BOOK REVIEWS


"History of Israelite religion" is one of the two broad approaches to the Old Testament as a whole over the last two centuries, especially in Germany. The other is "Old Testament theology." In the 1930s W. Eichrodt successfully challenged the dominance of Religionsgeschichte with his Theology of the Old Testament built around the concept of covenant conceived historically. Eichrodt's work was partially eclipsed in the 1950s by a work that came to dominate the field, G. von Rad's Old Testament Theology. It attempted to integrate theology with history by redefining biblical theology as the study of Israelite confessions and the great literary works that grew from them. Though much less popular than OT theology over the last three quarters of a century (by a factor of three books to one, according to Albertz), "history of Israelite religion" never entirely disappeared, witness G. Fohrer's much used History of Israelite Religion (1970). Fohrer is now superseded by the volume under review, ably translated from the German, which, by its scope, breadth, methodological precision, and general competence, is now the standard work. It begins with the ancestors in Genesis and ends with the Maccabees.

Albertz differs somewhat from earlier authors. His habilitationsschrift, Persönliche Frömmigkeit und offizielle Religion: Religionsinterner Pluralismus in Israel und Babylon (1978), prompted him to write a history of religion that integrated a social history of Israel. He is sensitive to seminal distinctions—official, local, and family religion; religion in the North and in the South; individual and family religion, diaspora and Judaean religion. Another virtue is that he makes a persistent effort to avoid a pure history of ideas; as much as possible he roots concepts in institutions.

One can get some idea of the work by looking at his understanding of religion in important stages in biblical history: the ever-problematic "patriarchal period," the exodus, the rise of monarchy, and the Deuteronomic reform. Following E. Blum and others, for whom the Genesis stories of the ancestors do not pre-date the time of David and the time of Jeroboam I, A. believes the palpable difference between the religious world of Genesis and of Yahwism cries out for an explanation, and the explanation is largely sociological: the religion of the ancestors is family piety. "Thus 'patriarchal religion' can largely be understood as a form of personal piety, as a typical family piety" (29). The "piety of early Israelite families projected on to the patriarchs is not yet the
real beginning of the history of Israelite religion” (42). In the turmoil of the exodus a unique (in the ancient Near East) bond was formed between Yahweh and a large group. Other religions knew of such a bond only between the god and an individual or a small group. When the group under Joshua entered Canaan, the land was already seething with social change and liberation: “The religious traditions of liberation which they brought with them made an essential contribution toward stimulating and channeling it and creating a social order which for more than a century secured a life for the population of the hill-country in the greatest possible freedom” (72).

Under the monarchy, the national consensus over the form and values of society, which had developed in the wake of the exodus, collapsed. The religion of the larger groups went into different and sometimes conflicting positions that could no longer be held by society as a whole but only by groups within it, e.g. the official theology of king and temple, the theology of resistance groups, and in between various accommodations to traditional Yahwism and court/temple religion. With the downfall of the kingdom in 587, the official theology ended and the resistance theology was adopted as a new “official” theology. The religion of the Deuteronomic reform is interpreted by A. as a summarizing of the whole religious tradition under a single concept, which ensured the survival of Israel when there was no longer a unified state to hold things together. In place of king and cult there now was the Torah accompanied by a pervasive legal stamp.

A.’s history is an extraordinary achievement, fair-minded, largely successful in rooting theological ideas in real life, and up-to-date. Inevitably, so bold and comprehensive a work invites questions and criticisms. One major question is the method entailed by the decision to write a “history” rather than a “theology”: the method pits A. against his chief source, the Bible. A. is perforce constantly suspicious of projection and “interests.” Overuse of historical analogy readily leads to reconstructions based on “this must have happened” or “this is most unlikely”. The reviewer is also uneasy with A.’s “sectarian” view of society after the rise of the monarchy—society is formed of competing groups, each preserving its own traditions and rejecting others. One wonders whether ideas define social groups or whether subgroups within a society reinterpret or conveniently forget them according to circumstances, e.g., “When in the Temple, do as they do in the Temple.” A final and minor point: A.’s dismissal of infant sacrifice in Israel and Canaan (192) is most unpersuasive; see L. Stager and S. Wolff, “Child Sacrifice at Carthage—Religious Rite or Population Control,” Biblical Archaeologist Review 10 (1984) 30–51.

Weston Jesuit School of Theology RICHARD J. CLIFFORD, S.J.

Symptomatic perhaps of renewed interest in the relationship between theology and prayer, Miller writes from the conviction that the shape of biblical faith emerges from the forms and content of biblical prayer. He aims to look comprehensively at biblical prayers—their typical forms (genres), their recurrent motifs, and their vital interconnection. And, although most of the attention goes to the Old Testament, especially the Psalter, the unity of the testaments functions as the theological underpinning of his entire project. In fact, frequent reference is made throughout the work to the New Testament, and a concluding chapter suggests not only lines of continuity with the OT, but also the NT's innovative stress on prayer for one's enemies, its understanding of prayer as an ongoing spiritual discipline, and, of course, its movement toward trinitarian formulation. But M. also avoids a myopic canonical focus by contextualizing his study in the forms and practice of the ancient Near East. In a manner largely free of polemics against Israel's polytheistic neighbors, Chapter 1 in particular shows how the forms and even much of the content of biblical prayer is at home in the ancient Orient.

This study is addressed to a broad audience, both academic and church folk, as M. puts it, "from faith for faith" (4); discussions of a technical nature are restricted largely to comprehensive notes at the end of the volume. Throughout, the treatment of textual sources is judicious and balanced, sensitive to the theological issues which emerge from a close reading. The starting point is not a systematic analysis of prayer from a theological, phenomenological, anthropological, or sociological perspective, but a kind of working definition ("when human beings . . . address God with some sort of need and in hopes of divine response" or in "praise and thanksgiving" (41)). This provides a principle of text selection M. can use for his inventory of biblical prayers, along with, or in the absence of, other indications of prayer, such as appear in Chapter 2, which treats various terms designating prayer in the OT and, notably, the gestures/actions accompanying it.

The heart of M.'s study, and the key to the dynamics of biblical faith, comes in chapters 3–5, where he embarks upon a thorough examination of the principal prayer genres, along with their customary motifs, especially in the Psalter. The dominant prayer type here is, of course, the "prayer for help" (the individual "lament" psalm), in which the human cry for help in a situation of overwhelming need evokes a divine response, typically an "oracle of assurance/salvation" ("Do not be afraid. I am with you."). But prayer is basically dialogical; so this movement continues as the one who cried to God now responds gratefully with hymns of thanksgiving and praise, to be elaborated further
in songs of trust and confidence—all well attested genres in the Psalter. Certainly, the variety of prayer attested in the OT is not limited to these few forms, and others are taken up in subsequent chapters, e.g. women’s prayers, prayers of confession and penitence, intercessory prayers, and blessings and curses. But the dynamic depicted in the movement from petitionary prayers to songs of thanksgiving stands out and reveals for M. the very structure of the dialogue which is faith, indeed a structure that M. suggests is universal (53).

Given the restricted geographical and temporal focus, such a claim for universality in the structure of faith and prayer is perhaps overly ambitious, since it does not seem to highlight adequately the contemplative or meditative dimensions of prayer, even those suggested in the Psalter. Indeed one might well ask whether or not within the dynamics of faith the cry for God does not itself originate in some sense in God’s prior gift. Nevertheless, one cannot easily set aside the important theological point M. makes on the basis of the proposed structure, and particularly the rhetoric of the “cries for help,” namely, that “the impassibility of God and the immutability of God were not part of Israel’s understanding of prayer” (126).

To be sure, there will be quibbles with aspects of M.’s study. The issue of prayer’s definition cannot be avoided, since the entire text selection and resulting analysis depend on it. Why some prose texts are “prayer” for M. and not others is not always evident, particularly when God functions as a character in a story (e.g. Gen 18:23–32). So, too, one may question the status of vision reports or oracles delivered outside the cult through a prophetic intermediary. The answers to these questions will determine not only what constitutes “biblical prayer” historically, but, perhaps more importantly, what these biblical paradigms actually mean for the contemporary experience and praxis of prayer.

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Robert A. Di Vito


A useful collection of nine essays written by Borg on various aspects of the ongoing historical scholarship about Jesus and its impact on Christian faith.

In Part 1, Borg explains his understanding of Jesus as “a teacher of subversive wisdom” (9) and the focus of recent scholarship on the social world of Jesus, giving very clear descriptions of the recent portraits of Jesus by several contemporary scholars. Among the emergent trends he identifies is the end of the old consensus on Jesus as an apocalyptic figure who proclaimed an imminent end of the world. Indeed, many (but hardly all) of the scholars of the Jesus Seminar (of which he is a leading member) lean in the direction of a “non-eschatological Jesus,”
but he may be overstating the case when he considers the trend an “emergent consensus” (9).

In Part 2, Borg goes on to tackle this highly debated issue, making a strong case that Jesus was a nonapocalyptic wisdom teacher. He points out that “the primary foundation of the eschatological Jesus” is the “coming Son of Man” sayings. One must agree that these logia are “now commonly viewed by scholars as inauthentic” (51) in scholarship coming from a variety of directions. Borg continues his assault with the very persuasive opinion that imminent “end of the world” theology is also without basis in those gospel texts which speak specifically about “kingdom.” The apocalyptic expectation of the early Church, he maintains, is not based on Jesus’ own eschatology but on the Jewish (-Christian) notion of (his) resurrection as the beginning of the end-time.

Very useful is Borg’s broad definition of “politics” in the very enlightening essay “Jesus and Politics.” Here he declares that Jesus “both challenged the existing social order and advocated an alternative,” namely, God’s will of human compassion, rather than the Jewish purity laws’ “domination system of his time” (116). Borg’s brief expostitions of peasant society, patriarchal society, and the politics of purity in first-century Palestine (101–12) are a very clear introduction to these concepts and “must” reading for seminarians and beginning graduate theology students.

Borg concludes that the inadequate vision of Jesus as apocalyptic preacher should not be replaced, however, by a merely political notion of him as critic of the “practice and ideology of the dominant classes” (116). Jesus was much more—and this leads into a truly fascinating essay (chap. 6) in which Borg sketches out a second or higher level of reality (the supernatural) addressed by the “primordial tradition” embodied in all religions. Of this reality he shows that Jesus is a visionary.

In the final three essays, Borg addresses the relevance of the Jesus research for the Church today. His description of the Jesus Seminar is a very clear and fair exposition of the way these scholars work and of their commitment to raising biblical consciousness. He makes a helpful distinction between “natural literalism” (the acceptance of the Bible as completely factual by everyone in the pre-critical period) and “conscious literalism” (= fundamentalism), a “twentieth-century reaction to . . . the Enlightenment” (177).

In the final essay, “Does the Historical Jesus Matter?” Borg treats very delicately and from a faith perspective the impact of historical-Jesus study on the Church today. He maintains that “historical knowledge is not necessary to being a Christian” (192) because the vast majority of Christians through the centuries did not have it. Nevertheless, “how we as Christians think of Jesus shapes our understanding of the Christian life itself” (192). Recent discoveries about the “pre-Easter Jesus” (a better phrase than “historical Jesus”) preserve
us from a fideistic, moralistic, or individualist existential understand-
ing of the "post-Easter Jesus" (better than "the Christ of faith"), the
Jesus of ongoing Christian belief and devotion.

Borg is to be congratulated on producing a book of great value and
usefulness for students and scholars alike. This reviewer considers it a
balanced presentation of an important area of academic historical

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PARABLES AS SUBVERSIVE SPEECH: JESUS AS PEDAGOGUE OF THE
OPRESSED. By William R. Herzog II. Louisville: Westminster/Knox,

In a study of the parables that is nothing if not methodologically
clear and consistent, Herzog engages in what he terms an "experi-
ment" (259). As the subtitle suggests, he applies to the parables prin-
ciples derived from Paulo Freire's Pedagogy of the Oppressed, in order
to show how they might have functioned for Jesus' first hearers as
speech that was subversive of the dominant cultural patterns of first-
century Palestine. H. is well read in previous parable research. He
knows that after many attempts to connect the parables to the histor-
ical Jesus, the more recent fashion has been to place them once more
back in their gospel contexts. He also knows why: attempts to take the
parables out of the gospel narratives always requires some other con-
text to act as interpretive cipher for these coded stories (44). And he is
willing to "experiment" with an interpretive framework that is neither
literary nor theological, but explicitly ideological. He writes out of the
"conviction that they did function as part of the liberation praxis of
Jesus' ministry" (3).

The opening chapters provide the rationale for such an experiment,
as H. considers in turn the surface similarities between Jesus' parables
and Freire's work for the "conscientization" of the oppressed poor, the
inevitability of using some sort of contemporary theoretical framework
in studying the historical Jesus ("The Peril of Not Modernizing
Jesus"), and the way in which his effort fits within the history of
parables research.

H.'s key chapter is called "The World of Agrarian Societies and Tra-
ditional Aristocratic Empires," for it provides the basic framework for
his subsequent interpretation of specific parables. Here, H. makes a
conscious choice of theoretical models dealing with "macrosociology,"
especially that derived from Gerhard Lenski's work Power and Privi-
lege: A Theory of Social Stratification (1966), rather than a compara-
tive anthropological or traditional historical approach. The choice is a
fateful one, for in choices between what the model says "must be" and
what history suggests "was the case," H. will choose the model. Thus,
Palestine is construed as a world of oppression, in which the few very
rich exploit the many who are poor. No real news, here, of course. What is distinctive is the way in which this basic reality is made the absolute grid for the interpretation of the parables.

In Part 2, H. considers a series of parables under the rubric, "Unmasking the World of Oppression: Posing the Problems." His titles tell all. The parable of the Laborers in the Vineyard (Matt 20:1–16) becomes "Blaming the Victims of Oppression." And the parable of the Wicked Tenants (Mark 12:1–12) is now "Peasant Revolt and the Spiral of Violence." Part 3 is dedicated to "Opening up New Possibilities: Challenging the Limits." Here H. considers parables which, in his view, not only encode the system of oppression but challenge it. Thus, the tiny parable of the Friend at Midnight (Luke 11:5–8) becomes "The Moral Economy of the Peasant." And the parable of the Dishonest Steward is "A Weapon of the Weak."

The success of the experiment can be measured by how well it interprets the data and how successfully it can be replicated. H. himself acknowledges the limited applicability of the method beyond his sample, conceding that "some parables simply will not fit the framework proposed here" (4). What he does not recognize is the gap between the claim to interpret this selection of parables (even if successful) and his implied claim that the historical Jesus was engaged in just such a "pedagogy of the oppressed."

But neither is the approach completely successful in interpreting this selection of parables. The exercise is not without insight. H.'s reading of the difficult parable of the Dishonest Steward is as helpful as any I have seen. Too often, however, the demands of the model tend to twist the specifics of the stories. The Laborers in the Vineyard is H.'s all-important test case. To make it work as a codification of oppression climaxing in an "honor-shame riposte," however, H. is required to do more than fill in the silences of the story. The very possession of a vineyard had to involve the foreclosure of peasant farms, and the denarius offered all the laborers must be (despite the evidence cited by the majority of H.'s own sources) not a generous amount or even sufficient for survival, but itself a mechanism for keeping laborers in a condition of need. And so on. In contrast, the action in the Friend at Midnight must take place in a village (despite the story's reticence on this point), so that it can demonstrate the "moral economy of the peasant" as a metaphor for the kingdom of God. One can't complain about the level of originality, but plausibility is another matter. The parable of the Talents (Matt 25:14–30; Luke 19:11–27), e.g., becomes a lesson in "the Vulnerability of the Whistle-Blower." I suspect that these readings will be persuasive to the degree that one is already committed to the vision of the world espoused by the author and Paulo Freire.

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Luke Timothy Johnson
A HISTORY OF THE BIBLE AS LITERATURE 1: FROM ANTIQUITY TO 1700.

The immediate subject of this book is the reputation of the Authorized, or King James, translation of the Bible as one of the finest examples of English prose. Norton notes at the outset that the quality of the KJB as English prose is a given among educated people in English-speaking cultures. So much is it a given that we have forgotten that it was not always so. Nor has the quality of the Bible as a literary work always been taken for granted. Both, as it is now fashionable to say, have histories, and the tracing of those histories is N.'s task in this book.

This volume, the first in a two-volume work, treats chiefly the backgrounds of the Bible's reputation as a literary work, the history of theories about the work of translating sacred texts, and the narrative of 16th-century translation efforts that led to the publication of the KJB in 1611. It ends with a survey of early reception and the beginnings of literary influence for this translation, focusing chiefly on uses of the Bible in their works by Donne, Herbert, Cowley, Milton, and Bunyan. Volume 2 (see TS 56 (1995) 165–66) takes the story forward from the 17th century until the supplanting of the KJB by contemporary translations in the late 20th century.

N.'s focus is of course on the development of the English Bible. The bulk of this volume covers the great period of 16th-century translation beginning with Tyndale and Coverdale, then moving through the Anglican Bibles and their Roman and Puritan competitors to the production of the KJB. But he appropriately begins at the beginning, tracing differences and similarities among classical and Hebrew attitudes toward language, especially when employed in religious writing. He then moves to a survey of developing attitudes toward the Bible as text and as artifact among the Church Fathers and later medieval writers, culminating with the early translations of Wycliff.

Subthemes of N.'s work include changing attitudes toward the Bible as a sacred text and the evolution of a concept of appropriate English style for biblical translation. N. enhances the quality of his work by including a copious selection of plates illustrating the visual appearance of the various 16th-century translations and a lengthy appendix providing numerous textual examples of the differing styles of these translations. As one reads through these selections, guided by N.'s discussions, one can experience the development of what we are all familiar with as the "King James style." What often comes as a bit of a shock is to discover that this style was not inevitable, that there were other styles present in the earlier translations that could have served as models for its translators. Had they done so, of course, our sense of what constitutes appropriate style for biblical translation would be quite different.

N.'s story is a fascinating one, illustrative of the way we too often
take recent developments as long-standing realities and obscure the complexities of historical development. N. points to ongoing conflicts within Western culture between concepts of the sacred and the secular, especially as they touch on the cultural reception of the Bible as both a sacred text and as a literary artifact able to serve as a model for both religious and secular writers. He explores origins of our more recent attitudes toward the biblical text and traces the role of the KJB in the development of those attitudes. He traces effectively the development of the English Bible as a literary source and influence.

This is an important book for Bible readers, for literary scholars, and for those interested in understanding the still significant power of the Bible as a religious or sacred text. As one who studies English Renaissance literature, I value N.'s contribution to that subject. As one who remembers the controversies that once surrounded the introduction of the Revised Standard Version, I value N.'s insights into that subject as well. One of the major developments in American religion has been the evolution of the Bible as a sacred object apart from the worshiping community, as the object of private as opposed to public or liturgical reading, as the object of regard as a kind of sacred thing in a magical as well as in a religious sense. This volume begins the story of that development, and constitutes a major contribution to our understanding of it.

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JOHN N. WALL


Widdicombe's special concern in this very readable work is to understand Origen's and Athanasius' doctrines of God the Father in each author's distinctive context or Sitz im Leben. To accomplish such an understanding successfully, W. carefully sets out the issues and influences that affected each author. In the case of Origen, for example, W. takes the reader through important issues regarding middle Platonic understandings of whether God can be known and how the Logos functions to reveal God. W.'s thoroughness gives the book a synthetic dimension that some other treatments of Origen and Athanasius lack: the reader has a clear sense of both Origen's and Athanasius' theologies of God over-all, and how the specific doctrine of the fatherhood of God figures in each of those theologies.

Origen and Athanasius constitute the end points of W.'s analysis because what is actually being described in the book is the doctrine of the fatherhood of God in Alexandrian theology. Origen, it is argued, establishes a theology of fatherhood which will characterize most of the successive generations of Alexandrian theologians. Alexander and Athanasius are the most significant of these later theologians, and both find their moment of crisis when a fellow Alexandrian, Arius,
promotes a doctrine of God which denies the legitimacy of the traditional insight of God's fatherhood. The debate with Arius is treated by W. as the decisive event in shaping Athanasius's mature understanding of the fatherhood of God. W. makes the argument that Athanasius's doctrine of God's fatherhood keeps faith with Origen's while Arius's neglect (or rejection) of the doctrine breaks with Origen. Athanasius's anti-Arian understanding of the fatherhood of God thus constitutes the full development of Origen's doctrine.

Which is not to collapse Origen's and Athanasius's doctrines into one another. As W. makes clear, Origen's doctrine of divine fatherhood is set very much within the context of cosmology, in which Origen is developing a distinctively Christian alternative to pagan understandings of divine transcendence: responding to texts like Republic 509B and Timaeus 28C are important milestones for Origen. W.'s emphasis on the centrality of Origen's argument against God's materiality in particular is well taken and illuminating. Athanasius's doctrine of divine fatherhood, as has already been suggested, is by contrast very much engaged with refuting what seemed to Athanasius as the fundamental disavowal of God's natural or intrinsic productivity. What binds Origen and Athanasius is precisely the insight that God must be understood to be, by nature, productive.

While I have only quibbling criticisms to make about W.'s analysis of the content and context of the Alexandrian doctrine of God's fatherhood from Origen to Athanasius, I must disagree with his assessment of the significance of the doctrine's last stage, in Athanasius. W. asserts that the ultimate significance of Athanasius's doctrine of God's fatherhood lay in its function as the foundation for later pro-Nicene trinitarian thought, in that Athanasius's discussion of divine fatherhood sets the parameters for later fourth-century theologians, such as the Cappadocians, in their treatment of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. There is another fourth-century argument over God's fatherhood which seems the more likely foundation for Cappadocian trinitarian theology, namely the debate between Basil of Ancyra and George of Laodicea, who favored father-son language, and Eunomius of Cyzicus and Eudoxius of Antioch, who favored Creator-creature language. In this debate, the use of "father" for God is thought by Eunomius and Eudoxius to attribute passion to God and thereby imply material generation and, more importantly, take away God's freedom. Basil and George's theology likely owes nothing to Athanasius, and that of Eunomius and Eudoxius may owe just as little to Arius. It is premature, I think, to give Athanasius the fourth-century role of being the normative expression of Eastern pro-Nicene theology (although I would not argue with a claim that he obtains this status in the fifth century).

I emphasize this point because some of W.'s readers will be searching for a good historical account of the patristic doctrine of God the "Father" as a resource for contemporary gender-related speculations (as W. foresaw and provides for in a Postscript). They will certainly find
that in W.'s work of first-class scholarship. What cannot happen next, I suggest, is the conclusion that an account of Athanasius's doctrine of the fatherhood of God provides as well an account of the fundamental "Nicene" trinitarian doctrine of fatherhood of God.

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MICHEL RENÉ BARNES


Cazier's book is an excellent example of the sometimes elusive genre "historical theology," difficult to describe but easy to recognize when well executed. It is also a good example of a growing tendency to take early medieval theologians seriously, respecting the genres in which they chose to write and eschewing tired clichés about their derivative, compilatory character. C.'s work is a study of Isidore's three books of Sentences—truly a forbidding tract from the perspective of those interested in repeating clichés, for it is an entirely "derivative" collection of sentences based on the Latin fathers, topically arranged. But C.'s book, precisely as a study of the Sentences, becomes a study of "the birth of Catholic Spain" as well. By refusing to "reduce Isidore to his sources" (8), and recognizing that Isidore's work is never simply repetition but always a "rewriting" of his sources, C. shows that the Sentences present a synthesis of "Christian wisdom" (163) for the newly Catholic society (converted 587), heir simultaneously to the classical and Christian traditions of Hispano-Roman culture and to the Visigothic traditions native to the formerly Arian kingdom.

Specifically, for C. the Sentences provide a vision of a "solidly religious culture" (101), offering a synthesis of theology and politics in which reflection on theological topics "illuminates" the discussion of the moral life (102), while that discussion in turn is intimately linked to current social reality, especially to the Fourth Council of Toledo in 633 (C. persuasively re-dates the treatise, previously assigned to 615). With Isidore presiding, the Council addressed the crisis of Sisenand's deposition of King Suinthila in 632 by recognizing Sisenand as King but qualifying this recognition significantly (clemency to Suinthila, limitation of royal influence on episcopal appointments, etc.).

Many chapters of the Sentences which on a cursory reading seem like rehashed patristic moralizing come alive once their connection to current politics is revealed. Especially stunning is the demonstration that passages in Book 2 on swearing are directly linked to the Council's condemnation of those who (like Suinthila's erstwhile retainers) harbor mental reservations in taking oaths of fidelity (180). Isidore was sympathetic to the politics of Suinthila, whom he had depicted, in History of the Goths, as a protector of the poor; perhaps Suinthila was overthrown precisely because of anti-aristocratic policies (64). Isidore
used his presidency of Toledo IV to salvage what he could of Suinthila's programme and to temper the violence of royal politics. The Sentences articulate and develop the ideals out of which he acted—in this sense they are his "spiritual testament" (7, 57) to the kingdom.

C. demonstrates how the Sentences accomplish this by synthesizing and modulating patristic thought, sometimes through subtle shifts of emphasis (especially elegant work vis à vis Lactantius, Augustine, and Gregory, 97–103). Isidore develops the Augustinian conception of "pride" into an analysis of the sins of the powerful, emphasizing the responsibilities of clerics to protect the people from abuses of power (echoing Toledo IV). The eschatological tension between hic and illuc, developed from patristic writers, pervades the whole work and underscores the liability of the cruel and prideful to judgment: hell must be depicted fearsomely if the nobility is to be made to fear anything. And despite the increasingly anti-Jewish character of this Catholic kingdom (Jews were the only holdout against Catholic orthodoxy), Isidore finally insists they must not be forcibly converted.

If at times the book seems somewhat diffuse (e.g. a "Conclusions" section three chapters long and difficult to summarize) or fragmented (too many short sections whose mutual relation remains unarticulated), and is marred by a recurring typographical error (mid-sentence periods), this is more than mitigated by the sheer sustained attention to a text which, after C.'s book, can no longer be regarded as a hackneyed collection of patristic opinions; it must be seen as a prophetic commentary on, and visionary blueprint for, that society which C. calls the "laboratory for the new Christian society which will be that of the High Middle Ages" (74).

University of Notre Dame


This collection of essays furthers our understandings of female saints in their historical context and an appreciation for the considerable risk they faced in becoming visible, in daring to write of their experience of God, and in assuming spiritual authority in their teaching and actions.

In her Medieval Women's Visionary Literature (1986), Petroff did more than any other feminist scholar to make the historical record of mystical women available by creating an anthology of texts by and about these women. Her introductory interpretations and analyses which preceded each section began a project to which she returns in this collection. This time, she offers skillful close readings of many of the same texts and develops new themes in the material, which reveal the linguistic and rhetorical strategies adopted by these women, authorized by their mystical experiences in order to "transgress" the
limits imposed on them by their deeply misogynist society and teach publicly without being unduly penalized for their audacity.

The essays are grouped in three sections, dealing with backgrounds, change and continuity, and the acquisition of authority. The analyses are literary and historical more than theological. Essays circle around several figures who are introduced in the first section in a more general way against the background of the conditions which fostered mysticism and which led or enabled women to write against otherwise overwhelming odds. Subsequent essays develop motifs and themes in the same writings through close literary analysis of selected passages, drawing on a variety of theoretical perspectives.

P. accounts for the emergence of the new feminine spirituality in the 12th to 13th centuries, typified by the Beguines, but also expressed by lay tertiaries in Italy. By analyzing the motifs in the *vitae* of these Italian saints and the texts written by the Northern Beguines, she uncovers both the mystical innovations of these women and their points of continuity with the tradition, revealing at the same time how their writings depart from the standard literary canon.

Drawing on French feminist literary theory of “writing the body,” P. explores the entirely new terrain revealed through analysis of the way the gendered body and its gestures functions in the writings of three of the women, enabling them to say the unsayable through bodily analogies and metaphors. P. discovers in the writings she presents “what is missing in the literature of the rest of the medieval world—a female subject, living autonomously in a world she defines, speaking a language she invents and controls” (21). Thus, she argues for the way women’s mystical writings expand and challenge the notion of literature and the expectations of mystical writing. She offers particularly strong and unique insights into the Beguine literature, poetically, thematically, and theologically in the pair of essays which treat these texts.

Despite its subtitle, P.’s volume is less about the experience of mysticism itself than about its effects on the lives and writings of women saints whose mysticism was a condition of and an impetus for their textual creation. It is an important contribution to our understanding of female mystics and accounts for some of the reasons why their writings continue to be neglected or dismissed in standard studies on mysticism, namely, “because they derive from a different experience of the body, a different epistemology, and a different relationship to language” (ix).

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JANET K. RUFFING

Anyone who devotes more than a cursory reading to Julian's *Showings* is aware of the theological complexity of this deceptively simple work. Baker's book uncovers several layers of this complexity. Her purpose is to provide cultural frames of reference by investigating the affinity between Julian's text and various traditions of medieval spirituality and theology.

The opening chapters examine images and thought patterns which likely influenced Julian's visionary experience. While B. acknowledges that new insights can come from mystical experience, she rightly sees such experience as inevitably affected by the expectations and cognitive awareness of the mystic. Thus, B. describes the tradition of affective piety which likely led to Julian's prayer for the three "wounds" of contrition, compassion, and longing for God, and the practice of meditation upon the details of Christ's passion which gave content to Julian's vision itself and to her subsequent meditation upon it. Particularly commendable are B.'s careful comparisons of Julian's desires with similar sentiments in the writings of Bernard, Aelred, Bonaventure, and Hilton, and her analysis of the influence of artistic renderings of the crucifixion upon Julian's own vision of the Crucified.

Then B. turns to the Long Text, the result of 20 years' reflection during which Julian developed the theological implications of her visionary experience. B. studies three themes of Julian's theology: her theodicy, her treatment of sin, and her anthropology, presenting Julian as both deeply indebted to the Augustinian synthesis which dominated medieval theology, and selectively critical of certain areas of that tradition. B.'s finest achievement here is the clear contrast she draws between Julian's teleological theodicy with its emphasis upon God's creative purposes, and Augustine's more etiological theodicy with its focus upon the causes and consequences of the fall. Here B. allows the originality of Julian's "all will be well," with its implicit suggestion of universal salvation, to emerge against the backdrop of the 14th-century debates between the Augustinians (Bradwardine and Gregory of Rimini) and the Ockhamists. B. gives the Parable of the Lord and the Servant the pride of place it deserves in any description of Julian's theology, focusing upon its scriptural roots in Genesis and Romans, and its overt challenge to the Augustinian doctrine of original sin. Especially helpful here is B.'s analysis of how the Bernardine notion of the *regio dissimilitudinis* (following Augustine) finds echoes in Julian's thought. B.'s study of Julian's anthropology acknowledges its debt to the notion of the *imago Dei*, a debt impossible to overestimate for an accurate understanding of Julian's view of human nature. B. develops one aspect of how the *imago Dei* functions in Julian's theology, linking it to Julian's imaging of God as both Father and Mother, thereby emphasizing how both male and female can be seen as...
created in God's image and challenging any interpretation that would suggest otherwise.

In her final chapter, B. discusses Julian as an author, describing the difficulty involved in the production of the Long Text due to the need to preserve simultaneously the spontaneity of the original experience, the gradual unfolding of its meaning over a 20-year period, and the essential unity of the entire experience. B.'s assessment of how Julian achieved these aims is admirable. The chapter ends with a detailed analysis of Revelations 1, 2, and 13, in which B. tries to show the structural complexity of Julian's literary achievement.

This book promises a much needed excavation into the sources behind Julian's theological achievement, and it is an impressive beginning to such a project. B. provides a nicely detailed analysis of the influences upon Julian's visionary experience; the themes she chooses for analysis are Julian's most original contributions to theology; and she rightly identifies the chief sources for their development. Yet something essential is missing: a sensitivity to the theological process itself. B. wants to establish Julian as a theologian, but nowhere does she define theology. She calls Julian a moral and mystical theologian, but develops themes which should more properly be described as doctrinal. B. shows the correspondences and differences between Julian's ideas and those of her inherited tradition, but provides no explanation for why Julian develops her theology differently. Her description of Julian's theological method is sketchy and dependent solely upon Peter Moore's philosophical analysis of the interpretation of mystical experience (11–12, 138). While B.'s command of certain theological themes is impressive, she exhibits weakness in others (e.g., her comparison between Julian's Showings and Anselm's Cur Deus Homo is flawed).

I suspect that B. was trained not as a theologian, but as a scholar of medieval literature (which would explain her impressive analysis of Julian's literary achievement). For these reasons, I believe the subtitle "From Vision to Book" could be misleading for anyone expecting a more thorough analysis of Julian's theological process. Yet my overall assessment of this work is positive: it offers an insightful and helpful introduction to Julian as an original and creative thinker, situated within her medieval theological milieu.

John Carroll University, Cleveland

JOAN M. NUTH


The past three decades have been marked by a rising crescendo of scholarly interest and activity regarding the life and thought of John Wesley, a development fed by the steady production of the Bicentennial Edition of Wesley's works (see Maddox's excellent "Select Bibliography" [375–408]). The development of a very diverse and largely
undifferentiated corpus of secondary studies presents an apparent confusion of profusion. M. undertakes here to analyze and organize this complex and often contradictory body of scholarship into a systematic theological structure that will be “friendly” to the student of theology as well as the specialist—a survey textbook on Wesley’s theology.

M. joins a great chorus of scholars in refuting a longstanding assumption that Wesley has little theological function and no theological significance. He goes on to address the problems of consistency and coherence that plague nonacademic theological writings aimed at practical concerns, framed as they often are by almost random contexts and occasions. To this end he identifies what he calls Wesley’s “orienting concern” (responsible grace), which emphasizes the fundamental role of God’s grace (affording “response-ability”), while preserving the indispensability of human response to and in God’s gracious gifts. He seeks to sort out Wesley’s writings of numerous and various kinds, tracing his theological output and tracking his thinking through the various periods of his life, seeking to discern both development and maturity of thought. Yet another concern is to relate Wesley’s theological development to various known or supposed sources without assuming responsibility to establish actual influence and dependence. Highlighting Wesley’s non-Western Christian traits is a very pervasive, sometimes distracting undertaking whose purpose is not clearly revealed until M.’s “Concluding Reflections” (254–57), an Epilogue that might better serve as a Preface.

The organization of the work correlates with classical theological loci, beginning with a methodological consideration of authority focusing on Outler’s Wesleyan Quadrilateral (Scripture, tradition, reason, and experience); carrying on with consideration of God and Trinity, theological anthropology, and soteriology; continuing through its various dimensions to be crowned with a splendid presentation of Wesley’s eschatology.

The work as a whole is a masterful fusion of a daunting mound of scholarly productions. M. has put all who have interest in this growing field of study greatly in his debt. His decision to note rather than quote the sources has compressed the text, with masses of meat presented in 118 pages of endnotes. Regrettably the publisher’s decision to separate the text from this very thorough and integral documentation presents the reader (as against the “miner”) of the book with an almost insurmountable obstacle. A single, both careful and comprehensible reading of this book has been rendered almost impossible by this decision. (The index of selected names is severely limited, that of subjects disappointing.)

In M.’s discussion of Wesley’s understanding of experience, there is an excellent focus on the concept of “spiritual senses” or faculties. Unfortunately it lacks any treatment of Wesley’s identification of such senses with “faith” as a general category. This association might go far toward clarifying Wesley’s concept of “perceptible revelation” as it
correlates to various sorts of faith. M.’s systematic treatment of Wesley’s doctrine of God is one of his crowning achievements. His treatment of the human creature in its various states is clear and responds cogently to the various controversies that smoulder around Wesley’s position regarding original sin and prevenient grace.

The treatment of Wesley’s emphasis on the workings of grace and the role of human response in salvation is clear and well conceived. M.’s careful nuancing of complex “facets” as against “steps” in Wesley’s soteriology seems better to relate to an ordo than to the preferred via of salvation. The resulting presentation is rather too complex for a survey text in this subject. The possibility of this work actually replacing Colin Williams’s now-outdated John Wesley’s Theology Today (1960) as a beginning textbook is thus regrettably doubtful. After the reviewer has tested it in an upcoming John Wesley seminar its actual utility will become much clearer. Meanwhile, a reflective reading is recommended before assuming that Responsible Grace can fulfill this intended function.

United Theological Seminary, Dayton

JAMES D. NELSON


These two books bring us back to the foundations of structured hierarchical Catholicism in the U.S. As the new nation emerged from its colonial past, so did the Catholic Church. In the summer of 1784 Pope Pius VI named ex-Jesuit John Carroll Superior of the Mission in the thirteen United States of America. Four years later the priests of the mission elected Carroll their bishop. In 1787 Carroll acquired property for both Trinity Church and the Academy at Georgetown. Trinity was not the first oppidan church in what is now the U.S. That honor belongs to Nombre de Dios at St. Augustine. Nor was it the first oppidan church in the original States. That was Old St. Joseph’s in Philadelphia. But Trinity holds a special place as the first parish church in the nation’s capital. For its part, Georgetown had some short-lived predecessors on the rural plantations of Bohemia and Newtown manors. They were what their Jesuit founders considered “preparatory schools” for their college-in-exile at St. Omer in French Flanders or later at Bruges in the Austrian Netherlands. The “Academy at George-Town, Patowmack River, Maryland” began classes with two students in attendance on January 2, 1792. Early student ages ranged from six to twenty-nine. The academy grew into a high school (Georgetown Preparatory School) and an American-style college which then became a university chartered both by the Federal Congress and the Roman
Congregation for Propagation of the Faith. Meanwhile the parish church of Holy Trinity ministered to the spiritual needs of Catholics in the Georgetown area and spun off new churches in and about Washington on both banks of the Potomac.

Both college and parish have found exceptional historians: Pulitzer Prize winner William W. Warner for Trinity and Georgetown Jesuit historian Robert Emmett Curran for the school. Curran's book covers Georgetown's first century; a second volume is projected on the modern Georgetown. Warner takes the parish story to the eve of the Civil War. Neither church nor college was founded to meet the needs of the great immigrant waves that later became Catholicism in the U.S. Instead they came of the Anglo-Maryland gentry who made up perhaps one-third of the population of the town of Georgetown which served as their urban center. W. traces the intricate web of many of these interrelated families and of African American clans like the Butlers who shared their multi-generational heritage, if in decidedly unequal measure. There were landowners and politicians, artisans and professional people, as well as shopkeepers and canal laborers and servants. And immigrants joined the Anglo-Marylanders. W. highlights the surprising extent to which the latter were major players in the development and organization of the national capital during the years when they were "at peace with all their neighbors." As his story draws to a close, a different Washington is on the horizon, one which shares with much of the rest of the country an anti-Catholic Know-Nothingism. There are good vignettes of Trinity's spiritual leaders and of their sermons and spiritual activities. Perhaps a bit more could have been said about them and the spiritual life they fostered in their very special congregation.

Telling the story of John Carroll's college, C. retraces the steps of John M. Daley and Joseph T. Durkin, who covered the first century in earlier books. He has the advantage of added material, including thorough demographic information on the makeup of the student body. The story divides into three sections: beginnings to 1830; from academy to college, 1830–1860; and college to university, 1860–1889. John Carroll dominates the first period with the help of some strong presidents. The Jesuits, fully restored in 1814, take over, both native-born and Europeans sent to assure Jesuit orthopraxis. European revolutions made distinguished professors available. The college remained a small southern school, mainly Catholic in patronage, but with a steady percentage of Protestants, especially among day students. African Americans were not accepted, which lent considerable irony to the appointment as dean (1868–1880) and then president (1873–1882) of Louvain-educated Patrick F. Healy, S.J., son of a slave mother and an Irish father. He moved Georgetown to university status and earned the sobriquet of "second founder." The signature Healy building is named for him. Like most Catholic colleges, Georgetown was surprisingly innocent of theology as an intellectual discipline. Pious devotionalism was
intermittently strong, particularly in the post-Civil War years. The Sodality of the Blessed Virgin and the Apostleship of Prayer flourished. In the classroom memorized catechism (non-Catholics had to memorize Latin poetry) and a natural moralism held the fort. No use was made of the 1833 papal charter’s authorization to offer courses and award doctorates in theology. The presence on the faculty of Camillo Mazzella, soon to be a cardinal and chief whip in Rome of the neo-Thomistic revival, made no difference. Theology was for seminarians only. There is considerable food for thought here as American Catholics today debate endlessly the “Catholic” nature of our institutions. C. has written what is surely one of the premier university histories, or rather, one-half of that history, to appear in recent days. We await the sequel.

St. Peter’s College, Jersey City


Richard Hurrell Froude (1803–36), one of Newman’s closest friends, idiosyncratically labelled the parties in the Church of England at the time of the Oxford Movement as: “X’s” = Evangelicals, “Y’s” = Tractarians, and “Z’s” = High Churchmen (20). Of these groups, the Tractarians have received the major share of scholarly attention during the past century and a half; indeed, some have claimed that the history of the Oxford Movement has been written largely from a Tractarian perspective, though with obvious points of difference between those who remained Anglican and those who became Roman Catholic. But what about the “X’s” and the “Z’s”? The reaction of the Evangelicals—initially suspicious and eventually hostile—has been surveyed by Peter Toon, Evangelical Theology 1834–1856: A Response to Tractarianism in regard to three divisive issues: the rule of faith; justification; and the Church, ministry, and sacraments (cf. TS 41 [1980] 803). The present volume performs a similar service, in more extensive fashion and in even greater detail, for the High Churchmen.

Nockles traces the “Z’s” ecclesiastical influence and theological positions from 1760—when George III ascended the throne and High Churchmen again began to receive hierarchical preferment—to 1857 and the aftermath of two pivotal ecclesiastical decisions. The first concerned the appointment of George Gorham to a benefice in spite of his denial of baptismal regeneration; the decision of the Privy Council in Gorham’s favor prompted Henry Edward Manning and others to become Roman Catholics. The second case was the prosecution of Archdeacon George Denison for teaching an objective understanding of the Real Presence; while the resolution of this case was ambiguous, it effected a truce between High Churchmen and Evangelicals. As these cases suggest, ecclesiastical positions in Hanoverian and Victorian En-
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St. Peter's College, Jersey City

JAMES HENNESEY, S.J.


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gland were inextricably linked to the anomalous relationship of Church and Crown. Readers puzzled by the complexities of “the politics of High Churchmanship” (44–103) can find a fuller treatment in the first volume of Owen Chadwick’s *The Victorian Church* (London, 1966).

N. next carefully examines four theological areas where Newman ultimately parted company with pre-Tractarian High Churchmen: “antiquity” and the rule of faith; ecclesiology, especially apostolic succession; spirituality, liturgy, and worship; and the “economy of salvation,” particularly the sacraments and justification. These chapters, in tandem with Toon’s treatment of the corresponding Evangelical positions, furnish a useful backdrop for seeing the way in which Newman worked out the “History of My Religious Opinions” (1833–45) in his *Apologia*. Nonetheless, some of N.’s conclusions are subject to further discussion. E.g., while Newman was evidently steering a *via media* between the “X’s” and the “Z’s,” should one conclude that “Newman’s journey to Rome followed a Protestant prophetical route as well as a High Anglican ecclesiastical one” (178)? Similarly, given the ambiguous language and varied interpretations of the *Thirty-Nine Articles*, is it hermeneutically appropriate to conclude that “the Articles meant both more than latitudinarians allowed, and less than Evangelicals maintained, but also represented ‘catholic’ principles in a sense different from that advocated by the Tractarians” (142)?

On the whole, however, this volume is a veritable goldmine. N. has examined a considerable number of both primary sources and secondary studies. In the narrative, one encounters not only familiar figures such as Keble, Froude, and Pusey, but also people like Hugh James Rose and William Palmer of Worcester College, whom Newman mentioned in passing in his *Apologia* but who have since faded from sight. The historical treatment also throws better light on some previously enigmatic events, such as Newman’s publication of Froude’s *Remains*, which strained relations with the “Z’s” to the breaking point, but “would exert an almost hypnotic appeal on [Newman’s] own younger followers” (282). And, in a broader historical perspective, N.’s work is helpful in understanding why some Tractarians remained Anglicans, while others became Roman Catholics. Indeed, one hopes N. will explore further the curious fact that many Tractarians who became Roman Catholics (including Newman) had earlier been Evangelicals, not High Churchmen.

Finally but regretfully, although an impressive amount of secondary material is cited in the footnotes, access is difficult, since secondary sources are not listed in the bibliography nor included in the index; readers need to compile their own list of secondary sources for further reference.

*Catholic University of America*  

JOHN T. FORD

Although Schatz seems immune from the temptation, one can wax distinctly Hegelian over the historical contemplation of the First Vatican Council. After all, Schatz sums up the place of Vatican I in history as “a first attempt” of the Catholic Church as a whole to respond cohesively to the secularizing trends of modern liberal society (305). He does not have to mention that a second such attempt, Vatican II, did not simply proceed further down the same path. Vatican II worked on the integration of an ecclesiology of papal primacy into a more comprehensive ecclesiology of communion and collegiality, but this meld has not (yet) coalesced. A reader might ask whether a Vatican III is called for. Perhaps not just yet, in light of Schatz’s concluding advice to theologians and canonists: not to jettison the essential emphasis of Vatican I, but to forge ahead in integrating it with “forgotten aspects or marginalized strains of tradition that nevertheless belong to the ensemble of Catholic tradition” (311).

Although no mention is made of them, this new standard history of Vatican I offers itself to the inner-Catholic and ecumenical dialogues concerning the Petrine ministry as a conscientious scholarly determination of the historical reality of the Council and its immediate, theologically relevant aftermath. This concluding volume covers the climactic three months in 1870 during which papal infallibility was up for formal consideration. It begins, however, with a few pages on the third item in the maximalist ultramontane program for the Council. Besides its two constitutions, Dei Filius embracing an apologetics firmly based on objective proofs, and Pastor aeternus professing an indisputable authority equipped for all eventualities in the papal apex of the Church, the Council endorsed (but not in final form, hence without effect) the project of a single rudimentary catechism for the whole world. This was not the only act of the Council that illustrates, in the light of more recent events, the irony of history.

For theologians looking for a sound historical basis for serious interpretations of the dogmatic constitutions of Vatican I, Schatz is now a necessary resource. Previous interpretations by church historians such as Roger Aubert are by and large confirmed, but both the careful noting of details and nuances, as well as the more developed treatment of what was at stake in the Council, render Schatz indispensable. One and the same basic option was expressed in the positions espoused, not only in Pastor aeternus on papal powers, but clearly also in Dei Filius on revelation. The concern of the Council was to reassure people about the Church, that the “Rock” was not in danger of crumbling.

In the modern world, traditional authorities were no longer taken for granted; on the contrary, confusion about what to believe spread and deepened in proportion as the modern ideal of autonomy prevailed. Those who regarded the definition of papal infallibility as opportune,
indeed as urgently necessary, conceived it as a guarantee that the Church was not in ultimate danger of succumbing to the galloping uncertainties of the age. Proponents as well as opponents of infallibility supposed that, once it was dogmatized, infallible papal pronouncements would be a frequently employed, efficient means of relieving confusions. Actually, the prime efficacy of papal infallibility turned out to be symbolic rather than juridical, an eventuality hardly within the Council’s horizon circa 1870.

Newman looked for a subsequent council to “trim the boat,” which Vatican I held on a risky tack. Vatican I was so successful at shaping the symbols of modern Catholicism that the boat still lists. It is one of S.’s contributions to have made clearer than before just which difficulties and shortcomings are to be laid at the foot of the Council itself. He does not “minimize” as Newman did, but seeks simply to deepen our understanding of the Council on an ecclesial-historical level. Unlike August Hasler’s 1977 study, S.’s conclusions do not tend to delegitimize the Vatican I for ecclesiological thinking—note the care and disinterestedness with which he discusses the questions of the Council’s freedom (169–203). But he notes the “tilt” in Vatican I’s orientation: never was the leadership of the majority disposed to dialogue with the minority. This despite the presence of plenty of moderate members of the majority, who would have supported a less one-sided definition.

After the voting was over and the Council prorogued, to be sure, the pope and curia made it as easy as possible for minority bishops to sign on, while not one of the latter contemplated anything resembling a Lefebvre-like schism. Can one see here too an irony of history?

_Marquette University, Milwaukee_  
**Paul Misner**


These are critical times for Whiteheadian process thought. Will it turn out to have been merely a transient episode sustained primarily by a minority of theologians? Or are its best days still ahead of it, as David Griffin has recently prophesied? While most philosophers still ignore Whitehead, his supporters have found in his thought a safe harbor for metaphysics in an age dominated by science and antimetaphysical sentiment. To followers of Whitehead, no other philosophical system is capable of providing such a credible alternative to eliminative materialism on the one hand and dualism on the other. How many others, they would ask, can integrate the findings of science so generously without capitulating to mechanism and determinism? Or what other philosophy has so daringly encompassed simultaneously the facts of perception, common sense experience, consciousness, civilization, evolution, and physics, and still left abundant room for affirming that religion refers us to something real. And, therefore, what ancient,
modern, or contemporary philosophy provides more functional tools for theology today as it attempts to think out how God acts in a world where science seems to have ruled out any such possibility?

Many theologians have only cursorily examined the resourcefulness of Whiteheadian thought, often suspecting it of being irremediably heterodox, but perhaps more often because mastering it seems to demand an inordinate amount of time and effort. At last, however, we have in Hosinski's fine book an exceptionally approachable introduction to process thought, and one especially apt for those who wish to examine its theological possibilities. Up until now, Donald Sherburne's *A Key to Whitehead's Process and Reality* has been the standard entry for initiates. H.'s work, however, has two major advantages over previous attempts to set forth Whitehead's mature thought. First, it is marked by an exceptional clarity of organization and style. It is quite possibly the most reader-friendly introduction to Whitehead's philosophy to date. By leaving to experts such as Lewis Ford the more arduous task of describing the historical evolution of Whitehead's thought, H. gives us a straightforward, sympathetic, and convincing outline of the complex of ideas contained especially in the "mature" works written during Whitehead's American period.

Second, H.'s introduction is helpful in its imaginative use of examples taken from everyday experience to clarify some of Whitehead's most difficult concepts. In fact this book's creative illustrations may be its most original and inviting feature. Philosophy teachers, students, and theologians for whom Whitehead's philosophical world now seems too intimidating will find H.'s pedagogically sensitive treatment an extremely accommodating first step into process thought.

The final two chapters also provide a thoughtful discussion of the theological potential that remains very much alive in Whiteheadian process thought. H. wisely reminds us that no philosophy has ever remained unchanged when used by theology, the classic example being Aquinas's selective use of Aristotle. Therefore, we should not expect every version of "process theology" to repeat some of the theologically unacceptable ideas of Whitehead, especially his speculation on divine creativity. For some reason, however, critics often see Whiteheadian theology as a seamless garment in which embracing one aspect requires accepting the rest. Thus they often dismiss process theology out of hand, superficially caricaturing it as "pantheism," or as "religiously inadequate." In the face of all the standard objections by classical theists, H., who is a Roman Catholic priest teaching at the University of Portland, boldly proposes that "Whitehead's philosophical interpretation of God fits the vision of God revealed in the teachings and life of Jesus far better than the traditional interpretation does." Though much work remains to be done in developing process theology, we must not allow its present defects to lead us to abandon the project altogether.

In this respect, as H. points out, it is helpful to know also just how
tentatively and humbly Whitehead offered his metaphysics to us, and how utterly unoffended he would have been by our attempts to refine it. An important message in H.'s book is that theologians do not have to swallow whole everything in Whitehead in order to make good use of his organismic, processive, relational, and experiential vision of the universe and God.

Georgetown University, D.C.

**JOHN F. HAUGHT**


The five essays in this collection, four of which appear in English for the first time offer an often densely argued analysis of the important points of contact and the fundamental differences between Kant and Lonergan in their respective accounts of human knowledge.

The first two essays identify the most crucial point of contact in the a priori of human knowing. According to Sala, Kant's notion of the a priori is twofold: it is both object-constitutive and subject-constitutive (34). He contends that Kant did not sufficiently distinguish these two functions and that a fundamental source of this confusion lies in the fact that, for Kant, "intuition is in the last analysis the only way and the only means by which knowledge, all knowledge, is related to its object. . . . [F]or Kant knowing is looking (intuiting)" (46).

The third and fourth essays accordingly focus upon the contrast between the intuition fundamental to Kant's account of human knowing and the intentionality fundamental to Lonergan's account. S. strongly criticizes the "sensualistic" intuitionism of Kant as well as the "intellectualistic" intuitionism which S. sees in Gilson and some other neo-Thomists, e.g. de Vries. He then articulates the alternative to intuitionism in terms of Lonergan's account of "knowledge as a threefold structure" of experience, insight, and judgment (71). Central to this account is an understanding of human intentionality as a performative dynamism with being as its correlate (69). S. recognizes that the subject-constitutive side of Kant's a priori runs parallel in crucial respects to Lonergan's account of intentionality. Kant's subject-constitutive a priori exhibits a performative dynamism as "the normativeness that is immanent within the subject and through which the subject promotes step by step the content of sensation into known reality"; it is "the a priori according to which the subject questions the object" (121). Despite this parallel, S. considers Kant's account locked into a phenomenalism fundamentally opposed to Lonergan's critical realism. This opposition provides the basis for a discussion, in the final essay, of each thinker's concept of reality.

Although S. effectively locates a number of the major historical and systematic tensions which bedevil the epistemological component of
Kant’s critical enterprise, there are some key points on which other Kant scholars would dispute S.’s interpretation. Most important are the two related claims that Kant considers intuition to be the fundamental form of knowledge, and that his account of human knowing leads to phenomenalism. While neither claim is implausible, similar interpretations of Kant have been challenged by a number of significant studies of the “transcendental idealism” Kant propounds in his first Critique (e.g., Henry Allison’s Kant’s Transcendental Idealism, D. P. Dryer’s Kant’s Solution for Verification in Metaphysics, Gordon Nagel’s The Structure of Experience). It may thus be more proper to draw a contrast on these matters between Lonergan and Kantianism, rather than between Lonergan and Kant, for even if Kant himself did not hold these controverted views, they have been held by many who invoke his name.

These essays, of substantive value in their own right, show the continuing importance of dialogue and argument between the heritage of Kant and the heritage of Aquinas. One word of caution about S.’s treatment of Lonergan seems nonetheless in order. These essays focus most intensely upon epistemological issues for which Insight is the pertinent text; they thus generally take only passing note of the broader social and value contexts for human knowing which Lonergan elaborated later, e.g. in Method in Theology. This, unfortunately, might give readers unfamiliar with the development of Lonergan’s thought the mistaken impression that his account of human knowing attends only to the introspective data of human consciousness.

Marquette University, Milwaukee

PHILIP J. ROSSI, S.J.


The title derives from a sermon preached against the use of lightning rods by Minnesotan farmers early in the 20 century. Ferré’s father “listened with fascination as the preacher demonstrated that attempts to shield lives and property from lightning in this world would be requited with fire—everlasting fire—in the next. Thunderbolts were God’s to hurl, not man’s to deflect. The fires of hell, deep under the earth on which the congregation now sat and quaked, were even then being stoked for those who insisted on rising in rebellion against God’s will by installing newfangled lightning rods” (27). Although F. sympathizes with the technologists in this instance, elsewhere it seems that he would like to summon the fires of hell to punish the “materialism, overconsumption, obsessive growth, ugliness, ecological crisis, anthropocentric insensitivity to nature, and contempt for human dignity” associated with the modern world (22–23).

F. is an apocalyptic Malthusian: “As human numbers grow and earth’s resources shrink, the material share we can claim as fairly ours
will necessarily diminish with the years ahead. The limits I speak of will be enforced by nature, whether we adopt them gracefully or not; my suggestion is that we seize the moral initiative" (170). He predicts the death of the modern world and the birth of a postmodern world in which we will learn to live within limits or else suffer the consequences: "The Promethean spirit has been left unbound too long in our modern industrial civilization, and the footsteps of Nemesis are drawing near" (101).

F.'s indictment of technolatry is persuasive. He makes a powerful case that "science functioning beyond its secular limits as mythic matrix of this obsolescent culture has itself been proven significantly flawed" (11). One can readily agree with him that the new science of ecology "simultaneously rigorous and holistic . . . may be a hopeful model" for postmodern science (42). His vision of the world "as a complex garden to be tended, respected, harvested, and loved" (94) is very appealing. My difficulty lies in his rejection of traditional Christianity and proclamation of "Multi-mythic Organicism" as its successor—"an organismic, ecologically holistic, scientifically relevant process theology" inspired by Alfred North Whitehead (161).

Although F. is critical of the excesses of the scientistic worldview, he nevertheless holds that religion must be "subjected to the scrutiny of reason" (86). Inspired by "the austere virtues of genuine science," he upholds the need to resist authority, challenge faith statements, and test claims "on the scales of independent confirmation" (147–48). There seems to be no room in his religious world model for a revelation given in history and guarded by an authoritative tradition. Christianity must be passed through the sieve of "independent judgment" formed by "the best in modern methods of thought" (155); "the stuftifying spirit of dogmatism" must be banished (108), along with "councils and creeds and anathemas" (190). The purified remnant of Christianity may then be merged with other visions of reality: "The great religions of the world may have much in common, seen from the organismic perspective, and in the long run they will need to be drawn into a fruitful differentiated unity that sees beyond contrasting mythic styles" (187).

There is no doubt that the modern world needs help. One cannot deny the value of drawing together all that is good in "Christian charity or Jewish observance or Islamic faithfulness or Hindu inclusiveness or Buddhist moderation or Taoist equilibrium" (46). But the price for entering F.'s league of reasonable world religions seems unreasonably high. What profit would Christianity show if it gained the whole world but lost its own soul?

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*MARTIN X. MOLESKI, S.J.*

This combination of Ward’s Gifford and Selwyn Lectures (1993–94) is a rational investigation into, and defense of, the category of revelation across traditions. The lectures read like two different books: one carefully and sympathetically describing Judaism, Hinduism (of the Vedanta tradition), Islam, and Buddhism; the other a comparative theology from a Christian perspective. W. attempts to create a Christian theology that is open to and informed by the revelations, traditions, and beliefs of other religions. Thus he joins the company of contemporary theologians such as W. C. Smith, J. Hick, and R. Panikkar, who have produced similar efforts.

W. roots his enterprise by appealing theologically to Aquinas and philosophically to Wittgenstein, while refuting Karl Barth, Emil Brunner, and Hendrick Kraemer for their separation of reason and revelation because their prejudice against the use of reason leads them to dismiss as false all claims to revelation, other than the Christian claim. W. understands revelation to be ambiguous and subject to various interpretations by particular communities in history, giving rise to different religions. Theology, then, is provisional, and previous articulations of it are subject to revision. While confessional theology that explores a particular revelation remains legitimate, W. distinguishes this from comparative theology that investigates the transcendent as understood in many traditions. Comparative theology also explores the meaning and rationality of religious beliefs in various traditions. These two kinds of theology are not necessarily in opposition, but they are different. In W.’s view, however, there is little necessary difference between theology and philosophy of religion. Thus, W., not unlike Hick in An Interpretation of Religion, weaves both disciplines into the work. He traces the history of revelation from primal, which in his view suffers from lack of rational and moral development, to canonical traditions, making the theological claim that the Divine has disclosed itself in various historical and cultural contexts by various means.

His descriptions of the four scriptural traditions (Judaism, Vedanta, Islam, and Buddhism) are accurate, although necessarily not comprehensive. His treatment of the Christian tradition is at the same time the most important and the most puzzling part of the book. For here he appears, on the one hand, to be a confessional theologian and, on the other hand, a comparative theologian; and the confessional theologian seems to prevail. W. acknowledges the many pitfalls and caveats associated with conferring on history a definitive significance when it comes to the claims to superiority by Christian theology because of its historical foundation. Yet he defends the validity of the Christian story on the basis of its intrinsic connection to history. For W. believes, unlike, e.g., Van Harvey, that history can be read through the eyes of
faith: “Faith will not always falsify; it may be the condition of a true perception of historical meaning and significance, if indeed God acts self-revealingly in historical situations” (247). While he accepts in principle the validity of historical and textual critical studies, he believes that their methodologies have been compromised by nontheistic presuppositions. W.’s theological reading of the Christian tradition reminds one of Pannenberg’s theology because of its close ties to history. One of the problems with this reading of “salvation history” is that many Christians are not natural heirs to Middle Eastern history (Asians and Africans, e.g.) and thus seem to be distanced from God’s historical self-disclosure as chronicled in the Old and New Testaments. Another problem is that the preference given to historical revelation creates a religious underclass of ahistorical traditions such as Hinduism.

In the end, W. tries to hold a delicate balance that acknowledges genuine revelation and a common soteriological structure in many religions, yet confessionally holds to the normative character of the Christian revelation that leads to a “practical certainty of commitment” (341). This is among the most pressing problems in theology, and W. has resolved it no more or less convincingly than others. He has further refined the discussion, particularly by clarifying the idea of “authentic manifestation” of the transcendent and by exposing the indefinite character of “the Real” as found in Hick and his insistence (against Gavin D’Costa) on rational criteria for judgment about religious truth claims. But W. admits that the book is a prolegomenon, an attempt to clarify the discussion about revelation in order to clear the way for a constructive theology of religions.

Georgetown University, D.C.

Chester Gillis


Martin has produced an erudite and exhaustive study that proposes to examine feminist theology from the perspective of Christian revelation, mainly the Bible and its interpretation from the Church Fathers to Hans Urs von Balthasar and Pope John Paul II. In his judgment, feminist thought (including the work of Schüssler Fiorenza, Tribe, Bird, Radford Ruether, McFague, Johnson, Carr, LaCugna, Schneiders, and Plaskow) fails as theology. That is, it fails to conform to an understanding of theology as M. frames it, drawing on selected aspects of traditional thought.

To accomplish his task, M. draws his readers through several studies, including historical studies of theology, of feminism, of the evolution of the notion of human rights, of Christian understandings of the body, and studies of analogy and metaphor. His argument about theology itself is the story of its devolution from its earliest form as obe-
dient listening to revelation (occasionally called "Augustinian"), in which revelation was understood as communication of real knowledge, to the disastrous Enlightenment crystallization of theology as a form of critical thought in which reason judges all things and revelation is instrumental. Thus feminist theology participates in the worst errors (from a biblical perspective) of the Enlightenment: foundationalism in ontology and representationalism in epistemology.

Throughout his work, M. acknowledges the global character of the feminist movement and its authentic achievements. Thus he mourns the failure of historic Christianity to more thoroughly incorporate women as full participants in its life and mission. But he is firm that the true understanding of "masculinity" and "femininity" as activity and receptivity are essential: not only of the essence of things but essential realities in themselves. Although he eschews the feminist distinction of sex and gender, he substitutes persons and personae (roles, functions) as synonyms to suggest his own focus on relation rather than the individual. For much of the problem of feminist theology is its individualistic, rights-oriented provenance and substance. M. believes that the philosophical and theological anthropology in feminist theology lacks the understanding of person-in-community inherent in the notion of relation. And although he introduces his understandings of "masculinity" and "femininity" early on in his work, he apparently derives these "essences" from his later analysis of the significance of male and female as mother and father in their distinctive biological embodiment as relational selves. Frequent references to the Genesis texts support this approach as the biblical revelation to which the theologian owes obedient listening, "indwelling the tradition" as he names it (265), rather than a hermeneutic of suspicion, rooted in the Enlightenment perception that "reason must judge."

Thus the central issue seems to be one of the appropriate theological method. The idea of correlation (Tillich) and especially of a mutually critical correlation (Küng, Schillebeeckx, Tracy) is dismissed because it means that judgment is left to the individual theologian, whereas "indwelling the tradition" means that revelation itself, the Holy Spirit, is the final arbiter of judgment. M. would thus suggest that "obedient listening" avoids the "risk" of new interpretation because the theologian remains bound to texts that are only rightly interpreted by tradition. But his own theory of analogy, as well as the judgments he makes of thinkers like Eliade, Ricoeur, and Rahner (certain elements are accurate, others are weak) does seem to indicate the work of an individual interpreter whose reason is judging. Perhaps an acknowledgment of the genuine accomplishments as well as the failures of the Enlightenment would better name M.'s own method in theology, rather than a simple claim to the revelational high ground. I found myself wondering if the author would not subject the slavery texts or the anti-Jewish texts of the New Testament to a critical perspective. Thus it appears that M. judges feminist theology from an Olympian
height where he can opine that different theologians are “confused,” or suffer from a “myth of total oppression,” or are “agnostic,” or err by choosing the wrong method, in which the “light of faith” as “thinking with assent,” the “essence of theology” (265), is not present. And although M. objects to the advocacy stance of feminist theology, his lengthy discussions, especially of the “essence” of office in the Church, suggest that he has his own advocacy of the way things are.

University of Chicago Divinity School

ANNE CARR, B.V.M.


This is the second volume of a three-volume study; the first was entitled Thinking the Faith. Hall explains that “professing the faith” adds commitment to understanding. That commitment has three qualities: fidelity to the Christian tradition which always exceeds any attempt to explain or interpret it, commitment to Jesus Christ which despite its particularity nevertheless has a universal inclusiveness, and commitment to the way of discipleship as the context for theological thinking.

In constructing a committed theology, Hall advances in three methodological steps. The first step, historical theology, retrieves the Christian tradition. The second, critical theology, reflects analytically upon the faith in a specific historical context; in Hall’s case, this is contemporary North American culture. The third step, constructive theology, reformulates the tradition in ways which address the realities of the situation in which one professes one’s faith. In the present volume, Hall applies his method systematically to three interrelated doctrinal issues: the doctrine of God, human creaturehood, and the saving work of Jesus Christ.

In handling the doctrine of God, Hall ponders the history of Christian trinitarian theology, questions whether conceiving God as the almighty Father fits the contemporary theological situation in North America, and calls for a constructive reconception of God in terms which resonate with process theology and with themes in European political theology. He believes we need to introduce an element of vulnerability into our understanding of the Christian God, replacing an image of God which stresses divine power with a suffering God, a God-with-us, who is at work in the world and empathizes compassionately with the world’s sufferings.

In dealing with our human creaturely status, Hall first retrieves a traditional understanding of human nature as created in the divine image, as fallen and sinful, and as called by God. He then faults the tradition for focusing too narrowly on the relationship between humanity and God, and calls constructively for a rethinking of our creaturely status which would also affirm an organic relationship between humanity and the rest of creation. He proposes a theological affirmation of the fundamental integrity of creation despite human sinfulness.
and an understanding of the human creature as responsibly inserted into the rest of the created world.

In treating the saving work of Jesus Christ, Hall approaches Christian revelation as a process. He first presents Jesus and his ministry and then the way in which resurrection faith transformed the Church's perception of the person of Jesus. He recalls Chalcedonian Christology and the traditional doctrine of the threefold office of Jesus as priest, prophet, and king. Hall faults the tradition for failing to do full justice to the humanity of Jesus, and suggests that the category of "representation" can transform Christological doctrine in ways which will make it more accessible to North American Christians.

Hall argues that the notion of "representation" comes naturally to people in North America. In every walk of society people represent other people. Representation requires that one possess the qualities which transform one into a genuine representative. A representative always mediates between two others. In situations of conflict, representation frequently demands suffering. The act of representing another frequently flows from one's life work, or vocation. Those who are being represented come to know themselves in the representational event or act. Hall believes the idea of representation accurately interprets the incarnational work of Jesus. It interprets His oneness with God and His distinction from God. Jesus also represents us to ourselves. Hence, the notion of representation links Christology to ecclesiology. Moreover, as our representative before God. Jesus confronts us as God-with-us and reveals to us the compassionate face of a God who enters into human suffering.

This is a readable and stimulating book. In each doctrinal section Hall exhibits a sure sense of the right issues. Moreover, he succeeds on the whole in writing a theology which challenges the reader to recommitment to Christian faith in a North American context.

While I judge that in the constructive chapters Hall's thought moves in interesting directions. I wonder whether he has dealt adequately with the philosophical implications of theological hypotheses. Hall does not banish philosophy from theological thinking in the manner of Barth, but philosophy does not play as strong a role as it might in his reconstruction of the faith. Josiah Royce, in my judgment, was right when he suggested that Christianity is a religion in search of a metaphysics and that only a metaphysics of community does justice to a Christian faith experience. Hall's argument would carry more conviction, if it dealt more systematically with the way in which philosophical presuppositions have shaped the development of Christian theology, with the implicit philosophical presuppositions at the basis of North American culture, and with the role which a metaphysics of community might play in reconstructing the faith. Nevertheless, Hall has written a readable book, which I recommend to readers who like being challenged.

_Jesuit School of Theology, Berkeley_ DONALD L. GELPI, S.J.

Sparshott sets out to show how Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* "works as an Aristotelian text" with a unified argument (360). Although the text is a "scissors and paste job," S. reveals its continuity of thought and argument which "more learned and scrupulous commentaries ignore" (xvii).

For S. the *Ethics* investigates the question facing human animals with imagination and reason, "How shall I organize my life?" Aristotle is concerned "with the straightforward problem of how to live a lifetime, as that problem confronts any being that is capable of posing the question" (9). "What a human life is is essentially the life of a being that can ask itself how it is to live its own life" (11). Aristotle assumes his inquirers want to live the best possible life; they want to make their *telos* ("end") their *skopos* ("aim"). The human *telos* is to realize the potentials and opportunities of human existence in a rationally reflective way. Those (few) who do things well are "serious" (*spoudaios*) about their lives; they make the "object of conscious attention, the 'political' integration and reconciliation of demands and opportunities that animals with a sense of time cannot help doing anyway" (52).

S. highlights Aristotle's pre-Christian "picture of the world," which "supports the value of *energeia*, the full realization of specific potentialities, and the value of *spoudē* ("zeal"), the curiosity and energy required for the realization of these potentialities by a being endowed with *logos*, a being with a sense of time" (368). *Spoudaios* is usually translated as "good," but S. retrieves its literal meaning ("serious, zealous") to connect happiness with virtue, transforming the first-personal question "How shall I live?" into third-personal reflective inquiry. Those who are good at something take it seriously, and in turn are taken seriously by others. "And there is no real problem about who they are, once we take life seriously enough to try and see what it is all about" (51). To be "serious" about the work or "function" (*ergon*) of being human is to articulate and understand one's life, "largely a matter of putting things into words" (48). The human good is "taking seriously the project of living a human life" (71), and Aristotle (with a confidence we would dispute) thought "a serious approach to life is self-correcting" and will effect "a genuine unity of real and apparent good" (128).

S. sheds new light on key Aristotelian topics: the nature of pleasure; the primacy of *nous* ("insight"); justice and friendship; the relationship between the "good life" of virtue and the "best life" of intellectual contemplation. His account of why Aristotle's discussion of friendship is crucial to his overall argument is particularly insightful. If justice concerns "the right amount of something in a relationship . . . this assumes that relationships with others already exist to be regulated" (266). The "unforced willingness to share lives . . . establishes the
groupings within which good sense is exercised for a common good” (267). Happiness is not solipsistic; friendship is the “softening and elimination of the contrast between self and other” (268).

S. seems ambivalent about the relevance of the Ethics for today. He says that although human beings cannot always choose, “when and insofar as they can, what Aristotle says is what has to be borne in mind” (361). Yet S. repeatedly notes the economic and sociopolitical assumptions which divide us from Aristotle, whose “basic conceptions have no purchase on an evolutionary world” under conditions of global scarcity (360). He accuses Aristotle of the “fallacy” of supposing that the economic problem of how we are to feed ourselves can be solved, thereby providing us with the leisure to be serious about the exercise of our freedom (cf. 360–61). S. believes the “economic problem” cannot be solved. Need we be so pessimistic? To the extent that human beings take seriously their economic and ecological choices, might not the scope for freedom be enlarged, and the modern primacy of the economic be challenged?

This is a complex and provocative study of the Ethics. The astringency of S.’s argument will temper overly Christian and overly thematic readings alike. Philosophers will debate the particularities of S.’s interpretation. Theologians will be challenged to reflect on what it is to be serious about human living in a world without “external” religious authorities. Veritatis splendor has made the relationship between moral knowledge and revealed moral truth a topical issue once again. As theologians rethink the relationship between natural and revealed morality in terms of virtue rather than law, Aristotle’s pioneering and still unrivalled discussions will be indispensable precisely because of his pre-Christian assumptions which S. has exhibited so clearly.

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GERALD GLEESON


Human rights have become the lingua franca of public moral discourse; yet their nature, status, and justification in moral theory remain elusive. Dyck contends that the abstract rationalism and individualism of the regnant liberal theory belie the very moral bonds that sustain rights’ discourse. D.’s assessment in Part 1 of the seminal theories of Calvin, Hobbes, Bentham, Mill, Marx, and contemporary moral philosopher Alan Gewirth traverses familiar moral terrain in illuminating the lacunae of modern, Western rights’ theory.

The primacy of responsibility, adumbrated in Part 1 is fully developed in Part 2, which is devoted to a critical reconstruction of the nature and foundation of human rights. For rights, D. argues, are best
conceived as deriving from the moral relations or bonds that are logically and functionally requisite for life in community. These relations, fostered by our natural proclivities and inhibitions, are in turn sustained by belief in the power, persistence, and ultimate vindication of our moral behavior. D. rests his case on a cognitivist moral theory in which moral knowledge is tempered by ideal companionship, a complex notion comprising sufficient knowledge of nonmoral facts, empathy for those affected by my action, loving impartially, sufficient power to form and act upon moral judgments, and otherwise human tendencies. Loving, rather than merely observing impartially, redresses the limitations of Gewirth's formalism and Roderick Firth's ideal-observer theory, for impartial judgments depend upon our ideal conceptualization of the self and the moral propriety of self-love and group affiliation. Ideal companionship invests our moral perceptions with the enlarged affections necessary to generate undistorted moral demands as "felt necessities" (189). In Part 3, D. further specifies his understanding of justice in terms of the moral responsibilities that as requisites of community ground legitimate claim-rights. Such responsibilities entail not only what Mill describes as "the essentials of human well-being," e.g. restraints against aggression, but proclivities to procreate and nurture, e.g. the responsible education of children, provision of the necessities of life, and cultivation of one's own and other's moral development.

Rich and expansive as it is, D.'s argument reveals certain limitations. His interpretation of Marx, for instance, derives from Engels's polemics rather than Marx's own critique of natural rights in "On the Jewish Question." D.'s criticism of the logical sufficiency of Gewirth's ethical rationalism fails to acknowledge the role a "dialectically" (and not merely assertorically) necessary defense of agential goods plays in Gewirth's theory. Neither does D. engage more recent philosophic scholarship, even where it might support or refine his claims. His substantive critique of formal impartiality, for instance, recalls Charles Taylor's interpretation of the (post)modern self in Sources of the Self. In a similar vein, his cognitivist moral epistemology raises questions addressed in Jürgen Habermas's theory of the redemption of practical validity claims in discourse ethics.

Yet these affinities with the differing moral theories of Taylor and Habermas pose a problem for D.'s interpretation. For one wonders if the ideal constraints of impartiality, elaborated by Habermas and John Rawls in his recent Political Liberalism, can be sustained if one recurs to the "strong preferences" defining the moral self in Taylor, i.e. the partiality of self-love and group identity. D.'s reliance upon a theory of enlarged moral sentiments, reminiscent of the British sense theorists, suffers from their selfsame limitations. For as Habermas and Rawls argue, it is the very pluralism or even incommensurability of our egoistic and ethnocentric conceptions of the good that give rise to modern deontological, rights-based theories of justice. The conditions
requisite to sustain a particular, distinctive ethos (what Hegel termed Sittlichkeit) differ from those presupposed for an ideal, universal community of moral agents (the putative "kingdom of ends" in Kantian Moralität). Laudable as his recognition of the cognitive role of the affections may be, one must finally ask if D. is not too sanguine in believing that "empathy and wishing the self and others to exist and live" (14, 270) can admit of universal extension without attenuation. As the recent tragedies in Rwanda and Bosnia attest, the persistence of ethnocentric particularism remains our bête noire.

Although one might wish that the heritage of Roman Catholic social teaching and non-Western traditions of rights figured more prominently in his analysis, this is, nonetheless, an admirable book, suitably erudite yet nontechnical in exposition. One of its many virtues is how D. attends to vexed issues, e.g. euthanasia, divorce law, and universal access to health care, in elaborating his larger themes. This fruit of considerable wisdom and experience should enjoy a wide and appreciative audience.

Jesuit School of Theology, Berkeley

WILLIAM R. O'NEILL, S.J.

ELOGE DE LA CONSCIENCE. By Paul Valadier, S.J. Collection Esprit.

In this vigorous defense of conscience, Valadier challenges several attempts to supplant its primacy in governing human moral conduct. To this end, he takes aim at a variety of false dichotomies that jeopardize the claims of conscience. He admits, e.g., that the postmodern world provides no moral tradition, and therefore leaves in doubt whether conscience can be properly formed to make its own moral judgments. But are communitarians like M. Oakeshott and A. MacIntyre right when they suggest that the pretext of the liberty of conscience has undermined moral traditions, and that we ought to withdraw to moral communities to reconstruct those long neglected traditions and enforce their values despite any claims of conscience? V. responds, challenging three premises. First, to pit community's traditions against individual consciences is dangerously simplistic; how is moral insight achieved but through some individual consciences? Second, difference from one individual conscience to another is hardly an indication of moral chaos; in fact, like consciences, moral traditions have not been free of internal disparities and inconsistencies. Third, philosophers denigrate conscience when they associate it with irresponsible agents who claim it as grounds for their "right" to licentious behavior. V. contends that if we are to articulate traditions it will only be through communities open to respecting the claims of individuals whose consciences compel them to search for moral truth.

Like conscience itself, V. helps the reader to recognize that moral truth is not simple, predictable, or certain. Moral truth, because its
task is both complex and particular, must express sufficiently the morally relevant demands that any situation and its attendant circumstances make on us. To attain that truth, conscience must constantly scrutinize the data of human experience, not settling for simple, incomplete solutions. To oppose the defenders of conscience on the ground that they cannot yield a moral truth free of circumstantial considerations is to assume another false distinction.

Certainly, ethical principles are universal and make overriding claims on us, but to determine the force of any principle at any moment, we cannot simply make a deductive application of one (which one?) to the case at hand. Invoking Jonsen and Toulmin (*The Abuse of Casuistry*), V. argues that moral reasoning is not geometric logic. To bring his point home, he takes aim at a particularly French target, Pascal, whom, he notes, French intellectuals have notoriously failed to critique. V. argues forcefully that Pascal deceived many into assuming that moral truth is not like the practical world, but rather universal, simple, and perpetually consistent regardless of circumstances. At length, and with particular dexterity, V. bares the naive epistemological assumptions and dangerous theological beliefs that prompted the enormously popular attack on Jesuit casuistry, *The Provincial Letters*.

Through another historical examination, V. demonstrates that, contrary to belief, writers like Machiavelli and Hobbes did not propose a triumphalistic view of conscience. Their investigations led them to find within the human a profound yet natural conflict between the most basic tendencies of altruism and greed. Conscience was terribly divided and weakened by this near impotent ability to find moral resolution. To argue, then, that the Enlightenment was animated by unnatural and overblown claims of human capabilities is patently false. If anything, Christianity, V. suggests, has esteemed the human more.

Finally, V. confronts those who believe that defending the conscience is an attack on the sovereignty of God. In a turn to Scripture, he remarks that Jesus changed not the law, but our rapport with it and taught that application of the law directly without consideration of other more urgent issues was immoral. Furthermore, Jesus elevated the authority of conscience by insisting that true moral evaluation was based not on one's action, but on one's intentionality. Similarly, Paul fosters our new relation to law by upholding conscience as the arbiter of law and by identifying the primacy of the interior virtue of charity. To recognize God's sovereignty, then, we are obliged to the demands of conscience. The final dichotomy is revealed as equally without merit.

V. understands conscience the way many recent American writers (e.g. J. Wilson, *The Moral Sense*, and O. Flanagan, *Varieties of Moral Personality*) do, as an indisputable given that claims the moral integrity of an individual's moral awareness and reasoning. But he provides readers with an analytically rigorous critique of conscience's declaimers and a sound defense of that dimension of the human where, regardless of one's religion, one encounters the call to go beyond one's
more basic urges. In a time of moral perplexity, V. encourages us not to give up on this weak, certainly fallible, and often uninformed source of moral guidance, nor to capitulate to misguided arguments that posit truth in intolerant traditions, abstract claims, or naive voluntarism.

Weston Jesuit School of Theology


The subject of love and Christian ethics attracts renewed attention, as Vacek's volume importantly demonstrates. V. has read Roman Catholic and Protestant literature assiduously, and displays both an ecumenical openness and a capacity for reaching independent judgments. While the timbre of his book remains more Catholic than Protestant, he criticizes some features associated with each tradition.

Three key claims V. advances are these. First, charity or friendship with God, as both God's act and our act, is the ultimate relationship. It is a matter of mutual affirmation rather than one-sided obedience. V. is prepared to say that "when we colove with God's love, we effectively cooperate with God in redeeming the world" (57), that as we act we modify God's being and action (124). The metaphysics that underlies his book is a form of process theology (32). Moreover, charity should be the center of gravity for Christian ethics. The final criterion of goodness consists in what Christians discover while they are in relation to God; they should do their thinking within this relation, defining and redefining what they shall count as good. Charity transforms the entire moral life. Natural-law ethics too often fails to accord a decisive place to our personal relation to God. And charity leads us beyond the moral order given in creation.

Second, V. claims three kinds of love to be Christian. We may love the beloved for the sake of the beloved (agape), for one's own sake (eros), and for the sake of the relationship one has with the beloved (philia). No human life is complete unless all three kinds of love are present. Each kind may be a form of cooperating with God. We can establish no general priority-rule among the kinds when we make particular decisions, except that we should always love God above all else (310).

Third, V. claims to surround his entire account with a phenomenological analysis that discloses love's most general features. Formally, "love is an affective, affirming participation in the goodness of a being (or Being)" (34). He wants above all to secure a permanent place in any adequate anthropology for the emotions. And he relies at the end of the day on "human experience." Such experience is not free of tradition, and his book "swims in the Christian stream" (xv). Yet "the final appeal that I make is not that a given idea can be found in Scripture
but that it adequately illumines Christian's experience" (xv). Although the biblical stories help us to learn about love, we require some idea of what love is if we are to interpret these stories correctly (xix).

I introduce the three claims in the order of substantive importance I find them to have. That Christian ethics ought to begin and end with charity is a claim some version of which seems to me compelling. V. deserves unending praise for pressing this claim in a sustained fashion. My enthusiasm diminishes when he affirms not only mutuality between God and human beings, but reciprocity of the sort that breaks with classical theism. Sometimes he stresses the differences between Creator and creature, to be sure (133). But at others he enlarges unwarrantably our powers to cooperate with and affect God.

The second claim V. elaborates in a host of important ways. Again he deserves emphatic praise for attending to *eros* and *philia* no less than to *agape* at constructive length. What he says about each of the loves is perceptive and engaging. Yet stresses and strains can appear. One example must suffice. His phenomenological analysis leads him to insist that *agape* as a kind of *love* must include an emotional affirmation of the beloved and that the beloved is a determining factor in the lover's own self-constitution (and always somehow an enriching factor) (160-1). But he elsewhere grants that *agape* remains *unconditional* in the sense that it means "I will love you even if that love does not do me any good" (175). Obscurity reigns, until something gives way.

The third claim generates uncertainties that the example just cited illustrates. How V.'s commitment to phenomenological analysis interacts with his commitment to swim in the Christian stream occasionally leaves me perplexed. He denies that *any* love can be commanded, yet quotes the love commandments favorably. He identifies love's most general features that appear intelligible to people inside and outside religious communities, yet maintains that an atheist cannot perform the same act as a believer. I want to whisper that although he affirms a correlational rather than intratextual theology (xviii), his finest moments occur when he practices the latter.

Despite any reservations, this book is enormously rich. Those who aspire to write seriously on this subject in the future are bound to reckon with it. The discussion overall should never be the same again. V. has put everyone in his debt.

*Yale University*  

GENE OUTKA


As her subtitle indicates, Gudorf is not merely tinkering with but reconstructing the very foundations of Christian sexual ethics. Key to her argument is the premise that contemporary scientific descriptions of human sexuality should be privileged in this process. Neither tra-
dition nor Scripture ought to be retrieved apart from a “hermeneutic of suspicion” because the theology evidenced therein does not always give voice to the experience of the whole people of God. Consequently it is “counter-revelatory” at points.

G. contends that “disproportionate weight” has been given to these explicitly Christian sources of moral wisdom in the formation of church teachings and that the insights found in “descriptive accounts” of sexuality have been “insufficiently developed” in Christian sexual ethics (6). Therefore the balance among various sources of moral wisdom needs adjustment. When the broad areas of consensus in contemporary biological and social sciences are taken more seriously, the results will be twofold.

First, G. argues that many of the patriarchal, misogynist, and heterosexist assumptions behind traditional church teachings about sexuality will be challenged. E.g., she contends that in this process the inadequacy of the biology behind “the assumption that sex is naturally oriented toward creation of human life” will be illuminated (29 ff.). The evolutionary shift among human mammals away from the links between reproduction and sexual desire typical of estrus, and the fact that coitus is not the only or for most women even an effective avenue to erotic satisfaction, are two of the factors that invite the critical reevaluation of procreationism.

Second, G. is clear that her methodological commitment will generate a new agenda for Christian sexual ethics. Attention to individual acts yields to a focus on more relational or structural concerns. E.g., she identifies the silence in our society about sexuality as sin. We cannot delude ourselves into thinking that the problematic consequences of this pattern of socialization (unnecessary sexual ignorance and widespread sexual dysfunction, among others) are natural. These evils are social constructions, and there is, she notes, no proportionate reason for enduring them.

The moral landscape in the field of sexual ethics may even be turned completely upside down. In light of her frank analysis of the scientific data, G. uplifts sexual pleasure as gracious gift. Mutual sexual pleasure surfaces as the primary end of sex (100). Sexual desire “creates connections between persons” (132). Sexual attraction is seen primarily as a powerful drive that energizes relationships (136). In the context of such an affirmation, not only marital rape, but painful intercourse, and even the failure to include one’s partner in sexual pleasure, become morally problematic. “Sex which is not aimed at mutual pleasure is not only incapable of promoting intimacy and bonding, but is actually, especially if repeated, destructive of relationships and self-esteem” (142).

Bold and creative as the chief assets of this work are, they are also its liabilities. Occasionally G.’s argument lacks the nuance and thoughtful precision she has evidenced elsewhere. E.g., she argues that sexual pleasure should be the “primary ethical criterion for eval-
uating sexual activity" for three reasons (114 ff.). While she claims that bonding depends upon sex being pleasurable, she succeeds at demonstrating only that pleasure can serve love. She claims that pleasure is more easily and immediately recognizable than intimacy, but this too establishes only its instrumental (rather than its intrinsic) value as a norm. While she notes that we turn to sex for pleasure, this establishes (only) its essential (and perhaps inseparable) link to the unitive purpose of sexuality.

Despite a tendency to exaggerate its significance, G. succeeds at making the case that mutual pleasure should be central to the Church's teaching about sexuality. Also insightful is her analysis of the confusion in our culture about bloodlust. Of particular value is her tracing of the roots of our eroticization of domination and violence to the contemporary acceptance of the ancient misunderstanding of the sex drive as irresistible. Given the forces antithetical to such claims in the Christian tradition, this is no mean accomplishment, and G.'s book is a most welcome contribution to the field.

Loyola University, Chicago

PATRICIA BEATTIE JUNG

SHOR SHORTER REPORTS


Westermann has packed into this volume an independent translation of the five chapters of Lamentations, along with a trenchant, illuminating commentary which engages, fairly and quite extensively, the vast amount of scholarly work devoted to the book in the 20th century. But his work is not meant solely for the academy; he offers this serious study to the modern church which has witnessed in our century such incredible suffering, especially among the innocent victims of war.

W. insists on interpreting the book within the context out of which it emerged. We are dealing with something more than poetry, howsoever exquisitely crafted; much less is this theological literature proposed as teaching. The laments are first and foremost prayers, initially handed on orally and only later set down in poetry so that they might be heard by later generations. His learned and sensitive commentary keeps reminding us that we speak to God as authentically in our tears as in our doxologies.

What is the context in which these laments arose? Apart from chap. 3, which most commentators see as a composition formed out of independent units, this poetry has a firm terminus a quo in the conquest and destruction of Jerusalem in 587 B.C. Though there is little reason to believe that the laments were composed later, W. suggests a possible terminus ad quem around 550, when Second Isaiah was active (see Is 51:17–20).

There is surely a relationship between these laments and that moment, recorded in Mt 23:37–39 and Lk 13:34–35, when Jesus laments prophetically over Jerusalem. W. notes that Jesus anticipates the laments of those who will live through the horrors of 70 A.D. But Jesus goes further; by sharing in their calamity he gives to the laments of 587 B.C. their true dignity as a proper response to suffering. Allow me a final suggestion. In the Hebrew, Lam 3:33a reads literally, "For he (Yahweh) does
not afflict from his heart." I think the poet is saying that when Yahweh punishes, his heart is not in it.

FRED L. MORIARTY, S.J.
Boston College


Instead of presenting wisdom theology in the language of abstract, second-level discourse, Perdue remains close to the narrative and poetic structure of the literature with its various images. His task of clarification often involves the explicit naming of metaphors to which the wisdom writers only allude. By analyzing them and stating their (mostly Canaanite) background, he brings out their full dramatic impact and theological intention. Careful attention to the organizing metaphors for God, humans, and the world, allows him to retain the beauty of linguistic creation which would be lost by transferring wisdom theology too early into a strictly discursive mode.

God is seen as king, judge, parent, teacher; humans appear as students, lovers, children, created beings; the cosmos is a work of art, a city, a kingdom, a household. Woman Wisdom is a teacher, God's playful daughter, a goddess of love. P. does not enter directly into the debate whether or not Woman Wisdom is a personification or an hypostasis of a divine quality, but seems to opt for the former. He states: "Since normative Israelite religion did not provide a divine consort for Yahweh, the personification of wisdom as a goddess was, to the imagination, a metaphorical alternative" (99).

The "center" or organizing principle of wisdom theology is creation, the bringing of order out of chaos in both nature and society. There are consequently three major themes in Israel's wisdom literature: cosmology, with its concern for world order; anthropology, a search for guidance in life, including love, beauty, passion, and delight; and theodicy, fear that God might be a wicked and corrupt judge, a tyrannical king "guilty of malevolent misrule" who ought to be dethroned (168). The final restoration of Job, e.g., is actually a redemption of God.

P. concentrates on texts that deal with creation, and focuses on their literary character as an essential first step towards a more general systematic treatment. He is sensitive to the beauty and poetry of language, to the aesthetic and emotional dimension of wisdom, and provides a most useful guide for further study.

JOSEPH F. WIMMER, O.S.A.
Washington Theological Union


This is a precisely focused study of the development of the early Church's understanding of "creation from nothing." The conventional wisdom on this subject has been that the concept emerged in pre-Christian Hellenistic Judaism (2 Macc 7:28-29 is the classic example) and was simply presupposed and absorbed by early Christians. May shows that this was not the case. He finds that both Hellenistic Judaism (e.g. Philo) and early Christian writers (e.g. Justin Martyr) were quite at home with the cosmology of Middle Platonism and could hold the biblical account of God's creation of everything in tension with the Platonist model of world-formation from eternal matter. Only in the second half of the second century does the church theology, responding to philosophical theology and Platonizing gnosis, develop the doctrine of creatio ex nihilo strictly speaking. Though the Christian gnostic Basilides anticipated the orthodox expression of creation from nothing, there is no evidence that this outsider influenced mainstream thinking in the Church. It was Irenaeus who first clearly articulated the doctrine in that context. This response of orthodoxy was driven not by a speculative philosophizing about origins, but by an interest in defending the omnipo-
tence and freedom of God against gnostic dualism.

This discussion might have been enhanced by a sketch of the trajectory leading to the formal teaching of the magisterium at Lateran IV in 1215, against the dualisms of the Cathari and the Albigenses. But May's project was to trace the emergence of a first clear assertion of creatio ex nihilo; he does that comprehensively and crisply. The translation is, for the most part, clear, if not always smooth. The documentation is abundant and meticulous, including the full Greek and Latin texts in the footnotes where major sources are summarized in the body of the argument. Typographical errors are infrequent. In his preface to this 1994 translation, May reviews the literature on the subject since the 1978 German original and finds that the essentials of his interpretation still stand.

At a moment when interreligious dialogue and ecological questions are stimulating a renewed interest in the Christian understanding of Creator and creation, the appearance of an English version of this study is timely. Since it addresses with great scholarly rigor a very specific subtopic within the Christian approach to creation, the book will interest the specialist more than the general reader. It belongs in any theological library aspiring to completeness.

DENNIS HAMM, S.J.
Creighton University, Omaha


This book is the most recent attempt to address the religious iconology of Michelangelo's works, a subject that has fascinated and engaged a number of scholars for the past fifty years. Most attempts have focused on the Sistine Ceiling and the Last Judgment, an enterprise energized recently by the cleaning of those two towering masterpieces. The results have generally been unconvincing, for two major reasons: the paucity or ambiguity of the evidence, and the often questionable presuppositions of the researcher.

Dixon's is the most satisfactory interpretation to appear. It is based on what I judge to be sound principles: it considers the full range of Michelangelo's works; it assumes that the inspiration for them is profoundly Christian and that Michelangelo, not some "learned theologian," determined their religious meaning; it sees a centering on the mystery of the Incarnation especially in the earlier works, which translates into a "material, somatic, carnal" reality or spirituality (94); it recognizes more concern with the atonement in the later works; it also recognizes, however, that Michelangelo was not illustrating "doctrines" but attempting to capture the religious meaning of events (134). In particular, D.'s interpretation of the Ceiling and the Judgment are, in their broad lines, persuasive. E.g., as even others have pointed out, Christ in the latter work is not the terrifying judge traditional interpretation has ascribed to the figure.

No book on this difficult subject is without problems, especially a book as sweeping in its scope and judgments as this one, which in some ways is a learned meditation, intended to some extent for a readership beyond specialists. It is "critical interpretation, not art history" (xi)—at least not art history as practitioners of the discipline would recognize it. The historical basis for D.'s reconstruction of Michelangelo's religious world sometimes seems thin. His case could be strengthened by a bibliography more strongly representing what we now know about religious sentiment in Florence and Rome during Michelangelo's time, which would complement his judicious use of Dante. Nonetheless, bravo!

JOHN W. O'MALLEY, S.J.
Weston Jesuit School of Theology


The contention of this monograph
is that Luther's exegesis of Scripture is significantly different from that ascribed to him by modern historical scholarship, which, Hagen argues, takes Luther out of his own world.

Hagen uses the actual printed text of versions and printings of L.'s "commentaries" on Galatians from 1519 to 1536-38 (as well as the 1516 lectures). He demonstrates that the term "commentary" is misleading since L.'s interpretation is not commentary in the modern sense. He criticizes the editing of the Weimar text: the marginal comments of the printed text are omitted, as well as names and words printed in full capitals; scriptural texts are set off in quotation marks, making them less a part of L.'s text, and the elliptical character of L.'s biblical references, where L. has a whole passage in mind, is lost.

The Weimar text thus obscures, just as historical scholarship has obscured, that L.'s biblical interpretation aims to unfold the theology of Galatians by the closest attention to Paul's grammar of faith and rhetoric, and so to engage the reader. *Enarratio* (L.'s term for what interpretation is doing) is testimony to faith in Christ, it is part of the fight for faith, the conflict between Christ and evil.

L.'s method may be characterized by the term *sacra pagina*. It is close to patristic and medieval monastic interpretation; it is prayerful, experimental, and practical—aimed at spiritual edification. L. is opposed to scholastic interpretation where philosophical and dialectical terms are too much in control, and where Paul's theology is lost (hence L.'s appeal to Augustine and his criticism of Jerome). His interpretation is to be contrasted as well with humanism, especially that of Erasmus, where classical Greek is the measure of Paul and classical Latin is the interpreter's style. Such is not a rhetoric of engagement and of Paul's theology. The historical and philosophical presuppositions of modern scholarship also divert attention from the primary concern for theological proclamation. The context of L.'s interpretation of Paul is Christological and Trinitarian; the theology is that of law and gospel—justification by faith.

ROBERT GOESER

Pacific Lutheran Theol. Seminary
Berkeley, Calif.


Tamburello's book, based on a dissertation directed by Brian A. Gerish at the University of Chicago Divinity School, deals with the "mysticism" of Bernard of Clairvaux in Calvin's writings. The concept T. features is "union with Christ." Unfortunately, the equally important concept of the sacred and *dulce commercium* is not taken into consideration (see Bernard's Sermon 85 on the Canticle). The chapter on the Christian anthropology of both authors fails to enter a scholarly discussion of John R. Sommerfeldt's recent contribution to this subject (The Spiritual Teachings of Bernard of Clairvaux [Kalamazoo: Cistercian Publications, 1991]).

The chapter on justification centers on Bernard's tracts and sermons on the Canticle, but does not feature, as it should have, Bernard's *First Sermon on the Annunciation*, which is a locus classicus for the Reformers in the 16th century (Luther, Melanchthon, Calvin). T. only touches upon this most significant sermon, and simply relies on the "excellent analysis of this quotation" by Jill Raitt in 1981 (55), who herself builds on the work of A.N.S. Lane who is actually the chief authority on the topic "Bernard and Calvin." Lane's most recent paper, "Bernard of Clairvaux: A Forerunner of John Calvin," seems to be unknown to T. It was delivered in 1990 and published as part of the papers presented at the nonacentenary celebration of the birth of Bernard of Clairvaux in Kalamazoo, Michigan (Citeaux: Commentarii Cistercienses, 1992, 533–56).

Despite these critical remarks, I am pleased to see this investigation by a Catholic theologian (a Franciscan friar) appear on the book market, as it
is a valuable contribution to the study of the Bernard-reception by the "Protestant" Reformers of the 16th century, and thus a welcome boost to present-day ecumenism, which unfortunately appears to be declining toward the end of this century and millennium.

FRANZ POSSET
Beaver Dam, Wisconsin


Clavius (1538–1612) has been a subject of tangential interest to historians of the science revolution, but prior to the book here under review there has been no detailed study of his thought or his place in that revolution. Lattis's work fills a void in the literature, and it does so in several ways.

L. gives a comprehensive account of Clavius's contributions to astronomy; he supplies superb pedagogical aids for those who would study the conceptual changes that took place between Ptolemy and Galileo; and he covers in some detail how Jesuit mathematician-astronomers and philosophers reacted in different ways to astronomical discoveries in the late-16th and early-17th centuries. Some, such as Robert Bellarmine, held for a fluid-heaven through which planets move "like fish in the sea"; others, such as Benedict Pereira, continued to defend Aristotle's universe of homocentric spheres; yet others, such as Christopher Grienberger, inclined at first toward Copernicus's heliocentrism. After the latter's condemnation in 1616, however, most Jesuit mathematicians subscribed to Tycho Brahe's geo-heliocentrism as best in accord with Scripture and Galileo's telescopic discoveries.

Against this background L. portrays Clavius as certainly the preeminent theoretical astronomer in his day, yet one who was preoccupied with integrating Ptolemaic planetary theory within Aristotelian physics as understood in the 16th century. So, unimpressed by Brahe, he defended a universe of solid (as opposed to fluid) orbs enhanced with eccentrics and epicycles. In my view this portrayal makes Clavius somewhat too intransigent on the solidity and eccentric-epicycle issues. Just as, after initial opposition, he was won over by Galileo's findings, he would have endorsed Kepler's discovery of elliptical orbits had he lived to see the evidence. But that is a matter of interpretation. For the facts, L. has given us the best account of Clavius and his work now available.

WILLIAM A. WALLACE, O.P.
Catholic University of America


Previously unavailable to English readers of the Galileo Affair, this little jewel merits careful attention and wide reading. Blackwell, whose earlier Galileo, Bellarmine, and the Bible (Notre Dame, 1991) has been well received, has produced an excellent translation of Campanella's text.

Galileo came to know and correspond with many persons, including a surprisingly large number of professed religious. His early friendship with Christopher Clavius, S.J., and his later falling out with the Jesuit Fathers are well known. Fr. Benedetto Castelli, O.S.B., was his pupil and later a colleague. One of the earliest defenders of Galileo was the Carmelite Father Antonio Foscari. Galileo's associations with the Dominican Fathers were many and varied. Among these, Thomas Campanella of Calabria wrote the Defense of Galileo about the time of the March 1616 condemnation of the Copernican system. (It is often forgotten that none of Galileo's writings were mentioned during the 1616 procedure). Both Foscarini and Campanella saw their works on Copernicus and Galileo placed on the Index. Neither of these defenders
wrote at the time of the later trial in 1633. Campanella, who had been released from prison some years earlier, was in residence at the convent of the Dominicans during this trial and could have witnessed the sorry event of June 1633 when Galileo made his solemn abjuration.

Blackwell gives us a long-needed, reliable, and well-documented English version of Campanella’s Defense, a most worthy contribution to the continuing research on these topics.

MARTIN F. MCCARTHY, S.J.
Vatican Observatory


Beginning with a thorough discussion of the role of biblical places in the life of the 17th-century Christian, with an emphasis on the experiential value of places as an aid to Christian assurance, Haskin moves quickly to an analysis of the Parable of the Talents as “Milton’s uneasy place.” Carefully exploring the potential biographical connections with the parable, H. demonstrates the pervasiveness of Milton’s references and develops some highly insightful connections that illuminate important aspects of Milton’s approaches to biblical interpretation.

The divorce tracts mark a critical stage in Milton’s development, challenging the “doctrine of scriptural plainness.” H. reminds us that Tetra- chordon “addresses the four principal places where divorce is treated in the Bible.” By establishing the value of a “conference of places,” in which an overall context of a given place is established, Milton concentrates “on the words of the Bible only” in order to “discover in the general tenor of the Scriptures the deep structure of God’s language.” H. treats the “analogy of faith” extensively in Chapter 3, “Discontinuities in Milton’s Thinking About Places.” Some important moments in the book concern Milton’s treatment of Mary, Samson, and the last two books of Paradise Lost and their role in “finding an assuring place.”

The final chapter, “The Bookish Burden Before the Fall,” discusses literacy and the trope of reading throughout Scripture and Milton. H.’s focus on language in terms of “prelapsarian simplicity and postlapsarian complexity” is especially interesting in treating the description of landscape in Paradise Lost. Scholarly, cautious, and focused, this book is of special interest to those interested in hermeneutics and Milton’s philological approaches to interpretation.

LEE A. JACOBUS
University of Connecticut, Storrs


Wolfe argues that in late-16th-century France, “politics often seemed to be but a branch of theology” (73). With a mastery of manuscript and printed sources, his examination of King Henri IV’s conversion to Catholicism in 1593 serves as a valuable case study demonstrating this thesis and as a broad window onto issues of church and state in the Counter Reformation. The Huguenot king’s conversion brought an end to some 30 years of civil war in France.

Detailed depiction and analysis of Henri’s abjuration at the royal Abbey of Saint Denis is the centerpiece of this book. After splendid processions of ecclesiastical and lay dignitaries arrived at the Abbey, Henri, clad as a simple penitent, knelt on the church steps before assembled prelates to renounce “error” and to recognize the Roman Catholic Church as the “true Church of God. Only then was Henri dressed in royal attire; amid shouts of Vive le roi he entered the Abbey, made a tearful sign of the cross before the altar, and entered a confessional specially installed for the occasion. While the new convert confessed his sins the choir sang a triumphant Te Deum punctuated with further cries wishing the king a long life. The
richly decorated royal pew in which Henri was then seated represented "a sort of spiritual enthronement of the now Catholic king" (152).

Thus the public spectacle of Henri's conversion was "simultaneously an act of penitential submission by the king and a glorification of absolute monarchy" (157). Though W. acknowledges the "ambivalence" of such simultaneity, full exploration of early-modern tensions between royal absolutism and French Catholicism necessarily extends well beyond the reign of Henri IV. Under Louis XIII and especially Louis XIV, did politics continue to be a branch of theology, or did theology become but a branch of politics? Did either accommodation of politics and theology serve, in the long run, the best interests of church or state?

THOMAS WORCESTER, S.J.
College of the Holy Cross, Mass.


Ross offers some new insights as to why the Jesuits were initially so successful and yet ultimately failed in their attempt to Christianize China and Japan. When Pope Alexander VI divided the "newly discovered lands" between Spain and Portugal in 1493, he blessed the extension of the reconquista mentality to the Americas and Asia. However, Ignatius Loyola's concept of mission was quite new in its idea of making Jesuits available to do the work of the papacy; it was an option that was not subject to ecclesiastical or royal power; Ignatius's vision challenged the Caesaropapism of the medieval world, the Iberian reconquista, and the Spanish Inquisition.

Portugal controlled the main naval ports to Asia, while Spain had conquered the Philippines and had proceeded to enforce hispanicisation. The Jesuits felt that it was better to spread Christianity freed from the royal claims of both countries, but they went further, desiring a truly Chinese and Japanese Christianity, not a replication of Europe. Ross probes deeper, asking why Jesuits of that period (like today) opted for indigenisation and acculturation which was often labelled a falling away from Christianity into syncretism. All the leading Jesuits were the product of Italian humanism; they were free from Iberian imperialism and raised in the golden age of Catholic humanism which was able to identify with Confucian humanism. Furthermore, the Spiritual Exercises, if lived out in a Jesuit's life, meant the stripping of emotions, will, and intellect, and re-directing these towards the greater honor and glory of God; they engendered confidence to choose the right way to achieve the goal of a given mission—a way which often challenged the conventional wisdom of Church or state or both.

Their experience in China and Japan convinced most Jesuits that both countries though alien, were definitely civilized. Some even considered Chinese society superior to the old Greco-Roman world. However, some Iberian Jesuits thought otherwise, e.g. Rodriguez, the interpreter, who wrote that the Japanese were not fit to be Jesuits, despite the fact that just a few days before he had seen Japanese die for the faith. Of the great missionaries like Adam Schall von Bell and Ferdinand Verbiest, who followed the "soft way" of the Italian vision, Ross concludes: "To say that the vision was betrayed is perhaps too harsh. What is certain is that Europe of the eighteenth century, whether Catholic, Protestant or Deist, was not ready for it and could not understand it. To the arrogant imperialist expansion of nineteenth century Europe it was nonsense" (206).

BENJAMIN L. WREN, S.J.
Loyola University, New Orleans


Kastfelt analyzes the ways in which the Sudan United Mission (Danish Lutheran) in the Nigerian Province of Adamawa influenced the
development of a political class among its indigenous members during the two decades before the country came to independence in 1960. The distinctive character of the place played a critical role in the process. The Fulani people, backed by the Fulani-Hausa government of the Northern Region and by the British colonial administration, dominated the Province's ruling Native Authority. The population, however, was mostly non-Fulani, divided into numerous small ethnic groups—the “minorities.” In addition, the Fulani were Muslims and earnest propagators of Islam, whereas the minorities were pagan or Christian. The minorities resented Fulani rule, anticipated that Nigeria's imminent independence would make it permanent, and feared that it would then quickly effect the destruction of their cultures and the suppression of the Christian churches.

This resentment and fear led S.U.M. Christians to take various initiatives to correct past governmental discriminations against the minorities and to protect against future inequities. Advantaged by Western education in mission schools, the Christians presented their complaints boldly to Fulani and British officials. At the same time they used the mission's network of institutions to mobilize people behind a nascent political party and to build support for creating a new “Middle Belt Region” which would be responsive to the concerns of the area's small ethnic groups. Their activism inevitably promoted change also in the church itself, accelerating the indigenization of its identity and leadership and winning more sympathetic appraisal of traditional cultural expressions.

Although the study is informative, it deals with only a tiny fraction of African Christians—who were preoccupied, moreover, with narrowly local and ethnic issues. So it is likely to offer more contrasts than parallels with the oft-noted development of anticlonal nationalism among mission-trained elites elsewhere.

JOSEPH C. MCKENNA, S.J.
Fordham University, N.Y.C.
spoken and interpreted by white, Western, masculinist theological discourse has stultified and misrepresented the sacred and legitimate "'echoes of God' that are articulated through 'voices of struggle'" (138). Whether these voices are the ones that have been consistently silenced or those that are seldom, if ever, heard, W. insists that a metaphor of human as well as other-than-human voices will lead us to an understanding of who God is and how God is known far more effectively than continued insistence on the immutability of the Word with all of its possibilities for and history of abuses in the hands of its self-proclaimed representatives.

W.'s text is carefully documented and well reasoned. She is critical of the work of some white feminists as well as Protestant biblicism and what she calls Roman Catholic magisterialism. Her main objection to them is their lack of awareness of and concern for the voices not heard by these "privileged" groups. While she tries to incorporate as many voices as possible, the reader is left wondering if W. may not have slipped into a one-dimensional approach toward these very groups she castigates while remaining open to the heretofore silenced groups. At least a veiled recognition of this possibility is indicated in her last chapter where she admits to finding it difficult to hear as many voices as she would have liked.

Altogether, the book works. W.'s text is scholarly, insightful, and helpful both to readers in sympathy with her position and those who would like to learn from it. She is thorough, challenging, and generally clear in her presentation.

MONI MCINTYRE, I.H.M.
Duquesne University, Pittsburgh


Will deals freshly with the complexity of genuine dialogue between cultures and religions. He steers a middle course between "monological meditations," which collapse all differences into a single voice, and the "deconstructionist eulogies of chaos and anarchy." Instead, Will proposes a "dialogical hermeneutics"—prefigured by Gadamer and refined by Habermas—to move finite horizons toward the universal while respecting the distinctiveness of the various cultures and religions.

The theological foundation for communal interaction in the world is provided by the relational cosmology of Whitehead and his reinterpretation of God's creativity to include the notion of evolutionary change. Whitehead's panentheistic metaphysics and the dialogical method it entails accord primacy to the largely forgotten notion of truth-as-manifestation. This means that any adequate understanding of redemption will not only account for the plurality of traditions (Christian, Jewish, Islam, Hinduism, Buddhism), but will also cultivate the virtue of tolerance among them. Tolerance is not reflective of modern apathy, but of the hope of possible enrichment and mutual transformation through encounter and dialogue.

In turning to the question of how we should live in the global village, Will builds on Habermas's theory of communicative action, so that dialogical hermeneutics is the means to reverse traditional prejudices through emancipatory and transformative praxis. In terms of justice, this means that the continual relativization of local and finite perspectives manifests the eschatological pull of God's justice, "who lures and leads us toward a more adequately universal concretization of it" (142). Only by extending the boundaries of our cultural and religious communities through dialogical interaction, will we share in the "ontological Whole that God is creating" (222).

Not only does Will make an important contribution to the literature surrounding interreligious dialogue, he presents a rich research programme for future philosophical and ethical reflection.

THOMAS R. KOPPENSTEINER
Kenrick School of Theol., St. Louis

A stimulating reexamination of the condition of original sin, which challenges traditional and modern interpretations. Suchocki believes that sinfulness is secondarily, derivatively rebellion against God; primarily, violence that inflicts ill-being, intentional or not, on our planet and its inhabitants. Perhaps "primarily" should read "immediately" and "secondarily," "mediately." S. recognizes vertical and horizontal dimensions as co-constitutive of sinfulness. More interestingly, she argues that sinfulness has its roots not in hubris but in a triadic structure: a physiologically encoded proclivity to aggression tilting to violence, a web of interrelatedness entangling each in the sorry deeds and lot of all, and institutions systemically shaping communal and personal consciousness. Given this triad, all, willy-nilly, contribute to ill-being. But if sin abounds, grace more abounds. S. ends with a fine analysis of forgiveness, one mercifully free of mawkishness. This way lies escape from entrapping spirals of violence.

S. takes seriously universal sinfulness, too frequently ignored or glibly trivialized. In mounting her argument her armature is process metaphysics. Its categories, debatable for some, do not seem essential to her illuminating insights into the opacity and power of evil. As do most modern theologians, S. stresses the corporate sinfulness of sinfulness. The *noum* she brings is her focus on violence as refusal of self-transcendence. Aggression and violence, as expounded in scientific literature and dramatized in popular writing, are, however, riddled with ambiguity and beg clarity. Often they are taken to designate inclusively all destructive behavior, which may be reductionistic in assuming that analogies between humans attacking humans and animals attacking animals are homologies and that the dynamics in both cases coincide. Further, is aggression as central in animal life as S. makes it? Can aggression/violence be stretched to explain monicausally all moral evil? And what motivates the aggressive instinct to violence? It will not do to stress that violence causes fear; fear also causes violence, as do greed, anger, love, acedia, and deeper still, radical ontological angst, which S. may not do justice to in tending to reduce it to fear and a concern over mortality.

Nonetheless, S.'s engaging book brings provocative views and questions to the conversation concerning Christian anthropology and a healthy reminder that we are not disembodied moral agents.

**Stephen J. Duffy**  
Loyola University, New Orleans


The book, originally a doctoral thesis, begins by reviewing different approaches to the theology of religions. Lai's survey indicates a tendency among theologians to go beyond Christocentrism and theocentrism toward a "trinitarian approach" that seeks "to integrate the centrality of Christ and the freedom of the Holy Spirit within the framework of the doctrine of the Trinity" (43).

The book's special contribution consists in delineating the influence of the problem of interreligious encounter on Tillich's systematic theology. Lai points out the development of T.'s thought between the first two volumes of *Systematic Theology* (where he formulates the method of correlation based on a Logos-incarnational theology, representing a Christocentric approach to the theology of religions) and his third volume. Lai argues, convincingly, that there T. moved away from Logos-Christology toward a Spirit-Christology which, while maintaining the centrality of the Christ event, also upholds the freedom and activity of the Holy Spirit in history, before and after
Christ. In this development Lai identifies a major step toward interreligious dialogue.

Lai's final chapter examines the implications of T.'s trinitarian doctrine as a model for the theology of religions. T.'s special merit lies in what Lai describes as his "two-stage approach" to the Trinity (155). The first stage, prior to the Christ event, refers to the experience of the living God leading to the trinitarian symbols: the abysmal, logical, and spiritual character of divine life; such tridadic symbolism is thought to be universally present in all religious traditions. The second, i.e. Christological, stage of the doctrine safeguards the centrality of Christ in history. It is here, however, that we discover a weakness in applying T.'s trinitarian theology of religions. As T.'s Logos- and Spirit-Christology are merely juxtaposed without being integrated, one finds in each case a binary rather than a trinitarian Christology.

JOSEPH H. WONG, O.S.B. CAM.
New Camaldoli Hermitage, Calif.


Christology remains the central task in Christian dialogue with other religions. Thangaraj takes on the question of Jesus' significance and possible normativity in the context of dialogue with Saivites of Tamil Nadu (South India). He offers a much-needed alternative to earlier avatar-Christologies proposed by Christian theologians who sought to adapt Hindu Vaisnave notions of divine descent to traditional Logos Christology. T. argues that the avatar concept, with obvious parallels to traditional high Christologies, has proved unsuitable for both Tamil Saivites and Tamil Christians. Philosophically-minded Saivites reject the notion of avatar, because they repudiate all doctrines of divine incarnation. Tamil Christians, for their part, have been led by Christ's alleged avatarhood to overlook his real humanity, and have thereby fallen prey to a modern docetism, which in turn has led to the omission of a comprehensive liberative praxis.

T.'s solution is the construction of a new "guru Christology," one which uncovers for both Saivites and Christians the soteriological significance of Jesus for oppressed humanity (not for the soul alone). The concept of guru is readily understandable to both Hindu and Christian Tamils, though not without necessary revisions when applied to Christ. T. proposes a "Hindu-Christian" Christology which requires the mutual "informing and shaping" of traditional understandings of Christology and guruhood. The focus on Jesus as suffering guru still present in Spirit accomplishes at least four goals. It furthers dialogue between Saivites and Christians, makes Christ's mission more intelligible, inspires to societal reform, and contributes to worldwide Christology in the making.

T. is persuasive in arguing for the inadequacy of traditional Christologies, both Indian and Western, in the Tamil context, and he laudably focuses on the implications of all Christological theory for orthopraxis. However, a more systematic ontology of the God-guru relation (chap. 2) would have better clarified the differences between guru- and avatar-Christologies, perhaps even paradoxically allowing for a greater synthesis of the two than T. presently recognizes.

BRADLEY MALIKOVSKY
University of Notre Dame


Tekippe presents the views of Aquinas and Lonergan on the will, offering accurate translation and a sound commentary of key texts of Aquinas (two of them otherwise unavailable in English) on human freedom, grace, and charity.
In discussing Lonergan’s interpretation of Aquinas, T. rightly judges that Lonergan misread a key text of Aquinas’s early period and erroneously considers texts from Aquinas’s middle period as a momentary aberration. T. points out that *De Veritate* 24.12 already asserts the main point of *De Malo* 6. Likewise, the idea (though not the terminology) of specification and exercise appears much earlier than *ST* 1–2. Again, on the four influences Aquinas allegedly overcame, T.’s analysis is more precise than Lonergan’s.

To my mind, Lonergan is dissatisfied with Aquinas’s middle-period definition of freedom as mere coercion because Lonergan sticks to a single, univocal meaning, whereas Aquinas analogically uses two, which are equally valid since each considers a different aspect of the will (*libertas*/*liberum arbitrium*). Lonergan rejects the first sense, whereas T. approves of both senses. On the other hand, both Lonergan and T. depart from Aquinas’s usage: Lonergan characterizes as “not free,” and T. as “free” the *libertas a coactione*. But Thomas never uses the adjective *liberum* in this context of freedom from coercion. Although what each of them wants to say is true (depending on the sense adopted), both “not free” and “free” are nevertheless adjectives too strong to be fruitfully applied to the liberty of inclination.

At times, T. surreptitiously introduces the concept of free choice into the concept of freedom from coercion. Misled by a couple of texts in which Thomas casually associates justification with operative grace, T. suggests that consent is given in operative grace itself. But Thomas is clear that justification also includes cooperative grace and that consent (an exercise of free will) belongs only to cooperative grace.

In sum, T. exposes a few mistakes made by Lonergan the historian of Aquinas’s thought, but he doesn’t succeed in demonstrating that Lonergan the interpreter failed to grasp the essentials of Aquinas’s position.

LOUIS ROY, O.P.
Boston College


Does John of the Cross have relevance for a spirituality of liberation? In the Prologue, Casaldáliga, Bishop of São Felix, Brazil, offers his own poem “Questions on the Ascent and Descent of Mount Carmel” in order to emphasize a spirituality that is truly liberative in these times of captivity and in this place called Latin America. The purpose is to show that there can be no room in true Christian spirituality for dichotomies between the God of love and life and the world of the poor and oppressed. In the Epilogue, G. Gutiérrez affirms the relevance of John for the “dark night of injustice” (208) in Latin America because of the intensity with which he communicates the gratuitousness of God’s love, a boundless love that enables us to overcome all idolatry, not only of money and power but also of social justice, the poor, and suffering. The call is to love the God of both justice and beauty and so to speak a language at once prophetic and contemplative.

The authors propose “two types of spirituality” that structure the book. Part 1, “The Spirit of Liberation,” offers a variety of “ethical-political” features that are universally human. Part 2, “The Liberating Spirit of Jesus Christ,” offers a similar variety of “religious, evangelical-ecclesial” features that are specifically Christian. Whatever we say about spirituality on a Christian level must be grounded in the experience of the human and historical; hence the importance of Jesus and his “reign-focus.” The authors do not intend to write a theology of spirituality but a work of spirituality for devotional purposes. One is encouraged to meditate on any section that spontaneously appeals. The style is simple and straightforward but also very repetitive and exhortative. For the reader familiar with liberation theology, there is
nothing new here except perhaps the attempt to enlist John of the Cross.

MICHAEL L. COOK, S.J.
Gonzaga University, Spokane


Stewart, an anthropologist specializing in the Bedouin of the central Sinai, provides a crosscultural, analytic study of honor. He examines the widely studied European ideas of honor to derive a concept of honor that can be applied crossculturally. Clearly well versed in the literature, S. draws upon Icelandic sagas, Roman law, German medieval literature and law, the French Arthurian epics, late-medieval and early-modern Swiss law, modern English literature and court martial records, and, particularly, the modern German legal treatments of honor.

Most theories of honor are “bipartite,” i.e., they separate “outer honor” or reputation from the personal qualities of “inner honor.” S. argues that this separation is too rigorous. Instead, he conceives honor as a rights claim, with inner honor as the basis of that claim and outer honor as the right claimed. This unified concept of honor is, I believe, both interesting and compelling. S.’s unified concept of honor is also applied to Bedouin ‘ird (‘honor’) and wajh (‘face’), which are explored along with the various affronts to honor (primary impugnments of ‘ird, blackening, other affronts to dignity), and the consequences of the loss of honor or the scorn of face. This treatment is fascinating and masterly. S’s extensive fieldwork with the Bedouin over seven years is clearly evident. That his concept of honor works crossculturally strengthens his thesis.

The notion of honor holds much promise for professional ethics. Whereas legal controls merely enforce minimal standards of conduct, honor is a social mechanism which promotes the virtuous dispositions that lead to supererogatory conduct. S.’s thesis thus offers a valuable source for a much-needed development in professional ethics.

KEVIN O’SHEA McGOVERN
Weston Jesuit School of Theology


Post provides a fine case for the primacy of the family in Christian ethics. There are two distinct, but related spheres of love. The first is that of the family (and in some references friends). Here, the person first learns how to love. The second sphere is that of “impersonal” love, where one extends what one has learned to strangers (6–8). A vital first sphere is a precondition of genuine interaction in the second. The focus on the family is not a return to patriarchalism. Post’s “new familiarism” includes “fairness in gender roles” (4).

To sustain his otherwise compelling book, P. needs to extend his argument in two areas. First, he states that patriarchal forms can and must be “stripped” (64) or “removed” (25, 62). A “sacred canopy of dyadic theism” where God is both mother and father (17 ff.) can aid in such removal. Under this canopy, the married couple together are in the image of God. This is an interesting beginning, but the argument stops here. The danger is that in assuming that we can so readily be rid of patriarchy, we can overlook where it still resides. P. lauds John Paul II’s Familiaris consortio as being “past patriarchy,” with no mention of the contraindications in this and other of the pontiffs’ encyclicals (68).

Second, P.’s emphasis on the family overshadows the treatment of the love of the stranger. Both chapters on love of the stranger center on qualifications of that love. The developed points are that such love “must be expressed as though it were conditional” (110) and follows after love of self and family in the order of love. The emphasis on the qualifications to love of the stranger submerges the case P. states, but does not develop as fully the idea that familial love can
lead to stranger-love. In an era marked by small-group violence, making this latter case fully is crucial.

TODD DAVID WHITMORE
University of Notre Dame


This remarkably timely work on distributive justice puts the primary emphasis on burdens (who gets hurt, and how) rather than benefits (who gets what, and how much). Smurl discusses the strengths and weaknesses of several theorists (e.g. Ryan, Nozick, Maclntyre, Rawls) and then argues that “the aim of distributive justice is both to design and to maintain just situations and social structures in communities and to promote justice in the people who encounter each other in these situations” (11). Through case studies, S. shows how assessments of justice in the four areas listed in the title (“law” refers to contract law) require factual, conceptual, and normative inquiries. A focus on degrees and kinds of harm is crucial, leading to a sharp critique of current trends and practices in the four areas.

S. challenges controlling myths and metaphors that skew practical insights regarding justice, and he avoids utopian narratives or counter-proposals. In the tradition of Aristotelian virtue theory, realism and regard for concreteness characterize this work. E.g., burdens are best assigned or negotiated only by persons both committed to justice and truly knowledgeable in specific areas. S., professor of religious studies at Indiana University at Indianapolis, acknowledges his debt to religious traditions, in relation to which he stands as an “emphatic observer” (12), and key insights from Bernard Lonergan inform his work. Still, he deliberately downplays theology in a way that might disappoint some readers. Theologians ought, however, to note S.’s emphasis on intergenerational justice, a topic that receives scant attention in theological literature.

A few editorial flaws (e.g. incorrect page headings for the Conclusion) mar this edition. The book will tax undergraduates, but it may be used at that level. It is perhaps more appropriate for professional schools and graduate ethics programs. I especially hope that policy makers in various fields will grapple with S.’s important argument.

WILLIAM P. GEORGE
Rosary College, River Forest, Ill.


Drawing on a sophisticated survey of the U.S. labor force, Wuthnow investigates the often ambiguous relationship between religion (primarily Christianity) and economic behavior in the lives of ordinary Americans. The survey results suggest that, when it comes to shaping attitudes toward money- and work-related issues, the influence of religious faith is less profound than might be hoped for. The economic sphere has become a relatively autonomous source of meaning and value that resists the intrusion of religious concerns. W. contends that many believers have unwittingly acquiesced in this situation by adopting a “therapeutic” brand of religion which too easily assumes a snug fit between the goals of serving God and pursuing material gain. The data convincingly reveal that in many important respects the mentality of churchgoers and non-churchgoers on matters related to money and work is virtually identical.

The picture is not without its bright spots. W. finds that religious faith makes an appreciable difference in a number of areas of people’s economic lives, e.g., in their ability to find meaning in their work, in the firmness of their commitment to ethical behavior in the work-place, in their willingness to think seriously about their responsibility to the poor. On the whole, however, the effect of faith
on the economic behavior of American workers is unimpressive. W. maintains that reversing this trend will require religiously committed people to address more explicitly the cultural values which obscure the authentic meaning that faith ought to bring to the economic sphere.

W.'s prose can be labored, and on occasion I found it difficult to follow the thread of his thought as he worked his way through the survey results. But his book, which is aimed at a broad educated audience, brings a welcome measure of empirical substance to a topic where vagueness and sweeping generalities typically prevail.

J. MICHAEL STEBBINS
Woodstock Theological Center D.C.


For many, the relationship of worship and technology is perceived as ambiguous or even negative. White's scholarly and thought-provoking work shows that the relationship need not be negative; it has often been and can be mutually beneficial.

W.'s historical survey notes significant developments of technology which have influenced worship. Among the developments have been the printing press and the fixed liturgical text; the accurate measurement of time and the liturgical calendar; the biotechnology of disease control and revised funeral rites; the development of mechanistic systems analysis and the rise of congregational studies. In all such developments, technology has had both positive and detrimental effects on worship. Often even the positive effects of technology have encountered resistance in the church rather than a proactive, creative attitude and application.

Theologians would do well to heed W.'s call for a dialogue with "technologists" at the level of academic societies such as the American Academy of Religion and the North American Academy of Liturgy. At the heart of the matter are two central questions: Can technoculture and its media become sacramental, a bearer of God's self-giving love for the world? In a world saturated with technological advances and sophisticated, influential mass media, can worship still provide a formative vision of right relationship to God, self, and others?

Theologians must question technology's potential for dehumanization and isolation; technologists must question the limitations of orders of worship based on ancient texts employed outside of their context and rituals based on anthropological studies of primitive cultures. Inculturation must take seriously the formative symbols and narratives of contemporary technoculture; failure to do so will impoverish both worship and technology.

This is a groundbreaking work for pastoral liturgical studies and, as such, deserves to be widely read.

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SCRIPTURAL STUDIES

The Community of the Renewed Covenant.
Presenting This Issue

After a very important article on translating the divine name, this third issue of volume 56 includes articles on Ignatius of Loyola, Bernard Lonergan, Karl Rahner, and Thomas Aquinas, before moving on to a current theology review of recent books in comparative theology, a quaestio disputata on Karl Rahner and demythologization, and a note on Evangelium vitae.

On translating the divine name points out how important it is that theological discussion of our naming of God not neglect, as it often has, the highly nuanced problems raised by contemporary theories of translation. David S. Cunningham has his Ph.D. from Duke University and is assistant professor of theology at the University of St. Thomas. Specializing in the relationships among theology, literary theory, and contemporary rhetoric, he is the author of Faithful Persuasion: In Aid of a Rhetoric of Christian Theology (Notre Dame, 1992) and the forthcoming Negative Trilectics: Toward a Rhetorical Doctrine of God (Blackwell’s, 1996).

Ecclesial mysticism in the Spiritual Exercises of Ignatius explores the hypothesis that in the Spiritual Exercises the exercitant is to become configured to the Church in its relationship to Christ, and that in the exercitant the Church is to realize experientially both its mission and its radical nature as the beloved of Christ. Michel J. Buckley, S.J., Ph.D. from the University of Chicago, is professor of systematic theology and director of the Jesuit Institute at Boston College. Author of the magisterial At the Origins of Modern Atheism (Yale, 1987), he is currently preparing further essays on Jesuit spirituality, as well as books on Catholic higher education and on the rise of atheism in the 19th century.

Revisioning Natural Law: From the Classicist Paradigm to Emergent Probability uses Lonerganian insight to raise questions about the natural moral law in light of the modern acceptance of both statistical and classical laws as constitutive of world process. Cynthia S. W. Crysdale, who has her Ph.D. from the University of St. Michael’s College, Toronto, is an associate professor at the Catholic University of America. Specializing in gender studies, feminist ethics, and moral and faith development, she is currently investigating issues in conversion and faith development and in genetics, ethics, and emergent probability.

The Freedom to Say “No”? Karl Rahner’s Doctrine of Sin argues that Rahner’s understanding of the essence of sin as a free “no” to God, along with his understanding of freedom, leads into a dilemma, an inconsistency rooted in the central Rahnerian idea of the supernatural existential. Ronald C. Highfield, a Ph.D. from Rice University and associate professor of religion at Pepperdine University, is the author of Barth and Rahner: Toward an Ecumenical Understanding of Sin and Evil (Lang, 1989) and “Galileo, Scientific Creationism, and Bibli-

The Incomprehensibility of God: A Buddhist Reading of Aquinas, as opposed to a theology of religions based on a general theory of religion, offers a concrete example of comparative theology by comparing the Thomistic doctrine of the incomprehensibility of God and a classic Buddhist text, *The Stanzas on the Middle* by Nagarjuna. JAMES L. FREDERICKS, Ph.D. from the University of Chicago Divinity School, is assistant professor at Loyola Marymount University, Los Angeles. Specializing in systematic theology, comparative theology, and Japanese Buddhism, he has recently published articles in *Horizons, Eastern Buddhist,* and *Christian Spirituality Bulletin,* and is preparing a book on comparative theology in the theology of religions.

Comparative Theology: A Review of Recent Books (1989–1995), surveys under the rubric of CURRENT THEOLOGY, the variegated and relatively uncharted field of comparative theology, with attention to the effect of comparative study on established areas of theology and on our understanding of theology itself. FRANCIS X. CLOONEY, S.J., Ph.D. from the University of Chicago and associate professor of theology at Boston College, is the author of *Theology after Vedanta: An Experiment in Comparative Theology* (SUNY, 1993) and the forthcoming *Seeing through Texts: Doing Theology among the Srivaisnavas of South India* (SUNY, 1996).

Karl Rahner and Demythologization constitute this issue’s QUAESITIO DISPUTATA. Raschko, taking issue with Barnes’s “Demythologization in the Theology of Karl Rahner,” *TS* 55 (1994), argues that Barnes misinterprets Rahner on a number of key points, mistakenly attributing to him a demythologizing agenda. As Barnes responds, it becomes apparent that the difference between the two relates to whether or not (or to what extent) God works from within the process of the universe rather than from outside or above it. MICHAEL B. RASCHKO, who has his Ph.D. from the University of Chicago, specializes in the thought of Tillich, Rahner, and Lonergan, and teaches in the Institute for Theological Studies at Seattle University. MICHAEL H. BARNES, Ph.D. from Marquette University, is professor of religious studies at Dayton University. He specializes in religion and science and the theology of God, and is preparing a book on the development of forms of religious thought through history.

The Doctrinal Weight of *Evangelium Vitae* discusses the significance of the fact that the formula used in this encyclical to “confirm” its central teaching included a declaration that this traditional doctrine was taught by the ordinary and universal magisterium. FRANCIS A. SULLIVAN, S.J., is professor emeritus of the Gregorian University and adjunct professor of theology at Boston College. Author of *Salvation Outside the Church?* (Paulist, 1992), he is currently working on a book on the evaluation and interpretation of the documents of the magisterium.

Robert J. Daly, S.J.
Editor


SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY

BOOKS RECEIVED


HISTORICAL


MORALITY AND LAW


PASTORAL, SPIRITUAL, AND LITURGICAL


Deutsch, E. Religion and Spirituality. Al-


PHILOSOPHY, OTHER DISCIPLINES


