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This volume of THEOLOGICAL STUDIES appears under new editorship. My first task, on behalf of our readership, is to thank the outgoing editor, Robert J. Daly, S.J., who oversaw twenty issues of this journal and promoted its excellence. Our thanks also to several editorial consultants who have completed their terms: Gregory Baum, Charles Hefling, James Hennesey, and Jean Porter. A new editorial consultant, William M. Thompson of Duquesne University, has joined us.

The first issue of volume 57 contains four ARTICLES that study divine providence, John Courtney Murray, Eberhard Jüngel, and the axiom "in persona Christi." There is also a short NOTE on reader-response criticism, as well as CURRENT THEOLOGY, Notes on Moral Theology, focusing on two specific issues: pastoral care of the divorced and remarried, and the return of casuistry in moral theology.

Does God Play Dice? Divine Providence and Chance sets up a dialogue between contemporary scientific consensus on the role that chance plays in the universe and the classical Thomistic view of God's providential relationship to the world in order to help us endorse anew the integrity of created systems and reimagine God's play in the world. ELIZABETH A. JOHNSON, C.S.J., received her Ph.D. from the Catholic University of America and is professor of theology at Fordham University. Author of the award-winning SHE WHO IS: The Mystery of God in Feminist Theological Discourse (Crossroad, 1992) and more recently Women, Earth, and Creator Spirit (Paulist, 1993), she is currently writing a book on Mary and the saints from an ecumenical and feminist perspective.

Theological Sources of John Courtney Murray's Ethics examines the two fundamental paradigms by which Murray understood human participation in God's life. J. LEON HOOPER, S.J., received his Ph.D. from Boston College and is a senior research fellow at Woodstock Theological Center, Georgetown University. He has edited two volumes of Murray's texts: Religious Liberty: Catholic Struggles with Pluralism (Westminster/John Knox, 1993) and Bridging the Sacred and the Secular (Georgetown University, 1994).

Eberhard Jüngel on the Structure of Theology probes Jüngel's early essays on the nature and tasks of Christian theology, stressing the role of faith in theological reflection and outlining his understanding of theology as a "scientific" discipline. PAUL DEHART received his M.A.R. (1990) from Yale University and is at present completing doctoral studies at the University of Chicago with a dissertation entitled "Metaphysics after the Cross and the God Beyond Necessity in the Thought of Eberhard Jüngel."

In Persona Christi: Towards a Second Naïveté further pursues the author's earlier research on the much cited axiom (see TS 1994 and


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MORALITY AND LAW


PASTORAL, SPIRITUAL, AND LITURGICAL


**PHILOSOPHY, OTHER DISCIPLINES**

BOOK REVIEWS


McGinn, well known for his work in the history of apocalyptic thought and spirituality, here turns his attention to a key player in any such scenario, the Antichrist. He traces that figure from its origins in the combination of myth, history, and legend of Judeo-Christian apocalyptic speculation down to the present day, thus surveying over 2000 years of Christian history, both in the East and the West.

At the same time that we view this rich forest, individual trees stand out for extended treatment (with up-to-date bibliographical references in the footnotes). Thus we meet such thinkers as Origen, Jerome, and Augustine; Adso the Monk, Joachim of Fiore, Peter Olivi, John Wycliffe, and the Hussites; Luther, Calvin, Anabaptists, English Puritans; Hal Lindsey and John Walvoord. Significant historical events left their mark on the Antichrist figure. The conversion of the Roman Empire to Christianity meant that it was no longer the enemy (as in the Book of Revelation) but would have a positive role to play (the "Last World Emperor"). The rise of and struggles with Islam would begin to push out Judaism as the home of the Antichrist. In the controversies over lay investiture and papal reform, each side used Antichrist language to attack the other. With the rise of the mendicant orders (seen especially in the Franciscan Spirituals) and the career of Frederick II, individual popes were often cast in the role of Antichrist. For the Protestant Reformers, the office of the papacy itself housed the Antichrist, but as different reform groups grew and divided, Antichrist invective was thrown at each other; thus this once terrifying figure became a bit of a bore. With the coming of the Enlightenment, Antichrist was marginalized even more as the province of fanatics and cranks.

While the writings of theologians and exegetes form a major source for our knowledge of the Antichrist through the centuries, they are not our only source. Illuminated manuscripts, especially of the biblical books of Revelation and Psalms, often depict the Antichrist figure. Later, blockbooks and chapel frescoes will depict cycles from the life of Antichrist. He appears also in morality plays (from France, Italy, Germany, and England), often with vulgar, scatological humor. Poets (e.g., in the Romance of the Rose, The Divine Comedy, Piers Plowman) present him in vivid colors. In more modern times, he figures in both novels (Dostoyevsky, Solovyev, R. Benson, C. Williams) and movies (Rosemary's Baby, The Omen).

M. highlights a number of dialectics which recur throughout the various representations of the Antichrist. In a few instances, he is
identified with the devil, but more often he is a human figure, embodying, in a parody of the Incarnation, what each age sees as the greatest evils. Sometimes, Antichrist is an individual figure, at others, a collective one. He can be a threatening figure from outside, external to the Christian community; or he can be located within, either as heretics who would lead others astray, or as a force to sin within each person (the position of Origen and Augustine). At times he is a powerful, oppressive tyrant; at others, the slick deceiver, father of the lie. The tendency to demonize one's opponents, within or without the Church, has been one of the most disturbing and destructive aspects of Antichrist speculation. The problem is certainly still with us.

In considering the Antichrist today, some approach him in a literalistic way; others dismiss him as irrational folly. Between these two extremes lies a third way which M. espouses and argues persuasively. Antichrist should be taken seriously but not literalistically. It is a powerful symbol of the meaning of human evil; "the Antichrist legend can be seen as a projection, or perhaps better as a mirror, for conceptions and fears about ultimate human evil... Perhaps Antichrist today is not so much dead as disguised..." (2). In an age such as ours, whose power to destroy seems equalled only by its ability to deceive, this important book offers not just a trip through history for the curious, but a strong reminder in our time of the gospel challenge to be ever watchful.

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MICHAEL D. GUINAN, O.F.M.


Goldingay presents a doctrine of Scripture by revisiting the traditional categories of tradition, inspiration, authority, canon, inerrancy, and revelation. These categories often form battlegrounds that sharply divide conservative and liberal Christians, and widely differing viewpoints surface in the present discussion. Rather than abandon the traditional categories G. seeks to heal them by bringing them under the framework of models. G. asserts that each of the main categories—tradition, authority, inspiration, and revelation—contains a core metaphor that is particularly suited to describe a part of Scripture, and difficulties arise when the metaphor is extended to all of Scripture. E.g., inspiration naturally arises in discussing the prophets, but it has been extended to cover the entire Bible. The extension may be legitimate, but clarity can only come from first exploring the primary place where the metaphor arose and then extending it carefully to the rest. G. proposes four models: Scripture as witnessing tradition, as authoritative canon, as inspired word, and as the record of experienced revelation.

G.'s work has several strengths. First, he dialogues with a wide
range of contemporary scholars (the bibliography weighs in at 30 pages), and his discussions of individual points are nuanced and balanced. When necessary he sketches the historical background of disputed issues. Second, in presenting a doctrine of Scripture he tries to stay close to the text of the Bible. E.g., he introduces the section on authority with treatments of Psalm 119 and the temptation narrative in Matthew and the section on inspiration with a discussion of Jeremiah 36. Third, although his primary audience is the academic community, he also demonstrates a pastoral concern for how a doctrine of Scripture can influence the life of the churches; in his discussion of inerrancy, e.g., he includes a section on the practical disadvantages under which a doctrine of inerrancy labors.

G. gives pride of place to the witnessing tradition since narrative dominates both Testaments. Both recount foundational events that come to us in the form of stories about Israel’s encounter with God and God’s work in Jesus handed on by witnesses. G. concedes there is no bare history devoid of interpretation, but he argues that good grounds exist for considering the witness of Scripture to the facts generally reliable and adequate, though not inerrant. The biblical preference for “story” and fiction complicates any discussion of factuality. All biblical narrative lies somewhere on a continuum between historiography and imaginative writing.

For G., authority is most at home in legal and ethical norms. To speak of the authority of Scripture is to speak of the help Scripture gives on social, political, and ethical issues. But apart from its natural home in ethics G. shows how the notion of authority can be invested in all of Scripture, so that the Bible also provides the norms for Christian doctrine. He embeds his treatment of canon in this section on authority, devoting chapters to the development of the Jewish and Christian canons. G.’s general balance and good judgment surface in his discussion of the bounds of the canon. He sees content as the operative norm in canon formation. Christian writings were accepted as apostolic not primarily because they had apostolic authors but because they expressed the shared vision of the apostolic faith. He also insists that the edges of the canon may be blurred, but that the core of the Second Testament, the four Gospels and the Pauline Letters, is not a subject of controversy. G. is at his best sorting through difficult questions like the relationship of Scripture and human experience. He rejects a naïve view of experience as prereflective immediacy and opts rather for a nuanced view of experience that includes interpretation, and he argues for a dialectical relationship between language and experience. We bring understanding to our experience and experience molds our understanding. Learning the story of Israel and Jesus helps us interpret and experience ourselves and our world, and our experiences reflects back on our understanding of Scripture.

In treating inspiration G. begins with the prophets and their claim to speak for God, and he works outward toward the rest of Scripture.
The prophetic word as word of God works dynamically for both negative and positive ends; it "brings people to death or to new life" (211). It also claims to be true, reliable, effective, and meaningful, even beyond its initial context. These qualities of the prophetic word transfer to other parts of Scripture that also are effective in realizing God's purpose and that are significant even beyond their original contexts. Although G. treats psychological models of inspiration, he wisely places the main emphasis on the text, not the author. He discusses inerrancy in relationship to inspiration, and he concludes with his usual moderation that Scripture is broadly accurate but not inerrant.

G. finds the model of revelation most at home in the apocalypses. Staying close to the text, he uses Daniel 10–12 to show how an apocalypse resolves the crises in history by opening up a vision of the future that has its basis in the lived past experience of God. In extending revelation to all of Scripture G. includes a fine synthesis of how imagery, metaphor, and symbol serve as vehicles of revelation. This treatment of imagery is typical. The book contains many insightful syntheses of issues, and it forms a welcome addition to the debate about the Bible.

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Harry T. Fleddermann


Meyer's title already reveals that this work is more of a Kampfschrift than one expects a "primer" to be. M.'s publications on the problem of New Testament hermeneutics, including Critical Realism and the New Testament and Christus Faber, have been promoting Lonergan's epistemology as the antidote to the chronic discord in this field. His sometimes brusque and patronizing dismissals of the epistemologically unsophisticated, whose ranks include a number of scholars who have had their names in lights, strike a resounding contrast to his reverential transmission of Lonergan's theory of cognition with "no attempt to improve on the master" (viii). One is instinctively on guard against the likely sleight of hand by which such a theory of knowledge will be fitted to, maybe even wrapped around, the NT text, which is allowed only a rather small space and summary treatment in chaps. 1–2 and 7–8.

But there is much to appreciate here. M. writes in a lively and engaging style which will help the reluctant explorer of philosophical hermeneutics through such Lonerganian sinews as "intentionality," "self-reversals," "horizons," "conversion," "sublation," "dialectic," etc. (A thoughtful and sizable glossary offers assistance to the traveler inexperienced in this terrain.) He is also quite astute in his appraisal of the present state of affairs in NT study, especially in North America,
where "ideological movements" from mostly nonreligious sources have replaced theology as guide to textual interpretation (60).

And in the face of this trend, "critical realism," with its "inbuilt antibodies against ideology" (142), insists on the primacy of interpretation over analysis, urges the intersection of cognitive horizons as the basis of interpretation, and rehabilitates the "intended sense as intrinsic to the text and as the primary object of interpretation" (60). One can only applaud these hermeneutical theorems and augur their victory in the contest with hard-core deconstruction, postmodern pluralism, and other "fallacies of insight" subjected to trenchant critique in chap. 6. The fallacies are exhaustively divisible, so it seems, into those which make intellectual insight a pure reception (picture-thinking, as in neoscholastic "naive realism") and those making it a pure projection (Kant's innumerable progeny).

When it comes to "identifying New Testament horizons and making them accessible to prospective interpreters" (156), however, "critical realist" hermeneutics looks like an intellectualistic canopy for conservative exegetical positions—much as, one remembers, Lonergan's *Method in Theology* was depicted in respect to conservative Catholic dogmatics. Circular reasoning yokes cognitional theory to basic beliefs, and the theorist spends nearly all his or her time on the operations to be performed in the discipline, relatively little on its content. There is a basic distrust of history concealed in all the talk about it, and "diversity" in the NT traditions is not allowed to proceed to the point of "division" (170–71), *pace* Galatians 1:6 ("another gospel"), 1 Corinthians 1:10–17, Matthew 5:17, and other discomforting witnesses. Indeed, a unitary kerygma at the core of all NT expression is also de fide for M. One should therefore not wonder at the absence of H. Conzelmann from the bibliography—an advocate of the nuclear significance of NT kerygmatic formulas, but not their seamless unity.

Given the critical realist's cognitive certainty about the existence of a God who is all-powerful, all-knowing, and all-good, and the fact that this rational affirmation belongs to the "horizon" required for critical-realist hermeneutics of the NT (see M.'s Appendix), one is left wondering what can be done with texts like 1 Corinthians 1:18–25, about the God who *acted* in the crucifixion, whose "ways are not your ways," etc. Forging ahead on this rational premise, however, we find that the problem of evil, depicted as the NT "problem" *simpliciter*, necessarily has a comprehensive "solution" because clear thinking will not let things turn out otherwise. This, in turn, already puts us on the track of the solution which revelation has obligingly furnished. Moreover, an agile step then requires that the expiatory effect of Jesus' death should be traced to Jesus' own interpretation via another apriorism: "an expiatory death cannot be conceived as an unwilled act" (184). By this point, the room left to the historical contingency and independence of God's revelation, to say nothing of the incarnate historicity of God's word in NT traditions, seems to have shrunken considerably.
Small disappointments include endnotes to which one is not alerted in the text. Some partners in the dialogue did not make the bibliography back-up to their endnotes, e.g. A. Vogtle, P. Fiedler, and R. Pesch, contenders in the expiatory-death debate. And such NT passages as are quoted or presupposed in argument are not always cited. In sum, I doubt that many wayward interpreters will be brought to "conversion" by this work. All the same, I found it informative, stimulating, even entertaining, though it must be read with caution.

Fordham University, New York

RICHARD J. DILLON

A CRITICAL AND EXEGETICAL COMMENTARY ON THE ACTS OF THE APOSTLES 1: PRELIMINARY INTRODUCTION AND COMMENTARY ON ACTS I–XIV.


The ICC has been a venerable institution in biblical study and interpretation. Begun in 1895 under the direction of C. A. Briggs, S. R. Driver, and A. Plummer, it has been known for its detailed, critical, and theological interpretation. Despite many eminent volumes commenting on books of the Old and New Testaments, it never had a commentary on the Acts of the Apostles. A new series of the ICC was begun with the two-volume commentary on Romans by C. E. B. Cranfield in 1975. Now, finally, we are getting one on Acts, and it lives up to the venerable tradition of its forebears in the series.

In this first volume, Barrett presents a "preliminary introduction," discussing the text of Acts, its author, the sources, plan, and outline of Acts 1–14. The rest of the volume contains the commentary on Acts 1–14. One might be surprised that only a few introductory questions are discussed; that is the reason for the adjective "preliminary," since an introduction is properly the last thing one writes for such a commentary, after detailed exegetical work has provided the basis for the generic discussion of such introductory topics. As a result, the reader will have to await Vol. 2 for B.'s answers to some of the usual questions raised by the text of Acts.

In discussing the text of Acts, B. supplies the necessary evidence of its threefold form: the Alexandrian or Neutral text (on which his translation and commentary are based), the Western text, and the Byzantine text (with both of which he copes in notes on verses). The only surprise in lining up the evidence of papyri, uncials, minuscules, lectionary, and patristic readings is his failure to list 33, "the queen of the minuscules" (7). He supplies a good account of the ancient versions of Acts (Latin, Syriac, and Coptic) and reckons with the recent work of M.-E. Boismard and A. Lamouille in their attempt to reconstruct the form(s) of the Western text. But he rightly prefers not to agree with them that the text stems from Luke himself as well as the Alexandrian. He is inclined to regard the "occasional additions or paraphrases" of the Western text as the work of "an editor or copyist" (28).
The solution of Boismard and Lamouille is, however, far more complicated than B.'s presentation of it, because he says nothing of what they call the "literacy criticism" of Acts, which should rather be referred to as "source criticism" ([Les Actes des deux Apôtres [3 vols.; Paris: Gabalda, 1990]). Their analysis of Acts from this point of view, related closely to their discussion of the textual transmission, is so complicated as to be improbable. Perhaps that is why he has not mentioned it.

In the second part of the introduction B. treats "Acts and Its Author," limiting himself to a discussion of the ancient ecclesiastical tradition about Luke as the author of Acts. He begins with the end of the tradition, Eusebius, Jerome, and canonical lists, and then goes on to show how that tradition developed from earlier testimonies in the New Testament, 1 Clement, Didache, Barnabas, Ignatius, Polycarp, 2 Clement, Hermas, Epistle of Diognetus, Epistula Apostolorum, Justin, and the Muratorian Canon.

The third part is devoted to "Acts 1–14: Sources and Plan," in which B. presents the main opinions of A. von Harnack, R. Bultmann, J. Jeremias, and P. Benoit. He is skeptical about the suggestions of these scholars when they are taken as referring to written sources, but he all too readily accepts the view of E. Haenchen that the generation that regarded itself as the last did not write for a coming one. B. emphasizes that Luke probably got information by letters from the great Pauline centers such as Philippi, Corinth, Antioch, and Jerusalem. (Since the We-Sections only begin in Acts 16, B. reserves his discussion of that problem and its relation to a possible source for Vol. 2.) The fourth part of the introduction supplies a numbered outline of chaps. 1–14, which shows the thrust of Acts as B. understands it.

The commentary proper is filled with many good exegetical discussions. Each numbered pericope provides a translation, a select bibliography, a comment on the pericope as a whole, and exegetical notes on individual verses. B. takes into account recent articles and books on each pericope and invariably makes good use of them, sifting the likely from unlikely suggestions. Details in the bibliographies might have been more carefully checked; some of the abbreviations used in the sectional bibliographies do not appear in the list (xiii–xxiii). Over all, the commentary makes a very good impression, and it will long be used by students, scholars, and educated readers. The last mentioned may find the quotations in foreign languages a bit disconcerting, not to mention untranslated Greek and Hebrew phrases.


For more than a century the preponderant scholarly portrayal of Judaism has been of a tradition primarily auditory rather than visual.
The notion that in Judaism from time immemorial the godhead has spoken only in words is now cogently and compellingly challenged by Wolfson in this broad ranging, carefully analyzed and trenchantly argued study of the revelatory function of vision and imagination in the central texts of Jewish mysticism during its formative and classical periods.

With a balance that gives weight both to personal experience and to the interpretive background provided by the tradition of the mystic, W. in instance after instance shows that “the visionary experience itself is shaped (and not merely interpreted in light of) certain theoretical assumptions” (7). Hence, his richly suggestive first chapter, drawing from biblical, apocalyptic and rabbinic sources, clearly sets out the paradox already present in the Bible itself: “From one perspective it is clearly impossible to speak of seeing God, since it is axiomatic that God does not possess a material form; yet from another it is precisely such a claim to visionary experience that must be upheld” (51). (Cf. Exodus 24:10 and 33:20.)

Ever appreciative of Gershom Scholem’s invaluable contribution in making Jewish mysticism available to this age, W. nonetheless qualifies certain of Scholem’s assertions, among them the latter’s tendency to prefer mysticism of the introverted type, “a formlessness that overcomes all forms,” over the cognitive, “the beholding of the ultimate form—a vision of God in gleams of ecstatic vision” (61–62). Affirming the role of imagination “hermeneutically as an agent of meaning in the production of symbols” (63), W. then proceeds to analyze typologically, phenomenologically, and historically visions of God in the early Hekhalot literature, some important medieval pre-Cabbalistic figures, and more extensively the German Pietists of the 12th–13th centuries, and the array of Provençal-Spanish cabbalists whose work culminates in The Zohar.

This bare listing, though impressive enough in the scope of material covered, fails to convey the energy and excitement that burst forth from page after page of this remarkably wide-ranging yet tightly argued work. Biblical verses gain new significance. “And through the prophets I was imaged” (Hosea 12:11) is repeatedly cited as warrant for the imaging of the divine in various forms. Images of the divine involving chariot, throne, light, fire, name, crown, face, phallus, and hieros gamos tumble from nearly every page, yet always in phenomenological and historical context and carefully directed to advance W.’s central thesis, the centrality of the visual in medieval Jewish mysticism, with ample biblical and classical rabbinic support.

Certain of W.’s arguments, however, are more intriguing than convincing. E.g., the chain of reasoning and symbolic interpretation on behalf of the claim that “the Shekhinah is the protruding aspect of the divine phallus, the corona of the penis” (339) seems both strained and constraining. Such a restricted concretization of Shekinah, apart from questions about the validity of some of the symbolic equivalencies,
makes difficult the visualization of Shekinah as participant in the clearly heterosexual hieros gamos, another central cabbalistic image. W. himself speaks elsewhere of the “fluidity” of the motif of coronation imagery (367). More generally, I would argue that a unique strength of a nonrepresentational iconic tradition (that is, one which validates images but refuses to give them concrete material rather than verbal form) is precisely this fluidity of form with its possibility of a simultaneity of valences for any given image. Despite this caveat, W.’s overall argument for an ocular phallocentrism is surely an intriguing one that invites, I think, a possibly fruitful comparative inquiry into the phallus of the Anthropos and the Shiva lingam typologically and dynamically.

W.’s work is scholarship in the grand tradition—sweeping in scope and references, precise in analysis and argumentation—with a range of primary and secondary citations that are all the more accessible because they are printed in footnotes to each page rather than as endnotes. Yet W.’s work is not only for scholars; it has value for religious seekers and practitioners as well. While not easy reading, it is clearly presented and evocatively rich in its wealth of source citations. The discussion of prophecy, poetry, and the mystic with respect to imagery is quite suggestive, and the judicious selections of poetry (173–81) would enrich any religious service or meditation. The emphasis on the experiential, together with the excitement of textual confrontation that for the mystics provided “the occasion for visionary experience” (326) might have comparable if mild effects on the reader as well.

Technically speaking, W.’s book is a speculum that does not shine (from intrinsic divine light). It does, however, manage to provide considerable illumination by virtue of the light that it collects and refracts from a variety of visionary and critical sources. Erich Neumann once wrote: “The godhead speaks in colors and symbols. They are the core of the world of feeling and truth. . . . Only the flame . . . can reveal the secret of the world and its divine heart.” If Neumann’s words are true, we have all the more reason to be grateful to W. for so generously stoking that flame.

Phillips Academy, Andover, Mass.        Everett Gendler


This important, stimulating overview of a crucial aspect of Pascal’s project for an Apology, namely his views concerning various brands of disbelief and the processes of conversion, providing a useful mise au point of much current Pascal scholarship. For those without French it includes English translations of all passages and refers to Lafuma’s numeration, the only one readily available in English.
Wetsel argues strongly that Pascal intended to forge a single complete Apology from his notes. Citing the most recent scholarship (Sellier, Ernst), he claims that in certain texts (specifically 427) we see Pascal reworking earlier notes (in this case 163 and the dossier “Commencement”) and encourages scholars to find other such cases demonstrating the evolution of Pascal's vision of his intended work.

W. opens with a long chapter reviewing the history of libertinage in the 17th century, in which he appears to me to give too much credence to evidence from Garasse and Mersenne and to Pintard's assessment of how widespread the libertinage actually was. He concludes, like others before him, that the libertines were not in Pascal's mind adversaries. (This seems natural since for Pascal disbelief was not so much a set of doctrines as a state of the heart.)

The following chapter deals at length with Isaac de La Peyrère, whose pre-Adamite thesis Pascal alludes to (apparently without having read La Peyrère's works). W. points out that in Pascal's day the modern concept of "deep time" was emerging, and that here, as elsewhere, Pascal's stand was doctrinaire and retrogressive, as he defended the literal interpretation of Old Testament time.

Since Pascal frequently claims that Christianity alone among world religions understands human nature, just what religions does he have in mind, and what does he know about them? W. shows that Pascal mentions only Islam and Chinese religion in any depth, and that he was indeed skimpily informed on both, though each was the subject of significant discussion at the time (e.g., Du Ryer's 1647 translation of the Koran and Père Martini's 1657 Histoire de la Chine).

Although W. concludes in each of the three opening chapters that Pascal's acquaintance with the issues of disbelief was not profound, his surveys of what was known and discussed in Pascal's day provide essential contexts for understanding the dimensions of the Pensées and their rather rigid Augustinianism.

The following chapter details with 418 (the wager) and fragments 427 and 428, which constitute a "Preface" for the Apology. In some of his most valuable pages, W. analyzes carefully 418, especially the seven speeches by the disbeliever, in order to determine whom Pascal envisages as his adversary—not surprisingly a man who is searching earnestly for the truth. He then turns to 427, which he argues convincingly would open the Apology. The portrait of the obdurate skeptic there does not describe the unbeliever Pascal wishes to convert; rather it depicts a state of mind so perverse that it will inspire disgust in the more moderate unbeliever (something of an honnête homme) and prepare him for the next argument—the wager.

The final chapter, for me the most original, discusses the mechanisms of custom, religious practice, and catechesis in the process of conversion. Since grace is ultimately a free gift from God (and one which can be refused), what role, if any, can argument or indoctrination have? How can any Apology expect to be effective? W. concludes
that Pascal felt constrained to change his target disbeliever from the hardened skeptic to the unhappy but sincere seeker of truth.

W.’s topic prevents him from considering significant areas of Pascal’s thought, especially the *misère de l’homme sans Dieu*. He fails to treat at length Pyrrhonism, though it seems to me a natural appendage to his topic. (In fact his few comments err by tracing Pascal’s Pyrrhonism to Montaigne, when it is clearly formulated entirely in Cartesian contexts.)

He comments frequently on how incompatible Pascal’s conservative stands are with modern Christianity (in our “post-Christian” age). I do not see modern Christianity as so monolithic or unanimous in its thinking; nor does Pascal seem to me so terribly outdated.

I am disturbed that on occasion W.’s use of technical terms (“ontological argument” [41], “theodicy” [106 f.], and “cosmological argument” [283]), seems to betray a shaky understanding of their meaning.

Bringing Pascal’s diverse fragments, often inconsistent or enigmatic, into a comprehensive perspective is a challenging task. W.’s discussions are models of clarity and pertinence (though the work would benefit from elimination of the many repetitions). My occasional demurrers in no way diminish my admiration for this work, essential reading for Pascalians. Bravo!

*Fordham University, New York*  
*Craig B. Brush*


The High Church tradition of English Anglicanism surveyed in this volume claims that the established church is not the Protestant Church of England, but the Catholic Church in England. Hylson-Smith, a Fellow of St. Cross College at Oxford, maintains that in every generation from the Reformation to the present there has been one, distinctive stream of Anglicanism which held to the position that religion unnourished by a historic visible church with its sacramental system could not long maintain vital spiritual life within the realm of England, that a visible church is essential to the survival of Christianity, and that bishops in the apostolic succession are necessary. High Churchmanship, by contrast to other strands of Anglicanism, for 450 years has conceived of the English Church as a spiritual organism deriving its life and its authority from Jesus Christ and his apostles and their successors, rather than from the British Crown, the laws of Parliament, or the actions of 16-century Reformers. For these reasons it has made a unique, if often overlooked, contribution to world Christianity, and it is the purpose of this book to make the entire sweep of High Church Anglicanism more readily accessible.
H. succeeds in this goal, for he provides a comprehensive account of the accomplishments of this group within the Church of England through five centuries. As such the book will serve as a useful overview text within Anglican seminaries and other institutions, and as a corrective to the false or incomplete views of Roman Catholics, Lutherans, and others who are in theological dialogue with Anglicans around the world. There is precise analysis given of the key theologians of the school (Hooker, Butler, Newman, Gore, Ramsey), of the poets (Herbert, Ken, Keble), of spiritual guides (Ferrar, Andrewes, Taylor, Pusey), of liturgists (Dix, Hebert, Frere), of ecclesiatical statesmen (Laud, Church, Temple, Runcie). Nor does H. neglect Anglican slum priests or social reformers such as Frederick Denison Maurice who spoke of the Eucharist as the power to redeem the social order, a sign which could show the way to the recovery of corporate life in a Western civilization that had lost any common bond. These variegated riches are brought together in an imaginative, lucid whole and placed judiciously within the cultural dynamic of the economic and political shifts of England since 1534.

In addition to providing access to this multiplicity, a particular contribution of the volume is its treatment of post-World War II Anglican Catholicism. For the first time, H. gives us a systematic introduction to the story of the deep division which arose within the High Church party between traditionalists of the Right (Graham Leonard and Gareth Bennett—a suicide), who have migrated toward the Roman Church, and Anglo-Catholics of the Left such as the Jubilee Group and Affirming Catholicism (led by Bishops Richard Holloway and Rowan Williams), groups who have embraced the ordination of women as part of the natural development of Catholicism and who have extended hospitality to gay and lesbian Christians. H. also fills a lacuna by providing information on the Hackney Phalanx, a little-known High Church group which came just before the well-known Oxford Movement of the early 19th century.

Ultimately, however, the book goes no farther than being a fine introduction to famous and obscure names. It is based on secondary sources in English (in addition to a few unpublished dissertations). These titles are drawn almost without exception from the traditional British bibliography of the High Church. An alternative perspective drawn from unpublished archives, or rare pamphlets, or the interpretations of Anglicans from other continents, or critics, or the appraisal of the High Church by Christians of other denominations is almost entirely absent from these pages. The marked ecumenical dimension of Anglican Catholicism from the time of the Oxford Movement through the tenure of Archbishop Michael Ramsey is overlooked. Such limitations of perspective and research prevent the book from breaking new scholarly ground.

*General Theological Seminary, New York*  
R. WILLIAM FRANKLIN

With this work, Sieben completes his four-volume history of the idea of council in Roman Catholic theology. It began with Die Konzilsidee der Alten Kirche in 1979 and included volumes on the Latin Middle Ages (1984) and on the period from the Reformation through the 18th century (1988). Like the other three, this volume is a major work of scholarship, embodying massive research in primary and secondary sources. The whole book consists of clear and systematic accounts in chronological order of what authors or groups said about the nature and role of councils, meaning mainly ecumenical councils, in the Church, with relatively little comment by S.

Clarity and objectivity pervade every chapter, as S. painstakingly threads his way through divergent views on the nature and relationship of the episcopate and the papacy, noting wherever relevant significant political and other influences on the authors studied, some famous, some long-forgotten. Thus, Roman ex-Jesuit Giovan Vincenzo Bolgenti, in a treatise on the episcopate (1789) significantly recognized the collegial quality of the body of bishops but reaffirmed the traditional Roman stress on papal supremacy. A council has authority only under the pope. National differences concerning conciliar authority come through in the next several chapters also. Italian authors uniformly rejected the doctrine of the Council of Constance on the supremacy of a council over the pope, and applauded the steadily growing Ultramontane movement, which became the dominant phenomenon of the decades leading up to 1870. In France and Germany, some became strong adherents of Roman-style papal monarchy, while others were disturbed by it. Henri Maret of Paris, convinced that church history shows no basis for the absolute subordination of the whole Church to the Roman Pontiff, argued eloquently that a more constitutional regime would be truer to the Church’s own tradition and also enable the Church to benefit from the valid insights of modern liberal thought. Johann Heinrich of Mainz, thinking that a powerful papacy would help free the Church from oppressive governments like the Prussian, strongly promoted the Ultramontane view, including papal supremacy over councils.

Two chapters deal with the events of Vatican I (though not with the council’s own documents). S. details in the Roman Jesuit journal Civiltà Cattolica the view that the council’s purpose is to reassert church authority against all liberals. But though Pius IX and most of the council fathers shared that view, a surprising chapter shows that they thought the council should not be thought of as against the world, but for the world, for the council would benefit humanity spiritually and even temporally with its assertion of Christian faith and wisdom. The really exhaustive nature of S.’s research shows itself in two chapters that plough through a huge array of post-Vatican I treatises and
De Ecclesia manuals studying what they say about questions like the papal role in convoking and confirming councils, and noting how few took newer historical research into account.

Ways in which the situation changed dramatically in the era of Vatican II are well known, but S.'s chapters on these recent decades are valuable for the way in which they integrate the new contributions coherently into the ongoing development of the idea of council. S. gives good succinct reports on how Congar, Künig, and Rahner complement traditional juridical treatments with more deeply theological accounts of what a council is (for Künig, e.g., the council by human convocation is a representation of the Church convoked by God; for Congar, the council is an expression of the Church as a communion of faith). An excellent chapter presents Pope John's own understanding of the council, drawn from several encyclicals, his opening address at the council, and many other statements. The book's longest chapter details what Vatican II itself says about the exercise of collegiality which a council is, especially in Lumen gentium and Christus Dominus.

Among valuable chapters on the postconciliar years one discusses the role of the idea of council in some major consensus documents produced in ecumenical dialogues, and the last deals with the ongoing discussion of three contemporary topics, infallibility, reception (which S. sees as a most significant idea), and the interpretation of Vatican II documents. As always, S. details what numerous authors have said with very little comment of his own. The book ends in this same way, with no summary, synthesis, or prognostication. This volume, like the previous three, is meticulous in its detailed handling of sources and encyclopedic in scope; it will stand as a major reference work for years to come.

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RICHARD F. COSTIGAN, S.J.


Cox desires to draw critical attention to the spectacular rise of Pentecostal and charismatic forms of Christianity. He is convinced that the mainline religious and theological communities, Protestant and Roman Catholic, are failing to notice what very well may be the single most significant phenomenon in 20th-century Christianity. Pentecostalism is the fastest growing movement in Christianity today. As a distinctive branch of Protestantism, it soon will celebrate 100 years since the day in 1906 when an itinerant black preacher by the name of William Joseph Seymour launched his Azusa Street congregation in Los Angeles.

Part 1 evokes the turn-of-the-century excitement which attended the birth of Pentecostalism, narrates in detail the circumstances that led
to the establishment of the Azusa Street church, and traces the growth of the movement throughout the U.S. and to every corner of the globe. Part 2 attempts to explain this stunning development.

Pentecostalism’s appeal resides in its ability to retrieve elements of a primal spirituality that modernity has diminished. The established, mainline churches, seduced by an Enlightenment mentality, have paid little attention to basic human needs, such as “primal speech, primal piety, and primal hope” (82). In addition to Pentecostalism’s ability to tap into basic needs, it has also provided a way for women to assume church leadership. Pentecostals have ordained women almost from the beginning. C. tells the remarkable story of another Los Angeles Pentecostal preacher, Aimee Semple McPherson. And in what may be the book’s most intriguing and original reflection, C. also suggests that Pentecostalism is the religious version of jazz. Both were coming into their own at the turn of the century, both are powerfully influenced by African American culture and manifest similar qualities of tone, style, and mood.

Part 3 is a wide-ranging report on Pentecostalism’s growth in Latin America, Europe, Asia, and Africa. In his closing assessment, C. tells us where he thinks Pentecostalism is going, what he admires, and what he finds especially problematic about it. He discusses two conflicting approaches to religion, fundamentalism and experientialism, that are playing themselves out in today’s culture wars and religious ferment. Pentecostalism is a major player in this “war.”

This very readable book is classic Cox in the sense that it eschews the academic tone. The work often reads like an autobiography or even a novel. This holds the general reader’s attention, but scholars may find it annoying. C. unfortunately opted for bibliographical notes rather than footnotes. Consequently there are many quotations and assertions of fact that one cannot pin down. There is a lack of straightforward data, and a lack of seriousness in assessing the limited data provided. How many Pentecostals are there? Are charismatic Catholics to be included among them? How reliable is the estimate that there are 410 million Pentecostals worldwide? What is the rate of defection or backsliding after a few years of fervor? What is the breakdown worldwide and in the U.S.? A clear exposition of current knowledge about his subject would have required Cox to ask these questions and many more and to give greater attention to the phenomenon outside the U.S., where Pentecostalism is much stronger.

C. hardly mentions the movement’s considerable force among U.S. Latinos and gives the impression that in this country Pentecostalism is now a middle-class phenomenon; yet he tells us that 13% of Pentecostals live in affluence and 87% “live below the world poverty line” (119). Which is it, and where did he get this information? He discusses the role of Black preachers in the origins of Pentecostalism and laments the fact that today’s Pentecostal congregations tend to be racially separate. C. seems unaware of the strong emphasis in evangelicalism on
evangelizing the "nations." In the Church Growth Movement this means preferring to work in homogeneous rather than heterogeneous communities. While this may mask racial or cultural discrimination, there may also be valid practical reasons for the races and cultures remaining apart. Immigrants who do not speak English are not going to be comfortable in an English-dominant congregation. Working-class and middle-class communities do not usually feel very comfortable together for prayer and worship. Blacks may need to "do their own thing." Indeed, Blacks and Latinos have formulated a critique of multiculturalism along these lines. There may be a valid explanation for the breakdown of racially and culturally integrated communities within Pentecostalism, of which C. seems unaware.

Over 25 years ago, Prudencio Damboriena, S.J.'s Tongues as of Fire: Pentecostalism in Contemporary Christianity (Washington: Corpus, 1969) offered an excellent analysis of Pentecostalism. C. fails to cite Damboriena's pioneering work. Theologians and pastoralists might be much more satisfied with this older work in which the substantive theological and practical issues underlying Pentecostalism in Christianity are treated with greater precision. Moreover, C. overlooks the surprisingly fruitful International Roman Catholic/Pentecostal Dialogue carried on by theologians for ten years and the result of Pentecostal theologian David du Plessis's lifelong work. In providing the historical framework for discussing Pentecostalism, C. gives too much importance to the Azusa Street congregation and fails to place Pentecostalism within the larger and more complex history of evangelical Protestantism in the U.S., as George M. Marsden does in Fundamentalism and American Culture. While C.'s book is a timely and creative general commentary on a complex subject, those who seek a more grounded, incisive, and focused interpretation of its meaning will have to look elsewhere.

Loyola Marymount University, L.A. ALLAN FIGUEROA DECK, S.J.


Weightman is an excellent intellectual anatomist. He carefully dissects the systems of Michael Polanyi and Thomas Torrance, showing in detail how various ideas arose in each man's development and how they interact with each other. His reading of both men is clear, helpful, and persuasive.

In his own person, Polanyi represented an amalgam of religious and intellectual traditions. Born in a nonobservant but socially concerned Jewish family, he was baptized a Catholic in 1919; however, he never took communion, and after 1934 he identified himself with the Anglican Church for a time, then spent his last years in contact with a Methodist congregation. He trained in medicine and served briefly as
a physician in World War I, but soon moved into the field of physical chemistry, where he did research in the adsorption of gases, X-ray crystallography, and reaction kinetics; after 1948, he devoted himself to philosophy, sociology, and economics.

The most surprising and disturbing result of W.'s reading of Polanyi is the demonstration that all of his work from *Personal Knowledge* (1958) to *Meaning* (with Harry Prosch, 1976) is imbued with an atheistic outlook. When Polanyi speaks of God, religion, and Christianity, he is not asserting any "independent existence in a parallel fashion to the independent existence of scientific realities" (56). For Polanyi, religion, mathematics, and other creative arts are "works of the imagination which do not correspond to already existing coherences" (120). God is therefore just as real as unicorns or fractal dragons, but not as real as the world of science. W. traces how Leo Tolstoy, J. H. Oldham, Vladimir Lossky, Paul Tillich, and Mircea Eliade "inculcated in him the futility of applying any concept to God" (77).

Polanyi's philosophy of science nevertheless appeals to theologians because he holds that "the dynamics of knowing are structurally similar in both science and religion" (54). Many theologians gloss over Polanyi's own denial of religious realities and consciously or unconsciously relocate his epistemology in a theistic universe, but W. objects that this is "Polanyian window-dressing for a predetermined theology" rather than a true confrontation with his religious (or antireligious) position (9).

W.'s reading of Torrance focuses primarily on his interaction with Polanyi. A pupil of Karl Barth, Torrance described his theology as "Reformed, Nicene, scientific, realist, relational, systematic, rational, conceptual, personal, doxological, dialogical, ecumenical, Christological, Trinitarian and Biblical" (150). Unlike Barth, Torrance aimed "to forge a link between the theology of Barth and our modern scientific culture" (144). W. shows that Polanyi played a central role in Torrance's system in *Theological Science* (1969), *Space, Time and Incarnation* (1969), and *Space, Time and Resurrection* (1976). The relationship between Polanyi and Torrance was personal as well as intellectual; Torrance saw Polanyi as "a senior friend and mentor, and on Polanyi's death in 1976 he became his Literary Executor" (203).

W.'s most devastating criticism of Torrance is that he "makes an impressive claim for the tacit dimension which is not a legitimate extrapolation of Polanyi's thought" (214). Because Polanyi "gives no content to the concept of God who interacts with the world . . . Torrance has fundamentally misunderstood Polanyi" (275). Furthermore, Torrance's enthusiasm for Polanyi blinds him to other philosophies of science (206–7) and leads to a "radically unrealistic" reading of Einstein and the history of science (191). "Torrance's horizon is too circumscribed. He does not reckon with natural science's ongoing evolution and his dialogue is only with the small circle in which Polanyi is the brightest star in the philosophical firmament. The task which Tor-
ranee has set himself—to coordinate theology and science—is far from finished" (271).

Although W. does not fully develop his own position, an epilogue sketches science and theology as "cultural solar systems" (281—91). W. seems to posit a Barthian schism between reason and revelation. "Theological options, scientific theories and other cultural endeavors like economics form interacting but distinct solar systems, as it were, since each orbits around a different center of gravity" (288). He claims that "people do not simply find themselves within one cultural solar system but may inhabit several systems" (289).

Perhaps such imagery may be palatable to a generation raised on the mythology of Star Trek, but I much prefer the difficulties of Torrance's classical theism in which every part of the universe orbits the single divine center of being, truth, and beauty. Unlike W., I do not think we need to adopt the whole of Polanyi's ontology in order to profit from his insights into epistemology. Polanyi is an excellent guide to the art of discovery because this was central to his own lived experience as a scientist; he may be a correspondingly poor guide to the recognition of God in Christ because this was, unfortunately, peripheral to his personal experience.

Canisius College, Buffalo, N.Y. 

MARTIN X. MOLESKI, S.J.


The decennial year of Rahner's death witnessed the appearance of several critical studies of his theology, noteworthy among them that of Guenther, who teaches church history in Santiago, Chile. G. compares Rahner and Rahner's one-time student, assistant, co-worker, and most trenchant critic—admirer, Johannes B. Metz. Drawing exclusively on published sources, G. intends to demonstrate that Rahner's transcendental theology "largely meet(s) Metz's requirement for political theology" (8). This eminently readable work is instructive, not only for its energetic, occasionally enthusiastic discussion of the public elements in Rahner's enterprise, but also for its presentation of the thought of Metz, an often underappreciated figure.

G. opens his study by focusing on Metz. He concludes that Metz's "new political theology" is actually a "practical fundamental theology" marked by a strongly "interruptive-apocalyptic" strain, combining a prophetic critique of evolutionary modern consciousness (the eschatological proviso) along with a commitment to a narrative theology embracing the dangerous eucharistic memory of the cross in solidarity with the suffering of the world.

Attention then turns to the characteristics and dynamics of Rahner's theology, and the political content of his work. G. locates Rahner's development within the history of the antecedents, unfolding, and con-
sequences of Vatican II, hoping thereby to underscore the experiential roots of that development. Legitimate in the exposition is G.'s emphasis on the situation-specific methodology of Rahner's theology, and on the intersubjective, social-horizontal components of Rahner's philosophy of human self-realization. In part the result of Metz's critique, argues G., in part due to the horizons opened by the Council, Rahner learned the lesson of the social/public dimension of faith. Rahner's 1965 address to Cologne social workers on the unity of love of neighbor and love of God is foundational in G.'s view. Though not mentioned, Rahner's 1967 essay "On the Theology of Hope" makes even more explicit the political-structural elements of his view of the Christian project. G. joins other sympathetic commentators who note the progressively historical-horizontal shift in Rahner's later years. He concludes that Rahner and Metz represent legitimate "political theologies," the former with sacramental-incarnational-mystical, the latter with prophetic-apocalyptic leanings (288). Curiously, when quoting Rahner's *Hearers of the Word* G. cites the 2nd edition, revised by Metz. Nevertheless, G. generally relies on a wide range of secondary sources for his interpretation of Rahner's underlying philosophical anthropology, sources he uses well.

While appreciating the helpful elucidation of the projects of both Metz and Rahner, I found the argument that Rahner's is a "political theology" somewhat strained. But I would concur with G.'s interpretation that Rahner and Metz provide converging and mutually complementary approaches to theology. And G. certainly presents a welcome counterposition to Klemens Baake's study, *Praxis und Heil* (Würzburg, 1990), which compared Rahner with liberation theologians Gutiérrez, Sobrino, and Boff, but found no foundation in Rahner for a political theology. Clearer definition of terms such as "narrative theology," "solidarity," "apocalyptic," "prophetic-apocalyptic," and "human experience" would have been helpful, perhaps crucial to G.'s study, and greater attention to Rahner's pneumatology would have strengthened his argument. Although G. does not unearth vital new information for the Rahner specialist, he provides an accessible, balanced, historically contextualized study of two important figures who have greatly influenced each other in addressing a pressing contemporary question. That makes it worth the read.

*Jesuit School of Theology at Berkeley*  
GEORGE E. GRIEGER, S.J.


The recent death of Yves Congar, O.P., one of the world's leading theologians, has occasioned a sense of loss in the ecumenical community. However, other outstanding ecumenists remain committed to and engaged in efforts to bring about "a 'conversion of the churches' to one
another as part of the process of their on-going conversion to the Lord” (viii). Among the leaders in ecumenical dialogue, both internationally and nationally, is George Tavard, one of the surviving periti of Vatican II. The present work is offered as a study of Tavard’s theology, specifically, his “theology for ministry within the context of his vision of the Church” (xiii–xiv).

As a study based on a doctoral dissertation, it is marked by both the advantages and the shortcomings of such an adaptation. On the one hand, extensive footnotes, frequently in Tavard’s original French, allow for an in-depth reading of his thought, make it possible to grasp nuances that lie beyond translation, and provide a context within which Tavard’s reflection and discourse have taken place. On the other hand, the particular structure of each chapter betrays the book’s origin in a dissertation, and at times this becomes burdensome. Overall, however, the work represents the scholarly pursuits of an author sympathetic to his subject and dedicated to integrity in his research. In his Foreword, Tavard presents an overview of the theology he has developed over the years. He acknowledges that A. has “ably analyzed” his views on ecclesiology and ministry. A., for his part, admits to a “working presumption” that he is dealing with a “life’s work ... written by a sincere, competent, and respected scholar” (xv).

A. begins with an introduction to Tavard’s “view of theological method from the perspective of the science of language” (xiv). Indeed, Tavard sees theology primarily from this perspective. The significance of the “semantic structure of theology” (38) and of the unique vocabulary proper to the science and the art of language in theology calls for a careful reading of Chapter 1, devoted to Tavard’s theological system. A. asserts that Tavard’s ecclesiology and theology of ministry bear the marks of “five major characteristics peculiar to him: participationist, historical, ecumenical, Trinitarian, and pneumatological” (38).

Tavard’s ecclesiology is founded on the concept of catholicity. It is “a much deeper concept than catholicism” (41). It includes wholeness and mystery; it is the process of a still-unfolding reality, reaching out in expectation and anticipation toward the eschaton.

Each of these elements carries implications for personal holiness, for Christian unity, for cosmic fulfillment. Tavard has the ability to deal with fine distinctions, with apparently contradictory ideas. His approach is both mystical and pastoral. He is at home in the past, the present, and, through anticipation, in the future. For Tavard, the Church, a “communion of communions” (195), is “the God-given, Christ-centered, Spirit-empowered community of salvation” (159), a eucharistic community. This has ecumenical implications: “Tavard’s vision of a plurality of churches, but only one Church, centered on the one and only Christ, present in Word and sacrament emerges. . . . This Christ is both focus of unity and source of diversity. This Christ makes us his body, allowing the diversity of expressions (of forms) to be united in a unity of purpose, the continued proclamation and mediation of his
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gift of salvation” (200). This vision leads us to recognize the Church of Christ wherever it is present. This “recognition of Church” is the primary question for the recognition of ministry. “Once Church has been seen, ministry has also been seen at work” (ibid).

Tavard envisions a general ministry of the Church in proclamation, liturgy, education, and service as well as ministry to the universal Church, the Petrine ministry. He perceives the exercise of papal infallibility as but “another manifestation of the infallible power of God to make known his truth through his imperfect creatures” (300). The present crisis in ministry calls for a necessary restructuring of ministry and its forms on the basis of theological principles “applicable regardless of the time, regardless of the needs” (308).

A. concludes with a synthetic summary of Tavard’s understanding of ministry within the context of his ecclesiology, with several critical remarks regarding Tavard’s thought, and with a statement on the contribution of the study and of his theology of Church and ministry. The book will interest all those for whom ecclesiology, ministry, and ecumenism are important; it provides material for serious reflection and lively discussion.

Mundelein Seminary, Illinois AGNES CUNNINGHAM, S.S.C.M.


Anthropologists face a particularly thorny problem in elaborating a general theory of religion. On the one hand, they must provide an explanation for the origin of religious representations which covers all human religious experience; on the other hand, they must generate principles to explain differences among groups. That is, they must root religious experience within human life in society, either within the social interaction of individuals—primarily—or within the individual psychological requirements and still explain why one social group differs from another in its religious representations. So intractable is the problem that few anthropologists today try to address it in the breadth with which the founders of modern anthropology dared. The historians of religion or comparative religionists face no such difficulty. They accept the historical particularity of the different religious beliefs which they study and need only to tease out commonalities, trends, and marked differences, but need not go further in relating these to some basic human condition. The content of religious ideas speaks for itself, as it were.

Boyer, Senior Research Fellow in Cultural Anthropology at King’s College, Cambridge, proposes to do more than the comparativists and slightly less than the classical theorists. He accepts the assumption that important aspects of religious representations are constrained by universal properties of the human mind-brain and then uses the find-
ings of cognitive psychology and cognitive science to suggest that the cognitive processes of cultural transmission offer the key to a coherent anthropological theory of religion.

The structure of the argument follows a reformulation of a series of anthropological problems. For those unfamiliar with the literature around these problems and especially cognitive development, this part may be heavy going. B. first presents the general anthropological and psychological framework in which religious ideas should be addressed. He treats certain types of mental representations in different sociocultural groups as a consequence of transmission processes, which themselves are partly dependent upon universal aspects of cognitive processes. B. disagrees with the accepted wisdom that “cultural transmission need not be described in a precise way, that it is a jumble where socialized subjects eventually find what they need in order to become competent members of the group” (40). Rather he asserts that there are different types of representation and different processes of transmission which correspond to these types. So for B., “a proper study of religious concepts must take into account the fact that religious representations belong to different types.” Therefore an adequate theory of religious concepts requires that we understand with precision and not in some general way the processes whereby concepts in general are represented and acquired. B. discusses the positions of various theorists, e.g. Piaget, in developing his understanding of these processes of transmission and acquisition.

The elements of B.’s argument are too detailed to be summarized here and too specialized to attract most theologians if the literature on cognitive theory is not part of the usual baggage they carry. The book is really a dialogue with cognitive theorists, and while it certainly has interest for the theologian, it is more likely to find a ready reception among anthropologists for whom it represents a really helpful approach to the study of religion and among cognitive psychologists.

Anthropologists especially will find a theory of religion that is both explanatory and heuristic. Theologians should be alerted to the fact that the “naturalness” of the title means that B. chooses to ignore the possibility that the assumptions on which many different religious “systems” converge are in fact divinely inspired truths. But this by no means should lead to the conclusion that B.’s work cannot be helpful to those who choose otherwise.

Boston College  
Edward M. O'Flaherty, S.J.


This collection of ten essays, spanning forty-six years of Fr. Clarke's philosophical research, is a welcome resource to “Thomistically in-
spired" metaphysicians. Revised in part to include his latest insights and published with an illuminating autobiographical introduction to his philosophical thought, these essays have lost nothing of their original vigor, clarity, and relevance. Taken together with his Person and Being (1993), they form a compendium of his metaphysics.

C. views Aquinas's metaphysics as an original synthesis of Aristotelianism and Neoplatonism which understands being as dynamic, existential act (esse) that overflows into action and forms a world of vibrantly interrelated substances. He sees his own work as a "creative completion" of Aquinas's thought, using insights from contemporary philosophy and showing how each tradition can learn from the other (x, 220). I will look especially at two of those learning opportunities.

Contemporary science and philosophy have much to learn from Aquinas's understanding of substance. Many scientists now speak of a "causality of the whole" on levels ranging from molecular organization to human freedom. Yet their thinking is continually challenged by a reductionism which sees a "whole" as nothing more than a conglomeration of parts. To ground the new "holistic thinking," C. effectively retrieves Aquinas's notion of substantial potency as "the condition of the possibility of the intrinsic unity of complex wholes in nature" (19).

But C. seems to undermine his own argument for substantial unity by allowing a "latent plural presence" of lower elements in complex wholes and suggesting that such component elements might be "not totally integrated" (19–21). Such elements would then exist in a realm "in between" pure indetermination (or pure determinability) and merely accidental determinability" (21). But if primary matter is immediately actualized by substantial form, it is difficult to see how there is room for something "in between" primary matter as actualizable by substantial form (i.e. primary matter considered as pure determinability) and primary matter as actualized by substantial form (which actualization is an existing substance capable of accidental determinability). Perhaps a refocusing on the relationship or proportion between matter and form would be useful in this context (e.g. In meta. XII, lect. 2, no. 15 [2438]; In de gen. et corrupt. I, lect. 10, no. 8 [80]).

C. believes the Thomistic tradition can learn from contemporary philosophy's critique of its understanding of God's immutability and relation to creation. His careful analysis of what is and is not intended by Thomas's phrase that God has "no real relation" to the world is most helpful. But his argument for "otherness" in God is unconvincing (as I noted in The Unchanging God of Love 252). On the level of intentionality, God's consciousness is considered "other ... than it would have been had he chosen a different world or none at all" (194). But isn't this like saying that I am presently "other" than I would have been if I'd been a professional football player? Isn't it more correct to say that I am not presently "other" at all, but would have been other if my career had been different? So also God is not presently "other," but would have been other if he had not willed what he willed. But such
contrary-to-fact conditionals do not seem to warrant C.'s attribution of "change" "modification" or "differentiation" to God (187, 189, 194). Furthermore, since intentionality and existence are one in God (as C. himself points out), it is difficult to see how a "real" modification of intentional consciousness in God would not imply a real change of divine being—a possibility which C. wisely refuses to entertain (187, 189, 192). How a single act of divine will which is God's very being can freely produce the created world is admittedly a profound philosophical question, and C.'s discussion of intentionality in this context is illuminating and reminiscent of Aquinas's own approach (700).

In general, C. offers an insightful, challenging, and eminently readable book, one that should awaken its readers to "the seminal riches in St. Thomas' metaphysical thought" and help them continue C.'s own work of "creative completion" (xiv–xv).

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MICHAEL J. DODDS, O.P.


Swinburne has become one of the most eminent and celebrated practitioners of the philosophy of religion. Here, as in his other books, one finds an exceptionally careful, fresh, well-reasoned, and balanced exploration of fundamental human and religious issues. This work is the third contribution to a projected tetralogy, whose earlier volumes are Responsibility and Atonement (1989) and Revelation (1991) and which will culminate in a study of providence and the problem of evil. S.'s concern in this volume is with the arguments of pure reason which would show to be true the Christian additions to the core Western doctrine of God, especially the teachings on the Trinity and the Incarnation.

To provide a firm base for the theological discussion which constitutes the final five chapters, S. devotes the first five chapters to a rigorous clarification of basic metaphysical categories—substance, thisness, causation, time, necessity. He then develops a fairly classical theory of the properties of God who exists necessarily and eternally as a person essentially bodiless, omnipresent, creator and sustainer of any universe there may be, perfectly free, omnipotent, omniscient, perfectly good, and a source of moral obligation. However, S. departs from the older tradition in affirming that God is a temporal being, who exists through all periods of time. Omnipotence is construed as God's knowledge at each period of time of all those true propositions logically possible for God to entertain. God can not know in advance the actions of free agents, and must be ignorant of his own future actions (except in so far as his perfect goodness constrains him to act in certain ways).

In a climactic chapter, S. develops an a priori argument for the
necessary truth of the doctrine of the Trinity, to back up an argument from revelation. He renounces the argument that he presented in the original edition of *The Coherence of Theism* (1977) that denied the possibility of there being more than one divine individual. S. supports the teaching on the Trinity of the early church councils, and asserts that there is overriding reason for a first divine individual to bring about a second divine individual and with him to bring about a third divine individual. On this account the three divine individuals form a collective source of the being of all other things; the members are totally mutually dependent and necessarily jointly behind each other's acts. S. describes his view as a moderate form of social Trinitarianism (more sympathetic to Moltmann than to Barth and Rahner) which stresses the logical inseparability of the divine persons and the absence of anything by which they are individuated except their relational properties.

Finally S. argues that the Chalcedonian definition is not merely self-consistent but consistent with the NT picture of Christ as acting in ignorance and weakness and subject to temptation. Remaining divine, Jesus becomes human by acquiring an extension to his normal modes of operation, and simultaneously does different actions guided by different sets of beliefs of which he is consciously aware. S. avers that we need revelation to confirm more directly that Jesus Christ was God incarnate, but he is disappointingly brief in suggesting a framework by which such testimony and public evidence can be judged and integrated.

The vigor with which S. applies his incisive intellect to the defense of Christian doctrines can raise fears of a religious rationalism. Yet there is wisdom in his claim that both reason and revelation have a role in respect to most items of doctrine. He submits that it is an integrated web of argument from the whole of experience which leads to the Christian doctrine of God, and that doctrine is justified to the extent to which that web is a seamless garment (238). We can hope that in the future S. will have the opportunity to weave that experiential fabric of human reason and divine revelation that shows unambiguously the God of the philosophers as the living God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob.

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**DAVID J. CASEY, S.J.**


Several of Berthrong's chapters were written in response to the first and second international Confucian-Christian Conferences held in Hong Kong (1988) and Berkeley (1991). As studies in "comparative religion and philosophy," or "comparative theology and philosophy"
(4–5), they examine the renewed status of Confucianism in East Asia and the Asian diaspora. At these conferences Confucians and Christians came to a general consensus that both traditions possess doctrines of divine transcendence and immanence, albeit “in distinctive fashions” (6).

To define tradition, B. indicates, one must realize that there is a “three-way dance” (52) among the fundamental, systematic, and practical theologians. The dialogue of Confucians and Christians must move forward in the context of a world “in which we read many texts” (58), not just one. Chaps. 3–4, the core of B.’s book, portray the dialogue in terms of process theology. B. indicates that “the claim that Confucianism is a religion is controversial” (70). Yet, in his view, the Confucian Way derives its religious dimension from the fact that Confucianism centers on the question of the ultimate values for human life. This is examined through a history of Confucianism and Neo-Confucianism of the Sung dynasty (960–1279), especially that of Chu Hsi (1120–1200), the chief synthesizer of that newer philosophy.

Against this background B. offers a systematic overview of two harsh critics of Chu Hsi, Mou Tsung-San and Tu Wei-ming. Despite their criticism, both of these contemporary Chinese scholars find a modern Confucian reformation under way that has some nexus to Neo-Confucianism, and both defend Confucian religiosity. The last term is the key to understanding the current movement in reconstructing a Confucian Way. As New Confucians, both are pressing the case for such religiosity, Mou perhaps somewhat more than Tu. In fact, Mou focuses on the human mind, human nature, and on creativity mediated by concern for others. B. portrays connections of these scholars with form, dynamics, and unification as developed from Whitehead’s principles of ontology, creativity, relativity, and the hope for rationalism.

Not supportive of the growth of a syncretism between Confucianism and Christianity, B. emphasizes the necessity for both sides to seek the truth. Aware of the efforts of the Pontifical Council for Interreligious Dialogue and the World Council of Churches Sub-Unit on Dialogue with People of Living Faiths, B. foresees three kinds of dialogue in the future. First is the actual interfaith dialogue in terms of daily life and practice with a concomitant discussion of truth claims or the dialogue of meaning, that is, an exploration of the values of life which the New Confucians argue are basic to all philosophy and theology. The second discussion will be among the fundamental, systematic, and practical theologians. This in turn will lead to the third type of dialogue in which the participants “respond to the callings of the meditative heart” (187).

B. here contributes to a meaningful understanding of the level of the contemporary dialogue between the New Confucians and Christians. Whether further discussions can be expected to occur (beyond those
centering on human values which have brought the two sides together) remains an open question.

Georgetown University, D.C. 

JOHN W. WITEK, S.J.


Augustin is an Indian Roman Catholic priest who studied in Tubingen and wrote his doctoral thesis (the origins of this book) under Walter Kasper. He presents the foundations for a Christian theological reflection on world religions through an extensive exposition of the theology of Pannenberg (who wrote a brief foreword to the book); since the book is so heavily dependent on Pannenberg’s theology, readers will have to assess A.’s work according to their view of the latter.

Throughout, A. argues a single clear thesis: an adequate Christian theology of religions must be firmly founded in a comprehensive understanding of the meaning of Jesus Christ as the fullness of God’s revelation given first to Israel, and then to the world; for it is this crucified and risen Lord who gives to history its meaning and who is its eschatological fulfillment. If a theology of religions does not begin with a comprehensive and integral self-understanding of this sort, the attitude toward other religions will be inadequate, however well intentioned.

Part 1 surveys and assesses current trends in the theology of religions, much of which A. views dimly. He situates himself between liberal pluralists (who generate an understanding of religion out of the dialogic situation and accompanying factors, in the process adjusting Christian self-understanding to this new situation) and Christian fundamentalists (who from the start preclude learning anything from non-Christians, as if commitment to Christ as the fullness of revelation justifies sheer close-mindedness). Part 2, the major portion of the book, is an exposition of Pannenberg’s theology, in which the key relevant themes (e.g. religion, theology, God, history, the divine-human relationship, the meaning of “absolute”) are thoroughly set forth. A. sets forth Pannenberg’s precise understanding of the uniqueness and universality of Jesus Christ, presenting a Christology firmly situated in a theological appreciation of salvation history, the Incarnation, the death and resurrection of Christ, all aligned with a vital appreciation of the living mystery of the Trinity.

The much briefer Part 3 draws some consequences for the dialogue with world religions: Christian self-understanding must be clear before the theological meaning of religious pluralism can be established; in dialogue, “Jesus” and “the Christ” must always be spoken of together, and there is no cosmic detour around Christian specificity; the
contemporary situation must be assessed specifically in light of God's larger plan for the world and the expected eschatological completion of that plan; the project of discovering a common ground among religions is laudable, but must sacrifice nothing of the integrity of theology, Christology, soteriology, and ecclesiology; upon the basis of the preceding, there is still ample room for a positive appreciation of religions, since a strong sense of the universal significance of Christ is the measure by which one can appreciate the goodness and truth present in religious traditions.

The book is a splendid exposition of what is at stake in the theology of religions and a testimony to the great responsibilities incumbent upon those venturing to write a theology of religions today. This theology must not only be open-minded, but also complete, integral Christian theology, attuned to the entire Christian revelation and rooted in a mature attention to Scripture and tradition and in clear philosophical thinking. Dialogue is all the richer and more fruitful when Christians enter it aware of what is at stake within their own traditions.

For that reason, though, A.'s work needs to be extended, for it also challenges theologians to match their appreciation of the Christian tradition with an understanding of the comprehensive and integral systems of thought which make up the various non-Christian traditions in all their variety and nuance. A developed Christian theology of religions must be matched with a developed knowledge of the other religions one writes about, since vague or fragmentary comments on themes excerpted from those traditions achieves little of value. A. would have helped us by giving us some example of how a comprehensive and integral theology of religions is fruitful in some particular interreligious encounter. Perhaps, though, he did not want to dabble in so large a project; instead, he leaves us tantalized as to what he will do with his very solid starting position.

Boston College

Francis X. Clooney, S.J.


Context rather than text is the primary concern in Schüssler Fiorenza's latest volume, intended as the sequel to In Memory of Her. Her opening chapter carefully lays out what she sees as the determinative influence of context in the framing and articulation of Christology and describes the context of her own theological work. She believes that past theology in general, and Christology in particular, has been vitiated and falsified by its subordination to the preservation of "kyriarchal" male hegemony. In order to maintain a truly critical function, then, feminist theology must be done in the context of the "ekklesia of wo/men," which she describes as "the full democratic assembly of wo/
men, ... a feminist space and discourse, counterhegemonic to that of imperial or democratic kyriarchy in antiquity and modernity" (27). S. insists persuasively that critical theology of whatever stripe too often accepts as the structure of reality the often-undisclosed assumptions of the very position it would correct, often thereby ending in inefficacy. She also rightly asserts that one of the most important theological questions is whether religious faith and community can make a significant difference in the transformation and recreation of the social, political, and economic world which is its full context.

Three subsequent chapters construct a many-sided dialogue around three difficult and engaging issues. S. explicates the various positions feminist theologians have taken in regard to the significance of Jesus' "maleness." She addresses the question whether the Christian-feminist struggle against patriarchy leads inevitably to anti-Judaism. And she raises the issue of the "theology of the cross" seen through a critical feminist lens. In each case, S. lays out a range of positions, allowing the insights generated by each to illuminate the weakness and potential futility of others. Each chapter raised, for me, more questions than it answered, but the careful reader will not fail to be challenged to greater clarity and more thoughtful articulation of her own position by the feast of ideas that S. places on the "christological table set by Divine Wisdom" (31).

Her final chapters search for and evaluates the traces of the early wisdom tradition about Jesus and analyze the mythologizing of Mary—a process which transferred the Wisdom from Jesus to Mary and ended by disconnecting both Jesus and Mary from the real, socio-economic world of those who have believed.

Following S.'s own caveat, I would question one of her assumptions about the very nature and goal of critical theology. Speaking of those who work within the "ekklesia of wo/men," she says, "They do not need to construct christological discourses as fixed positions that exclude each other. In such a way critical feminist theological practices can make available polyglot discourses through which individual wo/men can shape their own narratives of interpretation in conversation and debate with other christologies and discourses of liberation" (28).

While indeed discourse and debate is both exciting and fruitful, and while genuine theology (which is always pastoral) must be continually reshaped by the narratives of real believers, surely all who participate in debate do so in hopes of arriving at some position which is understood as valid precisely because it can bear the weight of the narratives of others as well as one's own. Is not the goal of shaping only one's own narrative a certain road to solipsism?

S. does in fact privilege some interpretations over others, in spite of disclaimers to the contrary. E.g., in presenting the debate on the "theology of the cross," the very arrangement of the conversation partners betrays her bias. She frames the thought of some Asian-feminist theologians within a range of critiques that undermine its power, and this
in spite of the fact that it is their context and the particularity of their experience which had led them to reappropriate that theology.

Occasionally, too, her examination of the context of various positions is insufficient. Thus she affirms that the “critical feminist debate on redemption and salvation is conducted mostly in terms of the Anselmian interpretation of atonement” (105); this requires, I think, an analysis of the context of the participants in that debate. Why have they focussed on this particular interpretation among the many proposed by the traditions? Even if it is the predominant position in the popular imagination, other forces are surely at work. Finally, in describing the Galilean Jesus movement and its possible espousal of the Wisdom tradition, S. describes it as one of the “emancipatory movements inspired by the democratic logic of equality, on the one hand, and the dominant kyriarchal structures of society and religion, on the other” (91). I find the use of “democratic” somewhat anachronistic here and, together with the idea of “equality,” in need of some evidence that the historical and social context of that movement gave birth to such inspirations.

The solidity of S.’s scholarly reputation will ensure a wide distribution of this book. Its critical presentation of current scholarly opinions will cause serious theologians to revise and reformulate their opinions with care. S. has raised central concerns, not peripheral issues, and she will continue to be a welcome guest at Wisdom’s feast.

Loyola Marymount University, L.A. MARIE ANNE MAYESKI


This is a curious book. It deals with an important and long-standing theological topic; it is fully ecumenical in its scope and intent; it presents a clear methodology and does a competent historical survey within clearly defined parameters; and it seeks to articulate a contemporary model for understanding eucharistic presence which would transcend past conflicts and divisions. Yet it leaves one unsatisfied because it is incomplete, and it is difficult to recommend for any particular audience.

As Jones notes, the very meal which ought to be a source of unity for Christians has become throughout history a major source of division. J. takes the reader through the complicated history of the doctrine of eucharistic presence. This journey begins with the conflicts between Redbirds and Ratramnus and Berengar and Lanfranc. Some kind of resolution is reached in the time of Aquinas with the concept of transubstantiation. But divisions over the understanding of eucharistic presence irrupted at the time of the Protestant Reformation. J. clearly presents not only the differing views between Catholics and Protestants, but also the differences among the major reformers, Luther,
Zwingli, and Calvin, among whom Calvin appears to present the most viable approach to real presence.

As the historical survey reaches the 19th century, J. deals with some pertinent movements such as the well-known Oxford Movement and the less-well-known Mercersburg Movement. Albert Schweitzer and 19th-century Roman Catholic theology brings the discussion up to modern times.

There is much that has been bypassed on this journey. While some attention is given to the communal aspect of eucharistic celebration, J.'s presentation seems to be isolated from the Eucharist as people lived it. Moreover, there is no mention of eucharistic sacrifice to which real presence has been closely tied. While one can justify these omissions because this is "a history of the doctrine," it is also true that one cannot recommend this book to those who are seeking a history of the Eucharist.

The work proceeds analytically by what J. calls *eidetics* (the essential structures of the Eucharist) and *empirics* (how the tradition has tried to understand the Eucharist). There are four constitutive features of the Eucharist that must be considered in any eidetics of the Eucharist: the communal context, the connection of ritual and material elements, the past-future dialectic, and the presence-absence dialectic. It becomes evident that at any period in the history of the Eucharist one or more of these elements was recessed or even missing. These four features are helpful in analysis, and they are the book's major contribution.

J. believes the solution to the dilemma that has been present in the history of this doctrine is found the "interpersonal-encounter model." He briefly describes the positions of each of the proponents of this model: Bernard Cooke, Joseph Powers, Piet Schoonenberg, and Edward Schillebeeckx. It is Schillebeeckx who seems to have made the most significant contribution. More than any of the other previous theological articulations of the Eucharist, this model corresponds to the four features which should be found in a eucharistic celebration.

The difficulty is that J.'s history stops with the Second Vatican Council. Much has been done since then. Missing are the names of David Power, Edward Kilmartin, and Regis Duffy, who are but a few who have extended the discussion beyond Schillebeeckx. Kenan Osborne has made use of the phenomenological model which is far more comprehensive than the personal model with which this book ends.

The conclusion of the book is most unsatisfactory. It raises some important questions but very briefly. What resolution was achieved by the interpersonal-encounter model is undermined by the lack of any attempt on J.'s part to address the criticisms he raises against this model. For some unknown reason J. refers to Charles Davis as a Protestant; yet Davis was dealing with the issue of eucharistic presence as a Catholic priest.

*San Fernando Cathedral, San Antonio*  JAMES L. EMPEREUR, S.J.

This work is a study in philosophical, theological, and scientific epistemology. It studies at some length not only the three thinkers mentioned in the title, but also Heidegger and Hegel in the section on Tillich, and Niels Bohr and Werner Heisenberg in two separate chapters. In different ways all these thinkers deal with the transcendental horizon.

The "transcendental horizon" refers first of all to the epistemic limits of human knowing as determined by Kantian epistemology. Kant concluded that human knowing involves two elements: sensible experience and nonempirical categories that come from the human knower. This was Kant's Copernican revolution, in which the knowing subject determines the object of knowing rather than the other way around. The Kantian categories that make knowledge possible include space and time, causality, substance, and the principle of noncontradiction. These categories apply only to the phenomenal world known through sensible experience, and hence any attempt to go beyond the limit that is specified thereby cannot lead to genuine knowledge. Thus God and the noumena, or things-in-themselves, were unknowable to speculative reason; they lie on the other side of the transcendental horizon. However, Kant said that although we cannot know what is on the other side of this horizon, the postulates required by the moral imperative of practical reason enable us to think about that side; thus we can think God, free will, and the immorality of the soul. It was in this way that he proposed to cross the transcendental horizon.

For Tillich the transcendental horizon lies between "ontic" reality and "ontological" reality. He deemed that Kant's limits must be crossed in order to do theology and to have at least some "directive" concepts for ultimate reality, though no empirical, positive-rational, empirically verifiable knowledge is possible on that side of the transcendental horizon. Thus ontic reality is empirical or ideal reality that obeys "classical" categories: space, time, causality, substance/energy, or process. The principle of noncontradiction and formal logic apply here. Ontological reality, on the other side of the horizon, is nonempirical. Morrison says that ontology as used by Tillich is quite different from Aristotle's science of "being as being." It is a study of primordial "existentially" knowable reality that is "prior" to metaphysics. Here the principle of noncontradiction is de-absolutized. This realm is prior to the subject-object distinction, and this means a kind of mystical monism and no centered personhood for God. God is above the God of traditional theism, the Prius, the Unconditioned, ontological being itself (379). Tillich contended there is a noncognitive "neutral" awareness through which we have immediate unity with the Unconditioned, but this is not "experience" or "knowledge" (153). It
should be noted that, as M. observes, not all Tillich scholars agree with his understanding of Tillich as so utterly "de-onticizing" ontological reality (187).

With the advent of quantum theory in science the transcendental horizon became the border between the macro-world of classical physics and the micro-world of subatomic physics. The experimental evidence at this level raises a major question: Is light particles or waves? This dilemma led Bohr to a theory of complementarity that was willing to accept contradiction, and to say that the subatomic world is not objectively or physically "real." There is causal indeterminacy at this level. Heisenberg was so impressed by the contribution of the observer to the results of experiments at this level that he questioned the reality of subatomic particles between observations. He used these ideas to make room for free will (271) and posited a three-layer view of reality, adding to the macroscopic (material nature) and microscopic (potential reality) a primordial layer of ultimate reality, nature itself, the Central Order, which is the source and prototype of the ontic, classical categories and principles (380).

Einstein resolutely opposed the interpretations of Bohr and Heisenberg. He reversed Kant's Copernican revolution by insisting that the task of science is to understand the world of reality that exists and operates by rules that are quite independent of the human knower. The mind must conform to objects, not the other way around. He developed both Special and General Relativity theory to show the invariance of the laws of nature whatever the frame of reference: spatial, gravitational, or accelerating. He maintained the primacy of the objective and a minimum metaphysics which held that causality and noncontradiction are valid at every level of reality. He did not attempt to explain the empirical world by a speculative metaphysics designed for another world beyond this one. He recognized and accepted the limits of a transcendental horizon. Nevertheless, he revered an imageless source of the order and intelligibility of the cosmos without acknowledging a personal God, freedom of the human will, or personal immortality.

M. has done an impressive and valuable work. His analyses are patient and complete, though sometimes debatable. His care shows up in many numbered lists of typologies, points of refutation, arguments, methodological factors, etc. Though there is a fair amount of repetition in his exposition, this clarifies the topics under discussion and is a genuine help to the reader in following the argument.

However, M.'s own area of scholarly competence appears confined to Kant and what followed in Protestant circles. Though he refers to Aquinas once or twice, he shows no understanding of his philosophy based on a grasp of the act of being. He speaks of causality only in a deterministic sense and shows no acquaintance with Aquinas's analysis of free agency in the Prima secundae of the Summa Theologica. He knows nothing of the work of modern Transcendental Thomists like
Joseph Maréchal, Karl Rahner, and Bernard Lonergan. However, these limitations do not deprive his work of genuine insight and significant value.

Jesuit School of Theology at Berkeley

John H. Wright, S.J.


My heart was strangely warmed while reading Shain’s fine study of the intellectual impulses that informed the ideas of “liberty” and the “individual” during America’s Revolutionary era. Diving feet first into the raging cultural debate over “original intent” (or, more specifically, over what, exactly, the Founding Fathers meant by “ordered liberty,” and how they meant to balance individual rights and social responsibilities in the foundational documents that define the American experiment), S. offers us a compelling revisionist “take” on the vision of human flourishing that informed the discussions of the Revolution. At the very outset of his study, he announces that the foundational vision of the American experiment that he has discovered was profoundly communitarian and intensely reformed Protestant in nature.

A student of politics who has braved the rapids of American religious and cultural history, S. presents powerful evident against the (until recently) canonical view of the political philosophy that shaped America’s foundational vision. Over against the contemporary proponents of liberal individualism, S. argues that “America’s Protestant, democratic, and communal localism is its most enduring political tradition” (xviii). Following the lead of several important students of colonial religion and culture but extending the discussion in significant ways, S. observes that if what he has discovered about the 18th century also obtains in the 19th and 20th, then “political individualism is not a goal toward which Americans intentionally strove, but is instead the unintended end product of multiple failures” (xviii).

Marshalling an impressive range of primary evidence produced between 1760 and 1790, when Americans were defining themselves as a separate nation, S. argues that “most 18th-century Americans lived voluntarily in morally demanding agricultural communities shaped by reformed-Protestant social and moral norms” (xvi). He shows rather convincingly that the Revolutionary-era concept of “liberty” had little or nothing to do with autonomous individual freedom or self-expression, as many scholars of American politics have argued, but was rather characterized by “voluntary submission to a life of righteousness that accorded with objective moral standards as understood by family, congregation, and local communal institutions” (4). Further, the near-total agreement of political leaders like Sam Adams, the ministerial elite, and the popular forces on this communally based public philosophy was less the result of shared political texts emerging

In his third chapter, perhaps one of the most creative and important sections of the book, S. argues that what has generally been taken for the individualistic aspect of American life was simply the existence of a "plurality of communities" in the late 18th century. This misunderstanding, propagated and canonized, ironically enough, by two of the most important foreign commentators on American culture, de Tocqueville and Chevalier, was based on conflating colonial America's powerful impulses toward localism, communalism, and particularism with social and political individualism (91).

With his eyes firmly fixed on the contemporary cultural debate over "values," S. argues that Revolutionary-era American culture was divided between the few who understood human flourishing to be best accomplished by individualistic means, and the many—including the clerical and political elite no less than the soldiers of the colonial militias—who were supportive of communal ones. Using Isaiah Berlin's famous twofold definition of liberty as a reference field, S. observes that America's founding generation, profoundly shaped by reformed Protestant principles, did not mean freedom from group oversight and intrusion in using the word "liberty" so much as it meant positive liberty toward accepting and even abetting the "socially-approved freedoms" of a dedicated Christian life as defined by the local community. The understanding of "individual liberty" held by most patriots was thus "not procedural but substantive . . . controlled by an understanding of virtue that was Christian, rational, and positive" (119).

S.'s compelling historical analysis is part of the most recent crop of revisionist historical studies that seek to nuance, or even to replace, those historical paradigms that define the American cultural and political past by marginalizing religion. Such marginalization, S. informs us, results in a fairy tale about the American Revolutionary era. Scholars of American religious history will recognize the shadows of Allan Heimert and Nathan Hatch in this work; but this study might very well come as a wake-up call to historians of American politics, who for years have been far more drawn to Locke and Montesque than to Edwards and Mayhew.

The implications of S.'s scholarship will be even more pertinent to the contemporary discussion about the "original intent" that informed the creation of America's national experiment. S. has gone a considerable way toward illustrating how America's "lively experiment" was defined by profoundly Protestant, communitarian, and localist impulses. A must-read for scholars of colonial religion and politics.

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MARK S. MASSA, S.J.

"The world in which we live is in the grip of an anthropological crisis of unimaginable proportions," says Bailie (259), sounding a theme he develops throughout this fascinating and powerfully hitting exposition of the whys and wherefores of cultures of violence.

B.'s work is largely a by-product of the writings of René Girard. He holds that at the base of all reality is a "white-hot core of generative violence" (256), which no one, least of all philosophers, is willing to face. Life is a process of enshrouding that violence with myths, and in the manner of primitive religions, reenacting that violence as sacred ritual—turning it into socially tolerable structures that end chaos and restore order. Cultures are a product of mob violence, organized forces of mimetic desires, uniting rivalry, covetousness, jealousy, and resentment against another, sometimes arbitrarily chosen, as a source of evil (scapegoating); by a unanimous victimizing, the mob achieves social solidarity and moral righteousness.

As long as sacrificial systems are generally accepted, cultures remain stable: "good" violence is distinguished from "bad" violence and sacralized (holy wars, public executions, and beatings). But there is a growing sense of "moral symmetry" (63) between the two, because the world no longer has the strength to "endow these bloody rituals with moral respectability." Without moral authority, sacred structures collapse. New exaggerated sacral rites are constantly generated to thwart disintegration, but they cannot carry the burden of the moral unraveling. Spasms of violence occur, like the massacre at Rwanda, overwhelming cultural structures designed to contain them, showing how fragile today's myths are. As a result, we move inexorably "closer to the abyss of uncontrollable violence" (25).

What has brought this disintegration about is the influence on Western culture of the biblical revelation, creating the "most sweeping historical revolution in the world" (21). Jesus' execution on the Cross tells us that the cycle of sacrificial systems built on myth is over. Their inherent weakness has been exposed, and cultures under the influence of the Cross feel the effect of its disarming power. For this gospel acclaims that the Victim who is outside all systems is Lord, creating moral and religious empathy for victims everywhere. As the crucified Jesus gradually draws all humanity to himself, cultural systems crumble. We can no longer avoid calling into question mythical justifications and sacrificial systems, because the deconstructing process is too advanced. The time has come to live by "genuine religious transcendence" (264), the God-centered life of Jesus as Victim. Either we discover that transcendence or we risk experiencing the biblical vision of apocalyptic violence.

B.'s thesis is insightful as an explanation of the contemporary unraveling of society. Why it took 2000 years, he does not say. He is better at providing a biblical foundation for it in the gradual prophetic and New Testament desacralization of society leading up to the emancipating power of the Cross of the Victim Jesus than at describing what
we should do about it. He calls for a renunciation of culture's base of law and order in mystification of reality and cycles of sacred violence, especially since the sacral structure is coming undone anyway. But he gives no new insight on how to do this, other than to live by the will of our heavenly Father, and accept "forgiveness and the renunciation of violence and vengeance" as Jesus did (25). He provides no program for achieving this, since it would inevitably feed into some kind of system and defeat B.'s purposes. While he surely is correct that the world will either find God or perish, he provides no course for finding God except the threat of encroaching apocalyptic violence.

B.'s basic insight is correct, but it is needlessly pressed for validation, often in unconvincing ways, upon countless people and events of history. There are also ragged edges: Though he urges the Church to escape conventional ways of sacralizing and scapegoating, he recognizes that as an institution it cannot do so; on the other hand, he is grateful that the Church still provides us with some stability in a disintegrating world. Moreover, what does B.'s theory do to the Church's understanding of the sacrifice of the Eucharist? Is this unwarranted sacralization? No discussion here of a question raised by his views.

The heart of B.'s work is the fundamental opposition between the Cross and all cultural constructs. He brings welcome clarity and urgency regarding its consequences. What Jesus' death as Victim on the Cross tells us is that all cultural structures are not only limited, but also enslaving. B. addresses the conflict in Christianity: how to devote one's life totally to the God who destroys all enslaving structures in a world that dissolves into chaos without them.

Saint Joseph's Univ., Philadelphia

MARTIN R. TRIPOLE, S.J.


Mackey pursues two goals here. The first is to argue that power as authority may attend Christian ethics. The second goal, as enunciated by the editor of the series, is to write a book within Christian ethics that is "taken . . . seriously by those engaged in the wider secular debate." M. succeeds in the first goal and at least partially fails in the second.

M. discusses two kinds of power as they relate to Christian ethics. On the one hand, there is coercive power, which is inconsonant with true ethical living inasmuch as uncoerced freedom is necessary to morality. On the other hand, there is the power of authority, by which M. means the power of moral prestige and moral persuasion, a power that leaves freedom and creativity intact.

Though the latter is the ideal, M. finds that Christian ethics have often been promulgated through coercive ideas. He lists a few: the idea
of revealed moral precepts, which seems to preempt the moral necessity of freely judging or arriving at these precepts on our own; all ideas that enjoin moral living through penal enforcement, ideas like hell or the vengeance of God; the idea of reward, heaven; the idea of papal infallibility, which seems to invite passive assent instead of active personal assessment. For M., these things are actually demoralizing because they interrupt freedom. Any type of enforcement is coercive and therefore incompatible with morality.

Here we might stop and mention the millions of people who do not have the time or the ability to come to moral conclusions on their own, people who rely on the existence of antecedent moral precepts as well as the decisions of other people who function as moral guides. By M.'s standards, would these people be amoral in their choices? M. anticipates this critique and offers two responses. First, he says that as long as peoples' right of assessment is respected, there is nothing demoralizing about their making moral choices based on the conclusion of other people. He could have and should have stopped there. But he goes on to develop a theory of "masters and apprentices." By this he means that at all levels of society there exist relationships between moral teachers and moral learners. When the learners retain the power of dissent, M. feels there is nothing coercive about this power. But surely this is too universal a claim, and there yet remains a risk of coercive domination over the "learner's" conscience.

As to whether this book will be taken seriously by secular scholars, the bulk of it could be, but M. undermines this result by making a weak case that an "Eros-like" striving of humanity toward self-integration, and a similar striving of creation in evolution, suggest "that the source of this striving universe is both moral and good" (106), a "cosmic moral agent" for whom "natural evolution is that agent's original letter of invitation" (148). Though M. disclaims this argument as an argument for God, it nonetheless retains that familiar flavor of desperate apologetics and would hardly be convincing to a secularist like, say, Michael Martin of Boston University, because, at the very least, it presumes a teleology that Martin would not accept as a given.

M. is a critical supporter of Roman Catholicism. He delivers stinging criticisms of the papacy, of Vatican policies on morality, and of Vatican appointments of bishops world wide. This robust and candid work may resuscitate discussions of loyal dissent within the Church; though this was not one of M.'s expressed goals.

California State Univ., Long Beach

Joseph H. McKenno


Barbour here studies loss of faith as a significant turning point in almost thirty individual autobiographies. The discussions of these life
stories are organized more or less around four rubrics which are intended to clarify the autobiographical projects: the storyteller's intellectual criticism of the previous faith commitment, the moral criticism of one's adherence to the earlier belief, the metaphors used to describe the process of change, and the overall form of the narrative itself as a key to interpretation.

"Deconversion" is B.'s expression for the "mirror image" of religious autobiographies as they have been known since Augustine. Thus, rather than treating the movement to religious (or secular) belief, B. stresses the terminus a quo of the process, that from which a person turns in a change of belief, as well as the process itself of the change in belief pattern. The types of "deconversions" range from Augustine's conversion to the Church and Bunyan's struggle with tepidity in his Christian life to moral repugnance at the sexism (Mary McCarthy, Daly) or racism of (American) Christianity (Frederick Douglass, Lame Deer). B. even treats the deprogramming from cult membership as a type of "deconversion."

Space does not allow for an evaluation of the adequacy of the treatment of the lives under consideration, but it is useful to reflect on the value of the project itself. At first glance, B.'s project might appear to be a "mirror image" of the turn to "the narrative quality of experience," one of the responses to the devaluation of religious language and adherence which followed the challenges to religion by World War II and the "death of God" movement. B.'s book might seem to turn that project on its head, an "equal and opposite reaction" to the validation of religious language by articulating the experiences which give that language meaning.

But the project emerges as more than a dialectical trick. B. states that, as a literary theme, the "loss of faith" and the writing of autobiography from that perspective continue to be part of the continuing contemporary search for individuality and autonomy. The religious values of stories of "deconversion" are based on the fact that these autobiographies are themselves religious actions performed by people who have been deeply affected by the very religious traditions which they have abandoned. Their authors remain convinced that religion is indeed a serious matter. Religiously, these stories form a critique of religious convictions which have come to be seen as "idolatries." Conscience and good faith demand the criticism. They demonstrate the continual dialectic between faith and doubt in which doubt is seen as something which must be accepted courageously as a springboard for personal growth, "religious" or otherwise. Paradoxically, the "loss of faith" emerges as an integral part of the story of transformation, be it spiritual, intellectual, moral, or social-political.

Those who have studied and taught in the area of religious autobiography will find B.'s work an insightful addition to the literature on "religious" autobiography. I had the impression of reading an extended syllabus for a course on the subject. The stories, I think, furnish some
encouragement for a generation which has difficulty with its own religious traditions, showing that growth in faith is not a linear process, but one that wanders through many strange and apparently contradictory byways. B.’s book is profitable for teacher and student alike.

Jesuit School of Theology at Berkeley


Wittberg invites sociologists to analyze Catholic religious orders, and members (and friends) of religious orders to consider sociological analysis. For sociologists, she applies the vocabulary of social-movement and organizational theories to the cyclical history of religious orders and congregations, from the first cycle in the fifth century to its present-day steep and demoralizing decline in the West (but growth in Africa and India). She suggests this neglected history will deepen their understanding of “charisma” in a wider variety of movements, including political-mobilization efforts. For members and supporters of religious orders, W. employs empirical data and a sociological perspective to counter the more prevalent psychological analyses of membership attachments. She suggests that an explicitly sociological perspective better focuses attention on the key transindividual tasks of collective identity and collective purpose required to counteract the high costs of vowed life greatly weakened by Vatican II’s valorization of the lay state and the universal call to holiness and the corrosive power of American individualism.

Since adding to cognitive maps of academics is easier than changing cultures, sociologists might find W.’s book and her invitations more satisfactory than those (and she includes herself) personally committed to the renewal of religious congregations and orders. There are 273 pages of text, plus copious footnotes, an extensive bibliography, and a glossary to help sociologists understand otherwise arcane ecclesiastical terms. There is no parallel glossary for the nonsociologist interested in other kinds of “insider” terms such as “ideological hegemony” (although for the committed reader they are clear enough in the text). The briefest chapter is the last, entitled “Conclusions,” which has but seven pages. W. characterizes her work as “a preliminary study” which she hopes will stimulate further research and reflection. It should do so.

W.’s theoretical framework is coherent, and stimulates by explicitly placing religious orders and congregations within the broader context of religious “virtuosity,” such as sects, religious enthusiasm, political protest, and collective mobilization in general. “It should be possible,” she writes, “to advance some basic hypotheses about the causes of their growth and decline in the past. Such hypotheses could then be used to
analyze empirical regularities within the precarious situation that confronts current religious orders in some countries and to advance some tentative predictions as to their future” (7). This promise is so appealing that we almost know in advance that it will not be satisfactorily realized, which, alas, is the case.

Since the work is a first effort, it is not surprising that the application of social-movement theory to religious life is mostly an extension of technical terms that redescribe less systematic knowledge about religious congregations. The identity of a congregation becomes its ideology, and through “frame alignment” religious virtuosos successfully revise and expand their beliefs in ways that appeal to wider audiences. The relationship between the congregations and their hierarchical and lay environment is analyzed in terms of “resource mobilization” or “resource depletion.” The practices required to keep plausible collective identity and to renew the sense of self-sacrifice become “communal commitment mechanisms.” As in the case of sociology generally, these categories are used post factum to schematize centuries of history. There are no formulas for applying them proactively. Still, the vocabulary itself helps focus attention on key dimensions in the cycle of origin, renewal, decline found in all embodiments of religious “virtuosity” that succeed for any appreciable period of time in attracting individuals to discover, or construct, their own deepest identity in a “charism” that attracts across generations and even cultures.

The cycles themselves are worth thinking about. They also remind us why a comprehensive theory of the rise and decline of religious orders would have to be, at the same time, a theory of culture and a theory of social change. E.g., there is no extended discussion here of secularization and the West. But these are daunting intellectual challenges, indeed. In the meantime, this reviewer would have appreciated a longer look at the “surprising number of new religious ‘orders’ [that] have been established within Catholicism during the last two decades” (269), which are briefly mentioned but not analyzed in the concluding chapter. Perhaps W.’s next book will get the lengthier title “The Rise and Fall and Rise of Catholic Religious Orders.” Or maybe it will be shortened to “The Fall.” From W.’s cognitive analysis, either title seems equally possible. But her own intelligent concern for religious life in itself makes the cyclical theory seem the more plausible.

Fordham University, New York

James R. Kelly

SHORTER NOTICES

In this series of eight lectures Heaton assumes the existence of schools in Ancient Israel and then examines various “Wisdom” texts for features that would pass unnoticed

unless one considered their school background. His assumption runs contrary to much scholarly study of Wisdom literature, which denies the existence of schools in Israel since explicit evidence is lacking in the Bible. H. surveys evidence of schools in Israel's neighboring countries for comparative purposes, but asserts that in Israel "absence of evidence is not evidence of absence" (36).

H.'s lectures offer a very refreshing view of the style and contents of Wisdom writings such as Ecclesiasticus, Proverbs, Job, Ecclesiastes. He also demonstrates how the school tradition transformed and redacted prophetic texts, the Deuteronomistic history, and great narratives like the stories of Joseph and David (in 2 Samuel). One learns about genres, theological stances, and the many connections with Egypt's schools and writings. There emerges a portrait of the wise as reserved and cautious, discreet and discriminating (Proverbs), "preeminently humane and rational men" (177). Not surprisingly, some of today's academic prejudices are reflected in the Schoolperson's self-identity, including a detached assessment of problems rather than engagement.

While H. focuses on Israel's school tradition (moral and intellectual matters; embracing the world and all creation) he also postulates the existence of a "temple seminary" (religious and institutional, rooted in the nation's past, training for priests and Levites). H. obviously prefers the former and rejoices over the prophetic "triumph of conscience over cult" (177). Likewise, he considers some postexilic works too cultic (Chronicles, Leviticus, and Numbers). Instead H. champions Wisdom's practice of deriving moral norms from "the light of nature" (180). Some of his remarks hint that Wisdom writings almost become for him a new self-sufficient "canon within a canon." These matters, however, do not seriously detract from H.'s lively presentation of Israel's Wisdom literature.

JOHN C. ENDRES, S.J.
Jesuit School of Theol., Berkeley


In the Roman Lectionary, the First Testament readings were chosen primarily because of their relationship to the Second Testament selections, especially the gospel pericopes. Liturgical authors have often remarked about the dangers inherent in this method. They have warned of the development of a hermeneutic of evolutionism—the anti-Semitic hermeneutic that what is later in the Bible is somehow better. Contemporary scholars in intertestamental studies have pointed to the inadequacy of this assumption that the First Testament is "fulfilled" in the New Testament. Another problem with trying to harmonize both Testaments is that we often hear mere snippets of the first reading rather than enjoy them as integral stories in their own context.

This book is a valuable contribution to lectionary preaching because it seeks to solve what seems to be an insuperable problem for preachers. Allen and Holbert present a hermeneutical model in which they suggest that the First Testament contains paradigms of God's presence and purposes today. They develop a step-by-step method for interpreting specific texts from this perspective for preaching. By tracing four themes (creation, hosed, the deliverance of Israel, and justice) they offer preachers possible directions for their exegesis of texts.

A. and H. deal forthrightly with such thorny homiletic issues as how preachers deal with texts from the First Testament that seem hopelessly out of date or appear to sanction vindictiveness or violence. Surprisingly, they do not address the neuralgic problem of preaching from texts which demonstrate the patriarchal dehumanization and victimization of women. But they practice what they preach when they conclude their book with five of their own sermons that clearly demonstrate their methodology. And in general they offer intelli-
Gent and practical guidelines for preachers and students that clarify how First Testament liturgical readings can be used appropriately in the proclamation of the gospel.

ROBERT P. WAZNAK, S.S.
Washington Theological Union


Pursuing the same line of anthropological research as Esler on glossolalia (Biblical Theology Bulletin 22 [1992] 136–42) and Pilch on altered states of consciousness (Listening 29 [1993] 231–44) but citing neither, Davies draws upon contemporary anthropological and psychological research to sketch a comprehensive causal explanation of events from the baptism of Jesus to the emergence of authoritarian churches reflected in the Pastorals and Petries. Jesus the spirit-filled healer and exorcist had the common human genetic ability to experience and induce in others altered states of consciousness which his culture identified as possession or trance states.

Jesus' open-ended parables, the confusing content of Paul's letters, and the contentless discourses of John's Jesus were strategies similar to those espoused by Milton Erickson that could induce trance states. In these states, individuals suffering from conversion disorders, e.g. physical problems like blindness or paralysis stimulated by stressful intrafamily situations, could find solutions to their problems or find healing for their ills. Altered states of consciousness or dissociation allow a person to develop an alter-persona. Jesus' alter-persona was spirit of God. For Paul and other Christians, the alter-persona was spirit contrasted with flesh.

To my disappointment, D.'s correct insight is inadequately developed. Cross-cultural approaches by definition focus on differences between cultures. D. regularly but mistakenly cites cross-cultural anthropology globally and vaguely to validate analogies and similarities between contemporary and ancient cultures. Further, as A. Bame Nsamenang and David E. Stannard have demonstrated, modern psychology is a monocultural (= Western) science and entirely useless for interpreting other cultures. Finally, D. seems completely unaware of Mediterranean anthropology, a discipline that helps prevent ethnocentric misinterpretations of the New Testament evidence yet provides a very reliable basis for creating or testing culturally plausible reading scenarios for biblical texts.

JOHN J. PILCH
Georgetown University, D.C.


Written from the perspective of the radical left-wing of New Testament scholarship, this book presumes that references to Thomas in John, the Gospel of Thomas, and other apocryphal Thomas traditions reflect the opinions of a primitive Christianity whose theology contradicts what became the orthodox doctrines of Christianity. The doctrine under challenge here is resurrection of the physical body.

Disputes over Riley's history of early Christianity aside, the book provides a wealth of information about the diversity of beliefs in late antiquity. Accounts of the survival of the "soul" of the deceased should be contextualized in terms of burial rites. They show that a "soul" can exhibit material characteristics such as those attributed to Jesus in the Gospels. R.'s desire to demonstrate this thesis sometimes leads to overinterpretation of the evidence. Game boards in tombs and food offerings are both alleged to show that the deceased retain material existence (54). Literary sources suggest that the pieties associated with burial cults are not necessarily correlated with convictions about the deceased.
R. also goes to great efforts to depict Thomas as a "negative" figure in the Johannine narrative because the demands a repulsive method of proof (115). John, he claims, condemns Thomas as ignorant because enlightenment and gnosis do not lead to knowledge of God (122). R.'s discussion of Gos. Thom. 71 forces the saying into the temple polemic of Jn 2: 19–22 par. by taking the saying to mean that no one—not God, Jesus, or the community—rebuilt the temple. This reading ignores the probable anti-Jewish reference in the saying: the Jewish temple will never be rebuilt. R. wants to enlist Thomas's sayings in favor of a polemic against the bodily resurrection of Jesus (148–55).

Despite exegetical difficulties on most points, the book provides a wealth of suggestive information to reinterpret the resurrection accounts.

PHHEME PERKINS
Boston College


In these Wiles Lectures which he delivered in 1993 at Queen's University in Belfast, Bowersock focuses attention on the historical context of martyrdom and argues that this phenomenon first came into being in the Roman empire as something inextricably rooted in the society and culture peculiar to that world.

In developing his thesis, B. makes the following observations. (1) That the concept of martyrdom, as we know it, gradually took shape in the early years of the second century in both polytheist and Christian as well as Palestinian Jewish contexts. (2) That the Acta of the early martyrs that we possess clearly contain much that is fictional but are not totally devoid of authentic material. (3) That it was hardly in the interest of advancing the cause of Christianity to suffer martyrdom in a place where few could witness it and, for that reason, such actions normally took place in larger cities. In a final chapter on martyrdom as a possible form of suicide, B. contrasts the opinion of Tertullian who appears to favor the Roman glorification of suicide with that of Clement who, rejecting the value of violent death, advocated a restoration of the original meaning of martyr as "one who bore witness" and who could do so in a less questionable manner.

The entire presentation is scholarly and well documented. There are four brief appendices on Stephen the Proto-martyr, on martyrdom in the writings of Ignatius of Antioch and IV Maccabees, on the "Great Sabbath Martyrs" in Smyrna, and on the martyrs in Asia, Aphrodisias, and the Lyons Martyrium. This attractive volume includes a select bibliography and a copious index.

JAMES A. O'DONOHOE
Boston College


Most studies of books in the early Church deal with the transition from roll to codex and with what text survives in which manuscript. Gamble treats the former at length and devotes some small space to the latter, but he goes well beyond these. He investigates in impressive detail the production, dissemination, and use of texts in the rise, spread, and development of Christianity. G. stresses how literacy helped to shape the early Christian self-understanding. He deals with books in Greek, Roman, and Jewish cultures; he then demonstrates their role in Christianity, not just by listing how the Christians differed from the others but by describing how that difference stemmed from the necessity of literacy for Christianity. How could this be, since few Christians could read and even fewer could afford books? G. explains how books were read publicly and how significant the order of lector, now just a minor order, was to the early communities.

G. devotes an entire chapter to pri-
vate and communal libraries and their crucial role in the acceptance of Scripture, a process usually thought to be determined solely by theological factors. Beyond Scripture, the technical and financial consequences of employing scribes furthered or retarded the spread and acceptance of non-scriptural literature. Countering the view that scribes simply copied out texts for dissemination, G. proves that authors, even great ones like Augustine, expected their texts to be modified by their initial, sometimes informal circulation, and thus "a text qualified as an edition only when it had been emended and released by the author for copying" (137). So important did texts become for the early Christians that some were used in magical practices.

Congratulations to G. for one of the most original books on early Christianity in recent years. Useful to both scholar and graduate student, it should be in both private and institutional libraries.

JOSEPH F. KELLY
John Carroll Univ., Cleveland


In this excellent translation of the 1984 German revised edition of Schönborn's work, originally published almost 20 years ago in French, the bibliography is reasonably current and the presentation of the historical material has been brought quite up to date.

S.'s work is a thorough and very readable review of the Christological foundations of Eastern iconography as developed prior to and in the iconoclastic controversy of the eighth and early-ninth centuries. His presentation has now become classic. He grounds the iconophile position in the orthodox Christology, developed out of the fourth- and fifth-century debates and culminating in the work of Maximus the Confessor. On the other hand, iconoclasm finds its pre-eminent roots (S. here follows Georges Florovsky) in Origenism. To his credit, however, S. points out that much of what is regarded as Origenism "represents a narrow version of Origen's theology" (46). Thus, although Origen's tendency to emphasize the interior and the spiritual can be utilized to condemn images, "Origen's argumentation cannot be interpreted as a strict rejection of artistic representation and images" (55), as some would argue. In fact, S. concludes the Origen contributed to an atmosphere which allowed the Church to accept images. It is rather the work of Eusebius of Caesarea and his interpretation of Origen which created the strongest theological foundations for iconoclasm.

S. also ably presents the thought of the main players in the iconoclastic controversy. The reader is introduced to the theological motivations of both sides and the underlying issue in the debate about Christology, and shown how one's view of Christ directly affects one's view of matter and specifically images.

Although the primary sources of the period are becoming increasingly available to the English reader, S.'s work remains an excellent synthesis of the material and introduction to the subject.

MYROSLAW TATARYN
Univ. of St. Michael's College
Toronto


Hildegard (1098–1179) was not only the most significant woman author and musical composer of the Middle Ages; she was also an abbess, founder of an important monastery, religious reformer, natural scientist, seer, exorcist, and great mystic. Her prophetic and visionary mysticism profoundly marked her age and earned for her the epithets "Teutonic Prophetess" and "Sibyl of the Rhine." Although gifted from "earliest childhood" with divine revelations, "this
"little form of a woman" did not begin her public career until she was 43 years old. Convinced that "the Living Light" spoke to her, she often erupted into mordant and thunderous denunciations of popes, cardinals, emperors, and others responsible for the corruption, schisms, and heresies which plagued her times.

One should note her confident, yet hesitant letter to Bernard of Clairvaux in which she seeks his advice and approval. Fascinating for the light they shed on sharply contrasting views of proper monastic life in the 12th century are the acerbic, critical letter of Mistress Tengswich and H.'s trenchant reply. The exorcism letters manifest both her reputation and her practicality; the letters seeking her views on the real presence, the Trinity, and the divine nature show her theological acumen. To those who would abandon burdensome pastoral duties for a more contemplative eremitical life, she writes: "You do not understand that your striving for God and your labor for His people are the same thing." One letter proffers a lovely theology of music. Many are redolent with a sacramental, creation spirituality which rebuts the dualistic views of the thriving Cathars.

H. averred that her letters "were written in a language given ... from above." One welcomes, therefore, Lievan van Acker's projected four-volume critical edition of the complete correspondence of nearly 400 letters. This first volume—ably translated by Baird and Ehrmann—makes available for the first time in English 90 letters to and from both the upper echelon of church and state and lesser ecclesiastical figures. The introductory essay, the introductions to each letter, footnotes, and the Latin of the more obscure texts are most helpful for understanding the letters.

Harvey D. Egan, S.J.
Boston College


In this well-crafted study which traces its origins to the Pontifical Institute for Mediaeval Studies in Toronto, Dobbs-Weinstein amply demonstrates her capacity to show how two major medieval philosophical theologians once illuminated each other, and can now serve to guide us in the relatively uncharted area of comparative philosophical theology. In doing this, she offers a real assist to Christian theologians attempting to respond to Karl Rahner's insistence (in his 1979 Weston College lecture on "world-church") that Christianity now stands vis-à-vis other global religions.

D. compares these two medieval thinkers in their interpretation of Scripture, using the example of their respective commentaries on Job, their intertwined treatments of creation, and their differing yet complementary exploration of human aspirations and the role of divine law in directing them. To focus on the "limits of reason" gives her a strategic way of showing how each of them cannily uses reason to delineate its own limitations in dealing with the One who is source-of-all, as well as to show the relative utility of the "parabolic" language of Scripture to speak of what must transcend straightforward philosophical assertion.

Christian theologians will receive a reliable and thorough purview of Maimonides on these matters—no mean task, and also come to appreciate why Aquinas so often used him as a model for his inquiry. They will in turn discover a fresh Aquinas in the process—another signal achievement. Moreover, D.'s concluding pages on their respective uses of Being and of Good suggest a fruitful way of responding to some recent proposals of Jean-Luc Marion on these matters. Withal, this careful comparative study offers an object lesson for Christian theologians, showing us how to retrieve a medieval tradition that was already interfaith, intercultural in perspective.

David B. Burrell, C.S.C.
University of Notre Dame

This is the third and final part of Schreckenberg's comprehensive, annotated collection of the texts developed by Christian religious leaders and others in direct counterintervention of the teachings of Judaism. Previous volumes appeared in 1990 and 1991. The Münster-based professor has provided us with an invaluable resource for anyone interested in the history of Christian-Jewish relations and in the history of theology generally. For as Johannes Metz and others have rightly insisted, these anti-Judaism texts colored the basic texture of Christian dogmatics, not merely the Church's explicit theology of the Jewish people.

S.'s approach is both chronological and categorical. The book is fundamentally divided into the respective centuries from the 13th onward. Within each century texts are grouped by categories. The first category always includes the tractates especially directed against the Jews and their supposed errors. Then follow other types of texts—canonical, papal, historiographical, secular, conciliar, synodal, etc. A description of the basic content is given for each listed document, together with some indication of the context from which it arose. These descriptions are sometimes brief (one-half page) and sometimes more extended (several pages). A bibliography is usually included, sometimes fairly extensive, for each text.

This volume is not likely to be a continuous read for most people. It will serve rather as a basic reference to which scholars and students can turn for information about a particular text as well as suggestions for further reading. The theological community owes S. a profound debt of gratitude for assembling these important materials in such a usable fashion. His three volumes provide us with a ready-reference that will greatly facilitate further research on the texts that have had a profound impact on shaping Christianity's traditionally distorted views of Jews and Judaism. Hopefully translations will eventually appear in other languages.

John T. Pawlikowski, O.S.M.

Catholic Theol. Union, Chicago


Despite its ambitious title, Brett's work is actually a close study of texts concerning the institution of slavery from three theologians, Aquinas, Francisco de Vitoria, and Domingo de Soto. Although the latter two were self-consciously admirers of Thomas's theology (indeed leading figures in the Thomistic revival in 16th-century Salamanca), the changing context in which their theological commitments were forged prevented them from appropriating Thomas's insight that authentic creaturely dominion excludes slavery. The tragic result is that, despite celebrated personal opposition to slavery in Spain's New World colonies on the part of both Soto and Vitoria, neither could muster the metaphysical clarity to condemn the institution of slavery as in all cases "repugnant to the plan of God and human wisdom" (ix). B. demonstrates how patterns of theological thought and compromise, influenced by cultural currents, can have profound practical consequences.

B. rightly identifies jus, jus gentium, and dominium as the three central categories which drive these theologians to their conclusions about the liceity of slavery. The chapters explicating texts on these themes are masterful at times, but occasionally cluttered with needless biographical detail. With remarkable clarity, the final chapter contrasts those elements of Thomas's theology which led him to condemn slavery (analogous relation, finality of agents' acts, relation to common good, inviolability of the eternal law) with Vitoria's and
Soto's emphasis on univocal right, legal title, subjective power, and *jus positivum*.

One significant weakness of this work is the manner in which the developments of the intervening centuries, the 13th to the 16th, remain largely an unexplored "black box" except for occasional mention of the influence of nominalism. Why and how did the role of positive law come to supplant that of metaphysics? A more robust institutional analysis of legal traditions, political practices, economic structures, and even racial factors that changed the face (and theological acceptability) of slavery from medieval to early colonial times would add welcome depth and hue to B.'s careful theological analysis.

THOMAS MASSARO, S.J.
Emory University, Atlanta


Sullivan makes accessible for English readers previously untranslated works of Las Casas organized around two questions: What happened in Spanish America following the "discovery" by Columbus? and Why did it happen? The "what" emerges from this Dominican bishop's horrific narrative of the Spanish conquest of the New World, the slaughter of thousands of its inhabitants, the subjugation of the survivors in an institution called *encomienda*, and his valiant struggle to defend Indian freedom.

Las Casas's answer to the "why" of this exploitation is twofold: first, the invaders' insatiable greed for gold, and second, the *encomienda* that permitted Spanish conquerors to exact labor service from the Indians on the condition that the latter receive religious instruction. Las Casas's reflection on greed as a blind, insatiable appetite that leads to committing savage crimes is insightful and sobering. The conversion of Las Casas himself, who relinquished his own *encomienda* to become an advocate for the Indians, is skillfully presented by S. As for the *encomienda*, S. shows in his splendid prenotes and through the writings of Las Casas that the situation of *encomienda* was worse than slavery.

S. anticipates critics who would dismiss Las Casas for unfairly accusing 16th-century Spain of gross misconduct, a condemnatory interpretation called the Black Legend. Las Casas recounted these horror stories not to denigrate his country's name, S. says, but "to prepare the heart and mind of the king and commissioners to act and stop the atrocities" (225).

S.'s translation is clear and lively. I highly recommend the book as a resource for courses in liberation theology and social ethics.

THOMAS L. SCHUBECK, S.J.
John Carroll Univ., Cleveland


A first-rate translation of a major book, originally published in 1819, which reveals why Johann Sebastian Drey (1777–1853) is hailed as a founder of the Catholic theology faculty at the University of Tübingen. Drey forged here an understanding of the nature of theology marked by his deep commitments to the incarnational, ecclesial, sacramental, and mystical character of the Catholic tradition, and deeply attuned to contemporary debates about the historical, scientific, and practical character of theology in the modern university setting.

This book should be recognized for situating the study of Catholic theology within a broader treatment of the religious nature of the human person, the diversity of religions, and the heritages of different Christian communities. Drey delineated the various branches of theology: he stressed the
historical study of the Bible and of the Church's doctrines and life practices, defended the scientific character of apologetics and dogmatics, and urged the importance of practical theology in training clergy. Drey's German Idealist view of science and his commitment to the clerical paradigm of theological education offered clear evidence of the limitations of his worldview. But this text is not a period piece. It is a witness to a vibrant tradition of theology that merits attention in classes on modern theology, on the nature of theology, and on theological hermeneutics.

Himes contributes an informative introduction that includes a biographical sketch of Drey and an analysis of several important facets of this work. His bibliography should be augmented by consulting Abraham Kustermann, ed., *Revision der Theologie—Reform der Kirche: Die Bedeutung des Tübinger Theologen Johann Sebastian Drey (1777–1853) in Geschichte und Gegenwart* (Würzburg: Echter, 1994).

**BRADFORD E. HINZE**
*Marquette University, Milwaukee*


Winquist cites Tillich's assertion "that the truth which does not disappoint dwells below the surface in the depths," and he equates this desire for importance and significance with the desire for theology. Yet, as a postmodern thinker, he insists in principle that we cannot probe below the surface and that theology plays its proper role as a minor literature helping to map the topology of the surface and to generate a tropology agitating the surface through metaphor and metonymy.

The main contemporary examples W. brings forward are Charles Scharlemann's reflections on the disruptive force of God-talk and Mark Taylor's s/theology after the death of God. Both make us confront the other beyond language and literature. The quarrels are with Descartes's autonomic self and its clear and distinct ideas, with Kant's transcendental forms, with Schleiermacher's sense of the absolute as well as with Tillich's depth probes. A viable theology will be a theology of experience, one which recognizes its limitations and sees desire itself as fixing the locations of importance and significance.

The book is a brief philosophical prolegomenon to any future theology rather than a theology in detail. Within its declared scope, it is a thought-provoking, valuable book. My regrets are that, in fact, it remains a very academic text full of the familiar categories and strategies of postmodern theorizing, that it is often confusing as it follows a rhizome rather than a taproot in its argument, and that it turns so little on the momentous or ordinary experiences proclaimed as the very basis of theological thought.

**MICHAEL J. KERLIN**
*La Salle University, Philadelphia*


These essays reflect a lifetime of commitment to ecumenical dialogue on the doctrine of the Trinity among Reformed, Catholic, and Orthodox Christians. Torrance credits both Barth and Rahner for breaking through scholastic structures in which De Deo Uno became a separate treatise from De Deo Trino. The model of a self-giving, self-communicating God now provides the "fundamental grammar of Christian theology" (4) and the basis for ecumenical concord. In pursuit of this claim, T.'s first essay is a brilliant exposition of Athanasius' doctrine of the Trinity and makes a convincing case that Athanasius intended *ousia* as a term of personal endowment. T. argues that the Athanasian doctrine could serve as the basis for agreement between East and West today if the "being" of God is identified with the personal "I am" of Exodus, a personal God of active self-communication.
The strong monarchian emphasis in the Athanasian approach would also allow the nonecumenical *filioque* to fall away.

This essay is followed by a treatment of Calvin's doctrine of the Trinity and a fascinating essay on Rahner's work as seen from a Reformed perspective. T. finds plenty to wonder about in Rahner's approach, such as an alleged conceptual gap between the economic and immanent Trinity in Rahner's thought, a problem which T. seems to see beyond in the end. He asks further whether a trinitarian theology that so stresses the Incarnation of the Logos must not also take account of the Passion, so that a *theologia crucis* becomes an apophatic avenue toward the God who is revealed in the historical person of the suffering Jesus. Finally, T. demurs, for ecumenical purposes, from Rahner's suggestion that "person" be replaced by "distinct manner of subsisting." These reservations aside, he still sees Rahner's work as an important ecumenical tool.

T.'s ecumenical concern comes into focus in the final half of the book, where he reports the agreement between Reformed and Orthodox on the doctrine of the Trinity, and offers a commentary on its significant features. At a time when Rome seems intent upon ecumenical relations with the East, it could well be that the work of Protestant theologians such as T. will ironically pave the way.

**Paul G. Crowley, S.J.**
Santa Clara University, Calif.

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Does the comparison of religious truths require that we presume at the outset a source common to all religions? Inclusivist theologies of religion (like Rahner's) and pluralist philosophies of religion (like Hick's) would have us make such a presumption as the price for carrying out comparisons. But that price is high indeed. Since all religions appear as *exempla* of this single essence, inevitably similarities shared by religions are emphasized at the expense of the differences which separate them—differences which may be of great theological interest.

Implicit in Eastern and Western religious traditions, according to Bracken, is a metaphysics of "the Infinite," which thus forms the best candidate for a foundation on which to carry out comparisons between these traditions. B. develops this idea based largely on Whitehead's related notions of creativity (which is an activity, not an entity, actual only in its concrete instanciations) and the extensive continuum (a relational matrix within which all entities become intelligible). Most of this book is devoted to an analysis of religious thinkers, Western and Eastern, in the hope of demonstrating that the Infinite is either required by a careful reading of the texts involved or that contradictions in the texts are best resolved by an appeal to this notion. Western thinkers like Aristotle, Aquinas, Eckhart, Schelling, Heidegger, and Whitehead, along with eastern thinkers like Shankara, Siddhartha Gautama, Nagarjuna, Kitaro Nishida, Lao-zi, and Zhuang-zi, are analyzed in relationship to B.'s notion of the Infinite. B. makes good use of current commentarial material; his treatment of these authors and his presentations are both clear and concise.

Given that B.'s goal is to identify an overarching "structure of intelligibility" which cuts across religious boundaries, it should come as no surprise that the comparisons in this book emphasize similarities without recognizing much theological value in the differences which distinguish these authors from one another. B. is to be admired for his willingness to acknowledge differences and to emphasize the strictly heuristic nature of his experiments with the Infinite as a basis for comparison.

**James L. Fredericks**
Loyola Marymount Univ., L.A.

Through the recounting of a personal experience with anti-Semitism, von Kellenbach leads us into a comprehensive, well researched and thoroughly documented study of the roots of anti-Judaism in feminist religious writing. She describes Foucault's categories regarding discursive practice in order to use these categories to define the rules of formation which she asserts govern the distorted representation of Judaism in Christianity. K.'s rules of formation are: (1) that Judaism is seen as the antithesis of Christian beliefs and values; (2) that Christian theology tends to scapegoat and characterize Jews and Judaism as guilty, evil, and predisposed to die-cide; and (3) that Judaism is portrayed as old, out-dated, and thus relegated to part of Christian prehistory.

Each of these rules of formation becomes the framework for the themes that K. identifies and explores in subsequent chapters. Her final chapter, "The Teaching of Respect," provides an excellent summary of the arguments presented and clarifies the nuances and differences in degree of anti-Judaism in West German and American feminist writing. It also provides a counterbalance to an earlier chapter, "The Teaching of Contempt."

K.'s scholarship provides us with the first comprehensive study of anti-Judaism in feminist religious writing. Several areas invite further development and discussion, e.g. the status of women in the Hebrew Bible, goddess theology, and the god of slave holders. One also wonders if the impact of Vatican II could have received a more complete discussion. Undoubtedly K.'s survey will stimulate further research and discussion as feminist scholarship responds to her challenge: "Feminist communities must begin to replace the teaching of contempt with a teaching of appreciation which explicitly affirms the legitimacy and vitality of the Jewish tradition. . . . [F]eminists must move beyond verbal condemnations and cosmetic changes towards a genuine respect for Judaism" (140).

ANNE ANDERSON, C.S.J.
Univ. of St. Michael's College
Toronto


Porter presumes that modern philosophy tried to develop ethical theories that would proceed more geomet-rico, resulting in uniquely correct solutions to every moral problem. She devotes two chapters to contemporary philosophy's demonstration that such a project is impossible, two chapters to showing that Aquinas had a better solution anyway, and a final chapter to updating and improving on Aquinas's account of the virtues.

The main difficulty P. sees with the "modern" project is that generic moral concepts such as "murder" are open-textured. They do not permit the unambiguous applications that a deductive, theoretical ethic needs. As evidence, she discusses borderline types of killing such as euthanasia and abortion. Thus the category of "intrinsically evil acts" is not so much wrong as misconceptualized.

Nonmaleficence and perhaps respect (not, e.g., autonomy or love) constitute for P. the focal meaning of morality. Moral concepts are to be understood analogously and in terms of particular moral actions, rather than univocally and a priori. P. thinks she thus avoids both deontology and utilitarianism.

P. argues that Aquinas meets the challenge of contemporary (linguistic, nonfoundationalist) philosophy. She claims that for him the center of morality is nonmaleficence towards equal persons. She sees his further contribution to be a minimum, substantive account of the normatively human. She nicely demonstrates how Aquinas depicts the virtues as both self-perfective and fostering the ex-
ternal good. She concludes with a fine chapter in which she uses G. H. Mead to rethink the meaning of the virtues.

P.'s arguments here often seem to this reader less persuasive than in her other writings. Nevertheless, though the book contains little explicit theology, it does make a significant contribution to the contemporary philosophical debate going on within moral theology, and it suggests once again the perennial value of Aquinas.

EDWARD COLLINS VACEK, S.J.
Weston Jesuit School of Theology


Moltmann-Wendel's theology of embodiment does not attempt to outline a new theology but rather to re-visit Christian theology and re-awaken it to the truth of its revelation, that God reveals God's self to humanity through flesh and that our destiny is in this flesh.

The work is basically a weave of reflections that extend from an appraisal of various contemporary movements (student, feminist, and New Age) that promised more than they delivered, through the ambiguity of Christian teaching about the body which both extols and suspects the body, finally to new ways of being and thinking with the body. Along the way we encounter the Pauline induced shame of being in the body, a well-considered recognition of the significance of healing in Jesus' ministry, a wonderful set of helps for preaching from the perspective of a theology of embodiment, and a rather lengthy description of the differences between woman's and man's bodies and how those descriptions have harmed both genders.

These loosely connected ideas are pulled together rather impressively in a brief summary, but the freewheeling claims concerning the dominance and repression of the human body particularly due to the "historical" normativity of the man's body are rather dated and oversimplified and could be substantially challenged by the ongoing research of Peter Brown and Caroline Walker Bynum.

JAMES F. KEENAN, S.J.
Weston Jesuit School of Theology


Hood challenges all Christians to reexamine the unconscious perceptions with which "blackness," both as a color and as a too often negative label used to deny the humanity of people of African descent, has been traditionally understood.

"Why," he asks, "does the experience of blackness as a color and skin hue as well as a symbol conjure up dual sensations for most people in the United States and Western Europe?" He attempts to answer this question by reviewing the roots of racial (color) prejudice from its apparent beginnings in the Greek and Roman cultures through Judaism and Christianity to the present day. In so doing, he exposes how all of these cultures and Christianity in particular developed an understanding of "blackness" which supported the enslavement and oppression of African peoples, creating a legacy of racism that persists to the present.

At the same time, he presents evidence to support his contention that "blackness," despite its negative aspects, has also historically suggested "sexual allure" resulting in a secret fascination with persons of color. Both this "disdain/fascination and fear/allure" he sees as grounded in Christian tradition and Christendom.

H. builds a strong foundation for his assertions which, though occasionally too broadly presented, yet serve as a strong counterargument to contemporary efforts to find in Christianity only an overly spiritualized love of others and a racial inclusiveness that did not always exist. This work is especially timely for its contribution to the ongoing debate regarding "difference" and the Other in a global society increasingly divided
by ethnic/racial and religious bias. It helps the reader to understand their origins while providing a much needed critique which challenges one to explore more deeply the gap between Christianity's teachings and its actual praxis.

DIANA L. HAYES  
Georgetown University, D.C.


A collection of essays from the Center for Health Care Ethics of St. Louis University, selected from a monthly newsletter for medical students and faculty at the St. Louis University Health Sciences Center. A first, and briefer, section, “Principles for a Pluralistic Society,” consists of 25 essays, mostly about three pages long, that discuss topics such as ethical norms, foundations for ethical evaluation and decision making, informed consent, medicine as a profession, and health-care reform. A second section, using the same brief essay format, discusses cases and conflicts, including such causes célèbres as the Nancy Cruzan case, Baby Fae, Dr. Kevorkian, and the conjoined Lakeberg twins.

The authors have done an excellent job in presenting clear viewpoints, although not all will agree with their conclusions. There is a sustained critique of the American emphasis on personal autonomy in medical decision making, with the authors favoring a less individualistic approach that emphasizes a communitarian stance and the notion of shared responsibilities. Ethical evaluation rests on a determination of how actions meet or frustrate human needs, with spiritual and creative needs presented as the most important.

The volume can be somewhat frustrating for its brief exposition of complicated subjects, its occasional repetition of a topic, and some inconsistencies between essays. Its short essays may be particularly appealing, however, for caregivers without the time or inclination to wade through longer studies. It would serve as a good text in an undergraduate class on health-care ethics as well as a useful resource for health-care personnel.

MYLES N. SHEEHAN, S.J., M.D.  
Loyola Univ. Medical Center, Ill.


For over 30 years the author of this provocative study, the former dean of the University of California School of Law at Berkeley, has been writing about the Establishment and Free-Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment. In this welcome summary of his teaching Choper demonstrates subtlety and sophistication in seeking to reconcile the ban on aid to religion in the Establishment Clause with the guarantee of religious freedom in the second part of the First Amendment.

Critics will differ on how successful C. has been in his reconciliation. He opposes officially sanctioned prayer in the public school but would allow for silent prayer. He would eliminate tax exemption on property used exclusively for religious purposes while permitting government assistance for the secular components of church-related schools. These conclusions are at variance with some 35 major decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court, which for a period of almost 50 years has rightly or wrongly ruled unconstitutional all prayers in the public schools and all but incidental governmental funds to schools of less than collegiate rank that are church related. C. concedes this but argues that the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment should sometimes "trump" the Establishment Clause and thereby maximize the nation's respect for the conscience and the religious convictions of its citizens.

C.'s book will take its place as one of those studies which are indispensable in every dialogue and debate on
SHORTER NOTICES

the fractious topic of the relationship of government and religion in America.

ROBERT F. DRINAN, S.J.
Georgetown Univ. Law Ctr., D.C.


The Third Standing Committee of the Episcopal Diocesan Ecumenical Officers and the National Association of Diocesan Ecumenical Officers have accomplished the rare feat of writing a clear, fascinating book that informs the specialist while it enlightens the amateur—and they wrote it collaboratively. A camel may be a horse produced by a committee, but this is not its literary equivalent. Its style is uniform and lucid.

It presents a detailed study of the Episcopal–Roman Catholic relationship in the U.S. today. No important matter is overlooked. One major section, over one-third of the book, focuses on authority. After an overview of the theology of episkope, instances of its exercise are analyzed in the cases of Raymond Hunthausen, Charles Curran, David Jenkins, and Graham Leonard. Another section is devoted to ordained ministry. Following the theological overview are studies of the reception and nonreception of the ordination of women and of the "Pastoral Provision" that has complicated the Episcopal–Roman Catholic relationship. Even specialists will learn from these studies.

Local ecumenism is not neglected. A chapter on "interchurch families," where one spouse is Episcopal and the other Roman Catholic, shows how truly they are "signs of unity bearing the weight of disunity"; some of the testimonies given here are poignant. Another chapter studies covenants between parishes and dioceses. This shows the important role that ecumenists on the diocesan and parish levels play in reconciling the churches and helps them to avoid mistakes that other covenant part-ners inadvertently made. Added benefits are the glossary of ecumenical terms and a bibliography for further reading.

This book belongs in the library of everyone interested in ecumenism, the Anglican–Roman Catholic relationship today, and the dynamics and difficulties of the process of "reception."

JON NILSON
Loyola University, Chicago


Considerable debate concerning confirmation has accompanied recent liturgical reforms across a broad spectrum of Christian churches. Browning and Reed, extending their collaboration in liturgy and religious education, address the debate in this well-informed book. Confirmation, they argue, should be understood and practiced both as integral to a unified initiation rite and as a sacramental act repeatable at various times in the course of the human life cycle.

Sketching a working history of confirmation, they examine its theological significance: "... that it is related intrinsically to baptism and ... is grounded in the empowerment that comes through the family and the faith community" (3). Presenting eight overlapping models of the rite, the authors view them in light of contemporary research conducted in seven church traditions, Roman Catholic and Protestant. This provides an ecumenical framework for assessing differing Christian practices and theological interpretations of confirmation and baptismal renewal.

The most provocative chapters explore a fresh rationale for confirmation/baptismal affirmation as a repeatable act of blessing. Drawing on recent scholarship in faith- and moral-development theory, they propose that confirmation "... can and should be repeated in response to ev-
olutions in self-understanding and changes in personal response to God's living Spirit throughout life" (114).

Liturgists and educators will find the concluding practical guidelines and model liturgies useful, though the prayer texts favor personal, experiential images over the ecclesial and social images of baptism. One wonders whether the strong emphasis on repeatability tied to developmental needs may diminish their insistence on the unified rites of initiation. But their integrative approach is a stimulating contribution toward the reclaiming of baptism at the heart of Christian faith and life.

DON E. SALTERS
Emory University, Atlanta

ROBERT FROST'S "STAR IN A STONE BOAT": A GRAMMAR OF BELIEF. Edward Ingebretsen, S.J. San Francisco: Catholic Scholars, 1994. Pp. vii + 300. $64.95; $44.95.

The poem mentioned in the title suggests the direction of Ingebretsen's analyses. It meditates on a star fallen to earth and its use as a building stone by a farmer; Frost saw the interplay between stellar components and mundane life as parabolic of human experience. Because F. did not separate belief and poetry, Ingebretsen's study promises his spirituality to be a literary one, built on biblical references but much more broadly exploratory, asking how to save one's life, one's soul through language. He shows F.'s achievement to be "a body of poems that rarely mention God, but in which the problem of God's existence is everywhere present" (275); the poetry translates theological questions into aesthetic ones.

A transition between F.'s first two volumes suggests the dynamics for his later books: F. shifts attention from the visual to the aural, from lyrics to poetic dialogues, from romantic cliches and conventional metaphysics to dense verbal worlds. Metaphors serve as the material by which spirituality speaks itself; domestic images, instances of home-making, reveal spirit as it extends itself into the world. The imagination necessary to make oneself at home must be adequate, Ingebretsen finds, in the same way belief must be. Failure, haunted love, guilt, and fear test the making of these metaphors. In F.'s Gothicism, moments of intimacy become moments of terror. The poems drive inward where the human point of view becomes inadequate; the poetic will fails. The analysis becomes most engaging as it traces the "metaphysical bankruptcy of language."

Design, for a poem as for living, necessarily includes closure, ending. F. shows life as imagined from the edge or margin of woods, of home, of life, where form-making helps manage accidental ends and conclusions. F.'s final poems continue questioning how to identify, establish, and sustain spirit. Both belief and poetry venture into resistant material risking both creature and creator. The risks of love and of belief most expose spirit and so shape F.'s poetry.

A careful and stimulating study. I would only suggest that the wealth of research reflected in the footnotes deserved full and complete attention in the bibliography and index.

RONALD BIEGANOWSKI
Marquette University, Milwaukee

BOOKS RECEIVED

SCRIPTURAL STUDIES

