BOOK REVIEWS


Holladay’s passionate conviction that Christians must “hear” the word of God in the writings which were Scripture for Jesus is apparent throughout this thematic introduction to the Old Testament. It looks first at the pervasive metaphor of the covenantal relationship between the sovereign God of the Jews and Israel; chapters on Israel’s understanding of Law, of the “fear of God” and of the “wrath of God” develop aspects of this fundamental metaphor. Four chapters suggest ways Christian readers today can hear the word of God in those sometimes sordid or simply incredible or tedious accounts of “battles” or “signs and wonders” or “lists” of descendants. H. treats the prophetic, apocalyptic, and wisdom materials in separate chapters before turning to an issue which increasingly disturbs women today, the predominance of the male in the narratives and in the image of God as well. A final chapter on the Psalms, under the rubric of “worship,” completes this introduction.

 interspersed with his summaries of these writings and their historical context is what H. calls a “manual of theological considerations that can stimulate a reading of the [OT] for listening—an expectant listening that heightens the possibilities for hearing God” (1).

Two examples might illustrate his approach. When reviewing the oracles of judgment against Babylon in Jeremiah 50–51 H. suggests that, much as the New Testament used Babylon as a symbol for Rome, so we might “ponder the possibility of seeing our own nation-state as an analogy of Babylon. . . . it may therefore be a useful exercise to ponder the place of the Church within our nation-state after the analogy of the Jews in Babylonian exile” (198). And when treating the Psalms of Lament where today’s Christian reader might stumble over the frequent expressions of self-righteousness and hatred of enemies he suggests three approaches: an identification with the victims (a battered woman might find Psalm 41 describes her plight); perceiving the demons within us, such as “habit-forming substance or behavior” (312); and a listening to Jesus’ own use of these psalms. In these ways H. hopes to reawaken a “listening” for the voice of God in the OT text today.

In the excellent chapter on male and female, H. deals with the status of women in Israelite society and the relevant texts about the status of males and females before examining at length three “crucial” texts (Genesis 1–3, Jeremiah 31:22 and the Song of Songs) and finding “guidance” on this issue from NT texts. If the “parity” of male and female in Genesis 1 is “never glimpsed, let alone expressed” in
most of the OT, then "in the crucial matter of relations between the sexes the [OT] does not in general offer God's direct voice" (288). Still, there are "occasional feminine images of God" (295) which remind us that in practice we must conceive of a personal God in images that are either male or female, while acknowledging that all talk about God remains metaphor.

H. has omitted those books which appear in Catholic versions (those classified as "Apocrypha" in other versions). It is an unfortunate decision, for these writings are also Scripture for Roman Catholics and there is material in those books which could have aided his interpretations. His treatment of the history of wisdom in Israel seems perfunctory without the inclusion of Ecclesiasticus and the Wisdom of Solomon, the latter a book included even in two early lists of the writings used in the early Christian churches.

While H. is careful to employ historical-critical perspectives for OT materials, locating writings in their probable historical context, he does not make the same effort for NT texts. Indeed, the reader might not know that there even was a historical-critical approach to NT texts or that each writing reflects something of the variety of distinctive theologies which contributed to the developed Christology of the end of the first century. This can often lead to misreadings of NT texts. Moreover, the absence of an extensive table of contents and of an index of subjects reduces this book's usefulness as a "manual"; while an index of scriptural passages is provided, it is not easy to find again a topic that one would like to reread or cite.

This book is, nonetheless, a remarkable effort. It is clear that H. strongly believes the OT is neglected today and that this neglect has impoverished the Christian tradition. Reading the book is like taking a series of seminars with a compassionate and erudite guide, whose own hearing of the word of God in the OT emerges in the process.

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Hugh M. Humphrey


Preuss offers us a magisterial two-volume overview of historical theology as found in the Old Testament. The work abounds in references to classical and contemporary scholars, mostly German, and strikes one as solid, somewhat traditional, but open to new insights.

Preuss dates the Yahwist to the time of David or Solomon, argues strongly for the historical reality of Moses underlying both the Exodus and Sinai traditions, and accepts the Midianite provenance of "Yahweh" and the eventual formation of Israel as a union of tribes around a nucleus of Yhwh-worshipers arriving in Canaan from Egypt, in line with the usual interpretation of Joshua 24. But he shares the reserve
of current scholarship about "covenant" in Israel prior to the eighth century, is very skeptical about the early history of the priesthood, and confesses an inability to date the patriarchal period on the basis of the Pentateuch. At best its culture is different from that which existed after the exile.

P. begins with the "center" of the OT, "YHWH's historical activity of electing Israel for communion with his world and the obedient activity required of this people (and the nations)" (1.25). The "primal election" of Israel occurred in the Exodus and served as a promise of future salvation, but also imposed on the people the obligation of a continuing relationship. P. has wisely substituted the concept of "election" for what used to be called "covenant." This allows him to accept the basic theology of Sinai and argue that it developed later, under Deuteronomic influence, into covenant. Though the Decalogue is of Deuteronomic formulation, its first two commandments, to worship Yhwh, a "jealous God," alone and without images, go back to the time of Moses. So does the ark, "as a typical, portable, migrating shrine and war palladium" (1.253). Its designation as "ark of the covenant," however, came later, in Deuteronomy and deuteronomistic texts.

In seeking to understand "the theological basis of the law of God" (1.80), P. is essentially correct when he notes that apodictic statements are not laws but fundamental principles upon which legislation of the later community is established. They are derived from the family and seek its survival through the death sanction. Eventually they were associated with the will of God and the sphere of sacral law or "the law of YHWH's privilege (Exod 34:10–26)" (1.89). Casuistic or secular laws based on social or economic relationships are found in the Code of the Covenant mixed with laws of "YHWH's privilege." Both were part of a legal code sanctioned in the name of God. Transgressors were subject to a curse, stood within the sphere of evil, and were excluded from the community of salvation. The God of Israel exercised at the same time gracious mercy and firm demands of his holy will.

P. takes a new approach in discussing God's righteousness. It used to be seen as an expression of divine covenant; Yhwh's deeds of salvation would be at one end, and human response in righteousness at the other. P. argues that Yhwh's righteousness originally involved neither compensatory nor retributive justice but simply acts of salvation for his people (Jgs 5:11; Deut 33:21). Surprisingly this does not include the Exodus; apart from the special text of Deut 33:21, there is no mention of the righteousness of Yhwh in the Pentateuch. It begins with the divine gift of the land and is associated with Zion/Jerusalem, a Jebusite city named for the god Salem and probably a center of worship of the god Sedeq, "Righteousness." There is now evidence of the existence of the god Sedeq in the Phoenician-Syrian region. He is mentioned in 14th-century Ugaritic personal names, and of course in the Bible, e.g. in the names of Melchizedek and Adonizedek, kings
of Jerusalem. Sedeq is a solar god responsible for a just world order, perhaps similar to Utu or Shemesh of Mesopotamia. Yhwh absorbed Sedeq along with his characteristics and functions, and could be called upon especially in the cult to display his merciful "acts of righteousness." If one is not warranted to think of Yhwh's righteousness in terms of covenant, then P. presents a good alternative.

In a section on divine revelation in the OT, P. states that it occurs in history and its interpretation, and is not found directly in the Wisdom Literature. He rejects attempts by N. Lohfink to recognize "natural revelation" in Qoheleth 3:11 ff. or M. Saebo's efforts to see the same in the experiential sayings of wisdom (1.208-9). I believe, however, that greater openness to the idea of revelation through nature would be warranted.

When describing the recipients of divine election, which comprises most of Volume 2, P. begins with the ancestors, aware of the difficulty of assessing their historicity, but with confidence, e.g., that the promise of the land made to them was not the same as that made to the Moses group, an indication of real differences between the two groups. New promises are associated with the monarchy, which led eventually to the messianic hope, in connection with eschatology, which "has found no parallel in the cultures surrounding ancient Israel" (2.35), but which is related to Israel's own theology of election. P.'s insights here are very helpful in understanding the uniqueness of Israel, and further his thesis considerably. His thoughts on the history and theology of the priesthood are equally valid. It too is marked by the concept of being "chosen," the earliest expression of which is found in 1 Sam 2:28 with reference to the house of Eli. Zadok is the first priest of whom we know some details, though the most important one, that he was a pre-Israelite priest of Jebusite Jerusalem at the time of David's conquest of the city, was covered over in later texts. Of the historical Aaron we know nothing, nor anything certain about the origin of the levites. Later descriptions of priestly activity show that it was much different from that of pagan nations, where various forms of omenology, care for idols and magical rites were practiced. These were forbidden in Israel, because that would not conform to the character of Yhwh. The prophets were aware of Israel's election tradition but were generally critical of it, because the people were unwilling to abide by Yhwh's ongoing demands for justice. They interpreted Israel's subjection to the Assyrians and Babylonians as acts of God.

P.'s final section begins with a chapter on anthropology, which includes biology, the relationship of matter and spirit, language, life and death, resurrection, faith, trust, sin, guilt, and atonement. One learns, e.g., that it took so long for the Israelites to accept resurrection after death because that was part of their neighbors' beliefs, which they had rejected as idolatrous. Questions of theodicy led to the eventual Israelite acceptance of reward and punishment in a new life after death.
Righteousness of the individual involved fidelity to relationships with Yhwh and the human community; sin was rebellion against those obligations, but Yhwh punished and forgave for reasons based on his own nature, not on human righteousness.

A chapter on ethics warns the reader about the great cultural distance of the OT from ourselves; regulations on the ban in wartime or ritual purity must be seen in that context. In general, the focus was on the good of the community rather than the individual. A chapter on worship presents the history of sacrifice and prayer and concludes with the observation that its purpose was the continuing sanctification of the people of God.

Eschatology did not mean “last things” until the very end of the OT period when it merged into apocalyptic. OT hope was primarily this-worldly and was based on faith in Yhwh’s promises and interventions going all the way back to the Yahwist’s account in Genesis. The “Day of Yhwh,” relatively frequent in the prophetic texts, was thought to be a time of judgment “near at hand.” Apocalyptic developed out of prophecy in response to questions of theodicy brought on by terrible persecutions and martyrdom.

A final chapter looks at Israel’s attitude toward foreigners, which was a combination of fear and hope. Statements about their possible salvation are intertwined with those expecting their destruction. Ambivalence about the nations is one example of the “openness” of the OT with which P. concludes his presentation.

This is a valuable contribution to biblical scholarship. It abounds in discussion with different opinions but arrives at balanced conclusions, not jettisoning the main outlines of biblical history but aware of the limitation of preexilic sources. P.’s attempt to place the whole OT under the category “election” is not entirely successful; the Wisdom Literature’s openness to scientific exploration of the world still sets it apart. The indices of biblical citations and subject matter are most helpful, as are the numerous footnotes with up-to-date bibliography.

Washington Theological Union

JOSEPH F. WIMMER, O.S.A.


Here is a major work on the lessons from Greek tragedy for our reading of the Gospels, especially Mark. It is also an indictment of modernist and postmodernist caricatures of tragedy based on oversimplifying dichotomies between pessimism and optimism. Tragedy begins with suffering but need not end badly. Indeed, as Nietzsche maintained, the point of tragedy is the journey, not the ending.

Ruprecht gives us well-documented studies based on primary and secondary sources of Sophocles, Hegel, and the Synoptic Gospels. For him the crux of Sophocles’s Antigone is the conflict of wills between
Antigone and Creon, rather than, as Nussbaum would have it, the interjections of the chorus. The key to the Synoptics is the agony in the garden of Gethsemane. To Hegel's lectures on esthetics we owe the differentiation between fate and destiny on which a true understanding of tragedy depends. Of three men on crosses in Mark, for only one was the cross his destiny (229).

Rather than allow shifts of meaning according to context, R. assumes that the earlier classical meaning of "tragedy" should be normative. This is necessarily religious, since the resolution is of a divine-human conflict of wills which is redemptive through suffering. On this reading, Waiting for Godot and the Fourth Gospel are not tragedies, the Antigone and Mark are. Both the latter are classic, dramatic renderings of stories familiar to their audiences. The authors' genius is to deepen the account of pivotal contests into moments of authentic choice. In this connection, Mark's ambiguous ending is dramatically superior to John's triumphalism.

The classical tragic vision embraces extremes in an ennobling movement of the human spirit. The tragic posture of modernists, by contrast, assumes that tragedy must be flatly pessimistic. George Steiner and Alasdair MacIntyre are faulted on this score. MacIntyre's After Virtue is doubly wrong, despite its many insights, because, according to R., it assumes that our posture must be "after" or "post-" a nostalgically portrayed tradition. And it follows Aristotle on virtue. Aristotle advocated the mean between extremes, not a dialectic of the spirit. For R., the tragedians, not the philosophers, are the Greeks to whom we should turn for insight into the human condition.

R. is kinder to Hegel than to Aristotle or Nietzsche because Hegel, like Aquinas, synthesized Greek and Jewish wisdom. Nietzsche corrects Hegel's later teleological optimism and returns us to the contrast between fate and destiny. But his either/or dichotomy between Dionysius and the Crucified One trades on a superficial dismissal of Christianity as nihilistic. The chapter on Nietzsche serves primarily as a transition from Hegel on Greek tragedy to the Gospels so misunderstood and neglected by Nietzsche.

While R.'s scholarship is generally impressive, one misses any reference to C. N. Cochrane's account of Christianity and classical culture and J. M. Robinson's discussion of the problem of history in Mark. More serious is the absence of any discussion of N. Frye's fourfold schema in terms of tragedy, comedy, irony, and romance as applied to Christian narratives, for instance by James F. Hopewell. R. keeps his wide-ranging discussion within bounds by concentrating on the contrasts between tragic posture and tragic vision, unmitigated disaster and self-affirming destiny, the atheism of No Exit and the redemptive imagination of the classical poets. His work will have to be consulted by anyone debating whether or not the Gospels are tragedies. But his conception of the genre could be enriched by considering more of their differences from classical tragedies, as well as their
similarities. Here Hegel's Lutheran background and emphasis on history might point us to prophets as well as to poets for insight into the ethical absolute R. finds characteristic of true religion.

**General Theological Seminary, N.Y.**

C. Peter Slater


Imagine a history of Galilee from about the third century B.C. to about the third century A.D. that takes no significant account of the crucial role religion played in Galilean life and deliberately chooses to say very little about the Jesus movement, that dwells on matters of economics, politics, and social life in general without integrating these factors with what we know of early Jewish religious life, and you will have a general picture of Horsley's book.

In spite of this deliberate neglect or trivialization of the religious character of early Judaism, however, the book has much to recommend it. For one thing, H. has read extensively, in some cases almost exhaustively on his subject. He has interacted with detailed archeology reports, the work of social scientists, economists, political historians, and the primary source material in Josephus and the Mishnah, and occasionally with the New Testament. He offers a wealth of detailed data which helps give a thicker description of the social matrix out of which both early Judaism and early Christianity arose in Galilee.

For another thing, H. brings a sophistication to the discussion, which includes a realization that all the sources, both ancient and modern, must be evaluated critically. He does not simply endorse a modern social model as a tool to evaluate the ancient data, though he does seem overly enamored with the works of J. H. Kautsky, G. E. Lenski, and J. C. Scott (none of whom is an expert in Ancient Near Eastern culture) when it comes to evaluating the relationship of the governed to the governors in what H. calls a peasant society in Galilee. Evidence must be weighed and sifted, whether it is a modern archeology report, or an ancient literary source. H. is usually a careful sifter and his efforts produce some interesting results, not the least of which is the conclusion that Galilee was not only a mixed language milieu, and a mixed cultural milieu, but that it continued to draw on ancient Israelite traditions and ideas, which becomes evident when one evaluates some of the periods of social unrest and banditry in the midst of which popular kingship movements sometimes arose. H. is tempted to draw an analogy between the Jesus movement and such popular kingship movements in Galilee (271–82), but he refrains or perhaps defers the task to another day. What he suggests, namely that Jesus was interested in reforming local village life in Galilee, does not differ from what he has asserted in past writings (e.g. *Jesus and the Spiral of Violence*), and he still does not come to grips with
the various traditions that suggest that Jesus really intended to form out of his diverse group of followers a family of faith bound together by their allegiance and discipleship to himself (reflected, e.g., in Mark 3:31–35).

H. continues to be unpersuaded by the arguments of Hengel and others about the Zealots, and continues to ignore the critiques of his views by myself and others. His view remains that there was no continuous revolutionary or Zealot movement throughout the period of the Herods. In his view Zealots properly speaking do not show up until the revolt in A.D. 66. Of Saul of Tarsus H. has virtually nothing to say, even though, in order to evaluate whether there were religious zealots around during our period prepared to do violence in the service of Torah piety, one supposes that he would have to discuss Paul and his persecutions of early Christians.

H. also continues to argue that there were no synagogues in first-century Galilee, in spite of the fact that he allows that Galilee may have been something like a diaspora setting in terms of everyday religious and social life, and in spite of the fact that both the evidence of the NT and Josephus (our basic literary sources) suggest otherwise, as may also some of the recent archaeological data. H. is clearly right that lower Galilee was a frontier area, well removed from the religious center in Jerusalem, and this should have led to a more serious reflection on what Jewish religious life was likely to look like in such a setting.

H. has written an important and stimulating book that gathers together much relevant and helpful data about Galilee. Throughout, he uses the work of S. Freyne’s Galilee from Alexander the Great to Hadrian as the main jumping off point for his own discussion, because he disagrees with Freyne on many if not most of the major issues. Readers would do well to read these two books in tandem. Together they remind us that evaluating Galilee during the first century A.D. and before is a complex matter, and some sort of integrative approach that does justice to religion, politics, economy, history, and social life and pays attention to both literary and archeological data is likely to help us get a truer picture of things. A purely religious reading of the data will not do, but neither will an underestimation of, or reductionist approach to, the religious factor. If many of us in the past have been guilty of the former sort of imbalanced approach, H. is guilty of the latter. Somewhere between the two extremes is likely to lie the historical truth about Galilee and its Galileans.

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BEN WITHERINGTON, III

Fédou is a French Jesuit born two years after H. de Lubac published *Histoire et Esprit: L'intelligence de l'Écriture d'après Origène* and while he was still engaged in the preparation of *Exégèse médiévale*. He treats us to a powerful and eloquent argumentation, redolent of the spirit and style of de Lubac's masterpiece. The specialized readership he presumes are educated Catholics familiar with the patristic and theological revival of recent decades in France.

F. presents Origen's Christology in the frame of an apology for Origen himself, and as if this were not sufficient in itself, he considers this goal as a *détour* in order to reach "some light for the contemporary tasks of Christology" (18). The whole argumentation is set in the frame of self-affirmation within the boundaries of confessional Catholicism. While F.'s elegant prose is touched by a nostalgia that brings to mind the lyrical rhetoric of Balthasar, de Lubac, and other proponents of the patristic restoration that flourished in France half a century ago, his work is none the less very enlightening about the state of Origenian studies today.

After a brief introduction to the historical context of the third-century Church in the Eastern Mediterranean, F. plunges straight into a consideration of Origen's biblical thought. Instead of limiting the analysis to the notions of "allegory" or "type" on which the controversies were focused in the 1950s, he focuses directly on Origen's faith experience: "The christological exegesis does not have the status of an affirmation allegedly dictated by the scriptural text: it is consequent to a choice which is nothing other than a free commitment to Christ" (54). Emphasizing a principle already at the core of de Lubac's synthesis, F. underlines that it is faith as such that is the very source of Origenian allegorism. He goes a step further, consonant with recent trends in conservative circles, when he claims that "Christian exegesis originates in the exegesis of Christ himself, the first to explain 'in the whole of Scripture the things that referred to himself' (see Luke 24:27); and this exegesis of Christ is itself inseparable from his salvific presence among humanity" (55). Thus a poetic allegorizing of the gospel verse becomes a foundation for Origen's spiritual exegesis and an argument for its perennial value, permitting "a christological interpretation full of coherency and of a great beauty" (71).

A sequence of four chapters ("Figures and Prophecies," "The Coming of the Savior," "The Way of the Gospel," and "From Cross to Glory") filled with extensive extracts from Origen's works translated in an easy French illustrates the "coherency" and "beauty" noted above. In particular, F. reacts against hypercritical dismissals of the Latin version of Origen by Rufinus; he also contests Jerome's attacks and the condemnations of Justinian.

From Chapter 6 onwards, the exposition of Origenian themes becomes more systematic, and the broad presentation of Origen's doctrinal themes gives a remarkably clear account of their richness and consistency. The authority of Henri Crouzel is invoked page after
With full-page citations of Origen (and de Lubac as well) the distinctive voice of the Alexandrian theologian achieves impressive resonance, as do F.'s deepening calls for the vindication of Origen's orthodoxy. In a lyrical climax, he invites his readers to celebrate Origen's "mystical theology" (364) as Origen shared with his congregation his personal "expérience mystique" (368) when preaching on the Canticle. F. concludes that Origenian Christology as a whole should be declared "in the deepest sense of the word, a spiritual and mystical theology" (373). Such homage becomes characteristic of the study as a whole and may mark its most significant limitation for a wide-ranging readership.

F.'s richly documented exposition of Origen's thought is particularly valuable to introduce some of his readers to what may be a comparatively unknown territory of Christian spirituality. For others it will be a deterrent from the possible abuses of deconstructive criticism (J. S. O'Leary finds no friendly advocate here) (52). The overall impression is of a laudative paraphrase rather than a scholarly evaluation. F.'s identification with the motivation of his hero is at the cost of the needed critical distance. His attempted retrieval of the "coherence" and "beauty" of Origen's doctrine ignores the need for exploring the presuppositions of the Alexandrian's noetic world which is the very context for Origen's christological exposition. At only one point is F. constantly perplexed, namely at Origen's belief in the preexistence of human souls, a notion he laments as an "unfortunate blunder" (127 n. 6 and passim). It is noted, but not critically examined, presumably because it would undermine Origen's "consistency." That limitation should not deter even more critical readers from subscribing wholeheartedly to the hopes F. expresses in the final chapter regarding the continuing relevance of Origen's heritage for Christology.

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PAMELA BRIGHT


Perhaps no area of patristic theology has received such thorough revision in recent decades as the conflicts between "Arian" and "Nicene" Christianities in the fourth century. Numerous attempts have been made to understand Arius's original Christology and to chart the development of its offspring (e.g. neo-Arianism). The very label "Arian" has proved to be increasingly unhelpful, as distinctions among the different forms of resistance to the Council of Nicaea and its creed (Homoian, Homoiousian, Eunomian, etc.) have been elucidated. Williams here offers a succinct and well-reasoned account of the rise and fall of "Arianism" (Homoianism) in the West and the not-so-pivotal role played by Ambrose of Milan in its demise.
Standing squarely in the revisionist tradition of recent scholarship, W. argues that a "triumphalist" account of the development of orthodoxy, first articulated by fifth-century historians and hagiographers, has continued to distort modern perceptions of the "Arian" controversy. In particular, W. maintains, modern accounts have both overstated the weakness of Western Arianism and exaggerated the strength of Nicene Christianity and the role of Ambrose as its defender. W. argues convincingly that there was little explicit acknowledgement (and perhaps even little knowledge) of the Nicene Creed in the West prior to the late 350s. Suspicion of the term *homoousios* (it had Sabellian overtones and lacked biblical warrant), together with Emperor Constantius's support for non-Nicene Christianity, account for its comparative neglect. In 359 when the Councils of Ariminum (Rimini) and Seleucia drop all reference to the divine *ousia* and state only that the Son is "like" (*homoios*) the Father, most bishops acquiesce, owing to imperial pressure and the lack of real commitment to the Nicene formula. When the decrees of both Ariminum and Seleucia were ratified at Constantinople in 360, the Homoian creed became official orthodoxy and Homoian Arianism became a recognizable force in the West.

Only then, according to W., do we see a strong pro-Nicene reaction in the West. One of the great virtues of W.'s book is its attempt to draw attention to little-known defenders of Nicaea who preceded Ambrose: Hilary of Poitiers and Eusebius of Vercelli. W. carefully charts the careers of both men and their efforts to restore to the Nicene faith those bishops who had capitulated at the Western Council of Ariminum.

But the bulk of W.'s account deals with the career of Ambrose. Ambrose entered the see of Milan, probably as a compromise candidate, in 374 as successor to the Arian Auxentius, who had reigned for 19 years. Although Ambrose had a "familial and personal" attachment to Nicene Christianity, W. argues, he was no zealot and probably followed the policy of religious neutrality favored by the Western Emperor Valentinian I. The absence of anti-Arian polemic in Ambrose's earliest works, as W. notes, confirms the view that Ambrose took some time before coming to the defense of Nicaea.

The situation changed in the later 370s. Under pressure from the pro-Homoian court of Valentinian II and his mother Justina, Ambrose articulated his first attack on Arianism (and defense of himself) in the first two books of *De fide* in 378. Over the next few years Ambrose gradually solidified his relationship with the emperor Gratian, who himself turned against the Homoian party only after the Eastern Emperor Theodosius had begun to mandate Nicene orthodoxy as the "divine religion" in 381. In other words, W. suggests, Homoianism remained strong in the West and its suppression was spearheaded by the Eastern, not the Western, emperor.

In his final chapters W. examines the evidence for further revivals
of Homoianism in Milan during the early 380s. The famous events of these years (the conflict over the altar of Victory in 384 and the siege of the Milanese basilicas by the pro-Homoian forces of the court) are viewed against the background of Magnus Maximus's usurpation in Gaul. W. suggests that Ambrose skillfully used his position as envoy of the court to Maximus in order to strengthen his position at Milan, despite Maximus's murder of Gratian. Only after Maximus invaded Italy and Theodosius counterattacked, according to W., did the Homoian party finally succumb to the pressure of Theodosius's pro-Nicene legislation.

W. has presented a well-researched and convincing thesis. Like his mentor, T. D. Barnes, W. pays close attention to detail and intricate discussion of the dating and purpose of individual works. The readers of this journal might be disappointed by the lack of any discussion of the theologies or ideas at stake in the controversies. Nevertheless, W.'s study should prove fundamental to any future discussion of Western Arianism and Ambrose of Milan's role in the establishment of Nicene orthodoxy.

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DAVID G. HUNTER


Augustinian scholars distinguish at least three conversions in Augustine's life, which he recounts in Books 3, 7, and 8 of his Confessions. O'Connell has taken these three conversions as the focus for his fascinating study, showing us how much there is still to learn from a fresh examination of these pivotal episodes through an analysis of the images Augustine used in describing them.

O. argues that the first conversion, which was triggered by the reading of Cicero's Hortensius and, after a brief disappointing exploration of the Scriptures, led Augustine to turn for some nine years to Manicheism, actually had positive results, even in the eyes of Augustine the bishop. For it set him upon his search for intellectual certainties and freed him from the sort of blind submission to authority that he found demanded in the African Church.

Augustine's second conversion followed his contact with the books of the Platonists and led to his baptism at the Easter vigil of 387. O. argues that Chapters 10 through 20 of Book 7 do not represent a historical narrative of a series of insights, including mystical ascents and visions, that Augustine had in 386. Rather, they articulate a complex philosophical worldview that he came to only gradually and probably did not have fully formulated until close to the time of the Confessions. The argument that Augustine here presents a set of philosophical insights worked out over a period of months and even years suggests that we should understand the immutable divine light Au-
gustine claims to have seen not as a mystical vision of God but as a mediated vision, somewhat as we see the sunlight filtered through the clouds on a hazy day.

The later dating of the final formulation of the worldview to which Augustine began to move in 386 opens the door to the possibility, or even probability, that Augustine read more of the *Enneads* in those years than the very few books which he admits to having read during his initial contact with them. If one takes Augustine's claims to have "seen" in the sense of philosophical insight rather than in the sense of mystical vision, there are still other events, such as the vision at Ostia, that present strong evidence that Augustine was, as Cuthbert Butler said, "the prince of mystics."

In 1888 G. Boissier claimed that early dialogues and the *Confessions* present two quite different Augustines: the Augustine of the dialogues was mainly a neo-Platonic philosopher with only a tinge of Christianity, while the *Confessions* describe Augustine the Catholic bishop in the light of the Christian faith to which he had come. Contemporary scholars such as L. Ferrari and P. Fredriksen have argued in favor of an analogous view. Ferrari, for example, has argued that the text from Romans that Augustine read in the scene of his conversion in the garden in Book 8 could not have had the influence upon him that the *Confessions* describes, since these verses do not play any significant role in the works written prior to the *Confessions*.

O. argues that we must take Augustine seriously when he reports that he read not merely Romans 13:13-14, but the whole capitulum in which those verses occur. Then one finds that the imagery in those verses, for example, light and darkness, waking from sleep, the urgency of the present moment, the donning of the armor of Christ, and the casting aside of what holds one back from commitment to Christ, is abundantly present in the early dialogues. Indeed, O. shows that Christian themes are so dominant in the dialogues that one wonders why the dialogues were ever taken to be "philosophical" in any sense but the Augustinian sense according to which philosophy includes the Christian message of salvation as an understanding of the faith.

Once again O. offers us an exciting book on the greatest of the Western Fathers. He places the central sections of the *Confessions* in fresh perspectives and reveals the power of image analysis for uncovering the mind of that puzzling man from Hippo who continues to fascinate after more than 1600 years.

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ROLAND J. TESKE, S.J.

**AUGUSTINE AND THE CATECHUMENATE.** By William Harmless, S.J.  

In the past two decades a large body of literature examining the early Christian rite of initiation has appeared, fueled in part by the liturgical-renewal movement. This movement claims as one of its
most important products the 1972 Vatican-promulgated Rite of Christian Initiation of Adults (RCIA). Given this resurgent interest in the historical structures and theology of baptism, one would expect to find a parallel interest in the history of catechesis, those lessons and practices that formed Christian adults and brought them into the Church. In fact, the subject has suffered relative neglect. Few scholars have attempted a general critical survey of the ancient catechumenate, and only a few others have turned their attention to the catechetical treatises of particular Church Fathers or the practices of specific regions. Harmless's contribution is therefore a welcome contribution, opening up a subject of some critical importance not only to historians of Christianity, but to those who would learn from the past how they might proceed in the present.

This second objective is H.'s stated goal in writing the book. Chapter 1 presents both the problem and his proposed solution: the Roman Catholic Church has developed a new baptismal rite for adult converts but has failed to provide a clear guide or curriculum for the catechesis to support and deepen the conversion as it forms and educates the convert. H.'s proposal to fill the gap demonstrates his concern that scholarship have practical and pastoral application. He argues that just as the liturgists who developed the RCIA shaped its contours by gleaning from a variety of ancient liturgical texts, so catechists might turn to ancient catechetical documents, learning "what we can from those for whom the catechumenate was an ordinary reality, that is the Fathers who directed the ancient catechumenate" (28).

H. surveys the prominent catechetical texts of the third and fourth centuries, primarily as backdrop, and then turns to the catechetical teachings and techniques of Augustine as exemplary. He acknowledges that we can learn much from such ancient teachers as Cyril of Jerusalem, John Chrysostom, and Ambrose, but points out that the more numerous Augustinian materials vary in audience, date, and purpose. Moreover, they are augmented by voluminous available data concerning their physical and historical context.

Before surveying this rich body of material, H. vividly reconstructs Augustine's own experience of conversion and catechism in Milan, an experience which (he effectively argues) influenced the mature Augustine, bishop and catechist in Hippo. The real gift of this book, however, lies in the way H. orders and analyzes the mountain of data he culls from Augustine's treatises, his letters, and especially from the sermons in which Augustine exhorted the wavering to make the final step towards baptism or preached to the competentes in Lent or to the infantes (following their paschal baptism) during the Easter Octave. H. breathes life into this body of facts, turning it into a skilled and moving description of the interior and actual passage from catechumen to neophyte in fifth-century Roman North Africa. He also examines Augustine's rhetorical methods, showing how the classically trained advocate applied his skills to an ecclesiastical classroom.
Unfortunately, H.'s motivating thesis, that a modern catechetical curriculum could actually be based on or modeled by ancient teachings, is both debatable and only of tangential interest to this reviewer. First, retrieving and adapting ancient rites for modern Christians (assuming we could actually reconstruct these rites with accuracy) grants a high degree of normativity to antiquity for its own sake, a proposition which is even harder to defend regarding ancient catechisms which may be far removed from the issues and learning styles of a modern audience.

Second, this whole question is only marginally relevant to readers who are not directly concerned with the RCIA and its catechism. Students of ancient Christianity and/or the history of worship and liturgy (whether Roman Catholic or not) will value this book for what it tells us of the catechetical theories and programs of Augustine and not for its rather parochially stated purpose. Unfortunately since this purpose comprises the first chapter, it might lose a wider audience—an audience it certainly deserves.

This book deserves serious attention. It has at least as much value for Augustinian scholarship and the history of Christian worship and liturgy as it has for modern Roman Catholic religious educators. Perhaps it will encourage similar studies of the catechumenate in other places and of the catechetical teachings and methods of other influential teachers.

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ROBIN M. JENSEN


Hibbs concisely summarizes the text of the *Summa contra gentiles* (SCG), of which we possess substantial portions in Aquinas's own handwriting. This detail is germane inasmuch as scholars recently have identified the Parisian provenance of the ink that Thomas used, and, on the basis of this fact and other arguments, have been able thus to place the inception of the SCG at the end of Aquinas's first Paris regency, that is, around the summer of 1259. This means that the SCG exhibits Aquinas's first effort to overcome the *éparpillement* (to borrow a word from J.-P. Torrell) to which his writings on the *Sentences* had reduced him. While Aquinas realized a different kind of systematic achievement in the later *Summa theologiae*, his first summa still commands our attention as "an essay in personal reflection," one that according to R.-A. Gauthier reveals Aquinas's conception of his own vocation as a Catholic theologian. Now we are indebted to a Catholic philosopher on the faculty of Boston College for a careful yet fresh exposition of the SCG that enables us to appreciate just how much Aquinas deplored "scattering" in theology.

With appeal to the divine mercy, Aquinas announced that his inten-
tion in writing the SCG was to make known the truth that the Catholic faith professes and to set aside the errors that are opposed to it. It might seem odd that the execution of such a seemingly straightforward objective has produced so many different views about the method and plan that Aquinas follows in the work. H. takes serious account of these hypotheses, and offers a proposal that can abide the more worthwhile suggestions made by other scholars. One does not find in this book still another effort to explain what Aquinas was really about in the SCG; instead H. interprets the text in a way that remarkably imitates Aquinas’s own cogitatio fidei, his thinking about the truth of Catholic faith. The result is so brilliantly accomplished that one is led to ponder whether H. works here as a philosopher or as a theologian. Whatever the answer, he renders a tremendous service to the world of Roman Catholic theology. Let me give just one reason for this judgment.

After an initial chapter that argues that both dialectical inquiry and narrative serve to disclose divine truth, H. outlines the important doctrines contained in the four books of the SCG. In the course of his summaries, he takes account of the principal theological questions that have generated controversy since the 16th century and identifies most of the main characters in those debates. There is something refreshingly scholastic about the way H. proceeds: we are clearly involved in a kind of disputation. H. assumes, moreover, that theological exchange aims to arrive at blessed truth, and that disputation is governed by divine truth. The book illustrates what Aquinas himself wrote: that “to be able to see something of the loftiest realities, however thin and weak the sight may be, is ... a cause of the greatest joy” (SCG 8). For Aquinas, the exercise of theology achieved more than promoting dialogue among parties who hold opposing views about theological issues.

Among the topics that have divided theologians since even before Vatican II, the question of the supernatural ranks high. The debate continues today in sometimes heated exchanges between certain Thomist theologians and the practitioners of resourcement theology, while still other theologians remain content to speak about the gift and drama of divine grace as if “the ‘sun of the Good’ [is] eternally shining” (114). By his creative account of the “twofold mode of truth,” H. puts good perspective on this perennially nettlesome topic for Christian theology: God’s grace and man’s nature. At the same time, he achieves what few others have been able to do, namely, he shows that one can place Aquinas and Balthasar on the same side of these controversies, since both are opposed to flat and reductively naturalist accounts of God and creation.

I offer one question for further reflection. Aquinas affirms that the ultimate vocation for the intelligent creature is the vision of God. Contemplation begins the creature’s participation in divine wisdom, which achieves its final perfection only when the saint possesses in
vision the divine science that informs all truth, whether known here below by faith or reason. How then does the centrality of contemplation and vision in Aquinas's SCG square with H.'s view that "the dialectical engagement of received opinions is the key to the method of the text" (116)? Drama and dialectics undoubtedly inform Aquinas's pedagogy, but does he not also hold that, given the revelation of the supreme wisdom, one is able to mount a different kind of theological argument? In this connection, I should add that some reference to the Northern Italian theologian Francesco Silvestri (d. 1525), known as Ferrariensis, would have been useful. Pope Leo XIII directed that Silvestri's commentary be included in the edition of the SCG that bears Leo's name.

St. John's Seminary, Brighton, Mass. Romanus Cessario, O.P.


Nirenberg examines the persecution of Jews, Muslims, and lepers in southern France and the Crown of Aragon in the half century prior to the plague of 1348. Though his focus is considerably more restricted than his subtitle suggests, he advances a number of provocative theses that merit consideration. In the cases of violence against minorities that he analyzes, N. find that local contexts and particular meanings provide adequate explanation. With more than a little scorn for a teleological approach to the history of European intolerance (an approach that often interprets such a history as the growth of a persecuting mentality leading to the Holocaust), he endeavors to show that "linear narratives of escalating violence" (246) ignore the distinctive meanings of particular episodes of violence and obscure the many long violence-free periods.

N. supports his theses with case studies. Examining the Shepherds' Crusade of 1320, he argues that the context was a revolt against the monarchy: "The shepherds and the townspeople who supported them saw the Jews as fiscal agents of the state, which some Jews were" (48). When the shepherds attacked the Jews, "they were both attacking a much-resented aspect of administrative kingship and dramatizing the state's inability to protect its agents" (50). The year 1321 saw lepers and other minorities under attack in France and Aragon. Accused of poisoning wells and other water supplies, many lepers were tortured and executed. Though some Jews and Muslims were also persecuted in 1321 for such alleged misdeeds, the principal victims were lepers, foreigners, and locals with "creative" enemies, i.e., those prepared to make false accusations in order to get rid of certain individuals. Yet in dealing with the events of 1321, historians have focused "only" on Muslims and Jews (108), even though the accusations and victims were "ecumenical" (119).
N.'s strategy and conclusions will unsettle many readers. Is he trying to minimize or perhaps even excuse certain cases of anti-Jewish violence perpetrated by Christians? His chapter on violence between religious minorities, i.e. between Muslims and Jews, also seems to smooth over violence carried out by the Christian majority.

In a chapter on "miscegenation anxiety," especially anxiety about sexual relations between persons belonging to different religious groups, N. asserts that Christians, Muslims, and Jews "drank together, gambled together, went to war together, lived in the same neighborhoods (sometimes in the same house), established business partnerships, engaged in all forms of commercial exchange, even watched each other's religious ceremonies and processions" (157). In such a context, sexual liaisons between those of different faiths were not uncommon. Though one accused of transgressing religious boundaries through sexual intercourse could, in some cases, face the death penalty, such violent consequences were but "occasional" (165).

Though he strives to downplay any patterns or repetitions of violence between religious groups, in examining Christian (and Muslim) Holy Week attacks on the Jews of Aragon, N. acknowledges the ritual, annual nature of such violence. Though they might be "terrifying or brutal," such rituals were also stylized, restrained, and even "ludic"; in some cases of Holy Week violence, "we are not far from the world of play and carnival invoked by Bakhtin" (211-12). While N. may rightly assert that the Holy Week violence directed at early-14th-century Jews lacked the brutality of the pogroms of later centuries (208), did the victims of medieval violence find it playful?

The book is well researched, contains copious notes, and includes an excellent bibliography and index. The many descriptions of particular incidents of violence in pre-1348 Aragon and France are fascinating. Nevertheless, I am not fully convinced by a study that seems a bit too keen to absolve the medieval past of any connection with the horrors of the 20th century. N. is surely on target when he cautions against a "linear" narrative of growing intolerance in Western culture. But is the sole alternative the interpretation he proposes, an interpretation that exalts the particular and the contingent and utterly disregards the longue durée of attitudes and values? What about a narrative that is not linear, yet takes full account of bends and curves and circles in the history of Western persecution of minorities? Such a narrative could integrate the kind of intriguing case studies N. produces and also shed light on continuities in the history of persecution.

College of the Holy Cross

THOMAS WORCESTER, S.J.

This interesting and provocative book paints a new portrait of John Calvin: Calvin as artist. Jones turns to Calvin’s *Institutes* as theological art and finds there “carefully detailed and rich language, wrought by the pen of one of early modern Europe’s most powerful rhetoricians.” Calvin’s purpose is not simply to persuade the intellect, but also to “affect the emotions and will of its audience.” In this, Calvin showed such an immense talent for shaping both written and spoken word, that his work did “not simply meet Renaissance standards but itself became a new standard by which the artistry of rhetoric was measured (2).”

J. examines how the “rhetorical tools of his trade, namely, words, are used.” Her purpose is “to attend to the subtleties and nuances of the linguistic texture of his prized work, the *Institutes*, and subsequently to develop a deeper appreciation of the rhetorical mechanisms that drive his theological/artistic project.” This focus on Calvin’s rhetoric leads her to ask questions about Calvin’s “word choice and the play of various tropes while simultaneously charting the text’s argument in all its twists, turns, and inconsistencies” (2).

J. begins by placing Calvin within the context of humanist rhetoricians in 16th-century France. A central theme is that for those humanist rhetoricians, truly eloquent written prose had “the capacity to transform the disposition of its reading audience by inducing a ‘play of mind’ that leads to specific actions that the author intends to elicit” (6).

Chapter 2 analyzes the proposed audiences to whom the *Institutes* was addressed: Calvin’s students, whom he wished to instruct; friends and followers in French parishes whom he wished to strengthen and console in the Christian faith; humanistically-minded scholars and aristocrats whom he wished to convert to the Protestant reform; and his various “enemies,” including those whom he wished to attack and marginalize. These groupings hold keys to the various rhetorical functions Calvin sought to carry out. A “rhetorical map” of the *Institutes* would include pedagogical, consolatory, apologetic, and polemical rhetorics. These rhetorics also serve social functions, depending on to whom they are addressed. J. wants to indicate the ways by which all of Calvin’s agendas, audiences, and social functions are “simultaneously negotiated, often in the same paragraph or sentence and sometimes even in the same turn of phrase or figurative image” (74). The three following chapters demonstrate this approach in Book 1, chaps. 1–3.

J. provides a nontraditional way of reading Calvin. She indicates that Calvin’s purposes are to “take the reader through an educative process of reflection” rather than “to present a set of propositional truth claims about where one should begin the theological enterprise.” His texts aim at “dispositional reorientation” rather than to convey hard and fast doctrine. Misguided notions of textual meaning have located Calvin’s “meaning” in texts, “somewhere beneath or be-
yond the images and the rhetorical play that move across the surface of the text." This has led to the assumption (mistaken, according to J.) that "the text's rhetorical play can be interpretively bypassed in the theologian's search for the true meaning of the Institutes" (112).

J. challenges such assumptions, claiming instead that "one of the text's principal functions is to move the reader through a series of rhetorical strategies designed to convert and redispose him or her." When the text is "read in this manner, one comes to see that it is precisely through the play of these images that the text's functional meaning is constituted." For it is "through the reader's engagement with these rhetorical mechanisms," that "the truth of the text—the reorientation of the reader toward God—is enacted" (112). J.'s final chapter, "Calvin and the Rhetorics of Contemporary Theology," discusses this understanding of Calvin in relation to postliberal, pragmatic, and other contemporary theological views.

Traditional approaches to Calvin must now engage J.'s work. Her portrayal of Calvin as rhetorician and crafter of rhetorical strategies raises issues about Calvin's views of truth—and here dialogue must go on. Also, how did Calvin see himself as an interpreter of Holy Scripture who stood within an historical exegetical tradition? J. does not address this, but it has been a dimension highlighted by other Calvin scholars as a basic perception. What effect would this insight have on how Calvin functioned rhetorically? J.'s fresh approach will certainly stimulate Calvin studies and provide needed dialogue points for further discussions.

Don't Theological Seminary

DONALD K. McKIM


Lamm explores an important issue in Schleiermacher interpretation: the influence of the philosopher Spinoza's pantheistic metaphysics on S.'s theology. This topic is not just a mopping-up exercise in a well-worked field, explaining yet another nuanced influence on a great mind. S.'s career-long grappling with Spinoza—in the unpublished writings of his youth, in his first book, Speeches on Religion, and in his mature dogmatic theology, The Christian Faith—represent the first efforts of a post-Enlightenment theologian to construct an understanding, and later a doctrine, of God's radical presence to the world, a conceptualization of divine immanence free of the anthropomorphic and personalistic traits that had come under the attack of rationalistic critics. Lamm offers a case study in the theological revisionism with which S.'s method has come to be identified. That S. was accused of pantheism by both his contemporaries and later generations of theologians is an indictment of his efforts to mediate tradi-
tional Christian truth to modern sensibilities. Lamm enters the fray of this nearly-200-year-old dispute to defend at least the mature theologian against the charge of pantheism.

Lamm is not immodest in her claim to have written the first monograph in English on this topic (4), a somewhat surprising fact in light of its significance. I found the historical and interpretive narrative she constructed to be insightful, controlled, and judiciously executed. She never loses sight of the different levels of nuance that her study requires. She knows very well that the assessment of Spinoza's influence on S. depends entirely on how S. read and continued to read, and how he used and continued to use Spinoza throughout the various stages of his career. In this last respect, her book is particularly accomplished. She argues effectively that the young S., already a careful but not uncritical student of Kant when he entered the “pantheism controversy” in 1793, read Spinoza through Kantian eyes. S. thus tempered Spinoza’s metaphysical claims about the one, divine, and lifeless substance, emphasizing instead the dynamism implicit in the experiential encounter with a God now conceived as vitally involved in the ordinary workings of the world. This “organic monism” enabled S. to speak of the divine as an infinite reality comprehending the finite, while yet retaining the reality of individual existents themselves, now viewed as manifestations, even living manifestations, of the divine. Lamm develops and justifies a typology of several traits (organic monism, ethical determinism, higher realism, and a nonanthropomorphic view of God) to characterize S.’s particular commitment to Spinozism.

After considering S.’s increasingly mitigated use of Spinoza’s thought in the editions of Speeches, Lamm turns to Spinoza’s influence on S.’s dogmatics, The Christian Faith. The first part of the Glaubenslehre, in which S. doctrinally expounds the God-world relationship, provides the most obvious test case for Spinoza’s influence, and Lamm shows how S.’s treatment of the doctrines of creation and preservation, and the divine attributes of omnipotence, omniscience, and omnipresence, negotiate Spinoza’s powerful vision of divine immanence and the Christian tradition’s commitment to a living God. In her concluding chapter she extends her inquiry to the second part of the Glaubenslehre which expounds the doctrine of redemption. It is in this dimension of S.’s theology, she argues, that one appreciates fully both Spinoza’s influence and how S. appropriated Spinoza in a way that could be reconciled with a Christian understanding of God’s relationship to the world. Lamm believes that S.’s God was living but not necessarily personalistic, not pantheistic though utterly enmeshed in the workings of the world and in the hope of human fulfillment.

While I began my reading already convinced of Lamm’s thesis that the later S. could not legitimately be charged with pantheism, I completed it immensely more informed and secure in my judgment. This
is an excellent study and one that will be well received by scholars in the field.

Fairfield University, Connecticut

John E. Thiel


Conkin has undertaken to tell the story of Reformed Christianity in America "in its glory years," from its Puritan plantings to the Civil War. During these two centuries, when this congeries of Protestants made up the largest and most influential segment of Christianity in America (claiming 90% of all Americans in 1776, and 60% in 1865), "Reformed" almost defined the cultural meaning of "Christian," and perhaps even the meaning of "religion" itself. These Christians, "to use a spatial image, occupied the center. To use a topological image, they were the mainstream" (xi).

Two overlapping theological categories, "Calvinist" and "evangelical," help to provide clarifying focus. C. convincingly argues that Calvinism cannot be taken as synonomous with Reformed Christianity. While Calvinism, at least as that confessionally precise and scholastically well-defined response to Arminianism defined in the 17th century, remains a key subject in his book, it does not define or exhaust C.'s focus. As he deftly shows, a growing share of American Reformed Christians in the 19th century simply did not consider themselves, and were not in fact, "Calvinists." Likewise, while all Christians claiming descent from the reforms of Zwingli and Calvin (Low Church Episcopalians no less than Separate Baptists) proudly claimed as their own the title "evangelical," at least as that term identified an emphasis on the preached Word and the efficacious working of the Spirit in personal piety and worship, most Reformed Christians in America were not evangelical in the revivalistic, emotional sense popularized by 19th-century Methodists. Thus, while "Calvinist" and "evangelical" do overlap in C.'s category of "Reformed Christianity," they do not do so neatly or definitively.

What groups fall into that "Reformed" category that C. identifies as the uneasy center of antebellum American religion? In C.'s spatial terms, if Roman Catholicism and the Lutheran tradition occupy a position on the "right," while anabaptist, antinomian, and adventist groups define the "left," then a broad spectrum of groups claiming the Reformed label—Episcopalians, Methodists, Congregationalist, Presbyterian, Baptists, German and Dutch Reformed, Disciples of Christ—occupy the culturally hegemonic but theologically contentious "center." While these groups could and did fight each other over questions of theology, polity, and worship, they all nonetheless claimed the Reformed tradition for their patrimony, closing ranks against "others" to offer tearful renditions of "Blest Be the Tie That Binds."
C. here contributes in a number of significant and exciting ways to
the study of American religious history. Eschewing both "denomina­
tional history" and the generic "Jamestown to Jonestown" approach
to religious history, he has explored a critical but strangely under­
studied prosopographic niche in American religious ecology. He has
focused theologically on that group of Protestants loosely defined as
the "Religious Establishment" or the "Seven Sisters," a group that
both in 1800 and today exercise extraordinary cultural influence.
While this religious "establishment" has long been the subject of sig­
nificant sociological and demographic studies, explicitly theological/
ecclesiological studies of the "Reformed Center" of American religion
have been few, and good ones have been nonexistent. We now have a
balanced, well-recounted, and carefully nuanced examination of just
this group in a field desperately in need of such a study.

Further, C. offers a sophisticated "history of Reformed theology in
America" from the First Great Awakening to the Civil War—from
Jonathan Edwards through Samuel Hopkins and Joseph Bellamy to
the "New Haven Theology" of Nathaniel Taylor, the "Old School" Cal­
vinnism of Charles Hodge, and the momentous innovations of Horace
Bushnell. One of the greatest lacunae in the field of American reli­
gious history is the lack of a narrative account of theology in America.
Previous scholars of the stature of Frank Hugh Foster and William
Hutchison have offered brilliant histories of specific parts of the main­
stream theological tradition (the "New England Theology," Protestant
modernism, etc.), but the larger story remains unnarrated. C. goes a
long way toward addressing that need by offering an engaging and
provocative morphology of theological ideas for 200 years, taking on
the big questions of who provided conversation partners for whom in
the mainstream theological tradition, all the while exercising master­
ful control of mounds of details.

Perhaps most importantly, C. allows his reader to see the American
Reformed tradition itself as a whole—as a discreet set of institutions,
a specific tradition of liturgical principles, a recognizable kind of pi­
ety, even in a broad tradition that includes both Methodist camp
meetings and Mercersburg theologians—so that its profound influ­
ence on American thought and culture can be clearly discerned, in
some respects for the first time. His book can be added to the shelf of
"must reading" for students of the American religious experience.

Fordham University, New York

MARK MASSA, S.J.

THE DOMESTICATION OF TRANSCENDENCE: HOW MODERN THINKING ABOUT
GOD WENT WRONG. By William C. Placher. Louisville: Westminster/

Contemporary theologians seem to agree that, at some point,
"thinking about God went wrong"; but they typically locate this mis­
step among premodern writers (Augustine, Thomas, and the Reform-
ers get most of the blame). In contrast, Placher rightly recognizes that the real watershed took place in the modern era, when the transcendence of God and the reality of grace were “domesticated” into something that human beings could analyze and control.

While other recent commentators have relied primarily on secondary sources (and have thus read pre-Enlightenment thinkers through modern lenses), P. begins with the texts of Thomas, Luther, and Calvin. He shows that all three had a tremendous sense of God's mystery; God cannot be fully comprehended, and yet we still feel compelled to speak. And all three recognized that the assurance of our salvation was located in God’s gracious work in Christ. These chapters are well executed, and the one on Thomas is especially commendable: it provides a fine summary of the argument, recently developed by David Burrell, Nicholas Lash, and Bruce Marshall among others, that Thomas was not the logical positivist that neo-Thomism has made him out to be, but rather had a healthy respect for the ultimate inadequacy of all our language for God.

These accounts are followed by two chapters that narrate the domestication of modern thought about God. Its mysterious multiplicity, brought into focus by Christ, was displaced by a generic and systematized claim to univocal comprehensibility. This occurred not only among philosophers (Descartes and Leibniz), but also among theologians, both Catholic (e.g. Cajetan and Suárez, who systematized and narrowed Thomas’s observations on analogy) and Protestant (e.g. Quenstedt and Turretin, who sought to turn the profoundly tentative theologies of the Reformers into straight-laced, logical systems that would fit the tenor of the times). In addition, the radical depth of God's grace was domesticated by those who urged introspective piety and moral order—Pietists, Puritans, and Jansenists.

These shifts led to “contrastive” understandings of God and grace, making them into zero-sum games: transcendence was played off against immanence, and human activity was thought to be inversely related to that of God. The theological results were disastrous: partisans lined up to champion either God or the world (e.g. in controversies about miracles and about the problem of evil), and a number of quasi-Pelagian theologies were reborn (Molina, Arminius, and the so-called “federal” theology). And of course, the most complex and mysterious aspect of premodern thinking about God—its thoroughly trinitarian character—almost disappeared from Christian theology.

In two final chapters, P. assays implications for contemporary theology. He does not advocate a purely negative theology, but does seek to recover the premodern ability to hold together those elements of God’s nature and activity that the Enlightenment deemed “contradictory” or “mutually exclusive” (e.g. divine foreknowledge and human freedom, God’s grace and our actions). P. draws on resources offered by theologies both postliberal (Frei, Lindbeck) and hermeneutical (Ri-
These chapters include fine discussions of revelation, sin and grace, and theodicy.

P.'s argument is thoroughly persuasive. Contemporary theology has been extraordinarily impoverished by its slavish devotion to certain Enlightenment idols. While the postmodern critique has alerted us to this malady, it has not always oriented us toward truly theological cures. This book does so. Its flaws are few and minor: an occasional reference to an unproblematic concept of "truth," a slightly excessive deference to Calvin and Luther on free will. It also might have profited from an expansion of its suggestive comments on Calvin's rhetoric to a more thorough engagement with the rhetorical tradition, which was so thoroughly interwoven with premodern theology (and so thoroughly marginalized in the Enlightenment).

But these are tiny quibbles; the book is a fine success. Not only is its argument clear, coherent, and (to my mind) correct; it is also written in a thoroughly readable style. P.'s language for God is inclusive but never cumbersome, and he offers numerous concrete examples (especially when the going gets philosophically tough). Students should find it quite digestible; indeed, if it could be placed in the hands of every advanced seminarian and beginning graduate student, both the academy and the Church would be very much "enlightened."

University of St. Thomas, St. Paul

David S. Cunningham


Over the last two decades, a number of theologians who did doctoral work at Yale have published studies contending that in some respect or another Karl Rahner was seriously mistaken about the identity of Christianity. Reno's is an interesting addition to this literature because he maintains that Rahner's basic account of transcendence is faithful to the logic of Christian identity and grounded in it. Nevertheless, R. stands in this tradition because both his claim to advance "a new reading of Rahner" (12) and the dominant subtext of caveats interspersed throughout the footnotes presuppose that Rahner is likely mistaken in many of the ways suggested by others.

R. frames the discussion in terms of a conceptual tension within the Christian ideal of transcendence between the extremes of radical transcendence (an extraordinary change which leaves the ordinary world behind) and pure immanence (which finds God intrinsic in the ordinary givenness of life). He discerns the basic patterns of this conflict in Hume's Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion. Although the pure immanence advocated by the Skeptic Philo appears to win out in the Dialogues, R. thinks that Hume's enigmatic conclusion highlights the appeal of a mixed, or as R. calls it, "amphibious," view that affirms a real interpenetration of transcendence and immanence.
He argues that the logic of Christianity requires such a notion of transcendence, in which the ordinary is transformed by the initiative of God’s transcendence towards humanity.

In the end, this argument is not so much with Hume as with Fergus Kerr’s *Theology after Wittgenstein*. For the most part, R. accepts Kerr’s critique of “metaphysical ways of thinking” and particularly philosophical notions of transcendence and Cartesian foundationalism as serious distortions that lead to antipathy toward the body and to indifference toward the community. Kerr’s solution, at least in R.’s admittedly forced reading (137 n. 2), is not acceptable, however, because its radical appeal to the givenness of ordinary life ultimately denies transcendence. His analysis aims to show that Kerr’s critique of Rahner as foundationalist is mistaken and that Rahner’s affirmation of the amphibious character of transcendence, although not his transcendental language, is necessary to preserve the logic of Christian faith even after Wittgenstein.

Chapters on Rahner’s inheritance and the Catholic discussion of nature and grace demonstrate that the context of Rahner’s early philosophical and theological investigations was the effort to overcome the extrinsicism of the manual tradition without affirming the intrinsicism attributed to the *nouvelle théologie*. Rahner’s project was not foundationalist in the sense Kerr alleges. Quite the contrary, R. argues, the foundation for Rahner’s position is ultimately the Christian conviction of God’s love and initiative towards humanity. The genius of his conception of the supernatural existential is that instead of opposing the scholastic separation of nature and grace, it redefines the terms of the debate by recognizing that “grace must be the point of departure for any theological account of nature.” Since Rahner’s starting point is revelation rather than ontological analysis of nature or, for that matter, grace, R. characterizes it as a “purely theological” solution. From his assertion that “‘Nature’ in the theological sense . . . as the concept contraposed to the supernatural, is . . . a remainder concept (*Restbegriff*)” (*Theological Investigations* 1.313), R. concludes, “The strategy of separation remains, but Rahner has transformed it from an ontological to a *begrifflich* or, better, a ‘grammatical’ distinction” (117).

At this point, it appears that the “loud Barthian echoes throughout the study” (12) drown out the nuances of Rahner’s position. The difficulty is not with R.’s central affirmation that Rahner’s theology as a whole is grounded in the particularity of Christian revelation and that this revelation must govern reflection on the logic of human transcendence. Nor is this a new reading of Rahner. The problematic thesis is the further assumption, for which R. offers no sustained or convincing argument, that Rahner’s solution must be either purely theological or ontological and that it cannot be both at once. Since most of what is new about this reading of Rahner as well as many of R.’s caveats about Rahner and Rahnerians presupposes such a dis-
junction, R.'s account is much more controversial than its primary thesis.

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**ROBERT MASSON**


Originally a Habilitationschrift entitled Weltangst und Weltende (1987), this work offers a theology of anxiety caused by the expectation of the end of the world. Körtner's basic theses are that the apocalyptic understanding of human existence is to be interpreted through the lens of “world anxiety,” that world anxiety is disclosed in the expectation of the “end of the world,” that Christian faith is essentially apocalyptic and therefore has to deal with world anxiety and the expectation of the end, and that the proper Christian response to world anxiety is faith as “courage.”

Apocalyptic is a notoriously slippery concept. To circumscribe it, Chapter 1 presents a literary, religiohistorical, philosophical, and psychological phenomenology of apocalyptic, concluding that apocalyptic is an understanding of human existence characterized by world anxiety occasioned by the expectation of the end of the world. The twin notions of world anxiety and end of the world are explored in Chapters 2–4.

K. takes anxiety (horror vacui) to mean the discovery of our future (self-anxiety) and that of the world (world anxiety) as questionable and as positioned in possibility. In other words, anxiety is the perception of ontological finitude. At the same time, in anxiety we discover that we are free. Thus, the experience of anxiety is both threatening and liberating, dangerous and enriching. When anxiety, in connection with experiences of catastrophe, perceives finitude as something inescapable, threatening the future itself and producing feelings of powerlessness, it becomes apocalyptic. Apocalyptic is the unveiling of reality in decline. At the center of apocalyptic anxiety lies the expectation of the end and apocalyptic attempts to overcome anxiety by world negation, either by articulating the feeling of extreme powerlessness due to the inescapability of finitude (negative apocalyptic) or by opening new hope by means of the vision of a future and different world (positive apocalyptic).

Chapter 4 very helpfully expounds various conceptions of the end of the world: as successfully endured catastrophes, as cyclical palinogenesis, as a one-time event, as annihilation and renewal, as destruction of the cosmos, as the decline of the West, as limits to growth, and as a nuclear holocaust.

Theologically and pastorally, what can the Church do for those gripped by world anxiety? Whereas negative apocalyptic simply ver-
balances the sense of overwhelming helplessness in front of inescapable finitude, the intention of positive apocalyptic is to console those crushed by world anxiety; apocalypses are literature of consolation, and the positive apocalyptist is a "consoled consoler" sent to encourage those in despair over the expected end. But this consolation must not bypass world anxiety, since hope is grounded in world anxiety itself, or as K. puts it, "World anxiety proves to be the real hermeneutical key to understanding apocalyptic hope" (210). Christian faith is particularly suited to offering this consolation and hope because it is essentially apocalyptic, but with an all-important difference. Whereas apocalyptic is exclusively the anticipation of the possible future, Christian faith is the recollection of the present reality of salvation. "[W]hat separates apocalyptic and the Christian faith from one another is faith in the cross and resurrection of Jesus as a salvific event" (258).

Remembering the fate of Jesus, however, does not eliminate world anxiety and the fear of the end of the world. For K., Christian faith takes the form of "courage for questionable existence" (265); to use Tillich's formulation, faith is "the courage to accept acceptance." In this faith as courage, hope is not hope for the end of the world as the annihilation of the present world but for the new intervention of God which has already occurred in Jesus. Thus God appears as the Absolute Future which is coming (adventus or Zukunft) and not as a planable future (futurum). Because faith as courage is based on the death and resurrection of Jesus, it is also courage to suffer along with other victims of world anxiety, to protest against all that is catastrophic and destructive, and to pray.

K.'s comprehensive analysis of the concept of apocalyptic anxiety brings into the conversation all the major contributors to the theme as well as scholars of Jewish and Christian apocalyptic. This dialogue gives exceptional depth and substance to K.'s work, even though it makes for laborious reading.

K.'s definition of apocalyptic world anxiety as the perception of the future as questionable and finitude as inescapable allows him to enter into conversation with psychologists and philosophers of fear and anxiety. But it is debatable whether this heavy ontologization of apocalyptic does justice to the historical roots of many apocalyptic movements in the historical experiences of structural evil, unjust suffering, and sin. Apart from this immediate sociohistorical context, it is hard to see how the (even overwhelming) sense of one's ontological finitude as something inescapable and of one's future as something possible would serve as the logical subtext for faith as courage to suffer, especially to suffer for others and to struggle against oppression and injustice. In spite of this disjunction between K.'s philosophical analysis of world anxiety and his theological prescription of consolation and parenesis by means of faith as courage, this is a rich and profound discussion of world
anxiety, and hence a timely work as we approach the end of the millennium.

_Catholic University of America, D.C._

**Peter C. Phan**


Anyone who attempts to study or teach the theological tradition about Mary is soon overwhelmed by the sheer number and diversity of interpretations that have arisen in different historical and cultural settings. The felicitous title of this study not only reflects this profusion but seems to promise a chart to steer by. In this Tavard does not disappoint.

In a series of clearly written, judiciously documented chapters, he depicts how theology, piety, dogma, art, poetry, and visions have understood Mary within the Christian faith. Part of the interest of this book resides in the way the standard sources are spiced with ecumenical ones. Thus, insights from Scripture and the apocrypha are joined with insights on Mary from Islam, explained with excerpts from the Qur'an, a neat fit inasmuch as first- and second-century Christian literature provided the main basis for Arabia's view of Mariyam. In a similar way insights on Mary from the conciliar period are not stated as bald facts but are traced as they led to differing developments in the Byzantine East and the medieval Latin West.

The sensibility of the Reformation is drawn through the Protestant tradition and its minimalist approach to Mary, and then redrawn through Anglicanism, traced in its Marian expression in the 17th-century divines, the Oxford movement, and a range of English poets. In the modern era insights from the popular piety of visionary experiences are coupled with understandings from papally proclaimed Marian dogmas as two sides of the one conservative Catholic culture which at Vatican II formed an uneasy truce with more ecumenically minded Marian views. Finally, taking up questions stemming from contemporary feminism and interreligious dialogue, T. explores the ancient _Magna Mater_ along with feminine manifestations of the divine in Hinduism and Buddhism to arrive at an "unfinished conclusion" about Mary as a female icon of divine presence, all the while that she is a poor working woman of Nazareth and an ideal model of discipleship.

This study is an achievement on several counts. It brings a certain order out of chaos, arranging the sprawling story of the Marian tradition into a comprehensible narrative. Richly imbued with a passion for the unity of the Church, it draws on the wisdom of world religions to shed light on this disputed field. There is a tremendous amount of knowledge carried in its pages, the author being something of a Renaissance man, but it is learning worn lightly, to intrigue and teach. The book has its origin in actual courses taught on Mary, and
is easily accessible to students. Anyone who reads it will be vastly instructed.

But this book is more than a compendium. Its theological subtext engages the reader in a range of relevant issues. Here I would enter into debate, suggesting, e.g., that T.'s sympathies with women's search for equality would be better served if he used social analysis in his discussion of male and female designations for God. Linguistic gender may not signify sex, and God transcends all names, but the actual, concrete symbol of God functions in church and society nevertheless. Hence the issue of exclusive male images for God is more important and the notion of Mary's thousand faces as reflective of the divine more critical than he is willing to grant. Sparking such theological discussion is but another contribution of this engaging book.

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ELIZABETH A. JOHNSON, C.S.J.


One way to present and to praise this book is to say that it could be a good companion to the Catechism of the Catholic Church. After all, the Catechism is a complex document: each of its doctrinal statements retains the authority of the source from which it was taken. Without thorough familiarity with the art of interpretation, there is no way of grasping the nuances (that is, the true meaning) of its teaching.

Sullivan explains and demonstrates through numerous examples how to determine the authority of ecclesiastical documents. In the center of his book, occupying some 80 pages, he handles the questions "What is dogma?" (truth revealed by God and taught as such by the magisterium [28]), and "What are the criteria for its identification?" He then leads the reader into an extensive exercise in discovering dogmatic statements (or the absence of them) in conciliar decrees, in papal documents, and in the teaching of the ordinary magisterium. The rest of his exposition concerns the interpretation of pronouncements by lesser authorities, such as the various congregations and commissions of the Holy See. He dedicates a special chapter to Vatican II and offers an "afterword" concerning the problems that have arisen around the apostolic letter Ordinatio sacerdotalis.

S.'s book, clear and competent, should be compulsory reading in every school of theology, and it should be in the hand of every person who needs to evaluate the weight of doctrinal pronouncements, whether they be bishops or journalists.

Three observations, however, may be in order, with a view toward a revised edition. First, S. tends to give too much weight to comments by officials involved in the drafting of a document. It is true that they may know more than anyone else about the genesis of a given text, but at the same time they may be inclined to stress a personal inter-
pretation that the text, once in the public domain, does not necessarily support. In other words, after a document has the seal of a higher authority, a lesser one cannot have the final word about its meaning.

Second, the small chapter on decrees and responses of the Holy Office would have gained in clarity if S. had recalled for readers the principle that “infallibility cannot be delegated.” The pope cannot “share” his teaching charism with any office, but he can lift a document prepared by an office into the realm of his own authority. The seemingly humble canonical distinction between the approval “in special form” (the pope makes the content of the document his own) and “in common form” (the pope approves the document for publication but does not adopt its content as his own) is no mere play with words; it marks the difference between a papal pronouncement and a curial statement. This distinction is often missed even by theologians.

Third, the book would be significantly enriched by a doctrinal introduction explaining the complex doctrine of the assistance (which is not inspiration) of the Holy Spirit to the Church; that is, to the faithful in general and to the episcopal college presided over by the pope in particular. It is the Spirit who signals the authenticity of a dogma through its willing reception by the people; it is the same Spirit who helps the episcopate to preserve incorrupt the memory of the gospel teaching. When we inquire about the authority of a doctrinal statement, we are really searching for clues and signs that can give us some indication about the intensity of the assistance of the Spirit. Thus creative fidelity obtains its full meaning: it is a response to the Holy Spirit.

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LADISLAS ORSY, S.J.


This will rank as one of the most important and incisive contributions to the current retrieval of virtue ethics, or “eudaimonism,” Kekes’s preferred name for a theory in which the conception of “a good life” is paramount. Moral wisdom is the crucial “capacity to judge rightly what should be done in particular situations to make life better” (5), but this is neither Aristotle’s phronesis nor Aquinas’s prudence. Whereas prudence immediately commands action, K.’s moral wisdom is a reflective, second-order virtue whose object is one’s character and the conception of a good life as a “regulative ideal” within which action finds its significance. “Good lives are both uniform and plural,” affected by the goods and evils relevant to every human life, as well as those relevant to particular lives. The task of moral wisdom is “to acquire knowledge of these goods and evils, to evaluate situations encountered in the course of trying to live a good life in the light of that knowledge, and to judge well in situations whose evaluation is difficult” (18–19).
Particular virtues like justice and moderation govern particular types of action, and when there is "a robust moral tradition" endorsing a clear conception of a good life, and when people are "succeeding in living the life they want," possession of the particular virtues will be sufficient to guide action (205–6). But, K. argues, "harmony between a moral tradition and individual conceptions of a good life is the exception, not the rule," and with the authority of our moral tradition "in tatters," and a plurality of values in "constant conflict," we need "judgment, reflection, and moral wisdom now to cope with the ever-increasing number of complex moral situations we must face" (207–8).

K. offers a penetrating exploration of the "permanent adversities" of contingency, conflict, and evil which beset the realization of a good life: contingency as to the external goods—from one's genetic inheritance to the provision of food and security—necessary for the enjoyment of the internal goods of character which are partly constitutive of a good life; conflict over competing conceptions of a good life and the plurality of values whose incommensurability is a mark of their objectivity (61); and wickedness due to the failure in self-knowledge as to the evil we do. As a practically oriented knowledge of both the necessities and the contingencies which affect good lives, moral wisdom eludes Aristotle's division between speculative and practical knowledge.

Growth in moral wisdom means increased control: strengthening motivation to live a good life, and preventing inappropriate reactions to the adversities which oppose it (72). Control transforms "complex moral situations into simple ones" in which we know what to do to better our lives (95). Growth in moral wisdom needs moral imagination as to other possibilities, self-knowledge about one's character, and a view of one's life that is correct because it takes seriously the primary values for any human life, the secondary values particular to an individual's life, as well as the limits one's conception of a good life imposes by the possibilities it excludes (156).

The ideal of justice enables us to respond to the "external limits" on a good life, above all the absence of a "cosmic justice" to coordinate virtue and satisfaction. The ambiguity in the notion of "a good life" ("satisfying" versus "morally virtuous") straddles the concerns of rival theories (utilitarianism and principalism) and, as K. so eloquently shows, points to both the depth and the difficulty of the moral life. Justice urges us to develop institutions and characters that distribute benefits and harms according to moral desert. Moral wisdom enables us to live with our partial success (203).

The arduous achievement of moral wisdom leads to a "reflective innocence" by which a person is able to contain the impact of contingency, conflict, and evil, and develops the second-nature "that makes spontaneity once again possible" (223). Reflective innocence is the "great internal good"—"having a reasonable conception of a good life,
knowledge of good and evil, facility in evaluating the actual situations we face . . . and good enough judgment to render simple the complex situations whose evaluation is difficult” (223).

The accessibility and lapidary formulation of K.’s analysis will be apparent from this brief summary, though not its richness of example. For ethicists in the Catholic tradition there are two issues that might be explored fruitfully in the light of K.’s account: the place of conflict in the moral life, and the possibility of inherently evil kinds of action which no virtuous agent would choose. Where Veritatis splendor presents a “linear” model of moral reasoning in which an evil act may not be chosen for the sake of good, K. presents a “conflictual” view of moral wisdom in which one may have to choose a course of action morality prohibits (59). Clarification of the relationship between act analysis and virtue analysis is surely among the most pressing tasks for Catholic moral theology. K.’s profound study will shed much light on that inquiry.

Catholic Institute of Sydney

GERALD GLEESON


Elegantly written with incisive analyses of major figures, O’Neill’s work carefully constructs an important argument about affinity between self-knowledge of one’s own best interests (“formal semantics of the good” [95]) and knowledge of the common good (a “phronetic interpretation” of Kant’s kingdom of ends [122]). This erudite rapprochement of Aristotle with Kant on prudence (and Kant’s Anglo-American retrievers) will influence future discussions.

Part 1 examines the eclipse of classical practical reason. O. starts by presenting Aristotle’s practical reasoning (phronesis) against attempted reductions into formalism (episteme) or relativism (techne) with two theses: that virtuous activity is desired both for its own sake and as an excellence of the perfect community. Next he qualifies Kant’s oversimplification that seeking a supreme good is hedonist and egoistic. Kant effectively reduces prudence to recommendations about a “semantically indeterminate” notion of happiness (shredded from “one’s best reasons for acting” as part of “common excellence” of the perfect community [28–29]). “Kant’s interpretation of autonomy offers neither a necessary nor sufficient justification of morality. Practical legislation does not necessarily imply that maxims be given the (universal) form of moral law, nor does the formal stipulation of universalizability suffice to discriminate moral from immoral maxims” (3, 39).

Part 2 discusses first the universal prescriptivism of R. M. Hare. Despite qualifications nuancing Hare’s “Kantian variety” of utilitarianism, the self is “benevolently” but implausibly reduced to one with
"representative preferences" who is deserving of an undefended notion of "equal respect" (59). Then O. takes up the Kantian constructivism of John Rawls, surveying Rawls's "procedural interpretation of Kant's concept of autonomy and the categorical imperative," which uses an "original position" (enabling selection of principles of liberty with inequalities favoring the disadvantaged and equality of opportunity). Rawls's "thin theory" of primary social goods depends upon a thicker conception of agents' goods prejudiced by a social point of view congenial to citizens of a modern democratic society with some wealth. Rawls's procedural retrieval of Kant masks an undefended stipulation: a right to equal respect due to persons as ends in themselves. Hence, "In neither Hare's nor Rawls's analyses did purely formal or procedural considerations suffice to generate a determinate moral theory. For attitudes or motivational assumptions of an antecedently moral nature were tacitly invoked in the material interpretation of universality" (75).

Part 3 begins with an analytic reconstruction of the concept of prudence as expressing rational autonomy. Using Davidson, O. presents intentional action descriptions (expressing a "conative [volitional] propositional attitude about actions in one's best interests") as a prelude to a reconstruction of Kantian hypothetical imperatives of prudence, concluding with moral implications in light of a formal, semantical theory of the good (82). Subsequently O. argues that Gadamer's retrieval of Aristotelian practical reason "permits us to understand how our 'knowledge of the good' (in intentional action sequences) is determined by our self-knowledge as autonomous prescribers (with phronetic self-knowledge as members of a moral commonwealth)" (121). Finally he offers a highly compressed proposal for a middle way between formalism and relativism by reconciling two differing perspectives about whether and in what respects ethics is distinctively Christian. After comparing Barth and Balthasar with Rahner, Fuchs, and Schüller, he concludes that a retrieval of religious morality can be faithful to its own distinctiveness and universal.

Challenging to read but repaying the effort, one tradeoff for O.'s analytic precision about formal syntax and semantics is some abstractness, notwithstanding helpful examples from Sophocles against torture and on promise-keeping. O. sympathizes with communitarian insistence on the constitutive significance of the good (human flourishing) for moral theory and (neo-Kantian) universalizing aspirations of some Western moral discourse. Yet is Aristotle's "perfect community" (with "finality and sufficiency for human flourishing") commensurate with Kant's "kingdom of ends"? Especially suggestive is O.'s construction of volition as a conative propositional attitude, "judging some action to be more preferable than any available alternative on the basis of my best reasons" (82). Assorted remarks about the "aesthetic" (evaluatively significant) context of understanding (94, 100 f.) and "situational appreciation" linked to Heideggerian "disclosure"
contain tantalizing promissory notes (110). Aside from quibbles about selection (why not Aristotelians Maclntyre or Nussbaum?) and interpretation (Barth, Rahner) and a few typos, this is a superb contribution.

Mount Saint Mary's College, Emmitsburg, Md.

WILLIAM JOSEPH BUCKLEY


The question of suffering is an acute issue, particularly for a people who have known innocent suffering, believed in an omniscient and omnipotent God, and understood themselves as chosen. The paradox of their suffering has prompted Jews to reflect on how suffering has shaped their understanding of God. To provide a context for their reflections, Leaman appropriates Franz Rosenzweig's "philosophy of experience" and investigates "how the structure of our experience gives rise to and necessitates a metaphysical investigation into the presuppositions of that experience" (13). This philosophy does not simply establish a conceptual framework for understanding and investigating suffering, it "also sets out to reorganize our experience" (17).

Fittingly, Job's presuppositions are at the heart of this book. L. begins by looking at three aspects of them: the suffering of the virtuous, who God is who permits such suffering, and Job's relationship with God. Getting to those latter issues forces Job to reorganize his entire understanding of God. L. then turns to a variety of Jewish thinkers who lived in Gentile cultures and appropriated the claims of those cultures while maintaining a distinctive Jewish identity. When they reflected on suffering, they inevitably turned to Job; reading Job in their own cultures, they reexamined their own understanding of their relationship with God.

Three basic patterns emerge from the chapters that follow. In the face of the paradox, the earliest thinkers insisted on God's distance while presuming God's redemptive activity. Philo attempted both to establish the rationality of Judaism and to integrate the Greek conception of a pure being with the Hebrews' God; he presented a very remote deity whose perspective on evil is infinitely distant from ours. Saadya accepted Philo's chasm but attempted to illustrate the intelligibility of the divine viewpoint by demonstrating the ultimate benefits and inevitable recompense that one receives from suffering. The second pattern is seen among those who insisted on the unique nature of God, rejected any association of redemptive activity with virtue, and eventually reduced the Hebrew God to an impersonal, natural one. Rejecting Saadya's arguments as too human, Maimonides attacked the assumption of inevitable recompense: the recognition that
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Three basic patterns emerge from the chapters that follow. In the face of the paradox, the earliest thinkers insisted on God’s distance while presuming God’s redemptive activity. Philo attempted both to establish the rationality of Judaism and to integrate the Greek conception of a pure being with the Hebrews’ God; he presented a very remote deity whose perspective on evil is infinitely distant from ours. Saadya accepted Philo’s chasm but attempted to illustrate the intelligibility of the divine viewpoint by demonstrating the ultimate benefits and inevitable recompense that one receives from suffering. The second pattern is seen among those who insisted on the unique nature of God, rejected any association of redemptive activity with virtue, and eventually reduced the Hebrew God to an impersonal, natural one. Rejecting Saadya’s arguments as too human, Maimonides attacked the assumption of inevitable recompense: the recognition that
virtue is no guarantee of blessing is the beginning of wisdom. And the presumption of God’s distance eventually let Spinoza dismiss any claims of personality in God; he turned the reader’s eyes to the world in which we live and insisted that the answer to the problem of suffering was to be found in our intellectual abilities to eradicate it, not in the hope of God’s redemption. The third pattern appears among those who reflect on Job’s consolation in the light of suffering and who reject both the first group’s expectation of recompense and the second’s de-personalization of God. Buber, for instance, wrote that Job’s sense of God’s proximity gave him comfort; that comfort could give anyone, in turn, the strength to resist and combat evil.

L. brings Buber’s insights to bear on post-Holocaust reflection. He notes that contrary to Jewish philosophical thought, Job’s thought moved from belief in God’s existence to a felt sense of God’s presence. Job questioned everything about God except God’s existence; what Job came to understand in the light of his investigations is not why the virtuous suffer, but that God is quite near. L. finds this insight central for Jews today. In the light of the Holocaust there can be no argument that God rewards virtue. Yet, were Jews to abandon their faith in God, they would ultimately give the triumph to Hitler. Thus a presumption of God’s existence and an assertion of God’s presence needs to be articulated. What Jews can assure themselves both in faith and from the testimony of Job is the certainly that God is present and that the God of Judaism knows that the Jews suffer. Like Job, L. does not explain why the virtuous suffer, but he does lead us to assert God’s existence and presence.

This book is a rigorous read. It presumes no theological or philosophical competence but demands considerable intellectual energy. One query arises. The question why the innocent suffer is misleading. People suffer for all different reasons. In the Holocaust innocents were murdered; but in the rest of this century’s suffering, it is not always easy to distinguish how much suffering has been innocent, and to what degree. The question of innocence suggests often that if there is even the slightest blameworthiness then there is no need to question suffering. The extreme innocence of those in the Holocaust, like Job himself, makes one wonder how helpful investigations into why the innocent suffer are for the rest of us (Jews included) who do suffer today. Aside from this query and the fact that the work is both remarkably dispassionate and free of any ecumenical urges, anyone with the most remote interest in suffering will find this perhaps the most important intellectual investigation on the subject in recent years.

Weston Jesuit School of Theology

JAMES F. KEENAN, S.J.

Haliczer places current debates about sex and celibacy in the Catholic Church in the particular historical context of 1530 to 1819. Identifying sacramental penance as one of the most striking characteristics of post-Tridentine Catholicism, he focuses attention on how this sacrament was influenced by the Spanish Inquisition, the Council of Trent, and Counter-Reformation spirituality. Drawing upon a legion of case studies and trial evidences, he outlines the various ways in which the confessional became a focal point for sexual abuse.

H. maintains that very little attention has been given to the problem of solicitation in the confessional or specifically the role of the Spanish Inquisition in attempting to repress it. This assertion is perhaps overstated, however, when one considers that the idea of the supposedly celibate priest as sexual exploiter can be found throughout the medieval and early-modern centuries and surely played a prominent role in the culture and politics of the English-speaking world of the 18th and 19th centuries.

Relying heavily on confessors' manuals and other works written by theologians for confessors and penitents, H. develops three basic points: the individual stresses and developmental factors shaping the clergy of this period; the structural factors within the Catholic Church that created, sustained, and inflamed these problems (e.g., mandatory celibacy, the seminary training process, a system that placed a high premium on the individual priest’s role in confession); and the bureaucratic structures of the Church that attempted to check the abuses.

One also learns a great deal about confession, especially the ways in which the practice of confession used and misused the clergy, created tremendous scruples in the penitent, “feminized” the confessional, sexualized the ambiance of confession (which H. details with great flourish and interesting storytelling), confined and regulated the lives of cloistered nuns, and impacted the laity’s understanding of premarital and marital sexuality. The Society of Jesus emerges in laudatory fashion. At the same time, members of the old-line mendicant orders come in for great scathing; H. documents the fact that 96.9% of the cases of solicitation arose from those religious orders.

Undoubtedly H. provides a valuable service in highlighting the problems of solicitation and abuse by clergy (and the Church) in confessional practice from 1530 to 1819—and beyond, as he implies. H. seems, however, to have a tendency toward three “misinterpretations.” First, he psychologizes much of the history he is citing, reading back into it a good amount of Freudian interpretation. Second, he portrays the place of celibacy in the Catholic Church in an extremely negative fashion, suggesting that there is virtually no positive aspect to this particular charism. One has the impression that many of the problems of sexual solicitation/abuse would have not taken place if the clergy had not been bound to the law of celibacy. Third, he tends
to misunderstand and misrepresent contemporary church reforms regarding the sacrament of penance, which he understands simply as community penance with the priest as a type of presiding officer or moderator. While H.'s historical study has much merit, many of his conclusions seem overly zealous and apologetic.

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GERALD D. COLEMAN, S.S.

SHORTER NOTICES


The bulk of the study consists in the second and largest of its three parts, a straightforward survey and analysis of the teaching and presuppositions about prayer in the New Testament. Predictably, Cullmann treats prayer in the Synoptic Gospels (the Our Father gets the lion’s share of attention), in the Pauline corpus, in John and the Johannine letters, and in the other NT writings. What emerges from this survey is a coherent and strikingly unified portrait of the understanding and practice of prayer in the early Christian communities. Even as we grow in our appreciation of the theological diversity of the NT documents, the experience to which they witness emerges as a stunning unity, the encounter with the Creator in Jesus, sustained in the Holy Spirit, and accessed especially in prayer (to the Father, with the Son, in the Holy Spirit). On the what and how of prayer, Matthew, Mark, Luke, John, Paul, and the rest are in fundamental agreement. This picture emerges inductively from C.’s reading of the texts.

C. precedes the central section with an introductory Part 1 acknowledging perennial difficulties in praying and summarizing modern (European) objections to prayer in general (deriving from such sources as Kant and Nietzsche) and objections in particular to prayer of petition (e.g., Rousseau, Schleiermacher, Ritschl). Then, throughout his survey of the NT texts, he sustains in extensive notes a running dialogue with other authors who have written on prayer, from Irenaeus to D. Sölle. Finally, in Part 3, he describes the answers that the NT gives to our questions today—which relates the fruits of his study to the questions raised in Part 1. The whole is rounded by a two-page conclusion expressed in ten theses.

Indexes of names and biblical references enhance the usefulness of this study, which deserves a place in any theological library and on the shelf of any serious student of Scripture, Christian liturgy, and prayer.

DENNIS HAMM, S.J. Creighton University, Omaha


The work of three energetic Evangelical scholars, this volume consists of an introduction to the Qumran scrolls, new translations of the best preserved nonbiblical manuscripts, and a ten-page bibliography. The translations for the most part are accurate and reliable. They appear according to the Qumran caves (1 through 11) in which the main manuscripts were discovered and to the inventory numbers assigned to them many years ago. The introductions to the translations describe the content and comment (where possible) on historical setting and relevance for New Testament studies. Numbers are
given for each line (thus facilitating reference and quotation), and comments in italic type guide readers through the texts. Some familiar texts are given new names (e.g., 1QS is now "Chartar of a Jewish Sectarian Association"). The use of running headings at the top of each page would have made a handsome volume even more user-friendly.

In their general introduction the translators explain and criticize the "standard model" for the origin of the Qumran scrolls: from the "motherhouse" of the Essene movement in reaction to Hasmonean rulers of the mid-second century B.C. Instead, they propose that a first-century B.C. setting—conservative (Sadducean) opposition to growing Pharisaic influence under Queen Salome Alexandra and her son Hyrcanus II (the "Wicked Priest")—better explains those few texts that contain historical allusions. Their proposal, however, is sketchy and underdeveloped. More needs to be said about the purpose of the Qumran site and its relation to the scrolls found there, and about the nature of the community and its place in Second Temple Judaism. It may be that the authors have not yet thought through these matters or (more likely) do not agree on them. But their frequent appeals to the "new proposal" in the introductions to individual texts may leave readers confused and wondering whether they have missed something.

DANIEL J. HARRINGTON, S.J.
Weston Jesuit School of Theology


Rubenson's valuable study of the seven letters of St. Antony seeks to authenticate Antony's authorship and to correct the received image of the saint's literary achievements. R. deals first with the compositional, theological, and philosophical background of the letters, and then with the historical veracity of ancient material concerning Antony. The letters appear in an appendix.

R.'s comparison of the versions of the letters (Coptic, Greek, Syriac, Georgian, Arabic, and Latin) in manuscript sources ranging from the fourth to the fifteenth centuries convincingly posits an original Coptic text. The chapter on gnosis makes the case that Antony's intellectual level was not that of an unlettered Egyptian peasant, as claimed in Athanasius's Vita Antonii. R.'s uncovering of Platonic and Origenist content in the letters, however, is based upon isolated passages, since Antony did not leave a systematic reception of the traditions, and therefore is open to question. R.'s critical review of sayings attributed to Antony in the Apophthegmata patrum and other sources rightly questions their authenticity, offering a basis for a further specialized study.

The letters themselves have been clearly translated with attention to all extant versions. Important variants in the manuscripts are offered in notes. Some typos appear throughout the book. The book has clear, though modest value for specialists in one or more of the Oriental languages, perhaps inspiring further study of the letters in comparative texts. For those interested in the philosophy and theology of early monasticism and its subsequent appearances in both Eastern and Western monastic traditions, this book offers important conclusions concerning the intellectual life of the monks of the Egyptian desert.

THOMAS S. FERGUSON
Manhattan College, New York


This scholarly investigation, originally a doctoral thesis at the Sorbonne, has two distinct parts. The first studies the early literature, starting in the second half of the fifth century, written in Syriac, Greek, Coptic, Arabic, Ethiopian, Latin, Georgian, Armenian, relating to the Dormition and Assumption of Mary.
The second studies the Marian liturgies of Jerusalem and Constantinople, the traditions locating Mary's house and tomb around Jerusalem or (much later) Ephesus, and, more briefly, the traditions of Constantinople and Jerusalem regarding relics of Mary (her dress and her cincture).

In Part 1 the literature is organized around Mimouni's thesis that there were three moments in the reflection on the end of Mary's life. The oldest writings affirm the Dormition (Mary's soul is taken to heaven and her body, preserved from corruption, is hidden away by angels until the final resurrection); intermediate writings describe a Dormition followed by an Assumption; the latest pieces present only Mary's Assumption, some with her resurrection after she died, others without death and therefore without resurrection.

In Part 2 the main inquiry relates to relations and rivalries between Jerusalem and Constantinople, claims about Mary being exploited to support political aims. The general conclusion is that the ideas about Mary's Dormition and Assumption were born and grew in Jerusalem among Monophysites during the polemics that opposed the followers of Severus of Antioch and those of Julian of Halicarnassos in the turmoil that followed the Council of Chalcedon. These beliefs were echoed in Orthodox circles after Emperor Maurice's imposition of the feast of Mary's Assumption on August 15.

GEORGE H. TAVARD
Assumption Center, Brighton, Mass.


Beginning as early as the eighth century, Muslims have produced one of the world's richest bodies of mystical literature. With Sells's new "Classics" volume Paulist Press continues its service of providing first-class translations of seminal primary sources. More importantly, this is the first truly ample assortment of texts spanning the eighth to tenth centuries. S.'s renderings are superb as is his choice of materials. In addition to several freshly translated texts of Qur'an and Hadith, the chapter on the sources of Islamic mysticism describes pre-Islamic poetry as an oasis of Arabic mystical imagery—an important but generally neglected connection.

The introduction is designed to give readers new to the subject most necessary conceptual tools; the main chapters offer selections by and about nine major early Sufis. In an exception to the general use of Arabic sources, a chapter on the celebrated woman mystic, Rabi'a (who apparently left nothing in her own hand), retranslates a 13-century Persian hagiographical account in a fine rendering by Paul Losensky. Use of Munawi's late-16th-century Arabic version of Rabi'a's story would have kept the selections linguistically unified and presented a first English translation of that text, but Losensky's version is markedly preferable to Arberry's. S.'s new translations of texts from Junayd, Hallaj, and Niffari likewise represent notable improvements over earlier attempts by Arberry and others.

S. carefully and commendably discusses major technical and theoretical issues in his introductions and annotations. A keen sense of subtle nuance in mystical language and a breadth of familiarity with Judaic and Christian as well as Islamic mystical traditions make this volume a must for courses in Islamic spirituality and comparative mysticism.

JOHN RENARD
Saint Louis University


There is no known precedent for this fascinating study of Dhuoda's Liber Manualis, written in Latin by a Carolingian aristocrat for the practical and religious formation of her
two sons. It deserves attention, not only in the scholarly but above all in the pastoral and catechetical worlds.

Mayeski skillfully situates Dhuoda in her historical, theological, and literary context in order to give the reader a better understanding of the complex world of medieval exegesis out of which her work emerged. Dhuoda displays familiarity with key Church Fathers, from Jerome and Augustine to Bede and Gregory, as well as with Scripture. In trying to present a comprehensive understanding of the mystery of salvation, she departs from accepted interpretations of traditional texts, modifying and adapting to suit the needs of her sons, taking time to substantiate her own theological credentials in her exegesis of the story of the Syro-Phoenician woman. She views her role as teacher and counselor as an extension of her maternal role.

Concerned lest her sons adopt moral values unworthy of their Christian heritage, she reworks the popular moral tradition based on the Beatitudes into a developmental program appropriate to the adolescent warrior, revealing in the process her understanding of the role psychological and social development play in opening one up to the reception of doctrine. She is especially concerned about the conflicting claims on one’s loyalty in court circles and sets forth a moral strategy to help her sons negotiate these sometimes difficult situations. The social implications of sin are never far from her thoughts.

M. convincingly exposes Dhuoda’s uniqueness as an example of the varied and complex biblical theology produced in the Middle Ages and often dismissed without careful study, a laywoman who subverts, if subtly, the masculine dominance of the text, to give us a spiritual last will and testament and a primitive catechism. Most readers will undoubtedly want to read the latest English translation (Handbook for William, University of Nebraska, 1991) the better to appreciate Dhuoda.

SONYA A. QUITSLUND
George Washington University, D.C.


Laurence develops a useful panorama of the lives of ordinary, mostly illiterate women in England from the Reformation to the Industrial Revolution. Much of the information is not new, and many of the theoretical positions on issues have been developed by others. What is new is the scope of the work. L. looks at women’s reality beyond the family, considering other aspects of women’s lives which she categorizes as “worlds.” Under the heading “material world” she considers issues of health, livelihood, paid work, fashion, gardening; under “mental world,” literacy, religion, and popular customs. A final segment deals with the public intersection of men and women’s worlds: as participants in the political process; in terms of their relationship to property; as violators of the law.

On balance L. presents the religious turmoil in 17th-century England as detrimental to women’s participation in public life: “In the Church of England women were excluded from all positions of power, both clerical and lay” (199). Dissident groups such as Methodists and Quakers were welcoming of women in their early phase of development, but became more restrictive toward them as they became more established. The dissolution of the women’s religious orders removed a corporate space in which women had lived together in community with a degree of autonomy for centuries as well as leaving many former nuns in dire financial straits. Oddly enough, among the most marginalized were wives of clerics. There was considerable ambivalence toward clerical marriage in the Church of England. Clerical wives remained stigmatized into the early-17th century and contrary to other women were not allowed to assume their husband’s social status when they married.

L. provides a useful compendium of data on women in the early modern
period. Her bibliographic notes give ample sources for further research. But for the general reader as opposed to the specialist the detail is nearly overwhelming. At times I wished for some illustrative "evidence" from more literary sources. Though L. dutifully recounts an array of theories about specific trends in her data, I missed a critical evaluation of the theories on her part. Despite these reservations, I welcome her book as a solid contribution to the effort to reveal the role of women in history.

PAMELA KIRK
St. John's University, New York


This study of confession in German-speaking areas that remained largely Catholic not only shows how early-modern confession differed from medieval but also how it expressed (and helped effect) characteristic features of Catholic spirituality and ethos for four centuries. Students of spirituality and moral theology, as well as students of sacramental theology, will find much food for thought here.

Myers avoids common ideological biases by carefully investigating contemporary records to determine how confession actually functioned. His examination of late-medieval and Reformation-era confession shows the ambiguous, even confused, state of the sacrament in both theology and practice. The Lenten ritual whereby members of the Catholic community prepared for their annual Easter communion had no great significance for lay spirituality. Lay unwillingness to confess in detail (more for social and logistical reasons than principle) was common and generally accepted by the clergy.

What changed after Trent is the focus of M.'s second half. Trent clarified doctrine along late-medieval scholastic lines with a coherence and uniformity that had been lacking. Its defense of integral confession to the priest meant an emphasis on the private and individual rite and the rejection or restriction of traditional possibilities that had come to be identified with Protestantism. Subsequent changes in the ritual, setting, and circumstances of confession brought about ritual uniformity, intensified its formal and juridical character, and heightened privacy. Frequent (quarterly or even monthly, rather than annual) confession was reoriented to function as a continuous process for achieving spiritual perfection. It also promoted a self-conscious and self-disciplined laity loyal to the Church.

Minor corrections are in order: a reference to absolution as the matter of penance (123); an incorrect citation—misquoted from Jungmann—and overly-simplified history of the absolution formula (126). But the book is well done and its thesis well argued. Surprisingly, however, M. does not advert to how quickly the situation has changed since the 1950s and whether that supports or challenges his conclusions.

JAMES DALLEN
Gonzaga University, Spokane


Much has been written about Kepler's mysticism and its putative effect on his science, but this is the first systematic attempt to document the effect of his philosophical and religious views on his contributions to astronomy. Kozhamthadam provides a remarkable analysis and synthesis of Keplerian texts. The analytic part consists in isolating key religious, philosophical, and scientific ideas that continue to recur in Kepler's many writings; the synthetic part then shows how each group of ideas actually functioned in his acceptance of Copernicanism and his discovery of his first two laws of planetary motion. The exposition is completed with copious endnotes, a glossary of technical terms, a bibliography and
an index. Thirteen line drawings assist the reader in understanding the details of Kepler's astronomical discoveries.

There can be no doubt that Kepler is the best subject by far to show how religious beliefs can exert a positive influence on science. K. focuses on Kepler's idea of God as Creator, with a trinitarian as well as a simple nature, and eminently rational; related ideas are those of God as a geomet er who is an active force and the source of life, light, and harmony in the universe. Further, some of these attributes are reflected in human beings and in the structure of the world. Thus, for Kepler, nature itself is an ordered unity, at once rational, mathematical, dynamic, and harmonious. As a result the scientific ideas he favors are those of realism, empirical knowability, generalizability, the validity of inference to unobservables, and physical explanations through the concepts of force and mass, in all of which divine influences can be discerned.

William A. Wallace, O.P.
Univ. of Maryland, College Park


This might seem a very specialized book of little interest except to musicians and liturgists involved in research in the Methodist tradition. But in fact it is a significant contribution to the study of the relationship between doxology and theology, an area of increasing interest to many. Part 2 is devoted to an examination of various hymns in this Methodist collection. Part 1 contains a summary of recent discussions on the relationship of doxology and theology, and in many ways is an excellent source for those who wish to acquaint themselves with this conversation. Part 3 tries to clarify the essence of doxological speech and its relationship to theological reflection.

Berger defines doxology as "the explicit and implicit speech of praise, confession of faith, prayer, and thanksgiving, as directed to God for God's glorification" (17). Hymns belong to the genre of doxological speech. Hymns are common to both liturgical and nonliturgical traditions, and the hymns of Charles Wesley in particular are good examples of such speech. In her study of these hymns B. intends to "chart new territory by intentionally placing the debate on the relationship of doxology and theology in the context of the study of a specific doxological tradition" (57). This section is an excellent study of the spirituality of these hymns.

I think the part of the book most helpful to theologians and students of the liturgy is Chapter 2. Here I finally found a succinct and clear discussion of the lex orandi, lex credendi tradition. And this clarification of this Roman Catholic methodology is aided by B.'s comparison of it with the Protestant approach. Unlike Roman Catholic theology which addresses the matter of doxology from the principle referred to above, Protestant theology sees the relationship between the two not as a liturgical concern but as a theological one. This discussion is enriched by B.'s treatment of the Orthodox tradition where liturgy is seen as theology and theology as doxology. I recommend this discussion to all who are seeking clarity on the way doxology contributes to theology and vice versa.

James L. Empeeur, S.J.
San Fernando Cathedral
San Antonio


Cogliano has produced a cogent, well-argued account of the persistence and power of anti-Catholicism in colonial New England. He an-
nounces his purposes at the outset and meets them with cogency of argument and clarity of style.

Taking as a time frame the period from 1745 to 1791, from the siege of Louisbourg to the first visit of Bishop Carroll to Boston, C. first of all reviews the importance of resistance to the papacy and the Roman Church as a defining fact of New England life. Furthermore, he presents this resistance as a shaping factor in the New England response to the emerging revolutionary crisis of 1765–1775. As he succinctly puts it, "Anti-popery was an important intellectual source for the American Revolution." Finally, he elaborates on the limited toleration of Catholicism that resulted from the Revolution's alliance with Catholic France.

Very few errors of fact have crept into this carefully crafted text. One might note, however, that when Carroll visited New England, he was not yet an archbishop, and that the Charlestown convent burning took place in 1834, not 1832. Both the extensive endnotes to chapters and the bibliography are impressive. This work is a worthy and concise study of the era and the issues undertaken.

Clyde F. Crews
Bellarmine College, Louisville


Since its publication in 1825, Möhler's Die Einheit in der Kirche has proved an extraordinarily influential work. M. drew upon patristic authors to depict the organic emergence of the community of the Church in the early centuries. The work has now been published in English translation for the first time. Erb renders the text accurately and clearly, with sensitivity both to its Romantic context and to its Catholic apologetic thrust.

Erb's substantial introduction accomplishes many tasks. He situates Unity in the Church within the larger framework of M.'s life and work. He first treats M.'s early life, his studies, his formation as a professor, and his works leading up to Unity. He then explores the themes and structure as the work progressed through several drafts and revisions. He indicates M.'s selective but masterful use of patristic writers, as well as what secondary literature M. was acquainted with. Next he examines the significant turns that M.'s thinking took afterwards, as expressed in such works as Athanasius der Grosse and Symbolik. Finally, he considers the reception of Unity in the English-speaking world, with particular attention to Ward, Newman, and Manning. None of these topics are treated exhaustively, yet they are all explored with depth and care.

Erb adds several helpful appendices that reproduce brief works and lecture materials of M. both prior and subsequent to the publication of Unity. The end result is an impressive volume, an exceptionally helpful contribution to theological scholarship that fills in what had been a significant lacuna in the English-speaking world.

Dennis M. Doyle
University of Dayton, Ohio


Hayes has been a longtime scholar-student of Schelling, and now he has produced a valuable book for English-speaking readers: it is an orientation to Schelling's final system. This thought, presented in Munich and Berlin between 1827 and 1854, is a tripartite unfolding of a transcendental idealism, a theoretical organization of mythologies, and a philosophy of Christianity. Each of these three sections is lengthy and dense, and a full translation and publication of the entire system is problematic;
moreover, even a translation of that which interests theologians, the philosophy of revelation, is a daunting task.

H. offers a summary with extensive translated excerpts from three central books of this triadic final system: from the Philosophy of Mythology there is the first book which gives the philosopher's definitions and categories for mythology, and the second book which relates the inner content of mythologies (myth is a record of the becoming of God expressed in the histories of peoples); to these are added an important book from the Philosophy of Revelation discussing revelation, Christology, the world of spirits, and the future of the Church. H.'s title indicates correctly that this is an introduction and summary for Schelling's philosophy of myth and revelation and not merely a translation of three segments.

A 50-page propaedeutic locates Schelling in his cultural, philosophical, and religious times, while a lengthy retrospect discusses the meaning and value of this philosophy of religion for today. H. has his own views on Schelling, views that he has pondered for three decades and that go back to conversations with Paul Tillich. English-speaking students and teachers, daunted by thick volumes of Gothic script, can be grateful that for issues of religion in one of the major figures of modern philosophy there is now a summary and interpretation.

THOMAS F. O'MEARA, O.P.
University of Notre Dame


Lane demonstrates extraordinary research into the texts of Teilhard, his supporters and critics; his accounts of Teilhard's thought are often well done and insightful. He documents well Teilhard's considerable influence on both the New Age movement and on Catholic and Protestant theologians. He cites many Christians who are enthusiastic supporters and others who are quite critical, and one is left wondering how one author can touch people so deeply and be read so differently.

L. is among those who are "highly critical" of Teilhard, but many of his conclusions concerning Teilhard are unwarranted. He quotes a passage wherein Teilhard predicts the advent of "a hitherto unknown form of religion" and adds, "This implies that Christianity is destined to disappear"; but such an implication is in no way evident. Having told of Teilhard's Omega, L. concludes it is "the creative presence of Absolute Self rather than the Risen Christ" (47); but he does not say why "Absolute Self" (L.'s phase) would be incompatible with the risen Christ. Citing Teilhard who speaks of the life of Jesus as "a veritable world-soul" permeating all things, L. observes that "the notion of God being 'a veritable world soul' finds no support whatsoever in Scripture" (68); but he does not explain why passages like Col 1:17 and Eph 4:9-10 offer no support whatsoever for Teilhard's claim. At this point, L. quotes Mascall: "The logical outcome of a purely immanentist theology is pantheism—the doctrine that God and the world are simply identical"; but since Mascall's text never mentions Teilhard and Teilhard was far from presenting a "purely immanentist theology," one wonders why this citation has been introduced.

L. describes some passages of Teilhard as "profoundly Christian," yet he finds the basic ideas underlying these passages incompatible with Christianity. L. directs a Christian Apologetics Society in New Zealand and mentions preparing a more comprehensive study of Teilhard. One hopes that his analysis will be more to the point.

THOMAS M. KING, S.J.
Georgetown University, D.C.

AUFHEBUNG ZUR EIGENTLICHKEIT: ZUR PROBLEMATIK KOSMOLOGISCHER ESCHATOLOGIE IN DER THEOLOGIE KARL RAHNERS. By Philip Geister. Uppsala
An excellent investigation of the cosmic dimension of Rahner's eschatology. Following the lead of several recent interpreters, G. wishes to show that Rahner's approach, while anthropological in method and focus, manifests evolutionary and cosmic dimensions as well. But he is convinced that these perspectives must be developed much further and in a more central way than Rahner was able to accomplish.

Part 1 offers a lucid discussion of Rahner's writings on matter, the principle of active self-transcendence, and spirit in the world. Human beings are understood as the pinnacle of the evolutionary history of matter becoming self-conscious. This history, which is at the same time God's act (salvation history), comes to its fulfillment in Christ. Therefore, the "cosmological Christology" G. finds suggested in Rahner is characterized as a meeting of an "ascending" and a "descending" Christology. G. also discusses the relationship between the fulfillment which has already been accomplished in Christ and the future fulfillment.

Part 2 offers a sympathetic critique of Rahner's approach. G. correctly points out the deficiency of Rahner's characterization of apocalyptic as distinct from eschatological statements. He briefly raises the important question regarding the relationship between theology and the natural sciences, but curiously omits any reference to Barbour and others who have already contributed much to this debate. For G., the starting point for any tenable cosmological eschatology must be the twofold experience of the basic interdependence of all cosmic systems and the massive pollution of the environment. In closing, G. presents four theses that indicate the basic lines along which such an eschatology might be developed.

G. reminds us of our need to recover a sense of the importance of nature. The cosmos as a whole, and not simply the human species, is what God is creating and saving. He rightly insists that concern for other species and for the environment must be an integral part of Christian discipleship.

JOHN R. SACHS, S.J.
Weston Jesuit School of Theology


Naud's thesis is that the aggiornamento regarding freedom of thought in the Church which was intended by Vatican II has suffered a reversal during the postconciliar period, and that this reversal can be explained by the fact that the mind of Vatican II on freedom of thought can be known only to those who are familiar with the Acta of the council, since the intentions of the council were not clearly expressed in the council documents. It is N.'s purpose to present the evidence in the conciliar Acta of the aggiornamento intended by the council, and to document the "eclipse" which this has suffered in the recent exercise of the Roman magisterium.

N. argues that the sense of Vatican II on this question was expressed by the members of the Central Committee when they rejected the profession of faith that was presented to them by Cardinal Ottaviani, and when they criticized the statement in Humani generis excluding the free discussion of judgments expressed in papal encyclicals. He finds another indication of the mind of the council in responses of the Theological Commission which recognized the legitimacy of well-founded disagreement with positions taken by the ordinary magisterium.

N. illustrates the "eclipse" that has taken place on this issue with his critique of the new "Formula for the Profession of Faith," the Code of Canon Law that requires assent to nondefinitive teaching with a canonical penalty for dissent, the decision of the Holy See with regard to Charles Curran, and the "Instruction on the
Ecclesial Vocation of the Theologian." While I would disagree with him on a few details, I believe he has proven his thesis.

Francis A. Sullivan, S.J.
Boston College


Tilley offers a much-needed corrective to philosophers who treat religious claims as analyzable propositions isolated from their meaningful context in religious experience, practice, and a broader doctrinal tradition. He commends the value of a "practical" philosophy of religion, one that appreciates "phronesis" and its lived wisdom as much as it does the reasonableness of "scientia" as it walks its reflective path.

T.'s contribution to the discussion is detailed in a differentiated analysis of prudential religious practice in which a worthy, justified act of commitment is one that displays consistency with one's beliefs, follows from one's assumptions, has examined its warrants, and conforms to the standards of the agent's responsibilities. This insightful analysis of the prudential religious act will well serve philosophers of religion, systematic theologians, and ethicists.

In his last chapter, T. uses the responsibilities of the Roman Catholic theologian as a test case for the application of the prudential act. But if this is a good test case for exploring commitment, then to what degree is T.'s analysis generalizable to the vast majority of faithful practitioners who are not theologians? While I applaud T.'s defense of theological inquiry, I was puzzled by his conclusion that the "upshot of our analysis is that we cannot give an answer to the question of whether a prudent person can be a Catholic theologian" (151). It would seem to me that his careful formulation of the conditions of prudential action could not be accomplished theoretically or logically but only in accordance with the actions of real prudent persons, including prudent theologians whose modeling performance requires us to answer his question in the affirmative.

These questions, though, are instigated by a very provocative and successful book that is an important contribution to the philosophy of religion and well worth reading by all who do theology.

John E. Thiel
Fairfield University


The Library of Philosophy and Religion "explores contemporary religious understandings of humanity and the universe.... Some of the books in this series are written for the general educated public and others for a more specialised philosophical or theological readership." The present volume presumes more than a general education in science, psychology, and philosophy. However, it has a straightforward thesis: The material conditions intrinsically required for the existence of free human beings are sufficient to make natural evils inevitable. A similar psychological argument shows that evil human acts are likewise inevitable. By providing scientific and philosophical understanding of the human before God, Worsley gives a prolegomenon to theological understanding.

His argument sounds remarkably like Plantinga's free-will defense. Indeed, he shares with Plantinga the concern to deal with this problem globally rather than requiring in principle an application to each individual instance of evil. But he finds a major fault in Plantinga's failure to recognize "that, at least for the monist, all human experience, and, hence all human possibility is inextricably interwoven with the fabric of the material, created order" (173). W. therefore explores in some detail the structure of the human brain required for freedom and the evolution-
ary process required for its coming to be, and he concludes that these requirements make some natural failures unavoidable. He illustrates this with the paradigmatic instances of earthquakes and cancer.

W. never fully explains or justifies his monism and seems to lump all forms of dualism together, making mental acts simply aspects of neural events. (Unaware of Aquinas's treatment of angelic freedom and sin in *ST* 1, qqs. 59 and 63, he judges that an immaterial creature would lack freedom.) This seems unnecessary to his thesis, which is well argued.

JOHN H. WRIGHT, S.J.
Jesuit School of Theol., Berkeley


Black theology irrupted in the U.S. in the politically and spiritually tumultuous period of the 1960s. Its exacting demands on theology’s priorities provoked a paradigm shift which for more than 25 years has given the U.S. some of its most searching, promising, and creative theological thinkers. In this concise and clearly written study, Hayes provides a brief and critical introduction to black liberation theology. She makes no attempt to take on all of the issues and developments of that theology but selects major issues, ideas, concerns, and theologians in the field. So while H. charts the emergence of womanist theology and brings to light the appearance and potential of black Catholic theology, she limits this essay to black theology in the U.S.

H. begins by defining black liberation theology as “faith seeking understanding.” Thus black liberation theology is the disciplined articulation of faith by peoples of African ancestry on the continent and in the diaspora in a way that reflects their own lived experience. Chapter 1 explores the African religiocultural roots of black theology, the advent of the historic black church, and African-American Christianity’s mediation of black rebellions against enslavement and its pernicious legal and social extension. Chapter 2 treats the influence of Protestant and Catholic revivalism on the formation of black Christian consciousness; this is a fruitful way to engage elements of ecstatic worship in African traditional religions and in Protestant evangelicalism, as well as Catholic sacramentality. Chapter 3 locates the rise of black liberation theology in three chief sources: the Civil Rights Movement, the Black Power Movement, and black reaction to Joseph Washington’s controversial *Black Religion*. The remaining chapters are especially good at bringing highly theoretical issues (sources and norms, symbol and metaphor, narrative and testimony) to lucid explanation and synthesis.

H. has consciously addressed the book to both a popular as well as a scholarly audience; the bibliography offers a good general reading list that college, university, and seminary instructors as well as undergraduate and graduate students will find helpful.

M. SHAWN COPELAND
Marquette University, Milwaukee


This book is an expansion of Kelly’s doctoral thesis. K.’s mentor, J. M. R. Tillard, O. P., wrote the Preface to the book. Tillard, with Congar and others, has contributed much to the contemporary understanding of ecclesiology. His *Church of Churches: The Ecclesiology of Communion* is basic to K.’s understanding of “recognition” as a theological concept and process whereby the apostolic faith contained in Scripture “is continually being transmitted in and by the church” (219). Churches achieve unity when each church recognizes koinonia both in itself and in the other churches.

K. traces the development of the process of recognition in the history of the Faith and Order movement
from Lausanne (1927) to Santiago de Compostela (1993). His study of Faith and Order is rooted in its major documents, including the six volumes of official responses by churches to *Baptism, Eucharist, and Ministry*, the Lima document. As a theological history of Faith and Order, the book reflects its origins as a doctoral dissertation examining primary and secondary sources.

K. describes recognition as “an emerging ecumenical term.” The issue of methodology has been a constant in the history of Faith and Order. The comparative, the contextual, the consensus, and the convergence methodologies have all been utilized. Recognition has been consistently applied but has yet to become a discreet process within the theory and practice of ecumenical ecclesiology. In this extensive and comprehensive examination, K. argues persuasively that the process of recognition, based on a theological rather than a juridical foundation, should be an integral part of the methodological exploration and future development of ecumenical ecclesiology.

William P. McShea
Carlow College, Pittsburgh


Drawing on organizational theory, this useful contribution to the literature on women’s ordination offers insight into the relationship between theory and practice in the attitudes of five churches to the ordination and ministry of women. Unlike the more common theological and historical approaches, either advocating or opposing women’s ordination, Schmidt offers a qualitative analysis of the actual experience of fifty women, forty ordained in the Episcopal, United Methodist, Evangelical Lutheran Churches, and Southern Baptist Convention, and ten women seminary graduates from the Roman Catholic Church. His conclusions will confirm the suspicions of many women about their ongoing marginalization, even in those churches that ordain women, and will prove informative to those not familiar with the internal workings of the different churches.

S. used interviews and questionnaires to gain information about the actual experience of ordained women within their denominations. He discovered that in spite of considerable denominational diversity in theology and attitudes to ordination of women, when viewed through the lens of gender, there existed surprising commonality in the continuing perception of church leadership as male dominated. Perhaps the most interesting dimension is S.’s analysis of the bureaucratic and cultural linkages within each denomination and their impact on the obstacles to women’s gaining access to power and full participation in church leadership. S. concludes that the “glass ceiling” is firmly in place in the churches.

This study is valuable for its attempt to probe the reality of women’s experience in ministry behind the public perception of the different denominations, and for its use of organizational theory to gain a different kind of insight into the human dynamics of church institutions. It is not a theological analysis, and S.’s presentation of the bureaucratic and organizational dimensions of the churches needs to be read with an awareness of their theological self-understandings. S. acknowledges the limitations of such qualitative research, and he is cautious about generalization. It would have been helpful to include in an appendix the interview protocols and questionnaires.

Mary E. Hines
Emmanuel College, Boston


This slender volume focuses on an understanding of ethics and the moral life as found in the earliest cor-
pus of Buddhist literature, leaving aside those portions generally recognized as later additions. To accomplish this task Kalupahana discusses the Buddha’s thought against the background of ancient Indian philosophy (largely Brahmanical thought) as well as relating early Buddhist philosophy to categories of modern Western moral philosophy. The book’s 17 chapters (some only a few pages long) are divided into three parts: “Historical Background and Problems,” “The Moral Life, the Principle and Justification,” and “Applications of the Principle.”

K. generally exhibits a good grasp of Western moral philosophy, and therefore the volume will be helpful to the nonspecialist to “decode” Buddhist moral philosophy, so that its terms, categories, and principles may be more properly understood by those who have only a rudimentary acquaintance with Buddhist thought. This in turn should help overcome some unfortunate oversimplifications and misperceptions commonly used by many who condemn certain Buddhist tenets without an adequate grasp of what these tenets entail. Yet, K. himself betrays occasional oversimplifications. E.g., he attributes the lack of treatment of economics in Western philosophy textbooks to the supposed Western distinction of the moral life from the good life, which makes them “so incompatible that if one were to have a good life one would have to sacrifice morals, and if one were to be moral, one would have to abandon the good life” (119).

In sum, the book’s major strength for the nonspecialist is also its greatest weakness. A good overview of early Buddhist thought is obtained through terms of comparative philosophy, but often at the price of oversimplifications and without a sustained textual analysis which might have shown how this early stage of Buddhist doctrine came to develop into those forms prevalent in contemporary Buddhism.

JAMES T. BREITZKE, S.J.
Jesuit School of Theol., Berkeley


Shannon states that he is neither a medievalist nor an expert in the philosophy of Scotus. However he believes that a true dialogue with Scotus’s thought might enlighten two contemporary agendas. The first concerns Scotus’s ideas on freedom and how they might suggest an alternative to the typical U.S. experience of freedom as mere choice. The second concerns the current debate within Roman Catholic moral theology over the issue of proportionalism.

S. is correct that the general U.S. understanding of freedom is almost always restricted to the capacity to choose. He argues in a helpful way that Scotus’s notion of freedom as firmitas or steadfastness can enlarge this narrow understanding of freedom by focusing also on the object of choice and its goodness. In S.’s opinion, Scotus’s definition would correct an overly capricious understanding of freedom because it would focus on freedom as steadfast adherence to what is good or valuable.

S.’s analysis of Scotus’s contributions to the issue of proportionalism is informed, but in the end it may not be too helpful to a reader unfamiliar with this methodological issue. Because S. only briefly summarizes the essential lineaments of the debate, possibly only those already familiar with the discussion could benefit from the dialogue with Scotus. However, S.’s analysis of Scotus’s discussions of the nature of intrinsic evil and of the role of intention and circumstances in forming moral judgments should be helpful to those already involved in this debate.

S.’s analysis of Scotus does not purport to be original; most often it relies on secondary sources. Nonetheless, the book’s value lies in its attempt to bring insights from Scotus’s system to bear on contemporary issues.

JAMES J. WALTER
Loyola University, Chicago

Wainwright proposes "that mature religious belief can, and perhaps should, be based on evidence [that] can be accurately assessed only by men and women who possess the proper moral and spiritual qualifications" (3). The most suitable author to support his project is Jonathan Edwards, who believes that God and the holy "are overwhelmingly beautiful" (22); the human being's experience of this beauty in creation is one that consists both of "a spiritual sensation" (24) and a consent of being to being. For Edwards, the benevolence of the saints provides a "superior epistemic position" (42), since grace removes sin-induced corruptions of reason and affords affections by which the saints reason "differently and more accurately" (51). Less fitting is Newman, for whom all rational endeavor requires "a sound and sensitive conscience," while the study of revelation needs a conviction of God's goodness as well (67). Weakest for W.'s thesis is James's stress on "interest" in all rational explorations.

W. is stronger in defending his proposition against intellectual challenges. Charges of subjectivism fail because they assume "that theism is false or that subjective qualifications are not needed to know God" (115). The benign circularity of religious proofs are "endemic to most disciplines" (123). W.'s deep analysis of the charge of relativism concludes that the different ways of "coming to terms with life" (136) appropriately reflect the richness of religious belief.

Aside from Edwards's "benevolence," it is difficult to determine what passions (or virtues) are appropriate for passional reason, perhaps because for W. and his authors, passions "[do] not involve a direct or immediate . . . awareness of God Himself" (33), much less do they engage directly with a God who is personal and covenantal. Overall, a close and intellectually satisfying analysis and defense of the need for proper dispositions for evaluating religious truth claims.

G. Simon Harak, S.J.
Fairfield University, Conn.


Bonanate here tackles the urgent task of drawing together the political realities analyzed in international-relations theory with the normative moral and legal issues more often discussed in the fields of social ethics and international law. Abundant notes witness to B.'s wide-ranging research and provide a wealth of relevant bibliographic material. The aim of his ambitious project is to argue that nation-states have duties to all individuals—people both within and beyond their borders, citizens and noncitizens alike.

Normatively, B. defends this view in a neo-Kantian fashion, though unfortunately without attending adequately to the connections between citizenship, justice, and conceptions of the good. His analytic and empirical arguments are, however, much more persuasive. Rightly targeting those who confine morality to the state, he delineates nine areas of international life on which we ought to make moral judgments, the most interesting being associated with the justice of postwar arrangements, jus post bellum. Such arrangements are crucial for B., who maintains that the international system has mutated after each "constitutive" war, the victors determining the norms for international life in the interwar periods.

Yet B.'s most important empirical points concern not past wars and mutations but the most recent mutation, as yet barely upon us. This change, he argues, has been brought about by the creation of end-of-the-world weapons, the ongoing processes of globalization, and the need for inter-
national responses to global problems, especially ecological threats. Since such changes have knitted domestic and international politics intricately together, they provide the empirical basis for B.'s normative claim about the universal duties of states. B.'s thought-provoking ideas deserve to generate much discussion; hopefully, they will help hasten the development of a truly international ethic.

FRANCIS M. ELVEY
Boston College


The Catholic magisterium’s teaching in sexual ethics insists that homosexuals have no human or moral right to engage in same-sex genital activity because such activity is objectively and intrinsically evil. Does that teaching justify or necessitate support for the conclusion that homosexuals may legally be denied certain civil rights? Peddicord here responds negatively to that question, and goes further to argue that Catholicism’s strong social teaching on human rights and justice, as seen in Thomistic political theory and John Courtney Murray’s work on the church-state relationship and on religious liberty, “ought to take priority over its sexual ethic as regards the moral advisability of protecting gay and lesbian people from discrimination” (144).

Recognizing both the distinction between legality and morality and the civil law’s limited function of establishing the minimal protective parameters needed for humane social living, Catholicism has no basis for insisting on the illegality or criminality of all that it considers immoral. Hence, although condemning fornication, contraception, and adultery as immoral, Catholicism makes no attempt to curtail the civil rights of people known or thought to be involved in such activity. Consistency suggests, therefore, strong support for the view that “discrimination against lesbians and gay men on the basis that they are likely to have sex with members of their own sex is arbitrary and indefensible” (184).

After an informative overview of the gay-liberation movement in America and the secular debate it inspired, P. offers a fair analysis of Catholic sexual teaching on homosexuality. Beyond this, however, he rightly maintains that “the Church cannot be satisfied . . . with simply reiterating moral condemnations against gay sex: part of her task is to promote and defend the human and civil rights of gay people. In so far as this seems controversial or even paradoxical to the average Christian, the Church has failed in her preaching of gospel justice” (182).

VINCENT J. GENOVESI, S.J.
St. Joseph’s Univ., Philadelphia


Preston first traces the history of the World Council of Churches and, to some extent, of Roman Catholic social teachings. He finds most adequate the ethical methodology of Christian realism and tells the story from that perspective. Consequently, he views the 1966 Geneva conference as the WCC’s high water mark, for it managed to be both inclusive and disciplined, both boldly prophetic and cognizant of the Church’s critical roles as preserver and sustainer. Taking a positive, but not uncritical, stance toward technology, the conference sponsored a rich interchange between theological and empirical disciplines.

P. perceives a precipitous decline in the work of the WCC’s Life and Work division since Geneva, reaching its nadir in Seoul (1990) and Canberra (1991). He roots this disarray in an inadequate theology: biblicist, eschatologically utopian, and crudely monistic, it is incapable of perceiving proximate ends or selecting the relatively best among possible options. P.
believe the WCC has compounded the problem with inchoate procedures and methods. Overgrown and unwieldy, the WCC is held captive by an agenda-laden professional staff. Moreover, the council’s uncritical adoption of liberation theology’s “action-reflection” methodology has rendered illegitimate theological and technical expertise. First-world theologians sit by helplessly, rendered immobile by guilt, and experts from empirical disciplines are called on only to buttress positions already established.

In the second half of the volume, P. sets out a positive program for ecumenical social ethics. He calls for a balance between the prophetic and sustaining roles of the Church in society, the discipline to develop middle axioms between generalities and detailed prescriptions, a genuine dialogue between theology and empirical disciplines, and for disciplined reflection that balances “the concerns of the third world with the ‘expertise’ of the First” (174). Despite its title, this volume will prove disappointing for those who seek sustained analysis of Catholic social teachings in their ecumenical contexts. Moreover, P.’s controversial argument may be alarming to those who applaud the recent work of the Life and Work Division of the WCC. This said, P.’s work is sensitive and compellingly written. It will be warmly welcomed by those who share his theological and methodological convictions.

DAVID OKI AHEARN
LaGrange College, Georgia


Petrà begins with a brief essay on “the grace of indissolubility,” and then in his first part treats at length and in detail the question of the divorced and remarried and their access to the sacraments. Here he summarizes magisterial teachings and the theological-canonical debates from Vatican II right up to the 1994 response of the three German bishops to the letter of the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith. He divides the debates into “painless” and “painful” solutions, depending on whether or not they seem to cause lesser or greater doctrinal and communal trauma. This material will be familiar to those who have followed this moral and canonical discussion.

In the second, larger, and much more intriguing part, P. asks, “Why does the death of a spouse dissolve Christian marriage?” He painstakingly traces the tradition, which begins with Paul’s treatment of remarriage in 1 Corinthians 7, which permits remarriage after the death or departure of a spouse, but as a lesser good to the ideal of chaste widowhood. He sees Paul’s apostolic intervention in Corinth as a pastoral acceptance of both Jewish and Roman law which allowed for marriages of surviving spouses. But Paul authorized this accommodation without determining whether the prior bond endured in some sense or was dissolved by death. Does the personal union of the spouses in Christ actually remain intact after the death of one of them? Was Paul’s disposition of the cases in Corinth an exercise of authority for the bonum animarum and the bonum commune, rather than a declaration that the marriage itself was ended by the death or departure of one of the partners?

P. asks why the Church cannot make the same authoritative disposition today in marriages which are “dead” as a result of irreversible separation. And he suggests a “juridic organ,” with canonical, theological, psychological, and experiential competencies, to assist couples to discern their situation and to issue certifications of their free state (237–38). P.’s creative, thorough, and well-documented work offers a nuanced and provocative approach to the “death of marriage” argument.

JAMES A. CORIDEN
Washington Theological Union
BOOKS RECEIVED

SCRIPTURAL STUDIES

SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY


HISTORICAL

Collopy, M. Mother Teresa of Calcutta and the Missionaries of Charity. S.F.: Ignatius, 1996. $34.95.

MORALITY AND LAW

Brock, R., and S. Thistlethwaite. Prostitution and Liberation in Asia and the


**PASTORAL, SPIRITUAL, AND LITURGICAL**


**PHILOSOPHY, OTHER DISCIPLINES**


**SPECIAL QUESTIONS**


