. does not mention and hardly anybody reads, his quaint Victorian novel, Callista: A Tale of the Third Century.

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JAMES GAFFNEY

FORMS OF TRANSCENDENCE: HEIDEGGER AND MEDIEVAL MYSTICAL THEOLOGY. By Sonya Sikka. SUNY Series in Contemporary Continental

In exploring some comparisons between the thought of Heidegger, especially in his later writings, and four medieval authors of mystical theology, Sikka essays the task of thinking about God in the present age and rethinking the relation between God and metaphysics. She proposes that Heidegger’s explicit critique of metaphysics falls short, because not all metaphysics is what Heidegger claims it must be: a subject-centered logic of empty concepts which thinks of being only in terms of what-is. The suggestion is that there are forms of metaphysics which still have something to offer on the question of God, as the object of religious apprehension. Such metaphysics contributes to natural theology as the theology arising from natural religion, a poetic conceptualization of a God whose presence and activity are manifest in the world. In the case of Bonaventure and the 14th-century mystics, metaphysics and mysticism are bound together as a “seeing” where what is given in experience transcends the world as a spatio-temporal continuum, an intuition to which no categories adequately apply. The God of metaphysics need not be an unholy God (as Heidegger asserts), a speculative construct devoid of religious content.

S. readily admits that there is a vast difference between the formulations of the age of theistic faith to which the medieval mystics belong and those of the god-less age of Heidegger. Yet seeing the genuine differences between the conceptions of these mystics and those of Heidegger requires that one also recognize the extent of the similarity. In particular, S. argues that there is a relation between Heidegger’s Sein (Being) and the God of medieval mystical theology, such that what is being said by these terms is not identical, but what is being talked about is in some sense the same. For example, Bonaventure and Heidegger both find being revealed in the human experience of a harmony within the world which enraptures and indicates a hidden source. Heidegger’s structure of the epochal unconcealment of being in relation to its hidden source forms a historicized analogue to the structure of finite disclosure in relation to its hidden ground in the thought of Eckhart, where the ground of God is dark and every determination of it is simultaneously a manifestation and a falsification. S. affirms a significant affinity between Eckhart’s God in relation to the unknowable Godhead and Heidegger’s being as presencing in relation to “inscrutable being,” although for Heidegger the Christian God is only one historical sending, subordinate to Sein.

Furthermore, S. seeks to demonstrate that the relationship of the soul to God in the sermons of Tauler is similar in content to that of Dasein to being in Heidegger’s Being and Time. Both authors discern a universal call to the self, although for Tauler the caller is God, but not a God who can ever be made definite or familiar. Finally, Ruusbroec’s notion of God as love is presented as comparable to many aspects of what Heidegger describes as the essence of being. Ruusbroec’s emphasis on the need for grace finds a parallel in Heidegger’s empha-
sis on the dependency of Dasein upon the gift of Ereignis. Both men stress the importance of a human relinquishment that is a willingness to endure absence and an abandonment of the search for security. What is the same in the differences between Ruusbroec's Christian God and Heidegger's being is that both are a sustaining ground as well as an abyss of possibility, that refuses any final conceptualization.

Given that an interest in Heidegger is an acquired taste and reading him demands considerable patience, S. offers a plausible interpretation of his mature thought that is generally clear and illuminating. She makes a strong case that Heidegger is mistaken in his insistence that "God" names an entity and should never be equated with being. The distinction offered here between being as presencing (as a finite trait) and being as what makes presencing possible (as a transcendent source) is helpful. Also fruitful is S.'s suggestion that the search for the meaning of being can be construed as the search for the meaning of God, where the search does not begin with a determinate sense of God, but ends by saying "and this we call God." And this God revealed as holy in the absolute priority and ultimacy of being may be suitably addressed as personal in an analogous sense.

The central thrust of this work performs the valuable service of a reminder that experience has always been a vital source for authentic metaphysics, and it recaptures powerfully the oft-neglected evidence of the life of prayer and the history of spirituality as a resource for the philosophy of God. Moreover, S. retrieves effectively the religious dimension in Heidegger's meditations on being, which his self-interpretation frequently obscures. Perhaps the very humility and sense of limit which such investigation of religious experience manifests augurs fresh courage in rethinking God for a postmodern age.

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DAVID J. CASEY, S.J.


Romano Guardini's notable contributions to Catholic theology and specifically his impact on Vatican II serve as the subject of this impressive study. Krieg offers a comprehensive overview of Guardini's life and work situated within the cultural, social, political, and theological context of 19th- and 20th-century Germany. He argues that apart from this context, Guardini's legacy cannot be adequately evaluated and appropriated.

One example of this contextualization is K.'s placing of his subject's ecclesiology within the framework of (1) the theological influence of Möhler, (2) Guardini's own communal experiences, (3) Germany's cultural longing for Gemeinschaft, and (4) specific social movements to achieve community. K.'s ability to integrate material from a wide range of sources is masterful. There emerges a well-textured and
multifaceted presentation, a result that K. achieves on a wide range of topics.

In K.’s judgment, Guardini’s most significant achievement lies in the creative dynamism with which, in anticipation of *Gaudium et spes*, he brought together the richness of the Christian tradition with the questions posed by life in the 20th century. Guardini broke with the remaining neo-Scholasticism by using a phenomenological method that was personalist and existential, yet always with an eye toward objective truth. Guardini’s approach yielded fruit in such areas as revelation, Christology, ecclesiology, and theological anthropology.

Permeating K.’s contextualized appreciation is a polemic against those whom K. believes are misusing Guardini to support pre-Vatican II notions of the Church rather than to engage creatively the issues of our time. Guardini’s position on revelation, K. notes, is to be appreciated for its personalist emphasis on the need to encounter God through Christ. Against the background of the neo-Scholastic, Kantian, and Hegelian options, such personalism offered many advantages and indeed set the stage for significant advances at the council. However, K. argues that contemporary readers who look to Guardini for inspiration should not overlook that his position remained mired in an ahistorical positivism that Vatican II surpassed. In a similar vein, K. discusses how Guardini’s ecclesiology, while anticipating Vatican II’s move beyond juridicism to relationality and communion, did not sufficiently value the Church’s own historicity, its social mission, or its need for ecumenical progress. Even on the topic of engagement with the modern age, where Guardini’s greatest strength lies, K. finds him, relative to *Gaudium et spes*, to be too pessimistic and to lack a sense of the Church as an advocate for dignity and values within the world’s own context.

The deficiency that bothers K. the most is Guardini’s refusal to embrace historical criticism of Scripture. K. assesses Guardini’s kerygmatic Christology to be superior to the other theological options of the 1930s. However, K. seems aghast that such a creative thinker would not embrace what critical avenues were open at the time, and especially that he retained his literalistic habits even after the 1943 publication of *Divino afflante Spiritu*. K. holds that this flaw seriously weakened Guardini’s entire Christology.

Ratzinger and Balthasar lurk at the edges of K.’s discussion as interpreters of Guardini whose emphases differ from K.’ own. Ratzinger stresses Guardini’s fierce loyalty to the Church. Balthasar stressed his insistence on the need for a personal encounter with the God of Jesus Christ. But K. argues that these assessments are made without adequate attention to the history of difficulties that Guardini had with church authorities or to how deficient his positions are in relation to today’s biblical scholarship and other advances affirmed by Vatican II. The reader is left to judge to what extent Ratzinger and Balthasar directly represent for K. those who have misappropriated Guardini to support pre-Vatican II conceptions of the Church. Rahner emerges as
K.'s model of one who appreciates Guardini's creative dynamism more than his specific, time-bound positions.

K. acknowledges that the reality of Guardini is not exhausted by any one portrait. And he does better than most in being knowledgeable about and respectful of the views that he is criticizing. He is writing as though he believes that Guardini's contribution has been co-opted by one theological camp, and he wants to redress the balance. But his contextualized study of the many positive and deep contributions that Guardini made to Vatican II is overburdened by K.'s desire to point out frequently how deficient Guardini's positions are relative to the full achievements of the council. Thus at times K.'s interest in judging Guardini's contributions in relation to the contemporary discussion works against the need to appreciate Guardini within his own historical situation. K. would have done better to recognize that other configurations of Vatican II's achievements might promote important elements of the council that K. himself neglects or ignores. In like fashion, K. might have acknowledged more explicitly the deep affinities between Guardini's emphases and the esthetic approach of Balthasar, as well as the counter-cultural approach of Ratzinger.

K. is at his best when he is contextualizing Guardini's positions in their historical, cultural, social, and personal context. Since this task constitutes a substantial majority of the text, the work is overall an excellent one.

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**DENNIS M. DOYLE**


Rise's original work in Norwegian addressed the development of the christological doctrine of one of the giants of 20th-century Christian theology. Unfortunately the translated work suffers from awkwardness in expression and sentence structure.

Pannenberg took human anthropology as his points of departure and of reference. The human belief in God and in Christ Jesus as Son of God emerge from humans' self-understanding. He follows as his models of such a Christology the theological arguments of Irenaeus of Lyons, Athanasius of Alexandria, and Maximus the Confessor. From Irenaeus P. took the concept that Jesus so led individual persons to become more human that individuals began to infer that Jesus had been inherently capable of leading them to interrelate with the Creator. From Athanasius he took the notion that Jesus' use of human reason and knowledge to grasp the Father had reconciled individuals and God. From Maximus he took the idea that Jesus held so fast to the Father's will in filial love that he bound all of creation, including death, to God in an eschatological union.

From that anthropological perspective P. derived the identities of God, of Jesus, and of the human person.
The identity of God is derived “from below,” i.e., from the relationship that Jesus had developed with God: Jesus revealed God-in-the-world as the One who is God-giving-life-to-the-world. Yet the identity of God is eschatologically oriented toward the future.

The identity of Jesus, also “from below,” reveals God-in-Jesus. That union is especially evident in Jesus’ preaching and in the paschal mystery. The paschal event reveals the highest and most concrete visible expressions of God’s majesty within the world. From that union P. inferred that Jesus had always been with God as the pre-existent one. Thus Jesus is for P. consubstantial with the Father. Most significant as the foundation for his Christology is P.’s insistence that the Logos, i.e. the Son who is Christ Jesus, is not to be treated by human theologians as a logical subject: the Logos is not bound by our laws of logic.

The identity of the human person for P. bears a forensic character: the individual is conscious of self as a sinner graciously forgiven and even liberated from guilt and anxiety. Individuals can experience that forgiveness and liberation not only in religious themes, but entirely apart from religion. God is present in the individual’s life even when God is not identified as God but as a nonthematic Presence.

P.’s Christology imitates the pattern that the Fathers had initially formulated. God is the one who communicates self to individuals. Jesus is the agent by whom God sets in process the divine self-realization among humans. Humans are those who are beset by, but liberated from sin by God through Jesus.

The book would appeal to teachers and students of philosophical theology; it is a highly “left-brained,” logical analysis of a Christology. Those with a more “right-brained” historical or scriptural approach would find this study tedious.

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Daniel Liderbach


Souletie explores Moltmann’s view of the relationship between eschatology and history in The Crucified God, the Theology of Hope, and to a lesser extent in The Way of Jesus Christ, showing how his understanding of the cross of Christ functions to criticize all theology, especially political theology. S. offers a meticulous analysis and critique of the underlying features of Moltmann’s thought. His aim is to emphasize that the proper relation between eschatology and history is to be found in a post-Vatican II reconstructed theology of the Eucharist grounded partially in Moltmann’s theology and partially in Augustinian theology. S. demonstrates Moltmann’s indebtedness to and divergence from such disparate figures as Bultmann, Käsemann, Pannenberg, Hegel, Bloch, and Rahner. There is an extensive analysis of Moltmann’s trinitarian Christology as it relates to Rahner’s theology, to
Luther and to Barth (S.'s understanding of Barth is not particularly illuminating). S. believes Moltmann opposed natural theology even though experience rather than revelation dictates much of Moltmann's thinking.

Moltmann attempted to articulate from within a trinitarian perspective the relationship between eschatology and history, using the logic of political theology "after Auschwitz" as a theological locus. He used the image of martyrs to speak of the distinction between the word of the cross and the cross itself, to criticize ideology from within the horizon of expectation in order to distinguish clearly between anticipations of the Kingdom and the Kingdom itself. In the midst of the contemporary political situation the martyr confronts the whole Church with an eschatological decision to accept faith or repudiate it. The connection between the martyr and the Eucharist suggests that the martyr discloses violence as a lie while the Eucharist determines the credibility of the whole of practical ecclesiology. Moltmann invites us to think about the connection between the two from within the horizon that connects eschatology and history.

However, S. finds that Moltmann cannot offer a satisfactory view of the relation between eschatology and history primarily because his eschatological perspective prevents him from giving due weight to history itself. S.'s key question then is whether or not Moltmann's conception of history gives us a proper view of God acting within history on our behalf or leads rather to the Hegelian idea that history is in God. S. illustrates how this difficulty surfaces and its implications throughout Moltmann's works. There is a thorough analysis of just what Moltmann means by the Resurrection: it cannot be seen as a fact but is understood on the basis of the disciples' experience as a vision which has the proleptic meaning that God is seen to be at work eschatologically in the cross of Christ bringing justice to the impious and powerless. The only problem here is that, while S. is not uncritical of Moltmann's theology, he does not offer any thoroughgoing critique of his understanding of the Resurrection in his later works where Moltmann clearly is unable to maintain the traditional sense of the Resurrection as an event that took place in the life of Jesus on our behalf. Moltmann seems to confuse its objectivity with the disciples' vision experiences and thus falls into a version of the "Jesuology" he himself rejects.

Further, Christ's "for us" is a profession of faith made possible by interpreting the cross of Jesus as the cross of Christ: the hope of the Resurrection not only declares God's coming but retrospectively announces the suffering and death of the exalted Lord in accord with the priority of eschatology in Moltmann's thought. The Resurrection established Jesus' person as the Christ of God. Thus in the order of history there was first Christ's death and then his Resurrection, while in the eschatological order the first reality is his Resurrection and then the death. The noetic and ontic orders are reversed so that one must recognize proleptically, in the anticipation of his Resurrection, the In-
carnation of the future of the Kingdom in the death of the crucified. This is the “for us” manifested in Jesus’ death.

This leads S. to wonder who Jesus was in his earthly life. Attempting to improve upon Moltmann’s views, but without substantially departing from his method of correlation, S. seeks the connection between eschatology and history in the Lord’s Supper where the community confesses him who presides over the community which announces the death of the Lord until he comes. There is no “christological vacation” in the sense that someone or something other than Christ mediates between God and us during the time between the Resurrection and the parousia. S. finds any adoptionist overtones unacceptable, and when he explores Moltmann’s wish to restructure Chalcedon’s understanding of Christ by making suffering the determinative factor of Jesus’ person and work, he wonders correctly whether or not Moltmann has allowed history to define God’s nature rather than the other way around. S. helpfully indicates that Moltmann did not sufficiently distinguish between the immanent and economic Trinity in his earlier work, while in his *Trinity and the Kingdom* he believes that he did make such a distinction. S. appeals to Rahner’s view of God’s self-communication in Christ to correct Moltmann’s tendency to project history into God instead of seeing God acting within history. But this is not entirely helpful since Rahner’s own view of the relation between Christology and anthropology does not decisively escape the mutual conditioning associated with Moltmann’s views. It is surprising that in S.’s analysis of Moltmann’s trinitarian Christology there is so little discussion of the *Trinity and the Kingdom*. That important book clearly indicates the basic difficulties latent in Moltmann’s social doctrine of the Trinity, among which are his tendencies toward tritheism, toward making God dependent upon history, toward pantheism via panentheism, and toward a Pelagian view of worship.

The most interesting parts of the book, in my opinion, are those where S. traces Moltmann’s Christology back to Hegel’s philosophy of religion, and the sections on the Eucharist that analyze and develop a contemporary theological understanding of sacrifice. Overall I would say that the book’s major contribution lies both in showing the antecedents to Moltmann’s thought and in S.’s presentation of the Eucharist which shows the important connection between ethics and dogmatics. While both Moltmann and S. correctly assert that Christ is in the Eucharist “for us” one wonders whether or not the Eucharist at times actually displaces Christ, as when we are told that the Eucharist gives us the capacity to call on Jesus and that the Eucharist restores our relation to God broken by sin.

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Paul D. Molnar

Drawing on his rich background in 20th-century theology, both Protestant and Catholic, Fackre sets forth in this volume a typological approach to the theology of revelation, reminiscent of H. R. Niebuhr's *Christ and Culture* and the present reviewer's *Models of Revelation*. Recognizing the consciously Catholic character of my work, he aims to present a "kindred" analysis of revelation from a Protestant point of view.

F.'s typology, rather complex, can here be presented only in truncated form. He distinguishes between an experiential approach, largely nonconfessional, and a variety of confessional approaches: a Reformed Christocentric model, an Evangelical biblical model, a Catholic ecclesiocentric model, and a Lutheran futurist eschatological model. These five approaches are represented respectively by Paul Tillich, Karl Barth, Carl Henry, Karl Rahner, and Wolfhart Pannenberg, but a large number of other theologians are cited in the course of the discussion. In the case of each major author, F. gives a concise exposition followed by fair yet incisive appraisals of their strengths and weaknesses. A guiding presupposition (borrowed from Niebuhr) is that most theologians are correct in what they affirm but wrong in what they deny.

*My Models of Revelation* made use of the category of symbolic communication as a synthesizing principle. F., while showing a keen appreciation of the importance of symbol, prefers to integrate the materials under the overarching caption of narrative, which he views as a kind of metaphor extended in time. He can therefore arrange his models in a chronological order, beginning with creation and the "Noachic covenant," then following the course of salvation history up to its culmination in the Christ event, later adverting to its inscripturation and to its interpretation in the Church, and turning finally to the eschatological consummation.

By his chronological arrangement F. succeeds in bringing some order into the chaos of conflicting opinions. But, as he recognizes, the authors whom he treats do not neatly fit into his categories. While discussing Karl Barth in his christological section, he cannot avoid presenting Barth's views on the written and proclaimed forms of the word of God, thus anticipating themes to be taken up in later chapters. F. treats Rahner exclusively in his chapter on the Church as interpreter of revelation. Although Rahner's view of biblical inspiration may properly be characterized as "ecclesiocentric," his theology as a whole, in my opinion, might better be described by some other adjective—possibly "anthropocentric" or "Christocentric." Even in his ecclesiology Rahner focuses far less on the papal-episcopal magisterium than F. implies. The exigencies of F.'s typological pattern compel him to oversimplify Rahner's theology of revelation.

A further weakness is that the format of the book does not give adequate scope for F. to explain his own positions, which emerge chiefly in his criticisms of others. Thus he criticizes Thomas Aquinas
and Carl Henry for minimizing "the radical character of the fall," but
does not adequately justify his own view that human reason has been
fundamentally impaired. On points such as this his appeal seems to be
to his own Protestant tradition and to Scripture as seen through that
lens.

F. evidently holds that the Bible is the only true source of Christian
doctrine, but he does not explain why this must be so. Is it because the
Bible makes this claim for itself or because it is so regarded in the
Protestant tradition to which F. adheres? How precisely is inspiration
to be understood if it gives authority to every portion of the Bible
"including those parts of it that cannot be reconciled with its overarch­
ing message" (168)? Can a book that teaches contradictory things enjoy
peremptory authority?

F.’s views on the authority of Christian doctrine could likewise ben­
efit from further explanation. Quite evidently, he does not wish to
promote narrative at the expense of doctrine. In opposition to extreme
forms of pluralism and relativism, and in agreement with Carl Henry’s
propositional understanding of biblical truth, he treats certain doc­
trines as unexpendable. But he also speaks as though doctrine could
never be magisterially defined but is always subject to revision in an
ongoing conversation involving the whole people of God. In a more
systematic work F. might have been able to expound more fully his
views on the stability and mutability of Christian doctrine. As I myself
have experienced, it is hard to combine a typological with a systematic
approach.

Without necessarily agreeing with F. on all points, Catholic and
Protestant readers will be grateful for this insightful and readable
synthesis, written from a perspective that aims to be at once evangeli­
cal, reformed, and catholic. It provides a highly accessible panorama of
the current positions. While acutely criticizing his interlocutors, F.
writes in an irenic spirit. Allowing for inevitable Catholic-Protestant
differences, I find his perspective similar to my own. Having profited
from F.’s advice in writing my own Models of Revelation, I welcome this
Protestant counterpart.

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Avery Dulles, S.J.

The Three Are One: The Practice of Trinitarian Theology. By

In one of his sermons on Trinity Sunday as an Anglican divine, John
Henry Newman warned his congregation that to abandon belief in
"God as Three" in favor of the oneness of God in the manner of the
Unitarians would mean that the Unitarian "God as One" would soon be
countered by a revived Manichean dualism ("God as Two," so to
speak, as in fact happened early in this century with Rudolf Steiner's
Anthroposophical Movement) which would then soon bring to birth an
outright atheism—"God as None."
This Newmanian declension from Three to One to Two to None forms a useful background to Cunningham's rich new book on trinitarian theology, because the remarkable renewal of trinitarian theology in the past several decades has in fact taken place against the very background that Newman predicted. Because of this easily traceable movement from Unitarianism to Anthroposophy to atheism, Christians, it seems, have almost been forced to return to their best sources and to exploit them to the full in order to meet the challenge that Newman predicted would soon be facing us.

C.'s book can perhaps best be seen as the fullest marshaling yet of these resources. Although he very much wants to strike out on new ground (and quite properly so), what the reader has in this work above all, in my opinion, is the fullest account yet available of all the cultural means available to the Christian to make trinitarian theology the direct resource for evangelization and church transformation that it can be. This makes for an extremely rich book, a richness which tends to work somewhat at cross-purposes with C.'s stated intention of making it a useful coursebook for upper-level undergraduates: it is not a textbook per se, but the amount of citation and allusion makes for a "thick" book in both the literal and figurative senses of that word.

Undoubtedly, the most innovative section is Part 3, on "Trinitarian Practices." Here the intersection of traditional theology with postmodern theory comes to its fullest fruition. One of the most consistent arguments against monotheism is its potential for "hegemonic discourse," that is, its potential for giving ideological underpinnings to a cultural imperialism that obliterates the contribution of the Other because of the allegedly totalizing claim of the "one" God. C. however, brings out in the richest detail the potential lurking in the Christian doctrine of the Trinity for "peacemaking," "pluralizing," and "persuading" in three chapters that answer this important accusation from within postmodern theory. Building on his theoretical work on rhetoric in Part 1, C. shows how both the production of language and the construction of the audience are "vestiges" (in the Augustinian sense) or, to use C.'s terminology, "triune marks," of God's internal self-differentiation. He then goes on to show how this means that human beings are inherently partial (that is, limited in their perspective) and therefore communicative, a fact that then impels him to a trinitarian justification for pacifism and pluralism (the critique of Augustine's just-war theory is unique in that it argues the point from within Augustine's theology of the Trinity rather from a political or eschatological ethic that meets Augustine as opponent and not resource).

Given this stress on the pluralistic and nonhegemonic, the reader is probably wondering where C. stands on the now neuralgic issue of gender-talk applied to God, especially in a book that is trinitarian from start to finish. Not surprisingly there is a certain amount of thrashing around, and not through his own fault: given his literary and imaginative sensitivities, C. fully realizes that abstract substitutes for "Fa-
ther, Son, and Holy Spirit” such as “Source, Wellspring, Living Water”
(which is his usual substitute phrase) do not carry the semantic or
emotional weight of the Church’s more traditional confessions; but he
also holds that traditional trinitarian confessional terms for the Trin-
ity (meaning primarily, it seems, Father, Son, and Holy Spirit) “tend to
minimize the classical claims . . . and have, in our contemporary con-
text at any rate, lost most of their power to evoke the central claims
upon which trinitarian doctrine is based” (70).

C. makes this claim more by assertion than by argument, but I think
the central source of his difficulty is, ironically enough, precisely the
same difficulty the early Church fell into when it defined Nicene trini-
tarian theology independently of christological doctrine, leaving it to
Chalcedon to hammer out a somewhat conceptually awkward solution
to a problem that Nicea had previously made insoluble on its own
terms. Similarly, C.’s reflections are too divorced from a radical incar-
nationalism that identifies the flesh of Jesus with God (John 1:14), an
identification which in fact must always accompany trinitarian theol-
y if it is not to relapse into either tritheism or bloodless abstractions.
It is for that reason that I think “Son-language” will prove indispens-
able, and therefore that, correlative, God will continue to be ad-
dressed by preference in Christian worship, pace the feminists, as “Fa-
ther.”

While reading this fascinating, learned, and at times moving book, I
kept hearing the voice of Kierkegaard speaking from his journals:
“People fight so fiercely against anthropomorphism and forget that
Christ’s birth was the greatest and most important thing of all.”

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EDWARD T. OAKES, S.J.

LIGHT OF TRUTH AND FIRE OF LOVE: A THEOLOGY OF THE HOLY SPIRIT.

In response to the general criticisms that 20th-century theology has
been dominated by Christology at the expense of pneumatology, that
little effort has been made to integrate our experience of God through
the person and work of the Spirit into our theological systems, and
noting that, although we are presently witnessing a welcome revival of
trinitarian theology, the person and work of the Spirit nevertheless
remains relatively neglected in these discussions, Badcock sets about
the complex task of readjusting these imbalances.

Approximately the first third of the book is devoted to a descriptive
analysis of the biblical material on the Spirit, patristic developments,
the Filioque controversy in the Eastern and Western traditions, and
the traditions of the Reformation. Here B. does not simply offer the
customary general survey but skillfully keeps the reader’s attention
closely focused on the decisive moments in this long development.

The theme of the experience of the Spirit is introduced in Chapter 5
and revisited in the final chapter. With the assistance of the positions
developed mainly by Heribert Mühlen and Walter Kasper, B. then goes on in the next chapter to discuss the merits of a Spirit Christology and its importance for the Church understood as the community of the Spirit that lives in the tension between Church as charism and Church as institution. This is followed by a detailed and lively analysis of the place assigned to the Spirit in contemporary trinitarian theology. The various positions put to the test in this extremely helpful chapter are those of Barth, Rahner, Pannenberg, Jüngel, and Moltmann. In all of these cases, though clearly in different respects, B. argues, the status and role of the Spirit receive insufficient emphasis especially with regard to the economy of salvation. For example, apart from the respective strengths of their positions, Jüngel’s exclusively “staurocentric” stance forces the more comprehensive content of the gospel into a Procrustean bed that leaves little room for the ideas of God as Creator or God as Sanctifier, and Moltmann’s ontologized eschatology is made to support a trinitarian structure that the biblical eschatological imagery was never meant to bear. In other words, the one position selects one theme from the diversity of the economic data while the other surpasses this diversity in the interest of an ongoing, overall eschatological development. In response to these and to other recent tendencies in trinitarian scholarship B. acknowledges its crucial insight that knowledge of the immanent Trinity comes only by way of the economy and incorporates it into a third alternative, namely, a position based on a notion of the relation of reciprocity between Word and Spirit that both does justice to the diverse data of the economy of salvation and also permits a corresponding reciprocity between faith and fellowship, truth and love, and orthodoxy and orthopraxis in the lived experience of the Church (272).

The book has many virtues. With its emphasis on the person and work of the Holy Spirit it represents a creative attempt to advance trinitarian discussion beyond the somewhat conflicting paradigms to which it is currently captive and thereby to reinvigorate dialogue between the churches on this key doctrinal issue. Its spirit is refreshingly irenic and ecumenical. If it covers a fairly extensive range of historical and theological territory in a relatively short space, nevertheless it can hardly be criticized of suffering from superficiality. The style and arguments are direct and vigorous, and there is clear evidence of careful and creative scholarship on virtually every page. In places it is quite demanding, calling for considerable expertise in the long and complex history of the development of trinitarian doctrine. Hence, it is not a book for the beginner, or for that matter for the fainthearted.

There are some rather surprising omissions, such as any discussion of Augustine’s notion of the Spirit as “the soul of the Church,” or of Abelard’s definition of the Spirit as anima mundi. (One wonders whether or not Moltmann’s mature view may be somewhat akin to this). The question that still vexes in the general context of Protestant/Roman Catholic discussion, that of Spirit in relation to the individual
and Spirit in relation to the community, might also have been treated more extensively. With regard to the contemporary debate, LaCugna's work is cited only briefly and Jenson's not at all. If chapters 5 and 9 on experience in relation to the person and work of the Holy Spirit are somewhat less satisfactory than the rest of the book, it is perhaps because this subject is something of a hydra in any case. However, a more precise account of the role that experience may be said to play in the enterprise of doctrinal construction would certainly have been helpful.

These points aside, this book's fitting place is with those that have also made a creative contribution to this very important discussion.

Knox College, Toronto

Iain G. Nicol


In the title, the term "Church" refers to the entire Christian Church. Nichols's main concern, however, is the life of the Roman Catholic Church. He contends that the most serious challenge facing modern Catholicism is to recover the true meaning of hierarchy.

N. holds that hierarchy is essential to the Church, not only because of the evidence of Scripture and tradition, but also because egalitarianism is unworkable and eventually leads to loss of communion, fragmentation, and chaos. He distinguishes two kinds of hierarchy which are rarely found in their pure form: command hierarchy, and participatory hierarchy. Command hierarchy, a top-down model, depends on centralized control, discourages creative interaction, and often results in rigid authoritarianism. N. claims that command hierarchy, often resorting to force and fear, has been a major cause of rebellions and schisms in the Church. The Church, however, by its very nature is a participatory hierarchy or a hierarchical communion that is inclusive and integrative. This second kind of hierarchy is a bottom-up model that opts for decentralization and promotes consensual decision-making and subsidiarity. Participatory hierarchy balances unity within diversity and enables the members of the Church to experience a vital communion in the life of God and Christ through the Spirit.

The general theory of hierarchy used by N. is drawn from such authors as Michael Polyani, Ludwig von Bertalanffy, Charles Birch, and Ian Barbour. His conceptual framework is based on the theory of holons, a term coined by Arthur Koestler to refer to individual units within a larger system in which there is reciprocal influence between the parts and the whole. Every complex body, whether linguistic, biological, or social, is composed of many holons which form a system called a holarchy. In the Church, the basic holon is the parish which is related to the diocese, regional or national groupings of bishops, and the universal Church. All of these units are interdependent and interactive.

The book is divided into twelve chapters. After some introductory
material, N. traces the history of participatory hierarchy from the Hebrew Scriptures to the present. He points to the role of consent and election in Israel; the participation in the life of the New Testament Church (Acts 6 and 15); the role of councils and synods and the election of bishops in the first centuries; moderate conciliarism and the reform movements of the Middle Ages; and the growing authoritarianism after the Reformation, at Vatican I, and in the years following Vatican II. Finally, he discusses ontological hierarchy, the social nature of the Church, and the Church as communion.

The enthusiasm N. has for participatory hierarchy has to be realistically assessed. It should be noted, e.g., that some form of command hierarchy has been operative in the Church from the early centuries to the present. Even N. admits that "genuine participatory hierarchy has been rare in Christian history" (14); that in the medieval period "the patristic model of hierarchy, which was largely participatory, was displaced by a model-based command" (167); and that despite great advances made at Vatican II "the deeper problem of papal absolutism has changed little in practice" (248). A major paradigm shift in a large, complex, and venerable institution is a formidable task.

Without giving a detailed blueprint of how to construct a full-fledged participatory hierarchy in the Church, N. does offer some suggestions. His recommendations include the following: the election of bishops; the voicing of dissent on church teaching apart from the fundamentals of the Christian faith; the positive use of the sensus fidelium; and the implementation of the principles of legitimate diversity, collegiality, and subsidiarity. Each of these complicated topics has been widely discussed in the years since Vatican II. They deserve a fuller explanation than the one N. gives.

Contemporary Catholic ecclesiologists would generally agree with N.'s pleas for greater participation and accountability. Anyone who has read the postconciliar literature on the theology of the Church is familiar and supportive of the ideas of collegiality, authority as service, and the desirability of active involvement of people in the life of the Christian community. N. has not presented anything new in this regard, but he has reaffirmed important aspects of Vatican II and reminded us that the task of implementing the Council is not yet finished.

N. touches on a wide range of topics: ecclesiology, church history, social theory, metaphysics, feminism, and the debate on the historical Jesus. Unfortunately, because he paints with such a broad brush, his intended focus on hierarchy may at times be obscured. Yet he writes calmly and clearly, argues with conviction, and shows a good knowledge of the sources. His treatment of participatory hierarchy is helpful because it shows us once again the importance of interdependence in the life of the Church.

Catholic University of America, D.C. PATRICK GRANFIELD

Only a few years ago, politically correct anthropology urged us all to respect other cultures as integral and stable wholes, each to be judged only by its own internal norms. Tanner argues that postmodern anthropology takes us beyond a world of neat, stable, and independent cultures. She then applies this postmodern view to theology, in an excellent illustration of what a postmodern interpretation of culture might imply, for better or worse, especially as a critique of postliberal theology.

After a quick history of the meanings of the world "culture," T. describes the early-20th-century rejection of a progressivist unilinear model of cultural evolution, in favor of a functionalism that promoted respect for different cultures as well-functioning unities, not steps along an ideal path towards a modern European way of life and thought. She praises this respect for other cultures, but argues that the functionalist notion of a culture as a fairly self-contained, stable, and unified whole is seriously flawed. A closer look at cultures shows their boundaries are quite porous; they are always in a process of change of some kind; and they contain conflicting internal currents. On this basis, she criticizes Milbank for proposing that Christianity can be a distinct alternative social group, and Lindbeck for postulating clear and stable boundaries between the Christian community and the rest of the world. She criticizes correlational theologies for supposing that both culture and a set of Christian claims to meaning and truth are "independently generated wholes" (107) to be correlated with each other. She even criticizes Gadamer for claiming there is genuine continuity in tradition.

A postmodern anthropology of cultures, T. claims, allows us to see that there are always multiple levels and competing versions of interpretation and reinterpretation going on in any society. Each interpretation selects different things to borrow from outside, and in different ways; or selects different internal elements to be worthy of the name "tradition" even while minimizing the significance of other old practices; or gives priority to the values and practices of some groups within the society at the expense of others, and so on. T. argues that theology, both the traditional academic sort and current postliberal forms, have "interests" they serve, and will construct selective interpretations to serve those interests. Each in particular must construct a coherent whole to have as its object of study, a system of beliefs for academic theology, or a community of practices for postliberal theology. She claims that a more realistic theology ("everyday theology") will use bricolage, creatively assembling new ideas for the needs of the immediate context, free to go where the Spirit leads. She argues that "Christian identity does not mean in any strong sense that all Christians share a common set of beliefs and values" (124). From this she
moves to a particular theological judgment, that Christians should define their solidarity only as a "community of argument," committed to a loving mutual criticism, with a common style of humility before the Word to which Christian are to bear witness.

As a postmodern thinker, perhaps T. might acknowledge that she too is being interpretively selective. She is correct, I believe, to recognize an ongoing exchange among sociocultural groups as well as continuous inner developments and conflicts. But how one bears identifiably Christian witness without some shared set of significant beliefs, values, and practices more specific than just mutual loving criticism is the missing part of her analysis. She shrugs off the historical effectiveness of certain beliefs, practices, and norms (Incarnation, baptism, love of neighbor, for example) in providing fairly effective reference points for Christian identity over many centuries. God may indeed freely speak anew to each generation, as she insists, but she has used academic postmodernism to obscure the actual everyday impact of long-term tradition in guiding people in how to interpret what they hear. It is nonetheless instructive to watch her push a postmodern perspective toward the limit.

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MICHAEL H. BARNES


The importance of this collection is due not only to Milbank's theological acumen, but also to the contemporary theological movement he represents. This movement, sometimes dubbed "Radical Orthodoxy," finds recent Christian theology guilty of a long-standing slavish devotion to modernity, and names such collaboration as puerile and even idolatrous. The seeds were sown in M.'s encyclopedic Theology and Social Theory, which examined the theological and atheological claims hidden at the heart of various modernist metanarratives (whether sociological, dialectical, or nihilistic) and proposed a "postmodern critical Augustinianism" as the most truthfully Christian response to Enlightenment rationalism and romanticism.

Many of the essays in this new collection explore the larger implications of two fundamental Christian claims: (1) that the world is created ex nihilo, rather than through the violent overcoming of some primeval chaos; and (2) that there is no positive evil, only the privatio boni that results from human sinfulness. These claims, often considered mere theological hairsplitting, take on enormous significance insofar as they preclude any ontology rooted in violence and conflict. Instead, they remind us that God's relationship toward the world is characterized by peaceable, superabundant donation—with important implications for Christology, pneumatology, and ethics.
Three examples. “The Linguistic Turn as a Theological Turn” is a reworking of an important two-part article entitled “Theology without Substance” in which M. offered some early ruminations on Christianity as an overcoming of (rather than a capitulation to) a metaphysics of substance. The essay displays a mastery of Christian authors writing both “in” and “over against” the Enlightenment—Vico, Hamann, Herder—as well as an impressive rehabilitation of Berkeley and an explication of the medieval sources upon which many of these writers drew. This revised version goes beyond the original article by suggesting that Christian authors had already completed the “linguistic turn” well before the idea entered the heads of certain 20th-century philosophes, who only thought they were avant garde.

“The Second Difference,” originally a 1986 article bearing the subtitle “For a Trinitarianism without Reserve,” offers a capsule theology of the Holy Spirit, and in so doing clarifies many of the issues underlying the focus on “relation” in contemporary trinitarian theology. M. understands the relation of the Spirit through the category of difference: she is properly a “second difference” that prevents the “very perfection of relation between Father and Son” from “obliterating the usual significance of personal relatedness” (188). This is contrasted with the “transcendentalist” approach of Walter Kasper and the “Hegelian” solution of Moltmann, Pannenberg, and Jüngel. Along the way, readers will find a good defense of Augustine against facile modernist charges of “psychologism” and an appropriately reserved appreciation for the Cappadocian contribution.

Finally, “On Complex Space” is a brilliant political analysis of the theology underlying recent Roman Catholic social teaching in general and the encyclical Centesimus annus in particular. M.‘s originality lies in setting this tradition against a new foil: not liberation theology’s “priority of praxis” model, but rather the medieval appreciation for “complex space.” M. uses this term as a Bakhtinian chronotope which contrasts mightily with its modern political alternative—that of “enlightenment.” The latter would represent the past as a time of illusion and confusion, which can only be extirpated by establishing “the political” as a simple, unmediated space between individuals and the sovereign. By contrast, “gothic” space was aware of networks and overlapping jurisdictions, of mediations and dispersements, well embodied by the “fragmentary and therefore always-already ‘ruined’ character of the gothic structure” (276). This contrast is employed to analyze the emergence of the secular, the modern distrust of indeterminacy, and the craving for monolithic unity. M. endorses the Catholic advocacy of a complex, gothic space, but fears that it is too often alloyed with modernist absolutism in ways that can easily lead to fascism.

The book contains nine other essays of similar caliber, some of which invite attention through their allusive titles alone: “A Critique of the Theology of Right”; “Only Theology Overcomes Metaphysics”; “The Poverty of Niebuhrianism.” Vast learning stands behind all twelve
essays, and the implications of M.'s project are profound: if he is right, much of what is being done today under the guise of "theology" is destined for the scrap-heap that Feuerbach prepared for it. In contrast, "Radical Orthodoxy" proposes Christianity as a metanarrative of non-mastery, repudiating a self-enclosed fideism yet also denouncing the peculiarly modern form of theological abdication which hands over the criteria of judgment to atheological enterprises. Contemporary theologians would do well to heed M.'s claim that "there is no independently available 'real world' against which we must test our Christian convictions, because these convictions are the most final, and at the same time the most basic, seeing of what the world is" (250).


History of Religions, said Joseph Kitagawa, is a descriptive-normative discipline, attempting a description of normative systems. Ingram tells us that he is a "historian of religion writing a theology of religious pluralism" (10), interweaving historical description with normative evaluations and his own personal story. The result is a "thought experiment" (10) which is provocative but inconclusive. We close the book still hearing the grunts and bellows of Ingram's struggle, which he feels will last his whole life.

The book is in ten chapters, structured according to the Ten Ox-Herding Pictures, a famous, if rather mysterious, Zen commentary on the gradual stages of enlightenment in a tradition that is not supposed to have any stages. In their Buddhist context, the ox stands for the Original Buddha Mind, and the herder stands for the practitioner who is searching for his preexisting identity with himself. I. ingeniously reworks the parable to illustrate his own descriptive-normative search, interpreting the man as all humanity and the ox as "the relatively inaccessible Sacred," tracking it through the words of scriptures, taming it in myth, ritual, and doctrine, and riding it home with suggestions for ecology, feminism, and soteriology. In order to make this reworking convincing he has to make a controversial ontological assumption: that there is a Sacred in more or less the same way that there is a Buddha Mind. He adopts the category Sacred from Eliade and, while being aware of its "unrecognized Christian theological assumptions" (213), he asserts its existence within a pluralistic context, identifying it with "God, Allah, Dharma, Emptying, Tao, Brahma, Śiva, Krishna, or Wa-kan Taka," names which he sees as metaphors of the one Sacred, and then using the word God "simply because it is as good as any other metaphor" (215) and taking "a theocentric perspective that . . . recognizes religious pluralism [and] celebrates it" (205–6).

Is this a Christian Vedanta, a theologically sophisticated version of
Dom Bede Griffiths? I. denies it, saying that although “all paths do lead to the same summit,” nevertheless “they need not be interpreted as forms of Advaita Vedanta” (32). But his denial is not persuasive. There are too many statements about the relativity of religions and the absoluteness of the Sacred. All religious experiences are, he says, “different forms of the same ox” which is itself beyond form so that the “nonpersonal experience of the Sacred most closely approximates what the ox’s reality is” (82). Surely this is advocating the nirguna brahman as the true faceless face of the many faces of Ishvara?

This is surprising, given that I. is an accomplished Buddhologist. Has he confused the nondualism of Nagarjuna with the monism of Shankara? He is startlingly dismissive of the Buddha. Not only does I. admit that he himself has not seen everything, he asserts that “no one has, not even enlightened sages” (209). This remark would appear to deny the possibility of the existence of omniscient beings, and therefore of Buddhas as taught by Mahayana. There is an anthropocentrism and a “professor-centrism” in I.’s assumptions. “Today all holy mountains are keeping mum,” he says (57). For whom are they mum? Not for Rennie McOwan, whose book Magic Mountains (Edinburgh and London: Mainstream, 1996) happened to show itself as this review was being prepared. For McOwan and his informants, the mountains of Scotland are still full of talkative spirits. Perhaps professors are deaf.

In other passages, I. seems to suspect this. Although he does not admit to praying and meditating as a means of gathering information about religions (and we might wonder why he does not, since he is concerned with experience), he frequently mentions how he finds the Sacred in nature and admits that “the Sacred is apt to catch us when we are not looking” (75). That is the point. It is not up to us to tell the religions how, if at all, they cohere. We need to listen, and contemplatively hear what it is they ask of us.

This is a frustrating book, with which the reader is apt to wrestle as I. wrestles with his subject matter. But I.’s masterly discussions of the state of the field and his spirited defense of his own stance, which he calls the primordial model, help to illuminate what it is we might be doing when we do interreligious dialogue.

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ROGER J. CORLESS


This second volume on Hinduism in an ambitious series complements a 1989 treatment of mostly classical Sanskrit-language sources. The present volume highlights three areas: vernacular literatures, both those derived from Sanskrit (e.g. Hindi and Bengali) and those of independent origin (e.g. Tamil); the contributions of modern figures
including the familiar (Swami Vivekananda, Rabindranath Tagore, Mohandas Gandhi) and some relatively unknown in the West (Ramalingar, Sivananda); and broader cultural resources, such as temples, festivals, art and music.

The volume documents the depth and complexity even of regional spiritualities which claim "only" ten or twenty million adherents, and should make clear the impressive vitality and depth of Hindu thought and practice. It is a treasure chest which contains information and wisdom for readers of varying interests. The numerous local traditions have endured as integral religious paths sensitive to both spiritual and intellectual concerns; as these essays suggest, such paths can enrich the lives of Western, English-speaking readers today. Even in premodern times vernacular communities clearly owed a great deal to particular charismatic men and women whose experiences became sources of guidance for their disciples; the writings of such communities offer much to those who would undertake a comparative study of religious experience. Throughout history local communities manifested both continuity and rupture with respect to older, dominant religious forms, and these local traditions offer valuable evidence for those who wish to study religious change and the construction of local theologies: famous texts like the Upaniṣads and the Bhagavad Gītā were reinterpreted to suit local needs. Marginal deities became major, new ideas central, peripheral communities influential. Seemingly immovable social structures (such as caste hierarchies) were critiqued, undercut, and surpassed in numerous bold and inventive ways.

Most of the contributors are Indian Hindus, and even the few who are Western Christians have lived in India and are well versed in its religions. It is therefore a striking virtue of the volume that Hinduism is seen from within, not from a distance. This legitimate preference for Indian voices seems also to entail, however, an absence of attention to recent Western scholarly writing about spirituality, mysticism, and Hinduism itself; this absence makes it more than necessarily difficult to discover books useful for further study, particularly for those versed in contemporary methodologies in theology and the study of religions.

The editors have conscientiously insured that a wide variety of topics and approaches are covered by the contributors. As a result, though, the volume does not venture any consensus on invariable and distinctive features of Hindu spirituality. Not that such an effort would be cost-free. Even prudent attempts to demarcate key features of a "Hindu spirituality" would go against the view (common particularly in the West!) that there are many "Hinduisms" which share few features common to all. Seeking a consensus would also have involved the editors in doctrinal or ideological choices about which ideals and standards apply most widely. But given the inclusion of this volume in this particular series, it would have been interesting to see this group of mostly Hindu authors collaborate in identifying a bit more boldly the distinctive "Hindu contribution" to "world spirituality." Since Hindu
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Communities have always situated themselves vis à vis the wider array of Indian spiritual paths, the essays themselves offer starting points for this further step. For instance, when Bettina Bäumer identifies in traditional Kashmir Śaivism four spiritual ways (individual experience, divine energy, divine identification, and a way that is no-way), or when Anantanand Rambachan presents and evaluates four pathways (detached action, love for God, religious reasoning, yogic practice) described by Swami Vivekananda at the end of the 19th century, such models offer promising frameworks in which to organize and describe what distinguishes Hindu spirituality, even if exceptions would immediately be noticed.

At this point the value of interreligious dialogue too comes to the fore. Just as Christians learn more about Christian identity by encountering people of other faiths, Hindu identity should become clearer through encounters with people of other religions, through having to articulate in word and deed what it means to be and remain Hindu today. Three essays at the end of the volume offer valuable starting points for this reflective discernment. One of them traces the role of the medieval saint Kabir, who lived at the border between the Hindu and Muslim worlds, and the other two examine the contribution of the Sikh and Christian communities to the formation of Indian religious identity as a complex whole.

Boston College

Francis X. Clooney, S.J.


This is both an engaging and maddening book. Its goal, derived from the research programs of early-20th-century Religionsgeschichte, is to provide general cultural and religious categories in which to understand the development of Christian worship, primarily the Eucharist. At moments, e.g., in its attempts to situate the Christian sacraments within the Neoplatonisms of late antiquity, it illuminates an insider/outside view of how Christian life might have been experienced in a particular historical period. At its worst, it becomes a reductionist, overly simplistic survey, with little relevance to any standard theology or ritual studies. Marketed as a history, the book does not provide any developmental study of liturgy; it mixes together periods and thinkers; and it tends to choose historical perspectives (a revision of Morton Smith's view of Jesus as Magician) which most historians find suspect. Many theologians would find any text that labelled Karl Rahner a rationalist, "uninvolved in German mysticism" (5) or that named Augustine's belief about the Eucharist as an "eminently personal ritual" (262) as at best overextended.

But the structure of the book, however eclectic, and its goals are laudable. Lang divides the essence of Christian worship into six cat-
Catholic University of America, D.C.


This extensively researched and thoughtful book highlights the theological character of Aquinas’s moral thought. Bradley argues that it is impossible to construct an autonomous systematic Thomistic moral philosophy that is utterly independent of Thomas’s theological frame-
work and warrants. B. patiently mounts an exegetical analysis of key texts in Thomas's corpus to show that Thomas never held that there are two ends of human life, one natural and the other supernatural, but rather only one, supernatural end, perfect beatitude. Because there is one proper end of human action, it is improper to attempt to construct a rationalistic or secular ethic on the basis of imperfect beatitude. Understanding the true end of human action provides the best avenue both for understanding Thomas's ethics and for its contemporary recovery.

B. covers an enormous amount of scholarly ground in painstaking detail and with relentless patience. The early chapters examine Thomas's theological method, his mode of relating Aristotelian science and theology, and his critical appropriation of Aristotle's views of practical wisdom, deliberation, and choice. B. then takes up important features of Thomas's accounts of practical reason and its first principle, the nature of the will and human acts, and human happiness. Drawing contemporary implications, the penultimate chapter emphasizes the "paradoxical" character of Thomas's interpretation of human nature as intrinsically oriented to a finality that cannot be attained in this life, and the final chapter argues that Thomistic "moral science," contra figures such as Maritain and Santiago Ramirez, can only be construed theologically; for "if human nature is naturally endless, a systematic teleological ethic based on the ultimate natural end of man is manifestly impossible" (529).

This book has manifest strengths and weaknesses. On the positive side, it spares no details in its argumentation, follows a clear order, examines carefully the ambiguities in texts, and treats opposing positions evenhandedly. B. is clear about what he advocates and what he finds unacceptable in scholarly exegesis of Thomas's texts. He properly warns against efforts to extract a strictly philosophical moral theory from Thomas's writings that would in fact be quite foreign to the religious spirit as well as the letter of his theological ethics. B. also very helpfully spells out the key differences between Aristotelian and Thomistic ethics, thus providing a hedge against the tendency to interpret Thomas in excessively Aristotelian terms.

On the negative side, B.'s audience tends to be only other Thomists. He does deal with some contemporaries, e.g. Ralph McInerney and Germain Grisez, but his circle of conversation partners is excessively small. His major sources are Thomas and other Thomists. Pegis, Gilson, and Maritain, for example, are certainly giants in 20th-century scholarship, but at the present time their interpretations of St. Thomas's moral thought are hardly at the center of debate.

Moreover, B.'s concerns are dated, as is exemplified in his sustained attentiveness to issues over "pure nature" that were resolved some time ago. He is correct to hold that Thomas's understanding of the finis hominis constituted a decisive break from that of Aristotle, but this claim is hardly novel. It is also the case that Thomas did not hold that
a person can naturally attain his or her ultimate perfection *per sua naturalia*, but this point was made long ago by Rousselot and others. B.'s contribution lies in the extent of scholarly support he musters in defense of these and related theses rather than in any new insight he brings to the questions.

Ironically, the greatest weakness of the book as a constructive argument, despite its insistence on attending to the theological character of Thomas's moral science, is theological. B. is content to simply repeat the principles of Thomas's theology without in any way addressing the need for their transposition into a contemporary idiom. This would be fine if the book were intended simply as an exercise of historical erudition, but it also intends to influence contemporary theological ethics. Surely such an agenda requires more than baldly asserting Thomas's theological conceptions (e.g. those regarding the soul, grace, and divine "infusion"); it requires their reconsideration in the light of contemporary theological conceptualities and modes of argument. To mention one example, most professional theologians will not find plausible B.'s simple adoption of Thomas's fairly propositional notion of revelation (e.g., see his treatment of the Ten Commandments [243, 320 f.]).

Staying within the narrow circle of Thomistic philosophical scholarship insulates B. from the kinds of criticisms he would be forced to address by contemporary theologians, but doing so guarantees that his appeal will be quite limited, perhaps miniscule. No doubt this book will be well received in Thomistic circles, yet it will exert little influence outside of them. This is especially true for the field of contemporary theological ethics, where it is not intellectually credible simply to assert Thomistic theological and philosophical concepts without their transposition. This book is intelligently written and will benefit those who are willing to work through it, but insight into the contemporary relevance of the theological ethics of St. Thomas will have to be found elsewhere.

*Boston College*  
*Stephen J. Pope*


Some moral theologians write extensively and well about foundational issues; some with acuity about practical principles; and a few with insight about current questions. Rare is the person who does all three. In his first volume of this series, Grisez masterfully generated a revisionary theory of morality. In the second, he developed how virtues and norms illuminate broad areas of human life. In this third volume, he manifests an extraordinary ability to analyze particular, practical moral questions.

G. considers 200 cases, many of which come from people facing tough
decisions in their ordinary life. Such "real" issues are usually neglected in standard textbooks of moral theology. Because of the difficulty of the cases, G. acknowledges that others might legitimately disagree with him. Still he takes this possibility as a challenge to put forth clearly and concisely not only various issues that everyone ought to consider but also a specific judgment about what should be done. While some authors fear that making specific judgments amounts to imposing a view or coercing an agent, G. rightly has no such hesitation. Pastoral agents have a duty to help people inform their consciences and that includes offering solutions.

The first set of cases deals with church life, e.g., whether one should report to the bishop a priest who espouses unorthodox views. G.'s well-known confidence that he understands the teaching of the Church and that those who disagree are betraying the Church is apparent here. Thus, for him, even minor changes in the Church's rubrics are likely to be grave sin.

Approximately 25 cases deal with familial issues such as whether one should stop an elderly parent from driving or whether one should sponsor a child's wedding in a Protestant ceremony. Family life is an area too often neglected by moralists, and G. intelligently analyzes some of its demands and responsibilities.

A third set of approximately 50 cases concerns health-care ethics, e.g., issues such as separating Siamese twins or getting a face-lift. Those familiar with G.'s arguments about life and death and sex will not be surprised by the way he deals with these issues. His supporters will appreciate his consistency, and his critics likely will not be further persuaded.

Roughly 60 cases deal with business questions, ranging from hotel-room pricing and fund raising to planting tobacco and tipping in restaurants. Moral theology has been notably neglectful of such issues. G. challenges any mushy laxity, such as executives who use their office to obtain lavish perquisites. He is strong on the need for restitution. Still, he recognizes that at times one need not make major sacrifices such as losing a job to correct various evils in business.

In the area of law and politics, G. addresses some 50 cases. He tends to a relatively strict approach but recognizes that accommodation is sometimes necessary. For example, jurors might vote to acquit someone they feel is guilty of a greater crime if that is the only way to reach a guilty verdict on a lesser crime. In another case he argues that a legislator should resist voting for a gambling casino, because the large amounts of money that some people would bet should be better spent elsewhere.

G. frequently appeals first to the golden rule as a way of overcoming biases and second to the principles of cooperation. In two appendices that contain the book's only explicit development of theory, he treats these two topics more extensively. He develops his own view in oppo-
sition to some traditional and more recent ecclesial positions, and he continues his battle against proportionalism and other theories.

It is difficult to suggest how this book might be used. Like its companion volumes, it contains almost 950 pages of small print. Thus few people are likely to read the whole book. Unlike the other volumes, this book makes no attempt at a unified and systematically arranged text. Rather it is a collection of disparate (though fascinating) cases. Hence theologians and pastoral agents cannot turn to it expecting that their particular practical questions will be treated. Perhaps it is best seen as an exercise book, to be read a few cases at a sitting, with the profit that comes from matching one's own judgment against that of a brilliant moral theologian.

In recent decades, Christian ethicists have too often focused their attention on a few areas such as contraception, abortion, or euthanasia, while neglecting detailed reflection on many of the questions sensitive Christians face in their lives. Even when one disagrees with G. or thinks him too absolutist (as I often do), one should admire his energy and insight in addressing questions that are usually ignored. Neglect of such questions tends to make moral theology irrelevant to most Christians.

Weston Jesuit School of Theology

EDWARD VACEK, S.J.


The charge that contemporary bioethics lacks the moral resources to guide us safely through the genetic age and the advent of physician-assisted death has become commonplace. Theologians and philosophers from Richard McCormick to Stanley Hauerwas, from Hans Jonas to Daniel Callahan, have bemoaned the enshrinement of individual autonomy, the unquestioned embrace of technology, and the marginalization of religion that characterize debates in bioethics today. In this fascinating study, McKenny offers a refreshingly uncommon account of what went wrong. Drawing on phenomenology and postmodern social theory, he shows how standard bioethics (and even its most trenchant critics) has become blind to biopower, i.e. the complex and often subtle networks of social and political control over the body. Having adopted the Cartesian "body as machine" of modern clinical medicine, having made its own the Baconian ideals of relief of suffering and expansion of choice, bioethics cannot provide what is most needed: an account of the moral significance of the lived body capable of telling us how and why we ought to address suffering, what goods health should serve, and what limits the control of our bodies by technology should observe.

M. begins with a brief critique of the dominant secular approach to bioethics growing out of the theories and principles of modern analytic
philosophy. Using physician-assisted death and human germ-line therapy as case studies, he effectively shows how, despite achieving some of its aspirations for a common morality, standard bioethics has failed to retain a necessary critical stance vis-à-vis medical culture. The failure of efforts to draw a line between killing and letting die and between therapeutic and nontherapeutic genetic interventions illustrates the extent to which moral discourses and practices merely shore up the utopian ambitions of the Baconian project. Against the threat of expanding technological power, we are offered not guidance in “enlisting technology in the service of a responsible and well-lived life” (31), but an illusory self-determination through technological control. Because standard bioethics is “incapable of determining what practices of dying best serve our moral projects and what kinds of suffering interfere with those projects, it cannot tell us what kinds of suffering to relieve or what choices to make” (37).

The bulk of the text is given to a critical survey of current alternatives to a Baconian bioethics. Although sympathetic to efforts by Hans Jonas and James Gustafson to develop counter-anthropologies and by Leon Kass and Stanley Hauerwas to recover moral and religious counter-traditions, it is the explicit turn to the lived body in the work of Richard Zaner, Drew Leder, and especially Michel Foucault that proves most valuable for M.’s thesis. A genuine alternative to Baconian utopianism, M. argues quite convincingly, must attend to what even perceptive critics such as Jonas and Hauerwas have failed to recognize: the social construction and function of the disciplines and practices that attend the living body. What is needed is not a new moral subject or a new medicine (although it is important to recognize medicine as a vehicle of social formation) but communities capable of forming subjects who both resist and appropriate technology according to “an alternative (in this case, Christian) discourse and set of practices” (218).

After M.’s masterful treatment of the voices from the margins of bioethics, his brief constructive proposal is somewhat disappointing. His suggestion that a Christian view of the body as that which both exteriorizes our will and resists it, as harbor of both sin and redemption, can serve as a basis for forming subjects who can understand illness and healing eschatologically is creative and intriguing. So too, is his broad vision for a medicine shaped by the hope of resurrection rather than the elimination of suffering. But his appropriation of the Pauline view of the body as the Christian view masks the complexity and diversity of treatments of the body in Christian traditions and thus the difficulty of recovery. Moreover, he argues for the importance of living communities of moral formation, but says nothing about how such alternative communities might be created or sustained. Indeed, M. seems doubtful that it is even possible. Silence here leaves him open to the charge that he levies at Hauerwas, that all depends on an ideal, nonexistent community. These reservations aside, this book makes an
important contribution to the literature of Christian bioethics. Neither specialists nor serious students of ethics will want to miss it.

*University of Notre Dame*  

MAURA A. RYAN


First published in France in 1985, this generally reliable English translation introduces an important voice into the North American sociological/philosophical debate concerning the role of religion in the shaping of Western societies. In this densely written book, the patient reader is rewarded with a rare *tour de force*, an original and thought-provoking general theory of secularization. Standing on the shoulders of Durkheim and Weber (from whom he derives his title and his inspiration), G. argues that religion itself is the source of the secularization of human civilization. In the French Unilinearist tradition, he posits a pre-neolithic “primeval religion” (33) wherein primitive humanity swam in a pantheistic sea of divine presence. In this world inundated by mystery, all phenomena were animated by the gods. Humans related easily to this reality through magic, rite, incantation, dance, etc. Yet this nascent religious mentality contained the seeds of its own destruction, for human attempts to experience the divine lead to an inexorable process of investigation, analysis, and understanding. The desire to lift the veil and see the divine allowed humans to see instead “a series of phenomena rigidly determined by sufficient reason,” i.e. the laws of nature (62). To preserve the sacred while continuing the investigative process, humans began to posit the transcendence of God and the autonomy of nature.

This insight gave rise to two fundamental modes of reflection. The first was an investigative human curiosity which took the natural world as a field of exploration—the birth of scientific method. The second was the religious construct of a parallel world from which the divine intervened periodically in the natural world. The transcendentalization of the divine, and the concentration of all that is pure, good, and holy in a single God mark the human exit from paradise and the entrance into history, where monotheism would support the view that the natural world is a place of human effort to effect a historical journey through and, ultimately, beyond visible reality to that “other world” of God. In this alienation of the sacred G. sees the source of all dualistic religious and philosophical constructs, from Plato’s theory of forms to the distinction between the mortal body and the immortal soul.

In G.’s treatment of the Judeo-Christian tradition, some readers will find points of disagreement with particular analyses, yet G. does intrigue. Judaism advanced the process of distancing God from the world
of matter, change, and confusion. Christianity would paradoxically complete this movement by affirming the utter transcendence of God from the world in the doctrine of the Incarnation. God became a human being precisely in order to bridge the yawning chasm between heaven and earth, yet the Messiah was rejected and left to die a lonely and miserable death. It was only as the invisible Spirit within the private bounds of individual conscience that God would continue to be present to persons and to offer them eternal life in a paradise separate from an increasingly secular world.

For this reason, G. calls Christianity the "religion for departing from religion" (101). G. proposes that Christianity ultimately frees people from all mediating structures of organized religion even as it encourages human curiosity to subdue and possess a disenchanted world. He describes this latter process as the rise of politics. Prehistorical religious ritual gave birth to social organization in the form of cultic priesthood tied to tribal leadership; with the distancing of God, this office evolved over time into the political state. Just as science is the outgrowth of disenchanted reverence, so politics is the secularized modern variant of cultic life.

There is a Gallic nostalgie in G.'s account of this story. Rather than proclaim God's death, G. relates an even sadder report: humanity has driven God into exile. At the outset, G. announces his atheism, yet by the end, amidst evident reverence for the Incarnation of the God-man Jesus Christ, one suspects that G. is actually a French intellectual agnostic. He bemoans the sacral emptiness of modernity, and he seems to hope for the eschatological victory of God. Between these two poles he would have us stand, unwilling to go back, unable to go forward, humans after all, promised wholeness by an unrecognized divinity, hanging on a tree, suspended between a distant heaven and a disenchanted earth.

Santa Clara University, Calif.

Paul J. Fitzgerald, S.J.

SHORTER NOTICES


The "plowshare" oracles of Isa 2:2–4/Mic 4:1–4 ("beat your swords into plowshares") and Joel 4:9–12 ("beat your plowshares into swords") provide the foil for this study of both literary and canonical questions of canon, canon formation, and canon authority. The seminal work of James Sanders provides the context of the discussion, but Brenneman draws on a wide range of other scholars in literary and hermeneutic theory.

Part 1 deals with the broad questions of contradiction and intertextuality, reader response and communities of interpretation, and the complexity of the meaning of canon itself. Part 2 surveys traditional approaches to the biblical question of true and false prophecy, the "swords into plowshares into swords" texts (including a tradition history of these texts), and a final summary which argues that, for us today, the Joel passage is false prophecy.
For B., the locus of canonical meaning lies not in the text but in the interpretative community with its hermeneutics and reading strategies: "Scripture cut away from its source of authority, the canonical community of faith, simply loses its meaning. . . . The people of God as living texts are inspired by God to create and sustain their own canon of Scripture as their guide for faith and practice . . . the sequence of authority: God to (Spirit-led) human communities to text" (50). Questions of ecclesiology are certainly involved here: "the implications of emphasizing reader-in-community . . . undermine a certain classic Protestant view regarding the a priori role and authority of sacred scripture over its readers" (90). B. argues for an important shift from canon as object (text) to canon as function (process) in which ethos (behavior) has a certain priority over mythos (story).

The book's argument is complex but clearly developed. As we live within the pluralities of postmodernism, this work seeks to move the biblical community of faith to respectful and more sophisticated forms of persuasive discourse. (A final note: throughout, theologian David Tracy's name is spelled Tracey).

MICHAEL D. GUINAN, O.F.M.
Franciscan School, Berkeley


This brief commentary matches the high quality of others in The Old Testament Library series. Nielsen devotes one-third of the book to an introduction which discusses the contents and structure, genre, intertextual reading, literary context, historical context, theological themes and text of Ruth. She treats the book as a work of art with multiple layers of meaning. "Like all works of art it is not a book with a single message for a limited time and circumstance but belongs in a network of texts that each underline particular themes in the narrative" (29).

The network of texts or intertextuality provides the methodology for the commentary. N.'s purpose is "to present the interpretations that appear most likely if we attempt to read the book within a network of texts out of which it came into being" (12). This method recognizes that no text is an independent entity but each consists of strands in a network of texts.

The method of intertextuality offers some wonderful new insights. N. considers Ruth a part of women's stories that deal with infertility and the triumph over it. The ending genealogy, which is set aside as a later addition by some scholars, becomes a basic premise and starting point through intertextuality. N. unveils the background known to the original audience and reader as well as the social and political situations that asserted the story of Ruth as a legitimation of the claims of David's family to the kingship. This commentary is highly recommended for its contribution of new insights as well as its careful application of a methodology.

CAMILLA BURNS, S.N.D.DE.N.
Loyola University, Chicago


Such is the ongoing fascination with The Song of Songs that virtually each of the last ten years has seen the publication at least one more translation into English of these erotic poems. This edition features a rendition by Ayo of each line of the text accompanied by an extensive commentary, illustrated with some half dozen impressionistic paintings by Craighead. Ayo is not a Hebraist, but he has consulted virtually every available commentary, with the result that his version is not only remarkably faithful to the original, but often exhibits a greater feel for the subtleties of the Hebrew than that found in many translations by Semitists. The En-
glish captures the lushness of the Hebrew throughout, and the charged eroticism of such passages as 5:1 ff. is conveyed with the same poetic sense of playful ambiguity as the original. For sheer readability, A.'s translation is probably even superior to the superb treatment of Roland Murphy in his Hermeneia commentary (The Song of Songs, 1990).

But the special beauty of A.'s contribution lies in his commentary. He always provides enough exegesis and historical and anthropological background to make the text intelligible and, where possible, explores other passages in Scripture where similar themes are pursued. He then discusses, sometimes with exquisite sensitivity and never with embarrassment, the erotic significance of each passage, drawing conclusions for modern couples to contemplate. Invariably, since he emphasizes the beauty and God-givenness of human love and sexuality, he is able to place the whole treatment in a profoundly spiritual context.

This is an exceptional book, both profound and provocative. It challenges the reader to find, in a new and more significant way, the numinous in the human.

WILLIAM J. FULCO, S.J.
Loyola Marymount Univ., L.A.


Johnson states that his “commentary will help present-day readers construct the meaning of Romans through the process of reading, coming as close as we can to the way the first readers experienced it. . . . Romans will be read in sequence as a developing argument” (3). Unfortunately, the book is not entirely successful in accomplishing these worthy goals. Although it generally follows the text of Paul’s letter in sequence, in a section-by-section rather than verse-by-verse manner, it often mentions later verses the reader has not yet heard. J. seems to presuppose that the first readers knew the rest of the New Testament, as the commentary makes constant reference to it. It is most doubtful that this is the way the first readers experienced Romans.

Although this commentary comes up short as a “literary” commentary, it is more successful as a “theological” commentary, placing Romans within the context of Pauline theology. In this regard, it is very clearly and insightfully written. Especially to be recommended is the section on the difficulties of interpreting Paul’s thinking on “submission to civil authorities” in Rom 13:1–7.

Key to J.’s commentary is that the controversial expression pistis Christou means “the faith of Christ in God” rather than “faith that believers have in Christ” (15). This reviewer disagrees with that interpretation and prefers the understanding of “faith in Christ” recently proposed by J. D. G. Dunn (The Theology of Paul the Apostle [Eerdmans, 1998] 379–85). The commentary lacks notes and indices, but includes some bibliography within the text. This is more an intermediate discussion of Paul’s letter to the Romans than an introduction for beginners.

JOHN HEIL
Kenrick-Glennon Sem., St. Louis


Winter’s revised doctoral dissertation, written under the direction of E. A. Judge at Macquarie University, examines Philo and Paul as critics of the first-century sophistic movement. Novel is the suggestion that both are important for our knowledge of first century sophists. The Second Sophistic is usually dated to the second century C.E., and in the East Dio Chrysostom of Prusa is its first representative.

The book is organized in two major parts, which deal with sophists in Alexandria and Corinth respectively.
The interest in Alexandria and Corinth as centers of first-century sophists, is, in part, determined by the book’s thesis about the common struggle against sophists shared by Philo and Paul.

The import of this book for New Testament scholarship lies in W.’s attempt to resurrect and confirm an earlier thesis of J. Munck regarding 1 Corinthians 1–4, i.e., that the divisions in the Corinthian church had more to do with sophists than theology. Controversial will be the identification of Paul’s opponents in 1 Corinthians with those in 2 Corinthians, whom W. identifies as Jews trained in Greek rhetoric. W. likens the situation in Corinth to the one he sees addressed by Philo in Alexandria, so that both Philo and Paul end up as antisophistic religionists of the first century.

Students of the Second Sophistic are likely to question the interpretation of the evidence provided for the first-century-c.E. witnesses of the movement in Alexandria and Corinth. The creative solution W. offers to resolve the conflict between the report of Neilus in P. Oxy. 2190 and those of Philo and Dio of Prusa on the respective lack or abundance of sophists in the city rings of special pleading. Therefore, one wonders whether the book’s claim about Philo and Paul among the sophists is indeed well founded.

ALAN C. MITCHELL
Georgetown University, D.C.


Donovan provides an accessible and well-written introduction to the Adversus haereses of Irenaeus, attentive to issues of structure, argument, and historical context. While the chief benefit offered by her book-by-book analysis is the illumination of the design and content of this complex work, along the way D. makes some important contributions to the study of Irenaean exegesis.

At the heart of Irenaeus’s disagreement with his Valentinian opponents is his insistence that any reading of Scriptures confirm and be confirmed by the Church’s “Rule of Faith.” D. suggests that this dialogical relationship is the basis of two compositional strategies that provide the key to the organization of Adversus haereses. First, in Books 1 and 2 Irenaeus contrasts the faith of the Church with that of the Valentinians, with an emphasis on unity as over against multiplicity. Second, D. finds that Irenaeus’s exegetical method of citing and commenting upon prophetic or do- minical words, which was isolated by Philippe Bacq in his study of Adv. haer. 4, is an organizing principle in Books 3 and 5 as well. In addition, D. makes an important advance in the observation of chiastic structure in large sections of Adversus haereses: this offers, as in the case of Adv. haer. 3.18.2–7, for instance, indispensable insight into the shape and direction of the argument.

D.’s close and methodical reading of Irenaeus offers fresh understanding of his characteristic emphases on the Incarnation, the unity of God’s action in the economy of salvation, and the present dignity and future hope of the human person. One would have hoped for more reference to the other extant work of Irenaeus, The Demonstration of the Apostolic Preaching, but perhaps that should remain material for a companion volume.

DANIEL A. SMITH
Wycliffe College, Toronto


Osborn has written what is quite simply the best introduction to the thought of Tertullian in any language. Over a long and prolific scholarly career he has accumulated a large fund of wisdom, learning, and good sense, all of which he brings to bear on this notoriously difficult, deliberately provocative, and frequently irritating author. O. cuts through the surface rhetoric and personal mannerisms to concentrate on Tertul-
lian’s “final vocabulary, the words and meanings which continually recur in his arguments” (xiii), which he elucidates with a hermeneutic approach that owes as much to Wittgenstein, Gadamer, and Quentin Skinner as to traditional patristic scholarship. This analysis of the underlying structures of his thought produces a Tertullian who is a rational, systematic, and creative theologian and thinker, “an intellectual Genghis Khan, who explores the Bible and classical culture, yet manages to present antiquarian, scientific, medical, and philosophical material in an original way” (255).

The only weaknesses I have detected concern minor historical matters of peripheral relevance to the central theme of the book. The first Christian martyrs of Africa were not tried “near Carthage” (1), but *Karthagine in secretario*, i.e., in the proconsul’s official residence on the Byrsa. And, although O. has read, understood, and absorbed what I have written about Tertullian’s relation to his historical milieu, none of his repeated discussions of the treatise *De Pallio* ever considers the implications of Georg Schöllgen’s proof that its conclusion (6.2) is comprehensible only on the hypothesis that the author possessed the legal status of an *eques Romanus*—a fact which gives greater precision to my presentation of Tertullian as a Christian Apuleius and a man whose social connections protected him from persecution.

T. D. BARNES
*University of Toronto*


From its inception until the Vandal conquest of Roman Africa, Donatism was able successively to reconstruct its world, and thus ensure its survival, as it moved from the status of persecuted minority to structured separatist movement, then to an internally divided community. It achieved this in large part by modifying its ways of interpreting Scripture. So argues Tilley in a volume which, though repetitive at times, is lucidly written and logically developed.

T. examines how Donatists employed the exegesis of Tertullian and Cyprian, and of pre-Donatist martyr stories, for their own purposes. Further evidence for Donatism’s self-identity lies in the biblical exegesis of its own martyr accounts and “literature of pastoral care” (77). As long as the movement viewed itself as the antithesis to both a hostile government and wayward Catholicism, its biblical interpretation could emphasize faithful Israel as its model; but dissension within the Donatist community itself called for new ecclesiologies to account for the presence of sinners within the Church. Finally, a shift in imperial policy and a change in ecclesiastical leadership, at the end of the fourth century and beginning of the fifth, further redirected the choices by Donatist exegetes of the biblical passages to employ if Donatism’s continued existence was to be validated.

Despite the occasional citation in Latin, T.’s book can be profitably read by most, since there is no presumption of a broad background knowledge. A projected wider readership may explain why, though a helpful summary or conclusion follows each chapter segment, the concluding chapter is little more than a brief review of the book’s method, contents, and earlier summations. Yet the volume will also profit scholars, for it takes a new and promising path by focusing on Donatists’ own exegesis to help clarify the movement’s identity.

J. KEVIN COYLE
*St. Paul University, Ottawa*


Bader argues that the Psalter is fundamentally mute and silent without the music that once was an integral part of it. Even in its present condition, it retains a memory and expectation of its former sound. The Psalter...
is the singable book of song, not a text to be read; the Psalms are the Psalter minus song. Today the Psalms without music are only a mute Psalter, and they are studied only for a "theology of the Psalms," which B. alleges to be unbiblical. On the other hand, the sung Psalter is no longer a biblical Word, but only the object of hymnology.

To develop the theology of the Psalter, B. undertakes a historical survey of the Prefaces to the Psalter, which began to be written in the fourth century and conclude with Luther's, the last important example of this genre. The fourth century stands out as the epoch of the theology of the Psalter of David. The outstanding characteristic of the Psalter is the medium (song), not the message. Psalms were viewed by the Church Fathers as hymnic theology. There is a need for future study in this area: the prefaces to the Psalter have not been the object of comprehensive monographs.

B.'s work is very important, difficult though it may be to appreciate fully. The Psalms are an instrument of worship from the past; the Psalter is a special kind of theology. In the Psalter the complete inner dialectic of music emerges into the "theodynamic" world of divine praise. This reviewer is more confident that the hymnic understanding of theology, not as a scientific discipline, but as a kind of heartfelt expression, will never disappear. Witness the popularity of the music of Hildegard of Bingen and Gregorian Chant, and the unending vitality of Protestant hymns. "Theology of the Psalter" will live as long as Psalmody and the Greek (patristic) tradition of "speech and song" remain with us.

MARGARET A. SCHATKIN
Boston College


Surveying the biblical theology of François Durrwell, the Thomistic systematics of Ghislain Lafont, Hans Urs von Balthasar's theological aesthetics, and Sebastian Moore's psychological appropriation of the story of Jesus, Hunt finds emerging a revolution in trinitarian theology. The traditional Augustinian-Thomist synthesis is ceding place or at least finding a complement in theologies which recognize the revelatory as well as redemptive character of the paschal mystery. From this perspective the single event of the cross and Resurrection becomes the enactment in time of the eternal perichoresis in which each of the divine persons exhibits concretely distinct characteristics and plays a vitally distinct role, so that relationality takes precedence over substance, and being and traditional divine attributes like immutability require reinterpretation in view of a fresh grasp of the divine reality as Ipsum Amare Subsistens. Thus grounded in its economic roots, trinitarian theology regains a soteriological context of cosmic scope.

For an explanation of the emergence of this trend H. turns to Robert Doran's expansion on Bernard Lonergan's articulation of theological foundations to suggest that each of the authors exhibits psychic conversion, while the movement as a whole heads toward a transposition of theology from the second stage of meaning, in which objective theory dominates, to a third stage in which human interiority provides the context for mediating the meaning of Christian revelation. While not the place where beginners in trinitarian theology ought to start, this book offers an interesting and valuable addition to the literature on the subject.

WILLIAM P. LOEWE
Catholic University of America


Using the hymn of Philippians 2:6-11 as his primary biblical warrant, Richard makes a persuasive case for a kenotic Christology. He begins with a cogent analysis of contemporary culture in North America and concludes with hortatory reflections on the Church as a communion of compas-
sionate love. In between, he offers readable and reasonable coverage of a range of topics such as the doctrines of Trinity and creation, the authentic humanity of Jesus Christ, and the mystery of suffering. Throughout, R. is utterly consistent in applying the hermeneutics of kenosis, i.e., God’s gracious self-emptying and voluntary self-limiting in Christ. Kenosis is the all-purpose lens through which he examines biblical testimony, patristic teaching, and select contemporary issues.

Two of R.’s long-standing interests in research are woven within the fabric of this book: the universal scope of salvation, and the theology of suffering. R. advocates an understanding of God “not as the cosmic clockmaker, not as the absolute monarch, but as the husbandman in the vineyard of the world” (150), attractively portraying God as the self-communicating agent of salvation in a created universe characterized by chance and evolution. With respect to the theology of suffering, R. sides with Moltmann and others who challenge traditional understandings of divine immutability and impassibility and predicate suffering as intrinsic to the being of God.

From his kenotic Christology, R. spawns a kenotic anthropology which affirms the interdependence and (what Marcel calls) the heterocentricity of human personhood. He also entices the reader with an outline of a kenotic pneumatology in which the Spirit is named as the “continuous self-emptying of God in creation and history” (113). Well researched and lucidly written, this book whets one’s appetite by demonstrating the theological versatility of kenosis, though the Christologist might hunger for a more sustained analysis of the particulars of God’s self-emptying in Christ.

PAUL E. RITT
St. John’s Sem., Brighton, Mass.


The teaching on “uncreated divine energies,” with roots in the writings of the Cappadocian Fathers and Pseudo-Dionysius, and systematically articulated by Gregory Palamas, is an attempt to safeguard the distinctions between creator and creature, between the inner life of the Trinity and the work of divinization, and between the ineffability of the divine and the reality of human mystical experience. In this edited version of his dissertation, Reid presents the theory of “uncreated energies” as articulated by two 20th-century Orthodox theologians, Georges Florovsky and Vladimir Lossky. In an attempt to create an ecumenical dialogue, he also presents the views of two representatives of Western Christian thought, Karl Barth and Karl Rahner.

While claiming that the Western approach regarding the Trinity and sanctification can make a contribution to the discussion, R. stresses mainly its inadequacies. He interprets Rahner’s teaching on the “economic” and “immanent” Trinity as in effect identifying the two concepts, and views Barth’s position as similar to Rahner’s. This “identity principle” regarding the Trinity “understands the divine modes of being primarily on the basis of their economic functions.” In contrast, R. claims that the Orthodox doctrine of energies “postulates a superessential doctrine of the Trinity, where the Trinitarian hypostases are regarded as fundamentally independent of economic functions or motifs” (67). R. considers the Rahner/Barth position as a step backward to the “economic, functional triadology” of the early Church, left behind long ago by Athanasius and the Cappadocians. He fails to take note, however, of the core Rahnerian teaching that the divine will always remain elusive mystery even in the Beatific Vision.

On the other hand, R. seems to be an apologist for the Orthodox position in providing what is a good introduction to contemporary Orthodox thought. However, there are no new
insights in response to the perennial question of how the doctrine of “uncreated energies” can be used at the same time to express both the unmediated presence of the divine to humans, and the ontological separate-ness of the divine essence.

SEELY BEGGIANI
Catholic University of America


The past decade has seen a rebirth of interest in the writings of Underhill, early-20th-century Anglican spiritual writer, retreat director, speaker, and spiritual mentor. For those just discovering this “spiritual guide to her generation,” Callahan offers a detailed introduction to her life and spiritual journey, a synthesis of her extensive study of mysticism, and a retrieval of themes appropriate for contemporary spirituality.

C. incorporates a wide range of works by and about Underhill among the sources, extensive notes, and suggested readings supplementing each chapter. Stylistically this occasionally makes the text weighty with references, but overall there is a clear development of each theme. Each chapter concludes with “suggestions for prayerful reflection” from Underhill’s works, as well as questions related to the text and chapter. These suggest a well-read audience who might use this book for personal growth as well as more academically oriented readers.

C. presents Underhill as offering significant spiritual direction for the next millennium, without avoiding her Edwardian-era shortcomings. In spite of her class background and the limitations of her social-analytical interests, Underhill believed that a connectedness with the poor was an essential element of authentic Christian spirituality. At the heart of her vision was a “practical spirituality,” one rooted in the Incarnation and ordinary life. Her valuing of human experience as the starting point of the spiritual quest clearly identifies her with 20th-century theological directions. Her love of nature connects her with contemporary ecospirituality. While some of her personal practices related to her own spiritual guidance today raise feminist concerns, her mentoring of others offered a holistic approach that is worth recovering. Overall, C. offers a convincing introduction to a woman whose life and works deserve continuing contemporary study.

JOY MILOS, C.S.J.
Gonzaga University, Spokane


Inchausti situates Merton within the stream of American intellectual history and attempts to assess his unique contribution to it. The opening chapters trace Merton’s own spiritual development, pointing out that he came to his mature vision in 1958 in his mid-forties (Merton had entered the Trappist monastery of Gethsemane in 1941 at the age of 27). His vision, emerging from his contemplative experience and resulting in the unitive consciousness of Being typical of mystics, occasioned his critique of American culture. To quote Merton, “The task of the solitary person and the hermit is to realize within himself . . . a universal consciousness and to contribute this . . . into the communal consciousness which is necessarily more involved in localized consciousness, and in such a way that there is a dialectical development toward a more universal consciousness” (90).

From 1958 to his untimely death in 1968, Merton’s prophetic voice emerged as he evaluated American cultural attitudes in light of his contemplative vision. I. laments the fact that Merton’s voice was silenced just at the time that many Americans, prompted by the assassinations, of Martin Luther, Jr., and Robert Kennedy, came to the realization that American civil religion with its democratic individualism was an inadequate foundation for our society be-
cause of its lack of ontological (religious) roots. I. sees Merton in 1968 as standing at the high point of American democratic individualism and prophetically challenging it from his unique religious perspective.

Among books about Merton, this is distinctive in presenting an introduction to Merton’s life and writings against the background of American intellectual history. I. thoroughly grasps the religious and contemplative dimensions of Merton and accurately presents this as Merton’s distinctive contribution. Though he may overgeneralize regarding American intellectual history, he offers not only a fresh perspective for understanding Merton but also a stimulating approach to American intellectual history. I believe Merton himself would be pleased with I.’s assessment of his contribution.

Richard J. Hauser, S.J.
Creighton University, Omaha


Dhavamony’s contribution brings inculturation to the center of theological discourse. In two introductory chapters on culture, enculturation, and acculturation, he constructs a solid anthropological base, making ample use of Geertz. He then moves on to a theology of culture, symbol, and language.

The centerpiece of the effort is the chapter “Theology of Inculturation,” previously published in Studia Missionaria in 1995. “Just as the Son of God assumed human nature in order to redeem it, so also the gospel has to become incarnate in culture in a vital and intimate way in order to transform it and save it” (94). Revelation, Christology, the paschal mystery, and eschatology are tightly but carefully interwoven with the inculturation process. “Inculturation is founded on the mystery of the redemptive incarnation” (96). That redemptive incarnation is continued through the presence of the Holy Spirit, “the agent of inculturation” (105). These themes are applied in chapters on the laity and inculturation and on missionary spirituality. The final essays present reflections on the Indian faith experience, dialogue with Asia’s cultures and religions, and a brief discussion of Asian Christian theology. While culturally insightful, the chapters betray an overly cautious ecclesiology and make no mention of current scholarship in comparative theology.

A few criticisms on presentation are necessary. Some of the material is dated. The gender-exclusive language and the number of editing lapses are glaring. Nonetheless, this is a significant contribution neatly summarized in a quote from the Asian Bishops: “True inculturation, far from being a tactic for the propagation of the faith, belongs to the very core of evangelization, for it is the continuation in time and space of the dialogue of salvation initiated by God and brought to a culmination when he uttered his Word in a very concrete historical situation” (176).

John P. Hogan
Washington, D.C.


In his fine introductory study of this important subject, Sittser observes that it has been customary for students of 20th-century culture to study American religion in the 1940s and overlook World War II, or to study the war and overlook religion. The thesis of his book is that American religion played a crucial if complex role in World War II, contributing in important ways to the war effort while being itself profoundly shaped by that conflict.

S. argues that, by and large, the American churches were neither blindly and fanatically patriotic nor aloof and pacifistic during the “last good war.” Rather, with the embarrassing memory of the role of American religion during the First World War (when many “preachers presented arms”) clearly in mind, most
American religious institutions opted for a “cautious patriotism”—a stance that enabled organized religion in the U.S. to rally its resources to support the Allied cause while maintaining biblical fidelity and spiritual integrity to loyalties that transcended tribal and nationalistic bonds. This cautious patriotism sought to “strike a balance between nationalism and internationalism, political realism and religious idealism, priestly concern and prophetic criticism. [It] wanted to walk the thin line between labeling totalitarianism as the absolute enemy and viewing war as the ultimate evil” (12-13).

S. offers a richly textured study of U.S. religion during the war, starting with the ideological debate between “neutralists,” pacifists, and interventionists at the end of the 1930s, through the much-debated role of military chaplains in the American armed forces, to the fervent but frustrated interdenominational efforts to build a more secure and just postwar social order. He likewise offers compelling glimpses of the “domestic war” fought by the churches between 1941 and 1945, focusing on the nascent civil-rights, ecumenical, evangelical movements that would emerge with full force in the decades after the war.

S. has deftly adumbrated a crucial but largely ignored field of study. As a ground-breaking study, it offers tantalizing but necessarily brief glimpses of a host of issues, figures, and movements that need further study. A must-read for students of American religious and cultural history.

Mark S. Massa, S.J.
Fordham University, New York


The chapters of this book read like letters from a journey reporting and reflecting on the peoples and events encountered on the road. The journey in this case is, of course, that of the Christian churches toward unity—an enterprise in which O’Gara has been involved ever since her graduate studies at Yale. The first chapter, “On the Road toward Unity,” sets the tone: cultivating new habits of the heart and the mind is the indispensable condition for progress. The last chapter, “A Guide for the Perplexed,” speaks about the ongoing tasks of the “pilgrims” concerning their Tradition: the tasks of recovery and transposition. Recovery is the repossession of those elements of the revelation which may have been less attended to or neglected yet helpful toward unity; transposition is the “playing” of the well-known themes in a new key. Biblical and historical research has done much for recovery; fresh hermeneutics inspired by the goal, unity, can lead to a deeper understanding of the long received truth.

In the body of the book two topics command attention. One is the stumbling block of infallibility: it is ultimately a manifestation of God’s fidelity to his people, who as a community are entrusted with keeping the evangelical doctrine intact. Another is “a certain, but imperfect communion”; it leads O. to reflect on how dissensions in the Church of Christ could give place to unity and how, through the conversion of all concerned, a community could emerge in which diversity is honored and promoted as essential for the health of the whole body.

This is a book on ecumenism from the inside of the movement. It is not technical, but it is well informed. Its content is a balanced blend of personal experience, historical knowledge (especially of the Vatican Councils), and sound doctrine—all marked by the conviction that God, who has called his people to undertake the journey, is powerful enough to bring them to the promised land, that is, to the Church of Christ, one, undivided, and rich in diversity.

Ladislas Orsy, S.J.
Georgetown University, D.C.


Fundamentalism in Islam, along
with female circumcision, have caught the imagination of readers in the West. Fundamentalism is a widely discussed topic in the media because the statements of some of its spokesmen and the dramatic acts of some of its adherents are stark and unambiguous. But apart from its made-for-television scenarios, it is still an elusive force that has become hard to capture and analyze from a distance. It is difficult to separate its reported actions from its overall thrust, whether religious, political, or both. Nor are there statistics on its adherents in different populations. Jansen tries to trace some of its historical roots by going back to the writings of Ibn Taymiyya and al-Afghâni of the 13th and 19th centuries, respectively. There are, for sure, other important figures in between and subsequent to these two, like Hasan al-Bannâ, the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood in the 1920s who played an important part in the movement. J.'s treatment is selective and brief, not a sustained historical analysis from the 13th century up to the present.

The major part of the study is devoted to the more current events of the 20th-century Middle East, and to the darkest aspects of this movement. It is to be pointed out, however, that this study quotes more original Arabic sources than studies that depend on secondary sources. One finds quotes from fatwas, but also from letters to editors and similar things. There are chapters in the book that are only marginally related to the theme of the book. Unless one were to grant that any mention of fundamentalism makes that document or doctrine such, then chapters 5 through 7 are not particularly focused on fundamentalism, but have to do with Islam as a system of beliefs and practices.

This is a book with an attitude. It refers to religious leaders as "functionaries." It concentrates on the negative aspect of one religion and on a specific movement within that religion. In addition, J. claims that he conducted oral interviews which he decided not to use, but actually he quotes his oral sources without attribution. The quotes are extremely stringent, e.g., that "Islam has always been a violent, half-fascist theocracy" (xiv). So, in effect, J. uses them unfairly, and their use early in the book sets the tone of the study and tarnishes its objectivity.

Solomon I. Sara, S.J.
Georgetown University, D.C.


In this searching and provocative inquiry, Ellis reflects upon the role of religious tradition in perpetuating the litany of suffering that so marks our time. His first chapter is devoted to an assessment of reformist Jewish theology that, in his perceptive extension of George Steiner's phrase, comes after both Auschwitz and the establishment of the state of Israel. In view of the differing perspectives of post-Holocaust theology espoused by Steiner, Elie Wiesel, Richard Rubenstein, Martin Buber, and others, E. questions whether a Jewish covenantal theology can be redeemed and whether such a renewed theology can redress the Palestinian suffering inflicted by the Israeli state.

The second chapter poses a similar question for Christians who must confront not only their complicity in the Shoah, but the religious warrants invoked in a legacy of intolerance, colonial conquest, and persecution of the "discontinuing other." Even the liberationist critiques of James Cone and Gustavo Gutiérrez finally fail to surmount the imperial tenor of the "universalist symbolism of the Christian message." In succeeding chapters, E. explores Walter Benjamin's dictum that the very foundational texts of our Judeo-Christian civilization are tainted with barbarism.

E.'s ethical deconstruction of hegemonic readings of our religious texts is richly documented and persuasively argued. If at times he paints with broad strokes in his depiction of Christianity, his questions nonetheless belie the bad conscience of any
theology that would drown the cries of victims in ceremonies of innocence. And here, perhaps, we face the limits of theological inquiry which, as Gutierrez reminds us, is always a second act. In response to the question of whether one can pray in the wake of the Shoah, Johann Baptist Metz affirms, “We can pray after Auschwitz because people prayed in Auschwitz.” In the midst of enduring atrocity and genocide, they still do.

William O’Neill, S.J.
Jesuit School of Theology, Berkeley


The most pressing issues facing bioethics today, from abortion to xenotransplantation, frequently hinge on the answer to the question raised by this title. For that reason alone, this volume should be required reading for students of bioethics. After a brief and somewhat hurried discussion of physicalism and personalism as the two prevailing answers, Walters offers his own view which he calls proximate personhood. The substance of W.’s position is that self-consciousness is a necessary and sufficient condition of personhood and that only beings with a personal life have intrinsic value. Unlike the personalist view, however, proximate personhood recognizes and values potential for, development toward, and bonding with personal life. Although similar to other views in the literature, the distinction W. draws among intellectual, developmental and social proximity to persons is an important contribution. For example, the National Institute of Health panel that made recommendations about federal funding for human-embryo research would have found valuable support for its position here.

Proximate personhood is a compromise between extreme positions, a compromise W. hopes will be consistent with commonsense views. This mediating spirit is evident in the chapters where W. applies proximate personhood to questions about animal rights and anencephalic infants. The comparison between organ donations from animals and donations from anencephalic infants is instructive because it highlights the fact that, although proximate personhood lies between physicalism and personalism, it is closer to the latter. Indeed, proximate personhood is clearly designed to correct the defects in a personalism that defines moral status solely in terms of self-consciousness and is thus incapable of objecting to practices like infanticide that almost everyone finds reprehensible. Whether a view that treats adult primates as more fully persons than anencephalic human infants is any less counterintuitive is debatable. But, as W. makes clear, this is a debate worth having.

Paul Lauritzen
John Carroll Univ., Cleveland


This carefully translated and edited collection of essays published by Metz over the past dozen years makes available to English readers material that further develops the concepts and themes in Faith in History and Society and his other writings. While these essays retain the decisively critical, provocatively suggestive, and often fragmentary qualities that led J. Colombo to characterize M.’s work as “a sort of theological guerrilla warfare,” they all together provide greater depth to his “new political theology” by means of prose that is often homiletic in its passionate apology for the biblical tradition and pathos for the suffering of others.

Time remains of the essence for M. The apocalyptic question of time, “What is God waiting for?” (58), is the focal point from which radiate the sharp, double-edged trajectories of his thought, cutting through the social and religious myths of late modernity and carving the finer details of the positive praxis engendered by a post-idealist “negative theology” (28).
Against a new "proreligious godlessness" excessively enamored with depth-psychology and seeking consolation in "myths and fables" (102), M. insists with greater vigor upon the theological imperative of faith's dangerous memory, the historically mediated narratives of suffering and salvation that Christian theology too early abandoned for Platonism's timeless, ahistorical version of anamnesis. He argues more rigorously for the "anamnestic rationality" available to theology in Israelite-biblical traditions, modeled in Jewish practices of prayer (including those of Jesus), and irreversibly demanded by the crisis of Auschwitz. In the process he critiques recent trinitarian theologies that locate suffering "in" God, finding in them too speculative and tidy a solution, worked out "behind the back of the human history of suffering" (69). M. thus continues to press apocalyptic "conjectures" (47) that strip theology of its hermeneutical comforts and interrupt the monotony, apathy, and individualism engendered by technology's instrumental reason and the market's principle of exchange. New to M.'s analysis of this evolutionary worldview is his greater attention to Nietzsche.

Of special interest to English readers will be the numerous places where M. discusses the relationship and discontinuities between the Continental, Anglo-Saxon, and North American contexts for doing political theology. New to M.'s analysis of this evolutionary worldview is his greater attention to Nietzsche.


Vickers here makes a worthy contribution to a small but growing scholarly conversation about the connections between economics and philosophical ethics. Impressively, he surveys a good deal of historical development concerning the unfortunate split between economics and moral theory; he outlines a moral method emphasizing "five dichotomies"; and finally he moves toward an application of theory to specific economic questions with moral import.

The five dichotomies (individuality and solidarity, deontology and consequentialism, entitlement and contribution, static and iterative ethical criteria, and immanentistic and transcendentalist perspectives) help to provide a framework by which to address ethical issues. This framework is brought into critical conversation with orthodox economic theory in as much as it focuses myopically on efficiency and relies on a metaphysics of autonomy, individualism, and self-interest, and presents a "tidily logical, quasi-mathematical, and self-contained system of thought, positivistic and sanitized from ethical encumbrances" (32). The application of the theoretical findings to specific economic questions of moral import centers around the need for income redistribution. The Rawlsian spirit of redistributionism is celebrated, while his strict egalitarianism is rejected in favor of a more moderate policy of minimum economic rights.

In my view, V. might have extended his conversation to include discussion of theological perspectives and contributions to the topic. This would have been warranted, given his interdisciplinary intentions and the many historical and contemporary contributions of religious theory and practice to the topic. The short book also surveys so much territory that one is frequently left wanting more explanation or support for various claims. However, it would be an excellent text for a course in ethics for participants who already have some acquaintance with economics.

RICHARD C. BAYER
Fordham University, New York


Four essays of this uneven translation articulately campaign to legalize assisted suicide (Küng, literary
Theo  legal  Studies

scholar  Jens,  and  lawyer  Eser)  or  qualifiably  support  German  decrimi-
nalization  (pediatrician  Niethammer).  An  "open  discussion"  among  the
four  focuses  on  the  justifiability  of  di-
rect,  active  help  in  dying  for  intoler-
able  terminal  suffering.  "[I]t  . . .
part  of  a  dignified  dying  for  people  to
be  able  to  decide  as  far  as  possible  the
time  and  manner  of  their  deaths?"
(23).  This  English  edition  concludes
with  a  postscript  in  which  K.  faults
Evangelium  vitae  for  succumbing  to
"the  trap  of  the  ideology  of  infallibil-
ity";  hence  K.'s  constructive  claims
are  presented  as  a  responsible  middle
way  between  papal  rigorism  and  lax-
ist  autonomism  for  a  post-Christian
audience  of  educated  Germans,  who
recognize  K.'s  interpretations  of  Kant,
Heidegger,  and  experiences  of
dying  but  have  only  an  embryonic
hospice  movement,  and  who  are  sur-
rounded  by  countries  which  tolerate
assisted  suicide  (Netherlands,  Swit-
zerland,  Finland,  and  Sweden).

Merely  dismissing  K.'s  gospel  of
probabilism  for  consensus  building
(about  limited  assisted  suicide)  in  a
liberal  polity  risks  overlooking  how
he  astutely  engages  classic  Catholic
claims  that  are  theological  (images  of
God,  Jesus  and  suffering),  anthropo-
logical  (responsible  decision  making
for  the  "whole"  of  life  includes  its  final
phase  and  belief  in  eternal  life),  and
social  (fears  about  inhumane  dying
are  widespread).  Yet  K.'s  inductive
method  with  universalist  appeals  to
(European)  experience,  theonomous
autonomy,  and  Tübingen  rights  dis-
course  will  strike  churlish  commu-
nitarians  as  accommodationist  and
physicians  as  bereft  of  clinical  data
about  better  pain  management.  Fo-
cusing  only  on  assisted  suicide  rather
than  the  art  of  dying  well  (as  in  K.'s
1982  Eternal  Life)  could  suicidally po-
larize  forthcoming  state-by-state  de-
bates  in  the  U.S.—which  currently
has  more  animal  shelters  (5000)  than
hospices  (3200),  though  we  have  less
than  half  as  many  dogs  and  cats  as
people.

William  Joseph  Buckley
Georgetown  University,  D.C.

The  Irony  of  Virtue:  Ethics  and

Lefever  describes  public  policies  de-
veloped  from  good  intentions  that  end
with  dire  consequences,  for,  as  Mi-
chael  Novak  puts  it,  "One  of  the  best
ways  to  create  an  immoral  foreign
policy  is  to  try  too  hard  for  a  moral
one"  (194).  L.  does  not  target  just  any
proponent  of  virtue;  William  Bennet
is  hardly  a  villain  in  this  anthology  of
40  essays.  Rather,  L.  takes  aim  at
those  who  lack  the  moral  courage  to
face  tough  decisions  and  tolerate  to-
talitarian  adversaries.  Likewise,  he
attacks  nonalignment  as  evidently
morally  and  politically  hypocritical.

While  acknowledging  that  his  theo-
logical  views  are  implicit,  he  evi-
dently  shares  the  theological  assump-
tions  that  grounded  Reinhold
Neibuhr's  worldview.  He  defines  him-
self  as  passing  through  three  stages
"from  a  pietist  pacificism  to  an  active
liberal  political  pacifist  stance  and
then  on  to  a  humane  realist  under-
standing  of  political  accountability.
To  put  it  another  way,  I  moved  from  a
rational  idealist  to  a  historical  realist
position  or  from  liberalism  to  neocon-
servatism"  (19).  These  are  crisp,  no-
holds-barred  writings  of  an  intelli-
gent  man  with  considerable  experi-
ence  and  conviction.

What  L.  lacks  is  what  one  expects
from  contemporary  proponents  of
theological  viewpoints:  a  critical  un-
derstanding  of  oneself  and  a  belief
that  inclusive  discourse  is  the  appro-
priate  method  of  theological  and po-
litical  development.  Instead  he  is  one
tough  bully  preacher  who  sees  the
world  as  a  white-and-black  Mani-
chean  universe  of  good  and  evil,  who
never  asks  why  one  should  equate
historical  realism  with  neoconserva-
tivism,  and  who  insists  on  identifying
himself  as  a  centrist  without  giving
the  listener  any  idea  of  what  the
"right"  would  look  like  with  such  po-
litical/theological  geography.  A  work
for  those  comfortable  with  such  view-
points.

James  F.  Keenan,  S.J.
Weston  Jesuit  School  of  Theology
BOOKS RECEIVED


Epstein offers an insightful description of a pernicious dynamic that plagues contemporary U.S. civic culture. The rationality of our public discourse is compromised by poorly designed and conducted social-science research on poverty and related social problems. Because of the absence of rational proofs of the causes of poverty and authoritative evidence about the efficacy of proposed remedies, the public-policy community is reduced either to silence or interminable dispute. All too often, the lack of adequate empirical support for any particular program of interventions allows partisan agendas and dominant cultural prejudices to dominate policy-making circles. Observers of recent rounds of welfare reform, immigration restrictions, and social-service cuts justified by spurious claims of the need to reassert the work ethic will appreciate E.'s description of how social science so easily becomes a tool abused in the interest of providing the cloak of rationality to misguided policies.

E.'s analysis will be most helpful to readers with extensive previous knowledge of the relevant policy debates, such as disputes over the effects upon welfare recipients' behavior of job training programs, work requirements, and other social-service policies. However, E.'s observations are not restricted to narrow technical matters. The originality of this volume lies in its clear articulation of the ways in which the contentiousness of debates over poverty research points beyond itself to such larger issues as the deep ambiguities latent in our shared political culture. Why do we as a people so consistently bracket our most dearly held values (social inclusiveness, neighborliness, egalitarianism) when we insist that social policy be determined solely by criteria of efficiency and rational-choice theory? Why do we shun more creative and generous approaches in the struggle to define the "good outcomes" targeted by policy? This book is critical of both liberals and conservatives for interpreting flawed social-science research in ways convenient in their partisan positions, which generally seek to avoid true structural reforms to benefit the poor. Religious social ethicists will find this a refreshing rejoinder to conventional wisdom about social policy.

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