BOOK REVIEWS


Japhet has contributed a major work to the Old Testament Library series—the first contribution to the series by an Israeli scholar. Her dissertation on Chronicles, completed in Jerusalem in 1977 and published in English translation in 1989, along with half a dozen scholarly articles, have established her as the major scholar in contemporary study of Chronicles. So this massive commentary is a welcome addition to recent publications on a somewhat neglected book. It will take its place with the commentaries of H. G. M. Williamson, Roddy Braun, and Raymond Dillard.

J.'s work is distinguished by several important features. She argues for separate authorship of this book rather than conceiving of a "Chronicler" responsible for 1–2 Chronicles plus Ezra-Nehemiah. Moreover, she distances herself from those who have stressed the midrashic aspects of Chronicles, claiming that the Chronicler truly intended to write history (34), a genre which J. describes elsewhere as "theocentric history." She demurs from a common tendency to evaluate Chronicles by linking historical reliability with exact determination of historical sources. This question is quite important especially in the nonsynoptic parts of the history, i.e. sections where Chronicles does not parallel the narrative in Samuel-Kings. For example, 2 Chr 20 (Jehoshaphat's war with Moab and Ammon) is absent from the Kings' tradition/source, but even though she cannot produce the "source" material she concludes that the Chronicler had access to some kind of chronicle from the monarchic era (801). She believes this author did use a single, comprehensive history of Israel together with other written and oral sources to create his own history (22–23). But he also used sources such as divine revelations and prophecies of his own composition, which "seems to derive from his own self-understanding as inspired"; so the Chronicler viewed his work as "an authentic expression of the divine will" (34).

A refreshing feature of J.'s commentary is that she emphasizes the reworking of traditions to address contemporary religious issues. "Chronicles is a comprehensive expression of the perpetual need to renew and revitalize the religion of Israel. It makes an extremely important attempt to affirm the meaningfulness of contemporary life without severing ties between the present and the sources of the past; in fact, it strengthens the bond between past and present and proclaims the continuity of Israel's faith and history" (49).

For J., the time of the Chronicler is the end of the 4th century B.C. She marshals several reasons for her dating: its Hebrew style is known today as Late Biblical Hebrew; it contains very few "Persianisms"; it
shows no signs of Hellenistic influence; it seems to use texts and motifs from the Pentateuch, Deuteronomistic History, Lamentations, Zechariah, and Ezra-Nehemiah; it presents a developed form of cultic organization, i.e. priests and Levites, that corresponds to later, Second Temple organization.

In J.'s parlance, ideology seems to substitute for the more familiar notion of an integrated theological program. It includes a consistent view of God (monotheism is taken for granted, and there is a clear view of providence as God's direct and immediate intervention in history), of the people Israel as linked by covenant to God from the very beginnings in the patriarchal era. This ideology manifests itself particularly in “rhetorical” pieces authored by the Chronicler (e.g. sermons, speeches, prophetic warnings), and in the public, cultic ceremonies so prominent in this telling of Israel's history.

J.'s continual study of Chronicles is manifest in her sympathetic reading of this postexilic work which has frequently been dismissed or ridiculed by Christian exegesis. Responding to implications that the Chronicler showed too much interest in legal issues and cultic formalism, she discerns in the celebration of Passover during Hezekiah's time a spirituality of repentance underlying the external pilgrimage to Jerusalem, noticing in 2 Chr 30:11 and 19 an internal journey as well: “these people recognized the need to repent and to bring to fruition the implications of repentance” (947). With regard to resident aliens, J. emphasizes the Chronicler's notion that none who dwell in Israel are true foreigners, to be excluded from Passover; she discerns here a “comprehensive view of the people as all-inclusive” (956). In 2 Chr 20 she notes the Chronicler's “democratizing” tendency (the king often consults with the people before taking serious action) and a view of worship as characterized by music and joy. Later, she notices “the Chronicler's realistic awareness of the difficulty of complete devotion” (801).

J. pays sufficient attention to historical, literary, form-critical, and philological matters to satisfy serious scholars and researchers. But her work will prove beneficial also to advanced students and ministers who may wish to pass over technical matters in search of a comprehensive view of the Chronicler's theology and ideology. J. moves the religious continuity between past and present up to contemporary times—reason enough to consult this commentary regularly.

Jesuit School of Theology, Berkeley

JOHN C. ENDRES, S.J.


The chief value of this splendid book is negative: it exposes a common view of Matthew and his community as an anachronistic oversimplification. In the traditional view, still dominant in popular understanding but also frequently found in scholarly circles, a sharp distinction between “Judaism” and “Christianity” had already taken
place in Matthew’s situation—often connected with a supposed “coun­cil” of Jamnia that altered the synagogue liturgy in such a way that Christians could no longer participate. For such an understanding, the primary issue is whether Matthew’s Christian group is “still in” or “already out of” the synagogue.

Rather than taking sides on this issue, Saldarini exposes the fallacy of posing the question in this way. Every student of Matthew must be grateful to him for this. After working through S.’s book, no reader can any longer pose the question in such neat yes/no, in/out, Jew/Gentile categories. He develops his case by arguing that first-century Judaism was varied enough to include the Matthean believers-in-Jesus within it, the sharp distinction between “Jews” and “Christians” not having developed until the middle of the second century. Matthew understood both the people in his narrative and those in his own group as belonging to Israel; the sharp polemic of his Gospel is directed against the leaders, not the people as a whole. A study of Matthew’s usage of the word *ethne*, usually translated “nations” or “Gentiles,” does not indicate a Matthean rejection of Israel as God’s people, though Matthew does want to “open” the boundaries of Israel to more Gentiles. The tensions between Matthew’s “group” and the Jewish “community” to which they still belong are explained by a particular understanding of the sociological categories of deviance, sectarianism, and kinship. Matthew’s understanding of law, custom, and practice fit within the acceptable range of first-century Judaism, and even Matthew’s Christology need not be seen as placing him outside its world of thought.

Thus S. argues that the Matthean believers-in-Jesus are to be understood as they understood themselves, solely as a particular kind of Jewish believers who continued to circumcise their children and their converts, to abide by the purity laws, and to keep the Sabbath, there being enough flexibility on all these points within first-century Judaism to accommodate the Matthean groups “deviant” practice.

Whether one concludes that S. has made a convincing case partly depends on terminology and definitions. On the one hand, despite the title of the book, S. speaks only of a Matthean “group,” but no Matthean “community.” “Community” is reserved for Judaism in all its manifestations, including the Matthean: “This study concludes that the Gospel of Matthew addresses a deviant group within the Jewish community in greater Syria, a reformist Jewish sect seeking influence and power (relatively unsuccessfully) within the Jewish community as a whole” (198; see 85–90). Yet the Matthean group “can be understood as a sect or deviant association within the larger Jewish community and also as a Jewish community of a particular kind, a Christian-Jewish community” (199). The latter statement seems to soften the edges of the distinction so carefully made in the general argument. The same is true when one considers that Matthew’s group has “recently withdrawn or been expelled from” the Jewish synagogue (2; cf. 112), has its own assemblies, leadership, and discipline (102–20), and prac-
ticed baptism of new members (90), but that baptism was only a mark of a renewal movement within Judaism. Nothing is made of the eucharistic worship of the Matthean "group," no reference to 26:26–29 as representing their continuing practice. Thus S.'s discussion seems to presuppose some of the in/out distinction he opposes, but places Matthew's community "in" rather than "out."

A weakness of the book is that it deals with the text of Matthew as all on the same historical plane. While S. incidentally refers from time to time to Mark as a Matthean source, the role that Mark might have played in the Matthean community, and what one might learn about the Matthean community from Matthew's interpretation of Mark (and Q) is strangely not mentioned. S. has attempted to understand everything in Matthew by expanding the boundaries of Judaism so that it could embrace the Matthean group, a spatial approach. But history is space/time. The study would have been improved by expanding the temporal perspective to embrace the history of the material, which must reflect some of the changes that the Matthean community had undergone. Source analysis must be joined to social history and literary criticism. This is the way forward for Matthean studies. S. has contributed a helpful and provocative study of one dimension of the problem, but it cannot be treated in isolation without distortion.

Texas Christian University

M. Eugene Boring


As the year 2000 approaches, we can expect more and more preachers to appear proclaiming the end of the world. They will stand within a long tradition which engages in "arguing the apocalypse." In this study, O'Leary sets out to provide "a theoretical framework for understanding the millenarian and apocalyptic discourse . . . as rhetoric" (3).

O. first presents an overview of recent scholarship touching on biblical, historical, and sociological aspects. Incorporating and building on these, O. moves to develop his own rhetorical approach. He identifies three recurring topoi of apocalyptic rhetoric: (1) evil—the problem of theodicy: how to reconcile our concrete experiences of evil with belief in a good God; (2) time—chronology: relief will come at the end of time; and (3) authority—how to justify one's argument that the end is near: charismatic, traditional, and rational legitimations are offered.

O. then situates these three topoi within a larger frame of reference. Here he develops Kenneth Burke's tragic and comic "frames of acceptance." The tragic view sees evil in terms of sin or guilt; it views time and human action as predetermined and moving to an inevitable resolution and absolute close. The comic view sees evil more in terms of error, misunderstanding, and ignorance; it views time as more open-ended and moving to recovery of equilibrium. Using Burke's view of
psychology of form, O. examines how the rhetor’s claim that the end is near evokes and interacts with the response of a given audience.

After setting up his methodology, O. applies it to two particular historical examples, that of William Miller in the 1840s, and that of Hal Lindsay in our own time, examining their historical settings, background, audience, argumentation, and results. He also discusses the use of apocalyptic rhetoric by Ronald Reagan and Pat Robertson. Finally he offers some implications for the future and comments briefly on Waco and the Branch Davidians.

I would single out for brief mention just a few intriguing elements of O.’s thought. (1) Since theodicies, in a way, put God on trial, they can be seen as a species of forensic rhetoric. The four types of classic legal argument can help classify different attempts at theodicy (36–42, 197–98). (2) Early Christianity tended to locate itself with reference to the expected return of the Lord in glory; the shift to locating itself with reference to the birth of Christ (anno Domini) was one way to counter apocalyptic expectation (46–49). (3) O. highlights the fact that the Book of Revelation in the New Testament contains both tragic and comic elements, and he concludes his study by arguing for the recovery of the comic frame of acceptance (218–24). (4) In apocalyptic rhetoric, the Scriptures are seen as an encoded message which simply needs deciphering, not true interpretation. Thus the interpretations of Miller and Lindsay, e.g., are masked and obscured. O. describes them as “self-effacing interpreters” (143–45).

In both scope and depth this is an exceptionally rich book which will certainly stimulate further research and discussion.

Franciscan School of Theology
Berkeley, Calif.

Michael D. Guinan, O.F.M.


Although there have been various collections of essays on the relation of Gnosticism and the New Testament, this is the first English monographic treatment of this subject in nearly two decades. Perkins concentrates on the results and questions generated by gnostic scholarship of the last 25 years. Besides surveying the work of others, she offers many instances of her own scholarship, particularly on gnostic mythology in its relation to the Johannine movement and NT Christology.

P. treats the relationship between Gnosticism and the NT in three parts. “Gnostic Origins” investigates the question of a non-Christian Gnosticism that may have emerged prior to or concurrently with early Christianity, especially the contributions of Jewish traditions. “Gnostic and Precanonical NT Traditions” treats sections of the NT where gnostic influence is generally detected: the sayings of Jesus, the Pauline “opponents,” images of Jesus as heavenly redeemer/revealer, and
the revelation discourses of the Fourth Gospel. And "Gnostic Christianity" deals with the emergence of a self-consciously Christian Gnosticism and its conflict with "orthodox" Christianity over the matters of anticosmism, libertine or ascetic behavior, the role of women, and scriptural authority.

This book has the virtue of moving the question beyond the old debates about the pre-Christian or post-Christian character of Gnosticism. P. correctly argues that the origins of Gnosticism are to be found in a particular interpretation of foundational Jewish traditions, especially those found in the Enochic treatment of authoritative Genesis traditions. These form a coherent set of mythemes incorporated into gnostic rituals and their accompanying myths of origins and salvation according to a well-established "grammar" that presupposes a community of users. Frequent word-play and extended exegetical transformations of these mythemes suggest a textual rather than oral base for the formation of gnostic traditions. Although gnostic myths and rituals often appear to be superficially Christianized during the first century, their formation is not dependent on emerging Christianity. Neither is it possible to discover a single line of development from the first century into the sociologically identifiable gnostic groups of the second century. Both Christian and Gnostic origins are to be found on the margins of Judaism where the question of Jewish/non-Jewish identity was at best fluid.

Part 2 explores a number of possible gnostic influences on NT traditions. Studies of the sayings of Jesus in the synoptic tradition and gnostic sources suggest that Jesus' original teaching emphasized the presence of salvation through wisdom rather than apocalyptic judgment. Jesus calls his hearers back to the state of the primal androgyne rather than to face impending judgment. In the second century, the existence of acontexual collections of sayings demonstrates that the realistic narrative contextualization of the life-of-Jesus Gospels was unnecessary to understand the Savior's wisdom. P.'s review of the Pauline tradition suggests that Paul and gnostic myth concur most closely in conceiving humanity as subject to demonic powers because it dwells in the flesh, and in speculation concerning the relation of the earthly and the divine Adam (both of whom the Gnostics place in primordial times, while Paul places the latter strictly at the eschaton).

In Part 3, P. observes that both Gnosticism and Christianity featured unconventional interpretation of inherited tradition that threatened to reshape social relations. Both elicited suspicions of dangerous antinomianism, and both tended in an ascetic rather than libertine direction in an attempt to resist the influence of the demonic cosmic powers.

This excellent book offers a balanced treatment of the relation between Gnosticism and the NT. It builds upon established results and refrains from dogmatic conclusions. It contains excellent reviews of recent research. Most of the argumentation is based on firsthand ex-
egesis of individual texts. While the work is a “must” for the specialist, it is particularly to be recommended as a supplementary text in courses on early Christianity, where the chapters of Part 2 would serve better than anything else currently available to focus on a range of exegetical and historical issues crucial to NT interpretation.

University of Nebraska-Lincoln  

JOHN D. TURNER


Marxsen, Professor at Münster until his death in 1993, distinguishes ethics taught and lived by “Christians” of various stripes from authentic Christian ethics. To do so, he recognizes that Christian ethics must be an integral part of theology, which is defined as talk of God, not about God.

M. searches for the authentic in two “entirely separate” early traditions—the Galilean, which preserved stories of Jesus in his ministry, and that of Jerusalem, which began from the Easter experience of the salvific death and resurrection of Jesus. Mark is normative for the first tradition, Paul for the latter. In each case, an eschatological indicative grounds and includes the authentic Christian imperative.

In Mk 1:14–15 the completion of the kairos means no time remains for the Jews to earn their admission to the Kingdom by stricter observance of the law; the Kingdom arrives as a gift. People’s decisions for or against Jesus already place them in the position of being judged by the coming Son of Man (Mk 8:38). And so in Jesus the eschaton is already present; Christian ethics is the actualization of this risky eschatological existence, which can have no specifications or rules. Nominal Christians are those who have once lived this eschatological existence and now are waiting to experience miraculously this lordship of Christ again as kairoi.

For Paul, Christ is the end of the law (Rom 10:4). Since God has already passed favorable judgment on us in Christ, works are useless. Paul’s imperatives are situation specific, and so not rules for other Christians. There is no new content in Paul’s imperatives; the only difference is in the obedience of faith. Imperatives are Christian only when they are hortatives flowing from Christ’s achievement.

Most of the New Testament is an unsuccessful development of this vision, because ethics gets separated from apocalyptic Christology. John, however, reforms this already-deformed tradition by a “present eschatology,” which grounds the love commandment in the missions of the Son from the Father and the disciples from the Son. His Gospel, however, has no specifications of this command. The Johannine school turned this eschatological vision into a new tradition, and so eschatological Christology and ethics again separated.

In sum, both for Mark and Paul, directives are superfluous for the
Christian grasped by the unconditionally loving God in the eschatological moment; at other times they are non-Christian, otiose. M. concludes that the Church should eschew its “worldly” (inauthentic) instructions to the world; its sole task is to proclaim over and over the indicative.

This new articulation of classic Lutheran theology is remarkably coherent and frequently brilliant. There are pungent remarks about historical-Jesus criticism and insightful interpretations of individual pericopes. More important is the location of exegesis and Christian ethics in the task of (doctrinal) theology. Most important is M.’s devout insistence that personal experience of the lordship of God as unconditional love is the bedrock of Christian life and Christian theology.

But the book has stark limitations. The water-tight separation of Galilean and Jerusalem traditions provides an unstable foundation for “authentic” tradition. M. ignores the new social-science analysis that has produced a quite different Jesus from his own. His interpretation of Christ as the cessation of the law in Rom 10:4 is no longer preferred. His theology sometimes drives him into indefensible interpretations, e.g., that “the law was the god of the Jews” (67), a position untenable not only after Sanders, but even after G. F. Moore.

M.’s appeal to theology as the matrix for Christian ethics is promising, but his naive rejection of God’s omnipotence (7) soon warns one that his theology may not be up to his task. Indeed, Bultmann’s assertion that theology is talking of, rather than talking about, God reduces theology to little more than personal religious experience. No matter how indispensable this experience is for its project, only a theology which talks about God in explanatory categories can deliver it from the subjectivity to which experience alone restricts it. It is not exegesis, but rather this defective theology, which denies any guidelines, rules, or norms to authentic Christian ethics. Further, while Christian ethics derives from Christology, a Christian anthropology also mediates Christian ethics. Here forensic justification cannot help, for it leaves Christians with a changed status before God, but not with a changed state. M.’s justification by faith cannot create a character which is historically real, and so it cannot provide an authentic ethics. Neither can it found a pneumatology.

Although M.’s caution about rules for Christian ethics is a healthy corrective to some Catholic moralists’ assurance about such rules, still, not even Fletcher left his Christian readers so devoid of ethical guidance. What is needed is a doctrine of Incarnation and redemption which truly penetrate history with eschatological grace. This perspective would see the various theologies of the NT not as defections from the canon within the canon, but as graced developments, and would understand in the experiences of these churches the Spirit’s continuous elaboration of the ethical implications of salvation for Christian living. Thence could come norms which are not opposed to justification by faith, but its complement in a historical religion.

Seattle University

John Topel, S.J.

The Hindu áśrama system refers to the four vocational states or life-styles (student, householder, hermit, renouncer) open to Indian males of the three higher classes. This is the first historical study of the system as a theological concept from the hermeneutical perspective of those who developed it through three millennia. Olivelle's research began in 1977 and initial chapters were written as early as 1981, but the work was interrupted by O.'s magisterial two-volume study on Renunciation in Hinduism: A Medieval Debate (1986–87) which grounds the thesis in this book. The goal here is to establish that in Brähmanical Hinduism (prior to the fifth century B.C.E.) the áśrama system consisted of four distinct and alternative paths for leading a religious life, and that only in the development of classical Hinduism did it evolve into temporary stages of life through which one passes in the religious quest.

O. treats the system less as a socioreligious institution than as a theological construct. Theological constructs function as discourses that give meaning to socioreligious reality and institutions. The four variations of religious life-styles, however, existed before the emergence of the theological construct. The purpose of the construct was to legitimate as Hindu law alternate ways of being religious. Such theology represented a liberal stance in the ancient period, intending a structure of inclusion in order to manage the vast diversity in the tradition. However, a transformation of structure took place in classical Hinduism, whereby it became more exclusive and restrictive, one reason being the conservative influence of the married performers of ritual.

Ritual in ancient India was limited to married householders. By 600 B.C.E. a reversal of worldviews and life-styles had taken place with the greater presence of ascetics, hermits, and life-long students. Interest shifted from marriage to celibacy, village to wilderness, outward ritual to inner meditation. Accordingly, early writers argued a construct that gave legitimacy to the life-long student, hermit, and renouncer. They based the áśrama system (1) on choice, (2) for the adult, (3) as permanent paths, (4) for males, (5) and each as legitimate in itself. The classical theologians who came later reversed the system by (1) eliminating choice, (2) inviting youth into the system, (3) classifying each as a temporary stage with the exception of renunciation, and (4) elevating renunciation to a superior way of liberation. The confessional and sectarian theologians accomplished such an evolution in doctrine through hermeneutical skills.

The exceptional aspect of O.'s work is his use of Indian hermeneutics to demonstrate a shift in theological development. India's hermeneutical tradition is at the core of its theology and law, especially in resolving conflicts in the interpretation of Vedic texts and even later texts seemingly in contradiction to scripture. The early thinkers drew upon
the hermeneutic principle of option or choice, since in their view the four ways of life were equally legitimate. If one text had more authority over another, it could be selected over the other. The married ritualists used this principle since marriage alone was the requirement for sacrifice and procreation. The classical theologians drew upon an assimilation theory which was used when all the texts were understood to hold equal authority and could be followed at different times, by different people, and involving different activities. Thus resulted the āśrama system as progressive stages in religious development.

O. reveals a tension at the core of Hindu theological development: namely, between inclusivity and exclusivity on the one hand and between marriage and celibacy on the other. Again, hermeneutical tools were brought to the fray. Classifications were common strategies to assign a higher qualification in another system to a lower position in one's own. Since all theologies emerged from sectarian groups, a position could be rejected by referring it to a lower class. Moreover, what one would consider a scriptural injunction became a honorific tool for another, all indicating fluidity between the normative and the ideal. In the end O. makes a plea for a study of exegesis and hermeneutics of those we seek to understand before we bring our own strategies to interpretation. This has frequently been absent among historians of religions and theologians.

Catholic University of America

William Cenkner


The frame makes the picture. In any art shop where you find a print presented in different mattings, you see how each matting changes the picture. Studer's frame is clearer in the original title, Gott und unsere Erlösung im Glauben der alten Kirche. He emphasizes theologia and oikonomia and develops his continuing interest in salvation by concentrating on trinity and incarnation within the context of ancient worship, pastoral care, prayer, hymns, and spirituality, all with an eye to the modern Church.

What might be a confused collage, or a reconstructed mosaic with tiles lost, in S.'s hands becomes a colorful, clear presentation of early Christian doctrine built by a faithful Roman Catholic theologian. Philological care and concern for context neither overpower the great themes of Christian faith nor turn the work into turgid paragraphs of interest only to patristic specialists.

The best chapter is the second. After looking at general pre-Nicene Christological developments and setting those within their cultural background in Chapter 1, S. speaks of “The Mystery of Christ in Prayer and Exhortation” by concentrating on narration, doxology, epiclesis, and baptismal creed as the Church's frame of reference. S. struc-
tures this material with a master’s hand and his treatment is excellent; yet I suspect it could be improved by even more emphasis on the practice of the Church.

Some aspects of the picture are expected, but deftly handled. The apologists's message has a distinct unity. Irenaeus does center his work on the salvation of the whole person, the salus carnis. Carefully making his way, S. questions binitarian interpretations of Spirit Christologies and highlights the trinitarian positions of Tertullian and Hippolytus. Origen and Augustine are treated well; without them Greek East and Latin West are inexplicable. S. warns against modern critical studies and texts dependent upon Origen's opponents, and he favors the new editions of the De principiis which are not. He cuts through the fat of Augustinian scholarship to bone and sinew.

Nicaea is the turning point. Athanasius and Hilary are the Eastern and Western builders of what becomes a consensus, while later all three Cappadocians and Amphilochius work to create terminology that moves the debate forward. Further development comes in the great Christological traditions of Antioch, Alexandria and Rome. For S., Chalcedon refocuses Christology; modern research on Neo-Chalcedonians closes the treatment. A chapter entitled "Retrospect and Prospect" completes the frame and returns to the baptismal center of Christian faith first expressed by the apostle Paul.

There are strengths that are weaknesses. (1) The bibliography is European, deep and selective into the 1990s, but introducing patristics without Robert Grant is odd. African and Asian studies must be included, particularly in our religiously pluralistic modern world that so interests S. (2) A look at traditions neither Latin nor Greek is welcome but fuzzy. Aphraates, the Syriac writer, is "archaic" only if philosophical developments in the Graeco-Roman world are the norm; in his context, he is penetrating. The Persian Church at the Council of Seleucia in 410 accepted a creed they thought was universal, but it was not the Nicene. (3) The careful progression toward Nicaea up through Chalcedon's interpreters is well done but dependent upon a particular perspective. The Eastern Orthodox do not view the filioque clause as a logical progression from an implicit confession. In his Theology and Identity, Kwame Bediako sees second-century Christianity as most helpful for his situation in contemporary Africa.

There are mistakes. (1) Chapter 11, "The Spirituality of the Imperial Church," exhibits European state-church blindness. Constantine freed the faithful from the threat of persecution, but establishment suborned Christian faith and practice. The Nicene-Chalcedonian center of Christology does not hold because of state support, but because of its reception by the churches. Without a clear sense of "church," imperial colonial expansion of Christianity is difficult to criticize at its root, let alone its 16th- or 19th-century catastrophic branches. (2) The "proper" Antiochene school is not a late fourth-century development; Eustathius and Diodore both saw that Arius had not given enough attention to
Jesus’ inner life. Antiochenes knew Apollinarius was wrong well before Alexandrians or Cappadocians because they saw in his Christology Arian error. (3) Monophysites and Nestorians need more sensitive treatment. Those who honor Cyril through his Apollinarian formulas and those who honor Nestorius through Theodore of Mopsuestia live as churches today. They have persisted in an Islamic context and deserve nuanced consideration, particularly in light of growing persecution.

Buy this translation for yourself, your pastor, and some modern theologian you think is salvageable.

Emmanuel School of Religion
Johnson City, Tenn.

FREDERICK W. NORRIS

INITIATION À SAINT THOMAS D'AQUIN: SA PERSONNE ET SON OEUVRE.

One of the paradoxes of the post-conciliar period is that, despite the rapid decline which Vatican II brought to the neo-scholastic monopoly on theology, after the 700th anniversary of Aquinas’s death in 1974 abundant new resources and studies have appeared. These range from the anniversary letter of Pope Paul VI, Lumen ecclesiae, to the IBM Index Thomisticus. Otto Pesch speaks of books and articles on Aquinas “sprouting up like mushrooms” in recent years. One thinks of Pesch’s own publications, particularly his Thomas von Aquin, essays by Walter Principe, Albert Patfoort’s Clés à la théologie de Thomas d’Aquin, and the many volumes from various congresses, particularly the more than 50 volumes of the Studi TomisticL. And most recently a bibliography of the last two decades has appeared, Richard Ingardia’s Thomas Aquinas: International Bibliography, 1977–1990 (Bowling Green, 1993). Torrell’s book is the crown of recent research into Aquinas. Coming in the 1990s, it shows how greatly the 20th century has expanded the knowledge of Aquinas’s thought and medieval milieu through the work of so many reaching from Martin Grabmann to Torrell.

T.’s volume (anticipated by a summary published as “Thomas d’Aquin” in the Dictionnaire de spiritualité) is, as he describes it, a guide to or an exposition of the person and the work. Experts will decide to what extent this book replaces J. A. Weisheipl’s Friar Thomas d’Aquino. With painstaking scholarship T. offers his own opinions on hundreds of technical problems of biography, chronology, and of the context and purpose for all the writings. He devotes more time to Aquinas’s theology and to Aquinas’s life in the midst of a religious world than did Weisheipl whose perspective was that of history and of the philosophy of science. T.’s chosen pattern is the chronology of the life joined to a consideration of the works composed during the various periods. Up-to-date research concerning a myriad of issues ranging from the nature of the controversy over religious life to the purpose of
the commentaries on Aristotle is offered. It is clear that this book is the result of decades of careful reading and annotation; it is the work of a special career including membership on the Leonine Commission and university professor; it is the work of a scholar who is interested in meticulous discussions over chronology but also in the human side of Aquinas's years of intense labor.

The chapters on the life and works are followed by two on the controversies in the years immediately after Aquinas's death, and on the process leading to canonization. Few references are made to the history of Thomism. A chronology leads to two addenda written by a co-worker Gilles Emery, O.P.: a catalogue of all the writings of Aquinas (including some designated as inauthentic) in terms of manuscript witnesses, published texts in Latin, and French translations; and a bibliography which can lay some claim to being international.

Typical of the riches of the books is its seventh chapter. Set between the complex history of the Summa contra gentiles and the return to Italy, and the inception of the Summa theologicae in Rome is a treatment of the "Sojourn at Orvieto." In these pages we learn about Aquinas's involvement in provincial meetings and his activity of priroral lector, and about his commenting on Job and the composition of the study requested by the pope of ecumenical issues between East and West. Interesting minor studies on philosophy and canon law are first considered exhaustively so that more space can be given to two interesting and individualistic works, the liturgical office for the Feast of Corpus Christi, and the Gospel commentary drawn from patristic sources, the Catena Aurea.

T.'s volume offers a kind of tour or synthesis of the most recent and most perduring of research in Aquinas: P.-M. Gy on the Feast of Corpus Christi, P.-M. Gils on Aquinas's writing of texts, Leonard Boyle on the origins of the Summa theologicae, René Gauthier on the Summa contra gentiles. But this is not to imply that the work is only a compendium, for in both details and overview T. gives his own insights and resolutions.

T.'s perspective includes both that of historian and of theologian. Theology appears in T.'s pages on the profession of the university professor and on the purposes of the many writings. But it also surfaces in rather original considerations of Aquinas as a preacher, as the author of a theology which is also in modern terms a spirituality, and as a religious poet. T.'s is the difficult task of discerning in the various early biographers of Aquinas, each at their own distance from him, what is report and what is embellishment. Perhaps here he is too respectful; his critical sense at first limits their elaborations, but then he seems to admit some reports for the sake not of historical events but as indications of a general but unsupported biographical atmosphere.

While T. disagrees with other scholars in this century on no small number of points, his approach is never demeaning; he judiciously shifts their opinions, learns from each, and then chooses his own res-
olution. In the extensive collation of sources, in the breadth of historical and theological perspective, in the tranquil balance of opinion, his work resembles its subject, the person and work of Thomas Aquinas.

University of Notre Dame  THOMAS F. O'MEARA, O.P.


Histories of theology continue to skip from late-medieval scholasticism to Luther and other Reformers, bypassing the achievements of Renaissance Humanists like Lorenzo Valla and especially Erasmus, except for possibly mentioning their pioneering work in textual and historical criticism. The tradition of contemptuous dismissal of Erasmus as a theologian began with Luther in 1525 on the Protestant side and became even more devastatingly operative among Catholics when his opera omnia were placed on the Roman Index by the fanatical Pope Paul IV in 1559. For the past 30 years scholars on both sides of the Atlantic have been discovering the depths of Erasmus's many writings on ministry, piety, and theological method. If it is true that Vatican Council II was an “Erasmian Council” in its basic themes and style, as several scholars have proposed, then Erasmus deserves more attention from theologians than he has been receiving, and the history of theology needs to make room for him.

H.'s book deals in essence with Erasmus's theological method, the heart of the matter. Its basic thesis is that, like Valla before him, Erasmus wanted to replace the dialectical theology of the scholastics with the “ancient and authentic” theology of the Fathers, based not on dialectics but on rhetoric. Erasmus is the culmination of the theologia rhetorica that began with the Italian Humanists, first studied in depth by Charles Trinkaus 25 years ago. H. tries to show that Erasmus, one of the greatest philologists who ever lived, was much more than a philologist, that in fact he created a coherent theological system.

H.'s starting point is Erasmus's biblical hermeneutic, which entails an analysis of his understanding of metaphorical language, especially as it relates to the “allegorical” sense of Scripture where Erasmus applies his Christological and ecclesiological insights. Important though allegory was for Erasmus, it has usually been undervalued by his commentators. This makes H.'s treatment particularly valuable. He summarizes his thesis: “To put it simply, [Erasmus] abandoned the speculation on metaphysical problems in favour of understanding metaphorical language” (8).

Almost as important is H.'s treatment of “accommodation,” another leitmotif, and the relationship, beautifully described, between the “moral innocence” required in the interpreter and the puritas of the biblical text itself (89–93). Moreover, H. shows, as have so many recent scholars, that Erasmus's Christ is not the moral exemplar of the
Imitatio Christi, as is still so often alleged, but the powerful Word and Redeemer of the Johannine and Pauline texts.

The final chapters describe how certain principles and figures of rhetoric (e.g. inventio, elocutio, loci communes, and prudentia) operate in Erasmus's synthesis and method of interpretation and then how they relate especially to the ministry of preaching. H. draws much of his material here from Erasmus's treatise on method, Ratio verae theologiae, and from his massive and ground-breaking treatise on preaching, the Ecclesiastes, by far his longest and his last major work. Although H. is thoroughly familiar with all of Erasmus's writings pertinent to his subject, he uses these two works most consistently as his touchstones.

This is an important book on an important subject, with which I am in substantial agreement. The prose is dense and abstract, on occasion clouding rather than clarifying the point at issue. I sometimes felt that H. left Erasmus in the dust to engage in theoretical elaboration beyond what the text allowed. I felt perhaps the most uneasiness in H.'s failure to give rhetoric itself a firm definition by relating it clearly and foremost to oratory and the speech-act. Erasmus often referred to himself as a grammaticus, but never (I believe?) as a rhetor. The traditional task of the “grammarius” in classical times was textual interpretation especially of poetry, which led to the development of “allegory.” No doubt, rhetoric at least in its secondary senses powerfully influenced Erasmus's method, and grammar and rhetoric at some point melded into one another, but I wonder whether he might not just as aptly be called a “grammatical theologian” or even “poetic theologian” as a "rhetorical theologian"? This may sound like a lis verborum, but I think it has important implications, about which I have written elsewhere and that are too complicated to discuss here.

Weston Jesuit School of Theology

JOHN W. O'MALLEY, S.J.


The second volume of Norton's large-scale project is actually about the history of the Bible in England, with a primary but not exclusive focus upon how English and American writers and readers responded to the Bible as a literary text. While there are some substantive discussions of continental figures like Herder, Strauss, Renan, and Schweitzer, they appear almost exclusively in terms of their influence upon English thinking. Even with this strict limit, N.'s topic is far too broad for his two substantial volumes, and his approach ultimately is to consider a series of themes and issues of recurring importance (“ways of thinking are perennial,” he notes [435]), developing some of them at length (he is very interested in the evolving understanding of Hebrew poetical forms and their use of parallelism), and pointing only
quickly to others (his discussion of Blake perhaps wisely devotes only a page to the endless complexities of the Bible's influence upon the prophetic works).

An enormous amount of work has gone into the writing of this book (N.'s working bibliography for 20th-century sources alone contained nearly 1500 items), and one of his substantive contributions is to locate books and ideas within a broad historical perspective. With remarkable patience he corrects the eager assertions of novelty which introduce Alter and Kermode's *The Literary Guide to the Bible* (1987), pointing out how some of their interpretive strategies are indeed centuries old. This same encompassing erudition permits N. to throw emphasis upon writers of earlier centuries like Robert Lowth (1710–1787) who may be unfamiliar to many of his readers.

At the heart of N.'s second volume is the ongoing history of the King James Bible. He begins with early-18th-century objections to that translation which find it "so old, the words ... so obsolete, the orthography so bad . . . that most people will not be at the pains of reading [it] ..." (3). He traces the rising reputation of the KJB through the late 18th century, with its increasing appreciation of the biblical sublime, to the climactic adoration of the KJB among the Romantics and Victorians, and then on to the downward turn of the mid-20th century, when objections, primarily from clergy desperate at tiny congregations incapable of even reading the KJB aloud with any comprehension, led to the widely disputed appearance of the New English Bible and other "modern" translations. N.'s admiration for the beauties of Jacobean prose make him openly critical of both the more accurate late-19th-century RSV and the colloquial NEB, and the final, rueful conclusion to his discussion of the problems of translating afresh the most widely read book in the language is this: "No Bible can become a classic if it is not perpetually and inescapably encountered by all of us. It was the KJB's good fortune to be inescapable for centuries . . ." (436). What is left out, but clearly implied, is that this collective belief no longer exists, and with its passing goes any real possibility for a replication of the KJB's historically unique success.

N. is never content simply to report the shifts and reversals of intellectual history; he actively engages in the arguments he is summarizing and frequently he joins in the dispute. Having reviewed, e.g., L. C. Knights' 1933 essay "How Many Children Had Lady Macbeth?" and its insistence upon the distinction between historical and fictional characters, N. goes on to point out that in the root character of their textual formulation the four Gospels implicitly attempt to "reveal or preserve a particular body of truth that is not in them but only indicated by them." Hence their "literary form is anti-fictional" (377). N.'s conclusion is more powerful and more suggestive than the essay which inspires it, and this is by no means the only moment where the reader feels that it is this historian of ideas who has some of the best ideas to offer.

*Georgetown University*  
**JOHN PFORDRESHER**

This densely written book considers the phenomenon of anti-Jesuitism in 19th-century France as a case study in conspiracy theory. Similar studies can be done about anti-Semitism or Masonic conspiracy. The common denominator would be that they have little or no relation to the living, breathing Jesuits or Jews or Freemasons who lived during the period studied. Those living embodiments of the species are curiously irrelevant to those who indulge their paranoia about imagined groups of conspirators. Cubitt amply demonstrates this, using the Jesuits as an example.

"Jesuits" in this context need not be from the 19th century; any example from the past will do. Nor must the examples be French, and so Escobar and Busenbaum are adduced as well as Lavalette and Moullet. Jesuits in general, of any time or clime, are presumed to be advocates of lèse-majesté and regicide, homicide and parricide, perjury and falsehood, idolatry, magic and astrology among other perversions. A standardized "record of intrigue and criminality which passed, in anti-Jesuit eyes, for Jesuit history had long since been compiled and set in the stone of the anti-Jesuit myth. Jesuits were guilty in the assassinations and attempted assassinations of French kings, in England's Gunpowder Plot, for the revocation of the Edict of Nantes and the persecution of the Jansenists of Port-Royal, not to mention the "misbehaviour of Jesuit missionaries in the Indies, the Orient and Latin America."

C. points out the "mythical character" of the great majority of these allegations, but no matter, they made up the Jesuit "criminal record" about which readers wanted to hear, whether the tales were of shady commercial and industrial activity, or of political interference, or of a morally destructive theological approach. In one relatively rare example drawn from the contemporary scene, eager readers were informed that "in California the Society has gold-mines; and a whole street in San Francisco has become her property. It is there that she does her best lending business, at 30, 40, 50, 100, 200 per cent." Metaphors were not complimentary: Jesuits regularly were accused of casting entangling nets; they were likened to reptiles, beasts of prey, insects, chameleons, spiders, and wood-lice. The Society was an "octopus" or a "hydra."

The chief source of this all-out assault in the middle years of the century was the prestigious Collège de France, and the chief attackers were the distinguished historians, Jules Michelet (1798–1874) and Edgar Quinet (1803–1875), joined by the novelist Eugene Sue (1804–1857) with his depiction of Jesuit intrigue in The Wandering Jew. For Michelet and Quinet it was "la guerre aux jésuites," while Sue battled in them a "secret society bent on world domination by all available means." On the 19th-century French politico-religious scene, the battle lines were seen as drawn between the Jesuits' ultramontanism and
intolerance and the toleration and feeling for universal religion that were the legacy of the French Revolution, between Jesuit insincerity, deviousness, and artificiality and Revolutionary truth, authenticty, and spontaneity.

The chief propagators of the Jesuit myth were from the left, the heirs in the never-ending schism that has divided France since the Revolution, but their efforts were applauded and, where possible, supported by the avatars of the right, descendants of political Gallicanism and religious Jansenism. For them, and for many of the moderate leftists, if for differing reasons, the Jesuits were what was wrong with the Church of France. They suffered as surrogates and scapegoats for the reactionary conservatism of the Roman Church.

C. has written a good study of the conspiracy-theory mentality that can so easily grip the uncertain, whether in church or state, even today.

St. Peter's College, Jersey City

James Hennessey, S.J.


The German theologian Erik Peterson (1890–1960) is perhaps better known to specialists in Christian origins than to most readers of this journal. That is unfortunate. Though the Catholic context of his work was the post-World War I Catholic revival, hence even earlier than the patristics-based renewal of the nouvelle théologie (which he helped inspire), Peterson’s work has suggestive and unexpected connections with the contemporary situation, though these are not much explored by the present book.

Peterson was educated in the historical and comparative methods fostered by the dominant liberal Protestantism, just prior to the neo-orthodox revanche, whose Kierkegaardian inspiration appealed strongly to him. Doubts about the dogmatic viability even of neo-orthodoxy eventually led him to leave the Lutheran Church and become a Roman Catholic in 1930. Feeling compelled to resign his professorship on the Evangelical faculty at Bonn, he then moved to Italy, where he married and raised a family and pursued a productive scholarly life, even though he did not receive a formal academic appointment until 1948. He died in 1960.

His published work is of two types: short scholarly articles on early Christianity, Judaism, and gnosticism, many of which have been reprinted as Frühkirche, Judentum, und Gnosis (1959); and sharply written essays and monographs on broader theological topics (political theology, Jewish-Christian relations, angelology, martyrdom, dogmatic theology, etc.), though even these are highly focused studies, often cast as exegetical exercises. Several of them have been reprinted as Theologische Traktate (1951). They document a restless, even mercurial religious sensibility, which was tempered by Peterson’s rigorous
Nichtweiss's daunting book, which originated as a Freiburg dissertation, is an intellectual biography devoted to Peterson's education, personal and professional relationships, and the contexts, contents, and critical reception of his major publications. Peterson's relationship with Barth and dialectical theology is treated exhaustively; N. argues that the critical exchanges between the two during the twenties eventually left their mark on the *Church Dogmatics*. Particularly illuminating to this reviewer is the treatment of Peterson's complex connection with the controversial Catholic jurist and sometime Nazi sympathizer, Carl Schmitt. Here N. makes an important contribution to the still-lively debate inspired by Peterson's celebrated claim about the impossibility of a Christian political theology, which he made in the book *Der Monotheismus als politisches Problem* (1935).

This is the first truly comprehensive study of Peterson's life and work, though an important resource is still the volume of essays edited by Alfred Schindler, *Monotheismus als politisches Problem? Erik Peterson und die Kritik der politischen Theologie* (1978). Besides his published works N. had access to Peterson's literary remains in Turin. These included a mass of notes, diaries, and the manuscripts of his university lectures from the twenties. In addition she located and examined large numbers of Peterson's letters to Barth, Schmitt, Anne Reinach, the Benedictine monk-scholars Odo Casel and Thomas Michels, and others, which taken together provide an almost seamless and vivid record of his life after 1918. N. has given us a massively detailed reconstruction of Peterson's life and work, skillfully set against the religious, philosophical, political, and cultural ferment of the crisis of the Weimar Republic and the onset of National Socialism. We are in her debt.

*University of St. Thomas, St. Paul*  

Michael J. Hollerich


Dorothy Day is known as foundress of *The Catholic Worker*, activist for disarmament, and provider for the hungry and the homeless. Merriman presents the contemplative and intellectual values that animated her work. Day is seen as a voracious reader, a philosopher, and a woman hungry for prayer. As a young girl, she was taken by the New Testament, the Psalms, and *The Imitation of Christ*—"a book that followed me through my days." But she was also reading Dostoevsky, Tolstoy, Upton Sinclair, and Jack London. She renounced her Episcopal faith, and at eighteen was interviewing Trotsky and writing for Socialist and radical journals; she talked into the night with artists and anarchists, traveled, married, and had two common-law marriages
and one abortion. But she began attending daily Mass, praying the Lord's Prayer while walking the streets, and wondered whether she believed in God.

After becoming Catholic in 1927, she struggled to integrate religion with the social ideals she had shared with her radical and anti-religious friends. In late 1932 she met Peter Maurin, a former Christian Brother much taken with the Benedictine ideal. He provided the vision that allowed her to begin her life's work. Together they founded *The Catholic Worker* in order to build a new civilization based on "cult, culture, and cultivation." Day continued to read and pray: "Yes, reading is prayer—it is searching for light on the terrible problems of the day." She found answers in the New Testament, the papal encyclicals, the novels of Dostoevsky and Tolstoy, the personalist philosophy of Emmanuel Mounier, and the humanism of Jacques Maritain. From St. Benedict she learned hospitality and became a Benedictine Oblate. For almost forty years, she made retreats according to the austere and controversial ideals of Onesimus Lacouture, S.J. Her column in *The Catholic Worker* told of the struggle to understand the gospel in difficult times. Most of her readers lacked her courage and commitment, but they found the light they could bear.

Day studied the saints and has been considered a saint herself, but she described herself, with humor, as "only some aging lady who is religiously obsessed." The present work brings Day to life. She is shown to be more than an heroic ideal; she was a complete and passionate person: "Thank you, Lord, for everything, but friendship especially." By her reading, prayer, and retreats, she drew from the life of the Church, while her own life and writing shaped the Church. M.'s easy prose conceals the research on which the present work is based; this is evident only in the 80 pages of notes that evaluate the letters, interviews, and abundant sources. Day was known for her activism; the present book considers her contemplation. Still, some indication of her activities would help us get the full picture. This well-written book reminds us that the history of the Church is shaped by the saints, and there are few Americans who have embodied sanctity for us as has Dorothy Day.

*Georgetown University*  
**THOMAS M. KING, S.J.**


Liddy has written an important book on Lonergan. It details the young Lonergan's journey to the intellectual conversion he experienced in the early 1930s, and the expressions of that conversion in the following two decades, up to and including the writing of *Insight*. The book's subtitle seems to emphasize the last of these, i.e. the expression. Perhaps the first and most important half of the book, on Lonergan's
own experience, would have been more sharply highlighted had the title of the pivotal seventh chapter, "Lonergan's Intellectual Conversion," been used for the subtitle. This is what the book is really about. Though the second half is impressive in its research and execution, it is essentially a history of "intellectual conversion" in Lonergan's writings from his Gratia Operans dissertation to Insight. The first half, in contrast, is an intellectual biography which makes it clear that the Lonergan who taught and wrote about intellectual conversion as a professor and author had as a student experienced such a conversion himself after an arduous struggle of many years. The explication of this struggle is the book's special contribution.

Here we can only note key points on the itinerary of a journey that Liddy covers in satisfying depth. After a few pages on Lonergan's youthful life and education in Canada, Liddy follows Lonergan to Heythrop College in England for his Jesuit philosophical studies (1926–1929). Suarezian scholasticism was the order of the day, and Lonergan found it unacceptable. What influenced him during these years was Newman's Grammar of Assent, with its focus on experience. At this point Lonergan considered himself a "nominalist." Back in Canada for a period of teaching at Loyola College in Montreal, Lonergan read the early dialogues of Plato, in which he appreciated the methodology of questioning and the normativeness of intelligence. Archival fragments from the period show Lonergan critiquing Aristotle's misconception of Plato's Ideas. Then, in the summer of 1933, before going off to study theology in Rome, Lonergan took up Augustine's early dialogues, written in 386 in the wake of his conversion. Through Augustine, whom he found "psychologically exact," Lonergan was able to break from nominalism, but also feared that he was becoming an idealist. Of the many Augustinian influences on Lonergan, Liddy stresses Augustine's Veritas, which Lonergan will understand as the transcendental a priori of Truth.

So far, we have noted Lonergan's focus on Newman, Plato, and Augustine. What about Aquinas and Aristotle? Only after he arrived for his theological studies at the Gregorian University in Rome (1933–1937) did Lonergan begin to take them seriously. It was probably the work of the Gregorian's Jesuit philosopher Peter Hoenen, recovering Aquinas' act of understanding from behind the Scotist scholastic tradition, that led Lonergan to study the Summa theologiae and realize that St. Thomas was "not nearly as bad as he is painted." At the same time a fellow Jesuit student introduced Lonergan to Belgian Jesuit Joseph Maréchal's interpretation of Aquinas, from which Lonergan learned that knowing is discursive (not intuitive) and that it is realized in affirmation. How all the elements of his intellectual development came together is addressed by Lonergan in a 1935 letter to his Jesuit superior in Canada. There he asserted that the "current interpretation of St. Thomas is a consistent misinterpretation," and that he could prove it out of St. Thomas himself. (This remarkable letter is just one of many contemporary sources used by Liddy, along with Lonergan's
later autobiographical reflections.) Before long, Lonergan would be calling himself a Thomist, especially after lectures on the *unicum esse in Christo* in Jesuit Bernard Leeming's Christology course (1935–1936) convinced him of the real distinction between essence and existence. Some ten years after beginning his study of philosophy, Lonergan had finally realized an intellectual conversion to critical realism. During his doctoral studies in theology (1938–1940) he began expressing and expanding that decisive experience, first in historical studies and later in a focus on scientific method.

Lonergan's achievement was the result of a personal and painful struggle. Perhaps my image of journey (or Liddy's "way") is misleading. At the time it must have seemed more like endless wandering than goal-oriented journeying. There was no map, no preset destination; he had to find his own way, without knowing where he would end up. This is worlds apart from reading and understanding *Method in Theology*—or even *Insight!* Readers of Liddy should be less likely to find in Lonergan's expression of intellectual conversion a measure of others' achievements and more likely to find in his experience of struggle toward conversion an inspiration to set out and find their own ways in yet unchartered waters.

Villanova University  
WALTER E. CONN


Containing previously published articles, Tang and Wiest's book offers only two original essays, each by the editors. Disclaiming any one perspective on the Church in China today, the editors have opted wisely for different perspectives which receive treatment in three sections. A historical part links some of the major issues which confront Chinese Catholics, such as religious freedom, the style of church leadership, the underground church, and theological-canonical questions. Most of the essays in Part 2 come from the "church above ground" and the "underground church," and here one realizes the conflicting human complexities facing the Church in China today. If one reads complexity as the text for the Church in China, then long-standing emotional loyalties can be read as the subtext. The essays in Part 3 speculate on the future of the Church in China.

The book has three shortcomings. It lacks an essay on what the Chinese government says and what it actually does regarding religion. The essay on Hong Kong is too short, and next to nothing appears about the Church in Taiwan. Despite the complexities facing the
Church in China, and despite the Chinese government’s diplomatic and martial strategy of calculated ambiguity, the Church as portrayed in this book suffers, but is very much alive.

Hunter and Chan’s book on Protestantism in China takes religion seriously as an important renewing force in a nation’s cultural, economic, and political life. Scholarly, well-documented, analytical, and written as the result of extensive fieldwork, this is the most comprehensive work on contemporary Protestantism in China. Like T. and W. in their treatment of Catholicism, but more in detail, H. and C. examine Protestantism from various perspectives: its history, social and political contexts, the variety of its communities, and its relationship to Chinese culture. The authors also devote one chapter to Buddhism and Catholicism. In this book readers will receive a clear picture on the relationship between Chinese law and religious policy, as well as a fascinating narrative on Chinese folk religion and its Christian indigenization. The authors observe that, lacking a hierarchical structure, Protestantism’s identity is more diffuse, but more adaptable to Chinese culture, whereas Catholicism, with its hierarchical structure, has a more centered identity but remains less adaptable to Chinese culture. Both Protestants and Catholics appear to follow the government’s policy on birth control, a policy which actively promotes contraception and easily permits abortion. That these latter issues have not been addressed in greater detail remains a shortcoming of the book.

Both of these books provide good introductions to contemporary Catholicism and Protestantism in China; they also refute a gratuitous assumption of Marxist-Leninist-Mao Zedong thought that with the rise and eventual triumph of the socialist state, religion would cease to exist because there would be no need for it. The two books hint at, but do not sufficiently challenge, another gratuitous assumption of politically correct Chinese thought, that whatever changes occur in China will be made on China’s own terms. Some claim that as many as sixty million Christians live in China today, and to Protestantism, twenty thousand Chinese convert daily. Exaggerations, perhaps, but as H. and C. assert, a “Christianity fever” exists in China. Religion also has Chinese officials worried. On June 4, 1994, five years after the Tiananmen Square massacre, Prime Minister Li Peng signed into law a new prison expansion project—thirty new penitentiaries every year until 2000—designed particularly to crush political and religious dissidents.

The rise of religion does not constitute the only element whereby Maoist discourse has lost its hegemony. Cracks continue to widen in the great wall of the United Front. Dr. Li Zhishui, Mao’s personal physician, stated in his recent biography, The Private Life of Chairman Mao, that Mao succeeded in passing himself off as a revolutionary deity not because of any genius on his part, but because he excelled more than his apparatchiks at being a ruthless and skilled manipulator of his own perversely twisted narcissistic canard that he was the apotheosis of Chinese history. Maoist discourse and the United Front
have not been able to stifle art, some of compelling depth and tragic beauty like Chen Kaige's *Yellow Earth*, *King of the Children*, and *Farewell My Concubine*, worldwide-acclaimed films critical of China's authoritarian tradition. Utopian absolutes crafted during the failed great leap forward and Cultural Revolution movements have been eroded by technology. Fax machines and satellite dishes prove that the ideological certitudes of a closed system exhaust neither the complexities of modernization nor transcendence. Beijing's bureaucrats thought that they could control China's population growth by technology, but only recently they banned the sex-screening of fetuses by ultrasound machines because of a threatening imbalance in the ratio of men to women. Commentators have pointed out that there exists a climate of self-doubt in China, and one has even suggested that because of Deng Xiaping's internal reforms, Chinese leaders have learned to negotiate and compromise among themselves, thus ending the vicious cycle of vengeful power plays.

The two books under review do not address or even mention all of the above or similar issues, but they should have. Works on religion in China tend to be too parochial in focus and scope; the aroma of sacristy or chancel dust is much too strong. Both books are good, but incomplete. Writers on religion in China would give a better understanding of Chinese society if they crossed over into other fields, particularly art, film, music, and literature, to show how a considerable number of post-Mao Chinese today struggle to understand and to create those symbols of transcendence for which they deeply hunger. Many Chinese know that beyond the soul-enervating politicized tribalism of *homo sinicus maoensis* there exists a new extended international family not locked in cement by blood and jingoism, but one which preserves history and yet does not become entombed by it. The issue of China-Vatican diplomacy also needs addressing in depth. China's negotiators are tough, and so are the Vatican's, and with good reason, because the fundamental human right of religious freedom is at stake. In the history of church-state relations China has a long memory, but the Church has a longer one. A greater power exists than the one which comes from a gun barrel. Their subject being religion, both books, however, address an important lacuna in China scholarship, a subject about which most China scholars have little knowledge, or which they trivialize or benignly neglect.

*Milwaukee, Wisconsin*  

*Peter Fleming, S.J.*


This philosophical inquiry, based on extensive reading and mature reflection, is a valuable contribution to the typology of faith. It is precise in its goals, orderly in its arrangement, and measured in its judgments.
The book consists of an introduction, two principal parts, and a conclusion. Part 1, dealing with models of faith, presents six thematic models: faith as a personal relationship with a revered or trusted authority; faith as belief in propositions that are not evidently true; faith as a comprehensive attitude that radically changes the subject’s total horizon; faith as a feeling of serenity and confidence in oneself; faith as wholehearted devotion to a way of life; faith as hope, that is, desire and expectation for a supreme but improbable good.

In Part 2, S. analyzes conceptions of faith that exemplify, more or less purely and adequately, the six models. Seven conceptions are proposed. The first is a Thomistic theory, as presented by Josef Pieper; the second is a Calvinist view, expounded by Victor A. Shepherd; the third is a Lutheran conception, found in Gustaf Aulén. All three of these are Christian conceptions exemplifying the personal-relationship model, although they combine this with elements of the belief, attitude, and devotion models.

In his last four examples S. depicts non-Christian conceptions. The fourth, based on the contemporary American philosopher James Muyskens, is an almost paradigmatic instance of the model of faith as hope, except that Muyskens denies that hope involves firm expectation. As his fifth example S. takes a tripartite Hindu conception set forth by Satchidananda K. Murty, in which faith appears as a combination of belief, devotion, and confidence (a combination that S. finds incoherent, insofar as the confidence model precludes relationships to an external authority). Sixth, S. analyzes a Japanese Shin Buddhist conception of faith (shinjin) that paradoxically integrates aspects of the personal relationship, attitude, and confidence models. The last example, from Korean Mahayana Buddhism, depicts faith (choshin) as confidence unaccompanied by any personal relationship to another or by articles of belief.

In a brief conclusion S. discusses several deviant versions that do not fit into his models—for example, the existential model (Kierkegaard, Buber, and others) and the “agapeistic” model set forth by R. B. Braithwaite. S. also discusses the unity of faith. He contends that the concept of faith, while lacking univocal or categorical unity, has the unity of an analogy or family. He does not propose any general definition of faith, although it would seem that an analogous concept should be definable. S.’s concept, since it attempts to make room for “nondual” theories that deny any personal relationship to another, verges on the equivocal. S. admits the difficulty of deciding whether Buddhist terms such as shinjin and choshin ought to be translated by our word “faith.”

S.’s typology is clear and useful as it stands. No two authors will construct exactly the same typology. My own would differ in some respects from his. I would not make a separate category of “personal relationship,” since such relationships enter into a great variety of models, including those that emphasize belief in authority, trust in a Savior (confidence), obedience to a higher power (attitude), and hope in
promised blessings. In his exposition of the belief model, S. speaks too much as though the object of belief had to be a proposition—a view that I find too restrictive. Also, S. repeatedly describes confidence as though it necessarily meant self-confidence rather than confidence in God or in a divine messenger. When explaining the hope model, S. writes as though hope had to be grounded in desire alone. The classical theologians, recognizing the intimate connection between faith and hope, grounded hope not only in desire but in the signs that God has given of his redemptive purpose. S. in my opinion treats hope too much in isolation from belief and trust. Seeking to keep sharp distinctions between the models, he minimizes the interlocking.

Catholic readers may regret certain omissions. The attitude model would have furnished an occasion to discuss transcendental theology, and the devotion model (which I would prefer to call a commitment model) could have been appropriately illustrated by liberation theology. In S.'s defense it may be said that he writes not as a theologian but as a philosopher. He is sparing in his examples from Christian theology since he wishes to give sufficient attention to non-Christian conceptions. These other conceptions should be of interest not only to philosophers but also to theologians. Even if they do not measure up to the Christian theological definition of faith, they suggest themes that could enrich Christian theology.

While this work does not lend itself to classroom use as a theological textbook, it situates the theology of faith in a broad philosophical context. It clearly presents the principal issues and options that must be addressed in any serious theology of faith. S. writes with great care and deliberation. He is logical and consistent, and commendably objective in his assessments of the various models and conceptions.

Fordham University

AVERY DULLES, S.J.


Hefner is Professor of Systematic Theology at the Lutheran School of Theology at Chicago. He is also Director of the Chicago Center for Religion and Science, and Editor-in-chief of Zygon: Journal of Religion and Science. This work is the fruit of an effort "to make sense of traditional Christian faith in the context of the welter of contemporary knowledge and experience ... [It] aims at a theological anthropology in the light of the natural sciences" (xiii). The aim of the book is "to challenge. I make no other claim, and I ask that it be judged by the criteria pertinent to such an aim" (xv). The central question of the book is "Who are we human beings and what are we here for?" (4).

H. proposes an answer to this question in a theological theory that grows out of history, science, and experience. The theory is theological because it deals with ultimate issues. It proposes that human being is
a created co-creator. As created, human being is the fruit of the natural evolutionary process. Within this process human being inherits genes and culture, both of which belong to nature. Religion is part of the adaptive processes of culture, enabling the human being to understand and act in the world, taking responsibility for actions and justifying them. H. proposes “the audacious conjecture” that between 100,000 and 20,000 years ago a crisis overtook humanity which was successfully surmounted through religion, i.e. myth, ritual, and appropriate praxis. He suggests that the current crisis challenging human being requires us to revitalize myth, ritual, and praxis in the light of scientific development.

As co-creator, human being is supposed to act within nature, as kin to nature, to further the wholesome development of nature. The present crisis arises from the threatened collapse of a beneficent relationship between human being and nature. Instead of furthering nature, the overlay of human activity causes pollution, the destruction of natural resources, the corruption of the environment, war, etc. All this threatens not only the world around us but also our own survival within nature. “Calamity is the prospect” (278).

To meet this crisis we need all the resources we can gather. The Christian tradition can make a positive contribution through its traditions concerning God, human dignity, sin, grace, Christ and redemption—though all these will need new interpretation offered in loyalty to the central message. Revelation, however, “happens within nature, and ... it is received, understood, and interpreted through the thoroughly natural structures of a natural animal, Homo sapiens” (41).

Judged precisely as offering a challenge, this book succeeds admirably. It seems to me that H.’s audacious conjecture about primitive humanity coincides well with the emergence of the human sense of transcendence. At some point in human evolution it became possible for the emergent being to reflect upon itself and its place in a total scheme of things, and to conceive, at least implicitly, a source and goal beyond the world given in immediate experience. To express this sense of transcendence in imaginative discourse human being constructed myths. To relate to the content of these myths, human being devised ritual. To live out the meaning of this ritual an appropriate praxis was adopted. Without this elaboration of myth, ritual, and praxis human being would lack the inner sense of identity and worth required to live and work in the surrounding world in kinship with it and in responsibility for it and for oneself. In other words, the emerging sense of transcendence itself provoked the crisis and likewise supplied the fundamental means of meeting it. Science has renewed this need, but has not been able to satisfy it.

However, this seems to put us in about the same position as Rahner’s “hearers of the word”: beings with a sense of transcendence toward a horizon, and waiting for some word coming from that horizon. H.’s reflection upon the human situation, it seems to this reviewer, calls
not only for a deeper awareness of our origin through evolution and our kinship with nature, but also for an understanding of revelation beyond the resources of history, evolution, and science, one that will allow the God spoken of in myth to communicate with us not only about the world of nature, but about himself and his purposes for us in a personal encounter beyond the unfolding of natural processes.

Jesuit School of Theology, Berkeley  
JOHN H. WRIGHT, S.J.


After publishing many important articles and books on the Church, Dianich here offers a valuable reflection on the too-often-neglected theme of method in ecclesiology. Its distinctive problem arises from its subject, which is at once an object of faith and the empirical reality known to everyone as “the Church.” This distinction already reveals two distinct semantic fields, not always distinguished with enough critical care; but the problem is further complicated by the need to distinguish also eschatological and confessional levels of discourse. Still further complexities arise when one recognizes that the real nature of the Reformation question De vera ecclesia concerned less the question of the “true” visible Church than the truth, the authenticity, of the visible Church. If Catholics have recovered the invisible dimensions of the Church, they have not often succeeded in integrating them into the traditional institutionally focused treatment. Finally, what precisely is the object of ecclesiology also underlies the debate about the status of church history: Is it theology or history?

After setting out these difficulties, Dianich reviews various hermeneutical instruments offered to meet them: sociological categories (society, community), figures (metaphors, symbols), and the theological category “sacrament,” none of which is found to be satisfactory. His search for a hermeneutical principle leads him, after a brief review of typologies, to propose the solution he has set out in earlier work: that of ecclesiogenesis, the event from which the Church must always arise. This he finds in 1 Jn 1:1–4, the proclamation of Jesus Christ, which is an invitation to a fellowship (koinonia) that is at once vertical and horizontal. Church-constitutive, it is also the event by which the Church has affected the world, human history.

But D. does not think that communion is the be-all and end-all of ecclesiology. After a brief history of the recovery of the term and a warning that it not be assumed to be equivalent to “community,” he carefully examines the various levels of meaning “koinonia” has in the NT. The concrete event that gives rise to koinonia, the announcement of the gospel, is then explored in the light of modern communications-theories. Turning then to the theme of “community,” D. urges as the crucial question the relation, not between communion and institution, but between the transcendent koinonia into which the announcement
introduces people and the concrete historical and collective subject through which that communion influences human history. "Communion" by itself is not adequate to address this question, and so the last chapters are devoted to a presentation of the notion of "people of God" as the only term which can comprehend and integrate the transcendent and the historical dimensions of the Church.

D. carries out his investigations, whether historical, analytical, or systematic, with great care. His range of reading is ecumenical and includes works in many languages, even works published in the U.S. One welcome development in his thought is his effort to assess the theological usefulness of various sociological categories. Here he finds much to borrow in communications-theory, but he is perhaps too negative on the help that might be derived from other social theories. One noticeable lack is any serious discussion of institutions, which he appears to take to refer only to the full apparatus of a Church, but which surely need discussion also on the level of the most primordial experiences of koinonia. The implications of his theory of ecclesiogenesis for the relation between the whole Church and the local churches and for relations among confessions also remain undeveloped.

The work can be highly recommended to anyone interested in elevating the critical and systematic level of contemporary ecclesiology. It very much deserves to be translated.

Catholic University of America

JOSEPH A. KOMONCHAK


Throughout these eleven collected essays Davis, professor emeritus of religion at Concordia University in Montreal, asks about the social role of religion after the shift from traditional culture to modernity. In this shift—from authority to freedom, from perennial truth to science, reason to rationalization, compactness to differentiation—D. believes that modernity has produced "distortions" like positivism, relativism, reductionism, and evolutionary theory as automatic progress. While religion is incompatible with these particular distortions, it has not been displaced by modernity. The resilience of religion is attributable to its two distinct species, faith and belief. (Wilfred Cantwell Smith made a similar distinction. John Dewey made this distinction using the terms "religious" and "religion"). D. thinks the role of religion in the making of society rests upon this distinction between faith and belief. And this is where his thesis becomes pleasantly nuanced.

For D., faith is human openness to reality and to the meaningfulness of life. Faith is metahistorical for this reason. Beliefs, on the other hand, are context-determined and vary with varied contexts. D. seems to be saying that a context (like modernity) cannot affect faith but can affect belief. As for belief, antecedent religious beliefs will always chal-
lenge, and be challenged by, new contexts. Hence, religious belief will challenge something that seems incompatible with it, like the aforementioned distortions of modernity. But belief will inevitably and necessarily risk real change in the process. Meanwhile religious faith is the meta-contextual constant, timely in any age.

Therefore, modernity cannot eclipse the role of religion in the making of society, because religious beliefs continue, through argument, "to form part of the patrimony of truths and values that are debated through politics" (36). The role of religious faith is even more fundamental because it serves to thwart nihilism while relativizing every existing order. We might ask if there are historical examples of faith operating socially in this way. It would appear, by his schema, that belief (not faith) is the actual solvent and relativizer of existing orders, if in fact this occurs.

Since modernity has decoupled religion and politics in the West, D. thinks religion is faced with an unprecedented opportunity to offer a permanent critique of society. In his estimation, this can only occur if religious people opt for a public piety and dissociate religion from inwardness. Here D. takes up the deprivatization thesis. Although he approaches this thesis with some novelty, he fails to show why privately held religious beliefs are of necessity incapable of coexisting with a lively socio-political commitment. Must inwardness of religious belief spell political quietism? Considering all the claims (some acrimonious) to "God's will" in contemporary religiopolitical discourse—from every spot on the political spectrum—would a union between religiousquietism and political activism be preferable to a deprivatization of religion? We should recall that the American religious right—a deprivatized religiosity—veers perilously close to theocracy.

Most of these provocative essays are quite strong, though a few are weak by comparison with the others. I was especially disappointed with the essay critiquing political radicalism, which seems to presume a literalness in utopic literature, as if late-20th-century radicalism has learned no lessons and still thinks it can create the beloved community on earth. Given D.'s Catholic background, Catholic readers will be familiar with his allusions to Blondel and Rahner, among others. Certainly a book like this can serve to generate lively discussions in graduate courses on religion and theology. It is an intelligent book for intelligent readers. D. once again makes a clear-eyed, percipient and welcomed contribution to the social-theological conversation.

Loyola Marymount University, L.A. JOSEPH H. McKENNA


Although holding divergent views of modernity and morality, neo-Kantian and neo-Aristotelian projects steer a middle course between
foundationalism and postmodern relativism in ethics. The discourse or communicative ethics of Habermas, Apel, and others stands under the long shadow of Kant, promising a potentially universalist account of morality, reflecting a procedural rationality and notion of justice that transcend and govern conflicts among competing conceptions of human flourishing. For communitarians like MacIntyre, Sandel, and Taylor, however, the liberal commitment to justice and formal procedural rules ignores the constitutive role that tradition and conceptions of the good have in any account of the justification of moral norms.

Unlike Thomas McCarthy's earlier and still unequaled work on Habermas's critical theory, Rehg offers a detailed and sympathetic exposition of discourse ethics as a moral theory, bringing the reader up to date with Habermas's central texts, "Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action" and "Justification and Application." R.'s devoted defense of discourse ethics is a liberal rejoinder to the communitarian critique of autonomy, and to the doubts raised by the ethics of care when practical argumentation is reduced to impartialist or neutrality-securing principles. The result is an impressive interpretation of discourse ethics that moves beyond traditional Kantian boundaries, reconceiving a notion of moral insight "as a process occurring in the public space defined by communication and dialogue" (78).

The "decentering" of the moral point of view reflects the close contact of both communitarian and discourse ethics with the philosophy of language, especially with Wittgenstein, and, in the case of Habermas, with Searle and Austin. Nevertheless, differences between these moral theories abound. Where communitarians focus on the ideational nature of learning of post-empirical philosophers of science, discourse ethics integrates learning with the social and institutional transformation of critical theorists. Further, though mutual understanding results from a process reminiscent of Piaget's theory of cognitive development, it does not entail a fully substantive endorsement of the other's good as with MacIntyre (81). For Habermas, languages and traditions are porous to one another, so that in the encounter with the other what is required is an empathetic understanding of the other's interpretation of needs. In a helpful parallel to Lonergan, R. points out that the intersubjective nature of insight means that in moral argumentation each participant's claim to moral objectivity is submitted to intersubjective testing; claims are necessarily open to further, pertinent questions so that insight is constituted only intersubjectively. In this way, conflicts are not solved through coercion but by reason, in the sense that "within the very structures of language use there exists a cognitive exigency to redeem one's views in discourse with others" (246).

Do conflicts over right, however, involve incommensurabilities that preclude rational formal-procedural solutions envisioned by liberal theorists? Does the intersubjective nature of insight disregard the modern distinction between moral and ethical discourse, and validate
the insistence of communitarians like Taylor that questions of right cannot be considered apart from the good? Though R. judiciously avoids the simplistic caricatures of the communitarian-liberal debate, he insists on the priority of justice or the constitutive good of rational cooperation (149). The seeming intractability of this debate is best expressed hermeneutically. On the one hand, because discourse ethics is abstracted from the communication practices of traditions, it is dependent upon conceptions of the good. On the other hand, though the universal ethic of communication cannot generate substantive conceptions of the good, it supplies the transcendental norms to govern, test, and rationally critique them. In this way, the acceptance of a modern ethic does not undermine what it means to be part of a tradition.

In a final section, R. relates discourse ethics to real social contexts—a move reflective of Hegel's critique of Kantian abstractness. In light of the feminist critique of impartialism, a distinction is made between justification discourse and application discourse. This distinction allows a universalist ethic to account for the situational particularities upon which a norm's appropriate application depends. The liberal caveat, of course, is that any application stands in reference to what a universal justification discourse counterfactually would or would not agree to (200).

Scholars sympathetic to neo-Aristotelian moral theories will not be convinced by R.'s tightly argued study. By attending to the most serious communitarian salvos, however, R. has enriched the appeal of discourse ethics to those philosophers, political theorists, and theologians who are concerned with social cooperation in an increasingly fragmented world.

Kenrick School of Theology  
St. Louis  


A thoughtful, comprehensive examination of the ethics of liberation theology. Schubeck draws his material both from the writings of liberation theologians and from extensive personal interviews with many of the theologians themselves. The question he seeks to answer is, "How coherent in its methodology and how comprehensive in its use of sources is the ethics of liberation theology?" He fashions a four-part answer to the question.

First, S. briefly traces the history of liberation theology with its distinctive sources and perspective. He then takes up those who have voiced criticism of liberation theology's ethical dimension. This brief review allows the reader to see how S.'s question is grounded in the history of liberation theology itself.

S. then offers a clear discussion of the historical development of praxis and its expansion in liberation theology. He argues that praxis conditions the method of ethics in liberation theology, transforms the
agent, and identifies the human. Social analysis builds on praxis by deepening the individual's and the group's grasp of their reality. S. shows what certain representative liberation theologians mean by social analysis and evaluates how well they do it. The three case studies of Leonardo and Clodovis Boff, José Comblin, and Ignacio Ellacuría are both interesting in themselves and serve S.'s pedagogical purpose very well.

The discussion of the sources of ethics concludes with a reflection upon Scripture and ethics. S. chooses Jorge Pixley and Gustavo Gutiérrez as exemplars of the liberation-theology biblical tradition. He examines the theologian's reasons for interpreting a particular text, the method of interpretation, the specific way each theologian uses Scripture in ethics, and, finally, he appraises that use. Once again, S.'s development of his case studies is heuristic. Although, as he says, any attempt to summarize how liberation theologians read Scripture is a risky undertaking, still his five-statement summary is helpful: Liberation theologians read the Bible as the book of life; they relate the word of God to praxis in a dialectical process; they read it from the perspective of the poor and the oppressed; they focus on eschatology that serves as the general framework for their ethics; and they use Scripture primarily as a source to transform others into free and just human beings.

Reflections on the ethics of discipleship and the ethics of power constitute S.'s final part. Although many liberation theologians approach ethics through discipleship, S. believes that the work of Jon Sobrino not only incorporates representative elements of discipleship from the writings of other Latin American theologians but has developed them more extensively, and that Sobrino has consciously attempted to construct from his Christology the foundation of Christian morality. Again, through both his choice of case study and his well-organized discussion, S. illumines the issues, the strengths, and the tensions in this model of liberation ethics.

The second model of liberation ethics, the ethics of power, is best represented by José Miguez Bonino. S. develops Bonino's thought as it moves from experience, to God's Kingdom as the standard of justice, to an understanding of the hermeneutical circle, and to the strategies of social change. Once more, a sustained analysis of a particular figure reveals the wider context.

S. closes with a section on the status of moral norms. He inquires here whether Christian ethics guides and shapes the methods of analysis, and whether liberation theology has moral norms precise enough to guide its moral judgments. He concludes that liberation theologians are neither situation ethicists nor utilitarians but mixed consequentialists, because they account for concrete norms as well as consequences.

S.'s study is well researched and imaginatively written. His practice of examining in depth a particular theologian is unusually heuristic. He sheds light on the theologian, the theme in question, and the di-
versity inherent in liberation ethics. The book is an important addition for those of us who teach ethics.

_Simpson College, Iowa_  

ROGER BETSWORTH


Schockenhoff, a professor of systematic theology at the University of Regensburg, sets out to articulate an ethic of life that will form the fundamental conditions for discourse in bioethics. He recognizes the profound nature of the problems of bioethics for contemporary moral reflection in theology, philosophy, and social policy. He argues correctly that the moral controversies of bioethics go beyond the particular issues in the field. Issues such as euthanasia reflect and influence the fundamental ways we understand and conceptualize human life. Our fundamental assumptions about human life shape our views on sexuality, sickness, death, and health care. Our practices in these areas, in turn, affect the way human life is understood and conceptualized. These concrete questions in bioethics are related to questions about the fundamental grounding of our moral thought, and yet, as S. rightly argues, bioethics rarely moves beyond the particular, concrete issues to the more fundamental issues.

It is these basic, fundamental questions that S. addresses here. He sets out to create a ground for theological discourse on these issues. To achieve this goal S. first moves to explore the meanings and uses of the concept of human dignity (Menschenwürde). He is particularly concerned with the meaning of the concept within a community that does not share a canonical religious worldview, which is his description of contemporary secular societies.

S. begins by reviewing different positions that have been developed in secular bioethics. It is clear from his account of secular bioethics that he assumes human dignity is a central concept which, he thinks, has not been sufficiently developed in bioethics. While secular bioethics recognizes human dignity, it fails to explore the assumptions and implications of the concept. S. argues that a theologically grounded ethic returns us to the person and the dignity of the person as the starting point for moral arguments in bioethics. Next, S. examines the philosophical background questions for a life ethic and the theological background for such an ethic. S. traces out various scriptural themes in the Old and New Testaments, such as the prohibitions against killing, suicide, and euthanasia, or the themes about the human person as the image of God. From the foregoing materials S. develops three basic principles: the guarantee of human dignity, the prohibition against killing, and the ethical assessment of personal well-being.

Subsequently S. devotes a series of chapters to some of the concrete problems in bioethics and the philosophy of medicine, examining, e.g., the normative role of concepts of health, disease, and diagnosis, the use
of intensive-care medicine, organ transplantation, prenatal diagnosis, suicide, euthanasia, and family planning.

For all its potential, the book is disappointing. While it does outline basic Christian attitudes toward life (e.g. respect, compassion, and care) it makes no theological argument. This is a major failure for a book that announces itself as developing a theological grounding. The book also fails to address the fundamental conceptual problems facing the use of concepts like human dignity in bioethics. One reason why bioethics has been such an explosive area of scholarship and debate, particularly in the U.S., is because it must confront the reality of moral pluralism. It provides a lens and a laboratory for the problems of moral discourse in a post-Christian society. S. appears to recognize this problem when he speaks of a society without a religious worldview. Yet he never seems to grasp the profound challenges that it poses for moral discourse.

In post-Christian, secular societies there is no canonical moral narrative to provide a context for concepts like human dignity. Outside of a particular context, such concepts have so many meanings that they become useless unless individuals share the same moral framework. The goal of a theological argument makes the book promising. Exploring concepts like human dignity within the Christian tradition is crucial, if the tradition is to understand itself and if the believing community is to articulate its views to others. Unfortunately the book does not achieve that goal.

_Georgetown University_  
KEVIN WILDES, S.J.


Pope has emerged as a leading voice both in the theological analysis of the nature of love and in the relation of Christian love to evolutionary theories of altruism. This book is among the most persuasive recent studies in theological ethics and will become a benchmark for informed future discussions.

P. understands the limitations of behavioral biology. He does not appropriate uncritically the disciplines of neo-Darwinianism (ethology, behavioral ecology, biosociology, and sociobiology), all of which he understands well. But from the mixture of insight and confusion that typifies these disciplines, he draws out what is usable and thereby sheds considerable light on the question: "If human beings are naturally predisposed . . . to develop special bonds with close kin and friends, and to exhibit greater generosity and higher degrees of self-denial for their loved ones, what relevance does this have for efforts to understand the hierarchy of moral responsibilities for various neighbors" (xii)? Furthermore, "Is it possible to appreciate the necessity and value of establishing priorities of love while retaining a lively and critical sense of the universal scope of neighbor-love" (xiii)?
P. is appreciatively critical of two major movements in Catholic moral theology. First, while lauding the personalist and existentialist movement of the 1950s and 60s for emphasizing the primacy of charity in moral theology, he faults this movement for its inattention to the “order of love” and to familial bonds even as it stressed intersubjectivity. Second, he observes that while liberation theology in its Latin American form appropriately focuses on love for the poor and oppressed, it nevertheless neglects the “order of love.” Neither movement recognizes the need to “prioritize the moral responsibilities attending various relationships” (42).

Where then, to turn, except to Aquinas, whose incorporation of nature and biological theory, however limited by then-existing knowledge, points in the right direction. Aquinas views biological embeddedness and natural inclinations as the handiwork of a benevolent God. The work of charity is to animate natural affections. Christian love is universal in its desire for the good of all, but partial in its implementation. Specifically, “the love of natural relations is informed and indeed commanded, rather than replaced, by charity” (63). Relations grounded in biological ties have a priority, other things being equal, although the stranger in great need may have a stronger moral pull in some cases. Within the family, Thomas also articulated priorities, although these are unfortunately informed by Aristotle’s theory of paternal generation.

P. goes on to present an engaging hermeneutics of evolution and altruism, clarifying the notions of “kin preference” and “reciprocity” as they have emerged among the biologists, and underscoring the problem of biological reduction that rightly plagues sociobiology. This is one of the finest critical expositions of ethology that I have read, indicating a clear mastery of an immense literature.

The book culminates in the chapter “Human Nature, the Ordering of Love, and Evolutionary Theory.” Here Pope constructively integrates what is useful in kin preference, stressing the reality of human finitude, the need for some ordering of love as evidenced by human nature and its evolution, and the vital importance of childrearing by parents. Christian love must include not only love for the distant, but also a legitimate role for kin preference. But Pope is highly critical of the “centripetal rather than the centrifugal” quality of human affection, especially in the context of in-group reciprocity, which tends to create “out-group bias.” He argues that the function of Christianity is to provide the cultural sources that socialize the agent to expand “the circle of concern to include all human beings and communities” (140). A balance must be struck between preferential and nonpreferential love, but no exceptionless priority system can be offered.

This book is significant for its methodological conversation with the life sciences, for its analysis of the current state of Catholic ethics, for its retrieval of aspects of the Thomistic notion of ordered love, for its
suspicions of the disembodied and denatured self that underlies some theories of Christian love, and for its appreciation of the importance of familial love especially on the parent-child axis. Pope calls his peers to take seriously the wisdom of a deity who made us the kind of creatures we are.

*Case Western Reserve University*  
STEFAN G. POST


This book is directed against “heterosexism” in the Christian churches. One author is a Lutheran, the other a Roman Catholic. Heterosexism is defined as a “reasoned system of bias concerning sexual orientation” (13), in which heterosexuality is privileged as the normative form of human sexuality. Homophobia, in contrast, is an emotional reaction of bigotry, reasoned out or not.

The authors, both heterosexual, are earnest, sensitive, and compassionate. Each chapter is headed by a biographical vignette or personal statement intended to make readers aware of the suffering endured by gay Christians as they struggle to find identity, meaning, and encouragement. One, never having had a sexual relationship, still says, “Deep inside I know that I’m a worthless person because the church’s view of homosexuality has told me so over and over again. . . . I just wish I would die” (139). Another tells how his father withheld physical affection from him out of fear that it would make him “gay” (89). One homosexual man recounts how denial led him into a marriage which broke up when the truth was admitted (167).

The moral energy of the book is focused against “Christian” hatred of gay persons. As such, its message is powerful and appropriate. However, not all will be persuaded that to see heterosexuality as the human sexual ideal necessarily entails exclusionary attitudes, nor even that to center sexual morality on male-female partnerships necessarily implies that same-sex relationships are in all cases evil. The authors seem to set up alternative stances in a way which does not represent the nuance of the actual spectrum. They suggest that one can only affirm that “just, loving, and faithful homosexual unions are good” if one is willing to accept the premise that homosexual orientation is but a natural “variation” which is “part of God’s original blessing” (23). On any other premise such unions either “fall short” or are evil. Missing here is the possibility that a good number of sexual and other relations open to people in the real world may be seen as positive goods for those people, even if their circumstances do not in every way match up to an ideal the Church holds forth. Less controversial examples would be second marriages, and adoption of children who in an “ideal” world could be cared for by their biological parents.
The real impact of this book lies in its extended revelation that, certainly due to rampant homophobia if not to what is defined as heterocentrism, gay persons are not in fact treated in Christian fellowship in a way consistent with the treatment of heterosexual persons whose situations may be in some sense nonideal too. Indeed, even in Roman Catholicism, where the homosexual orientation is supposedly not a sin, gays are given to believe that “God is against homosexual people in the very fabric of their existence as human beings” (88). This reality is a scandal and a judgment on “Christian” communities which make sexual norms sources of judgment, fear, anger, anxiety, and self-destructive guilt, quite in contradiction to the New Testament values of compassion, forgiveness, solidarity, and peace. The ethical challenge this book presents is to unite Christian sexual morality around sex as a universal human experience which offers all persons an ongoing task of authenticity, self-transcendence, and integration, a task in which few if any of us are “without sin.”

Boston College

SHORTER NOTICES


Schreiner’s history of exegesis maps theological streams that swell, converge, dry up, then reappear in the interpretation of the Book of Job from the Middle Ages through the 20th century. The major watershed to which these streams here lead and from which they flow are Calvin’s Sermons on Job. Gregory the Great, Maimonides, and Thomas Aquinas all contribute interpretive categories that will influence Calvin’s struggles with Job. Calvin’s Sermons, in turn, raise questions that will preoccupy 20th-century interpreters of the book.

The central theme of Joban interpretation, according to S., is that of perception. Attending particularly to the commentaries’ uses of metaphors of sight, vision, faith, and related terms, S. finds a characteristic fascination with the question of the human capacity to know. What can humans know about God, self, and history in the face of inexplicable suffering? Calvin’s Sermons attempt to solve the problem by bringing to Job a belief in two levels of divine justice: the justice of the Law, and a secret, hidden justice that creates an infinite distance between divine and human righteousness. Providence, therefore, turns out to be inscrutable and God unreliable. Human perception ultimately fails for Calvin in the face of the chaos of historical life. In this respect, he anticipates the failure of all “seeing” in such 20th-century writers on Job as Jung, MacLeish, and Kafka. But while Calvin leaves Job with faith in things unseen, these modern interpreters abandon Job to meaninglessness and cruelty.

S.’s book is a superb and lucid history of ideas that illuminates the Book of Job and its seemingly infinite ability to engage readers of every age. Her approach provides indisputable evidence of the contextual nature of interpretation while it illustrates the development and collapse of Western “ocularcentrism” (21).

KATHLEEN M. O’CONNOR
Columbia Theological Seminary
Decatur, Ga.
MINISTRY IN THE NEW TESTAMENT.

Few topics in New Testament studies are as important and explosive as ministry. Bartlett prefaces his study with a brief review of two official church documents: Lumen gentium (Catholic, 1966) and Baptism, Eucharist, and Ministry (Protestant, 1982). B. speaks to theologians and clerics interested in understanding and broadening the implications of these statements in the light of NT texts. Aware of limitations in both documents, B. expresses equal concern over a narrow professionalizing of ministerial practice. He refers to the diversity of the canon as a warrant for diversity of the one church, and the unity of the canon—and the Spirit—as providing “hope that our ongoing conversations will be friendly, familial” (22).

Individual chapters focus on Paul, Matthew, Johannine literature, Luke-Acts, and the Pastoral Epistles, with a final chapter on ministry today. Each chapter offers an overview that emerges from asking questions like: What were the historical circumstances of the writing? What meanings are distinctive to the author? What disputes arose? What leaders or offices are described and what is the basis of their authority? And what images of church appear? A summary list of impressions and questions concludes each chapter, inviting reflection for today’s church.

The editor’s Preface claims that B. “challenges the contemporary church to take a bold look at the New Testament.” But a bigger challenge are the women enrolled in ministry programs. In 1993, they represented 32% of the total; in some Roman Catholic programs, nearly 75%. For them, what matters is not only how texts on ministry are read, but how they are interrogated, probed, judged, valued, creatively imagined and proclaimed as “good news.” Unfortunately B.’s discussion leaves out important contributions by women scholars (e.g. Tetlow, Women and Ministry in the New Testament) or relegates them to footnotes (e.g. Schüssler Fiorenza, In Memory of Her). To remain friendly and familial, ongoing discussions of ministry will need to be more inclusive.

KAREN A. BARTA
Seattle University


In this companion piece to Saint Paul at the Movies (1993), Jewett claims European views of Paul have overinfluenced nearly all the apostle’s American interpreters, both popular and scholarly. So he offers a series of essays consciously grounded in and directed to American traditions and preoccupations; most of them develop J.’s earlier work. The European foil, while giving the book an appearance of unity, is not particularly satisfactory and is fortunately not seriously sustained beyond the opening chapters. Stuart Miller’s Painted in Blood: Understanding Europeans is provocative, but it does not bear the weight put upon it, even in a popular work such as this.

J. hits his stride in later chapters, where he shows how Paul offers Americans resources for more fully understanding Jewish-Gentile relations, women’s position in Christian communities, and slavery. These three aspects of their culture provide Americans with a particular contribution to make and/or a problem to work through. J. also finds in Paul support for communitarian enterprises, both practical and intellectual, that might help mainline churches counteract individualism. With insight and a light touch, he suggests that Paul’s “freedom from the law” might translate into freedom from consumerism’s thrall. Finally, J. revisits the political dangers of “zeal without understanding,” using Oliver North’s Iran-Contra testimony.

Although one could argue about some details (e.g. occasional reliance on anecdotal evidence, or assump-
tions about the meaning of "female leadership" in Pauline churches), J. offers food for thought here, not least in the work he makes available to nonspecialists.

PATRICIA M. MCDONALD
Mount Saint Mary's College
Emmitsburg, Md.


Why has no specifically Christian art been discovered which confidently be dated before the end of the second century? That question is often answered by saying that the earliest Christians were hostile to images. Finney disagrees heartily with this view and proposes another that is both interesting and plausible. To arrive at it, he studies the apologists' attacks on pagan idol worship and their emphasis on the spiritual nature of the Christian religion, and he discusses in detail (with numerous illustrations) the paintings in the Catacomb of Callistus in Rome, the site of the most ancient unmistakably Christian art.

The existence of representational painting in that catacomb suggests to F. that the apologists' emphasis on the immaterial aspect of Christianity must not be taken literally but was intended to make a favorable impression on their pagan readers. F. holds there was a Christian art before 200 but that it was virtually indistinguishable from its pagan counterpart (and hence "invisible" to both ancients and moderns), which was consonant with the early Christians' desire to blend in with their contemporaries. The Callistus paintings were the Christians' first attempts to produce an art that was distinctly theirs and would make their religion and their God "visible."

One might qualify F.'s assertion about the apologists' concentration on the spiritual side of the Christian cult: e.g., the liturgy that Justin describes in 1 Apol. 61–67 is certainly not striking for its immateriality. With respect to style, F.'s presenta-
the issues of freedom and fatalism, Origen defends the self-determination of the individual and sees Christ, as a teacher and exemplar, as "a critical hinge between divine goodness and human freedom" (162–63); his cosmology is optimistic. Eusebius sees the public triumph and power of Christianity as historical signs of divine power; the acts of Jesus endow with meaning all history from Moses and Plato to Constantine. His view of salvation is, like Origen's, optimistic, but with a more social dimension. Athanasius is a bishop in a powerful church and an ascetic, for whom the body is a hindrance; fatalism yields to a sense of divine transcendence, and so Athanasius defends a fully divine Son assuming human flesh to transform material life totally. He is less interested in individual progress and social transformation than in the "necessary transformation of all flesh through the Word" (164).

In offering valuable insights into the development and teaching of her three subjects, L. also underlines the pluralism of thought and expression that existed in pre-Nicene Christianity. Her analysis clearly indicates their dependence on Greek thought, but she wisely avoids attributing everything to this source by demonstrating the influence that Scripture and Christian faith had on all of them. She thus seems to show that the Hellenization of Christianity does not necessarily negate its central Judaean-Christian inspiration.

GERARD H. ETTLINGER, S.J.
St. John's Univ., Jamaica, N.Y.


Even medievalists aware of the popularity of Boethius' De consolatione philosophiae (which perhaps claims the most illustrious translators in English literature) may find it something of a surprise to be told that Boethius and Job were heroic in a way wholly compatible with the epic champions of Homer and Virgil. Cer-

The historiography of the early Reformation in England has undergone several revisions. These centered around the question of the origins and nature of English Protestantism. E. G. Rupp (1947, 1966) and J. E. McGoldrick (1979) stressed the decisiveness of Lutheran influence on the Henrician reform. W. A. Clebsch (1964) and L. J. Trinterud (1962) argued against the influence of Luther, especially on William Tyndale. A. G. Dickens (1967, 1987) revived the Lutheran connection in portraying Tyndale as essentially a Lutheran. Trueman's study is in this tradition in terms of his thesis that the theology of the early English reformers was grounded in Luther's concept of imputed justification. This foundation was modified under the influence which the humanism of Erasmus, Bucer, Bullinger, Melanchthon, and Oecolampadius exercised on the soteriology of the five reformers studied here.

After brief biographies of William Tyndale, John Frith, Robert Barnes, John Hooper, and John Bradford, to his basic argument that humanism provided the context in which they interpreted Luther's "justitia aliena Christi," T. joins a detailed study of the doctrine of salvation in each of the English reformers. While Tyndale, Frith, and Barnes had differences on the manner of election, for them it was a corollary of their doctrine of grace. Hooper adopted a synergistic view of election, and Bradford chose a doctrine of limited atonement.

When T. asserts, against W. A. Clebsch, that Luther and Tyndale shared a common understanding of Christian ethics, he is neglecting Luther's distinction between doctrine and life. As Luther said of Wycliff's emphasis on ethical regeneration, he failed "to grab the goose by the neck." Also, in describing Tyndale's attitude toward the patristic writers as one of "critical respect" T. forgets Tyndale's "it were the Fathers that...brought
us into this captivity.” However, T. has succeeded in transforming his dissertation into an intense and careful study of the doctrine of salvation in these early and mid-Tudor reformers.

WILLIAM P. MCSHEA
Carlow College, Pittsburgh


Reston’s full-length book about the “philosopher and mathematician of the Grand Duke of Tuscany” reveals the magnificent mind and spirit of Galileo, who had wonderful insights into the workings of the heliocentric system but little solid proof to offer doubting contemporaries such as Cardinal Bellarmine. The book is carefully planned and very well written, as one might expect from the son of “Scotty” Reston, the distinguished editor of the New York Times. The younger Reston is a master of narrative and his vivid description of Renaissance Padua, Florence, and Rome set the scene for the rise and fall and final triumph of Galileo, who died happily after his publication of Two New Sciences and the Letter to Christina.

The lack of a more scholarly format may disappoint some Galileo scholars; however, R. will probably not on this account lose any of those readers who begin this book. His treatment of Galileo and his friends is fair and full, though his portraits of foes seem less well drawn. It is an excellent presentation of the complications of life, style, and manners in the Renaissance.

After finishing R.’s book, the concerned reader can readily turn to two other very recent books about Galileo, both replete with scholarly apparatus: Mario Biagioli’s Galileo Courtier (University of Chicago, 1993), and Annibale Fantoli’s Galileo: For Copernicanism and for the Church (University of Notre Dame, 1994). These in turn can point back to the true beginnings of the rehabilitation of Galileo through the 28 volumes of the works of Galileo in the Edizionale Nazionale under Antonio Favaro in the years 1890 to 1909.

MARTIN F. MCCARTHY, S.J.
Vatican Observatory


This study has a broad and sometimes breathtaking significance. Treating Paradise Lost as a revealing intervention in the history of Bible-reading, it commands attention from everyone interested in the vexed, and vexing, history of relations between Jews and Christians. Rosenblatt traces Milton’s fertile conception of Edenic experience back to his engagement with the Hebrew Bible in the period when he began writing political pamphlets. Relying upon rabbinical commentary mediated through John Selden’s scholarship, Milton advocated, precisely on biblical grounds, that divorce be made legal in the new Israel of 17th-century England. He saw himself as a new Josiah, recovering the book of the law from its devaluation in historic Christianity.

R. demonstrates as no one ever has before how the Edenic books in Paradise Lost owe their glories to the Mosaic law, as the poet espouses a bracing aesthetic monism derived from the Hebrew Bible. Yet he thinks the poet fails to sustain the courage of his prophetic vision. Insistent intimations of the “gospel” in the last books are said to betray Milton’s capitulation to Pauline dualism and reliance upon typological thinking and demonstrate his fall into a deadening “hermeneutics of supercession.”

While R. ultimately ascribes to Milton conformity to anti-Jewish polemic, his book offers fascinating evidence that Milton knew how to enlist the more boldly imaginative possibilities of typological symbolism. As the invocations of Josiah and of a new Israel intimate (and as the longing for a new Exodus and for a restored temple in the later books of the Hebrew Bible attest), Torah offers a powerful para-
digm of perfection that will never be cancelled out by facile dualisms. Detailing as it does the depth of Milton’s Hebraic vision, this book re-creates with exhilarating learning and with brilliance an electric moment in the enduring encounter of Judaism and Christianity.

DAYTON HASKIN
Boston College


This volume of the Yale Works merges what originally had been planned as two separate projects, providing us with fine critical editions of three separate manuscripts which represent Edwards’s various attempts to develop a coherent theology of biblical typology: “Images of Divine Things,” “Types,” and “Types of the Messiah.”

The reader will appreciate the painstaking efforts at thoroughness and accuracy in regard both to the manuscripts and to the theological and historical context of E.’s argument. The editors have pursued as complete a solution as possible to the various textual complications involved by means of a meticulous comparison of the types of paper, the number and diversity of pens and shades of ink, the style of writing, and the contents of entries with published sermons and treatises. They have also provided an introduction to the whole question of biblical typology and to E.’s interaction with contemporary thought on the subject.

E.’s fascination with typological interpretation of Scripture is related not only to his interest in biblical exegesis but also, and perhaps more radically, to his profoundly incarnational perspective, which often gives him an unexpectedly Catholic tone. While attempting to avoid “the excesses of traditional allegory,” E. refused to confine typology to a merely literal, historical reading of Scripture or to the narrow correspondence of the Old and New Testaments. Rather, “the essence of a type consisted in a certain metaphysical relation to its antitype,” an expression of “the profound harmony with which God infused creation.” This volume shows the development of E.’s thought and his articulation of a systematic defense of what he saw as the intimate relationship between Scripture, history, and nature.

CHRISTOPHER J. VISCARDI, S.J.
Spring Hill College, Mobile


Kay’s purpose is to demonstrate that Bultmann “remains an indispensable conversation partner for theology today” (xii). To achieve this, he offers an introductory chapter on Bultmann’s formative liberal heritage (Ritschl, Harnack, Herrmann, and Weiss) and concludes that, while “the presence of Jesus” remains central, Bultmann parts company with liberalism’s attempt to understand that presence “as the continuing influence on piety of his incomparable personality” (24). Kay insists that Bultmann cannot be fairly understood without a full examination of the broad range of his writings, both historical-exegetical and philosophical-theological. Hence, he has two fine chapters on Bultmann’s exegetical work on Paul and John, followed by an equally fine chapter on Bultmann’s more theological work. Extensive citation of Bultmann allows the reader to have a good sense of the nuance in his thought.

Two insights stand out: (1) that “the proclaimer has become the proclaimed” does not mean that Jesus ceases to be the proclaimer, only that he becomes such in a new way—Jesus continues to be enfleshed in the kerygma as “God’s speech act”; and (2) that mythical narrative, historical information, or even doctrine about Jesus can all be the “occasion of revelation, but only the kerygma as lively summons from Jesus (the Word
of address, demand, and promise) can be the “condition for” a true revelatory encounter “for us.”

The final chapter, which takes up three critics of Bultmann (Frei on narrative presence, Sölle on the “political coram Christo,” and Moltmann on the “adventus Christi,”) is not as convincing a defense of Bultmann. While one might agree with some of Kay’s objections against these critics, nonetheless the critics have highlighted important limitations in Bultmann’s theology. Kay’s narrow focus must be complemented by these wider concerns. Nonetheless, his book is an open and honest discussion of the issues, an excellent demonstration of Bultmann’s continuing relevance.

MICHAEL L. COOK, S.J.
Gonzaga University, Spokane

RECLAIMING DIETRICH BONHOF-FER: THE PROMISE OF HIS THEOLOGY.

Marsh has produced here the profoundest study of Bonhoeffer’s theology to appear in many years. He argues “that Bonhoeffer’s christological description of life with others offers a compelling and unexpectedly rich alternative to post-Kantian models of selfhood—to conceptions of the self as the center of all relations to others” (vii). For B., all relations are mediated by Christ.

To reclaim B. for contemporary theology, Marsh undertakes three tasks: (1) an exposition of B.’s complex relationship with Karl Barth; (2) the positioning of B.’s theology within the wider milieu of the philosophical currents of the time; and (3) a delineation of the value and promise of B.’s new thought about how Christ’s presence in the world leads to a distinctive social ontology.

Marsh argues persuasively that B.’s Christocentric theology should be understood within the general framework of Barth’s mature trinitarianism. That is, B. presupposed both Barth’s distinction between God’s primary objectivity (God in Godself) and God’s secondary objectivity (God in revelation) and Barth’s stress on the priority of God’s aseity over God’s promeity, even though B.’s own consuming interest is in the latter. As Marsh states, “Bonhoeffer wants to plumb the depths of God’s promeity . . . in all its christic grandeur” (32).

Especially valuable is Marsh’s careful investigation of the philosophical influences on B., with primary attention given to Kant, Hegel, and Heidegger. B.’s closeness to Hegel becomes evident, but his difference from Hegel is crucial.

There is much in B.’s thought that goes untreated by Marsh, but he certainly illuminates its core. He shows how B.’s conceptions of “Christ existing as community” and “Jesus as the man for others” can help the Church to a richer understanding of God’s togetherness with the world and of humanity’s reconfiguration in Christ. The book is well worth reading.

JOHN D. GODSEY
Wesley Theological Seminary, D.C.

SPIRIT, NATURE, AND COMMUNITY:
ISSUES IN THE THOUGHT OF SIMONE WEIL.

Allen and Springstead have written a significant book about Weil’s thought, a scholarly analysis which attempts to break away from the pattern of publications regarding this French 20th-century thinker. And they succeed in moving Weilian scholarship to a new level, in no small measure because of the sustained conversation that has engaged both authors for some 20 years.

Indicating that their approach is designed to locate Weil’s contribution in the contemporary discourses of theology and philosophy, A. and S. decline to draw a “conceptual map” of the pivotal thoughts found in Weil’s writing. They attempt to identify and probe interpretive issues that have not been salient in the works of many English-speaking modern philosophers but which contribute to our understanding of the human condition and the fragility of persons, e.g. afflic-
tion, necessity, the notion of intermediaries, divine and human love. They offer clear, accessible explanation of ideas that sometimes strike Weil's readers as elusive. Moreover, they provide conversational partners and parallel readings to better illuminate her thought. This juxtaposition of philosopher companions is particularly compelling, inviting the reader to enter into the places of textual ambiguity with a fuller sense of what is at stake. While Peter Winch's study of Weil grounds much of this juxtaposed reading, the relevant contribution of Rowan Williams, Charles Taylor, Anders Nygren add to the rich discussion of Weil's thought.

The study embraces a diverse set of Weil's writings and presents the collaboration in an even, well-paced manner. A.'s contribution of four independently written chapters and S.'s five are supplemented by two that are collaborative. These last are among my favorites, focusing upon two of the knottiest facets of Weil's thought: the supernatural and affliction.

CLARE B. FISCHER
Starr King School for Ministry
Berkeley, Calif.


Yates writes that his aims are to provide "some historical perspective on the development of Christian mission in the period since 1900" and "material towards a twentieth-century missiology" (3). Both aims are admirably fulfilled. The book consists of almost exactly equal halves; Part 1 treats 1900 to 1940, and Part 2 covers 1940 to 1990.

Rather than a history of missionary activity or missionaries, Y. has written a history of 20th-century Christian thought on the nature of mission, and it is this which makes the book a genuine contribution to a number of missiological, ecclesiological, and Christological debates in our century's concluding decade. Not only the great moments of missiological history are treated—Edinburgh, Tambaram, Vatican II, Lausanne; interwoven are brief but able sketches of seminal thinkers like Roland Allen, Max Warren, Donald McGavran, and Lesslie Newbigin. The discussion of Bruno Gutmann's (and Christian Keysser's) development of the theology of Volkskirche, and the debate surrounding Hendrik Kraemer's controversial work on world religions are extremely interesting and hauntingly contemporary.

Y.'s focus, however, is almost exclusively Protestant. He does treat Vatican II, Evangelii nuntiandi, and liberation theology in some detail and with basic accuracy, but he omits any reflection on papal "mission encyclicals" prior to Vatican II, and he deals with hardly any Catholic missiological thought. Contributions of Seu-mois, Hillman, Dupuis, and Catholic thought in the 1970s and 80s on inculturation are not dealt with at all. Nevertheless Y. provides an invaluable, informative, and inspiring resource for missiological study. The book is the work of a scholar who is both a careful historian and a competent theologian. Were it in paperback, its price might make it more accessible to students.

STEPHEN BEVANS, S.V.D.
Catholic Theol. Union, Chicago


Brümmer states that "philosophical theology does not demonstrate what must be believed. It merely tries to limit the conceptual options to those that can be accepted without contradiction." It is therefore a practice open to the widest variety of religious commitment: open, that is, to "the theist and the atheist, the Christian and the humanist, the Buddhist and the communist."

In his endeavor to test this method of conceptual investigation, B. examines whether (and how) we can use language meaningfully of God; in what sense the grace of God is irresistible; in what sense God is impec-
cable; and finally whether (and how) we can speak meaningfully of a good and gracious God in a world wracked by evil.

B. is brilliant, sophisticated, and filled with enthusiasm for his project. It is precisely these virtues, however, that account for the book’s weaknesses. Apart from giving summaries at the end of most chapters, B. rarely stops to take a breath; he covers a massive amount of ground in a small book, indicating positions and counter-positions with sometimes daunting brevity. The reader hurtles from distinction to distinction, as if sped along by a dazzling tour-guide who has taken one cup of coffee too many. That may tempt some to leave the tour. But those who persevere through chapter 6 will be well rewarded: B. has some extraordinarily profound and sensible things to say there about the problem of evil. That discussion alone should earn the book a wide and grateful (though slightly exhausted) readership.

RONALD K. TACELLI, S.J.
Boston College


Stoeber here presents a typology of mystical experiences, which are ranked according to their capacity to attain what is essentially a theistic ideal of self-realization. S.’s novel evaluation of monistic experience, or pure consciousness, constitutes the heart of his study: monistic mysticism is not only legitimized and integrated into a theistic teleological framework, but is regarded as a necessary prerequisite to the highest level of mystical or “theo-monistic” insight. S. seeks thereby to overcome R. C. Zaeher’s unnecessarily dismissive approach to monism. In addition, he attempts to reconcile the truth of contemporary constructivist and essentialist interpretations of mysticism by allowing for variety in both mystical experience and its interpretation.

S.’s ideal ascent and transformation of the mystic into a unique and perfect creaturely expression of divine compassion and creativity is said to reflect an eternal movement within Deity itself from monistic, impersonal, self-luminous, nonrelational quiescence to a personalistic, dynamic, creative mode of being. Here S. finds support in the convergent testimony of important Hindu and Christian mystics, e.g. Ramanuja, Aurobindo, Eckhart, Ruusbroec, Abhishiktananda. Such theo-monists (read: higher-level theists) give witness to a monistic dimension of the Divine. Conversely hierarchies constructed by pure monists tend to nullify theistic-personalist claims about the Absolute.

Readers may wonder about the coherence of speaking of an “impersonal essence of a personal Divine” (3), or of lumping Shankara the nondualist with contemporary monistic Advaita. Yet S. makes a strong case for a dual-natured Absolute on the basis of a balanced, articulate, and stimulating elucidation of mystical texts. The book’s greatest strength is its novel and ambitious attempt to synthesize two disparate types of mysticism.

BRADLEY MALKOVSKY
University of Notre Dame


Brown examines the subject of tradition and the canons of traditions. He spells out the characteristics of traditions and canons. He is concerned to show how humans are inevitably, endemically “traditioned.” He is also concerned to show how traditions and canons can be a source of creativity and innovation within the boundaries they establish and the trajectories they open up. What is unique to B.’s handling of these subjects is his appreciation of their relationship to what he calls ritual. Rituals keep traditions from being merely cognitive transmissions of intellectualist archives. The Roman Catholic
reader will see many augurs of sacramental theology and devotions under this staid rubric of ritual.

Three cautions about this very engaging and readable book. First, the title would lead one to believe that a theology of tradition is going to be done. What is done is closer to a taxonomy and a phenomenology of the desired marks of a tradition than a theology. Second, one searches in vain here for an examination of a particular tradition. One finds many very good insights into how traditions and their canons function without being sure how these insights apply to any particular tradition such as one's own. This may be due to the breadth of B.'s scope. B. contends that "Christian theological claims must be defended in relation to the varied arenas of contemporary knowledge and experience." Third, B. hardly touches upon the issue of the relationship of living authority to tradition and canon. Although B. comments that his "approach (about tradition) has had to become more Catholic and less Protestant than it once was," Catholics will find many of their concerns about tradition not addressed here.

JOHN C. HAUGHEY, S.J. Loyola University, Chicago


Arising from Gustafson's 1992 Moll Lectures at Baldwin-Wallace College, this book applies his theocentric perspective to our current environmental crisis. G. reiterates its by now familiar components: the challenge to anthropocentrism, the sense of radical dependence, a relational value theory deeply appreciative of multiple centers of value and the ambiguous choices among them, our accountability amidst limits, and the necessity of taking the full range of sciences with theological seriousness. Importantly, G.'s most basic and controversial claim remains in force: "the source and power and order of all of nature is not always beneficent in its outcomes for the diversity of life and for the well-being of humans as part of that . . . God is the source of human good but does not guarantee it" (47–48).

The upshot is more groping and suggestive than didactic. Though recognizing and affirming interdependence, G. explicitly opposes views that exaggerate, factually and ethically, nature's equilibrium. Though emphasizing science and rational decision making, he also stresses the affective component of our relationship to nature. He urges cross-disciplinary integration yet recognizes its extraordinary difficulties. In the end he leaves a vast amount of room for practical wisdom amidst competing values.

One's critical evaluation of this book will inevitably echo one's original appraisal of Ethics from a Theocentric Perspective. That said, there is more to this book that should be noted, particularly its welcoming style. It is readable without being shallow, and it contains a great deal of common sense. G. has folded into his argument both autobiographical reflections and personal asides concerning past criticisms. It is not necessary to have read his earlier work to grasp what he is doing here, though having done so enriches it. And he returns effectively to his trademark use of typologies to organize the philosophical and theological terrain. This is Gustafson new and old.

DANIEL COWDIN Catholic University of America


Nelson's well-balanced and lucid book probes the vital import of genetic research and eugenics on future ethical-religious and human concerns. Much of its content emerges from two recent conferences on the ethical impact of the federally funded Human Genome Project. Addressing a wide audience, N.'s dialogical task
is both to educate the scientific community on the ethical import of theological assumptions in bioethics, and to persuade moral theologians and churches to be more informed in current genetic research.

With expertise in genetics, medicine, bioethics, and theology, N. explains how the biological revolution of eugenics affects religious conceptions of human nature, identity, behavior, and destiny. He further asks whether prenatal diagnosis for the treatment of inherited diseases should lead to gene therapy and germ-line manipulation, and whether genetic counseling, testing, and screening imposes on the human rights of individuals, particularly women and ethnic minorities. He addresses such problems with a thorough grasp of current scholarship in genetic science and religion, but also with a keen awareness of historical tensions between these traditions of inquiry. The last third of the book consists of individual papers responding to these and other issues from the standpoint of particular Christian and non-Christian religious traditions and official statements from ecumenical and denominational bodies.

In contrast to most books on genetic science, this one takes religion and theology seriously, as it weaves N.'s interest in ecumenical relations, theology, bioethics, and genetic research together into one unified volume. So, although this work serves as an introduction to the issues in genetics and religion, it ought to be required reading for those who participate in such crucial discussions.

DAVID W. HADDORFF
St. John's Univ., Staten Island


Aquino develops a lucid formulation of the special contributions of feminist perspectives to the theological enterprise. Latin American feminist theology opens our theologizing to the inclusive nature of the God experience. Beating a rhythm of active reflection and reflective action, it brings to theological discourse the web of tradition and experience woven with the threads of God's self-communication in the history of the world as experienced by women labeled oppressed and poor.

A. consistently grounds herself in the experience of women in Latin America: their marginalization and suffering, their faith and hope, their rituals and traditions, their search for identity and claim to selfhood. Having established the parameters of the women's experiences, she weaves their experiences into the traditions of theology and religious expression. Contributing to the integrity of her methodology is the conviction that for the Latin American woman, "being Christian is partly a cultural tradition and inheritance. But above all it is a vocation, a special way of living and experiencing the world as the place where God works" (70).

A.'s work is limited by its very ambitiousness. Her effort to present a new paradigm for theologizing and to establish inclusive ways of understanding God through contemporary experience calls for changes in the suppositions underlying current theological method. The dominant patriarchal language for naming and categorizing experiences of the Holy and for articulating and ritualizing those experiences are only slowly giving way to a reimaging of God in the light of women's experience through the application of feminist analytical tools. Consequently, in her search for ways to make her insights clear, A. can sound more as if she is advocating a position than contributing to the discourse. Yet this is a "must read" for anyone wanting to find language and expression for the liberating experiences and contributions of Latin American women to the Christian faith.

JUDITH VALLIMONT, S.S.P.S.
Loyola Marymount Univ., L.A.

Brubaker's outstanding work on women's pauperization and marginalization is comprehensive, thorough, focused, and ethically responsible. The phenomenon of poverty is a hidden, global reality among women mainly due to the productive and reproductive roles they play. "Women don't count" because their work is not valued for economic and political reasons. B. systematically analyzes the economic vulnerability of women and shows the multiple factors that fuel this vulnerability. She also offers a critical analysis of Christian social ethics pertaining to women found in the Roman Catholic Church and in the World Council of Churches. While highlighting the strength of each teaching, B. indicates the detrimental effects of the churches' teachings on women.

The strengths of this book are many, most notably the careful and comprehensive analysis of the causes for women's marginalization and pauperization. The book offers summaries, and insightful comments after each presentation of new material by weaving together several strands of criteria. These strands, sometimes unclear, wind their way through each of the six chapters, converging in the final chapter—which is worth the price of the book. Here B. synthesizes and critiques five types of feminism found in the many documents she reviewed. She believes the transformation model most adequately addresses women's social problems. In addition, she offers concrete suggestions to improve women's fate through criteria for adequacy of social analysis and of policy proposals.

This outstanding work in social ethics should be a required text for courses in feminist and social ethics. Although a dense text, it could serve well for discussion groups that focus on issues of justice, economy, women's roles, and challenges to Christianity today.

ELIZABETH WILLEMS, S.S.N.D.
Notre Dame Seminary
New Orleans


Weiner proposes a thought experiment to test whether even within the bracketing of a strictly naturalistic anthropology a reasonable case can be made in contemporary terms for the ancient view of the unity of mental health and moral virtue. W. analyzes mental health in terms of behavior and motivation. Mental health behaviorally consists in effective self-maintenance combined with equally effective aid in preserving the species. Pleasurable functioning motivates us in effecting self-maintenance and the preservation of the species. But this harmony of pleasure and function is not snug, since work and even love are often painful.

W. distinguishes between simple pleasures and pleasures resulting from relieving pain. Relief of sufficiently intense pain takes priority over simple pleasure. Of all pains the anxiety of self-condemnation in the face of failure to be true to one's values is perhaps the greatest. Self-deception (partially unconscious, yet still known and affectively willed) is most often our way of relieving this anxiety. But the pleasures of anxiety relief through self-deception are not pure pleasures but rather eccentric, dysfunctional pleasures of a false self. Mental illness is all behavior motivated by the relief of self-condemnation through self-deception. The harmony of the soul is realized through negating the false self through enlightened self-knowledge. Here mental health and virtue come together. The virtuous person enjoys the simple pleasure of doing what is truly good because it is good. W. suggests that, all else being equal, virtue is the state of character which be-
longs to the person without need for neurotic pain relief.

W.'s work is challenging, original. I highly recommend it. I would only caution that there are multiple causes of mental illness and that due to God's grace even heroic virtue can coexist with deep psychic woundedness.

BERNARD J. TYRRELL, S.J.
Gonzaga University, Spokane


Although this excellent study of leadership draws on psychological and other social-scientific insights for its theory, it provides rich fare for religious and theological reflection. Heifetz, a psychiatrist, musician, and lecturer in public policy at the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard, defines leadership as that activity which mobilizes the resources of a group or organization to do difficult work. The difficult work in question he calls adaptive work, i.e. work which entails significant change, loss, redefinition, and new ways of learning for the organization. In other words, the kind of work which an organization is likely to resist doing.

H. distinguishes between leadership and authority, concepts which are ordinarily identified. He is alert to the positive functions of authority: direction, protection, orientation, management of conflict and maintenance of norms. He is equally attuned to its dangers: unbridled sex, grandiosity, and destructive power. Formal, or designated, authority is, in turn, distinguishable from informal. People can and ought to exercise leadership in an organization even though they do not hold formal authority. The functions of authority change when an organization is going through a time of serious disequilibrium, when the group needs to engage in a deeper form of learning. During times of stress a primary contribution of authority figures is to provide a holding environment for the group to do its adaptive work.

H. employs abundant examples from American political history. A theologian concerned with issues of ecclesiology could easily find parallel material from church life. A principal merit of this volume is the healthy stimulus it can provide to theological discussions of the role of leadership in the Church in relation to authority figures.

BRIAN O. MCDERMOTT, S.J.
Weston Jesuit School of Theology

BOOKS RECEIVED

SCRIPTURAL STUDIES


This first issue of 1995 opens with ARTICLES on possible developments beyond postmodernism, on personal pacifism, and on Catholic (papal) social teaching, moves on to a QUAESTIO DISPUTATA on the formula in persona Christi and its bearing on women's ordination, and concludes with the annual NOTES ON MORAL THEOLOGY.

Ontotheology to Excess: Imagining God without Being, following suggestions by Jean-Luc Marion and Walter Kasper, proposes that between the extremes of traditional metaphysical approaches to God-talk and their total rejection by postmodernism lies another alternative which thinks God in terms of affect rather than in terms of being. ANTHONY J. GODZIEBA, Ph.D. from the Catholic University of America and assistant professor at Villanova University, recently published Bernard Welte's Fundamental Theological Approach to Christology (Peter Lang, 1994) and is currently working on several articles dealing with a broad range of issues in fundamental theology.

Personal Pacifism is a historical and philosophical exploration of the claim that, even if resort to war is, under some conditions, an obligation of communities, individuals may nevertheless choose a life of complete abstention from violence. KENNETH W. KEMP, who has his Ph.D. from Notre Dame and is associate professor of philosophy at the University of St. Thomas, specializes in questions of morality and war. His recent publications have dealt with conscientious objection, truth telling, and the Second Gulf War. His current research centers around the just-war theory.

What Ever Happened to Octogesima Adveniens? records how John Paul II is reversing the earlier emerging articulation of a historically conscious methodology in the Church's social teaching in preference for a transcendental personalism as the basis of universal norms. MARY ELSBERND, O.S.F., earned her S.T.D. at the Katholieke Universiteit te Leuven and is assistant professor at the Institute of Pastoral Studies of Loyola University Chicago. She specializes in the historical and contextual development of a broad range of issues relating to Catholic social teaching such as peacemaking, human rights, feminism, and work.

“In Persona Christi,” containing A Response to Dennis M. Ferrara and A Reply to Sara Butler, constitutes this issue's QUAESTIO DISPUTATA. Butler argues against Ferrara (TS 55 [1994] 195–224, 706–19) that Inter insigniores's interpretation of the formula in persona Christi has a firm basis in traditional scholastic theology. Ferrara, in responding, clarifies his position and explores the differences in theological approach underlying this dispute. SARA BUTLER, M.S.B.T., a Ph.D. from Fordham University, associate professor at Mundelein Seminary, University of St. Mary of the Lake, and a specialist in Anglican–Roman Catholic relations, is currently working on the question of the possibility of reconciling the equality of the sexes with the exclusion of women's ordination. DENNIS M. FERRARA, S.T.D. from the Catholic
University of America and independent scholar residing in Washington, D.C., is continuing his research into some of the basic issues which underlie this question.

In the Notes on Moral Theology 1994 there are four contributions:

1. Jesus and Christian Ethics examines three themes which characterize recent literature: the shift from history to ethics, the sage-vs.-eschatological-prophet debate, and the use of analogical reasoning. WILLIAM C. SPOHN, Ph.D. from the University of Chicago's Divinity School, and the John Nobili, S.J., Professor at Santa Clara University, researches and publishes in areas relating to Scripture and ethics, and Jesus and ethics.

2. Ethics and Liberation Theology responds to two commonly made objections: How does preferential option for the poor fit with the universality of God's love? and, How does the option relate to the concepts of the common good, justice, and rights? THOMAS L. SCHBECK, S.J., a Ph.D. from the University of Southern California and associate professor at John Carroll University, recently published Liberation Ethics (Fortress, 1993). His continuing research on this theme focuses on the common good and on pentecostal and liberationist churches in Central America.

3. Nationalism, Ethnic Conflict, and Religion analyzes the increasingly obvious role of religion in the various violent conflicts characteristic of the post-Cold War period. JOHN P. LANGAN, S.J., the Rose Kennedy Professor of Christian Ethics at Georgetown University, has his Ph.D. from the University of Michigan. Editor of Catholic Universities in Church and Society (Georgetown, 1993), he is known for his research into issues relating to religion and politics and to the just-war theory.

4. Ethical Issues in Health-Care Restructuring analyzes issues related to the shift from fee-for-service to managed care, and also challenges posed by the newly revised Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic Health Care Services, in particular the principle of cooperation. M. CATHLEEN KAVENY, Ph.D. and J.D. from Yale University, is an Associate in the Health Law Group of the firm Ropes & Gray, Boston. She has published in The Thomist and Religious Studies Review and specializes in issues where law, ethics, and religion intersect. JAMES F. KEENAN, S.J., S.T.D. from the Gregorian University and associate professor at the Weston Jesuit School of Theology, recently published Goodness and Rightness in Thomas Aquinas' Summa Theologiae and is currently working on issues related to casuistry.

Robert J. Daly, S.J.
Editor

SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY


HISTORICAL


MORALITY AND LAW


**PASTORAL, SPIRITUAL, AND LITURGICAL**


**PHILOSOPHY, OTHER DISCIPLINES**


*In Good Company: Essays in Honor of Robert Detweiler*. Ed. D. Jasper and M.


