
This exciting book contends that biblical exegesis should get beyond historical criticism's emphasis on the world behind the text and literary criticism's focus on the world of the text to a theological interpretation of the text's meaning for the contemporary world. In the Introduction, Watson defines his terms: the Church is the primary reading community of the biblical text; "the world" refers to the vast social space that surrounds and encompasses the Church, within which it is to fulfill its mission. The university is the place in the world where the text is read as nonproclamatory; but if the Church's liturgy is the primary location of the biblical text, the university's reading of the Bible must change.

In the first three parts, W. describes and criticizes three new hermeneutic approaches to the Bible, looking for some elements upon which to construct a theological hermeneutic. Part 1, "The Autonomous Text," criticizes the primacy of the historical-critical model for exegesis from the standpoints of literary criticism (Frei), canonical criticism (Childs), and the irreducible plurality of hypothetical solutions endemic to the historical-critical approach. Part 2, "Theory and Postmodernism," critiques Derrida's antilogocentric theory of indeterminacy, Lyotard's antimetanarrative theory of particularity, and postmodern theories of God's creation as speech act.

Part 3, "Holy Scripture and Feminist Critique," deals with strategies of containment (Heine), as well as the more radical feminist critiques of Tribble, Ruether, and Schüssler Fiorenza. W.'s solution is that God has created humankind, male and female, in his/her image; the primordial sin introduced patriarchy into human culture. The New Testament, which presents the savior as a male revealing God as Father, nevertheless in Luke 10:21–22 evokes a trinitarian interpretation of the relationships of Father, Son, and Spirit which underlies an image of father in the Parable of the Prodigal Son which shatters patriarchy.

W.'s constructive proposal, Part 4, "Theology, Hermeneutics and Exegesis," builds on the trinitarian image of God he has derived from McFayden's theological anthropology and his readings of Genesis 1 and Luke 10:21–22 (with Luke 15:10–32). That the Word became not text but flesh demands an intratextual realism which refers to an extratextual theological reality. This theological realism is grounded in the work of the Spirit in all creation, which is the source of the world's critique of oppressive texts in the Bible. W. finds in Titus 3:4–5; 2:11–14 a soteriology in which Jesus as the divine philanthropy transforms human relationships toward the eschatological goal of perfected hu-
Consequently, even the sectarian command to love one another in 1 John 3:11 is "corrected" by God's love of the world. Thus there is no love of God which is not simultaneously love of neighbor. Since the practice of such subversive agapē, establishing koinōnia instead of division and oppression, is more likely to issue in crucifixion than in transformation, it will be fulfilled only in an eschatological future.

This summary cannot suggest the riches of the book. Its strength lies in its thesis and in its accurate description and profound critique of contemporary hermeneutical theories. Everyone will profit from careful reading of these twelve chapters.

The constructive four chapters are wonderfully suggestive, but ultimately disappointing. W. seems to intuit his positions rather than to demonstrate them; the all-important link between an intratextual realism and extratextual theological reality is explicitly treated only with regard to the Resurrection narratives, and that in a mere four pages at the end of the book. That the Spirit works in the world hangs from a sketchy exegetical thread and how the Spirit's work grounds the world's critique of oppressive biblical texts is not developed. These issues require an analysis of the nature and impact of human culture on the reception, writing, and reading of the Word of God as well as on a comprehensive theology of nature and grace. But W. is locked in an exclusive discussion with Protestant theology, and one seeks in vain for dialogue with Rahner, Schillebeeckx, Schneiders, and, above all, Lonergan and his disciples (Tracy, Meyer, McEvenue) in the area of public theology and hermeneutics. In short, it is W.'s vision of systematic theology which keeps him from executing so promising a proposal. But this brave beginning should stimulate others to complete this important project.

Seattle University  
JOHN TOPEL, S.J.


The question of Jewish and Christian origins has been a central concern of scholars since the rise of the historical-critical method. Kee here applies contemporary sociocultural insights in order to address this question anew. His aim is "to produce a new set of analytical modes and theoretical procedures by which the diverse and dynamic development of postexilic Judaism and the origins of Christianity can be illumined and more responsibly analyzed" (13).

Although K.'s overall argument has not convinced me, the structure of his work is simple and well organized, and the breadth of knowledge that he brings to his project is magisterial. In the first, and perhaps foundational, part he identifies five models of community in the literature of postexilic Judaism by which the Jewish people sought to iden-
tify and reconstitute themselves as the people of God: the community where God dwells among his people; the ritually pure and law-abiding community; the community of the wise; the community of mystical participation; and the community of ethnic inclusiveness and cultural adaptation. In the second and more developed part, K. employs these models of community to explain how different communities within the early Christian movement identified themselves as the people of God. Finally he briefly investigates how these five models of community developed in the post-New Testament period.

The models of community that K. proposes can be helpful, and he provides abundant evidence from Jewish and Christian literature to support them. But when he applies his models to the writings of the NT, I find them to be somewhat restrictive. E.g., he draws upon the Q source, the Gospel of Mark, the letters of Paul, Jude, and 2 Peter, when describing the community of the wise (the elect community to whom God has vouchsafed his purpose for them and for creation). Now there are strong wisdom motifs, understood in terms of apocalypticism, in these writings. But there is also much more. In the Pauline writings, e.g., there are elements of other models that K. proposes, such as the ethnically and culturally inclusive community. Paul, after all, more than any other NT writer, defended the rights of Gentiles to enter the Christian community without requiring them to submit to the prescriptions of the Mosaic law. Moreover, there are Pauline models of community, such as the Body of Christ, which do not play a major role in K.'s discussion.

It is most curious, however, that when studying the Pauline writings, K. does not examine them individually and in context but prefers to synthesize them. Yet Paul did not write to a single community but to diverse communities in Asia Minor, Greece, and Rome, and his letters provide various models for community life. Consequently, it would seem advisable to study his writings in context.

These critical remarks are not intended to detract from K.'s achievement. His chapter on the law-abiding community, represented by the Gospel of Matthew, and that on the ethnically and culturally inclusive community, represented by Luke-Acts, present compelling and satisfying arguments that these models were operative in the communities which cherished these writings. Likewise his chapter on the community where God dwells with his people, represented by 1 Peter, Hebrews, and Revelation, and his chapter on the community of mystical participation, represented by the Gospel of John, make a number of interesting points. But overall, there is a sense that these models may be too confining, and that many NT writings embrace more than a single model for community. One could argue, e.g., that the Gospel of Mark also embraces the model of the ethnically and culturally inclusive community, as does the letter to the Ephesians.

This said, a major value of this work is its comprehensive review of Jewish and Christian literature, both within and outside of the canon,
as well as its consideration of pertinent Greco-Roman writings. Moreover, K.'s judgments about the dating and nature of this material (especially the Gospel of Thomas and the Q source) are sound, and he provides a healthy balance to the many bizarre hypotheses of dating extracanonical material and of the origins of Christianity that afflict NT studies today. While this is not specifically a work of NT theology, those working in the area of ecclesiology can garner from it helpful insights into the many ways in which Jewish people and the early Christians identified themselves as the people of God.

*Catholic University of America*

**FRANK J. MATERA**


This challenging book is not social history in the usual sense, much less a study of women in the Pauline churches or Acts as its title might suggest, but rather a use of social history to construct a feminist liberation reading of early Christianity. Schottroff first offers a critique of German scholarship as having failed to grapple with the social struggles of the ancient world. Theissen made radical discipleship a voluntary option and so did nothing to address genuine social oppression. Schüssler-Fiorenza by naming the Jesus movement as a renewal movement in Judaism missed the point that it was not about abuses within Judaism but about the suffering of the whole Jewish people under Rome.

S. takes her clues from the "social-historical interpretation" of the Heidelberg Working Circle, a group of scholars and pastors committed to solidarity with disadvantaged nations and to the effort to overcome the split between theory and praxis in the context of Germany and Western Europe. The foundation of her historical view is that the real distinction in early Christianity was not a religious one between Jew and Greek as such, but between oppressed social strata and those who benefit from their oppression. The modern notion of Gentile Christianity is the heart of the problem. The notion is androcentric because it makes freedom from the law its central point, with circumcision as the symbol of this freedom, thus excluding consideration of women as equal partners and portraying the patriarchal church as its ideal. It is also Eurocentric because it considers Christianity's move from Asia to Europe as progress, citing for instance Paul's entry into Macedonia (Acts 16:9-15) as "entry into Europe" or posing Lydia as the "first European Christian woman." The true message of the gospel is concrete liberation for all the oppressed. So, for instance, the imagery of the Church as body in 1 Corinthians 12 is a critique of unjust structures, and the Christ-hymn of Philippians 2:6-11 emphasizes Christ's identification with female and male slaves.

The book contains four parts, the first of which is the requisite study of method and hermeneutics. The other three parts are arranged ac-
cording to three topics: the everyday life of women, the critique of patriarchy, and liberating praxis. Each chapter is organized around the following structure: text, social-historical questions, feminist observations on the history of interpretation, and feminist perspectives. Each chapter has a particular biblical text to launch it: 1 Timothy 2:9–15 on oppression and hatred of women; the lost coin (Luke 15:8–10) on women’s struggle for money and bread; the adulterous woman (John 7:53—8:11) and the Magnificat (Luke 1:48) on the exaltation of debased women, etc.

One of the more startling studies is “The Stubborn Widow and the Resistance of Women (Luke 18:1–8),” in which S. critiques, among other things, the androcentrism of the Sermon on the Mount. With the help of reflections by Walter Wink, she shows how some of the more radical ethics of the Sermon could be held out only to men: giving an undergarment to one who seizes one’s outer garment, which for a woman would be an invitation to rape, or turning the other cheek, which is effective “only when, under normal conditions, the one who strikes expects to be struck in return”—not an expectation when a husband strikes his wife or a master a slave. The stubborn widow, on the contrary, fights back by continuing to insist on her rights, not by violence, which would be ineffective, but with the only weapon she has, persistence.

At every turn, the reader encounters new twists to old stories, always with a view to upholding the interests of all oppressed people, and women within that context. As might be expected from a book written in Europe, there are occasional “in-house” references that an English-speaking reader unfamiliar with German politics will miss. Some assumptions are not self-evident to an American audience, e.g. entrenched resistance of scholars to feminism and liberation theology. A rare exhibit of superficiality is S.’s unwillingness to discuss any of the complexity of abortion; objection to it is seen only as a piece of patriarchal oppression.

Those who approach the biblical texts from a more strictly historical-social standpoint will disagree with some of S.’s basic assumptions. Did all Jews see themselves together as a class oppressed by the Romans? Ancient historians steadfastly maintain a total lack of evidence that slaves identified with each other as an oppressed class. Missing is a sophisticated analysis of what the language of the poor meant and how the economic system functioned in the ancient Mediterranean, analysis readily available from classical historians. For a challenging feminist liberation interpretation of key texts about women in the New Testament, however, one can do no better.

Catholic Theological Union, Chicago  CAROLYN OSIEK, R.S.C.J.

The search for the origins and development of eucharistic praying constitutes one of the most complex and important aspects of liturgical studies, since the content and manner of such praying among early Christians have significant ramifications for contemporary eucharistic theology. Mazza has already contributed to the study of eucharistic praying and patristic theology of the liturgy in his *Eucharistic Prayers of the Roman Rite* (1984) and *Mystagogy* (1988). This current work, the culmination of a number of years of study, deserves to be placed alongside classic contributions to the subject by W. H. Frere, G. Dix, and L. Bouyer.

Following the line of L. Ligier, who asked how the institution narrative became appropriated into the tradition of the Christian anaphora or eucharistic praying, M. provides a thorough structural and content analysis of traditions through the fourth century. He begins with the paleoanaphoras of the *Didache* 9–10 and the *Apostolic Constitutions* 7:25–26. These he calls paleoanaphoras because they do not yet represent the unified whole that will eventually form the classic anaphoras of East and West.

After careful analysis M. concludes that *Didache* 9–10 does indeed constitute a Eucharist despite its lack of an explicit institution narrative. The treatment hinges on *Didache's* oblique reference to Deuteronomy 8:10 (“When you have eaten your fill, you must bless the Lord your God”), which serves as a warrant for the repetition of the ritual. In contrast with a number of scholars, however, M. pays as much attention to the prayers of *Didache* 9, which precede the meal, as to *Didache* 10, which has been called the Christian Birkat-ha-mazon. Both sets of prayers are tripartite, consisting of two thanksgivings and a petition or embolism. M. stresses the former set of prayers (the equivalent of the Jewish Kiddush) because he will argue that the sequence cup–bread was original to the celebration of the Eucharist, and that the prayers of *Apostolic Const.* 7 reveal a shifting of balance from the prayers at the end of the meal to those that precede it, thus making way for a more consecratory theology.

After considering 1 Corinthians 10:16 ff. in order to validate his theory about the cup–bread sequence and to argue a very early dating for *Didache* 9–10, M. deals with the anaphora of the *Apostolic Tradition*. Here he finds a similar tripartite scheme, but now the first thanksgiving has been replaced by a series of christological motifs drawn from the paschal homilies of the second century. The last motif in the series is the institution narrative which then introduces an explicit anamnesis as a bridge to a second thanksgiving (for being able to offer the sacrifice). The petition becomes an epiclesis of the Holy Spirit. Thus M. finds the anaphora of the *Apostolic Tradition* to be paschalized Christian Birkat-ha-mazon along the lines of *Didache* 10.

The next section of the book deals with the origins of the anaphoras of the Alexandrian and Roman traditions. Like G. Cuming, E. Kilmar-
eucharistic prayer. Not surprisingly, he finds here a tripartite structure in which the first strophe is a Christian adaptation of the first Jewish morning blessing (Yotser) with its theme of light. The second strophe introduces the notion of thanksgiving as the pure sacrifice of Malachi 1:11, which serves here as an “institution narrative.” The final strophe consists of petitions for the Church. M.'s hypothesis with regard to Jewish morning prayer enables him to account for the eventual introduction of the Sanctus, since the Yotser concludes with that formula. He concludes, however, that the Sanctus is not original to this tradition, but is most likely an import from Syria.

M. goes on to link the remainder of the Alexandrian anaphora of Mark with the West Syrian anaphora of James, arguing that the latter tradition is responsible for the Sanctus—epiclesis—emolism block. He concludes his treatment of the Alexandrian tradition with consideration of the anaphora of Serapion, in which once again he finds a tripartite structure.

In an analysis too complex to summarize here, M. discovers an identity of structure between the Strasbourg papyrus and his hypothetical reconstruction of the Roman Canon—shorn of its Sanctus, institution narrative, anamnesis, and oblation.

Finally, M. deals with the baptismal catecheses of Theodore of Mopsuestia, demonstrating that the liturgy on which Theodore comments and the Ordo at its basis represent two different stages of liturgical evolution in a tradition that is moving from relatively free expression to fixity of language. In the Ordo M. discerns the same structure implied by Cyril of Jerusalem’s fifth mystagogical catechesis, namely one that lacks institution narrative and anamnesis.

I have been able to summarize only very briefly the main lines of M.’s argument. Each of his treatments is much more complex and deserves close attention by scholars, especially given the massive erudition of the work. There are a number of questions and difficulties that remain unanswered. First, M. must posit intermediate stages of development (for which evidence is lacking) at several crucial turns in his argument, especially with regard to the Roman Canon. Second, he seems to force all of the anaphoras he treats into a tripartite scheme and appears entirely to dismiss the research on the origins of thanksgiving sacrifice (zebach todah) made popular by C. Giraudo. Third, M. seems to presuppose a strictly linear development of texts in a period when pluralism may likely have predominated, thus enabling him to date Didache 9–10 before A.D. 50.

Nevertheless, in showing the gradual evolution of the institution narrative, as well as suggesting plausible hypothesis as to the introduction of Sanctus, anamnesis, and epiclesis, M. has offered scholars a study that must be dealt with seriously for some time to come.

Jesuit School of Theology, Berkeley

JOHN F. BALDOVIN, S.J.
PUBLIC DISPUTATION, POWER, AND SOCIAL ORDER IN LATE ANTIQUITY.
By Richard Lim. The Transformation of the Classical Heritage Series.

It is a tribute to the historical genius of Peter Brown, Lim’s mentor,
that he carved out an exciting new period of history between A.D. 150
and 750, called it Late Antiquity, and showed its significance to the
modern world. The period had been neglected by classicists, but, as the
age of the Church Fathers, it has since the Renaissance been a subject
of intense scrutiny by patristic scholars—though from the traditional
perspective of the original protagonists. Brown and his disciples have
enlarged the focus to include social and cultural history. Patrologists
welcome this new approach to the patristic age, which can only enrich
our understanding of events and figures of a period so vital to Chris­tianity. In antiquity, especially, because of the laws of literary genre
and the rhetorical conventions of the day, it can never be sufficient to
take a text at face value.

L. has produced an outstanding piece of work which displays wide
knowledge of the original and secondary sources. He utilizes a variety
of new theories and methodologies to shed light on the practice of
public debate among non-Christians and Christians in Late Antiquity.
In undertaking to write a social history of public disputation he is not
primarily concerned with literary or even intellectual history, but with
the social, one might almost say, human, realities underlying the de­bates. One of the themes he emphasizes is how Christians in the course
of the early centuries came to call into question dialectic and verbal
disputation. Thus the opening chapter concerns “the diffusion of the
logos” and the final chapter deals with “the containment of the logos.”

Competitive dialectic and rhetoric, specifically the public dispu­ta­tion, were deeply imbedded in Greco-Roman culture. The public debate
was a kind of sport (agōn), a combat between opposing arguments. It
follows that in such a culture, Christians, Jews, and pagans would
publicly debate their differences. Jews and Christians shared common
ground in the Prophets, as in Justin’s Dialogue with Trypho. What
mattered in Jewish-Christian debate was the correct interpretation of
the written text, rather than proof by philosophical demonstration.
Characteristic of the Roman Empire was the open airing of both posi­tions. The great Alexandrian, Origen, illustrated in his life the sover­eignty of rational persuasion both within and outside of the Christian
community. Origen’s faculty of calm persuasion made him a formi­dable opponent. In general the character of pre-Constantinian church
debates was nonauthoritarian and submissive to reason, as displayed,
e.g., in the victory of Dionysius of Alexandria over the millenarian
movement in the Fayum.

Gradually, as ecclesiastical culture developed, the written word be­came more important than the spoken word in public debates con­cerned with subtle points of biblical interpretation. L. considers as a
turning point the introduction of stenographers, which occurred at the
Council of Antioch in 264. Here the transcript made it easier to refute the opponent, Paul of Samosata, by recording the inconsistencies of his statements.

L. makes interesting observations on the teaching of philosophy in Late Antiquity. Already Lucian of Samosata had noted with disapproval the competition between various philosophical sects. The element of competition pervaded Platonist circles, where ultimately the dialectic of inquiry was replaced by the innate authority of the philosopher, who appeared as a holy man. The lecture replaced the Socratic exchange, the dialogue became the monologue. Influences on early Christianity are evident: Gregory Thaumaturgus lectured much as did Plotinus. The Plotinian term for interpreting Platonic texts became a technical term for the spiritual sense of Scripture (theòria).

In short, L. gives us a sociological analysis of certain aspects of intellectual history in Late Antiquity which illumines many dark corners and shows how the Fathers are products of their time. We get glimpses into a world not so different from our own: Plotinus disparaged Longinus as a philologos, while Longinus criticized the style of his opponent’s works. Quite different from today is the way philosophy moved from rational discourse to theurgy and mysticism. Eunapius depicts Iamblichus as a holy wise man able to display supernatural power. Like Brown, L. does not emphasize competitiveness with Christianity or Christian influence in the creation of the pagan holy man, though he characterizes the age as one of rivalry and careerism.

Theologians may not think often enough about the passion and ambition that may enter into religious debates. L.’s study serves to alert us to the presence throughout history of the form of argumentation developed in ancient Greece by sophists, who aimed at securing victory in argument rather than discovering truth. This is a serious contribution, worthy of respect.

Boston College MARGARET A. SCHATKIN


For centuries a cloud of doubt has been hanging over the existence of Isidore of Pelousion, denying him his rightful place in the history of fifth-century Christianity. The major stumbling block is the poor quality of the text of his letters, which were not printed until the end of the 16th century. More recently, scholars like Rudolf Riedinger have suggested that the names of both Isidore and Nilos of Ankyra, his near contemporary, are probably fictitious names affixed to a collection of works issued in the fifth or sixth century by a community of learned monks in Constantinople. Hence the 2,000 letters attributed to Isidore plus the 1,000 ascribed to Nilos would be the product of that monastic center, not the work of two real people.

While it is easy to cast doubts, disproving them is much more diffi-
cult. For at least 20 years Evieux has been engaged in investigating the matter of Isidore, patiently tracing down all the manuscripts containing his works, checking all possible quotations and versions, evaluating all the objections raised against his authorship and his existence. The present work is the result of that painstaking research. It also constitutes a prolegomenon to the next task, a critical edition of all the letters of Isidore in the series Sources Chrétienes.

In great detail and with exemplary accuracy E. reconstructs Isidore's historical, geographical, political, ecclesiastical, and monastic milieu—between 350/360 and 435/440 in the Roman province of Augustamnica, Egypt. He utilizes all available contemporary sources, ancient geographical handbooks, travellers' logs, as well as more recent archaeological excavations on the left bank of the Nile, where Pelousion is thought to have been located. The evidence suggests that at the time the city, lying on the major highway linking Egypt to Palestine, was also an important harbor, second only to Alexandria, and that Isidore, after a career as rhetorician, joined a group of monks in its neighborhood. E. reviews various forms of monastic life then in existence, and concludes that Isidore embraced a communal organization on the Pachomian model. Ordained presbyter against his wishes, Isidore was elevated not long afterwards to the rank of bishop in the church of Pelousion.

Before and after his episcopal ordination Isidore maintained a lively correspondence with bishops, monks, laypeople (Christian and pagan alike), and a great many government officials. One letter addressed to Emperor Theodosius II survives. He corresponded with no less than 426 people, whose names E. lists in alphabetical order (387–410). Covered in the 2,000 surviving pieces of correspondence are subjects of biblical interpretation, spiritual advice, Christian ethics, and clarification of christological and other teachings. Every letter exhibits a refined style, embellished but not obscured with vivid reminiscences of Isidore's early reading in Scripture and the Greek classics.

E.'s book on balance represents more than just a rehabilitation of Isidore. The first two thirds of it contain a mine of information on many of the events and problems Isidore and his contemporaries faced, particularly in the first half of the fifth century. Several indices at the end of the volume facilitate access to this valuable data. It is to be hoped that, after laying such a solid foundation, E. will soon make available the complete Greek text and a French translation of Isidore's correspondence, enabling Saint Isidore to speak to today's world as he spoke to so many in his own time.

University of St. Michael's College, Toronto Paul J. Fedwick

Studies in Maximus's daunting systematic thought are always welcome. Like others in this excellent series, this one is serious, scholarly, and deep. Karayiannis, a Cypriot archimandrite, has filled a lacuna in studies of Maximus's theology. Of particular interest is the Eastern perspective he brings to the subject.

Part 1 is devoted to the ontology of the distinction between essence and energies. Here K. covers the ontology of essence, viewed not only philosophically but christologically. In his discussion of the relationship of essence and hypostasis Maximus shows dependence on Leon-tius of Byzantium. Essence, they both claim, is general, while hypostasis is particular. Both use the example of body and soul. The christological key is that the human nature does not have its own hypostasis but acts through the divine hypostasis. With a nod to Aristotle, Maximus defines energy as the movement toward the finality of a being. God's essence, of course, is unknowable; Maximus goes even further in apophaticism than his predecessors. Nevertheless, God can be known through his energies, the finality of his will. The infinite is so in both the oneness (logos) of his essence and the threeness (tropos) of his existence. In willing creation God freely exercised his creative energy, allowing liberty to his creation yet circumscribing everything in his providence. The Chalcedonian principle of unity without confusion plays out as well in both the creative act and the eschatological fulfillment of the creature. What is revealed in all this, K. claims, is not the divine essence but God's energies which are really distinct from it. K. insists along with the Eastern Orthodox tradition that the ontological distinction between the divine essence and its energies is demanded by God's unknowability.

This teaching on energy becomes the basis of Maximus's celebrated christological system. The divine will is essential but distinct from God's essence; it is that essence's mode of life and existence. In the rational creature, too, the will is the agent of the realization of its finality, the energy tied to its very essence. K. gives us a helpful look at the antecedent uses of the term "energy" in Proclus, Philo, Didymus, the Cappadocians, and Pseudo-Dionysius. Against this background Maximus sees energy as the definition of the nature as well as its external effects. His insistence that energy and will are tied to essence, not hypostasis, positions him to defend the duality of energies and wills in Christ in the Monothelite debate. It is in his application to Christology of the patristic teaching on essence and energy that Maximus shows his originality. K. faithfully reviews the stages of Maximus's argument in favor of the reality of Christ's two energies and wills. He correctly points out that in Christ's Incarnation there is signified not the overturning of natural laws but their renewal.

Part 2 is devoted to the knowledge of God, not merely an intellectual knowledge but one involving divinization. It is acquired through the senses, reason, and experience, i.e. the practice of the virtues. These can be considered as divine energies through whose exercise we come
to know God. Knowledge by essence and knowledge by energies are the two ways of knowledge, apophasis and kataphasis, corresponding to truth and goodness. The first knowledge comes through faith, the second through creation. The first is immediate, the second mediate. Divine revelation reveals God's energies, K. submits, but not his essence. K. devotes a good bit of space to Maximus's treatment of our knowledge of God, especially in the three laws of nature, Scripture, and grace. It is Christ who recapitulates these three laws in himself, leading us to our finality, creaturely divinization. Apophaticism and kataphaticism, which in Pseudo-Dionysius seem to be in conflict, are seen by Maximus as the two modes of theology working in a harmonious dialectical relationship. They are, in fact, related as essence and energy. Divinization is rendered possible by the divine energy, which K. claims Maximus identified with (uncreated) grace, even though the term "divine and uncreated" grace appears only once in his corpus. Indeed, K. further suggests that Maximus may be the basis of the Palamite theology of the uncreated divine light.

K.'s final discussion of conclusions, listing six "original points" of his study, helps to bring his lengthy and somewhat diffuse work into clearer focus. Like many Eastern Orthodox scholars, K. tends to a rather hasty Palamite reading of Maximian vocabulary. For all his christological orthodoxy, Maximus was of an ecumenical frame of mind in the appreciation of the tradition of the West. K. passes very lightly over points of contact between East and West, including the great figure of Augustine, and disposers of the filioque in short order. The famous reconciling diffloratio of Maximus (Opusculum theologicum et polemicum 10) he rejects out of hand as the work of a later author. As is to be expected, there are criticisms of Westerners who have written on Maximus (von Balthasar, Garrigues, and Piret) on the basis of their Thomistic (or Hegelian) readings of Maximus. Nevertheless, this is a very welcome monograph, rich in documentation, competent in its treatment, and a welcome addition to the studies of the great Eastern Doctor.

Manchester, New Hampshire

GEORGE C. BERTHOLD


This latest addition to the growing literature about the Song of Songs in the Middle Ages presents an original interpretation of a rich tradition of interpretation. Turner argues that one important medieval understanding of the Song is a consequence of the meeting and intermingling in the monastic setting of Neoplatonic metaphysical eroticism and ascetic eschatology. This came about through the influence of Greek authors who managed to strike an accommodation between Christian speculative theology and the eros theory of the ancient
T. grapples boldly with the theoretical question of Christian spiritual eroticism. The infusion of Neoplatonic language and concepts into medieval theology, especially through the writings of Pseudo-Dionysius, brings the crucial element, the inadequacy of human language of any sort to encompass the divine outpouring of life from the All. The problem of human yearning for union with a Divine who cannot even be comprehended or described is, of course, the basis of the rich stream of Christian apophatic theology. The tension between kataphatic and apophatic theology—between the attempt to "speak God" as opposed to the "unspeaking of God"—is obviously the point. T. is certainly right to suggest that this tension is found throughout medieval Christian theology, even in the pragmatic and kataphatic Latin West. Pseudo-Dionysius is the key to T.'s thesis: even in the chapters which consider more "Western" forms of imaging the divine, such as allegory, typology, and imagery, he is the main foil for reading medieval Latin and vernacular authors.

T. supports his argument by presenting 13 English translations of treatments of the Song from the Western Christian tradition. Many of these are selections from commentaries heretofore unavailable in English. He begins with a translation of the Vulgate text of the Song and follows this with an engaging translation of "The Spiritual Canticle" of John of the Cross, the only selection not originally written in Latin. There are also three theoretical passages about the levels of meaning in Scripture. This book would be significant if only for the superb collection of medieval commentaries judiciously chosen. The imaginative and reader-friendly nature of his presentation will even make it possible for students to engage his thesis and argue with it. I certainly plan to use this book in the classroom.

But such praise does not mean T.'s thesis cannot be justifiably criticized on several points. I think the most obvious problem is the fact that he has chosen certain texts to develop his thesis, and simply put aside other texts which do not support his arguments. Commentaries which would certainly present a challenge to T.'s thesis are that of Haimo of Auxerre (PL 117.295–358) and the two commentaries of Honorius Augustodunensis—an early Marian interpretation (PL 172.495–518) and a later, long, complicated four-level commentary (PL 172.347–494). Haimo's commentary was the most widely diffused interpretation of the Song in the Middle Ages; it shares with the long commentary of Honorius the basic insight of the love in the Song as the story of the Church on earth. Honorius's early commentary is a reminder of the small but lively collection of twelfth-century readings of the Song as the love between the Virgin Mary and the God of the Annunciation. In short, there were other ways of looking at the Song in the Middle Ages, perhaps even more widely known and used ways
than the tradition T. presents here. How wide *was* the influence of Pseudo-Dionysius?

I also think that T.’s passing remark about the absence of Song commentaries by women (23) needs more refinement. While it is true that women did not usually write biblical exegesis (and were sometimes forbidden to do so), the importance of Song spirituality to women writers such as Clare of Assisi, Gertrude the Great, Hadewijch, and Teresa of Ávila could well be considered part of the tradition. Hadewijch in particular could be a good example of the combination of neo-Platonic eros and eschatological asceticism T. describes. What is at stake here is the definition of “commentary” and the breadth of influence of a theological tradition.

But these complaints simply return us to the questions with which T. has struggled with such honesty and insight: Why is the Song of Songs such an important book in the Western Middle Ages? How does such a passionate work become so important for celibate monks? What should or could be the “literal” sense of such a book in the context of medieval theology? T.’s fine book will certainly advance the discussion of these important questions.

*University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia*  
E. ANN MATTER


A first-class general study of lay religiosity in the period between the Fourth Lateran Council in 1215 and the conclusion of the Fifth Lat-eran Council in 1515. Although written as a textbook, it displays none of the aridity or patronizing dogmatism of the textbook genre. Swanson presents his material with freshness and verve; his discussion advances steadily without the distraction of numerous footnotes; and he appends a selective bibliography of primary and secondary sources.

Readers will be relieved to find that this is not another account of Benedictine monasticism, medieval papal bureaucracy, the conflict between *regnum* and *sacerdotium*, the theoretical underpinnings of papal monarchy, the organisation of the mendicant orders, etc. S. eschews these tired subjects and plodding chronological narrative, in favor of a looser, less pedantic approach concerned with the nature of the spiri-tual experience of medieval lay people and shaped by a generous per-ception of those supremely amorphous entities, the “Church” and “Western Christianity.”

S. describes “Western Christianity” as an “umbrella term” denoting a multitude of “regional, parochial, familial, and individual Christiani-ties” (8). Similarly, he rejects the view of the Church as an unyielding, authoritarian institution, arguing that it was pliant and vital, and that its very institutional existence was contingent upon the imaginative capacity of churchmen to respond to the devotional and spiritual re-
quirements of the laity. This was no easy task. Lay spirituality was protean, revealing itself in numerous and diverse forms. Some, like the religious confraternities, the guilds, the mendicant orders in their early days, the associations of mendicant Tertiaries, the Humiliati, and the Beguines and Beghards were expressions of corporate religiosity. Others, reflecting a more intense, perhaps obsessive, religious impulse, are to be seen in hermits, anchorites, and solitaries. All of these grew out of lay religious initiatives and, in S.'s views, should be valued as deeply significant factors in shaping medieval Catholicism.

No less significant were the devotional practices of the medieval laity, devised to secure divine assistance in this life and salvation in the next. Among the topics S. surveys are the Mass and changing attitudes towards its celebration, cults and relics and saints, the new cult of Corpus Christi, the process of canonization, penance and pilgrimage, the preeminence of purgatory, intercession, indulgences, and post-mortem commemorations. Much of this is familiar, but S. strikes an original note in the broad perspective he brings to his material, a perspective which allows equal weight to magic, sacramentals, and folkloric cults, many of which evolved and were sustained without the imprimatur of ecclesiastical authorities. Readers will find here much that is entertaining, but beneath the anecdotes S.'s serious purpose is to discern in popular devotions as well as in approved practices the reality of the late medieval religious experience.

S. acknowledges the critical difficulties of such an enterprise. The number of medieval documents is modest, and those that do exist offer only indirect, often ambiguous, indications of internal spiritual or religious feelings. Furthermore, the vast majority of the faithful were illiterate, unable to preserve personal records of their needs and aspirations. Conversely, those who did write were often among the discontented, and a facile acceptance of their views as broadly representative produces a picture which is seriously skewed. S. shows, however, that a judicious, dispassionate reading of evidence for lay “acceptance of and participation in religious practices,” and similarly for signs of their “scepticism, doubt, and ignorance” (312), permits a sane appraisal of the devotional and spiritual condition of Catholic Europe at the beginning of the 16th century. This appraisal reflects positively upon late medieval Catholicism as an evolving, vital religion, and it effectively obviates the conviction, so dear to religious whigs, of the ineluctability of the Protestant Reformation.

Changes between 1215 and 1515 were in part due to external events. But more importantly, in S.'s view, they resulted from ongoing attempts by the lay faithful to derive meaning from their religion through new and spiritually focused forms of devotional and spiritual self-expression. In such a long, complex evolutionary process, skeptics, blasphemers, doubters, and even heretics make their appearances. But to discern in the experiences of these individuals the signs of repressive ecclesiastical authority and moribund religiosity (for an egregious
example of such an interpretation, see R. I. Moore, *The Formation of a Persecuting Society* [1987]) is wildly inaccurate and based upon assumptions about the monolithic, unchanging nature of Latin Catholicism which are anachronistic and unhistorical. As S. observes of the medieval perceptual mode, "‘Believers’ and ‘sceptics’ . . . were not distinct species" (339).

S.’s intelligible and compelling study never falters and is never dull. He provides a broad prospectus of medieval religion which will be welcomed by students. At the same time, the far-reaching, penetrating insights he advances are sure to stimulate sharp discussion and argument among scholars in the field. We hope, however, that for a second edition, the press will eliminate the irritatingly numerous editorial lapses.

*University of Toronto*  

**Penny J. Cole**


The title of the Italian original, *Europa del diritto commune*, literally "Europe of Common Law," better expressed the thesis of Bellomo, professor of legal history at the University of Catania, that ever since the Middle Ages and well into the modern times, through all the vicissitudes of its history, Europe had a common law. It was the law inherited from the Romans and preserved in the compilations of Justinian. It held together the nations of the continent. With the rise of nationalism in the 17th century, however, and the rush for codification in the 19th century, this bond was broken and the unity it had forged fragmented. Yet B. believes that all is not lost. This common law can be recovered and again become a powerful instrument of unity in the service of the emerging European community.

B. is aware that many legal historians would be opposed to his position: for them, there was no "Europe of common law," only a Europe of many particular laws. Roman law, they contend, played only a supplementary role, to be invoked when local norms could provide no satisfactory solutions. Not so, B. insists. The thousand of students who flocked to Bologna and other universities did not expose themselves to mortal perils in journeying so far, and they did not spend time and money for the sake of learning some auxiliary rules. They journeyed and studied precisely because they wanted to know in depth the principal ideas from Roman law that had penetrated into, and animated the particular laws of every corner of the continent—ideas such as *ius, dominium, imperium, obligatio, iudicium, aequitas*, etc. Further, they wanted to apprehend the art of jurisprudence that the Roman jurists created and the medieval doctors perfected. The source books, for teachers and students alike, were the *Corpus iuris civilis* and the *Cor-
*pus iuris canonici*: the two together (with appropriate commentaries) represented the legal learning and wisdom of the age. The former took care of the secular society, the latter of the community of the faithful, but they had to operate in harmony because the subjects of the two laws were the same human persons. The two systems also recognized a correct hierarchical order in the world of law; every human ordinance had to be ultimately subject to the divine law, which was (mostly) mediated by canon law.

B. mentions the British Isles only cursorily, declaring that during the 16th century they "went their own way (as they have been doing for centuries)" (223). This is true in substance of England but not of Scotland: the roots of the Scottish law remain to this day in European common law. England, however, from the twelfth century, through the unifying efforts of her Norman rulers, developed its own common law, the King's law. It was a rigid system that often gave more importance to the observance of formalities than to the administration of substantive justice. The rescue, or the balancing factor, came from the office of the Chancellor who in the name of the King's conscience began to dispense justice according to the rules of equity that he himself formulated. He had help, though, for he was inspired not only by the norms of Christian morality but also by the ancient Roman tradition of turning to natural justice when the severity of the law was working injustice: when *summum ius* amounted to *summa iniuria*. Thus equity that once brought fairness and humanity into the civil law of the Roman Republic did the same for the law of the English Kings. Ever since, to this day, all who get equitable relief in an English court, or for that matter in a U.S. court, should remember gratefully the merits of the continental common law.

Cochrane's English translation is "elegant and lucid," as the Introduction claims, except for the bland rendition of the title that rather obscures than reveals the content.

This book has already seen success in Italy, going through five printings since 1988. The success is deserved, for B.'s content is well structured, his thesis properly documented, and his argument persuasive. Also, B. has a gift for letting history become the *magistra vitae*: he is able to narrate past events in such a way that they become an inspiration for the future, in this case the future of Europe.

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*Georgetown University Law Center, D.C.*

LADISLAS ORSY, S.J.

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This latest biography of Emerson, and the best to date, draws on his extensive journals and correspondence in order to describe in detail Emerson's relationship to his family, to both of his wives, to the members of the Transcendental club, and to the growing number of acquaintances who sought him out as his fame and influence grew.
Richardson depicts a more passionate Emerson than most of his biographers, giving us glimpses into Emerson’s friendship with the other women besides Ellen Tucker, his first wife, whom he adored, and Lydia Jackson, his second wife, whom he loved faithfully. The passionate and brilliant Margaret Fuller held a special place in Emerson’s affections. One learns of Emerson’s deep feeling for his brothers, especially for Charles, who tragically died an early death in 1836. R., who has also written a prize-winning biography of Thoreau, depicts the ups and downs in the relationship of two dyed-in-the-wool individualists.

A different strategy grounds R.’s contextualization of Emerson’s thought. As he did with Thoreau, R. has undertaken the daunting task of reading every work we know Emerson read. Emerson read voraciously; but he filtered the thought of other writers through his own view of the world. As a consequence, he skimmed rapidly through books whose thought he found alien. He read more thoroughly writers who seemed to give him back his own best insights.

While I recommend this study heartily to students of Emerson and of American intellectual and literary history, I must confess some reservations. The strength of R.’s study lies in its extensive contextualization of Emerson’s literary and intellectual achievement. But it fails, in my judgment, to read the works of Emerson themselves in sufficient depth. It leaves one with the impression that Emerson produced a series of loosely related aphoristic essays. In fact, he did much more than that.

A consistent method structured practically everything Emerson wrote—a method of phenomenological description which presupposed a modified Platonic universe in which the surd historical facts of the material universe express the universal unchanging laws of the transcendent realm of Spirit. He believed that by extensive description of surd facts he could disclose to his auditors and readers the external transcendent laws which they symbolize. During Emerson’s “saturnalia of faith,” from 1832 to 1842, this descriptive method took on an ecstatic, visionary character and sought to evoke a burst of creative energy from others by putting them into contact with the infinitely creative Oversoul. In his mature period, from 1842 until he ceased writing, systematic description acquired a more dialectical character as personal experience and the tragic death of his son forced him to come to terms with human finitude.

Greater sensitivity to Emerson’s method of thinking would not only have sensitized this study to the depth and complexity of Emerson’s metaphysical religion of creativity, but it would also have taken into better account the dark side of Emerson’s genius. In reading R.’s account of Emerson’s friendships, e.g., one gets no hint of the fact that his dualistic metaphysics prevented him from finding any ultimate reality or value in individual persons.

In Emerson’s transcendental universe, individual facts acquire
value only in the moment of creativity itself, with the inrush of creative energy from the Oversoul. Once creativity ceases surd facticity takes over. This strange metaphysics endowed Emerson's though with its prospective character. One lived for the next moment of creative ecstasy to break through the tedium of the factual and individual.

Unfortunately, Emerson also regarded persons as individuals. In principle, then, he found them valuable only insofar as they functioned as symbols of impersonal, external beauty and value, as his strange philosophy of love makes clear. Emerson confessed to his journals that his beliefs about persons did not always agree with his experience of persons, whom he found more fascinating than his metaphysics warranted. Nevertheless, as the mature Emerson despairof a life of ongoing, ecstatic creativity for most people, including himself, he came to believe that Nature, universal Spirit, uses persons for its own ultimately impersonal ends.

Greater sensitivity to Emerson's darkening metaphysical vision would, I believe, have forced R. to qualify the somewhat idealized portrait of Emerson which he paints. Emerson experienced moments of deep passion, no doubt; but, if one believes what Emerson says in his writings, his overriding passion remained concern to preserve the integrity of his own creative genius. That passion explains the remoteness of which his friends often complained.

R.'s Emerson manifests none of the ambiguity which haunts the elder Emerson's darkening vision. That fact leaves this reviewer somewhat suspicious of the passionate, politically active Emerson R. describes. The sage of Concord became a politically active (if mildly racist) abolitionist only when the passage of the Fugitive Slave Act threatened the integrity of his genius. That passion explains the remoteness of which his friends often complained.

This impressive study of the context of Emerson's life and thought succeeds, then, better with context than with the man himself. Nevertheless, it makes a significant contribution to Emersonian scholarship and will prove a valuable resource.

Jesuit School of Theology, Berkeley

DONALD L. GELPI, S.J.


This volume is the fruit of Lennan's doctoral work at the University of Innsbruck where Rahner began and ended his long theological career. His specific focus is the phenomenon of change in the Church, and his thesis is that Rahner's understanding of this phenomenon underwent significant development. While always convinced that change and development belonged to the fundamental character of the Church, he moved from his earlier preoccupation with change in the organic sense of the Church becoming more what it is under impetus and guidance of the Spirit to the later notion of change in the sense of deliberate adaptation to a changing world in a changing history. This
distinction accounts for the division of the book into two parts and for L.'s chronological method in tracing this shift.

As a necessary first step L. describes the basic understanding of the Church which enables Rahner to see change in both of the above senses as a positive, future-oriented reality rather than negatively as a past-oriented and regrettable need to return to original purity. This understanding is derived from Christology and is based on the notion of the Church as the sacrament or real symbol of Christ. But the fact that the Church is also sinful both avoids the danger of a monophysite ecclesiology and grounds the possibility and necessity of change: the Church must change in order to close the gap between the sinful symbol and that it symbolizes. This necessity was strengthened by Rahner's commitment to ecumenism and the need to remove those abuses which stood in the way of church unity.

This positive understanding of change is then applied to the development of doctrine and to the development of church structures. Structures are necessary and de iure divino because the Church is a historical and not merely interior reality. But these structures can change because what is ius divinum always becomes historically concrete in some form which is ius humanum and so susceptible of further development. The relationship of papal primacy and the episcopate is a case in point. The final chapter of Part 1 is devoted to the central role of the Spirit as "the element of dynamic unrest" in the Church. L. highlights Rahner's ability to hold in fruitful tension various polarities of church life, particularly those of charism and institution, the need for permanence as well as change, legitimate authority and individual freedom, and finally the complementary roles of hierarchy and laity.

Part 2 shows how the present century has presented a particular challenge to the Church and made change and adaptation an urgent imperative. The end of European world domination, the explosion of technology and the spread of pluralism, secularism, and relativism are among the factors challenging the Church to courage and creativity in forging a different relationship to this new world rather than becoming a relic of the old. Rahner sees the significance of Vatican II in its acceptance of this challenge and the beginning of its becoming a genuinely catholic and world Church. He developed his sacramental ecclesiology to show the compatibility of universal salvation with the necessity of the Church for salvation.

The greatest threat to the Church and its faith in this new situation is pluralism, the many and irreducible sources of knowledge that generate divergent worldviews. But this also challenges the Church to purify its faith so that it can preach the essential core within the hierarchy of truths, a process that also has important implications for its ecumenical discussions. Looking to the future Rahner saw many changes both possible and desirable in accordance with his principle that the Church is an "open system" guided by the Spirit and that its history is still incomplete. L. describes these possibilities in many
areas: the role and exercise of authority; ministry and ordination; the organization of communities; ecumenism and the Church’s relation to the world. He also notes critiques by more conservative theologians such as Avery Dulles, but shows that his criticism is often based on misunderstandings of Rahner’s views.

L.’s study is thorough and nuanced and presents a balanced and comprehensive view of Rahner’s contributions to contemporary ecclesiology, contributions not welcomed and accepted by everyone in what Rahner described as a “wintry season” in the Church.

Fordham University, New York

WILLIAM V. DYCH, S.J.


Stebbins provides a synthetic interpretation of Lonergan’s writings on the doctrine of grace from the late 1930s until about 1950. His chief focus is on the unpublished De ente supernaturali: Supplementum schematicum (1946) and on other writings insofar as they illuminate or enlarge the meaning of that central text.

S. generally follows Lonergan’s development of theses in De ente supernaturali, though with two principal exceptions. Chapter 1 focuses on Lonergan’s cognitional theory; this tack is strategically important because Lonergan understands internal actual grace as consisting in conscious acts of understanding and willing. Chapter 3 explicates Lonergan’s “theorem of the supernatural”; and this move is critical because Lonergan’s theorem provides the explanatory framework for his dynamic understanding of the natural/supernatural relationship as it relates to the analysis of grace.

Lonergan’s theorem acknowledges a real distinction between the supernatural and natural orders. But he formulates the distinction in terms of a vertical finality through which lower-level realities enjoy the potentiality for dynamic sublation by higher-order realities in such a way that the intelligibility of the lower is maintained, even as it is incorporated into the higher order; e.g., the sublation of the chemical in beings existing on the biological level does not negate the intelligibility of chemical laws. This applies even to the strictly supernatural instances of vertical finality in which human beings are elevated to a created sharing in the divine nature (sanctifying grace) and the human intellect and will are obedientially, passively receptive to such actualizing operations as faith, hope, and love of God. These latter (actual graces) at once transcend the natural capabilities of intellect and will, without negateing the laws to which human intellect and will as such are subject. S. rightly concludes that in his theorem Lonergan transcends two-story-universe explanations of the natural/supernatural distinction which end up extrinsically gluing together the two elements. He likewise eliminates the need for adding a third element, such as Rahner’s supernatural existential, which is hypothesized to
serve somehow as a link between nature and grace in its sanctifying and actual forms.

The leitmotif of S.'s work is the interpretation of Lonergan's understanding of internal actual grace. This grace consists in volitional and intellectual activities of the type that cause the occurrence of other acts of will/intellect in the same respective potencies; e.g., the movement of the will to desire growth in the love of God causes the willing of the means to realize this growth. These activities are supernatural because their motivation/goal is supernatural, e.g. the willing of a deepening of one's faith. These activities are principally caused in us immediately by God without any exercise of efficient causality on our part; e.g., we find ourselves moved to desire growth in loving God. These activities are derivatively supernatural insofar as we are both moved and move ourselves to the willing of a means; e.g., we choose the means of praying more as a way of deepening our love. In the latter instance we have an example of actual grace as both operative and cooperative. S.'s exposition strikingly reveals the comprehensive, coherent, compelling power and intellectual beauty of Lonergan's synthesis.

S. provides evidence that Lonergan underwent a profound deepening in his own religious experience shortly before he wrote De ente supernaturally (334). This may partly explain his stress in that work on the conscious nature of internal actual grace. S. adds a pastoral richness to his study in referring to an observation of Lonergan in his later years that for some there exists a profound awareness of the divine power at work in them. Others may need to recall their past and its religious high points and movements toward deeper holiness in order to discern the ongoing work of God's grace in their lives (126). Here Lonergan joins Rahner in stressing the experiential reality of God at work in our hearts and minds.

In his culminating chapters S. brilliantly displays the power of Lonergan's method in its ability to handle such complex issues as the Molinist/Bañezian controversies, divine and human causality, freedom, sin, and God's transcendent providence. Lonergan extensively utilizes metaphysical categories throughout his early works. S. correctly observes that Lonergan's later study of grace in terms of intentionality analysis does not basically negate his earlier metaphysical study. Rather, the two approaches validate one another.

S.'s overall work is excellent. Only rarely does he leave the reader hoping for greater clarity, more examples. He provides extensive footnotes and a superb index. The judicious user of these sources will discover overlooked observations in early chapters which clarify subtle discussions in later chapters and vice versa. Even the seasoned Lonerganian will find this study quite challenging; yet for the reader who sticks with it the rewards are immense.

Gonzaga University, Spokane

BERNARD J. TYRRELL, S.J.


The first chapter is a general survey; each of the subsequent ten chapters focuses on the seven books or the major themes in Moltmann's theology. Because B.'s work, with the exception of the final chapter, is a compilation of lectures, articles, and chapters he composed from 1986 to 1993, and because there is overlapping in Moltmann's books, there is inevitably repetition of Moltmann's fundamental perspectives. Perhaps B. concentrates too much on the stages of development contained in each of Moltmann's books, a matter likely to interest only the most select reader.

With the possible exception of his Christology, The Way of Jesus Christ, which B. considers "probably the most important work on Christology for a decade at least," B. shows that Moltmann's brilliance still lies primarily in his early works. The major insights reside in his first two, where he developed his basic eschatological perspective and then situated it inside the history of the Trinity's life with the world. The farther Moltmann strays from his fundamental insights, it seems, the less valuable his thought, and the less secure he becomes, so that secondary insights shift, depending on his experiences and efforts to shore up his system against criticism.

In answer to his own question, Moltmann summarized his theology around three key points: "a biblical foundation, an eschatological orientation, a political responsibility" (8). Remarkably accurate, except that he omits his theology of the Trinity. The four capture the essence of Moltmann.

The first two should be combined. Based on the Bible and the atheist Ernst Bloch's insights, Moltmann lit up the theological world in the 1960s with his eschatology of promise empowered by the indwelling Spirit of hope. God's promise found its origins in the Exodus, an experience that made revelation future-oriented, rather than extra-temporal. Suddenly God was to be found in history rather than outside it.

In Moltmann's second work, he adumbrated his trinitarian theology. The immanent Trinity was the economic Trinity, and God was in history sharing in the suffering of Jesus on the cross, a suffering that was necessary to incorporate the transience of the world and the godless and godforsaken into his own divine life, so that all would be incorporated into the fulfillment of the promise of the eschaton contained in Jesus' Resurrection.
Two things might be noted. First, the utterly dialectical nature of Moltmann’s theology: everywhere there is the overcoming of opposition, variations on the dialectic of the cross (suffering) and resurrection (joy and divine indwelling) that permeates all reality. Secondly, Moltmann places this whole dialectic inside the history of the Trinity’s own suffering love in the world, as the world’s history as well as the Trinity’s own history (there is mutual perichoresis) are brought to fullness in panentheism, where “God will be all in all” (1 Cor 15:28).

One can see admirable creativity in Moltmann, but there are shortcomings. Though generally sympathetic, B. nevertheless accuses Moltmann of “undisciplined speculation” and “hermeneutical irresponsibility” when he strays in his later work from warranted exegesis. B.’s developmental approach also readily exposes how Moltmann’s views seem unusually open to change in brief periods of time (even now, it does not seem clear whether his economic and immanent Trinity are the same). Moltmann strongly insists that God suffers, in his inner life, in the sufferings of his people, but B. criticizes him for not clearly indicating that such suffering must be analogical (but in that case, what does it mean when Moltmann says that God experiences “grief”?).

The final chapter on mysticism is both encouraging and discouraging. One of Moltmann’s basic diatribes has always been against the unhistorical epiphany of the divine in the transient in nature religions and platonic Christianity. He represented the opposition of the 60s to the contemplative mystical communion with God apart from history, and justified theology’s immersion in history as the only true avenue for communion with the divine. Now B. tells us that Moltmann in *The Spirit of Life* (1991) has found that contemplative union with God apart from history provides fulfilled moments of anticipation of the eschaton and there is no inconsistency. Did it take 27 years to find this out? What happens to all those who had so deeply committed themselves to Moltmann’s earlier opposition?

B.’s work is of immense value as the most complete and objective study of Moltmann’s theology to date. It also provides the most complete listing to date of Moltmann’s publications and studies of his theology in English.

Saint Joseph’s University, Philadelphia  MARTIN R. TRIPOLE, S.J.


Ricoeur has so deeply established himself as a creative philosopher, religious thinker, and dialogue partner to a host of theologians across a range of traditions and theological issues that one can only applaud this latest collection of his essays. Freshly translated by Pellauer and expertly introduced by Wallace, this anthology includes works in philosophy, theology, exegesis, and homiletics, selected and organized so
as to show the scope and the development of R.'s religious thought over the past 25 years.

The anthology opens with three foundational reflections on the study of religion, specifically the relation between philosophy and religious language, between manifestation and proclamation, and between sacred text and the community that regards it as sacred. As is true throughout his work, R. is here the great reconciler, skillfully putting a new spin on apparent opposites, and showing them to be in fact two moments within a single dynamic hermeneutical process. The opening essay illustrates R.'s method in all three. Faith and reason, classically taken to be opposed, in fact meet in language. A philosophical inquiry into religious faith is possible because religious experience, whatever else one may think about it, comes to expression as a kind of discourse that not only says something other forms of discourse do not say but presents itself as both meaningful and true. Since faith cannot be separated from the process of interpretation that brings it to speech, it belongs properly within the larger philosophical hermeneutics as a valid philosophical inquiry.

Part 2 illustrates R.'s dialogical method as he engages respectively Kant (Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone), Rosenzweig (The Star of Redemption), and Levinas (Otherwise Than Being or Beyond Essence). These three critical engagements represent not only a dialogue between R. and three different philosophical approaches to religion, but even more the gradual emergence through dialogue of R.'s own constructive position. Central themes in this section are hope as response to radical evil, the claim of the future in the face of death, and openness to others as constitutive of authentic human identity.

In Part 3, R. traces on a larger and more developed scale the same procedure that took him in his earliest works from a structural to a hermeneutical phenomenology. In dealing with biblical texts, structural methods are appropriate when one pursues a reconstruction of redactional levels, the path backwards towards the elusive arché of the text. These same methods, however, do not explain the rationale behind redaction history, which is the forward movement of telos. Proper interpretation requires that both be pursued in tandem. Following his lead essay on method, nicely subtitled “The Polyphony of Biblical Discourses,” R. exposes readers to the role of the imagination in the transmission of biblical faith, the way time operates in the various genres of biblical discourse, and the nature of narrative as a rich vehicle of interpretation.

In Part 4, R. conducts four theological “overtures”: on God, self, narrative, and evil. Here again he tips his hand in the direction of telos, presenting hope as the finality of theological discourse, examining the invitational nature of the ways in which God is named, exploring evil as lament and the task of imagination to lead lament to catharsis, and identifying the true nature of the self as formed through response to a word that is addressed to it. Part 5 brings R. to a practical address of
such human issues as suffering, fairness, personal identity, and the relation between love and justice. In his final essay he ends as he began, weaving both love and justice into that living dynamic where each is essential to the other.

In the end, one does not critique R.; one admires him. One does not analyze what he says; one engages him in the saying. So much of his own thought has developed through dialogue with others (his renowned “detours”), that it would be a disservice not to engage him in the same way. R.’s thought does not boil down to a system, much less a collection of slogans (even his trademark “the symbol gives rise to thought”). The master of telos is only served well if the reader comes away wondering, perhaps even in directions which the master himself never imagined.

Those already familiar with R. will find here food to delight, challenge aplenty, and perhaps even an invitation to journey with him along paths as yet untried. For those seeking an entry into R.’s thought, a caution and an endorsement. The caution: there is no easy road into his world, no privileged or logical place to begin. Yet there is much to recommend this volume as a point of entry. The introduction offers an excellent sweep of the structure and content of the book and locates its essays within a carefully wrought intellectual biography of their author. And the essays themselves present in ever recurring fashion the foundational themes that lie at the heart of R.’s work.

Weston Jesuit School of Theology, Mass. Peter E. Fink, S.J.


O’Collins has written many books on Jesus, five alone on the Resurrection. In 1983, he published Interpreting Jesus to introduce students to the best in recent thinking about Jesus. Now, in the most recent study, he sets out, in some ways similar to Interpreting Jesus, to present a systematic Christology. As in his earlier work he stresses that the interpretative key is the Resurrection.

O. devotes nearly half the book to examining the scriptural bases for Christian belief about Jesus; he follows this with a shorter treatment of the conciliar and medieval contributions, then with a discussion of contemporary issues. The concluding chapter relates all the central themes of the book to the theme of “presence,” which permits O. to emphasize in his Christology “its Jewishness, its feminine characteristics and its connections with mystical and pastoral spirituality” (322). All the chapters, except perhaps the last two, reflect the work of a scholar long grounded in the Catholic theological tradition, conversant with contemporary questions, and capable of clear and lucid explanations of complicated conciliar teachings.

The second-last chapter, “The Universal Redeemer,” would have
been more satisfying if it had been extended, given both the importance of the issue of the relationship of Christ to other religions and the amount of scholarship recently devoted to that topic. The final chapter, "The Possibilities of Presence," only sketches out several ideas that call for further development, especially given O.'s initial statements that the key to his entire study will be the Resurrection, a focus that benefits greatly from the final chapter's idea of presence. Earlier chapters that deal with the formation and meaning of the classical conciliar teachings reflect incarnational rather than soteriological preoccupations and emphases. O. makes clear that both the ontological and functional approaches are important for a balanced understanding of Jesus, and his interpretation of these conciliar teachings shapes that discussion so that the soteriological dimension is never lost. He succeeds as well as any contemporary theologian in overcoming that lack of adequate integration of the ontological and soteriological so characteristic of Christology in the Western Church.

O. demonstrates his sure grasp of the tradition when he discusses contemporary questions such as the knowledge, faith, and sinlessness of Jesus. Concerning Jesus' knowledge, he follows the lead of the 1981 and 1985 documents of the International Theological Commission, and states (contra Roger Haight) that Christ's personal pre-existence does not make it impossible for him to have during his earthly life "a limited (human) understanding of his divine identity and no consciousness at all of his eternal pre-existence" (241-42).

Concerning the faith of Jesus, he notes that traditional christological thinking rarely even raised the question of whether Jesus exercised faith during his earthly life. He explains that recent authors (Mackey, Sobrino, Rahner, even von Balthasar), have not distinguished clearly enough between the confession and the commitment of faith. Along with Jean Galot, he argues against Aquinas's thesis that Jesus' human knowledge embraced the beatific vision, for then Jesus neither could have genuinely suffered nor acted freely. At the same time, he avoids saying that Jesus' human knowledge drew upon no divine knowledge. He finally argues that Jesus exercised a sort of fides qua, a faith by which he, at a level more radical than any of us, committed himself obediently to the God whom he called "Abba."

This idea of Jesus' obedient self-commitment leads O. to the question whether Jesus ever sinned. Was Jesus not just de facto, but also de jure sinless? And if Jesus could not sin under any circumstance whatever, was he truly free? He explains that the question can not be addressed by discussing only Jesus' humanity. Rather, the question needs to be put this way: Was Christ personally impeccable de jure? He answers yes, because otherwise God could be in opposition to God. In dealing with this question, O. explains that to be fully human is to be fully and in principle virtuous, and that freedom should be thought of less as choice and more as conscious self-determination. Finally, if a distinction between the order of being and that of knowledge can be made,
then O. believes it is possible to say that Jesus was truly tempted, but did not know that he could not sin (271).

At the end, acknowledging that he has intended to speak from within the Catholic theological tradition, O. states that he has never tried to adopt a neutral position in relation to his subject matter. He believes, rather, that personal commitment and critical reflection can mutually support each other. This mature and insightful systematic work reflects O.'s capacity both for critical reflection and for personal commitment. Yet more remains for him to do, especially if the Resurrection is to be the interpretative key and the possibilities of Jesus’ presence among us are to be realized.

University of Dayton, Ohio

JAMES L. HEFT, S.M.


At a time when the reality and importance of Jesus’ Resurrection for Christian identity is debated in national newsmagazines as part of the (seemingly endless) historical-Jesus issue, this scholarly yet passionate study offers a welcome combination of clarity and conviction. Lorenzen is not responding to the media moment; this is a book that has emerged slowly out of classroom lectures, and if the “point one, point two” style eventually becomes a bit pedantic, at least its sobriety matches the seriousness of the subject: “When we speak about the resurrection of Jesus Christ we are not dealing with a question of faith, but with the question of faith” (1).

The opening section is especially useful to those who suspect that the various combatants on the issue of the Resurrection are talking past each other. L. organizes various positions into “interpretive models”: traditional, liberal, evangelical, and liberation. His treatment of representative figures in each model is necessarily sketchy but sympathetic, seeking to identify not only the respective positions but especially the premises concerning “history” and “truth” attached to each that so often go unattended. Positions also tend to privilege either what happened to Jesus or what happened to the disciples, with a corresponding neglect of the other dimension. L. usefully distinguishes two streams in the liberal model, one associated with kerygmatic theology (Bultmann) and the other with a focus on the pre-Easter Jesus (Strauss et al.). The only classification that seems odd is that placing Schillebeeckx in the “evangelical” model. Quibbles aside, the analysis is eminently useful for those trying to figure out why people using the same words seem to mean different things.

The next section contains L.’s own careful reading of the New Testament evidence, in which he tries to play fair both with the “reality” of Jesus’ bodily presence and the experience of his followers. Especially rich is his appreciation of the experience of the Holy Spirit as an e-
sential, even defining, element in the Resurrection. A key statement: “We need to engage in a dialogue with a philosophical understanding of history that allows no room for the resurrection of Jesus Christ, while claiming at the same time to have an adequate understanding of historical reality. Here we must insist that there are realities that cannot be grasped with our historical understanding and our historical methodology. The resurrection of Jesus is such a reality. It is real and it reaches into history in and through the lives of those who participate in it” (144).

The following section takes up the implications of such an understanding of the Resurrection as a defining reality for Christians by considering “the dialectic of Christian knowing.” L. declares that “the way of knowing must correspond to the object of inquiry . . . we seek to discover the way of knowing that is appropriate.” In the case of the Resurrection, it means a response of faith that is not simply a matter of profession but also a matter of participation, not simply a position concerning an event in the past, but an involvement with the reality of God’s power in the present. One cannot really “understand the resurrection” unless one “knows the power of the resurrection.” This discussion of “experience, faith, praxis” is distinctive and one of the book’s virtues.

Finally, L. considers the “consequences of faith in the resurrection of the crucified Christ” for theological understanding and discipleship. He shows how his strong reading of the Resurrection shapes what he calls a “holistic Christology,” a richer appreciation of God as the one “who raised the crucified Jesus from the dead,” a perception of salvation as “all encompassing,” including both human and cosmic liberation, and a distinctive sense of the Church and its mission. Despite some decidedly worthwhile observations, this section reveals the “point one, point two” syndrome most painfully. By trying to say everything, L. runs the risk of numbing the reader. There are also some questionable arguments here. L. is simplistic concerning the negative role of “law and cult” both in the ministry of Jesus and in the life of discipleship, and overly casual on the difficult interconnections between spiritual and social “liberation.”

On the whole, however, this book is well worth reading as a guide through theological positions and biblical texts, as well as a serious reflection on this most central of Christian convictions.

Candler School of Theology, Atlanta


At the beginning of this century a widely used and highly regarded manual on sacramental theology was that of Pourrat, which was ac-
tually a study of the historical theology of sacrament rather than a systematic examination. Ninety years later another French theologian has written an important book on the same topic, but how different both the method and the results. Chauvet’s is an innovative and foundational study in systematic theology with wide-ranging concerns, a familiarity with related areas in the human sciences, and highly original insights. Whether one agrees or not with its approach or its conclusions, it will have to be considered by anyone writing on this topic in the future.

C. had already prepared the ground by his earlier Du symbolique au symbole (1979) and has more recently followed up the work under review with the less technical Les Sacrements: Parole de Dieu au risque du corps (1993). These other books share some of the same concerns about symbol and “corporality,” but they are more modest in their aims and sometimes more pastoral in their applications of C.’s insights. Even the theologian might be better prepared for the present work by first reading the 1993 work. While C. is always rigorous in his logic and clear in his writing, he still demands a great deal of his readers. The translators are to be especially commended for their fine translation of this book, no easy task.

There are four major parts, each closely argued and preparing for the positions and insights of the next. Part 1, “From the Metaphysical to the Symbolic,” is crucial to C.’s line of argument. Among its aims are a contemporary critique of metaphysics and an epistemological reorientation that invite dialogue with both Aquinas and Heidegger. This discussion allows C. to set up and define important categories such as language, symbol, and presence which he then develops in subsequent sections.

In Part 2, “Sacraments in the Symbolic Network of the Faith of the Church,” C. profiles Christian identity by rethinking the connections between Scripture as the level of cognition, sacrament as that of thanksgiving, and ethics as that of action. The result of this process is an understanding of sacrament as “the symbolic place of the on-going transition between Scripture and Ethics, from the letter to the body. The liturgy is the powerful pedagogy where we learn to consent to the presence of the absence of God, who obliges us to give him a body in the world” (265). To test these connections, C. then proceeds to examine the Second Eucharistic Prayer and its notion of sacrifice. This section shows C.’s ability to unfold the implications of related disciplines (in this case, Girard’s work on violence and the sacred) and the historical development of priesthood with its sacrificial overtones and thereby to arrive at pastoral corollaries regarding the use of sacrificial language.

Part 3, “The Symbolizing Act of Christian Identity,” is, in a sense, the heart of the book. C. examines sacrament as ritual and embodiment, and then as a dialectic between the instituted and the instituting dimensions of sacrament. The sacraments are the “most instituted of ecclesial mediations of our relationship with God.” When the
Church, in turn, carries out “the memorial of Jesus as its Lord . . . it is engaged in this act of accomplishing its very essence” (409). In Part 4, “Sacramental Theology and Trinitarian Christology,” C. tests the axiom that sacramental theology and Christology reflect one another rather consistently. C. examines scholastic sacramental theology and its starting point, the hypostatic union, and then his own starting point, the pasch of Christ. C.’s approach results in a very strong pneumatological dimension as well as a reaffirmation that the sacraments are “the major symbolic ‘expressions’ of God’s effacement through the Spirit in the flesh of the world, which thus becomes sacramental” (537).

What are the strengths of this demanding book? First, it is a major systematic effort to rethink sacramental symbolism within a larger theological structure. C. has impressive command of the historical and liturgical underpinnings of the discussion as well as long familiarity with the contributions of the human sciences to questions of language and symbol. Readers might be tempted to become impatient with the extended conversations with Heidegger or Barth but soon learn that these are a necessary part of C.’s argument.

Second, C. establishes a sacramental ecclesiology that is both challenging and convincing. After listing three of the most common forms of “the imaginary capture of Christ,” he describes the Church as radicalizing “the vacancy of the place of God”: it is precisely in the act of respecting his radical absence or otherness that the Risen One can be recognized symbolically” (178). C. deals head on with the problems of accepting the institutional mediation of the Church as a gift of grace. For him, it is the liturgical assembly that “constitutes the fundamental ‘sacramental’ representation of the presence of the absence of God” (188–89). Thus, the Church is the symbolic place where one continues to become Christian by consenting to this “absence” rather than using it as an excuse. The orientation of C.’s theology is ultimately pastoral as is Rahner’s. I hope that his 1993 work where those pastoral connections are more extensively elaborated will be translated into English.

St. Bonaventure University, N.Y. Regis A. Duffy, O.F.M.


Murphy’s title led me to expect something different from what I discovered in reading the book, and I suspect that others, too, may be misled. M.’s expressed intent is to open up a new conversation between the sexes based on the recognition that neither is superior to the other, that each is profoundly different, and that, although each person strives for autonomy, a “vital interdependence” is unavoidable. The purpose is familiar to anyone who reads literature about gender and yet there are some rewarding surprises to be found in the way that M. pursues it, not least of which is clarity of structure and expression.
In Chapter 1, "Sexual Oppression and Personal Freedom," M. resumes the pervasive and destructive existence of patriarchy, the beginnings of modern feminine resistance, and the ways in which patriarchy has shaped, or rather mishaped, the self-esteem and the appropriation of social roles in the experience of both men and women. Chapter 2, "Reason and Gender," explores various engendered explanations of human knowledge; there is little that is original here, but M.'s use of his sources is judicious and illuminating and his synthesis, helpful. The chapter "Love and Marriage" brings into interesting relationship M.’s reflections on romantic love, the contractual nature of marriage, family patterns and responsibilities, and a psychological understanding of the developmental stages of human life. The mix here is interesting and informative; the variety of sources upon which M. relies gives added depth and texture.

In the chapter "Public and Private," M. explores some new ground. Here he attends more to the reconstruction of masculine myths and perspectives than he does in the earlier chapters, and his legal training and experience as a professor of law at Duquesne undoubtedly help give his text both balance and acuity. His carefully constructed line of reasoning culminates in an intriguing assessment of the traditional separation between the public and private (or, more accurately, domestic) spheres. While M. acknowledges that such a separation has consistently been rationalized by patriarchal theory (i.e., because men and women must by nature operate in difference worlds), he believes that the separation remains necessary because economic and survival needs must not be allowed to eclipse all the other bonds which hold society together. He describes the deleterious effects of what he calls the "inflation of necessity" (xvi): "The difficulty is that whenever relations of exchanges and consumption predominate, the imperatives of immediate need not only drive public policy, they also determine the nature and duration of whatever union exists among peoples. As the public become consumers rather than citizens, they develop a sense of togetherness in which the central trait is that of simply being alive" (125-26).

Wary as I generally am of Aristotelian arguments, the conclusions of this chapter ring true and continue to challenge my own assessments. The desire expressed in the preface, the desire for a new conversation beyond gender based on antagonisms, seems at once possible and fruitful.

Loyola Marymount University, L.A. MARIE ANNE MAYESKI


Arguably the most substantive work yet produced by the growing number of U.S. Hispanic theologians. Goizueta's Spanish title, "Let Us
Journey with Jesus," refers to the vision of the paschal mystery implicit in Hispanic popular Catholicism. G. first contextualizes his thought in his own experience as a Cuban exile, unpacks the idea of Hispanic popular Catholicism as especially revelatory, and develops the notion of a U.S. Hispanic anthropology—one that insists on community as the birthplace of the self, and thus contrasts markedly with the prevailing individualism of modern, liberal approaches.

Next, he constructs a social ethic upon the notion of relationality, affectivity, and aesthetics, subsuming and going beyond the thought of Mexican philosopher José Vasconcelos. One of G.'s greatest contributions is his trenchant critique of praxis-based notions of transformative social action that end up instrumentalizing the very persons they mean to liberate. A liberative social praxis appropriate for Hispanics cannot dichotomize justice from beauty, for Hispanic cultures manifest the abiding esthetic, expressive orientation of their popular Catholicism. In the narratives, myths, rituals, and exuberant symbols of this Catholicism can be detected an implicit but nonetheless powerful social ethic.

G. goes on to link the notions of a U.S. Hispanic anthropology and social ethics with contemporary discourse regarding modernity and postmodernity, demonstrating how U.S. Hispanic theology must distance itself from deconstructionism, pluralism, and a spurious multiculturalism, if it is to remain loyal to its social, ethical, and liberative vocation. Finally, he elaborates the practical implications of the epistemological "option for the poor" that a U.S. Hispanic theology must make if it is to remain true to itself. In perhaps his most intriguing contribution, G., following the lead of Hispanic women theologians, discusses the need for theological reflection on family life and domesticity, where the elements of affectivity and relationality, hallmarks of the intersubjective praxis of the poor, may most fittingly be linked to the pursuit of God's reign.

G. brings an outstanding background in systematic and philosophical theology to his task. He knows mainstream Roman Catholic theology well and is unusually conversant with Latin American theology. Perhaps more than any other U.S. Hispanic theologian, he manifests an abiding concern for theological method. He takes the praxis methodology of liberation theologians and combines it with the corresponding concerns of Lonergan. G. has read most of the current U.S. Hispanic theologians, and he engages the thought of U.S. Hispanic women writers more creatively and consistently than any other current theologian. Much of his work is inspired by the seminal ideas of Virgilio Elizondo, but he grounds Elizondo's ideas in contemporary discourse on pluralism, multiculturalism, and postmodernity. His approach and sources reveal a broad familiarity with key thinkers both European and North American on the subject of individualism and pragmatic, universal rationality.

This work therefore has a rich texture. Indeed, it is a watershed in
the sense that with this work U.S. Latino theologians have a refined example of what they have been seeking: an original theology in strict and ongoing dialogue with their multiform reality in the U.S., one that provides bridges for further dialogue with their Latin American mentors, with the mainstream theological community and, of course, with the Hispanic communities themselves upon whose reality this theology claims to be a constructive reflection.

On the negative side, G., like many U.S. Hispanic theologians, uncritically takes up the themes of mestizaje and the devotion to Our Lady of Guadalupe. Yet there is a growing body of social analysis in Mexico that shows how Vasconcelos' exaltation of the mestizo was the centerpiece of an ultimately discredited ideology of the Mexican Revolution and the political party that emerged from it. The notion of mestizaje is seriously tainted. And recent historical studies regarding the Guadalupan apparitions call into question some of the affirmations made about the events surrounding this devotion. A credible scholarly approach does not require a rejection of the Guadalupe event as mere myth or human invention, but it does demand some attention to the substantive findings of reputable historians like Stafford Poole who today call into question the historical accuracy of some affirmations made about the event, particularly the idea that the indigenous peoples were attracted to Guadalupe in the 16th century or that this devotion had much to do with the native peoples at all until much later in Mexican history.

Furthermore, it is necessary to develop a more critical notion of popular Hispanic Catholicism, to name some of its negative manifestations, its functionality with machismo and other dehumanizing trends in Hispanic cultures. I think this can be done without destroying G.'s main lines of argument. Otherwise G. might fall into what he himself abhors: the romanticization of the people's religion. Finally, one might also ask why G. opted not to integrate his substantive reflections on the option for the poor and the limits of modern individualism with Catholic social teaching. Many of the concepts he develops have corollaries in the thought of Pope John Paul II and have been taken up in the magisterium especially by the Latin American bishops. In some ways, of course, G. further refines and develops their concerns. That Catholic social teaching's extensive contributions to these themes are seldom if ever cited is puzzling.

G.'s accomplishment is, nevertheless, solid and inspiring. The appearance of this challenging book suggests that U.S. Hispanic theology is, indeed, coming of age.

Loyola Marymount University, L.A.  ALLAN FIGUEROA DECK, S.J.

Kent is one of several scholars who are reshaping the "standard," largely Thomistic, account of medieval debates about voluntarism, virtue, and moral responsibility. On the standard view, the condemnation of 1277 overturned the fragile Thomistic synthesis of Aristotle (virtue) and Christianity (freedom and sin), and paved the way for the untram­melled voluntarism of the “Augustinian” and nominalist theologians. K.'s study of significant 13th-century thinkers reveals that "efforts to reconcile Aristotle with the faith were the rule, not the exception" (93). Moreover, the issues for reconciliation were more philosophical than theological, reflecting long-standing tensions between Stoic and Aris­totelian outlooks.

K. focuses on "voluntarism" (the will's freedom to override reason's dictates), moral weakness (the contrast between Aristotle's akrasia and the Christian understanding of sin), and the "location" of the moral virtues (whether in the emotions and passions or in the will alone). Around these themes classical virtue ethics was transformed in the course of the 13th century, a transformation later to culminate in the Kantian good will. K.'s close textual readings reclaim the philo­sophical significance of Walter of Brugges, Giles of Rome, William de la Mare, and Richard of Middleton, as well as Bonaventure, Thomas, and Scotus. K. believes there was a real conflict between Aristotle's understand­ing of virtue and the “new” (Christian) idea of freedom. She shows how Thomas “quietly but drastically” revised Aristotle's understand­ing of a habit (253).

K.'s inquiries highlight issues of importance to contemporary virtue ethics, in particular, the tension between virtue as habit or disposition and virtue as excellence in choice. For the medieval theologians, the basis of moral responsibility lay in the will's freedom. How is this responsibility (and its misuse in sin) to be understood in relation both to the natural moral virtues of appetite and passion, and to the infused theological virtues of faith, hope, and charity? What is the primary locus of moral praise and blame? Kant's answer—the “hero assess­ment,” as it has been called—built upon the growing conviction of medieval theologians that “moral goodness” primarily concerns that which lies within the agent's control. But K. shows that for Scotus it was the agent's control, rather than the moral struggle itself, that was intrinsically good. For Scotus, the will moderates the emotions, and one's emotional responses are praiseworthy, because as habits of char­acter they are “co-causes” of right action.

K. detects a generational shift between Thomas and Scotus. Thomas asked a normative, pragmatic question: Why do people need moral habits? His answer explained that habits were psychological correc­tives, dispositions for making sound choices. A generation later, Scotus was asking a more radical question about theory construction: Does the psychology of moral responsibility required an explanation in terms of habits? Although his answer still allotted a subordinate role to habits, the question itself was a “direct challenge” to virtue ethics
K. observes that normative virtue ethics today is proceeding at a pace, despite "bitter disagreements about what kind of ethical theory might conceivably support it" (253).

Although K. concludes that the "story of virtue ethics remains to be written" (254), she has provided a crucial part of that story, to which future scholars will be indebted. For those drawn to the contemporary revival of virtue ethics, the philosophical questions K. has identified still need to be addressed, and the various solutions proposed in the 13th century are still relevant.

Catholic Institute of Sydney

GERALD GLEESON


This exposition and assessment of McCormick's contribution is notable for its accuracy, balance, and detail. Odozor, a lecturer in moral theology in Nigeria, first examines McCormick's roots in the pre-Vatican II manualist tradition. As early as his dissertation, McCormick shows signs of challenging and moving away from that tradition. Yet his career as a whole has been aimed toward the renewal of moral theology rather than a complete rejection of an enterprise that others have pronounced dead. In successive chapters, O. explores themes or "hubs" central to that renewal effort: the nature of Christian ethics, the Church as moral teacher, proportionate reasoning, anthropology, and casuistry. His careful review of McCormick's writings reveals McCormick's knack for detecting and elucidating key emerging issues, fairness and clarity in presenting a range of views, an ability to move the discussion forward with fresh insights, and a willingness to revise his position after conversation with others.

While highly sympathetic, O. gently criticizes McCormick's theology on several counts. These include an underdeveloped ecclesiology and a distracting overemphasis on dissent, a possible dualism embedded in his distinction between "moral rightness" and "moral goodness," the absence of a virtue ethic, and the limited range of topics and dialogue partners engaged. Some of these problems have been cited by others, but O. adds important insights of his own. Some of these deserve further development; e.g., he might have explored more fully the interconnections between McCormick's ecclesiology and anthropology, his understanding of norms, and his views on such substantive issues as homosexuality. This would have led not only to further testing of McCormick's theology, but perhaps also to advances in our thinking about issues central to the recent tradition in which he has played a key role.

O.'s appraisal of McCormick's contribution is that it has been immense even if in certain respects ambiguous. Something similar might be said of O.'s own effort. On the one hand, he offers not only an expert presentation of McCormick's thought, often on highly technical issues,
but also a well-placed window through which to review the major developments and controversies in moral theology (e.g. the proportionalism debate) over the past few decades. On the other hand, O.'s assessment of both his subject and the tradition of moral theology is itself at times ambiguous. For example, he lauds McCormick for using systematic theologians (e.g. Congar, McBrien, and Sullivan) to help "rescue moral theology from its former splendid isolation from other branches of theology" (179), but notes earlier that he simply "clings to bits and pieces" from these thinkers rather than working out an ecclesiology of his own (72). He questions the lack of attention to non-Eurocentric perspectives and to such issues as racism, but he seems quickly to excuse such narrowness as an inevitable function of rootedness in a moral tradition that "has been interested almost exclusively in the problems of white Europe and America" (173), and he approvingly repeats McCormick's reminder that individual theologians ought not spread themselves too thin by taking up every possible topic. Most significantly, just as McCormick has been content to "put out fires" (23) rather than develop a systematic moral theology, so O. does not here present the fully articulated theological basis for his critique. Such ambiguity points to the unfinished nature both of McCormick's thought and of moral theology in its present state.

Rosary College, River Forest, Ill.  

WILLIAM P. GEORGE


Schweiker, theological ethicist at the University of Chicago, handles this extremely complex topic with an analytic care, breadth, and synthetic imagination unsurpassed in the literature on responsibility. He provides a broad philosophical framework within which responsibility can be fruitfully interpreted, a tightly constructed theory of responsibility based on a notion of integrity, and an account of the theistic source of responsibility.

S. has a number of purposes here and accomplishes all of them. First, he engages directly all of the major 20th-century positions on the theme of responsibility. He has mastered a vast range of contemporary literature, from the dialogical model of the personalists to the treatments of accountability, freedom, and punishment by analytic philosophers. His analysis of contemporary sources is always insightful, his judgments fair, and his criticisms balanced.

Second, he clarifies previous Christian accounts of responsibility and identifies their insights and shortcomings in terms of the standards of contemporary ethics. Deeply rooted in the Christian tradition, he displays an admirable knowledge of the history of moral philosophy and theological ethics, and especially classical contributions to reflection on his topic by authors like Augustine and Luther.

Third, and most importantly, he provides a constructive ethics of
responsibility based on a distinctive interpretation of the meaning of Christian faith (as an "identity-conferring commitment" [2]), addresses a number of fundamental moral questions (e.g. the meaning of conscience, integrity, and freedom), and contributes to contemporary ethical reflection (e.g. the status of responsibility for nature). S. understands responsibility primarily in terms of integrity, the persisting coherence of life and its values over time, and its relation to faith, the qualities of trust in and loyalty to valued objects which are the basis for moral identity. God is the source of being and the good, and thus the imperative of responsibility holds: "in all actions and relations we are to respect and enhance the integrity of life before God" (33, 125). This claim is extended when it is specified to include not only human communities but also the "community of life before God" (209).

Finally, S. strives to engage in "Christian moral philosophy," which he describes as "faith seeking moral understanding." For reasons of internal coherence, external plausibility, and validity, Christian ethical reflection must be philosophically informed. Philosophical distinctions, for example, allow S. to develop an integrated theory of responsibility that synthesizes the best insights of agential, social, and dialogical theories of responsibility without simply lumping them together in a chaotic eclecticism.

One shortcoming of the book is its insufficient treatment of classical Christian symbols and themes in systematic theology, most notably, grace and salvation (what does it mean, for example, to say that God "affirms," "enhances," and "respects" finite reality? [46]). More generally, S. grants too readily that "the modern Western world" appropriately rejects what he calls the "set of interlocking assumptions" which supported "traditional moral realism" (107). His characterizations of "traditional moral realism" sometimes fail to appreciate the conceptual sophistication of premodern sources. This is seen, for example, in the assertion that classical advocates of natural law ethics assumed that "we can find out how we ought to live simply from looking at the natural world or natural tendencies of human life" (107). The same is true of his claim that in classical theism, "nature manifested a moral order because its origin and end, beginning, and telos, was God" (193). Aquinas in fact held that nature manifests the ordering intelligence of divine governance but not "moral order" per se, a phenomenon found only in humanity.

Many of the important elements of this book cannot be explored here, including its "agentic-relational" alternative to the prevailing voluntaristic view of human agency, its "hermeneutical realism," and the "moral-ontological proof of God" (S.'s response to Nietzsche's valorization of power, which may require further amplification). Yet this is undoubtedly one of the best argued and most profound books on the topic of responsibility to have been written in the last 50 years. It is a brilliant and creative synthesis that ought to and will be read by any-
one seriously concerned about the nature, source, and implications of responsibility.

Boston College

Stephen J. Pope


Breaking from a modern conception of morality that is based on duties and obligations has allowed theorists to explore anew the nature of moral truth and recapture the phronetic character of moral knowledge. Moral truth is not the object of our mind's passive gaze but concerns the whither-and-whence of our existence; and moral knowledge is not modeled on the deductive reasoning of the exact sciences but mimics the legitimate expectations of freedom as we strive to become particular kinds of persons through our actions.

Devettere's wonderfully conceived book brings an aretaic conception of the moral life into the area of health-care ethics. After giving a brief overview of the well-known theories of obligation (divine law, natural law, utilitarianism, and deontology), D. offers an ethics of the good. Central to such an ethics are the virtues, especially the virtue of prudence; they are the means to achieve human happiness or the morally good life. In this context, D. presents a variety of topics—health-care decisions, reproductive issues, euthanasia, nutrition and hydration, medical research, transplantation of organs—from their legal, medical, and moral perspectives. The only disappointment here is that current topics such as AIDS, health-care reform, and the human genome project are not discussed.

D. believes that the retrieval of virtue brings to light two considerations that have been obscured by modern ethical theories. First, virtue ethics does not describe the moral life in terms of individual autonomy, but in terms of the social and communal nature of human existence. Good character and the behavioral skills that it requires are inseparable from the relationships we have with others; moral qualities like faithfulness and trust are found and sustained by being another's colleague, parent, friend, or partner. Secondly, virtue ethics opens up new vistas for the discussion of moral casuistry. Moral casuistry is no longer modeled on geometrical demonstration but on rhetorical argumentation. A moral choice is not the result of syllogistic reasoning, but, as Aquinas states, "correct reasoning about what ought to be done." D. stresses that in order to make a prudent choice in the controversies of medical ethics, one must not only be aware of the general principles of morality but grasp the particular circumstances at hand and be able to draw relevant similarities and dissimilarities between past experiences and new situations. Two examples that he provides can introduce these characteristics of virtue ethics into moral discourse.
Discussions about the issue of abortion, e.g., are often sculptured in the language of rights. On the one hand, the right of the woman to choose; on the other, the right of the fetus to life. As incommensurable as the caricatures of these positions are, D. poignantly underscores the similarity between the two positions in their use of rights language. New possibilities of thought and action can emerge only when the truncated and individualistic language of rights gives way to the broader and communal language of relationships.

The kind of moral argumentation D. puts forth is seen also when discussing the recent issue of artificially assisted nutrition and hydration. Though he uncritically dismisses the traditional distinctions between ordinary and extraordinary means of treatment, D. concludes that the removal of nutrition and hydration from someone in a persistent vegetative state can be justified when the burden outweighs the benefit. In reasoning to this conclusion, the prudent person must ask what similar case solutions are provided by the tradition, how our way of describing the medical techniques for providing nutrition and hydration enhance or limit our insight, and what precedents will reasonably be built on this case solution.

This is intended as an introductory textbook for health-care professionals interested in moral questions. It is a welcome alternative to the principle-based texts of philosophers like Beauchamp and Childress or theologians like Ashley and O'Rourke. In addition, though D. is appreciative of the role religious commitments play in moral reasoning and is often in agreement with Roman Catholic casuistry on particular issues (e.g. physician-assisted suicide and commercial surrogacy), he is also sensitive to the pluralism that exists among the various religious traditions on medical moral issues (e.g. artificial contraception and in vitro fertilization). When we recognize the legitimate plurality that surrounds some of these difficult medical-moral issues, our moral assertions will be justified not by a facile and dogmatic dependence on authority or tradition but through the self-correcting process of dialogue and debate.

Fordham University, New York

THOMAS R. KOPFENSTEINER


In recent years, a number of books and academic conferences have tackled the issue of the relation of political liberalism to religion. Do we need another book on this subject? Yes, if it is as scrupulously fair, critical, and illuminating as Hollar's, which describes both the strengths and the weaknesses of a liberal account of social life and faults theological critics who caricature it.

Liberalism has come under increasing assault, principally by com-
munitarians, for its thin notion of the good and its view of the self as unencumbered by commitments and discoverable apart from the communities out of which it emerges. A stipulated veil of ignorance shrouds access, for liberalism, to the truth that both selves and theories of justice remain, inevitably, teleological. H. builds on these communitarian critiques of liberalism, especially the well-regarded criticism of Michael Sandel.

To be the Church in the U.S. is, inevitably, to be a church in a liberal democratic polity characterized by free markets and a political project that exalts rights and looks to equality of liberty as the guarantee for respect of the autonomy of its citizens. Liberal philosophy and politics remain neutral as to the various conceptions of the good life. Yet under liberal polities religious liberty is respected and religion flourishes. Liberalism put an end to the wars of religion. What stance should the Church adopt toward the regnant liberal paradigm of the U.S.?

H. argues that the way we answer that question depends, first, on our assessment of the compatibility of liberalism and liberal institutions (which, after all, can be justified, as they were by R. Niebuhr and J. C. Murray, on premises other than those of liberalism) with the Christian faith. The answer will also depend on how we address three central questions. Does the Church have a distinctive moral knowledge which is not available to the world? Are the same moral principles and values valid for life in the Church and in the world? Does the Church have greater human possibilities for conforming its life to its ideals than are available to more secular counterparts? In the end, only a contextual analysis can help us decide whether our stance toward liberal culture will entail counter-cultural withdrawal, selective engagement, and/or strong support.

In a nuanced and judicious way, H. reconstructs the moral thought of R. Niebuhr, S. Hauerwas, R. Reuther, and Roman Catholic social teaching (principally, but not exclusively, through the work of D. Hollenbach). For each, he asks about their critique of liberalism and their distinctive strategy for church-world engagement in a liberal polity. Thus, if for Niebuhr, the U.S. actually became his church, this is because he tended to downplay any distinctive epistemological or moral privilege to the church. In point of fact, liberalism was less egalitarian and less open to love for neighbor than Niebuhr's scheme postulated. His judgment of liberalism was too benign.

If Hauerwas sees the Christian as a resident alien in the U.S. and the liberal democratic polity as a subtle but insidious danger to authentic life as a disciple, this stems from his strong version of an epistemological break between Christianity and liberalism. All morality, in his view, is narrative dependent. Liberals and Christians simply inhabit different, incompatible stories. How this jibes with accounts of how Christianity actually helped to shape many of the motifs of liberalism is not squarely faced by Hauerwas.

Reuther, for her part, acknowledges the positive contributions of
shorter notices

liberalism's notion of equality for women's liberation, even as she draws on a more radical communitarian sense of the self and faults the economic bases of liberalism. She shows how care for the poor and oppressed should enter more clearly into Hauerwas', thought, given his emphasis on Christianity's need for hospitality to strangers. Catholic social thought allows a qualified affirmation of the U.S. The Catholic critique of liberalism is more nuanced than that of Hauerwas, yet social Catholicism could learn much "from Hauerwas's attention to the social and political life of the church itself" (317).

There are many virtues to H.'s study. It is an excellent example of distinctively theological ethics, with attention to the issues of ecclesiology, Christology, sin, eschatology, and their relevance for a Christian moral evaluation of the liberal project. H.'s comparison of the four figures displays illuminating cross-referential correctives, e.g., on how Reuther's realism improves on Niebuhr's because of her superior use of eschatology. The drawback in this kind of internal comparative work is that H.'s constructive vision gets submerged in the dialogue. Yet, H. remains scrupulously fair and nuanced in his account of the four figures. Finally, he helps us see that much is at stake (and what is at stake) in any too easy correlation or rejection of a church dialogue with liberalism.

Jesuit School of Theology, Berkeley

JOHN A. COLEMAN, S.J.

shorter notices


Crenshaw here contributes one of the most useful commentaries to the prestigious Anchor Bible series. He takes a fresh look at this highly charged, passionate expression of divine wrath balanced and rendered supportable by divine love. This is a theme, of course, which runs throughout the prophetic canon, but C.'s research has allowed us to contemplate it with a fresh intensity. In undertaking this task C. put aside certain presuppositions about the nature and purpose of later prophetic works and allowed the text to speak with its own raw power.

The translation is neither rigidly literal (formal correspondence) nor pervasively free (dynamic equivalence). C. is faithful to the Hebrew text without being indentured to it. A healthy respect for the reliability of a text transmitted by a community of faith dissuades him from emendation on the basis of conjecture or ancient translations. The end result captures the urgency of Joel's threatened judgment along with its transformation into a message of hope for a repentant community.

The difficulty of moving from text to context in most OT books is notorious. There is nothing in Joel which gives us a clear idea of its historical background; its position in the Masoretic Text offers no help. Relying on internal evidence which is far from conclusive, C. favors a date in the fifth century. This accords well with the view that Joel marks a transition from prophecy to early apocalyptic and C. finds plausible evidence in the language itself for this date.

My own study of this fine commentary leaves the impression that
Joel recapitulates earlier prophetic themes of divine retribution and deliverance, opening a way to the more feverish language of apocalyptic, not to mention the overt use of Joel by Peter at Pentecost (Acts 2:16–21). Finally, this book comes with all the armature of a good commentary, exhaustive bibliography and five indexes. As is so often the case in the Anchor Bible, the quality of the work is enriched by the rare skills of Noel Freedman, the general editor.

FRED L. MORIARTY, S.J.
Boston College


The Russian Michail Bakhtin is a highly original thinker who moves between the boundaries of Russian Formalism and contemporary critical theory. His impact on humanities now extends to biblical studies through Craig’s study of Esther. C.’s access to his thought is through the novel, which Bakhtin saw as a means for expressing ideas inaccessible to rational or philosophical discourse. Bakhtin maintained that novelistic discourse preceded the comparatively recent genre of the novel by thousands of years.

C. attempts to determine in what way the Hebrew text of Esther is linked to the novel, which Bakhtin associates with carnival. The “carnivalization of literature” is an interplay between the official world and the unofficial world. Carnivalesque elements noted by Bakhtin are prominent in Esther: banquets, a large number of peripeties, emphasis on clothing, cosmetic treatment, scepter and ring, crowning and uncrowning, and masks (secrets). The entire story seems explainable within a carnivalesque model of interpretation.

The stumbling block for all commentators is the so-called massacres in Esther 8 and 9, with their tone of harsh vengeance and ruthless destruction. A “carnivalesque war” as a war of overkill may be a sound explanation of the text as it exists. No interpretation seems to justify the brutality, but this comes close.

C. has made a fine contribution to the interpretation of the Hebrew text of Esther. But what happens when one considers the additions in the Greek version which change the “secular” story to one with “religious” language and themes? For those whose canonical Esther includes these additions, does the carnivalesque interpret their story?

CAMILLA BURNS, S.N.D.
Loyola University, Chicago


This brief but informative book surveys the history of the early Church from the beginning up to the sixth century. Brox, a respected historian known most recently for his edition and translation of The Shepherd of Hermas, seems to deal most happily with pre-Nicene material. The initial chapter treats the primitive Church, its Jewish roots, and the Greco-Roman religious and political environment. Seven thematic chapters consider mission and conversion, state and society, life within the Christian community (which topic rightly gets the lengthiest treatment), heresies and schisms, theological “orientations” (normative criteria), theological literature, and the doctrinal definitions of the ecumenical councils. Each thematic chapter covers the whole ancient period, an arrangement which creates redundant and overlapping treatments of numerous subjects; Donatism, e.g., is treated three different times. The layout resembles that of a handbook rather than a coherent history. Beginners who find it confusing may profit more from a short narrative survey such as W. H. C. Frend’s The Early Church.

B. stresses the contingent development of many features of Catholic
ecclesiastical life and practice. At times he writes as though his readers are the prisoners of a dogmatically misconceived history which it is his duty to correct. Not only does this sort of reverse confessionalism make for irritating reading; it also leads B. to debatable judgments about the development of church order, ministry, liturgy, doctrine, and monasticism. The discussion of Frühkatholizismus tries to correct tendentious interpretations, yet still grants too much to an evolutionary shift from the “charismatic” towards the “institutional” (77–81). The contrast between “realistic” and “symbolic” interpretations of the presence of Christ in the eucharistic elements makes the former seem less universal than it was (103–4). Christian contentiousness about doctrine is not explained satisfactorily (120). The theology of Alexandria cannot without significant qualification be described as “the Hellenization of Christianity” (138). Alexandrian exegetes did not “practise allegorical interpretation exclusively” (141). Athanasius of Alexandria’s Life of Antony cannot be flatly categorized as a “legendary narrative” (140). Among the errors noted: it was Constantius II, not “Constantine” who first removed the Altar of Victory from the Senate in Rome (52); and Constantine the Great was succeeded by three of his sons, not two (160). The bibliographies are somewhat helpful.

MICHAEL J. HOLLERICH
University of St. Thomas, St. Paul
(Paris: Beauchesne, 1972), which appeared in his own English translation some twelve years later as *Eucharistia in Philo of Alexandria* (New York: Mellen, 1984). While all seven chapters appeared originally in English in various periodicals and books, the appeal of this French edition is not only that these essays are now conveniently available in a single book but, as revised and expanded, they constitute together a unified study of various common liturgical-theological themes in these two ancient authors. Added to this are the helpful topical indexes, one each for Philo and Origen, which allow one to study items of particular interest.

Students and teachers of patristics, Jewish and early Christian liturgy, and sacramental theology will find this an excellent resource. Indeed, those seeking an understanding of eucharistic sacrifice in the early Church, the relationship of purification, sacrifice, and asceticism, the roots of our contemporary understanding of Easter as the Christian's own *passover* in Christ, and an interpretation of "original" sin and baptism which flows from a different model than that of Adam will profit greatly from this work. But above all, this study demonstrates how one of the greatest theologians of Christianity was able to synthesize the Philonic models of Alexandrian Judaism with the New Testament and with Christian liturgical and spiritual life and to produce the classic formation of that unique Alexandrian theological tradition. A great service would be performed if this book were now retranslated into English.

MAXWELL E. JOHNSON
St. John's Univ., Collegeville


Rankin, of Trinity Theological College in Brisbane, carries forward into ecclesiology some recent appreciative scholarship on Tertullian. His thesis is clear, important, and closely argued: Tertullian maintained throughout his career consistent doctrines of both Church and ministry. His perfectionist ecclesiology is as characteristic during his "Catholic" period as it is after his transition to the "New Prophecy". The apostolic foundation of the Catholic ministry is never repudiated. The claim of a universal priesthood appears only in order to impose on the laity the disciplinary obligations of the clergy (e.g. no remarriage after a spouse's death).

R. does not deny that there were shifts in emphasis but accounts for them sensibly. Tertullian himself, e.g., "was not so much influenced by the New Prophecy, as found there a congenial 'home' for his rigorous views" (50). On the nature of the Church, a new situation (the influx of new people, pressures for moral accommodation, and a more "liberal" penitential process) created new questions and forced greater attention to discipline than to doctrine. On ministry, "the increasingly presumptuous claims of some Catholic bishops" seem to have prompted Tertullian to question the theological-ecclesiastical framework in which he had previously operated" (169). This last claim is crucial, and, to this reviewer, exactly right. Some scholars, however, are likely to want more evidence than R. (and Tertullian) can provide.

R. obviously knows Tertullian well and is fully conversant with relevant English, French, and German scholarship. The agenda is set by his effort to overcome the earlier, conventional, textbookish dichotomy between Tertullian's alleged "Catholic" and "Montanist" periods. While he is fully successful here, the agenda exacts a twofold price. Those uninitiated into the issues will find themselves left behind by the argument. Perhaps more important: Tertullian's conception of the Church as a gentile and universal people "superior" to Israel and "replacing" it, which is a regrettable but important part of both his and the subsequent Church's ecclesiology and anti-Judaism, goes unnoticed.

Nevertheless, R. has notably con-
tributed to our understanding of Ter-
tullian and the history of ecclesiology.

DAVID P. EPROYMSON
La Salle University, Philadelphia

AQUINAS AND THE JEWS. By John
Y. B. Hood. Philadelphia: University
$14.95.

Aquinas's ideas about Jews and Ju-
daism came primarily from August-
ine who showed a measure of tolera-
tion for Jews and believed they had a
continuing role in the drama of salva-
tion, from Jerome who admired Jew-
ish scholarship but disdained Jews, and
from Chrysostom, arguably the most anti-Jewish of the Church Fa-
thers. Within that framework Hood
views Aquinas as tending toward tol-
eration rather than persecution.

Prior to the coming of Christ, Aquinas believed, Jewish life and
worship testified to divine righteous-
ness and set the stage for the Incar-
nation. At the time of Jesus' death,
the Jews fulfilled the words of the
prophets and contributed to the sac-
rifice which made possible the salva-
tion of the Gentiles. After A.D. 70,
Jewish homelessness and misery rep-
resented divine punishment for their
role in the Crucifixion, giving silent
witness to God's justice and the truth
of the Christian message. Nonetheless,
he urged a measure of civil tol-
eration for Jews; he believed their
family life and worship should be pro-
tected; and he did not espouse the ag-
gressive efforts

really was. He also demonstrates that
trying to maintain civil tolerance
without an adequate theological base
is doomed to failure. This very read-
able, well-documented volume splen-
didly fills a previous gap in scholar-
ship.

JOHN T. PAWLIKOWSKI, O.S.M.
Catholic Theol. Union, Chicago

ST. TERESA OF AVILA: AUTHOR OF A
HEROIC LIFE. By Carole Slade. Berke-
Pp. xxii + 204. $35.

Except for Rowan Williams' recent
book, the most innovative work on
Teresa is now emerging not so much
from church historians and theolo-
gians, but from literary theorists and
students of genre. The best new re-
search is judiciously informed by
modern studies of Golden Age Spain
that deal with gender, conversos, and
the Inquisition. Slade makes a solid
contribution from this arena.

Building on both old and new work
that established Teresa as an esoteric
writer, S. argues that Teresa's auto-
bioographical writings are best under-
stood when approached with the ubiq-
utious threat of inquisitional judg-
ment in mind. In light of the charges
of real and imagined heresy and de-
clusion that plagued Teresa from the
mid-1560s on, S. maintains that Ter-
esa's self-interpretation is shaped by
"judicial confession," a form for inter-
rogating the accused found in inquisi-
torial manuals and imposed on her by
anxious confessors.

S. maintains that because this
genre assumed guilt, Teresa manipu-
lated it precisely to avoid that judg-
ment. Her self-presentation is a com-
plex self-defense, not a confession. To
achieve exoneration and prove her
spiritual authority, Teresa intro-
duced other genres into her "confes-
sion" and her relation of her "old" and
"new" lives (e.g. Christian autobiog-
raphy, New World chronicle, scrip-
tural exegesis, anatomies of the soul,
books of "the city of ladies"), angling
them toward her experience as a par-
ticular woman in a restrictive world
and toward female experience in gen-
eral.
This argument is persuasive (even Teresa’s contemporary detractors, the closest and most skeptical readers of her texts, understood and denounced her evasion of the requirements of confession) as a clue to Teresa’s “innocent textual self.” It also allows S. to reveal original features of Teresa’s thought more pointedly: her handling of sensitive biblical material (the Song of Songs), her predilection for the Magdalene as female apostle, her peculiar use of biblical types (e.g. the Exodus), her social and ecclesiastical resentment, her spiritual anguish and “feminism.”

This is a dense and ambitious book. Occasional abrupt shifts within and between chapters give it a slightly disjointed feel, as does the concluding section on psychoanalytic readings of Teresa’s mystical experience, which adds little of substance to an otherwise strongly-argued thesis.

J. MARY LUTI
Andover Newton TheoL School


This splendid study enhances our perception of Calvin’s methods of Old Testament interpretation. Puckett sets Calvin in an exegetical continuum between “Jewish” approaches that would sever Old and New Testaments, not recognizing the OT’s prophetic character, and “Christological” interpretations by which God’s revelation in Jesus Christ would be read into every OT passage. P. rightly contends that Calvin saw both testaments as one book and that the OT is only properly understood when interpreted in light of the NT. Calvin considered Scripture as having a dual authorship, a divine and human dimension. This enabled him to strike a “via media” between interpretative extremes. He made constructive use of allegory, typology, and predictive prophecy as guides for interpretation, particularly where one might question the ways in which NT writers interpreted OT texts.

P. is correct that Calvin favored “spiritual exegesis” over allegory. He rejected the allegorical “excesses” of earlier interpreters. His approach to determining if passages are allegorical is: “If there has been no historical fulfillment of the promise, one should look for a fulfillment that is not literal” (113). Spiritual interpretations are appropriate for OT passages that are earthly, shadowy presentations of NT promises. P. is most helpful in showing that Calvin more fully used typology as a significant aid. He justified it by arguing that NT writers saw OT texts as prophecies which are fulfilled in Christ and that their language does not fit with any OT figure, yet perfectly fits the reign of Christ. Calvin’s use of prophecy recognizes historical fulfillments as they occurred, without severing these from a complete fulfillment that comes only in Christ. For Calvin, both the Holy Spirit and philosophical expertise are needed for biblical interpretation.

P. here accurately describes Calvin’s exegetical methods and makes accessible a great body of commentary materials that demonstrate his methods in action.

DONALD K. MCKIM
Memphis Theological Seminary


Morimoto, a Japanese Christian theologian, builds this study on the work of Korean scholar Sang Hyun Lee, The Philosophical Theory of Jonathan Edwards (Princeton, 1988). M. holds that Edwards’s soteriology offers an understanding and an articulation of the traditional “federal (cov-enant) theology” of Puritan Calvinism which is best described as ontological and sacramental rather than merely legal, forensic, or imputed. In the tradition of Calvin and Turretin, as distinct from the later and narrower “textbook Calvinism,” Edwards’s theology connects to the Catholic, Thomist vision in ways that neither he
nor the Reformers themselves would have recognized.

The study is divided into the four phases of redemption commonly described in Reformed theology: conversion, justification, sanctification and glorification. In each phase M. examines Edwards's theology over against the traditional Protestant-Catholic dichotomies and finds in Edwards's vision the fundamental insights of both perspectives. With such an ambitious scheme, it is not surprising that M. relies heavily on a spectrum of secondary sources, giving the impression of trying to resolve too many issues a little too quickly. Some of the claims made for Edwards are not fully convincing. Has Edwards really made "a qualitative leap from the metaphysics of form and substance to a dispositional ontology still relevant today" (4)? At least one key issue seems greatly underemphasized, namely Edwards's distinctive Calvinist insistence on the total depravity of "natural man" and on the irresistible grace of the "regenerate." And at several points one would quarrel with the precision and/or framing of M.'s study: the de auxiliis controversy "between Roman Catholic orders" (18), the contrast between Lombard's "Protestant concern" for divine initiative and sovereignty, and Aquinas's "Catholic concern" for the relative permanence and integrity of the created world (59).

Despite these shortcomings, I think M.'s fundamental theses are valid. He has marshalled a great deal of previous scholarship, both from Edwards and from general ecumenical studies, to give what is overall a far better understanding of the fundamentally Catholic vision of "America's greatest theologian."

CHRISTOPHER J. VISCARDI, S.J.
Spring Hill College, Mobile


Pavlishcek proposes the thesis that the theoretical ground for religious freedom is always an unstable one. The instability results from two facts. First, neither the modus vivendi approach, which makes a pragmatic case for religious freedom, nor the "Esperantist" approach, which attempts to ground religious freedom in a transpragmatic principle (like "human dignity") that all persons can agree on, are adequate. Second, these two approaches cannot be modified and combined so as to avoid the relativism of the first and the impossibility of the second. Therefore, the problem of religious freedom is a true dilemma.

P. tests his thesis through a close reading of John Courtney Murray. Of all 20th-century Christian thinkers, "Murray's attempt to deal with the problem is easily the best in terms of lucidity of analysis, historical sensitivity, and theological depth" (3). Yet, P. argues, even Murray could not escape the dilemma. Murray's attempts to argue pragmatically for religious freedom, making the case that what church-state arrangement is best depends on the circumstances of the country in question, leaves him little different from the proponents of the "thesis-hypothesis" approach to religious freedom, who argued that constitutional orders like that of the U.S. are at best to be tolerated until Catholicism can be established as the state church. Murray could not rule out the possibility that concrete conditions in America could change so that the religion clauses of the First Amendment would no longer serve the freedom of the Church. However, if he were to try to offer a more substantive grounding of religious freedom, Murray would move too far in the direction of his Protestant interlocutors who set out a theological, and therefore too tradition-specific theory.

It is to P.'s credit that he does not try to resolve this problem prematurely, but rather lets it stand. P. thinks that the idea of religious freedom—in anybody's thought—is not as soundly grounded as its proponents think that it is. Yet, unlike those who think that Murray is fundamentally
mistaken in his set of concerns, P. does not consider the constitutional question of religious freedom unworthy of the attention of Christian ethicists. The question to put to P. is whether pragmatic and more principled responses to religious freedom are as mutually exclusive as he thinks and the term “dilemma” implies. Still, this is an important book, a fresh contribution to Murray studies, and highly recommended.

TODD DAVID WHITMORE
University of Notre Dame


Marthaler, theologian, religious educator, and church historian once again provides a study that is timely and helpful—timely because it is appearing so soon after the publication of the Catechism of the Catholic Church, helpful because this new universal catechism, though intended to heal grievances among Catholics, has to some extent exacerbated them. This study, consisting of a preface, 15 historical chapters, and the text of three documents, can be read with profit from two directions: from the front historically, and from the back thematically. The historical direction begins in the mid-14th century with The Lay Folks’ Catechism called for by Archbishop John Thoresby of York. With deliberate speed it moves through Reformation, Trent, Counter Reformation, evangelization in Latin America, vernacular catechisms in England and Ireland, conflict between Enlightenment and neo-Scholasticism, Vatican I, the Baltimore Catechism, catechisms after Vatican II, the new universal catechism, and obstacles to its English translation.

The book provokes thematic reflections difficult to resist. If we begin where its historical overview ends, we see a Church whose members do not agree on such basic questions as: What does it mean to believe? How should belief be formulated? How do contemporary men and women come to believe? How does a community of faith pass on this faith to others, especially to children? With such questions in mind we can reread history; there we find parallels and differences. History may not answer our present questions, but it can suggest roads taken that have helped or hindered the Church in its pilgrimage of faith. M. does not argue at length from history for answers to present-day questions, but by providing events with their meaning he implicitly invites others to follow such a thematic direction.

This study is well conceived, well developed, well articulated. It balances wide-angle overviews with close-up details. It shows scholarly control of primary and secondary sources.

JOHN S. NELSON
Fordham University, New York


Gelpi’s principal purpose is to examine “the inadequacies in the contemporary theological turn to experience” (53) as a backdrop to an alternate proposal in the final chapter which tests “the ability of a realistic, triadic, communitarian construct of experience to advance the work of foundational theology” (124).

The heroes of the book are Peirce and Royce, and the source of difficulties is regularly found in “the presuppositions and fallacies of Kantian logic and epistemology” (124). The reforming schools of thought criticized in chapters 1 to 4 (Schillebeeckx, liberation theology, process theology, and transcendental Thomism) can be expected to appeal to experience for fundamentally different reasons, and with different construals of “experience” as a result. However, G. does not attend to these differences, but rather focuses on two common characteristics that are embodied in various ways in these contemporary theologies: their use of a “di-polar construct of experience,” with its
frequent result, "conceptual nominal­ism"; and, to a lesser extent, the di­vorce of theory and practice. Both characteristics are traced to Kant's (or more generally, modern philo­sophy's) residual influence on these the­ologies.

One may find, not without reason, that the sketches of the use of experi­ence by Schillebeeckx in particular, but also by liberation theology and process theology, are considerably briefer than experts in each author or school of thought might find accept­able for a thorough exposition. Chapter 4, on Rahner and Lonergan, car­ries out this analysis and critique more successfully, ranging far wider than the notion "experience." Lest the constant appeal to Peirce and Ameri­can pragmatism sound like a mere appeal to authority, it is recom­mended that the reader begin with Chapter 5 on G.'s own constructive proposal in order to see whether the appeal is justified in itself, pertinent to the problems of the four schools of thought, and without other traces of inherent faults making them unuse­ful to Christian theology.

GEORGE P. SCHNER, S.J.
Regis College, Toronto


Gunton shares much in common with Vatican II's vision of revelation as the disclosure of a personal mys­tery and with the typical Catholic view that revelation has to be medi­ated through tradition, creeds, and other prepositional formulations, in­cluding Scripture. Working out of the Reformed tradition, G. debunks the stereotyped image of Protestants as antitraditional. He maintains that most interpretations of revelation in this century reduce revelation to some kind of immediate experience. He argues that all truth involves a givenness or the "authority of the other," so that knowledge of whatever kind is a revelation.

G. carefully distinguishes revela­tion from the various forms in which it is mediated, while recognizing an intrinsic relationship between the two. Still, there are some basic points of disagreement with traditional Catholic approaches. G. rejects reason as an autonomous source of our knowledge of God and concludes that all truth has to be derived from the revelation of the Bible. How G. would reason with non-Christian believers or nonbelievers who do not accept bib­lical revelation needs clarification. In­deed, a notable gap in his theology is the relationship between Christianity and other world religions.

Furthermore, while G. states that revelation is mediated through a com­munity of believers, the ecclesial di­mension receives hardly any consid­eration, and the role of a teaching au­thority is given no place at all. The magisterium for him is an oppressive authority which tends to reify the tra­dition. He argues that truth, being es­chatological, will eventually emerge, because the Spirit guides the Church to the fullness of truth. But judg­ments about truth are left in the meantime to rational argumentation, an inconvenient conclusion for one who downplays the authority of rea­son. Despite these divergences from typical Catholic concerns, Catholic theology has nevertheless much to gain from G.'s reflections on the es­chatological and pneumatological na­ture of revelation and the ultimately apophatic nature of all forms of rev­elation's mediation.

PAUL J. LANGSFELD
Mount St. Mary's Seminary, Md.


Based on his experience in the United Kingdom's Council of Churches, Clements's book attempts to counter the growing didacticism of church statements in public affairs with an outline of a credible public witness which is reflective of the church as a learning community. To this end, he marshals an impressive theological argument in which the re­sponse to urgent and concrete needs
is always seen in light of the Church's continual wrestling with the ways in which the Kingdom is mysteriously taking root in the world despite conflicting evidence. The learning needed is first that of the Church constantly reimaging the costly discipleship of the prophets and Jesus. The emphasis here is on redemption, not solutions. Through historical precedent and contemporary examples, C. lays the groundwork for a challenging religious discernment of social questions. To this, he adds a realism in the reading of public affairs which is knowledgeable and nuanced. A guiding light is the struggle, witness, and unfinished agenda of Bonhoeffer.

Though situated in the United Kingdom and emanating from Protestant theological reflection, C.'s exposition of biblical theology and ecclesiology has much to offer those engaged in the practice of American Catholic social ethics. Catholic reflection still falls short of D. Hollenbach's call for a Catholic contribution to the development of a public theology whose roots are in the biblical symbolic vision. Not unlike his American counterparts, C. is ambiguous about his audience. As C. Firer-Hintze observes, apprenticeship in different skills is needed if church reflections are to be influential not only on the governmental but also on the grassroots level. Many of the ingredients are present here, but a more systematic reflection is needed. Here the work of virtue ethicists and a deeper recovery of the ethical dimensions of the Catholic liturgy could be helpful. A strong recommendation for this, and, hopefully, succeeding works from this author.

JOHN J. BARRETT
Setauket, New York


Fowler and Hertzke do not seek to make original arguments about the interplay between religion and politics in America; nevertheless, they make an important contribution. They supply an outstanding synthesis of historical, sociological, and cultural perspectives on religious activism and church-state issues in the U.S. Their analysis tends to emphasize insights from the social sciences, but also includes a sophisticated appreciation of theological warrants that motivate various religious groups to enter the world of electoral politics and legal action.

The book suffers somewhat from an unresolved tension between its goals of comprehensiveness and accuracy. The text contains many broad generalizations that cry out for greater nuance, but most of the failings can be attributed to the inherent difficulty of providing a coherent, synthetic narrative on this complex topic. Overall, F. and H. are successful in providing an accessible roadmap through U.S. religious history, one which maintains a consistent and sharp focus on how religious belief has often come to be a defining characteristic of American political life.

Particularly informative is the treatment of religious politics in the courts, including a succinct (and remarkably jargon-free) survey of competing schools of First Amendment interpretation. Also noteworthy is the balanced assessment of the claim that a "culture war" is the best description of current cleavages in religion and politics. Religion and U.S. politics is a volatile mix. This accessible and even-handed text is neither alarmist nor complacent about the inherent dangers, but will deepen the general reader's understanding of the cultural and historical roots of this neurotic aspect of American public life.

THOMAS MASSARO, S.J.
Emory University, Atlanta


This study of Roman Catholicism and ecumenism is based on two of Nilson's published articles and his his-
SHORTER NOTICES

torical sketches. His recommendations for Roman Catholics form the conclusion of the book. He organizes his ideas around The Unity of the Churches: An Actual Possibility by Karl Rahner and Heinrich Fries (Paulist, 1985) and focuses on the first and second of the eight theses they present.

The first bases the unity of faith on the authority of Scripture, the Apostles' Creed, and the Nicene-Constantinopolitan Creed. The second deals with the divergencies that have developed in the Christian churches. Here N. presents Rahner's concept of epistemological tolerance as a means of hastening church unity. As churches tolerate divergent views on nonfundamental issues within themselves, this tolerance can be extended to other churches.

N. analyzes the responses of Daniel Ols, Aidan Nichols, Avery Dulles, and especially Joseph Ratzinger, for whom only Rome proclaims the whole truth. He neglects to explain the Lutheran Harding Meyer's argument that the concept of epistemological tolerance was inadequate; that the doctrine of "partner churches" should be accepted as legitimate but not as equally obligatory for all. Rahner died in 1984. In 1988 Fries said that both he and Rahner realized that the second thesis needed to be clarified and that he welcomed Meyer's contribution.

N. concludes with recommendations on how the Roman Catholic Church can provide its commitment to church unity. These include clarifying "the hierarchy of truths," reforming the exercise of papal primacy, re-examining Anglican orders, and developing joint education and formation programs among the Christian churches. This book would serve well in adult education classes of Catholic parishes.

WILLIAM P. MCSHEA
Carlow College, Pittsburgh


Hoose offers a critical account of the role and relevance of tradition in the formation of contemporary Christian ethics. His well-reasoned and eminently readable book addresses Christian attitudes towards sexuality, killing (with particular attention to capital punishment, abortion, suicide, and euthanasia), and punishment. In each instance, he seeks to demonstrate that the "received wisdom" invoked by "traditionalists" to resolve vexed questions is neither perspicuous nor fully persuasive.

In Chapter 2, H. contrasts the denigration of married love and sexuality in patristic and medieval authorities with the renewed understanding of the marital covenant in postconciliar theology. In succeeding chapters, he queries the traditional vindication of an absolute and exceptionless norm against the killing of innocent life and the dubious legitimation of modern practices of punishment. The cumulative force of his criticism of "inherited teachings concerning certain so-called 'absolute' norms of behaviour" (153) supports a revisionist, or more precisely, proportionalist interpretation of moral reasoning.

Although the scope of H.'s interests compels him to paint with a broad brush, one might wish for greater consideration of non-Western sources of Christian wisdom, and, in general, more explicit recognition of the hermeneutical complexity of moral interpretation. What T. S. Eliot called the "presence of the past" yields not only action-guiding norms, the principal subject of H.'s criticism, but overarching regulative ideals or virtues, e.g. agapé. Such general attitudes expressed in scriptural narratives, not only provide ultimate justification for our specific norms, but illumine the context of acting. Fidelity, rather than mere conformity, to the received wisdom of our forebears thus presumes a polyvalent understanding of tradition which may account not only for normative continuities but for shifts in practice, e.g. Christian attitudes towards slavery. These quib-
bles notwithstanding, H.'s book stands as a fitting complement to his foundational work on proportionalism.

William O'Neill, S.J.
Jesuit School of Theology, Berkeley


An extended reflection on the universal experience of suffering and its role as a foundation for a compassion-based moral theology. MacDonald argues that suffering is a constitutive dimension of the human condition and that Christianity offers special resources for understanding it and relating it to behavior. While aware of suffering’s potential to undermine or destroy the human spirit, he claims a compassionate stance can emerge from suffering considered in light of Jesus’ suffering and death.

Chapter 5, comprising a third of the book, relates compassion to central themes of contemporary moral theology. M.’s treatment of experience, fundamental option, conscience, and imagination is very helpful, but he is most persuasive in his discussion of compassion as a specification of the virtue of charity. Here we see the power of the memory of Christ’s sufferings to transform the suffering agent, enabling one to respond to others similarly burdened. M. believes a special sensitivity to “the crucified of today” must inform any authentic articulation of Christian charity.

Less successful is M.’s treatment of the relationship between compassion and justice. He argues that the compassionate person is not concerned solely with alleviating visible suffering but is also committed to eliminating the sources of human suffering. It is not clear how M.’s methodological commitment to experience and his understanding of compassion as “suffering love” generate a necessary requirement to promote justice. His discussion of the contemporary moral issues of abortion and capital punishment, while attentive to real suffering experienced by all parties, demonstrates a resistance to analyzing the oppressive social structures which serve to shape these controversies.

Brian F. Linnane, S.J.
College of the Holy Cross, Mass.


A professor of political science at the University of British Columbia, Elkins has written a volume which is intentionally provocative. He describes the book as “a work of imaginative non-fiction” (?). While richly informed by history, political economy, and a knowledge of contemporary technology, his aim is to extrapolate from these disciplines a vision of what political authority might look like in the next century. A special focus of the work is to examine the connection between territoriality and political organization. E. believes that the close connection of these two things, which supporters of a nation-state system take for granted, will be considerably “relaxed” in the future. The central chapters examine the likelihood of such relaxations and their implications for technology, economics, public administration, and our ideas of citizenship.

The great strength of the book, and one which helps to make it enjoyable reading, is the knack E. has for giving concrete examples of how our assumptions can be challenged. Through his historical knowledge he ably demonstrates how relative is the conventional wisdom by which political theory operates. He shows how brief has been the period in which the assumptions of a Westphalian system of nation-states have held sway. His style is to explicative and challenge these assumptions through an almost conversational and, at times, interrogatory tone.

At the same time a weakness in E.’s approach is the tendency to settle for simply questioning the status quo without providing convincing arguments for his vision of the future.
Many would agree there are forces eroding the traditional model of nation-states, but E.'s scenarios for the future are too often vague or unconvincing. But as a suggestive work which helps the reader to rethink the possibilities for a new political order the volume is both clever and thought-provoking.

KENNETH R. HIMES, O.F.M.
Washington Theological Union


This is a case for reform of U.S. capitalism. Fatalism, revolution, or reform are the options open to any serious critic of the system. Buell, a serious critic and long-time contributor to The Progressive, a liberal journal, is anything but fatalistic as he presents this idealistic prescription for reform. B.'s new world of work, leisure, and environment (which would, he says, require first reconstituted media and better functioning political parties) calls for empowerment of both workers and communities. He would strengthen workers' rights in the workplace, limit the mobility of firms, and find new ways "to intervene in corporate governance that further the chances for individual development, individuality, and even entrepreneurial success in domestic and world markets" (119).

If you are inclined to ask, "Why intervene? Why not work to transform the person who, in turn, can transform the corporation?" B. would reply, I suspect, that he has in mind transformation of both persons and corporations because "reform will never be viable or acceptable unless it grows out of and helps to foster effective opportunities for citizens and workers to participate directly in governing their individual and collective lives" (121).

B. provides a useful overview of the historical and intellectual context out of which the modern corporation arose, a fair discussion of the differences between "thoughtful conserva-


Simons stimulates and frames a conversation on economic issues and Catholic social teachings through an expose of anthropology as a common ground and of engaged public churches whose sense of social responsibility invites informed participation in the socioeconomic arena. The retrieval of fundamental Christian teachings for his presentation both on theological anthropology (Trinity, Creation, original sin, communion of saints) and on the Church as communion (trinitarian, eucharistic, ecclesiological, baptismal and world communions) provides solid foundations for participatory and social dimensions of public theology.

S. argues correctly for a communitarian anthropology to restrain economic individualism and socialist collectivism; with equal accuracy he finds statements of such a communitarian anthropology in the Christian social-ethical traditions. In his subsequent description of how Christian churches might move toward public policy, he draws together Habermas's critical social theory of communicative action, social analysis, witness, grassroots action, and an ecological consciousness.
S.'s work could be strengthened in two ways. First, his effort at retrieval of central foundations from the Christian traditions would benefit from an historically contextualized and critical presentation of "current church teaching on the economy" in addition to Paul Lakeland's critique of an inadequate critical social theory in Catholic social teachings. Second, his plan for the transformation of churches into public churches relies heavily on Western, rational, linguistic thought and method, i.e. Habermas and middle-class conversion; a thorough integration of liberationist and feminist method and reconstruction might well have provided tools and insights for the emergence of the inclusive communities S. seeks.

MARY ELISBERND
Loyola University, Chicago


One more among a number of contemporary studies aimed at effecting a radical paradigm shift in the way churches think about human sexuality and sexual ethics. The churches, in this case, are Protestant churches, no reference being made to Catholicism or Orthodoxy. G., a self-described "lesbian feminist liberation theo-ethicist" (30) who was denied admission to study for ordination in one Episcopal diocese for being a woman, and denied ordination in a second for refusing to take an oath of celibacy, sets out to free eros from what she believes is its dualistic and subordinate relationship to agape in both contemporary theological writing and church policy statements.

Chapter I attempts to show this dualist understanding by a cursory review of works by Anders Nygren, Helmut Thielicke, C. S. Lewis and D. S. Bailey. Chapter 2 looks at policy statements issued in response to debates over homosexuality by Lutheran, Episcopalian, Presbyterian, and Methodist church officials. The remaining four chapters read like a political tract advancing the cause of the new paradigm. The book is useful because of G.'s clarity in what she is about and her bluntness in facing the implications of her position for traditional Christian beliefs and moral teaching. God, e.g., is radically imminent, sexual, changing, becoming. Jesus is but one of many incarnations of God, and human experience in its diversity and particularity trumps all doctrinal claims. The "forbidden sexual practices include incest, rape, and domestic violence. Risky practices . . . include sadomasochism, capitalist produced pornography, and nuclear family relations between male breadwinners and female housewives" (126).

Solid scholarship, care in making her arguments or defining her terms, attention to any arguments or evidence that would counter or challenge her own position, are all notably absent from the book. On pages 110–12 G. offers a statement of her belief about who and what God is, a statement, as best I can tell, of her personal experience. She is quite correct in saying that her god "most definitely . . . is not a God who has the male defined, misogynistic characteristics of the Christian God" (111).

JAMES P. HANIGAN
Duquesne University, Pittsburgh


DuBose's book is a timely contribution to theological medical ethics as well as to secular medical ethics and philosophy of medicine. It comes as medical practice is being dramatically reshaped by the forces of scientific research and economics. D. argues that it is the success of the scientific-technological model of medicine that has undermined the basic element of trust in the physician-patient relationship. Trust is essential to all social relationships, and it has been at the core of the physician-patient relationship as well as the relationship between society and
the medical community. The physician-patient relationship is a fiduciary one and the authority and power of physicians is tied to the assumption of trustworthiness by the public. D. picks up on the erosion of trust, at both levels, as the starting point of the book.

D. contends that many of the assumptions of the scientific model of medicine seek to offset any notion of dependency in human life. This model seeks control over human life and so usurps God’s primacy and denies a basic truth of human existence. Trust becomes a form of control when and where it exists. D. believes that dependency is inescapable, and that the way for medicine to recapture a sense of trust is to realize the central element of dependency in all human existence, especially in medicine.

D.’s analysis goes to the heart of many issues facing contemporary models of medicine. While medicine is scientific, in many ways it is not a science; it is concerned with individuals, not universals. D. is correct in arguing that trust is essential to the practice of medicine. The intellectual and practical puzzle is how to establish trust in the postmodern culture of mistrust that he describes so well.

KEVIN W. WILDES, S.J.
Georgetown University, D.C.


Meissner here describes the evolution of Judaism and Christianity from King David to the present, focusing on the recurring phenomenon of the splitting of religious organizations and the formation of splinter cults by self-proclaimed prophets and messiahs.

M. clearly exposes the dynamics of false prophets such as Jesus warned of (Matthew 7:15; 24:11,24). These disruptive individuals typically seek to become the power of an organization, rather than leading the organization to the power of God; they have often been psychotic; and the movements they founded have frequently survived them by many years. M. offers an excellent psychoanalytic explanation of this type of cult leaders, their wide appeal to the masses, and the various forms their ideas have assumed at different periods of Jewish and Christian religious history.

The book abounds in scholarly documentation, but it is well written and engaging to read. Since M. not only draws on psychoanalytic and theological resources but also integrates concepts from the wide range of scholarly fields, his study will appeal to those who are interested in Freudian psychoanalysis and developmental psychology, as well as to students of contemporary hermeneutics and the history of theology. We may hope that his book challenges colleagues to employ the techniques of psychoanalysis and its insights into human behavior for equally profound inquiries into yet other types of social and organizational phenomena.

RALPH WADESON, JR.
Wadeson Psychiatric Center, Md.


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Postmodern Thought in Buddhism and Christianity. Ed. D. Loy. Atlanta: Scholars, 1996. Pp. 120. $35.95; $23.95.


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