in fact and is true? Further, must not the Spirit of truth also call forth, at times, a Word, based on the text, that may be a Word over against the community? Community is far more inherently anchored in the revelatory and normative text of Scripture than Hays seems willing to admit.

3) The final chapter dealing with contemporary hermeneutics is fragmentary. Despite Hay's disclaimers, would not the end result of his "free-ranging hermeneutical innovation" lead to the self-destruction of Scripture as, in any significant way, authoritative for the Christian Church? The assertion that to "limit our interpretation of Paul's scriptural echoes to what he intended by them is to impose a severe and arbitrary hermeneutical restriction" (33) is indeed precarious and subject to objection by any practitioner of the historical-critical method. Given this controlling presupposition, however, two factors are strikingly absent from the discussion: Paul's consciousness of his apostolic authority; and the hermeneutic and purpose of the apostolic Church in determining the parameters of its canon. Certainly for Paul himself, and for the NT as well, the constraints on interpretive freedom are considerably more intricate and forcible than Hays acknowledges.

Particularly with respect to Paul's application of the OT Hays' monograph is rich and provocative. The discussion is more tentative in its treatment of Paul as a hermeneutical model. Here, in the final analysis, Hays offers no persuasive hermeneutical bridge, nor does he demonstrate in detail how one can read Scripture as a narrational whole, yet not anticritically; nor does he suggest convincingly how the Church, as Spirit-transformed communities of believers, can reach a hermeneutical, proclamationary, and theological consensus. Yet, by penetrating and insightful analysis of many texts and by encouraging so many critical hermeneutical issues, Hays makes a material contribution to both subjects.

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KARL P. DONFRIED


In the academic study of the Bible, two approaches in particular have generated excitement and allegiance over the past 20 years, as more and more scholars became disaffiliated from the context in which theology made sense and disenchanted with the prospects of the classic historical-critical method: one approach is loosely called "literary," and the other "social scientific." The present book encompasses and expands a series of articles written since 1986 by Neyrey, a scholar who enjoys a first-rate reputation as an exegete in the classic mold, and who has vigorously championed one version of the social-scientific approach represented by cultural anthropology, especially as disseminated by the influential writ-
ings of Mary Douglas.

N. sets out to read Paul's letters as evidence for the "symbolic" world inhabited by Paul and his readers. What is distinctive about the anthropological approach is that it focuses not only on the "emic" dimension (Paul's specific symbolic language) but also on the "etic" dimension (how that language demonstrates more universal patterns of social interaction). N. seeks thereby to shock readers into a fresh perception of Paul by insisting that he is not first of all a "theologian" but a first-century Pharisee concerned above all with maintaining the cosmos according to his socialized norms. At the same time, N. wants to test whether this approach (here directed primarily at the Corinthian and Galatian correspondence) holds out hope for further research and insight.

The style of the book reflects its orientation: paragraphs are numbered, the "social scientific" mode of citation is used, and the reader encounters language about "mapping" and "boundaries" and "classification" as well as "deviance" and "witchcraft accusations." Is it also due to this style, or to the fact that pieces of this book were stitched together from previously published articles, that there is a great deal of repetition in the consideration of the elements making up the symbolic universe: purity, rituals, the body, sin, cosmology, evil and misfortune? The repetition has the pedagogic effect of reinforcing key terms, but it also tends to obscure the weakness of some points of argumentation: positions reached somewhat tentatively at one stage become certainties not by force of further evidence but by force of repetition.

One admires the boldness and courage with which N. advances his argument. In that respect, the book serves its purpose admirably, as N. turns over every text for the sort of evidence he can use. And some points he establishes effectively, even if one wonders whether the specific language about "mapping" and so forth would be required to reach them. No one who has read Paul should need to be instructed in his habit of making classifications of every sort, although N. certainly shows just how obsessive Paul could be in this respect, and he is also emphatically correct in asserting that Paul always opts for order rather than disorder. Nor should it be a "shock" to learn that Paul connects his language about the human body to that of the social body, even though N. shows dimensions of this we might otherwise have missed. These discussions make the book worth reading, especially as an antidote to "theologies" that make Paul simply a purveyor of ideas.

This reader finds N.'s anthropological treatment of sin and deviance, as well as suffering and misfortune, to be less satisfactory; what the method throws fresh light on seems less significant than what it does not enable us to see. N. properly alerts us to language used by Paul that
we often simply ignore, such as that referring to Satan and other cosmic forces. But his approach does not allow him to show how Paul makes careful and subtle distinctions that reflect something more than the reflex of cosmic ordering. The same reservations apply to N.'s discussions of witchcraft accusations in Galatia and Corinth. Here above all one has the sense that the theory has seized hold of some legitimate textual leads, but carried them to places beyond plausibility. The demands of the theoretical framework at times even seem to force the data, as in the attempt to show how Paul and the Galatians inhabited a "witchcraft society."

These chapters reveal the limits to the anthropological approach as it is here employed. As N. himself recognizes, the ethnographic examination of ancient epistolary literature has certain obvious handicaps, the most obvious of which is shown by its inability to deal convincingly with letters for which we lack rich supplementary historical resources. But more than that: Paul is not simply representative of "Mediterranean, peasant societies" (217). Nor is he simply a "pharisaic reformer" (57). If the effect of a social-scientific reading is to reduce this subtle and creative mind to that status, then "the other words" given by the method run the danger of being another sort of "anachronistic reading" (13).

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LUKE TIMOTHY JOHNSON


Muller wants to provide the scriptural basis for a communitarian analogy of the Trinity and so to establish its theological usefulness that it matches Augustine's psychological analogy. He questions the appropriateness in theology of a dominating psychological approach to human reality, yet intends to follow in the tradition of the treatises De Trinitate of the past. In fact, M.'s presentation resembles Augustine's De Trinitate, the examination of which constitutes the heart of his understanding: a consideration of Scripture first, followed by an elaboration of theological concerns which look to the establishment of a form of trinitarian analogy. However, in his last chapter, he goes a step further and attempts to formulate an overall systematic metaphysics that will adequately incorporate the trinitarian analogies. There he sketches a coherent theological system in which the psychological and communitarian analogies can be correlated. He also provides an appendix of some proposed literary structures in Paul, a bibliography, and indices of citations from Scripture, Augustine, Thomas, other ancient, medieval, and modern authors, as
According to M., to develop a communitarian analogy of the Trinity and to have it take root in theology and in the modern context, one needs to go back to Scripture and the works of the first interpreters of that apostolic tradition. M.'s approach toward the Pauline letters is descriptive rather than explanatory, to "do theology" rather than exegesis. He focuses on the linguistic reality of the Pauline texts, prescinding as much as possible from all questions of their genesis. He aims at evoking the thought world of Paul's letters and its internal relationships and contends that Paul so structured his ideas that the pattern of his understanding of Christian community mirrors that of the divine Triad; M. attempts in rigorous fashion to construe that imaging theologically. He concludes that for Paul the oneness and creativity of God find their correspondence in the one flesh which husband and wife become; the world order that flows from Christ's priority and Adamic status finds its correspondence in the orderliness of the marital relationship; the holiness which Paul expects of the marital union is a manifestation of the presence of the Holy Spirit of God.

It is not easy to evaluate this book, since among other things it requires an expertise in scriptural studies, church history, Augustine, and sociology. M. does get the reader's attention, and his main thesis proves attractive and in se has a great deal of validity. He is a thinker and diligently and conscientiously covers a vast amount of material.

On the negative side, although no such information is given, the book leaves the definite impression that it is M.'s doctoral dissertation and consequently tries to cover everything related to its main topic. Moreover, an accurate development of such a thesis demands the kind of knowledge and breadth of vision that doctoral students simply do not normally have. Nor does M. rigorously limit himself only to what will develop his main theme, and most NT scholars will find his interpretations of Paul (esp. 1 Cor 6:12–20; 11:2–16) tenuous. Paul's main way of speaking of salvation is through the unity of the Christian with Christ, and this does provide him with an easy way of speaking of community or Church. However, this Pauline understanding of community does not easily translate into the kind of marital community M. thinks he finds in Paul and which supplies the basis for his analogy of the Trinity.

Nonetheless, M.'s main theme merits attention, and may be able to be supported by a nonmarital approach toward community in Paul or by other scriptural passages. E.g., M. might have found a more fertile field of investigation in John's Gospel. Moreover, church historians, dogmatic systematiticans, and sociologists will want to evaluate M.'s arguments

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ROBERT F. O'TOOLE, S.J.

This book first appeared in French in 1981; it is based on Cochini’s 1969 doctoral dissertation, which attempted to prove that the obligation of clerical celibacy in the Western Church originated with the apostles. After presenting the views of previous writers on the topic, C. explains that he was not searching for an explicit law enforcing celibacy, but for a tradition going back to the apostles. During the first three centuries, he maintains, a priest was not supposed to marry after ordination and those already married or widowed could not remarry; from the fourth century on married clergy were obliged to abstain from intercourse with their wives. At some length he discusses the marital status of the apostles, concluding that after their call those who were married practiced continence. As evidence he adduces a string of patristic guesses. C. then provides an annotated list of married clerics in the first seven centuries, an impressive demonstration of research, but which proves nothing.

Most of the book is taken up with a presentation and discussion of patristic and conciliar statements concerning priestly celibacy-continence from the beginnings of the Church to the end of the seventh century. This is the substantial part of the book and its major contribution. All the texts which in some way touch upon his topic are presented with commentary and bibliography. While C.’s comments are generally scholarly and objective, he often belabors minor points at benumbing length, and he strains to reach some of his interpretations.

About 305 the Council of Elvira in Spain, in its 33d canon, promulgated the first explicit law requiring clerics in ministry to abstain from marital intercourse. C. deduces that this implies an ecclesiastical tradition going much further back, indeed, back to the apostles. In 390, moreover, the Council of Carthage asserted that such is what the apostles taught and antiquity has observed. Thus, “the discipline of priestly celibacy had its origins, as we have frequently seen, in a positive will of the apostles” (438).

A great deal of serious research has gone into this book, and it is well presented and nicely packaged. But has C. proved his thesis? The answer must be a resounding No. Based on the documents at our disposal, the very ones which C. so competently presents, there is simply no clear evidence of a general tradition or practice, much less of an obligation, of priestly celibacy-continence before the beginning of the fourth century. The impressive array of texts produced by C. does not justify his conclusions. It is by this criterion, of course, that his book must be judged.

This book is noticeably deficient in treating the Christian East; the
bibliography in note 325 on p. 396 is sufficient indication thereof; indeed, C. manifests very little understanding of the Byzantine Church. He condemns the Council in Trullo in 691 of open hostility to Rome and of departing from apostolic tradition by allowing married priests and deacons to continue to exercise their marital rights. It is not true that after Justinian Byzantine bishops were “mostly, even exclusively, recruited among monks and single clerics” (133). One should read Sapienza, not Sapience (26). “The college of apostles in union with Peter” should have been left in parentheses, as in the French (194). “Monotheistic heresy” (383) is clearly a mistranslation of “monothéliste.”

But more serious questions arise. The bibliography is exactly the same in both the French and English editions. Surely, something has been written on the subject in the intervening nine years. The English translation, a good one, takes no account of research after 1981 and makes no attempt to respond to criticisms of the French original. How can one ignore, for example, the extended critical review by R. Balducelli in this journal (43 [1982] 693–705)? What purpose is served by publishing without any changes an English version of a book which has been severely criticized and which is in need of substantial revision?

Catholic University of America

GEORGE T. DENNIS, S.J.


This doctoral dissertation provides a thorough exposition of the life, times, and Christological teaching of a Syriac Father, Aphrates, who lived in Persia in the third and fourth centuries. Since theologians have paid scant attention to early Syriac writers, the present work is a welcome expansion of our knowledge of a pristine tradition that evolved outside the Roman-Hellenistic cultural world. As such, it can provide theologians with a means for comparing our Western Christological formations with a Semitic tradition that is pre-Nicene.

Bruns begins by critically evaluating earlier studies of A. and outlining his own approach. He sketches the early history of the Persian Church and presents an in-depth treatment of the theological milieu in which A. wrote. He also discusses the dating, authenticity, and style of A.’s writings and summarizes what is known about his life and his relationships to the Jews and pagans of his day.

Specifically approaching A.’s Christology, Bruns delves into the ascetical, liturgical, and confessional modes in which that Christology is expressed. He probes A.’s use of typological exegesis in interpreting the Old Testament, with emphasis on the parallels between Christ, on one
side, and Adam, Moses, and Elijah, on the other. Investigating the classical Christological themes concerning the divinity, the preexistence, and the nature of Christ, Bruns shows that A.'s view of Christ's divinity is primarily functional, in that Christ reveals God and acts with His power. However, A. is hindered in his understanding of Christ's preexistent nature and substance because of his lack of a technical vocabulary, especially as regards such concepts as nature and person.

Bruns illustrates A.'s preference for speaking of Christ in concrete images rather than in abstract and speculative terms. For him, names and images contain symbolic power that say something real about the meaning of Christ. A. used these images to stir up religious sentiment and open the way for believers to come into contact with Christ's salvific power. Bruns does, however, describe A.'s understanding of the meaning of redemption, of the communication of the Spirit, of the Incarnation (as the assumption of a body), and of Christ's descent into Sheol. He also discusses how language affected the way that the Syrians could react to the dogmatic formulation of Nicea.

In a concluding summary of his major findings concerning A.'s Christology, Bruns emphasizes A.'s lack of interest in determining how Christ could be both human and divine. A. preferred rather to present, as Scripture does, various images that could lead believers to a personal experience and knowledge of what Christ means for their lives. A.'s Christology, in brief, is a functional Christology that does not clearly distinguish between the person and the mission of the Redeemer.

This is an indispensable work for anyone interested in the early Syriac period. It highlights in detail a pre-Nicene Christological outlook promoted by the first great Syriac Church Father. It is also significant for the way it has applied, and expanded upon, R. Murray's monumental study into the symbolism of early Syriac ecclesiology. By investigating the names and images A. used, Bruns demonstrates the need to attend to A.'s spirituality, if one wants to understand his Christology. This insightful study is highly recommended for all those who have a scholarly interest in early patrology and Christology.

Saint Louis University

FREDERICK C. MCLEOD


From the beginning of Christianity's emergence as a vital intellectual and spiritual force, Christians engaged in a lively and productive dialogue with the great schools of philosophy of antiquity, above all, Platonism.
Von Ivánka’s comprehensive volume explores the interrelationship between Platonism/Neoplatonism and Christianity in the writings of such major patristic figures as Origen, Gregory of Nyssa, Augustine, Dionysius the Areopagite and Maximus the Confessor. He further notes the influence of Neoplatonism in the theological debates of the Western Middle Ages and Byzantium.

The second-century apologists, in their initial dialogue with Greek philosophy, did not fail to note the difference between the impersonal, inaccessible divinity of the Platonists and the personal creator God of the Bible. Nevertheless, the writings of Plato and his followers continued to exercise a growing influence on Christian intellectuals and apologists, notably in centers of scholarship like Alexandria.

In the writings of Clement of Alexandria, Plato is so present that it is hard to say whether one is dealing with a Christianity that is Platonized or a Platonism that is Christianized. But far more influential on Christian thought was the Platonic/Christian synthesis created by Origen. I. shows that the very concept of systematic theology, which Origen developed in his treatise On First Principles, derives from Neoplatonism. I. believes that Origen’s system represents a fusion of Christianity and Neoplatonism in which the Christian aim predominates; but, because a Christian concept of creation is lacking, the thought is distorted by elements of Neoplatonism and Gnosticism. A true debate with Platonism, which would have rejected the incompatible themes or would have transformed them into legitimate means of expression for Christian truth, did not occur in the treatise On First Principles, or in any other work of Origen.

Critical reflection on the basic problems of Origenism and Platonism had to await the appearance of Gregory of Nyssa, who engaged in a radical Christianization of many Platonic and Neoplatonic concepts. The Platonic doctrine of the purification of the soul may be taken as an example. When the soul turns from the external (material) world and towards the internal (spiritual), the important consideration for Gregory is not (as in Platonism) the abandonment of external material things, but the love of God, effected by divine grace, which creates the likeness of God. Gregory refuses to affirm the identity of the human soul and the divinity in a Plotinian sense: the resemblance of the soul to God does not reside in a shared essence, but only in its love for God, which is realized in conversion. Gregory also teaches a true Christian concept of creaturehood and of the essence of humanness, emphasizing the capacity of a human being to decide for or against God. However, Gregory seems to retain Origen’s idea of apocatastasis, i.e., the final restoration of the perfect status of God’s original creation. By not accepting the idea of an eternal punishment after death, Gregory tilts away from the biblical
perspective towards Platonic optimism. Nevertheless he rejects the pattern of eternally repeated cycles and of metempsychosis and accepts the tragic tension inherent in human existence.

I. distinguishes Augustine from the Greek fathers by his dynamic interpretation of the Platonic teaching of participation in the divine. For him, the effort required to order the soul is a dynamic process, accomplished with the help of divine grace, which causes the soul to realize its own true essence. Augustine has moved far from the Platonic metaphysical understanding of the identity of the soul and God; rather, he emphasizes the abyss separating the absolute from the status of creaturehood.

Especially valuable is the analysis of the Pseudo-Dionysian corpus, commonly viewed as a striking example of the complete absorption of Christian form and content by Platonic and Neoplatonic philosophy and mysticism. I. puts forward the hypothesis that Pseudo-Dionysius wished to combat the seductive influence of Neoplatonist paganism, introducing a Christian version of Neoplatonism with a missionary goal in mind. This hypothesis would provide a means of evaluating the function of the disparate elements that form the pseudo-Dionysian synthesis. The true intention of the Areopagite would thus be revealed when the Neoplatonic thought or formulation is rejected or replaced by a Christian thought or inflection.

I.'s erudite and profound work concludes by comparing the relative merits of Platonism and Aristotelianism as components of Christian thought. The door is left open for theologians of the future who may once again utilize Platonic metaphysics to revitalize Christian theology. All students of theology are urged to consult this volume, which will open new vistas of thought. Doubtless the clear and accurate French version will now supplant the difficult and inaccessible German original for most readers.

Boston College

MARGARET A. SCHATKIN


Markus begins with the “mass Christianization of Roman society” after Constantine, suggesting that swarms of new Christians deprived Christianity of “discernible identity.” The outcome: “in a society in which to be Christian no longer needed to make any visible difference in a man’s life,” asceticism swiftly came to be “the mark of authentic Christianity.” But successive transformations of ascetic ideology by the likes of Ausonius, Augustine, and Cassian licensed simultaneously “the spread of an ascetic mentality through Christian society” and “the absorption"
of what had been considered secular. M.'s middle section illustrates and interprets those transformations. Effectively, they altered the meaning of renunciation. They accommodated ancient Christianity's appetite for culture. They shaped an urbane, aristocratic, moral spirituality in the fourth century and creatively met pastoral and administrative challenges during the fifth. Yet M.'s story ends with the reassertion of "ascetic norms," relatively untransformed, which prompted "a constriction in what was comprised within the sphere of Christian discourse."

From start to finish, M. is wonderfully readable, drawing specialists and generalists alike into profound engagements with the texts and personalities of late antiquity. He writes his way up to Pope Gregory I, but not along the familiar roads recently and painstakingly resurfaced by scholars intrigued by episcopal squabbles and cultic continuities. M. compellingly attends to other things, "the framework of thought, imagination, and discourse," making his case for "the ascetic take-over" of Christianity and culture.

Talk of takeovers will want further testing and amplification; and when M. pulls illustrations from their political contexts, he seems sometimes to pull them slightly out of shape. E.g., he hauls the monks of Lerins alongside Augustine for purposes of contrast; unlike "the Hippo man," as he was called by the Dowager Duchess of Denver, the Lerinese appeared irrevocably committed to maintaining their splendid isolation. To be sure, pages later, M. acknowledges that Lerinese monk-bishops, including the author and recipient of the isolationist De laude heremi, entered "mainstream Christianity" in Gaul. He takes them as excellent specimens of "leakage" from the monastery. But this "transformation" not only raises questions about the previous contrast but also generates suspicions about the character of the ascetic "take-over," for episcopal redistricting occasioned intense rivalries (unmentioned here) and involved the Lerinese episcopal network in a ruthless and bruising campaign for influence over omnes Gallias. Did asceticism, then, take over when it "moved from the fringes of society to its center," or was it, from time to time, overtaken, submerged or sacrificed rather than transformed?

Of this volume's many and memorable strengths, the lively account of what ends with the end of ancient Christianity may have the broadest appeal. M. expertly depicts a religion desecularizing and devouring the culture of late antiquity, a nearly omnivorous Christianity that left less and less in the encircling world unsifted and unassimilated. Theorists annexed to their church hopes for the empire's future, which otherwise fared poorly as territories were utterly lost or compromised. "[S]ecular Roman time was transformed into Christian liturgical time." "Religion
swallowed up the secular civic consensus, citizenship merged with membership of the community of the faithful, and municipal affairs came to be dominated by the church.” Panic seized some worshippers of all gods on offer when the Goths came to and through the gates, but this voracious Christianity survived the Goths’ various successes. In 535, an ambitious Cassiodorus was planning a Christian university for Rome; then, as M. explains, Justinian’s protracted and mismanaged reconquest of Italy and a series of schisms which he and his heirs seemed capable of making only nastier and more intractable left Christianity “more localized and regional.” The university and the ideal of universality were among the casualties. In 580, Cassiodorus completed his final work, a spelling lesson for monks. The shift amounted to that “constriction of Christian discourse” which signalled the end of a Christianity distinguished by its heterogeneity and versatility—its appetite. At the end, early medieval Christendom, “a radically and almost exclusively scriptural culture,” lumbers into place.

M.’s elegant, informing, and absorbing study will encourage colleagues who, Foucault notwithstanding, still harbor the conviction that historians may honorably and usefully write about origins and ends.

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Peter Iver Kaufman


McInerny describes his book as “a focused monograph on the relation between Boethius and Aquinas.” Having years earlier promised a comprehensive book on Boethius, but having been preempted by Luca Obertello and Henry Chadwick, he now declares the narrower intention of overturning the standard account of the real distinction in Boethius and Thomas. M. is far too modest. His volume not only serves to fulfill his avowed purpose but also includes material that is important for understanding these thinkers and their relation to classicism. Evidently some of the book he decided not to write was included nevertheless, and the reader benefits from the overflow.

M. invites more than a specialist readership with a nicely-honed introduction on the life and work of the “two Italian scholars.” His brief comments on Boethius’s influential Consolation make one wish for more, while his emphasis on the condemnation of Aquinas in 1270 provides a long view of the anti-Aristotelian bias that M. finds behind the scholarly treatment of Aquinas’s commentaries in general and Boethius in particular. Part of the problem, M. explains, is that scholars refuse to accept the simple solution to the problem of Thomas as a commentator: that he
was in fact seeking to elucidate and understand the text before him, not use his reading as just another occasion for stating his own views. M.'s careful explanation of both Boethius and Aquinas in the classical tradition of the commentator is one of the many strengths of the book. He also provides careful reading of Boethius's two commentaries on the *Isagoge* of Porphyry with special emphasis on the relation of logic to philosophy and the problem of universals. M.'s treatment of Aquinas's commentaries on Aristotle's logical treatises underlines the crucial role the *proemium* plays in the commentary structure. In comparing Aquinas's treatment of universals to Boethius, he relies upon a reading of *De ente et essentia* to clearly delineate the crucial distinction between first and second intentions and expose the "parlor game idealism" that results from confusing them.

Before directly confronting the issue of real distinction, M. discusses the nature of Boethius's *opuscula sacra*, his influential lexical correlations of Greek and Latin, and, in a chapter-by-chapter exposition, Thomas's commentary on *De trinitate*. Of course this commentary treats issues crucial to understanding the historical Thomas, as well as issues still debated among contemporary Thomists: the nature and division of the sciences, the degrees of abstraction, the role of *separatio* in metaphysics, the nature of mathematics, and the difference between natural and revealed theology.

But M.'s main concern is to answer the question whether the real distinction, so precious to many modern Thomists, was actually first taught by Thomas or was first taught to him by Boethius. In order to disperse the "anti-Aristotelian animus" that has opened a gap between Thomas and his Aristotelian sources and isolated Thomas from Boethius, M. seeks to correct the misreading of Pierre Duhem who accused Aquinas of misunderstanding Boethius in his commentary on *De hebdomadibus*. For nearly eighty years, Boethius has been consistently read as an essentialist by his interpreters: Roland-Gosselin, Brosch, Fabro, Hadot, Obertello, and Maioli. M. asks: If Aquinas says he finds in Boethius a real distinction between essence and existence, why don’t we believe him? The long-disputed assertion from Boethius's commentary is "diversum est esse et id quod est." Where Boethius speaks of *esse*, Duhem interpreted him to mean form or essence, thus protecting the uniqueness of real distinction for Thomas. But, according to M., Duhem’s reading makes this and other statements in Boethius unintelligible (e.g., "omne namque esse ex forma est" [*De trinitate* 2.20–21]). Modern Thomists who wanted to stress Aquinas’s uniqueness by reading him in isolation from his sources were predisposed toward accepting Duhem’s reading.

M. persuasively argues that the real distinction Thomas claims to find
in *De hebdomadibus* is in fact there: Thomas's commentaries on it and *De trinitate* are reliable guides to Boethius's thought. Indeed, he comments that Thomas' genius "was not to develop doctrines unheard of before" but "to find similarities among dissimilar things." M. finds that, unlike Thomas himself, several contemporary Thomists, especially in Fabro's notion of intensive act, have developed "fantastic readings of the meaning of esse" stemming from the habit of applying what is said of uncreated existence to created existence. The primary metaphysical issue is not the distinction of essence and existence: "The heart of the matter is to establish that there is one in whom they are not distinct." If Gilson is right in suggesting that Aquinas's metaphysics was influenced by the revealed data of the Judeo-Christian tradition, specifically the declaration to Moses, "I am Who I am," then why assume the insight had to wait for the thirteenth century? Boethius, after all, did not have to await the rediscovery of Aristotle to offset an entrenched idealism. M.'s contribution is both persuasive and long overdue.

*Fordham University*

DEAL W. HUDSON


A survey of Calvin's life and influence within a broad chronological framework beginning with the 15th and 16th centuries and ending with the present. McGrath deals with Calvin's theology and political thought, the impact upon him of his education and historical circumstances, and the influence of Calvinism on Europe and the modern world. The first half of the book is a biography of Calvin's life up to the triumph over his opponents in Geneva in 1555. Several chapters then deal with Calvin as rhetorician, communicator, and theologian, and provide a useful summary of Calvin's *Institutes of the Christian Religion*. M. then returns to Calvin's life, the Company of Pastors, and the impact of Geneva on France up to the outbreak of the Wars of Religion in 1562; his death in 1564, the transition from Calvin to Calvinism, with changes in the movement engendered by later theologians and diverse local circumstances; the interaction of Calvinism, capitalism, and modern Western culture. The book has a glossary of theological and historical terms and an index.

M.'s greatest strengths are his skill as an historical theologian, his ability to focus on central issues in the life and times of Calvin, and his willingness to rely on the work of historians directly engaged in archival research. This gives the book the scope to be both informative and compelling. His lucid writing style, clear organization, and logical tran-
sitions readily engage the reader in both the life of Calvin and the movement that emanates from Geneva.

M. places Calvin as a theologian within the context of late medieval Augustinianism and notes the similarities of his absolute double predestination to the *schola Augustiniana moderna* as exemplified by theologians such as Gregory of Rimini and Hugolino of Orvieto. He presupposes no unifying principle or central doctrine within Calvin's thought such as his doctrine of the knowledge of God or his doctrine of the Church. Calvin is thoroughly Christocentric.

One of the remarkable features of the book is M.'s willingness, although an intellectual historian, to take seriously the impact of the real world on the man and on the movement. He gives adequate weight to the history and influence of the city of Geneva, rendering his text realistic to sophisticated readers—a result, perhaps, of interaction with historians actively at work in Geneva today. A substantial part of the book is derivative, of necessity, but derived from major scholars in the field who are, by and large, fairly represented, although not every working historian in the field of Calvin and Genevan history catches M.'s attention.

From the intellectual world of the Renaissance M. emphasizes the impact of Christian Humanism on Calvin's skill as a Latinist, his interest in returning to the sources, his compelling rhetorical style, and his clarity of expression. He notes Calvin's influence on the development of the French language for theological and philosophical expression, especially through the remarkable popularity of the 1541 French edition of his *Institutes*.

Unlike other modern studies, M. makes no attempt to psychoanalyze Calvin, but his comments on Calvin as a person are unfortunate and ill informed. He portrays Calvin as unattractive, lacking in wit, humor, and warmth, a man of many supporters but few friends (17, 107). This does not correspond with the portrait of Calvin as fast friend and faithful correspondent that comes through in some of his letters and in archival sources into which M. does not seem to have delved. M. also says little of Calvin's family and siblings, even his brother Antoine with whom he lived in a household filled with nieces and nephews. He credits Calvin with one natural-born son, who died early. Other sources allude to several children, although none of them lived. He acknowledges Calvin's step-children, a boy and a girl, but fails to comment that it was the girl who lived with Calvin and his wife in Geneva and was a source of disappointment.

A more serious problem is M.'s interpretation of the relationship of Calvinism to other reformers such as Luther, and Reformation groups such as Anabaptists. He credits Anabaptists with abolishing private
property (119). In reality it was a minority of them, Hutterites, who practiced common ownership. He considers "justification by faith" a cause of the first generation of reformers, especially Lutherans, and states that it was not central to Calvin's conception of the Christian faith (165). He credits Calvin rather than Luther with emphasizing the importance of work and vocation for all Christians in a variety of occupations, thereby facilitating his attribution to a Protestant work ethic to Calvinism, an interpretation that appears to exclude most Lutherans and Germans. He is correct in crediting Luther with more conservative attitudes toward economic modernization but fails to note the influence that Luther's earlier birth date (1483) might have had on his negative views of both urbanization and contemporary astronomical discoveries. He does not remark on Luther's forward-looking views on education and literacy.

The book could use more endnotes and more specificity within individual notes. E.g., page numbers are sometimes absent in notes, or a series of authors who hold to a particular view will be alluded to in the text without mentioning their names or works in a note. This makes it difficult to check sources and to trace specific historical detail. The selected bibliography is cumbersome; its subcategories necessitate looking through several alphabetical listings to locate a particular work. However, the book is a readable, provocative, and interesting contribution to the field.

Rhode Island College, Providence  
JEANNINE E. OLSON


Robert Bellarmine (1542–1621) was both the leading theologian of the Counter-Reformation and a model churchman and pastor. Nephew of Marcellus II, he entered the Jesuits in 1560 and studied at Padua and Louvain. Ordained in 1570, he was immediately appointed professor of theology at Louvain and spent seven years developing lectures designed to refute Protestant teaching. In 1576 he was appointed to a new chair in controversial theology at the Jesuit Collegio Romano. These lectures became his famous Controversies. The three volumes of the Controversies, which appeared in 1586, 1588, and 1593, constitute the most famous and comprehensive Catholic theological response to the challenge of Luther and Calvin. The Controversies, together with the work of Melchior Cano, gave theology a new, more historical direction, moving away from (but not repudiating) the speculative and philosophical orientation of scho-
lastic theology. The hallmarks of B.'s theology are erudition, clarity, and order. B. also served as rector of the Collegio Romano and provincial of the Neapolitan Jesuits. In 1598 he published a catechism that was translated into 62 languages and went through hundreds of editions. Toward the end of his life he wrote five short spiritual works that also enjoyed enormous popularity for centuries. In 1599 he was appointed cardinal; administrative work in the Curia absorbed his last 23 years, except for the interval 1602–1605 when he left Rome to serve as archbishop of Capua. The most noteworthy and unfortunate task of his last years was his involvement in the first process of Galileo before the Inquisition; B. personally delivered an official admonition to Galileo in 1616.

Most of the facets of B.'s long and varied career are reflected in the papers of this congress, held in Capua in 1988 to commemorate the 400th anniversary of the second volume of the Controversies. An Italian convegno has no real counterpart in the U.S. Local banks are obligated to bear much of the costs of hosting the congress and publishing its papers. The congress is a civic event in which local dignitaries participate. This volume prints the greetings of the mayor of Capua and the Archbishop of Capua; the Archbishop also wrote two substantial contributions, one on the state of the Church in Capua when B. became its archbishop and the other on the pastoral visitations in 1587. Five other papers relate to B.'s years in Capua.

Bellarmine studies entered something of a decline in the two decades after Vatican II. This is hardly surprising since B. was the leading spokesman for the Counter-Reformation theology against which Vatican II was reacting. Now, 30 years after the Council, Bellarmine studies are enjoying a mild revival, in which the Italians have clearly taken the lead. In 1986 there was a convegno on B. in Sora whose acts were published: Bellarmino e la Controriforma: Atti del Simposio Internazionale di Studi (Sora, 1990). The Sora papers are mostly in Italian but with a good number in English and Spanish. All the papers in the Capua volumes are in Italian, and only two of the contributors teach outside Italy. The 22 papers from the Capua congress vary in length from eight to 94 pages and are broken into three divisions: theology, pastoral work, and philosophy/science/iconography. There are also ten appendices, including a superb systematic bibliography of works on B. published since 1900. The papers on B.'s theology, which have greatest interest for readers of this journal, deal with the following topics: his sacramental theology in today's perspective, bishops in his ecclesiology, their duty to reside in their dioceses, his use of Jewish exegesis, his use of Protestant sources for his Louvain lectures, the influence on him of Augustinianism, his spiritual
doctrine, his controversy with Hospinian, and his role in reorganizing theological and philosophical studies. The papers from the Sora congress seem more likely to interest Americans.

While many specific aspects of B.'s life and work are richly detailed, the man and the theologian seem missing here. James Brodick published his classic two-volume biography in 1928; he condensed it to one volume in 1961. In 1909 J. de La Servière published La théologie de Bellarmin. Bellarmine studies have now progressed to the point that we need a new full-scale biography and a synthetic study on his theology and its historical influence.

These volumes contain a fine index, several illustrations, and real footnotes. There is an English summary for every article. Unfortunately the summaries, with few exceptions, have not been revised by anyone skilled in English. The results are almost humorous.

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JOHN P. DONELLY, S.J.


This study constitutes the first volume of a sustained historical inquiry into the origins and nature of modern atheism in France. It is an original and valuable contribution.

Over the past 50 years, major studies of this historic phenomenon have reached contradictory conclusions. For Lucien Febvre, "atheism" was quite literally unthinkable before the 17th century since the language for this denial was wanting. In sharp contrast, François Berriot found authentic atheism extant among the 16th-century marginaux, accurately identified by the Christian apologists of this and subsequent centuries. Conventional wisdom has located the sources for the origins of atheism within the growth of scientific sophistication, an antiphilosophic skepticism, a disgust with religious intolerance, a hidden tradition of atheistic thought stretching back for centuries, and the clandestine literature of free thought. Such philosophers as Hobbes and Hume, Spinoza and Bayle are often assigned positions as preamble to this emergence of atheistic conviction or as its embodiment.

Kors argues for a remarkably different interpretation. The material sources for atheistic advocacy lay not with the socially or religiously alienated nor with the philosophically skeptical, but with the unimpeachably orthodox. With painstaking scholarly competence, he builds the paradoxical case that it was not so much the circles of disbelief that forged the arguments that were to bring down convictions of the existence of God; it was contending schools of Catholic theology and philosophy.
Cartesians argued that the a posteriori ways of Aristotelians could not warrant the god of Christianity, while the Aristotelians [read often: the Scholastics] and their allies contended that the a priori methods of Descartes and Malebranche led only to paralogisms. Positive assertions of both schools would at rare moments be assembled into some unity, as in the pluralism of Fénelon, but when their negative assertions were combined, no further strategies emerged for a sound and valid philosophic assertion of the divine existence on "natural" grounds. If then, in sceptical despair, the foundational claims of philosophy were abandoned, fideism emerged. If one still demanded a prior philosophical demonstration—a praeamble become required foundation—the consequences could be atheism.

Kors carries his history of ideas to the dialectical conclusion that "it was above all within the deeply Christian learned culture of those years that there occurred inquiries and debates that generated the components of atheistic thought." To ground this conclusion, he details with considerable scholarly sophistication how early-modern France judged atheists, atheism, and the necessary relationship between philosophic demonstrations and belief; how the new discoveries in other cultures as well as the retrieval of the ancient Western classics undermined assertions of universal consent; how in this context the great battles between Cartesians and Aristotelians neutralized one another, left the field open for a radical denial of the existence of God, and provided this denial with its arguments against all belief. Kors introduces as evidence for his study French philosophers and theologians, the manuals that were in influential use, the catechisms that trained the religious mentality of France, and the great debates that riveted the attention of the nation. It is a fascinating history and it is told very well.

What cannot but strike a reader is the utter failure of conflicting parties to look beneath their philosophic differences to the religious foundations which they shared in common. The interpersonal and multiple experiences that constituted religious consciousness and were obviously fundamental to human lives and thought (it was a golden age of French spirituality) were accorded no cognitive value. Religion might be impetus for their concerns, but it did not figure as component in their arguments. What had cognitive value was philosophy—either Cartesian or Aristotelian or some cognate intellectual world. Philosophy either grounded religion or, as in Malebranche, sometimes subsumed it. Kors maintains that for the Cartesian theologians philosophy itself "was in and of itself a primary religious experience." Even if one grants this, it was "religious experience" as Christian tradition would hardly recognize it, one stripped of the interpersonal and reduced in Malebranche to a
consciousness of the impersonal infinite.

Kors gives welcome access to a massive amount of materials previously not so available to the scholarly community as he registers the “mutual fratricide of a Christian learned world.” Inevitably, scholars will disagree with one or another of his judicious interpretations and conclusions. But his scholarship has limited the possibilities of disagreement considerably. A central issue emerges from reading these pages: There have been other times with other conflicts, perhaps as contradictory as this. How is it that atheism emerged here, but not then? One awaits the second volume for an explanation of this impetus to religious denial.

Kors has written a splendid book, and one that the contemporary “Christian learned world” would be well advised to take quite seriously. For theology, few lessons from the laboratory of history are more important to grasp than the lesson that “a believing culture ... generates its own antithesis.”

University of Notre Dame

MICHAEL J. BUCKLEY, S.J.


Tilliette is not only the international authority on Schelling but a historian and philosopher whose research, never far from literary and theological ramifications, has labored over idealists like Fichte, French philosophers of religion like Maine de Biran, and sources of modern French thought like Merleau-Ponty.

This book treats the same field as did La Christologie idéaliste (1986); both are drawn from lectures in Paris and Rome. While the approach is not that of survey but theory and synthesis, the area remains the Christian themes and leitmotifs in European modern philosophers, particularly of the 19th century. T.’s book has two sections. “Heuristique” looks at the issue of a Christian philosophy. What would that mean—as Christian and as philosophy? How did past figures view Christ as a philosopher? There is, of course, a discussion of the issue among the neo-Thomists in this century, as Dominicans and Jesuits defended the view of Aquinas that theology (which is inevitably fashioned out of philosophy in the broadest sense) is the exploration by a believer of a held revelation, while philosophy does not explore the truths of faith, because their initial and basic acceptance and ground requires a grasp beyond reason. A second section, “Topique,” looks at areas of Christianity which were popular fields for modern philosophers, not so much areas for the philosophers to study as dynamic stimuli for their own thought. These are the kenotic theology of Philippians, Jesus’ Sermon on the Mount, the Prologue of John.
The text and its notes are a treasure of information, sources, and ideas. This and *La Christologie idéaliste* are incomparable resources for understanding the course of modern philosophy and theology. T.'s elegant literary style and his encyclopedic knowledge come together even in brief observations of insight.

The book holds that a Christian philosophy in the European sense is legitimate and truly philosophical. It is possible and legitimate for true philosophers, for thinkers little attracted to faith and church to find insights and forms in the Christian Gospel. While one can understand how such a Christian philosophy is pursuing the footsteps of God (Blondel) in a remotely apologetic approach, it is not clear how Christian motifs can be employed, except as structural or aesthetic forms, by men and women who do not believe in them as real or historical. This issue results from modern philosophers; from philosophers often educated in Christian schools and living in densely Christian Europe. Pioneers for this philosophy are Hamann or Schelling, who offer a monism in which their "Christian philosophy" is to replace faith in revelation.

T. sometimes moves rapidly through different kinds of thinkers using Christian themes: there is a difference between a marginal believer, an idealist monist, a Russian panentheist, and a modern philosopher of religion. But his book is valuable for readers in North America, where a recently emerged form of Christian philosophy involves the analysis through logical systems expressed in English of past Latin and Greek theologies in order to prove their reasonableness. The venerable tradition T. surveys has nothing to do with this: it examines how Christianity offers not proofs (which would frighten any true philosopher) but thought-forms. "Christian philosophy" is not amateur theology but modern continental philosophy since the late 17th century now analyzed in its origins and format. One should not forget that this relationship between all-encompassing philosophies and a faith which is not just a conviction but a dark way of seeing (as in Aquinas and Bonaventure, Rahner and von Balthasar) has had for Christian theologians through many centuries boundaries which history shows are important. Precisely the many thinkers presented by T. show that in modernity the pursuit of philosophy through Christian words or themes remains an enterprise, but a puzzle and a temptation as well.

*University of Notre Dame*  

THOMAS F. O'MEARA, O.P.


This book on the conditioning of theological understanding is an excellent illustration of our contemporary fallibilist mood. Pailin essays
a post-Cartesian (and, in that sense, postmodern) exploration of theology as a human undertaking within the limitations of the human condition and without anxiety about the loss of an ahistorical, Archimedean point to stand secure from temporal passage. Humility, modesty, tentativeness are the qualities that describe this book, as P. insists on the relativity of thought—including his own. P. explores the fundamental notions of theology: faith, belief, God, religious experience, and revelation in search of a critical evaluation of the range of theological understanding.

Faith names the basic existential stance of the Christian which is characterized by its own kind of “certainty,” the certitude of conviction in action, not the impossibility of intellectual error. Essential to theistic faith is the conviction that it is more than the subjective attitude of the believer. Faith must have a realist reference, an objective reference to ultimacy which is real independently of the mind. This reference to reality is, however, unique, for in certain respects this reality is a priori and necessary—not an Object among objects. Belief is the conscious, intellectual aspect of faith. Belief is indeed cognitive, if not comprehensive, of the God who is the objective of faith. At times discrepancies arise between the conceptual structures of belief and the authentic stance of faith. Here theology finds one of its central tasks of critical engagement with tradition. To the extent that Anselm’s famous definition of theology as “faith seeking understanding” would limit the theologian to a merely descriptive role vis-à-vis the faith of a religious community it is inadequate. Theology must be free to answer crucial questions about what is to be included and what excluded from the community and its faith. This demand for a broad range of critical evaluation is really not a novel revision of the work of theology for P. who claims that theologians have always performed this task. At times the conceptual coherence of the faith will require that it be somewhat altered in new theological expositions which may invite the suspicion of members of the community. A clear illustration of the critical responsibility of the theologian is to confront the traditional problem of the tutorship of Athens over Jerusalem concerning the divine attributes (impassibility, immutability, etc.). On the other hand, philosophers who seriously address the question of God from outside the pale of a particular religious community should not be dismissed as “nontheological.” In all forms of theological reflection the role of reason (“faith’s friend”) is central. There should be no uncritical reliance on the “self-authenticating character of faith-statements.”

In his delineation of the notion of God P. does not shy away from the language of “cosmic projection,” “anthropomorphism,” etc. Human beings must begin from themselves in attempting to construct a concept
of God. On this point P. confronts the reductionism of Feuerbach by showing that predicates attributed to God by theists are unique to the divine reality (philosophically ultimate and religiously worshipful). P.'s notion of God is elaborated in accord with the process thought of Hartshorne, a philosophical theism which enables him critically to retrieve elements of Kant and Hegel. God actualizes the "regulative ideas" and thus is the basis of all our principles of understanding. Our grasp, however, of the regulative role of God is always culturally conditioned.

In his discussion of religious experience P. emphasizes the constitutive role of language without denying that authentic religious experience is of God. He exhorts theologians not to forget the distinction between what they seek to describe (religious experiences are cognitive) and their culturally conditioned ways of describing it. Following a hermeneutically sophisticated treatment of revelation comes a consideration of necessary revisions for the notion of salvation. P.'s final chapter is an interesting retrieval of theology as "queen of the sciences," a queen neither regnant nor consort but a constitutional monarch conditioned by the various ways of understanding in the sciences which it is to integrate and make sense of in a meaningful whole.

This book is a significant contribution to foundational theology beyond foundationalism. It illustrates critical realism—a balanced presentation of our contemporary recognition of the cultural-linguistic conditioning of human thought with what might be called traditional theological realism.

Washington Theological Union, Md. Michael J. Scanlon, O.S.A.


Cooke states his project clearly in his introduction: to elucidate the ways in which Christian religious symbolic structures have either made the saving love of God present or have "distanced" people from the "primary symbol" of divine presence, their ordinary human experience. He actually focuses on the latter, viz., how the symbolic structures have "distanced" people from their experience from very earliest times in the life of the Christian community, but maintains that this "distancing need not continue" today (268).

A first section offers a historical survey of the original experience of Christians and the progressive distancing from their experience by institutional, theological-philosophical, and cultic mediations. Since the treatment focuses on the "distancing" factors, it is selective and negative, although C allows that much in the tradition is positive. Starting from
the original Christian experience of the immanence of Christ among them, C. points out how "Judaizing" tendencies proceeded to distance believers from their own experience by cultic and legal mediations. The same tendencies are traced through the primitive and early Church and the theological debates and formulations of the patristic ages. "Tradition," clergy, and Roman centralism are all developed. The same factors are seen continuing to function and increase in the feudal, Medieval, and Renaissance Church. Luther's attempts at returning to the faith experience of the believers as the symbol of God's presence was counteracted by the standardization of ritual, theology, and hierarchy. The 17th- and 18th-century enlightenments attacked the infantilizing factors of dogma, tradition, and hierarchy, but the Church continued to cling to its clerical and mythified mediations. Finally, C. points to a critical factor for the credibility of structural symbolic systems: their conscious manipulation by the modern communications media. He restricts his treatment to political usage, but economic and ecclesiastical manipulation of symbols and metaphors might also be alluded to as factors which undermine the credibility of religious structures.

The second, shorter section outlines some modern contributions to the understanding of the functions of symbols. From anthropological (socio-logical?) studies C. selects four functions of symbols which set an agenda for contemporary sacramental theology: analysis of the underlying ideological structures of symbolic structures; the "social memory" of a people; the social values and aspirations underlying symbolic structures, and the control of public imagination by the manipulations of symbolic realities. Psychological studies raise two principal issues: the "life-model" for the understanding of the person, and the social character of the "self"; given the variety of social symbolic traditions and systems, the question of the uniqueness of Western religious tradition is opened in a new form. Literary criticism rephrases the issue of subjectivity and objectivity in terms of the interrelation of the structure of the self with the symbolic forces (especially language) of the community; narrativity, tradition, and theater all have contributions to make to the effective functioning of sacramental symbols.

A final consideration of experience as the basic symbol of divine presence leads to a brief epilogue. It is the underlying actuality of human experience, the "core awareness of divine presence," which grounds religious life, especially sacramental practice. Without it, there is no religious awareness or identity, no faith community. This is the "original revelation" at the heart of faith. This basic flow of "raw experience" is the medium for the knowledge of the divine. It is this which is ritualized and shared in Church and sacrament, and it has the potentiality to
overcome the “distancing” which theological, hierarchical, and ritual systems place between God and believers. C.’s “theological epilogue” raises the question of the presence and action of God in the world. If the “magic” view of God’s presence and action are to be discarded, is there any meaningful way to talk about “God” or “providence”? C. insists on the necessity of returning to the experience of the believer and allowing that experience to interpret itself in the current and complex of human experience. Ritual, structure, and theory must all be anchored in and promote the day-to-day experience of people of faith, if the symbolic realities of Church, ritual, and Christian life are to find credibility in today’s world.

C.’s project is valid, and his book could serve as a useful college text on the topic, especially if an instructor can elaborate some of the issues and keep the thread of the argument from being lost in the welter of historical detail. But there are problems with his treatment which disappoint some readers. Historical development is a very useful theological approach; it serves to relativize the sense of “tradition” which equates tradition with what is familiar. However, C.’s treatment loses focus as it threads its way through the complexities of history. Those who know the tradition have no need of this kind of survey and those who don’t can well get lost in detail. Further, C.’s “intellectualist” framing of the function of symbols creates problems from the outset. Although there is some attention to the social origin and function of symbols in the second section, their socio-ecclesiastical function is not highlighted in the historical survey. E.g., there is no mention of the Gregorian reform in the Medieval section. The clericalizing “distancing” of the divine consistently carried out in that movement (including the present restorationist papacy) is a potent factor in the contemporary crisis of belief. The manipulation of symbols (254 ff.) is still being carried on, as can be seen in the struggle for the language of Church and theology today (Church as “mystery,” “ministry,” and “services,” etc.). Symbols are always ambiguous, because all human symbols are human. They share in the ambiguity, fallibility, and vulnerability of the human reality. And all symbols (even religious symbols) are human elaborations and live in human traditions. Greater emphasis on such basic facts would have made C.’s case even stronger than it is.

Jesuit School of Theology, Berkeley

JOSEPH M. POWERS, S.J.


This text, originally a doctoral dissertation written under Matthew
Lamb, explores an issue that has increasingly occupied a place on the agenda of fundamental theology over the past decade: the relation between science and theology as forms of historical human rationality. As one proceeds through the work, Ostovich's focal question becomes clear: "How is human rationality itself to be described?" His strategy is to attend to what theologians and scientists actually do as reflected in political theology and contemporary philosophy of science, arguing for the thesis that human rationality is most appropriately described as a communal praxis, inseparable from the specific narrative tradition that informs it.

The proximate context for O.'s argument is polemical: Pannenberg's methodological separation of Naturwissenschaften and Geisteswissenschaften and D. Tracy's understanding of the unity of theology and science as established by a critical correlation of theory. Against this, he poses a description of J. Metz's view of the praxis of conversion-discipleship (communally mediated by the dangerous memories of the Christian narrative tradition) as primary in constituting the foundation of theology. Even though both Metz's understanding of science and H. Peukert's attempt to establish a dialogue between science and theology through a transcendental rescue of faith are judged inadequate, Metz's position does permit an alternative vantage point to Pannenberg's and Tracy's. The turn to the primacy of praxis in theology has its parallel, O. argues, in the work of T. Kuhn, I. Lakatos, and P. Feyerabend in the debate over the relation between the history of science and philosophy of science. Both in the categories of Metz's practical fundamental theology and in the debate over paradigms, progress, the internal versus external history of science, etc., O. sees a correlation—more or less drawn out by A. MacIntyre, R. Rorty, and R. Bernstein—in that praxis is recognized as the foundation of both enterprises and is understood as historical, communal, and narratively conditioned. So conceived, science and theology represent "parallel forms of historical human rationality" (223).

On the whole, O.'s argument is both clear and persuasive. The chapters on Metz and Kuhn et al. are particularly well done. Within this context, however, four critical observations can be made. First, the distinction tacitly made identifying primacy-of-praxis models with those emphasizing the transformative dimension of rationality, and primacy-of-theory models (e.g., Tracy) with those emphasizing reason's disclosive dimension, seems at times to become a separation. To my mind, such an identification is mistaken. Transformation and disclosure are aspects of both second-order theory and the in-formed activity of the life-world.

Not unrelated, second, are some rather anemic comments on "truth." In O.'s presentation, truth seems to be a function of communal self-
transcendence or "progress from" a given state of knowledge. To be sure, the exorcism of "mistaken" concepts of truth is essential to the argument. Yet O.'s historicist leanings suggest, by default, that "truth" represents a category mistake. The lacunae of this position become more apparent in thinking through two other theological "parallels" to the category of "paradigm" in science: the pluralism of religions and the status of competing understandings of the "essence of" Christianity, Buddhism, etc.

Third, given the wide compass of the figures examined, there is some lingering ambiguity in the use of terms like "reason" and "rationality." An example: "What it means 'to know,' processes by which knowledge is acquired and standards of what constitutes knowledge all change over time" (171). What is circumscribed by this statement: paradigms or the praxis constituting these paradigms or both? While his argument has a quasi-transcendental ring—similar to those of Lonergan or Gadamer—some statements seem to suggest that the activity itself of the subject, abstractions to be sure, constituting the standards of knowledge changes, thus threatening equivocation in talk about "reason."

Finally, at best, O.'s attempt in the last chapter to describe formal parallels between theology and science seems strained and risks overlooking the material significance that categories such as "hope" or "eschatology" have for Christian theology. At worst, his emphasis on the social-critical function of theology might adumbrate a position that reduces the material content of Christianity to its formal function as a means of social negative dialectics.

University of San Diego  

J. A. COLOMBO


Thomson has written a careful, clear, painstakingly argued analysis of one of the major notions in morality and law. It does not deal directly with the grand schemes of the major political ideologies or with inflamed issues of public policy in which rights are affirmed or denied. She takes care to elaborate many of the details of her analysis without prejudging the issues in dispute between utilitarians and deontologists or between proponents of natural-law theory and legal positivism. T. gives almost no attention to the developing history of human rights, though Hobbes and Locke are continually present in the wings. Rather, she starts from very influential analysis of the conception of rights developed in the second decade of this century by Wesley Hohfeld, a professor of law at Yale University. She then unfolds the implications of this analysis in the intellectual context of late 20th-century moral philosophy.
In an introductory chapter which is extremely well done, she sets out her criticisms of moral scepticism and her view that there are nontrivial necessary truths in morality. At the same time she sees moral theory as an effort to connect our various moral beliefs through explanatory judgments and not as a universal set of a priori principles. This enables her to proceed in a way that is exploratory (since she recognizes the range of moral disagreement both theoretical and practical in our society), dialectically sophisticated (since she is confident in the power of logical exposition to structure our efforts to connect), and candid (since she prefers to state her arguments in measured terms without attempting to force controversial conclusions through).

The first half of T.'s book deals with the general analysis of what rights are. She understands a right as a claim that X has against Y that P, which is equivalent to Y's duty toward X if and only if P. This requires her to deal with the related notions of duty and ought, with the enforcement of claims, and with the general idea of value and the analysis of tradeoffs since these figure prominently in the justification of infringements of claims. This section of this book is a valuable and refreshing alternative approach to some of the issues dealt with in contemporary Catholic discussions of double effect, incommensurable goods, and exceptionless moral norms. The second half of the book lays out what rights we have. These begin with what T. calls our "first property," our bodies, which are not to suffer trespass or harm. We have a right against others that they not cause us distress, when this is not mediated by beliefs. T. rejects a general right of noninterference. She then considers the way in which we confer rights by giving our word, the rights we have to "second property," or property as we commonly use the term in colloquial English, and the ways in which we can cease to have a right. These discussions are all subtle and instructive.

The book as a whole is a useful island of calm and order in the often turbulent waters of disputes over rights. T. cares passionately about the language of rights, as becomes apparent in her treatment of Carol Gilligan's presentation of rights as a male aspect of our moral life. But she always writes with care and respect for the intelligence of her opponents. The strength and weakness of the book lie in its steadfast adherence to a highly individualistic paradigm for rights. Anyone interested in doing serious scholarly work on rights in morality and law will find the book very worthwhile, even though there are many points this reviewer would disagree with (e.g., T.'s views on abortion). Using the book does require that the reader be familiar with the first-order predicate calculus. As a result, the book will be helpful primarily for philosophers and only in a derivative way for theologians and others. This is a pity,
since T.'s work is fresh, bracing, and insightful.

Georgetown University  JOHN LANGAN, S.J.


Juxtaposing the names of a fourth-century B.C. Chinese philosopher and a 13th-century theologian in a title calls attention to a type of speculative analysis covering fundamentally different civilizations and thinkers. Recognizing that religious expressions of human beings are neither all the same nor all different, Yearley states that his book will map “part of the middle ground between the same and the different” for it will chart “similarities within differences and differences within similarities” and thus “discuss the normative conclusions the process produces.” His opening chapter outlines the general differences and similarities between Mencius and Aquinas; e.g., propriety (li), fate (ming), and attention (ssu) are lacking in Aquinas; revelation, church, or sacraments are not found in Mencius. He relates such a “comparative philosophy of religions” to three areas of ethics; injunctions, lists of virtues arranged in a hierarchical order, and ways or forms of life “protected by the injunctions and picked out by the virtues.”

Y. describes the contexts for the ideas of virtue of Mencius and Aquinas, which are quite different. For Aquinas, the acquired natural virtues (also called cardinal virtues) are practical wisdom, justice, courage, and moderation; they differ from the theological virtues of faith, hope and charity. For Mencius, the list is considerably different, as it includes propriety (li), intelligent awareness (chih), righteousness (yi), and benevolence (jen). Y. also expounds the theories of virtue of both philosophers as well as their conceptions of courage. His concluding chapter reiterates the essentials of the book and portrays how and why analogical imagination in which “the locus of comparison must exist in the scholar’s mind and not in the objects studied” is to be viewed as integral to this type of comparative philosophy.

In expressing the hope that his work “illustrates, both in results and in approach, the significance of doing that kind of comparative philosophy of religions in which we compare views of human flourishing or excellence,” Y. underlines several problems in his book. “Religious flourishing” and “human flourishing” are interchangeable in his view, though he admits that such usage is “not uncontroversial.” Alongside such an ambiguous exchange of language, Y. fails to explain a number of points: Why does he chose Mencius and not Confucius or some other Chinese philosopher as a point of comparison to Aquinas? Why is the D. C. Lau
translation of the *Mencius* preferred without entering into serious discus­sions of other English translations of various terms and phrases, let alone other Western-language translations? Why is there so little dis­cussion of the historical context in which each philosopher wrote? And why does he document in disproportionate abundance the opinions of Western thinkers concerning Aquinas, but so sparingly the opinions of Western and Chinese thinkers about Mencius?

A reader may learn from this study something about Aquinas, less about Mencius, through an analogical process which Y. holds can be applied to other thinkers across cultural boundaries.

*Georgetown University*  

*John W. Witek, S.J.*


Although Gallagher presents an overview of the history of moral theology, he is concerned mainly with the contrast between the late 19th- and 20th-century neo-Thomist manuals and the moral theology that has replaced them since Vatican II.

His opening chapter discusses the penitentials, the *Summae confesso­rum*, and the contributions of Aquinas and the other university theologians of the Middle Ages. His next chapter (1) sketches the history of the moral-theology manuals from their origin in the post-Tridentine church to their nearly total disappearance at the time of Vatican II and (2) proposes that moral theology, particularly the neo-Thomist version, be understood as a genre.

The following chapters focus on the neo-Thomist manuals and discuss in turn their theology, moral theory, and casuistry. This discussion is followed by considerations of four competitors of neo-Thomist theology: Modernism, Thomas Boquillon's theology, *la nouvelle théologie*, and transcendental Thomism. From the external competition G. turns to alternatives to neo-Thomism within the manualist tradition itself: the manuals of Fritz Tillman, Dom Odon Lottin, Bernard Häring (*The Law of Christ*), and Josef Fuchs. Having considered these European options, G. looks to the U.S. to examine ways in which Catholicism has interacted with Protestantism and culture.

The final chapters are devoted respectively to (1) summaries of the moral theologies of Häring, Karl Rahner, Bruno Schüller, Fuchs, Richard McCormick, and Charles Curran; (2) situation ethics; and (3) proportionalism viewed as a contemporary comprehensive moral theory, in which neo-Thomist rigidity is replaced by flexibility and practicality.

In this readable and interesting volume G. has summarized, sometimes
with help from Gerald McCool and others, large amounts of material from the theological past and present. Yet, its title speaks not of past and present but of past and future, even as its subtitle announces an historical study. This seeming titular disjointedness is indicative of a certain disequilibrium in the text itself. On one level the book is an overview of the history of moral theology from its antecedents in the penitentials to contemporary proportionalism. But, as G. makes clear in a preface and an afterword as well as in a passage interrupting the historical narrative (41-45), on another level the book is set on identifying the name “moral theology” with the manuals of moral theology, particularly with the neo-Thomist manuals (44), and on giving the contemporary discipline a different name (271).

G.’s inclination to restrict the name “moral theology” to the genre of neo-Thomist manuals will seem arbitrary to many. So too will the assertion that if “moral theology” is seen as an analogical term, neo-Thomist moral theology is the prime analogue (269). Yet, such terminological positions shed light on why in this historical study only a few pages (33-37) deal with the 300-year period of moral-theology manuals preceding the neo-Thomist manuals and why Alphonsus Liguori receives hardly more than passing mention.

A few factual errors in the text apparently escaped detection, and a number of interpretations of history and historical opinions might be subject to further discussion. Yet in general G.’s book is a handy reference work, which should be particularly helpful to those less familiar with the neo-Thomist past of moral theology.

_University of San Diego_  
NORBERT J. RIGALI, S.J.


A number of works have appeared in recent years which summarily declare the “Enlightenment project” to be a failure and Kant the progenitor of all that’s wrong with modern moral theory. Gamwell’s book is a refreshing exception to this wave of Enlightenment bashing. Although G., too, believes that some key features in modern ethical theory need correction, he is not glib in his criticism of the directions in ethical theory established by Kant, and his own theoretical proposals conclude by incorporating major insights of the Enlightenment tradition.

G.’s central claim is that a theistic conviction, in the form of necessary belief in a religious metaphysical telos or “divine good,” is needed to ground moral theory. This claim, he admits, runs counter to the dominant consensus established since Kant that ethics cannot be theistic. G.’s
defense of his view begins with a series of negative arguments meant to uncover fatal deficiencies in the major alternative positions represented by the a priori formal ethics of Kant, the empirical teleology of Alasdair MacIntyre, and the a priori hermeneutical teleological ethics of Karl-Otto Apel. Only after this extended series of negative arguments does G. make a positive case for the conceptual necessity and adequacy of a religious metaphysical teleology.

G.'s discussion begins with a penetrating defense of the modern commitment to autonomy in ethics: the appeal to human reason and experience as the test of claims. Although first clearly articulated by Kant and obviously related to the needs of a civilization just emerging from the control of religious authority, this modern commitment, G. argues, is not merely an artifact of history. Autonomy, he maintains, is a formal and necessary requirement of thought. Any reasoned defense of the alternate view, appeal to authority, is self-refuting, since it presupposes the supremacy of independent reason as the test of claims.

To advance his argument for a theistic position, G. employs a series of similar "transcendental" reflections on the necessary presuppositions of valid cognition or understanding. He contends, e.g., that Kant was right to believe that ethics must be a priori, based on a universal rational foundation, because the alternative, an ethic deriving from any contingent condition, involves itself in the contradiction of arguing for the necessity of that which is rationally arbitrary. The same line of reasoning is employed to critique MacIntyre's tradition-based approach to ethics and Richard Rorty's "anti-foundationalist" view that meaning and truth claims are sustainable only within discrete linguistic communities. To the extent that each of these views purports to be a generally true account, G. maintains, it necessarily relies on universal conditions of thought and is therefore self-refuting.

Although G. agrees with Kant that ethics must have grounding in the universal features of human thought, he disagrees with Kant's purely formal ethic of rational law, with Kant's rejection of moral teleology, and particularly with his denial of the possibility of a metaphysical telos. G.'s arguments here are complex. Positively, they involve a defense of the possibility of metaphysics. Negatively, they involve a lengthy critique of Kant's ethics as being unable to provide the material content—ends or purposes—needed to yield determinate moral judgments. A similar criticism is applied to Apel's effort to find a nonmetaphysical, a priori telos in the argumentative consensus among participants in an ideal communication community. This telos cannot rationally adjudicate conflicts, G. contends, because without a transcendental norm or values to guide it, such a consensus is either nonexistent or arbitrary.
Having established the need for an a priori metaphysical grounding for ethics, G. outlines his own metaphysical teleological position. Drawing heavily on the work of Whitehead and Hartshorne, this contains a comprehensive telos of "maximal divine creativity," or, what is the same thing given G.'s understanding of God, maximal human creativity and the freedom of persons in community. G.'s discussion concludes by suggesting that this value can make a substantive contribution to moral choice, especially in the face of today's political and economic options.

Any theory as ambitious as this one is bound to raise serious questions. My own list is extensive. Most fundamentally, I question whether G. has adequately appreciated the complex procedure for moral choice implicit in Kant's ethic or Apel's very similar approach. Both positions, I believe, point to a rational legislative procedure that allowably imports material content for the purpose of adjudicating conflicts. While such adjudications (and the resulting norms) are always contingent and subject to revision, the procedure itself is not. This view thus has a formal and transcendental component even as it draws material content from the real world of empirical desires. If such a position is sustainable, it satisfies both the transcendental and moral requirements on which G. rightly insists, and it renders his own metaphysical alternative unnecessary. This is important since G.'s alternative has serious problems. Among them is the inherent vagueness of such concepts as "maximal creativity" or "maximal public freedom." Imprecise concepts like these may be less suited to adjudicating conflicts than a well-worked-out Kantian-Apelian procedure based on (impartial/ideal) consensus and agreement.

These criticisms only suggest the array of challenges facing G.'s enterprise, despite the power and insight of G.'s arguments. The enormous value of his book is that it understands the issues so well and chooses to argue at the very forefront of where the debate should be. The Enlightenment project is not dead. Some of its best impulses live on and seek completion in G.'s penetrating and deeply informed study.

Dartmouth College, N.H. 

Ronald M. Green


Ambitious in scope, this book centers on an important but uncompleted task for Roman Catholic "natural law" ethics: to affirm a universal community of moral discourse, while recognizing moral pluralism and the historicity of belief and practice. Thomasma's book illustrates the difficulty of this project.

T. has four objectives. (1) To reinstate an essentially natural-law appeal to the universal and "enduring" (cross-cultural) value of the
intrinsic worth of all human life. He says his book is addressed to "all human beings of good will," and that it takes the form of the "apologies" of early Christian writers. Like them, he intends to address a larger society on the basis of "premises all might share." However, his argument is essentially historical; in separate chapters he outlines the religious, philosophical, and political support which our "heritage" provides to the concept of the value of life. (2) To transcend the polarities of the abortion debate, along with other "life" debates. T. observes that opponents come out of different belief systems, assert as self-evident premises which are contested by the other side, and use the same terms with different meanings, e.g., "respect for life." (3) To display the complex ways technology impinges on modern life, and to provide technology with a moral evaluation which is both forward-looking and social. (4) To take flexible positions on concrete issues, so that a nuanced response to the "value of life" can be made in conflict situations (e.g., abortion, abnormal newborns, infertility therapies, "right to die" cases, and allocation of health care).

These admirable aims are not fully realized. First, there are at work in the book competing paradigms of the nature of moral knowledge. Is it essentially relative to historical communities or does it transcend cultural differences? On this issue of moral epistemology, T.'s claim that human values correspond to "actual" and "enduring" human "needs" is in tension with his emphasis on community and his distinction between "knowledge" and "belief." Although he asserts that beliefs can provide "a normative basis for our ethical decisions," he does not fully clarify the reliability and truth status of such beliefs. When he falls back on communal consensus and "heritage," and suggests that civilizations use values to relate conceptions of the ends of life to "myths of meaning constructed over the centuries," his commitment to universality in moral argument recedes. At points, he mentions the criterion of "fittingness" linked with H. Richard Niebuhr, and, like Stanley Hauerwas, asks about "the kind of community we wish or ought to be," without naming these authors or pursuing their epistemological and ecclesial problems.

Second, T. does not achieve a unified position on how the fairly formal "value of human life" yields concrete choices and policies, especially when the interests of valued lives conflict. He outlines three options: (A) the purist view; (B) the accommodationist view; (C) the contextualist view. In A, the right to life is "absolute"; in B, life is considered in relation to other human values; in C, a more utilitarian position, the value of life varies with its level and with other social needs. After describing strengths and weaknesses of all three, T. insists on the priority of A: it should be the basis of policy "whenever possible." But B can serve as a "temporary
respite" in cases of difficulty, and C is "available for emergencies." At one point T. admits that "[b]y suggesting that a single position is not adequate, one automatically is forced into position C." Yet while T. advocates A, and almost concedes C, his positions on actual moral problems seem closest to B. E.g., after stating that "all life is worth living," he later comments in relation to a case of withdrawal of life supports from a permanently comatose patient that "life is not always worth living, even though it has intrinsic value." Or: "Just because human life is to be taken as sacred and loved by God does not mean that we have the same obligations to all forms of human life." T. puts great weight on respecting the personal values of seriously ill persons when making treatment decisions, for to do this is to recognize their worth and integrity. He insists that "marginal" persons have intrinsic value, but seems to allow that this value increases with potential for moral agency, thus providing for decisions favoring pregnant women over early fetuses. T.'s instincts are clearly with moderately "revisionist" theologians and natural-law philosophers, who want to reintroduce reasoned argument into inflamed policy debates, and to uphold the distinctive Catholic commitment to vulnerable life, while avoiding a rigid legalism in expressing it. However, these sympathies are still in search of a satisfactory theoretical framework.

Boston College

LISA SOWLE CAHILL


At the end of his argument for the participation of Christians in the restoration of the environment, McDonagh presents a new decalogue, beginning with the commandment, "You shall not act in ignorance of the ecological consequences of your acts" (204). By the time I had read this far, I shared M.'s sense of urgency and hoped, with him, that Christian churches would begin stressing the religious importance of the human relation to nature as strongly as they have emphasized relations among human beings in the past.

The two main segments of the work include an analysis of three problems M. views as critical to address before the advent of the next century (Third World debt, overpopulation, deforestation) and the construction of an environmentally sound theology. I found the initial portion powerful in its clarity and boldness; here M. explicitly takes on institutions such as the International Monetary Fund, the Catholic Church, and the Aquino government. This is very courageous, given the fact that M. is a Roman Catholic priest serving as a missionary in the Philippines. He shows how IMF officers apply the language of First
World diet regiments ("belt-tightening") to obscure the reality of their brutal loan repayment terms. He takes Pope John Paul II to task for his aggressive affirmation of *Humanae vitae*, and he points to the passivity of the Aquino government in its failure to address the problem of deforestation.

Section 2 selects material from the Hebrew Bible, the New Testament, and Christian traditions to fashion a theology that might serve as a foundation for the responsible stewardship of nature. Although I believe M. is on the right track here, I would criticize this theological section for not going far enough. M. affirms the traditional image of God as Lord, and yet such an image presents us with an idea of a hierarchical universe that legitimizes certain forms of domination. Wouldn't Sallie McFague's depiction of God as mother, lover, and friend in *Models of God* send us further along the road toward a democracy of being in which humans, the natural world, and the divine might all escape the fate of being only means rather than ends?

Among the many strengths of this book, the most important is probably the careful forging of links between the traditional themes of liberation theology and the concerns of environmentalists. E.g., M. shows how the terms of debt repayment set by First World lending institutions not only impoverish humans beings, but impoverish the environment as well. In a circular fashion, economic pressure on people causes environmental degradation that further pauperizes them. We see this when Third-World farmers, driven to desperation by conditions related to national debt, resort to slash-and-burn techniques that decimate the rainforests. This temporarily provides plots of land to farm, but the topsoil quickly wears away, leaving natives with neither the farmland nor the food, medicine, or firewood that the forests traditionally provided. M.'s linking of the demands of social justice and environmental integrity is particularly important, given the argument that environmentalists are First-World elitists more interested in pleasing scenery than in the well-being of the poor. M.'s accomplishment is to show that justice for the poor won't be possible without a deep and long-term commitment to the healing of nature.

*Trinity University, San Antonio*  
MARY ELLEN ROSS


Johnson presents a Christian spirituality "that takes seriously the life of ordinary people in a world shaped by modernity" (1). The audience he has in mind is the general public, and although he constantly appeals to
his experience as an academician and makes use of various theological insights this never renders the book inaccessible to the target audience. J. first proposes a creedal (Nicene) framework for understanding God, explains his anthropology and understanding of religious experience, and describes the basic dynamic of his spirituality. Next he makes various applications to prayer and virtues, highlighting certain possible distortions of a lay spiritual life in the process. He grounds his observations throughout in Scripture.

On the negative side, in an attempt to acknowledge feminist concerns, J. argues that the “terms Father, Son, and Spirit are metaphors” (16). An older Thomistic theology would argue that all theological language is metaphorical; more recent thought deriving from Ricoeur would argue that all analogical language is at root metaphorical. J. intends neither of those understandings. Furthermore, J.’s portrait of the Trinity is modalistic—Creator, Savior, Sanctifier, broken only by the addition of a fourth, not completely distinct characterization, Judge. This underdevelopment of the trinitarian relations undercuts his attempt to formulate a relational spirituality. We are left with vague references to “the Other.” Moreover, J. makes no attempt to formulate a sexually sensitive spirituality. Male and female are simply interchangeable in everything he presents. But perhaps one cannot blame him for avoiding one of the touchier areas in contemporary theology.

J.’s approach is that of Platonic phenomenology. There is an insistence on the transcendence of God and on the *via negativa*. We never “encounter ‘the Other’ as such, but only an implicit presence mediated by many separate others” (83). Thus, “we do not directly hear God’s Word in the prayer of silence, but our own word” (112). He does not everywhere sound this note (his comments on petitionary prayer imply a dialogue with God), but it is a persistent thread.

No separate human project is absolute. This is true even of Jesus, whose own Messianic project was relativized in his contacts with others. We read that “Jesus’ human spirit progressively opened itself to the presence and power of God. . . . He progressively became obedient Son” (91). Perfection lies not in some completed product but in the continual process of becoming. At root, J.’s anthropocentric approach is similar to Rahner’s; his intent is to emphasize the humanity of Christ as providing a model for our own. Norms for the spiritual life are perhaps possible because “some human experiences intimate God’s power and presence more than others” (47). But “none do so unambiguously.” Our own or others’ projects are not normative, nor is Scripture, nor are creedal affirmations of the Church (witness J.’s willingness to strip the Nicene creed of affirmations offensive to modern ears), and indeed, even Jesus’
project changes. At best God’s project seems fully incarnate only in Christ’s death and resurrection. This is what one would expect of a Platonic phenomenology.

The relative absence of a Eucharistic focus is also striking. J.’s focus in public worship is on the liturgy of the Word, on confrontation of the individual by the gospel; what is received “in the ritual of bread and wine” is “the normative meaning of our own passage through death to new life” (103, italics added). Again this seems to be primarily a matter of emphasis, shifting attention from the presence of Christ in the Eucharistic elements to a “recognizing the Lord in the sacrament that is this assembly of worshipers” (103). Along with the lack of any sex-specific discussion, the Platonic cast, the faded ecclesial context, this absence of a Eucharistic heart leave J.’s spirituality curiously disembodied—in spite of the expressed determination at the beginning and otherwise worked out in concrete to pay particular attention to bodily aspects of spirituality.

One of the real strengths in what J. offers us, on the other hand, is that it rings true. This book is contemporary, and much that he says his audience will find truly helpful. Although selective emphasis throughout threatens to distort what J. does, there are also numerous counterbalancing elements. Especially to be commended is his willingness to face the problem of sin honestly and helpfully. While this is not the single book I would give someone, it is a book that I would give.

Marquette University, Milwaukee

EARL C. MULLER, S.J.


These two books have little in common, despite their time together in the spotlight, for while Sipe appreciates celibacy, Ranke-Heinemann would have it buried.

Sipe focuses on the status of celibacy among America’s Catholic priests and writes for “those who would like to understand more about the mystery of celibacy, its nature, and its practice, and how to achieve it” (12). Over a period of 25 years, he conducted 1500 interviews with priests, some in therapy, others not, and with men and women who “had firsthand information on the priests’ [sexual] behavior because they were their lovers, sexual partners, victims, or otherwise direct observers of it” (8).

S. maintains that celibacy’s essential validity and integrity are in no
way dependent upon either “an incomplete theology of sex or a distorted concept of women” (51). People (e.g., seminarians) wanting or expected to be celibate need to appreciate that a true celibate lifestyle, as an expression of human sexual identity, involves much more than genital abstinence. Rather, as a charism to be cherished, a discipline to be practiced, and an ideal to be pursued, true celibacy must lead finally “to the expansion of lovingness” (36). Authentic celibacy embodies the social concern of the virtue of chastity as seen in S.’s articulation of the essential elements of celibacy as (1) a freely chosen dynamic state, (2) usually vowed, (3) involving an honest and sustained attempt (4) to live without direct sexual gratification (5) in order to serve others productively (6) for a spiritual motive (58).

S. acknowledges that while union with Christ can surely flourish without celibacy, celibacy languishes without a Christ-relationship or at least some transcendent or spiritual motivation. “Only a love that can match or exceed what is possible with sexual love can sustain celibacy” (65). While describing a lengthy developmental process required for the attainment of the celibate ideal, S. finds that priests achieving true celibacy are a rare breed; those that exist are marked by humility, flexibility, and humor; they are supported by, among other things, their work, their daily prayer, and their communities.

S. is sympathetic, sensitive, and provocative in his theoretical exposition of celibacy and its requirements, but there is much to question regarding his overly long account of the discrepancy between priests’ profession of celibacy and their practice of it. S. estimates that fully 50% of priests have genital relationships or involvements of some sort more or less frequently. They often live comfortably with this reality for two reasons: the secrecy involved, and the phenomenon of “splitting,” whereby their sexual activity is psychically separated from their professional life. The process by which these statistics were obtained, however, makes them suspect, if not invalid. Not intended to meet the strict criteria of a sociological study, the book has simply a pastoral intent, reflecting not scholarly research, but a more informal searching. Still, this portrayal of priests’ observance of celibacy is neither happy nor hopeful.

It is difficult to overstate the disdain which Ranke-Heinemann has for celibacy and the Catholic Church’s teachings regarding sexuality. She views the hierarchy as little more than “bedroom inspectors and conjugal police” (7), who nurture a “barefoot-in-the-kitchen” view of women (12). Catholic sexual morality is corrupted by the aversion to pleasure and the predilection for celibacy which are seen as Gnostic-Stoic legacies to Christianity that have been superimposed upon the gospel. For R.,
celibacy is properly identified as an “obsolete pagan custom” (48), and its prescriptions for purity are best written off as derivations from “the Stone Age of religious consciousness” (99). Not content with arguing that Christ offers no grounds for preferring celibacy over marriage, R. goes further to propose that there is no Christ-given validity to celibacy at all. She maintains that Mt. 19:12 (the eunuchs verse) is incorrectly perceived as referring to celibacy and pertains, rather, only to the issue of divorce and remarriage.

R. claims that because it was left to the likes of highly-but-wrongly touted celibates, Catholic sexual moral theology has flourished as an antipleasure, antiwomen, and antimarriage tirade. It took centuries before all four of the traditionally acknowledged motives for marital intercourse (procreation, conjugal duty, preservation of continence or fidelity, and attainment of pleasure) were accepted as sinless, provided, of course, that there is no positive interference with procreative potential.

R. rightly points out that Catholic emphasis on procreation is without justification in the New Testament. She highlights various historical vagaries of Catholic teachings. Paul, for example, permits spouses abstention from conjugal intercourse only if they mutually agree to it; later, the Church imposed frequent periods of abstinence. Augustine opposed rhythm as a form of contraception; recent popes praise periodic abstinence as the only acceptable form of family planning. Augustine pined for people’s ability to procreate apart from intercourse; current teaching prohibits reproductive technology like IVF.

For a purportedly scholarly work, the book has notable limitations. Gross generalizations abound. R. often fails to cite references. No differentiation is noted between official church teachings and the idiosyncratic and neurotic views of individual theologians. Secondary sources are mostly decades old; e.g., the positions attributed to Häring date from 1967 and are not his current views. Finally, R. ignores the work of Catholic theologians like Cahill, Curran, Farley, and McCormick who have been engaged for years in responsible and critical dialogue with the body of church teachings regarding sexuality.

Criticizing this book in no way implies that the official sexual teachings of Roman Catholicism are themselves beyond criticism. Far from it. Flawed and inadequate, some of these teachings strain credulity, defy reason, fly in the face of common sense and human experience, and scar earnest consciences. R. undoubtedly speaks for many justifiably angry and disillusioned women and men, but her book, excessive and caustic, offers no fair assessment of Catholic sexual morality and fails to raise the level of reflection in this area. Nor is it likely to inspire church leaders to pursue and value the needed insights into sexuality which
married people enjoy and yearn to share.

Reading these two books reminds one of the sad reality that "love" is still too lonely a word in Catholic writings about sexuality.

St. Joseph's University, Philadelphia VINCENT J. GENOVESI, S.J.


The lectionary genre, a collection of biblical pericopes and responsorial psalm verses, regained a place among the Church's liturgical books as a result of the liturgical reform at Vatican II. Concern to open up the treasure of the Scripture produced not only the three-year cycle of readings for the Sunday assembly, but also topical lectionaries to accompany the ritual books for reconciliation, the pastoral care and anointing of the sick, and the order of funerals, etc. Yet liturgists with feminist sensibilities, most notably Marjorie Procter-Smith, have shown how these lectionaries, albeit unwittingly, continue to diminish, distort, negate, or conceal the active and constructive roles of women in the formative period of the Church. Winter's work serves to redress the distortion.

W. has set out 48 New Testament texts in which 64 women are individually identified and groups of women active in the early community are mentioned. Because the NT, at its best, is diffident in its advertance to the women of the community, W. often uses compilation as her method in the presentation of texts. The method honors ancient tradition dating back to the second-century practice of the Syriac Church and familiar to biblical and liturgical scholars through Tatian's Diatesseron. These pericopes constitute the core of the book.

But the book is more than the pericopes. Each text is introduced by an original Meinrad Craighead portrait depicting the women named in the pericope, inviting the user to visualize women who have generally been overlooked as subjects in the tradition of Christian art. The Craighead illustrations are added wealth not normally found in contemporary prayer books, but they too carry forward an ecclesial tradition, this one medieval and monastic. The pericope introductions also include any available biographical elements and a statement of context that regularly takes note of the results of contemporary biblical scholarship.

Each pericope is followed by a brief meditation, the personal nature of which suggests that this book had its origins in W.'s prayer as much as in her scholarship. Then a series of "points for shared reflection" encourages the contemporary Christian to enter empathetically into the biblical narrative by adopting the viewpoint of the women and relating
it to one’s own personal viewpoint. The method is not new in the Church; what is new is the subject of reflection. Two prayers bring each unit to a close. The first is in the collect genre, but quite deliberately expands the conventions of the Western liturgical tradition in its naming of God and its identification of the *mirabilia Dei*. The second is the “psalm,” a poetic text prepared for communal praying.

In what sense is the lectionary feminist? It is clearly guided by the feminist hermeneutic of remembrance and proclamation that aims to retrieve the memory of women as an act of truth-telling. It also manifests a commitment to the feminist hermeneutical principle of celebration of God’s redemptive deeds in and through women. This is perhaps most evident in the original “psalms.” That the quality of the poems is uneven should come as no surprise to persons who pray the divinely inspired Psalms of David daily. W.’s psalms supplement the canonical collection by giving voice to women’s reasons for praise, thanks, lament, and petition. The *mirabilia Dei* recounted here affirm women’s experiences of covenant salvation, as these are suggested by the biblical pericope. W.’s most effective psalm form may be the litany. The heavy didacticism of some of her wisdom texts is equal to and no worse than that of comparable canonical texts. She is at her best when she is playful. I happily anticipate standing in an assembly someday, singing with full voice: “Sarah, Hannah, Elizabeth, Anna: Shaddai loves older women. We give thanks and praise to God.”

Which brings us to W.’s naming of God. The God of this lectionary-prayer book has many titles, all of them grounded in biblical deeds. But W. has chosen to name the three-personed God of biblical revelation Shaddai, Jesus/Christa, and the Spirit of Shaddai and Jesus. In place, there is neither artifice nor explanation of the usage. I see in such texts another reflection of the book’s origins in W.’s prayer and perhaps her common prayer with other women. Behind the use lies a decision to bracket [forever? for a time?] the name Abba, beloved of Jesus and the historical tradition, in order to retrieve the suppressed memory of the most high, mountain God of ancient Israel, El Shaddai, depicted in ancient art as many-breasted. A book for public prayer in the Church is inevitably theological, just as theology in the Church is at least implicitly doxological. What prayer and what theology do not risk idolatry in their attempts to comprehend mystery? The gift of feminists in both ecclesial arenas is to have brought that inevitable risk to new consciousness.

This is a prayer book. It will readily commend itself to women. All who have begun to bring the mystery of God and the mystery of women
to their own prayer in preparation for pastoral and liturgical leadership will find here a gift from the women of the Church mediated through the prayerful creativity of Craighead and Winter. It is a work of faith, hope, and love.

_Catholic University of America_  
MARY COLLINS, O.S.B.

**SHORTER NOTICES**


Deuteronomy is rightly regarded as the most powerful text in the Old Testament, and Miller presents us with a powerful commentary. The Interpretation Commentary series, of which Miller is Old Testament editor, proposes to present "the integrated result of historical and theological work with the biblical text" in order to "create an interpretation which is both faithful to the text and useful to the church" (v). The result is the kind of commentary which is particularly useful for theologians.

M. is fully familiar with the relevant historical and literary research of the past half century, and he alludes effectively to the wealth of complex conclusions which have been possible. However, he views Deuteronomy as "a book of instruction, not a legal document" (226), and his own contribution is not so much to reconstruct the kerygma addressed to a specific moment in Israel's history as to express in contemporary logic and language the instruction for life which it contains.

M. consistently illuminates his texts with any added light of New Testament commentary, and he moves "toward a theology" (44) by articulating underlying principles (such as the "sabbatical principle" [138 ff.] or "covenantal logic" [202]) and by drawing upon the systematic thought of theologians such as Karl Barth. Deuteronomy's teaching is revealed as a surefooted guide particularly through the recurring tangle of gospel vs. law, grace vs. human performance, invisible Lord vs. idols, authentic decisiveness vs. compulsive agendas. M. is profound, lucid, and convincing on every chapter and verse.

SEAN MCEVENUE  
_Cordwana University, Montreal_


Witherington's intention is to raise "first-order questions about the meaning of texts and their larger historical context and behind both of these, the way Jesus understood himself" (30). Thus the title of this book should be construed primarily as a subjective genitive, as it seeks to answer the question of Jesus's self-awareness.

Such a formidable project approaches the old question of Jesus's consciousness from a new perspective, combining aspects of historical, sociological, and literary criticisms. It looks at indirect evidence for Jesus's self-perception: the way he relates to others, preaches, teaches, and acts in the Gospels. In successive chapters W. sets out his methodological and historical presuppositions, considers Jesus in relation to others (John the Baptist, the Pharisees, toll collectors and sinners, revolutionaries, disciples, and the Twelve), considers Jesus's deeds (his miracles and mighty signs), and examines Jesus as a preacher and teacher, who had a special sense of his relationship to God, and who characteristically
communicated in parables the substance of his teaching: the Kingdom of God. The book finishes with an afterword and overall conclusions.

The achievement of the book is impressive for its new approach, what it attempts, and some helpful discussions of historical and literary matters in the Gospels. In the end this reader is unconvinced that W. has presented Jesus's Christology. Much of the argument remains probable and is drawn from inference. W. concludes to thirteen characteristics which can only be fully accounted for if Jesus saw himself as God's mashiach. These emerge from analysis of Jesus's relationships, words, and deeds. Whereas some of them, like his use of bar enasha, Amen, or abba, probably reveal something of his historical self-perception, they may just as well represent the Gospel authors' view of him. W.'s study does not finally distinguish between the two.

ALAN C. MITCHELL, S.J.
Georgetown University


Few books are as clearly titled, organized, and focused as this one. Via here discusses the nature of self-deception, examines self-deception in Paul, and shares Paul's vision for recovery of wholeness in Christ, repeats this two-step pattern in Matthew, and ends with conclusions and implications.

For Paul, one is self-deceived in claiming a righteousness based on obedience to the law. Such righteousness avoids submission to God's sovereign will by appealing to one's own achievements as the way to establish a right relationship to God. "Overcoming self-deception shows that faith is what is required for salvation.... Wholeness is the actualization of a consciously understood connection between my flawed finite concreteness and God's sovereign and gracious freedom" (133). For Matthew, the claim of righteousness in itself is not the problem but rather that it falls short. God requires works of righteousness but from a heart that is "renewed by understanding. This is what the overcoming of self-deception discloses. And wholeness is correspondence between inside and outside, heart and act." For Paul we are accepted unconditionally by God regardless of our achievements, but for Matthew "the good news is that God makes our works acceptable" (134).

No book can do everything. This study avoids historical questions in keeping with Via's stated method as "existential in the broad sense," using an approach that is "focally literary-critical." Thus how the "self" was understood and experienced in first-century consciousness in contrast to modern conceptions is not addressed. Via's use of gender-inclusive language is appropriate since both sexes deceive themselves, but deeper issues of gender never surface. E.g., given the Bible's androcentricism, are Pauline and Matthean images and metaphors more suitable and effective for men than for women in overcoming self-deception and recovering wholeness? The book does, however, live up to its declared purpose of using the admittedly modern concept of self-deception as a hermeneutical lens for reading the "old" texts of Paul and Matthew in "new" ways.

KAREN A. BARTA
Seattle University


Should theological reflection be grounded within a biblical or a philosophical framework? Should the Bible's own claim to be revelation be nor-
mative for its interpretation? Or should interpretation of biblical texts be governed by secular and/or extratextual disciplines? What is an acceptable interplay between biblical theology and philosophical hermeneutics? Wallace makes an intelligent and accessible contribution to this discussion.

Within the debate between neo-Reformation and neoorthodox movements in Protestant theology, W. aligns himself with those voices which represent his own conviction that interpreters should accept the Bible’s own claim to be the Word of God. He proposes a reconsideration of the principles of Karl Barth’s biblical theology in spite of its Christocentric perspective. He summarizes Paul Ricoeur’s presuppositions about the polyvalent nature and literary variety of biblical texts. He outlines a comparison and contrast of the positions of Barth and Ricoeur and their assumptions about the nature of biblical texts. He indicates Ricoeur’s critique of Barth’s Christocentrism that exegesis and theology operate with a plurality of reference points. He reviews the New Yale theology of Lindbeck, Frei, and Holmer and emphasizes their insistence on “the primacy of the Bible’s storied realities for doing theology” (94). Finally, he argues for a retrieval of revelation as part of the hermeneutic of “the second naïveté” succeeding the “first naïveté” understood as both a “pre-critical” and a “scientific” biblicism (123).

W. gives incisive, nuanced summaries of the positions of various theologians and philosophers. He leans toward the “sola scriptura” pole in his rejection of liberal foundationalism. His rejection of general philosophical systems to ground theology may carry a heavy price tag in failing to integrate influential disciplines, such as cultural anthropology, into a viable biblical hermeneutic.

MARIE-ELOISE ROSENBLATT, R.S.M.
Santa Clara University


This book is largely a history of attempts to compare early Christianity with the mystery religions of late antiquity. Smith’s thesis is that such comparisons have not been strictly scholarly, but have been motivated by Protestant, anti-Catholic apologetics. S. demonstrates persuasively that a Protestant theological assumption has usually controlled the use of comparisons: the notion of a pure and “unique” primitive Christianity, untouched by its environment, that has been gradually “corrupted” by foreign influences to produce Catholic Christianity. In such comparisons the mystery religions “have become code-words for Roman Catholicism,” which is regarded as a “borrowing” from the mysteries (43).

But S. is interested in more than simply a critique of scholarship. He is also arguing for another use of comparisons, one more compatible with a “religious studies” mode of inquiry than a “theological” one. S. Argues for an “analogical” rather than a “genealogical” use of comparison. Genealogies, used by the old Protestant apologetic, accounted for similarities with the concept of “borrowing.” Analogies, S.’s preferred method, describe similarities between early Christianity and the other cults as “analogous processes, responding to parallel kinds of religious situations” (112-13) rather than as examples of “borrowing.” His own attempt in the final chapter to provide such an analogical comparison (between the soteriological development of the cult of Attis and Cybele and that of competing forms of early Christianity) is suggestive, but too sketchy to be fully convincing.

S. is at his best in unmasking the anti-Catholic presuppositions of the
scholarly tradition, carrying the reader from the Reformation, through a fascinating correspondence between Thomas Jefferson and John Adams, on to more recent discussion of Christianity and the "mysteries" by A. D. Nock and Bruce Metzger. This book should be required reading for all NT scholars, for it forcefully reveals the extent to which the so-called "historical-critical" study of Christian origins has been shaped by a theological and polemical agenda.

David G. Hunter
University of St. Thomas, Minn.


Aspegren had completed only 8 of 11 projected chapters at the time of her death, and collaborator Ragnar Holte added a final chapter based on her notes. As a whole, the book therefore necessarily lacks unity. But this should not overshadow the interesting material it contains.

A. sets out to document the fact, not newly exposed but rarely developed so thoroughly, that the prevalent Hellenistic philosophical dualism cast the male-female relationship as that of spirit to flesh and strength to weakness. This mindset so influenced most early Christian writers that the ideal for woman was to become "manly," to display rationality and courage (the "manly" virtues), and thus to triumph over feminine weakness. A. establishes the foundations of this thinking in Plato, Aristotle, and Philo, then documents its effects on a variety of Christian writers, especially the author of the Acts of Thecla and Methodius of Olympus. The one exception seems to be Clement of Alexandria who, in spite of statements on the inferiority of women, through his Stoicism advocates a basic equality of the sexes. The child-bearing woman martyr Perpetua who dreams she is a male gladiator is perhaps a harmonious meeting point of male and female qualities.

Students of Christian theology need to be aware of these roots of ideas about the inferiority of women in anthropological dualism. This study exposes those roots of a mindset that is still very much with us: that the male is the norm of humanity and the symbol of the fully human—associations that remain just below the surface in much of our ongoing church life and theological debate.

Carolyn Osiek, R.S.C.J.
Catholic Theological Union, Chicago


Clayton examines in detail a cult that many critics have recognized but no one else has explored. Through liturgical texts, prayers, monastic dedications, art, and vernacular poetry and prose, she documents interest in Mary first in Northumbria and Mercia from the end of the seventh to the beginning of the ninth century and, second and most important, in the southern centers of the Benedictine reform from the middle of the tenth century to the end of the Anglo-Saxon period.

C. first offers background on the continental origins of Marian doctrine, on legends about Mary's life, and on the origin and development of feasts associated with Mary. Turning to Anglo-Saxon England she documents the development of liturgical texts for the Marian feasts as well as of masses and offices to the Virgin. Focusing on private prayer to Mary, she shows that prayer addressed directly to Mary was an accepted feature of early Anglo-Saxon religious life, and that from 750 A.D. on prayers were explicitly composed and recorded in collections. She also illustrates the Benedictine prefer-
ENTIAL DEVOTION TO MARY IN Dedications

C. appeals for evidence to art and vernacular literature as well. Her treatment of art focuses on iconography and on historical changes from a Christological focus to celebrations of Mary in her own right. While her treatment of vernacular poetry suggests another witness to the cult of the Virgin, the poetry is much less important than the vernacular prose which C. explores at some length. The numerous homilies for the various Marian feasts indicate the main method of transmitting Marian doctrines and legends.

Although her work is intended for scholars, C. makes it accessible to a larger audience in several ways. The technical vocabulary, especially in the areas of liturgy and art, makes some background in these fields useful. The 16 full-page plates, however, provide illustrations of many of the terms; these plates are also useful accompaniments to C.’s analyses. The extensive Latin and Old English quotations, as well as a few French and German ones, are almost all translated. In sum, C. gives us a readable, thorough, and interesting survey of manifestations of Anglo-Saxon devotion to the Virgin.

SANDRA R. O’NEAL
Columbia College, S.C.


This doctoral dissertation is a thorough study of religious experience according to Bonaventure, and it establishes some significant conclusions. Initially Hoefs surveys the linguistic usage of the verb experiri and its derivatives, esp. the phrase cognitio experimentalis (experimentiae). Since the concept of experience in the 13th century lacked any technical philosophical or theological framework, B.’s assertions must be gathered from various contexts and assessed with care. Hoefs focuses upon the experience of God. To clarify the meaning of this broad term, he analyzes all the pertinent texts according to two evaluative perspectives: the content of the experience and its origin. Where God is mentioned as experiential referent (cognitio Dei experimentalis) an immediate unmediated experience is not meant; rather God comprises the intentional object, that upon which the experience bears. The locus of religious experience is the interiority of the person, specifically the soul, whose highest capacity, the vis unitiva (unitio amoris), is a central factor.

In analyzing the gift of wisdom in the Sentence Commentary, Hoefs shows how B. begins to transform theological traditions by his usage of experiential terminology. He interprets B.’s teaching on the gift of wisdom to involve a movement from a preliminary action of religious knowledge and love, through the principal act of wisdom (namely, affective love, where only a kind of negative knowledge may remain), to the culminating point of ecstasy and rapture (where the soul, largely passive, experiences the divine sweetness in a way anticipatory of the beatific vision). Already as a young theologian, B. understands wisdom predominantly from the dimension of human will and affectivity. His use of experiential language in his academic writings enables him to conciliate major theological authorities who present wisdom primarily or exclusively as an act of knowledge. After B.’s formal teaching career, when he offers his own formulation of wisdom in his mystical works, experiential terminology becomes less frequent while affective language increases. Hoefs’ concluding chapter evaluates the controversy concerning the interpretation of B.’s teaching on ecstasy. He accepts the positions of Rahner and von Balthasar about an obscure or “dark” experience of immediate union of love with God, realized in the innermost part of the person, an experience which is quali-
tatively distinct both from the operations of grace and from the beatific vision.

The book is highly recommended for the wealth of its pertinent texts, its unified and critical argumentation, and its sensitive exegesis. There are a few typographical errors; and two indexes, indicated in the Table of Contents, have unfortunately been omitted. But such lapses do not seriously mar this interesting and convincing inquiry.

GABRIEL SCARFIA, O.F.M.
Christ the King Seminary
East Aurora, N.Y.

THE GERMAN PEASANTS' WAR AND ANABAPTIST COMMUNITY OF GOODS.

A very detailed study of the controversial connection between the German Peasants’ War of 1525 and Anabaptism. Stayer, who is Professor of History at Queen’s University in Canada, alerts the reader to the controversial aspect of his work by concluding that the Anabaptist practice of the community of goods “owes a crucial, if indirect, debt to the Peasants’ War.” The main thesis, then, is that all Anabaptists, affected by the war, shared their goods, according to Acts 2 and 4, not just the Hutterites.

This main thesis is argued on the basis of a detailed critical recollection of the controversial literature about the Peasant’s War in the 1970s and 1980s, especially by social and Marxist historians. While the author shares some of the views of the social historians, he wants to maintain a proper balance between thought and practice, theology and society—a perspective he calls somewhat enigmatically “neo-liberal.”

The book is a collection of essays rather than a flowing argumentative narrative. Three essays on the Peasants’ War argue the thesis that the war was “significantly connected with the beginnings of Anabaptism.” Part 2 deals with the Anabaptist community of goods, beginning with the Swiss Brethren in Zurich and its various expressions as “anti-materialist piety” (linked to Thomas Müntzer) in Müns- ter and in Moravia. Two appendices offer a glimpse of primary evidence: a list of Anabaptists in the Peasants’ War; and the text and translation of a “fragment of the lost chronicle of Gabriel Ascherham,” a Moravian Anabap- tist.

This is a useful contribution to the ongoing debate about the theological and social character of Anabaptism. S.’s thesis could have been more clearly argued, perhaps in the “epilogue,” which links the findings to subsequent developments, including modern socialism and capitalism. S.’s contentions and conclusions may have demonstrated what he calls an “indirect debt” of the Anabaptist community of goods to the Peasants’ War, but not a “crucial” one.

ERIC W. GRITSCH
Lutheran Theological Seminary
Gettysburg

THE PLAY OF ALLEGORY IN THE AUTOS SACRAMENTALES OF PEDRO CALDERÓN DE LA BARCA.

Kurtz’s project is to reconstruct Calderón’s allegorical theory by ex- amining obiter dicta on that subject by various personifications in the autos sacramentales. C. shows first that the allegory of the autos, like the Eucharist they were performed to celebrate, uses one visible reality to veil another, transcendent one. By likening the auto to the Eucharist, C. emphasizes the liturgical function and “sacramentalism” of the genre, which always ended with the “discovery” of the host and the chalice. Kurtz insists on the radical logocentrism of C., who invokes divine authority to sanction his allegory.

Kurtz then discusses allegoresis as a
mode of interpreting myth in the *autos*, and demonstrates how thoroughgoing C.'s rewriting of ancient mythology is. She also emphasizes the kerygmatic incorporation of sacred truth into the *auto*. The performance time of the *auto* illustrates or foreshortens all of history as it was “written” by the Divinity. By individualizing typology, C.'s *autos* actually “sacralize” secular figures (such as the monarch) and nations, seen in this way to have a preordained place in eternity. Finally, Kurtz underlines C.’s relationship to the Jesuit Order by suggesting that the reader/spectator of the *auto* had to create a “composition of place” similar to the one imagined by the exercitant of the Ignatian Exercises in order to “apprehend the sacral and divinely ordained concept” underlying the text (201).

There is general truth in the notion that the Counter-Reformational *autos*, like the Exercises, use images to appeal to the understanding and move the affections toward a desired response. But to posit a “conjectural allegorical composition” in the *auto* with an analogue in the reader’s own “composition of place” (183) entangles the issue. The role of exercitant and spectator must be somewhat different by virtue of the fact that the former imaginatively creates the “composition of place” in meditation. The influence of this solitary mental activity on devotional metaphysical poetry is well documented by Louis Martz and others, as Kurtz herself says. But the *auto sacramental* is theater. The spectator’s role, the mode of reception, are not truly analogous, and it seems misleading to blur the distinctions. This, in my view, is the only vulnerable point in an intelligent, well-written study that makes an important contribution to our understanding of Calderonian allegory.

ELIZABETH B. DAVIS
University of Oregon, Eugene


Among the personalities connected with the Modernist movement in the Catholic Church, Tyrrell has always exerted a strong fascination. Contemporary writers, particularly David Schultenover and T. M. Loome, have contributed much to the understanding of his life and thought. Sagovsky’s work, however, is the first major biography of Tyrrell since that written by Maude Petre not long after Tyrrell’s death in 1909. S., who earlier published a book on the thought of Tyrrell and Matthew Arnold, has carefully and painstakingly drawn material from such sources as Jesuit archives, diocesan records, and the vast correspondence relating to Tyrrell, and has produced an informative and readable life. He is careful to show the development of Tyrrell’s thought in the context of his life and of the controversies that marked his life as a Jesuit and a priest.

Tyrrell’s complex personality emerges clearly. He was intelligent, sincere, deeply religious, witty, compassionate, and a gifted writer. But there was also an extremely fragile, mercurial, reckless, and combative side to his personality that led him repeatedly into conflict and controversy, often in a way that seemed to be self-destructive. Tyrrell was never able to resolve the tension he felt between the internal and the external aspects of religion. This seemed to leave him in a position in which he could not live with the Church but also could not live without it. He expressed this dilemma in a letter to a friend late in his life: “*Institutionellem* or externalism is at once essential and fatal to religion” (214).

Writing a biography of Tyrrell is a very challenging task. S. has succeeded in writing a good one and has made a fine contribution to Tyrrellian studies.

CHARLES J. HEALEY, S.J.
Pope John XXIII Seminary
Weston, Mass.

Greene's biography chronicles Underhill's intellectual and spiritual development largely through her own writings—39 books and more than 300 published articles as well as personal letters and papers from new archival material. Greene focuses most intensely on U.'s preoccupation with the relationship between this world and the experience of God, emphasizing the role of beauty and nature.

Particularly engaging and refreshing in the treatment is a sense of U.'s personal life, as Greene traces the subtle shifts in U.'s focus from mysticism as experienced by the great mystics to the spiritual life which is accessible to everyone open to relationship with the Holy. Thus, Greene adds a significant interpretive dimension to U.'s work by allowing the reader to glimpse her growth in the spiritual life under the guidance particularly of Baron von Hügel and Reginald Ward, as well as her increasing role as a retreat leader and spiritual director. Since Mysticism remains a classic in the field, Greene's careful presentation of U.'s gradual shift from Neoplatonism toward a more incarnational view which grew to include participation in the Church of England and work with the poor amplifies one's reading of this important book. Since U.'s treatment lacked an appreciation for the role of history and culture in the development of mysticism, Greene's portrayal of these influences operative in her life is genuinely interesting and illuminating.

U.'s scholarly and ministerial accomplishments as a married laywoman would be remarkable for a woman at any time in history, but even more so in the Edwardian period. This biography is thus not only a contribution to the field of spirituality but to women's history as well, since U. achieved so many "firsts" for women in both her public and private lives.

JANET RUFFING, S.M.
Fordham University


Doctrinal pluralism in 20th-century Protestant churches is a fact of life. Some roots of this phenomenon can be traced to the fundamentalist-modernist controversy that scarred the Protestant landscape following World War I. No denomination epitomized this controversy so clearly as the Presbyterian Church in the U.S.A. in the 1920s and 1930s. Longfield's excellent chronicle focuses on six major Presbyterian participants: J. Gresham Machen, William Jennings Bryan, Henry Sloane Coffin, Clarence E. Macartney, Charles R. Eerdman, and Robert E. Speer.

This biographical approach allows each personality to emerge as well as the amalgam of forces—doctrinal, ecclesiastical, philosophical, and cultural—that shaped and motivated each. In closing, L. weaves his findings together. He shows, e.g., how Machen's Southern roots provided the cultural context in which ecclesiastical separatism was an acceptable way of responding to an intolerable ecclesial situation. Against Machen's emphasis on doctrine, the liberal Coffin honored modern thought, seeking the promise of modern civilization throughout the conflict. Macartney, who, like Bryan and Machen, endorsed the "Five Fundamentals," would not follow Machen into separatism due to his view of the relation of church and culture. Eerdman and Speer were "moderates" seeking to further the church's evangelical ends without adopting either a liberal theology or an exclusivist view of the
church. Bryan, the anti-evolution fundamentalist of the famous Scopes trial, emphasized the Christian life more than doctrine, which moved him to a more inclusive view of the church before his death. These samples show the complexities of each personality and their fascinating interconnections.

This is an enormously illuminating book about major Presbyterian figures who had counterparts in other churches also torn by conflict.

Donald K. McKim  
Berwyn, Penn.


Study of the Unification Church has been so influenced by heated debates on its nature and practices that examination of its theology has played a secondary role even in academic studies. Chryssides attempts to correct such imbalance by presenting a phenomenological description of the origins and beliefs, as well as the practices, of this small, but highly visible new movement.

After summarizing the main Unification theological tenets, contained primarily in its basic manual The Divine Principle, C. concentrates on its Korean religious heritage. He traces influences of several traditions, mainly folk shamanism, Taoism, Confucianism, and Buddhism, showing how they have contributed to making the Unification Church a new religious entity. Its rise is seen in the context of the advent of Christianity to Korea and the subsequent emergence of distinctive Korean Christian movements. An analysis of its Christology and a description of its liturgical rites and festivals, including its elaborate marriage ceremony, provide a more complete picture of the church than one encounters either in popular or scholarly literature.

C.’s book is a model for the study of new movements. By avoiding the temptation to focus primarily on polemical issues (though these are briefly discussed in a postscript) C. contributes to our understanding of the group and, consequently, sets the stage for a better evaluation of its religious claims. Though one might disagree with some of his conclusions (e.g., about whether the Unification Church can be labeled Christian or whether its view of Jesus makes his mission a failure), one must be grateful to C., not only for supplying often-neglected factual material about this controversial group, but also for offering many insights into its complex theology and its enduring appeal.

John A. Saliba, S.J.  
University of Detroit Mercy


This biography of our country’s best-known living liturgical pioneer holds the reader like a novel, especially any who have known him, lived, and labored with him in the liturgical movement before, during, and after Vatican II. Through taped interviews and letters Hughes has let many of them help her narrate the story of Diekmann’s life from boyhood to his golden years. She has left out no one who could help her—family members, fellow monks, longtime colleagues and collaborators, students, and friends.

It is D. himself, however, who acts as the principal narrator through his diaries and his memories of the past communicated through conversation. Hughes has given us an admirably complete portrayal of the “larger than life man” that D. is. In ten chapters she takes us through his growing up, his early years as a novice and cleric at St.
John's Abbey, his theological and liturgical studies at San Anselmo and Maria Laach, his teaching and his activity as editor back at St. John's, his initiative and collaboration through the 40s and 50s in the Liturgical Conference, his involvement in the ecumenical movement and social action, his work as a peritus at the Council, and finally his activity after the Council as a member of the International Commission on English in the Liturgy and consultor of the Consilium for the Implementation of the Constitution on the Liturgy. Scattered through the chapters is a well-chosen selection of pictures. The book ends with a bibliography of D. and a 17-page index.

All readers of this biography will surely be grateful both to D. for trusting Hughes to tell his story and to her for doing it with such honesty, thoroughness, and skill.

EVERETT A. DIEDERICH, S.J.
South Bend, Ind.


Jones attempts to explicate the central significance of the Trinity for the Christian moral life, a topic clearly in need of extended attention. His argument is presented in three well-organized and logically connected sections. Section 1 argues via narrative ethics for the centrality of social context and tradition for rationality and ethics. Section 2 connects the narrative form to trinitarian piety and culminates in an interesting discussion of the centrality of friendship with God for the moral life. Section 3 argues for the significance of communal "practices" (baptism, Eucharist, reconciliation, and interpreting Scripture) for the "transformative discipleship" which is the heart of the Christian moral life.

J.'s effort can be praised on a number of counts. He engages current sources (Hauerwas, MacIntyre, E. Pincoffs, M. Nussbaum) in a way that is consistently perceptive, fair, and respectful. He employs themes especially common to "narrative ethics"—discipleship, transformation, narrative, character and virtue, truthfulness, the distinctiveness of Christian ethics, to name a few—but does so in a creative and critical way; e.g., his emphasis on the Trinity attempts to correct Hauerwas' exclusive focus on Jesus.

The text does have loose ends (e.g., the relation of narrative to doctrine) and leaves some relevant topics unexplored (e.g., the meaning of "participation" in God). J. is aware that for purposes of economy some fundamental issues must be left to another time, e.g., the realism-relativism debate. Recognizing the complexity and depth of his topic, he modestly claims that he offers "no more than a sketch" of a trinitarian account of the moral life. Jones in fact carefully lays the methodological grounds for a promising ongoing project: delineation of the significance of trinitarian piety for concrete moral discernment.

STEPHEN J. POPE
Boston College


Dorrien has brought together first-and third-world, religiously-based calls for the socialistic organization of contemporary societies. He claims that a democratic version of socialism (as he previously spelled out in The Democratic Socialist Vision) best responds to the theological roots of those arguments. By allowing those various calls to challenge deficiencies of the others, necessary elements of a broad social vision emerge.

Rauschenbush shaped a vision of the economic and political orders, without giving much attention to those who were denied participation in those or-
Tillich developed the theoretical underpinnings for socialism, but then, in his U.S. incarnation, backed away from calls for socialism and therefore from specific policy recommendations that could give participatory socialism a real world presence. Moltmann emphasizes the necessary, Liberally based, democratic elements for an adequate socialist vision without, however, working out the theoretical and practical implications of a preferential option for the poor. Latin American liberationist visions correct first-world tendencies to ignore those at society's economic margins and the social truths that the marginalized can access. But those liberationists also suffer from the vagueness of their own socialist vision (opening the way to totalitarian centralization) and from reliance on simplistic dependency theories. D. claims that the work of Gutiérrez and Bonino both are sympathetic toward full democratic participation, while Sobrino's social vision remains sectarian and elitist.

D. argues for the religious and social importance of a thick theory of the common good, a theory that in its ties to specific policy recommendations is guided by a Christian social concern, but that in its recognized open-endedness and incompleteness also remains humble. D.'s method of allowing effective cross-challenge among the authors he considers embodies the social cognitive methods that he claims are necessary for society at large. The clarity and precision of his analyses aids in that service.

J. LEON HOOPER, S.J.
Woodstock Theological Center
Georgetown University


D. argues for the position of pacifism via a method of "logical exhaustion." By showing that the "war is hell" view is inherently incompatible with Christianity and that the just-war theory is no longer compatible with Christianity, he leaves us with pacifism as the only viable option for a Christian.

"War is hell" rejects moral restraints either regarding the rationale for war or the conduct of war. This view is presented objectively and critiqued thoroughly. D.'s real debate is with the just-war theorists on whom the burden of proof lies because of the gospel's clear expectation that Christians avoid the use of violence. The debate turns on the character of modern warfare which depends on weapons that kill or threaten innocent people. This violates the key condition in the just-war theory which Christians have typically (and mistakenly) cited as an application of the principle of double effect. D. discredits this appeal by turning Thomas Aquinas against just-war supporters, relying heavily on Thomas' overlooked contention that there is no justification for killing innocent persons.

Before treating pacifism directly, D. observed how artists' depictions of Jesus and the moneychangers and certain forms of "violent" dance undercut the persuasiveness of Christian pacifism. After the customary affirmation of saintly pacifists like Gandhi and King, D. describes three types of Christian pacifism: opposition to nuclear war, opposition to all war, opposition to all violence against humans. He notes what is permissible, what is obligatory, and what is supererogatory in each view. His own position, obligation to oppose all violence, is elaborated from the perspective of process thinkers, notably Henri Bergson and Charles Hartshorne.

The book was published before the outbreak of the Persian Gulf war, but if it is read (especially the chapter "On Future Wars") with the Gulf war in view, D.'s argument becomes even more persuasive.

ROBERT L. KINAST
Center for Theological Reflection
Madeira Beach, Fla.

An excellent collection of twelve essays by Tillich on the theology of peace. It is arranged in chronological order and covers T.'s reflections on peace and justice from 1938 ("The Meaning of Anti-Semitism") to 1965 ("The Right to Hope"), the last year of his life. Four essays appear here for the first time. Of particular interest are "Power and Justice in the Postwar World" and the "Christian Basis of a Just and Durable Peace." In the first, T. proposes love, power, and justice as three guiding principles of reconciliation. In the second, he explores the social-political consequences of unbridled capitalism, the principle of justice as empowering and necessitating change, and the new world order of which the ecumenical movement is a fragmentary eschatological sign.

This collection clearly shows that while T. believed in reconciliation and reunion, he maintained a "faithful realism" that eschewed utopian or escapist solutions. Peace, for T., is a desirable goal but is never to be reduced to an ideological principle. Understood properly, power itself is a divine phenomenon and ought not to be dismissed as demonic in principle or as antithetical to peace. Consequently, T. himself refuses to endorse an unconditional pacifism.

Stone's volume will probably prove instructive as a means to "focus peace work" for theologians, laypersons, and those involved in the peace movement. He offers brief but helpful introductions to the essays at the beginning of the book; these might have been better placed before each piece. Often T.'s reflections are more suggestive than prescriptive, opening up ways of ethical questioning rather than stating fixed or definitive positions. It is precisely this character of T.'s thought that Stone so clearly has recognized by allowing T. to speak once again to issues of peace and justice.

Colin B. O'Connell
St. Thomas University
Fredericton, New Brunswick


A comparative analysis of the roles of the jus in bello norms of proportionality and noncombatant immunity in the classical just-war tradition, and as found in the contemporary writings of M. Waltzer, P. Ramsey, and W. V. O'Brien. Sichol's concern with the "validation" and "range of applicability" of these norms provides a helpful structural analytic for her close, comparative reading of key texts. Her critical treatment of the authors' ethical assessments of nuclear-weapons use and deterrence provides valuable insight into key historical developments in the positions of Ramsey and O'Brien.

S. also questions the adequacy of the authors' positions, arguing that both classical and contemporary just-war principles have overshadowed the threefold value of the "bondedness of peoples" which she appropriates from earlier philosophical foundations and within the methodologies of the three contemporary just-war doctrines. Ramsey's ultimate validating norm, agape, while closest to the bondedness of peoples which she appropriates from earlier philosophical foundations and within the methodologies of the three contemporary just-war doctrines. Ramsey's ultimate validating norm, agape, while closest to the bondedness of peoples, is finally inadequate for protecting noncombatants in counterforce warfare, and it fails to appreciate the bonds that bind just defender and aggressor. O'Brien's emphasis on "interdependence" as the condition for respect for the human person, while necessary, does not equate with bondedness of peoples; indeed, "interdependence" has kept peoples from
meeting their basic human needs through changes in the environment and trade. Waltzer's emphasis on the value of "civilization," while important, finally fails theoretically in his willingness to abandon individual rights for global order in the "supreme emergency." For S., in contrast, the making of a nuclear peace demands that "kinship" take precedence over the self-interest of the nation-state, that the *jus cosmo politum* replace the *jus gentium*.

The notes for the final chapter need reworking. Notwithstanding, S.'s analytical methodology and the classical and contemporary scope of her book make it a valuable contribution. She has succeeded in creating a "clearing" for the truth within the *jus ad bellum* and *jus in bello* principles, reminding the reader that it is no longer possible to restrict the just-war debate to merely the limiting conditions of war and peace in the nuclear age.

GREGORY J. WALTERS  
*St. Mary's University, San Antonio*


The fundamental question that Latin Americans in their own situation have to ask is: "Who is Jesus Christ for us today?" The memory of Jesus, the celebration of his life, is not primarily a past reality but something that is happening here and now in actual situations of oppression. Jesus is Enrique crucified by the Salvadoran military (178–81). Batstone writes as one deeply involved in the current struggle of Latin Americans. Recognizing the limitations of one writing from a different culture, he nonetheless brings to bear many of the actual experiences of oppression, especially in Central America. In this context, he seeks a sympathetic but critical understanding of what the liberation theologians are saying in order to further and strengthen the liberation process (7–8).

The book has value on two levels. First, it is a critical reading of some of the main authors, e.g. Gutiérrez, Croatto, Galilea, Boff, Sobrino, Segundo, that offers valid and interesting insights into their developing views on the mission of the historical Jesus, his death and resurrection, and Christ in Latin America today. The purpose is "to evaluate the particular hermeneutical keys and epistemological commitments which orient these investigations and which lead to the stress of certain aspects of Jesus’ life over others" (10). Thus, B. begins and ends with the hermeneutical question. Every Christology reflects a certain horizon of interest, i.e. a social location and ideological/practical commitments. But the perspective of liberation theology is or should be the experience of the indigenous and poor in the base communities. The second value, then, is the constant reminder that a Christology truly indigenous to Latin America must finally come, not from the academic theologians, but from the voice of the voiceless, from Enrique and Maria.

MICHAEL L. COOK, S.J.  
*Gonzaga University, Spokane*


Pope-Levison offers an overview of the concept of evangelization found in Latin American liberation theology. She examines the writings of 10 liberation theologians, both Catholics (Boff, Galilea, Gutiérrez, Romero, Segundo, and Sobrino) and Protestants (Arias, Castro, Costas, and Bonino), as well as several Roman Catholic documents (from Ad gentes to Puebla) and World Council documents (from New Delhi to Vancouver). The book is written clearly
and succinctly and is even-handed in its treatment. P. might have offered, however, some reflection on the work of Evangelical groups in recent years, e.g. "The Thailand Statement" of 1980.

The book's shortcoming is its hermeneutic. P. uses the category "evangelization" as the norm by which she assesses the theologians' writings. "Evangelization" is too broad a term. It is used variously in different contexts. It does not function well as a measure of a theologian's thought if that thought was not framed in light of P.'s own interests. To render a fairer evaluation, more space and cautious appraisal need to be given to the term and the concept behind it. Chapter 1 illustrates the difficulty. In the case of Ad gentes, P. mistakenly understands its use of "evangelization" in opposition to the meaning given it later by Paul VI in Evangelii nuntiandi. Her reading identifies "evangelization" with "missionary activity" and excludes pastoral activity as evangelization. This is clearly not the intention of the council decree.

The book is, nonetheless, useful insofar as it both stimulates reflection on and offers some very helpful insights regarding the holistic nature of evangelization: the Word proclaimed and the transforming Word justly lived.

Lou McNeil
Glenmary Research Center, Atlanta


In the fall of 1986 Fred Berger of the University of California at Davis died suddenly at the age of 48. Russell, whose dissertation was directed by Berger, has in this volume gathered together in an attractive form fourteen for the most part previously published articles of Berger.

The essays present a nontheistic approach to freedom of speech, judicial review, racial discrimination, and pornography. B.'s writings are thoughtful, balanced, and generally in agreement with the views of John Stuart Mill. But one senses that B. was still developing as a philosopher when death interrupted his promising career.

B.'s reflections on pornography contain an unusually sound analysis of the extremism on both sides of this issue; especially valuable is his careful critique of the claim of certain radical feminists that pornography does not deserve the protection of the First Amendment because its very nature pornography degrades women. For B., this contention is exaggerated and cannot be supported by any acceptable interpretation of the First Amendment or by whatever empirical data is available.

This volume contains the finest contributions of a philosopher and academic whose approach is, in his own term, "consequentialist"; that term, unfortunately, is not as well explicated in this volume as it might be.

Robert F. Drinan, S.J.
Georgetown University Law Center


Mercadante's work accomplishes two tasks: it provides a history of Shaker experience, language, and imagery regarding the issue of God and gender; and this history serves as counterpoint and critique for our contemporary questions concerning God and gender.

By accepting Ann Lee as visionary founder and movement leader, the Shakers in the late 18th century consented to the principle and practice of female authority. Yet patriarchy continued to permeate their religious and social structure. By the early 19th cen-
tury, Shakers posited masculine and feminine elements in God, denying divine androgyny. They took their experience of nature and of themselves regarding gender seriously, allowing it to form their theology of a binitarian God who was both male (Father) and female (Spirit). Yet maleness predominated. For them, God sent two messengers into the world, a very human and male Christ, and his analog, Ann Lee. Christ, the man, was more important. Although shared authority preceded doctrinal formation, and doctrinal formation included a dual, genderized God and dual divine messengers, masculinity continued to dominate social and religious structure and theological constructs.

M.'s work is a valuable, readable, and intelligent presentation of Shaker history. It is worth reading for the biographical material on Ann Lee alone. It also constitutes a warning that the theology of a genderized binitarian God and the experience of dual authority will not necessarily ensure gender equality or inclusivity. The most unsatisfactory part is M.'s conclusions and suggestions about how knowledge of the Shaker experience might help us develop more gender-equal God imagery and God language; M. does not further us along this theological path. At times it is unclear how M. sees the relationship between experience and the expression of experience, or between imagery and experience, or how culture shapes experience or experience shapes society, either in general or from the Shaker perspective. Still, this work is certain to inform, stimulate, and delight the reader.

MARY SCHWEITZER
Winthrop College, S.C.


Loftin studies Hopi religion as religion and not as a function of other dynamics. However, in agreement with just about every other study of American religious life, he finds that Hopi religion permeates all of life, and that it is "practical" rather than philosophical or theoretical. In spite of assertions of some scholars that Mircea Eliade is dated, L. draws much wisdom from him, basing Hopi life solidly within "the sacred" and its religious origins in "timeless time." He cites Hopi witnesses as explaining that they do things "because the ancestors taught us to."

Part 1, "Work and Ritual," is a "synchronous" study of Hopi religion, using the present tense (though in the second part L. points out that Hopi religion has changed in post-contact times). Hopi religion is explained as utilitarian and causative of harmonious relationships. Part 2, "Dominance and Religion," studies Hopi life under white American domination (the third cycle in Edward Spicer's Cycles of Conquest, which L. does not mention among Spicer's works). There is a fine discussion of the tensions between Hopi traditionalists and progressives (the latter desiring to accommodate to white society) as they deal with externally forced change. Students of contemporary Amerindian life will find this reflects similar tensions everywhere. L. also holds the thesis that the Hopi prophetic tradition has enabled the tribe to handle these tensions better than many tribes have.

Such valuable studies as this will hopefully enable Amerindians to make and write their own histories. They can also help keep theologians aware of the complexities of any relationship between aboriginal worldviews and Christian theology.

CARL F. STARKLOFF, S.J.
Regis College, Toronto
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