BOOK REVIEWS


This informed and informative study is a compendium of data and analysis that sets Paul in the concrete context of the ancient Mediterranean understanding of human beings in order both to correct and complement our current readings and interpretations of New Testament literature, especially the letters of Paul and the image(s) of Paul that existed in earliest Christianity. Malina and Neyrey are well-known experts in NT studies who are devoted to the careful exposition of biblical texts, especially in relation to primary ancient literature, the methods and insights of contemporary cultural anthropology, and the perspectives of social-scientific research.

Paul, the early Christian worker and author of seven to thirteen documents in the canonical NT, serves as a model or test case for the rethinking of the present-day understanding of ancient personality. The authors eschew the task of recreating the historical Paul; rather, they focus on Paul's letters, the Acts of the Apostles, and The Acts of Paul to reexamine, reconstruct, and reinterpret three prominent portraits of Paul from earliest Christian writings. They engage in detailed rereading of selected portions of these writings in relation to and in the light of three prominent, pertinent types of ancient writings (and patterns of reflection) on the ancient person: the encomium, the public forensic defense speech, and physiognomic literature.

The encomium was a speech of praise that dealt with the established categories of the subject's origin and birth, nurture and training, accomplishments and deeds, and outstanding qualities in comparison with other well-known figures. M. and N. refer to writings by a host of ancient authors to build their case concerning the ancient view of "personality." In relation to ancient instructions concerning the composition of the encomium, they examine portions of Galatians, Philippians, and 2 Corinthians to show clearly that Paul knew and used this form to present himself as a typical member of society whose life had been touched dramatically by God. Paul reveals himself to be a "group-oriented person typical of collectivist cultures" who labored "for the group's well-being, integrity, solidarity, and health" (62). They argue that Paul's concepts of justice, righteousness, and even faith are to be viewed and understood in this matrix.

The public forensic defense speech of antiquity had five parts: exordium, statement of facts, proof, refutation, and peroration. The work examines each portion of such speeches in detail before turning to the speeches of Paul in Acts 22–26. Comparative analysis demonstrates that Paul's apologies and justifications in Acts "indicate a person who
enjoys doing what the in-group expects. In-groups refers to the collection of persons who share a common fate . . . [and] Paul's in-group . . . are those 'in Christ' to be found in various localized gatherings" (98–99). Thus, again one finds Paul (and his contemporaries) to be group-oriented and collectivist.

Moreover, ancient persons believed that function followed form, i.e., physical structure determined behavior and characteristics. The shape, hue, and structure of human beings were held to reveal the person's type and nature. Abundant physiognomic literature exists that documents and details this conviction, revealing extensive sets of stereotypes that informed the ancients in their appraisal of others. The authors survey this particular literature and then examine the person of Paul (description and character) in The Acts of Paul. The preserved description of Paul proves him to be an ideal male: in the collectivist knowledge of antiquity Paul was "masculine, fearless, pious, virtuous, truthful, benevolent, but above all, fit for public life" (148).

Further chapters examine the collectivist person in antiquity, the picture(s) of Paul as understood in that context. Two detailed appendixes list "progymnasmata and rhetorical treatises" used in the study and offer a comparative table of salient features that summarize the distinctions between "individualists and collectivists." The work includes a full bibliography, an index of Scripture and other ancient sources, an index of modern authors, and a subject index.

This work is a gold mine of information. It scores the point that modern readers of ancient writings, especially NT texts, are visitors in a foreign land and that a certain cross-cultural sophistication and sensitivity are necessary for true comprehension of what one encounters in these documents from another time and place. Moreover, M. and N. argue consistently and persuasively that the ancient mind revolved around categories of generation, geography, and gender. According to this study, Paul is not the person he is often perceived to be by later readers. He was a collectivist, not an individualist; he is to be viewed and interpreted in terms more appropriate to his age. This is not a book about the historical Paul, and it is crucial for readers to keep that in mind. It teaches about the ancients' views of their contemporaries which were stereotypical in ways far different from those common to today's individualistic understanding of persons. If read as it is intended to be, this book is an excellent resource; but if one misreads it as a book about the Paul of history one will go badly astray in attempting to comprehend the apostle. The picture of Paul that emerges in this presentation fits neatly into the ancient world, as one stereotyped human among the many. Yet after learning much important information about the authentically ancient view of human persons, one should be left wondering why this particular man, Paul, was so controversial and so adamant that the gospel he preached was God's own truth, often misunderstood by others.

*Louisville Presbyterian Theological Seminary  Marion L. Soards*
This substantial commentary by Brendan Byrne of the Jesuit Theological College in Melbourne takes its place alongside other recently published major commentaries on Romans by J. A. Fitzmyer (Double-day, 1993) and D. J. Moo (Eerdmans, 1996). But B. attempts a newer, more up-to-date approach by treating Romans as an “instrument of persuasion,” a literary-rhetorical document “designed to have a transforming effect upon its hearers” (8).

The Introduction explains B.’s rhetorical approach, beginning with the key distinction between the real, as opposed to the rhetorical or implied, author and audience. It includes discussions of the historical context of Paul and the Christians at Rome, of the literary form of Romans as an instrument of persuasion, and of the knowledge shared by Paul and his audience, so important for the rhetorical dynamics. The Introduction not only serves as an informative summary of the state of the research on Romans but also has relevance for the rest of Paul’s letters. The remainder of the commentary provides for each pericope a new and fresh translation, a more general “interpretation” section that situates the pericope in the overall rhetorical argument, and a section of “notes” for more specific details. Ample but not exhaustive bibliography is provided throughout.

This commentary certainly makes a significant advance in attempting to apply a literary-rhetorical approach to Romans. But this reviewer found the introduction more promising in that regard than the actual commentary, especially the “notes” sections. Although B. frequently discusses rhetorical points and emphasizes the importance of considering each pericope’s role in the overall rhetorical argument, he does not focus as much as he could on how the rhetoric is transforming the hearers. Much of the commentary (both “interpretation” and “notes”) provides the traditional exegetical information without discussing its rhetorical effect on the implied audience. Nevertheless, with regard to a rhetorical approach, B. has broken new ground which he and others can build on.

B.’s exegetical judgments are well balanced, reflecting the maturity of one who has devoted much time and effort to understanding Paul and his relevance for today. There are numerous references to Paul’s other letters and to extrabiblical literature. Especially interesting are the many parallels drawn between Romans and the Book of Wisdom. From time to time B. provides thoughtful reflections on problems of contemporary relevance, e.g. on homosexuality (Rom 1:26–27) and AIDS, on the danger of an anti-Jewish interpretation of 2:17–29, on 8:18–22 and the contemporary concern for the environment, on 13:1–7 and church-state relations.

On certain issues B. adopts a minority opinion. Noteworthy is his emphasis on an exclusively Gentile audience for Romans, rather than the majority view of a predominantly Gentile audience that includes
Jewish Christians (cf. Fitzmyer, Moo). He acknowledges the letter's "double address" to both Gentiles (11:13) and Jews (2:17), but explains this as part of Paul's rhetorical strategy "to convince the Gentile believers in Rome of the power and all-sufficiency of the Christian gospel, specifically in its inclusion of them within the community of the saved" (62). But the community of the saved includes the Jewish Christians in Rome. And as B. himself notes, the conclusion of Romans (16:3-16) indicates the presence of several Jewish Christians in Rome. It is hard to imagine that a letter that emphasizes the inclusivity, unity, and complementarity of Jew and Gentile in God's plan of salvation would not also be addressed to the Jewish Christians at Rome.

With regard to controversial items of interpretation B. opts for the objective genitive in the pistis Christou debate, that is, "faith in Christ" rather than "faith of Christ." He explains very well why the fleshly "I" sold into slavery under sin in 7:14-25 does not refer to Christian existence. He interprets the one who subjected creation to futility in 8:20 as Adam. Although he translates 10:4 "Christ is the (true) goal of the law" rather than "Christ is the termination of the law," he explains in the note that "the sense of 'termination' is implicit. The 'purpose' in question is a thoroughly negative one" (315). He provides a good explanation for the christological as opposed to theological basis for the salvation of all Israel in 11:26. Most convincing is his argument that the passage on duties toward governing authorities in 13:1-7 fits its context and is not an interpolation.

Many fine exegetical gems sparkle throughout the pages of this useful commentary. Anyone interested in a modern but traditionally grounded approach to and understanding of Romans will want to consult it.

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John Paul Heil


Achtemeier has written a typical Hermeneia commentary, a work of enormous detail, vast erudition, comprehensive scope, and judicious evaluation of previous scholarship. He begins by discussing the requisite introductory matters, such as the authorship of 1 Peter, its relationship to the Jesus tradition and the letters of Paul, its own thought world and historical situation, its date, and the like. He includes materials both on rhetorical and literary structure and a summary of the document's theology. There follows a very detailed commentary on each unit of thought, with remarkable engagement with contemporary scholarship. Typical of this series, at important points readers are invited into various excursuses on topics pertaining to the background or structure of materials under discussion, which would weigh down the exposition if included directly. The very completeness and thor-
oughness often provide a surfeit of exposition and argument, yet A. invariably aids us with convenient refocussing at the end of long disquisitions by coming to "the point" of it all. He closes with bibliography and, more importantly, with useful indices of passages, Greek words, and subjects.

This magisterial work by a senior scholar who brings a career of information and judgment to the task is both a significant and successful volume. Yet it may turn out to be not so much a work read by scholars for its own point of view or its sustained argument as a resource into which one dips and browses. In fact, it is a marvelous dictionary of materials about late first-century Christianity, truly significant for the resources gathered, the conversations reported, and the parallels noted on 1 Peter and its background.

A.'s viewpoint is that of a historian who invariably finds critical fault with most previous scholarship, and therefore is willing to remain unconvinced and skeptical, content to leave disputed questions open. This is both a virtue and a vice of the book. As a virtue, A. examines most previous proposals in detail and notes their weaknesses in regard to the claims made on their behalf, e.g., Was 1 Peter a "baptismal" liturgy or a recitation for a Christian passover? In general, he is much more successful as a leveler of scholarly constructs and a expositer of weak reasoning or inadequate data than as a proponent of new ideas. Thus most of the exposition has the form of trying on and discarding hypotheses; ultimately, one wonders what fresh contribution A. makes, if indeed such is expected in commentaries. Yet the virtue of rigorous historical scholarship often becomes a vice, because A. is better at tearing down than building up. Needless to say, this is a very critical commentary; it is littered with the debris of previous scholarship.

The cumulative effect of relentless and deserved criticism is an overall impression of 1 Peter as a rather generic exhortation. As regards sources for ideas and expressions, A. invariably concludes that this or that item belongs to the general tradition of Christian belief and praxis. One wonders what would happen if he were to catalogue all such traditions and examine the incredible collection that is known to this author. Here would be the opportunity to begin a significant reflection on the social location of the writer in terms of what he knows. Similarly, A. studiously avoids making judgments on the social situation of the audience, except to say that it is urged to take countercultural stands by virtue of its monotheism and possibly its sectarian separation from its neighbors. The exiles and sojourners mentioned in 1 Peter are for him not social groups truly without roots in the local ethnos or polis, but people who have been made social outcasts by Christian beliefs—a modest conclusion, at best.

Having criticized the commentary for its thoroughness, it may seem disingenuous to say that it lacks something. But some judicious appropriation of contemporary anthropology and sociology would at times
have given the volume greater clarity and sharper bite. For example, sections such as 3:13–17 describe occasions of public shaming of members of the group. It would have been useful to know how important reputation was in this world, what role honor challenges played, and what “reviling” and “ashamed” mean in terms of social status (the language of honor and shame thoroughly permeates the document, although A. seems unaware of this social and linguistic phenomenon). Although we are regularly told about Roman imperial policy, some mention of the nature of political religion would have aided the integration of detailed but scattered comments which have a direct impact on the social situation envisioned. Materials dealing with the binary opposition of purity and pollution, which are just as prevalent in the Hellenistic as in the Judean world, would give special significance to many elements of the exhortation. We mention such items because 1 Peter has been the object of intense interpretation from the point of view of culture and anthropology, to which A. makes an obligatory nod but which he ignores in his interpretation. This studied neglect greatly reduces the social impact of this document and weakens the sense of the social function it played.

As noted above, this is a magisterial work by a traditionally trained scholar who is at his prime. Thus one might argue over the interpretation of this or that point, but the commentary as a whole delivers what Hermeneia commentaries always provide: exhaustive, informed, critical reflections. I intend to return to this volume to consult it on select passages, but more to mine its wealth of background materials, access to which is conveniently provided by a detailed index.

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Jerome H. Neyrey, S.J.


Hays provides an important resource for moral theologians who seek to employ Scripture in their work. His book is an ambitious project and, in my view, one of the most significant works written on the moral teaching of the New Testament since the Second Vatican Council, which, in its Decree on the Training of Priests, urged that the scientific presentation of moral theology should draw “more fully on the teaching of Holy Scripture” (Optatam totius no. 17).

In addition to presenting the ethical dimensions of the NT in an engaging manner, H. synthesizes its teaching, evaluates the hermeneutical strategies of several contemporary scholars who employ Scripture in the service of ethics, and applies the moral teaching of Scripture to five contemporary issues.

NT ethics, according to H., must carefully and accurately describe what the text says (the descriptive task), synthesize this teaching
within a canonical context (the synthetic task), interpret its meaning (the hermeneutical task), and relate that meaning to the contemporary situation (the pragmatic task). Accordingly, in Part 1 H. provides a reliable description of the moral vision of the NT in light of its major witnesses. Although his presentation does not include all the writings of the NT, it provides readers with a solid grounding in its moral teaching. If there is a weakness in H.'s descriptive work, it is the brief treatment he accords the Deuteropauline tradition. He correctly views these writings as developments of the Pauline tradition, but in my view he tends to measure them against Paul rather than viewing them in their own right as responses to new situations.

Unlike most studies of NT ethics, this work does not begin with the moral teaching of the historical Jesus. In fact H. devotes only a few pages to the ethics of Jesus, and this after his treatment of the Gospels. While some will be disappointed in this summary discussion of Jesus' ethics, in my view H.'s procedure in this matter is correct and to be commended. The moral teaching of the NT is contained in its writings as canonically shaped rather than in a historical reconstruction of Jesus' teaching. Accordingly, H. emphasizes the role that narrative plays in moral discourse, not only in the Gospels but in the Pauline writings as well, since they presuppose a story of Jesus' faithful obedience.

Part 2, on the synthetic task, is brief, and here some readers will ask for more development, since the concepts H. presents are crucial for the remainder of his work. He proposes that the moral teaching of the NT can be synthesized by three "focal images" which have a textual basis in most NT writings: community, cross, and new creation. These focal images are remarkably similar to the categories H. employs in his organization of Paul's moral teaching, and this suggests to me that it is the writings of Paul that ultimately determine H.'s understanding of the NT's moral vision.

Love does not qualify as a focal image since it is absent from a number of NT writings. Accordingly it is subsumed under the focal image of the cross. While I agree that love should be related to the cross, I would argue that it plays a more prominent role than H. allows, since it is so central to the teaching of John and Paul.

After explaining these focal images, H. employs them in Part 3, where he examines the hermeneutical strategies of five theologians: Reinhold Niebuhr, Karl Barth, John Howard Yoder, Stanley Hauerwas, and Elisabeth Schüssler Fiorenza. While some may object that these figures are not representative, most will approve of the rigorous diagnostic questions H. applies to each of them. How accurate is their exegesis? How comprehensive is the range of texts they employ? What mode of appeal do they make to the text (rules, principles, paradigms, symbolic world)? What other sources of authority do they employ (tradition, reason, experience)? How would their moral vision be embodied in a community?
Having examined how others use Scripture, H. addresses five moral issues: violence in defense of justice, divorce and remarriage, homosexuality, anti-Judaism and ethnic conflict, and abortion. Although these are not the only important problems of our day, they are among the most contentious, and H. faces them with pastoral and ecclesial sensitivity. His views are refreshingly moderate and traditional, and he employs a methodology that others can follow with profit: a careful exegesis of the key texts; an evaluation of how these texts function within the canon; a hermeneutical discussion of the mode in which the texts speak, and how they are related to reason, tradition, and experience; and consideration of how the NT's witness might be applied today.

The task of employing Scripture in moral theology is an ongoing challenge for moral theologians. I can recommend no better place to begin than with this book.

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**FRANK J. MATERA**


This is an angry book by an author who appears to dislike almost everything about Augustine, particularly everything which flows from his Neoplatonic philosophical formation—his hierarchical worldview, his soul-body dualism, his ideal of an ordered universe, his promotion of the ascetic life, and his assumption that women are inferior to men. Power's understandable anger is generated by the effect these convictions have had on the Western Church. For most of us this is an old and tired anger, one worked through and put aside; the freshness of P.'s reaction to Augustine is startling.

P.'s research has clearly been extensive, and her knowledge of Augustine's writings is supplemented by her psychological training and her control of a good deal of recent feminist writing. She tries to be fair. She acknowledges that attitudes to gender and sexuality are culturally shaped, and that Augustine did not represent the most extreme anti-feminism of his age. She also recognizes that his personal relationships with women marked him deeply. But these and other excusatory assertions are so embedded in accusations that it often seems that what is given with one hand is taken back with the other. While P. is clear, e.g., that Augustine had shed the Manichean belief in a dual creation and the inherent evil of the flesh, she (correctly, I think) finds him unwilling to place any positive value on human sexuality.

There are, however, many instances in which P. is unfair to Augustine's text. E.g., she writes, "In *De Genesi ad litteram* Augustine denies that a man should recognize his need for a wife and receive her as precious" (103). In that treatise, Augustine is querying why all the animals were brought before Adam. Was it because God wanted Adam to recognize that there was no fit helpmate among them "and thereby
receive his wife as a most precious gift”? What is denied is not what P. alleges, but this as the reason for the animal parade. Going on to discuss the creation of Eve and refuting writers who say that she received her soul from Adam, Augustine argues that Scripture, because it does not say “soul of my soul” (which would have been “more tender”), is telling us that Eve’s soul was not made from Adam’s, but in the same way as his, directly from God. Augustine here asserts equal dignity in the creation of the two souls. But P. reads the hypothetical “more tender” as a denigration of marital sexual relations, with which the passage is not concerned, one way or another (105).

The question of the image of God in Augustine’s teaching is rightly given prominence. On the one hand, P. correctly points out that Augustine (unlike some patristic writers) affirms that women as well as men are made in the divine image. Women in the society Augustine knew were physically and socially subject to men, and he endorses this subservience, but he goes on to say unambiguously that Eve was created in such a way that “in the mind of her rational intelligence” she is “equal in nature” [to Adam] (Confessions 13.32).

On the other hand, P. says that for Augustine the image of God in women is not total. “According to Augustine, whatever is separated from God cannot be totally in God’s image, ‘for the image is only then an expression of God in the full sense, when no other nature lies between it and God’” (166). This reference is from On the Trinity where it sums up Augustine’s reason for rejecting the second of his psychological models. He writes that this trinity of memory, attention and will “is not the image of God for it is produced in the soul through the senses of the body, ... yet it is not altogether unlike God ... [N]ot everything in creation which is like God in some way or other is also to be called his image, but only that which he alone is higher than” (11.5.8, Hill translation). Only wisdom (tagged as masculine) fits this description and can contemplate God; it will always stand between God and the knowledge of temporalities (tagged as feminine). Therefore, P. concludes that, for Augustine, women cannot be totally in God’s image.

Here the thinking is less than rigorous. To label the higher part of the human mind “masculine” and the lower “feminine,” as Augustine frequently does, is unfortunate, to say the least, but one cannot go on from there to say that he denied wisdom to women, or, indeed, knowledge to men. The judgment expressed in On the Trinity concerns the inferior role of sense knowledge in Augustine’s epistemology, and has nothing to do with the image of God. P. has wrenched Augustine’s language of simile from one context and applied it mechanically and incorrectly in another. Her reasoning runs: (1) Augustine makes wisdom figuratively male, (2) and knowledge figuratively female; (3) only wisdom can contemplate and be in the image of God; (4) therefore women cannot be in the image of God. To say that Augustine makes the jump from (3) to (4) is to say that he saw his figures of speech as identical with created reality, and there is ample evidence that he did
not. On this basis (or, to my mind, any other) it cannot be said that he thought the image of God only partial in women. Augustine is the source of much that has been to the detriment of women in the Church, but nothing is put right by faulty argumentation.

**General Theological Seminary, N.Y.**  
**JOANNE McWILLIAM**


Leyser remembers learning “with fascinated horror” as an Oxford undergraduate that the 19th-century dons who “devised the Oxford syllabus” of history had left out, in Richard Southern’s words, “that which is most interesting in the past in order to concentrate on that which was practically and academically most serviceable” (ix). Such a syllabus found women and their concerns of little value. This book is the result of L.’s efforts to restore to the past what she finds “most interesting” about women’s roles and influence in medieval England. While the book makes no claim to original research, L. succeeds in her aims: to provide an introduction to recent interdisciplinary scholarship on medieval women’s history, and to present medieval women “on their own terms” apart from the androcentric assumptions of modern history.

Part 1 studies the Anglo-Saxons. In a fascinating chapter, L. looks to archeological evidence from burial sites for clues about the status and roles of women in Anglo-Saxon England. She documents the stories of the women depicted in Anglo-Saxon history and hagiography: the role of nun as well as queen as peacemaker, leaning as the preserve of women in the double monasteries, various interpretations of female “virginity.” She also studies the law codes of Aethelbert, Alfred and Cnut and the *Penitential* of Theodore, largely with respect to how marriage legislation affected women, and finally analyzes the portrayal of women in Anglo-Saxon literature.

Part 2 examines the significance of 1066 for women, beginning with a clever speculation about women as depicted in and as weavers of the Bayeaux tapestry which memorialized the Battle of Hastings; here L. considers the undocumented story about war’s effects upon women. Like several recent scholars, she challenges the generally held assumption that the conquest brought with it a drastic reduction in women’s rights: new circumstances simply demanded different roles for women which were not necessarily better or worse.

The High and Later Middle Ages are examined in the remainder of the book. Part 3 is devoted to family roles, examining sex, marriage, motherhood, women’s work, and widowhood. Part 4 treats of women’s contributions to culture and spirituality, discussing female monasticism, anchoresses, lay piety, and literature. Throughout these sections, L. handles an immense amount of material admirably, creating a gen-
eral impression of women in medieval society with enough specific
detail to keep her narrative authentic and interesting.

The book ends with a grouping of nicely chosen, meaty extracts from
primary sources, designed to complement each chapter, and a useful
bibliography arranged according to chapter headings. Seventeen won­
derful illustrations from medieval art, obviously chosen for their comic
worth as well as their utility for enhancing content, accompany the
written text. These counterpoint L.'s delightful sense of humor which
she interjects into appropriate places in her narrative.

The book's content and design are well suited for the general and
student readership at which it is aimed. More sophisticated scholars
would look for more, particularly with respect to bibliographical cita­
tions. Unfortunately, the book is marred by frequent and irritating
grammatical and spelling errors. This embarrassment, along with the
price, would prevent me, at least, from considering the book for class­
room use.

An appealing feature of L.'s presentation is her moderate, open­
minded stance with respect to controversial issues. She presents sev­
eral sides to an issue, challenging unexamined assumptions, but al­
lowing readers to come to their own conclusions. Her respect for the
vagaries and uncertainties of historical scholarship is evident through­
out, as is her empathy for the women she studies. In short, L. succeeds
in providing the nonspecialist with a general, up-to-date introduction
to the most recent scholarship on medieval English women with useful
directions for further reading and research.

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THE POWERS OF THE HOLY: RELIGION, POLITICS, AND GENDER IN LATE
MEDIEVAL ENGLISH CULTURE. By David Aers and Lynn Staley. Univer­
sity Park, Penn.: Pennsylvania State University, 1996. Pp 310. $45;
$19.95.

The subject of this book is the humanity of Christ, its manipulation
by the Church, and the political implications of this for the structures
of power and authority in late medieval English society.

While the title suggests a broad study, the authors' historiographical
purpose is specific. They desire to demonstrate on the evidence of ver­
cacular writings (particularly by John Wycliffe, Langland, Julian of
Norwich, and Chaucer) that during the late 14th and early 15th cen­
turies, the image of the suffering Christ, of the tortured, lacerated body
on the cross, was superseded in emphasis by the image of the polit­
cally active Christ, the consummately radical social reformer, a mar­
ginalized man, bent upon subverting the structures of oppressive au­
thority in the interests of justice and freedom.

The late medieval English Church, Aers and Staley argue, had
ceased to be true to Christ and to his gospel of reform. The aim of
churchmen was not to protect the integrity of Catholic orthodoxy but to
secure the hierarchical status quo. To this end, and to avert opposition, their argument goes, the clergy concocted a “dominant mode” (76) of Christ’s humanity to ensure that lay piety and devotional expression would be shaped by the figure of Christ the crucified, pacific, obedient, and suffering Servant. That the Church failed, however, to achieve completely its agenda of repression is the principal contention of this study.

A. and S. are committed deconstructionists, applying a hermeneutic method of linguistic analysis to decipher what they believe was a coded language of resistance to entrenched ecclesiastical authority and to symbol of that authority in the crucified humanity of Christ. Thus in Piers Plowman A. discerns a Christ presented in terms of his “mission, message, and lifestyle”; this, he contends, is evident mutatis mutandis in the “verbal, active and public” (63) Christ of Lollardy, the imitation of whom demanded vernacular preaching, organized communal study, worship, and reading of the Bible. While A. distorts the nature of the tension and evinces a skewed understanding of the broadly based relationships of late medieval society when he speaks of “transgressing officially policed boundaries between laity and priests” (ibid.), his findings are not without interest. Clearly, there were various ways of thinking about Christ’s humanity and of expressing devotion to it, and A. and S. may well be correct to claim that in some contexts, vernacular writing on the nature of Christ was viewed with misgivings by the ecclesiastical authorities. To conclude from this, however, that the Church was homogeneous and resistant to reform, insisting stubbornly upon a single mode of imitatio Christi which excluded, as is implied here, broad ethical and moral obligations, is untenable.

Much attention is devoted to Julian of Norwich’s Book of Showings. In a close analysis of the Paris version of the Long Text, S. constructs a plausible, if not altogether convincing, case for a subtext in which was hidden Julian’s expression, on her own authority, of a “complicated truth” (109). What were the factors that prompted or, more accurately, necessitated recourse to such a literary subterfuge? Again, the demon is established authority. S. argues, probably correctly, albeit on flimsy evidence, that Julian was not out of touch with contemporary events and was alive to the fact that they afforded neither a safe nor encouraging environment for idiosyncratic reflections, especially of a theological nature. Out of a combination of fear and devotion, therefore, and with an eye on Wycliffe and other critics, she undertook, according to S., a creative process of “fictional self-fashioning,” inventing “a mode of vernacular expression that would communicate the complexity of her own inner experience” (ibid.) without appearing to embrace heterodoxy. Through the filter of this consciously crafted textual persona, she was able to use her contemplative experience as “a screen . . . to explore alternatives to contemporary views about subjectivity, about sin, and about the divine nature” (ibid.). But, Julian’s theological project was fostered by more than personal insights. S.’s
deconstruction of Revelation 14 reveals that beneath the professions of simplicity and unsophistication in letters lurked a determined polemicist; S. declares that Julian was "profoundly polemical" (110).

There is no doubt in S.'s mind that Julian's polemic was uncommonly subtle, a skillfully crafted hermeneutic devised over the course of 20 years, and throwing open to criticism matters pertaining to theology, epistemology, exegesis, and the contemporary hierarchical structure of authority and gender. The absence of any suggestion of heterodoxy was essential to her polemical strategy. For if Julian was to give an authoritative expression of the truth which she had come to know as "the result of subjective inquiry into her own experience," and if she was to resolve "the tension between her interior knowledge of God and the church's teachings about him," it was crucial to appear "pristinely orthodox" (164).

Adherents of Derrida and Foucault, to mention only a few of the postmodernist names that are dropped throughout this study, will find this book engaging. So, too, will students of so-called cultural history. And, indeed, A. and S. say much that is interesting and insightful about the political consciousness of some of the late medieval English mystics and vernacular writers. In the final analysis, however, much of their discussion is undermined by a rhetoric of axe grinding. Their central thesis concerning the repressive agenda of the medieval Catholic Church is not new; and it is a thesis which is notoriously difficult to substantiate, leading even the most cautious into injudicious overstatement and unacceptable selectivity in the use of documents. A. and S. are convinced of the validity of their position, but conviction is no substitute for evidence.

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Penny J. Cole


In 1973 Ernest Becker challenged what he perceived as a trend within Western (consumer) society which attempted to deny the existence of death. In his Denial of Death he argued that people had insulated themselves against the reality of death, and thus caused deeper emotional psychological problems. In the last 25 years, historians and sociologists certainly have not denied death, at least in their research; many have investigated the rituals, art, and community response which surround the event of death. The representations of death continue to fascinate, and Binski here supplies a significant "essay" on the visual representation of death in the medieval period.

Perhaps one of B.'s most important contributions is his clear explanation of the radical difference between the Christian relationship to the dead and that of the Greco-Roman society from which Christianity sprang. Whereas Roman law legislated extramural burial, Christians embraced the dead, especially bodies of the saints, brought them into
churches and placed them under the altars, at the very center of worship.

This relationship between the dead “body” and the body social is an important theme in B.’s work. Utilizing the categories of transition described by Arnold Van Gennep and the issues raised by Mary Douglas regarding “purity,” B. describes the various roles and functions used by society to reintegrate the body into the community. The presence of the dead body (though not all dead bodies) within the body of society was important. Bodies of saints had power, and their body parts encased in reliquaries assured a community of patronal intercession. Kings and queens took on the role of saints (some actually were) and willed their body parts to be divided within their kingdoms. A king’s heart or a martyr’s finger were provided with casings, often exquisite works of art which extended the “body” of the deceased and enabled the pious to touch tombs or reliquaries and, by extension, the body part itself. Thus, as B. rightly argues, tombs and reliquaries must not be considered just works of art to be viewed; rather they provided thurmaturgic opportunities for the living to discourse tangibly with the dead. This relationship was not limited to saints or royals, since the less distinguished preferred their tombs within churches in order to encourage the relationship between their souls and the living.

No study of medieval death would be complete without some recognition of what is commonly referred to as the macabre, the representation of a dead body as a worm-eaten corpse. Some authors have identified the cause of the phenomenon as a reaction to the transitus mundi, a sentiment identified among those who survived the mid-14th-century plagues. But B. effectively argues that this visualization was part of a “gothic realism” evident during the 12th and 13th centuries, a period which Philip Aries characterized as embracing the less gruesome or “tame death.” Here again the representation of the worm-eaten corpse, whether in manuscript or sculpture, was part of a dialogue between the living and the dead, and therefore cannot be viewed merely as grotesque illustration. The macabre, as B. describes, reintroduced the dead body in all its realism into the society and thus fulfilled the medieval artists’ goal of “making real” what is hidden.

This work could have been improved if B. had used more material on confraternities. Much research has been done in the area of confraternity life, and the passing reference to the work of James Banker only hints at the complex role confraternities played in resocializing the dead into society. Confraternities commissioned works of art which played an important role in reconnecting the dead members with the living. Use of these examples would have strengthened B.’s argument that representations of death and dying were not viewed for their own sake but were the means by which integration occurred.

B. provides a superior introduction to a very complex field of studies.

University of Minnesota

MICHAEL W. MAHER, S.J.

To understand the issues that Ohst examines in this fine Habilitationsschrift from the University of Göttingen, readers should note that the book begins and ends, not with the Middle Ages, but with the Protestant Reformation. O. focuses attention on canon 21, "Omnis utriusque sexus," of the Fourth Lateran Council in 1215, which enjoined annual confession and communion on each Christian. This obligatory confession became a central element in medieval sacramental penance, a command that Luther later rejected as a human innovation perverting the Gospel's consolation into the Law's tyranny.

O. first discusses the prehistory and establishment of the canon "omnis utriusque." To the question whether any general custom or obligation of periodic penance existed before 1215, he provides a balanced answer: the sources do not demonstrate any universally applicable command to periodic confession prior to "omnis utriusque." Among the canon's specific innovations were the commands to confess to one's own priest and to publish the document in churches, which placed the burden for undertaking penance on the individual Christian. At the same time, however, the canon had a clearly identifiable background in attempts, especially by emerging mendicant orders, to spur lay Christians to the regular confession already common for monks.

O. also examines the command to confess within the development of the sacrament of confession itself. He reminds us that it is impossible to understand that command without also understanding the practical situation of confessing and especially the theological developments of the 12th and 13th centuries. He concludes that the demand for yearly confession had less to do with some form of "social control" (as skillfully argued by Thomas Tentler) than with genuine concern for the health of Christian souls which consciously or unconsciously lay in danger of damnation through mortal sin. He believes that the "seal of confession" enjoined upon the priest prevented the sacrament from being a useful tool of control. O. treats these concerns as mutually exclusive, however, when in fact they could easily coincide. The seal of confession might preclude external forms of social control, but O. pays little attention to the psychological dimension of the penitential process. Of course, the seal of confession was itself not foolproof. In the late 15th and early 16th centuries, ecclesiastics and reformers noted that unscrupulous or negligent clerics could and did circumvent the seal of confession.

In Part 2, O. concludes that the obligation to confess played at best a marginal role in the struggle against heresy. His overall discussion of the question of confession among Cathars and Waldensians, as well as the orthodox Church's struggle against them, comprises the most illuminating section of the book. Most general histories of confession and penance have concentrated on the mainstream. But O. sets heretical
theologies within the general framework of the medieval Church's penitential process, seeing the Cathars and the Waldensians as opposite extremes between which orthodox theology and praxis steered a middle course.

The last quarter of the book concentrates on the *Summa Angelica* of Angelus de Clavasio, a 15th-century manual for confessors significant not only for its wide popularity but also because Luther and Melanchthon signaled it out for special criticism and included it among the books burned in a Wittenberg bonfire in December 1520. O. tries to bring all the different strands of his work together in investigating the *Summa Angelica*, using the printed Strasbourg edition of 1513. He concentrates on this single work in order to provide a deep reading of an important text, and he criticizes the now-standard work of Thomas Tentler for being "superficial" in treating the issues of sin, forgiveness, and law—an unfair criticism, since Tentler's wide-ranging work provides the broad basis and themes for any specific discussion of late medieval confession. Nevertheless, O.'s concentration allows him to explore the complexities of late medieval confession with unprecedented depth.

About the *Summa Angelica* and pre-Reformation confession generally, O. argues for a model of cooperation between confessor and penitent. Even so, this model contained much potential for spiritual unrest (as Luther himself experienced) in its ambiguous discussion of the minimum qualifications for forgiveness. Furthermore, the *Summa Angelica*′s preoccupation with sins rather than with sinfulness meant that late medieval theology dealt with the "periphery" rather than the "center" of the problem of human sinfulness. "Actual sins" and "good works" were only indications or symptoms of the central problem of sinfulness and guilt which Luther sought to address.

O.'s discussion is thorough and solid, and the material he presents will serve scholars well. On the other hand, he views medieval developments too much through the lens of the Protestant Reformation, which resolved the problems that medieval theology could not successfully address. Readers who bear this fact in mind will find O.'s book rewarding and revealing.

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DAVID MYERS


Karl Marx saw the French Revolution as the victory of one economic class over another, the victory of the bourgeoisie over the aristocracy. For most of the 20th century Marxist and other economic interpretations have dominated the historiography of the Revolution that put an end to Old Regime France. In recent years, however, other approaches have gained the ascendancy, among them the political and cultural
interpretations offered by Roger Chartier. Van Kley’s fascinating work on the religious origins of the Revolution now poses an even greater challenge to a purely economic hermeneutic of what many have considered the greatest event in modern European history.

V. seeks to show how religious, even theological, controversies in pre-Revolutionary France laid foundations for the discourse and deeds of the French National Assembly that would proclaim itself sovereign after 1789. His main focus, however, is on controversies that divided Jansenists and constitutionalists on the one hand, from Jesuits and absolutists on the other. Constitutionalists, echoing Calvin’s suspicion of any “majesty” but God’s majesty alone, upheld the rights of the individual’s conscience and the need to restrain papal and/or royal authority through legal statutes and traditions, and through corporate institutions, such as councils of bishops, parlements, and the Estates General. Absolutists, invoking divine-right theories, lauded “blind obedience” to pope and king. V. demonstrates convincingly that Revolutionary discourse drew many of its ideas from Jansenist constitutionalism. He also shows how what began as conflict between two theologies of grace, Jansenist and Jesuit, evolved first into a clash of two ecclesiologies, Gallican/conciliarist and Ultramontanist, and finally into a very public debate on two political theories, constitutionalist and absolutist. These conflicts undermined the legitimacy and credibility of the Old Regime church and state. It is to V.’s credit that he also acknowledges an absolutist side to the Revolution, especially in the Terror of 1793–94.

Opposition to Clement XI’s Unigenitus is the principal theme of this book. The 1713 papal bull, a condemnation of 101 Jansenist propositions, was given the force of state law in France. V. terms the 18th century the century of Unigenitus, and 18th-century Jansenism a “critical commentary” on absolutism (72); an anti-absolutist agenda was “galvanized” by efforts to enforce the bull. As the monarchy and its absolutist allies applied coercive measures (such as refusal of sacraments) to compel acceptance of Unigenitus, Jansenist resistance grew ever stronger. Though the monarchy succeeded in removing most of the bishops and other clergy unwilling to accept Unigenitus, Jansenism more than made up for this loss with greater lay support, especially in the judicial milieu of the parlements. From this very milieu would emerge the Revolution’s idea of locating national sovereignty in a legislature representing the people.

Some weaknesses should be noted. The subtitle is rather misleading, for at least 80% of the text is concerned with the years after the publication of Unigenitus. V.’s dichotomy between absolutists-Ultramontanists-Jesuits, and constitutionalists-Gallicans-Jansenists, is, if the term may be used, too absolute. Simple classification of “blind obedience” with Jesuits and individual conscience with Jansenists illustrates the problem. Had V. paid more attention to the 17th century, and especially to Pascal’s Provincial Letters, he would have found Pas-
cal, that most eloquent of Jansenist spokespersons, condemning Jesu­
its for allowing too much freedom to individual conscience! Had V. paid
close attention to the Jesuit Constitutions, he would have found those
who govern the Society of Jesus obliged to take seriously the individual
consciences of those under their authority. Moreover, most histories of
Jansenism emphasize prominent roles played by women. V. gives sur­
prisingly little attention to Jansenist women or to any gender issues.
Why not? Is it because the most prominent women associated with
Jansenism, such as Angélique Arnauld, lived in the 17th century?
These reservations should not obscure the fact that this is a very
important study, perhaps a seminal work for further examination of
the religious origins of the French Revolution. Such examination will
be most fruitful when it approaches history as a longue durée and
delves more deeply and broadly into religious diversity and contro­
versy in pre-Revolutionary France.

College of the Holy Cross, Mass.          THOMAS WORCESTER, S.J.

RELIGION AND NATURAL THEOLOGY. By Immanuel Kant. Translated
and edited by Allen W. Wood and George Di Giovanni. Cambridge

Six of the projected fourteen volumes of the Cambridge Edition of the
Works of Immanuel Kant, under the general editorship of Allen W.
Wood and Paul Guyer, are now in print. When complete, this edition
will comprise not only all the works Kant published in his lifetime in
new (or, in some cases, newly revised) translations, but also an exten­
sive selection of important writings (such as the Opus postumum, lec­
ture transcriptions, correspondence, notes and marginalia) for the
most part previously unavailable in English translation. The overall
project, which has enlisted many able scholars as translators and edi­
torial consultants, signals the state of full maturity which English-
language Kant scholarship has now attained.

The volume under review contains Kant’s published writing on re­
ligion from the mid 1780s until the end of his life: the essays on ori­
entation in thinking ((1786), on theodicy (1791), and on chiliasm
(1794), The Conflict of the Faculties (1798), the brief, previously un­
translated preface Kant wrote for his student Jachmann’s Examina­
tion of the Kantian Philosophy of Religion (1800), and most notably a
new translation by Di Giovanni of Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der
bloßen Vernunft (1793); also included is Wood’s translation of student
transcriptions of Kant’s lectures on philosophy of religion which most
likely date from 1783–84. While there are obviously other parts of
Kant’s writings which are important for placing his accounts of religion
and theology within the context of his overall philosophical project as
it developed in the course of his career, the collection of these particu­
lar texts in a single volume makes it possible to examine the often
complex contours of his most mature views on these matters. As recent scholarship has noted, such an examination can yield surprising results when set over against what is often taken as his definitive judgment on theological inquiry, viz., the criticism of speculative proofs of the existence of God articulated in the Transcendental Dialectic of the Critique of Pure Reason.

In their preface the general editors enumerate five general principles which individual translators were asked to follow for the purpose of “freeing readers from the philosophical and literary presuppositions of previous generations and allowing them to approach texts, as far as possible with the same directness as present-day readers of the German or Latin originals” (viii). Readers familiar with previous translations will most readily notice the impact of two of these principles: one encourages “a high degree of terminological consistency, especially for Kant’s technical terms” by the use of a single general glossary; the other “preserve[s] Kant’s own division into sentences and paragraphs wherever possible” (viii). With respect to the application of first principle, Di Giovanni provides, in his “Translator’s Introduction” to Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der bloßen Vernunft, a helpful account of the decisions he made in translating some key terms, including its title and the sometimes vexatious distinction between Wille and Willkür. In the first instance, he renders the title as Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason rather than the more familiar Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone of the Greene and Hudson translation; in the second, he translates Wille as “will” and Willkür as “power of choice,” a decision which seems to capture the force of Kant’s use of these terms in his account of the formation of a human agent’s fundamental moral disposition. With regard to the second principle, its application can add further tangles to the reading of texts well known for their conceptual density; at the same time, it does mean that the tangles one finds are more likely to be ones which Kant himself left for unravelling.

The introductory material and editorial notes for each of the texts seem also to be shaped by an intent to leave major matters of philosophical interpretation as much as possible in the hands of the reader. Thus they principally focus on details of the historical context in which Kant wrote and published each text; particularly thorough coverage is given to the dispute between Kant and the Prussian authorities occasioned by the publication of Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason.

In an enterprise of the scope of this series, there are almost inevitably matters of detail about which questions can be raised (e.g., Does ethical “community” capture the public and social dimension of the way Kant uses gemeines Wesen in Book III of Religion quite as well as Greene and Hudson’s ethical “commonwealth”? and errors do creep in, such as the unfortunate typo, “the germ of the god which lies in our species” rather than “the germ of the good which lies in our species” (101). These nonetheless do not detract from the overall worth of this
volume which, like the other texts in this series, will become a major resource for serious study of Kant by philosophers and theologians in the English-speaking world.

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*Philip J. Rossi, S.J.*


Harvey here examines Feuerbach's works on religion, focusing especially upon *The Essence of Christianity* and *Lectures on the Essence of Religion.* His book represents an expanded version of an argument which H. had outlined previously, namely that Feuerbach's later theory of religion is marked by a decisive shift away from and is somewhat more successful than that presented in the earlier, more famous work. H. has three aims: to "correct and reinterpret" (18) the prevailing view of Feuerbach through a careful reading of his major statements on the roots of religious belief; to retrieve what is valid in Feuerbach's theories for the modern conversation on religion by providing a "rational reconstruction" of his thought; and to argue that Feuerbach has a rightful place among those critics of religion noted by Ricoeur as the "master of suspicion" (Marx, Nietzsche, Freud), and indeed that he has "a far more complex interpretation of religion" than any of them (13).

The opening chapters offer a close reading of *The Essence of Christianity* and its basic premise that "the superhuman deities of religion are, in fact, involuntary projections of the essential attributes of human nature" (25). Here Feuerbach aimed to show three things: that divine attributes are really the alienated perfections of the human species projected into reified divine objects; that subsequent theological objectifications of these attributes lead to all sorts of absurd metaphysical claims; and that the true goal of Christianity is the renunciation of God for the purpose of humanity's well-being (the atheism which is reflected in the divine kenosis of the Incarnation, according to Feuerbach). H.'s careful analysis reveals how complex the theory of projection is: not only does it rely on Hegel's schema of objectification-alienation-reappropriation, but on Feuerbach's application of the "transformative method" to this schema (inverting the direction of Hegel's abstract absolutes in order to root them back within human subjectivity), on non-Hegelian elements such as the role played by imagination and feeling (e.g. the human desire for love and recognition by a "Thou"), and on what H. terms the "felicity principle," namely that "the principal aim of religion is to secure the welfare or felicity of humanity in general and the self in particular" (69).

After documenting Feuerbach's development of a more materialist philosophy in response to criticisms from fellow Young Hegelians, H. takes up the topic of Feuerbach's new "bi-polar model of religion" and the more negative counter-interpretation of religion offered in both the
aphoristic *Das Wesen der Religion* (1846) and the 1848 *Lectures*. In these works Feuerbach made the “naturalist-existentialist” approach primary whereas earlier it had been a secondary concern. He dropped the Hegelian elements and the emphasis on consciousness in favor of a theory which saw religious belief rooted in two poles, “a contingent self confronted with an all-encompassing nature” (162), a relationship which provokes in human beings both the fear of death and the drive-to-happiness. Feuerbach consequently reevaluated the character of “projection”; it was no longer considered a necessary unconscious process fueled by species attributes, but rather as the imagination’s mistaken unification and personification of attributes from nature into an ultimate personal subject. In H.’s view, all this makes for a more successful and coherent argument. The final chapters bring Feuerbach’s theories into conversation with some recent projection theories (characterized as either “beam”- or “grid”-type theories) and anthropologically based theories of religion.

Though somewhat repetitive in style, this book should be required reading for all who deal with the theology of God or the history of theism in Western culture, and particularly for those whose knowledge of Feuerbach is limited to textbook reductions of his work to *The Essence of Christianity* and to a simplified presentation of the projection theory. H. succeeds in clarifying Feuerbach’s positions and in arguing that Feuerbach was a “master of suspicion” in his own right and not simply a precursor of Marx or Nietzsche.

One slight problem is that the “rational reconstruction” never makes clear precisely why the Hegelian dialectical schema should be considered “outdated foolishness” (19). I detect three more serious problems as well. First, H. situates Feuerbach’s thought mainly within its 19th-century Hegelian context, whereas a “thicker” description of the modern religious and cultural situation is called for. The extrinsicist notion of God, which late medieval nominalism asserted and which developed during modernity into what Kasper has called “the heresy of Christian theism,” is the “God” who is both inherited and resisted by Feuerbach; this background needs examination. Feuerbach’s roots in Protestantism are an issue as well, but are mostly passed over here. Second, the “modern conversation” into which Feuerbach is inserted seems a bit dated (the majority of references are to works of the 1960s and 1970s). Postmodern philosophies and the recent dominance of the Nietzschean genealogical strains of suspicion have changed the playing field and must be addressed to some extent if any retrieval of Feuerbach is to be successful.

Lastly, as is usual for works of this type, the conversation partners are from Protestant theology or religious studies; there is no engagement with Catholic theology to speak of. This conversation would have been fuller and more varied if a work such as M. Xhaufflaire’s *Feuerbach et la théologie de la sécularisation* (1970) had been consulted. Of course, the fault in this latter case can be pinned on Catholic theolo-
giants too. How many are willing to walk through the "fiery brook" before reading, say, Rahner's *Foundations*? H. will show them how high the stakes are, and why they should not put off the encounter.

**Villanova University, Pennsylvania**

**ANTHONY J. GODZIEBA**


Prickett, Regius Professor of English at the University of Glasgow, began as a critic of Romantic English poetry. But in *Romanticism and Religion* he shifted his focus to the Victorian Church, exploring some of the ways in which Coleridge, Wordsworth, and their intellectual posterity sought for "the possibility of unity between philosophy, theology, and aesthetics" (2). This issue became P.'s central concern, and in *Words and the Word* he returned to the problem, invoking, as he does again in the book under review, Humbolt's decision in 1809 to separate theology from the study of the humanities at the new University of Berlin. For P., this is the moment when modernity bit the apple, creating an unbridgeable gap between "biblical studies and the study of other literatures" (1), and his aim has been to reconnect the two through a study of the relationship between poetry and religious language.

The present volume is a part of this ongoing project. The title could be misleading. P. is not interested in how Romantic writers used the Bible in their invention of narrative forms, nor is he interested in the Romantic appropriation of biblical materials. His actual subjects are how the reading and interpretation of the Bible helped to form Romantic literary theory, and how the concept of the Bible's nature, and the way the Bible should be read, shifted in the 19th century. P. is enormously erudite. At the same time, he is a graceful, ingratiating, and frequently innovative stylist. His book is full of ingenious thinking, though at times his arguments do not satisfactorily prove his assertions.

P. begins with a mythic narrative, the story of Jacob stealing Esau's birthright, a theft "at once illegitimate and somehow irreversible" (13), which paradoxically becomes a blessing, a generative source for a people set apart. This story, as he shows, can be read as a primal tale about both religious and literary history. Christians, like Jacob, later appropriated the Bible from the Jewish people and re-read it as their own book. This forced the creation of a literary theory which would justify a "a massive metaphorical re-interpretation... a 're-birth of image'" (58), since the Bible, a book written in an ancient, alien language about a people culturally remote, has always been for the West an unassimilated text, "culturally meek, but fully prepared to inherit the earth" (6). This process of theft, translation, and re-interpretation has been replicated many times: Virgil's Homer, Dante's Virgil. In
much the same way, P. argues, the Romantics appropriated the Bible from a sacred, religious tradition, and used it to their own, often secular imaginative ends.

At the center of P.'s book is a consideration of how British, French, and German Romantic writers reshaped Europe's concept of the Bible and of the Christian religion for their own era. In the chapter "The Bible as Novel" he argues that William Lowth initiated an era in which an empathetic, sentimental approach to reading Scriptures led to people like Sarah Trimmer, who in her Help to the Unlearned in the Study of the Holy Scriptures (1805) is "totally engrossed in the [biblical] narrative . . . and reads it with the same attention to character and plot as she might any secular novel" (130). P.'s other examples of this method are a sermon by Sterne and a typological interpretation, which he himself makes, of garden imagery in Austen's Mansfield Park. One wants to agree with P. that popularizers like Trimmer might indicate how ordinary folk in the Romantic period read the Bible; but this slender and very odd trio of examples cannot convince anyone that a particular mode of reading was widespread or authoritative, and P. does not do the kind of historical and sociological research needed to make his case convincing.

Other chapters take a more congenial, persuasive form. "Appropriating the Revolution" deals with Chateaubriand's witty reversals of Volney's efforts to undermine biblical authority. "The Bible as Metatype" considers the German fascination with epigrammatic fragments, the necessary consequence of a conviction that "no aesthetic idea can be fully expressed or presented" (188), and P. magisterially surveys a complex tradition which stretches from Schleiermacher to Julius Hare's Guesses at Truth. His final chapter deals with Victorian novels set in ancient Rome, texts such as Kingsley's Hypatia and Newman's fictional response, Callista. Here P. finds an eroticized religious sensibility which he links to passages from Schleiermacher's Speeches on Religion and Schlegel's earlier novel Lucinde. A relatively brief epilogue on Mann's Joseph and His Brothers ends the book.

P. points the reader's attention in many directions. He initiates a large number of inquiries which the reader may be eager to follow further. As with much in contemporary theory and criticism, the book's thought provokes rather than satisfies.

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JOHN PFORDRESHER


Lindley presents an admirable introduction to the history of women in American religious life. In a well-written narrative, she provides an excellent synthesis based on the explosion of scholarly material about women in their multiple roles in American religion as well as in American history generally.
Structured chronologically but featuring thematic chapters appropriate to the various periods, the book successfully achieves one of L.'s goals: it covers "a broad geographic, ethnic, racial, and denominational range of American women's religious experiences and contributions" in a "single-volume survey" (x). It begins with Anne Hutchinson (from whose trial the title comes), then continues on to women's participation in the evangelical awakenings of the 18th and 19th centuries, their engagement in 19th-century social reform efforts, the formulation of 20th-century feminist theologies, and women's increased involvement in faiths outside the Christian and Jewish communities. L. deftly introduces the reader to such important movements as Puritanism, the so-called Second Great Awakening, overseas missions, and the social gospel. While chiefly focusing on women in Protestantism, Roman Catholicism, and Judaism, the three major religious groups that dominated American religious life until recently, L. also informs us about the alternative religious experiences of women among the Shakers, Mormons, Oneida Community, Christian Scientists, and Native Americans. In each case, she examines women's involvement in light of how the communities and movements shaped their lives and, where appropriate, how women shaped them. Biographical vignettes of female leaders, some better known today than others, put faces on the broad canvas, including Antoinette Brown, Rebecca Gratz, Phoebe Palmer, Elizabeth Cady Stanton, Leonora Barry, Nannie Helen Burroughs, and Georgia Harkness. One wishes that more "ordinary" women appeared in such sketches to contrast with the experiences of their confrontational sisters.

L. casts women's "stepping out" in two ways, and it is this dual meaning that generates the argument of her book: "the women's story is one of... a movement out of the subordinate female places enjoined on Anne Hutchinson" even by "those who see themselves as anti-feminist" yet who have also "accepted some of the gradual changes that have occurred during America's history" (434). The first meaning of "stepping out" is rebellion that directly challenged male power in organized American religious life. In these cases, women sought the power that males held, culminating in a struggle for ordination and the accompanying voting privileges that determine institutional, religious life. The second meaning pertains to indirect, less intentional or unintentional challenges to male power through women's expansion of their male-delimited spheres. In these cases, women widened the arena of their effective influence by extending their domestic concerns beyond the bounds of the home through their endeavors in temperance reform, the establishment of Sunday schools for indigent children, and missions. While L. tells the story of the firebrands, she also brings to light the work and faith of women revolutionizing America from within traditional female spheres.

This approach also allows her to present rather unobtrusively the range of modern scholars' analyses of American women's history in
general and American women's religious history in particular. A merit of the book is that along the way the reader is cumulatively familiarized with the methodology of women's studies as well as the names, works, and theses of leading scholars on American women's history and American religious history.

Two outcomes arise from L.'s combination of historiographical interlacings and a structure based on the two meanings of "stepping out." First is a two-pronged analysis of women's "place" in the various periods and organizations, most often put in terms of "on the one hand" and "on the other," with the conclusion that both were true, reflecting the diversity of experiences among women. Second is a series of telling episodes within parallel narratives, conveying the idea that the larger story here is one of pluralization: American women's religious history reflects the growing diversity in the history of American religion in general. L. quite successfully captures this essential reality. But does a thesis of pluralization provide a coherent enough concept of American religious life for the reader to grasp what is uniquely American here? Only in part. But that this is so says as much about the state of our profession in its search for a new paradigm as it does about the accomplishment of this book.

As a synthesis built on existing scholarship which has focused more on the 19th century, the narrative weight falls on that century. It would have been worth the extra length to have more about the women's movement in the 20th century, particularly the 1960s and 70s in the wake of Betty Friedan's *The Feminine Mystique*, and a more richly textured treatment of women's involvement in 20th-century ecumenism and resurgent evangelicalism. Also, as an introductory survey for the novice, some terms needed definition, among them "justification" and "sanctification."

In sum, L. has rendered a service to American women and religious historians by providing a highly readable, usable past accessible to scholars, teachers, church people, and the simply curious.

*University of Virginia, Charlottesville*  
**Heather A. Warren.**


Although historians have given a great deal of attention to the role of the Christian churches in the Third Reich, few studies have investigated the German Christian Faith movement, and Bergen is the first English-speaking scholar seriously to undertake a study of it.

The sudden collapse of the Empire in 1918 was a staggering psychological blow to Protestant church leaders. The end of the centuries-old alliance between throne and altar, and the removal of the secular princes who had served as heads of the church, left many Protestants with a fear that complete separation of church and state would result.
Hostile towards the Weimar Republic, the Protestant clergy sided with its archconservative enemies and longed for the restoration of the Hohenzollerns. Therefore, when the National Socialists came to power in 1933 and appeared to replace “political chaos” and “free thinking” of the Weimar era with the older political and religious virtues, Protestant officials and clergymen initially responded enthusiastically.

For the next 12 years German Christians attempted to seek a synthesis of Nazi ideology and Protestant tradition. The membership represented a cross section of German society: “women and men, old people and young, pastors, teachers, dentists, railroad workers, housewives, and farmers, even some Catholics” (7). Some held important positions in the church hierarchy, while others were prominent in Nazi affairs. All embraced the traditional anti-Jewish prejudices, and added the Nazi categories of blood and race as requirements for membership. Enthusiastically adopting Luther’s venomous attacks against the Jews, the German Christians sought to abolish the Old Testament and to “dejudaize” the New. The heart of the New Testament message was not the drama of salvation, but racial struggle.

However, in their zeal the German Christians overreached themselves; their crude tactics and their threat to provincial church autonomy quickly aroused resistance. The traditional Protestants in the “Confessing Church” attacked the German Christians’ outrageous interpretation of the Scriptures, and the insistence that blood and race were the true basis of Christianity. And when it became clear that the German Christians were unable to unite all sections of the Protestant churches behind the Nazis, the Party also turned against the movement.

Throughout 1934 and 1935, the German Christian movement suffered further fragmentation. By the time Germany invaded Poland in 1939, Nazi authorities demonstrated increasingly open hostility towards the churches, including the German Christians. The Nazis muzzled the preachers, closed their printing presses, and subjected them to other discriminatory measures.

While much of B.’s study of this ill-fated movement has been told before, she adds some well-chosen examples of its rhetoric. Perhaps her most interesting chapters deal with the gender issue. The German Christians viewed the people’s church as a “manly” institution. B. notes that the emphasis on “manliness” in this male-dominated movement was reflected in words as well as deeds. The extensive use of militaristic language and the praise of soldierly values was accompanied by heavy doses of anti-Semitic propaganda.

Another interesting chapter deals with the role of women in the movement. Given this emphasis on “manliness,” B. explains why so many women contributed legitimacy, energy, and resources to this movement. She concludes that it was as mothers that women found their most celebrated role. The cult of motherhood not only complemented the military virtues of their menfolk, but also “provided women
with a space and an identity for their work in the movement (122). Although some women, like Guida Diehl, gained positions of prominence, they were relegated to the margins of the church's activities.

Among the more outrageous efforts of the German Christians were the attempts to dejudaize Christianity. When the Nuremberg Laws were promulgated in 1935, the German Christians responded with their own anti-Semitic rhetoric. They preached the wholly fallacious doctrine that Jesus was not a Jew and the gospel's message was hatred towards Jews. In 1939 they founded the Institute for Research into and Elimination of Jewish Influence in German Church Life. In March 1939 representatives of eleven regional churches issued the Godesberg Declaration, which promoted the view that the Christian faith is "the unbridgeable religious opposite of Judaism" (149). Thus directly and indirectly the German Christian movement underwrote and even promoted Nazi policies designed to destroy the Jews.

B. is to be congratulated for this scholarly, well-balanced account of the German Christian movement, which comes as a welcome addition to studies dealing with the Holocaust.

*Loyola Marymount University, L.A.*  
RICHARD W. ROLFS, S.J.


In keeping with his earlier theological works, Farley's latest book tackles a classical theological discussion in idiosyncratic and revisionist manner. This work, inevitably to be accounted F.'s "magnum opus," takes up the challenge of a theology of God starting from the "facticity of redemption." In F.'s view, the five ways in which the question of God is typically posed (through the retrieval of tradition, historical-cultural analysis, "world-puzzlement," praxis, and fundamental ontology) are all dependent on the prior experience of "the redemptive coming-forth of God as God" (21). Hence F. believes it is here that the theology of God should begin.

His project proceeds in three phases. In the first, F. conducts a dialogue with both the classical Catholic theology of God and various forms of anti-theism. The second phase essays a way of speaking about God, a "symbolics" in F.'s terminology, that respects the fact that knowing God in God's "redemptive coming forth" is not knowing God as an object, being, or entity of which attributes can simply be predicated. The third and lengthiest task is the attempt to say how God and the world are related, or, in F.'s terms, how God acts in the world. F.'s conclusion is that the divine creativity and the redemptive activity of God in the world are both to be understood as empathetic, i.e., as oriented to "the promotion of the reality, freedom and cooperative interrelation of entities" (303). The event of Jesus Christ is for Christians the specific location or "through-which" of this facticity of redemption.

As the tripartite division of the text suggests, F.'s manner of pro-
ceeding is by way of a phenomenology of the experience of God's redemptive activity. In the individual's experience of emancipation from the chains of various idolatries, redemption in fact occurs. God is not known directly in this experience, since God is not the kind of reality that human beings can know directly, but God "comes forth" in this event of emancipation as the "only thing that could found the being of the human being so as to break the hold of idolatry" (72). Structurally, this is not unlike the method of a cosmological argument; isolate the redemptive/creative activity at work in the world, and "this we call God." But as F.'s text unfolds, there seems to be more in common with Schleiermacher than with Aquinas. The experience of God's redemptive activity occurs in a way not at all dissimilar from that in which analysis of the feeling of absolute dependence initiates the logic of the Glaubenslehre. This may leave some readers dissatisfied, since naming the power that makes emancipation possible is not quite the same thing as showing the necessity of God, any more than a "feeling of absolute dependence" is itself proof of the existence of any entity upon which this feeling rests. But then, for F., the moment of classical theism is past.

F.'s establishment of a theological middle ground between classical approaches and their radically postmodern critiques is most evident in his second section, where he structures a "symbolics of God." F. agrees with the classical attribute tradition that we can indeed say some things about God, but is persuaded by the anti-attribute opponents that this cannot be done by way of ontotheology. Attention must be to the "facticity of redemption." Stepping away from the "way of eminence" of classical ontotheology, F. argues that what can be said about God symbolically ("ciphers" is his preferred term) emerges through reflection on what God must be like to be the agent of redemption. In other words, F. replaces the traditional conviction that through revelation God is known as redeemer by the significantly different proposal that it is through redemption that God is revealed. But the process has a comfortably familiar outcome, as it leads to the identification of "three inclusive names for God: Redeemer (or Spirit), Creativity and the Holy" (124). Indeed, it is generally true of this work that despite the methodological radicalism, the content of Christian faith is largely left unchanged.

If it is true that the God of F.'s book is the God of the Christian tradition, this should not lead to undervaluing the work's novelty and force. Those who in the past have found F.'s work difficult to read have done so, I believe, because of the way in which his extraordinary discernment and intelligence leads him into the practice of constant qualification. In this present book that stylistic foible becomes a positive strength. As he turns away from one well-trodden theological avenue after another, F. is clearly engaged in a species of negative theology. But where scriptural authority and ontotheological positivism are denied, his redescription of the facticity of redemption allows something alto-
gether less tangible to return. Those committed to one or other house of authority will be uncomfortable with the process and the conclusions. For the rest of us, F.’s work suggests not only how unnecessary those authorities are, but how without them God emerges in the experience of redemption—at once both less surely known and yet more reassuringly encountered.

*Fairfield University, Connecticut*  
**Paul Lakeland**


In this fine work, based on the Wilde Lectures delivered at Oxford in 1993, Wolterstorff offers a comprehensive examination of the philosophical issues related to the religious claim that God speaks. He discusses in succession the declaration that God speaks, the interpretation of texts believed to be God’s speech, and the justification for believing that God speaks.

W.’s brief is simple: divine discourse, commonplace as it is taken to be by the world’s major religions, receives very little philosophical attention. This is so because, while many theologians have discussed the importance of the Word of God, few have examined issues of principal interest to a philosopher. More importantly, divine speech has too often been reduced to the more comprehensive term, revelation. W. argues, however, that divine discourse is unique and must be taken on its own terms. In light of this assertion, he proceeds to examine the claim that God speaks with reference to contemporary philosophical and hermeneutical issues.

The first part, which is the strongest, constitutes a careful analysis of both the natural act of speaking and the predication of speech to God. W. adduces Austin’s familiar distinction between locutionary acts (uttering sounds or writing words) and illocutionary acts (declaring, promising, commanding, etc.) as the fulcrum for his argument. In certain routine cases of double agency, one person performs locutionary actions while another performs illocutionary ones. This is the case, e.g., when an ambassador is deputized to represent the head of state or when a trusted aide assumes the voice of a government official. In each case, the former actually speaks but the latter’s intentions are expressed. In a similar way, God appropriates human discourse in order to speak. Particular agents represent him in the biblical testaments, agents through whom God performs illocutionary acts. A constant interlocutor here is Barth who resists conceding that human speech may be appropriated for divine discourse. For Barth, the dictum that God and God alone speaks for God does not allow for this kind of attribution. W. argues, however, that his own theory in no way compromises the divine sovereignty and freedom that Barth is determined to protect.
Moving to the question of interpreting what God has said, W. conducts a spirited dialogue with Ricoeur and Derrida, finding in each some flaw as compared with his own defense of authorial-discourse hermeneutics. Refreshing is W.'s defense of discovering what the author was actually saying, an interpretative approach under attack from several quarters in contemporary thought. W. seeks to balance the importance of the author's subjectivity with the normativity of the public text, opposing along the way the option of Ricoeur which rightly avoids the twin shoals of Romanticism and structuralism but which insufficiently emphasizes the role of the author, who is often completely absent from the hermeneutical process. Unfortunately, there is no discussion, or even mention, of H.-G. Gadamer who, with his careful examination of historicity and finitude, has lodged what may be the most forceful criticisms against authorial-discourse theory.

In his last and briefest section W. concludes more than argues that it is certainly possible for intelligent, educated men and women to believe that God speaks, not only in Scripture, but to individuals throughout the course of history. Interesting here is the demurrer he presents against strict inerrantists, arguing that while the illocutionary stance of the Bible is always true (God declaring, etc.), the locutionary actions (the authors actually writing the text) may contain errors. This is, of course, quite close to Dei Verbum's point that, with respect to salvific truth, Scripture is always inerrant.

Overall, this is a very well-written and carefully argued book. One problem many Catholic theologians will have, however, is that Reformed epistemologists, as W. describes himself, live largely in the world of Anglo-American linguistic philosophy and with the practitioners of that discipline: Strawson, Austin, Alston, and Searle. There is little dialogue with metaphysics, transcendental thought, or with traditional and contemporary Continental philosophy (despite the presence of Ricoeur and Derrida) which Catholic theology so often utilizes. But this should not deter one from reading the book. It is an excellent and demanding study. We should be grateful to W. for his careful work illustrating that it is philosophically coherent to attribute discourse to God.

Seton Hall University, New Jersey

THOMAS GUARINO


This anthology contains 13 essays, most of them revised and updated, three of them previously unpublished. They are grouped under four headings: Christian theology and religious pluralism, rethinking some central Christian themes, reflections in dialogue with Buddhists, and religious truth as pluralistic. Kaufman's main concern is "the ongoing imaginative construction and reconstruction of the basic Chris-
tian symbols” (71), which is how he defines the task of theology. It is very useful to have the reflections of this careful and mature scholar on theology in a pluralistic global context gathered in one place.

Christianity usually presents itself as the communication of the one absolute and divine truth. K. is troubled by this viewpoint, which he sees as parochial, but he does not wish to collapse theological statements into an indiscriminate relativism. As an alternative to absolutism and relativism he proposes a biohistorical and dialogical dynamism in the globally pluralistic context which, he says, must be taken as given. By starting from human biology and moving into human history and society, he paints a picture of religions putting out culturally conditioned feelers into the future, moving ever closer (but, it seems, asymptotically) towards the ultimately impenetrable mystery of existence. In their movement, religions talk to each other, and in their dialogue they refresh themselves by questioning their most basic assumptions. Such questioning K. calls critical theology, and he does not restrict it to Christianity but sees it as “an umbrella discipline within which the investigation of many (religious and secular) faiths [can be] pursued” (209), so that theology could and should be a feature of all departments of religion, whether at denominational or secular institutions.

To prepare for this argument, K. goes to some trouble to redefine some central Christian themes, of which the most important is God. Consistent with his more Whiteheadian and less Aristotelian approach, God is, for K., “serendipitous creativity” manifested in various “evolutionary and historical trajectories” (72, 102). God is “a particular form of ordering activity,” but he is dynamic, a sort of, dare we say, Heraclitean version of Parmenides’s Logos. The dynamism, being biohistorical, is good when it moves humanity from animality to culture; evil is the blocking of this movement.

K.’s theology is a type of normative anthropology. It starts with humanity, which is seen as pushing toward greater richness of experience, and moves toward, not so much God as divine truth, which is in the distant future. That this is the opposite of traditional theology is clear from his assertion that the image of God is an “extrapolation” of human metaphors such as “father, lord, judge, son” (45, 47). K. is saying that we call God our father on analogy with human fathers. Aquinas, on the other hand, says that we call our human fathers “father” because they participate imperfectly in the perfect fatherhood of God, who alone can truly be called father. The analogia entis of Aquinas is from God to humanity; for K., it is from humanity to God. This reversal is of a piece with his claim that the truths of theology are not “a direct expression of divine revelation” but human “imaginative and intellectual . . . activity” (66). The heavens do not open upon K. Indeed, they are closed for ever, or for the foreseeable future, against mystery, “conundrums which we cannot solve and that we should not expect to solve” (97).
At this point one might have expected Buddhism to be brought in to unscrew the inscrutable. K. has been around a lot of Buddhists. He was a member of the Board of the Society for Buddhist-Christian Studies, and some of the material in this book was originally delivered as lectures at a Buddhist university in Kyoto. But K.’s engagement with Buddhism is disappointingly preliminary. The central question—not “what is truth?” but “what sort of thing is truth?”—is not broached. Truth for Buddhism is never absolute, nor is it relative, nor is it biohistorically dynamic, but contextual and operational. K. wonders if he misses this, asking us to instruct him if he has read Buddhism “too metaphysically (in analogy with the way [he] read[s] many Christian theological papers)” (167).

With respect, this reviewer does so instruct him. Buddhist truth is therapeutic, it is skillful means (upaya) which is true when it is appropriate to the recipient, false when it is not. Buddhist truth “speaks to the condition,” as Quakers say, and, to nuance the word a little, strives to remove the conditions which are obstructing the pure bodhi mind. When the unconditioned is obtained, the mind functions in its native omniscience, and reality is thoroughly understood. The pure bodhi mind is perfect in wisdom, compassion, and activity, somewhat as is the mind of God in traditional Christianity. K. does not speak of the mind of his serendipitously creating God, but he is explicit that “human beings . . . do not have unmediated access to the ‘primordial’ or ‘ultimately’ Real or True—whether through ‘divine revelation’ or through ‘enlightenment’ ” (174). K. is entitled to his opinion, but he should be aware that it contradicts the teaching of Buddhism. A dialogue between his serendipitous biohistorical truth and Buddhist therapeutic truth would, however, be fruitful.

Duke University, Durham, North Carolina

ROGER CORLESS


In this collection of essays, dating from 1972 to 1994, Vanneste reviews some of the historical evidence in favor of his thorough-going rejection of the Western theology of grace and nature. That traditional theology, he believes, lost its credibility once the evolution of the human race from a multiplicity of ancestors was established as a scientific fact. Contemporary exegetes then ceased to present the account of Adam’s fall in Genesis as historical, and once that occurred, original sin, in the sense in which traditional Western theology understood it, could no longer lay claim to a basis in Scripture. Furthermore, he believes the Western theology of grace and sin has shown itself to be intrinsically incoherent. For both of these reasons the traditional understanding of original sin can no longer be accepted, and the theology of human nature, grace, natural reason, and supernatural revelation associated with that understanding, must be radically revised.
A quarter century ago, when V.'s proposed revision first appeared, it was given serious consideration, although it never won general acceptance. V.'s revised theology of original sin, nature, and grace, however, is the unifying thread which ties the present series of essays together. Far from being the historical father of the human race, the Adam of Genesis, in what is now generally accepted to be a mythical account of the fall, is meant to be a symbol for all sinners. Born, as they are, into a sinful world, all humans find themselves drawn by the atmosphere of sin around them into personal sin once they reach the age of free decision. Personal sin, the morally evil act of consciously rejecting God's freely offered grace, is the only kind of sin of which Scripture speaks. The nonbiblical notion of an inherited original sin, consisting of human nature's ontological privation of supernatural grace, is the result of a Western theological aberration.

And now that the metaphysical categories that Western theologians took over uncritically from the Greek philosophy of nature have been replaced by the personal categories which contemporary theology requires, that long-standing aberration can finally be set right. The Greek conception of nature and the metaphysics associated with it made their way into Western theology during Augustine's controversy with Pelagius, and it was that metaphysics which structured the theology of the Middle Ages. It gave specious plausibility to the Western theology of sin, nature, and grace systematized by Anselm, and it was drawn upon by Aquinas to justify his ontological distinction between the realms of nature and grace. Thomas used it again to ground his essential distinction between truths accessible to natural reason and truths of faith knowable only through historical revelation. Although V. makes no claim to be a professional philosopher, the basic incompatibility of Greek metaphysics with Christian revelation is one of the major points which he tries to make in his historical critique of the Western theology of grace and nature. Greek metaphysics, he insists, is the source of the fundamental dualism which we find in it.

All the essays in the present volume represent a continued attempt to expose that dualism, and, although V. makes very clear that his attention was first drawn to the problem of grace and nature by de Lubac's *Surnaturel*, he insists that de Lubac was far too timid in his criticism of the Western theology of nature and grace. The "two storey" conception of nature and grace which it introduced did not originate with Cajetan, as de Lubac claimed. On the contrary, it goes all the way back to Augustine. Furthermore, far from revealing a fruitful "paradox," Thomas's theology of grace and nature, suffers from the incoherent dualism in the Western theology of grace first proposed by Augustine, and which Anselm, Thomas, Bonaventure, and the great post-Tridentine theologians made their own. To support that contention V. reviews once again the major sources of the Western theology of nature and grace: Augustine, Anselm, the early-13th-century theologians, Thomas, Bonaventure, Baius, Jansenius, and Bellarmine. The topics
considered are the traditional ones well known to medievalists and systematic theologians. The novelty of the essays comes from V.'s radically revisionistic reading of these familiar sources.

As was the case with V.'s theology of original sin, these historical essays may stimulate reflection without fundamentally changing the established appreciation of the Western theology of grace and nature. Many readers may question whether the use of nonmetaphysical personalistic categories will be able to provide a satisfactory theology of original sin. Others may remain unconvinced that the Western theology of grace and nature is really incoherent and dualistic. Not all will agree that Greek metaphysics is incompatible with revelation and incapable of working out the revisions in the theology of original sin which many contemporary Catholic theologians consider necessary. Convinced or not, however, they will find V.'s essays provocative reading and an interesting example of the efforts Catholic theologians have been making to strike out on new paths since Vatican II.

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GERALD A. MCCOOL, S.J.


Schatz is convinced that "forgetfulness of history threatens the Church in its very substance" (175). Yet he realizes that history is not a seamless web; it has to be deciphered, because it inevitably contains inconsistent, contradictory, and perplexing elements. The complexities of the history of papal primacy present a challenge to any historian. The Jesuit author, professor of church history in Frankfurt, is up to the task.

This book, originally published in 1990, is a history of the concept of papal primacy, not a history of the papacy or of the popes. No comparable work by a Catholic historian exists. S.'s purpose is to trace the origins of the historically developed papal primacy. He does not discuss other aspects of the institutional Church which relate indirectly to primacy, such as the Roman curia, papal finances, or the papal states. His exegesis of the data is meticulous, avoiding any sort of retrojection.

The structure of the book is chronological. Each of the four parts covers a period of about five hundred years: the first five centuries, the role of Rome; the fifth to the tenth centuries, the development of the primacy in the East and West; the eleventh to the fifteenth centuries, the Medieval Church to the eve of the Reformation; the modern era, from the Reformation to the present.

S. begins by tracing the trajectory of primacy with the early Church. Rome, because of its connection with the life and death of Peter and Paul, became the spiritual and religious center of church unity; it was the privileged locus of tradition and the guarantor of apostolic truth. Subsequently, the primacy had to face imperial church structures in
the East and to contend with the rise of regional churches and German inculturation in the emerging West. Eventually, in the Middle Ages, the papacy assumed leadership of the entire Church and Christendom. The formal definition of primacy, which represented an Ultramontanist victory, occurred at Vatican I.

The overall interpretation that S. gives to the development of papal primacy is persuasive. Arguing that multiple historical factors contributed to the acceptance of papal primacy, he notes that it is simplistic to affirm that primacy was only the result of Roman power politics, curial influences, or strong, visionary popes. The role of the periphery was significant—active laity and younger clergy with high regard for the papacy. Historical factors that promoted papal primacy endured, and those that opposed it (such as schisms, weak popes, and internal crises) often, in fact, strengthened it in time.

Frequent mention is made of the episcopacy, which is also a ius divinum ecclesial structure, and its relationship to the development and exercise of papal primacy. Thus S. appropriately discusses several important topics: patriarchates, provincial synods, ecumenical councils, conciliarism, French and German episcopalism, the nomination of bishops, and the establishment of dioceses.

This modest-sized book is well focused, without extraneous material. Its scope is huge, from the New Testament to the present, and, consequently, some of the sections are a bit thin. Only a few pages are devoted to scriptural evidence. The position of the Orthodox and the Reformation churches on papal primacy is not treated extensively. Likewise, Vatican II receives cursory treatment. Given S.'s suggestion that supradiocesan structures need to be strengthened, surprisingly little is said about the principle of collegiality and how it affects papal primacy. Similarly, the major organs of collegiality, the synods of bishops and episcopal conferences, are not examined.

At the end of each part, S. gives a selected bibliography. Most of the works referred to are in German, a few in Italian or French, almost none in English. This creates a problem for the English-speaking reader desirous of further study of papal primacy but with limited language skills. Despite these few reservations, S. has written an excellent book that can be read profitably by all who are interested in theology and history.

_**Catholic University of America, D. C.**_ **PATRICK GRANFIELD, O.S.B.**


The most important contribution this book makes to the field of feminist theological ethics is its review of a range of important feminist work in both theological and nontheological disciplines. Parsons discusses three areas within feminist theory which she categorizes as “the
liberal paradigm,” “the social constructionist paradigm,” and “the naturalist paradigm.” After a descriptive sketch of some of the main ideas within each “paradigm,” she offers a critique, again drawn from different feminist theories, of each paradigm.

The opening chapter, “On Diversity,” establishes both P.’s commitment to a mixed approach to feminist theological ethics and the structure of the book which covers a diverse set of elements derived from many areas of feminist theory. In spite of her stated commitment to diversity, however, P. makes clear that she is working toward the promotion of a viable and credible “universalism by which justice may be known,” as well as “gender-sensitive natural law ethic in which the basic features of our humanness may yet be developed and sustained” (13). With this statement P. indicates that she holds a singular notion of humanism, one which is rooted in a (revised) natural-law ethic. She does not consider the possibility of a concrete humanism not based on natural law that may in fact be more appropriate to her own agenda for a humanist feminist ethics.

P.’s references to postmodernist feminists are critical but balanced. On the one hand, she is sympathetic to their search for an alternative to totalizing ethical theories rooted in a correspondence method of objective truth and consequent norms. On the other hand, she is critical of some of the implications of postmodernist approaches, which she insightfully describes at one point as “postmoral.” “Postmorality” is the result of the postmodernist celebration of what might be called subjectiveless agency, a decentering of the subject to the point of dissolution of attributable moral responsibility altogether. She writes, “The consequent loss of emphasis on the individual person as a clearly defined being, with precise boundaries, makes it difficult to understand how political action or moral evaluation could take hold” (106). Here P. implicitly acknowledges the incoherence at the core of many postmodern theories. Without a clearly delineated subject, there is no recognizable human locus of moral responsibility or political resistance.

Although P. provides a valuable resource for feminist theologians who may not read widely in feminist theory, she refers to so many authors that she cannot possibly indicate the complexity, depth, or importance of their thought within feminist theory nor for theology. E.g., Seyla Benhabib, one of the more challenging and important feminist political theorists and ethicists, is treated much too briefly for a discussion of her work to offer much to P.’s argument.

Furthermore, P. does not sufficiently develop her own perspective in this book. After reviewing too briefly a too substantial body of feminist literature, she can only suggest what a “gender-sensitive natural-law ethic” might be, and even here, she ends quoting another writer. A feminist Christian natural-law approach leading to a “new humanism” where “woman and man are both known to be made in the image of God” (242) is an outdated theological platitude that offers nothing helpful that can even address the pervasive condition of injustice that
characterizes the human condition nor the growing oppression of women. It also has little to do with the critical humanism which P. wants. Unfortunately, P. betrays her own commitment to diversity when she concludes with the abstract and empty categories, "man" and "woman," thereby demonstrating her failure rather than inability, to escape the identity thinking that so much of her book challenges. If she had devoted more time to elaborating her own critical feminist ethics based on a revised natural-law theory, she might have avoided this pitfall. Or maybe abstraction and identity thinking are too much a part of natural-law theory to be overcome within it.

Trinity College, Toronto

MARSHA AILEEN HEWITT


In this highly readable and thought-provoking book, Hudson examines modern and classical constructions of happiness and proposes alterations to the classical definition that would help to reinstate happiness as a prominent element in contemporary ethical theory. H.'s work complements Alasdair MacIntyre's work on virtue, but, unlike MacIntyre, H. attempts to formulate an approach to happiness in which virtue can transcend specific communities.

Although H. offers a solid overview of various philosophical approaches to happiness, the strength of this book lies in his lucid comparison of modern approaches regarding happiness, which define happiness in terms of "well-feeling," and older approaches for which virtue is indispensible to well-being. He systematically develops these distinctions so that readers can discern how a shift in focus from one approach to the other has implications not only for philosophical theory but also for political theory and many other branches of the social sciences. H. points out that a major advantage of returning to a concept of happiness for which virtue is essential is that happiness would move out of the purely subjective realm and be held up to objective third-person scrutiny. Likewise, it would include concern for the common good as well as for the good of an individual's soul. In Part 2, H. illustrates that the objective view of happiness has never totally disappeared and is currently gaining stronger recognition as a result of research in the social sciences.

In Part 3, where H. constructs a new approach to happiness, his critical skills are most obvious. He focuses here on three problems: the need to reject excessive intellectualism, to affirm the imperfect nature of earthly happiness, and to recognize the central role of love in the dynamism of a happy life. H. relies heavily on the works of Aquinas, especially his distinction between perfect and imperfect happiness, and stresses that we need to avoid Augustine's mistake of pushing any concept of happiness solely into the realm of the next world. Instead,
we need to recognize that there is a state of imperfect, earthly happiness, which contains a certain measure of pain, and which centers on realizing the finite, human good. H. recognizes the danger in this approach, which is that finite goods might be raised to the status of final goods; nevertheless, he stresses that it is only this middle ground that can “challenge the dualistic separation of the cities of God and man” (161) and ground love’s full obligation to work for the good of others.

According to H., earthly happiness is derived from a person’s will to do good and characterizes that individual’s existence. What is omitted in H.’s approach to happiness, however, is the important role that prudence plays in properly identifying what is good and in enabling a response that establishes virtue rather than a mere inclination to do good. Thus, according to H., our earthly lives must always be directed toward a preexisting dominant good, but he offers little guidance as to how this good relates to our daily living. Nevertheless, he very ably sets up the necessary framework to ponder such questions.

This book is highly recommended for both students and professionals who are interested in a greater understanding of the importance of happiness in the context of a moral life. Particularly commendable are H.’s historical analysis of the downfall of a classical appreciation of happiness and the insights offered regarding the development of a contemporary understanding of happiness that has theological underpinnings.

St. John’s University, Jamaica, N.Y. MARILYN MARTONE


This is a sequel to Gewirth’s magisterial volume Reason and Morality (1978), which provided a comprehensive argument that morality is based not on personal preferences or social conventions but on the rational grounds given in the necessary conditions of human action. G. argued there from the premise that every human agent has an indispensable need for freedom and well-being (the “necessary goods of action”) to the moral claim that every agent is logically bound to affirm (on “pain of self-contradiction”) that he or she has rights to these goods and that all other actual or prospective agents also have these rights. The argument generated a principle of equal and universal human rights, called the “principle of generic consistency,” which combines the formal consideration of consistency (i.e., affirmation of one’s own right to freedom can only be held with consistency when one affirms the same right for others) with the material consideration of the generic features and rights of action (i.e., what concretely is needed by all agents, particularly freedom and a reasonable degree of well-being).

In the present sequel G. examines systematically the implications of the principle of generic consistency in the domains of political, economic, and social ethics. His main purpose is to address the massive
violations of human rights experienced in our century by providing a detailed, comprehensive, and intellectually cogent justification for the ethical requirements of the "supportive state," which has as its main purpose the promotion of certain significant equalities of the effective rights to freedom and well-being where these equalities have institutional sources. G. believes that removing the causes of these afflictions is properly conceived in terms of more effectively equalizing the enforcement and application of human rights, and specifically economic and social rights.

The structure of the book moves from the general to the particular. It begins with a review of the basic argument from the necessary conditions of human action and the principle of generic consistency to positive rights, mutuality and community, and the right to productive agency. The second half concerns both more specific rights, especially the right to private property and to employment, and the implications of the principle for economic and political democracy. Chaps. 3–8 develop a sequence of "economic biography" and "economic constitution" the implementation of which would progressively realize the genuine equality of human rights.

The most important feature of the book is its balanced presentation of the reciprocal interdependence of community and human rights, which, far from being necessarily adversarial (as argued by MacIntyre and Hauerwas), can provide reciprocal support. As an heir to Kant, G. places great emphasis on individual responsibility and regards ethically principled autonomy as an important moral achievement. Yet he also appreciates natural human dependence, sociality, and interdependence. He is acutely aware of the great obstacles to freedom imposed on those who are marginalized and exploited by much more powerful members of society; indeed, his attention to the most deprived members of society has a significant affinity with the "preferential option for the poor." Thus G. argues not only for respect for civil liberties ("negative rights") but also for the proactive responsibility of the state to assist persons to develop their abilities of productive agency (he employs something like the principle of subsidiarity in this regard). A genuine community of rights is held together by duties as well as rights and in bonds of mutuality, reciprocity, and solidarity. G. thus distances himself from the "social atomism" attacked by Robert Bellah, the "unencumbered self" rejected by Michael Sandel, and the exclusive focus on the right to privacy criticized by Mary Ann Glendon.

Readers will find here a fascinating and brilliant application of a comprehensive ethical theory. G. examines a wide array of practical issues from the just wage and employment goals to management-worker relations and tax policies. Many of his general principles are in fact consistent with those provided by the U.S. Catholic bishops in their "A Catholic Framework for Economic Life" (1996). G. exhibits impressive mastery of concrete detail and appreciates the complexities and ambiguities found in concrete moral choices faced by policy makers.
He makes a persuasive case for the extension of positive human rights to all people in what he calls "an institutionalization of love" (xv).

This is doubtless one of the most significant philosophical works in the last decade. It should be read, studied carefully, and discussed by all who are concerned seriously with philosophical dimensions of human rights.

Boston College

Stephen J. Pope


Helminiak's project is the systematic elaboration of the science of spirituality as a specialization within psychology. He differentiates between a positivist psychology that is neutral regarding the cultural meanings and values it studies and a psychology whose focus is human authenticity, concern for correct meanings and worthwhile values. This latter he defines as psychology within the philosophic viewpoint. He acknowledges the validity and importance of studies of spirituality that are theist and "theotic" (his term for "human deification," as in Christian belief); but he argues insistently that the human core of spirituality must be expressed on its own terms, apart from theistic or religious talk of God. H.'s challenge to the religions to give up their monopolistic hold on spiritual matters and his claim perhaps to have developed a unique breakthrough in approaches to the science of spirituality lend a controversial character to his work. His goal is broadly ecumenical; it is nothing less than the development of a science of spirituality that can provide a consensus on the spiritual basis common to all humanity.

H.'s work is heavily dependent on Lonergan, but he clearly goes his own way as the book unfolds. He envisages the human being in tripartite fashion as consisting in the distinct but not separate elements of spirit, psyche, and organism. He identifies "spirit" with human consciousness as Lonergan understands it. Human consciousness is at once nonreflective self-awareness and reflective openness, which dynamically unfolds in the self-transcending process of experiencing, understanding, judging, and deciding. The core of human spirituality consists in radical fidelity to the transcendental demands of this process to be attentive, understanding, reasonable, and responsible.

But the human being is psyche and organism as well as spirit. H. suggests that psyche consists in emotions, imagery, and memory, and that it mediates between spirit and organism. He frankly admits that, unlike spirit, psyche still remains unexplained in a truly scientific way. But he does suggest that spirit, as the ultimate organizing principle, subsumes psyche as well as organism, and that consequently psyche is present nonreflectively to the human subject and hence potentially
open to interpretative understanding by the subject. He offers a revised interpretation of key Jungian categories as perhaps providing grounds for a systematic understanding of psyche. H.'s reliance on Jung is problematic, since the highly descriptive character of Jung's categories makes it unlikely that a future, truly explanatory science of the psyche will be Jungian in character.

The final section on human integration provides a good explanation of organism; and, following Maslow, H. cogently argues that if the needs of organism are not met, the higher levels of psyche and spirit are adversely affected. Inversely, a sick spirit impacts psyche and organism negatively. H. ends with a highly controversial discussion of human sexuality and with admittedly fanciful speculations on possible eternally interpersonal orgasmic dimensions of bodily resurrection.

H.'s book is clearly written, insightful, and stimulating to read. His goal of developing a science of spirituality in strictly psychological terms within a philosophical viewpoint is valid in the context of its self-imposed limits. But it has its dangers and existential deficiencies. E.g., H.'s eagerness to reduce religion's monopoly on spiritual matters tends at times to lead him in the direction of a psychological and philosophical reductionism. Further, if Lonergan is right that it is best to work out the philosophy of God within the context of systematic theology in order to avoid an emphasis on proof at the expense of mystery, a fortiori it is far more fruitful to develop the science of spirituality within a systematic theological context. At least from the Christian perspective, a study of spirituality limited to its psychological and philosophical dimensions fails to be fully existential, since it prescinds from the doctrines of original sin, grace and redemption in Christ, resurrection and the face-to-face vision of the trinitarian God. And it is belief in these truths that forms the core content of Christian prayer and hence of Christian spirituality. Yet, despite these reservations, I consider H.'s work to be very original, well thought out, and intellectually challenging. I highly recommend it.

Gonzaga University, Spokane

BERNARD J. TYRRELL, S.J.


Not until the last page do readers fully understand Faulkner's title: the expression "wiser than despair" comes from a hymn by Brian Wren addressed to "old, aching God," which, in F.'s reading, points to "what it means to be in the world but not of it, confident that when the time is ripe humankind will be renewed, . . . and will be given new energy, new direction, new possibilities" (213). Readers are required to stay the distance before receiving this assurance, because up to this point the tone, if not one of despair, is often one of exhausted nostalgia and hand-wringing exasperation.
From F.'s historical survey of the evolution of ideas in the relationship of music and the Christian Church, it is clear that he holds out little hope for the generation of ideas in this area, at least for the foreseeable future. To demonstrate his thesis he has chalked out a huge canvas, nothing less than the history of the influence of "metaphysical, speculative Christian theology" (151) on music in the Church. After beginning with the Bible and its scattered references to musical practice in ancient Israel and the even more tantalizing allusions in the New Testament, F. treats more fully the development among the Greek philosophers of the concept of "number" and of the far-reaching influence exercised by Hellenic thought, especially Pythagoreanism and Platonism, on the Christian understanding and practice of music.

Thereafter F. maintains a chronological approach to his (chiefly Western) material, devoting at times distressingly short chapters to large areas; e.g., Reformation and Counter-Reformation are dispatched in seven pages. Interspersed with these more historical chapters are several more speculative ones. The first sets out F.'s understanding of two (opposing?) worldviews: the "world-conscious," which refers to one's awareness of being integrated into an orderly world governed by some higher power or powers; and the "self-conscious," that product of the Enlightenment that regards the individual as free to pursue personal goals and fulfilment and declares that what may now appear mysterious will eventually be explained by science. Other speculative chapters map the reasons for the rise and fall of Christian speculation about music and of the fading of the Church's control of music, its composers, and performers.

The highly summary nature of F.'s treatment gives a clue as to its intended audience. It reads like a series of classes for students of music history assembled to understand the influence of the churches of the Christian West on music. It is not directed primarily at the student of theology, though theologians may be pleased to have between two covers such a large body of citations from ecclesiastical and musical history, and may also be spurred to take up F.'s challenge of reflecting upon the interaction that church and music (and the other fine arts) have on each other today, a challenge which, in F.'s opinion, has been ignored for too long.

There is a more serious disappointment in the book's claims for itself. Even if we allow F.'s unwillingness to try his own hand at some speculation (212), we could have expected him to report some of the more significant efforts at articulating the theoretical and practical understandings of this interaction that others in our own time have made. Even if we restrict ourselves to some initiatives that have sprung from within the Roman Catholic Church, it is remarkable to find nothing about the contributions in this area to the sub-series on liturgy in the periodical Concilium; nothing about the deliberations of the international group on music and liturgy, Universa Laus; and nothing about the concluding statement from the participants of the

Another serious weakness concerns F.’s argumentation. One of his common refrains is that, thanks to the Church and the speculative theology it developed out of the matrix of pagan and then Christian ideas of order and number, more complex forms of musical composition in both sacred and secular genres were produced. He says, “It is not overstating the case to assert that the development of polyphony as we know it is inconceivable without the formative influence of Christian speculation” (150). Even more provocatively he asserts, “If the rudimentary practice of music as it existed in the early church had continued to prevail, then church music today would in all probability be a relatively insignificant branch of music history and practice, demanding only limited technical skill and musicianship, unlikely to excite widespread admiration or enthusiasm” (170). Whatever the rights and wrongs of the first assertion, it is surely mischievous to restrict general acclaim to the contrapuntal works written between the Renaissance and the High Baroque, the principal examples of “musical artifice” that command F.’s esteem. I am forced to make the counter-proposal that, in varying ways and degrees, the “rudimentary” monody of Gregorian chant, e.g., continues to excite the admiration and engagement of both the specialist and the untrained listener. In this matter, as in others throughout the book, one finds oneself coming to a judgment different from F.’s.

In brief, F. offers us more a plaint from a church musician and an academic distressed at today’s neglect of the higher art forms in the Church than a dispassionate assessment of the critical nexus between the Church and its music. His work could have gained by paying attention to groups such as those I have mentioned, who may have contributed towards dissipating the despair that F. sees descending on us.

Jesuit Theological College
Melbourne

CHRISTOPHER WILLCOCK, S.J.

SHORTER NOTICES


Names of God reflect the social situation of a particular community and are not always fitting for another community in a different social situation. Gerstenberger traces the origins of our current image of God through the primary source, the Bible, as well as through extrabiblical sources. He approaches the Bible with historical-critical, form-critical, and social-critical methods, but it is the latter that is key to his thesis that the names of God for a community must reflect its own social situation. G. starts with the exilic and postexilic period as a theological line of demarcation. The exclusive worship of the one and only God, Yahweh,
emerged in that era. The social condition which led to calling Yahweh father was the need of a devastated community for God’s protecting function. The arguments are based primarily on prophetic texts with no recognition of the feminine images of the Wisdom tradition that also emerge during this period. The monarchic period knew Yahweh as a national God with the concomitant worship of god/goddess pairs, while the tribal era worshiped Yahweh the Warrior.

A brief study of the contemporary situation indicates that we no longer live as our ancestors did in economically self-sufficient family groups which spawned the biblical images of God. Our theology must reflect the contemporary global and universal relationship of human beings. Although one may not agree with all of G.’s specific suggestions, the importance of the social context for naming God allows a discussion that eschews either a blind devotion or a total rejection of the biblical names of God.

Camilla Burns, S.N.D.DEN.
Loyola University, Chicago


This is Moore’s fourth contribution to the Anchor Bible. It maintains and enhances his reputation for painstaking attention to the textual, literary, social and, above all, theological issues which a modern commentary must address. In Tobit the usual questions of author, date, language, and locale, though not uncontroverted, benefit from a broad consensus. Still, M. is scrupulously fair in giving other views a hearing. Though Tobit is not accepted as holy scripture by Jews, it is quite clear that it was written to aid Jews in coping with a pervasive Hellenistic environment in Palestine or the eastern Diaspora. M. dates this interesting Jewish romance between the fourth century B.C. and sometime before the Macca­bean era (167–135 B.C.).

Tobit reflects, in its own ironic and novelistic fashion, some of the most cherished teachings in Israel’s sacred literature. The moving rhetoric of Deuteronomy lurks in the background along with the prophetic exhortations to act justly and care for the poor. M. has incorporated sapiential aspirations while advancing an overriding theme: be faithful to God and Torah, realizing that divine providence works within the framework of ordinary events.

The discovery at Qumran of one Hebrew text of Tobit and four in Aramaic has settled the question of its language in favor of a Semitic rather than a Greek original. M.’s research on this matter was helped immensely by having access to galleys of J. A. Fitzmyer’s critical edition of Tobit for the Clarendon Press Discoveries in the Judaean Desert. On the same linguistic question D. N. Freedman has offered the educated guess that Tobit was probably first written in Aramaic (for the wider public) and soon after, or even simultaneously, translated into Hebrew (for official circles).

Let me conclude with one complaint: M.’s complete English translation of Tobit should have been the first item of the Introduction to this commentary.

Fred L. Moriarty, S.J.
Boston College


This is a significant expansion, deepening, and sharpening of the themes and issues raised in McDonnell’s earlier collaborative work, Christian Initiation and Baptism in the Holy Spirit. M. cites many more early patristic opinions, especially from the Syriac and the apocryphal literature, about the theological meaning of Jesus’ baptism in the Jordan. He detects nine major motifs.
M. shows considerable familiarity with the research findings of present-day scholars with regard to the origin, institution, source, and paradigm of the baptismal rite. M. examines why Jesus' baptism which was cited in the early creeds and whose second-century feast might have been subordinate in celebration only to the Easter cycle lost its importance in the fourth century when there emerged a new emphasis connecting baptism with the theme of Christ's death and Resurrection. Since little has been written in English on this topic, this is by far the best summary work on these questions.

On the whole, this is a clear, concise, balanced, illuminating, and monumental work that is a "must" buy for libraries and those interested in the development of baptism and/or seeking to learn how the early Fathers preached and catechized the themes contained in Jesus' baptism in order to instill a greater participation in Christ's prophetic mission. My only major caveat centers on its treatment of divinization, which I think needs greater precision. Granted that it is difficult to lay bare the meaning underlying the early Syriac writers' poetic and symbolic terms, I question whether their understanding of one's "putting on" and "sharing in God's glorious life" is equivalent to what the Alexandrians, "Monophysites," and we today intend by the term "divinization."

FREDERICK G. MCLEOD, S.J.
Saint Louis University


A study and English translation of a seventh-century hagiographical text by Leontius, bishop of Neapolis in Cyprus. The story of Symeon is set in Palestine and Emesa in Syria, but K. suggests that Leontius's statements about Emesa reveal more about his own setting in seventh-century Cyprus. The social picture that emerges is of a prosperous, religiously diverse society which was also a haven for those exiled because of religious persecution or the Arab conquests. Leontius presents Symeon as someone able to evangelize in a complex urban society by adopting the persona of "fool."

K. notes the parallels between Leontius's portrayal of Symeon and the commonly known anecdotes about the Cynic Diogenes of Sinope, as well as the significant Jesus typology that shapes the narrative line of Symeon's ministry. K. emphasizes the Diogenes material more than the Jesus parallels, for his primary interest is to interpret Symeon's outrageous behavior as a fool. The parallels with the life of Jesus therefore receive less attention than they might; in them, of course, lies the evangelical heart of Leontius's project. Furthermore, Symeon's career as a fool for Christ takes up only half of the vita; the first half, in which Symeon makes a pilgrimage to Jerusalem and becomes a monk in the monastery of Gerasimos, receives scant attention from K. Although it is more conventional in content and tone, further exploration of that first half could help to situate the more unusual second half in the broader world of early monasticism, particularly that of Palestine and Syria.

K. writes well, provides adequate documentation in his notes, and translates smoothly.

COLUMBA STEWART O.S.B.
Saint John's Univ., Collegeville


An important, balanced, and much-needed account of the emergence of early Franciscan thought. Poppi starts with the sermons of Anthony of Padua, the defender of human rights, and the writings of Bonaventure. While the "philosophy" of each is based on the Scriptures, Anthony's is a starkly, realistic indictment of clever, human practices like usury that exploit the neighbor, while Bo-
naventure's leads to an ascent to divine illumination of true happiness. From below and above, both call the rational human to a modest self-assessment which does not undermine the capabilities of reason but frees it from pretensions.

Language and method take shape as well: Anthony's prophetic and Bonaventure's mystical language prompted Roger Bacon to pursue a philosophy expressed through rhetoric seeking poetic expression rather than the Schoolmen's pursuit of the speculative through scientific form. But the language of persuasion couples with the concrete, and Bacon advanced the relationship between rhetoric and phronesis. In three essays, P. defends Scotus's concern for contingents precisely as the call to respond to objective criteria and not as an excuse to escape to subjectivity. Scotus brackets the call to right reason with the primacy of freedom and the love of God; the former is at the service of the latter.

After briefly treating Peter Aureoli's encounter with Averroism, P. deals with Ockham, negotiating the debate between Louis Vereecke's insistence that obedience overrides all other Ockhamist interests and Marilyn McCord Adams's claim that Ockham does not undermine rationality in general or phronesis in particular. P. concludes this admirable work with John of Capistrano's casuistry, hinting at the influence that Franciscan interest in rhetoric, phronesis, and contingency might have had on that important form of moral reasoning. This is a satisfying and illuminating work on an oft-neglected school in the history of ethics.

JAMES F. KEENAN, S.J.
Weston Jesuit School of Theology


Burns is a pre-eminent scholar on the history of medieval Mediterranean Spain. This latest contribution is intended for three audiences: researchers in his own specific field, persons specializing in medieval studies generally, and a wider, non-specialist audience. While the book will not prove an easy read for the third group, B. provides a glossary of unfamiliar terms to facilitate the process.

Those familiar with the discussions about Christian-Jewish relations since Vatican II's affirmations about the Church and the Jewish people will find this work of special interest. The medieval era has been relatively neglected in terms of research on Christian-Jewish relations. Recent scholarship has tended to concentrate on the first and the twentieth centuries. When attention has turned to the medieval period, it is usually in terms of the widespread anti-Semitism that scared its face. B. here looks for more constructive aspects of the relationship.

B. examines some 50 Jewish wills and will-related charters prepared by notaries of the time. These materials offer a remarkable window on the daily life of the pluri-ethnic society of Mediterranean Spain. His analysis clearly shows that Jews were not totally marginalized in medieval Spanish society. On the contrary, they were far more integral to the life of the general society than is usually presented in history books about the period. B. also gives special attention to the role of women in these documents and to women's wills in particular, extracting from them material important for an understanding of the role of women and of gender relationships during this era.

This well-researched and well-documented volume adds considerably to our knowledge of an era whose full picture is still somewhat veiled.

JOHN T. PAWLIKOWSKI, O.S.M.
Catholic Theological Union


Tracy is a distinguished historian, whose specialities are Erasmus and the history of the Netherlands. He brings these two subjects together
here by showing how Erasmus, cosmopolitan though he was and wanted to be considered, must be understood against the culture, politics, problems, and prejudices of the place where he was reared. While the book is successful in that regard, it shows at the same time how much Erasmus in the scope of his accomplishments transcended the confines of his native soil.

The book is perhaps most valuable in providing in handy form a kind of hermeneutical guide for interpreting Erasmus, as T. analyzes his antipathies, his themes, and his literary devices, especially those like dissimulatio, for fending off enemies. The individual chapters and their subdivisions, moreover, are succinct and judicious summaries of scholarship on important topics, such as “The Philosophy of Christ,” “The Anti-Semitism of Erasmus,” “On Monks and Mendicant Tyrants.”

T. has a broad and deep knowledge of Erasmus’s writings, and, in my opinion, his assessments of Erasmus on almost every issue are sound. In this volume, however, he deals with a somewhat limited number of Erasmus’s works, which for the most part does not include in any depth those that might be of the most interest to readers of this journal, such as Erasmus’s works of theological exposition and his works on ministry and spirituality, which he always faces with a strong measure of theology. The book provides for the theologian, rather, useful background for approaching Erasmus.

John W. O’Malley, S.J.
Weston Jesuit School of Theology


This study of More’s politics refutes recent psycho-historical approaches to the man who, according to Wegemer, contributed more to the recovery of the concept of statesmanship than any other early modern theorist. While others attribute More’s actions, especially those at the end of his life, to repression or rage, W. understands his maneuvers, and the motivation behind them, in terms of “civic humanism” (12). Sticking to More’s own texts, he shows how More’s politics is grounded in classical thought, biblical theology, and English common law. He also cites contemporaneous accounts of More’s last days and works, and these support W.’s assertion that More is best understood as a man of letters as well as a politician.

Because More never articulates his thinking in one place, W. surveys texts in which More’s political and literary theories are shown to be inextricably linked. For More, “literature is not only beautiful; it is also something useful and indeed necessary in shaping human action and in allowing political life to develop inasmuch as it artfully leads one to exercise reason freely” (25). More often reiterates reason’s primacy in the practice of statesmanship, and the fact that Protestants emphasize reason’s corruption incites his indignation. He believes they are undermining the principle of intelligibility upon which civic order and the common good rest. As an antidote, More prescribes the “re-nascence of good letters” (11).

W. points out how More appropriates classical and patristic writers in appealing to his nation’s conscience. More reminds his countrymen, as W. reminds us, to be optimistic about politics. Because “time tries truth,” as More puts it, a true statesman can “lose his head and have no harm” (214). W.’s book is refreshing for its clarity and copious references to primary sources. Students of More and others interested in the relationship between early modern politics and poetics will find it useful.

Scott Pilarz, S.J.
Georgetown University, D.C.


This carefully developed doctoral thesis critically explores the cogency
of a subject-oriented epistemology of religious knowledge. The title clearly delineates Carr's project: he focuses upon tracing a correspondence between the thought of John Henry Newman and of Hans-Georg Gadamer in order to work toward founding a way of proceeding in the study of religion. C. argues persuasively that Newman's theory of religious knowledge can be understood effectively in light of an appeal to an existentialist esthetics; this is a bold stance that is receiving wider acceptance in Newman scholarship today. In particular, this view of Newman's thought is conducive to the comparison C. insightfully draws with the rationality of esthetics in Gadamer's theory of interpretation. Hence, his study provides a fascinating combination of 19th-century British empiricism and 20th-century German existentialism.

After a valuable introduction to Gadamer's thought there is a helpful historical account of Newman's philosophical background. C.'s main argument then develops a perceptive synthesis of the epistemological themes around which Newman constructed his theory of religious knowledge compared with Gadamer's main esthetic and hermeneutical principles. C. deals fairly with the crucial weakness to such an esthetic-hermeneutical approach that relies on experiential, intersubjective experience. Hence he goes on to discuss the problem of authority and legitimate sources for reliable inferences in an esthetics of religious knowing.

Perhaps in a subsequent work C. will develop further his confidence in the tantalizing relation between symbolic, imaginative, and experiential knowing as a reliable basis for objective claims in religious knowledge. Though, had he researched current Newman literature more thoroughly, he could have developed here a more substantive view of this constructive relation. The weak bibliography and lack of an index compromise an otherwise exciting work.

GERARD MAGILL
Saint Louis University


Originally a 1992 doctoral dissertation at the Graduate Theological Union, Berkeley, this work compares and contrasts the anthropologies of neo-Confucian Wang Yang-ming (1472–1529) and neo-orthodox Karl Barth (1886–1968). Though aware that Confucianism and Christianity are different systems of thought, Kim believes that Wang's teaching on self-cultivation and Barth's on sanctification are "thickly resemblant views of a common issue, i.e., how to be fully human, or the Tao of radical humanization" (9).

K. first explains Wang's doctrines of the identity between mind-and-heart and principle, of the unity of knowing and acting, of sincerity, of the innate knowledge of the good, of humanity, of sin as evil desires, and of self-cultivation. For Wang, humans can achieve radical humanization through a double action: preservation of the heavenly principle and extirpation of human desires. Next K. delineates Barth's teaching on the relation between gospel and law, on the unity of theology and ethics, on the humanity of Christ as the foundation of sanctification, on humans as the image of God, on sin as sloth, on the direction of the Holy Spirit, and on God's elective, purifying, and creative love. Finally, K. draws out the parallels between Wang's and Barth's doctrines, constructing on the basis of this dialogue a Christology in which Jesus is seen as the Tao of radical humanization, the Ultimate Sage, the Ch'eng par excellence, the paradigm of the unity of jen and imago Dei, and the ultimate embodiment of humanity.

This work is a significant contribution to the Confucian-Christian dialogue. K. rightly takes the question of radical humanization as the starting point for an interreligious theological conversation. While illuminating resemblances, he avoids a facile identification of fundamental Confucian anthropological concepts with those of
Christian theology. It is to be hoped that in the future K. will expand the scope of his dialogue by including such important themes as the Trinity and the veneration of ancestors.

PETER C. PHAN
Catholic University of America


This is the product of King's 1996 Bampton Lectures at Oxford, which examined Christian spirituality from a Teilhardian perspective. It is a clear, well-written introduction to Teilhard's views of humanity and divinity and a fine biography for the general reader. King includes a good overview of T.'s family and his Jesuit formation. She does not emphasize themes from her previous books on ecotheology, feminism, and especially T.'s ambivalence towards Eastern spirituality, but she does treat T.'s relationships with women, especially Marguerite Teillard-Chambon and Lucille Swann, forthrightly, adequately, and with delicacy.

Each page contains a picture or a quotation from T.'s writings, or both. The photographs offer a pictorial view of T.'s world to the increasing number of young people who have never heard of him. The quotations manifest King's familiarity with T.'s spirituality and offer even the scholar solid material for reflection and meditation.

Although King rightfully describes the significance of T.'s World War I experience, it could have been even more helpful if she had developed his notion of creative union, a notion so fundamental for T. that it requires emphasis. Also, in introducing the fine chapter on T.'s three years in Cairo, King writes, "It was customary for Jesuit novices to devote themselves to a period of teaching between their years of philosophy and the beginning of their theological studies" (24). There is a slight inaccuracy here, for by the time of the teaching period, T. was no longer a novice but had already pronounced his perpetual vows as a Jesuit and was called a "scholastic."

King, a theologian, here offers a good introduction to T.'s vision and his Christian spirituality. At the same time she recognizes the importance of fossils, geology, and scientific research in his daily life. Her description of T.'s founding of the first journal of geobiology with his dear friend Pierre Leroy and the testimonies she later offers from other colleagues help readers understand the profound influence T. has had within the scientific community and beyond.

JAMES F. SALMON, S.J.
Loyola College, Baltimore


With this anecdotal chronicle of the 23 women invited by Pope Paul VI as auditors to Vatican II, McEnroy fills a major gap in historical studies on the ecclesiology of the council. Through personal interviews with almost all these women, who were seen but never heard in the conciliar sessions, she weaves a deft narrative of their experience, interspersed with recollections of bishops and periti. While M. deliberately sets out to break the literary silence surrounding women's presence and contributions at the council, she is equally determined to revive and evoke what she judges is becoming a "dangerous memory" of women as visible witnesses to the Church's universality and capacity to change.

The tale is at once informative, fascinating, amusing, and infuriating. Before introducing her major characters, M. situates them in a preconciliar Church that treated women as minors: unequal, unheard, ignored yet indispensable collaborators in its mission. She describes the courageous, if belated, invitation of Paul VI to these few women as the result of promptings by influential periti like Congar, Rahner, and Häring and two leading hierarchs, the Melkite Patriarch Maximos Hakim and Cardinal Leon Suenens. In introducing each of
the "council mothers," she describes their background, experience, participation, and influence. By the fourth session, the women included ten members of religious congregations and one from a secular institute; only two of the remaining laywomen were married. Three participants were from the U.S., among whom was Mary Luke Tobin, S.L., whose leadership and courage emerge in several interviews. The final chapters detail changing perceptions of the Church resulting from women's visible, symbolic conciliar presence.

This well-documented overview suffers at times from repetition and from M.'s personal editorializing. Clearly the subtext of her own recent dismissal from a theology faculty informs her treatment of the topic. She reminds the Church to implement its own Vatican II teaching on women's equal status and dignity, and to heed more carefully the voices of half its members, who lay claim to fuller participation in the Church's life and ministry.

Janice Farnham, R.J.M.
Weston Jesuit School of Theology

Paul Ricoeur: His Life and Work.

There are various ways into someone's life. Reagan captures four ways: a biographical essay, a personal memoir, a philosophical reflection, and unpublished interviews with Ricoeur himself. He clearly wishes to give access to a man whose work he has studied and whose life he has shared, a student become friend become confidant. Too close to be objective, he seeks a different kind of access, entrance into the "ordinary" of this extraordinary scholar.

Both biography and personal memoir name the ordinariness of Ricoeur. The essay on his life tells how his philosophical musings are born of a man who "wonders," not in some ivory tower but in the very fray of acceptance and rejection that were part of Ricoeur's journey. The more personal essay tells the same tale, showing now the intense interaction between Ricoeur and R. Both interweave Ricoeur's quest with the affairs of everyday life. The philosophical essay is a slice of Ricoeur's thought offered by looking at a single work, Oneself as Another. The task here is to relate the "ego" of personal identity with the "other." Through a classic Ricoeurian process, with assessments of action, agency, and narrative identity, with detours into the world of ethics and morality, and with a special concern for a dialectic between self-esteem and friendship, the full force of "oneself as another" gets articulated.

The final segment, the personal interviews, shows Ricoeur's thought at a number of different places, leading to his own most recent concern, the language of suffering. It names another language to be explored, of memory and forgiveness, a language to address the unmerited suffering in the world. It is in Ricoeur's own words a more immediate task replacing evil and guilt in the abstract, the problem of suffering man.

It is perhaps a misnomer to speak of this work as a study of Ricoeur's "life and work." Paul Ricoeur: a Personal Look might be a more appropriate title. Nonetheless, R. gives us an intriguing insight into Ricoeur's life.

Peter E. Fink, S.J.
Weston Jesuit School of Theology

The Bridge Betrayed: Religion and Genocide in Bosnia.

Sells recounts the enormity of the genocide perpetrated against the Muslim population of Bosnia-Herzegovina by Croatian and Serbian nationalists from 1992 to 1995. For S., himself of Serbian ancestry, the destruction of the 16th-century bridge of Mostar is a fitting symbol of the genocidal ideology invoked to efface a multireligious heritage that flourished for almost five centuries. Hannah Arendt once remarked of the Shoah that to "describe the concen-
tration camps *sine ira* is not to be ‘objective’ but to condone them,“ and S.’s description of the genocide and its historical antecedents summons the scholarly passion demanded by his topic.

S.’s admirably researched inquiry reveals the systemic nature and scope of the torture, killing, rape, detention, displacement, and destruction of cultural monuments, including the razing of ancient mosques, that conspired to justify the appellation of genocide—a tragedy abetted by the obfuscation of Western political leaders and the United Nations’ failure to fulfill its mandate to provide security and protection. Yet S.’s aim is not merely to describe, but to explain the genocide in terms of the ethnoreligious passions enflamed by Serbian Orthodox and Croatian Roman Catholic militants alike. Although such an attempt to unravel the “logic” of genocide is perforce more problematic, S. argues persuasively for the central role played by a Christoslavic mythology depicting Muslims as “Turkified” racial apostates. In their revisionist interpretation of the battle of Kosovo (1389), Serbian apologists thus drew upon the 19th-century portrayal of the fallen Prince Lazar as a Christlike figure whose treacherous death must be avenged by cleansing the nation of Muslim “Christ-killers.”

Genocide remains a complex phenomenon, yet it is perhaps not surprising that such absolute evil should exact an absolute “religious” sanction. S.’s fine book is a sobering challenge to all who would think otherwise.

WILLIAM O’NEILL, S.J.
Jesuit School of Theology, Berkeley

**A Preface to Theology. By W. Clark Gilpin. Chicago: University of**


The rise of fundamentalist movements in different religious traditions has been the subject of many studies over the last decade. This book focuses on what the authors label “the new Christian fundamentalism” which has a global presence. The main tenet of this study, strongly supported by the data provided, is that in Christian fundamentalism “the universalizing of the faith is intertwined with the homogenizing influences of consumerism, mass communication, and production in ways that are compatible with the creation of an international market culture by global capitalist institutions” (3).

The authors start by outlining three main features of Christian fundamentalism: the “born-again” experience, a stress on the inerrancy of the Bible, and an interpretation of history based on millennialism and dispensationalism. Then they successfully show how Christian fundamentalism is linked with American nationalism and the American gospel of success, wealth, and prosperity. The preaching of Christian fundamentalism in different parts of the world is shown to be intimately connected with the proliferation of American mass media and communication, American economic aid programs, and the adoption of English as the international language.

The bulk of the book explores how Christian fundamentalism has taken root in Guatemala, the Philippines, South Korea, Liberia, and elsewhere in Africa. Most of the original contributions of this study lie here. The authors conclude that everywhere Christian fundamentalist defines itself as anti-Islamic, anti-communist, anti-Catholic, and anti-feminist. Since they make no theological evaluations and no assessment of the movement’s repercussions on both society and religion, the reader is left wondering whether the new Christian fundamentalism is another form of Western colonialism and whether it would create, rather than solve, the religious issues which Christianity and other religions must face at the turn of the millennium.

JOHN A. SALIBA
University of Detroit Mercy
This volume is really a history of Protestant theological education in the U.S. from 1720 to the present. Gilpin is particularly attentive to the social context in which theological education has taken place, which he terms “the American circumstance,” namely, “the transition from theology done in the context of nationally established churches to theology done in the context of religious pluralism and the separation of church and state” (xiii).

In the period 1720–1830, the most common method of theological education was a ministerial apprenticeship, known as “reading divinity.” This could be haphazard and isolated, however, and so the first institution for theological education, Andover Seminary, was founded in 1808 by the Congregationalists. By the mid 1820s some 15 other seminaries representing Baptists, Episcopalians, Presbyterians, Lutherans, and Reformed traditions had been established. The middle decades of the 19th century saw these seminaries transformed by the ideal of scholarship, which had “major consequences both for the self-conception of the theological faculty and for the relation of theological scholarship to American public life” (42).

From the beginning, however, these schools had been perceived as having a double role in society—as pruveyors of a religious tradition and as institutions of innovation, free inquiry, and reform. These dual expectations have generated tensions between the schools and their various constituencies. These tensions became even more acute with the emergence of the modern American research university in the latter part of the 19th century when theology became another graduate department whose purpose was not only ministerial education but the extension of knowledge by original research.

G. suggests that the historic tensions in theological education continue today because of the shifting relationships among theology’s three publics: church, academy, and society. This is reflected in the current discussion (Tracy–Lindbeck) about the public character of theology. This volume provides no answers but helps put these current debates in a larger historical perspective.

T. HOWLAND SANKS, S.J.
Jesuit School of Theology, Berkeley


This excellent book directly addresses our social condition and cultural flux and comes to grips with what must be done to remedy them. We have experienced an effacement of the “power words,” i.e. deep symbols, that were a major source of social coherence in former generations. We still use such power words as “obligation, law, tradition, hope, the real,” but they have lost their heft or, as Farley would say, their enchantment.

Deep symbols have several characteristics: location in a master narrative, normativity, enchantment, and fallibility. The price we must pay for reenchanting these symbols is reengagement with the master narratives and the transcendent reality they have mediated. These symbols will not be reenchanted by analysis, by greater conceptual precision, nor by being isolated one from another. Since the master narratives of religious traditions are the sources of deep symbols, citizens will have to reinvest themselves in these traditions if they wish to be formed and empowered by them. Symbols shape persons and cultures if they are appropriated as symbols. If they are taken as concepts they will, at best, inform, as they do at present. Evidence of their effacement is the endless wrangling that attends their misappropriation as concepts. F. does not spend much time lamenting, so diligent is he in convincingly constructing a way of understanding and remediating our condition.

Postmodernity, which is given only brief treatment, is seen as the bane of deep symbols because it is always ef-
facing "fixed meanings such as truth, reality, self, god, knowledge, history" (11). The result is a citizenry which is "multiphrenic," i.e., constantly exposed to multiple symbolic worlds whose values are endlessly in conflict because they float free of the meta-narratival homes from which they derived.

JOHN C. HAUGHEY, S.J.
Loyola University, Chicago


Many commentators on our age have fled in terror from the mathematical and tightly disciplined understanding science involves. Many theologians have never had a postsecondary course in mathematics of any kind. If we add in the brutalizing experience theology has endured when it has wandered into the scientific universe and tried to assert a normative role, the theological horror before science is sadly understandable.

Ward does not share this anxiety. In a short but elegant and wide-ranging analysis he looks at cosmology and biology and related projects and takes on some of their outstanding advocates and interpreters. Being an Oxford divinity professor, he concentrates on Oxford and Cambridge figures such as Stephen Hawking, Peter Atkins, Richard Dawkins, and Michael Ruse. They are, however, standout proponents of the "new materialism" and popularizers of power and influence. A theologian must confront them or risk the charge of irrelevance to our age.

W. accepts that all science, from cosmology to sociology, is now based on an evolutionary paradigm. But he notes that if something comes into being in a slow, gradual process, it is just as amazing as if it came into being rapidly.

W. is gracious and polite. At times he also moves close to logic chopping in this analysis, particularly of Darwinian evolution as Dawkins presents it. But perhaps such relentless hewing of stone is needed to free a full statue from a difficult material and fashion a scientific worldview from within a Christian perspective.

FRANK R. HAIG, S.J.
Loyola College, Baltimore


Special divine action, in contrast to general divine action, operates at a particular time and place to bring about a result that would otherwise not happen. Indirect special divine action operates through the ordinary network of created causes, whereas direct special divine action bypasses that network in some way to produce a miracle. Gwynn surveys, organizes, and evaluates with clarity and judicious care a vast amount of literature on this subject in the period from Vatican II up to 1995. The concept itself lies at the heart of Christian faith, since it touches on matters like revelation, the Incarnation, the grace of the Holy Spirit, the sacraments, and the guidance of the Church.

G. analyzes the language used to describe and define his topic, distinguishing especially the language of causality and that of intention. He considers the difficulties against special divine action coming from the natural sciences and from the nature of the divine agent (God's transcendence, faithfulness to the created order, and moral character) though God's personal involvement in creation favors special divine action. The most acute problem is found in God's failure to act to prevent certain evils. G. concludes that in spite of difficulties there are good reasons for affirming the coherence and credibility of such divine action.

G. succeeds admirably in what he sets out to do: illuminate the key issues in a contemporary debate. He does not cast a great deal of light on the underlying metaphysical issues of the causality and freedom of God and of creatures that one must consider in

In this work of political philosophy, Kautz challenges the current communitarian trend. He carefully argues for the abiding validity of liberalism, emphasizing its virtue of tolerance and its possibility for actual civic peace. He disputes the common criticism that the rights-based liberalism of the day leads to moral anarchy. Rather, he argues, the greater threat of arriving at that fractious end lies with the reigning, closed communitarian thinking that rejects the possibility of a common reason.

This book lays down an overdue challenge for theological ethics: the need to put the brakes on its communitarian trend and assess again the benefits of liberalism. K.'s realism and cogent analyses can help in this task. He argues that political theorist Michael Sandel's claim that "we can know a good in common that we cannot know alone" is asserted at the expense of a frank acknowledgment of the destructive effects of pride and ambition on communal life. K. also provides extended readings of Richard Rorty, Benjamin Barber, and Michael Walzer.

But K. can help theological ethics only so much. His anthropology labors under a reductionist Hobbesian influence. The body is the sole principle of individuality, leaving persons slaves to their desires. As he puts it: "Human beings are by nature solitary and selfish, querulous and untrustworthy competitors for scarce and often fragile private goods" (30). This overstates the case, even in the face of a problematic communitarian optimism. But it also raises the question: In a reassessment of liberalism in theological ethics, is it time to return to the Augustinian-Niebuhrian line, i.e., to a realism that recognizes the enduring power of sin as well as the transcendent dignity of the individual—a dignity oriented to love?


Theological ethics, especially Catholic moral theology, has wrestled extensively with the question of the distinctiveness of Christian ethics. Pellegrino and Thomasma grapple with a variation of that question: From a virtue perspective, what difference does it make to be a Christian physician? Using the traditional distinction between natural and supernatural virtues, they answer that being a Christian makes a substantial difference.

Although P. and T. too readily accept the distinction between natural and supernatural virtues, it serves their purpose. The distinction allows them to see continuity, or at least the potential for constructive conversation, between Christians and non-Christians. Yet, the distinction also provides for Christian convictions transforming both what we take to be a virtuous physician and the principles of bioethics—beneficence, autonomy, and justice. P. and T. illustrate the former transformation by defining the supernatural virtues of faith, hope, and love, and then by suggesting ways in which these virtues change the practice of medicine. Unfortunately, the analysis of these virtues is too basic to be of much help. The explanation of how these virtues change medicine is correspondingly thin.

They do better at illustrating how Christian convictions transform the principles of bioethics. For example, they rightly claim that a Christian-virtue perspective cannot maintain the distinction in beneficence between obligatory and supererogatory. Instead, the Christian is called to strive continually for the ideal "with the limits of grace open to him or her" (75). The supererogatory becomes the
norm for which we strive. Justice is similarly transformed into "charitable justice"—where "rendering to others their due" is defined by what is owed out of love (128). Although the book needs more substantive accounts of the virtues, its strengths outweigh its weaknesses. It is worth the read.

Joseph J. Kotva, Jr.
First Mennonite Church
Allentown


Opening with a passage from Thomas Wolfe's ode to America, Wuthnow argues that after a century of conceiving work and money in scientific and economic terms, the American dream that once provided a moral framework to restrain economic behavior now has become a metaphor for acquisitiveness and certain notions of economic equality. W. holds that an earlier rendering of the American dream—formed by a Protestant ascetic and expressive moralism derived from medieval religious injunctions against usury, Protestant Reformers' emphasis on stewardship, and Enlightenment philosophers' efforts to derive principles of compassion and civic virtue from natural law—once impelled those such as Benjamin Franklin (Poor Richard) to be disciplined and hardworking yet restrained in their economic pursuits. Today, in contrast, this sort of American dream has all but vanished and, as a result, Americans now are confused about the moral meanings of their economic commitments.

The greatest strength of this finely crafted text is its historical, literary, philosophical, religious, and social-scientific support for a central thesis that essentially counters Max Weber's Protestant ethic of capitalism. Both practical and insightful, W. draws on the experiences of ordinary people as he explains the confusion and secrecy that currently surround domestic financial matters.

Despite its many fine qualities, however, the text's weaknesses are its tendency toward narrowness and its tendency to omit the negative aspects of the early American dream. Non-Protestants surely will disagree that "only in the Protestant teachings... did the extreme separation of the material from the spiritual come to be challenged" (292). Others may object that though it provided some with an ascetic order and expressive language, the early American dream excluded many and allowed certain evils such as slavery and abuse of Native Americans to flourish virtually unchallenged. Even so, the book is recommended as a provocative rejoinder to Weber's Protestant work ethic and an insightful summary of contemporary American spirituality.

Martin Calkins, S.J.
Univ. of Virginia, Charlottesville


Wilbanks here tackles a vital yet sadly neglected area of ethics, that of immigration and refugee policies. His argument could be more clearly structured, but the content deserves close attention. W.'s approach is explicitly Christian and contextual, focused on the responsibilities of U.S. Christians toward those who seek to enter the U.S. His moral analysis, however, includes principles and priorities applicable beyond U.S. borders and open to affirmation outside church circles, since his particularist narrative ethics, grounded in the biblical norms of hospitality to the stranger and inclusive community, supports a universal human-rights ethic.

Movement across international borders, especially forced movement, raises pressing issues about the justice of the nation-state system as a form of international organization, the moral significance of membership
in nation states, and the extent and limits of nation-state sovereignty. In his approach to these issues, W. poses a series of pertinent questions and highlights the central moral problem: how to deal with the tension between the needs and interests of the community and the needs and interests of outsiders.

Through his brief historical overview of U.S. policies and analysis of the current immigration debate, W. exposes the inadequacy of utilitarian and nationalist approaches to immigration and refugee policies. Constructively, he stakes out a position in the broad moral space between Joseph Carens’s Rawlsian argument for open borders and Michael Walzer’s communitarian defense of sovereign control of entry, as he argues for developing moral communities that embody hospitality as a norm. Hoping that the U.S. can yet become such a community, W. proposes principles and priorities for U.S. regulation of entry. Appropriately, he assigns top priority to the admission of refugees, those for whom refusal of entry may well mean death.

FRANCIS M. ELVEY
Boston College


Jones is a clinical psychologist, professor of religious studies at Rutgers, and a practicing psychotherapist. His opening chapter presents a review of Freud’s approach to the origins of religion, stressing the location of religion in the superego and the id and Freud’s effort to replace religion with science. Next the argument moves to replace Freud’s view of human nature, caricatured as isolated, mechanistic and reductionistic, with a view of man as relational and all psychic functions as relationally embedded. The resulting view of analysis is cast in relational terms, as concerned with, embedded in, and adequately accounted for in terms of relationships. J. has boarded the relational bandwagon which is currently the analytic rage, but whether the fact that the self lives in relationships from the beginning and is capable of relations at many levels makes the self inherently, essentially, and exclusively relational remains an open question.

This relational psychology, originating with Macmurray, Fairbairn, and Winnicott, is extended to a relational theology. Here relational concepts sweep the field, but give rise to some difficulties. The effort comes around to a form of psychologizing of theology, in which all terms are drawn into the relational perspective—including the existence of God. But the idea of God as inherently relational, i.e. without meaning except in terms of relatedness to man, would trouble many theologians. Also J. does a disservice to some of his sources. He tries to separate my own thinking about transitional concepts from Winnicott’s notions of experience and creativity—ideas on which transitional conceptualization is actually based. Likewise, he forces Rizzuto into saying that God’s reality is that of a transitional object, whereas she regards only the God-representation as transitional, leaving the question of God’s existence open to theological definition. Students of religion will otherwise find much food for thought in these pages.

W. W. MEISSNER, S.J., M.D.
Boston College


This well-conceived work presents fresh concepts that demonstrate the depth and range of Fowler’s thought. Building upon his seminal faith-development theory, F. offers ways of conceiving personal and cultural challenges facing the formation of faith in the postmodern world. The book is well organized, with occasional subheadings enhancing the flow of ideas. Though the language is at times a bit ponderous, F. frequently rewards the reader’s perseverance with astute assertions.
Part 1 addresses the origins of a child’s faith through the emerging self. Recognizing the previous influence of Erik Erikson and Jean Piaget upon his thought, F. incorporates the research of Daniel Stern and Ana Marie Rizzuto to enhance his six-stage theory of faith development. The result is a more explicit emphasis upon emotions. Followers of F. will welcome a comparison between the “faithful change” described in faith-development theory and the “once-born” and “twice-born” types of change conceived by William James. Among the issues facing the postmodern world, Part 2 highlights the “fault lines” of shame. Finding that shame is no longer accentuated in Asian societies alone, F. describes shame’s cultural, psychological, and religious features. Perhaps the book’s greatest value is found in Part 3, where F. tackles postmodern consciousness. Combining constructs from faith-development theory with several theological approaches, F. addresses questions at the heart of a postmodern understanding of the providence or “praxis” of God.

In sum, this is a worthwhile book and deserves serious reading. The fields of religious studies and theology are fortunate to have a thinker such as F., whose writing extends his and other developmental theories into the social and spiritual landscapes of the postmodern world.

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