BOOK REVIEWS


Zuckerman has notably advanced our understanding of the most challenging and creative masterpiece of Israel’s sacred literature. Recognizing that no great literary work can be properly assessed apart from the historical and cultural environment from which it sprang, Z. has, with the help of an analogy from modern Yiddish literature, probed the dynamics which have shaped the Book of Job. Coming down firmly on the side of multiple authorship, he argues that the poem is a parody of the pious and silent Job we meet in the prose portions (Prologue and Epilogue). The poet deliberately and angrily wrote his own counterpoint to the pious folktale of the pious sufferer, denying it any validity. In other words, a literary genius struck angrily at a prose legend with parody as his major weapon.

But then history caught up with the parodist. “The very extremes he so subtly wrote into his text to illustrate the absurdity of the traditional premises themselves became realities as history itself took a turn toward the extreme. Then his parody had to be reread and its interpretation reshaped” (175). An example of this reinterpretation of the Book of Job in the light of a current crisis is found in the Letter of James 5:11.

The analogy mentioned above is a famous short story from the late 19th century written by Y. L. Perets and entitled “Bontsye the Silent.” Z. gives both the Yiddish text and a translation in an appendix. Bontsye is the silent sufferer, a model of piety. But Perets is not celebrating the virtue of silent submission; he is satirizing Bontsye and any other Jew who would silently endure unjust suffering without complaint. What looked at first sight like a hymn of praise for the uncomplaining martyr is now seen as a bitter parody. The comic and climactic request of Bontsye shows him to be, not the saintly sufferer, but the consummate schlemiel. Others have refused to read it as a parody; understanding their reaction means knowing something about the subsequent spirals of violence against the Jewish people, capped by the ultimate nightmare of the Holocaust.

Z. knows that the late Jewish analogy has its shortcomings. In the case of “Bontsye” we have clear historical evidence for the circumstances in which the story was written and later interpreted. Z. reminds us time and again that we have no such evidence for the com-
position and subsequent interpretation of *Job*. Not that we are entirely in the dark. We know something of the sufferings of the Babylonian Exile and the subsequent tragedies right up to the First and Second Jewish Revolts against Rome. But no one has been able to connect these events specifically with the composition and ongoing interpretation of *Job*.

There will be sharply different reactions to this book; I believe that Z. has made his case. After reading Z., I happened upon *The Book of Job as Sceptical Literature* by Katharine J. Dell (1991), a revision of a 1988 Oxford dissertation directed by John Barton. While neither author seems to have known of the other's work, I think that the arguments are often mutually reinforcing. Z. shows a thorough familiarity and critical engagement with the great commentaries on *Job*. His control of the periodical literature is impressive and he is very much at home with the broad Wisdom tradition in Israel and the ancient Near East. The skillful use of musical imagery adds pleasure to the reading.

Following the musical metaphor I suggest that most of our biblical books are open to the same method of listening to the different melodies and harmonies of the biblical fugue. This should come as no surprise once we see that the biblical writings are not the product of a literary salon; they are sacred expressions of a vibrant community probing the mystery of God at work in history. It is the living, growing, changing tradition of a community responding, well or poorly, to the *mysterium tremendum*.

*Boston College*  

**FREDERICK L. MORIARITY, S.J.**


Wire proposes a reconstruction of the social status, the behavior, and the self-understanding of the women prophets in Corinth on the basis of Paul's rhetoric in 1 Corinthians. She proceeds from the assumption that if Paul is trying to persuade the Corinthians, he begins from where they are, uses their language, and establishes points of agreement before addressing points of conflict. The method is that of rhetorical criticism, reconstructing the community as mirrored in Paul's arguments and not just in the direct social descriptions in the letter or in other writings about first-century Corinth. Nevertheless, W. does also draw on various models of social analysis to control and to corroborate her findings, especially the models of Mary Douglas and Peter Marshall. Since Paul's arguments are to a general audience in Corinth, W. builds her specific description of the women prophets on
several reasonable assumptions. In addition to information drawn from the few texts directly concerned with these women, further insight derives from the assumption that, when all were addressed, women were included, and that, when certain conflicts arose, women felt the tension more heavily than the men.

An initial chapter highlights four basic categories of rhetorical arguments that recur throughout the epistle and will be the focus of analysis in the rest of the book. One argument dissociates concepts, e.g., principles (on which Paul and the Corinthians agree) from practice (on which they disagree); what the Corinthians think from what Paul sees as reality; what should be done in public from what in private; what is shame and what is honor. A second argument draws from commonsense or quasi-logical deductions, e.g., what is equivalent treatment to be given in equivalent cases; what receives divine retribution. A third argument and fourth argument are based respectively on what is deduced from the assumed structure of reality (e.g., written tradition or church practice) and on what establishes the structure of reality (e.g., the model of Paul or Christ).

The bulk of the study is a detailed analysis of each section of 1 Corinthians, showing the differences between Paul and the women prophets in their understanding of how they were wise, in their exercise of freedom especially with regard to marriage and to matters sexual, in their expression of authority and self-confidence at community meals and at prayer and prophesy, in their practice of spiritual gifts, and in their theology of resurrection. A significant contribution of this study is the way it connects all these matters to show a basic self-understanding, a pattern of behavior and a related theology of the women prophets. W. suggests that these women agreed with Paul about God recreating humanity through the risen Christ so that there would no longer be male and female, but one people filled with the Spirit. They differed, however, on when and how this would take place. The women prophets experienced the resurrection of Christ as a present, transforming Spirit, giving a wisdom of the exalted Christ (from Apollos?) and positive self-attitudes reflected in rising social status into an egalitarian community. There they could manifest an abundance of interdependent gifts including public prayer and prophesy. There they took seriously their freedom from the sexually defined roles of their society and from the disproportionate demands on women in meals and hospitality. It seems they ran into conflict with Paul's declining social status when he became a Christian and with Paul's concerns over their exuberance and over the effects their newfound freedom was having on the men.

There is a creative spark in this general reconstruction and in the
way W. draws maxims, definitions, and short quotations of the women prophets out of what Paul says. This is a tightly structured work, free of sociological jargon that is unfamiliar to exegetes, and a major contribution to feminist studies and the understanding of 1 Corinthians. Twelve excellent appendices provide rich summaries of the research related to women and the social world of Corinth. Important questions are provoked by the study: What finally is the canonical authority of the text and its normativity? Does one take as normative the entirely plausible, but hypothetical reconstruction against Paul’s explicit statements? Does one simply admit that Paul was sexist in some matters and move beyond the text for normative Christian teaching today? If the text is somehow to remain normative only after its patriarchy is criticized and lost feminine voices are recovered, how does the revisionist text read?

Georgetown University

ANTHONY J. TAMBASCO


A new series of historically important theological texts, published attractively and with a helpful apparatus of introduction, notes and bibliography, is usually as welcome an event for the reading public as it is a courageous step for a publisher. These two volumes may elicit our admiration, then, since they mark the continuation, at a high level of excellence, of Herder’s promising new venture, the Fontes Christiani series, which was launched last year with an edition of the Didache and the Traditio apostolica, introduced and translated by Georg Schöllgen and Wilhelm Geerlings. Resembling the format of Sources chrétiennes, but with fewer scholarly ambitions in text or commentary, the volumes in this series offer original texts and facing-page German translations of patristic and medieval theological classics, along with intelligent, rather general introductions of 50–75 pages and a minimal commentary, all beautifully printed and available at what is, today, a fairly reasonable price. The 35 volumes presently planned for the collection include an interesting range of works, most of them not easily accessible in modern translation. The emphasis is on texts of liturgical, catechetical or spiritual interest, rather than on dogmatic controversy; thus the list promises editions of Aphrahat’s Demonstrations, the catecheses of Cyril of Jerusalem and John Chry-
sostom, Agnellus of Ravenna’s Liber pontificalis, and early Carthusian spiritual letters, as well as more readily available works like Athanasius’ De incarnatione, Tertullian’s Adversus Praxeum and Irenaeus’ Adversus haereses. Less expensive paperback editions will also be available.

The quality of these two early volumes promises well for the series. Origen’s commentary on Romans, curiously neglected by scholars and the publishing industry, is enormously important, both as a witness to Origen’s approach to Scripture and as an early Christian reading—innocent of the issues raised by the Pelagian controversy and the Reformation—of this densest and most characteristic of Paul’s letters. Available in full only in the abridged Latin translation of Rufinus of Aquileia (406), it is nevertheless the only extant commentary of Origen covering a complete biblical book; despite the somewhat benign filter of his fifth-century advocate, the commentary reveals the master at work with unparalleled fulness, and also reveals an intelligent third-century exegete’s conception of the structure and argument of Romans, in useful contrast to many modern analyses of the letter. Heither’s translation of Books 1 and 2 here, facing the text of the Maurist edition (1733) of Charles De Larue (which appears in the Patrologia latina), is clear and precise, and her introduction focuses the reader’s attention well on Origen’s real concern in interpreting Romans: to convince both Jews and Christians that Paul’s gospel invites them to a deeper, more spiritual understanding of God’s working in their own history. Two further volumes containing the remainder of the commentary in Rufinus’ translation are promised, as well as a volume presenting and translating the extant Greek fragments. On several levels this is an important work of interpretation, and the first installment is of the highest quality.

Ambrose’s two sets of “mystagogical catechises,” known as De sacramentis and De mysteriis, are more readily available, perhaps, and have been more widely studied. Josef Schmitz presents them here, again in a clear and careful German translation, facing a full reproduction of Otto Faller’s monumental critical text from the Corpus scriptorum ecclesiasticorum Latinorum (1955). Schmitz’s introduction, longer than Heither’s and considerably more specific in its focus, concerns itself almost exclusively with the shape and details of the liturgical rites interpreted by Ambrose—a subject on which S. has already written a monograph of his own. One might wish for greater breadth of interest—for some reflection on Ambrose’s use of Scripture, for instance, or on the theology of symbol and salvation implied in his catechises; but as a reconstruction, based on Ambrose’s texts, of the Milanese initiation liturgy of the late fourth century, S.’s introduction is
valuable and persuasive. Like its companion, the volume also includes a fairly full bibliography of primary and secondary sources.

Herder are certainly to be congratulated on this new series for both its planning and its execution, as are the general editors, Norbert Brox, Wilhelm Geerlings, Gisbert Greshake, Rainer Ilgner and Rudolf Schieffer. Anyone interested in the early development of Christian life and spirituality, who is fluent enough in German to use these texts, will find them convenient, reliable and illuminating.

Weston School of Theology, Mass. Brian E. Daley, S.J.


Though the early Christian practice of maintaining a discrete silence about the Christian mysteries in certain contexts (disciplina arcani) provides the basis of Jacob's study, the greatest value of the work lies in its analysis of Ambrose's use of allegory and in the implications of J.'s conclusions for our understanding of patristic literature.

J. begins with a lengthy review of scholarship on the genesis and purpose of the disciplina arcani in the early Church. For a long time scholarly disagreements on this topic were closely tied to polemical disputes between Catholic and Protestant theologians, and the issues involved not only the nature of the practice but the question of whether it was initiated in the second century or the fourth. The paucity of original sources made a plausible solution unlikely, and in the 20th century the issue lost much of its force when the whole idea came to appear somewhat trivial.

J.'s study will revive interest in the topic from a new perspective. He links the disciplina very closely to the allegorical interpretation of Scripture and to the sacramental life of the Church. By examining this connection in the writings of an author who flourished when the practice of the disciplina was quite pronounced, J. aims not only to explain the "discipline of the secret," but, much more importantly, to provide a clearer understanding of the allegorical approach to Scripture which was characteristic of Ambrose and many other patristic writers.

J.'s central point is that scholarly research on Ambrose's use of allegory has paid little attention to the fact that the whole process of allegorizing is itself allegorical and in need of interpretation. We have been too content to explain the Christians' fondness for allegory in terms of outside influences (either pagan or Jewish) and not in terms of Christian theology and practice. The sacramental grounding of al-
legory (most particularly the baptismal grounding) must take precedence over a purely moral or literary/historical explanation, and we must define allegory not simply as a principle of textual interpretation of past events but as a mode of communicating spiritual realities about the present.

Ambrose's use of allegory, J. argues, is directed not simply at understanding Scripture but at making a statement about the sacramental and mystical life of the Church in light of the text. OT prophecies and typologies, for example, apply to the contemporary Christian community and are to be viewed not so much from the perspective of the NT as from the perspective of the Church in every time and place. If all Scripture is Christocentric, the referent for every text is the Christ who continues to be present and operative in the Church. It follows that for Ambrose the meaning of Scripture will be evident only to those who believe in Christ.

In such a context the disciplina has little to do with maintaining a sense of mystery about the liturgical celebration of baptism or with establishing a visible distinction between Christians and nonbelievers. It has to do with the sacraments of Christian initiation, which enable converts to know the divine mysteries in a way heretofore closed to them. Baptism and the sacraments provide a new power of vision; initiation into the Christian mysteries is thus both a source of knowledge (Erkenntnisprinzip) about salvation history and a source of interpretation (Auslegungsprinzip) for understanding the Scriptures. The unbaptized simply lack the gratia spiritualis which is required for comprehending these realities, and any attempts to communicate them to the uninitiated through common human discourse is untimely and presumptuous. Hence the disciplina arcani.

Future studies of Ambrose's use of allegory will determine how applicable or useful J.'s theological analysis is. The task will be lengthy and demanding, but, whatever the outcome, J. is to be lauded for countering some of the commonplace criticisms of Ambrose's allegorical methods as derivative, capricious, or patently absurd, and for suggesting that the practice of reading the Scriptures allegorically is more coherent, intelligible, and theologically grounded than we are accustomed to believe. J. is not without predecessors (e.g. Mesot, Savon, Pizzolato, Dassmann) in his effort at rehabilitation, but his strong theological emphasis provides a new focus for capturing the mind and spirit of the Bishop of Milan and for helping scholars to consider the allegorical approach in a more positive light. For such reasons we should be grateful for this work and should take his argument seriously.

University of Kentucky, Lexington

LOUIS J. SWIFT
BOOK REVIEWS


The subtitle of this book is misleading, since the chief burden of the argument is to trace a development in Thomas’s account of Christ’s salvific act. The development that Cessario finds is from “a juridically construed understanding of Christ’s satisfactory work” to a “thoroughly personalist understanding.” The development is traced from the *Scriptum super Sententias* to the *Summa theologicae*. It is the influence of Anselm (as well as of Pseudo-Augustine) on the first stage which led to the subtitle. The initial stage is also characterized by the influence of Aristotle’s teaching on the virtues, particularly justice. “This trajectory remains closely associated with a broader theological understanding of justice as it figures in the account he gives of satisfaction. For alongside the Aristotelian model is set an ‘evangelical’ understanding of justice, one which St. Thomas never fully succeeded in relating to the Aristotelian model” (203). Early and late, *rectus ordo* or *rectitudo* dominate, but in the later account it is clearer that “the performance of the just deed proceeds on a prior divine initiative and that it consists formally in the subordination of the human person and his destiny to God in love” (ibid.).

To establish this thesis, C. begins with a quick survey of Thomas’ career as a theologian, sketching the two Parisian and the two Italian magisterial periods in a bio-bibliographical way. He then discusses the principles of Thomistic biblical interpretation, and then considers Thomas’ commentaries on Isaiah, Job, and the Psalms, as well as those on the Gospels of Matthew and John, and of course the commentaries on Paul’s epistles. It is in C.’s discussion of the *Commentary on the Sentences* that we find his treatment of Anselm’s *Cur Deus Homo?* The intermediate works C. considers (those which bridge the terms of the development he is arguing for) are the *Quaestio disputata de veritate* (particularly qq. 26 and 29), the *Summa contra Gentiles*, the *De rationibus fidei* and the *Compendium theologiae*. When C. reaches the *Summa theologicae*, a preliminary discussion of Ia IIae, q. 87 prepares for a close reading of the *Tertia pars* up to q. 59. In his final chapter, C. puts it all together in a remarkable theological exercise.

The book’s first task, its internal task, is to argue for a development of doctrine in the writings of Thomas, a development which moves away from a juridical understanding of satisfaction to the increasing emphasis on what C. calls the personalist model. Beyond that, he gestures in the direction of the relevance of the internal argument to current theology. A feature of the personalist account, we are told, is that it shows the rudiments of a sense of human historicity. In several
places C. indicates that his position lies somewhere between a “common nature” approach and historical relativism. The “personalist style” is meant to bear the weight of this middle position which, again, is a rudimentary awareness of human historicity. Clearly, what the book may be taken to establish and such claims for its argument’s current relevance differ, and it seems fair to say that C. owes us a book on methodological matters as such.

All in all, despite its perfunctory index, a serious, careful book, a contribution to “historical theology,” a concept C. imperfectly analyzes and interprets. C. aspires to practice a Thomism which, while grounded in the text and historically sound, nonetheless contributes to ongoing theology. He gives us here a partial payment on this promissory note.

University of Notre Dame

RALPH McINERNY


This work began as a doctoral dissertation at Cornell; it exhibits to a high degree the virtues of that genre with few of its customary vices. The richness of the topics and the carefulness of the treatment lend a density to the text, although the expression is consistently clear. Frequently parenthetical references and numerous ample endnotes lead us on a guided exploration of writings by and about John of the Cross as well as through the recent philosophical literature on mysticism and religious knowledge.

Payne claims that John offers a fairly accurate description of the range of experiences associated with Western mysticism and that one can draw from his works a coherent theory of Christian mystical life. P. aims to show that it is reasonable for individuals to regard mystical awareness as a cognitive mode of experience. This is so because John’s writings suggest a hypothesis which provides as good an explanation of the mystical data as any of the competing naturalistic alternatives. P. hopes to exhibit that mysticism has a significant bearing on the justification of religious faith, even if it cannot be used to “prove” the existence of God.

After a helpful introduction to John’s life and texts, P. displays John’s doctrine on the structure of the human person and the dynamics of spiritual development. He is concerned to dispel popular misconceptions of John’s mysticism as dualistic and anticognitive. Beneath the complex divisions of faculties and appetites John emphasizes the fundamental unity of the human person and presents contemplation, not
as an acquired state of mental blankness, but as a passive experience with a positive, nonsensory, content. John's spiritual program aims to bring human nature to fulfillment, and mystical experience does not depend on the possession of a special capacity for mystical perception. Advanced mystical states are continuous with more rudimentary religious experiences; it is moral and psychological immaturity which prevent human beings from experiencing God more profoundly.

P. attempts a more adequate characterization of mysticism in a critical dialogue with William James and W. T. Stace. Against the latter he urges that most of the contemplative states John discusses seem to have an intentional object perceived as personal and loving, rather than to impose a high-level interpretation on an experience of undifferentiated unity. Next P. engages several common objections advanced by philosophers against the cognitive value of mystical states. Some cast doubt on such experiences on the grounds they are not publicly accessible in the way ordinary perceptions are, or because the claims they sponsor cannot be corroborated by standard checking procedures. Other objectors highlight the disagreements among mystics themselves, alleging they make incompatible assertions about their experiences. P. counters with a series of acute analyses in which he points out, e.g., that if nonmystics make no serious attempt to surmount the moral, psychological, and spiritual impediments to contemplative awareness and to cooperate with the divine initiative, their failure to have mystical experiences is not surprising. Moreover, mystics and mystical theologians employ a variety of criteria, including empirical tests and logical considerations, to determine the veridicality of mystical states. Furthermore, the divergent descriptions proffered by mystics may stem from attending to different aspects of a similar experience or speaking within the conceptual limits set by one's own tradition.

Finally, P. outlines the explanatory mode of inference, and develops the hypothesis that contemplative consciousness is what the Christian mystic takes it to be since the effects in the recipient (e.g. charity, strength, wisdom) are what one might reasonably expect from a cognitive mode of experience involving mystical union with a loving God. He argues that reductive accounts—psychoanalytical, psychological, physiological, sociological—may capture some of the conditions shaping mystical experiences, but they fall short of establishing their claim to identify the sole cause of such phenomena.

P. brings to these philosophical debates a rare familiarity with the texts and practices of the mystics. Consequently this book sheds a refreshing light of empirical honesty on a discussion often marked by
the distortions of poorly digested hearsay and partisan preconceptions.
Beyond the restrictions of his project here, P.'s program calls for consider­
able elaboration: in elucidating the criteria for a good explanatory
inference and their mutual relationship, in integrating the data of
mysticism with other evidence in developing a comprehensive relig­
ious apologetic, in pursuing psychological studies on the maturity
and mental health of mystics and other religious believers. Contrary to
P.'s tendency to oppose the phenomenal character of mystical experi­
ence to interpretation, interpretation can be better appreciated in reli­
gious contexts as a mediated form of knowing that illuminates expe­
rience in a more intrinsic fashion than inference. Yet P. contributes a
voice of realism to the dialogue on mysticism which has suffered from
too many stale notes.

*Wheeling Jesuit College, W. Va.*

**DAVID J. CASEY, S.J.**


Bireley has set out to elucidate anti-Machiavellianism through six of
its leading representatives: Giovanni Botero, Justus Lipsius, Pedro de
Ribadeneira, Adam Contzen, Carlo Scribani, and Diego Saavedra
Fajardo. He employs this synecdochic approach because these authors
comprise the main transmission of the anti-Machiavellian tradition
during the late 16th and 17th centuries. All were widely circulated and
known, and most of them participated in or had contact with contem­
porary governments.

B. presents anti-Machiavellianism in a restricted sense, considering
only tracts which respond negatively to Machiavelli with the purpose
of intentionally refuting or modifying his work. In addition, they must
contain a detailed program of statecraft while adhering to Christian
principles. The dominant characteristic of these works is their attempt
to demonstrate on a pragmatic level that Christian morality and the
demands of secular life, especially governance, are compatible, and
that Machiavelli's doctrines were incorrect and immoral.

These anti-Machiavellians found their ideological bases in the schol­
astic tradition of the 16th century. Although B. sometimes employs
the term *scholasticism* broadly, he means primarily the writings of de
Vitoria, Bellarmine, and especially Suarez. Like medieval scholastics,
these authors attempted to define man and the universe comprehen­
sively in terms of the Christian moral and natural order. Hence from
some of the most prominent scholastics of the 16th century the anti-
Machiavellians derived some of their most dominant features, such as the concept of consent as the basis of government. After providing the intellectual context for the anti-Machiavellians, B. offers incisive sketches of them. He examines six characteristics of their writings: the relationship between reputation and power, the uses of deceit, economic development, war and the military, the place of religion and toleration in the state, and the role of fortune and providence in the state. These intellectual biographies, while not intending to be comprehensive, are marvelous portraits of the authors' most important thoughts regarding political theory. Moreover, given the paucity of information available in English about these often-neglected figures, B.'s accounts provide a valuable service.

Most importantly, his analysis goes well beyond the basic Machiavellian—anti-Machiavellian dialectic. He places each author—beginning with the founders of this tradition, Botero and Lipsius, and concluding with its climax in Fajardo—in the context of the tradition, explaining not only their relationship to Machiavelli and major scholastic thinkers but also to each other. The sections on Ribadeneira and Spain, Contzen and Germany, and Scribani and the Flemish-Spanish world show certain regional variations. B. also attempts to place the authors into a Counter-Reformation and Baroque intellectual context, but is less successful in this endeavor. The terms Counter-Reformation and Baroque appear vaguely defined. B. characterizes the Counter-Reformation by its efforts at personal and institutional reform and "accommodation to contemporary society and culture," from the mid-16th to the early 18th century. The Baroque, which covers the period from 1590 to 1680, is characterized by its efforts "to establish intellectual and political order after the varied and profound changes of the sixteenth century" (3, 218, 240-41).

B. sums up the general characteristics of the anti-Machiavellians with the basic observation that their primary principle was that "the good (bonum honestum) and the useful (bonum utile) were found together in the real world" (221-22). To support this principle, they employed arguments called intrinsic pragmatism and providentialist pragmatism (the former based on reason and the latter on faith and revelation). B. aptly shows the tensions arising from the differences inherent in the two approaches, which, nevertheless, were not always mutually exclusive. In fact, one of B.'s most outstanding traits is his ability to perceive nuance and contradiction; he does not attempt to impose a philosophic rigidity on the thoughts of these nonphilosophers.

The five main tenets of anti-Machiavellian statecraft are summed up concisely in the formula: "the good, virtue, produced the useful, reputation and power" (222). In this optimistic doctrine, "the anti-
Machiavellians deserve great credit for affirming a Christian’s place in the world and for showing how a Christian could work effectively in politics. They helped release into the world the energies of many genuine Christians with consequences that have benefited the world in ways it is impossible to measure but which can be fully appreciated if we consider the alternative, the abandonment of the world to the Machiavellians” (241).

B.’s reassessment of the significance of anti-Machiavellianism as well as his masterful explication of the intellectual composition of these authors should provoke interest in furthering the work begun in this book, perhaps by examining the lesser-known figures of the same tradition.

Duke University

ANTHONY B. CASHMAN III


An interesting and important book on science and faith interacting in the Galileo affair. Blackwell focuses on biblical interpretation following discoveries by Galileo with his first astronomical telescopes. He gives us many new insights and describes well the conflict about Copernicanism as viewed by two very important persons involved: Galileo, the observational astronomer who was also an amateur exegete, and Bellarmine, cardinal and inquisitor, who was also an amateur astronomer. This book will make fascinating reading for students of modern and ancient conflicts between religion and science.

Bellarmine, a true lover of the “starry skies” in God’s wonder-filled universe, was unable to adapt his traditional exegetical framework in interpreting Scripture to the new and still unproven features of the Copernican system, even though the cardinal had consulted the experts in astronomy (Clavius and coworkers at the Collegio Romano), had himself looked through Galileo’s telescope, and made sure during his own lifetime that Galileo was never condemned or repudiated. Galileo, always a loyal son of the Church, though often wronged by churchmen, could not demonstrate the truth of the Copernican system, which he saw and intuited so brilliantly; still, he provided us with an early and excellent formulation for today’s biblical interpretation in his letters to Castelli and to the Grand Duchess of Tuscany. The precepts set forth there by Galileo became incorporated into the approved method of biblical exegesis only much later, with Providentissimus Deus of Leo XIII and Divino afflante Spiritu of Pius XII. And only in the late 19th century did the observations of stellar parallax provide astronomers with the long awaited proof of the Copernican system.
Both Rome and astronomy each moved slowly toward the proofs and certainty sought by Galileo and by Bellarmine.

B. correctly fixes attention on the actions in 1616 by the Holy Office and Congregation of the Index, in which the geocentric position was affirmed by the consultors, then by the cardinals, and finally by the pope, Paul V. Of the trial of 1633 which condemned Galileo and forced his abjuration, B. writes much less, since this trial did not concern details of the Bible, nor indeed of celestial mechanics; rather it sought to determine whether or not Galileo had disobeyed the instructions given in 1616 from Pope Paul V to Galileo through Bellarmine about holding and advocating the Copernican position.

Much of the blame for Galileo's woes after 1616 B. assigns to the Jesuit Order for its rigid conformity through "blind obedience" to the will and mind-set of the reigning pontiff. Long a Jesuit boast and glory, obedience, sealed by special vows, caused a dilemma for Jesuit scientists who were also looking for scientific truth. And in B.'s documented account this led to the onset of intellectual "rigor mortis" after the scientific high points which had been reached in the period from Clavius to Scheiner. B. allows that there were "some isolated Jesuit scientists of the first rank including Boscovich and Sacchieri," but he passes over in silence their Jesuit brother scientists whose teaching and research in Europe and especially in the mission lands of China, Paraguay, the Pacific Isles, and India advanced the growth of knowledge among their people and also increased the sum of world treasures in mathematics, astronomy, and other humane sciences. Those interested in this point are alerted to consult Joseph F. McDonnell's small book, Jesuit Geometers (St. Louis: Institute of Jesuit Sources, 1990).

Of special value in B.'s work are nine appendices which provide clear translations and expert documentation, especially on the supportive role of the Carmelite Father Antonio Foscarini on behalf of Galileo.

Vatican Observatory  

MARTIN F. MCCARTHY, S.J.


Mexican poet and Hieronymite nun Sor Juana Inés de la Cruz (1651–1695), called the tenth muse, the Phoenix of the Americas, enjoyed a degree of publicity and influence in her lifetime unusual for a woman. Commissioned by the viceregal family, by the cathedral chapter, and by her superiors, she wrote lyric poetry, drama, and liturgical sequences. A volume of her collected works was published in Spain during her lifetime. In 1690 the publication of her critique of the theology
of Portuguese Jesuit Antonio de Vieira was the immediate cause of the Bishop of Puebla’s public censure of her literary activities and the occasion of the composition of her *Response to Sor Philotea of the Cross*, perhaps her most famous work. In it she defends her gift for poetry, her inquiring mind and her right as a woman to create and teach. Paradoxically her defense marked the end of her literary activity. Scholars are divided in their interpretation of her silence during the last four years of her life. Did she yield unwillingly to ecclesiastical pressures? Did she experience a conversion of heart leading her to flee the world and seek God in prayer and contemplation as beffited a religious? Was she silent out of an intellectual conviction that the mysteries of God exceed all possible expression?

Tavard’s book is the first lengthy study by a theologian of this remarkable woman. He presents basic facts of Juana’s life and introduces the reader to her primary religious writings. He includes translations of some poems not otherwise available, along with the original Spanish. His method is thematic rather than analytical, and often he focuses on one work when presenting a particular theme. Thus chapter 1 concentrates on the poem “First Dream” to explore Juana’s view of creation and her use of neoplatonic epistemology. Chapter 2, “The Baroque Edifice,” examines her liturgical poems exploring her views of the saints. Chapter 3, “The Temple of God,” presents themes of her Marian piety. Chapters 5–6 focus on Christological themes primarily through analysis of the sacramental drama *Divine Narcissus*, and in her criticism of Vieira in *Carta Athenagórica*.

The final two chapters cover primarily the crisis period in Juana’s life which T. sees as an integral development of her “theology of beauty,” as she progresses from a theology of beauty which celebrates God in creation to an existential embodiment of the appropriate attitude before divine beauty: awe and consequently silence. Through her retreat into silence, T. maintains, Juana indicated that all beauty flows into God’s glory, a glory beyond expression. As an enthusiastic student of Sor Juana’s I am struck by the irony of an interpretation which considers the most significant moment in the life of this poetical genius (Octavio Paz ranks her among the very best lyric poets of the Spanish language), who delighted in verbal expression, not only in Spanish, but also in Latin and Nahuatl, the Aztec language, to be her silence.

It may be that T.’s second ranking of the literary and artistic as forms of knowledge is responsible for a significant limitation of his presentation of Juana’s theology: lack of attention to the particular literary forms in which it is embedded. Contributing to a tendency to
simplify and smooth out problems of interpretation is T.'s beneficent view of ecclesiastical authority in Juana's life. He ignores her repeatedly expressed fear of the Inquisition and defends her ecclesiastical critics who urge her to turn from the frivolity of literature to more serious things: "They were more concerned about modesty of life in the convent than about aesthetic fashion" (170). As a result of these choices the portrait of Juana that emerges is not that of a woman of genius who broke literary, personal, and social stereotypes in a period much like our own but of a rather dull figure from a distant age.

On a more technical level T.'s analysis would have benefitted from consistent use of the four-volume critical edition of her work rather than the one-volume edition which he cites. Careful proofreading might have caught minor errors in dates. In spite of these reservations, however, I welcome this introduction to Sor Juana and applaud T.'s interest in her.

St. John's University, N.Y.
PAMELA KIRK


Wood's lucid presentation of Hegel's ethics not only testifies to the continuing revival of interest in Hegel among English-speaking philosophers but also underscores the relevance Hegel's thought has for current discussions within many disciplines about the role of human subject/selves in the matrices of modern and postmodern culture. The lucidity and the cogency of W.'s presentation rest upon an interpretive principle that he enunciates early: "The principal aim of Hegel's metaphysics is to address the predicament of modern humanity in modern society" (6). This principle enables W. to transpose the speculative discourse in which Hegel casts his account of human ethical life into a concrete set of arguments that support some of Hegel's central insights into the human subjectivity which for him constitutes the distinctive characteristic of modernity.

W. stresses two elements of Hegel's insight into human subjectivity that are of particular relevance for substantive discussions of the relationships between selves and society. The first is that freedom is fundamental to the way modernity understands and expresses subjectivity. Hegel's understanding of freedom, however, differs from the self-determining autonomy which is central to liberal accounts of modernity. Freedom, for Hegel, "is a relational property. It involves a self, an object (in the widest sense of that term), and a rational project of the self" (47). Complementary to this relational understanding of freedom is a second crucial element of Hegel's insight: the self-consciousness
and self-identity characteristic of modern subjectivity is not only rooted in the social processes of history, but also finds its most complete expression in the self's need for "rational, reflective identification with a social role" (51).

These two insights might seem to make Hegel a clear ally of the critique of liberal ethical thought that "communitarian" thinkers such as Alasdair MacIntyre and Michael Sandel have offered. W., however, quite rightly notes important strands in Hegel's thought which support the institutional forms and dynamism of the modern liberal state and its culture. Hegel thus claims "that our social roles in the modern state are indispensable to the fulfillment or actualization of ourselves as rational beings" (50); he also clearly defends "the one institution that is unique" to the modern liberal state, i.e. civil society, "the public social space in which individuals as free persons and subjects pursue their own welfare in their own way, choose their own way of life, and enter into voluntary relations with others who are likewise free choosers of their own ends and activities" (239). The ironic result is that "[a]lthough the state Hegel favors may be quite liberal, the ethical theory through which he justifies it is not liberal at all" (258).

W.'s analyses are quite helpful in showing that enlisting Hegel as a partisan for one or another side is less important than having all parties to this current debate take seriously the issues his thought raises—particularly the adequacy of our understanding of human freedom and the role such understanding plays in efforts to shape, sustain, or reform our culture's institutions, be they institutions of the "state" or of "civil society." Of particular importance is the challenge posed by Hegel's rooting of freedom most profoundly in those human social processes which require of each human self the full recognition of the selfhood of others. In consequence "I win freedom for myself not by subjugating others but by liberating them, granting them the same free status I claim for myself" (89). Hegel sees that such recognition entails not only each individual's respect for the rights of others but also responsible participation in a social order which makes such recognition possible. Hegel could confidently locate such social order in the modern state, which he envisioned as that "institution in which human beings make rational collective decisions about the form of their life together" (29). The debate between communitarians and liberals suggests, however, that current social and political institutions no longer instill in us a similar confidence in the rationality of their operations, let alone create an expectation that the substantive outcomes of their operation meet the standard that Hegel proposes for the rationality of a social order: "that it [be] fundamentally satisfying to the needs and selfhood of its members" (215).
Access to Hegel's thought is rarely easy. W. deserves high praise for leading the reader along paths that make it possible to locate key Hegelian concepts in relation both to the context in which Hegel proposed them and to a set of issues that, as much as in Hegel's day, still engender lively debate. Within the theological community, there are at least two kinds of reader likely to find helpful resources in this study: those interested in foundational issues in social ethics and those concerned with questions about the dynamisms of the human spirit that give shape to culture.

Marquette University, Milwaukee

PHILIP J. ROSSI, S.J.


The idea for this book grew out of McGrath's Bampton Lectures in 1990. Its purpose is to articulate, explore, and evaluate the function of doctrine within the Christian community. Doctrine emerged, M. insists, as a result of the concern of the Church to maintain continuity with the insights of the NT documents that witness to Jesus of Nazareth. Such continuity is dependent upon a continual "rebirth of images" which find expression in doctrine. M. cites the Council of Nicea as the decisive point at which the Church established the necessity of using extrabiblical images to interpret and transmit the kerygma. The principle "lex orandi, lex interpretandi" sets Athanasius apart from Arius (58).

Yet M. believes simple restatement of doctrinal statements is no advance over simple restatement of Scripture. Tradition is ongoing and developmental. If doctrine arose from the need of the community to understand the NT witness, it must be consistently reimaged and reappropriated in order to pass over and pass down the Christian tradition. Building upon this foundational insight, M. proposes and explores four theses which establish the horizon within which further discussion will occur: Doctrine (1) functions as a social demarcator, (2) is generated by, and subsequently interprets the Christian narrative, (3) interprets experience, and (4) makes truth claims.

Mindful of the need to pass over and to pass down authentic tradition, M. raises two questions around which the substance of the book revolves: What are the criteria used in evaluating the past? What is the authority of the past? It is especially in weaving a response to these questions that M. demonstrates his ability to lead the reader through a nuanced discussion of the sociology of knowledge which neither denies the historicity of knowledge nor succumbs to cognitive skepticism.
During the Western European transition from the culture of the Middle Ages to that of the Renaissance, there emerged a renewed appreciation of the past, and concomitantly, a conscious appreciation of historical consciousness. Against this background, M. conducts a detailed discussion of the authority imputed to tradition in modern Christian thought. He proceeds by discussing the attitudes toward Christian doctrine evinced by thinkers during the Italian Renaissance, the magisterial and radical reformations, and the German Enlightenment.

M. maintains that only during the Enlightenment, and due to its conception of objectivity, was the value of the past as formulated in doctrines denied status. Within this context, he engages readers in a discussion of cultural ideology which shows the Enlightenment mentality to be as culturally bound as the mindset of any previous era. He further demonstrates that even when the authority of the past is theoretically dismissed, the past is always a partner in any discussion.

Here, M. reiterates the dynamic quality of doctrine. Doctrine is expressed within a particular ideological context, but its meaning need not be reduced to that ideology. This means that no single notion of truth nor of doctrine can be imposed upon the Church. To do so would be to establish a particular insight as universal. Tension between and within historical periods must be maintained both to bring the development of doctrine forward and to prevent its being reduced to a particular ideology.

Finally, M. concludes that there is no place one can stand outside one's tradition; there is no universal viewpoint. Christian doctrine, therefore, can be understood properly and critiqued adequately only from within the community of the Church. Through memory and Eucharist, and through appropriating the meanings and values of Jesus of Nazareth, the community of the Church exists in continuity with the NT communities. Further, the Church expresses this relationship in doctrines which re-image the NT insights concerning Jesus of Nazareth.

M. demonstrates his command of sources and his scholarship throughout. His style is scholarly without being pedantic or condescending. He writes with self confidence but betrays no intellectual arrogance. Even when he responds at some length to George Lindbeck's *The Nature of Doctrine*, pointing out areas of disagreement, he does so with restraint and modesty. M.'s work is a valuable resource for theologians as well as for nonspecialists interested in the status of doctrine within the Christian community.

*Le Moyne College, Syracuse*  
NANCY C. RING
THE IRONY OF THEOLOGY AND THE NATURE OF RELIGIOUS THOUGHT.

Wiebe takes up one of the most difficult topics in the Western intellectual tradition, the compatibility of faith and reason, or mythos and logos, as two principles of ordering human thinking and living, and his thesis is a provocative one. He defends the dichotomy hypothesis of Lévy-Bruhl, which holds that the mythopoetic thought of primitives and the scientific thought of moderns are radically different and mutually exclusive. He draws out the implication of this position for theology, arguing that, inasmuch as theology seeks to be scientific, i.e. seeks an explanatory understanding of faith, it ironically undermines the foundation of religion, despite the fact that it emerges within religious groups and is done in order to support religion.

Wiebe admits that some forms of theology, which he renames “religious thinking,” are compatible with religion, and he points to patristic and monastic theologies as examples of this possibility. He emphasizes, however, that the “academic theology” that emerged in the twelfth century had a “new intentionality” that made piety and devotion subordinate to the rules of argumentation and evidence and created “a profound tension, if not downright hostility between ‘the love of learning and the desire for God’” (12–13). Admitting a spirit of critical reflectiveness to the understanding of religion unleashed a force that would eventually rebel against any attempt to contain it within limits set by something not subject to critical reflection.

To defend his thesis Wiebe devotes the great bulk of his book to explaining and defending Levy-Bruhl’s dichotomy hypothesis, and then applying the hypothesis to the history of philosophy and theology in ancient Greece and the emergence of theology within Christianity. However, despite most of the book being devoted to historical discussions, Wiebe’s thesis stands or falls with one’s willingness to accept how Wiebe understands the nature of religion, science, and rationality. His argument is essentially a conceptualist one, applying ahistorical concepts to history. While he devotes time to clarifying his concepts, he shows little awareness that they themselves are problematic.

“Religion,” for Wiebe, consists of “stories of transcendence,” of reliance upon “supernatural powers and beings” who can rescue human beings from their obvious limitations and offer meaning “in the face of the inexorable processes of nature that eventuate in death” (33, 37). “Science” is explanatory understanding based on nature, and nature is properly explained in “mechanical” terms (224). The Milesian philosophers of ancient Greece are thus the originators of the tradition of science that comes to full fruition in modern science, while Plato’s
philosophy is seen as an attempt to return to religion after the Mile­
sian revolution. His thought is essentially mythopoetic with rational
elements, and, inasmuch as patristic and medieval Christian theology
is Platonic, it too remains mythopoetic. In accord with the modern,
mechanistic notion of science, Wiebe sharply divides "meaning," which
only myth can give, from "knowledge," which can only disenchant.

A full defense of these notions would require that the book argue
more philosophically. That meaning and knowledge are incompatible
is more asserted than argued. Wiebe does contrast his view with those
of three post-Enlightenment theologies that differ in their understand­
ing of science and reason: the "allegorical theology" of Andrew Louth,
the "metaphorical theology" of Sallie McFague, and the "theopoetic
theology" of Amos Wilder. He objects to the ambiguity of their position
and their attempt to ground science in a broader understanding of
cognition, noting their reliance upon "Gadamer and others fond of
hermeneutics" (25). I suspect we see unveiled in this comment Wiebe's
true opponent, hermeneutical thought, which views reason not as uni­
versal but as itself grounded in culture (Bildung) and thus something
akin to faith. This view has supplanted an earlier understanding of
science and history, rooted in the Enlightenment, that Wiebe defends.
Were Wiebe to address this conflict more directly it would be a very
different but more worthwhile book.

Seattle University

Mark D. Hart

Creation out of Nothing. By Don Cupitt. London: SCM, and Phil­

This is not really a book about the doctrine of creatio ex nihilo. Cupitt
mentions this traditional theological locus as his starting point, but his
book is really about the human creation of religious discourse. He
employs recent insights in the philosophy of language in further sup­
port of his lifelong project, which might be characterized as an attempt
to reconstruct theology as a sharply antirealist anthropology of reli­
gion.

C.'s primary focus is the postmodern insistence on the priority of
language. He stresses the linguisticality of all experience, the frag­
mentation of the "human condition," and the perspectival nature of
truth. He points out significant flaws in Anglo-American philosophical
theism, and argues that all thought—even the internal, meditative
sort—always originates in language.

But C. is not content with epistemological skepticism; such "nihil­
ism" has become too normal in our lives. Instead, he makes the claim
that our entire world comes into existence only because human beings
will it so. We speak it into existence; we create it “out of nothing.” In other words, the human being replaces God as the ultimate agent of creation. Our language controls our world; nothing else is “real” in anything but a trivial sense.

C. assumes that the epistemological priority of language necessarily implies an antirealist ontology. Yet many theologians—including Nicholas Lash and John Milbank, two of C.’s colleagues at Cambridge—have demonstrated that this need not be the case. Unfortunately, C. does not grapple with this argument; nor does he clarify his own views about the relationship between epistemology and ontology.

For example, sometimes he asserts simply that we cannot know about anything beyond language (60, 156); indeed, some of his comments imply that there must be something else. For instance, he uses such terms as illusions and lies (98), and distinguishes between history and fantasy (105). Yet at other times, he is dogmatic in his rejection of all extralinguistic reality. And he will often jump from one of these positions to the other, claiming, e.g., that anyone who has recognized the limits of theodicy must, if thinking clearly, reject a realist conception of God; or that, simply because we cannot speak about anything beyond language, therefore “there is no such realm” (157).

This confusion reaches its zenith when C. attempts to articulate a theory of God. He claims that human beings create God with words (“out of nothing”), just as they create everything else. As C. admits, his view is essentially that of Feuerbach—though without Feuerbach’s idealist anthropology. But also, I would add, without Feuerbach’s clarity of argument: C. makes no attempt to justify his claim that any doctrine of revelation necessarily leads to timeless, uniform interpretations of God, or that culturally-determined language about God implies a culturally-determined God. While C. believes that the God of the philosophers is a product of their overly fertile imaginations (no objection!), he completely ignores the triune God of Christian experience—even though this doctrine could clearly help provide the grammar for the “new language” he seeks (90–91).

Similarly, C.’s understanding of Scripture seems to depend upon an extremely literalistic hermeneutics—a view meaningful only to the fundamentalists whose worldview he rejects. Sometimes C.’s characterizations border on the libellous, as when he claims that biblical commentators exist only to ensure a uniform interpretation of the texts—“to prove that they have one clear fixed meaning, to keep on reminding us of it, and to keep control of it” (142). C. never acknowledges the important contribution of postmodern biblical scholars, let alone the long tradition of allegory.
C.'s book is unhappily characterized by a dogmatically enforced skepticism and an instant rejection of almost every traditional source of Christian theology (whether a text, a person, or a community of the faithful). According to C., Christianity is characterized primarily by idealism, intolerance, and stupidity. Of course, such a position is music to the ears of many secular souls; this accounts for C.'s popularity in the British media. But while he claims that his philosophy can underwrite significant sociopolitical transformation, his playful nihilism will seem a bit too whimsical to those Christians who must fight in the real trenches of the postmodern battleground.

University of St. Thomas

DAVID S. CUNNINGHAM


Macquarrie, who retired in 1986 as the Lady Margaret Professor of Divinity and Canon of Christ Church, Oxford, envisioned this text as a statement of his Christology, the third volume of the set including In Search of Deity (1982) and In Search of Humanity (1984). The book has in fact turned out to be more than that, for it now consists of three, distinct parts, united by M.'s emphasis on "new Adam" Christologies.

In Part 1, "The Sources and the Rise of the Classical Christology," M. presents Christologies of the New Testament and the early Church. The single, abiding reality of the "Christ-event" was attested to by Christians' use of the Christological titles and by the witness of Paul, the Gospels, the Epistle to the Hebrews, 1 Peter, and the Epistle to the Ephesians. This "person-happening" was discussed in conceptual terms by the Greek and Latin Fathers, through whose controversies the Church hammered out its essential convictions regarding Jesus Christ. Among these beliefs is the rejection of docetism and the affirmation of Christ's full humanity. The doctrine of Chalcedon represents both the culmination of four centuries of reflection and also the point of departure for further inquiries, such as those of Anselm, Thomas Aquinas, and Martin Luther.

In Part 2, "The Critique of the Classical Christology and Attempts at Reconstruction," M. shows that most modern Christologies operate within a theological anthropology, in terms of which they approach Scripture, tradition and the Church's teachings. This orientation is evident in the critical reflections of scholars from Kant, Schleiermacher, and Hegel, through Ritschl, Harnack, and Troeltsch, to Bultmann, Rahner, and Pannenberg. It has been questioned by theologians
like Kierkegaard, Kähler, and Barth, who however (in M.'s judgment) have failed to offer constructive alternatives to Christologies that are anchored in the humanity of Jesus Christ.

In Part 3, "Who Really Is Jesus Christ for Us Today?" M. outlines his "new Adam" Christology. Jesus Christ has fulfilled humankind's dynamism of self-transcendence, and simultaneously he has realized God's self-communication with the human community. He is, therefore, the one in whom human existence has attained its fullness. He is the "second Adam," the "focus of being." M. explores this mystery by interpreting Christian belief regarding the pre-existence of the Logos, the nativity, Jesus' baptism, his temptations, his transfiguration, and his death. M. proposes two possible conclusions to the gospel story, the "happy ending" of Luke/Acts and the "austere ending" of Mark. Finally, M. considers Jesus Christ in relation to other religions' "savior figures."

This is a lucid, synthetic book. It clearly introduces Christological categories and issues. The presentation on the New Testament highlights unifying themes in the Bible's diverse testimonies. The review of the road to Chalcedon is succinct and insightful. Quick, far-reaching access is given into the complex ideas of major post-Enlightenment philosophers and theologians. M.'s "new Adam" Christology provides a fresh appreciation for Jesus Christ as one with us. The book leaves the reader wanting more. M. is eloquent on the importance of image, analogy and paradox in Christology, and thus one expects greater use of figurative discourse in M.'s Christology. Also, M.'s usual theological balance leads one to desire a lengthier consideration of Jesus' suffering, death, and resurrection. Part 3 could well be expanded into a book. In any case, as it stands, this text (especially in paperback) could be excellent in courses for upper-level undergraduates and for graduate students.

University of Notre Dame

ROBERT A. KRIEG, C.S.C.


Moltmann is best known for his provocative Theology of Hope (1964) and The Crucified God (1972). These seminal works evoked intensive discussion of central theological issues by forcefully directing attention to the importance of future eschatology, the centrality of the crucifixion, and the need to reflect anew on the political dimension of Christianity and on trinitarian doctrine and theology. They thus established M.'s reputation as a significant contemporary theologian.
The book under review is a work of a different genre. M. has begun the publication of a five-volume series intended to cover the major themes of systematic theology. This treatment of Christology is the third of this series; the two earlier volumes examined the doctrine of God and the theology of creation. The level of presentation and the consideration of the range of issues standard in a textbook on Christology provide M. with an opportunity to revisit some characteristic themes within a broader context; the result is a more balanced, though less stimulating, articulation of his ideas. Yet failure to provide basic historical information, sweeping generalizations from limited data, and internal inconsistencies mar the presentation of his thought and limit the work's suitability for classroom use.

Locating the matrix of Christology in Israel's messianic expectations, M. begins by summarizing the origin and development of OT hope for an ideal king who would bring justice to the poor; over the course of time, such expectation fused with the apocalyptic vision of a coming Son of man, thus fruitfully combining particular Jewish and universal human aspirations. In this context, M. reviews the role of Christology in Christian-Jewish dialogue, arguing for the preservation of future eschatology in Christian messianology and against any political theology based on realized eschatology. Discussion of selected elements of Christology's historical development and present state completes the introduction. Chalcedonian doctrine and various modern cosmological and anthropological Christologies (Schleiermacher, Rahner) are presented, in truncated form, and found wanting. As an alternative, M. proposes a narrative Christology focussed in the eschatological history of God.

To develop this approach, the central portion of M.'s book recounts Christ's messianic mission, apocalyptic sufferings, and eschatological resurrection. Little attention is paid to historical-critical exegesis. Selected principles of a Christian ethics are adumbrated, usually derived directly from Christology and lacking confrontation with the complexities of life. M.'s overall reconstruction presents Jesus as the Messiah "on the way" (139). Rejecting the traditional understanding of the virginal conception, he sees Mary "as the human form of the Holy Spirit, who is the eternally virginal and divine mother of Christ" (83). At the time of his baptism, Jesus underwent a unique experience of the Spirit. Henceforth, he recognized God as his Father and undertook a mission of proclaiming God's kingdom to the poor, healing the sick, and accepting outcasts—goals which cannot be reduced to purely spiritual or interior terms. Condemned by the Sanhedrin as a false messianic claimant and executed by the Romans as a threat to public order, Jesus also endured the contradiction between Sonship of God
and forsakenness by God. His human sufferings entail divine suffering on the part of the Father as well as the Son; both suffer, though in different ways, in order to become respectively Father and brother of the forsaken and accursed. The passion makes possible justifying faith and establishes communion between living and dead; it is witnessed in the sufferings of martyrs, ancient and modern, and remembered in the Eucharist. Yet these deeper dimensions are evident only in the light of the resurrection. Made known through exceptional visionary experiences of women at the tomb and disciples in Galilee, Christ’s resurrection is an eschatological event which implies a dynamic conception of history and anticipates the future transformation of mortal natural creation.

Against this background, M. considers Christ’s role in relation to creation, critically evaluates evolutionary Christologies, and sketches the ecological implications of his conception of the cosmic Christ as redeemer of evolution: the reconciliation of human beings and nature in a community of human beings, animals, and plants based on law. A final chapter explores the Christological significance of the parousia, but detailed exposition of eschatology is reserved for a future volume.

While offering intriguing ideas on such topics as cross-generational responsibility and the solidarity of the living with the dead, M. here leaves the reader with a frustrating sense of inconsistency and failure to confront difficult issues squarely. Examples abound, but are particularly prevalent in the sections on the resurrection and on ecology. M. refers to the resurrection as a new creation after ceasing to exist (223), but also insists that death’s inability to destroy all relationship to God is a presupposition of the resurrection’s possibility (261). Assurance that resurrection appearances occurred in Galilee (215–17) is followed by admission that “the localization of these phenomena is certainly a moot point” (217). The relationship of faith in the resurrection to appearances is presented in apparently incompatible terms (139, 222; 218), and the sense in which the risen Christ may be said to be embodied is specified in quite different ways (216; 256–57, 323). Similarly, we are told at times that every created being enjoys infinite value in God’s sight (256) and that every individual creature has rights (307), while elsewhere rights are attributed only to all living things (255) or only to all animal and plant species (308). Thus, despite suggesting some worthwhile lines of thought, this work can be recommended only with serious reservations.

Catholic University of America

JOHN P. GALVIN

By definition an encyclopedia may focus on one particular subject matter but in such a way as to produce comprehensive coverage. O'Carroll does not attempt any initial methodological statement in this work nor does he offer specific criteria which will guide his choices in constructing the encyclopedia. As a result the work roams somewhat idiosyncratically over a broad range of topics related to the Holy Spirit. O. acknowledges dependence upon Congar's three-volume work, I Believe in the Holy Spirit, as well as G. Montague's biblical study, The Holy Spirit. He also claims indebtedness to the international congresses held to commemorate the 16th centenary of the Council of Constantinople, and the 1,550th anniversary of the Council of Ephesus. Throughout his work O. manifests familiarity with magisterial teaching and solid knowledge of a large corpus of writing on the Holy Spirit.

O. charts the course of his work with more than 160 entries. Arranged alphabetically, each item can be classified according to a particular interest, e.g. biblical, theological, patristic, conciliar, papal. Individual proper names are introduced for their theological expertise, e.g. Peter Lombard, John of St. Thomas, Yves Congar, Karl Rahner; or for their spiritual acumen, e.g. Edward Leen, Francis Libermann; or even for their charismatic gifts, e.g. Sister Briege McKenna. When such an extensive range of categories seems to decide the matter of selection, one wonders why other names were not included, e.g. Ralph DiOrio in reference to charismatic healing, or the University of Steubenville for its leadership in the charismatic movement. (In an article on the "Charismatic Movement" O. does acknowledge the origin of the charismatic movement at Duquesne University.)

Each entry concludes with a select, multi-lingual bibliography. Without explanation a number of items do not enjoy bibliographic support, e.g. "Personal Fulfillment," "Personality," "Humour." Generally the bibliographies are specific and helpful.

O. has fashioned useful and competent articles on the character of the Holy Spirit in the NT; separate entries summarize the writings of the Synoptics, John, the Acts of the Apostles, the Pauline literature. He provides extensive coverage of papal and conciliar teaching (encyclicals are treated with specific entries) and includes a select number of patristic entries. He includes Ephraem the Syrian even though he is perhaps best known for his Christological writings. The encyclopedia reflects ecumenical sensitivity with entries on ecumenism, John Wes-
ley, James D. G. Dunn, William Barclay Swete. Controverted areas such as the *filioque* phrase are treated with due respect and competence.

One might question why the term “grace” does not receive its own entry since the mission of the Holy Spirit is so intimately associated with graced existence. (Grace does appear as a specific entry in O.'s encyclopedia *Trinitas.* ) However, dimensions of grace do enter in the entries under “Divinum Illud Munus” and “Indwelling of the Holy Spirit,” as well as other subject headings. An entry on “Apostolate” reviews magisterial teaching on the role of the Spirit in the Church’s mission. While “apostolate” is certainly the term used in Vatican II, the article does not address the use of the word “ministry” as a more inclusive context for considering service on behalf of the Church’s mission.

O. has manifested herculean diligence in his preparation of the various entries. He not only employs historical and doctrinal theology but also utilizes the insights of many contemporary theologians. Karl Rahner, Yves Congar and Han Urs von Baltasar are most prominent throughout. Given the monumental task of preparing an encyclopedia it would appear obvious that such a work might be uneven. Occasionally, O. strings together a series of quotations from a given author rather than attempting to provide synthesis and analysis. On the other hand, he has succeeded in bringing together an immense body of material. This work will serve its purpose as an introductory guide and a reference tool on the Holy Spirit.

*Seton Hall University, N.J.*

John F. Russell, O.CARM.


Recently I came upon my teenaged children arguing about the characteristics and merits of postmodernist rock music. How, they wondered, could anything come after the modern? Always the professor, I told them how “modern” had become an umbrella term for a set of ideas and tendencies involving objectivity, distinction, autonomy and control, and how “postmodernism” had become the umbrella term for the rejection of these ideas and tendencies. “That’s all right, Dad,” the children responded, “but what does it have to do with rock music?” I had no answer.

Rock music is not within Centore’s scope, and few people would expect to meet up with it in a philosophical or theological treatise. However, it is one of the problems with his book that he does not attend to the multiple uses of “postmodernism” to cover developments from
architecture to zoology. This diffusion and diversity should itself be of interest to philosophers and theologians. What concerns him is rather the philosophical and theological turn from modernity towards skepticism and relativism, a turn which is just as often identified as “deconstructionism” in intellectual circles. The authors commonly associated with this species of postmodernism are Jacques Derrida in France and Richard Rorty in the U.S. Both Derrida’s attack on the metaphysics of presence and Rorty’s disavowal of language as the mirror of nature mean the loss of fixed points in nature and in science. Only the play of images and ideas remains, with great consequences for any enterprise which has supposed itself capable of at least approximating such points.

For C., postmodernism “has become in effect the unofficial new state religion, the new salvation myth, with universal validity to which every citizen must adhere.” Although he clearly overreaches in this claim, he is nonetheless right that the postmodernism he describes is a major cultural phenomenon and that it merits a critique from anyone who worries about its often corrosive effects. What he does in these pages is to trace the genealogy of the new ism through Descartes, Kant, Nietzsche, James, Hegel, Heidegger and Sartre. For C., the unifying thread in this genealogy is, the denials of the thinkers notwithstanding, a reduction of reality to the elusive realm of ideas. In this way, reality always comes with quotation marks, and essences are willed into existence. Derrida and Rorty appear as simply the latest protagonists of rather hoary notions.

C.’s alternative is a return to the philosophy of Aquinas, where the real distinction between essence and existence, being and becoming, substance and accident allows us to unravel many of the puzzles which have set the moderns and postmoderns down unhappy paths. Reality no longer need come with quotation marks. “And” turns out to be a key word in this scheme since it saves both sides of each distinction. It is a small word with implications not just for metaphysics but also for ethics. Through it, we can have permanence and flux, being and consciousness, liberty and authority, authority and personal morality. Thus an old-fashioned realism makes it possible to have a richer world than all the current talk of liberation, play, and diversity. The argument concludes with a grand claim: “By exposing its historical roots, Deconstructionism is deconstructed, and if we follow Aquinas, it is done in a way which preserves our own selfhood, logic, science, freedom, good-naturedness, human solidarity and God.”

My heart and mind are with C. I too am convinced that postmodernism in its deconstructionist guise is a dead end and that something like his realism is the only sane recourse. So I had great hopes for this
learned book; and, in many respects, they were fulfilled. Still it probably will have little impact on the very debates C. wishes to influence. The neglect of the many postmodernisms is part of the problem. He also fails to locate the postmodernism he criticizes within the debate about modernity. The result is that the book stands as a confrontation between postmodernism and premodernism without much attention to modernism itself. Furthermore, even in the refutation of postmodernism, C. gives remarkably little attention to the very people, Derrida and Rorty, who have come to represent it. The genealogy squeezed them almost completely out. Lastly, in the constructive part, C. chooses to stress metaphysics instead of epistemology because he sees epistemology as moving in a hopeless circle. I understand that decision, and yet the decision does in many ways put his final argument outside the conversation which involves Derrida’s *Grammatologie* and Rorty’s *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature*. To be effective, a critique has to be part of the conversation it criticizes. A difficult task in this murky conversation, almost as hard as deciphering rock music.

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**Michael J. Kerlin**


This collection of essays contains contributions by D. Kelsey, D. Tracy, B. Marshall, D. Burrell, N. Lash, H. Frei, M. Root, S. Sykes, P. Ochs, and J. DiNoia. The collection celebrates the theological achievement of George Lindbeck. Of the several theological loci explored here, ecclesiology, particularly the relationship between church and culture, is the most prominent. Several of the essays focus this issue by attempting to name the criteria by which postliberal theological judgments are made.

How, Marshall asks, can one judge theological adequacy in light of Lindbeck’s ascription of primary normativeness to the plain sense of Scripture? It is in L.’s claim for the “assimilative power” of the plain sense, its capacity to describe the world in its own scriptural terms so that its secular vision can be absorbed into the Church’s message of salvation, that Marshall finds a functional criterion by which theologies can be measured and Christian belief and practice judged.

Marshall admits that this functional criterion might be more of a negative than a positive test of theological adequacy. I think he is largely correct in his judgment that the only evidence available for the assessment of theological adequacy is the actual success or failure of the plain sense’s “assimilative power” in particular instances of inter-
pretation. The failure of such power would, no doubt, be more easily recognized than an act of successful theological redescription. While I would agree with Marshall that "there is no general standard of assimilative power" (82), I would be reluctant to conclude with him that foundational theologies as a matter of course aspire to such a general standard and evince, by virtue of their indifference to the postliberal approach, a failure of ecclesial assimilation.

Marshall recognizes that the ecclesiology suggested by such a functional criterion runs the risk of isolationism. He believes, however, that the charge of sectarianism against L.'s postliberal understanding of normativeness is groundless. The very strength of the postliberal approach is that it is committed to the utter inclusivity of Scripture in its encounter with the world. The isolationism that some critics see in a postliberal fideism is, Marshall argues, the very plight of Scripture in the modern world that postliberalism seeks to address.

The problem of sectarianism is explored more closely in Kelsey's essay. Like Marshall, Kelsey insists that the fairest reading of L. would conclude that he understands the Church to be engaged in an ongoing dialogue with culture. Yet Kelsey is more willing to notice the susceptibility of the cultural-linguistic model of doctrine to the charge of sectarianism. He concedes that there is at least a "sound intuition" (29) in the charge, and argues that this grain of critical legitimacy points to the limitations of the metaphors of "culture" and "language" for describing the Church. To the degree that Lindbeck portrays the Church as a public or cultural (and not a private) realm with its own rules or grammar, he gives the impression that the Church's relationship with the public realm at large, its host culture, must be one either of hostility or in which the host culture is expected to capitulate utterly to the Church. Kelsey also wonders whether the cultural-linguistic model of Church encourages too sanguine a regard for the integrity of its grammar. Can a church be so ideologically captive to its own doctrinal metaphors that the reform of the ecclesial community is never even recognized as a need?

This last concern of Kelsey's is, I believe, the most pressing problem for a postliberal theology. While the concern by no means invalidates the value of the postliberal perspective, it does articulate the particular temptation to theological faithlessness that it faces. Kelsey's question might be put critically to Marshall's defense of L.'s notion of "absorbing the world," and receives an answer in Root's interesting analysis of ecumenical dialogue from a cultural-linguistic point of view.

In his efforts to articulate the boundaries of ecclesial identity and difference in ecumenical dialogue, Root defines a church-dividing difference as "one that threatens the identity of the church as church"
(174). Root notes that a church-dividing difference will always be about the right preaching and administration of the sacraments, but this fact in church history does not establish an objective criterion for authentic ecclesial practice. The only criterion available, Root argues, is a functional one: consensus between parties in ecumenical conversation about what counts as a legitimate rule for ecclesial practice. This criterion which seems to be sublated in the dialogue between church and culture, manifests itself plainly in the dialogue between church and church. The objectivity of this criterion, however functional, seems to suggest that the fear about the postliberal ability to hear the call for reform can be calmed by the multiple voices of faith engaged in a dialogue about what the faith means. The reforming vision of the churches, in other words, depends on their ability to engage each other meaningfully in dialogue.

It should be no surprise that the integrity of postliberalism is so clearly visible in the setting of ecumenical issues since it was in this context that George Lindbeck conceived of its value for theology. These essays are a fitting tribute to his important contribution to the discipline.

*Fairfield University*  
**John E. Thiel**


This introduction to religion in the U.S. and colonial background follows the recent tendency of scholars once again to concentrate on particular religions, traditions, and denominational groups in survey interpretations of American religious history. Wentz acknowledges the influence of such historians as Mead, Handy, Hudson, Gaustad, Marty, and others who have produced integrative approaches to religion in America organized according to themes and historical development (rather than denominations or traditions), and then he sets out to present an “American history of religions for the general reader” who may know little or nothing about either religions or American history.

Overall, the book fulfills W.’s goal in grand fashion. Any thoughtful reader will learn a great deal about most of the religious traditions that have thrived within the American experience. Readers will come to understand religious traditions as defined historically by beliefs, ideas, and practices; verbal, practical, and social expressions; formal theologies, sacred texts, and (in a few cases) myths and legends. Though some traditions receive brief historical overviews, W.’s concern is not with social or intellectual history, institutions, or persons.
History, however, does provide an underlying conceptual format for the survey. Religious traditions define chapters that are presented in the order of W.'s sense of their emergence as stable and influential phenomena, or as they came into their own within the American experience. This interpretative framework thus follows the pattern of Winthrop Hudson's widely used textbook *Religion In America* (1965), though in most other ways the two books differ greatly. Beginning with the already-present Native American traditions, Part 1 then treats the European-rooted Christian traditions (Protestant and Roman Catholic) that developed during the 16th through 18th centuries in distinction from one another and became solidly planted in North American soil by the early 19th century. Part 2 examines both such distinctively American traditions as appeared in revivalism, civil religion, Mormonism, African-American groups, new-thought and positive-thinking orientations, holiness-pentecostal movements, and the world religions more recently imported in substantial strength, such as Eastern Orthodox Christianity, Judaism, and Asian religions (Hinduism, Buddhism, Islam).

Missing from this otherwise-comprehensive survey are two traditions of significant importance to a full understanding of the American religious experience: (1) the Spanish-Mexican (Hispanic or Latino) heritage within Roman Catholicism and Protestantism (especially Pentecostalism); and (2) the large Baptist denominations, especially the Black church denominations and the enormous Southern Baptist Convention. Baptists overall receive brief treatment as part of 17th- and 18th-century New England Puritanism, but they are absent from Part 2 of the book (since mid-19th century) when especially the Southern Baptist Convention emerged as a major distinctively American religious tradition. Were W. more concerned with regional factors in religious tradition formation, both the Southern Baptists and Spanish-speaking groups surely would have loomed large in his sense of the American experience. A Pacific-Coast perspective, moreover, would have demanded at least mention of the California Franciscan Missions plus the early-19th-century planting of Russian Orthodoxy at Fort Ross, just north of San Francisco Bay.

The bibliography is useful but highly selective, missing some very important authors (most notably Sydney Ahlstrom, along with Henry Warner Bowden, Gayraud Wilmore, Jay Dolan, and others). Moreover W. is not without bias, which to his credit he acknowledges; e.g., he especially dislikes what he calls the "individualistic assumptions of the revivalistic evangelicalism that has so shaped American religion since the nineteenth century," and he laments whatever influence this might have had on such European-rooted traditions as Lutheranism.
But overall, W. is fair and respectful, even appreciative, in his interpretations of the various religious traditions. The book is well written, carefully organized, learned, and it will take its place as an important contribution to the literature of the field.

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Eldon G. Ernst


Wilson, dean of sociological scholars studying sectarianism, is already well known for such books as Sects and Society, Religious Sects, and Magic and the Millennium, which has become a standard work to understand new religious movements in the Third World. W. is also well regarded as a theorist, albeit a controversial one, of the secularization thesis in sociology which informs, indeed drives, all his sociological work. Briefly stated, this thesis holds that "the currents of secularization in society make all churches and sects more marginal to society's functioning. Their significance in the social system becomes bracketed with recreational pursuits, activities in the free zone of choice. An increasingly sharp contrast occurs between the self-interpretation of religious bodies and the actual importance accorded to them. Although they take themselves with immense seriousness, they are increasingly disregarded both by the agencies of the social system and the public at large" (126).

Yet sects today are more important than the tribes studied by anthropologists since there are more people living lives as self-conscious and active votaries of sects than there are people now living as active members of tribes. Moreover, sects provide us with unique laboratories to study religious conversion, motivation, and commitment to single-purpose groups and to probe issues of the tension between religion and society.

In this collection of previously published essays which, nevertheless, shows an organic coherence as a book, W. exhibits wide-ranging methodological as well as theoretical interests in sectarianism and devotes specific attention to tensions between the sects and the state or law and the evolution and appeal of sects in several modern countries, i.e. the U.S., Britain, and Belgium.

In examining in detail several law cases in Britain and the U.S., W. uncovers four sets of issues in tension between sects and the state: (1) issues in which the sect directly challenges the authority of the state (e.g. in refusing to accept its legal sovereignty); (2) issues in which sect
teachings are held to be contrary to specific aspects of public policy (e.g. in racist teachings, or when parents refuse medical treatment for their children, or compulsory schooling laws); (3) issues in which it may be alleged that adherence to the sect or its teachings endangers the rights even of those individuals who are its members; and (4) issues in which the authorities seek to defend conventional morality and to protect the general public (e.g. the Mormon polygamy case, and non-monogamous sexuality in some sects such as the Rashneesh commune).

W. takes exception with earlier theoretical work on sectarianism. Thus, Troeltsch saw sects as schismatic breakaway groups from established churches. Yet this does not well describe the origin of Christian Science, the Mormons, or Scientology. H. Richard Niebuhr postulated a necessary evolution from sect to denomination, but W. rebuts this claim by instancing counterexamples. Finally, Charles Glock and Rodney Stark become reductionist in seeing sects as havens for the sufferers of economic and other subtle deprivations, all of them nonreligious. W. is more apt to take religious motives on their own warrant.

These well-written essays offer important generalizations without forgetting that most understandings of sects are culturally specific to Christianity and the West and cannot be extrapolated easily to non-Christian religions. Rich in illustrative material and wise, this book can help mainline members of the churches who do not read or understand the literature of Jehovah's Witnesses, Mormons, Christian Scientists, Adventists, or Scientologists to understand the appeal of these groups to former members of Christian churches.

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JOHN A. COLEMAN, S.J.


The subtitle of this important book says more about it than the title. Its great contribution is the detailed description of the political context of evangelization not only in Latin America but here in the United States where the Protestant evangelizing efforts are based. At the time of writing, David Stoll was a graduate student of anthropology at Stanford University. This book is evidence of his great competence as an analyst, not only of the cultural features of religion but of the efforts of political leaders to exploit religion for political objectives. From this point of view it should be given careful attention not only by the Protestant sects and denominations, but by the Catholic community as well. No religious group can escape the political networks, and the
more religious leaders know about them, for better or for worse, the better prepared they will be to bring the Good News of the Gospels to the people of God.

Stoll states his two major objectives: (1) to caution Catholics, alarmed at Protestant growth in Latin America, that when they attempt to explain it as a result of U.S. money or the manipulation of the U.S. Government, they miss its very important meaning: the powerful spiritual impact of the Fundamentalist message of the Gospels which the sects present; and (2) to emphasize to the sects the clear and present danger of being manipulated by the U.S. government. The first two chapters are a detailed report of the extent of Protestant evangelizing in Latin America and its successes; and the response of the Catholic Church to the threat. Three chapters are devoted to an excellent and detailed description of the organizational structure of the sects and their evangelizing methods. For sheer information, these chapters make the book worthwhile. Then follow the important case studies of Guatemala, Nicaragua and Ecuador.

Stoll provides abundant evidence of the ways in which many of the sects allowed themselves to become identified with U.S. political interests. In their support of right-wing regimes in Guatemala, “conservative evangelicals ended up supporting a right-wing equivalent of what they rejected in left-wing Christianity and a more violent regime than the one they condemned” (261). In El Salvador evangelical Churches grew rapidly because “they served as a haven from government violence” (167). And in the Contra/Sandinista conflict, many of the evangelicals were strongly in support of Reagan’s policies in the area. Professing to be apolitical, and condemning liberation theology for substituting political action for religion, many of the sects identified themselves with U.S. political interests. This was not without opposition from within the sects. Stoll describes their efforts to define their missionary objectives and other evangelizing methods, as well as the differing points of view which divide them. Their fund-raising efforts at home are remarkable, although not always honest and admirable, and they often exploit their support of U.S. politics in their plea for funds. However, when the funds decrease, the consequences can be painful.

Stoll juxtaposes liberation theology to the drive of the sects for Latin America. This may be an oversimplification of the reality of the Church. Catholic reform is not confined to liberation theology nor are all basic Christian communities linked with it. Nor does he deal sufficiently with conservative movements in the Church. But, in view of evangelical successes while preaching only a gospel of repentance and born-again commitment to the Lord, he suggests that “viewing liber-
ation theology as the key to religious and social reformation, may be a mistake” (10). As the sects recognize the plight of the poor in Latin America, however, they face the challenge of the demand for justice among oppressed people.

The most interesting case study is Ecuador where the sects have made great inroads in Chimborazo, one of the most progressive dioceses in Latin America. Stoll suggests, with some reason, that the liberation of the poor by Catholic groups resulted in their demand for greater autonomy which they found in the sects. Delgados de la Palabra (lay ministers) in the Catholic Church become the pastors of their own evangelical churches.

The threat to the Catholic Church is real. Protestant scholars estimate that ten percent of Latin America was Protestant in 1985; Catholic writers placed it higher, at 12.5 percent. There were 11,196 U.S. Protestant missionaries in Latin America in 1985. But, as Stoll points out, this obscures the fact that Protestantism in Latin America has become largely indigenous. A large number of pastors are from the poor congregations themselves. Stoll suggests that “conversion to evangelical Protestantism may be the single most popular religious option in the region” (10). He quotes a prominent pastor: “If we could eliminate infidelity and immorality in Latin America, we could cut poverty by half in one generation. . . . [Most of the] middle class now emerging [in Latin American Protestantism] was converted poor, and rose through industry, honesty and justice to the educated, reasonable lifestyle that is commonly called the middle class. I think that is the biblical answer” (2).

This is a book that must be carefully studied by Catholics and Protestants alike.

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Joseph P. Fitzpatrick, S.J.


This reflective account deals with events between 1969 and 1987 within the Lutheran Church—Missouri Synod (LCMS), particularly conflict over its Concordia Seminary (CS), St. Louis, of which Tietjen was president 1969–74; the formation of a Concordia Seminary in Exile (Seminex) and Association of Evangelical Lutheran Churches (AELC), whose “Call for Lutheran Union” in 1978 T. credits with leading to the birth of the Evangelical Lutheran Church in America (ELCA) in 1987. About two-thirds of the pages focus on the seminary struggle, the last third on subsequent ecclesial alignments.
While the history is thus to an extent parochial, its themes have counterparts in many other churches. Catholics, in addition to seeing possible parallels as to how church authorities may respond to modern biblical criticism, will note with interest that the Saint Louis University Divinity School (though ultimately not the University) helped launch Seminex, and that the death in 1973 of Arthur Carl Piepkorn of CS, a valued contributor to the U.S. Lutheran/Catholic dialogue, may well have been from a broken heart at forced retirement from his once-beloved seminary (183–84).

The book, however, will not prove easy reading for non-Lutherans, as indeed it is not for many non-LCMS Lutherans, in spite of four pages of explanations for denominational acronyms and a chronology of events (xiii–xvi). The extensive documentation is relegated to endnotes. Vividness is added through “recreated conversations,” often with the approval of participants. The background would be clearer if more were recalled about societal and ecclesial events of the period, like Vatican II and its effects and Vietnam. Precisely in this period LCMS conservatives seized control of a major American church, reversing the pattern from Fundamentalist-Liberal controversies where conservatives were usually forced out. The dogged loyalty of people within the LCMS (cf. 229) will be more understandable if one keeps in mind that Missouri was the only major Lutheran body in North America that was never part of a merger.

"Memoirs" is probably the right name for the genre. It is not an autobiography. Little is told about T. prior to 1969, except by flashbacks (7–11) and even less about himself after 1987 (he is now a pastor in Ft. Worth). He chooses not to go into detail over his resignation as bishop of the Chicago Metropolitan Synod of the ELCA in 1987 a few weeks after his installation (339–40). Yet it is T.'s involvement that holds the events in the book together. It is clearly meant, in T.'s own words, as a gripping account for posterity of "what happened as I experienced it," events with "a dramatic shape" and in which "we saw God at work" (v–vi). It is a second-wave report, a decade and a half after Frederick W. Danker's *No Room in the Brotherhood* (St. Louis: Clayton, 1977) and earlier *Kontroverse-Literatur* from each side, but not yet "a definitive history." Inevitably a note of *apologia* runs through the account. Those who lived through the events on T.'s side see the book as "a jubilee and a confession," as one endorsement puts it, but the account raises questions to ponder.

"Confessional hope" seems constantly contrasted with "institutional conflict." Throughout, T. and colleagues maintained that Scripture and the Confessions suffice as authority (e.g., 12, 45, as in Articles II and VIII.C of the LCMS constitution). But at issue was how historical-
critical methods should now be employed to interpret Scripture (and Confessions). LCMS President J. A. O. Preus was not wrong to say that such questions “cannot be settled by sixteenth-century Confessions” (67). At issue was the “development of doctrine” question and where a “Lutheran magisterium” lies (cf. 149). The impossible answer Preus and others gave to a necessary question was to try to impose his “Statement of Scriptural and Confessional Principles” (104–6, 151), adopted in 1973, as doctrine to which pastors and teachers must subscribe. The difficulty was that Missouri did not conceive of “middle-level” working expressions of doctrines in a “hierarchy of truths.” Either “official” or nothing. This was coupled with a view of the church and institutions, often reflected in Tietjen’s frank reflections (e.g. 118, 252–53), that seems sociologically and theologically unrealistic, strange in a tradition that ought to regard the ecclesia as simul justa et peccatrix. “Moderates,” as Seminex-AELC adherents called themselves, were often not politically astute in assessing situations (e.g. 102, 138, 146). They were out-planned, out-organized, and out-voted time and again, after having failed to deliver in parish settings and church structures on how historical-critical studies can aid the faith. The epic is heroic, but future historians may have to ask what the outcome might have been if the CS faculty had faced the issues by staying rather than by a march into exile, or if T. had accepted offers that he called “deals” (155–58, 167–69, 181).

The memoirs thus become a cautionary tale. How do we combine justification and ecclesiology? The LCMS story has often been “confessional conflict.” Can there not also be realistic “institutional hope”?

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JOHN REUMANN


Except for the Prologue, most of the essays in this collection were written in the 70s and 80s. The general theme is the plurality of religions now readily available to all in the contemporary world, and how Christians in general and Christian theologians in particular are to deal with all these religions. The leitmotif may best be described as the need for and the beginning of a “theology of religions.”

Waldenfels is well suited for such an undertaking. In addition to his classical Western Roman Catholic background, he has also spent considerable time in the Orient, studying the Asiatic religions, as individual chapters on Buddhism and Hinduism and references to these religions throughout most of the chapters indicate. There are also chapters on Islam and on the new religions of the present age.

As with all such collections of essays, there is something for every-
one here, and the quality of the individual essays is mixed. Of special value for Americans is W.'s Germanic background, for our literature on the world's religions often seems overwhelmingly, if not exclusively, American and English. It is fun to read the passages W. provides from the earlier Joseph Ratzinger.

A theme running through the entire book is the contention, customary since Hegel, of the "absolute claim of Christianity." W.'s treatment is judicious and creative. So is his treatment of the much-maligned and often deliberately misrepresented "anonymous Christianity" theory of K. Rahner. W. understands that this theory is primarily for Christians, who have the problem of reconciling the conflict, classically stated by Lessing, about the historically concrete/individual and the universally valid/effective. Likewise interesting are W.'s new twist on ekklesia as not only convocation, but also provocation, and his emphasis on the importance of the doctrine of creation for proper understanding of both the pluralism of religions and the Christian claim to absoluteness.

I do not find his description of God as the "totally Other" convincing. Certainly that is unacceptable to Jewish and Christian theology, especially and precisely because of the Christian doctrine of creation. Certainly the prototypical creation theology of Aquinas would claim that God is indeed significantly other than creation, but not totally other. For God can only be totally other than nothing.

I find W.'s struggles to come up with an adequate definition of religion most interesting. At times he seems to require a transcendent ultimate, at others he seems to realize that in the modern world many people have an ultimate which is "only" immanent, but nonetheless just as ultimate in their lives as transcendent deities in the lives of traditional believers. The rub is that Theravada Buddhism and other Oriental religions have always been recognized as religions, although they clearly have no transcendent ultimate corresponding to Yahweh, Allah, or the Trinity. This problem is unavoidable, given the fact that W. acknowledges a plurality of religions, both traditional and new. To his credit, W. does not take refuge in such flights of fancy as pseudo-religion or quasi-religion, as Tillich did.

In this matter, as in others, W. would benefit from a greater study of religion in America, where even the civil courts have understood that religion applies even to those who believe in an ultimate, a god with a lower case "g." Then one has the proper problem to solve and the right question to answer—namely, not whether some are religious or not, but rather, since we are all religious, who has the better religion. On this most fundamental question, as on many others, W. already offers much knowledge and many insights.

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ROBERT KRESS

In Part 1, D. places his Christocentric theology of religions in the context of Indian (Hindu and Christian) reflections which locate Christ at the center of reflection on the unity and plurality of religions. He examines in turn the treatment of Christ by six Hindu thinkers over the last century, the uses of yoga and non-dualist Vedanta as resources in Christian theologians' treatments of Christ, and, finally, Henri Le Saux—Swami Abhishiktananda, whose work he recognizes as a profound Christian appropriation of Hindu thought and "a symbol for an existential encounter between Hindu mysticism and Christian mystery" (90). D.'s astute and on the whole generous analysis concludes with a critique of the common tendency to separate the Christ from Jesus, or God from the Christ, and with the insistence that "in Christian theology christocentrism and theocentrism cannot be mutually opposed as different perspectives between which a choice must be made" (110).

This steadfast Christocentric perspective energizes the longer Part 2, which "addresses the christological and theological problems raised by today's religious pluralism and the praxis of interreligious dialogue" (10). We have here a master theologian's mature reflections on Scripture, important moments in the Christian tradition, the documents of Vatican II and more recent papal ones, and the dynamics of the last 25 years of inter-religious dialogue—all with an eye to ways in which attention to the tradition facilitates serious openness to the work of Christ in the world religions. Among his more striking points: God's covenants with Jews and Muslims remain in force even after Christ, and "the other religious traditions, as well, still have the positive meaning assigned them by God in salvation history" (124); there is a "complementary uniqueness of the mystery of Jesus Christ vis-à-vis other salvific figures and the founding experiences of other religious traditions" (205); terms such as "the word of God," "holy scripture," and "inspiration" may be validly used with reference to extra-Christian traditions; "a prolonged encounter with the nonbiblical scriptures—practiced within their own faith—can help Christians to a more in-depth discovery of certain aspects of the divine mystery that they behold full revealed in Jesus Christ" (177). The final two chapters break new ground in a threefold anthropological, Christological, and pneumatological foundation for "a theology of dialogue." D. argues that dialogue must be considered an integral part of evangelization, "one of the distinct modalities in which the evangelizing mission is expressed" (230), worthwhile in itself and not merely as an instrument
of proclamation. He concludes with comments on “mutual conversion,” in which “under the influence of the Spirit of Jesus Christ, the partners in the interreligious dialogue are called—together and by each other—to a more profound conversion to God” (229).

The book is a remarkable addition to the rapidly expanding theology of religions bibliography, perhaps the best comprehensive volume available today. Though almost entirely bereft of particular examples from world religions, and though D. appears at times to accept the dubious equation of India’s religions with the apophatic and nondualist strands of Upanishadic and Vedantic thought, his long years of teaching and scholarship in India have nevertheless enabled him to avoid most of the pitfalls of generalists, and so he is a model of how Christian theologians can speak sensitively and responsibly about the world religions. One of D.’s finest sections is the short concluding chapter in which he modestly notes the limits of his book: religions are too rich and complex to be treated as all of one kind, and “theology” itself, practiced both inside and outside of Christianity, requires further differentiation if it is to be practiced properly. D. concedes that he has tried to offer basic principles “which will have to be applied differently to specific situations and different religious traditions” (246).

Nevertheless, these honestly acknowledged limits have their price, and application is the problem. The reader wants to know how this Christocentric theology will be articulated after “specific situations” in different religious traditions have actually been examined from a Christocentric perspective. If something theological is to be learned by this examination, how will it be spoken about theologically, in detail? If specific judgments are to be passed, how are they achieved? The few examples given are sketchy, and do not help us to decide what comes next. E.g., D. makes the following statements without supporting evidence: “Not everything in other religions is a presentiment of Christ. Not everything there is true and good” (151); “The Qur’an in its entirety cannot be regarded as the authentic word of God. Error is not absent from it” (170). Even if we are willing to accept these claims—there is no a priori reason not to, and faith may urge us to—in their generic form they do not help us to determine where precisely such inadequacies or errors or faults lie or how they are to be recognized. It is at this level of specificity that the urgent task now lies, precisely because the Christocentric starting point has been firmly established. The high quality of D.’s work therefore leaves us begging for more—and perhaps this is part of his achievement.

Boston College

Francis X. Clooney, S.J.

The scattered evidence of Jewish missionary activity does not support the thesis that Second Temple Judaism was a missionary religion, as some have claimed. On the other hand, the Jewish community was not isolationist nor inward turning. It adapted to Hellenistic culture but protected its own identity by resisting complete Hellenization. Jewish literature reveals positive attitudes toward the conversion of gentiles but no organized missionary program. Apocalyptic literature envisions the conversion of gentiles only through God’s intervention at the end of the world. Neither Jewish apologetic literature nor synagogue liturgical and educational activities were directed toward gentiles. Pre-mishnaic literature contains no certain procedure and ritual for receiving converts, suggesting that making converts was not central to Judaism. Converts were probably occasional and attracted through admiration of Jewish life. Jewish groups and communities had close but varied relations with gentiles. Gentiles were patrons and donors, often officially recognized as such by titles such as “God-fearers” in the Aphrodisias inscription. Some were socially integrated into the community through marriage and adherence to some Jewish customs or through repentance and conversion (e.g. the story of Aseneth).

McKnight is correct to stress the geographical and temporal variety of practice and outlook and the complex, important relationship between Jewish and Greco-Roman society. Most of the evidence is analyzed in its context (with the exception of the later rabbinic categories introduced in chap. 5). His evaluation of evidence is balanced, sensible and clear. The final conclusion, that Judaism was not a missionary religion is a prudent negative statement, but based on slim evidence. The extent to which Judaism sought converts is still uncertain.

Anthony J. Saldarini
Boston College


This is not a book about the meaning of the Scrolls, but an exposé of the deception allegedly perpetrated by Catholics in the last four decades, de-luding people worldwide about their real nature, which Baigent and Leigh now reveal. In the footsteps of Edmund Wilson, Cecil Roth, John Allegro, Robert Eisenman, the authors recount how a “consensus” has grown up about the scrolls and their relation to the Essenes and early Church. This consensus was masterminded by Roland de Vaux, O.P., the one-time director of the Ecole Biblique. This “ruthless, narrow-minded, bigoted and fiercely vindictive” Dominican, was an agent of the Vatican, under orders from the Biblical Commission to make sure that nothing emerged from the scrolls inimical to Catholic teaching.

A letter of Allegro reveals all: “[I]f something does turn up which affects the Roman Catholic dogma, the world will never see it. De Vaux will scrape the money of some or other barrel and send the lot to the Vatican to be hidden or destroyed” (60). Thus the discovery, the international team studying Cave 4 fragments, the scandal of the delay in publishing, the stifling of
voices opposing the consensus, all of this now culminates in the unmasking of the Vatican's attempts through its agents (De Vaux and his colleagues, including even this reviewer) to keep the public at large from learning that early Christianity was nothing more than the Qumran community under another name.

B. and L. bring to light much new information, derived from the papers of Allegro and from consultation with many scholars, but have laced their story with many, many errors, misinterpretations, and gratuitous assertions. If there is a "deception" connected with the Dead Sea Scrolls, this book is it. It has uncritically bought the Eisenman thesis that the scrolls, stemming from the mid first century A.D., are related to Christian origins. In its tirade against the palaeographical dating of them, which relates most of them to the first century B.C. or earlier, it wholly ignores recent Swiss radiocarbon dating of 14 texts that, with one exception, confirms the palaeographic dating.

Joseph A. Fitzmyer, S.J.
Catholic University of America


In this ambitious book Jeffers gives archaeological and literary evidence to support his contention that imperial "Roman ideology" made its way into first-century Roman churches through the influence of communities such as the one he finds behind 1 Clement. Predominantly "imperial freedmen and slaves or the freedmen and slaves of the great houses of Rome" (105), such Christians knew and had some sympathy with the values and institutions of Rome's ruling elite.

J. notes that Clement's community was atypical, for the mass of Roman Christians lacked their privileged background. The Shepherd of Hermas is J.'s source for this second type of Roman Christianity. These Christians, more in touch with poverty and oppression, regarded as dangerous the conspicuous wealth of successful freedmen and the attitudes that accompanied it. Organizationaly, too, such groups contrasted with the hierarchical type found in 1 Clement in having charismatic leadership (J. considers Hermas a prophet) and in lacking the other's world-embracing attitude. J. uses sociological theory (especially Bryan Wilson's analysis of sect development) to compare the two groups; "Hermas wrote his work as a protest against the type of social compromise with the world 1 Clement represents" (184). In a final chapter, J. outlines second-century challenges to Roman theology and church practice, and claims that these challenges ensured that Clement's type of Christianity prevailed over that of Hermas, thereby "molding the identity of the entire Roman church and . . . all of Christianity" (199).

Although J. offers much interesting material, his work is not conclusive. He pays insufficient attention to the literary context of 1 Clement and the Shepherd; much of his "Roman ideology" can more plausibly be traced to biblical traditions and rhetorical conventions. Further, insofar as Hermas speaks of the dangers of wealth, he does so from well within the NT framework. J.'s "conflict" remains unsubstantiated.

Patricia M. McDonald, S.H.C.J.
Mount Saint Mary's College, Md.


Despite its title, this is not a biog-
raphy, but an analysis of the character and activity of Athanasius during the first seven years of his episcopacy. Arnold seeks to determine whether he was, as per the traditional view, a great pastor and theologian and a staunch defender of the faith, or a ruthless schemer who used gangster-like methods to achieve his selfish goals and to avoid condemnation, as more recent scholars, such as Seeck, Schwartz, Barnes, Rusch, and Hanson, describe him.

Intrigue and accusations accompany his accession to the episcopacy in 328, for it was soon alleged that his consecration was invalid; later he was charged with various ecclesiastical and civil crimes: desecration of a chalice, an altar, and an episcopal throne; unjust persecution of Arians, Meletians, and Colluthians; the murder of a bishop and the practice of magic with his severed arm. He was finally accused of threatening to halt grain shipments from Alexandria to Constantinople, and this was the ostensible reason for his being exiled to Trier in 335, shortly after the Synod of Tyre had condemned him on other charges. A. maintains, however, that Constantine the Great may in fact have exiled Athanasius to preserve church unity, or even to save his life.

A. has read and mastered both ancient and modern sources, and his analysis shows that the charges against Athanasius generally stemmed from Arian, Meletian, and/or Colluthian adversaries and reflected their bias. He concludes that Athanasius, despite flaws, was not a gangster, and that the judgment of his opponents (ancient and modern) is too negative. His arguments are persuasive, but, despite the tantalizing intimations of its final ten pages, this volume fails to satisfy expectations, since its goal, the refutation of a negative view of Athanasius, is itself negative. A second volume, offering a complementary, positive portrait of Athanasius and his achievements during these turbulent years, is highly desirable.

GERARD H. ETTLINGER, S.J.
St. John's University, N.Y.


Hallman's work is an illuminating, lucid, and absorbing treatment of Christian thought on the relationship of God to the Incarnate Word from Philo of Alexandria to Augustine. The problem for the Fathers was how to remain faithful to the Platonic notion of God as perfect and therefore immutable and impassible, and yet be true to the apparently contradictory scriptural revelation of the God who became incarnate and suffered and died for us. H. asserts that the Fathers and the early councils consistently gave priority to the immutability and impassibility of God, and argued that the Scriptures either spoke metaphorically or made concessions to human weakness. This conciliar Christology has become remote and irrelevant in today's world. We need to develop a new philosophical approach that makes God present to our temporal physical concerns.

H.'s purpose is to show that small but significant divergences from the mainstream on divine immutability and impassibility can be found in the tradition which have gone unnoticed, but which may be recovered and re-conceptualized in a modern incarnational Christology of change based upon the thinking of Hegel and Whitehead.

H. shows the tradition's agonizing wrestling with the problem. Only gradually did the Fathers grasp the inadequacy of impasurable concepts of God. But because Arius denied divine status to the mutable and possible
Logos, Augustine argued with renewed determination for the tradition. Christian thinkers until modern times continued to repeat or refine Augustine's position. Only with Hegel and Whitehead have philosophical systems been found that are capable of showing that God changes and suffers while remaining perfect.

H. performs a service by exposing the divergent elements of change in the tradition not known for such. He should have concluded with a chapter indicating what the outlines of this new relevant Christology of change might be.

MARTIN R. TRIPOLI, S.J.
St. Joseph's University
Philadelphia


Lane sets out "to mediate a dialogue between scholarship and discipleship." As a complement to his earlier The Reality of Jesus, he offers an insightful summary of contemporary theological reflection on the reign of God, the paschal mystery, and the doctrine of the Incarnation. L. first examines the Jewish understanding of the activity of God in creation, in history, and in the historical experience of the monarchy as the foundation of a theology of the reign of God and as the context of Jesus' preaching of the kingdom as a present reality and a future gift. He then traces Jesus' vision of the reign of God to Jesus' personal experience of God as Father and relates the coming of His reign to liberating praxis.

L. emphasizes the unity that exists between the historical life, death, and resurrection of Jesus. The cross of Jesus is a revelation of God as active and historically involved in human suffering. The resurrection narratives disclose a new understanding of Jesus and his presence based on post-crucifixion experiences of the disciples. L. then reflects on the paschal mystery as the heart of Christian faith and discipleship. Finally, L. explores the significance of the Incarnation in the context of a relational and processive understanding of the human person and a theology of the cosmic Christ. In particular, he is concerned with a conversation between Christology and an emerging post-modern cosmology.

This book is a thoughtful resource for students of theology and ministers of the gospel. Throughout L. challenges narrow understandings of more traditional theology and relates fundamental issues in Christology to the contemporary discussions of feminism, ecology, and social justice.

Gerald M. Fagin, S.J.
Loyola University, New Orleans


Schleifer displays how much "post-modern" theory incorporates and intensifies literary modernism. His complex style gestures to the post-structuralist/deconstructive approach and seeks traces of the always-denied, Other of death (and God?) which hovers over against modernist writing.

S. finds that the modern mood is one of casting about for meaning in the face of the meaninglessness of death. Modernism is a "moment cut off from the future as well as from the past," a punctiliar location also typical of postmodern deconstruction and literary theory (55). Postmodern rhetoric does not seek to find or create meaning through connectedness, but lives with meaningless and disconnectedness. As language is now "known" to be constructed (not
given), arbitrary (not referential), and its constitutive trope to be metonymy (not synecdoche), no rhetoric can either declare or reveal anything save the empty silence beyond its noise. S. develops at length numerous parallels between four pairs of contemporary thinkers and modern writers (Roman Jakobson, Roland Barthes, Jacques Lacan, and Jacques Derrida, joined respectively with W. B. Yeats, D. H. Lawrence, Joseph Conrad, and Wallace Stevens).

Startlingly S. uses Kierkegaard as a foil in explicating Derrida: "Derrida articulates a sacred vocative discourse. But unlike Kierkegaardian Romanticism, he eschews synecdoche and articulates a language that speaks 'in memory of' another who is 'irremediably absent, annulled to the point of knowing or receiving nothing of what takes place in this memory'" (219). But God and the sacred are necessarily inarticulable and inarticulate (216) and sacramentality—save for a sacrament of emptiness—is impossible (224). Yet the postmoderns may, like the moderns, mourn the loss of the Other from and in their writing—even if that mourning cannot be mentioned.

While S.'s individual analyses are dazzling, one wonders whether his overall thesis, which plays out the implications of radical materialism, is news—at least in theological circles.

TERRENCE W. TILLEY
Florida State University
Tallahassee


The issue Johnson set out to investigate was the status and identity of medieval nuns: Were they living in the shadow of male monasteries, or were they equal participants in a great religious movement? Obviously the scope of the inquiry in those terms would have been too broad; hence she wisely restricted it in several ways. She confined it to Northern France, to the region where the langue d'oïl was spoken. There she selected twenty-six women's houses, located in fourteen dioceses, distributed among six major orders; in size they ranged from fourteen to sixty members. Further, she focused on their history in the central middle ages, i.e. in the 11th to the 13th centuries. Then she looked for "documents of practice," witnesses of daily life; she found them in some abundance in contemporary accounts of legal and financial transactions, and mainly in records of episcopal visitations.

In reporting her findings, J. describes the life of the nuns in relation to the world surrounding the monastery (family, civil, and ecclesiastical society), then she presents the organizing structures (spiritual, legal, and economical) of their monasteries, and finally she draws her well-grounded conclusion which sums up the result of her inquiry and gives the book its title: women were "equal in monastic profession."

This well-documented, judiciously organized, and pleasantly written work shows that the medieval nuns J. studied were women of strong personality and great sensitivity, who played a significant role in the life of the civic and ecclesiastical society and were in no way inferior to monks. At the end, J. hints how changing attitudes and restrictive legislations gradually led to the eroding of the great tradition of rightful autonomy. Once again, historia magistra vitae: there is a lesson here concerning the role and life of religious women and their communities in our modern society.

LADISLAS ORSY, S.J.
Catholic University of America

An Ordinary, or Liber Ordinarius, is a book of directions for liturgical use, comprising places, ministers, processions, feasts, and text indications for the Eucharist, the liturgy of the hours, and other services throughout the liturgical year. It is the equivalent of the Byzantine typikon.

The present work is the first printed edition of an early-13th-century Ordinary from Abbot Suger's famous Abbey of St.-Denis, the renowned birthplace of Gothic architecture. It is based on Foley's doctoral dissertation at the University of Notre Dame under the late Niels Krogh Rasmussen and subsequently William Storey. The text itself serves as a valuable monument in the history of medieval liturgy, but it is F.'s 270-page introduction that makes this edition an important tool for research and further study. F. situates this Ordinary in its historical and architectural context, adding a masterful and exhaustive commentary on the liturgy and calendar and a judicious concluding summary of the liturgy represented as royal, monastic, French, and in the tradition of St.-Denis. He attributes far less emphasis to the royal influence on the Abbey's worship than had previously been held. In the course of his treatment F. provides a model analysis of both the liturgy of the hours and the calendar for the liturgical year.

I have only two qualms with F.'s analysis. First, he too easily accepts a definition of the medieval monastic use of the term letanía as the litany of the saints (102). This is manifestly not the case in the Rule of Benedict. Moreover, it is not helpful to consider the preces of the divine office and litanies as different examples of the same basic form, even though they are similar in their responsorial structure. Second, given the major emphasis on the spatial deployment of the liturgy at St.-Denis, a more thorough analysis and taxonomy of the processional character of this particular liturgy is warranted.

These minor qualms aside, F.'s edition is superbly done and accompanied by an extremely useful appendix, intelligible charts, indices, and illustrations. It should serve students of both medieval worship and medieval history for a long time to come.

JOHN F. BALDOVIN, S.J. Jesuit School of Theology, Berkeley


Books which jump several centuries to discuss different literary works can be a problem. Is the writer versed in each period? Are the pieces chosen rationally or is this "cookie-cutter criticism," the procrustean application of theories to literature? Thorpe's rationale here is clear: he chooses three great English religious poets in order to discuss metaphor, both in its own right and in the use each poet makes of "labor," the metaphor of the building of the New Earth of T.'s title. T. adduces a remarkable number of sources from the traditional to the trendy, from St. Augustine and Hugh of St. Victor to Derrida, de Man, Ricoeur, and even the Japanese concept of "cloth weaving cloth"—the complete union of actor and act which the rational West dichotomizes. Thus he tests the limits not only of the metaphoric use of labor in these poems, but of metaphor itself. He wishes to link theology and linguistics, literary
theory and soteriology, then apply it to his authors. Although I understand the importance T. attaches to his theoretical schema, I do not feel, as he seems to, that it outweighs his discussion of the separate works. It is good to see a literary critic who takes theology seriously and who believes that criticism has consequences, but not all readers will be as interested in T.'s undergirding theories. As a theorist and a Blake scholar once reminded me, all theories depend on a good close reading of the text. Fortunately for T.'s theoretical interests, he does have some interesting readings. Even if I do not always agree with his emphasis, T. clearly has many insightful things to say about the works he analyzes. I believe his methodology probably works best with Blake, but I also found several useful insights into Pearl and The Temple which I can use in my own labors in class.

J. F. R. Day
Troy State University, Alabama

C. argues that “the maps of hell have by now become illegible” (vi). It is his achievement to have recovered some of the powerful infernal imagery of that period. His procedure is to weave together a series of related texts in order to amplify various themes and thereby reproduce a vivid sense of what people were thinking and feeling about these matters at the time. However, beyond reviving contemporary interest in these texts, it is not clear what C.'s scholarly objective or methodology is. There isn’t any recognizable interpretive framework beyond an energetic presentation of the material, which is sometimes accompanied by acerbic commentary on the tradition (e.g., see his criticisms, open or implied, of Christianity and the Jesuits (61, 70, 101). The absence of such a framework is most evident in the lack of a clear relationship between the first and second parts. Does C. believe that expressions of anxiety over human sinfulness shifted during the 18th century from fear of hell to terror over the abuse of the Eucharistic host? That would be an interesting claim, but it is not evident from his chosen texts.

Jonas Barciauskas
Boston College


In 1970 Ganss produced the first English translation of the entire text of Ignatius’ Constitutions, together with an invaluable historical-theological introduction and commentary in footnotes. To mark the Ignatian anniversaries he and a circle of distinguished collaborators have now made available to a wide readership the entire Autobiography and Spiritu-
tual Exercises and well-chosen selections from the Constitutions, Spiritual Diary, and Letters. Ganss edits the whole volume as well as authoring the monograph-length General Introduction and translating and commenting on the Exercises and Constitutions.

The General Introduction provides the background necessary for interpreting the texts. It offers an overview of I.'s historical environment and a synthesis of his spirituality. Ganss highlights I.'s clear grasp of the relationship between means and ends. All choices, actions, dispositions are to be oriented solely toward that end for which we were created: the greater glory of God. This principle forms the basis of I.'s doctrine of spiritual discernment and guides him in his own government and ministry. Ganss also chronicles the evolution of I.'s spiritual worldview. Particularly valuable are his study of the immediate effect and long-term impact on I. and his Exercises of Ludoph of Saxony's Vita Christi and his careful analysis of I.'s interior development at Manresa. Ganss also helps us understand how powerfully the vision at La Storta influenced and shaped the early Society of Jesus and the extent to which I.'s own spiritual outlook gave its specific character to the apostolic works and ministries of the early Society.

Ganss' translation of the Exercises merits special commendation. It is based chiefly on the critical text A, published by Cándido de Dalmases in 1969. Since he intends his translation to serve directors, retreatants, and first-time readers, he opts for the philosophy of "functional equivalence," i.e. he adjusts I.'s Spanish to the thinking patterns and needs of contemporary English readers. Ganss' endnotes are invaluable. His thorough familiarity with the text and with contemporary scholarship are exhibited on every page. Particularly useful are his explanations of Ignatian terms and the bibliographical information provided for more extensive study.

GERALD R. BLASZCZAK, S.J.
Syracuse, N.Y.


Senofonte tries to resurrect the "grand" Antoine Arnauld by championing him as victimized by the Jesuits but vindicated by the French people who found in him their theologian. The Jesuits, who had promoted obedience of the will to one’s confessor, spiritual director, and pope as the fundamental stance for all Christians, constructed probabilism, which gave the submissive subjects easy alternatives to lighten the moral burdens. Against that program, the Jansenists developed in France a more responsible, less voluntaristic, and more rational moral and spiritual theology. The latter’s offering was acknowledged as a threat by the Jesuits, and in protecting their hegemony they went after the Jansenists, in particular the Arnauld family and Port-Royal. S. observes that the Jesuits did not act in bad faith; they were convinced that obedience alone would guarantee the cohesion of Catholicism. Still the death of Arnauld and the destruction of Port-Royal prompted throughout French society an "inextinguishable hatred" toward the Jesuits which climaxed in the latter’s suppression. This is a bitter work, indeed.

S. presents a dialectical account of 17th-century French culture forming and in turn being formed by the thoughts and writings of Arnauld. The last and twenty-first child, fatherless at seven and trained by the women (his mother and older sisters)
involved in the intense struggles at Port-Royal, Arnauld developed the convictions that the God of revelation speaks clearly, that revelation does not require educated exegeses, and that academic polemics are indicators of human weakness. Still, these beliefs did not stay the hand that wrote against Descartes, Malebranche, Leibniz, the Jesuits, and the Calvinists, and that made access to the living God through Holy Communion a difficult matter. This is a passionate, though not convincing work.

JAMES F. KEENAN, S.J.
Weston School of Theology, Mass.

AN INTRODUCTION TO CANON LAW.

Coriden has undertaken the demanding task of addressing the entire Code of Canon Law, including in this relatively brief book a substantive historical review of legislation in the Catholic Church, the aborted Fundamental Law of the Church, two appendices, and an index. Unlike a very useful variety of recently published or updated commentaries, handbooks, and workbooks, C.'s opus is a skillful digest of the total codified legislation of the Latin Church. It is what it claims to be: an introduction to canon law.

It is directed toward two groups of persons: seminarians and students in schools of theology, and lay persons who want to become more familiar with how the Church is organized and functions. When they have overviewed the entire landscape they can turn their attention to the features which they may wish to explore in greater detail. To comprehend what C. has done in this book, in order to appreciate his sharply focused objectives, readers should make sure that they understand his preface. The book points to the Code itself and to its commentaries.

To quibble or even quarrel with the scope or contents of C.'s work is a serious temptation for a canonist and friend who, like C., has been a professor of canon law for nearly twenty-nine years, and I will not succumb to it. I will be, however, especially interested in how the sections on governance and “applying the rules” from Book I of the Code will work out in the classroom, given their respective locations midway and at the end of the text. I have adopted this book for my introductory course in Berkeley.

RICHARD A. HILL, S.J.
Jesuit School of Theology, Berkeley


Readers familiar with Dunne’s distinctive method (cf. TS 48 [1987] 65-86), developed through several books written over a 25-year period, will find further enrichment in this latest offering. For others, it represents a chance to meet a very creative theologian. The book characteristically unfolds through dialogue with a broad spectrum of poets, philosophers, and religious thinkers, especially with three contemporaries, David Daube, Erik Eriksen, and René Girard. The penultimate chapter summarizes Dunne’s conversations with the three of them.

It is Girard who provides him with the stimulus for the central statement of this lyric meditation, namely the need to distinguish between mimetic desire, to which Girard attributes the origin of violence, and “heart’s desire,” in which Dunne sees the source of nonviolence and peace. The distinction bears comparison with that between the false and the true self made by Merton and others, and represents for Dunne the focus for spiritual discernment. The movement from mimetic to heart’s desire
also constitutes an instance of the “passing over” experience which is at the core of Dunne’s enduring project.

Dunne’s elusive style is perhaps best represented by recourse to metaphors of weaving and musical composition, particularly counterpoint. The thought progresses through recurring interaction between image, feeling, and insight. The posture which is both required and nurtured within the reader is one of participation rather than of detached critical analysis. Engagement with Dunne presents a gentle but firm challenge to share in the “passing over” endeavor of the author. The resemblance to the method of Bernard Lonergan, his mentor, is clear, though Dunne brings to the process an impressive array of his own gifts.

THOMAS E. CLARKE, S.J.
Christ the King Retreat House
Syracuse

MONEY AND THE MEANING OF LIFE.

Needleman aims to state “the role of money in the search for consciousness, in the pursuit of that transformation of the self spoken of by the great teachers and philosophers of all epochs and cultures” (2). For N., humans live between two “worlds”: a material world and a spiritual world. The spiritual world is this world consciously experienced. Meaning in life is found in the pursuit of self-knowledge or consciousness, and can only come when we take both worlds seriously.

The proper role of money, the chief representative of the material world today, is to promote consciousness, but it becomes a force for degeneration when it is separated from this spiritual aspiration. Today the pursuit of money for money’s sake has become a drug which prevents us from seeing ourselves. Our culture of artificially created wants militates in all its aspects against the pursuit of consciousness. The path to wholeness here rests in the power of awareness: “Awareness of hell is the escape from hell” (171). However, this understanding “makes no change in our lives . . . this is just what it means to be between two worlds. If we can’t suffer this fact, this unique experience of powerlessness, we will never be able to live in two worlds” (180). N. considers this the error of “reformism”.

The book is also interesting for its pedagogical technique. N. presents his ideas in the form of conversation among “fictionalized distillations” of various exchanges with students; there is drama in these conversations occurring in coffee shops and such in the San Francisco Bay area. The book, a welcome application of philosophical and theological sources to contemporary questions, could be used in adult discussion groups or introductory classes. My most serious objection is N.’s defeatism with regard to “social ethics”; he is content with individual inner enlightenment.

RICHARD C. BAYER
Fordham University


The title notwithstanding, this is not exactly a book about bioethics. It is, so to speak, Engelhardt’s “Prolegomena to Any Future Bioethics.” In this small but certainly not superficial volume, he argues for the possibility of a purely formal set of principles to guide ethical discourse in our pluralistic society. He succeeds in clearly and succinctly setting forth and extending the philosophical background of his previous work, The
Foundations of Bioethics. His arguments are coherent and concise; his style erudite and attractive.

E. notes the cacophony of moral voices heard in an age which has lost its faith in God and has seen its faith in Reason shaken. He argues that the hope for a common morality based on reason ought not be abandoned. His positive proposal is a bioethics which is secular and humanistic. He devotes two very useful chapters to the history and clarification of the many meanings of the terms secularity and humanism. Asserting that his theory is purely formal, based only on the grammar of ethical discourse, he proposes a “contentless” bioethics that would permit whatever persons consent to, and do nothing to persons without their consent.

The problem, of course, is that E. fails to see that his theory already has a significant content, full of metaphysical assumptions about what constitutes a person, and what freedom, reason, and grammar are. He assumes a dualism between private religion and the public life. He assumes that we are all moral strangers, meant to live far enough away that we can “shoot in every direction without fear of hitting someone.” Rather than a common morality, perhaps he only succeeds in creating a libertarian morality acceptable to one brilliant philosopher-physician laboring under the influence of Hobbes, Hegel, ancient German tribal law, and contemporary American culture.

Daniel P. Sulmasy, O.F.M., M.D.
Georgetown University
Medical School


Iglesias, a lecturer in Ethics at University College, Dublin, and Associate Fellow of the Linacre Centre, here collects, and to some degree edits, six previously published contributions from 1984 through 1987; the introduction and one chapter are new. There is no mention of Donum vitae, no reference to Monsignor Cañara who is the alleged constructor of the Instruction and who has defended it in a number of publications and presentations. Is I. treating the argument on the purely philosophic level? I think not, for she states: “My conviction is that the human embryo is a human person, a being of human nature with an eternal destiny. I take this conviction to be true, and grounded on biological knowledge, philosophical reflection, and the Christian faith and way of life which I share with other Christians in the community we form as a Church” (86).

I. argues against in vitro fertilization (IVF) because those who practice it do so unjustly. She even considers observation of the developing embryo to be unjust—an activity that even Jerome Lejeune defended in oral discourse. She presents arguments against delayed animation of any kind but fails to take seriously the number of early embryos reported to be lost (perhaps 60%), and she ignores the evidence for natural fusing of embryos which is the explanation for certain true hermaphrodites and others found to possess cells which can only come about from two concepti becoming one. Another advance, the collection of an egg or eggs from a natural cycle rather than an induced cycle, is not treated but would remove some of the doubts in her mind about the unnaturalness of hormonal induction of superovulation and the surplus of ova.

One further surprise to this reviewer is the condemnation of gamete donation only on the grounds of withholding knowledge of biological par-
entage from the child. The child’s right to know its biological parent and the implied corollary of parental obligation are defended. This conservative book should be helpful for those timid infertility specialists who thought IVF was condemned because it was intrinsically evil. This book issues every caution sign but does not condemn.

Robert C. Baumiller, S.J.
University of Detroit Mercy


Willems states that her purpose is to delineate the constitutive elements of trust in interpersonal, communal, and institutional relationships. To accomplish this task, she takes the reader on an interdisciplinary journey in which theological, philosophical, and psychological studies are examined. She goes to great length to show the viable role of trust and adult Christian commitment.

W.’s topic is admirable. Commitment and trust are vital issues for Christian living. Her discussion of Marcel is lucid, and she shows a broad understanding of philosophical literature. A strong point of this text is its organization and clarity (I suspect it is a rewritten dissertation). The writing is straightforward, and her argument for the role of trust is compelling. In order to contextualize her speculative discussion, W. focuses on the midlife development of women and the emotional concerns germane to this age group. These examples prove helpful, though they beg the question as to the need to address trust as a universal quality important for both men and women.

One significant weakness is the uncritical nature of the discussion. E.g., W.’s treatment of psychological topics such as Gilligan’s work in female moral development fails to take into account the serious reservations many researchers have raised. Also, W. accepts uncritically the fact of a mid-life crisis, an event certainly open to debate in psychological circles. Finally, I was quite surprised to find an uncritical reading of Erikson inasmuch as questions arise as to how we relate psychosocial theory with feminine development.

This work would prove quite useful as a resource for instructors whose courses cover issues of trust, commitment, and interpersonal ethics from a philosophical or theological perspective. The psychological discussions are weaker and need to be supplemented with other material.

Charles Shelton, S.J.
Regis University, Denver


This significant book presents initial results in an area of inquiry to which leading Chinese scholars of philosophy and social sciences have given top priority: the enduring presence of religiousness in China, as expressed in recent systems of thought and social institutions. The seven central chapters are not very informative about the historical developments, but they point out how religion was used as a tool of suppression or an ideology of commiseration in “Old China.” It becomes obvious that religion has recently become functionally viable on the basis of social utility—a kind of All China Patriotic Social Gospel Movement—with Buddhists, Daoists, and Christians contributing practically, in fields and
factories, to advance socialist social change.

Working with the assumption that religion is a compensatory ideology arising from ignorance or psychological and socioeconomic needs, the writers affirm that the “persistence of religion” is due to the yet unfulfilled social transformation of China. However, at the same time, and with some peculiar shortsightedness, they affirm that, since religion flourishes in contemporary China, believers should line up shoulder to shoulder to help build the ideal socialist society. Most of the chapters begin their study of religion in China by considering European social theorists: Marx, Engels, and Lenin. However, these thinkers are not mentioned in any of the seven appendices—understandably, since the appendices present results of field surveys.

The Chinese scholars of the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences, who have conducted this study (part of the Introduction and five of the appendices of which appeared in English first in MacInnis’s *Religion in China Today*), are serious in their work. Their interpretation of religion will become enhanced, as they continue honestly to grapple publicly and in an international context with attempts to understand expressions of religiousness in China, when it becomes clearer to them that part of the consequences of “Religion under Socialism in China” is that religion in this particular time and place is being interpreted by social ideology.

**John Ross Carter**
*Colgate University*


Central to the understanding of religious identity and development is the issue of conversion. In Christian identity, ecclesial conversion is essential, and in Roman Catholic identity and that of other ecumenically aware Christians, conversion to the goal of full visible unity of the Church is crucial. This brief volume, by a venerable ecumenical group from southern France, including participants from Taize and Lyons, is an important synthesis of ecumenical reflection on these three dimensions of conversion.

The book includes biblical and historical treatments of the issue. It builds on over fifty years of conversation and ecumenical research. It takes account of some of the deep ecclesiological difficulties in asking the question of “identity” for the Christian Church. It is careful to treat some of the more delicate issues of ecumenical debate today, like the question of where the “one true Church” is to be found, and what are the relationships of the concrete realizations of the empirical expressions of churches thereto, with sensitivity to the internal debates within the churches involved in the ecumenical movement.

In its treatment of grace and human response to God’s converting initiative it is also theologically accountable to the debates and emerging agreements on the doctrine of justification among the churches and to their implications for understanding ecclesial and spiritual life. For this reason the volume will be an important contribution to spiritual theology as well as to ecclesiology and church history. Indeed, the methodology of the Groupe des Dombes continues to be a fertile, if informal, contribution to the renewal of the churches as well as to their reconciliation.

**Jeffrey Gros, F.S.C.**
*National Conference of Catholic Bishops*
SHORTER NOTICES

THE LITURGY THAT DOES JUSTICE.

Following Karl Rahner’s insight that the real liturgy is the liturgy of the world, Empereur and Kiesling illustrate how our sacramental rituals, “this bundle of symbols,” should create the possibility for worshipers to have an experience which they can use as a norm to judge what would be and are the authentic experiences of justice in the rest of life. In short, our sacramental rituals are moments to reflect upon, to judge and criticize the world’s provisional results in moving toward liberation, and to recommit ourselves in faith to God’s work in our world.

How to celebrate our sacraments in such a way as to “do justice” to this task is the question of this book. With a section devoted to each of the seven sacraments of the Roman rite and extended chapters on the lectionary and preaching, the authors offer a fresh look at the message of justice found within our sacramental rites. No cut and paste remodeling is available here; justice will not be found by adding a few prayers of the faithful directed toward the oppressed or by merely inviting the outcasts to the celebration. While E. and K. do not neglect areas in which our Church might be more critical of itself, our consumer mentality is singled out for having pushed an ex opere operato mentality to the extreme.

A simple, convincing treatment of why our efforts for social justice need liturgy and why our efforts to celebrate liturgy need social justice. Helpful annotated bibliography included at the end of each chapter.

MARYANNE STEVENS
Creighton University, Omaha

LAY MINISTRY: A THEOLOGICAL, SPIRITUAL, AND PASTORAL HANDBOOK.

Pastoral and theological ferment about ministry today makes the task of writing a handbook for lay ministry both necessary and challenging. This handbook successfully confronts that challenge by: (1) making contemporary theological discussion available to a wide readership; (2) identifying some key factors affecting the morale and spirituality of all, but particularly lay, ministers; (3) treating practical aspects of lay ministry such as job placement. Thoughtful bibliographies supplement the necessarily general treatment of topics in the handbook genre.

The early chapters present key moments in the historical-theological unfolding of ministry from its roots in the biblical expression “reign of God” up to Vatican II’s uneven mix, recovering the “people of God” as source of ministry while maintaining the essential difference between two priesthoods—one clericalized, the other common to the faithful. The special value in these chapters lies, as Joan Chittister notes in the foreword, in highlighting how the entire development of ministry has been historically situated and conditioned, and how that development has effectively clericalized understandings of sacramentality, of the ecclesial community as source of ministry, and of the role of women in leadership and ministry.

The central chapters treat post-Vatican II theological and pastoral efforts to renew ministry by recovering the ecclesial and charismatic character of ministry that had been diminished by clericalization. Particularly prominent in this praxis of recovery are the contributions of women and renewed communities of faith of many sizes and types. The treatment
of the Church's sinfulness and its humanity can be of particular intellectual and affective benefit to anyone involved in conflicts arising from the renewal of ministry.

The closing chapters attend to very practical aspects of establishing lay ministries: initiating and fostering partnership—intramurally and ecumenically; developing and sustaining spirituality, identifying skills and capacities; finding jobs. It is to be hoped that this honesty about practicalities will influence and encourage not only lay ministers seeking jobs, but diocesan, institutional and parish officials responsible for budgetary and hiring decisions.

MICHAEL J. McGINNIS, F.S.C.
La Salle University, Philadelphia


Many very rich gems of monastic wisdom, old and new, were garnered by Bianco in the course of the challenging grace he received of being allowed to live within several American Cistercian communities. These valuable insights could make this book worth reading. However, the Trappist Cistercians are not well served by the volume. It offers a lot of pop psychology which becomes pop monasticism. Anyone with a genuine Cistercian vocation would not be attracted to a monastery to which such attitudes and outlook are ascribed.

B. takes refuge in the expediency of writing "fiction," of offering composite characters who supposedly reflect the thinking of a number of the monks. Names are changed but identifiable positions in the respective monasteries are retained. (I wonder how the ones holding those positions feel about the characterizations attributed to them.) In the case of the lately deceased superiors of two of the abbeys, the names are not changed and what B. has to say about these deeply revered and holy men does little justice to their true greatness. The composites that B. creates are rather unique—they hardly represent most, if any, of the men you would meet in the American Cistercian communities today. One must conclude B. was not well served by his advisors from within the Trappists (preferably called Cistercians today) or that he could not hear what they were saying to him.

The work certainly does reveal filters on B.'s part. It is unfortunate such an unique opportunity and so much obvious dedication on his part turned out poorly. For a truer hearing of what is going on inside the Cistercians the reader might better listen to the monks themselves, e.g., Fr. William Meninger's 1012 Monastery Road.

M. BASIL PENNINGTON, O.C.S.O.
Saint Joseph's Abbey, Mass.


From Murdoch's seven latest novels Ramanathan concludes that "goodness is . . . their central preoccupation," that the novels, "deeply moral," inevitably focus on the "hidden presence of good in a world which tilts away from it" (2-3). But such metaphysical interests are not new to Murdoch: she is an accomplished philosopher, and all her 24 novels examine the good life, imagined in various ways. This is a life, R. suggests, in which Plato's Ideal ("realization at the intellectual level") and Christ's life ("the Christian myth for its emotional regenerative power") mark the parameters of human integrity (4).

Critics reading in a "realist" mode might find the "improbable possibili-
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Presenting This Issue

The first issue of volume 53 features a study of Vatican reactions to the new religious movements, an analysis of the appeal to experience in theology, the annual notes on moral theology, and a note on the integration of pastoral theology with the other theological disciplines.

Vatican Response to the New Religious Movements (cults) outlines the contents of the three Vatican documents on this theme since 1986, critiques the various reactions and interpretations they have engendered, and looks ahead to possible future official responses. JOHN A. SALIBA, S.J., a Ph.D. from The Catholic University of America and Professor of Religious Studies at the University of Detroit Mercy, specializes in theological and social-scientific analyses of the new religions. The author of “Christian and Jewish Responses to the Hare Krishna Movement in the West” in Krishna Consciousness in the West (Bucknell, 1989), he has also published two bibliographies: Psychiatry and the Cults (Garland, 1987) and Social Science and the Cults (Garland, 1990).

The Appeal to Experience analyzes the concept of the appeal to experience in theological argument by distinguishing rhetorical appeals from a whole continuum of appeals which range through five dialectically arranged types. This will help in analyzing the inner logic of texts and the role of experience, along with philosophy and Scripture, as an integral element of theological construction. GEORGE P. SCHNER, S.J., Ph.D. from Yale, is associate professor at Regis College in the Toronto School of Theology. A specialist in philosophical and systematic theology, he is presently preparing a commentary on Hume's Dialogues as well as a book-length work on the role of experience in theological imagination.

Notes on Moral Theology: 1991 has four sections with four authors:

1. The Return of Virtue Ethics examines the revival of interest in virtue in three areas: (a) whether the ethics of virtue is a clear-cut alternative to an ethics of principles, (b) the tension between an ethic of caring and one based on justice, and (c) the contributions of Aristotle and Aquinas on “the order of love” and friendship. WILLIAM C. SPOHN, S.J., Ph.D. from the Divinity School of the University of Chicago is associate professor at the Jesuit School of Theology at Berkeley. Known for his work on foundational ethical issues, he is currently working to complete An American Ethics which will examine the relation of religion and morality from Jonathan Edwards to H. Richard Niebuhr.

2. Christian Social Ethics after the Cold War reviews John Paul II's Centesimus annus and other recent literature exploring the impact of the collapse of Eastern block Communism on the agenda of Christian social ethics and argues for intensified efforts to shape market economies in the light of Christian moral norms. DAVID HOLLENBACH, S.J.,
Ph.D. from Yale, is the Margaret O’Brien Flatley Professor of Catholic Theology at Boston College. Author of *Justice, Peace and Human Rights* (Crossroad 1988, 1990), he is currently coediting with R. Bruce Douglass a volume on the theme of “Catholicism, Liberalism, and the Renewal of American Public Life.”

3. The Just-War Theory after the Gulf War examines three main objections to the application of the just-war theory to the Gulf War: (a) that just wars are no longer possible in contemporary conditions, (b) that the theory itself is incomplete, and (c) that it does not yield determinate answers. JOHN P. LANGAN, S.J., Ph.D. in philosophy from the University of Michigan, is Rose Kennedy Professor of Christian Ethics at Georgetown University’s Kennedy Institute of Ethics and Senior Research Fellow at the Woodstock Theological Center. Coeditor of *The American Search for Peace: Moral Reasoning, Religious Hope, and National Security* (Georgetown, 1991), he is currently investigating Protestant, Catholic, and Jewish ways of understanding the religious meaning of business.

4. Active Euthanasia reviews the long-held Catholic moral theological distinction between killing and letting die in the light of recently debated issues concerning termination of treatment, assisted suicide, and active euthanasia, and as reflected in the December 1, 1991 federal *Patient Self-Determination Act* and the narrowly defeated Washington-State Proposition 119 which would have authorized physician-assisted suicide and euthanasia. Ph.D. from the University of Southern California, JOHN J. PARIS, S.J. is the Michael P. Walsh Professor of Bioethics at Boston College. He is a prolific author, lecturer, and consultant in the areas of law, medicine, and ethics.

Signposts towards a Pastoral Theology argues for the integration of pastoral theology into a more comprehensive theological vision that is liturgical and ecclesial as well as Christocentric. ROBERT P. IMBELLI, Ph.D. in philosophical theology from Yale and director of Boston College’s Institute of Religious Education and Pastoral Ministry, is known for his illuminating and pastorally-sensitive articles on ecclesiology, Christology, and the theology of the Holy Spirit. His current project is a book entitled *Holy Spirit and Human Transformation*. THOMAS H. GROOME, Ed.D. in theology and education from Columbia/Union Theological and associate professor of religious education at Boston College, is widely known for his *Christian Religious Education* (Harper & Row, 1980), which was recently followed by *Sharing Faith* (HarperCollins, 1991). He is currently working on a statement on the essential nature of “Catholic” education for the Catholic bishops of Ontario.

Robert J. Daly, S.J.
Editor


SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY


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