
This is not a commentary on the Psalms. Levine makes sophisticated use of relatively new literary techniques to demonstrate why the prayer-poems of the Psalter have touched and energized the lives of both Jews and Christians. He opens with a sustained reflection on Psalm 19 (all his translations, unless otherwise noted, are from the Jewish Publication Society's Tanach: The Holy Scriptures). Through a rich understanding of liturgical acts and a careful literary analysis of the accompanying text L. illuminates the nature and task of public prayer as negotiating the liminalities between the secular and sacred, the human and the divine.

Thanks to the insights of religious thinkers such as Martin Buber and Franz Rosenzweig, together with the literary-discourse theories of Walter Ong and especially Mikhail Bakhtin, we now better understand ritualized prayer as "social acts, triangulating relationships between the individual, the community, and the idea of the transcendent that grounds the community's self-conception and social structure" (79). Commenting on two of the above authorities, L. observes, "It is no accident that these two major thinkers, each of whom chose to make dialogue the center of his life's work, were deeply grounded in their religious traditions: Buber in Judaism, and Bakhtin in Russian Orthodoxy" (81). I need not emphasize the powerful influence of the Spiritual Exercises of St. Ignatius on the thinking of Walter Ong, S.J.

From the dialogic relationship between God and humanity L. moves on to consider the perspectives of time and space in the divine/human equation. "For in Your sight a thousand years/are like yesterday that has passed/like a watch of the night" (Psalm 90:4). It is in the sacred space of the Temple that this dimension of time is realized. L. observes that by ritualizing space and time in worship the Hebrews sacralize the very physical dimensions through which they experience the world.

In their joys and sadness the Psalms wrestle with the problem of reconciling God's power and goodness. Prophets and psalmists address the issue in various ways. Here L. convincingly and creatively elaborates on one image, the sukkah (booth of the wilderness wanderings) as a means by which the biblical poet expressed the protection of God. The sukkah, once an agricultural hut, is now transformed into divinely protected space (Psalm 27:4–6). "To the divine sukkah, Israel brings its complaints about the seeming injustice of God's reign as well as its songs of praise for God's gracious gifts. Under the ambivalent sign of that poetic image, the individual poet and the congregation are united in their faithfulness to the hidden presence of their Lord" (169).
A final chapter deals directly with the Psalms and the historical catastrophes suffered by the Jewish people. Specifically, these tragedies are the two destructions of Jerusalem, the expulsion of the Jews from Spain and, by far the most troubling of all, the Holocaust. It is not surprising that, for both victims and survivors of the Holocaust, citations from the Psalms, in petition or reproach, are abundant. There is no one voice that speaks for the Jewish people, and the search for meaning, within the context of faith or upon its ruins, goes on.

This excellent book urgently invites us to look more closely at the formal elements of Israel’s sacred poetry. The way a biblical poet fashions a dialogue or builds up symmetries in a stanza reveals the poet’s understanding of divine/human encounter and the modulations that it produces. L. has a wonderfully sensitive ear for these modulations. I am reminded of what Seamus Heaney said in his Nobel Prize Lecture last year in Stockholm: “The form of the poem is crucial to poetry’s power to do the thing which always is and always will be to poetry’s credit . . . the power to remind us that we are hunters and gatherers of values, that our very solitudes and distresses are creditable, insofar as they, too, are an earnest of our veritable human being.” The book is flawlessly printed and includes a bibliography, an index of biblical/rabbinic passages, and a general index.

Boston College

Fred L. Moriarty, S.J.


Collins, professor of Old Testament studies at the Divinity School of the University of Chicago, states at the outset that his concern “is primarily with Jewish messianism,” because he recognizes that the traditional understanding of it, at least in Christian circles, has been “heavily influenced by Christian theology,” which has often assumed that there was “a uniform system of messianic expectation in ancient Judaism” (3). Since this assumption has been challenged in some quarters and since not enough attention has been paid to the relevance of the Dead Sea Scrolls for the question of messianism, C. has written this book.

Although C. thinks that “the Essene identification” of the Jews of Qumran “is highly probable” and that the “sectarian origin of the Scrolls” remains equally so (7), he rightly recognizes that not all the texts found in the Qumran caves were sectarian compositions and that some copies even date from the end of the third century B.C., before the emergence of the sect. So the scrolls “give us a wider sample of the Judaism of the time than has been generally supposed” (8), for they often reflect Jewish tenets beyond the “core group of sectarian texts” (10). C. includes evidence in his discussion from the Psalms of Solomon and other Jewish writings of the so-called intertestamental period that have not been found in Qumran caves.
Discussion of messianism begins with its roots in the Hebrew Bible. C. treats the royal ideology, predictions of an ideal king, the messianic movement of the Persian period, the absence of messianism in the Second Temple period, the transformation of messianism in Daniel, and the savior king in Egyptian Judaism. On this he builds his discussion of messianism in later Jewish writings, Psalms of Solomon and the Dead Sea Scrolls. This treatment includes the diverse titles of the Messiah, "the star and the scepter" in the Damascus Document, the role of the Davidic Messiah, the Messiahs of Aaron and Israel (one or two?), the origin of priestly messianism, the relation of various figures called Teacher, Priest, and Prophet to the Messiah, the messianic throne in heaven, the Messiah as Son of God, the Danielic Son of Man and its development in 1 Enoch and Fourth Ezra. Finally, under "messianic dreams in action," C. treats of such issues as prophetic movements, royal pretenders, and Jesus and the Davidic Messiah. From all of this C. rightly concludes that "Jewish ideas of messianism were not uniform. There was a dominant notion of a Davidic messiah, as the king who would restore the kingdom of Israel, which was part of the common Judaism around the turn of the era. There were also, however, minor messianic strands, which envisaged a priestly messiah, or an anointed prophet or a heavenly Son of Man. Christian messianism drew heavily on some of the minor strands (prophet, Son of Man) and eventually developed them into a doctrine of Christology that was remote from its Jewish origins" (209).

No one can object to the general thrust of this conclusion which stresses the complexity of Jewish messianism and the difference that the remote Christian development made of it.

A major problem, however, runs throughout the book, C.'s tendency to make of "messianism" a rubber-band concept. Many strands of Old Testament teaching that speak of promised figures become in his treatment "messianic," even though "messiah" is not used and their origins and development have nothing to do with expected anointed figures. The underlying problem is C.'s failure to reckon with the history of ideas, and the amount of time that it often took before a promised future David (Jeremiah 30:9; 23:5–6; 33:14–16; Ezekiel 34:23) developed into the notion of a "Messiah." In his initial discussion of "the terminological issue" (11–14), he recognizes that maššāh, "anointed one," does not necessarily refer to an eschatological figure. In fact, the verb maššāh occurs 69 times, usually used of the anointing of Aaron, his sons, priests, or cultic objects, but never of a coming/awaited figure. Maššāh occurs 39 times, in 34 of which it refers to historic figures, kings (Davidic, and even Persian!) or high priests; its meaning is debated in 2 Samuel 1:21, Habakkuk 3:13, and Psalm 28:8, but none of them has to do with a future/expected figure. Only in Daniel 9:25–26 does it occur (twice) with the preposition 'ad, "until," used of an awaited eschatological figure. Yet C. interprets that passage of high priests! C. rightly refuses to regard the Servant of Isaiah as "messianic," even though that figure eventually becomes in Targum Jonathan "my Servant, the Messiah"
Why then does he cite Nathan’s oracle (2 Samuel 7:11–17) as the “clear basis for the expectation of a royal messiah from the line of David” (22)? What Nathan promised has not yet become “messianic.” Again, where in the Old Testament or in any later Jewish text is a “Messiah” ever called the “Son of God”?

Despite the good goal that C. has set for himself and the excellent discussion of many of Qumran texts that bear on Jewish messianism, there is the pervasive problem just mentioned. So let the reader beware!

Catholic University of America, D.C. JOSEPH A. FITZMYER, S.J.


Luedemann early seizes the high moral ground, declaring it his “main aim . . . to investigate the historical truth—honestly and regardless of other factors” (vii). In a “ruthlessly honest quest for truth” (19) he wants to take “an undistorted look” at the Resurrection (6), looking “in a purely historical and empirical way at the historical context of the testimonies to the resurrection” (14–15). Those he disagrees with are often charged with “dogmatism” (211), fundamentalism, prejudice, “an anti-visionary complex” (69), “a conservative hermeneutic that tolerates no questions” (178), “going beyond everything that is otherwise historically probable,” indulging in “apologetic manoeuvres to evade history” (180), and knowing “a priori what needs to be proved” (178). His epistemology, incidentally, seems to exemplify classically that naïve realism which has been criticized by Lonergan and others for expounding knowledge as “taking a look.”

The original Easter experience, which happened to Peter and triggered messianic faith in others, is explained by L. with the “help of depth-psychological research into mourning” (97). A “moment of epiphany” (100) cut short the mourning process for Peter, who had been afflicted by deep guilt-feelings after his denial of Jesus. Abruptly “a living and vital image of Jesus”—but not the living Jesus himself—“took the place of the beloved dead person” (99). “An incomparable chain reaction” followed “the first vision to Peter,” which proved remarkably “infectious” as the news of it “went round like lightning” (174).

Even though he calls it “incomparable,” L. elucidates this ecstatic chain reaction by reflections on mass psychology and collective hallucination coming from two dubious authorities, Gustav Le Bon and Ernest Renan. In reconstructing Peter’s Easter experience, he also uses research done at Harvard University into the mourning processes of 43 widows and 19 widowers, but never reckons with the fact that these “normal” cases, at least in two ways, differ greatly from the situation of those who mourned Jesus after his violent death. Unlike the dead partners of the Harvard widows and widowers, during his lifetime Jesus
had made some remarkable, even unique, claims about his personal identify and mission, a fact L. acknowledges. Then, unlike the Harvard cases, Jesus died an utterly shameful and horrible death, also a fact that L. recognizes elsewhere. But L. fails to register how the awful scandal of Jesus' crucifixion affected those who mourned this end, the original disciples.

L. also appeals to depth psychology when accounting for Paul’s vision on the Damascus Road. Although he admits most scholars do not agree, he insists on interpreting Romans 7 as the apostle's description of “the history of his ego and the rift in it before he turned to Christ” (80), the “unconscious conflict which Paul endured before his conversion” (83). An aggressive fanatic and genuine hysteric, Paul experienced a breakthrough in his long-suppressed longings when his “image of Christ” received “a previously unknown dimension” (84). What is surprising here is his confidence that, despite recent scholarly doubts about the possibility and value of writing psychobiography of long-dead figures and despite irreconcilable differences between contemporary psychologists about the diagnosis and therapy of patients, L. can rehabilitate old psychological hypotheses about the Easter visions of Peter and Paul.

L. wants to follow “autonomous historical reason” (13) in giving his readers an historically reliable reconstruction of what happened after Jesus’ death. Let me list, however, some of the doubtful items in his historical reconstruction: that the experience of the forgiveness of sins is primary in “the earliest Christian Easter faith”; that 1 Corinthians 15:6 and Acts 2:1–13 derive from the same collective, ecstatic experience of the Spirit; that Paul’s Damascus Road encounter can be closely related to those reported in 2 Corinthians 12:1–10; that Revelation 1:9–20 illuminates the “original” Easter experiences; that the post-Easter encounters were characterized by ecstasy and light; that the first disciples did not know where Jesus was buried and that the empty tomb stories are merely conclusions from the Resurrection message; and that an appearance to Mary Magdalene is dubious historically.

Yet the problem with L.’s reconstruction extends beyond any particular points. His whole case is rendered precarious by the assertion that the case for the Resurrection is to be judged by what is “historically probable” (180 and passim), an assertion which is then followed by the admission that “historical proofs are not enough” (183). L. is well aware of the risks of reductionism. Yet he ends up with what he describes as a “minimum” that he presents as “a great liberation” (184). With this “minimum” he argues that in essence “everything that was finally recognized after Easter was already present” before Easter: “All the characteristics of the earliest resurrection faith” were already available in “the sayings and history of Jesus” (181–82; italics mine). Here L.’s version of Jesus’ Resurrection resembles closely that of Willi Marxsen in the 1960s, except that Marxsen did not invoke depth psychology in making his case. There's the rub. If depth psychology is to be applied to Peter, Paul, and others like William Wrede, why not interpret L.’s
own text as expressing unconscious conflicts and longings within his psyche? An interview with L., published in Evangelisches Kommentar (Oct. 1995, 605–8) provides further material for any critic who wishes to raise hypotheses about L.'s unconscious.

The long central chapter that analyses New Testament Resurrection texts contains many insightful comments and valuable criticisms. The problem is that L.'s exegesis aims to prop up a very flawed thesis about the origins of Christianity. John Bowden's translation is, as usual, simply magnificent. It is regrettable that this talent serves a book that many scholars, not least L.'s own Protestant colleagues at the University of Göttingen, find outrageously deficient.

Gregorian University, Rome

GERALD O'COLLINS, S.J.


A revision of a thesis originally presented at King’s College, University of Aberdeen. Baker’s intent seems to have been to go beyond the level of “introductory topics” (authorship, date, provenance, etc.) to a point of engaging “the content and actual thought” of the document traditionally referred to as the Epistle of James. The reason very few interpreters have taken steps beyond the “introductory topics” is clear: the history of research on this document reflects little consensus and much befuddlement among scholars about how to assess it and where to place it in the history of the rhetoric and diversification of early Christianity. B. is among the few who claim to have found an interpretative angle, viz. a specific theme whereby the document can be interpreted.

The theme B. thinks can explain the document—because it can be argued to be a “primary concern,” registered in different ways throughout—is what he terms “personal speech-ethics.” He admits that this is not a technical term used in James or any other ancient document, it is a term B. uses in order to signify the “idea or ethics of morality as applied to interpersonal communication . . . the rights and wrongs of utterance . . . when to speak, how to speak, and to whom to speak, as well as when, how, and to whom not to speak” (2).

The personal speech-ethics theme is so prevalent in James that it provides the fivefold schema B. uses in order to interpret James as well as a diverse group of writings in other “ancient Mediterranean” literatures. The rudiments of speech ethics (James 1:19–27), the evil of the tongue (3:1–12; 4:1–2b), speech in “inter-human” relationships (3:18; 4:1–2b, 11–12; 5:9), speech in human-divine relationships (4:2b–10, 13–17; 5:13–18; 1:5–8), and the relationship of speech to truth (5:12)—these constitute the basic subtheme divisions whereby the epistle registers the “personal speech-ethics.”

Although the basic theme is in evidence throughout the ancient
Mediterranean documents and cultures, the latter are basically relegated in the book to "background" status. So the five major parts of B.'s book correspond to the five thematic divisions. And each part includes two chapters, the first of which takes up one of the five thematic divisions by discussing the "background" material (Near Eastern wisdom literature, the Old Testament, Apocrypha and Pseudepigrapha, Qumran, Rabbinic literature, Philo, the New Testament) and the second of which takes up the same subtheme in exegetical treatment in the pertinent pericopes in James.

The book's importance and its strength lies in clearly establishing the pervasiveness of what is termed "personal speech-ethics" in the epistle of James and in other literatures. Through rather thorough exegetical analysis B. makes a strong case for the theme, as he defines it, as a significant rhetorical thread that can go a long way toward explaining the epistle. Yet in limiting the scope of the analysis to the formal and substantive significations of the theme in James, and in relegating all other material to the status of "background," B. created a circular argument and a theoretically flat analysis that ultimately renders his book much less the breakthrough it seemed to promise. Since the Epistle of James has never afforded the interpreter a clear window onto the social dynamics behind it, and since B. bases his analysis of the theme only upon James as text-base, the reader will doubtless be left wondering what the issues behind the issue of "personal speech-ethics" really are. Given the circular structure and curious presuppositions of the book, it is not clear how such issues could be determined.

This thesis turned book, although in general clearly written, is spotted with misspellings and infelicitous expressions; it required much more extensive and careful editing. Yet it deserves a wide and critical readership because it is a provocative treatment of an elusive and fascinating New Testament document and topic.

Union Theological Seminary, N.Y. VINCENT L. WIMBUSCH


Does one do full justice to Basil of Caesarea (330–379), when one identifies him exclusively as an opponent of heresy and promoter of monastic life? According to Rousseau there has been an overemphasis on these two facets in many studies devoted to Basil. He thinks one should also pay close attention to Basil’s position as the bishop of a provincial metropolis, to the wealth and status of his family, and the profound learning and verbal eloquence fostered by his own classical education. In spite of its title, R.’s book is not a full-scale biography. Its scope is more limited, aimed at answering the following questions: why and how Basil became bishop, how he defined his task, and how
successful he was in the performance of his duties. R.'s ultimate goal is to ascertain whether or not Basil can be considered the ideal "type" of a fourth-century prelate.

R. takes stock of all Basil's writings, as well as of the testimonies of his relatives and friends. His reading of the sources is perceptive, refreshing, and incisive, albeit sometimes not sufficiently attentive to the variety of literary genres involved. In searching for the answer to his questions R. discovers that Basil was a fragile man, fallible in his judgments about people, and even beset by doubt. Basil's willingness to shift in his opinions and his dependence on a small group of friends caused him not only to demand loyalty, but also to give it and to make as the central feature of his church the sharing of values based on a common tradition. This linkage to an idealized past, as exemplified notably by the first community of Jerusalem, made Basil an ardent advocate of ascetic values which he tried to foster and even impose, not only on his ascetic foundations but also on every local ecclesiastical community. As R. correctly points out, Basil's ascetic teaching and practical advice, influenced by monastic experiments of the time, particularly those of Eustathios of Sebaste, were designed for the benefit of all interested in bettering themselves, not just for a segregated elite.

In this portrayal Basil loses nothing of his traditional stature or significance as a staunch defender of orthodoxy and propagator of ascetic ideals. On the other hand he seems to appear at once more vulnerable and more human, isolated but not defeated in his search for a unified church and society. Basil well understood the need for opening up the paths of dialogue and cooperation with bishops and leaders from other regions. Already as a presbyter he played an important role in soliciting the assistance of other colleagues in his struggle against the Arianizing Emperor Valens. The people whom he contacted would appear to be, by later standards, politicians as opposed to ecclesiastics; however, as R. correctly stresses, the distinction between church and society in Basil's time was fluid and often the duties of civil and church servants overlapped. In this conjunction one should note a point missed by R., that in Basil's appeals to the West he was not merely seeking the help of Western prelates, but through them his ultimate goal was to drum up the support of the true head of the church, the orthodox Emperor Valentinian I, who unlike his brother and Eastern counterpart, Emperor Valens, was well disposed toward the supporters of the Council of Nicaea I.

Failures and successes in friendship, particularly failures, dogged Basil throughout his career, but foremost during his episcopal tenure. In 371/372, in order to protect the territorial integrity of his province, Cappadocia, he rather tyrannically imposed the episcopal orders on the two Gregorys against their wills—that of Nazianzos, he appointed to Sasima, and to his brother he gave the town of Nyssa. Gregory of Nazianzos not only resented his forced ordination, but he could never forget the way he was treated, and it was not until after Basil's death...
that he got over his sense of betrayal. Neither was Basil on speaking terms with his brother Gregory for most of the remaining years of his life. Other botched friendships, notably the one with Eustathios of Sebaste, seem to show in Basil a lack of understanding of human nature. However, R. argues for the opposite, that Basil's understanding of human nature emerges as his major legacy. His argument is well taken if one considers another aspect which his study brilliantly reveals: the lack of criteria at the time for judging acceptability not only in matters of dogma but also praxis. Hence Basil is not a typical bishop, if by "typical" one means bound by statutory regulations; he is rather an improviser and a charismatic, and thus perhaps typical in another sense: that the decisive element in any controversial situation is not a human rule but the "canon" or "charisma" of love.

The late Roman world in which Basil struggled to develop his understanding of a religion at home both in church and society, and a community loyal to its past without neglecting its present, appear in R.'s study on the one hand equally uncertain, yet endowed on the other with cultural resources and adaptable social forms that would safeguard proportion, humanity, confidence, and affection in its future growth.

This highly readable, well-documented, and superbly produced book is highly recommended for all those seeking creative alternatives and more contextualized interpretations of the crucial issues facing the Roman world and Christians in the fourth century and beyond.

University of St. Michael's College, Toronto  Paul J. Fedwick


In recent decades a vast amount of scholarly effort has been expended on the writings of John Chrysostom. Catalogues of manuscripts containing his works, genuine and spurious, have appeared. Critical editions and translations of his writings have been published, and various aspects of his thought have been investigated. Furthermore, our knowledge of the Syrian religious background which so strongly influenced him as a young man has been greatly expanded. Kelly's book, however, claims to be the first comprehensive study of Chrysostom since the two-volume German biography by C. Baur in 1929–30. The claim seems justified.

K. follows a traditional biographical format, recounting what happened to the saint from his birth and earliest years until his death in exile in 407. At the same time, though, especially in the earlier chapters, K. analyzes John's treatises and homilies and discusses his views on topics such as monasticism, marriage, and education. After a brief, perhaps too brief, account of John's youth and education, K. rightly devotes a fair amount of attention to the six years or so during which John led a rigorous monastic and solitary life in the Syrian wilderness,
practicing an extreme asceticism which, while it may have been beneficial for his soul, had devastating effects on his bodily health. John's strange refusal of ordination is considered in some detail, as in his work as a deacon and, eventually, a priest in Antioch.

The remainder of the book is concerned with his service as bishop in Constantinople. This is, of course, a much more fully documented period in John's life, and it was a very busy and turbulent one. The narrative takes us from one crisis to another and nearly overwhelms the reader with a hefty dosage of political heavy-handedness and ecclesiastical chicanery. Chrysostom's relations with the imperial family and state officials were sometimes quite friendly, at other times openly hostile, and always complicated. He also managed to earn the enmity of some of the clergy, especially of influential bishops. K. makes it clear that many of the controversies in which John became entangled were concerned not so much with moral or theological issues as with petty personal affronts and conflicts. He also shows that some of Chrysostom's problems were really of his own making.

K. draws as realistic a picture of John as we are ever likely to have: a powerful and popular preacher, a conscientious administrator, not always noted for good judgment, and an ambitious bishop striving to extend the authority of his see. As many other saints, John found it difficult to make compromises and committed serious political blunders. Finally, his deposition and exile are dealt with sympathetically, but objectively. In short, K. tells the story of a bishop who was indeed a saint, but at the same time somewhat intractable and a bit of a hypochondriac.

All this, and much more, is well told, well documented, and neatly presented. Nonetheless, the reader might expect a little more attention to have been given to John's homilies which, after all, earned him the title "Golden Mouth." A serious omission, it seems to me, is the silence about his liturgical activities, especially concerning the eucharistic liturgy which still bears his name. There is, for example, no reference to the writings of Robert Taft on the subject. In fact, there is no bibliography as such. Admittedly, compiling a complete bibliography on Chrysostom would be an immense task, but a selected listing or suggestions for further reading would have been helpful. Still, looking at what K. has produced, it is clear that the educated reader and the scholar will find this story informative and interesting, and any serious student of Chrysostom will have to begin with this book.

Catholic University of America, D.C. George T. Dennis, S.J.


In contrast with the usual evaluations of Celtic penance, Connolly puts forward a theological study of the Irish penitentials that is almost
totally positive. He claims a basic continuity between Celtic penance and the present reformed *Rite of Penance* and highlights the penitentials' significance for contemporary practice.

C. is at his best in a textual analysis of the eight key sinful diseases, showing their symptoms and the remedies proposed in the penitentials. His purpose is to reconstruct the Irish monks' understanding of Christian life as movement from vice to virtue, and to show how the remedies they proposed, primarily fasting, served to heal the disease of sin. From this analysis he isolates three symbols or paradigms for understanding sin and conversion—judgment, disease and healing, pilgrimage—which he presents with their strengths and weaknesses and their relation to the present *Rite of Penance*. He then offers pastoral proposals regarding pedagogy, ministry, penitential activity, and liturgical life, using the wisdom of the Celtic monks to respond to current pastoral challenges.

However, the pastoral proposals have only a loose connection with Irish penance. In fact, the sacramental problems mentioned among the pastoral challenges are more directly related to characteristic features of Irish penance. There is a general tendency to overlook differences in cultural situations and to highlight correspondences on the basis of similar terms.

C. generally fails to note negative features of the penitentials or to analyze the Irish system critically in relation to what preceded and followed. His comparison with the canonical system (18–20), for example, is procedural rather than theological. He does not mention continental bishops' antagonism toward Celtic penance and penitentials or condemnations by Carolingian reform councils.

Although C. sometimes notes significant issues or controverted matters in the interpretation of the penitentials and Celtic penance, he rarely gives references to scholarly debates (though some of these works are in his bibliography) or indicates their significance. Though he admits there were few priests in Irish monasteries (10), he assumes throughout that all confessors were priests. While admitting we have almost no information on actual reconciliation and that scholars (uncited) debate whether there was an absolution, he assumes that there was one and that it functioned and was understood, as in later centuries, as the means of purification and liberation through a judicial act (145 ff.). I not only question C.'s application of the penitentials' *iudicium sacerdotis* to absolution but also note his erroneous use of *Paenitentiale Vinniani* in support of such an absolution. He correctly cites "we say sins can be absolved in secret" (146), but he omits the remainder of Finnian's sentence, "per penitentiam et per studium diligentius cordis et corporis," which states that cleansing comes through penitential activity.

C. brings out positive features of Celtic penitential practice, and his study should be useful for a reconstruction of the underlying moral theory. However, his treatment of the penitentials in relation to the present *Rite of Penance* makes too much of verbal similarities and does
too little in-depth analysis of structure, function, and meaning. Overall, the study is insufficiently critical for a theological assessment of the penitentials in relation to moral theology or the sacrament of penance.

_Gonzaga University, Spokane_  

_JAMES DALLEN_


Constable here looks at prominent themes in medieval society and religion over a thousand-year period, concentrating on the eleventh and twelfth centuries. The three studies, on the interpretation of Mary and Martha, the ideal of the imitation of Christ, and the orders of society, are bibliographically and topically independent, but each contributes to a rich developmental picture of medieval society and spirituality. They represent material collected by C. over 30 years and include a long evolution of his thought on the topics. Black-and-white reproductions enrich the reader's awareness of medieval Western society's multiple visual communications.

Constable, professor at the Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton, is the right author for these detailed and nuanced discussion. His long and careful examination of medieval thought has substantially enriched present knowledge of medieval society and religion. His timeline organization of his material permits analysis of changes, for example, in ideas of how Christ should be imitated, or the relative value of Mary's and Martha's activity. C. characteristically begins with Scripture, sketches patristic treatments of his topic, and goes forward to discuss eleventh-and-twelfth-century authors, sometimes in more detail than the reader really wants. Nevertheless, his historical evidence cumulatively dismantles non-medievalists' tendency to flattened and monolithic versions of medieval theology. One is less likely to learn from these studies about the social, institutional, and religious factors that prompted changes in ideas and values, though these can occasionally be glimpsed, as, for example, in rival monasteries' differing interpretations of Mary's and Martha's choices (84).

Occasionally C. appears to take medieval sources uncritically, as when he refers to "the heretic Marguerite Porete" (108). But his care in remaining close to his sources also leads to his helpful caution against reading later attitudes into earlier texts (173).

The treatment of various interpretations of the imitation of Christ, the centerpiece of the book, is perhaps the most interesting. C. discusses a shift in the eleventh and twelfth centuries "from concentrating on Christ's divinity to following his humanity" (169). With imitation of the human Christ came new interests and practices such as the stigmata—300 known cases since the twelfth century (201)—as well as a range of other bodily mortifications.

The orders of society, the topic of the third study, were the subject of
frequent medieval interest, testifying to "a profound need to understand and to impose order on society" (251). Although many different proposals are extant, C. discusses divisions that were "for the most part based on recognizable and often visible criteria, not on inner qualities which formed the basis of other great divisions among mankind" (256). The book concludes with a description of the fluctuating definitions and values attached to medieval *mediocres*, not a class but a collection of medieval classes.

In sum, these studies will be useful to students interested in these topics as well as to medievalists. Although the book resembles in quantity a data-base search, it provides a delicately nuanced range of evidence and interpretation that no computer search could duplicate.

Harvard University Divinity School

Margaret R. Miles


Though her title might suggest that this is primarily a study of eschatology, Bynum makes it clear that her primary concern is with the understanding of the body in Western Christianity as this is reflected in some traditional ways of dealing with the metaphor of resurrection and a wide range of related practices of Christian piety.

If the Christian understanding of resurrection involves some sense of personal continuity beyond death, then the question must arise: How can we be and remain ourselves even beyond death? For the human self to survive, the body must survive. For the body to survive, there must be some form of continuity. Resurrection speculation, therefore, provides many clues about the Christian attempts to come to a more adequate understanding of the body. Thus, for Christian theologians during the periods B. covers, the notion of resurrection led to remarkable speculations about the nature of the human self and the body, and hence about the nature of materiality, in the effort to give some account of a form of structural continuity.

B.'s presentation takes us back to the age of the martyrs, then to Tertullian, Irenaeus, and Origen, and leads us through a plethora of Christian authors, including the Cappadocians in the East and Augustine in the West, and eventually to the high Middle Ages with Bonaventure, Aquinas, and Dante. Against the background of social history and popular Christian piety, she skillfully traces the images and speculations of Christian contemplatives and theologians over the centuries.

Readers may be surprised at extensive discussion of issues such as digestion, growth and change, and putrefaction, finding them bizarre and grotesque at times. It is important to keep in mind, however, that such issues reveal attitudes and insights as to the nature of the body, and hence of materiality. Metaphors other than resurrection and practices of Christian piety such as the veneration of relics, strange burial
practices, and various forms of asceticism reveal attitudes concerning
the body and are, therefore, fair game for B.'s argument.

Though far from alone in the patristic period, Augustine's City of
God stands out as a work of massive influence in Western thought.
Augustine treats a wide array of questions, some of which are serious,
and some of which simply reflect what he considers implausible views
of pagans and immature Christians: What happens to nail clippings
and hair that has been cut? What happens to sexual differentiation?
What happens to wounds and deficiencies in this life? What sort of
model works best in dealing with the sense of personal continuity
beyond death? One of stability and therefore of material identity? Or
one of organic growth which envisions a more "spiritualized" under­
standing?

For many readers, the most familiar terrain will be the section deal­
ing with the representatives of high Scholasticism such as Aquinas
and Bonaventure. In the context of the university theology of this
period, the discussion becomes more sophisticated from a philosophical
perspective, but the problem of materiality remains. It is now discussed
in terms of the Aristotelian theory of hylomorphism and the more
subtle understanding of materiality involved in this theory. But even
here, many of the questions raised by Augustine surface again.

In B.'s view, it is the puzzle placed before the Christian intellect by
the idea of bodily resurrection that has shaped our understanding of
personhood and survival in the Western world down to the present
time. She rejects the fairly widespread view that Greek dualism has
effectively won out in Western Christianity and argues instead that
the conviction that the self is by definition embodied or that it is best
understood as a psychosomatic unity may be seen as the underlying
issue over the centuries she covers. This, in turn, may be seen as the
anticipation of the common contemporary view of the self so different
from the Cartesian concept of the res cogitans and its relation to the
res extensa (341).

B. presents some 1100 years of the history of an important issue in
rare and remarkable detail. One might be tempted to see much of the
discussion in earlier periods of Christian history as an instance of
people pushing metaphors too far. Or as the unfolding of a religious
tradition which, in its initial creative moments, perceived religious
significance in material creation, including material existence in its
human form.

One might ponder the relevance of B.'s history for our current ques­
tions about eschatology and contemporary physics. What is the nature
of the body and of materiality? What might the final relation be between
matter and spirit? Is it possible to conceptualize this in any way that
is intelligible and not grossly naive? Christian theology has never been
able to provide fully coherent, consistent answers to such questions.
Christian consciousness has been pulled back and forth between a crude
materialism and an extreme spiritualization, sometimes even in the
same author. Yet it is the very nature of the Christian vision of human and cosmic destiny that raised such questions for Christians in the past and raises them for us today, when we ask about the meaning of Christian faith not only in terms of an existential theology but also in terms of contemporary physics and cosmology.

In the closing paragraph to what must be described as an impressive historical account, B. refers to the idea of bodily resurrection as a concept of "sublime courage and optimism" (343). If nothing else, the Christian conviction about human destiny will keep Christians alert to the religious meaning of material reality and make them willing to speculate about the structure and destiny of material reality. The answers, past and present, may seem strange and puzzling; but surely, as B. argues, the question is right.

Catholic Theological Union, Chicago  
ZACHARY HAYES, O.F.M.


While the term "Rome" figures prominently in its title, this book deals not just with the city but with the development of the idea of the (Holy) (Roman) (Catholic) Church after the Council of Trent. It is thus a theo-cultural analysis of the ways in which that Church decided to reshape its message-sending apparatus for the sake of controlling both its doctrinal content and the reception of that doctrine.

Specifically, McGinness declares that his "study seeks to chart the changes in sacred oratory to trace the way Rome began to think about itself from the period at the end of the Council of Trent (1563) to the end of the reign of Paul V (1621)" (5). By the end of that period, he argues, the city of Rome had become the religion's world center, and non-Reformed Christians viewed themselves as "Catholic" members of a true and "holy" body with a stabilized body of belief based on "right thinking" (recte sentire).

M. argues that two major developments made this possible. One was stabilization of doctrine, especially the publication in 1566 of the *Catechismus ad parochos*, or *Roman Catechism*, conceived by order of Pius V as a compendium of Tridentine theology. Immediately it became not only a valuable touchstone for the definition of orthodoxy, but, and perhaps even more importantly, the sure doctrinal tool for preachers. Epideictic preaching could then be based on a confident Christology, the preacher freed from intellectual uncertainties. "The frequency with which the *Catechism*’s phrases, dogmatic formulae, and ideas are repeated in the sermons is remarkable" (101).

The second development, which occupies most of the book, is the result of preachers returning to classical rhetoric. This movement was of course part of the general humanist trend well before Trent, but M. declares that the conscious blending of an active Christianity with
ancient rhetorical ideals, especially those of Cicero, looked toward a new *respublica christiana*. He sees "a revolution in Christian preaching" in the period 1570–1610, inspired by the council's decrees. Of special interest, he notes, was the decree of January 13, 1547, on justification, because it confirmed the necessity of human cooperation with grace—precisely the area of human action that the preacher could address. M. considers it as "a neat framework for presenting Catholic doctrine and morality, thereby channeling the matter of a sermon away from anything redolent of Lutheranism" (32).

Catholic preachers therefore could concentrate on using a sophisticated rhetoric in the presentation of this now-stabilized message. Modern rhetorical theorists have identified what they call the "persuasive campaign," defined as a systematic rhetorical appeal, consistent over time, delivered by numerous allied communicators toward the goal of achieving acceptance of a single major idea. A modern political campaign is of this kind. M. observes hundreds of preachers consistently following several basic principles in such a campaign: follow the *Catechism*; praise the papacy (if not always the individual pope); urge imitation of the good (the virtue, or the good person, or the "people of Rome"); abstain from blaming each other; praise hierarchy in the universe; concentrate on the positive message (and avoid debates with the Reformers or their ideas); promote the concept of the Holy City (*ciuitas sancta*); look to models from the patristic age.

This effective campaign was carried on by rhetorically adept speakers. Their training was taken seriously: "The pursuit of rhetoric was a serious matter at Rome. In this era the city became a virtual workshop of sacred oratory" (5). M. details the contributions of such institutions as the Jesuit Collegio Romano, and of individuals like Marc Antoine Muret and Pedro Juan Perpina. He notes that a spate of new rhetorical texts in the 1570s displaced almost overnight the medieval *artes praedicandi* which had been the mainstay of preaching theory since the early-13th century, "reflecting the shift from the more thematic (scholastic) style of preaching to one based on the classical tradition represented by Aristotle, Cicero, and Quintilian, among others" (50).

It is fair to observe, though, that M. is not concerned primarily with the details of rhetoric. He is more concerned with its tradition and its general influence. It is both a virtue and a vice of this book, e.g., that the specific treatments of rhetorical applications are focussed on this or that preacher rather than being collected or analyzed systematically. This practive enlivens the discussion of, say, Famiano Strada, but may leave the reader with a feeling of fragmentation. At the same time some key issues, e.g. the uses of *exempla* (99–101), are discussed only in general with little reference to specific preachers or sermons. And the important question of whether preaching belongs in one of the three classical rhetorical genera (judicial, demonstrative, deliberative) is discussed briefly (57–59) and inconclusively. Given his interest in
the campaign as a whole, though, it is probably not surprising that M. looks to the teleologies rather than the tecliné.

All in all, this is a valuable book. Its prolific notes (123 pages for 192 pages of text) offer a rich texture of detail. Its seven chapters approach roughly the same subject matter from different angles, so that some readers may wish for a more chronological or more analytic approach, but given the complexity of the subject the method works well.

University of California, Davis

JAMES J. MURPHY


In this fascinating study written by an Israeli scholar of the background to Galileo's trial and condemnation by the Church, the main actors are the Dominicans and the Jesuits involved with the famous scientist. Feldhay rejects common portrayals of the "Galileo affair" as a conflict of religion vs. science; she sees it instead as a critical dialogue shaped by institutional factors within the two orders and the emerging status of mathematical physics as a nuova scienza in the early 17th century.

The two moments of her analysis are the "trials" in 1616 and 1633. The first features Cardinal Bellarmine and the injunction served on Galileo in April 1616; it concentrates on six documents that F. considers marred by inconsistency if not contradiction. The second portrays the use of the documents in Galileo's condemnation by the Roman Inquisition in June 1633. The main background to both trials is provided by the doctrinal pronouncements of the Council of Trent and what F. calls "the cultural field" of the Counter Reformation. In this the Dominicans are "the traditional intellectual elite" of the Catholic Church and the Jesuits are "an alternative intellectual elite," each struggling to attain theological hegemony. The issues are orthodoxy in the matter of De auxiliis and varying degrees of commitment to Thomism, with the Dominicans focused on contemplation and speculative truth, the Jesuits on the active life and the complex needs of their growing involvement in education. Echoing the theme of Giorgio de Santillana's Crime of Galileo (1955), F. portrays Galileo as an almost accidental casualty of the resulting engagement.

F.'s textual scholarship is careful, her distinctions are finely drawn, and her case is complex; on all three counts it resists facile summary. Since one of the cornerstones of her argument is my research into Galileo's appropriation of Jesuit teachings in his early notes on logic, the heavens, and the elements, I shall restrict my comments to that theme. The key point is the status of astronomy and mechanics within the Aristotelian tradition as "middle sciences" (scientiae mediae), but as sciences nonetheless, and so as capable of yielding cognitio certa
Related to this is Bellarmine's use of the expression *ex suppositione* to characterize Copernicus's demonstrations of the earth's motion in his letter of 12 April 1615 to Paolo Foscarini and, indirectly, to Galileo. That expression, as I have shown, can have two meanings: it can mean hypothetical in the sense of reasoning that is merely probable, and so not strictly "scientific," which was Bellarmine's sense; it can also refer to suppositions that ground physico-mathematical demonstrations such as are found in geometrical optics, Archimedean statics, and the medieval science of weights, all regarded as sciences at that time. Ptolemaic astronomy, by way of contrast, was more questionable because of its use of hypothetical entities such as eccentrics and epicycles, and it is this circumstance that gave rise to much confusion.

In 1616 Bellarmine made the point that the earth's motion was a supposition that was as yet unproved, but he clearly left open the possibility that one day it might be proved, and in that event, he said, the Scriptures would have to be explained otherwise. By 1633, however, this estimate of the supposition had changed radically within the Church; it had gone from being unproven as yet to being forever unprovable (210). F. associates this change with a tendency to epistemological skepticism among Dominican Thomists following the controversy *De auxiliis* with the Jesuits (202). Her main evidence for this view, unfortunately, are statements of Pope Urban VIII and his theologian, Agostino Aregggi, neither of whom were Dominicans or Thomists. F. also has a tendency to conflate the expression *scientia media* as I have been using it with the *scientia media* of Luis de Molina, and that, of course, further complicates her argument.

The Jesuit program of education enters at this point. In his proposed draft of the *Ratio studiorum* of 1586 Clavius endorsed a privileged place for mathematics in that program; if implemented, it would have moved astronomy in the direction of being a real science. But Clavius and his disciples encountered opposition from conservative philosophers and theologians within the Society, with the result that the definitive version of the *Ratio studiorum*, approved finally in 1599, cut back heavily on Clavius's requests. F. sees this as the "lost moment" of the Jesuit educational program (223). Moreover, following the *De auxiliis* controversy Jesuit theologians felt the need for further legitimation as Thomists and put more restrictions on the mathematicians within the Society. It was under such institutional constraints that a few disciples of Clavius entered into critical dialogue with an uncooperative Galileo that ultimately defined a "cultural field" in which his *nuova scienza* would come to exist (252–53).

This illustration of one strain in F.'s thought fails to do justice to the richness of her thesis, but I hope it encourages readers to consider further what she has to offer. Hers is probably the most original study of the "Galileo affair" in recent decades, and from a quite unexpected
source. Present-day Jesuits and Dominicans will find much to quibble about here, but they also can learn much from F.’s researches.

**Catholic University of America, D.C. WILLIAM A. WALLACE, O.P.**


The misleading alliterative title notwithstanding, Marshall deals mainly with the relation of Locke’s religious beliefs to his ethical and political thought. This is the latest and best of a dozen or so books published in the last 15 years, as what John Pocock has called “the Locke industry” continues to broaden our knowledge of this complex, fascinating, and enormously influential thinker. Using manuscripts from the Locke Room of the Bodleian Library at Oxford, the British Museum Library, and the Public Records Office, M. completes the demolition of the reigning orthodoxies of right and left that dominated Locke scholarship from the 1950s to the 1970s. Neither the claim by Leo Strauss and his followers that Locke was a Hobbesian hedonist in disguise, nor that of C. B. Macpherson that he was an apologist for unfettered capitalism had gone unchallenged earlier (e.g., by W. von Leyder, John Dunn, and James Tully), but they can no longer stand up against the weight of evidence M. adduces.

M. carefully traces the continuities and changes in Locke’s thought as it developed from his early years as an Oxford don teaching Greek, rhetoric, and moral philosophy in the 1660s, through his work as advisor to a leader of the Whig opposition to the restored Stuart monarchy, his exile in Holland, his return after the 1688 Glorious Revolution, and his later years as a well-known philosopher with an increasing interest in religious themes. The changes in this thinking from his early acceptance of royal control over “things indifferent” in religion to endorsement of toleration, first because of his view of the appropriate sphere of government, and then in his famous Letter on Toleration because of his belief that the gospel requires it, are carefully and subtly analyzed. M. denies any conflict between Locke’s scientific empiricism and his belief in the possibility of arriving at moral and religious truth, and he argues that Locke never abandoned his belief in natural law but became increasingly skeptical about the ability of most human beings to arrive at it. Thus the moral truths that form the foundation of his political theory can be arrived at by reason, but for most people, as he argued in the Reasonableness of Christianity, they are founded in the teachings of Christ. M. also makes a persuasive case that the Second Treatise of Civil Government was written at the beginning of 1682 as a justification for an armed revolution against Charles II and the likelihood of a Catholic succession. (Locke was fiercely anti-Catholic, wrote an article against papal infallibility, and denied toleration to Catholics as agents of a foreign power.)
For theologians, the most interesting parts of the book are those that examine Locke’s beliefs on original sin, the atonement, and the divinity of Christ. Locke always claimed to be a member of the Church of England. He believed that the Scriptures were divinely inspired, wrote a commentary on the Pauline epistles, and received the sacrament at his residence when he could no longer attend church services. Yet as early as 1680 he wrote in his journal that a just God could not condemn men for sins they had not committed, and he repeatedly questioned the doctrine of original sin. Locke believed that Christ died not to atone for Adam’s sin, but to show us the way to eternal life. In turn, this undermined one of the arguments for the divinity of Christ, that an infinite satisfaction was required to atone for an offense to an infinite being. Locke never explicitly denied Christ’s divinity, but M. assembles evidence, such as Locke’s commentaries on the opening of the Gospel of John, which seem to amount to such a denial. Locke insisted he was not a “Socinian,” i.e. Unitarian, but associated with Unitarians and read many Socinian books. He was sympathetic with the latitudinarian wing of Anglicanism but, according to M., parted company with them on the question of the Trinity.

Those who consider Locke the progenitor of modern secularism may be surprised to read his description of theology, written only a few years before his death. It is a “science . . . incomparably above the rest . . . containing the knowledge of God and his creatures, our duty to him and our fellow creatures, and a view of our present and future state” (quoted by M., 444–45), and it is “that noble study which is every man’s duty, and [which] every one that can be called a rational creature is capable of” (Locke, Works, 12th ed. [1824] 2.360). Anyone interested in the relation of theology to the founding father of American liberalism will find this volume essential reading.

Princeton University

R. Sigmund


From the turbulent days of Luther until unification, the conflict between Protestants and Catholics was one of the fundamental, vital facts of German life. Smith skillfully explores the deeper implications of the mutual intolerance between these confessional groups. For the first time he brings together the themes of religion and nationalism in a fresh approach to the search for a national identity in the Second Reich. Confining himself to the years 1870–1914, he investigates the reasons for the revival of the Protestant–Catholic struggle and elucidates the impact of that conflict on the wider problem of nation building and nationalism. He concludes that German nationalism did not decrease the confessional conflict, but rather provided both religious groups with new ways to proclaim their differences.
S. begins with the Kulturkampf. Instead of viewing this as a church-state struggle, however, he considers it an attempt to create, by force if necessary, a cultural unity across confessional lines. But the attempt failed. Rather than assimilating the Catholic population, the repressive measures intensified the cultural rift which already existed between Protestants and Catholics; it created not one nation, but two.

The end of the official Kulturkampf did not result in a new age of peace and harmony. On the contrary, after 1887, the confessional controversy was marked less by the idea of two separate nations, than by the dilemmas resulting from the integration of two groups that competed about what it meant to be German. For the first time, S. traces the history of the Protestant League and its conflict with the Catholic Center party over the issue of German nationalism. The League maintained that Germany owed its ascendancy to Protestantism and that the cancerous growth of Ultramontanism threatened Germany; it desired to break the power of Rome on German soil. Catholic intellectuals, on the other hand, envisioned a different Germany—one rooted in past traditions, not future destinies. S. illustrates the predicament Catholics experienced in their efforts to integrate into a national culture fundamentally defined by Protestantism. However, as the Center party increased its influence in the parliament, the League moved away from propaganda to politics. By 1900 the League shifted from Scripture to culture, from state to nation—even to race.

In a convincing chapter on politics and religion, S. inquires into the relationship between religious and national identity and its impact on the people. With the aid of social science concepts, he demonstrates that the confessional conflict occurred in the midst of profound historical changes. The process of modernization and urbanization drove Protestants and Catholics closer together, but the two confessions still lived in different worlds, separated by an invisible boundary of culture.

S. maintains that this invisible boundary was further defined by what Protestants and Catholics read. S. concludes that the reading habits of Protestants were highly influenced by confessional concerns. However, his survey of Catholic literature lacks a similar evaluation. This suggests that further research into this question would be important for understanding the Catholic vision of the empire.

A final chapter investigates the impact of the Los von Rom movement, which began in Austria but was taken up by Protestant League and other German nationalists. The aim of the League was to make Austrian Catholics acceptable as equals in the national community. The fate of the Los von Rom movement was sealed in 1907, when political Catholicism emerged as the most powerful force in Austro-German politics, and the Pan-Germans who had supported the movement were reduced to political marginality.

S. writes with vigor and spark. His explanation of the relation between nationalism and culture is both exciting and innovative. For historians and social scientists interested in the impact of religion on
the formation of a national identity among the European nations, this work is a pioneering contribution and should serve to encourage further study.

Loyola Marymount University, L.A. RICHARD W. ROLFS, S.J.


During the long and painful debate that preceded the Vatican Council II's Declaration on Religious Freedom, Murray strongly opposed "French" attempts to ground the affirmation of civil religious freedom immediately in faith, Scriptures, conscience, or in an abstract obligation to seek the truth. The first two he considered an act of ecclesial hubris that was not honest to the historical record; the second two he judged to be far too individualist. Neither admitted the force of new, fuller moral insights that arose outside the Church and to which the Church must pay attention.

Gonnet adds new sources, detail, and theological reflection to our understanding of this argument between the defenders of the Declaration. He begins by bringing together familiar and new materials from the principal actors in the debate: Murray, Bishop Emile De Smedt, Guy de Broglie, Yves Congar, and consultations of the conciliar Acta. In this fuller adjudication of a debate that was previously sketched by Richard Regan, G. brings a solid appreciation of the distinctly theological aspects of Murray's claims, aspects that at the time Murray was only beginning to clarify—a lack of clarity that allowed the French school to write off his core insights as passing, temporal accidents that were "too American" and "superficial."

G. then goes on to develop the theology of the Declaration beyond the uneasy accommodation of the final document. He claims that progress in our theological understanding will most fruitfully occur if the full Church appropriates Murray's perspectives on the historical emergence of the contemporary correlation between human dignity and the limited state. Both notions are necessary to get beyond the abstraction and inherent individualism of the French argument for freedom. G. begins his argument from the exigency to seek the truth understood as a habitual openness to the preconceptual, nonpropositional self-presence of the human person. As a primary experience of truth, habitual openness is the duty toward truth that is antithetical to any state's claim to represent truth fully and to any religious claim that would use divine truth to justify state repression of full religious expression.

Clearly, G. argues, the Church and the Declaration oppose purely individualistic theories of human rights. Yet the only way to get at the social aspects of the Declaration's claims is by fully appropriating Murray's recognition of the ongoing historical conversation within which the Declaration emerged. With this recognition of the intrinsi-
cally historical nature of our claims, the Catholic tradition can coherently argue that rights and freedoms of expression exist for the common, not simply individual, good. With that recognition, the exigency to search for the truth is conceived as inherently social. Consistent with the late Murray, G. recommends deeper exploration of two distinct sets of Catholic doctrinal development: first, religious freedom and Christian freedom; second, Chalcedonian Christology and Gelasian social dualism. In the analogous dynamics of each of these pairs, the constructive, social dimensions of freedom can be explored.

An English translation would do well to include the appendices (except for four texts available in English), tables, bibliography and indices. G.'s substantive contribution to our understanding of religious freedom deserves both European and American attention.

Marquette University, Milwaukee

THOMAS HUGHSON, S.J.


A minor masterpiece of the theological journalist's art. Delivered to its American publisher in November 1994, a scant month before Hebblethwaite's sudden death at age 64, this modest volume should serve as the legacy of an outstanding Vaticanologist who in some 30 years of reporting on the papacy and the world-wide activities of the Catholic Church, its enemies and admirers, managed to depict the last three pontiffs—John XXIII, Paul VI and John Paul II—in a realistic fashion not unworthy of a truly great biographer.

H. traces the origin of the cardinalate to the twelfth century and thus the gradual growth of the conclave or elective process whereby the princes of the Church selected the new Bishop of Rome amid the political intrigue and ecclesial rivalries that characterized the papacy of the Middle Ages and the Renaissance.

After supplying a vivid description of the actual balloting process in the Sistine chapel, H. depicts the history of the conclaves from the Napoleonic usurpation in the early-19th century, down to the election of John Paul II, the first non-Italian pontiff in 455 years; he then concentrates on the elements that should enter into the election of the 265th successor of Peter.

Describing the Polish pontiff's enmeshment in the world's political order as well as his ecclesial domination, H. sees the pope's Slavic background and his concept of his destiny as an instrument of divine providence, as the driving force behind his determination to restore the Church to its preconciliar certainties and political solidarity. By supplying the Church with a series of monolithic encyclicals setting out its obligations in the doctrinal, social, and moral order, and by installing safe, conservative bishops in major sees round the world,
John Paul means to leave a legacy of absolutes tempered by his devotion to the Mother of God and his mystical consciousness of his own need to suffer.

H. downgrades the Polish pontiff’s reputation as a philosopher and theologian, insisting that in his doctrinal and moral disquisitions he furnishes but one side of an argument, relying on his monarchical authority in demanding conformance to papal demands. He deplores the favoritism shown by the pope to Opus Dei in contrast to his shabby treatment of the Jesuits, Dominicans, and Franciscans. And he suspects that for all his assurances of devotion to his predecessor, Paul VI, John Paul actually feels the Montini pontiff was vacillating and almost cowardly in his failure to control the rebellion in the postconciliar Church.

Merely mentioning John Paul’s apocalyptic preoccupation with preparing the Church and the world for the year 2000, H. concentrates on possible successors. In his prognosis for a future conclave, he lists only two Italian cardinals as papabili, the Jesuit Carlo Maria Martini of Milan and Achille Silvestrini, whom he felt were not compromised by relationships with the nation’s political and industrial leadership. He cites Cardinal Roger Etchegaray as the only possible French candidate, and downgrades both the Polish-born, Jewish convert, Cardinal Jean Marie Lustiger of Paris, and the Belgian Cardinal Godfried Danneels in favor of the two black curial cardinals, Francis J. Arinze and Bernadin Gantin. With a slight bow to the Brazilian former curial cardinal Lucas Moreira Neves, he mentions the American cardinal of Los Angeles, a linguist and social activist, Roger Mahony, who, he maintains, arrived in that Californian see with two fevers—scarlet, for the red biretta; and white, for the papacy.

In a final observation, H. insists that after a pope’s death the period of preparation for a conclave is an interval for reevaluating the Church’s spiritual and political approach to the contemporary world. Meanwhile, Vatican opponents of John Paul’s policies are wondering whether the next pope, presumably a man of their persuasion, will fall back on the precarious axiom “what a pope can do, a pope can undo.”

_St. Mary’s Rectory, Annapolis_  
FRANCIS X. MURPHY, C.SS.R.


In 1965 Schillebeeckx collaborated with Congar, Küng, and Karl Rahner in inaugurating the journal _Concilium_ as a way of continuing the theological dialogue and ecclesial reform that had characterized the Second Vatican Council. S.’s own commitment to that goal is evident in this collection of 13 of his essays, most of which appeared in _Concilium_ between 1964 and 1989.

Arranged chronologically, the volume offers a helpful, if incomplete,
overview of S.'s developing theological project through 1989. Given the scope and length of his works, it is a major service to draw together articles which highlight in a concise way a number of key themes in his writings on Jesus, salvation, and Christian ethics; Church, ministry, and authority; and the nature of the theological task. The centrality of Christology to every aspect of his theological project is evident throughout.

Reading the earlier essays in comparison with the later ones reveals not only continuity in S.'s theological concerns, but also a clear shift in method from his early historical-doctrinal work to his more recent engagement in theology as "hermeneutics which is critical of ideology" (243) involving a "critical confrontation between the present and past" (128). The chapters on the relation between church and world and the magisterium and politics reflect the ecclesial optimism that characterized the Second Vatican Council. S. argues for a "Church of dialog" open to the "foreign prophecy" of the modern world (28–32), describes the Church as sacrament of Christ ("what the Church as such does is done also by the glorified Christ together with the Spirit" [13]), affirms the language of "implicit" or "anonymous" Christianity (12–13), and directs the Church's critical function toward the social and political arena of "the world." The final essays, in contrast, focus on suffering humanity as the starting point for theology, call for a critical analysis of modern culture, accent the "liberating force" of the Christian faith tradition, highlight the cultural limitations of every expression of the gospel and the historical particularity of Jesus of Nazareth, stress the relationship between mysticism and politics, address the "unsound mystification of office" (219), and urge the Christian churches along with the religions of the world to confess that "they have often obscured and even mutilated the face of God's humanity" (245).

Similarly, while the early essays on magisterium and the infallibility of the Church's office include recognition of the limits of both and the hermeneutical and linguistic problems connected with the latter doctrine, the essays from the 1980s on Church, ministry, and "the teaching authority of all" underscore the human, sociological reality of the Church and the consequent danger of ideology being handed on in the name of the authentic Christian tradition.

While the volume provides a helpful survey of central aspects of S.'s thought and reveals some of the development and shifts in his thinking, the essays included are limited to those that appeared in Concilium or a closely related context. An adequate overview of his developing theology on a specific topic will require consulting key essays that appeared in other journals as well as his books, particularly those that have appeared since 1989, notably Church: The Human Story of God, and Theologisch Testament: Notarieel nog niet Verleden.

For those unfamiliar with S.'s thought some introduction and chronological contextualization of individual chapters would have been very helpful. The articles have not been revised, edited, or retranslated, resulting not only in gender-exclusive language throughout most of
the volume, but also in confusion at some points as to the topic under discussion. In spite of these limitations, however, this text offers a valuable collection of a number of S.'s most significant essays and will be an extremely useful teaching and research tool.

University of Notre Dame

MARY CATHERINE HILKERT, O.P.


This massive volume is but the second of a planned trilogy. Preceded by Judaism and soon to be followed by Islam, it is part of a grand project, supported by the Bosch Jubilee Foundation and the Daimler-Benz Fund, for promoting world peace by fostering peace among religions through an interreligious dialogue rooted in investigation of each religion's foundation. Yet even the trilogy will not complete the project, for Kung reserves for a future work a treatment of the Church in non-European areas and a full presentation of his proposals for Christianity's future. Accordingly, apart from a systematically important but brief account of the essence of Christianity, the present volume is largely devoted to an analysis of Christianity's history.

K.'s basic thesis is relatively simple. Freely adapting Thomas Kuhn's conception of paradigm shifts to the exigencies of his historical material, he argues that Christianity's essence, which can never exist in pure form, has been embodied over the course of Christian history in five distinct paradigms, each of which originated in a particular historical-cultural context, and most of which have survived to the present, despite having been superseded in later situations by a new paradigm. Since the specifics of a given paradigm do not pertain to the essence of Christianity, such elements ought not to be sources of division among Christians or of conflict with other monotheistic religions.

As K. understands it, the essence of Christianity lies in its concentration on the person of Jesus Christ, crucified but raised to eternal life with God. Though always in danger of compromising monotheism, obscuring openness to the activity of God's Spirit outside the Church, and degenerating into sterile preoccupation with dogmatic formulas, concrete and practical orientation on Christ constitutes Christianity's specific identity amid the vicissitudes of its history.

The bulk of the book presents the five paradigms which K. detects in the history of Christianity. K. does not seek to be exhaustive, but to locate the emergence of each paradigm, provide information about its major exponents, and diagnose its chief strengths and weaknesses. This approach allows him to range widely and yet be selective in choosing historical topics for examination.

At the origin, closest in time and apparently also in spirit to Jesus, stands the apocalyptic paradigm of early Jewish Christianity, which combined faith in Jesus as the Messiah with continued observance of Mosaic ritual law. Enmeshed in conflict with other tendencies within
Christianity even in the New Testament period, Jewish Christianity survived the destruction of Jerusalem but receded from clear historical view in the centuries which followed. The only paradigm unable to maintain its existence to the present, it nonetheless offers resources for interreligious dialogue with Jews and Muslims because of its uncompromising fidelity to monotheism.

The rival and immediate successor to Jewish Christianity, the ecumenical Hellenistic paradigm of Christian antiquity, also originates in the New Testament period. Inaugurated by Paul, it reaches its theological heights in Origen and continues to exist to this day in the Christian East. Responsible for developing a fixed rule of faith, a New Testament canon, and a monarchical episcopate, it tends to shift emphasis from concrete orientation on Christ to speculative theological questions and is inclined to identify its embodiment of Christianity with the essence of the faith.

Even greater problems in this regard are detected in the third paradigm, that of medieval Roman Catholicism. Developing theologically from Augustine through its peak in Aquinas to contemporary Roman theology, and marked from Leo I through the Gregorian Reform to Vatican I by increasing claims on behalf of the papacy, this form of Christianity has also lasted to the present, though not without compromise of the basic message of the gospel. The fourth paradigm, that of the Reformation, is discussed with particular focus on Luther; while presented in more sympathetic terms as a long-overdue prophetic reform of Western Christianity based on the priority of the Word of God, it is also criticized for tendencies toward fragmentation into a variety of churches and for periodic reliance on civil authorities.

The final paradigm is that of modernity, originating in the 17th century but fully developed only in later political, philosophical, economic and cultural revolutions. Exemplified theologically by Schleiermacher, this paradigm represents a needed rethinking of Christianity in a new age, but is often weakened by excessive stress on reason, uncritical belief in progress and ominous tendencies toward nationalism. The need thus arises for a sixth paradigm, of a contemporary ecumenical nature, which K. finds foreshadowed by Pope John XXIII and Vatican II but thwarted by subsequent reactionary developments within Catholicism. Sketching the outline of that paradigm—likely, one suspects, to hark back to Jewish Christianity with its relatively low Christology and undeveloped ecclesial structures—is a task for a future volume.

Written in an irenic spirit, K.'s book is intended for a wider public, and persevering readers will enhance their knowledge of church history. In view of the wide range of the work, K.'s reliance on secondary literature and on his earlier publications is inevitable. But the thin description of the essence of Christianity, the general aversion to high Christology (even in John) and to trinitarian theology, the reticence in speaking of soteriology, and the frequent glossing over of complex
issues through rhetorical questions and appeal to simplistic alternatives prevent the work from achieving its objective of fostering deeper understanding of the Christian faith. The tone of the book is lowered by its carping at anything associated with Pope John Paul II. That there is more to the essence of Christianity than is claimed here undoubtedly complicates Christian dialogue with Judaism and Islam, but an interreligious consensus in which at least one party is unable to recognize its own faith would be of very limited value.

Catholic University of America, D.C. John P. Galvin


Arnaldez’s credentials as an interpreter of Abrahamic religious themes are excellent, and this book is a fine example of the quality scholarship he has produced over many years. But readers who expect a discussion of Moses, Jesus, and Muhammad as founding, paradigmatic, or mediating figures will immediately suspect the book has been misnamed. “Abrahamic Mystical Spiritualities,” or perhaps “Three Spiritual Paths, One Goal” would have suggested the content more aptly. That said, Arnaldez offers many worthwhile insights into points and themes of mystical convergence. Most importantly, he avoids the temptation to homogenize the three traditions in the vortex of mystical ecstasy. On balance, he treats each as a distinct and distinctive tributary to an ocean of mystery.

Three of the main chapters, roughly half of the book, set out to establish the theological and spiritual foundations by drawing out a series of parallel themes and points of divergence among the three traditions. But Arnaldez early signals his longer-term intentions with a section on “the mystical opening.” His observations on the various themes are often arresting and creative, and always clearly the product of years of deep reflection. His progression from one thematic section to another, however, is sometimes difficult to follow and not always persuasive. Emphasizing experiential categories over doctrinal concepts, Arnaldez’s principle of organization seems to be one of linear or circular association rather than of systematic development, as he moves, e.g., from the God who speaks, to the law, to theologies and religious speculations, to a lengthier section on two types of mystics, to faith and works, and hypocrisy in action. The way Arnaldez views the interrelationships among these sometimes disparate conceptual categories is not always obvious. A clearer statement at the outset of the way he intended to develop his argument, together with a visual structure capable of indicating subordination, would have facilitated the reading. Easily the strongest and best integrated chapters are those on neo-Platonism and love as the languages of mystical experience, both brimming with fascinating
illustrations from major mystics, Muslim figures grabbing the limelight in the chapter on love.

Central to the argument is the contention that the mystics of the three traditions are concrete examples of the ability to appropriate values consistent with those of the other two traditions while remaining true to their own. Mystics are, in effect, living models of the goal, if not the actual practice, of interreligious dialogue. A. implies not some ultimate convergence of doctrines, but a parallel in the ways the mystics have appropriated and lived out the values of their respective traditions. He unfolds the elements of a "Judeo-Islamic-Christian humanism" that demands an interior transformation of doctrine into spiritual experience centered in the heart.

Thanks are due to the translators for making a fine book available to a wider public in a very readable rendering. The material nevertheless remains inherently challenging and difficult, pedagogically suited for advanced and graduate students. Lack of an index will inevitably diminish the volume's utility, but an annotated list of primary authors cited helps to counterbalance that shortcoming. Readers interested in pursuing the topic further will find a very different but complementary approach in Michael Sells' Mystical Languages of Unsaying (Chicago, 1994).

Saint Louis University


Clément, one of the best-known theologians of the Orthodox Church in France, was formed by the theological tradition brought to Paris earlier in this century by Russian exiles. In his many books he has articulated Eastern Christian theology in an unusual and poetic manner, using the lyrical possibilities of the French language to great effect. This book is one of the finest works on spiritual theology written in this century, and is suitable for inquirers, neophytes, and believers of long standing.

Although the prose is beautiful (and here astonishingly well translated into English), there is nothing sentimental or naïve or even pious about C.'s book. He soberly observes a modern age which has dehumanized and then destroyed millions of people and left the rest poised between skepticism and despair; C. was there himself until he discovered the tradition he presents here. He does this in thematic chapters which are commentaries upon quotations from early and Byzantine (and Latin medieval) Christian texts. He describes his purpose as "not so much to popularize its subject as to make it known in the first place. Not only is Christianity something strange to people today, but it cannot even attract by its strangeness, because people are familiar
with the distortions and caricatures of it” (9). The balance between texts and commentary tilts somewhat toward the former, though without choppiness in the narrative. C. reads and interprets with an uncanny ability to relate ancient text to modern need.

The book is in three parts. C. outlines the existential situation and its theological context; he considers challenges to, and means of, fulfilling the human vocation; and he explores prayer and contemplation as ways of encountering God now and preparing for eternal life. Along the way he deals with all of the principal theological and anthropological questions one would expect, including a substantial section on the Church and sacraments. The restriction to texts from “the undivided church” keeps the book ecumenical in outlook, though writers of the Christian East predominate. The “optimistic” anthropology characteristic of those texts is nuanced by a thorough consideration of the necessity and means of Christian asceticism and by C.’s own keen awareness of the reality of evil.

Biographical and theological notes for background material are placed at the end of the book for convenient reference (in the translation these are separated into two sections, an improvement which makes it easier to find the theological material). Unfortunately, those coming to this book with little background are ill served by the bibliographies appended to the biographical notes. These have been only partially updated, with very spotty notice taken of English translations. Even when these are indicated, in some cases recent and greatly improved translations are not listed (e.g. for Isaac of Nineveh). A relatively small amount of research by the translators or editors would have made a great difference to the usefulness of this material. A general bibliographical note about where one might find details of English translations appears to have been erroneously merged with the final entry of the biographical section. Finally, in neither the French original nor in this translation is there an index to the texts cited, which is annoying when one wishes to locate a favorite text or gather material by a single author.

Although the translation of C.’s prose is excellent, the patristic and Byzantine texts appear to be translated from the French rather than from their original languages. English translations of most of them are readily available, but have not been used. The problem of translation is thereby compounded; not a fatal flaw for a book of this kind, perhaps, but serious nonetheless. References for these quotations were not updated to acknowledge new editions of texts. Biblical citations are rendered in a form approximating that of the Authorized (King James) Version rather than modern translations. The translators have provided no introduction of their own to explain these decisions.

None of these criticisms are meant to deter potential readers. I first encountered this book more than a decade ago, and meeting it again in a new guise has only deepened my admiration for C.’s achievement.

Miller’s study is intended to counter arguments that women, since they cannot be ordained priests in the Roman Catholic Church, lack authority. M. proposes that women do possess a “feminine authority” which can only be understood in the covenantal terms of bride and bridegroom. Sexuality is thus central to salvation; claims to the contrary, especially those advanced by feminist theologians, are ultimately “a reversion to an ancient pagan pessimism in which the body is ultimately insignificant to salvation” (97).

Beginning with a critique of feminist theology, M. focuses on the work of Elisabeth Schüssler Fiorenza (whose name is consistently misspelled) and Rosemary Radford Ruether. Schüssler Fiorenza’s error is using “scientific paradigms” to challenge “the Revelation” (6), while Ruether’s is, among others, in denying the significance of symbols (7–10, 13). Both are mistaken, M. argues, when they deny the Church’s essentially feminine nature in relation to Christ’s masculine “Headship.” M. goes on to discuss the role of women in the early Fathers of the Church; any references to women’s inferiority, she argues, are due to the “pagan philosophical worldview” of the time, and not to what M. terms the sacramental, complementary, and egalitarian faith of the Church (31). Succeeding chapters cover the authority of Christ (Head and Cause of the Church), the linkage of priestly authority with male sexuality, and Mary as the new Eve and the source of feminine authority.

While much effort and passion went into this study, it suffers from significant flaws. M. makes some interesting points on male and female patterns of behavior, e.g. the male tendency to separation and differentiation and the female to relationship. But what is entirely lacking here is any social or historical contextualizing. Since for M. “scientific paradigms” stand outside “the Revelation,” her argumentation is basically circular. Secular reasoning has an agenda hostile to the faith and is therefore suspect. Thus the negative influences of Gnosticism and Platonism can be clearly distinguished from “the Revelation,” thereby relegating any sexism in the tradition to “pagan philosophy.”

The real key to M.’s study, however, is her understanding of symbol. Here again, M. pays no attention to theories of symbol and metaphor, and argues that unless symbols, especially those pertaining to sexuality, are interpreted literally, they are meaningless. Any sense of the multivalency of symbols, or of their rootedness in history, is absent. Thus, for her, God’s Fatherhood is no metaphor, and in one of her most striking statements, M. writes: “Feminine images of God are aberrations that serve a particular crisis moment” (83).

M.’s book provides much of the biblical (particularly Pauline) and patristic sources for the magisterial view of women’s essentially maternal and receptive “authority” in the Church. But without historical-
critical perspectives on these sources, M.'s reasoning is weak. The book assumes and asserts rather than argues. It is also marred by spelling errors and poor editing. It will be of interest to those interested in theologies of covenant and sexual complementarity. But it fails to engage the context and complexity of these issues, and replaces argument with rhetoric.

Loyola University, Chicago		SUSAN A. ROSS


In this unusual, at times frustrating and at times brilliant work, Arens essays a theology of human action informed by the communicative-action theory of Jürgen Habermas. Part 1 gives a brief account of Habermas’s ideas. A. is as well qualified as any theologian to provide this outline, and his description of the main lines of thought in communicative-action theory, discourse ethics, and the consensus theory of truth is admirably clear, though unaccountably brief. The fundamental problem here is that A. is concerned not only to represent Habermas’s views but also to place them in dialogue with other contemporary German theorists, in particular to suggest ways in which the approaches to ethics and a theory of truth propounded by Karl-Otto Apel may be superior to, or at least instructively different from, those of Habermas. These issues are perhaps too important to be dealt with in 22 pages.

Chapter 1 concludes with an outline of the ways in which A. believes Habermas may be fruitful for the theological task. Habermas’s theories provide a useful set of categories and concepts, they encourage theology’s development in the direction of a theology of action, and they stimulate fundamental theology to employ elements of these theories in the elucidation of religious reality. Criticizing Habermas’s separation of reason and religion, A. argues that religion must be seen as “an element and dimension of an essentially open communicative rationality”; the goal “cannot be to claim for religion a separate sphere of validity beyond communicative reason” (32). While A. is right to chas­tise Habermas for his weak view of religion, one has to wonder how religion’s transcendent truth claims are going to sit comfortably within the realm of communicative reason. And if they are not, then isn’t Habermas at least partially right to separate the two?

Chapter 2 seeks to show how the Gospels can be seen as communicative praxis: “To what extent can we say that the gospel is intersubjective, propositional and performative, textual, situational, and oriented toward reaching an understanding” (41)? There then follows a close examination of the gospel-praxis of Jesus, his disciples, and the early Church, in which their actions are described in categories drawn from communicative-action theory. I am not persuaded that this process
much advances our understanding either of the gospel or of communicative action. While there certainly may be secularists, like Habermas himself, or unregenerate biblical literalists, who for various reasons are uninterested in the Gospels as communication, they are not the audience for this work. And the intended readers would be unlikely to find it remarkable that the gospel was an exercise in communicative action, at least once the outline of the Habermasian categories was presented to them.

The objective of the Chapter 2, however, is not so much to explicate the gospel as it is to prepare the ground for the final chapter, in which constructive suggestions are presented about a theological theory of truth that can express the orientation to praxis, in which a fascinating phenomenology of witnessing and confessing is offered, and in which the Church is analyzed as a communication community. I wish the review of other positions were less prominent in this chapter, and that A. had devoted himself more to the constructive task, but where he does so he makes some significant contributions. In particular, he very helpfully argues for a theological theory of truth which takes seriously Apel's call for correspondence, evidence, coherence, and consensus, relating them to the "propositional, revelatory, systematic and practical structure" of theological truth (113). It is this discussion which is the key to the subsequent reflections on the relation of faith and praxis, on solidarity, and on the praxis of the Church as a communication community. A. is to be commended for an insightful book which takes a fruitful, unusual approach to some very significant issues in the Christian churches today.

Fairfield University, Conn.

PAUL LAKELAND


Catholic social teaching sees the principle of subsidiarity as applicable to the different forms of social organization. Does it apply also to the Church? This question, raised by the 1985 Extraordinary Synod of Bishops, is answered affirmatively by Leys, a former staff member of the Dutch Bishops' Conference, in this dissertation done at the Catholic University of Nijmegen.

L. finds the roots of Catholic social doctrine in the works of certain early 19th-century Catholic thinkers in France and Germany who stressed social solidarity and the importance of associations in reaction to liberal individualism and state centralism. Especially significant was Wilhelm von Ketteler, later archbishop of Mainz, whose advocacy of the greatest possible self-government for persons and associations established the principle of subsidiarity, without formulating it explicitly. Leo XIII furthered this current of Catholic social thought in his encyclical Rerum novarum by arguing that "man is prior to the state"
and defending the rights of the family against the state. But it was Pius XI who actually formulated the principle in his 1931 encyclical *Quadragesimo anno* (written by Oswald von Nell-Breuning), just as he was the first to introduce the concept of social justice (*iustitia socialis*).

Is the principle of subsidiarity applicable to the Church? L. finds some ambiguity on this point in the tradition. Although Pius XII twice stated that it was, Vatican II did not follow his lead in this respect. The Pontifical Commission for the Revision of the Code of Canon Law affirmed the principle of subsidiarity in the context of the relationship between the episcopacy and the papacy in the principles it drew up to guide its work, and the 1983 Code referred to it in its Preface. However L. argues that the Code, by failing to develop the consequences of subsidiarity and by accentuating the power of the pope at the expense of the bishops, “opens all the doors to a centralist exercise of primacy” (100). There was some discussion of subsidiarity at the Synod of 1985; L. suggests that the recommendation in the Synod’s final report that a study of how subsidiarity might apply in the Church was due to Walter Kasper, the Synod’s special secretary.

Most useful is L.’s theological and canonical discussion of the application of the principle to the Church. Many who see the Church as a *societas* demand that the principle be respected, as in any other society, while some who follow the *communio* model hold that the Church, and thus its authority, is simply different from other organizations. *Lumen gentium* itself has several ecclesiological visions with administrative-structural consequences: People of God, the hierarchical vision of chapter 3, and the emerging concept of the Church as a *communio*. Though the council did not really integrate these different visions, L. argues that the concept of *communio* is able to do so precisely in its implication of the Church as sacrament. As sacrament the Church is both *communio* and *societas*, and so must have the juridical structures to guarantee the “tensile” relationships—episcopacy and papacy, particular churches and universal church—which constitute it. Hence it needs the principle of subsidiarity.

The ecclesiological significance of the book lies in its nuancing of the ecclesiology of *communio* by showing the obligatory character of the principle of subsidiarity. Practically, it points to where the present Code needs to be updated in order to give better juridical specification to the cooperation that ought to exist between the primacy and the college of bishops, as well as to safeguard the rights of the Christian faithful as individuals. L.’s work should be of interest to both theologians and canonists.

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**THOMAS P. RAUSCH, S.J.**

Ten years after its initial French publication, the English translation of this major work by a moral theologian who enjoys considerable influence in various European circles (including the Vatican) is added to previous Italian, Polish, and Spanish versions. The title suggests the book's double focus, namely a treatment of the various sources for doing Christian ethics, as well as how these sources have been used throughout the history of Roman Catholic moral theology. After introductory chapters defining and giving a basic overview of Christian ethics, Pinckaers organizes his work into three major sections, dealing with ethics, human and Christian; a brief history of moral theology; and freedom and natural law.

P.'s definition of Christian ethics indicates his strong Thomistic orientation: "the branch of theology that studies human acts so as to direct them to a loving vision of God seen as our true, complete happiness and our final end. This vision is attained by means of grace, the virtues, and the gifts, in light of revelation and reason" (8). Indeed, P.'s analysis and reformulation of Thomas's thought is his major contribution here, as it goes well beyond simply a summary or exposition in contemporary language of the scholastic tradition. In presenting Thomas's moral theory, P. wrestles with a good deal of moral theology, past and present, which he believes has either paid insufficient attention to the Angelic Doctor or has departed radically from that tradition. In the latter instance, P. is particularly critical of casuistry and the traditional moral manuals, asserting that together they misled the whole discipline of Christian ethics into an improper preoccupation with law and obligation, rather than centering reflection on the moral life in terms of beatitude and the virtues. P. maintains that this error was compounded by the Enlightenment and Kantian moral philosophy which he finds still holds sway today, especially among "certain German theologians."

To confront and correct these errors P. argues for a return to the principal "sources" of Christian ethics, especially Scripture. He notes that when a typical modern "ethicist consults Scripture, he is looking for normative texts, laws, commands, and prohibitions in which the divine will expresses its authority. The results are rather meager; he usually falls back on the Decalogue" (199). This error could be corrected, P. believes, if theologians returned to the method of the patristic era, which "was indeed a golden age for morality as it was for all theology" (207). The Fathers held Scripture in definite primacy, and P. asks rhetorically "whether we ought to read Scripture directly, as the Fathers did, or be obliged to go through the exegetical sciences" (316). This antipathy to modern exegesis ultimately proves rather problematic for P.'s subsequent development of the actual use of Scripture as the primary source for Christian ethics, because he largely fails to address the whole range of concerns which contemporary exegesis and hermeneutics raise for any legitimate understanding and interpretation of Scripture. Instead, one finds a number of assertions whose lack of nuance would give pause to most biblical theologians: e.g., that St.
Paul in fact presents a "well-rounded teaching on moral theory" (104), or that Matthew's intention in writing his Gospel was to present the Sermon on the Mount, "a Gospel text of prime importance for Christian ethics," as well as to provide "a summary of Gospel morality as it came from the lips of the Lord himself" (134). Yet, P. seems aware that faulty interpretation of Scripture leads to misguided ethical conclusions; as one illustration he cites Tolstoy's pacifist political reading of the Sermon on the Mount which "perhaps prepared the way for the violent methods of communism, by helping to weaken the resistance of the Russian people" (139).

Coupled with a certain lack of nuance and a tendency to caricature and/or oversimplify opposing views, P. exhibits something of a polemic against much of post-Vatican II moral theology. He observes that in recent centuries the Church has necessarily found itself "in a state of siege in relation to the modern world" and in resisting revolutions, liberalism, and Marxism has "raised walls and dug trenches to defend the faithful" (304). Though P. allows that Vatican II showed a new openness to the modern world, this clearly has not been an unmixed blessing: sexual barriers have broken down, a shift to the left has occurred which holds "political and social involvement to become the criterion of the evangelical authenticity of the Christian life," accompanied by a decline of attachment to orthodoxy and truth occasioned by a prevailing "climate of research, dialogue, and pluralism, open theoretically to all opinions but in fact excluding the orthodox one.

In sum, the book is uneven. The treatment of Thomas and the history of the development of moral theology through the Middle Ages are both valuable. Though P. makes a strong case for using Scripture as the norm of Christian ethics, his own operative paradigm is essentially Thomistic rather than biblical. While P.'s own negative stance toward the contemporary state of moral theology will no doubt delight certain readers, this style regrettably detracts from many of the positive merits his work does offer.

Jesuit School of Theology, Berkeley

JAMES T. BRETZKE, S.J.


This final work of Lehmann discusses the Decalogue through Luther's hermeneutic in relation to current issues. L. is best known for writings in the 60s and 70s that celebrated Christian ethics as a resource for morality ("keeping human life human"). The present work exhibits the intuitive, situational, and biblical approach which made his earlier works both popular and controversial. The fulcrum of moral reflection is "apperception" which discerns the significant in the factual by a process that resists rational explication.
tral role in mental experience, as William James insisted. He would have appreciated L.’s description of moral discernment: “Apperception is the uniquely human capacity to know something without knowing how one has come to know it, and to bring what one knows in this way to what one has come to know in other ways, and, in so doing, to discern what is humanly true or false” (23). The next generation of Protestant Christian ethicists, such as Childress and Outka, turned away from L.’s sermonic style to a more philosophically exact manner, perhaps gaining in logic and “public” language what was lost in evocative rhetoric.

Santa Clara University, Calif.


Monti implies that the case has already been made for what he calls “ordinary canons of mature consent and prudent physical safeguards” (ix) regarding sexual behavior. The task remaining is to make sense of values like love, fidelity, and creativity. I would argue that this conception of the task before the Church is too narrow, given the extent of sexual violence and sexually transmitted disease, and the fact that pleasure is not routine for all in sexual partnerships. Be that as it may, this book is well worth reading.

As the title suggests it is as much about moral argument as it is about sexual ethics. The theoretical question with which M. wrestles is right on target. Why are Christians having such a difficult time articulating a sexual ethic that proves coherent and compelling? He believes that at the root of this impotence lie a misunderstanding of what it means to be faithful, and the confusion of ethical norms with moral rules.

M.’s first line of argument illumines well the modern landscape in and out of which the Church must teach. He contends that fidelity is distorted when it is conceived of only as a matter of standing in continuity with what is received. Since God is involved and conversant with the world, the Church must be as well. Christians have good reason to be wary of this: what is new may not be better. But the assumption that what is old was necessarily less “corrupted” by its cosmological environment does not withstand careful scrutiny. The Church should be equally wary of merely recapitulating past teachings: what is old may not be better.

M. establishes the possibility of faithfully saying something new by reconstructing a notion of historical progress that avoids the deadly forms of hubris associated with the Enlightenment. The postmodern response to the difficulties posed by foundational pluralism is understandable. The “burdens of continually coming to understanding are real” (97). Nevertheless the substitution of aesthetic preference for rational argument is escapist. Wonder, inquiry, a sense of limit, and an ongoing dialogue with the other are as much a part of the life and story of reason as are tyranny and violence.
Though insightful, M.'s second line of argument veers off course. By his account, a norm is an ideal which effects the values it designates. When a norm becomes moribund, a long period of moral confusion ensues. During that time people are "implicated in a new . . . intergenerational process of normative moral reconstruction with no guarantee that any 'new' norm will be better or worse than the one lost" (193).

M. argues that ours is not such a time. In my opinion, this judgment fatally flaws his analysis, but let me sketch his argument. Christians err when they argue as if the "needs of individuals are enough for the creation of new or parallel norms" (121), though rules which govern specific behaviors might be so constructed. In this regard he is right about one thing. At present gay unions may not be able to effect what they designate, precisely because they lack the foundation requisite for such normative work. We who equate gay unions with sacramental marriages may be programming them for failure.

M. argues that within its orbit any given ethical norm is flexible enough to accommodate multiple and changing rules. The Church can uphold as singular the norm of heterosexual marriage, while commending "a plurality of responsible rules of sexual life" (251). For M. these rules encompass responsible forms of heterosexual marriage, nonmarital heterosexual expression, and homosexual expression. Furthermore he argues that these lifestyles should not be hierarchically ordered because each in its own way falls short of the ideal.

Despite his theoretical protestations to the contrary, M.'s analysis reflects the inevitability of such ranking whenever an attempt is made to relate highly divergent rules to a singular norm. This is the inescapable implication of his argument that the value of creativity can only be epitomized by reproductive generativity. Hierarchical ranking flows from his claim that only Christians in heterosexual marriages have the capacity and vocation sacramentally to model the values expressed in this norm.

However because M. believes it is possible to avoid such ranking, he fails to comprehend what is really at stake in the present cultural war. In my judgment more than one rule of life can be judged compatible with the norm of heterosexual marriage, but only as more or less representative of that ideal. Whether one is single or gay, if one believes one's lifestyle ought to be celebrated as a good gift of God, then for it to be judged merely permissible is not adequate. M. is right to worry that foundational pluralism might cause confusion and backlash. In theory maintaining the singularity of the norm of heterosexual marriage could prevent schism. What M. does not adequately reckon with is the fact that the singularity of this norm (not the norm per se) has already profoundly split the Church, and is thereby a source of grave confusion for gay and lesbian Christians not already completely alienated from the Church.

Loyola University, Chicago

PATRICIA BEATTIE JUNG
SHORTER NOTICES


Johnson, whether he intended it or not, has once again proved the truth of Albert Schweitzer's claim that "there is no historical task which so reveals a person's true self as the writing of a Life of Jesus." His short book is long on accomplishment.

The opening chapters expose the work of the Jesus Seminar and evaluate recent attempts at historical reconstructions of the life of Jesus. Here J. unmasks the cultural agenda that has driven these attempts and the misunderstanding of historical knowledge upon which they rest. J. is direct and pulls no punches.

The heart of the book raises important questions about the relationship of history to faith and the false assumption that the latter depends on the former. History, properly understood as a rich human endeavor, an interpretative mode of human knowing, is the product of intelligence and imagination. History, however, has its limitations and is more at home in the realm of probability than certitude. Historians can make assertions about the life of Jesus and his ministry, but they cannot reconstruct the historical Jesus. The real Jesus is a living person not an historical reconstruction, and the real object of faith cannot be determined by history. That need not lead to total skepticism about making any historical claims about Jesus. In fact, J. isolates 17 historical points about Jesus that he has gleaned from the New Testament and ancient non-Christians writings that mention Jesus.

For all the strength of J.'s treatment of the relation of history to faith, I must admit some disappointment over the lack of a fuller discussion of the continuity between the two. That criticism notwithstanding, this is an important book that will be a help to scholars and pastors alike.


Charlesworth has written a most useful work. For someone who has spent years studying the Gospel of John, it came as a great revelation that over the centuries at least 16 historical figures have been proposed to solve the identity of the Beloved Disciple (BD), in addition to various suggestions that he is a fictional, literary, or representative figure symbolizing the Church or the Gentile Church or the ideal believer.

C. proposes that the BD is Thomas. He begins by presenting eight criteria to be used in the search for his identity, then undertakes a precise exegetical examination of the relevant passages, and follows this with further analysis of the Johannine School and the School of Thomas. Twelve exegetical insights led C. to opt for Thomas. The most significant is that Thomas had knowledge about the death of Jesus that only the BD possessed. Thomas knew without being told what the BD witnessed at the foot of the cross, where he saw the soldier thrust the lance into Jesus' side, and he refused to believe until he put his own hand into Jesus' side. C.'s eleven other exegetical suggestions are not as strong as the first, in my opinion. But the wealth of material C. has gathered is astonishing. He presents his reasons clearly. With careful build-up he leads the reader to join in the search. So subtly does he develop his argument that the reader feels almost impelled to accept his conclusion.

C.'s criteria are exceptionally well thought out and should be used by anyone in the future who tries to solve this problem. I remain unconvinced, however, for several reasons: (1) I do not believe the BD was one of the Twelve. "The Twelve" referring to the apostles appears only four times in
John, in contexts involving some lack of faith. I believe the BD was one of the disciples, and this explains John's lack of interest in the Twelve. (2) Before Thomas's confession of faith, the BD runs to the tomb and believes (20:9). How could the same person utter Thomas's statement, "Unless I see . . . I shall not believe" (20:25)? (3) No one has yet thoroughly determined the actual historical weight of events in the Gospels involving the BD.

JOHN F. O'GRADY
Barry University, Miami


McCracken intends to restore to the reading of the Scriptures their original aim of "scandalizing" their readers—as Jesus' parabolic relationships in and to his community were often marked by contention and "scandal." Such a reading, M. believes, is fairly traditional, one very much in accord with scriptural precedent, for a major motif throughout the Old Testament centers on an "accumulation of specific, vivid, powerful images: traps, snares, stumbling blocks, things that obstruct and things that cause a fall" (viii).

M. comes to the reading of Scripture from a career in Romantic literature. In this fine book both the literary critic and the theological exegete are in evidence. The scandal of each particular narrative, according to M., is the essential drama of the Scriptures, which are texts with narrative intentions "radically different from a tabloid or treatise" (vii). The scandal works at two levels. First, religious: "In the New Testament this image of Yahweh is transposed to Jesus, who warns his followers not to scandalize others but who is himself dramatically and repeatedly, a scandal to those who encounter him. Jesus is the essential offense" (viii). Second, narrative: M.'s reading is informed by a Kierkegaardian sense of dialectic between the inherent "offensiveness" of Christianity and its (higher) reconciliation in faith, he also finds Bakhtin's notion of "carnivalized scandal" helpful (131).

M. argues that the gospel narratives ought to be read as parables, i.e. as "world-reversing narratives." As Crossan argued over a decade ago, Jesus' parables are dark and contradictory, resisting narrative closure. Thus, to "read" them as moralistic stories is not only beside the point, it is a waste of time. M. elaborates Crossan's position, suggesting that "gospel stories are inherently scandalous for characters in them and for readers of them. Like parables, Gospels call on us to 'hear,' not to interpret" (ix).

EDWARD J. INGEBRETSEN, S.J.
Georgetown University, D.C.


This Oxford dissertation, directed by Martin Goodman, is a vigorously argued and welcome contribution to the current study of anti-Judaism in early Christianity. Taylor challenges what she sees as a "scholarly consensus," initiated by Marcel Simon's Versus Israel, which identifies various aspects of real-world Jewish-Christian conflict as sources of, and explanations for, Christian anti-Judaism. The "theological" explanation, she argues, has been given far too little consideration. The negative references to Jews and Judaism during the second and third centuries "make much more sense as expressions of an anti-Judaism rooted in theological ideas than as responses to contemporary Jews in the context of an on-going conflict" (127). They stem from the formation of a Christian identity "that affirmed itself through the appropriation of the Jewish tradition for the church and the denial of this tradition to the Jewish people" (140). This needed saying, and she has said it, convincingly.

The negative side of T.'s thesis is more complex. She effectively lays to rest several aspects of what she calls the "conflict theory": neither Jewish proselytism, nor Jewish "hostility"
(supposedly involved in the persecution of Christians), nor pre-Christian pagan attitudes can stand as explanations or sources. She seemed less successful in attempting to eliminate, as explanatory hypotheses, Christian "judaizing," and the relative inferiority of the church vis-a-vis a well established synagogue. She is certainly right in demanding of all of us that there be no appeal to either factor without evidence in the texts. Nevertheless, as clearly as she has established the sufficiency of the theological explanation, some will not be convinced that she has demonstrated its incompatibility with one or two of the "social" hypothesis, at least as exacerbating factors. Even without proselytism, without hostility, the sheer presence of a Judaism which "should have" disappeared but did not is a plausible irritant.

The distance between T.'s position and that of many whom she criticizes is not as great as she sometimes suggests. Most will welcome this book.

DAVID P. EFROYMSON
La Salle University, Philadelphia


This book is not about the origin of Satan. At the outset, Pagels directs the reader to other books which deal with that topic. She raises another issue, the demonization of the other in the New Testament and early Christianity. Informed by anthropological treatments of religion, the questions to be asked concern the social dynamics that are orchestrated around Satan and other demonic figures. The questions this book raises are creative and interesting. Unfortunately, the analyses cannot stand much scholarly probing. (P. even tells scholars to read the academic articles rather than this popularized version.)

In some chapters, that will not help. Where P. is dealing with the Valentinian gnostics, she controls the material and can make judicious selections from scholarly material. Where she deals with the Gospels, she is either not informed of scholarly discussion or chooses to select somewhat controverted views to fit her own schema. Even so, she injects more demonic conflict into the gospel narratives than is actually found there. Both the view that Mark is an apocalypse written in response to the Jewish war and that Mark's picture of the ministry of Jesus is essentially one of combat with Satan have been challenged severely in recent years.

P.'s injection of background material, such as Jesus sounding like an Essene in the Markan disputes over purity rules, or the extended digression into Gospel of Thomas and gnostic revelation discourses in the middle of the treatment of Matthew, is quite confusing. Not that such materials are not germane to her larger project. They are. One would wish for more historical clarity and precision in analysis. Relevant discussion of Matthew then turns up in the chapter on Luke and John! In short, this is a book to read for its creative, challenging questions, not for information about scholarly study of the Gospels.


As leader of the monastic revival in Anglo-Saxon England, the Benedictine Bishop Aethelwold (ca. 908-984) not only replaced worldly clerics with monks at the Old and New Minsters of his see at Winchester, he launched an intellectual and cultural revolution that was remarkable for its day. Deshman, a fine arts professor at the University of Toronto, has taken as his point of investigation the sainted bishop's Benedictional, one of the most lavishly produced liturgical books of the Middle Ages, in order to better understand that revolution through the layered symbolism of its imagery.

What he has uncovered in the book of blessings attests to the keen intelligence of the religious reformer. Aethelwold's sophistication and cosmopolitan outlook is reflected in his
patronage of the Benedictional where a heady blending of history, politics, iconography, liturgy, Scripture, and hagiography is contained. In a scholarly but easy-to-read fashion, D. unravels the various threads that run through the manuscript's complex, interrelated visual program. Like a skillful detective, he shows us how abstract theological concepts have been concretized in the very clouds, drapery, and architectural ornament of the Benedictional's illuminations. Rare iconographical motifs are featured in the book (like the Naming of Jesus) as well as bizarre innovations (an anthropomorphized altar!) that never gained acceptance.

Seldom has art history been so engagingly presented as here. D. reveals the depth and originality of Aethelwold's reform, and now the movement during the so-called Dark Ages cast much light in the history of Christian thought. Preachers and teachers will find in this work a treasure trove of material. Art lovers will be impressed by the interlocking of image with idea. The Princeton University Press has produced a handsome volume with gorgeous color plates and clear black and white images—a marked improvement over some of its earlier publications—and well worth the hefty price.

MICHAEL MORRIS, O.P.
The Dominican School, Berkeley


Although Muir identifies her audience as "the increasing number of scholars working in the field of medieval drama" and "the even larger number of people who attend performances of such plays," her "detailed survey and analysis of the surviving corpus of biblical drama from all parts of medieval Christian Europe" (xiii) can provide interesting information for theologians not primarily concerned with drama. While the first section focuses on the theatrical community, with a brief history and analysis of productions, the second section provides as indication of popular understanding of theology in the Middle Ages and of theological sources for the plays.

M. follows the biblical story from the Creation to the Last Judgment with a concise summary of the various treatments in all the different plays that "have been published or listed in bibliographies" (65). Since these plays were performed throughout Europe, they reflect the understanding of many people, and the inclusion of dates allows historical as well as geographic perspective. Since the plays communicated theological insight to their audiences or, more probably, reflected current beliefs, M.'s summaries provide a record of medieval understanding of salvation history.

M. also indicates some sources for theological interpretations included in these plays. E.g., she cites Irenaeus and Anselm for doctrines of atonement, the Gospel of Nicodemus and Legenda for the legend of Seth and the Oil of Mercy. She also indicates reasons for the choice of particular episodes from the Old Testament, e.g., Augustine's doctrine of the Seven Ages of the World in the City of God, or typological significance. Frequently she shows how details in the individual plays emphasize typological connections obviously accepted at that time.

A valuable summary for students of medieval drama, M.'s study also includes material for theologians studying the Middle Ages or interested in its theological beliefs and their sources.

SANDRA R. O'NEAL
Columbia College, South Carolina


Focusing on Lewis's writings about medieval literature, Milward detects a fundamental contradiction at the heart of Lewis's literary criticism. As an Ulster low-church Protestant, Lewis remained unable, for all his wide reading and rational brilliance,
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to enter sympathetically into the Catholic mind of medieval Christendom. Sensing an analogy between Lewis's early "stab of joy" and Luther's tower experience, M. also paints Lewis as an anti-intellectual Puritan who was incapable of generating a fertile theory of literary criticism abounding with nuanced meanings and ambiguous interpretations.

M. builds his somewhat scattershot case (with alphabetically arranged chapters) by claiming Lewis misunderstands the nature of allegory, unwarrantably tries to distinguish literary source from literary influence, unjustifiably rejects any philosophy of history, downplays the personal nature of poetry, and is a solemn "scholar of division." The single underlying cause is always Lewis's Protestantism.

M.'s argument hits a few marks but misses others, and suffers from the unsubtle nature of the broadside barrage. Yes, Lewis's "Mere Christianity" is more Protestant than Catholic, and he saves little room for Catholic authors in his English Literature in the Sixteenth Century. But the portrait of Lewis the anti-intellectual Puritan cannot truly reflect the author of Miracles, Problem of Pain, and Four Loves, or the Christian whose favorite scriptural verse (Ps 16:11) speaks of delights at God's right hand forevermore. M. sometimes misses Lewis's refined distinctions (myth vs. allegory, literary source vs. literary influence); moreover, there is nothing particularly Protestant about Lewis's anti-Romanticist hermeneutics, anti-historicist philosophy, or preference for myth over allegory. M. has written an engaging piece on his and Lewis's disagreement about literary criticism, but he propounds an unsupportable thesis by attempting to find the sole cause of these disagreements in the great divide between Belfast and Dublin.

GREGORY ROCCA, O.P.
The Dominican School, Berkeley


A significant work for Calvin scholars and for those who want a clear framework into which to set Calvin's overall theological work. Butin approaches Calvin's theology from the perspective of the Trinity, seeing in it the pattern for understanding the divine-human relationship. This is expounded through considerations of revelation, redemption, and human response as well as Calvin's concepts of the church, baptism, and the Eucharist. B. contends that "approaching Calvin's thought from the standpoint of the Trinity enables the interpreter to discern an intrinsic coherence at both the level of form and the level of theological substance that is not otherwise evident" (124). Thus the Trinity is the "structural paradigm for the 1559 Institutes" and gives throughout a "theological coherence" to Calvin's views (124).

The case for this perspective is well articulated and amply documented. Scholars have proposed various integrating principles for understanding Calvin, focusing mostly on a "radical, oppositional contrast between the divine and the human" in his thought (15). B. argues against these "dialectical interpretations" in favor of an "economic-trinitarian" perspective that appreciates the "prominence of the Trinity in Calvin's understanding of the divine-human relationship (21). His hope is that recognizing this will serve as "an important historical and ecumenically viable prototype for contemporary Reformed theology's understanding of God's relationship with those who are called to be Christian believers in the church" (22).

What emerges here is a richly textured view of a theologian who was so thoroughly steeped in the trinitarian pattern that it enabled him to add more detail to the doctrine of the Trinity itself. It also helped Calvin construe a theological vision that conveys the radical practicality of the doctrine as a shaping force in Christian life and experience.

DONALD K. MCKIM
Memphis Theological Seminary
THEOLOGICAL STUDIES


A systematic inquiry by an established historian of colonial Mexico into the early accounts of the apparitions of Our Lady of Guadalupe to an Amerindian convert, Juan Diego, in 1531, just ten years after the Spanish conquest. On the basis of belief in those apparitions a powerful myth of Mexican popular religion has grown from generation to generation as a compelling symbol of national faith, identity, solidarity, and liberation. Poole provides a thorough scholarly examination of the extant documentary data concerning the apparitions and of the significance and spread of the devotion. He marshals a prodigious volume of archival material and provides an impressive bibliography in support of his study. He repeats and builds on the work of earlier scholars as he highlights the strikingly conflicting accounts and interpretations of the apparitions.

Sure-footed in his journey through the archival and secondary material, fearless, objective, and balanced in his search of the truth, P. avoids the pitfalls of either a sensationalist or a debunking tone. He strips away pious but unfounded assertions and accretions from the core reality at the center of the traditional devotion of Guadalupe. He concludes that there is no first-hand historical evidence for the apparitions, but rather that the tradition springs from mid-17th-century sources meant to bolster the self-esteem and collective identity not of the Native People but of the criollos (Mexican descendants of Spanish settlers). He then challenges the uncritical myths which served to create the shaky thesis that the devotion to the “dark skinned virgin” played a major role in the conversion of the Amerindians. The famous purportedly miraculous painting of the Virgin on the mantle of Juan Diego also comes under close scrutiny.

Despite minor flaws in dating and translation, P. makes a compelling case for his interpretation of the Guadalupe phenomenon. His work, however, will not shake the foundations of popular religion. Scholarly criticism seldom does. Still, it provokes serious reflection on the processes behind the creation of religious myths. P. sees clearly that the Guadalupe devotion depends not on historical evidence of the apparitions but on the attribution of miracles, meaning, and power to the Virgin in service of national identity and religious faith. His work invites the reader to enter into the multifaceted realm of Mexican mystical symbolism wrapped in the mantle of Catholic and pre-Columbian beliefs and their accompanying symbols.

ERNEST S. SWEENEY, S.J.
Loyola Marymount University, L.A.


Fouilloux, the prominent historian of 20th-century Catholic theology in France, here provides an informative and lively account of the origin and development of Sources Chrétiennes, the splendid and world-respected series of texts and translations. Remotely indebted to an earlier project conceived by Victor Fontoymont, the series was launched under the inspiration of J. Daniélou and H. de Lubac in 1943 to provide easily accessible editions of the Fathers of the Church. The aim was not only to restore to Catholic consciousness neglected classics of spirituality but also to offer examples of a theology more vital than baroque Scholasticism and of a reading of the Scriptures more ecclesial than that of historical-critical method.

Some provocative comments by Daniélou caused the series to be implicated in the brouhaha over an alleged nouvelle théologie that erupted after the War. The collection survived this crisis less harmed than did its initial directors, and under the devoted direction of Claude Mondésert evolved into an indispensable and critically appreciated tool of research.
F. has had access to the pertinent archives and tells the story in organizational, personal, and ecclesial detail until 1953, when the 50th volume was published. Unfortunately, he provides only a sketch since then, although some remarks by de Lubac in his Mémoire suggest that this later history was not without drama. Chapter 4, which covers 1946-1950, along with F.’s essay, “Dialogue théologique? (1946-1948),” in Saint Thomas au XXe siècle (Paris 1994) 153–95, are required reading for the controversy over “la nouvelle théologie.”

JOSEPH A. KOMONCHAK
Catholic University of America

ORDERED UNIVERSES: APPROACHES TO THE ANTHROPOLOGY OF RELIGION.

Recent anthropological studies of religion with rare exceptions repeat the traditional categories of investigation with numbing regularity and little intellectual advance. In this introductory text, Klass presents a series of connected and sequential essays in which he grapples with what he calls the “scientistic” assumptions of traditional anthropological studies of religion. It is refreshing that he tries to break out of a mold which has confined theoretical studies of religion since the Second World War, but the reader should be prepared to revisit the usual ethnographic categories like values, beliefs, witchcraft, shamans, sacrifice, ghosts, revitalization, and so on.

In good contemporary intellectual fashion, K. avoids taking a position on whether the religious beliefs of others are true; what he wants to create are operational, nonjudgmental definitions for traditional religious categories. For someone unfamiliar with the debates encompassing these categories, K. provides informative and critical reflection. Indeed, each chapter provides an intelligent and succinct statement of the issues involved. But for those familiar with the literature the book is repetitious.

At most K. is able to set out a problem (which he does in a lively style) and point to the elements of solution, but the brevity of the book militates against giving any elaborate argument or indulging in any groundbreaking exploration. The book might serve quite well as a text in introductory anthropology, but its usefulness in a theology course is quite limited. Ultimately K. does not break the mold but shows its limitations.

EDWARD M. O’FLAHERTY, S.J.
Boston College

SERIOUS TALK: SCIENCE AND RELIGION IN DIALOGUE.

Polkinghorne has been a leading contributor to the recent dialogue between science and theology/religion. This volume updates his reflections on topics treated in earlier books. Readers familiar with his previous ideas will find them presented in even clearer fashion here; new readers will enjoy P.’s succinct and careful account of important issues relating science and religion today. For more complete reference and bibliographic material, one will have to consult P.’s earlier books.

P. offers eight reasons for taking science seriously and eight analogous reasons for taking theology seriously, using examples to show how they can be “cousinly partners in that necessary search for the fullest possible understanding.” From the perspective of this serious encounter, he then addresses the specific theological issues of creation (God’s originating action), providence (God’s continuing action in the world), resurrection, and eschatology.

Many will be familiar with P.’s points in relating the intelligibility and fine-tuning of the universe with meaning and purpose as understood in a theology of creation. Theology offers a “reasonable response” (note the reserve) to the metaquestions raised by science. Less familiar will be P.’s reflections on how one might understand God’s action within a world described by quantum mechanics and the dynamical theory of chaos, with
corollary reflections on what it might mean when one prays and how God might respond.

P. argues strongly for the reasonableness (seriousness) of belief in the resurrection, but this discussion is really outside the framework of the science-theology dialogue, unlike eschatology, which he discusses within the context of cosmological reflections on the final fate of the universe.

This book is P. at his best—knowledgeable as a distinguished quantum physicist, believing as an Anglican priest, delightfully curious and insightful as a "would-be theologian" (his words), earnestly trying all the while to demonstrate the possibility of a fruitful consonance between science and theology in the quest for understanding.

CHARLES L. CURRIE, S.J.
St. Joseph's Univ., Philadelphia


Drawing partly on the experience of the Spirit in his own life as a charismatic, Weinandy argues persuasively that the Holy Spirit has been conceived much too passively in classical trinitarian theology. Rather, "the Father begets the Son in or by the Holy Spirit, who proceeds then from the Father as the one in whom the Son is begotten" (ix). The Spirit is not simply the passive result of the dynamic relationship between the Father and the Son, but eternally present with the Father in the Father's begetting of the Son and with the Son in the Son's ongoing response to the Father. Thus W. believes that he safeguards both the Orthodox insight that the Spirit proceeds principally from the Father in that the Spirit is "the breath of the Father in whom the Word is spoken" (77), and the Latin insight that the Spirit derivatively proceeds from the Son insofar as the Spirit is involved in the Son's response to the Father.

I have nothing but praise for W.'s careful evaluation of recent trinitarian theology; see, e.g., his extended critique of Catherine LaCugna's position in an excursus at the end. Likewise, I commend his emphasis on what he calls the "perichoresis of action" within the Trinity, whereby the divine persons are defined in their individual identities by their ongoing activity vis-à-vis one another.

My only reservation with his theory is that perhaps the interrelated person-defining activities of begetting, being begotten, and being spirated might better be seen as variations on a single activity, e.g. the act of being, common to all three persons, albeit in different ways. The unity of the Trinity would then be grounded in the divine nature, as in classical Western trinitarian theology, rather than in the person of the Father, as in classical Eastern thought. W. might object that this would hinder doctrinal rapprochement between East and West, but it would better guarantee the basic equality of the divine persons, which is another important feature of W.'s approach.

JOSEPH A. BRACKEN, S.J.
Xavier University, Cincinnati


This rich study of the relation between liturgy and life focuses on the more particular connection between the worship of the Roman Catholic Church and religious experience within American culture. The title suggests an experience, the ongoing conversion of a people, a "walk that renews and changes the community and its individuals" (150).

Duffy develops the discussion within the familiar framework forwarded by Karl Rahner who, in coining the phrase "the liturgy of the world," urged the question of whether the liturgy of the Church was rooted in a daily experience where "people first find their redemptive situation in God's world" (14). The American scene is the world under examination here. The pastoral strategies of an inculturated colonial Church, a 19th-
early-20th-century Church stressing more centralized authority, direction, and liturgy in the face of the vast diversity of immigrant cultures (but failing to manage anything significant with African Americans and Hispanics), and the post-Vatican II years of renewal are subjected to the test of “participation” in the strongest, bottom-line sense of the word: Do Americans actively share in the death and rising of Jesus Christ day by day so that daily life authenticates liturgical praise? For the “Body of Christ cannot be separated from the act of participation which constitutes it” (132).

This work trusts Andrew Greeley’s stress on the “sacramental imagination” and more nuanced analysis of the American sense of community over against the usual attacks of sheer individualism. It offers a transformed profile of an “actively lay rather than clerical, a local church rather than a branch office of a worldwide institution, part of a world church rather than a European church, a church that encouraged new social and political participation, a prophetic church rather than a museum of older cultural models of church” (64). This is the story of a conversion walk.

JOHN GALLEN, S.J.
New York City


Basically, Gaziaux presents his doctoral dissertation, an in-depth study of the moral theology of Louvian professor Philippe Delhaye (1912-1990). Using Joseph Fuchs as Delhaye’s alter ego, G. highlights the latter’s distinctive contributions on such topics as the relevance of natural law, the needed renewal of moral theology according to the Scriptures, the debate over autonomous morality and morality of faith, and the magisterium.

From his involvement in the Second Vatican Council, Delhaye presented the possibility of a distinctive Christian ethics not in a natural-law based ethics, but in a scripturally based one. That position led him to question, among other things, the method of reasoning used shortly after the council in *Humanae vitae*. Later, through the International Theological Commission, he interpreted magisterial teachings to his own (more tolerant) way of thinking, combining a strong belief in the uniqueness of Christian morality with a realistic appreciation for the claims of diverse values. Fuchs, on the other hand, believed that the response to the call of Christ needed to be distinguished transcendentally and categorically. The former concerned matters of faith, grace, and charity; the latter required the natural law, which in Fuch’s postconciliar writings is clearly identified as right reason.

G.’s contribution is important. He places the differences between the two in strong theological contexts where foundational questions about anthropology, eschatology, and ecclesiology are positively discussed. While G. favors and promotes Delhaye, he presents the dissimilarities as well as the fundamental agreement respectfully and responsibly. In fact, he establishes their common theological presuppositions well and foresees where disciples of either moralist might find future common ground. Besides providing a much-needed presentation of Delhaye’s thought, G. offers a thoughtful and reconciling model for discussing differences about the meaning of autonomous ethics, clearly an alternative to *Veritatis splendor*.

JAMES F. KEENAN, S.J.
Weston Jesuit School of Theology


After placing his philosophical theory of practical realism in contrast to other current theories of ethical thought, Jacobs offers a clear and well-reasoned defense of an ethical vision which holds affectively imbued reason to be its central discerning power. Moving beyond the very dense and technical first chapter, which as-
sumes that the reader has some knowledge of such philosophical stances as projectivism, internal realism, and sensible subjectivism, J. presents a nuanced Aristotelianism, emphasizing the possibility of, and need for, attaining correct conceptions of the good. "Reason has a function. It is a capacity for understanding ... it has the authority of knowing the truth ... the capacity to lead ... in accord with conceptions of the good" (159).

J.'s nuanced "updating" of Aristotle in the light of current findings in modern psychology about neurosis and rationalization is quite satisfying and well pointed. His practical realism promotes the position that there are things to know about what is good, and that reason directs us to the good which can be understood and not merely felt. In fact, "knowledge of the good is needed in order for us to rationally desire it and to love it" (119).

Within his chapters on friendship, respect, and self love, one sees that J.'s realist methodology can be an approach to ethics which is at once deliberative and compassionate in its regard for each person's individual circumstances. Negatively, J. seems quite closed to any understanding of God as being the ground for the moral reality his mind so keenly judges (128).

Within his vision of practical realism J. accomplishes a relatively clear description of reason's role in judging moral truth. This book will be most valuable to those who are interested in current philosophical conversations about the role which reason (in contradistinction to desire and affects) plays in grasping the reality of the world. In this context, J. simply holds that being moral is a response to a proper understanding of the world.

AN ETHIC FOR ENEMIES: FORGIVENESS IN POLITICS. By Donald W. Shriver, Jr. New York: Oxford University, 1995. Pp. xi + 284. $27.50

Forgiveness is not a term often applied to politics. Indeed, we have been taught by "realists" like Reinhold Niebuhr to see little room for love or forgiveness in the conflicting power interests of human collectives. Shriver provides a profound challenge to this assessment, arguing that it is both possible and necessary to grope toward political forms of forgiveness.

S.'s view of forgiveness reflects neither cheap grace nor forgetfulness. Forgiveness is instead seen as a complex process, in which parties must name the wrong or injury, abandon vengeance, learn to empathize with the enemy's humanity, commit to repairing the fractured relationship. This process takes years, even decades; its end is difficult to achieve. Yet one comes away from this book with renewed hope. Here is a picture of human collectives seeking to redemptively remember, rather than conceal or forget, the harm they have done to each other.

The book's real strength is its abstaining from theoretical argument about the plausibility of repentance and forgiveness among nations. Instead, S. uses narrative "to identify both the need and the actual presence of forgiveness in [American] political history" (11). Looking to our wars with Germany and Japan and to the American civil-rights movement, he finds pain and ambiguity, but powerful examples of collective repentance and forgiveness also emerge (e.g. Germany's material compensation for Holocaust survivors, U.S. governmental apologies for the internment of Japanese Americans, Malcolm X's conciliatory movement toward civil-rights leaders).

The book has some limitations. S.'s discussion of American/Japanese relations makes one wonder if he seriously enough considers the culturally diverse ways in which people deal with a painful past (cf. 137–41, 152 ff.). Also problematic is the apparent presumption that repentance is always a prerequisite for forgiveness. S.'s own appeal to Jesus' forgiving his executioners (41) should have challenged this assumption.

JOSEPH J. KOTVA, JR.
First Menonite Church, Allentown

Kroeker reviews significant Christian voices in the debates about capitalism: the social gospel of Walter Rauschenbusch in the U.S.A. and of J. S. Woodsworth in Canada; their heirs in the Christian realism of Reinhold Niebuhr, and his critics in the Canadian Fellowship for a Christian Social Order; and the statements of Canadian and U.S. bishops on the economy. Generally fair in highlighting the theologies, social theories, and ethics of each, these summaries remind us of their sophistication, of important differences in Canadian and U.S. approaches to economics and theology, mission and politics, and of the need for dialogue.

Chapters devoted to those topics are bracketed by a critical analysis of “the modern social crisis” as a spiritual crisis reflecting a liberal anthropocentric utilitarian ethic limiting public discourse and by articulation of an alternative through retrieval of an Augustinian moral theology of creation. This retrieval enables K. to identify liberal influences in the modern Christian ethical approaches addressed.

K.’s criticism of the limitations of contemporary North American religious ethics is important; so is his stress on broadening debate to include spiritual/theological matters concerning the ordering of the whole of creation. But he does not try to situate various expressions of liberalism or their critics in their own contexts, or to evaluate their strengths and weaknesses accordingly. This suggests a certain idealism (“if only we had the right vision/theory . . .”), a thin sense of social order and politics, a weak sense of history, and vagueness concerning the relationship between “economic” and “spiritual” issues in the ethical agenda today.

There are other spiritual dimensions of the story: the religious overtones of the post-World War II discourse of “development” and “progress,” and of Cold War crusades concretely defining this agenda; baptism of the recent new right “revolution” by Christian fundamentalists and neoconservatives; the centrality of hope and faith for the social actors (communities and movements) which are nurturing alternative rationalities. Attention to them would reinforce and situate concretely K.’s stress on the spiritual character of the current crisis, and the importance of theological renewal for debates and struggles over the economy.

LEE CORMIE
Univ. of St. Michael’s College


Those who want a splendid journalistic account of the travails of the Catholic Church in dealing with sexual issues over the past three decades could hardly find a more interesting or informative book. They could not, that is, if they want their historical review organized and developed from the editorial perspective of the National Catholic Reporter. The connection is not arbitrary, since Fox is currently editor of NCR. Needless to say, more conservative minds will disagree strongly with the interpretation of this book.

F. ably describes how sexuality issues have split the Catholic Church, led to a loss of teaching authority, and divided theologians and laity alike. He details the debates over birth control, homosexuality, abortion, celibacy, population control, and sexual abuse by clergy. Looking behind the controversies, he discusses theological currents such as the renewal of moral theology, historical consciousness, and creation spirituality. As perhaps is inevitable, questions about church authority and about Catholics who have decided to make up their own minds form the background of the text. The role of women and the place of the laity in the Church get special attention. F.’s account is generally balanced. Still, he one-sidedly portrays John Paul II as a restorationist
who seeks to return the Church to its pre-Vatican II days. F. overlooks the personalist foundation that the pope tries to give for older teaching as well as for innovations he has introduced.

Though F. adds little to the academic discussion of the complex moral issues he treats, he is to be commended for a clear and fascinating survey of the recent Catholic debate over sexuality.

EDWARD COLLINS VACEK, S.J.
St. John's University, New York


Designed as an introduction for the general public to issues in contemporary medical ethics, this work aims to form intelligent consumers of medical care. The first section, “Everyday Medical Ethics: Issues for Everyone,” provides an overview of the ethical dilemmas that arise in daily medical practice, discusses physicians’ awareness of ethical issues, reviews elements of the patient-doctor relationship, and considers the difficult subjects of confidentiality and obtaining informed consent to treatment. The second part, “High-Tech Medical Ethics: Issues for Some,” discusses the ethical issues that are common in intensive care units, reproductive technology, and organ transplantation. The final part, “The New Everyday Ethics,” considers care of patients with AIDS, sexual abuse of patients by doctors, care of the elderly, and death and dying.

The book makes a worthwhile contribution in its discussion of the doctor-patient relationship and its emphasis on the need for patients to be active partners with their physicians in medical care. The authors provide valuable information on some of the ethical concerns arising in medical practice known to ethicists and ethically aware physicians but perhaps unknown to many patients.

There are, however, three difficulties with the book. The first is an abbreviated and confused approach to the foundations of ethical practice and decision making. The second difficulty is an occasionally unnuanced view of physician behavior that ignores some of the complexity and uncertainty inherent in medical practice. The third is that its discussion of end-of-life issues fails to distinguish passive euthanasia from withdrawal of life support and ignores the question of intentionality.

MYLES N. SHEEHAN, S.J., M.D.
Loyola Univ. Medical Ctr., Chicago


Most of us know firsthand that the traditional fee-for-service system of health care reimbursement has been replaced by some form of managed care in which a designated fee is paid for a specified range of health care services. While this is justified in the name of cost containment and resource conservation, Morreim explores how the changing economic realities of health care have altered the physician-patient relationship. What has emerged in the past few years is a “fiscal scarcity” where “literally every medical decision is now subject to scrutiny for its economic as well as its medical wisdom” (49). Fiscal scarcity creates an inescapable conflict for physicians between their fiduciary obligations toward the patient and their efficient expenditure of resources.

Unlike the standard of medical expertise that is owed to all patients in equal measure, the standard of resource use obliges the physician to secure only the resources to which the patient is legally and economically entitled. Beyond this, the physician owes the patient not only medical disclosure requisite for informed consent, but economic disclosure which includes the physician’s possible conflicts of interest and incentive arrangements.

The scope of this book is limited to be “moral issues facing physicians in the clinical setting” (83). This narrow focus facilely allows M. to assume the
legitimacy of the inequal access to health care evident in the current delivery system. Further, M. does not consider the role that religious commitments play in shaping ethical attitudes towards the issues surrounding the new economics of health care. Discussion of the social teaching of the Church and its concern for human dignity, the common good, the preferential option for the poor, and community accountability would have expanded the scope of this work to include the care to which a patient is entitled not only legally and economically, but also morally.

THOMAS R. KOPFENSTEINER
Kenrick School of Theology


Pastoral care is frequently criticized for replacing its theological basis with one from psychology or another human science. Howe addresses this criticism by invoking classical Christian theological anthropology, specifically the belief that human beings are created in the image of God. Summarizing the priestly tradition of creation in the book of Genesis and the theological reflections of Irenaeus, H. argues that human persons have the capacity to be the image of God but must activate this capacity by growing into the likeness of God throughout their lifetime while struggling with the effects of the fall and human sinfulness.

To explain how this process occurs, H. makes creative use of object-relations theory and its emphasis on interrelationships as the key to human development. A pivotal factor in his account is the role of transitional objects who provide the sources of comfort and strength which people need to progress through life. H. conceives God as analogous to a transitional object, and pastoral care/counseling as a way of helping people to recognize who they are, as mirrored by the presence of God, and to shape their lives in this likeness.

H. inserts case material (without much comment) to give these reflections a contemporary, pastoral connection. In Part 3 he concentrates on cases dealing with crisis, grief, and shame. H. uses these cases to illustrate the main points of his theology but does not offer many concrete suggestions for how a pastor might actually communicate these points in conversation or counseling. Nonetheless, he does show how the image of God, understood with the help of Irenaeus and object-relations theory, provides a suitable theological basis for pastoral care and counseling.

ROBERT L. KINAST
Center for Theol. Reflection, Fla.


Raj here attempts to show the affinity between classical Advaita Vedānta Hinduism and the contemporary New Age movement in North America and Western Europe. The author was born of Christian parents in Kerala, South India, received a Th.D. from Concordia Seminary in St. Louis, and now teaches at Concordia University in Mequon, Wisconsin. Consequently, he is in an excellent position to trace the influence of Hindu beliefs on New Age thinking in the West. His sympathies, to be sure, clearly lie with traditional Christian orthodoxy. But he evidently knows and within certain limits admires classical Hinduism.

His criticism is directed against the New Age movement which he sees as a pseudo-religion luring Western Christians away from the truth of Christian doctrine. In line with traditional Hindu monism or pantheism (only Brahman exists), for example, New Agers tend to blur the lines between God the Creator and creation with the result that belief in God as (tri-)personal is obscured. Likewise, following the classic Hindu belief in the Atman or transcendent inner self, New Agers repudiate the notion of themselves as sinners in need of redemption; “Christ” then signifies only a higher level of human consciousness, with Jesus as its principal though not exclusive embodiment.
While sympathetic to many of the complaints of Raj against the superficiality of New Age spirituality, this reviewer is wary of a sweeping condemnation of any contemporary religious movement. If certain insights drawn from classical Hinduism have such widespread appeal to contemporary Christians, perhaps they could be incorporated into the orthodox Christian understanding of the God-world relationship. Raj, however, points to experiments in this regard by Christian theologians which in his judgment have failed. Let the reader decide.

JOSEPH A. BRACKEN, S.J.
Xavier University, Cincinnati


Considerable attention has been paid recently to the fact that African traditional religions and cultures have survived despite severe encroachment by foreign religions and cultures. However, the focus is often on the dynamism and persistence of the indigenous religions and cultures in Africa. In this well-researched book, Paris adds a new dimension to the investigations.

Pointing to the African factor in the experience of African peoples in the North American African diaspora, P. shows that African spirituality, which the slaves carried to North America, has not only withstood obliteration, but has given and continues to give diaspora Africans both consciousness and direction in their struggle against slavery and a strategy for communal survival. He argues that there is "continuity of moral and religious experience between Africans on the continent and those in the North American diaspora" (161). In the experience of both, religion has played a central role in the struggle for social justice.

In trying to explicate the commonalities of religious and moral experience underlying the many cultural differences among Africans on the continent and those in the North American diaspora, P. shows his knowledge and experience of African religious and cultural traditions. Although African traditions are diverse in cultural form, he argues, African peoples everywhere are united in one spirituality which underlies the traditions. He points to the peoples' experience of God, community, family, and person as the foundation of this spirituality. The urge for communal survival, tolerance, vision, reciprocity, patience, understanding, hospitality—all elements of an African worldview—constituted the only reliable frame of meaning which enabled Africans, both on the continent and in the diaspora, to endure years of slavery and discrimination.

P.'s valuable study contributes significantly to existing literature in African and African-American scholarship.

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BOOKS RECEIVED

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SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY


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BOOKS RECEIVED


MORALITY AND LAW


**PASTORAL, SPIRITUAL, AND LITURGICAL**


**PHILOSOPHY, OTHER DISCIPLINES**


**SPECIAL QUESTIONS**


