Much more could be said about the discernment mode from within this ethics of discipleship, especially about the importance of social analysis as a prerequisite to moral analysis and the link between the two types of analysis. An important contribution to moral theology is the emphasis given to spirituality as a vital source for shaping the dispositions or attitudes that motivate the moral life. Many theologians, such as Gutiérrez, view spirituality as the heart of liberation ethics. Recent systematic treatments of liberation ethics have helped fill an earlier vacuum of ethical reflection and moral argument. More carefully reasoned arguments about issues stemming from people’s experiences needs to be done. Another distinctive contribution to moral theology, in my view, is liberation theology’s search for the distinctively human, demonstrated by Gutierrez’s tridimensional structure of the liberation process and by the process of negative-contrast experiences within a model of moral discernment.

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NATIONALISM, ETHNIC CONFLICT, AND RELIGION

In the post-Cold War period, it is no longer the global, nuclear, ideological confrontation of the superpowers and their networks of alliances that dominates our thinking about issues of peace and political order. It is the conflicts of nationalities, of ethnic groups, of communities divided by historic struggles and parochial allegiances that have come to the center of the stage. The struggles of Croats and Serbs, of Armenians and Azeris, of Hutus and Tutsis, of Ulster Protestants and Catholics, of Palestinians and Israelis, of Tamils and Sinhalese are not struggles which are satisfactorily explained by the categories of Cold War thinking on either side, or which were eliminated or even fundamentally modified by the great international conflict that went on for over four decades.

William Pfaff speaks of the desire of the peoples in what had been Soviet-controlled Europe to “become free again to be themselves—which logically implied, of course, the possibility of their becoming again, as many of them had been in the past, not at all democratic, but authoritarian in government, intolerant of religious and ethnic difference, and aggressive towards their neighbors.”¹ The grievances and fears of Québécois in Canada, of Russians in Ukraine and Estonia and Kazakhstan, of Hungarians in Slovakia and Romania, of Albanians in Kosovo and Macedonia, of Catholics in Sudan and Ulster, of Kurds in

Iraq and Turkey, of Zulus in South Africa, of Armenians in Turkey, of Turks in Germany, of Basques in Spain and France are not identical in shape or meaning to the grievances and fears of Marx's proletariat or of Mao's peasantry. The parties in these conflicts cross the class lines charted by Karl Marx and Max Weber; they are concerned with cultural issues and the shape of community even more than with economic processes and outcomes; they challenge political institutions and national boundaries rather than economic institutions and systems. They may indeed be related as oppressed and oppressors, but this relationship springs from histories of conquest and subjugation rather than from the forces and relations of production. In a contemporary world which largely acknowledges the validity of democratic ideals and the need for democratic practices, the crucial divide in most cases is the difference between majority and minority status, though it is, of course, possible for minorities to oppress majorities as was the case, for instance, in South Africa.

Ted Robert Gurr, of the University of Maryland, offers a useful mapping of the forms of ethnic conflict in the contemporary world in his 1994 presidential address to the International Studies Association. He divides them into three groups on the basis of their orientation to state power. The first is ethnonationalism, in which "proportionally large, regionally concentrated peoples" pursue independent statehood or extensive regional autonomy and have "exit" as their objective. The wars following the collapse of Yugoslavia and the secessions of Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia exemplify this pattern. The second is the struggle for indigenous rights, which are "the preoccupation of conquered descendants of original inhabitants" who aim at "autonomy" in order to protect their lands, resources, and culture "from the inroads of state-builders and developers." The recent rebellion in Chiapas, Mexico fits this pattern. The third is the contention for power in which the players are "culturally distinct peoples, tribes, or clans in heterogeneous societies who are locked in rivalries about the distribution of or access to state power," and in which the players often have a regional base and may on some occasions opt to follow the strategy of ethnonationalism. Examples of the third group are found mainly in Africa, but also in Afghanistan and Cambodia. Gurr remarks: "It is also evident that power contention was and is the source of much more severe conflicts than ethnonationalism or indigenous rights." For the period after 1987, power-contention conflicts produced more than ten times the fatalities and refugees of indigenous-rights conflicts and more than 50% more deaths and refugees than ethnonational conflicts. Sadly

3 Ibid.
4 Ibid.
5 Ibid. 355.
enough, the tragic conflict in Rwanda provides even more evidence to support Gurr's thesis about the special destructiveness of these struggles in which ethnically distinct parties struggle for control of one state.

In comparison with the great internationalist ideologies that animated the superpowers in the Cold War, the various nationalisms that drive current conflicts are both more and less religious. On the one hand, they lack the universalism which is characteristic of both the great ideologies and the major religious traditions. On the other hand, a particular form of nationalism is often very closely linked with a particular religious tradition or community, e.g. Zionism with Judaism; Irish, Croatian, Polish, Lithuanian, Slovak, and Timorese nationalisms with Roman Catholicism; Serbian and Russian nationalisms with Orthodoxy; Palestinian and Arab nationalisms with Islam. The conflict of competing nationalisms may coincide with a historic conflict of religious traditions, as we are repeatedly reminded in the case of Bosnia, where the three major competing groups are Muslim, Orthodox, and Catholic in their religious allegiances and are not significantly different in their ethnic composition or language. This creates the possibility that religiously identified groups will attack each other in ways that are manifestly incompatible with the teachings and values of their religious traditions. This religious ambivalence of the various nationalisms and the great difficulty that accompanies any effort to generalize about so protean and so pervasive a reality as nationalism in the contemporary world are almost certainly among the chief reasons why recent theology and church statements have paid comparatively little attention to this subject, at least if we compare what has been written on nationalism with the numerous treatises and documents that have taken up the challenges of communism and of liberal democratic capitalism to the Christian tradition.

Recognition of the extent of change between the Cold War and post-Cold War periods and recognition of the power, both latent and persistent, of the various forms of nationalism are both important themes in a valuable new collection of essays published by the U.S. Catholic Conference. The essays in this volume are elaborations of contributions made by various political and theological experts to the process of

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6 A very instructive set of essays on the historical roots of the current crisis in Bosnia is *The Muslims of Bosnia-Herzegovina* ed. Mark Pinson (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University, 1994). The essay by John V. A. Fine is particularly enlightening on the earlier religious history of the area before the arrival of the Ottoman Turks in the 15th century.

consultation that led to the preparation of the U.S. bishops' 1993 statement, *The Harvest of Justice Is Sown in Peace,* which itself was proposed as a continuation and celebration of the bishops' enormously influential letter, *The Challenge of Peace,* which had been issued in 1983 and which had the U.S.-Soviet strategic relationship as its policy focus. *The Harvest of Justice Is Sown in Peace* is itself a good illustration of the way in which the tradition of Catholic social teaching continues to develop in response to changed social, political, and technological conditions but also preserves essential continuities. Thus it repeats the teaching of John XXIII on the universal common good, according to which "the world community has a right and a duty to act where the lives and the fundamental rights of large numbers of people are at serious risk," and the commitment of recent popes, especially John Paul II, to the Church's defense of human rights in a universal and comprehensive way. It continues to deepen the Church's commitment to the pursuit of justice through nonviolent means, even while it urges the necessity of scrutinizing actual and potential uses of force through the categories of the just-war tradition. It recognizes the continuing relevance of the questions about nuclear weapons and about the morality of deterrence that dominated religious and ethical reflection in previous decades. But it also recognizes that nuclear proliferation, which in fact is likely to be tempting to some states as a means of protecting national integrity (Pakistan, Israel), or of enhancing national power (Iraq, India), or of preserving a regime whose appeal may or may not have nationalistic elements (North Korea, the now-abandoned program in South Africa), has become a particularly urgent concern in the post-Cold War period.

But what is particularly important for our topic is the bishops' judgment that "one of the most disturbing threats to peace in the post-Cold War world has been the spread of conflicts rooted in national, ethnic, racial, and religious differences." It is not surprising that the bishops' treatment of nationalism and the conflicts in which it is a major factor makes a particular effort to distance the Church from any religious endorsement of human-rights violations or of such atrocities as "ethnic cleansing." It criticizes those who would blame religion for current national conflicts and points to political, economic, and ideological factors as "the predominant causes of tension and violence"; and it makes the interesting claim that "instances of religion being the principal cause of conflict are extremely rare." But the bishops do acknowledge the close connections between religion and nationalism, even while they prefer to present "authentic religious belief" as "a powerful moral force for nonviolent human liberation."
David Little, a senior scholar in the Religion, Ethics, and Human Rights Program at the U.S. Institute of Peace and a former professor of religious studies at the University of Virginia, points out that the bishops here run the risk of making this claim a conclusion from an implicit definition of "authentic religious belief" so that any religious belief that leads to violence can be dismissed as inauthentic. Little perhaps overlooks the possibility that the bishops here are not so much relying on a definitional strategy to win an argument as they are expressing something like a legislative intent to rule certain religious endorsements of violence out of order in the internal religious debate. He also contends that empirical research shows that "cultural (including religious) differences do have a moderate influence, at least on the antagonism that often develops between majorities and minorities in plural societies, especially over the distribution of economic advantages." More positively, Little points to two factors that produce a close connection between religion and nationalism: first, "the strong natural affinity between religious commitment and patriotism, or devotion to the national cause," and second, the concern that both religion and nationalism have over political legitimacy, especially in the establishment and exercise of a monopoly in the use of force. Little mentions three internal conflicts in which religious factors are of central importance: Ukraine (Russian Orthodox vs. Independent Orthodox vs. Roman Catholic), Sudan (Muslim vs. Christian), Sri Lanka (Sinhalese Buddhist vs. Tamil Hindu). Little endorses the bishops' affirmation that militant nationalism is to be restrained by commitment to fundamental human rights; but he differs from the bishops in holding that the international human rights documents posit "an explicitly nonreligious basis for political authority and the exercise of force."

Little rightly objects to government coercion and government favoritism in the religious sphere; but formulations like the one just cited seem to rule out the religious concern for political legitimacy which he noted earlier, as well as the possibility of a religiously based justification for a nondiscriminatory state or for a regime that includes religious establishment within a framework of toleration. Little relies heavily on the language of the American separatist tradition with regard to church-and-state questions and does not explore the possibility of more pragmatic accommodations; and he falls back on a preference for sharp dichotomies, as, for instance, when he concludes that "the proper solution is, simply, to desanctify the civil order" and "to differentiate as much as possible between religious authority and civil

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14 Ibid. 88.

15 Ibid. 92.
authority, between religious communal identity and political communal identity.”

This Catholic observer sees roughly what is intended here and approves any position which holds that it is wrong to require any particular religious identity prior to allowing people to participate in the political community or to acknowledging their full humanity, but at the same time I am wary of an approach which seems to require substantially the same separationist regime for Israel, for Britain, for Iran, for Ireland, and for Poland as the one which has been developed with generally positive results in the U.S.A. What often makes the difference between aggressive and persecutory regimes, on the one hand, and tolerant and accommodating regimes, on the other, is not so much the purity of adherence to a strictly separationist view as the refusal to allow religion to be used in the transmission of hatred. It is worth remembering that a country with a Lutheran establishment, Denmark, did significantly better in resisting the anti-Semitic demands of its Nazi occupiers than did avowedly secular France. A more pragmatic alternative to Little’s approach would put more stress on developing particular understandings among religiously defined communities that have been at odds with each other. We should note, however, that Little is quite anxious to combat the view that a human-rights approach to the problems of religious nationalism is antireligious. Since a regime that institutionalizes human rights protects the freedom of all, including religious citizens, it promotes the free exercise of religion and is clearly not “totally antireligious.” But he rightly expects that a human-rights approach will force the major religious traditions to a self-critical examination of their tendency to use power to dominate other religious groups when the opportunity offers.

Jean Bethke Elshtain in her essay in *Peacemaking* shows considerable concern over “the drastic simplifications and overwrought evocations of competitive prestige in which the nationalist . . . indulges.” Following some suggestive comments from George Orwell, whose ear for the false notes of political exaggeration and self-deception was unrivalled in this century, she warns against the dangers to which the nationalist preoccupation with status leads and endorses what Orwell calls a “civic patriotism.” Nationalism too often pushes from the affirmation of the dignity of one’s own people to the proclamation of their superiority and to the denial of the claims and needs of others, who become or have already defined themselves as enemies. Elshtain cites G. M. Tarnas’s summary of the stance of ethnic nationalism: “Others ought to be elsewhere; there is no universalistic, overriding, transcon-
textual principle ‘legitimizing’ mixture, assimilation or diversity within the same politico-symbolic ‘space.’” Now the belief that others ought not and cannot share our space, both the land that belongs to our nation and the civic arena in which we determine our destiny, is clearly a belief that legitimates and even requires “ethnic cleansing.” But Elshtain rightly observes that this sort of nationalism is not the only kind that has emerged from the collapse of European communism, and she points to the independence movements in the Baltic states, in Poland, in Czechoslovakia (as it then was), “which protested their control by the Soviet empire, first, because it violated principles of self-determination imbedded in international law . . . and, second, because it trampled on basic human rights, including the right to participate in, and help to choose, a way of life.” Such universalist reasons both delegitimate the oppressive imperialism of an alien state identified with a universalist ideology and appeal to an alternative universalism, so that they both empower and restrain an emerging nationalism.

Elshtain, like David Little, believes that human rights ought to override the demands of nationalism and that “geopolitical and cultural definitions of nationhood must, at this time in history, be open to chastening by universal principles.” She sees this as in line with the tradition of Catholic teaching, and she points to John Paul II’s refusal to support the agitation of Polish nationalists in Lithuania during his visit in 1993. She also points to Vaclav Havel, the president of the Czech Republic, as someone who has rejected statist and triumphalist views of sovereignty and nationalism.

Two central features of this understanding of the national state are, first, that its political life “has to do with having a home, with being at home, with tending to one’s particular home and its place in the wider world in which one gets one’s bearings,” and, second, that it assumes “the coexistence of overlapping, porous entities” and thus a “dialogical, by contrast to a monological, political ideal.” The first of these points reminds us of the importance of the ethnic community with its culture and its language, its function of providing the setting within which the young develop the capabilities and skills which they will need and within which they form the bonds which enable them to say “we” and “our people.” One need not accept strong claims about the primordial character of ethnic bonds or about their moral weight or about their epistemological consequences in order to acknowledge the great importance of ethnic community for the way in which people define themselves and for the way in which they are perceived and understood by

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20 Elshtain 102.
21 Ibid. 103.
22 Ibid. 104.
others. A universalism that does not allow an important place for the sense of being at home with one's co-nationals will be remote, abstract, and weak. At the same time one has to acknowledge that the great majority of existing nations are not ethnically or linguistically monolithic, and that provisions have to be made to protect the human rights of members of ethnic and religious minorities and to sustain the dignity not merely of individuals but also of the communities with which they are identified. Forms of the nation state which do not allow the continuing public presence of minorities or impose degrading conditions on them are morally unacceptable; they are certain to produce serious violations of human rights, and they run the further risk of producing serious internal conflict.

The prolonged crisis in the former Yugoslavia and its successor states illustrates the practical importance of these considerations. The decision to partition a country in which there are overlapping and traditionally hostile ethnic communities in such a way that the newly created states will be ethnically homogeneous seems to offer the hope of separating the adversaries in an ongoing civil war; and so it may be seen as a reasonable, even if imperfect, step toward ending or reducing violence. This is the line of thinking underlying the Vance-Owen plan for the division of Bosnia into ethnically distinct units. (One should acknowledge that the ethnè or tribes in this case are effectively divided along broadly religious lines rather than strictly according to ethnic descent or language, since all the participants are Slavs who speak one language). But there is also a significant downside to this and similar plans since they legitimate or even require separating people along ethnic lines against their will. This point has been tellingly put by Bogdan Denitch, a sociologist of Serbian origin who lived for many years in Croatia and who is now a professor at the CUNY Graduate Center:

These “provinces” will rapidly move toward becoming ethnically homogeneous or, at least, toward being safe only for the dominant ethnic group. To support the formation of ethnically homogeneous “provinces” or ministates in highly mixed areas is to promote “ethnic cleansing”—that is, the forcible expulsion of nondominant ethnic groups in a given canton. Because peasants and many people in small towns will not desert the land on which their ancestors have lived for centuries, forcible expulsion can be effective only when it is carried out with great and visible brutality.23

This contains one serious overstatement, since “to promote” in the second sentence of the quotation implies a favorable attitude to what the policy one supports is bringing about, when we are actually looking at a situation in which one’s policy has undesired and undesirable

consequences because of the actions of other parties. But the point that a separatist policy abets the objectives of those who practice ethnic cleansing remains. Denitch goes a step further in his argument:

The brutality with which the ethnic cleansing has been carried out made the central claim of the xenophobic nationalists a self-fulfilling prophecy. Their central claim was that different ethnic and religious communities cannot co-exist in peace. The brutality of the Bosnian war may well set off a cycle of revenge and counterrevenge that will make this claim de facto true. That is why the claims of the nationalists to ethnically exclusivist states must be rejected.  

Again, the primary point seems to me to be well taken, namely, that the incriminating violence of the nationalists confirms the truth of their vision of the future and the validity of their demands. But Denitch chooses to ignore the possibility that settling for ethnically exclusivist states or mini-states in the area may be the best that can be done, particularly if the Serbs who demand such states are victorious on the field of battle.

Denitch describes himself as “by choice . . . a secular Yugoslav [as if that choice were still possible] and an egalitarian democrat . . . a democratic socialist.” His book is enlightening since it presents the views of someone whose political views would be intelligible, if not acceptable, to American academics and politicians. He is the kind of intellectual political activist who sincerely believed in the possibility of a democratic Yugoslavia in which the different peoples of this complex country would enjoy the benefits of a federal union which would permit a high level of local self-determination, even while it also insisted on the equal citizenship of all regardless of their ethnic identity or religious beliefs. Denitch believes that all the successor states to the former Yugoslavia have actually diminished their effective freedom of action, and more generally, that “ethnic nationalism, an essentially communitarian impulse to strengthen the immediate national community, results in the creation of political entities that are even more helpless.” His long-range hopes for the future of Yugoslavia are federalist and socialist; but even if one rejects these as the nostalgic remains of a set of hopes that events have now broken, Denitch is a perceptive and humane observer of one of the most desolating political landscapes in the contemporary world.

In particular, he raises some pointed questions about the role of religion and elementary and secondary education, especially the teaching of national history, in mobilizing national movements and in threatening the rights of those who do not fit the ethnic and religious profile of the dominant tribe. He observes:

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24 Ibid. 8.
25 Ibid. 19.
26 Ibid. 165.
School teachers, and especially school teachers of national history, have been a major element in inventing passionate modern nationalisms. It is said that school teachers in France taught provincials that they were Frenchmen and Frenchwomen. To do this they warred relentlessly against the *patois* spoken in many regions . . . School teachers and priests reinvented the Slovaks as a nation, as well as a number of other lost peoples who had to be reinvented in the nineteenth century.27

Part of Denitch's concern is that proponents of a narrow and passionate nationalism will actually have the support of a majority of their fellow citizens and that they will be the practitioners of what John Stuart Mill referred to as "the tyranny of the majority." Because of this concern for both individual liberties and minority rights, Denitch probably comes very close to Little's views on restricting the place of religion in public life. In countries which are deeply divided along religious lines, there may in fact be very strong pragmatic arguments for regarding such restrictions as morally justifiable when they are necessary to preserve public order and peace, even if one has doubts about their being required by universal principles.

This underlines the importance of the distinction between ethnic or ethnic-religious nationalism, on the one hand, and civic nationalism, on the other, in which citizenship rather than membership of the dominant ethnic or religious group is the basis for an affirmation of equal rights and in which citizenship is effectively available to all inhabitants of a territory who want it, subject to the requirements of fair immigration and naturalization processes. A consequence of this equality in a society where distinct ethnic groups are intermingled is that the key institutions of civic life, both those controlled by the state and those which are in private hands, must operate in a nondiscriminatory manner. A further consequence is that members of nondominant or newer ethnic groups are not to be dismissed as aliens or strangers or inferiors.

The fact that many social groups and institutions will thus cease to be ethnically pure or monocultural has to be accepted as a moral requirement of life in a democratic and pluralistic society. It has to be recognized that this is often a devastating blow to the preferred self-image of a national group. In this connection it is encouraging that Cardinal Kuharic, the archbishop of Zagreb, after affirming that "all nations are equal in their dignity and rights" and the necessity of inculcating respect for the rights of every single person, applies the approach of civic nationalism to the neighboring state of Bosnia-Herzegovina by saying: "The coexistence of Muslims, Serbs, and Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina is the common destiny of this state.

27 Ibid. 145.
Intermingling and being together are part of that destiny." This, of course, is a destiny that not all citizens or all members of dominant ethnic groups are willing to accept, when they have to deal with large numbers of immigrants or with the presence of minority groups within what they regard as their historic homeland. There are complex and deeply felt local conflicts about official languages and languages of instruction, about the presence of visible signs of diversity (e.g. veils worn by Muslim girls in French schools), about practices which are regarded as historically tainted or historically sacred. These are not to be resolved merely by invoking universal principles; pragmatic considerations will often provide the best feasible solution. In the process of working out such conflicts, it can be important to direct attention away from larger conceptions of justice and rights, which often open the door for people to bring in all their accumulated grievances.

At the same time it is important for us to develop a deeper and more positive appreciation of positive aspects of nationalism and of political life lived in a way which affirms the values of a national community. This is a theme which Michael Walzer has recently taken up. Walzer presents the current situation in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union as one of renewed tribalism, in which "men and women are reasserting their local and particularist, their ethnic, religious, and national identities." Walzer sees this as an ambiguous development which involves both the failure of totalitarianism in the face of local loyalties and the renewal of ancient hatreds. He comments: "Songs and stories are the expression of a thick moral and political culture, to whose protagonists we are likely to be sympathetic (as in the Czech example . . .) for thin or minimalist reasons: because we oppose the oppression, deceit, and torture that accompanied totalitarian rule." He acknowledges that the political left, to which he belongs, has always had trouble understanding the tribes and has preferred to contain them within larger political units, even though these units were to be democratic rather than imperialistic monarchies in the style of the Habsburgs and the Romanovs. Separation into smaller units seemed a step backward in economic terms, a failure of rationality and universality.

But Walzer sees the pressure which arises on multinational constructions once politics becomes democratic. He observes: "But bring the 'people' into political life and they will arrive, marching in tribal ranks and orders, carrying with them their own languages, historical memories, customs, beliefs, and commitments—their own moral max-

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30 Ibid. 63–64.
We cannot dismiss this aspect of a people's life or fail to take it seriously, even though it may itself stand in need of moral criticism and revision. Until these peoples feel that their experience has been recognized and evaluated, it is probably beside the point to preach to them on the economies of scale provided by larger national markets and on the advantages of belonging to larger political units. I would add that the end of the Cold War has meant that the necessity of belonging to a larger confederation or alliance for reasons of national security has been much diminished. Walzer believes that secession and the formation of smaller political units must be allowed and that attempts to hold states together by coercion will violate justice. In many cases, perhaps even most, Walzer seems to suggest, it will not be possible to establish a neutral, supratribal government. But even if secession is legitimate, because of the value which Walzer finds in the self-government of a political community, there remain troubling questions about the new minorities which secession creates; our concern shifts from the Croats in Yugoslavia to the Serbs in Croatia and then in turn to Croats in Serb-held areas of Croatia.

In line with the pluralist bent of his thought, Walzer counsels us against seeking one set of arrangements for handling the very diverse sorts of religious and ethnic minorities that we find in the world. He concludes: "We have to work slowly and experimentally toward arrangements that satisfy the members (not the militants) of this or that minority. There is no single correct outcome." Walzer does rely on two key distinctions in attempting to give more detailed guidance on the problem of minorities, namely, a distinction between territorially concentrated and dispersed minorities and a distinction between minorities radically different from and marginally different from the majority population. He admits that both distinctions cover what are really "unmarked continuums."

He starts with the case of the Albanians in Kosovo (which is controlled by Serbia), who are "a minority community with a highly distinctive history and culture and a strong territorial base." Kosovo is, in the opinion of many experts, the place where the next major war in the former Yugoslavia will break out. Walzer gives the following lapidary evaluation of possible solutions: "The humane solution to their difficulty is to move the border; the brutal solution is to "transfer" the people; and the best practical possibility is some strong version of local autonomy, focused on cultural and educational institutions and the revenues that support them." It is likely, however, that Walzer's preferred practical solution will turn out to be unstable since it nourishes national consciousness among the Albanian majority in Kosovo and awareness of continuing oppression. But that does not overturn

31 Ibid. 65.  
32 Ibid. 75.  
33 Ibid. 73.
Walzer's general insistence on the pragmatic adjustment of claims to circumstances,\textsuperscript{34} or his recognition that "the negotiation of difference will never produce a final settlement."\textsuperscript{35}

He concludes his customarily rich and suggestive lecture on this topic with a recognition of a paradox that touches on the central limitation of universalist approaches:

Our common humanity will never make us members of a single universal tribe. The crucial commonality of the human race is particularism: we participate, all of us, in thick cultures that are our own. With the end of imperial and totalitarian rule, we can at last recognize this commonality and begin the difficult negotiations it requires.\textsuperscript{36}

Walzer's view steers a middle course between, on the one hand, a relativism according to which the normative claims made by the contending parties in ethnic-religious-cultural disputes are irreconcilable and in which there is no higher viewpoint from which to adjudicate these disputes, and, on the other hand, an overly abstract universalism which is unable to generate principles which can simultaneously elicit consent and give guidance that is specific enough to resolve disputes which are often complex, asymmetrical, and politically enflamed. At the same time it avoids both the materialistic reductionism of a Marxist approach and the cynicism of realpolitik, which would dismiss moral and cultural values as impotent or irrelevant. I would describe his approach as a humane pragmatism, which relies on the hope that we can combine a consensus on the principles of a "thin" universalism (some norms stating basic human rights and affirming the worth of all persons) with more specific negotiated agreements which will draw their legitimacy from the consent of the conflicting parties rather than from the universal validity of the principles on which they may be imperfectly based. These agreements can be commended to participants in ethnic-religious-cultural conflicts on the ground that, in terms of the well-being and security of ordinary people and also in terms of some of the cherished values of the conflicting parties, the imperfections of a negotiated settlement, along with its accompanying restrictions, are preferable to the continuation of hostilities and to the continued festering of ethnic hatreds.

This I take to be the logic of the position adopted by most church authorities in the face of the terrible conflicts that have developed not merely in the former Yugoslavia but also in Sudan and Rwanda and East Timor. Catholic social teaching has tended to take the state as a given and has opposed calls to revolutionary violence and class strug-

\textsuperscript{34} Ibid. 74.  
\textsuperscript{35} Ibid. 83.  
\textsuperscript{36} Ibid.
gle; it has considered the possibility of just revolution,\textsuperscript{37} and has endorsed the movement to decolonization and the creation of new polities from the remains of the old empires. But it has not developed a general account of the justifications for secession or for what Gurr discusses as "ethnonationalism." Thus it is not surprising that the Pontifical Justice and Peace Council in its statement earlier this year on the international arms trade acknowledges that while "states have a presumptive advantage" in the making of decisions about what organizations one could properly sell arms to, "the possibility still remains open, however, that the regime in power can be wrong. When faced with any decision, whether or not to supply arms to a group that opposes such a regime, it is important to distinguish between a struggle which is legitimate in its ends and means, and pure and simple terrorism."\textsuperscript{38}

What guides this discrimination between legitimate struggles for national self-determination and terroristic movements are three considerations. The first is the violation of human rights, especially through the unjustified taking of innocent lives; this is a criterion of the "thin" sort which is available to people from nearly all cultures and religious traditions. So, for instance, Archbishop Roach in writing on behalf of the U.S. Catholic Conference to Secretary of State Warren Christopher in May 1993 speaks of the necessity of "replacing aggressive nationalism with a commitment to democracy and basic human and minority rights."\textsuperscript{39} The second is a more ambiguous and context-dependent criterion, namely, the recognition of certain forms of nationalism as "virulent," "militant," and "aggressive." This involves a judgment that these forms of nationalism have something extreme and excessive in them and that they fail to respect limits and boundaries that are important to others.

The third consideration involves a more explicit reliance on theological categories for making a judgment that a particular form of nationalism is morally unacceptable. In some church statements we find that ethnic movements are denounced as idolatrous, as manifestations of a distorted order of values which has become dominant in the minds and hearts of the extremist nationalists or tribalists. Thus the final message of the special synod for Africa makes the point emphatically: "The synod denounces and emphatically condemns the lust for power and all forms of self-seeking as well as the idolatry of ethnicity, which leads to fratricidal wars."\textsuperscript{40} George Basil Cardinal Hume in an address in


\textsuperscript{40} Special Synod for Africa, "Final Message," in \textit{Origins} 24 (May 19, 1994) 1–11, at 7 (no. 36).
Prague in September 1993 makes substantially the same point with regard to Europe: "The curse of nationalism, which haunts Europe's past, resulted from the elevation of national identity into a false absolute."  

The idolatrous character of nationalism is perhaps most apparent in the case of great states with imperial ambitions and rich cultural heritages when these fall into the hands of leaders who will brook no criticism and who demand obedience in the pursuit of extreme ends. But it may also manifest itself in the very extremity of commitment to the cause of an oppressed people when it subordinates an otherwise-laudable devotion to the oppressed to a plan of action which rejects the duties implied by human rights and the moral bonds of the common humanity that is manifest both in the oppressed and the oppressors. In such an extreme commitment it is reasonable to think that there is also a rejection of God's sovereignty and God's creative will which rejoices in the many kinds of human diversity despite the problems they present to political leaders and to political theorists. The heart of a religious response to these problems, however, needs to be sought, as John Paul II urged in the sermon that he was unable to give in Sarajevo in September 1994, in seeing the power of God present in forgiveness and the nearness of God "to the refugees forced to leave their land and their homes" and "in solidarity with women humiliatingly violated." Such a realization breaks the cycle of violent retaliation, as the current examples of South Africa and the peacemaking process in the Middle East and the earlier example of the reconciliation of Germany with its Polish and French neighbors illustrate.

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ETHICAL ISSUES IN HEALTH-CARE RESTRUCTURING

The Republican landslide in the 1994 Congressional elections augurs the demise of sweeping, national legislative efforts to reform the American health-care system by guaranteeing universal access to a standard benefit package and instituting mechanisms to control the nation's swollen health-care budget. Yet there is no end in sight to the furiously paced restructuring of the health-care industry, in which formerly autonomous health-care institutions affiliate with one another in order to provide a full spectrum of health care and compete for the

43 A great wealth of ideas for the practical resolution of the kinds of disputes that nationalism so powerfully exacerbates can be found in Conflict and Peacemaking in Multiethnic Societies, ed. Joseph Montville (New York: Lexington, 1991).
1 President Clinton's Health Security Act was published with a useful summary by Commercial Clearing House, Chicago, in 1993.