BOOK REVIEWS


The Book of Daniel was written in the 160s B.C. in the course of the ultimately successful Jewish resistance to the tyranny of Antiochus Epiphanes IV. Much of its importance lies in its being the only apocalyptic book in the Old Testament; Dan 1–6 inspire dispirited people with a powerful example of courage and loyalty in the person of Daniel the sage, and Dan 7–12 develop with new sources and rhetoric the prophetic theology of history. Its eschatology, part of its new theology of history, has contributed mightily to the Christian doctrines of resurrection, Christology ("one like a son of man" = "one like a human being"), martyrdom, and the kingdom of God. Its striking imagery has influenced the doctrines of the Trinity (the ancient of days and the son of man in Dan 7), angelology, last judgment, and heaven and hell (Dan 10–12).

Though Daniel is not an easy book, its very difficulty has stimulated excellent commentaries in our century, S. R. Driver, Montgomery, Hartman, and Di Lella to mention only those in English, and now this magisterial volume. In its scope, grasp of the issues, mastery of relevant scholarship, and sober judgment, Collins's commentary has to be judged as the best we now have in any language. Such an assessment should occasion no surprise, for C. has been working with good effect on Daniel and related issues for many years, treating its central concepts in The Apocalyptic Vision of the Book of Daniel (1977), and synthesizing the rich and varied data of Jewish and Christian apocalyptic literature in The Apocalyptic Imagination (1987).

Some of C.'s specific judgments and contributions deserve to be pointed out. One contribution likely to go unnoticed outside technical scholarship is his superb handling of the difficult textual problems. He shows how the eight Qumran fragments of Daniel (the oldest of which is only 50 years younger than the autograph!) essentially support the consonantal Masoretic Text but make possible some minor corrections. C. reviews the complicated story of the Greek text, using for the first time all the published fragments of the Old Greek version. He explains its relation to the version of Theodotion, which for reasons that are not clear was the text used by the Church.

The most important general contribution of the commentary, however, in the judgment of the reviewer, is its careful placement of the book within the apocalyptic movements of early Judaism. Many "apoc-
alyptic" works were written in the two centuries before and after the turn of the era, books such as 1 Enoch, The Book of Jubilees, The Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs. Analysis of these works is extremely difficult not only because of their inherent difficulty but because of confusion in scholarly terminology and lack of consensus on the proper classification of the books and their genres, and on their provenance. Fortunately, recent years have seen an increasing measure of agreement on key points: the literary genre of apocalypse, apocalyptic eschatology, apocalypticism as the ideology of a movement, apocalyptic language, and the questions of setting and function. One example, the definition of the genre of apocalypse, is relevant to the interpretation of Dan 7, 8, and 10–12. Based on wide empirical research by himself and others, C.’s own definition is useful for Daniel: “a genre of revelatory literature with a narrative framework, in which a revelation is mediated by an otherworldly being to a human recipient, disclosing a transcendent reality which is both temporal, insofar as it envisages eschatological salvation, and spatial insofar as it involves another supernatural world.”

Not surprisingly, the largest amount of space is devoted to Dan 7. A survey of the religio-historical background properly finds little Iranian or Babylonian, but a good deal of “Canaanite” traditions mediated by a long process of transmission: “the opposition between the sea and the rider of the clouds, the presence of two godlike figures, and the fact that one who comes with the clouds receives everlasting domination” (291).

The book is enriched by lengthy excursus on the four kingdoms, one like a human being, holy ones (they are angels, in the context of a synergism between the faithful Israelites on earth and their angelic counterparts in heaven), and resurrection. Adela Yarbro Collins has contributed an essay, “The Influence of Daniel on the New Testament.”

Weston School of Theology

Richard J. Clifford, S.J.


Soon after the ten commandments God ominously orders: “You shall give me the first-born among your sons. You shall do the same with your cattle and flocks” (Exod 22:28–29). Levenson, professor of Jewish Studies at Harvard Divinity School, confronts this stark command without solace from the more comforting and humane version in Exod 34:20, “The first-born among your sons you shall redeem.” Instead he marshalls a number of texts which suggest that child sacrifice was a
normative mode of worshipping Yahweh at certain times, just as it was in related Near Eastern religious traditions. Thus Mesha, king of Moab, sacrificed his son on the city wall and stopped the Israelite siege (2 Kings 3:26–27), the Phoenicians in Carthage sacrificed numerous of their children, Micah listed an array of acceptable sacrifices for sin, culminating in the offering of a first-born (Micah 6:6–7), and Abraham stood ready to give his son Isaac to God (Gen 22).

Though most commentators have recoiled at the thought that child sacrifice was practiced within normative Israelite religion, L. connects child sacrifice to an "ancient, protean, and strangely resilient story of the death and resurrection of the beloved son" (232) which underlies the Jewish and Christian traditions. The Genesis stories concerning the yahid, the "only, chosen, beloved" son whom God demands but then preserves, and the story of Jesus, the Son of God, who accepts death according to his Father's will and is raised to life, depend upon the same pattern. The deadly sibling rivalries which threatened the lives of Isaac, Jacob, and Joseph and resulted in the subjection of Ishmael and Esau and the temporary enslavement of Joseph participate in the same dangerous but gripping divine drama. Though the offering of the first-born to God most often was replaced by a redemptive payment, the power of the narrative lived on.

In Second Temple and rabbinic literature a willing Isaac became a self-sacrificing son rather than a child victim, and he along with Jewish martyrs provided redemptive grace to Israel. As the threatened sons of Genesis were returned to their parents, so persecuted Jews were rescued in the next life through resurrection. In some rabbinic traditions Isaac actually was sacrificed by Abraham and then raised by God (note Isaac's absence in Gen 22:19). In the New Testament God and Jesus displaced Abraham and Isaac but the fundamental relationships continued to be played out. The beloved, only son was betrayed by his own disciples (family) as Joseph was. Judas, like Judah in the Joseph story, sold his "brother." Jesus, like Isaac, willingly offered himself and was rescued by God.

Though Jews and Christians share this powerful story, it divides them. In Genesis the chosen line again and again dispossesses its siblings (Isaac vs. Ishmael; Jacob vs. Esau; Israel vs. Edom and Moab) from the covenant and blessings. Similarly Jews and Christians, though siblings, have excluded one another (as they must by the logic of the narrative) from the unique paternal blessings of a common biblical legacy.

L. uses the best of the historical-critical method in his analyses of texts, but, true to his previous criticism of its limits, he structures his book as an extended, meditative reflection on a series of biblical, Sec-
ond Temple, New Testament, and rabbinic texts. His “midrash” is rich and challenging, enlivened with the contrast of alternative positions and the dogged pursuit of hard truths. The choice and sequence of texts advance his theological argument. His God is a loving but unsentimental Father who demands the deaths of Isaac and Jesus. L.’s method eschews convenient pieties as solutions for religious problems; his viewpoint rejects the simplistic, vapid universalism of the Enlightenment in favor of the deep, complex, nourishing particularity of the biblical God revealed in the tradition. His agenda affirms God and humans, life and death as the point of theology. This study demands honest, concentrated reflection and repays it generously.

Boston College  
ANTHONY J. SALDARINI


The aim of this study, insofar as it is stated, is to recover from history “a credible, living memory to sustain the present and guide us into the future” (14). There is no series profile, but readers should not expect anything like Fleming James’s Personalities of the Old Testament (1939). We are in the post-historical-criticism era. Perkins’s earlier work on Gnosticism enriches the post-New Testament sections of this book. Frequently she invokes experiences with parish and clergy Bible-study groups. While historical questions are asked, literary and sociological perspectives are prominent. There is awareness of past landmarks like Cullmann’s 1952 volume Petrus and the 1973 collaborative assessment by Protestant and Roman Catholic scholars, Peter in the New Testament. But much has changed. The Introduction sets forth not only Peter “first among disciples” and “the apostle in a divided Christianity” but also “in a changing church: Roman Catholicism,” along with the book’s thesis, “Peter as an Ecclesial Centrist.” This derives from J. D. G. Dunn’s “bridge-builder” concept (5) and from Antioch and Rome (1983) by R. E. Brown and J. P. Meier (9–10), a book that saw both cities as quite uniform in their Christianity, avoiding the likelihood of house-church and sectarian variety.

A short “life of Peter” weaves together familiar New Testament texts, but closer analysis of the call story in Luke 5 and parallels, Peter’s confession, and his denial of Jesus erodes confidence that we can know what happened. This opens the way to exploration of Peter as a narrative character in each Gospel and in Acts. Tradition and redaction criticism, with, it is claimed, their tendency to present “antagonistic, dualistic views of early Christian origins” (e.g. T. J. Weeden,
who goes unmentioned), are downgraded in favor of narrative readings (e.g. 54–55). There are interesting insights, such as the (historical?) claim that Peter’s family “supported the renewal movements associated with John the Baptist and then Jesus” (60), just as Peter’s daughter is emphasized in later tradition. No single, distinct image of Peter in each Gospel can be said to emerge, let alone any line(s) of development.

“Peter in the Epistles” is taken up only after all the narratives. Here he stands “in the shadow of Paul,” since 1 and 2 Peter are pseudonymous works, after Peter’s death, and partially Pauline, and Paul’s letters pose the question of “fellow apostle or opponent?” (Why not both?) The dispute at Antioch (Gal 2:11–14) is minimized through rhetorical criticism; any anti-Pauline campaign is “conjecture” (115–17). The final chapters show how later writings fill in the gaps about Peter and present him as martyr, spokesman for “true tradition,” and bishop of Rome. But the data are always varied. Peter, like Paul, becomes a mouthpiece for contrasting views among gnostics and the orthodox.

The conclusion, “Peter for the Whole Church?” argues that “Peter as disciple in the New Testament exhibits the ambiguities that many Christians feel in today’s church” (184); his “faith makes him the source of unity in the apostolic testimony” (185); but a “Petrine ministry for the Christian churches of the twenty-first century certainly cannot be limited to the historical form that it has taken in the bishop of Rome” (186). All this may be true, but the often bland narrative results and the conflicting images probably do not have the power to move people to a “centrist Peter” (between whom?), lacking Paul’s emphasis on “the truth of the gospel” (Gal 2:5, 14) or the Beloved Disciple’s faith (John 20). The book will sound quite Roman Catholic to some readers, but not traditional enough for Roman claims.

**Lutheran Theological Seminary, Philadelphia**  
JOHN REUMANN


In this intriguing book on second-century theology, Osborn gleefully swims against the current. The currently dominant historicism leads readers to assume that differences are interesting and important, while unity and agreement are either uninteresting or suspect. In O.’s book, however, the most important word is “one”: he makes a good case for the unity of theology in the second century. And Protestant historians of dogma generally assumed that their task was to search out the point at which Christianity went wrong, to find the Deformation that justified the Reformation— which might have been the Hellenization
of right Christian belief, the replacement of faith by dogma, or the
flattening of history by philosophy. In his opening sentence, however,
O. proposes to write of "the lively beginning which brought Christian-
ity and classical thought together in Christian theology" (xi), a process
he fully approves of.

The objects of O.'s study are the writings of Justin Martyr, Athena-
goras, Irenaeus of Lyons, Clement of Alexandria, and Tertullian. The
latter half of the second century, he writes, witnessed an extraordinary
intellectual acceleration; it was a short period of human invention that
made earlier concepts irrelevant and set the course for the future of
European culture. Beginning just after 150, the five authors he studies
had a Christian Bible to expound and New Testament ideas to exploit.
They also had opponents to refute: pagans, Gnostics, philosophers, and
Jews. But, O. insists, the mere need to refute these opponents does not
adequately explain the emergence of Christian theology, any more
than the Third Reich adequately explains the United Nations. Instead,
late-second-century Christian authors developed a brilliant new syn-
thesis. In a schematic statement that dominates the structure of his
book, O. writes that Christians saw the one God as the first principle
of physics (metaphysics), ethics, and logic; that is, the one God was
being, goodness, and truth. As the first principle of metaphysics, God
is being; the one Lord, the universal Word, and Trinity. As the first
principle of ethics, He is goodness; He gives the one law, and provides
the one end and resource for ethical endeavors. As the first principle of
logic, He is truth, the one truth of faith and knowledge. For a reader
used to more standard categories like Trinity, Christology, and sote-
riology, this triad takes some getting used to. But O. uses it dexter-
ously, and again and again subtly invites the reader to see familiar
assertions in a new light.

Beginning with this triadic schema, O. provides three preliminary
chapters: one on the opponents of Christian monotheism, one on an-
cient Geist-metaphysik, and one on the Bible as the material for the-
ology (in which he offers a remarkable summary of the teachings of
Matthew, Paul, and the Fourth Gospel). In the five principal chapters,
he deals with the one God as cause and Father, the unity of all things
in Christ, the God who is one by the Son and the Spirit, the one Good,
and the one mind who grounds truth and logic. Throughout, O. con-
stantly quotes or paraphrases his five authors, demonstrating a uni-
fied teaching on the part of all five. References are embedded in the
text, but their presence there does not offend the reader's eye; on the
contrary, they show how thorough O.'s knowledge of his sources is. O.
covers most of the topics of the ordinary history of doctrine, but not in
the usual way. In particular, he does not measure the success of sec-
BOOK REVIEWS 543

ond-century authors by comparing their ideas with the doctrines of fourth-century councils. In fact, he waits until the conclusion of the book to make explicit what he has been doing all along: trying to show that second-century theology is better than, and preferable to, fourth-century Christian creeds, councils, and controversies. While he does not propose entitling his book *The Second, Greatest of Centuries*, he makes an intriguing case for his thesis, a thesis that should provoke some lively scholarly debate.

O.'s book flows from decades of studying second-century Christian writings, and from a love of what those writings had to say. The book is not easy to read, although O.'s wit is often evident. But reading the book is well worth the effort; what O. says about the unity of Christian theology, and its originality and brilliance, needs to be heard, again and again.

*Fordham University*  
JOSEPH T. LIENHARD, S.J.


A study of ideas about the final destiny of the wicked. More specifically, it explores why and how the idea of punishment in the after-life arose. Is this idea peculiar to Christianity? Or does the Christian belief in some form of other-worldly punishment develop through the interaction of the biblical tradition with ideas and images in the cultures and religions of antiquity?

Bernstein, associate professor of History at the University of Arizona, takes the reader back many centuries before the time of Jesus to search out the varied notions about the fate of the dead as this was envisioned in the ancient world. After some introductory reflections on Babylonia and Egypt, B. presents four different ways in which death was understood in ancient Greece and Rome. Each manner of understanding death involved a particular understanding of the relation between the living and the dead. Here the reader is brought into contact with the epics of Homer, the satires of Lucian, and the dialogues of Plato.

Against the background of this broad cultural and literary landscape, B. analyzes the emergence of the notion of hell in the biblical tradition, moving through both the Hebrew Scriptures and the early Christian writings. In the latter case, he studies not only the canonical writings but many early noncanonical writings as well. These include texts such as the *Apocalypse of Peter* and the *Apocalypse of Paul*, which have made significant contributions to the history of the Christian
imagination concerning hell. In short, the literary sources from which B. draws include myth, folklore, poetry, philosophy, and religion.

Important themes that run through the presentation are: divine mercy, divine justice, the desire for vengeance, and the meaning of retribution. How is vengeance related to divine mercy? If one grants that there is punishment in the after-life, is it temporary or eternal? What is the essence of such punishment? How is the essential issue to be distinguished from the plethora of images that are used to express it? Is there any sense in which hell’s punishment might be mitigated? Does the origin of the purgatorial tradition lie in this area? The wide range of viewpoints on virtually every one of these issues should go far to put to rest the idea that there is a clear, consistent tradition in Christian theology on issues about the afterlife.

The tracing of historical lines of development reaches a high point in the contrasting descriptions of the logic of universal salvation in Origen and the logic of an eternal hell in Augustine. This is particularly interesting since both Origen and Augustine were influenced deeply by neo-Platonism. It was precisely the logic of philosophical emanationism that led to Origen’s doctrine of universal restoration. And it was this theological view that the great Western Christian neo-Platonist rejected so strongly. The seeds of a powerful theology of will and freedom may be found here. The strong polarity reflected in the Origenist and Augustinian views remains a significant factor in contemporary studies of Christian eschatology.

While the reader will find much to think about in tracing the various extrabiblical influences which have shaped the Christian ideas of the after-life, B. still makes a clear and convincing case for what stands out as distinctively Christian. This he sees in the way the Christian view of hell reflects the Christian understanding of the mercy and justice of God. The varied attempts to hold these two divine attributes in an intelligible relation account for much of the diversity within the Christian tradition.

B.’s presentation as a whole is based on sound historical and literary analysis. The wealth of detail does not obscure the major lines of the argument, which is presented with remarkable clarity. This book is a major contribution to the growing library of studies on the history of the eschatological imagination.

Catholic Theological Union, Chicago

ZACHARY HAYES, O.F.M.


Early in this century Etienne Gilson made the claim that Augustine
never changed his views on any basic question, even in the area of grace, from the time of his conversion. The most fruitful Augustinian scholarship in more recent decades has worked on precisely the opposite conviction. This excellent study of Augustine's thought continues in that fruitful vein, examining the development of his doctrine of the will from his early dialogues through his anti-Pelagian works. Wetzel brings to this study the background of a well-trained philosopher and casts considerable light on some of Augustine's most difficult doctrines, such as the freedom of the will under the influence of grace. Unlike many students of Augustine's thought who view him as abandoning his early enthusiasm for Platonism when confronted with the Pelagian account of human agency, W. sees Augustine's commitment to Platonic philosophy, especially in the guise of the transforming power of the Good, as remaining fundamental to his views of virtue and willing, even in his later works.

W. first sets the stage with a discussion of Augustine's celebrated, if puzzling, views on time from the *Confessions*. He correctly sees the ambivalent character of time as God's good creature and as the source of our distortion that leads to our destruction. As W. reads Augustine, time emerges as lacking not reality, but ultimacy, so that time is simply creaturely existence. W. then turns to Augustine's fundamentally Stoic account of happiness and virtue in *De beata vita* and *De libero arbitrio*; he finds in both works the coincidence of virtue, wisdom, and beatitude, with beatitude secured against the loss of bodily goods without and against the pull of the affections within. He finds Augustine's account of the voluntariness of sin unintelligible in the light of what he refers to as the "beatific knowledge" of the wise and virtuous person. Here he has, I suspect, mistakenly carried Augustine's view that a beatifying wisdom was attainable in this life (a view found in his earliest writings) into Books 2 and 3 of *De libero arbitrio*, which were completed years later.

W. traces the development of Augustine's psychology of willing in his anti-Manichaean works, points to the emergence of the doctrine of involuntary sin and of the force of habit that opens room for moral struggle in the life of the sage. Augustine's critique of the pagan virtues in *De civitate Dei* represents, according to W., not a complete rejection of the Stoic ideal so much as its rehabilitation in the light of grace. While rejecting Cochrane's sweeping claims about the relation of Christianity and classicism, W. correctly sees Augustine's theology of grace as an answer to the inadequacy of pagan views of wisdom and beatitude and finds a thread of continuity between pagan accounts of the virtues and Augustine's redescription of them in relation to God. He suggests that the ideal of virtue's invulnerability remains a con-
stant goal in Augustine's philosophical interests, though he concedes that virtue no longer reflects simply our own sources of power, but the power of divine grace appropriated in recollection. W. examines in detail Augustine's account of his own conversion in the *Confessions* in comparison with his early exegesis of Romans in the *Expositio* and with the new interpretation of the relation of faith and grace he came to in *Ad Simplicianum*.

In a dense chapter on the evolution of the doctrine of grace and of human freedom as it is found in Augustine's writings from the *Ad Simplicianum* to the treatises written for Prosper and Hilary, W. struggles to portray the role of grace and human self-determination in conversion and moral growth. In conclusion, he notes the rejection of Augustine's account of freedom as a failure by Augustinian scholars, such as Gerard O'Daly and John Rist, and he tries to rehabilitate that account of freedom, in contrast with free choice, by pointing to parallels with Harry Frankfurt's account of freedom.

*Marquette University, Milwaukee* 

**ROLAND J. TESKE, S.J.**


This study focuses on the modern disputes over the relation of the parts of the great commandment of love of God, self, and neighbor, particularly the assertions that Augustine subordinated the love of neighbor to the beatifying and perfecting love of God. Canning engages Nygren, Brechtken, and Hultgren with the general assistance of Burnaby, Holte, and O'Donovan. C. ranges over the Augustinian corpus, considering first the texts which seem to separate the two loves and then those which treat love of neighbor as a ladder for climbing to love of God, which can then be discarded once the goal is reached. Having shown that neither of these positions is adequately founded in the texts, once they have been carefully interpreted, C. then moves to the coordination of the *uti/frui* distinction with the love of God and neighbor. After respectful consideration of Verheijen's proposal, C. opts for O'Donovan's. The results are not subsequently integrated into the study.

Next C. specifies the love of self, which serves as the reference point for the love of neighbor, and then considers the identity of the neighbor. C. shows the underlying unity of both loves, thereby undercutting any interpretation which would subordinate one to the other. He is then prepared to demonstrate the unity of love of God, self, and neighbor. Finally, C. surveys Augustine's interpretation of Matthew 25:31–
46, the eschatological judgment based upon service to the unrecognized Christ who has been identified with the "little ones."

A reader who has come to appreciate the value of attention to the development of Augustine's thought and to the influence of the successive controversies in which he engaged will be uneasy with C.'s neglect of chronology and context as he attempts to formulate a unified Augustinian view on the two loves. Though he is generally careful to date the texts he uses, C. ignores the changing controversial and social context. E.g., texts from 418 and 415 are interspersed with those from the 396–401 period (268–73). Even the role of a text within the particular work from which it is plucked is often neglected. Although C. successfully appeals to the immediate context of *Trin.* 8.8.12 to show that an improper distinction between exterior and interior vitiates du Roy's interpretation of the passage, he himself fails to attend to the place which this section of book 8 occupies in the development of Augustine's argument or to the contemporary parallels in *Gen. ad litt.* Even more striking is the curious neglect of the original unity of love of God, self, and neighbor in the gift of the Holy Spirit. Romans 5:5, "The love of God is shed abroad in our hearts through his Spirit who is given to us," is the most frequently cited of all scriptural passages in Augustine's works. Its interpretation is essential to every phase of his intellectual and religious development. Yet it receives only passing attention in this analysis of love for God and neighbor, although Labonnadière's study of its use appears in the bibliography.

Modern religious sensibilities and the conflicts over Augustine's teaching which have arisen from them seem to have overpowered C.'s historical analysis of the identity of the neighbor. In the final chapter, e.g., C. clearly indicates that Augustine tended to interpret Matthew 25:40 in the light of his belief that the Church was the whole Christ and thus to specify the neighbor who was to be aided as the fellow Catholic or the potential convert, Donatist or pagan. Yet both here and in the discussion of the parable of the Samaritan, C. strains against the historical limits of Augustine's perspective, attempting to show that the texts allow an identification of Christ with any other human person (383–84, 191–98). An even more egregious anachronism occurs in a reference to Augustine's respect for the inviolable freedom of each person's decision to love God (220), where C. has to ignore not only the doctrine of predestination and efficacious grace but the justification of social coercion which produces such liberty.

The volume will serve as a resource for studies of Augustine's thought on love of neighbor in relation to God, since C. has carefully collected and analyzed the relevant texts. He provides an English translation for each text analyzed, along with the Latin text and full
references to the major editions for each of his citations. The study summarizes, evaluates, and even advances the modern debates which were sparked by Nygren's evaluation of Augustine. It does not, however, take a higher viewpoint and transcend the limits of this continuing conflict by studying the social context in which Augustine worked. Attention to the Donatist controversy, the argument with the Roman traditionalists, and the barbarian threat to the pax Romana might have displayed Augustine's thought even more effectively.

Washington University, Saint Louis
J. Patout Burns


Russell's book presents an interesting and important twist: he demonstrates how early medieval Christianity got fundamentally transformed by Germanic religious concepts and thought. Indeed, he arrives at the conclusion that the Germanic peoples had not been christianized in the strict sense by the middle of the eighth century. Although baptized, their form of Christianity was basically a non-Christian Germanized one, since essential Christian soteriological concepts had been compromised. This Germanization of Western Medieval Christianity had serious consequences, R. claims, for the religiocultural orientation of popular Roman Catholicism for more than a thousand years—until of opening of the Second Vatican Council in 1962.

The Germanization of Western Christianity is not a new concept. R. is well aware of German research in particular that has employed the concept since the end of the last century; but for R., it is central in his understanding of the transformation of Christianity. What in the efforts of the missionaries to christianize the Germanic peoples led to this Germanization of the Christian religion thus transmitted? In studying this question, R. develops a general model of religious transformation for encounters of the generally “world-accepting” folk religiosity of the Germanic peoples with the “world-rejecting” attitude of the Christian religion. This makes for highly interesting and challenging reading. R. uses sociological, anthropological, and psychological perspectives and obtains criteria and concepts from the reports of contemporary missionary efforts in, e.g., Africa and Asia.

To apply such a method of conclusion by analogy is, of course, always problematic; but what can be done, when there is only the scantiest of information available? R. proceeds carefully and conscientiously, his results are generally acceptable, and he is to be congratulated for many interesting insights and ideas. The principal result of this in-
vestigation, itemized at the end of Part 1, is that a universal-salvation religion must temporarily accommodate the world-accepting ethos and worldview of a folk-religious society, if it is to succeed in its missionary efforts (103). The need to accommodate the Germanic peoples, if they were to become Christians, naturally led to religious beliefs, values, and views that were more Germanic than strictly Christian.

An approach such as R. has chosen elicits, of course, many questions. Did not the Early Church itself already dilute the strictly Christian ideas of the New Testament by opposing the Marcionites and allowing the old pre-Christian Jewish texts to be part of its Scriptures? Early German texts, particularly those influenced by the idea of crusading are pervaded by an Old Testament spirit. It is almost unimaginable how the Germanic peoples would have become Christian without the Old Testament and the interpretations it allowed. What about the strict Christian beliefs of the early missionaries themselves, who were often just first-generation Christians?

Other questions concern the time limit R. has set for his investigations. Occasionally he allows for tantalizing glimpses forward to the time of a chivalrous society or the crusades. They, together with the spirit of Cluny and the Gregorian reform attempts, would have been a marvellous field for an investigation with his model. Another hundred pages of research in this area would also have made for a better balance between the development of the model and its application.

Yet R.’s book is an important contribution to research, and, despite many long and overlong citations from secondary sources, it makes stimulating and challenging reading. As a revised thesis it obviously aimed first at establishing and presenting its model of religious transformation. Future application of the model to the efforts of Christianization in the Carolingian, Ottonian, and Salian-Staufian dynasties is to be expected and hoped for, as it will allow for new aspects and a unifying approach.

McGill University, Montreal

HORST RICHTER


Biagioli vividly presents the pioneer physicist to us through the active social relations he experienced with persons in the different courts with which he was connected. All of them influenced Galileo (and he them) without any loss to his scientific accomplishments. B. is not the first to link Galileo with his patrons. Robert Westman and Richard Westfall described the patronage scene in excellent earlier
works on Galileo. Patronage is always present and a factor in any absolutist (nondemocratic) regime but was seldom as nuanced and detailed as in the courts of 17th-century Italy. In B.'s work, however, we are looking at a larger screen than was available to his predecessors, and B. fills this screen with a plethora of finely drawn and documented details. The two courts B. describes in most detail are those where Galileo was a true courtier: the Medici court in Tuscany and the papal court in Rome.

After he had dedicated the satellites of Jupiter to the Medicis, Galileo asked for and obtained the position of Mathematician and Philosopher to the Grand Duke of Tuscany, as well as an appropriate salary and an exemption from the obligation of meeting classes for instruction. With his new instruments and the ability to produce other similar instruments, Galileo was now free to be a member of the court and enjoy its benefits without concern about petty things. Now he could turn his mind (along with his telescope) ad altiora. While still active in his major position at Florence, Galileo started planning to enter the palace of the popes in Rome as well. He never had to renounce his residence in Florence and he always turned to his patron, the Grand Duke, for support and protection. He was never formally a member of the papal household as he was in Florence. His contacts in Rome were through visits, letters, and conferences.

Perhaps the peak of Galileo's career as courtier was reached when his friend Cardinal Maffeo Barberini was elected Pope and took the name of Urban VIII. He had earlier written a most laudatory ode in honor of Galileo, and after coming to the throne he welcomed Galileo in several audiences, gave him gifts, and accepted the dedication of one of Galileo's major works, *The Assayer*.

B. describes in marvelous detail how Galileo used patronage to obtain his first teaching position in Pisa (through his friendship with Father Christopher Clavius), how he maneuvered his transfer from Padua to the "home court" of the Medicis, how he used his contacts with Prince Cesi and other well-placed persons in Roman circles to become an Academician and a person of influence, and how all of this turned to dust for Galileo, when he lost the patronage of Urban VIII, one of his two most special patrons.

B. challenges his readers with his eloquent description of the multilayered composition of the courts frequented by Galileo. Doubtless this work will encourage new and vigorous studies in the sociological methodology of science. We are in the hands of a master when we read B.'s text and especially when he leads us through the labyrinthine ways of that complex phenomenon, the downfall of Galileo.

Midway in B.'s narrative, a chapter entitled "Anthropology of In-
commensurability” will fascinate the sociologists of science and surprise those who are not. B. shows he has “won his spurs” here also and demonstrates his thorough mastery of the literature and all attendant reference tools. Thus enriched or slightly baffled, the reader moves into the second half of the text to examine how Galileo, who had risen so high as a courtier in two courts, could fall so fast, when his top ranking Maecenas, the Barberini pope proved to be so unforgiving and vindictive.

Years after the sentence of house arrest and his consequent absence from the company of scholars, Galileo was able to publish two of his greatest works, the Discourse on Two New Sciences (1638) and the Letter to the Grand Duchess Christina (1635). The first set the stage for the great developments to come under Descartes and Newton. The second was largely responsible for many current positions in modern biblical scholarship.

Vatican Observatory, Tucson

MARTIN F. MCCARTHY, S.J.


Recent Kantian scholarship has become more attentive to the later stages of the critical project launched in 1781 by the Critique of Pure Reason. As a result, there is growing recognition that, despite one trajectory in Kant’s thought that would reduce religion to morality without remainder, there is another trajectory in which religion—or at least elements central to Christian claims about God, the human person, and human destiny—functions as an irreducibly distinct and necessary feature in Kant’s account of the critical engagement of finite human reason with the realms of its proper activity: nature and freedom. Davidovich’s work offers a welcome perspective upon the theological significance of the Critique of Judgment (1790), which Kant himself declared to be the conclusion of his critical undertaking.

D. first offers what she terms a “radical reinterpretation of Kant’s Third Critique.” According to this interpretation, Kant’s “central argument, that reflective judgment bridges the gap between nature and freedom, led [him] to a contemplative conception of religion that differs significantly from the conception of religion in the first two Critiques” (xi–xii). From this interpretive base, she then argues that Rudolf Otto and Paul Tillich “are deeply indebted to the Third Critique and develop its seminal ideas to characterize two distinct conceptions of the essence of religion and its relation to other realms of culture” (xiv).

Three elements constitute D.’s treatment of the Critique of Judg-
merit and its impact upon Otto and Tillich. First, she takes Kant's goal in this work to be the elaboration of an account of the unity of reason with respect to the different functions— theoretical in the realm of nature, practical in the realm of freedom—which the two earlier Critiques had delimited. She thus affirms a thematic and argumentative unity in Kant's treatments of aesthetic and teleological judgments over against interpretations which see this final Critique as a philosophical pastiche or which take its primary import to lie in its seminal contribution to aesthetics. On these points, I consider D. correct.

Second, she claims that in this work Kant's establishment of the unity of reason "in a moment of contemplative thought about a moral designer of the universe" (xiv) has a fundamentally religious character. D. sees this as a development beyond, and a significant contrast to, what she terms Kant's "official" philosophy of religion in the first two Critiques, which has its focus on the refutation of theoretical proofs of God's existence and the articulation of a moral argument for God that makes religion, at best, an "adjunct to morality" (xiv–xv). This second claim has elements which I think are correct, but I hesitate to endorse it fully.

D. is surely right in arguing that the notion of reflective judgment marks an important development in Kant's efforts to secure the unity of reason. She also is correct in viewing this notion as one which allows Kant to offer a more complete analysis of "the highest good," a crucial element in his account of religion. In consequence, D. offers well-taken criticism of the tendency among some influential interpreters of Kant to neglect important links which the third Critique provides between the Critique of Practical Reason (1788) and Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone (1793). I am not convinced, however, that the development which Kant gives to his account of religion in the third Critique stands in such sharp contrast as D. proposes with respect to his "official" philosophy of religion in the earlier Critiques, nor do I agree with her views that the later Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone "was concerned primarily with preventing the danger of fanaticism, which he associated with historical religion" (xv), and was "not intended to achieve any further development of the critique of reason" (136).

Third, D. argues that even though "Kant himself did not continue to expand his suggestive conception of contemplative hope into a comprehensive philosophy of religion," Otto and Tillich respectively did so by presenting "two alternative ways of developing Kant's arguments into a systematic theory of religion" (xv). Her discussion of both later thinkers seeks to uncover their conceptual and argumentative indebtedness to Kant; of particular note here is the case she makes, on the basis of
parallels with Kant's treatment of aesthetic judgments, that Otto "did not write The Idea of the Holy simply to describe the various affective moments that are involved in the religious experience" (171), but to establish "the noeticity of religious feeling," viz. as "a state of knowledge in which we are aware of that which we do not understand" (186). D. then provides, in the final chapter, a sketch of a "Kantian tradition in a philosophy of religion that seeks to secure for religion an essential role in the economy of reason" (305).

One can legitimately take issue with specific points in D.'s interpretation of all three thinkers; a more serious matter is the fact that D.'s analyses of the aims and arguments of the Critique of Judgment and the pertinent texts of Otto and Tillich only occasionally attend to the historical contexts in which they originally took shape. In the absence of such historical anchorage, D.'s interpretation is open to the criticism of being just another speculative reading of Kant's enterprise. I think it is more than that: the overall argument of this work provides a fresh perspective on Kant and his influence which, while still in need of refinement and more extensive historical corroboration, deserves careful consideration.

Marquette University, Milwaukee

PHILIP ROSSI, S.J.

WORD AND SPIRIT: A KIERKEGAARDIAN CRITIQUE OF THE MODERN AGE.

We acknowledge Kierkegaard's defense of the individual yet overlook his concern for genuine community. Transcribing existential categories through the speech-act theory of J. L. Austin, Hall makes an important contribution to revising this received view of Kierkegaard. Hall argues that the Anglo-American language analysis need not exclude existential concerns with temporal and historically existing human beings which are commonly thematized in Continental thought. When I make a promise, admit my despair or hope, I perform something with my words vis-à-vis another in the world. "The reflexively integral speech-act" (201) bonds me to the addressee and to something in the world; it allows me to retrieve my selfhood while relating so. I live pinned down in my embodiment, and I transcend this limit in the possibility of becoming a free individual in community. This bonding/sundering of responsible speech reflects Austin's illocutionary or performative tie of speech-acts and Hall's existential core of action.

Hall argues that in Don Giovanni and Faust, Kierkegaard ironizes the spiritlessness of our age: once Western modernity forgets historical
and material concretion, it no longer differentiates between silent com-
munication and demonic solipsism or existential speech-acts and
"speech as music." Without distinguishing between existential action
(speech-acts) and the lyrical-aesthetic ("music"), even deconstructions
of logocentrism (183–186, 192–197) appear no more concrete than
modern calculative rationality. Hall questions equally modernist re-
ified agency and postmodern transgressions of reason by "demonic"
nihilism.

Hall’s controversial claim is that speech-acts are due to the Chris-
tian worldview and, therefore, that "the speech act is the chief enemy
of the modern age" (91); thus the link of speech to what is essentially
human proves Christianity as "the only world-picture" (88) with a cure
for the crises of modernity. In contrast Jürgen Habermas, who along
with Karl-Otto Apel expands speech-acts to ground moral and critical
social theory, argues that the performative attitude of speech becomes
available to us via the linguistification of the sacred. Habermas views
speech-acts as an ally and legitimate postconventional progeny of mo-
dernity. Hall writes that without Christianity and in hypersecular
modernity existential expression and freedom are impossible. Haber-
mas holds that without modernity we remain enchanted by metaphys-
cical worldviews, incapable of entering freely into the responsible
bonds of speech. Hall’s Kierkegaard supports communitarians rather
than, pace Sartre, modernist critics of religious and secular conven-
tionalism. Given Hall’s "demonic" view of modernity, it is difficult not
to read in his communitarian polemic with modernism an appeal to the
pre-modern—a move that he shares unwittingly with anti-modern
postmodernists.

Hall greatly adds to the recent renaissance of existential thought to
foster more just communities in the aftermath of the crisis of moder-
nity. He joins a new territory in Continental and Anglo-American
sociopolitical debates where Kierkegaard has become a long-overdue
partner in contemporary conversations. Commending Hall’s stimulat-
ing, scholarly book, I conclude with questions for further discussion.

Does the nodal point for an analysis of speech-acts lie within Chris-
tianity or within the sociopolitical assumption underlying Kierke-
gaard’s authorship that Christianity vanished from Christendom?
Does Kierkegaard reject modernity or does his authorship presuppose
linguistification of sacred and secular doctrines? Is Kierkegaard’s de-
fense of the individual necessarily Eurocentric or does it allow for a
more multicultural standpoint of diverse humanity that unites with-
out racial, sexist, classist, secular, or religious authority?

Purdue University

Martin J. Matuštík

The often-confusing taxonomy of postmodernism, the consequence of surprisingly diverse explanations of its cultural ascendancy, has stirred the need to name more precisely the modernity eclipsed by the troublesome prefix. Dupré’s study is an important addition to a body of recent literature that has assumed this difficult task. Although modestly described as an “essay,” the book is a magisterial study of the origins of modernity in the late medieval intellectual world, its account extending only as far in time as the 17th century. Like many commentators, D. identifies the spirit of modernity with the traits of autonomy and creativity. But unlike most, he judges the Enlightenment’s originality in shaping these characteristics to be “singularly overrated” (2). Nominalism figures prominently in D.’s explanation as the seedbed in which modernity flowered. And while his account makes its case from the evidence of metaphysics, political philosophy, painting, and literature, it finds the testimony of religion, especially in theology and spirituality, to be particularly compelling.

D.’s first section, “From Cosmos to Nature,” details the shift from a classical worldview, which presupposed the integration of the divine, the human, and the physical, to the modern worldview of nominalism, which accorded primacy to these as individualities, each with its own separate power and efficacious in its own sphere. Modernity was born, D. argues, in the consequences of this shift. In metaphysics, formal principles yielded to human understanding and will, which now exerted their creative power over nature and words. Renaissance values spurned the assumption that intellectual or artistic ideals were woven into the order of things, regarding them instead as products of human creation, as goals to be achieved rather than qualities inherent in existence. The modern canons of methodological objectivity arose with the empirical standards of scientific definition and the somewhat ironic Cartesian expectation that subjectivity itself furnished certain, first principles. While some reflective depictions continued to see the self as part of a greater reality, “increasingly the assumption that the human mind alone conveyed meaning and purpose began to dominate modern thought” (89).

“From Microcosmos to Subject” focuses more specifically on the rise of the modern notion of the individual self. Here D. sketches the efforts of the humanist tradition of letters to lay claim to the authority of the logos in Greek reason and Judeo-Christian revelation, though now in the liberated rhetoric of the vernacular and the time-oriented genre of the novel. D. laments that the humanist project gradually disinte-
grated as language itself became increasingly self-referential in the modern age, at the very least an indirect consequence, he suggests, of the nominalist underpinnings of late medieval culture. The result was an "indigent self" (119), isolated from a world of common meaning and inclined to understand freedom in terms of the fact of its individuality, rather than as responsibility to a divinely established natural law.

D.'s final section, "From Deified Nature to Supernatural Grace," explores the diremption of nature and grace in nominalist theology as yet another dissolution of the classical synthesis, and continues by considering several attempts to restore their lost unity in the theologies of the humanists (Valla and Erasmus), the Reformers (Luther and Calvin), and the Augustinian revivalists (Baius and Jansenius). These attempts, D. judges, were not successful, though he concludes his book with three attempts that "at least temporarily" (221) were: the humanistic spiritualities of Ignatius Loyola and Francis de Sales, the "religion of the heart" spirituality of the Reformation, and the assumption of 17th-century Baroque culture that creation is "pervaded by a natural desire of God" (243). These examples of worldly spirituality are presented by D. as missed cultural opportunities to develop a modern tradition in consonance with the values of antiquity. As such, they bring into relief an assumption that runs throughout the book that hope for an authentic modernity lay much more in Christian affectivity and action than in the Christian intellect which, more easily secularized, set the course toward modern atheism.

The story of modernity is so complex that any claim for the exclusive explanatory power of a particular thesis would be guilty of the most obvious reductionism. While there may be poor accounts of modernity there are any number of good ones, even perhaps when these latter offer different versions of the narrative. D.'s book certainly must be ranked among the very best accounts of modernity. Indeed, its greatest virtue lies in its refusal to understand modernity from the perspective of the postmodern. Though one might quibble with particular readings of the many figures D. examines (e.g., did Luther's theology "obviously" intend to reunite the orders of nature and grace? [206]), one can only be impressed by the masterly control of D.'s analysis and grateful for his remarkable erudition.

Fairfield University

JOHN E. THIEL


Comparative theology as an intellectual discipline goes back some
centuries. In its contemporary revival, it straddles the methodological fence between religious studies and systematic/philosophical theology, tilting one way or the other, depending on a given researcher's starting point. Burrell here comes down on the side of philosophical theology as he builds on his earlier *Knowing the Unknowable God: Ibn-Sina, Maimonides, Aquinas* (1986).

Tackling the “tendency of the Modern West” to posit a deadlock between divine initiative and human freedom, B. alters the course of the discussion so as to make it clear that the divine and human elements in question are simply not of the same caliber and are therefore not in competition. (Vague recollections of the venerable “analogy of being” may emerge from the mists of many a reader’s philosophical past.) Creation is not the battlefield on which two forces meet, with the vastly superior inevitably vanquishing the weaker. Instead, B. contends, one can regard creation as gift rather than as given, using the Jewish and Islamic emphases on a unitary view of God’s creative and redemptive activity as a “corrective” to Christianity’s dichotomy between nature and grace.

B.’s purpose is to discover “how each of the traditions has sought for an appropriate philosophical scheme to articulate their grounding faith in God’s freedom to create our universe” (4). If one first clarifies the issue of God’s freedom, one can then arrive at a better understanding of human freedom within creation. B.’s systematic framework would no doubt cheer the heart of Aquinas. Moving through careful “characterizations” of Creator and creation and the connection between the two, he brings together material from his three classic sources, demonstrating in effect how Aquinas was himself engaging in a little comparative theology.

To a reader who comes at the topic from the religious-studies side of the fence, the treatment may seem quite abstract and even relentlessly metaphysical. But the book rewards patient attention as it builds its case by looking at one tradition, with which most readers will be the most familiar, through the filters of the less familiar Judaic and Islamic sources.

B. has chosen a theme of central importance to an appreciation of the interrelationships among the three Abrahamic intellectual/faith traditions. He highlights some fascinating points in the thought of the three gentlemen in question, and occasionally of one or another of their more influential coreligionists. E.g., God’s freedom in creating need not imply an absolute beginning of time; nor does it necessarily imply that God “chooses” as human beings do, only that God’s creating is purely gratuitous. Even the idea of emanation did not pose in itself the key problematic; rather, it was the way that emanationism implied the
necessity of the universe that seemed to undermine the very idea of divine revelation.

B.'s book will need a good deal of glossing by teachers who choose it as a text for courses in comparative theology or in the Abrahamic traditions. Some fuller transitions between chapters would have strengthened its pedagogical legs, as would more regular summaries of the sort only the final chapter now contains. On balance, B. has written a fine study that one hopes will entice others to do a bit of fence-straddling, from which those of us who prefer the relative comfort of one side or the other will learn a great deal. Among the most gratifying of B.'s contributions here in his continuing insistence that we in our century take the relevant Jewish and Islamic sources and themes at least as seriously as Aquinas did in his.

Saint Louis University

JOHN RENARD


Gunton's point of departure is his observation that modernity's isolated self and postmodernism's decentered, fragmented self reflect extremes that result from an insufficiently developed notion of relation, such that the former excludes the "other" and the latter "simply seeks to render it irrelevant" (69). His study intends to overcome such extremes by a critical and constructive analysis of modernity's understanding of the relationship between God and creation. G. argues that, while relations are constitutive, they also exist only between distinct others, thus allowing for genuine particularity. The possibility of such distinction-in-relation is grounded in God's triunity; creation needs God, according to G., in order to "give things space in which to be" (71).

This rich and multilayered study is realized in a chiastic structure. Four observations about modernity comprise the first half: modernity's disengagement, the displacement of the other, the "false temporality" of modernity, and the modern problem of meaning. These are answered in reverse order with four theological chapters: on foundationalism, on the concept of relation, on spirit and particularity, and on the triune God.

G.'s concern is to develop a notion of universality that allows the particular to "be itself," for which he turns to nonfoundationalism. While his explicit discussion of this form of rationality is brief, it clearly undergirds his constructive proposal for trinitarian theology and the doctrine of creation. Drawing on the work of the 19th-century Anglican poet and thinker Samuel Taylor Coleridge, G. proposes an
understanding of the Trinity as the *Idea Idearum*, an idea that grounds three “open transcendentals”: the unity and diversity of human culture, the dynamism of the individual and society, and the relation between time and space and eternity and infinity.

G. argues for these trinitarian transcendentals as mediating concepts for the tension of homogeneity and fragmentation present in modernity, a tension that he traces to antiquity, in the contrast between Heraclitus and Parmenides. The Spirit is an important and flexible idea in this mediation as the principle of concrete particularity, maintaining “the concreteness of things in their particular configurations in space and time: in their *haecceitas*” (201). By this work of sustaining the relationship of creation and divinity in all its particularity, the Spirit brings creation to perfection, a recapitulation that reflects G.’s appreciation of Irenaeus’ teleologically oriented economic starting point.

Some oversights undermine the power of G.’s address. Drawing on the work of thinkers such as Václav Havel and Alain Finkielkraut, G. provides a compelling account of the ills of contemporary culture in the wake of Kant. But he never allows those who argue against the bias of the universals touted by such authors to make their case. It is curious that a study so attentive to particularity would sideline the insights of liberation and feminist theologians, for whom the critique of the homogeneity of contemporary culture is a well-developed thesis.

Theologically, G.’s nuanced use of the terms “hypostasis” and “perichoresis” are certainly due to his reading of the Orthodox theologian John Zizioulas. But G. ignores the appearance of these concepts in the well-documented explosion of trinitarian theologies in Roman Catholic thought in the wake of Karl Rahner (most recently in the work of Catherine LaCugna).

While I charge G. with a certain insularity, his work merits wide and careful consideration. His study is meticulously structured, replete with signposts that enhance its readability as well as sturdily conveying his vigorous and thoroughly theological intellectual program.

*Fairfield University*  
NANCY A. DALLAVALLE


Commentators lament the failure of theology to engage the work of Derrida. While deconstruction has affected biblical studies, its theological appropriation has been largely limited to those intent upon
proclaiming the "death of God" or otherwise dismantling religious belief. We have needed an exposition of deconstruction as a tool which could be adapted for use by traditional systematic theologians.

Such an exposition has now been written, and it is a tour de force. Lowe, professor of systematics at Emory University, believes Derrida's work can operate in the service of Christian theology. But he knows that few would be convinced if he spoke only the insider's argot and ignored traditional concerns; instead, he focuses on Derrida's affinities with perhaps the most important modern philosopher (Kant) and theologian (Barth). Theologians who have put off engagement with Derrida because "he's just too different" no longer have an excuse.

L. argues that the Enlightenment metaphysic ignored human limitations and sought to provide a complete, coherent, definitive metanarrative of origin, separation, and restoration. This metanarrative fails because it does not adequately account for the reality of human suffering, especially the violence that is the hallmark of our century. The alternative is a "radical hermeneutics" that admits the limits and brokenness of the human condition. Deconstruction provides an appropriate method, because it testifies, "directly or indirectly, to the reality of human brokenness" (xi). Deconstruction recognizes the reality of evil and sin.

Consequently, suffering is a focus of the book. Following J. B. Metz, L. argues that suffering provides us with a critical standard against which experience can be tested, as well as a common vision of the human condition and an awareness of our need for redemption. But unlike Metz, who focuses mainly on praxis, L. is concerned with theoretical reason as well: "that crucial, broken but perceptive thinking represented by the memory of suffering" (11). L.'s subtitle takes full advantage of its ambiguous genitive: reason may indeed inflict wounds, but it also bears a wound. "A reason aware of its own brokenness might prove, in the end, a better guide than one committed a priori to healthy-mindedness" (11).

L. begins with a fine discussion of Barth's Römerbrief, arguing that its emphasis upon the "qualitative difference" between God and humanity is not so much a minimization of human striving (as a Nietzschean critic might suppose), but a leveling of the playing field. In asserting the significant difference between God and humanity, Barth cautions us against attributing an inflated importance to the less significant (but always impinging) differences within the created order. Derrida is brought into the conversation, along with Freud and Husserl, in order to develop a splendid critique of traditional hermeneutics.
L. now returns to Kant, whose early work on theodicy echoes Barth's emphasis on the qualitative difference between God and humanity. This is nicely contrasted with Enlightenment optimism; and here readers, fearing a lengthy account of Leibnizian theodicy, are surprised by a delightful account of Alexander Pope's "An Essay on Man" instead. The contrast could not be greater, and it demonstrates the rhetorical appeal of linking humanity to God via "the great chain of being." By contrast, Kant appears almost Barthian: "On the terms which Kant has explicitly prepared, to speak of fundamental difference is to speak of one difference and one difference only, namely the difference between that which is finite, however grand, and that which is infinite" (90). Kant's metaphysics, rationalistic though they may be, nevertheless operate coram Deo; and this view continues, though implicitly, into the critical writings and especially the Second Critique. Consequently, the categorical imperative appears increasingly relevant for Christian ethics. And this is an important claim, for the ethical implications of deconstruction have not been adequately explored in the contemporary theological engagement with Derrida. Hence L. concludes with an incisive critique of the work of Mark C. Taylor, and reiterates the claim that genuine thought is broken thought, and that a genuine human life is a suffering life.

My only significant complaint is that L.'s account of brokenness and suffering is fairly abstract. His occasional nods toward a passion-centered Christology and a fleeting reference to The Brothers Karamazov suggest that L. has the resources to offer a more concrete account of this "wound of reason." A more Christological focus would also have made his concluding reflections on ethics more persuasive. Finally, suffering here is primarily a white, Western, male enterprise (the favorite example is of a platoon leader). Yet L. is generally sensitive about matters of inclusivity, and his larger claims need not be as limited as his examples.

L. sees his work as offering a possible alternative to the method(s) of correlation currently popular among theologians. For this alone, he deserves commendation. Moreover, he has produced a fine work of philosophical theology, inviting systematic theologians with traditional concerns to learn more about deconstruction and employ it in the service of the gospel. That the book will likely be attacked by deconstructionist "insiders," who will resent L.'s unwillingness to play their game and make sacrifices to their gods, only makes it all the more inviting.

University of St. Thomas, St. Paul

DAVID S. CUNNINGHAM
Enthusiastically reviewing Volume 1 of van Beeck's projected three-volume systematics, I concluded that it offered "great promise of good things yet to come" (TS 51/1990] 145-47). A further realization of that promise has now appeared in Volume 2/ Part 1 dedicated to fundamental theology as an integral element in the systematic enterprise. The present work is a worthy and exciting successor to the first.

The overall title of Volume 2, "The Revelation of the Glory," recapitulates the doxological focus and sensitivity already announced in Volume 1 and signals B.'s intent to move beyond the soteriological narrowing of theology consequent upon the Reformation, thereby rejoining the patristic tradition's stress on sanctification and deification. And devoting 2/1 to issues of fundamental theology, in particular the legitimacy of the enterprise of philosophical anthropology (as elaborated in this century by Blondel and the early Rahner), reflects B.'s affirmation of Catholicism's commitment to "the need for human integrity in believing—an integrity created and cherished by God." Nature and grace, reason and faith, the universal and the historical together constitute the admirabile commercium that B.'s volumes celebrate.

Moreover, such endorsement of fundamental theology does not detract from the admitted "positive ecclesial bias in systematic theology" that characterizes B.'s approach to the theological task. Rather, the very universality of faith's profession of one God, who is Creator of all, itself warrants such commitment. Consequently, a key task of fundamental theology will be the ongoing "search for a configurative balance between faith and culture." And this book, like the first, exemplifies B.'s discerning via media between an integralism that refuses serious engagement with culture and a modernism that effete capitulates.

Clearly, B.'s profession of the authority of the "great Tradition" (represented here by his use of the Creed as the framework for interpretation) replicates the two-fold process advocated by Vatican II itself: ressourcement and aggiornamento. A living tradition requires both distinctive identity and discriminating openness.

But to sustain with integrity such creative tension and demanding discernment is a costly spiritual achievement that demands nothing less than a mystical depth that both builds upon and brings to fulfillment the institutional and critical moments of the adventure of faith. That Ruusbroec and Teresa of Avila figure so integrally in this work
dedicated to fundamental theology is illustrative of and contributive to the “spiritual-pastoral-theological synthesis” B. is constructing.

As is evident, my respect for B.’s project and achievement is unstinting. My sole reserve in the work under review concerns the treatment of revelation. The last section of the book is entitled “Revelation and Its Anthropological Infrastructure”—certainly fitting in a work on fundamental theology. Here B. offers a sensitive and insightful analysis of the phenomenon of human communication as an analogy to the divine communication that is revelation. He also appeals to Rahner’s elucidation of the transcendental dimension of revelation, sometimes referred to by Rahner himself (without sufficient nuance?) as “transcendental knowledge.”

However, a coda that sounds so “transcendental” a note seems somewhat out of key in a composition that not only espouses a “positive ecclesial bias,” but defends the “superiority” of the positive elements of religion—in the case of Christian faith the objectivity of God, Christ, and Church. The theological logic and aesthetic of God Encountered had prepared my sensibility for a finale whose theme and variations would develop the specific “Christic shape of revelation.” (For a moment I even entertained the thought that my copy might be defective in ending thus abruptly.) No doubt the succeeding parts of Volume 2 will delineate fully that Christic shape, and I eagerly anticipate them. My one disappointment then may simply reflect my desire for more of an exceedingly good thing, even within the parameters of fundamental theology. For B. rightly construes fundamental theology itself not as a “separate” discipline, but as integral to systematics and already shaped by the theologian’s experiential participation in the faith tradition.

Boston College

ROBERT P. IMBELLI


Kennedy approaches Schillebeeckx’s theology from an epistemological viewpoint, taking his cue from S.’s remark that it has been central to his efforts as a theologian to show the knowability of God, in which faith is a form of knowledge.

Early on, S. followed his Dominican professor De Petter in rejecting both the neo-scholastic and the modern understanding of the human, insofar as they conceive of the human as a “pure nature” apart from God, a subjectivity endowed with a rationality capable of coming to an objective understanding of reality, where all gets measured, including
our knowledge of God, by the canons of our rationality. De Petter formulated a view which expressed the knowability of God in terms of an implicit intuition. Concepts are required to achieve a conscious awareness of God. But concepts, since they are creaturely, are to be negated in their content, so that what is left is the dynamism of the object known—rather than of the human subject itself, as in Maréchal—in a reference to what these concepts signify: the reality of God.

In the late 1960s, S. began rethinking this view. This stage of his thought was marked by the “crisis” of faith which he recognized on his trip to the U.S., where the talk was about the “death of God” and secularization. S. increasingly turned to the philosophy of language, hermeneutics, and the critical theory of the Frankfurt School to probe these issues. Gradually, he made a bold move, turning “from Chalcadon to Galilee” to root his theology in a mutually critical correlation between biblical sources and contemporary issues. (S. did not reject Chalcedon; the problem for him was one of a language which no longer communicates, where theology is not bound to only one possible linguistic expression of faith.) As he came to acknowledge the pervasive historicity of the human, the question of the knowability of God took on a dimension not found in De Petter: In the particularity and apparent contingency of anything historical (Jesus), how can any universal knowledge about God be justifiably asserted?

S.’s solution lies in the relation between the experience of suffering and the liberating Christian praxis of justice and love, where priority falls on the humanum in a commitment to create a better future. The universality in the particular (Jesus) is to be found, not in repeating abstract dogmatic formulations about Christ, but in following Jesus through the praxis of Christian ministry, in solidarity with all unjust human suffering.

S. now announces a departure from De Petter. De Petter’s view was “idealist,” and so not free from the suspicion of “ideology” insofar as the believer is abstracted from social-historical human being and the pluralism that entails. For S., what primarily informs the Christian about God is concretely the experience of unjust suffering, where God is revealed to be on the side of those who suffer. In any turn to the anthropological the problem of suffering is cognitively paramount. Through Jesus God is shown to be more truly human than we, offering liberation as the One Who saves. Here is the Deus humanissimus.

While not disagreeing with the direction of S.’s later theology, Kennedy nevertheless sees “the sorest point” in explaining the knowability of God to lie precisely in S.’s turn to ethical praxis: “the turn is incomplete . . . in need of some kind of rational, argumentative
justification” (368). He points in all too cursory a way to the later work of Habermas and that of Helmut Peukert as offering some possible insight into dealing with this problem.

Regarding the epistemological question, Kennedy argues that there is no substantive change in the later writings: throughout his career S. remains “mystical” in his Ruusbroeckian approach to the knowledge of God, although his mode of expression has altered from “a theoretical participation in a totality of meaning” to “a praxical prolepsis of absolute meaning” (356). But in light of his remarks about the problematic nature of S.’s turn to ethical praxis, this conclusion seems understated, if not unconvincing.

Kennedy further wants to stress S’s. fidelity to Aquinas in continually drawing upon two of his basic tenets: (1) creation as participation (“relational ontology”), which provides the basis for (2) analogy as a conscious unknowing of God. But Kennedy does not examine, in S.’s departure from “Greek, Thomistic metaphysics” (202), the extent to which creation, participation, and analogy are metaphysically thought out in Aquinas. The doctrine of creation, e.g., is not exclusively theological for Aquinas; he attributes it to “philosophers” such as Plato and Aristotle. In this context, S.’s turn to “negative contrast experiences” as providing the condition out of which theology should proceed today arguably presupposes more than what Aquinas’s “relational ontology” says, since such experiences of suffering could also bespeak for some no discernible God at all, or perhaps a Deus inhumanissimus, or simply a God who is not truly omnipotent to save. It is precisely this “more” which seems to be at the heart of Kennedy’s discomfort with S.’s turn to ethical praxis.

While leaving some questions unprobed, this book is a welcome addition to the study of S.’s labyrinthine theological output. But its delineation of S.’s theological journey (rather than his epistemological concerns) may be what is of most interest to readers.

Dominican School of Philosophy and Theology, Berkeley

VINCENT GUAGLIARDO, O.P.


There is a new image of Jesus as liberator in Latin America. Why has this image not been able to transform the rampant oppression and injustice? Why are the people still being crucified? These are the anguished questions that lie behind Sobrino’s book. This Christology is
not really new. Rather, it is “a more systematic development, with additions and corrections” of S.’s earlier works. But, it must be expressed again and again because the oppression continues. Dedicated to his six Jesuit and two woman companions, murdered and martyred in El Salvador while he was away, it is amazing that S. could write such a book at all. The work and spirit of Ignacio Ellacuría clearly echoes throughout, especially in the last chapter on “the crucified people.”

In the light of this, a question of great interest arises: For whom was the book written? Like the parables of Jesus, it would seem to call for a radical _metanoia_ on the part of those in positions of power: professional colleagues in the academy, hierarchical authorities in the Church, pastoral ministers and social workers in society—all of us who have not yet learned how to walk with Jesus in the poor and oppressed, how to be a Church of the poor. Indeed, the setting for doing Christology is not so much a place as a situation. “Latin American Christology—and specifically as Christology—identifies its setting, in the sense of a real situation, as the poor of this world, and this situation is what must be present in and permeate any particular setting in which Christology is done” (28).

This first of a proposed two-volume work is “a historical-theological reading of the Christ who is Jesus of Nazareth,” seeking “to give emphasis and primacy to the flesh of Jesus” (6). The next volume will examine the history and development of Christology after the resurrection. The current work organizes Jesus’ life “around three fundamental and historically established data: his relationship with the Kingdom of God; his relationship with God the Father; and his death on the cross” (63). The purpose is “to put forward the truth of Christ from the standpoint of liberation” (6) by concentrating on “liberation from injustice” as “the most comprehensive expression of oppression” (275 n. 15).

Consequently, the book does not deal directly with other forms of oppression: ethnic, cultural, sexual, etc. This seems unfortunate. While one cannot ask an author to write another or different book, there are omissions here that are fundamental to the argument. There is no one more oppressed than a poor woman of color who suffers the threefold injustice of class, sex, and race. Until her voice is heard, there can be no liberation for anyone. But where is her voice? I believe it is there behind the voice of S., present among “the crucified poor people” (which includes women, children, the elderly, as well as men), but she herself remains silent, as silent as God at the moment of Jesus’ crucifixion and death (235–40). It is surprising that there is not one reference to the work of a woman theologian. The interlocuters, in addi-
tion to Ellacuría and other Latin American theologians, are primarily European, mostly German. More surprising still, a woman's voice is heard only once, to describe the massacre at the River Sumpul in 1981 (256).

The unremitting emphasis on "the crucified poor people" is laudable, essential, and undoubtedly expresses the experience and courageous witness of S. himself. This, in fact, is the great value of this work. While S. recognizes the critical problems of historicity and the need for more analysis from cultural anthropology, he doesn't adequately deal with either. Rather, Latin-American Christology is "gospel" Christology (60–63). The "historical" Jesus is the Jesus whose practice and spirit set history in motion. The basic argument rests in the "structural similarity" (61) between Jesus' life and the reality of Latin America. What results is a profound and stirring reading of Jesus' life and death as presented in the Gospels from the standpoint of the poor. While not as "critical" as the "Jesus Seminar," this book will more effectively move the reader to want to follow the Jesus who walked in solidarity with the poor and oppressed even to death on the cross.

Gonzaga University, Spokane

MICHAEL L. COOK, S.J.


Three recent sets of lectures, based on papers written from 1987 to 1991, have been thoroughly re-edited here. The themes are familiar ones in Gilkey's work since his 1959 Maker of Heaven and Earth on the Christian doctrine of creation. In those 35 years G.'s method has shifted from a form of neo-orthodoxy to a mixture of liberal and revisionist theology. The overall approach is vintage Gilkey: to approach a major issue with great knowledge of relevant theological perspectives, clearing underbrush and moving trees until the outline of a viable theology appears. He leaves detailed study and support of particular parts to be done by others.

His themes overlap in the three major parts. The first is on method, how to know and interpret nature. As in earlier works G. complains that the objectivizing approach of science too readily overlooks the subjective element in the universe, including that of the scientist as knower. There are alternative ways of knowing, says G., in particular intuitions of nature's wholeness and value, intuitions best expressed symbolically. The second part elaborates on this. Relying largely on Eliade's writings, G. appeals to a primal awareness manifest in archaic religions of nature's power, vitality, order, and value. G. ends this part
with a notion of nature as *imago Dei*, citing Calvin’s idea of nature as a “mirror” of God. The third part pursues this image, tracking the ambiguities of a nature which provides life but includes death as an intrinsic part of its order, which manifests a developmental pattern yet with randomness. Only a metaphysical framework of some sort, says G., is adequate to meet these ambiguities. In fact the elements of order and value and development and meaningful subjectivity in nature are “traces” of God.

In asides and notes G. defines neo-orthodox theology broadly. He includes Bultmann, Tillich, and his own early works. A common element in all these was the need to discover God through faith and its symbols rather than through natural theology or metaphysical analysis, in a universe described by modern science as aimless and bereft of the ultimate meaning needed by the human person. Without calling much attention to it, this work continues a partial shift in G.’s *Reaping the Whirlwind* (1976) towards an openness to natural theology. Metaphysics is now necessary; the traces of God are strong enough to provide an argument for God’s existence. The anthropic principle is overstated by some, says G., but, as some of its versions assert, there is a wholeness, balance, developmental process, and special dimension of subjectivity to it all that makes belief in a God reasonable.

G. has moved from a neo-orthodox opposition of faith and nature to a claim that faith builds on nature, as it were. He has adopted a Schleiermächian intuition as a form of knowledge distinct from science, yet argues that religion must be consistent with good science to remain plausible. He might also have argued, but does not quite do so, that for any person to be both scientifically rational and deeply religious, a deep blending of the two must be possible. He comes closer to that with his “soft” natural theology.

G.’s strength is his usual ability to bring together resources from many theologies. He is an umpire in a team project that filters and revises theologies through the University of Chicago Divinity School: Odgen, Tracy, Hefner, and others. His large-scale reflections, however, leave to others the work of detailed learning and analysis on major issues. His appeal to intuition must eventually be worked through, as Wayne Proudfoot did in *Religious Experience* (1985); his use of Eliade’s interpretation of archaic religion requires critiques such as Donald Wiebe has done in part of *The Irony of Theology and the Nature of Religious Thought* (1991). G.’s complaint that science overlooks the subjective must find a more nuanced form through the study of neuropsychology in order to delineate the degree to which subjectivity is a legitimate object of the scientific method.

G.’s willingness to bring nature, religion, the human, and method all
together is the fundamental value of this work. Nature is again an intrinsic part of the larger religious interpretation of life rather than a problem to be addressed by faith from the outside. G. has done initial surveying; his work will be continued by careful specialists.

University of Dayton, Ohio

MICHAEL H. BARNES


In 1918 Romano Guardini's first edition of The Spirit of the Liturgy appeared in German. This book was to mark the theological foundation of the 20th-century liturgical movement and to influence Vatican II's understanding of the liturgy as an act of Christ and the whole Church. The world of liturgical studies has long awaited a worthy successor to Guardini's powerful work, one which takes account of contemporary theological and hermeneutical understanding. Such a successor can be found in the work under review.

Lathrop, professor of liturgy at the Lutheran Theological Seminary in Philadelphia, sets out to provide a critical understanding of the ordo of Christian worship and to invite the reader to enter into liturgical activity itself. He adopts the term ordo from the late Orthodox theologian, Alexander Schmemann, to whom he acknowledges indebtedness. But he goes further than Schmemann in articulating the biblical and theological basis for liturgy from a contemporary (post-Enlightenment) perspective. Put simply, for L. the ordo consists in a number of fundamental patterns that constitute Christian worship. Using (mainly) nontechnical language, he identifies these as praising and beseeching, teaching and bath, word and table, seven days and the eighth day, and year and pascha.

It is precisely in these juxtapositions that L. finds what is most characteristic of Christian liturgy. In a brilliant move he shows how the liturgy is fundamentally biblical in that it does precisely what the Bible does: it applies old words to the contemporary situation to do a "new thing." Crucial to his success is the insight that "the Christian ordo is the juxtaposition" (50) of elements in the basic patterns. Thus L. avoids a static or fundamentalist understanding of both Bible and liturgy, while showing why in both content and form the liturgy is essentially biblical.

L. divides the book into three sections. In the first, he deals with the patterned articulation of elements in worship (secondary liturgical theology). In the second, he treats the experience of worship via holy things, namely the basic symbols which give the community access to worship of God (primary liturgical theology). Finally, he deals with the
critical and reforming questions, e.g. ministry and the relation of the
ordo to social order, that arise from application of the ordo to particu-
lar contemporary circumstances (pastoral liturgical theology).

Perhaps most illustrative of L.'s aim and method is his treatment of
sacrifice. By means of a close reading and fresh translation of Justin
Martyr's First Apology 13, he demonstrates that Christians do a new
thing using "the wrong words." In other words, the use of the term
"sacrifice" should have a jarring effect because for Christians it is a
verbal activity rather than the traditional offering of animals and
material goods. Here L.'s theology is both Lutheran and ecumenical:
Lutheran because of its clearly biblical basis and insistence that all
religious meaning is broken on the Cross of Christ, ecumenical because
he provides a way through the impasse of traditional confessional di-
vision by showing that Christ is the end of ritual sacrifice. Thus he
concludes the section on sacrifice with an apt juxtaposition that char-
acterizes the approach of the book as a whole: Catholic Iconoclasm.

L.'s work represents a number of important values for contemporary
liturgical theology. First, it is thoroughly traditional while radically
critical of the application of tradition today. Second, it is a theology
that arises out of the activity of worship as opposed to a theology about
the texts of the liturgy. Third, it is explicitly and unapologetically
trinitarian. Fourth, without being at all reductionist it focuses on the
essential patterns of Christian worship which can serve as an ecumeni-
cal basis for a number of Christian churches and their respective
approaches to liturgy. Fifth, it is founded on the best of contemporary
liturgical historical scholarship. Sixth, it is elegantly written—so el-
egantly written that it serves well as the lure to worship which is L.'s
aim.

I have rarely found a book which expresses so well the profoundly
ironic and paradoxical nature of liturgy while maintaining respect for
what Christians have done in worship through the centuries. I heartily
recommend it to anyone who is serious about theological reflection on
Christian worship.

Jesuit School of Theology, Berkeley

JOHN F. BALDOVIN, S.J.

In Breaking of Bread: The Eucharist and Ritual. By P. J. Fitz-
$59.95.

Here is a thorough and fascinating exposition which, although
clearly centered on the issue of the real presence, nevertheless has
wide ranging implications for theological method as a whole. This is
not an easy book, and would, I suspect, be quite difficult for any reader
who lacked a basic foundation in philosophy. FitzPatrick, a Roman Catholic priest who was for many years professor of philosophy at the University of Durham, explains at several points that he has no alternative but to make his presentation extensive and detailed since the issues involved are themselves complex. Yet the book remains interesting on every page, and F.'s humanity and humor are evident throughout. The footnotes are a treasury of scholarly information and human insight, ranging widely from the theological masters of the Christian tradition to such modern writers as Rainer Maria Rilke, Philip Larkin, Julien Green, and James Joyce.

F. begins with an extended section "Against Transubstantiation" in which he presents his analysis of the weaknesses in the traditional scholastic teaching, emphasizing that terms and distinctions which are legitimate in themselves are put together in ways which are not legitimate. F. notes that Aquinas's exposition of the doctrine of the real presence is characterized by qualifying phrases, as for example in ST 3.75.4, where he writes that the conversion of the elements is not any kind of natural change, "but can be called by its own name transubstantiation." The expression "can be called" is one of many qualifiers Aquinas used, such as *quoddam, quasi, or aliquomodo*; but, as F. observes, "the elevation by Rome of Aquinas into an oracle made them be missed all too often" (11).

The discussion of transubstantiation continues with useful summaries of the issues involved in the debate which began in 1949 between Filippo Selvaggi of the Gregorian University at Rome, and Carlo Colombo of the Pontifical Faculty of Theology at Milan and later Cardinal Archbishop of Milan. This debate was probably best known to American readers through the article by Edward Schillebeeckx entitled "Transubstantiation, Transfinalization, Transignification," *Worship* 40 (1966), in which the conflicting views of Selvaggi and Colombo were presented. F. sees this debate as representing the ultimate absurdity of the scholastic attempt to "place" the doctrine of the real presence in a physical context of meaning. He writes that "the doctrine of transubstantiation is no more than muddle, and the appearance of content it possesses comes from a misuse of scholastic terminology, the kind of misuse to which that terminology has turned out to be naturally vulnerable" (47).

Having presented impressive arguments against transubstantiation, F. next aims his cannons against more recent theories, specifically "transignification." Although particular attention is given to Piet Schoonenberg and his emphasis upon the personal dimensions of real presence, for this reviewer, the discovery of the writings of J. de Baciocchi, a French theologian who was one of the first writers to suggest
a new approach to the doctrine of real presence, was a delight. De Baciocchi suggests that the scholastic teaching on the bread and wine as accidents to their substantial reality suggests that they "have a kind of external film, made up of their perceptible and scientific properties; and that they also have a mysterious kernel, unknowable in itself, a pure "en-soi," which is called "substance" (51). For F., the inadequacy in the teaching of both Schoonenberg and De Baciocchi, in spite of their needed emphasis upon the personal aspects of presence, is their failure to deal adequately with the Eucharist as ritual. Both transubstantiation and transignification share this failure: they "converge in failing to do justice to the ritual character of the Eucharist" (160). F.'s goal is to take the eucharistic ritual on ritual terms. "Ritual does not lend itself to being talked about as picturing does, because ritual is primarily what is celebrated. And not only is ritual celebrated rather than discussed; discussions of it must range far and wide, because ritual can never be 'detached' from natural things" (162).

What F. proposes he calls "the way of ritual." "The Way of Ritual invites us to set out on a journey towards the rite instituted by Christ. . . . We must let the stages on the journey keep their significance, we must take seriously the complex associations of the eucharistic rite. We must accept that it is a rite of eating and drinking . . . made by Christ into an eating and drinking of his body and blood. . . . A mystery does not suddenly appear when the elements of the Eucharist are considered; the mystery is there as soon as we start thinking about the presence of Christ in the members of his body, by which they are made sharers of the divine nature" (205–6). These phrases offer but a hint of the power of F.'s exposition of "the way of ritual." One senses in F.'s writing an enormous sense of awe toward the mystery of the Eucharist. That mystery can never be adequately expressed in human speech, but through ritual the people of God participate in its reality.

Church Divinity School of the Pacific
Berkeley, Calif.

Louis Weil


A collection of 14 selected essays written since 1987. The essays are arranged in four major categories dealing with the absolute in moral theology, historicity and the moral absolute, conscience and moral objectivity, and ethical self-direction. The essays reflect both Fuchs's own development on a variety of critical issues in contemporary moral the-
ology and a commentary on other authors in the field. The underlying theme of the book concerns the possibility of absolute norms within moral theology and the relation of moral norms, however conceived, for personal, concrete behavior. As F. says in the Preface, "the fundamental statement about normative morality is that many of its requirements are not univocal, but necessarily permit a certain plurality." Thus the contents of the book focus on a critical area of debate—not to say tension—within contemporary Catholic moral theology.

Thematically, the essays are a continued reflection on whether and in what sense one might speak of absolutes in moral theology and how moral norms are formed. In particular, F. asks how an ethical absolute might be preserved in concrete human constructions, dependent as they are on cultural varieties, different human realities, the varying perspectives of individual humans. Thus F. concludes: "It is necessarily true, therefore, that not one absolute ethics of correct conduct exists but various ethics exist as the forms through which various persons give expression to the one ethical absolutum" (22). Further, right reason is a consideration of the totality of the reality to be considered by the whole person. This is not a quantitative or mathematical analysis; neither is it relativity or subjectivism. Rather this is a "necessarily subjective act of evaluation that must be determined by the subject" (44). This leads F. to his defense of proportionalism, understood as "natural law reflection . . . on the concrete entirety of the reality of an action" (48). Ethical reflection, for F., does not and cannot consist of the application of some general moral norm to a concrete situation. Rather, the individual, beginning with his or her formed conscience, the teachings of the Church, and practical human moral experience, considers the totality of the situation and "seeks the right answer to a given concrete human reality as a whole and to embrace the corresponding action itself as the answer" (49).

These citations indicate the core argument running through the various chapters, each of which develops one or the other aspect. And the ideas are developed, not repeated. F. keeps circling around key concepts and bringing out other dimensions of the ethical task. There is also interesting dialogue with other moral theologians and magisterial statements. The material is well organized and presented clearly. One comes away from the book with an excellent understanding of proportionalism as an ethical method, as well as a good perspective on contemporary issues in moral theology. While the prose of one or other chapter is a bit turgid, the book reads well and will be an excellent addition to an upperdivision course or introductory graduate course.

Worcester Polytechnic Institute

THOMAS. A. SHANNON

This reworked dissertation is a very creative work. Cronin knows human-rights theories thoroughly and has described them with a brevity and a clarity that almost avoids reductionism. He also knows the weaknesses that surround rights presently, e.g. their rhetorical proliferation, their propensity for deepening an "ethics of strangers" rather than strengthening community, their assertion without consensus about what grounds them, skepticism about their precision or their ability to stand up to real politik at the crunch moment. C. is masterful in his analysis of the extant literature on human rights; he has also developed here a metaethics of human rights.

Three of C.'s moves have to be explained: how he understands the distinction between metaethics and normative ethics; how imagination functions in morality; how his moral theology complements his metaethics to supply a ground for human rights.

A rights metaethicist analyses the nature, meaning, and value of rights, while a normative ethicist is concerned with telling us what rights we have and with elaborating a usable moral code of rights. C. is a metaethicist who worries about the present state of human-rights observance, and who is also concerned that Christianity has gone from hostility to the idea of rights to promotion of rights without passing through the metaethical mediation of examining their nature, meaning, and value.

C. believes the moral imagination functions at the metaethical level by means of metaphors, images, and systematically developed metaphors which he calls models. Without neglecting the discursive, conceptual, normative language of rights, he moves out from there to explain the meaning and value of rights in ways that are both cognitively and affectively appealing. "My argument attempts to establish that both normative ethics and metaethics must for the sake of completeness embrace discursive and imaginative aspects."

The most creative part of C.'s volume is his development of rights models in terms of freedom and power. But he then proceeds to employ two further models from the world of faith, namely covenant and image of God, to complement the first two humanistic models. The result is "a specific vision of reality which is ultimately God-directed" which has rights at its core.

Both the insights and the overall project of this Irish Franciscan are critically important at this moment in history when many are becoming skeptical about rights. We cannot afford to ignore this skepticism
nor this effort to address the subject. Regrettably, not many readers will be able to afford the price of this book.

_Loyola University, Chicago_  

JOHN HAUGHEY, S.J.


True to the nature of a doctoral dissertation upon which this work is based, Schallenberg's thesis is strictly circumscribed. It is not an historical survey of Neo-Scholasticism, nor a systematic review of neo-scholastic moral theology, nor even an evaluation of neo-scholastic natural-law theory. S. focuses on the development of a theonomous understanding of the natural law in the work of two late neo-scholastic German moralists—Joseph Mausbach (1871–1931), longstanding professor of moral theology at the University of Münster, and Gustav Ermecke (1907–1987), who revised and augmented Mausbach's _Katholische Moralentheologie_. S.’s text will benefit any reader interested in the Catholic neo-scholastic tradition.

This truly exemplary piece of scholarship begins with a quick and helpful sketch of the traits of neo-scholastic moral theology up to the end of the 18th century. Briefly, there was the separation of the _lex aeterna_ and the _lex naturalis_ in a way the _natura normativa_ was understood either in voluntarist terms by nominalism, or in rationalist terms by baroque Scholasticism (Gabriel Vasquez) and Stoicism (Pufendorf). Second, under the influence of Kant, an ethics of duty replaced an ethics of virtue. Third, because post-Tridentine moral theology prepared future confessors, moral theology was separated from the dogmatic tracts and became a morality of law. The debates of the 17th and 18th centuries revolved around the moral systems by which the law was applied. Finally, there was the rise of the modern notion of science; using its criteria of rationality, neo-scholastic casuistry was no longer a rhetorical art but a _mos geometricus_ (Wolff).

But at the beginning of the 19th century, a number of developments contributed to a vital renewal of moral theology. Antonio Rosmini, e.g., attempted to provide a personalist foundation for ethics; at Tübingen, Johann Baptist Hirscher based his moral teaching on the biblical concept of the Kingdom of God; and Joseph Schwane, who taught Mausbach at Münster, reacted to the predominating nominalism and the legal-casuistic categories of Alphonse Liguori by returning to Thomas's understanding of virtue.
Mausbach's contribution to late neo-scholastic natural-law theory is seen through his discussions with the Jesuit moral philosopher Victor Cathrein on the nature of the moral good. Cathrein, following Suarez, draws a clear line between nature and grace; individual human nature is the norm of the moral good. Based on a theologically inadequate conception of human nature, moral action is analyzed without reference to the faith. Mausbach, however, interprets Thomas from an Augustinian perspective and holds that morality is dependent upon the finis ultimus; there is no destiny for humanity other than a supernatural one. This anchors morality on a theological base and provides a theonomous interpretation of the natural law. Following the axiom agere sequitur esse, the source of obligation for the Christian is the lex nova. In this way moral theology is a science of faith (Glaubenswissenschaft).

The relationship between nature and grace is given a stronger Christological interpretation by Ermecke through the scriptural motifs of Franz Tillman. The intellectual framework for Ermecke's moral theology was the essentialist metaphysics of Caspar Nink, and the mysticism of Gottlieb Söhngen. This protects the natural law from being reduced to the empirically given; human nature is normative in relation to its final end, which is to say, in relation to God. Furthermore, the moral life is an imitation of Christ. The foundation for following Christ is given at baptism, and one participates in the life of Christ through the sacraments. The sacraments provide an ontological character to our participation in the divine life. The Christian's new esse is the condition of possibility for a new agere. This distinguishes the Christocentric ethic of Ermecke from that of Otto Schilling who, while holding caritas to be the formal principle of moral theology, maintained the natura metaphysica naturalis as the source of normativity.

In situating these two thinkers in the Thomistic renaissance of the late 19th and 20th centuries, S. is careful not to overinterpret them. He is aware that since Mausbach-Ermecke, the metaphysical and epistemological tools of fundamental moral theologians have been refined to account for the exigencies of history in natural-law argumentation. These developments have all but eliminated the disastrous essentialist analysis of action by Neo-Scholastics like Mausbach-Ermecke. Nevertheless, historical studies such as this serve to remind moralists that their argumentation cannot fall behind the tradition's achieved standards. In this way, the work invites fundamental moral theologians to revisit the discussion of the proprium of Christian ethics and the ordinatio actus ad Deum through contemporary studies on the relationship between nature and grace. Though Mausbach-Ermecke rightly
insisted that nature could not be separated from grace, the question of how the lex nova is inserted into the lex naturalis and perfects it remains.

Kenrick School of Theology, St. Louis
THOMAS R. KOPFENSTEINER


Mott, professor of Christian social ethics at Gordon-Conwell Theological Seminary, offers us a perceptive theological interpretation of modern political ethics. Drawing upon the rich resources of the evangelical tradition, he seeks to elaborate the theological underpinnings of a "Christian political theory." His assessments of the uses of political power, the proper roles of government and intermediate associations, and the ethical ideal of the common good recall the motifs of Roman Catholic social teaching; yet his originality rests in the distinctively Christian nature and sources of his criticism. His arguments are thus less beholden to the philosophic tradition of natural law and rights than to a theological retrieval of the biblical imperative of divine justice in a fallen world.

In Part 1, M. develops the political implications of Christian understandings of power, human nature, group life, justice and love, government, and temporality. His discussion of defensive, exploitive, and intervening power, the fallibility of persons and groups, and the nature of governmental responsibility serves as a persuasive rejoinder to those tempted by religious quietism in the earthly kingdom. Christians, he argues, are not only morally obliged to contribute to the commonweal, but they bring distinctive resources to bear in their evaluation of its social arrangements. Complementing his earlier analysis in Biblical Ethics and Social Change, M.'s splendid discussion of biblical justice grounds his critique of purely formal or procedural interpretations of justice. For, consonant with the biblical ideal, justice entails persons' equal "freedom rights" and "benefit rights" so as to ensure the equitable participation of all in the political realm. His analysis of love and justice extends and enriches Reinhold Niebuhr's seminal interpretation, his final chapter in this part treats the meaning of remembrance, responsibility, and eschatology for political theory.

M.'s theology of politics bears the mark of considerable scholarly research, and indeed, one might say his argument unfolds as an extended dialogue with such varied theologians as Niebuhr, Tillich, James Luther Adams, and José Míguez Bonino. Yet throughout, his irenic appreciation of their contributions remains suitably critical. The Augustinian tenor of Niebuhr's "Christian realism" is thus tempered
by M.’s recognition that biblical justice admonishes us to seek not merely a mitigation of, but deliverance from social inequities.

In Part 2, M. applies his critical, theological framework to an evaluation of differing political ideologies, which he understands in a non-pejorative sense as the social ideals, beliefs, and values governing the distribution of power in society. M. treats of the political ideologies of traditional conservatism, liberalism, democracy, laissez-faire conservatism, Marxist socialism, and socialism in their classical historical forms and expression. Such an ideal-typical analysis permits M. to locate himself in the history of ideas, yet the peril of painting against such a broad canvass is that one necessarily paints in broad strokes. M.’s discussion of the affinities of prophetic criticism and Marx’s relatively early critique of alienation thus leaves one uncertain as to what William James might call the “cash value” of his remarks. For the prevailing forms of real socialism, as in China, bear little allegiance to such a beneficent Marxist humanism.

M.’s reflections upon philosophic liberalism as our regnant ideology are similarly illuminating, if incomplete. For the ideal type of classical liberalism obscures salient features of its modern (or postmodern) interpretations. If certain strains of early liberalism succumbed to the myth of a progressive harmony of diverse group and individual interests, modern political liberalism, as exemplified in the recent writings of John Rawls, is far more skeptical. Indeed, for Rawls, the pluralism of our incommensurable comprehensive doctrines of the good remains a permanent feature of modern, liberal democracies.

Such radical pluralism (with its correlative denial of a substantive notion of the common good) raises a significant methodological question which M.’s fine analysis does not fully resolve. For Rawls’s appeal to public reason in the political realm presumes our attaining an overlapping consensus of “reasonable” doctrines of the good. For Rawls, as for many modern theorists such as Jürgen Habermas, public reason necessarily prescinds from specific religious beliefs so that the very legitimacy of a distinctive “Christian political theory” is called into question. Our “realism,” for such agnostic piety, cannot be instructed by a Christian doctrine of sin or the Fall, nor can God’s purposes serve as a-priori warrants for the basic claims of justice. Yet such difficulties for postmodern political ethics merely attest to the significance of M.’s inquiry. In Tocqueville’s words, “How could society escape destruction, if, when political ties are broken, moral ties are not tightened? And what can be done with a people master of itself, if it is not subject to God?”

Jesuit School of Theology, Berkeley

WILLIAM O’NEILL, S.J.

Pasewark explores one of the most important questions of our age, whether the exercise of power over others is always domination, or whether a distinction can be drawn between a constructive and a destructive exercise of power. He argues that the tradition of political theory on power has influenced the contemporary tendency to view power as domination. P. examines this tradition through the work of one of its most articulate spokespersons, Michel Foucault. He criticizes elements of Foucault and draws on some of his achievements to establish criteria for an alternative view. He turns to Luther and Tillich for the main lines of this alternative view and examines this view in the light of a range of contemporary questions and criticisms, most notably from Arendt and Habermas.

P.'s argument is that the view of power as domination must remain unacceptable for Christians. If power is always domination, then God's creative and redemptive work is ultimately destructive of being. Such a God can only be despised. However, the search for an alternative view cannot take the road of a "transvaluation" which would simply redefine power as weakness. This only sidesteps the central issue, the fact that the contemporary language of power takes politics as its point of departure. Instead, a truly alternative approach must look beyond politics to find a new starting point.

P.'s criteria for his alternative arise from his critical analysis of Foucault. An acceptable notion of power must recognize power as omnipresent and not simply exercised occasionally or by a few; as productive and not simply repressive; as constitutive of inner relations and not simply operative externally; as consistent with human freedom; as integral to the body; as related integrally to knowledge; as active in the public realm; and as operative temporally in transformations and evolutions as well as spatially in mutations and revolutions.

P. finds his alternative starting point in Luther's understanding of sacramental power as "communication of efficacy at the border of encounter" (296). He studies Luther's writings on sacramental power and then goes to his views on politics in search of apparent and real contradictions in Luther's thought. P.'s analysis of Luther's sacramental theology focuses first on the debates with Rome over the type and mechanics of power operative in the Eucharist, and then on the debates with the radical reformers over whether the sacrament has any power at all. He finds that sacramental power begins externally (initiated by God), but moves to operate internally in the heart of the believer as comfort and empowerment, and then drives outward towards fulfillment in loving action towards one's neighbor.
In contrast to this, political power for Luther not only begins externally, but remains entirely external as a possession of duly appointed political officers, to be used only occasionally, as a negative exercise against the wicked to combat the effects of sin. P. finds that the apparent contradictions and inconsistencies in these two views can be reconciled, in part, in a careful reading of Luther’s theology of the two realms. The earthly realm is not entirely dominated by sinfulness, but is also the place where the power of God’s natural gifts remains operative, and where spirit “reconstitutes” earthly things.

However, all inconsistencies are not resolved, and Luther’s theology of political power remains open to two criticisms: (1) a full development of Luther’s theology requires recognizing that political power does, indeed, have a positive (not merely negative) effect on inner (not merely outer) life; and (2) whereas Luther associated political power entirely with office (external) and consequently admitted no role for revolutionary power, any exercise of political power must be evaluated in the light of higher ethical criteria (right office alone does not make right power).

The final chapters are devoted to a search through Tillich for insights which build upon Luther’s sacramental theory, for problems in Tillich’s thought which might be corrected with insights from Luther, and for responses to contemporary questions and criticisms. While the discussions remain exploratory rather than exhaustive, they are rich in questions, issues, and clues for further research. They include the relation between reason and power; coercive and persuasive power; power in discourse and the role of consensus in political power; heteronomy, autonomy, theonomy, and the relation of power to being; power and justice; varieties of power and the unity of power; power and love; power and ethics.

The book is readable and worth reading. P. treats his interlocutors with respect, scrutinizing with a critical eye, yet always in search of riches. If there is a central contribution to contemporary discourse, I suggest it is his effort to establish theoretical consistency in our understanding of the various spheres of power, to understand power as integral to all being, to reinstate power as fundamentally trustworthy, and to ground ethical criteria for the evaluation of power within an analysis of power itself. Such an effort can only be welcomed by all. After all, the critics of power need to account for the extraordinary power they have exercised over our lives.

Saint Paul University, Ottawa

Kenneth R. Melchin

In the mid-1980s, UNESCO initiated two interdisciplinary studies concerned with the implications of recent advancements in science and technology for the protection and promotion of human rights. The first, entrusted to the International Social Science Council, focused on broad issues arising in the clinical and biomedical sciences; it surveyed developments in areas such as genetics, neurophysiology, psychiatry, and the practice of organ transplantation. The second, undertaken by the World Federation for Mental Health, studied the impact of recently developed reproductive technologies on the rights of women. Both were presented and discussed at an international symposium in Barcelona in the winter of 1987. That symposium highlighted four “danger” areas for human rights that called for further study: developments in genetic screening, increased use of and traffic in body parts, institutionalization of reproductive surrogacy, and the burgeoning bioengineering industry. In this sophisticated and informative work, Brody, professor of psychiatry (emeritus) at the University of Maryland and Secretary General of the WFMH, takes up and exceeds the Barcelona mandate.

B. begins by situating health-related interests in the context of international human-rights discourse. He assumes as self-evident the rights of all persons to freedom from inhumane treatment, gender discrimination, and unwarranted restriction in speech, expression, and access to information. He also assumes as a given the existence of universal rights to freedom of personality development and identity formation, control of fertility, basic health care, a share in the benefits of science, and economic and social security. Although B. never offers an argument for the validity or universality of human rights (an omission which many readers will find problematic), his treatment of the nature of health rights is careful and appropriately subtle. Here, as in his reflection on particular technologies, B.'s extensive international experience is reflected in a welcome sensitivity to the diverse contexts in which health goals are pursued and technologies are employed. He presents human rights as culturally-specific claims, experienced and satisfied interpersonally. While he acknowledges that the scope of any human right is defined ultimately by law, culture, and existing material conditions, it is in the interaction between patient, physician, and family that these claims concerning human dignity are actually lived out. Thus, B.'s is a “relational and empathic” conception of human rights, concerned as much with personal and professional sensitivities as with legislative safeguards (19).

Having laid something of a theoretical foundation, B. moves on to an examination of human-rights issues as they arise in six areas of health care: reproductive technology, transplantation of adult and fetal organs and tissues, genetics, the care of the mentally ill and neuropsychiatric research, end-stage therapies and the treatment of comatose...
patients, and long-range societal expectations for science and technology. His discussion of these specific areas is far too technical to summarize. However, his analysis is consistently thorough, his research impressive, and he sends the reader away with an almost mind-boggling array of questions to ponder. Particularly helpful is his chapter on human-rights concerns in the care of the mentally ill; with skill and sensitivity, he bends the usual boundaries of medical ethics to embrace a class of patients whose unique needs and vulnerabilities are seldom addressed.

The international perspective of this work alone makes it necessary reading for specialists and advanced students of bioethics and healthcare policy. Moreover, B.'s fusion of medical ethics and human-rights methodologies is a welcome enrichment of both. But those who work their way through his difficult book will be frustrated at many points. To begin with, B.'s "culturally sensitive" and relational concept of human rights allows for the inclusion of so many variables that it finally becomes difficult to see what would be the enforcement value of acknowledging such rights. In his chapter on reproductive technologies, e.g., he admits that "the impact of these proclaimed rights [to space births, limit family size, and enhance fertility] has been limited by gross national disparities in educational level and resources, as well as in prevailing values and beliefs" (63). But because he does not offer comment on these realities nor attempt to distinguish between acceptable and unacceptable cultural and economic differences, B. ends up with a somewhat vacuous notion of rights, one which may not be any more satisfying or useful than the objective or abstract accounts he rejects. Further, he tends to collapse ethical and human-rights concerns. Many readers, even those sympathetic to human-rights language, may nonetheless think it necessary to bring other moral languages to bear in the health-care context (e.g., that of professional virtue). Finally, it is not always obvious when B. is reporting the state of a conversation and when he is offering his own analysis. A concluding chapter would have been very helpful. Such weaknesses aside, this is a formidable contribution, worthy of careful attention.

*University of Notre Dame*  

**MAURA ANNE RYAN**


In this compact, well-written survey, Patton identifies three paradigms of pastoral care and gives an historical development of each. (1) The classical paradigm extended from the beginning of Christendom until the advent of modern dynamic psychology's impact on ministry
about 1940. Its major emphasis was upon the gospel message which conveys the caring elements in Christian theology and tradition. (2) The clinical-pastoral paradigm began with the pioneering work of Anton Boisen, its founder, and has extended over the last 50 years. It has emphasized the persons involved in giving and receiving the message of care. (3) The communal-contextual paradigm emerged in the last 30 years in both Roman Catholicism and Protestantism. It involved the shifting of authority away from the Church's clerical hierarchy toward particular Christian communities. Liberation movements related to race, gender, and economic circumstances gave it further impetus. This paradigm, P. says, broadens the focus of the clinical-pastoral paradigm in order to include the caring community of both clergy and laity.

This new communal-contextual paradigm, which is reflected in P.'s title, does not negate either of the two earlier paradigms. Rather, it preserves and reinterprets for today the message of a God who caringly creates human beings for relationship (classical), and it underscores that the way one cares for others is inescapably related to the way one cares for oneself (clinical-pastoral). But underlying each of these emphases, the new paradigm understands pastoral care to be a ministry of the total faith community. Healing comes through memory, which mediates the connection of a person's individual story with other human stories of dwelling with God. These connections do not take pains away but reveal that our pains and sorrows are part of a greater pain and sorrow.

Though P. affirms the healing power of community, he also explains how people are becoming more aware of the ambiguity of the Church that they serve. The ambiguity arises from the Church's failures or the failures of its leaders. "It occurs because the church is both a divine gift and a human activity, both a spirit-filled community and a historical institution" (25).

Though P. does not offer much critique of the weaknesses of any of these paradigms, other authors have highlighted the tendency of the clinical-pastoral model to become individualistic and to develop a professional elite apart from an ecclesial context. Earlier in its own development the clinical-pastoral model had moved to remedy the impersonalized tendency of the classical model and to curb the danger of burnout in ministry caused by a lack of self-awareness.

P. is more comfortable and knowledgeable in the Protestant tradition, and some of his assumptions flow out of that context. For instance, he does not differentiate the different uses Protestants and Catholics have made of the clinical-pastoral model. Protestants have a bold, 50-year history with it; in its initial stages it was almost exclu-
sively for Protestant clergy. Roman Catholics, however, did not begin using it regularly until 25 years ago. Because of that, Catholic laity have become more involved with it than priests have. Despite these occasional blurrings of denominational practices, P. has an excellent command of both the Protestant and Catholic authors in pastoral care. In fact his forte is his command of the literature. His own experience as a teacher and director of a pastoral center pervade the book and give it grounding and credibility.

The book could serve as an excellent textbook for a course in pastoral counseling or in pastoral supervision. Enhancing its usability, P. offers provocative reflection questions at the end of each chapter. The text is especially suited for those ministry programs which are not satisfied with a narrow, personalized pastoral care but wish to examine the broad social, ecclesial context of efficacious ministry.

Seattle University

PATRICK J. HOWELL, S.J.

SHORTER NOTICES


Old Testament narrative frequently involves the relationships between older and younger offspring in a family. More often than not, this relationship takes the form of sibling conflict, familiar to us from the stories of Cain and Abel, Jacob and Esau, Perez and Zerah. But beyond the issue of rivalry, we are confronted with a surprising but repeated phenomenon: practically all the biblical heroes who come out winners in these ancient tales are younger offspring. From Abel to Solomon, almost every major player is known to have had older brothers or sisters. All this appears to run headlong against our notion, wrong as it turns out, that primogeniture was normative in ancient societies. Various hypotheses, some of them demonstrably contrary to fact, have been offered to explain this predominance of younger siblings in the biblical narratives.

In attacking this phenomenon of the younger brothers' preeminence, G. has made a notable and lasting contribution, demonstrating a remarkable control over both biblical sources and relevant legal, social, and anthropological material from the literature of the ancient Near East. Professor of Judaic and Religious Studies at the University of Denver, G. couples a close reading of the Hebrew text with the results of recent synchronic literary study of the Bible (e.g. R. Alter), thus advancing both our historical and theological grasp of the biblical stories of succession.

In pulling together the various strands of his argument, G. inevitably comes to the larger issue of Israel, Yahweh's first-born (Exod 4:22), a choice which Israel never fully understood and could only ascribe to a mystery of love (Deut 7:8). By filling its literature with stories about people
who seemingly do not deserve the preeminence they are given, the Hebrew tradition is possibly reminding us of the irrelevance of human merit and of God’s independence of the human values, which one finds at the heart of these lively narratives. A selected bibliography along with biblical and subject indexes conclude this excellent monograph.

FRED L. MORIARTY, S.J.
Boston College


This book is not easy to categorize. Boismard’s close reading of the Johannine text with variant readings, in view of the Hebrew Bible and its Greek, targumic, and traditional Jewish interpretations, contributes many constructive insights. For example, that Johannine Christology is more indebted to biblical and Jewish traditions than to gnostic Hellenistic redeemer myths. B. maintains two Samaritan influences: “the prophet like Moses” of Deuteronomy 18, and a messianic “son of Joseph” (John 1:45; cf. 2:5 Cana = Gen 41:55). B. also compares John’s prologue with Genesis and with transfiguration traditions.

Boismard resourcefully argues that the pre-Easter version of the miraculous catch of fish is prior (as in Luke 5, not John 21). Though his sources had seven signs, the evangelist’s stress on Jesus’ resurrection as his sign par excellence (therefore seventh) led him to postpone the fish sign and combine it with the Easter meal.

However, many of B.’s judgments are hard to correlate with current American Johannine scholarship. The conflicting source reconstructions of B. and the signs-source school reach such impasses as to raise questions about how unavoidably conjectural are the methods themselves.

Though B. wisely avoided basing his entire book on the four redactional levels in his and A. Lamouille’s L’évangile de Jean (Synopse des quatre évangiles en français, tome III; Paris, 1977), his chapter “The Evolution of Christology” necessarily draws on them. An especially problematic example is that John 17:3 is a later rejection of the high Christology of 1 John 5:20. B.’s arguments about immortality (79–84) dismiss key evidence as redactional additions (82). Some arguments seem to jump between Gospels (115–16) or be based on unlikely textual variants (115, 117–18).

WILLIAM S. KURZ, S.J.
Marquette University, Milwaukee


Lardet has provided an exhaustive philological commentary on Jerome’s Apology against Rufinus. As the editor of the critical text of this interesting work for both the Corpus Christianorum, Series Latina and the Sources Chrétiennes series, L. is superbly equipped for his task. Readers who wish to investigate the subject matter of the controversy (ostensibly) over the writings of Origen (Rufinus had produced a Latin translation of Origen’s speculative masterpiece, On First Principles, that had raised the eyebrows of Roman and other Christians) should consult L.’s 75-page introduction to his Sources Chrétiennes volume, or other books and articles that treat the controversy in its larger historical and intellectual dimensions.
The present volume is more of a reference work to be consulted by scholars studying the text of the *Apology*; it is not a volume that many will actually read from cover to cover. The book provides a section-by-section commentary, with notations keyed to the Sources Chrétiennes text. Some of L.'s comments illuminate the intellectual and literary dimensions of Jerome's work, for example his use of Ciceroonian material on friendship, Jerome's and Rufinus's "scientific" sources pertaining to the operations of the universe, and the knowledge and use of Pythagorean documents and ideas in Jerome's day. L. also identifies various characters mentioned or alluded to in the text. In addition he (or his computer) has counted assiduously such details as how many times Jerome cites various biblical books. The bulk of the commentary pertains to philology: grammatical points, peculiar constructions, unusual words and where else they appear in Latin literature.

Although some of the larger issues of the Origenist controversy are here touched on, such as the debates over the origin of the soul, the resurrection of the flesh, and the "Origenist" tone of Jerome's early *Commentary on Ephesians*, readers will find more discussion of such issues elsewhere. L. also includes appendices that detail such points as the seven new manuscripts found since he prepared his critical editions; some *addenda* and *corrigenda* to his editions; and voluminous indices. Although the book is dedicated to the memory of Michel de Certeau and invokes Foucault in the introduction, readers should not expect the subject matter to provide lively historical reading: the book rather stands as a painstakingly detailed treatment of the fine points of Jerome's *Apology*.


This book, which originated as a doctoral dissertation at Cambridge in 1988, proposes to elucidate the theological significance of the seventh ecumenical council from the documents it utilized or produced. Whereas previous studies have stressed the historical aspect of Nicea II, Giakalis concentrates on its theology. He examines the contemporary theological conceptions which shaped the dominant themes of the council, especially concerning the person of Jesus, the presence in the world of the uncreated energies of the Trinity, the meaning of reality, worship of God "in spirit and in truth," the understanding of Christian tradition, and the educational ideals of the period.

After summarizing the history of the iconoclastic controversy and the Second Council of Nicea, he discusses the veneration of images in tradition, the didactic function of the icon, the goodness and the deification of matter, the icon and Christology, and the icon in worship. He concludes by showing that the council's primary importance was theological and that at the heart of it was the Christological question of how the saving grace of God, the uncreated energies, might become accessible to human beings, a question which the iconophiles and the iconoclasts answered in ontologically different ways.

This book is the result of careful research, solidly based upon the original sources, and is thoughtfully written. G.'s distinctive approach to certain questions, as well as his conclusions, merit serious consideration, especially among Western theologians. Despite its elevated price, about three dollars a page, this
book is a genuine contribution to theological thought and scholarship.

GEORGE T. DENNIS, S.J.
Catholic University of America


Fowden offers an engaging essay on the developmental relationships of the structures of world politics and religious belief in antiquity and early medieval times that is consistently thought provoking, elegantly written, and frequently compelling in its argument. H believes that "[m]onothemism tends to be inherently divisive because of precisely [the] tension it sets up between orthodoxy and heresy. Although universalist by inner logic, it ends up generating pluralism."

F. identifies Achaemenid Persia as the first "genuine world empire," in what he calls the "strategically indispensable" part of the Greco-Roman world. His study concludes with an analysis of the "Islamic Commonwealth" of politically fractured but religiously linked Islamic states after the collapse of the Abbasid Caliphate in the tenth and eleventh centuries. F. argues that the development of the world’s great monotheisms had profound implications for both the strengths and the critical weaknesses of the Roman, Sassanid, Byzantine, and Islamic empires. These creeds, he believes, inevitably led to the emergence of more decentralized political structures such as the feudal monarchies of the medieval West, the "first" Byzantine Commonwealth of late antiquity (Byzantium and its Christian client states of Georgia, Armenia, Nubia, and Ethiopia), the "second" Byzantine Commonwealth of the Middle Ages (Byzantium and the independent states of the Slavic World), and the Islamic Commonwealth.

To accommodate the evidence to his theory, F. must necessarily propose many subordinate theses that, taken together, tend to weaken the conviction of the central argument. Also, was not the Ottoman Empire—beyond the temporal scope of F.’s essay—a notable revival of the antique model of world empire? But one need not accept F.’s argument of the essential link between the fortunes of empires and the rise of monotheism to profit from this stimulating and enjoyable book.

JOHN THOMAS
Walnut Creek, Calif.


Hamilton represents a growing number of scholars drawn to the Spanish alumbrados. His volume, the result of over twenty years of research, includes careful examination of proceedings of the Inquisition against the main characters among them. Its general strength is that it surveys in English, for the first time, the three manifestations of iluminismo in 16th-century Spain: the group around Toledo, active between 1512 and 1535; that in Llerena in Extremadura, late 16th century; and that in Seville, the object of inquisitorial investigation in the 1620s. H. pays relatively little attention to the last two groups, however, treating them in only one of the book’s eight chapters.

H. explores the religious climate in which reform and innovation were the order of the day, encouraging both religious and laity to create their own modes of spirituality, especially in terms of prayer and the interpretation of Scripture. The prominence of
lay women as spiritual leaders was disturbing to the Inquisition, giving rise to the expected charges of sexual indecency, as was the high percentage of *conversos*, the Christians of Jewish ancestry. The illuminist ideas and activities that prompted action by the Inquisition are the basis of 48 propositions listed and condemned by the inquisitor general in 1525. High on the list of condemned practices was mental prayer, either in the form of *dejamiento* (abandonment) or *recogimiento* (recollection), the former being particularly reprehensible for its excessively passive nature. Informing all the condemnations was concern about individuals rejecting the Church as intermediary and authority in favor of a personal relationship with God through the inspiration and guidance of the Holy Spirit.

H.’s familiarity with the protagonists of the drama around Toledo makes for fascinating and in some cases disturbing reading: the imprisonment of Fray Francisco Ortiz for publicly decrying the actions of the Inquisition against his spiritual mother, the beata Francisca Hernández; Pedro Ruiz de Alcázar denounced to the authorities by a beata angry over his change of affiliation to her rival; María de Cazalla, her cries recorded in the documents of the Inquisition while under torture, somehow managing to maintain dignity and claims of innocence. Less effective is the depiction of the *alumbrados* of Llerena and Sevilla, who for the most part emerge as prototypes of the lascivious priest and neurotic female.

Here is a succinct but substantive treatment in English of the Toledan *alumbrados*. Hopefully, the *alumbrados* of Llerena and Sevilla will be the subject of an equally excellent study in English.

**MARY E. GILES**
*California State University, Sacramento*


This magisterial study of Clément Marot (1496–1544) illuminates the early Reformation in France. Screech analyzes the biblical, specifically the Pauline, sources of Marot’s satiric poetry. The influence of the Renaissance translations of Scripture on Marot indicates the broader cultural influence of the French, Navarese, and Ferraran courts where Marot circulated. The analysis of the themes of election and martyrdom in Marot’s verse reveals the theological issues which dominated aristocratic circles at the dawn of the Reformation. Marot’s own history of successive exiles from hostile regimes permits S. to sketch the political repercussions of the exegetical and theological controversies of the period.

Less successful is S.’s attempt to classify Marot as a Lutheran. The evidence presented to justify this thesis is indecisive. Marot’s criticisms of monasticism and superstition are commonplace in Catholic, as well as Protestant, polemicists. S.’s dismissal of Marot’s explicit anti-Lutheran statements by appealing to their context and his efforts to parallel Marot’s theology with Lutheran doctrine appear forced. The distinctively Catholic traits of Marot’s poetry, such as prayers for the dead, prayers to Mary, and the use of the formula *foi vive*, rather than the Protestant *foi seule*, are unduly minimized. The ambiguous formulae of Marot reflect the diffuse nature of the *parti évangélique* in early 16th-century France, which had yet to polarize clearly along the Catholic–Huguenot cleavage of a later generation.

**JOHN J. CONLEY, S.J.**
*Fordham University*

As the postulator of Newman's cause for canonization in the Catholic Church, Blehl is well suited to write about the Victorian cardinal's spirituality. Though many have written previously on this topic, here we have a comprehensive explanation of N.'s spiritual theology. Despite his prolific writing, N. never published a specific work on spiritual theology. Yet, his incessant pursuit of sanctity as an Anglican vicar and then as a Catholic priest pervaded all that he wrote and preached. Blehl's perceptive and inspiring study is an appropriate tribute to N.'s deeply religious personality as we celebrate in 1995 the 150th anniversary of his conversion.

Blehl's introductory section presents a cursory investigation of how N. arrived at his spiritual theology. Unfortunately, to study the roots of his spirituality needs a more extensive analysis of N.'s Anglican years than this brief survey allows. Here Blehl helpfully identifies the crucial significance of N.'s concern for promoting truth and holiness together—a strand that weaves through the book. But a more substantive explanation of this foundational insight and its pervasive influence upon his spiritual development, both personal and intellectual, remains a task for future scholarship.

The major part of the book explains N.'s spiritual theology systematically. Its 13 chapters are organized impressively in four fascinating sections: on turning to God; on Christ and the Holy Spirit; on the invisible world; and on patterns of holiness. Here we encounter the remarkable influence of Scripture, patristic thought (especially the Greek Fathers), and the Anglican tradition on N.'s entire life and thought. It is unfortunate there is no index, but Blehl's mastery of N.'s writings will inspire the scholar and general reader alike.

GERARD MAGILL
Saint Louis University


McGrath here surveys the current state of worldwide Anglicanism. Despite the disarray of Anglicanism in the West, he sees hopeful signs of the renewal of the Anglican Communion. These signs are the vitality of Anglicanism in Africa and Asia, the initial fruits of the commitment to evangelism made by the Lambeth Conference of 1988 which shifts Anglicanism to a "mission" orientation, and the growth of evangelicalism in Anglican churches. Yet M. is aware that the decline of Anglicanism in the West must be reversed by its rediscovery of its purpose and potential if the Anglican Communion is to make its contribution to and for the universal Church.

M. traces the reason for Western Anglicanism's decline and sketches the outlines of a theology strong enough to reverse the downward trend. He traces the decline of Anglicanism in England and North America to a theological liberalism which hobbled Anglicanism through modern accommodation to the rationalism and individualism springing from the Enlightenment. M. insists that genuine renewal of Anglicanism is renewal in the lived faith of Anglicans. The renewal of Anglican theology will occur when contemporary Anglicans express their experience of Christ in a sensitive reflection on their experience in keeping with their distinctive tradition. Adequately to express their experience Anglicans will be constructing a new theological
THEOLOGICAL STUDIES

Via Media joining Evangelicalism and Catholicism which is free from the pitfalls of either fundamentalism or liberalism. Anglican seminary faculties should have a major role in helping to articulate this contemporary pastoral theology which both voices and nurtures the deepening Christian life of Anglican communities experiencing religious renewal.

This book is itself an example of the renewal of Anglicanism about which M. writes with such insight.

HERBERT J. RYAN, S.J.
Loyola Marymount University, L.A.


This study in cross-cultural analysis is very timely in a world in which pluralism is the accepted norm. Panikkar develops his analysis by calling for an open horizon in which are brought together the three aspects of reality: cosmic, divine, and human. The word “cosmotheandric” is his way of describing the holistic experience of these three forms of life. He discusses in detail what he calls the three kairopological moments of consciousness: the primordial mentality, the humanistic mentality, and the cosmotheandric moment. It is this last moment that P. studies in the major sections of the book. He attempts to overcome the dualisms of so many past explanations of consciousness, and he hopes to provide a framework for living in a pluralistic age.

Part 2 is devoted to a methodological reflection on the three forms of consciousness, now called nonhistorical, historical, and transhistorical. P. sees the world at a point of crisis. We have moved far from the more primitive mentality which is tied to the past, but the present scientific mentality of technology and progress which is directed toward the future has now ceased to be a source of hope. The system has broken down, the meaning of life cannot be found in the future or in the reshaping of society. Those concerned with the failure of technology, the continuing ecological destruction, and our obvious inability to transform nature and society will find in P. an astute analysis of our readiness for a new moment of consciousness. For P. the answer to the meaning of life lies not in the myth-laden past or the messianisms of the future, but in the present, in life itself lived with depth.

Much of cosmotheandric reality sounds like process thought, in particular Teilard de Chardin. P. notes the similarity but claims that process theologians are still caught in a historical consciousness which is now shown to have failed. The only meaningful choice is transhistorical existence. Although somewhat difficult to read, this work is a valuable addition to the discussion of how to discover the significance of life in a pluralistic world.

JAMES L. EMPEREUR, S.J.
Santa Clara, California


This book is the culmination of 25 years of rethinking Christology on Hick’s part. He ventures here that the historical Jesus did not make a claim to deity, and he rejects the dogma of Jesus’ two natures and the concept of atonement. Hick argues that the idea of divine incarnation has never made literal sense and should be interpreted metaphorically. The early Church transposed the metaphorical language of incarnation to metaphysical language, making claims about the Christ of faith that exceed the evidence found in the Jesus of history.

JAMES L. EMPEREUR, S.J.
Santa Clara, California
He also refutes later (kenotic) theories of divine self-emptying, arguing that such accounts are inadequate to explain a God-man who, when acting as a human, ignores the fact that he is also divine. Instead, Hick argues, not unlike Schleiermacher in the 19th century, that Jesus had such a heightened consciousness of God at every moment of his life, that he lived fully in the presence of God and his will was in accord with God's will.

In suggesting that the language of incarnation is metaphorical rather than metaphysical, Hick opens the way to understanding other outstanding religious figures as also having "incarnated" ideal human life lived as a response to the divine Reality. Thus Jesus is not the singular historical intersection between God and humanity. This functional rather than a metaphysical Christology paves the way for Hick's theory of religious pluralism, in which the various major religious traditions are more or less equally salvific. However, it does so at the cost of traditional Christology, a price many will not be willing to pay.

CHESTER GILLIS
Georgetown University


A thoughtful comparison of the traditional accounts of Christ and Buddha, Japanese Mahayana (Zen and Shin) and Christianity (Pseudo-Dionysius and Augustine), and Buddhist and Christian responses to modernity (Thich Nhat Hanh and Gustavo Gutierrez). Lefebure sees similar structures (the simultaneous striving for self-perfection and altruistic activity) within the context of different doctrinal presuppositions (creation and interdependent arising). The strongest features of the book are its emphasis on practice and experience, the attention to both cataphatic and apophatic systems and spiritualities, the solid discussion of Engaged Buddhism and Liberation Theology, and a refusal to make simplistic identifications between Buddhism and Christianity or to force closure on the new and complex issue of the dialogue.

However, except for the section on Nhat Han and Gutierrez, only secondary sources are used. And although L. has read extensively, he leaves us with the misleading impression that there is an ultimate reality of some sort (variably identified with emptiness, nirvana, Buddha, Nature, Dharma-kaya, etc.) in Mahayana Buddhism, despite quoting Nhat Hanh on the Heart Sutra, who correctly equates emptiness and interdependent arising (which Nhat Hanh calls "interbeing"). We can certainly say that Christianity has an ultimate reality (God) but we can at most say that Buddhism leads to seeing reality as it ultimately is. Christianity goes to a "there," but Buddhism dismantles the illusory "here" so that the nonillusory "here" self-manifests: this is the identity (better, nonduality) of samsara and nirvana which L. reports was such a problem for Tillich.

L.'s heavy reliance on D. T. Suzuki and Masao Abe leads him to be overly suspicious of conceptual statements about emptiness. A discussion of Tendai or Gelugpa would have provided a more effective foil to Augustine's doctrinal statements.

ROGER CORLESS
Duke University


Bevans understands contextual theology as a methodology composed of the following elements: the spirit
and message of the gospel, the Christian tradition, the culture of the theologian, and social change in that culture. Taking incarnation seriously, it is a new way of doing theology, differing radically from an earlier "one source" theology. B. prefers the term "contextualization" to other words like "indigenization" and "inculturation," since it includes all that is good in those terms while adding the process of social, political, and economic change.

B. adopts the widely employed models methodology, setting out "ideal types" and metaphors, symbols which "give rise to thought" (Ricoeur). He then describes five possible models, which he sees as ultimately inclusive of each other, citing examples of each: (1) translation; (2) the anthropological; (3) praxis; (4) the synthetic; and (5) the transcendental.

The values of this book lie in its efforts to bring order out of the chaos of the collapse of "classicism" and the shrinking of the globe. The book is generally clear, and thus usable by pastors and mission workers as well as academic theologians. Some points might be better clarified. (1) The translation model needs more qualification, since the thrust of B.'s book seems to demonstrate the difference between contextualizing "the gospel" and inserting an ecclesiastical system. (2) B.'s transcendental examples seem to differ little from praxis examples. However, the distinction is valuable, and it will be interesting to discover just how common the transcendental experience might be in cultural interaction. (3) Has B. adequately explained "inculturation" in the light of its origins? Properly understood, it seems to include all that contextualization includes. However, the problem is literally "academic," since local theologians will find their own terminology in any case.

CARL F. STARKLOFF, S.J.
Regis College, Toronto


A collection of 19 articles, all of which have appeared elsewhere in periodicals or in books edited by others. Though no internal arrangement of the essays is indicated, they could be generally grouped into two major headings: the first group treats various issues in fundamental moral theology, while the second set addresses more particularized aspects of applied ethics.

In the first section special emphasis is given to the public responsibility of moral theology, as well as to the inevitable tensions which are bound to arise in the concrete search for moral truth in our complex contemporary society. The second set of essays turns to a range of issues in bioethics, such as surrogate parenthood, the moral status of the preembryo, the question of ordinary/extraordinary means in the care of persistent-vegetative-state patients. These essays can be seen as practical exercises of many of the concerns raised in the first section.

While the book is entitled Corrective Vision, another possible title (suggested by the essay on abortion) might be Exploring the Middle Ground, as McCormick consistently seeks to avoid the extremes which characterize many of the more polemical ethicists of both the right and the left. The essays contained in this volume would be a good companion to a modern manual for an introductory seminary course in moral theology, or a simple vademecum for those who wish to keep abreast of current trends in Roman Catholic moral theology.

JAMES T. BRETZKE, S.J.
Jesuit School of Theology, Berkeley

THE WAY OF THE LORD JESUS 2: LIVING A CHRISTIAN LIFE. By Germain

In *Christian Moral Principles* G. expounded a fundamental moral theology based on his own theory of basic human goods. He distinguished his approach from both the proportionalist and "classical" schools by presenting morality as a matter of adhering to the intrinsic requirements of "integral human fulfillment" in those goods as spelled out in the "modes of Christian response." The present volume applies that theory to a myriad of specific issues. Its incisive analysis of the ways possible choices bear on those modes eloquently attests to the theory's power.

The first three chapters treat responsibilities associated with faith, hope, and charity; the fourth considers penance and the struggle against sin. The fifth, on the pursuit of moral truth, investigates the dynamics of discernment and offers a practical guide for moral problem solving. Social responsibilities, communication, restitution, life and health, sex and marriage, work, "subhuman realities," and property are covered in subsequent chapters, and the final one deals with patriotism, politics and citizenship.

Of particular interest is G.'s treatment of marriage, which he identifies for the first time as a basic human good. Complementing his account of this "many-faceted good" is a theory of "imperfect marriage" which explains why certain unions may be dissolved in favor of the faith despite marriage's essential trait of indissolubility. The chapter on human life offers astute applications of his principle of double effect. Given his definition of choice as "adopting a proposal," however, a general discussion of what a proposal may be understood to include would be useful.

Though intended as a seminary textbook, the encyclopedic scope of this volume, with its seven indexes, indicates its importance as a reference work. In bringing to bear with analytic precision a creative, non-legalistic approach on critical moral issues, the book is impressive indeed.

   Peter F. Ryan, S.J.
   Loyola College, Baltimore


The thesis of this wonderful and beautifully written book is that the virtues involve not only right actions, but also right feelings. Virtues integrate all the components of our personality in the service of the good. This is why we are morally responsible for the way we feel and why, Harak argues, the most fundamental task of the moral life is the transformation of our passions so that we feel the right way about the right things at the right time. Furthermore, by focusing on the centrality of the passions in the formation of character, H. wants to expand the modern notion of moral agency beyond the Kantian focus on autonomy to include the idea of acting on another's behalf. The latter is especially crucial in any Christian ethic that takes discipleship seriously.

H. starts by examining the biological foundation of the passions to show why any account of the virtues must begin with the fact that human nature is embodied and constitutively interrelational. He follows this by a careful study of the role of the passions and affections in the moral theology of Aquinas. He shows how all of Aquinas's ethic is rooted in the principle that human beings should be drawn toward what is good for them and avoid what is evil and harmful. He also offers a fascinating analysis of the role of the passions in the *Spiritual Exercises* of Ignatius of Loyola.

H. argues that the purpose of the *Exercises* is to train and transform the
passions so that they ultimately con­form to the passions of Christ; thus, what Ignatius sought was not to sup­press the passions, but to make them holy. He concludes with a poignant reflection on the connection between Christian justice and nonviolence.

This book both challenges and de­lights. Most of all, it shows how Christian morality really is a matter of a transformed heart.

Paul J. Wadell
Catholic Theological Union
Chicago


McAuliffe believes that she has achieved a paradigm shift in ethics, from an individual ethic to one of social solidarity. The latter is also viewed as a shift, from an ethics that is positive, universal, abstract, and ahistorical to one that is negative, concrete, social, historical, and innovative. In a large number of sources, especially liberation theology, M. concentrates and greatly relies on the works of Edward Schillebeeckx, Juan Luis Segundo, and Dorothee Soelle.

The foundation of this book is the “negative contrast experience” of Schillebeeckx, that is to say, the experience of suffering, the imperative to strive against suffering, and the search for salvation from this suffering. Throughout this struggle, the life of Jesus is viewed as the radical example for Christians. In order to eschew abstraction, a next step moves beyond the general imperative to resist suffering and focuses on liberation theology’s option for the poor. A further move concentrates on the kingdom of God, which explores our relatedness to other humans, social structures, and the ethics of social transformation.

Chapter 4 asserts that the liberationist ethic is an innovative and re­sponsible one, in which concrete prac­tice is prior to the norms for practice. The final chapter continues to high­light the priority of practice, and em­phasizes that in many ways ethics is prior to and even foundational for re­ligion and theology. Ethics is also seen to have much in common with almost all religions with regard to the central concern of the suffering of the world’s poorest.

Overall, M. has produced an inno­vative and flexible ethic that is des­perately needed, given the worsening, critical hiatus today between the af­luent first world and the impover­ished third world. Perhaps a second volume would be helpful to analyze many other concepts, norms, etc., in order to flesh out the lacunae in this very broad framework.

Alfred T. Hennelly, S.J.
Fordham University


Villafañe, a leading Pentecostal thinker, is professor of Christian so­cial ethics at Gordon-Conwell The­ological Seminary and also an or­dained minister in the Eastern His­panic District of the Assemblies of God. This work was originally pub­lished in 1992 by the University Press of America; its enthusiastic reception among Hispanic Protestant and Ro­man Catholic theologians explains its re-publication now in this more attrac­tive and substantial edition.

V. starts by contextualizing the Hispanic reality. He is most familiar with the Puerto Rican situation in the Northeast. Concepts such as socio­economic marginality, oppression, popular religiosity (especially devo­tion to Our Lady of Guadalupe), eth­nicity, and miscegenation provide per­spectives for interpretation. V. leans on excellent scholarship in the social
sciences and theology, the same sources as contemporary Roman Catholic Hispanic writers. He goes on to describe the rich, complex religious heritage of Hispanics in its Pre-Columbian, African, and Spanish roots as well as in its historical Roman Catholic and Protestant expressions. The inspiration of Virgilio Elizondo, the “father” of U.S. Hispanic Catholic theology, is quite visible at this point. Furthermore, V. highlights Hispanic Pentecostalism, giving a well-conceived overview of a major religious trend that too many mainstream theologians have preferred simply to ignore or dismiss. He also attempts to link his social ethical concerns with spirituality and a theology of the Holy Spirit, proposing a “pneumatological paradigm.” Finally, V. articulates a Hispanic Pentecostal social ethic, which shares many similarities with liberation theology and, indeed, Catholic social teaching.

No other current study represents so well the fascinating ecumenical dialogue among U.S. Hispanic theologians, e.g. in the Academy of Catholic Hispanic Theologians of the United States, at conferences of the American Academy of Religion, or at the annual summer program of the Fund for Theological Education. V. exemplifies how social ethical concerns of committed Christians may be today’s most viable path for ecumenism. Moreover, he provides a frame of reference for a “new ecumenism” in the heart of Hispanic Americans as they struggle for continuity, identity, and justice in the postmodern world.

ALLAN F. DECK, S.J.
Loyola Marymount University, L.A.


H. Richard Niebuhr developed a very fruitful and flexible approach to moral responsibility, focused on “the responsible self.” His views, however, reflected his social location: a white male, an empowered self, sharing in all the benefits of American society. Can his approach to moral responsibility speak to the concerns of marginalized peoples, in particular to African-Americans? Trimiew believes that it can, but not without criticism and correction.

T. notes various needed corrections in the course of his book; e.g., Niebuhr, while calling for solidarity with those who suffer, failed to see God as “liberating” and as empowering the marginalized to confront unjust oppressions. We can, however, find within the marginalized African-American community some inspiring examples of persons who fulfilled many of the traits Niebuhr called for in his articulation of the responsible self. T. gives special attention to three such persons from the late-19th and early-20th centuries.

The three differed in their approaches, but recognized in common that the achievement of true freedom must involve self-esteem, a struggle for equal social and political rights, and the fulfillment of basic human needs. (T. adds a special chapter on the importance of basic needs as a guideline for moral responsibility). Bishop Henry McNeal Turner thought these goals would be best achieved by encouraging emigration to Africa. Ida B. Wells-Barnett crusaded against the barbarism of lynching. Francis J. Grimke, a cofounder of the NAACP, stressed self-improvement but also fought for legal and social rights.

T.’s work is interesting, clearly written, balanced in its criticisms, and generally successful in achieving its purpose of adapting Niebuhr to marginalized situations.

ARTHUR F. MCGOVERN, S.J.
University of Detroit Mercy

How to combine exposition with application is a strategic question Fergusson answers by first expounding Murray's thought and then exploring its value for contemporary issues. Discussion questions close each chapter and foster a continuous orientation toward application. Clear prose enables the reader to follow the argument, which at significant points depends on that of J. Leon Hooper. Excellent expository chapters cover familiar themes, including a focus on the centrality of the believer-citizen who harmonizes church/state relations; attention to Murray's medieval sources; lucid tracing of his reading of Pope Leo XIII; clarity in spelling out the common good/public order difference; and emphasis, following Robert W. McElroy, on secularism as a problem. One out-of-context quote, however, confuses the sacred/secular with a universal/particular differentiation (82).

In discussing the broader meaning of Murray's theory for American society, F. touches, among other topics, on Murray's attempt to form public consensus and on the question of aid to schools. He rejects Murray's argument for the influence of natural-law thought on America's founding, without discounting Murray's advocacy of a natural-law mode for contemporary public discourse. By concentrating on Lockean and Deistic (not natural-law) sources for America's foundations, however, F. seems to reduce Murray's late appreciation of the rich religious and philosophical fabric of that foundation to a simple history of ideas. One appendix provides a handy, independent resume of much recent Murray scholarship; another helpfully contrasts Murray's appropriation of Aquinas with Reinhold Niebuhr's renewal of Augustine.

Throughout this text, F. relies on an interpretation of historical consciousness as the complex, prudential application of timeless principles to contingent circumstances (earliest Murray). F.'s own future work would be sharpened by a deeper appreciation of the social, historical nature of general truth and value claims themselves (later Murray).

THOMAS HUGHSON, S.J. Marquette University, Milwaukee


The primary effort of this book is to practice public theology by bringing specific theological doctrines to bear on concrete social problems. It is a welcome advance in the discussion concerning public theology because, after a first chapter locating their position on the question, the authors proceed to carry out, rather than simply talk about, the task of a theology that seeks to speak beyond an ecclesial audience in a pluralistic society. They draw upon the doctrines of original sin, the Trinity, grace, creation, Incarnation, and the communion of saints in order to address the issues of self-interest versus the common good, human rights, the consistent ethic of life, the environment, patriotism, and social solidarity. Each chapter provides enough grist for an entire book, but the authors control the material well.

The chapter on the Trinity and human rights is interesting because it establishes a better grounding for the claim that rights are realized in community than Catholic social teaching itself does with its emphasis on the dignity of the human person. Accent
on the Trinity helps to prevent any sliding into individualism. Similarly, the chapter on the communion of saints and social solidarity draws from a much-neglected doctrine to establish a social concept better than official teaching itself does. Another quite innovative chapter is that on the environment, where the authors reject—due to its many abuses—the concept of stewardship, and affirm the idea of companionship as an alternative.

Specialists may desire more development of each of the doctrines and issues, but such detail might have undercut the authors’ aim to make a general point about the viability of theological discourse to a broad audience.

TODD DAVID WHITMORE
University of Notre Dame

BIOETHICS IN A LIBERAL SOCIETY.

Charlesworth’s first two chapters present his vision of the liberal society: it is a society which treats all people equally and allows them the freedom to choose their religion and ethics for themselves as long as they do not violate or harm others. Far from advocating moral skepticism or relativism, the liberal insists on unequivocally objective values: the supreme value of personal autonomy and the accompanying social values of equality, justice, moral diversity, and religious pluralism.

Then C. examines euthanasia and suicide, new reproductive technologies, and the distribution of health-care resources. The results are predictable. In the liberal society, people should be able to kill themselves whenever they judge continued existence is morally pointless, and ask others to help them. People should also be able to reproduce any way they choose, and raise their children within or without traditional marriage. Finally, the distribution of health-care resources will be achieved not by planned utilitarian rationing but by the piecemeal social settlements of endless negotiation.

The liberal ideal C. defends is powerful because it captures a crucial truth in ethics: behavior is virtuous only if freely chosen. But many will argue that C.’s liberalism fails to develop adequately the idea that freely chosen behavior is virtuous only if it is also in fact good. Moreover, the line between the personal and the societal may not fall where many liberals draw it. Euthanasia, physician-assisted suicide, reproduction with commercial sperm and eggs, and surrogate motherhood are not simply private behaviors—they have important social dimensions as well.

C.’s extremely clear and well-written book is a welcome addition to the current debate between liberalism and communitarianism.

RAYMOND J. DEVETTERE
Emmanuel College, Boston

MINISTRY IN COMMUNITY: RAHNER’S VISION OF MINISTRY.

The content of Farmer’s book is somewhat narrower than the title suggests. Its first section offers an overview of aspects of Rahner’s ecclesiology, and the second focuses on what he calls Amt or “ministerial office.”

The ecclesiological section canvasses key articles in chronological order. Although individual sections offer faithful summaries of Rahner’s thought, it is not always easy to grasp the profoundly systematic nature of his views or to understand the real development they underwent. With
the exception of Vatican II, the theology is presented without any reference to ecclesial or extra-ecclesial factors that might have influenced it. Much of what Rahner has to say on Amt is touched on in the second section. The emphasis is on its ecclesial dimension and on its fundamental unity. F. develops Rahner’s position on the traditional threefold office of bishops, presbyters, and deacons as well as on the relation between the papacy and the episcopacy. He details what Rahner says about word, sacrament and pastoral leadership, and about their relative importance.

F.’s reading of Rahner is on the whole careful and precise, but the notes contain some typical examples of the errors that mar so many English translations of Rahner’s works. In spite of the book’s many positive qualities, this reader, at least, regrets that F. was not able to step back a little and offer something more of the larger picture of the development of Rahner’s thought and of the factors that provoked it. As it stands, however, the book brings together in a clear and accessible form key elements of a major modern Roman Catholic theologian’s understanding of the Church and of the nature and role of ministerial office within it.

DANIEL DONOVAN
St. Michael’s College, Toronto


Poorman’s text, which is based upon his dissertation, works on several levels. Most explicitly, P. proposes a method of moral discernment for Roman Catholic pastoral ministers from his synthesis of Norma Haan’s theory of interactive morality, John Macmurray’s philosophy, and James Gustafson’s theological ethics. Furthermore, he argues convincingly for the use of psychology in moral theology. His proposed method forges a nexus between pastoral and moral theology.

P. is concerned to show that discernment in pastoral settings is best described not as application of unchanging norms and principles to concrete circumstances. Rather, pastoral discernment constitutes a credible way of doing moral theology “from the ground up.” Furthermore, P. quite thoroughly addresses the warrants for using experience and empirical science (in this case, moral psychology) in moral theology. His proposed method adequately balances both consideration of the contingency and particularity of situations and the pastoral minister’s position as one who would attempt to represent the collective wisdom and truth claims of the Catholic tradition.

The process and goal of discernment, according to P., require an egalitarian relationship between the discerning parties in an open-ended dialogue. His exposition of this egalitarian relationship culminates in a critique of the deontological method employed in Humanae vitae, which implies that he intends the method not only for parishes but for the magisterium’s moral discernment. However, P. inadequately confronts the significant ecclesiological questions raised by the necessary equality among discerners in his proposed method of pastoral moral discernment. Nevertheless, his project fulfills his aim in that both pastoral ministers and moral theologians will find a foundation here for the renewal of their disciplines.

JENNIFER REED-BOULEY
Loyola University, Chicago

FUNDAMENTAL KANONISTIK: GRUND UND GRENZEN DES KIRCHENRECHTS.

In 1973 Yves Congar published an article entitled "Rudolph Sohm nous interroge encore." Indeed, ever since Sohm, a German Protestant lawyer (1841–1917), published his thesis that the essence of the Church and the essence of law exclude each other, he has challenged especially the German canonical scene to provide for a satisfactory explanation of the existence of canon law. Sebott, professor of canon law at the Jesuit School St. Georgen in Frankfurt, had already taken the discussion provoked by Sohm as subject of his dissertation defended in canon law at the Angelicum (1980). This book appears to be a substantially reworked edition of that dissertation.

Part 1 describes in a critical fashion the content and implications of Sohm's theory. In the first century the Church was governed by decisions made on the basis of charisms. After that, offices and institutions acquired increased importance. Sohm understood law as reinforcable; and that is against the nature of the Church, to which a person should freely submit himself. In Part 2, S. reports the reactions of German Catholic theologians. Sohm's theory encountered objections, due to his concept of church and of law. Yet, many of his questions could not easily be evaded, among which was the question of the role of canon law in the Church. Part 3 answers this question: canon law is founded in ecclesiology and in sacraments.

The book is well written. Especially the first two parts should be of interest to those ecclesiologists who are intrigued by Sohm's question. Congar himself is quoted as stating that he would like to take up that challenge (191).

MYRIAM WULENS
Westfälische Wilhelms Universität
Münster


For the past 25 years the decline in the number of priests and seminarians has presented the Latin Church with a problem demanding remedial action. One proposed solution is the removal of the obligation of celibacy for all priests. Vogels, who was himself ordained in 1959 and earned a doctorate in theology in 1975, studied the origins and development of the law of celibacy in his 1978 book Pflichtzölibat. He interprets the eunuch-logion of Matt 19:12 to mean that celibacy is a charism given to individuals by God and must, therefore, be retained in the Church.

It is anomalous, however, that a charism be imposed by law on all those who are called to the priesthood. Even if there were no shortage of priests, V. argues, the law requiring priestly celibacy should be repealed. He describes the gradual movement toward the law of celibacy, beginning with Paul's vindication of his right to have a wife (1 Cor 9:5) but his choice of celibacy, through fourth-century prohibitions of sexual activity by priests within marriage (which were based on a negative view of married sexual activity and a desire to restore an ancient ideal of cultic purity), leading to the twelfth-century requirement of celibacy for all priests in the Western Church. The Second Vatican Council continues to "recommend" celibacy while acknowledging that it is not demanded by the nature of the priesthood (Presbyterorum ordinis 16). V. argues further that ordination and marriage are positively compatible sacraments because in each the recipient is called to profess and grow in self-giving love.

V. married the year after the pub-
William C. McFadden, S.J.
Georgetown University


This is probably the last of the great "best of Rahner" series from Crossroad. There are 120 short pieces, from one-and-a-half to a dozen pages, arranged roughly according to the church seasons in six sections: Advent, Christmas, Lent, Easter and Pentecost, Yearly Feasts, and Feasts of the Lord and of the Saints. There is an appendix of two items: On the Selecting and Editing of the Texts, and Additional Rahnerian Texts for the Church Year. There are also indexes of Old and New Testament passages.

Most of the material has appeared in English in translations over the years. A fair number, however—twenty-two, to be exact—have been newly translated for this volume by Frederick Lawrence (except for one by Daniel Donovan); these are among the most nourishing, e.g. the meditations on Aquinas and Ignatius. Some of the themes developed include the mysticism of everyday life, experience of faith as the heart of human existence, Christian pessimism realistically facing death, and Christian optimism hoping for resurrection. There is a wonderful appreciation of the saints and the Church as means of holiness.

This is Rahner at his most accessible best. Direct, simple, sometimes abrupt, always engaging. One gets a sense of how this great theologian and Jesuit found his own mystical peace at the depth of an ocean of prayer and so weathered the stormy surface seas of one of the most demanding and theologically exciting lives of our time.

Andrew Tallon
Marquette University, Milwaukee


This book offers, especially to those in the Protestant tradition, new ways of understanding and conducting Eucharist. Using history, theology, and pastoral principles, Stookey develops eucharistic worship as a sacrament, not an ordinance, which is to be celebrated as a communal act of worship in preference to individual devotion.

This feast of Christ with his Church deserves to take place regularly as the central focus of the Sunday service. Useful pastoral and liturgical commentaries offer a critical eye to practices and omissions frequently found in many Protestant celebrations of Eucharist. S.'s six components of a renewed eucharistic theology are solidly based, and the chapter on conducting the Eucharist gives useful insights to those not sensitive to liturgical matters. He offers social and ecumenical challenges in the chapter "That My House May Be Filled". Particularly useful is the appendix on Eucharist in Methodism, where S. identifies the central role John Wesley attributed to eucharistic worship and the strong sacramental themes which are part of the Methodist tradition.

The work will be most useful to those who are being introduced into the Protestant eucharistic tradition, or who have a limited knowledge of the same. S. has a good command of the ritual tradition. His treatment of eucharistic theology is strongest when dealing with the Reformers, but his summary of the medieval tradi-
tion is too sketchy and could be misleading. There is a steadfast avoidance of the theme of sacrifice. S.'s work is a good introduction to a more complete theological treatment offered by William Crockett, *Eucharist: Symbol of Transformation* and the liturgical treatment of James F. White, *Sacraments as God's Self Giving, or Introduction to Worship*.

**EMMANUEL J. CUTRONE**  
*Spring Hill College, Mobile*

---

**WORSHIP: WEDDING TO MARRIAGE.**  

Study of Christian marriage has been enriched in recent years by insights from sacramental theology, biblical research, liturgical history and practice, and the human sciences. Martinez suggests that a synthesis of these perspectives is essential to both theological discussion and pastoral ministry relating to Christian marriage.

M. treats three basic aspects of marriage: the experience, the tradition, and the celebration. He explores marriage through the metaphors of worship, communion, sacramental mystery, and covenant. The interdisciplinary approach is quite evident, e.g., in the treatment of marriage as communion. While recommending the insights into marriage that have been gained through the personalist perspective of the human sciences, M. notes that the Christian perspective challenges and rejects the overarching individualism inherent in much personalist theory. It is characteristic of M.'s methodology that he neither ignores nor uncritically accepts the insights from a variety of disciplines from which he draws.

Liturgy serves as a common thread throughout, and useful summaries of liturgical issues regarding marriage are offered. In addition to an overview of the liturgical tradition of marriage in the Church's history and the 1990 revision of the ritual, M. discusses degrees of sacramentality in response to the pastoral frustration of celebrating marriage with "baptized unbelievers." Speaking of marriage as an initiatory sacrament and a rite of passage into a "vocation of conjugal love," he summarizes the suggestions made by bishops' conferences and others for a restoration of a phased initiation into marriage, beginning with engagement and continuing through the first years of marriage.

This orderly and accessible synthesis of insights into Christian marriage is current, timely, and worth the consideration of those struggling with the place of marriage in the Church's sacramental practice, both at the academic and pastoral level.

**PAUL COVINO**  
*College of the Holy Cross, Mass.*

---

**LOVE'S MIND: AN ESSAY ON CONTEMPLATIVE LIFE.**  

Dunne here pursues in a fresh way the search for God in time and memory which he has explored in his earlier books. In the spirit of Augustine's axiom "our heart is restless until it rests in you," he chronicles through a series of meditations the heart's desire as it awakens from unknowing to knowing. In his view, love is a direction, latent in the heart's longing, which a person finds already at work in one's life, and which comes to ascendancy when he or she affirms it willingly.

D. sees life as a journey with God, where the friend of God, wrestling with God in the conflicts of love, becomes a lover of God. Contemplation discovers the deeper pattern in one's love and work, serving as a bridge between action and enjoyment. Prayer
is the means by which a person becomes fully conscious of the heart's desire.

In previous works D. has stressed how storytelling can shape a person's experience, enabling one to see oneself living in a story that is still going on. Having followed the way of words for many years, D. now rejoines the way of music and includes the lyrics of two song cycles he has composed. To ask "What is your song?" is to query "What is the passion of your life?"

For D., the contemplative person grows adept in finding God present even in the midst of loneliness and seizures the learning that comes of suffering, from lack and loss and letting go. Love, like death, is a letting go of everyone and everything to enter into a new relation with everyone and everything. By casting aside resentment and choosing the situation imposed by circumstances a person becomes able to love. Walking the path from death to life in the company of D. and his merry band of poets and musicians is a spring awakening for pilgrim spirits.

DAVID J. CASEY, S.J.
Wheeling Jesuit College, W. Va.

BOOKS RECEIVED

SCRIPTURAL STUDIES

Hennessy, A. The Galilee of Jesus.

SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY

# Theological Studies

SEPTEMBER 1994  
VOL. 55, NO. 3

Published by Theological Studies, Inc.  
for the Society of Jesus in the United States

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

### ARTICLES

The Catholic Tradition of Eucharistic Theology: Towards the Third Millennium  
*Edward J. Kilmartin, S.J.* ........................................ 405

Paul Ricoeur’s *Oneself as Another* and Practical Theology  
*John van den Hengel, S.C.J.* .................................... 458

Some Early Reactions to *Veritatis Splendor*  
*Richard A. McCormick, S.J.* ..................................... 481

### CURRENT THEOLOGY

Contemporary Contexts and Issues in Eschatology  
*Peter C. Phan* ................................................... 507

### BOOK REVIEWS

- **Collins, J.**: Daniel ........................................ 537
- **Levenson, J.**: The Death and Resurrection of the Beloved Son ........................................ 538
- **Perkins, P.**: Peter ........................................... 540
- **Osborn, E.**: The Emergence of Christian Theology ........................................ 541
- **Bernstein, A.**: The Formation of Hell ........................................ 543
- **Wetzel, J.**: Augustine and the Limits of Virtue ........................................ 544
- **Canning, R.**: Unity of Love for God and Neighbor in Augustine ........................................ 546
- **Russell, J.**: The Germanization of Early Medieval Christianity ........................................ 548
- **Biagioli, M.**: Galileo Courtier ........................................ 549
- **Davidovich, A.**: Religion as a Province of Meaning ........................................ 551
- **Hall, R.**: Word and Spirit ........................................ 553
- **Dupré, L.**: Passage to Modernity ........................................ 555
- **Burrell, D.**: Freedom and Creation in Three Traditions ........................................ 556
- **Gunter, C.**: The One, the Three, and the Many ........................................ 558
- **Lowe, W.**: Theology and Difference ........................................ 559
- **Van Beeck, F.-J.**: God Encountered 2/1 ........................................ 562
- **Kennedy, P.**: Deus Humanissimus ........................................ 563
- **Sobrino, J.**: Jesus the Liberator ........................................ 565
- **Gilkey, L.**: Nature, Reality, and the Sacred ........................................ 567
SHORTER NOTICES


BOOKS RECEIVED

THEOLOGICAL STUDIES (ISSN 0040-5639) is published quarterly in March, June, September, and December by Theological Studies, Inc., at Georgetown University, Washington, DC 20057. Second class postage paid at Washington, DC and at additional mailing offices. POSTMASTER, please send address changes to THEOLOGICAL STUDIES, P.O. Box 465, Hanover, PA 17331, USA.


RENEWALS AND NEW SUBSCRIPTIONS should be accompanied by a remittance in U.S. funds and sent to Theological Studies, P.O. Box 465, Hanover, PA 17331, USA.

CHANGES OF ADDRESS, claims, and all correspondence dealing with subscriptions should be sent to Theological Studies, P.O. Box 465, Hanover, PA 17331, USA; phone (800) 352-2210 or (717) 632-3535.

MANUSCRIPTS (normally the ribbon copy or a computer printout of letter-perfect quality and a legible duplicate), TOGETHER WITH RETURN POSTAGE, should be sent to Editor, Theological Studies, Boston College, Chestnut Hill, MA 02167, USA. Author should certify that the article is not being submitted simultaneously to another journal.

BOOKS FOR REVIEW should be sent to Book Review Editor, Theological Studies, Inc., Georgetown University, 37 and O. Sts., N.W., Washington, DC 20057, USA.

BACK ISSUES are available from Theological Studies, Inc., Georgetown University, Washington, DC 20057, USA. Single copies prepaid: $6 in U.S.; $8 outside U.S.

FOR REPRINTS AND EARLIER ISSUES IN MICROFORM (35mm. and fiche), contact University Microfilms, Inc., 300 North Zeeb Road, Ann Arbor, MI 48106-1356. The full text of THEOLOGICAL STUDIES is also available in the electronic versions of the Humanities Index. Fax copies may be obtained through the UnCover Company, 3801 E. Florida, Suite 200, Denver, CO 80210.

Copyright © THEOLOGICAL STUDIES, INC. 1994

(ISSN 0040-5639)
Some Early Reactions to Veritatis Splendor reviews early journalistic, episcopal, and scholarly reactions to the encyclical and attempts a critical presentation of three key issues it raises: the positive value of the encyclical; its central issue, the meaning of object; and the issue behind other issues, ecclesiology. Richard A. McCormick, S.J., has his S.T.D. from the Gregorian University, Rome, and is the John A. O'Brien Professor of Christian Ethics at the University of Notre Dame. Frequent contributor to this journal, especially to its "Notes on Moral Theology," his specialty is in fundamental moral theology and bioethics. His most recent work is Corrective Vision: Explorations in Moral Theology (Sheed and Ward, 1994).


Robert J. Daly, S.J.
Editor


HISTORICAL


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Author</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Publisher</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Pages</th>
<th>Price</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mabry, E.</td>
<td>Balthasar Hubmaier's Doctrine of the Church</td>
<td>Univ. Press of America</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>236</td>
<td>$32.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Melady, T.</td>
<td>The Ambassador's Story</td>
<td>Univ. Press of America</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>224</td>
<td>$19.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moreau, J.-P.</td>
<td>Henry VIII et le schisme anglican</td>
<td>Presses Universitaires de France</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>$16.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neville, G.</td>
<td>The Mother Town</td>
<td>Oxford Univ.,</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>$35; $16.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigosian, S.</td>
<td>World Faiths</td>
<td>St. Martin's</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>$35; $20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O'Brien, C.</td>
<td>A Thematic Biography and Commented Anthology of Edmund Burke</td>
<td>Chicago: Univ. of Chicago</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>692</td>
<td>$22.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boni, A.</td>
<td>Vangelo e vita religiosa</td>
<td>Pont. Athenaeum Antonianum</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>445</td>
<td>L. 50,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gillespie, P., and M. Mathews</td>
<td>Voices from Within</td>
<td>Pasadena: Hope</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>$10.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dubler, N., and L. Marcus</td>
<td>Mediating Bioethical Disputes</td>
<td>United Hospital Fund of New York</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>$20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>McGrath, E.</td>
<td>A Psychology of Ethical Beliefs</td>
<td>Chicago: Loyola Univ.,</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>163</td>
<td>$13.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dubler, N., and L. Marcus</td>
<td>Mediating Bioethical Disputes</td>
<td>United Hospital Fund of New York</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>$20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mcgrath, E.</td>
<td>A Psychology of Ethical Beliefs</td>
<td>Chicago: Loyola Univ.,</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>163</td>
<td>$13.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moreau, J.-P.</td>
<td>Henry VIII et le schisme anglican</td>
<td>Presses Universitaires de France</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>$16.95</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**PASTORAL, SPIRITUAL, AND LITURGICAL**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Author</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Publisher</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Pages</th>
<th>Price</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alison, J.</td>
<td>Knowing Jesus</td>
<td>Springfield, Ill.: Templegate</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>$10.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alter, M.</td>
<td>Resurrection Psychology</td>
<td>Chicago: Loyola Univ.,</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>194</td>
<td>$12.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bartocci, B.</td>
<td>Unexpected Answers</td>
<td>Huntington, Ind.: Our Sunday Visitor</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>168</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bielecki, T.</td>
<td>Teresa of Avila</td>
<td>N.Y.: Crossroad</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>203</td>
<td>$11.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wicks, J.</td>
<td>Luther's Reform</td>
<td>Mainz: Philipp von Zabern</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>353</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**MORALITY AND LAW**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Author</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Publisher</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Pages</th>
<th>Price</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Boni, A.</td>
<td>Vangelo e vita religiosa</td>
<td>Pont. Athenaeum Antonianum</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>445</td>
<td>L. 50,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geiringer, S.</td>
<td>The Last Transfiguration</td>
<td>Grand Rapids: Phanes</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>$10.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gillespie, P., and M. Mathews</td>
<td>Voices from Within</td>
<td>Pasadena: Hope</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>$19.95; $11.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Judy, D.</td>
<td>Healing the Male Soul</td>
<td>N.Y.: Crossroad</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>188</td>
<td>$12.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Knight, H.</td>
<td>The Presence of God in the</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


PHILOSOPHY, OTHER DISCIPLINES


**SPECIAL QUESTIONS**


