BOOK REVIEWS


There is something to be said about consistency in the writings of a scholar. When such is the case, the reader is able to augment and advance some of the author's ideas that have already been grasped. An entirely different challenge arises when the scholar moves in a new direction and actually disavows earlier thinking. This is the case in Good's recent commentary on Job. Acknowledging that his earlier writing itself shows that he has changed his mind about Job several times, he states that this work will reveal a significant shift in interpretive approach. Good first provides the reader with an extensive annotated original translation of this difficult Hebrew text (48-173) and then leads the reader through the Book of Job by way of deconstruction's principle of indeterminacy. He insists that Job be read as an "open" text, not as a "closed" one. The 43 pages of endnotes and 22 pages of bibliography attest to the rigorous scholarship in which he engaged and into which he invites the reader.

Granting the importance of historical critical analyses and admitting his own employment of these methods, Good is more interested in literary questions than in historical ones. He demonstrates this preference by treating the customary preliminary questions in two short introductions; one labeled "dispensable," the other "indispensable." In the first, he addresses historical matters such as the book's original language, geographic origin, date, composition, and relationship with other literature. While he takes a position on each of these issues, he does not believe that knowledge of such specifics contributes to understanding the book as a work of literary art. Although some of the information in the first introduction may be beside the point of his argument, it may be very important for the reader.

In the second introduction Good discusses some of the problems facing the translator and explains how he either resolved them or left them unresolved. He takes serious issue with anyone who presumes to "rewrite" a difficult passage, believing that the emendation probably is more the creation of the translator than of the original author. Since Good is concerned with opening the text to new and multiple meanings rather than with claiming accuracy of translation, he prefers the principles of dynamic equivalence for rendering certain idiomatic phrases. His discussion of some of the characteristics of Hebrew poetry, specifically rhythm and parallelism, is straightforward and will be helpful for those unac-
quainted with these matters. Finally, his short section on language, "A Little Hebrew for the Hebrewless," makes me wish that my own introduction to Hebrew had been as clear as is this explanation.

The translation is fresh, engaging, and free-flowing. It is amazing how an unfamiliar sentence structure can open a well-known phrase to a new reading. While I might prefer a different rendering of certain Hebrew words, e.g., "real man" for geber, Good himself is honest about his dissatisfaction with some of his translation. Still, as stated in his indispensable introduction, there are some passages that do not lend themselves to easy translation. Therefore, the fault does not always lie with the interpreter. The transliteration of certain Hebrew words interspersed throughout the commentary is always interpreted, so that the necessary language study poses no problem for those who do not know Hebrew.

By his own admission, the commentary is "thick-textured." It not only examines the dynamics of the narrative and significance of the speeches, but also contains Good's own argument with literary points made by some of the other prominent commentators on Job. Despite the seriousness of this investigation, its style is conversational and many of its expressions are colloquial. The language Good uses to communicate his insights is inclusive and lively. All of this serves to make the book very readable, in fact, enjoyable.

The book does not end with Good tying the ends of his argument together in order to substantiate his theological claims, because he has made no such claims. Instead, it concludes with an overview of the literary movement of the Book of Job, leaving the reader to decide on its meaning. The triumph of Good's project rests on his ability to open the book to a multiplicity of readings. I think that he has succeeded admirably in this undertaking. The success of his commentary depends on the reader's willingness to play with linguistic imagination.

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DIANNE BERGANT, C.S.A.


Although the field of Marcan studies is already crowded with excellent books, room will now have to made for one more. Tolbert has produced a study that stands in the tradition that began with Theodore Weeden's *Mark in Conflict* (1971) and yet breaks new ground.

She describes her purpose as "to articulate one possible interpretation of the Gospel in all its parts in the light of its authorial audience" (53). T. is well aware of the problematic character of interpretation, that no one interpretation can expect to be exclusive. Yet she makes her case
strongly. Her methods are literary and rhetorical, both ancient and modern. She is concerned with the authorial audience, i.e., the one envisioned by the original author. She sees this audience as urban, gentile, and working-class. As ancient readers, they were concerned not with what something means but with how it means (rhetoric).

T. is concerned with the whole Gospel, not just various parts. Over and over again convincing insights and interpretations are gained by explaining a text within the Gospel as a whole. For example, she suggests that the strong man who is bound and whose house is plundered (Mk 3:27) refers to Jesus. Because of pericope preaching, form criticism, and the synoptic problem, we have traditionally attended to individual pericopes or sayings; this book will force readers to consider the Gospel as a whole. I had thought that I had been doing that for some time, but I was forced time and again to see that I had not been doing it.

The question of Mark's genre has been highly debated in recent studies. Some have considered it the beginning of a new form, "gospel," while others have cast about for appropriate Jewish or Hellenistic models. T. rejects all previous proposals and instead argues that Mark belongs to the genre of the ancient Greek popular novel. The genre of the popular novel has an historiographic form (thus verisimilitude), formulaic plots, "brief, dramatic scenes, dialogue with narrative summaries interspersed, episodic development, beginnings with minimal introductions or in medias res, central turning points, and final recognition scenes" (65). It also shares with the Hellenistic novel the myth of the individual isolated in a dangerous world. Unfortunately there are very few examples of this popular novel extant and the ones that are belong to the erotic type. T. skillfully exploits this minimal evidence to great advantage in order to illuminate Mark's Gospel as a popular novel. It should be noted that T. stands against the tradition that sees the Gospels as products of the liturgical tradition of primitive Christianity. For her Mark's Gospel is popular entertainment.

Since the concern of the ancient reader was with rhetoric rather than meaning, T. constructs a rhetorical outline that runs counter to the more standard plot outline of Mark. Normally critics divide Mark into two main parts: Galilee and Jerusalem, the turning point being Peter's confession. For T. the Gospel is divided differently into two parts. After an initial Prologue (1:1-13), the first major section deals with "Jesus, the Sower of the Word" (1:14—10:52), and the second with "Jesus, the Heir of the Kingdom" (11:1—16:8). The organizing clues to the Gospel are the parables of the Sower and the Wicked Tenants. They clue the reader as to what is transpiring in the story. In fact "Mark 4:1−34 supplies the audience with the fundamental typology of hearing-response that organizes the entire plot of the Gospel" (163). The Sower provides the
typology of characters in the story and describes their fate. Each type of seed represents a group which hears the word and its particular response. T. argues that those who fall along rocky ground are the disciples (rock = petra = Petros). Like Weeden, Kelber, and many other Marcan scholars, she sees the disciples as abandoned at the Gospel's ending. The Sower becomes Tolbert's hermeneutical key to Mark, and one might ask whether she has reduced the Gospel to this parable.

The parable of the Wicked Tenants organizes the plot of the last part of the Gospel. From the perspective of this parable, Mark becomes an apocalyptic drama forecasting not only the destruction of the temple, but the rejection of the Jews and their punishment for Jesus' death. At this point T.'s analysis shows a remarkable convergence with Burton Mack's controversial study, *A Myth of Innocence: Mark and Christian Origins* (Fortress, 1988).

This is a provocative, well-reasoned and well-written analysis of Mark's Gospel. But, as Tolbert admits, it is one interpretation. Whether or not she has gathered up all the mysterious strands that make up the earliest Gospel is certainly debatable. But no informed reader of Mark can overlook this book. It will richly reward careful study.

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BERNARD BRANDON SCOTT


We learn from this first-rate topical "overture" to Paul that nothing could lie farther from the great apostle's thinking about the death of Jesus than a certain television evangelist's nostrum for flagging spirits: "The cross was something (Jesus) had to endure . . . but he arose from the dead. He overcame the cross and put all that behind him" (88). So far from putting "all that behind him," the risen Christ always remains the Crucified for Paul. Where he mentions the risen One, the Crucified is implied, and vice-versa; Paul never speaks of one to the exclusion of the other. The pastoral corollary of this is that neither the Easter Sunday amnesia administered by the TV evangelist nor the permanently furrowed brow of Good Friday rings true to that "word of the Cross" by which Paul defined his whole mission and message.

His skillful organization of a bulky topic and lucid explanation of pertinent texts certify Cousar as a master expositor. The steps of his investigation are dexterously interconnected, and the hermeneutical circle is closed on each with a thorough summation. First, Jesus' death is expounded as God's act of self-disclosure, confounding human expecta-
tions with its strangeness and breathtaking freedom, yet demonstrably true to the character and promises of the One who spoke in the Torah and the Prophets (1 Cor 1:18—2:5; Rom 3:21—26, 5:6—8). Next, we explore the ways Jesus' death is thought to change the sinful human condition, and we discover a rich variety of soteriological idioms: the vicarious and substitutionary uses of "for us," the forensic talk of "justice" and "justification," the payment of ransom for prisoners, the "expiation" of wrongs through sacrifice, the accounting of debts, the collective participation in prototypical experiences (Rom 3:24—26, 4:24—25, 6:1—11; 2 Cor 5:14—6:2). All these weigh in as serious vehicles of Paul's thinking, and their variety and ready combination discourage attempts to gradate or systematize them. In all their array, these gritty metaphors gave Paul both graphic expression of God's saving action and a toehold in the everyday life and religious experience of his constituents.

Perhaps C.'s best chapter contains his answer to the salesman of Easter cheer, setting forth exactly how crucifixion and resurrection were related in Paul's preaching. Basic to this answer, of course, are the fundamentally different modes of participation in Jesus' death in comparison to his resurrection: the one being the very signature of Christian life in the present, the other kept steadfastly future and knowable only in promise and foretaste. Perhaps because we scan a greater number of texts in this section, with 1 Cor 15 in the lead, we gain better insight into the different directions a Pauline argument can take, depending on its "audience factor"—the human disposition and circumstance Paul is addressing in the given passage.

Two further chapters consider the ways in which Church and Christian life are defined by Jesus' death. Wonderful lessons for the Church on removal of human boundaries, freedom from social strictures, and forthright interaction with the world emerge from the exegesis of Gal 3 and 1 Cor 11:17—34, 5:1—13. Finally, Paul's arresting speech in the first person, interpreting his vocation and ministry in light of the cross of Christ (Gal 6:11—18; 2 Cor 4:7—15, 13:1—4; Phil 3:2—11), instill the existential consequences of his refusal to dissociate the experiences of Easter and Good Friday.

The fly in all this pleasing ointment is the complex interplay between contingent circumstance and theological consistency in Pauline discourse, which makes topical treatments like this one difficult, and makes pretense of "synchronic" treatment (18) wholly implausible. C. does not, in fact, prescind from the problem of the letters' target groups and circumstances, but since he does not furnish up-front audience profiles for his major documents, his reader might be forgiven for following certain developments at a distance: the use of narrowly Jewish terminology to depict the universal impact of Jesus' death in Rom 3:21—26; the
Corinthians' need to hear so many blockbuster arguments with apparently so little common substance uniting them; the Galatian Judaizers' contentment with only circumcision and diet on their Mosaic agenda (112, 114). Moreover, anyone following the proceedings in the Greek text could excusably blink at being plunked down in the middle of 2 Cor 5 with the exposition starting at a verse linked to the preceding by *gar* (76).

These are not quite quibbles, for they have to do with locating the cutting edge of Paul's arguments; but they bring on controversy and complexity, and neither plays very well in an "overture to biblical theology."

Fordham University RICHARD J. DILLON


In terms of canonicity 1 and 2 Esdras are considered as Apocrypha in Protestant "complete" Bibles but do not belong to the deuterocanonical group recognized by Trent, even though they had appeared in medieval copies of the Vulgate (as *III* and *IV Esdras*) and were published in a supplement to the Sixto-Clementine Vulgate. Of the three sections that compose 2 Esdras, the second (consisting of chaps. 3—14), called the "Apocalypse of Ezra" or "Fourth Ezra," is the work studied here. This apocalyptic set of visions, with similarities to NT Revelation, was probably written in Hebrew ca. A.D. 90-100 by a Jew living in Palestine or Rome, and was translated into Greek in the second century. Both Hebrew and Greek have been lost; but the latter served as a base for translation (if we simplify a bit) into Latin, Syriac, and Slavonic (one branch of translations), and into Ethiopic, Georgian, Coptic, and Armenian (another branch). Modern translations have mostly followed the Latin, but the control of a wide array of the ancient versions is essential for recognizing the best reading and the history of variants. Moreover, the logic of the contents is extremely difficult and has produced sharp division among scholars. Consequently a major commentary on this work—and this may be the most complete ever produced—is no mean task. Stone, who has previously written some thirty contributions on 4 Ezra and related Ezra literature (including the Armenian version), is superbly equipped to do it. The textual notes to the translation exhibit his control of the versions; and his constant debates with the views of other scholars (showing both appreciation and independence) reflect a mastery of the large secondary literature.

What I found most helpful is Stone's persuasive explanation of the
logic of the work. The governing question is why Jerusalem has been delivered into the hand of Rome (written about as Babylon). Are the deeds of this Babylon better than those of Zion? Why has God destroyed his people and preserved his enemies? The answer comes in seven visions the interrelationship of which is so complicated that earlier scholars (wrongly) doubted the unity of the book. Stone manages to find a deliberate structure in the changes of context and framework.

The first three visions involve a dialogue with an angel (who speaks for God): Ezra reacts with skepticism to the angel’s insistence that God’s ways cannot be understood by human beings; after all he is not asking about heavenly things but about earthly suffering. A series of riddle questions about the wonders of nature are posed to him and gradually bring him in the third vision to a partial acceptance. The request shifts from challenging the righteousness of God to seeking to understand. Stone maintains that Ezra and the angel are two faces of the author’s own self as he struggles with human suffering and God’s revelation. The fourth vision, which is transitional, involves a mourning woman in a field whom Ezra tries to console. Stone explains that Ezra is beginning to act toward the woman as the angel acted toward him, and he can do this because he has accepted and internalized what the angel told him. The woman is transfigured gloriously, and Ezra becomes frightened and disturbed: this is part of a major religious experience as he takes on the role of a prophet. The weeping woman is an externalization of his own grief over the fall of Jerusalem, and in offering consolation he experiences the awesome power of God to transform. Here Stone insists that the author himself probably underwent a true religious experience in his struggle over the fate of Jerusalem.

Visions five and six are dream visions with symbolism (respectively the eagle and lion and the man from the sea) redolent of Daniel. Ezra has now become the elect one and a prophet to whom esoteric revelation is given about the course of history in this last period of the Roman world empire, which is soon to be destroyed and replaced by the messianic kingdom which will gather in God’s faithful including Gentiles. The seventh and final vision concerns the receipt and preservation of the revelation that has been given. Ezra becomes a new Moses who makes 24 books public (the Hebrew Scriptures) and transmits seventy more secretly to be available only to the wise. Like Moses, he is taken to heaven alive.

Many of these interpretations of the individual visions were available before, but Stone has made the changing character and attitudes of Ezra in the book understandable both on the personal level of the author and on the wider ethical level of God’s dealing with his people in time of anguish. Indeed, he has presented a plausible insight into the religious
experience of apocalyptic. It would be naive to hope that 4 Ezra will gain a wide reading public; but certainly some knowledge of it and of its sister work, the (Second or Syriac) Apocalypse of Baruch, should be part of seminary background if we are ever to rescue Daniel and Revelation from the nonsense of fundamentalist literalism. One could not find a better guide to it than Stone, and Hermeneia is to be congratulated for making available this splendid commentary.

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RAYMOND E. BROWN, S.S.


An interesting reflection on Gnosticism as a religious phenomenon by one of the leading Italian scholars working in the field. Filoramo is abreast of both American and European developments in the field as the footnotes and bibliography show, but this is not an academic work addressed to fellow scholars. Nor is it a book for those who know nothing about Gnosticism or the development of Christianity in the second and third centuries C.E. The beginner had best read a more general introduction such as Kurt Rudolph’s _Gnosis_ before tackling this work.

The publishers chose to make the Italian subtitle the title and to translate the Italian _storia_ as “history.” As a result, the American reader who expects to find a reconstruction of the history of Gnosticism using the latest data, sociological theory, and historical critical method will be disappointed. F. does make some observations about the possible history of various gnostic schools toward the end of the book, but this is not a “history” as we commonly use the term. In fact, this book is much closer to Hans Jonas’ _Gnostic Religion_, a treatment of Gnosticism as a religious phenomenon in late antiquity.

The reader may also be annoyed by the ornate, convoluted Introduction. F. attempts to situate the place of gnosis in modern European thought since the Renaissance by referring to as many as he can of the alleged outcroppings of the gnostic spirit in the arts, literature, political thought, and philosophy. It is certainly true that analogies can be drawn between the new religious movements of late antiquity and the reconstructions of religious themes to suit the uprooted intelligentsia of the modern period. This story does not return in the rest of the book until the final paragraph. F.’s last word appears to be an attempt to affirm Hans Jonas’ philosophical description of Gnosticism as an ancient form of nihilism that sought an absolute metaphysical liberty. As a result, Gnosticism is without ethical commitment; both the libertine versions so abhorrent to the church Fathers and the ascetic versions which
dominate the new Nag Hammadi material can exist in the same religious movement. But F. wonders whether the average gnostic—not the great system builders like Valentinus or Basilides—was conscious of the speculative structure of his or her mythic and cultic system.

F.'s key contribution lies in his description of the gnostic mythological system. Gnosticism was one response to the major changes in the religious sensibility of peoples living under the Roman empire. Several features of that new perspective are evident in the orientalized pagan cults, in Christianity, and in Gnosticism. They include a demonization of the cosmos, a new individualism in the quest for spiritual salvation, and a heightened sense of the need for an authoritative revelation to bridge the gap between humans in this world and a distant divinity. Another element in the religious atmosphere of the time was the interiorization of the spiritual struggle. What really counts occurs within the individual's soul, not in the struggle of competing societies or heroes with whom the rest of the populace identifies. To be saved, each person had to undergo the disciplines of spiritual transformation for him or herself.

The description of Gnosticism itself begins with an attempt to distinguish the gnostic imagination and myth from the religious Platonism of the time. F. then treats the structural contents of gnostic speculation, following the sequence of many gnostic treatises: the heavenly world; the fall of wisdom, arrogance of the lower god and creation; the creation of humanity; the savior, reuniting the female spiritual substance scattered in the world and the divine; eschatology, the ascent of the soul and gnostic theories of the Church. Finally he sketches some elements in the development of gnostic systems: Simon Magus as gnostic founder; visionaries and prophets; the libertine and ascetic forms of Gnosticism. F. raises interesting questions as he surveys each of these themes, which would be particularly relevant to a history-of-religions course. But he does not resolve most of the questions raised. Specialists may benefit most from F.'s comments; less informed readers will probably wish there was more explanation or argumentation.

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PHHEME PERKINS


An immediate effect of Pope John XXIII's announcement of the Second Vatican Council was a flurry of scholarly activity devoted to the history and theology of ecumenical councils. One of the most important fruits of this activity was the publication in 1962 of the Conciliarium
Oecumenicorum Decreta (COD) which provided for the first time in a single volume a critical edition of all the conciliar decrees. In 1973 a 3d, revised edition appeared, augmented by the 16 documents of Vatican II.

The two volumes under review photographically reproduce this 3d edition and provide on facing pages an English translation produced by 29 Jesuits working in Great Britain. This edition includes the original brief introductions and explanatory notes, and supplements the brief bibliographies with a judicious selection of works that have appeared in the years intervening. Over 200 pages of indices increase the usefulness of the work: a chronological index of all the decrees, indices of biblical citations, Church councils, the Roman magisterium, the Fathers and the early Church, liturgical books, canon law, proper names, authors, and subjects, the last of these itself 100 pages long.

In the nearly 30 years since the first edition of the COD appeared, there has been an explosion of scholarly work on the Councils. Giuseppe Alberigo's 1962 Introduction included a brief paragraph, unfortunately poorly translated here, which noted that the ecclesial significance of ecumenical councils had been widely undervalued in recent centuries, particularly under the impact of Trent and of the Code of Canon Law. It also noted, while not taking sides, the debates about the number of councils that should be considered ecumenical and about the very criterion of ecumenicity. The original editors adapted a historical criterion when they chose to include all the councils commonly accepted within the Catholic Church, including such disputed councils as Constantinople IV and Lateran I, II, and V.

One can regret that this Introduction has not been revised, at least by bibliographical references to theological, canonical, and historical developments on these questions since 1962—e.g., the work of Vittorio Peri and Josef-Hermann Sieben; the perspectives possibly opened up by Pope Paul VI's reference to the Second Council of Lyons, not as an ecumenical council, but as "the sixth of the general councils celebrated in the Western world"; and the proposals made by Louis Bouyer, Joseph Ratzinger, and others with regard to the significance of the Western councils for an eventual reunion with the Orthodox Churches.

One need not entirely share the somewhat extravagant claims made about the importance of this collection (these decrees "stand alongside the Bible as one of the twin pillars of Christian beliefs"; "at least for Roman Catholics, the book may be regarded as the most authoritative work in the world after the Bible") in order to appreciate the importance of this translation. The decrees presented here often do represent lofty moments in the history of the Church and in the development of its doctrinal tradition; and every scholar and student will be grateful for the great and difficult labor that went into the preparation of this work.
Along with the wheat, of course, there is more than a little chaff; many pages are devoted to obscure and now quite insignificant matters of contemporary political or disciplinary interest. If the reading of these volumes leaves one with a new sense of the importance of the institution of councils in the life of the Church, it also provides an antidote to any lingering tendencies to idealize or romanticize the Church, even in the exercise of its supreme magisterium. For the glorious moments represented here are accompanied by more than a few signs of how low the Church and its leaders may fall both in the abuses the councils addressed and at times even in the responses to them they proposed. To understand and appreciate this complex history, one wishes, as Yves Congar once remarked, that the Church would require, as it does for the Bible, that editions of magisterial texts include explanatory footnotes. For this reason one can only hope that these volumes will be accompanied by an updated history of the Councils such as the *Storia dei Concilii Ecumenici* recently published under the direction of Giuseppe Alberigo. Without some such guide, vast sections of the decrees assembled in these volumes will be opaque to all but specialists, while others are likely to inspire a certain amount of *admiratio fidelium*.

In general the translators have succeeded in their attempt to be both accurate and readable. Quite properly they have kept to technical language when this was used in the original texts. They seem to have differed, however, in their assessments of the ability of modern readers to make their way through long and complex sentences, some of them, particularly the translators of the two Vatican Councils, chopping them into several short sentences, not always, however, retaining the rhetorical nuances of the Latin (see, e.g., 804.37–39; 822.30–32; 971.332–36; references are to the pages and lines of the original texts, which permits easy identification to the English translations commented on here).

A serious effort was made to avoid allegedly exclusive language, and this is for the most part well done. The general editor permitted some pluralism, however, for example, in the rendering of words referring to the *enanthrōpōsis* of the divine Word, which vary between “became human” (5.15; 24.17), “became man” (41.16; 51.6), “the taking of humanity” (28.38), and “the becoming man” (135.29–30). One may regret the loss of the rhetorical and dialectical power of the *Tomus ad Flavianum*, whose *qui... fecit hominem... factus est homo* becomes “who... made humanity... was made man” (78.36–39).

It will take specialists in the various councils to pass full judgments on the translations. I may at least indicate a few cases I found questionable. Something like “sovereign” would render the meaning of *principales* in reference to the divine persons better than “autonomous” (160.43–44). “Whose name stinks” is somewhat jarring, but perhaps was considered
an appropriate euphemism for stercoralis nominis (162.23–24). Ordinationes (202.24; 211.26) should perhaps be “ordinations” rather than “ordinances” (cf. 190.18). Simpliciter (230.2) might be better as “unreservedly” or “openly” rather than “simply.” “To guide souls is a supreme art” seems rather weak for ars artium regimen animarum (248.4). A lot of ink and pain could have been spared in the decade before Vatican II if everyone had translated the in quo omnes peccaverunt of Rom 5:12, quoted at Trent (666.21), as “because everyone has sinned.” Twice in Vatican I (805.25; 807.29) Dei verbo scripto et tradito is rendered as “the word of God in scripture and tradition,” which will not help those trying to understand a vigorous debate that preceded Vatican II. At 805.42, utramque creaturam, spiritualem et corporealem is poorly rendered as “the twofold created order, that is the spiritual and the bodily” (it would have been better to follow the translation of Lateran IV given at 230.11: “both spiritual and corporeal creatures”). Lumen is translated as “power” at 806.8, but as “light” at 807.29. “Its more effective leadership” will be a controversial version of Irenaeus’ potentior principatis, quoted at Vatican I (813.16). It is not customary to translate sponsa in reference to the Church as Christ’s “wife” (822.32)—elsewhere it is rendered as “bride” or “spouse.” “Kept under control” is odd for ordinentur (824.12). “Instrumental sign” is too summary for the signum et instrumentum with which Lumen gentium (LG) explained the meaning of sacrament (849.33).

Some more important questions: it is unhelpful that the translation of iustitia at Trent vacillates between “justness” (673.26,29; 674.7; 675.6; 684.6; 703.14,23), “righteousness” (674.4), and “justice” (674.17–18; 679.35,37; 680.35). The translation in LG 28 and throughout Presbyterorum ordinis of presbyteri as “priests” hides the deliberate decision at Vatican II to restore the ancient and more generic term for second-order ministers. Authenticus, when used of the magisterium, is regularly rendered as “authentic” rather than as “official” or “authoritative.” The deliberate use of the subjunctive in LG 14 (860.16–19) is overlooked. Obsequium, when used of the response due to the authority, is variously rendered as “obedience” (807.3); “assent” (869.11,12,25); “obedience” (931.6; see 944.32), “respect” (935.2); and “allegiance” (1007.5; 1008.25).

Typographical errors are remarkably few (but see 160.2 and 198.11 of the translation). In my copy, the first lines of the English translation of LG 4 are lacking (874). The last sentence in footnote 5 should read: “some of these studies go beyond simple historical commentary” (xiv). I found it odd that the names of the original editors of the COD are not given on the title page.

For theologians, canonists, and historians this publication is an event of major scholarly importance; and if the perhaps inevitably high cost of
this boxed set may remove it beyond the means of many a student and scholar, every serious theological library should have a copy.

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JOSEPH A. KOMONCHAK


Kaufman’s book could easily be subtitled “The Long Shadow of Constantine,” for he seeks to locate a single apologetic strategy via a series of vignettes stretching from the fourth to the 17th century. In the words of the Foreword, the book “is a study of how versions of Christianity and political cultures made claims upon each other at a number of junctures in western history.” By “political culture” K. means those doctrines, images and institutions used by apologists to distribute government power (3). His focus is on “sociolatry,” a Christian and biblical ideology that connects salvation with political idealizations that inspire loyalty and obedience, wherein salvation depends on political power (5).

In his first part, K. examines the myth that God works redemption through deputies. He presents the Eusebian Constantine as a triumphalist redeemer, and the Christian Empire as agent of the Logos. He details early medieval attempts to stand in Constantine’s shadow, and looks at broad medieval legitimations of universal rulership, in such figures as Dante and Henry VII, that were directed against papal claims. Finally, he turns to the amateur theologians in Cromwell’s New Model Army who combined determinism and activism. Part 2 deals with “clerocracy” in conflict, with attempts to transform Christendom into a republic of the faithful. Here K. tells the story of Gregory VII and his papal successors who sought to enlarge their rule over the Church in order to encompass rule over Christian society in a way that collapsed the line between Church and State, although their rhetoric far outpaced reality. He also treats Calvin’s attempts to make Geneva’s lay magistracy congruent with God’s purpose of regeneration, so that election would ensure civic order.

Part 3 focuses on periods when earthly rule seemed contrary to redemption. K. depicts Augustine as more favorable to politics than in the conventional view. Adjusting Eusebian triumphalism to take secular tribulations into account, Augustine argued against the Donatists that God’s rule, enshrined in the Roman Empire, fostered both personal and universal reform. K. also describes the sectarian dualism and sociolatry of left-wing Protestantism in the 1520s, when men like Conrad Grebel and Michael Sattler fused religious and secular aspirations in a sectarian retreat from the larger society; K. conjectures that even they came under Constantine’s shadow. His Conclusion seeks to balance the uniqueness
of each vignette with the continuities of the single apologetic strategy that gave meaning to history and politics by cogently annexing power to dreams of corporate redemption. A full bibliographical essay allows K. to contextualize his vignettes, and to display his historiographical erudition and sense of humor.

Underlying the book is the covert but fruitful ambivalence lurking in its title: does politics redeem the subjects of a political culture, or is politics redeemed when it serves redemption? K. usually emphasizes the first option, but occasionally Christianity redeems politics, as in the case of Gregory VII (96), or of Calvin (109), or of Augustine (132, 141 f.). Some readers may be uncomfortable with K.’s sometimes virtual identification of religion and (political) culture, of sacred and secular. K.’s use of anthropological terms, and his unchronological presentation may seem problematic and anachronistic. The selective treatment of case studies to show long-term continuities produces insights that are not always completely compelling. But, withal, K. gives us a richly metaphorical and densely textured appraisal that sparkles with deft comparisons and significant details. He presents an ambitious, valiant, thought-provoking paradigm that should stimulate further discussion.

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FREDERICK H. RUSSELL


In this remarkable book, a collection of essays written over a six-year period, Bynum argues that medieval Western Christianity, so often presented as solely interested in the soul and its salvation, was preoccupied with bodies, seeing bodies simultaneously as site and symbol of religious aspiration and achievement. Medieval religion was, in fact, embarrassingly concrete in its fascination with the body’s dissolution and dismemberment, and with its reconstitution for purposes of otherworldly reward and punishment on the day of resurrection.

B. acknowledges that she is a “text-centered” rather than an event-centered historian, but she construes texts broadly to include visual images, a rich selection of which illuminates various essays. B.’s conviction that historical women had distinctive religious experiences and appropriated Christianity by the use of distinctive practices and emphases unifies the essays. Assuming that “marginal and disadvantaged groups in a society appropriate that society’s dominant symbols and ideas in ways that revise and undercut them,” she seeks to understand women’s creative use of Christian piety within their societies as a form of resistance and empowerment.
B. here addresses the question of "presentism"—the extent to which a historian's sensitivities should be allowed to inform her vision of the past—in two exemplary ways. First, although she insists that the essays "arise fundamentally from medieval material" rather than from contemporary theoretical perspectives, B.'s textual sources provide a foundation from which she can evaluate the adequacy of several contemporary theorists—Victor Turner, Max Weber, Leo Steinberg, to name only the most evident. Secondly, in the most recent and one of the most fascinating essays, "Material Continuity, Personal Survival and the Resurrection of the Body: A Scholastic Discussion in its Medieval and Modern Contexts," B. demonstrates some common modern scientific and medieval religious interests and anxieties over the extent to which the body is the self. Contemporary debates over organ transplants, gene modification, and speculations about interstellar beaming raise philosophical issues about identity and survival that strangely parallel medieval interests in "glorified bodies or the fate of eaten embryos."

Throughout, B. assumes that, like the disassembled bodies that fascinated medieval people, the historian "regurgitates fragments" of history, and offers, at best, suggestions as to their reconstruction rather than a comprehensive picture of the past: "only supernatural power can reassemble fragments so completely that no particle of them is lost, or miraculously empower the part to be the whole." This exemplary historical humility suggests that history should ultimately be done self-consciously in the comic mode, a mode that acknowledges contrivance and risk, that "always admits that we may be wrong," that speaks with a "partial or provisional voice." Operating in the comic mode, the book's method parallels its content in that "the bodily resurrection at the end of time is . . . a comic—that is, a contrived and brave—happy ending." Yet the comic mode neither trivializes nor misrepresents medieval religion in the West. Rather, it has enabled B. to produce an embodied religious history full of irreducible physicality—body parts and bodily fluids. This is a thoroughly fascinating and pleasurable book.

Harvard University Divinity School

Margaret R. Miles


This collection of 13 essays spans more than 40 years of Wolter's scholarly career, dedicated principally to the reconstruction and elucidation of Scotus' texts. Though very sympathetic to the Subtle Scot, while putting his thought into its medieval context, W. evinces an awareness of modern philosophical movements to which he critically
compares Scotus' thought. The essays possess value for both historians of thought and thinkers.

The essays fall into three main categories: metaphysics and epistemology, action theory and ethics, and philosophical theology. The themes of these previously published articles often cross, and sometimes pure copying from one article to another occurs (compare 28–34 and 43–48), but on the whole the articles complement each other. Fascinating tensions develop between Scotus' acute criticisms of Aquinas' and Henry of Ghent's positions and his own attempts to maintain rational intelligibility in the universe. The singular's intelligibility to God seemingly relativizes essential concepts; so Scotus postulates an absolute nature common to both abstractions and concrete instances. Abandonment of the correspondence theory of truth threatens chaos, yet not everything known about realities is real; hence the formal distinction serves to preserve reason and allow for individualization in the Trinity and in individual material natures perfected by *haecceitas*. Similarly, abstraction yields essential knowledge, but the possible intellect does not remain merely passive; it and the object both cause conceptualization. Moreover the intuition of self in actual knowledge and memory as well as of God in the beatific vision grants another access to reality besides abstraction. (W. rejects the common Scotistic interpretation that material singulars can be intuited; despite the perceived need of postulating *haecceitas*, one does not intellectually grasp *haecceitas*.)

The basic tensions between universal and particular, abstraction and intuition, have repercussions in volition and morality. Understanding freedom basically as voluntary self-determination, Scotus distinguished the natural will, moved by the desire for self-fulfillment (*affectio commodi*), from the free will responding to the inherent value of realities perceived by the mind (*affectio justitiae*). Despite the apparent opposition, they must be reconcilable since the natural will is given by God as a value to be realized. Precisely because the will can freely orientate itself to objective justice, it surpasses the merely natural operation of the intellect, and by choosing to act according to reason, paradoxically it can be more rational than the intellect that naturally (i.e., necessarily) knows. Since reason goes beyond formal abstractions, morality with regard to the Decalogue's second table can find exceptions to universal prescriptions in view of context and consequences; nonetheless Scotus simultaneously upholds the law's general validity. Though God's creation causes the goodness of things, He does not act irrationally but according to His knowledge, which is His nature.

Contrary to Gilson's interpretation, Scotus strongly stresses the intellect's natural ability to know God's existence and nature. He transposes the proof of God's existence from factual motion to the order of possibil-
ity, what can be produced, to attain a greater intellectual necessity and coherence. This transition from physical fact to metaphysical necessity permits him to affirm God's infinity and securely to ground God's other attributes. Since Scotus acknowledges no essence-existence distinction, existence becomes a "mode" and is recognized in a concrete intuition; this existence Scotus considers more perfect than the essence. Thus the Thomistic tension between existential and essential orders is replaced by the Scotistic tension between quiddities and the existence to which some intuitions correspond. The similarities between Scotism and transcendent Thomism are obvious on the intelligibility of the singular, the intellect's constitution of knowing, the relativization of the concept, intuition's primacy, moral proportionalism, etc. The way to nominalism is easier, and its problems are real, but Scotus' witness of the need to preserve conceptual intelligibility, rational rigor, and careful distinction is refreshing. Sometimes W. goes beyond Scotus' texts, as in interpreting physical evil as the necessary "growing pains" of a Christocentric universe (159), and at other times one would like to learn the answer to questions, such as the relation between the concrete mode of existence and haecceitas, which arise from the not entirely systematic juxtaposition of diverse articles. But the scholarship is fine, and the essays are rewarding, even if difficult.

Gregorian University, Rome

JOHN M. MCDERMOTT, S.J.


A collection of eleven lectures, papers, and other studies dating from the 1960s and 70s. Their focus, as the Preface states, is on the biblical humanism of the early 16th century and the connection in one way or another of this humanist culture with Protestantism. It is a fairly random group of Protestant topics, however, that Hall discusses, and his final chapter on Alessandro Gavazzi, a maverick 19th century Italian Protestant, is totally outside the range of humanism. The unity of the book then is a loose one, although that in itself does not detract from the interest and value of the individual studies. It might be noted that all of the essays, save the first, were previously published, several in the annual Studies in Church History. There has been some updating, expanding, and revising for this edition.

Within the confines of his field the scope of Hall's subjects is quite broad. His first two essays are closely related: one is on Cardinal Jiménez de Cisneros and the making of the Complutensian Polyglot Bible, the other follows logically with a discussion of Erasmus' biblical humanism and reform goals. The next five essays deal with different, not to say
disparate, aspects of the 16th-century Reformation: Protestant reform in the cities, Martin Bucer's view of ministry, the Colloquies of 1539–40 that sought to end the religious schism in the Empire, the Polish Protestant reformer John a Lasco, Lutheranism in England. The eighth essay analyzes English Puritanism. Nine and ten are more in a literary vein, on Daniel Defoe and Jonathan Swift respectively, but with special attention to their religious views. The final essay presents Alessandro Gavazzi. Humanist and Erasmian influences can certainly be observed in several of the essays, notably the Reformation ones (John a Lasco, e.g., had been an ardent disciple of the Dutch humanist and had purchased his library), but these features, important as they are, hardly constitute a dominant or unifying theme.

One may ask the purpose of a collection of this sort. Obviously it assembles a number of Hall's scholarly pieces, and it has merit on that score. It is also a depository for a group of articles on specific topics that may in one case or another be relevant to inquiring students in the field of religious or Reformation history. Hall's studies, though dated in some respects, are substantial and informative. In my case the first two essays in the volume were of particular interest. Biblical humanism was a major concern of Hall, and his best work, I think, was in that sphere. The essay on Jiménez and the great Polyglot is as full an account of the background and editing of that superb masterpiece—a triumph of humanist scholarship as well as of early printing—as one will find, and it is based on extensive research. His essay on Erasmus is a fair appraisal stressing the role of the prince of humanists as a biblical scholar and Catholic reformer. His emphasis on the influence of St. Jerome on Erasmus is especially well placed. More could be said about the Catholic view of Erasmus, but that is a complicated historiographical issue, and Hall rightly looks askance at the adverse judgments of Joseph Lortz and Hubert Jedin. For a recent appreciation of Erasmus by a Catholic scholar, see the Introduction by John W. O'Malley, S.J. to the Collected Works of Erasmus 66: Spiritualia (University of Toronto, 1988).

Fordham University

JOHN C. OLIN


Classics of English spirituality from the 17th century are scarce, for the contentious spirit of the times and the long rift of the Civil War and its aftermath deeply lacerated the contemplative spirit. Indeed, save for the poems of George Herbert, few works in prose can qualify. But Jeremy Taylor (1618–1667), although the civil unrest of the mid century scarred
his life and career, produced one of the greatest English works in this
genre, The Rule and Exercises of Holy Dying, a book whose manifold
editions and reprints eminently qualify its author for a volume in the
distinguished Classics of Western Spirituality Series. T. wrote many
other homiletic and controversial works, the most important of which
are his meditation on the life of Christ, The Great Exemplar, his study
of the methods of and approaches to repentance, Unum Necessarium,
and his guide to the wavering in faith, Doctrum Dubitantium. The com-
panion volume to Holy Dying, The Rule and Exercises of Holy Living,
however popular, has always paled next to its successor.

According to the rubric of the series, T.'s works are arranged in
chapters, each focussing on a different aspect of his spirituality. Carroll
focuses on five aspects in T.'s works: Jesus Christ, the sacraments, faith
and repentance, homiletics, and holy living and dying. Each chapter has
a useful introduction and these, joined with the substantial discussion in
the general introduction, furnish nearly 150 pages of commentary. Stu-
dents and teachers will profit from this helpful and energetic discussion
which, barring an occasional error in dating and a few minor blemishes
of fact, is up-to-date and scholarly.

As a contribution to theological studies of 17th-century England,
Carroll's edition is not strikingly new, but this first scholarly edition of
T. in more than half a century will doubtless make some of his writings
more accessible to a learned audience. The drawback to such a collection
as this is that it is an anthology composed of a miscellany of T.'s works;
all but a few of them are excerpted. Even Holy Dying, which surely
deserves publication in toto because it is relatively short, appears in part
only. T.'s greatest work is remarkable not only for its spiritual message;
it is also one of the most splendid monuments of 17th-century English
prose style. T. was a charismatic coiner of metaphors expressive of the
human spiritual condition, and the long popularity of Holy Dying kept
the baroque style of the first half of the 17th century alive and available
to believers for the next century. The post-Restoration "reforms" in prose
style turn out to have been much less effective than we once thought,
and T.'s enduring popularity helped to ensure a long life for the baroque.

University of Pennsylvania

Paul J. Korshin


In 1959 Guennou, the archivist of the Society for Foreign Missions,
rotein a book entitled La couturière mystique de Paris. This book was
based on the spiritual writings of a hitherto-unknown French dressmaker,
Claudine Moine, a refugee from the Thirty Years War in the middle years of the 17th century. *You Looked At Me* is the first English translation of G.'s book.

Upon arriving in Paris in 1642, Claudine went to the Jesuits in the Marais and sought a spiritual director. Soon she lived a spiritual experience that her director asked her to describe. Relation 1 is her autobiography, which describes the states of her soul, her gifts from God, her exercises and style of living. Relation 2, entitled "Deepening" contains material on her spiritual combat, her infused lights, the Eucharist and the great darkness that she knew. Relation 3, "Light," reveals her insights on the mystery of Christ, of God and the effects and value of divine action on her soul. Relation 4 deals with the three stages of prayer, the familiarity of Jesus Christ with the soul, how God speaks to the soul, what disposes it to prayer, the effects of prayer and the excellence of such divine communications.

Personal reactions to spiritual experiences are interesting. Peace and tranquility in the light of adversity are expressed in statements that reveal Claudine to the reader: "When will it be, my God, that you will deliver me from this misery and that I will use not only an hour or a day, but a complete eternity without any hindrance or interruption in praising you and loving you?" (155). This language is quite typical in the history of Christian mysticism. And yet, in many instances, her language seems extraordinary for a 17th-century French seamstress. She describes an extraordinary light that she had on the vigil or feast of the Holy Trinity in this way: "The Holy Spirit is the personal and infinite love that God has for Himself; and because this Holy Spirit receives and contains likewise all the substance and perfections of the divine nature, [He] is equal in everything to the Father and to the Son, but is equal to the Father through the way of love, as the Son is equal through the way of knowledge" (185). It seems to this reviewer that the Ursulines at Langres, where Claudine was in school from the age of 12 to 15, did a wonderful job of "catechizing" their young pupil!

In spite of saying that "God is a pure act that cannot be augmented or diminished" (185), Claudine states ten pages later: "I am entangling myself, rather than making myself clear ... because I don't have the words to make known what I have experienced." In the excessively apologetic notes, Claudine is compared to Teresa of Avila, Julian of Norwich, and John of the Cross. Yet elsewhere G. writes: "[S]he belongs to no school of spirituality: she was led by the spirit. This is what makes this text extraordinary" (297).

This publication includes no imprimatur. Given the nature of this work I should think an imprimatur would appear quite necessary to G., although the practice has become less frequent of recent years. G. himself
poses the question: "What air of authenticity ... has this manuscript? How credible is the experience described in it?" (2). Instead of substantiating an authoritative, rational, and credible argument, he goes on to quote Claudine's phrase, "You looked at me." He then proceeds to describe the provenance of ms 1409 that has been in the archives of the Société des Missions Etrangères in the rue du Bac since the time of the Abbé de Choisy. On G.'s own admission "Claudine Moine does not appear on any page of Bremond's gigantic work on the literary history of religious sentiment in seventeenth century France. He knew nothing about her" (242). To have escaped Henri Bremond's meticulous research—extraordinary! On the other hand, Jean Orcibal has apparently worked on her writings and published about her in La vie spirituelle.

The verso of the title page states: "Published in French as La couturière de Paris by Editions Pierre Téqui." No date for this French edition is given. But after careful investigation, I can find absolutely no similarity between that French original and the present translation. On the contrary, after a search too long to recount here, I discovered that another publication of Claudine Moine whose title is actually Ma vie secrète, published by Desclée in 1968, is the original French edition from which this English translation is derived. Mysterious indeed!

The work Carroll has translated is interesting from many points of view. But the book suffers from a number of defects. The editing is poor, and subdivisions poorly indicated. The notes are apologetic and unnecessarily long. The print is very small. The endnote reference numbers are miniature. And endnotes are all grouped at the conclusion of the book rather than after individual chapters.

St. John Fisher College, N.Y. WILLIAM C. MARCEAU, C.S.B.


Scholarly and perceptive, this book aims to recover Kierkegaard as a historical figure and social critic by looking at three areas: Danish history, culture, and K.'s later writings. Its contention is that K.'s thought is a reaction to the tension between economy and ideology, that his politics is a "healthy and enormously fertile and insightful criticism of bourgeois liberal society," and that this political nourishment was from the "substance of the democratic social movement" taking place in the countryside, and not from the literary delights and ruminations propping up the urban elitist culture that came to mark the end of Golden Age Denmark. For one so nourished, the final phase of his authorship should hardly be construed as an incommensurable element or seen as a deviation from his pseudonymous writings.
Titled "Kierkegaard's Denmark," the first part of this study is a
comprehensive and substantial treatment of developments in economics,
politics, religion, and culture in the first half of the 19th century. One
section focuses on the changing economic and social realities correlating
with the rise of the peasant class, religious awakenings, and the emer­
gence of liberalism. A second section focuses on the Golden Age: its social
and intellectual origins, representative voices, and alternatives. In the
tension between economics and ideology, the ecclesiastical structure is
an extension of the high culture associated with Golden Age ideology.
The relationship between church and state was never strenuously de­
bated. And, when political reforms were instituted their relationship
remained equally ambiguous. As Kirmmse notes, the 1849 constitutional
statement that the Evangelical Lutheran Church is the Danish People's
Church might be read either normatively or descriptively.

Kirmmse holds that there are not two but three alternatives to the
Golden Age cultural synthesis with respect to the questions of history
and of culture. In a useful 2 × 2 matrix, the Golden Age mainstream is
labelled "mandarin romantic." The Grundtvigians, an alternative posi­
tion, represent the "populist romantics," sharing with the mainstream
faith in history. A second alternative is the liberals or "mandarin agnos­
tics," who shared with the mainstream an elitist notion of culture. But
there is a third alternative, contends Kirmmse: K., an agnostic on the
significance of history and populist on the locus of culture. The second
part of the study, titled "Denmark's Kierkegaard," substantiates
Kirmmse's claims for K.; it unpacks K.'s deliberations on religion and
politics reflected in eleven of his titles, two autobiographical pieces, "Two
Notes," and "An Open Letter" to Dr. Rudelbach.

K.'s later writings are those from 1846, beginning with the Review.
Kirmmse sees the latter as a programmatic statement of K.'s political
view expressed in liberal-democratic catchwords such as "universality,"
"equality," and "unity," but given religious application. Through the
vocabulary K. articulates two visions of how a Christian is to relate to
the political-social sphere: some writings lean more towards one than the
other. Central to these visions is an ordering principle that K. follows
and Kirmmse articulates with clarity: never relate infinitely to anything
finite, for to do that is to despair. Works of Love underscores one vision:
the command to love one's neighbour is really to understand the priorities
within which one relates oneself to political and social obligations. In
contrast is a vision which Two Minor Ethico-Religious Discourses sug­
gests: one becomes related to society through an absolute and radical
opposition, demonstrated by martyrs, saints, and apostles.

The tension between the two visions, Christian citizen versus Apostle,
is never resolved, showing up in Christian Discourses and Sickness.
Kirmmse thinks K. shows his hand a little by finding “hankering after sainthood a bit suspect.” The tenor of Training is a call to protect the priorities of the inner person when threatened by the claims of a society with a penchant for self-deification. In that book K. moves beyond the God-Caesar dichotomy, poising for an attack on Christendom, if it became necessary. Political intervention by the Christian might be necessary, even though Christianity can live under various political circumstances. Truth as a property of individuals rather than the “mass” or herd is the resounding theme of the autobiographical pieces, “Two Notes” and “Open Letter.” Here a comparison between Rousseau and K. is drawn: the former valuing the individual only in relation to the community, the latter valuing the community only in relation to the individual.

The two series of discourses, Self-Examination and Judge for Yourselves, show a radical difference between the programs for reform proposed by K. and by Grundtvig. While Grundtvig holds a view in which the two kingdoms are reciprocally related, K. insists that any relation between the temporal and spiritual is at best a contingent one and thus there can be no Christian state.

K.’s final attack on the State Church reflects, as Kirmmse notes, classical liberal values of secularism and of individual responsibility, all of which can be destroyed “by clumsy sociopolitical intervention in the private sphere” (479). In the end K. aligns himself with “the common man” in the call for a free church in a free state. The response to the attack, generally negative, was not unanimous; intelligent and respectable citizens in certain circles were very much in sympathy with the attack and its intention to separate religion from a Christian cultural synthesis.

Kirmmse’s depiction of K. as social critic does not in the least detract from the way he conceived his own task as religious writer. Nor does it overlook any significant strand in the writings considered. What we are left wondering about, however, is whether we are to understand K.’s two visions as being dialectically related or as an “either/or” choice. It would seem that the two are dialectically related for K. and therefore for a Christian not a question of an “either/or.” For readers who already appreciate K. as a historical figure and social critic, this book is still a refreshing treat. It turns to sources in Danish and archival documents to provide details of certain developments in European intellectual and cultural history. But, most of all, its commentaries are a celebration of the texts making up K.’s later writings, and a contribution to the tradition of textual hermeneutics.

*Trinity College, University of Toronto*  
ABRAHIM H. KHAN

This volume of exciting essays is an excellent centenary collection in honor of John Henry Newman (1801-1890). Although many of the 22 contributors are not Newman specialists, there is an impressive array of leading scholars in the fields of English, history, philosophy, and theology. The even quality of research and writing entices the reader to pursue avidly the variety of topics. Although these topics are not systematically organized, three common themes emerge that warrant critical comment: Newman as writer, conscience, and tradition. (Selected contributors are indicated in parentheses.)

N. remains one of the greatest English controversialist and satirical writers (I. Ker). His literary reputation in poetry (R. Sharrock) was surpassed in his non-fiction prose, best illustrated in his 1851 Lectures on the Present Position of Catholics in England (A. O. J. Cockshut); and the rhetorical mastery in his sermons received wide acclaim (E. Griffiths). Naturally, he turned his literary talent to personal advantage. In the Apologia (1864) he adopted a narrative form to express his faith and values, personally integrating his Anglican alienation with his new Catholic confidence (J. H. Buckley). In his private letters he skillfully used language to influence his correspondents (A. G. Hill), personally encouraging the growth of conscience in religion.

N.'s view of conscience portrays a concern not so much for social and political thinking as for its spiritual and moral roots in society; he used conscience to discern objective truths in a fashion similar to the illative sense (E. Norman). In the Grammar of Assent (1870), his most philosophical work, the illative sense attains truth through converging confirmations (H. Meynell). Similarly, conscience discerns truth through subjective judgments that make previous knowledge more intelligible without capitulating to subjectivist analysis. To avoid subjectivism Newman complemented the role of forming conscience in a tradition, the Romantic influence upon him, with the revision of the underlying presumptions of conscience in light of new experience and theories, the Empiricist influence upon him (B. Mitchell). Unfortunately, the connection between the illative sense and conscience is overlooked by J. Finnis, who reads N.'s “Letter to the Duke of Norfolk” (1874) only in reference to the traditional Catholic distinction between habitual and actual conscience. N.'s religious epistemology avoided the view of practical judgment (actual conscience) as an application of principles (habitual conscience). Hence, conscience discerns truth not by the logical application of general principles but subjectively through the accumulation of inferences. This personal account of conscience more easily accommodates what N. Lash appropriately describes as being at the heart of N.'s religion: a conviction of the presence of God's grace.

N.'s theology of grace illustrates another major theme: his appeal to
the Christian tradition. His Anglican Lectures on Justification (1837) remain a model for modern Ecumenism, seeking a middle way between Evangelical Protestantism and Tridentine Catholicism (H. Chadwick). But it was the tradition of the early Church that had the most influence on N.'s theology. E.g., his emphasis upon Christ's divinity can be explained by his preference for the Alexandrian school (R. Strange). Generally, the early Church shaped N.'s method in theology. E.g., his retrieval of an Augustinian dialectic between reason and authority (C. Gunton), which he implemented in his view of conscience and authority (M. R. O'Connell), shaped his view of ecclesiology in general (A. Dulles) and of infallibility in particular (F. A. Sullivan). In his first book, The Arians of the Fourth Century (1833) N. struggled with the question of method in doctrinal history by situating his essay in the context of religious language (R. Williams). Surprisingly, there is no study in this collection of N.'s essay on doctrinal development (1845), his major work on tradition. Nonetheless, in the closing chapter N. Lash argues plausibly that even if the metaphor of development has been surpassed in theology today, the achievement of N.'s essay on development is to identify the role of practical reason in history as faith struggles in different ways with divine mystery. In a sense N.'s historical method weaves together the three themes that I have highlighted: as a writer, most of his major works were responses to historical crises; and his historical method inspired his views on conscience and on tradition by appealing to the congruence of arguments as the safeguard of morals and of faith.

The book supplies a fine index of names and themes: the detailed references to N.'s works are useful and the list of key topics under his name maps the main arguments in the essays. However, it is a pity that in this centennial collection only four scholars represent the high quality of Newman scholarship that has appeared over the past decade in North America. Also, an introductory essay could have presented an overview of the variety of topics and the different methods of analysis. Finally, two items would have been helpful to scholars unfamiliar with this field: a bibliography of N.'s works, major commentaries, and select literature, as well as a detailed chronology of N.'s life. Nonetheless, the scholarly quality of the essays provides a valuable return for the book's high price.

Saint Louis University

GERARD MAGILL


Karl Barth is generally acknowledged to have been the greatest theologian of the 20th century. But this much-praised theologian has not
been much read, at least in America. So Hunsinger set himself the task of producing a guide that would unlock the riches of Barth’s theology. As one reads Barth, one becomes aware of certain patterns that are characteristic of his way of doing theology. Many analyses of Barth’s theology are unsatisfactory because they overlook these patterns. They highlight this or that aspect, but fail to present a complete account of the presence and interrelation of the motifs that shape Barth’s theology in its complex unity. H. identifies six such themes as keys to the formal construction of the *Church Dogmatics*:

1) “Actualism” refers to Barth’s preference for the language of occurrence, happening, event, history, decision, and act. Barth thinks primarily in terms of act rather than being, of events rather than substances.

2) “Particularism” means that Barth always moves from the particular to the general, not the other way around. Other thinkers begin with general principles or universal truths. But for Barth, every concept used in theology must be defined on the basis of the particular reality of Jesus Christ. He is God’s definitive act of self-revelation. Because Jesus Christ is absolutely unique and absolutely central, all general concepts must be redefined in terms of this particular.

3) “Objectivism” has a twofold significance in Barth’s thought. For one thing, the knowledge of God confessed by faith is objective in the sense that its basis is not in human subjectivity but in God. Against the anthropological reductionism of modern Protestant theology since Schleiermacher, Barth insisted that God’s identity is disclosed in God’s self-revelation in Jesus Christ. What God is in his revelation, he is in Himself. Apart from the objective ground of our knowledge of God, the other meaning of “objectivism” is that what God does in Christ for human salvation is objectively real, regardless of how we respond to it. God’s saving action is valid and effective, whether we acknowledge it or not.

4) “Personalism” calls attention to the fact that God’s self-manifestation in revelation and salvation comes to us in the form of personal address, to which we respond as persons. Barth’s objectivism does not result in a disengaged kind of theology with a scholastic flavor, because the objectivist emphasis is balanced by the personalist emphasis. “Objectivism does not deny but establishes the basis for God’s personal relationship with us and our personal encounter with God.”

5) “Realism” characterizes Barth’s view of theological language. In itself, our human language is radically unlike what it refers to. But by grace God makes use of it, so that it transcends itself (goes beyond what it is capable of naturally) and really refers to God. The realism of Barth’s interpretation is shown by contrasting it with two alternative views, which H. calls “literalism” and “expressivism.”
6) "Rationalism" is H.'s term for Barth's view of the relation of faith and reason. The term is obviously being used in a very special sense. H. sums up the rationalism peculiar to Barth's theology in two ways: "No knowledge without faith" means that theological reasoning is limited by the motifs of personalism and particularism. Personalism means that theological truth is always self-involving (commitment). Particularism means that theological truth can never be grounded in anything but the truth of the Christian message itself. "No faith without knowledge," on the other hand, means that Barth sees faith as intrinsically rational. Although faith is more than knowledge, it always includes a cognitive dimension. Anselm's phrase "faith seeking understanding" means, for Barth, "faith seeking to understand the implications of the cognitive content intrinsic to faith."

These six motifs are the formal patterns that recur again and again in Barth's theology. Unfortunately, merely to list these motifs conveys no impression of the richness of H.'s exposition of them.

H. calls attention to Barth's distinctive use of the terms "abstract" and "concrete." To charge that a theological proposal is "abstract" is one of Barth's chief objections to other views. A concept is abstract if it disregards the particularity of God's revelation in Jesus Christ and looks instead to general principles. Conversely, a proposal is "concrete" to the extent that it reflects the specific reality of God in Christ. While H. connects this "abstract/concrete" polarity with Barth's actualism, it seems to me to be more closely related to the motif of particularism.

The one weakness of H.'s schema, in my judgment, is its terminology. It is the difficulty of finding suitable terms for the themes he has identified. Is not the term "rationalism," for instance, so burdened with non-Barthian connotations as to be an unsatisfactory designation for the feature of Barth's theology H. uses it to describe? As H. concedes, "Rationalism as conventionally understood in philosophy has almost nothing to do with what is intended here."

Beyond the exploration of the motifs, a highlight of the book is its clear account of the dynamics of Barth's "universalism." H.'s analysis is the best explanation I have seen of why Barth treats this question the way he does. Another strength of the book is its examination of the problem of "double agency" in Barth. With his emphasis on the sovereignty of grace, how can Barth assign a meaningful role to human action? H. explores the inner logic of Barth's approach, analyzing criticisms often made against it, and showing that Barth's position is considerably more coherent than it is often made to appear.

In 30 years of studying the theology of Karl Barth, I have never come across so illuminating a treatment of Barth's thought. This book is absolutely indispensable for anyone attempting to understand Barth's
way of doing theology, and it will be of immense help to those seeking to take full advantage of the contribution Barth has yet to make to Christian theology in our day.

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**Russell W. Palmer**


Farley's purpose is to show how the Hebrew-Christian paradigm of good and evil, or sin and redemption, illumines the human condition in its experiences of the tragic, evil, and liberation.

He calls his method reflective ontology because it relates to the perduing features of human beings, yet in their practical and experimental modes of acting and interrelating. He characterizes his approach as "in the liberal and revisionist line of nineteenth- and twentieth-century theology." His manner is irenic: he wishes to overcome all dualistic conceptions of reality—individual vs. society, theology vs. ontology, praxis vs. theory. He hopes to win over those who see ontology as no longer meaningful to a world that eschews universals (deconstructionism), at the same time assuaging those who would see his method as insufficiently theological for not being Christocentric. And so, the question that hovers over his entire work is: Will he be theologically faithful, yet relevant to modern modes of thought? There is no doubt about the latter, in this work that ingeniously explores the inner workings of human beings, using a brilliant blending of categories borrowed from psychology, sociobiology, linguistics and philosophy. He is, however, less successful in maintaining the essentials of the Christian paradigm.

F. understands there to be three spheres of human reality: the interhuman, the social, and individual agency. The agent is self-presencing and determined by its being-as, but transcendent by its capacity toward discerned possibilities. In addition, the agent has several dimensions of existence: the biological as well as that of the elemental passions for subjectivity, the interhuman, and reality.

In all these spheres and dimensions, we experience a gap between our strivings for fulfillment in the eternal horizon and our delimiting realizations. This tragic element is not a product of sin (pace Pannenberg); it is a necessary consequence of human existence. Sin occurs when we refuse to accept the structures and situations of our finitude. Instead of living in reference to the eternal horizon which alone can secure our existence and give it meaning, we absolutize penultimate referents, and allow evil to take over our lives; in other words, we practice idolatry in the agential sphere, alienation in the interhuman sphere, and subjugation in the social sphere.
In each of these spheres, there is an opposing experience of freedom or redemption, found in a transcendence that allows us to rise up out of the dualism of striving and frustration intrinsic to each sphere.

In the agential order, we enter the state of being-founded, of participating in an historical milieu that mediates the founding actual presence of the eternal horizon as the sacred, the transmundane (not eschatological) power and creative ground of all things. Being-founded does not displace the state of human reality, but allows us to consent to the tragic character of our essentially good but now relativized world.

In the interhuman sphere, we overcome alienation with interhuman relationships and relate to others in compassionate obligation. We are able to transcend the natural and nonsinful egocentrisms in life by entering into communion or an agapic relationship with the face, the mystery of the thou, that represents the presence of the sacred. Though the power of the face is redemptive to all the spheres because of their interconnectedness, the redeeming presence of the sacred, which must in some sense be personal, is experienced most of all in the interhuman sphere.

In the social sphere, F. finds certain communities of the face, whose primary purpose is to mediate a relation to the universal face that overcomes regional limitations. Such a community is the Christian ecclesia. Though such a community will necessarily continue to be a mixture of forms of subjugation and redemptive presence, in its ideal form ecclesia will expose all forms of evil to all agents and in all interhuman relationships and social realities, and at the same time challenge them with the possibilities of freedom available to those who open themselves to the face of the sacred.

F.’s work is a masterful reconceptualization into the modern idiom of important features of the Christian experience of sin as the practice of idolatry and the power of social forces to enslave. But does he retain the Christian vision of redemption? I have reservations: (1) F. argues there is nothing new in the Christian vision over the Hebrew, and that he has grounded his views in a study of the Scriptures. Yet he provides no supporting apparatus. Can the NT experience of redemptive life in Christ be faithfully represented minus its uniqueness? (2) F. discards all pre-critical cosmological elements from the Christian tradition, including original sin, eschatology, and monarchical-judicial metaphors of sin and salvation. This does not appear to leave room for the Incarnation, crucifixion and resurrection of Jesus. If this is the case, small wonder the Christian vision is undistinctive. Why even call it Christian?

St. Joseph’s University, Philadelphia       MARTIN R. TRIPOLI, S.J.

Van de Beek is professor of systematic theology at the University of Leiden. In 1980 he published a dissertation on the human person of Christ, in which he spoke of the mutability and history of God. He approaches the problem of sin and suffering from this perspective. In his four main chapters B. explores the problem, treats the implications of divine omnipotence, considers the consequences of God’s goodness, and attempts a new way of regarding the problem of evil.

B.’s teaching on the mutability of God is not the fruit of philosophical reflection, but of an interpretation of Scripture. He takes the words of Scripture at face value. If they say that God repents, they mean that he changes his mind. This enables B. to reconcile divine omnipotence and divine goodness by having them mean different things at different times. Once we have dropped the premise of immutability, then we can speak “only about the omnipotence as it was at a given moment or the goodness as it was manifested at a certain time” (263). God himself simply determines what these are to mean: “And if today God acts differently than yesterday, goodness today is different from what it was yesterday. God is the criterion for good and evil, for power and powerlessness. There is no authority above him to which he could be subject” (ibid.).

Something, however, is constant: the fidelity of God. If he makes a choice at a certain time, he is bound by that choice. In choosing Jesus Christ God has put himself irrevocably on the side of human salvation, whereas before that choice he could have done differently. The same is true of the choices made by the Holy Spirit in the unfolding of history. Prayer enables us at times to persuade God to change his mind. Thus human beings participate with God in the government of the world. In this way we move to the ultimate transformation of heaven and earth, where God will be all in all.

It seems to this reviewer that B.’s enterprise collapses because he fails to come to grips with the central problem he has raised: the hermeneutics of biblical statements. His argument for taking these statements at their most obvious and human meaning appears simplistic and unconvincing: “Everything we say about God is said in human words. Those words either are, or are not, meaningful. Since words are not used without purpose, the people who in human words and earthly images say something about God intend to say something that does justice to reality” (273).

If it is true that God changes in the way that B. suggests, he has failed to show it. He has raised a whole cluster of philosophical issues which he fails to treat with any adequacy: how human language may be applied
to the divine; how the divine duration and creaturely duration are different yet somehow the same; how the creator of all things is affected by the conditions of time and space that he has established, etc. And his view that God simply decides what is good by doing it seems an ultimate expression of voluntarism.

The book has no index and no bibliography. If you check his footnotes to find the sources he uses, you will find mostly Dutch and German Protestant theologians; it is almost as if the rest of the Christian world has had nothing to say on what is the most deeply felt problem affecting faith in God. And the people he does cite do not in great part share his position.

No doubt the mystery of God’s dealing with our human world of sin and suffering calls for many approaches and many suggestions. B. frequently says things that are incisive and illuminating, indicating that he does have the native ability and training to deal with this matter helpfully. Unfortunately, in this work he does not fulfill this potential.

_Jesuit School of Theology, Berkeley_  
JOHN H. WRIGHT, S.J.


This book, originally intended to be an ecclesiological third part to complete the trilogy begun with _Jesus_ (1974) and _Christ_ (1977), has in fact been composed from a different perspective than originally planned. Because he does not believe that the new elements of Vatican II were given consistent institutional structures by the official Church during the 1970s and 1980s, Schillebeeckx decided to emphasize here the principle _ecclesia semper purificanda_: the Church must continuously purify, reform, and renew herself as the story of the saving God in the midst of sinful but redeemed and coresponsible humankind.

Chapter 1 purports to show that “no salvation outside the world” should replace “no salvation outside the church”—the teaching of the Council of Florence-Ferrara which S. considers “bewildering to us today.” This section is a helpful digest and development of S.’s foundational theology. Over the years S. seems to do his most creative theologizing when explaining how and why God’s revealing and redeeming word is mediated to us in a multiplicity of modes through both religious and secular experiences. His analysis of the distinctions and relationships between world history and salvation history lays the foundation for understanding the unique role of the Church without restricting the saving grace of Christ to visible boundaries within a hierarchical structure.
Chapter 2 confronts the problems of the human quest for God in a secularized world. S. surveys questions of religious belief and moral convictions in the contexts of their institutionalization within the Church, of philosophical reflection, of experiencing God within secularized society, and of the great world religions. One might label the discipline behind this section predominantly a Christian theology of contemporary religious experience. Its concluding reflections, “Letting God Be God,” state that we must “speak to God in terms which go beyond both theism and atheism,” and that such terminology as “mediated immediacy” is taking on new meaning. The bottom line seems to be that God’s being and action transcend the distinction between necessity and contingency, and so everything about them is absolute freedom and unpredictable to us.

This sets the stage for the central chapter, “Christians Find God above All in Jesus Christ.” Paradoxically, however, the human face of Jesus not only reveals the triune God most clearly but at the same time conceals the divine as inexpressible. The Christological revelation, therefore, lets God in his absolute freedom and incomprehensibility manifest other aspects of his infinite riches elsewhere. S. struggles to show both the legitimacy of the Christian claim to uniqueness and universality and the critical foundation for dropping its claim to absoluteness, which he describes as an exclusivist claim (161). He points out that Karl Rahner recognized the individual possibility of salvation for members of non-Christian religions and even attributed “saving worth” to them as such; Daniélou and de Lubac made similar comments. S.’s own position appears to be expressed in a statement such as: “God is absolute, but no single religion is absolute” (166). This review cannot attempt to unpack the intricate dialectical propositions about the intrinsic relativizing of human history and truth, etc., which lie behind that assertion. Suffice it to say that S. distances his own hypothesis from any theory resembling the “anonymous Christian” or “implicit Christianity.” He posits a “concrete universality” or catholicity, according to which “universal” means what is equally valid for all and which must be incarnated in each and every one without any particular incarnation exhausting its entire potential (169). Christ and Christianity offer us the universality whereby we believers unite ourselves with the call for justice of all. S. sees this expressed in the best of liberation theology and practiced incomparably by Mother Teresa.

Chapter 4, “Towards Democratic Rule of the Church as a Community of God,” provides provocative insights into the challenge to the contemporary Church to become more liberated from feudal authoritarian structures and assume a form of governance closer to the secular experience of free citizens in the modern world. S. shows how historically the Church
and her ecclesiologies have been encumbered by polities of the various worlds in which she has existed and to which she has related. He believes the great benefits to be derived from appropriating social and political developments since the French Revolution will provide more space for the liberating work of the Spirit. Appealing to the Church as a “mystery,” as though she ever exists in a political and social vacuum, has only preserved an authoritarian hierarchical structure and placed the blame upon the disobedient members for the problems that arise. Instead, S. maintains, those with special responsibility of spiritual leadership and service in the Church should be fostering the sensus fidelium as the listening to the Spirit by all, and so giving the magisterium its certification.

This is “must” reading for everyone wrestling with the thorny problems of our Church today and tomorrow and well into the foreseeable future. S. may not have all the right answers, but he raises the right questions and provides us with good paths to solutions. Yet one might well ask about S.’s use of history in the interpretations that lead to some of his conclusions, e.g., about the influences shaping the Church more into a societas perfecta, or hierarchical structure, than into a community of faith, love, hope, worship, and witness, or ecclesia semper purificanda. But this reviewer will leave such matters to historical theologians. Or one might question, as I do, the adequacy of his hypothesis about “universality,” which seems to fall short of the Christian claim that Christ saves all.

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FREDERICK M. JELLY, O.P.


Within the contemporary cultural and intellectual context of historical consciousness with its attendant sense of contingency, pluralism, and change, how do theological schools educating people for ministry in the Church move beyond the simple and safe repetition of church doctrines to a creative engagement of the tradition that will enable those who are subsequently in ministry to respond openly and positively to new data and developments? In other words, is it more important to communicate a comprehensive knowledge of the theological tradition or to offer a method that will enable students of theology to engage in a life-long process of doing theology? Haight addresses this issue with a clearly written and finely delineated prolegomenon or introduction to theology (its sources rather than its content), which, as a critical reflection upon the discipline itself, is also a constructive theological interpretation.

“Unless the church in its ministers and ministries can find the freedom
which is engendered by historical consciousness to dramatically reinter¬pret its message, it will not preserve that message but surely compromise and even contradict it by default” (x). To be true to the living tradition as opposed to any form of traditionalism or fundamentalism, one must have “a critical understanding of the very foundations of theology.” H. pursues this goal by selecting five key areas that are foundational to theological assertions, namely faith, revelation, Scripture, religious symbols, and method. Each area has two chapters: the first, a theoretical consideration of the topic, and the second, an application of the theoretical conception to the nature of theological statements. “The questions the book seeks to answer in its most direct form are: What is a theological assertion and how does one interpret its meaning?” (9).

Before treating the five areas, H. offers four basic principles which must be appreciated if one is to enter into the argument of the whole in a positive way: (1) “theology as apologetic,” not in the sense of proof but of explaining itself before a world in which it claims universal relevance in terms of common human experience; (2) “social historicity,” with an emphasis not only on the historical but equally on the social constitution of human existence with all its attendant disorder and ambiguity; (3) “transcendental analysis” to uncover the universal in the particular, the “anthropological constants” of historical existence while respecting “the distinction and tension between the transcendental and categorical dimensions of experience”; (4) “action” as a dynamic philosophy of life (the influence here is from Blondel) which recognizes the fully human to be “freedom in act” while not denying the importance of passivity. H. says that this dynamic concept of action is operative throughout the essay and, indeed, I think it is his most creative contribution to the theological enterprise. It helps define each of the five areas and is foundational to an integral conception of spirituality. “Since spirituality is the Christian life in action, and the purpose of theology is to nurture spirituality, the perspective defined by a philosophy of action may be seen as a principle that coordinates the whole work” (9).

In moving through the five areas, which H. admits might be differently organized, one is impressed with the clarity of presentation, the breadth of references, and the consistency of viewpoint. The key to the entire book appears to lie in the treatment of “religious symbols,” for it functions as a “reprise” of the preceding treatments of faith, revelation, and Scripture and it opens up the appropriate understanding of interpretation (method). Theology in the final analysis is a “symbolic discipline” and so is defined as “the construal of reality in the light of Christian symbols” (216).

Whether one finally agrees with every aspect of H.’s treatment, this book will surely force the reader to consider what is really going on when
he or she makes theological assertions. It should be required reading for every graduate student beginning the study of theology.

Gonzaga University, Spokane   Michael L. Cook, S.J.


Taylor begins by developing a model of theology that (1) responds to criticisms leveled against the correlationist formula of Tillich and others with respect to the nature of cultural discourse, social location, and political dynamics; (2) reflects postmodern interests in retrieving traditions, respecting plurality, and resisting domination; and (3) defines theology in a liberationist fashion as reflection on Christopraxis and in accordance with the hermeneutical privilege of the oppressed.

His hermeneutic theory focuses on the reception of traditions by flesh-and-blood readers in determinant social contexts instead of on ‘implied readers,’ the structure of textual traditions, or the production of traditions. He rejects any reactionary acquiescence to tradition that engenders homogenized, not pluriform interpretations, and serves supremacist, not emancipatory interests. On the other hand, T. commends the importance of explanatory theories in theology, both discursive (literary) and extra-discursive (political and anthropological). These theories can at times “challenge and correct” Christian traditions and understandings; however, they must serve, not eclipse Christianity. T. writes about (new or fuller?) receptions of traditions, but he seems at least as committed to refiguring, revisioning, remythologizing (i.e., transforming) Christian tradition in response to the interlocking forms of domination.

T. further explores a variety of “interested” social theories that address sexism, heterosexism, racism, and classism. His analysis privileges theories of sexism: political theories on the family wage system and gender implications, and cultural theories that examine male dominance and violence against women. Connections between sexism and heterosexism, classicism, and racism are developed. T. detects parallel dynamics between the different forms of oppression: monster making and monster slaying, and the process of being abstracted and alienated from body, gender, matter, race, and ethnic heritage.

Social theories are needed for Christian discourse and praxis, but T. confesses that ultimately Jesus Christ saves. Hence, theology must maintain its distinctiveness. He develops here his most important theological argument: Jesus Christ articulates the intersubjective and sociohistorical dynamic of reconciliatory emancipation; this dynamic is necessarily related to Jesus of Nazareth, but not reducible to him. Because of
"symbolic and social problems entailed in identifying the Incarnation so closely to the male figure of Jesus," T. believes that identification must be resisted in favor of interpreting Jesus as leaven in this dynamic (171–72). He proposes that this sociohistorical dynamic of reconciliatory emancipation be "remythologized," based on the root metaphor of *Christus Mater*. Though not entirely new, this metaphor is intended to shift attention from the person of Jesus to the process of reconciliatory emancipation, with emphasis on promoting the emancipation of women, sensuality, blackness, and materiality and an appreciation of diversity.

T.'s reconceived revisionist theology is methodologically astute and especially important for its incorporation of extradiscursive theories. He addresses some of the most difficult and urgent issues confronting the churches and society. His selection and adaption of certain political and anthropological theories will undoubtedly be critized from other "interested" perspectives. Still his approach proves productive and provocative both as cultural criticism and as Christology and soteriology. However, his justified and welcomed attention to extradiscursive phenomena and theories leaves discursive materials and methods, which he acknowledges as important, underdeveloped. Consequently, at the level of performance, traditions of discourse (biblical, creedal, liturgical, and theological) remain inadequately integrated into his model of theology; the postmodern sense of tradition, which T. wishes to affirm, is neglected. The result is that the transition from a theoretical exploration of exploitative situations to a remythologization of Jesus Christ as *Christus Mater* seems quick and raises many questions. Are we left viewing traditional materials not as ambiguous, but as primarily negative? Can revered traditions also provide potent resources for responding to troubling postmodern situations? In short, how are the hermeneutical and the constructive tasks to be interrelated? One may rightly wish to offset, suppress, or subvert a dubious tradition or a certain kind of reception, but is remythologizing the only option, one option among many, or ultimately problematic? Remythologizing, under various names, has been a defensible option in the history of Christianity, but so has *memoria* and *mimesis*. T.'s work raises many questions about how new interpretations, metaphors, and myths are generated out of older ones in response to new situations and how they are received by the Christian community.

T.'s reflections on salvation as reconciliatory emancipation provide a rich alternative to a perceived impasse between liberationists and their critics. His corresponding Christology remains, however, unsettling. Many will agree with T. that Jesus Christ must be identified with the process that Jesus of Nazareth initiates. But Jesus Christ also represents the personal otherness of God, the one in solidarity with those who suffer.
While T. appreciates the practical impact of liturgy and ritual in the process of redemption, one wonders whether his legitimate ethical and liberationist concerns are matched by sufficient attention to the doxological and mystical dimensions evident in traditional Christology that are equally in need of rethinking.

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BRADFORD HINZE


Shmueli had multiple roots in Poland, Germany, Mandatory Palestine, Israel, and the United States. This English edition of his classic volume (originally published in 1980) appears posthumously. His daughter partly edited the original Hebrew text in addition to translating it; three chapters have been omitted and a new introduction added. S. examined the translation prior to his death in 1988, so this English edition bears his stamp overall.

S. insists there is no single Jewish culture that carries through every period of history. Contrary to Leo Baeck and others, he argues against any “essence” of Judaism. Rather Jewish history is characterized by a succession of cultures. He does acknowledge the persistence of certain concepts, such as God, Torah, chosenness, and the Exodus; but the fundamental meaning of these concepts is so reworked from culture to culture that their similarity is purely external. If there is a continuous aspect in Jewish cultural transformation, it is to be found in certain recurring tensions. S. cites three in particular: (1) between universalism and particularism; (2) between the individual and the nation; and (3) between the different elements constituting culture (e.g., language, land, economy, army, etc.).

S. identifies seven cultures in Jewish history. Five of these he terms traditional: the biblical, the Talmudic, the poetic-philosophical, the mystical (and its offshoot Hasidism), and the rabbinic. The other two are modern expressions—the culture created by the Emancipation experience and the National-Israeli culture. S. emphasizes that these cultures do not simply represent historical periods; at times several existed side by side within world Jewry. The pivotal issues in each culture are basically the same; and it is a set of attitudes toward these issues which gives each culture its fundamental distinctiveness. The issues are: human happiness, sin and evil, death, the giving of the Torah at Sinai, signs and miracles, the character and mission of the Jewish people, the rationale for biblical commandments, human freedom, images of the patriarchs and the na-
tion's leaders, and the notion of redemption. Despite the fundamental distinctiveness of each culture, S. admits that all of them strove to revive the original biblical culture in some way. But this is quite different from the usual position that the biblical tradition remains normative for each culture. To illustrate concretely how this transformation of Jewish society occurred S. analyzes the varied approach to the Song of Songs throughout Jewish history.

S.'s summary chapter outlines the significance of his findings for Jewish life today. (1) His theory of pluralistic Jewish identity over the centuries enables contemporary Jews to recognize the legitimacy of options other than traditional Orthodoxy; (2) it reduces the tendency towards fanaticism in society by undercutting any idea of a sacred, fixed core that must be maintained at all cost by every communal expression of the Jewish spirit; (3) it reveals the richness of the tradition to those who may have turned their back on it too quickly and hence are suffering a certain lack of rootedness; (4) it enables contemporary Jews to establish links with the past without slavish adherence to a narrow, unchangeable core. Finally, S. believes we are now forced to recognize that contemporary meaning is a hybrid reality, drawing from the past selectively, but also responding creatively to new challenges today. Only such a combination can guarantee the continued vitality of Judaism.

Christian readers can also gain from S.'s insights into the growth, development, and death of cultures with a religious base. S.'s starting point is certainly scientific. Revelation is not a category he seems to acknowledge—a category that would make a critical difference at a certain point to Christians, for whom the biblical culture cannot be placed on quite the same footing as later cultural expressions. Nonetheless, S.'s approach shows how Christian history also might be analyzed with profit and how Christians might preserve a sense of identity and meaning in the midst of change. Judaism's remarkable quality, and one of its chief contributions to the dialogue of world religions, is its continuing ability to redefine its sense of being without losing its soul in the process. S. demonstrates this in a clear, concise fashion. He also demonstrates that cultures involve far more than beliefs in objective sets of dogmatic statements.

S.'s volume should prove useful in the contemporary Christian-Jewish dialogue. It reveals the complexity of attempts to compare the two traditions, owing to the significant transformation Judaism has undergone in the course of its long existence. Despite its origin in the 70s, it continues to challenge our understanding of Judaism and of religious development generally. There are any number of particular points (e.g. the individual–community tension needs greater nuancing in terms of
chronological development) on which S. may rightly be challenged besides the basic one of "revelation." Yet his overall contribution must be rated outstanding. 

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JOHN T. PAWLIKOWSKI, O.S.M.  


In his Introduction, Rothschild cites the response of an unnamed Catholic theologian to the question: "What do Jews think about Jesus?" The laconic reply: "Nothing at all." This remarkable volume clearly exposes the fallacy of such a response.

R. has selected excerpts from the works of these five leading Jewish thinkers of the 20th century dealing with the attitudes of Judaism to Jesus and to Christianity; each Jewish author is introduced by a Christian theologian who critiques the attitudes expressed from a Christian perspective. The reader is urged to bear in mind that each Jewish writer along with his Christian critic represents a particular viewpoint within the Jewish or Christian faith perspective. Despite these limitations R. has made an exceptional contribution to what he calls "Judaeo-Christian mutuality," a contribution which further emphasizes the truth of Bernard Casper's remark that we live in a "situation for dialogue between Jews and Christians such as may perhaps not have existed since the beginnings of Christianity."

All of the Jewish writers selected stress the unique relationship that exists between Judaism and Christianity, a relationship which within Roman Catholicism has been confirmed by Vatican II's Nostra aetate and by numerous Vatican statements in the ensuing 25 years. This relationship is rooted primarily in the person of Jesus. Baeck sees in Jesus a "God-sent personality," a "thoroughly Jewish character," a "Jew among Jews" for whom Judaism has nothing but "love and respect"; out of no other people could Jesus emerge, among no other people could he have been active, from no other people would he have found the apostles who believed in him. Buber looks on Jesus as "my great brother" who sought to return Judaism to its genuine origins by teaching what the prophets taught, "the absoluteness of the deed"; because of Jesus Christianity will always carry within its heart the spirit of Judaism. Rosenzweig agrees with the Christian teaching that no one can come to the Father except through Christ, but the Jew has no need to come to the Father
since through the covenant he is already with God; nevertheless, Israel can bring the world to God only through Christ. For Herberg, Judaism is able to see Christ as the one in whom God redeems the peoples of the world; in Christ a new covenant community is created, bringing the redemptive history of Israel to all the nations. The covenant established in Christ is new, not in the sense of replacing the old, but of extending and enlarging the old. The uniqueness of Jesus, in Herberg's view, lies in his being the way by and through which the peoples of the world may enter the covenant of Israel and learn to serve the God of Israel. Heschel likewise acknowledges the eminent role of Christianity in God's plan for the redemption of humankind. It is Christianity that has brought the God of Abraham and the Hebrew Bible to the Gentiles; Judaism is the mother of Christianity and hence has a stake in its destiny and in its faith.

Perhaps the strongest thrust of this book is its appeal to Jews and Christians for a reverence and respect for one another's tradition and for the tasks imposed by that tradition. Buber urges Jews and Christians to hold fast to their faith, which he calls their "deepest relationship to truth," and to manifest a "religious respect for the true faith of the other." If the Church were more Christian and if Jews were to become once more a true people of God, then a force would emerge in the world "which today is still inexpressible." Rosenzweig reminds Christians that what from their side appears to be Jewish "stubbornness" is from the other side Jewish "fidelity," that God has not created religion, but the world, and that in the redemption of this world both Jews and Christians are before God "laborers at the same task." Herberg points out that the authentic differences between Judaism and Christianity are not the result of "ignorance or blindness" but are irreducibly different ways of perceiving the one truth of God; in the age to come, when the two will be one, "neither 'our' truth nor 'their' error will prove to be quite as we see it today." Although separated, Jew and Christian stand united in a common allegiance to the living God and in a "common expectation of, and longing for, the One who is to come." Heschel insists that Jews and Christians have the mutual duty to help one another in overcoming callousness and in cultivating a sense of wonder and mystery, in exploring paths to holiness in our world and in opening minds to the challenge of the prophets. Religion should never be regarded as an end in itself; over and above all religion stands the Creator and Lord of history and to equate religion and God is idolatry. Heschel admits that a deep chasm will always divide Christians and Jews, but across the chasm "we can extend our hands to one another," and we can assist one another in striving for greater fidelity to the living God.

R. sums up well the conclusions one may draw from listening to these
five Jewish voices. They serve to remind Christian and Jew that "life is not a problem to be solved, but a task imposed and a grace bestowed." Readers will carry from this book a much clearer understanding of Judaism, and hence of Christianity, as well as a deeper appreciation of the meaning and purpose of the Christian-Jewish dialogue. We may also hope that others will be inspired to imitate the ingenuity of R. in compiling works that so well foster "Judaeo-Christian mutuality."

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DONALD J. MOORE, S.J.


Porter begins with an excellent overview and critique of the rival and seemingly irreconcilable positions of modern ethicists, proposing that consideration of the coherency of Aquinas' moral theory can "restore a basis for common conversation in the field of Christian ethics," and aid in constructing a modern theory of morality that unifies the "different motifs in Christian ethics today" (16). Especially illuminating is her discussion of the problem of incommensurability.

P. rightfully begins her discussion of Aquinas with his general theory of goodness, since "there can be no theory of moral goodness without a theory of goodness in general" (36). In her recognition that goodness and being are convertible, P. succeeds in establishing Aquinas' overall realist philosophy, in obviating the modern is/ought dichotomy, and in establishing a leitmotif for all her subsequent study of Aquinas's moral theory. P. then reconstructs Aquinas' "somewhat sketchy" (84) account of the natural human good, which she presents as an agent's consciously chosen "life plan" ordered toward the goal of her life (82). But she also notes that, for Aquinas, "there is such a thing as the objective good that serves as the organizing principle for the unity of a human life," and adds that the correct, ultimate goal is the vision of God (83). Her account of the agent's efforts to attain that ideal brings her to a discussion of virtue.

P. provides a remarkably rich description of what makes an act good (94 f.), and thus leads the reader to a discussion of the virtues and their relation to the goal of one's life. Because the affective virtues rationally order the passions, an agent can trust that his attractions and repulsions in immediate, concrete circumstances are aligned with his final end, even though he is not constantly consciously deliberating on it (103). P. then uses a discussion of gentleness to display an impressive grasp of what constitutes virtue and vice (109 f.). In her discussion of particular virtues, she is not afraid to address several of Aquinas' positions that might worry the modern ethicist—such topics as the unity of virtues in the
agent, the relative disvalue of the “effort to be good,” lust, homosexuality, and adultery.

P.’s progression in her discussion of the virtues follows Aquinas’ own, from temperance and fortitude, to justice, prudence, the cardinal and then the theological virtues. She demonstrates how each virtue provides a higher level of organization of the moral life, of integration of the agent, and of grasping one’s final goal. In Aquinas’ understanding of justice, for example, individual goods are not the means to the common good. “Rather, the well-being of the individuals and families within the community are a necessary component of the common good” (145). Often her observations are compellingly clear. When explaining why it is morally acceptable to take from another to sustain life, she says, “... not that this is justified robbery. Rather ... the institution of property has broken down, because it has ceased to fulfill its primary purpose (II-II 66.7),” which is to promote the common good (135).

Works as good as this point the way for future efforts. P. suggests that another book could address the challenges offered to Aquinas’ worldview by contemporary ethicists (174). P.’s work might have benefitted from a summary which more explicitly placed Aquinas in dialogue with the problems outlined in the contemporary discussion. Finally, we need a better explanation for the relationship between virtues and passions. That is, P. is attentive to the moral dimensions of attaining and intellectually grasping the ideal of the moral life, but not as attentive to a primary dynamic in Aquinas: that of being grasped, of being moved, by God and the good. The agent’s desire for the good is generated by the object. That is the foundational principle which unifies the theological and “natural” ethics [and virtues]: whereas we cannot grasp God of our own accord, God grasps us, and grasps us also by the goodness which God imparts to creation (nature). Thus it is by created goods that we are moved to union with God, our final goal.

Overall, P.’s establishing of a dialogue between Aquinas and modern ethicists enriches the reader and improves our understanding of both ancestor and contemporary.

*Fairfield University, Conn.*

G. Simon Harak, S.J.


In this exciting and important work, Wyschogrod attempts to read contemporary ethical theory against the vast unwieldy tapestry that is postmodernism. The result is as imaginative and hopeful as it is difficult. Her study emerges from the late 20th-century “historical horizon” that
she calls the “death event,” and in many ways is a continuation of reflections she began in her *Spirit in Ashes: Hegel, Heidegger and Man-Made Mass Death* (1985). Both books are grounded in the “post-Holocaust” aporia that Adorno and others present us with, and both struggle to say something about desire, language, and finitude because of—and not despite—the horrors that have been and continue to be a part of everydayness in our “mascara and soap-opera age.”

W. argues for an ethics that appeals to the life-narratives of mythical, fictional, and “real” men and women whose radical desire is for the well-being of the Other. Many, if not all, religious and cultural traditions have looked to these “saints” as models of morality and ethical action that fall outside and go beyond the linear and systematic presentation that these same traditions offer as normative behavior for self and community. The postmodern move that W. wants to make is to reappropriate these saintly lives by rereading them through the thick, fragmented lenses of postmodernism itself. Her metahagiography privileges the multiplicity of voices which are encountered in any rereading of this sort, and, perhaps paradoxically, listens most intently to the silences and absences that emerge from these narrative (dis)integrations.

Impatient with the results of contemporary moral and ethical enquiry, W. does not want to completely abandon such efforts as Alasdair MacIntyre, Jeffrey Stout, and Bernard Williams have recently put forward, yet sees them as severely limited as an effective response to our historical moment. Rather, she wishes to use them in order to bring to light the “impasses created by the confrontation of various moral theories.” Deeply informed by the poststructural reading strategies of Derrida, the genealogical epistemology of Foucault, the playfulness of Kristeva, and perhaps most importantly, the ontological alterity, or Otherness, of Levinas, W. (re)presents the life-narrative of such divergent “saints” as Catherine of Siena, Maximilian Kolbe, and in a particularly brilliant and provocative chapter, Millie, the “dove” in Henry James’ *The Wings of the Dove*. By detailing the absence of self-interest and the ultimate silence of the ego in the life “stories” of these “Holy” (Wholly) Others, W. creates a space for a postmodern ethics that respects both “postmodern” and “ethics.” While carefully screening (but not suppressing) the potentially life-denying and nihilistic turn of some postmodern postures, she proposes a “new path” towards an ethics of “the Other as seen from the standpoint of the saint.”

Postmodernism is nothing if not montage, fragmentation, and “borrowings,” and to this end, W. uses a vast and impressive store of gleanings from traditional hagiographies, modern art, absurdist and existential dramas, Buddhist and feminist texts, and what seems like every philosopher and critical thinker from the Pre-Socratics to Nicholas Rescher
and beyond. And therein lies a problem. Like so many “postmodern” texts, this book suffers from its very project: it tries to embrace too widely and at too profound a depth to really achieve either goal. In this case the result is not a disastrous and anarchistic heterogeneity, but a somewhat surreal and beautiful attempt at bringing together disparate “moments” in the ancient and ongoing desire to relieve the suffering of Others that is at the core of both ethics and holiness. As such, it would be fruitfully read alongside such books as Williams’ *Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy*, Stout’s *Ethics After Babel* and the recent works of MacIntyre, as well as Kristeva’s new work, *Strangers to Ourselves*.

It should be clearly stated that this is not a book for neophytes to either contemporary ethical concerns or postmodern theoretical discourse. It also presumes a serious familiarity with Western philosophical history. Nevertheless, W.’s style and clarity, even charm, breaks through the difficulty of her text so consistently as to provide the needed impetus for readers to continue to pursue with her the issues she raises in this provocative and timely study.

*University of Minnesota*  
MICHAEL GAREFFA, S.J.


With this published version of his doctoral thesis, Drees joins the ranks of physicists/theologians who are engaged in sophisticated dialogue between cosmology and theology today. D. covers just about every major issue in that dialogue, and his book is an impressive work of scholarship with extensive notes, eight informative appendices, and a 25-page bibliography. Readers are assumed, D. says, to have no detailed knowledge of theology or science, an assumption the reader will question soon into the text. However, D. makes numerous efforts to clarify difficult concepts and carefully tries to keep readers apprised of the direction of his argument.

D. sets out to find a theological position in “critical coherence” or “constructive consonance” with science, specifically with cosmology. Before developing his own constructive consonance, he reviews and offers critiques of other recent efforts to relate cosmology and theology.

Part 1, “A Common Quest for Understanding?” presents arguments for God’s presence in the world as they may or may not be based on cosmology. A broad range of opinions on the relation of big-bang theory to creation is reviewed, with critiques of the work of Jaki, the creationists Hoyle, McMullin, Barbour, Peters, Russell and others. Here as elsewhere in the text, D. is wary of the epistemological realism he finds in other
treats primarily the "new neighborhoods" that expanded around the city. These are relatively minor faults in an outstanding volume that will be a valued addition to any library or personal collection.

KEVIN G. O'CONNELL, S.J.
Le Moyne College, Syracuse, N.Y.


This book explains the use of the vocabulary of slavery in 1 Corinthians 9. Its methodology combines sociological and rhetorical analysis, based on both literary and inscriptive evidence. It includes five major chapters, appendices tabulating inscriptive evidence, and an eclectic bibliography. Martin first explores the phrase "slave of Christ" in its social context and in 1 Cor 9:16–18, and then investigates Paul's "slavery to all" in 1 Cor 9:19–23 on the basis of rhetorical topos of political leadership.

M. concludes that slavery was a complex reality in Greco-Roman antiquity, functioning within the larger social system of patronage. Since slave status was not univocally low, but depended on the status of the master within the larger client-patron pyramid, slavery could provide a means of upward social mobility and be positively valued. Paul as Christ's oikonomos (with a middle-level managerial function) is not self-effacing, since the high status of the master and the level of responsibility of such a position both expressed his authority and would have been viewed positively by all but the highest classes. Similarly, "slavery to all" as a metaphor for leadership reveals Paul's use of the topos of the demagogue who led through a lowering of status for the benefit of the masses, in distinction to the benevolent patriarch or the sophos who led from a firm position of social superiority and philosophical invulnerability. Paul's argument in 1 Cor 9:19–23 is intended to define his authority at the same time as it overturns the values of some Christians of the higher classes.

In general, the reader will find this book well researched, convincing, and enjoyable. M.'s style is sometimes repetitive and the structure of the book somewhat circular. However, M.'s work is both illuminating of 1 Cor 9 and proof of the value of such sociological/rhetorical studies of the NT.

CAROL L. STOCKHAUSEN
Marquette University, Milwaukee


The sarcophagus of the Roman prefect Junius Bassus, carved in 359 and currently exhibited in the Treasury Museum of St. Peter's in Rome, is one of the greatest of all monuments of early Christian art. Besides representing a notable innovation in sarcophagus design, it is a rich complex of theological symbolism. Apart from the lid, which is badly damaged and can be only partly reconstructed, it contains ten mostly biblical scenes on the two levels of its facade, which dominate the work, six somewhat damaged smaller biblical scenes in spandrels also on the facade (in which lambs substitute for human actors), and four seasonal scenes on its two sides. The workmanship of the whole is superior.

After exposing four different previous attempts to lay bare the religious meaning of the sarcophagus, M. sets out herself to decipher the work in detail, section by section. She does this in the realization that, whereas some interpretations must necessarily be rejected because they obviously do not
match with the work itself, others, while true, will nonetheless not exhaust the truth of the work, especially when it is as complex and allusive as this (20–21). What contributes to making M.'s study an unusual one is this open approach, as well as the fact that she is much more interested in the theology of the sarcophagus than she is in its craftsmanship. This latter point, it is probably safe to say, reflects the interests of the early Christians themselves. Her finding, in a word, is that the design of the sarcophagus is based upon baptismal–eucharistic considerations, which is clearly in keeping with the fact that Junius Bassus died as a neophyte. It is a conclusion that is hardly startling, given the centrality of baptism and Eucharist in early Christian thought, but it needed drawing in this context, and it is well made. In the course of coming to it, M. casts considerable light on early Christian symbolism in general, although one sometimes suspects that she is not totally at ease in the world of the Church Fathers, whom she must occasionally call upon to illuminate the iconography of the sarcophagus.

The book is furnished with 45 black and white plates, some of which are more shadowy than should be the case.

Boniface Ramsey, O.P.
Immaculate Conception Seminary
N.J.


The role of monasticism in Joachim of Fiore's theology of history was absolutely essential—monasticism was the locus of the coming status of the Holy Spirit in which God's plan would reach its culmination. Recent work on Joachim's views of monasticism, as well as his activity as a monastic reformer, has been enriched by some of Wessley's studies, which are gathered together, along with additional materials, in the present slim volume.

This is not a general book on Joachim's ideas on monasticism. It concentrates on showing the motives the abbot had in breaking with the Cistercians to found his new order at Fiore and on demonstrating how the early Florensians understood their place in history according to their founder's apocalyptic ideas. The five studies focus on the exegesis of five texts or bodies of texts: Joachim's own treatise De vita sancti Benedicti; the early anonymous Vita; the famous "novus ordo" figure from the Liber figurarum; early hagiographical material on Joachim; and the Pseudo-Joachite Super Hieremiam. The first two essays, containing materials already published, convincingly show how Joachim's conception of his new foundation's role in initiating the third status influenced his first followers, though it would be illuminating to locate these important insights within a more complete picture of the abbot's views on monasticism. The last three essays are less successful. That devoted to the "novus ordo" figure is very slight, adding nothing to the discussion of this much-debated diagram. The last essays concerning the roles of Florensians, Cistercians and Franciscans in the growth of Joachimism in the early 13th century have the quality of work in progress. Until we have good editions of the Super Hieremiam and related texts, as well as detailed studies of the materials produced by the early Florensians, all conclusions remain tentative.

Bernard McGinn
University of Chicago Divinity School


Since commentators first dealt with Dante's Comedy, the Paradiso has usu-
ally received more attention than the other two canticas. However, specific studies of particular subjects in the Paradiso have been and still remain limited. Pelikan’s work centers precisely on three theological allegories, all from Par. 32 (vv. 137, 128, 104): Beatrice as donna mia, the Church as bella sposa, and Mary as nostra regina. P. has cleverly unified this series of lectures within the frame of his “Prologue: Tre donne” and his “Epilogue: Wisdom as Sophia and Sapientia,” so that his “allegorical women” are more than three.

The work’s broad scope reflects the public for which it was intended. P.’s brilliant and passionate rhetoric seems sometimes to exceed the limits of Dante’s intentions (19, 21, 76, 80). Specialists—theologians and Dantisti—may be disappointed at the dearth of original argumentation about Dante’s thinking on the three themes selected and because the analysis of allegory and theology, which seems to be promised in the introductory pages, is never offered. However, the work contains an important number of philological, historical elements together with parallelisms, references, and connections of concepts, verbalization, and syntagmas spread through the disparate parts of the Comedy, which P. consistently and eruditely substantiates and blends thoroughly and creatively into the broad scope of Dante’s ideas.

The chapter entitled “The Otherworldly World of the Paradiso” could serve as a presentation of Dante’s world to the contemporary mind. The book is very useful for its general and enthusiastic approach to theological questions. Specialists are likely to regret that the text is cited only in translation: Dante’s language is discriminating in the choice of words and, in its specific thematic points, properly feminine. The bibliography reflects the generality of the work, with its mixture of fundamental and solid works together with derivative and weaker ones.

LOUIS M. LA FAVIA
Catholic University of America


Biblia pauperum is a term used to describe an illustrated book on the life of Christ, the blockbook versions of which, introduced in the Netherlands circa 1460, consisted of forty plates which were printed from carved wooden blocks, each plate showing three illustrations of bible stories and nine different texts. This facsimile edition contains the forty plates in reduced size. It also contains four further sections: an introduction, a Latin transcription of the texts, an English translation based on the Douay version, and Labriola’s and Smeltz’s commentaries on the iconography and typology of the illustrations.

Since the term biblia pauperum has been used only since the 18th century and is very likely a misnomer, it is unfortunate that L. and S. title their facsimile as they do. This tends to perpetuate the fallacy that the blockbook was intended for the “poor and illiterate folk.” But L. and S. are certainly correct in lauding the work as a medieval compendium for visualizing and interpreting Scripture and for studying typology. Their desire to make the blockbook available at reasonable cost in order to promote interdisciplinary studies is also commendable.

There are some difficulties with this edition: (1) the plates are too small for detailed study, being only 60% of the original size of 7½ × 10½ inches; (2) the format of the book makes it difficult to see relationships, for in order to investigate a single plate, the user must refer to three separate sections, as well
as to a template which shows the coded positions of the various texts; and (3) their conclusion that the blockbook was designed to combat heresy and affirm doctrinal orthodoxy has led L. and S. to devise commentaries that read like theological tracts and not the simple and commonplace interpretations that they insist was the popular outlook of the times. Nevertheless, this facsimile edition is a valuable resource for theologians interested in medieval life and art.

KATHLEEN M. IRWIN
Franciscan School of Theology
Berkeley


Whatever the case may have been as recently as ten years ago, it is rather common today to find German theologians asserting the existence of fundamental differences between Lutheran (Evangelical) and Roman Catholic teaching. This book is a good illustration of that trend. Baur rejects the claim that Lutheran and Roman Catholic teachings on justification never have been and/or are not today incompatible.

B. is replying to a much-celebrated ecumenical work edited by Karl Lehmann and Wolfhart Pannenberg, which appeared in German in 1986. An English translation followed in 1990, under the title The Condemnations of the Reformation Era: Do They Still Divide? (cf. TS 51 [1990] 791). A wide public was thus informed of a serious study conducted over a period of four years by Evangelical, Reformed, and Roman Catholic theologians in Germany. Under special consideration in that study were the mutual condemnations found in the Lutheran Confessions and the Council of Trent with regard to teaching about justification, the sacraments, and church office. The conclusion reached was that those condemnations no longer apply today. A response to this conclusion was sought from the sponsoring churches.

One result was that the Faculties of Evangelical Theology in the Universities of West Germany were asked to evaluate the document. The faculty at Göttingen has published a report, which finds deficient both the method employed in the original study and the conclusions which were reached. From that report the section dealing with the original study's treatment of justification recently appeared in English (The Lutheran Quarterly, Spring 1991). A member of that Faculty, B. points to what he regards as very serious defects in the study's treatment of the article on which the church stands or falls. His work has already initiated a debate in Germany and seems likely to generate lively discussion on this side of the Atlantic as well.

CARL J. PETER
Catholic University of America


Correcting the view of Thomas More as a cold-blooded prosecutor of heresy, Martz here considers the gentle, affectionate, yet upright man pictured in Holbein's family portraits and implicit in More's prose.

Martz draws the reader closer to the "inner man" that caused More at last, in his own words, to "patiently endure the loss of [his] body for the love of God" (101). His focus is upon "the presence of the artist [in More's writings] as a person and a personality" (96).
Each of his four sections engages a writer whose antiheretical fervor may be understood in the light of the age, his respect for the law, and general charity. More's passion, Martz argues, was to condemn those who led “other souls to eternal perdition” (4); but it is his presentation of More among his children, in the Tower, at his devotions, and, most especially, summoning courage by a witty pen that earns our sympathy for such an argument.

Martz begins his “search for the inner man” by contrasting Holbein's portrait of a grim More as chancellor with his sensitive studies of More as father, seated with the family he loved to teach. Martz analyzes More's anti-Protestant apologia in the light of his love for a larger family, the Church. He concedes, however, that More's occasionally tentative rhetoric reveals him to have been much tried by the duties of a polemicist. Martz quotes More's Latin passages in translations faithfully made by Mary Basset, his granddaughter. In such delicate ways, he reminds us continually of More, the family man, delighting in the little classical “school” he kept at home.

Martz's book ends by regarding More's conscious artistry—verbosity, improvisations, colloquialisms, ironies—as reflections of a mind determined to understand Christ's place in his heart. He proposes that the imprisoned More's last address shifts from English to Latin to protect the “inner man” from discovery and because Latin “was the language of the church for which he was prepared to give his life” (85).

JUDITH FARR
Georgetown University


On first encountering Teresa's writings, readers often recoil in distaste from her descriptions of herself as a vile worm or wretched woman. Weber not only addresses the question of Teresa's apparent self-deprecation but in her thoroughgoing analysis of rhetoric discloses linguistic strategies by which Teresa asserted herself as a strong-minded woman while at the same time respecting the social and religious constraints of 16th-century Spain.

After an opening description of the socioreligious climate of 16th-century Spain and the Counter-Reformation misogyny of Teresa's time, W. analyzes four major writings in terms of their dominant rhetorical strategy. Humility, e.g., is the rhetoric of The Book of Her Life, as Teresa sought to obey the order to write about her supernatural favors without sounding vain. Irony she selected for The Way of Perfection, written for her nuns; for them her discourse was subversive, with irony intended to gain their confidence and to strengthen them as a community of women. Obfuscation is the strategy for the dual audience of The Interior Castle: for contemplatives the image of the soul as bride, for the advocates of the Counter-Reformation, with their emphasis on works, the image of the soul as soldier defending a castle. In The Book of Foundations the strategy was authority, as Teresa rhetorically established her authority to determine orthodoxy in other people while rejecting authority in her bid for spiritual autonomy.

Humility, irony, obfuscation, and authority are the larger strategies that constitute what W. terms “the rhetoric of femininity.” She analyzes various dimensions of each strategy, providing generous samples of Teresa’s language (in Spanish with English translation) and carefully nuanced interpretations. For readers trained in literary criticism this study is a must. For readers interested in Teresa as a spiritual guide or
feminist model, W.'s work will bring even more respect and love for a woman who "with her golden pen won a public voice for herself, if not for other women" (165).

MARY E. GILES
California State Univ., Sacramento


Emerson's reputation rests largely on his writings during the 1830s, a period he later described as his "saturnalia of faith." Scholars have customarily ignored his pre-Transcendentalist period as a struggling Unitarian minister and his later writings which sharply qualified the ecstatic optimism and naive spiritualism of his Transcendentalist period. G. contradicts this standard treatment by tracing an evolving method which Emerson called "spiritual discernment" that links the three periods. This method has eluded critics looking for logical or terminological consistency. Instead, Emerson's intuitive approach focused on a specific human sensory experience and through detailed description "attempted to lead one to an awareness of the eternal spiritual laws which ground this and every other sensible fact" (11).

This rewarding work is the first systematic study of Emerson as a religious thinker; its footnotes engage the whole spectrum of critics over the past forty years. G. considers Emerson the initial and definitive proponent of "expressive religious individualism," the distinctively American stance described by R. Bellah et al. in Habits of the Heart. G.'s most significant contribution comes in tracing the revisions of the later writings which enunciated a "self-reliance deprived of ecstasy" (109) and celebrated the spiritual genius of a few "representative men" rather than every person. A richer portrait of Emerson as a religious philosopher emerges, balanced by a psychological evaluation which concludes that the great individualist's attempt to ground all truth in subjective insight alone led to loneliness and intellectual self-isolation—a pertinent lesson for today's expressive individualists.

WILLIAM C. SPOHN, S.J.
Woodstock Theological Center, D.C.


"No man," wrote Unitarian sage James Freeman Clarke, "has ever equalled Mr. Brownson in the ability with which he has refuted his own arguments." American Catholicism's most famous 19th-century convert, Brownson (1803-1876) had rounded nearly all the contemporary intellectual bases, from Calvinism to Catholicism. Once inside the precincts of the Roman tradition, he continued his propensity for ferocious argumentation and periodic recasting of position from conservative to liberal and back again.

Such a man is understandably difficult to encapsulate within a single volume, but Carey has managed the task particularly well. In a carefully wrought introduction that is both concise and comprehensive, C. reports his subject in all his dialectical complexity, leaning heavily on Brownson's intellectual history without slighting personal detail about this man who both as Transcendentalist and Catholic was so driven, so irascible, yet doggedly committed to truth. Identifiable phases of Brownson's life and work are discussed in the introduction under the same categories by which excerpts from the works are given in the primary-text section. Through the concept of "life by communion" as derived from Pierre Leroux, C. helpfully charts for the reader a structural principle that underlies so
much of Brownson’s mature thought.

The selections that may prove most revealing of Brownson’s underlying convictions are his incisive 1838 critique of Emerson’s Divinity School Address, and an 1842 letter to William Ellery Channing delineating the necessity of Christ the Mediator. If there is one omission particularly to be regretted, I would suggest it is the absence here of Brownson’s 1846 criticism of Newman’s theory of development. Predictably, Brownson would later repudiate his critique, and later still repudiate his repudiation.

CLYDE F. CREWS
Bellarmine College, Louisville


Acclaimed after her death as the “spiritual director to her generation,” Evelyn Underhill (1875–1941) is being reclaimed in recent years by a new generation of readers and scholars. A new biography, recent books, articles, dissertations, and conferences attest to such interest. According to Michael Ramsey, the former Archbishop of Canterbury, Underhill, a self-educated lay woman in the fields of mysticism and spirituality, did more than anyone else to keep alive the spiritual life of the Anglican Church during her era.

If U.’s work has been remembered, it has tended to be in association with Mysticism (1911), her first classic, or Practical Mysticism (1914). And yet, she left a corpus of over 30 books and almost 400 articles and reviews. Many of U.’s later books were edited versions of retreats she had been asked to present, most frequently to groups of women or clergy retreatants. She was the first lay woman to act in such a capacity. The present collection consists of previously unpublished retreat talks that Grace Brame recently discovered and transcribed from handwritten notebooks dating from the years 1924 to 1928. In addition to the presentations, Brame introduces the work with a synopsis of U.’s career, describes the recovery of the notebooks, analyzes their content, and reconstructs a retreat experience with U.

The work is significant for two reasons. First, these years are particularly significant in understanding U.’s personal spiritual development; this phase would lay the foundation for all subsequent books she would write. In addition, the talks provide a credible account of one 20th-century woman’s insight into the authentic search for God. The London Times hailed that insight as being “unmatched by any professional teacher of her day.” Even if occasionally dated in tone, U.’s assumptions regarding the universality of the call to holiness and her incarnational theological foundations still provide valid formulations of the 20th-century quest for God.

JOY MILOS, C.S.J.
Gonzaga University, Spokane


This work will be of interest to those wishing a summary of the main ideas (“beliefs”) running through Bordeaux sociologist and ethicist Jacques Ellul’s huge production (some fifty books: half sociology and history, half theology and ethics). It will help those seeking orientation early in their encounter with E., as well as those trying to make sense of many years’ reading. Much as E.’s Presence of the Kingdom functioned forty years ago, What I Believe provides us today with a wide-angle snapshot of his broad-ranging labors.

E. begins by describing “various beliefs” at the heart of his work. These very interesting central concepts,
methods, and presuppositions include freedom and necessity, good and evil, word and sight, truth and reality, and dialectic (in sociology, theology, and life). His chapter on “Lifelong Love” is a fascinating new reflection. In Part 2, E. reviews his interpretation of history and its development into contemporary “technological society” (the English title of his most famous book). While this social analysis has taken volumes to explicate and apply, all of the most central ideas are at least briefly and tantalizingly presented. Our challenge, he argues, is not the presence of particular machines or processes, but rather the global, universal, quasi-religious dominance of a technical way of thinking, analysis, evaluation, and problem-solving. In Part 3, E. reviews some of his major theological beliefs, especially those which have loomed progressively larger in recent years. These include his brilliant, creative view of God’s enigmatic relation to human history during this unending “seventh day” of creation, and his ideas on judgment, condemnation, universal salvation and the eschatological future. Unfortunately, E.’s characteristically powerful discussions of Jesus Christ, faith, hope and love, and discipleship and ethics, are not recapitulated in this work.

E. has always remained a polemicist, writing with existential “bite” as well as the hurried, “rough-around-the-edges” feel of a tract for the times. Readers of this work will be introduced to E.’s content but, just as importantly, they will encounter the vintage Ellulian style.

David W. Gill
New College Berkeley, Calif.


The central task Wisnewsk sets for himself is stated in the following passages: “[T]his book will argue that human beings, engaging with the natural world in the ways they ordinarily do, are inevitably and for good reason disposed to assent to the reality of God. . . . What we need to do now is justify the claim of natural theology by showing how it arises from our natural circumstances inevitably and for good reason” (7, 100). In my opinion, W.’s book, which otherwise has so much to recommend it, does not and, if I have understood its approach, could not successfully execute its project.

Having described our ordinary circumstances with considerable insight, W. makes what I take to be the operative assertion in his argument: “One of the basic contours of our natural life . . . is the pattern of work and rest. This pattern disposes us to be respectful of and find wonder in nature. It is these dispositions, furthermore, which lead to the basic affirmation of natural theology—that God is a reality our natural life places before us” (124). The reason why this approach fails is that talk about “pointing” (93), “witness” (97), and “symptoms” (97 f.) is an interpretation imposed upon descriptions of facts (102), and the move from description to interpretation appears to be gratuitous; certainly it is not the “demonstration” or “argument” W. claims it to be. The reason why the approach cannot succeed is that for concepts such as “symptom” and “witness” to do the work assigned to them here, they must involve a theory of some kind of causal connection between God and the world, and this is evidently just what W. wants to avoid (125).

Yet I would very strongly recommend this book to anyone interested in natural theology as pursued within the
idiom of the contemporary though not analytic approach. Besides the merit of bringing a fresh perspective to the authors it surveys and to the later history of the subject, it stakes out an important and possibly very rich claim. It is an important contribution to current philosophical discussions in theology.

JAY REUSCHER
Georgetown University


This study merits serious attention well beyond the circle of the specialized Kant scholarship to which it makes an important contribution. Michaelson’s analysis of Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone not only displays an acute grasp of the issues that this work poses within the development of Kant’s thinking on ethics and religion; it also shows great sensitivity to the complex theological and cultural matrix in which Kant gave shape to this work. This latter emphasis allows M. to make a persuasive case for reading Religion as a text exemplifying the ambiguity with which Kant—along with many others to this day—faces the “ongoing referendum on the idea of ‘otherworldliness’ ” (1), which M. sees as the central issue for Western religious thought since 1750.

M. believes this ambiguity issues from the conflicting demands that Kant’s understanding of human freedom places upon our capacity to bring full moral order into the world. On the one hand, the thrust of Kant’s theory of autonomy, embodying Enlightenment confidence in human capacities, makes wholly immanent the project of bringing moral order to the world. On the other, Kant sets forth a view of human moral evil in Religion that, echoing the Christian doctrine of original sin, requires transcendent help to overcome a self-inflicted, radical incapacity to set oneself (and, a fortiori, the world) morally aright.

M. does not chide Kant for such ambiguity but sees it, instead, as “symptomatic of a larger problem within modern religious thought” that pits human autonomy and divine sovereignty in competition with each other within our “culture’s depiction of its proper ends and objects of hope” (129). M.’s interpretation provides a plausible alternative to the stereotype that makes Kant’s religious thought reductionist. A lucid style allows M. to unknot some of the conceptual tangles which readers wary of Kantian vocabulary often find maddeningly complex.

PHILIP J. ROSSI, S.J.
Marquette University, Milwaukee


Had Rende entitled his book in the manner favored by German scholars, it could appropriately have been called: “Introduction to Lonergan’s Philosophical System, Presented in Its Three Stages of Development, with Special Regard to His Doctrine on Conversion.” Those already familiar with L.’s thought may find the summaries of his dissertation, articles, and two great books somewhat tedious, although they will recognize that the presentations are clear and well organized. Further, they will admit that they could not have done it differently, since there is no other way of explaining L.’s doctrine of conversion than by putting it in the context of his whole cognitional theory, epistemology, and metaphysics. For L., conversion, be it intellectual, moral, or religious, is always both a point of arrival and a point of departure in the dynamic process of
self appropriation; thus the issue stands or falls on the correct understanding of that process. Not surprisingly, therefore, there is quantitatively more in this book describing L.'s general philosophical ideas than his specific thoughts on conversion. This approach assures that his doctrine on conversion can be properly understood. At the same time, the book has all the qualities of a good introduction to L.'s philosophy.

Rende's interpretation of L.'s doctrine on conversion appears correct. He convincingly argues against four other interpreters and critics of Lonergan: Charles Curran, Karl Rahner, Walter Conn, and David Tracy. Their remarks and objections are too complex to be detailed here, but this reviewer noted with interest that in all probability Rahner never fully grasped L.'s cognitive theory. Great minds do not always meet. Rende has assimilated his material well and handles it with ease. He has the gift of getting hold of complex issues, and, while preserving their integrity, presenting them with clarity.

LADISLAS ORSY, S.J.
Catholic University of America


Having authored two excellent volumes about ministry to young people (Adolescent Spirituality and Morality and the Adolescent), Shelton now focuses on a theory for general ethics. After competently critiquing Kohlberg's cognitively based theory, S. sets out to establish, successfully in this reviewer's judgment, a richer basis for ethical decision and life in the affective domain of empathy. He argues that "empathy is a constitutive element of human experience and can be the basis for a morality whose focus is care" (59). Along the way, S. explores the thought of major developmental thinkers like Martin Hoffman, Norma Haan, and Carol Gilligan. He persuasively explains that empathic experience and emotion provide a fundamental understanding of morality that the impartiality of (Kohlberg's and other thinkers') justice principle is unable to address. S. does not abandon the cognitive, but demonstrates how, in the lives of ordinary persons, rational elements are integrated within and motivated by the "heart's vision."

Some of the richest sections of the book include: an insightful commentary on the role of empathy in the story of Billy Budd and the relationship between Billy and Captain Vere; a discussion of the role of empathy in the seven dimensions of conscience as illustrated in the moral growth of Charlie Babbitt in the story/film, Rain Man; a comparison of the mutually complementary perspectives of scripture scholar John Donahue, and of psychologists John Darley and Daniel Batson on the parable of the Good Samaritan. S. concludes with some useful pastoral reflections on the role of gratitude, the unlimited capacity for blindness, educating the emotions, and the limits of empathy.

Educators, psychologists, theologians, ethicists, helping professionals, ministry personnel, and anyone interested in the integration of spirituality and social science will want to read this groundbreaking volume and recommend it to their students and clients.

WILLIAM J. SNECK, S.J.
Loyola College, Baltimore


This is the first effort that has come to my attention to draw together the disparate strands of the current discourse among psychoanalytic thinkers...
on the subject of the psychoanalytic hermeneutic of religion. That discussion has moved the state of the question a good distance away from its position at the time of Freud's death. Jones draws together and tries to formulate and compare the contributions of a number of significant contributors to this current of applied psychoanalysis. Yet his commendable attempt to encapsulate the ideas of major figures ends up truncating their thinking and forcing them onto a procrustean bed. This gives a distorted view of their contributions to the debate, and at times falsifies their views. Moreover, the selection is somewhat narrow, leaving out of consideration important participants; names I missed include Pruyser, Ricoeur, Vergote, Ostow, Wallace, and Smith.

Even so, J.'s first section is worth the price of admission and careful study of it can be recommended, at least as an enticement to further study of the authors treated. But unfortunately, the rest of the book does not measure up to the expectation generated in the first section. The discussion of clinical cases, though thoughtful and sensitive, says little more than that good psychotherapy can help patients straighten out their religious conflicts. The descriptions of the work of Masterson and Kohut seem to come in out of left field, with only the flimsiest rationale for their inclusion. The final section, attempting to formulate a "psychoanalysis of the sacred," takes a stand on Tillich and Buber but seems unsatisfactory from a psychoanalytic perspective. The lines of demarcation between the properly psychoanalytic and the essentially religious are obfuscated.

There are also minor problems. The frame of reference is largely Kohutian and sometimes leaves the impression that a solid perspective on religion can only be achieved if one follows the self psychology line. There is also a disconnecting, and at times confusing, substitution of the feminine for the generic pronoun. Hopefully, these minor difficulties will not distract perceptive readers from J.'s useful overview of the present state of the psychoanalytic understanding of religious experience.

W. W. MEISSNER, S.J., M.D.
Boston College


Berenbaum is a young scholar of contemporary Judaism. At present he is Project Director of the United States Holocaust Museum, which should be opened in Washington, D.C. in 1993. He has been involved in this project since 1978. His collection of essays is divided into two parts: "The Holocaust in Contemporary American Culture," and "Jewish Thought and Modern History." The range is wide, including essays on Franz Rosenzweig and Martin Buber, Jacob Neusner, and Elie Wiesel, on whom B. published a theological study in 1979.

The library of studies on World War II is enormous, and the Nazi crimes against the Jewish people account for a considerable percentage of this historical and ethical/theological literature. B. alludes to some of this scholarship, but his purpose is to situate the Holocaust in American Jewish life. His brief comparison between American and Israeli "civil religion" concerning the Holocaust is evocative. It would be instructive to examine the same question in the liturgy and life of religious communities as such. Only by rooting an approach to the Holocaust in the commemoration of the millennia of Jewish history can one hope to grapple with the issues it raises. Only passing references are made to the work of Emil Fachenheim, who deserves more careful attention than he is given here.
An autobiographical tone at many points in these essays shows B.'s ongoing work in the fields of Holocaust studies and contemporary Jewish thought. Further scholarly work at various points would enhance the value of both halves of this volume.

Lawrence E. Frizzell
Seton Hall University, N.J.


The landscape of abortion is as important as the issue itself. Wilt, feminist and Catholic, describes a post-apocalyptic world where women tell their stories within the wreck of the maternal instinct and the lost fantasies of motherhood—imagery that informs her discussion of works by John Barth, Margaret Atwood, Alice Walker, and others.

Wilt describes maternal choice as not itself chosen but imposed by maternity’s emergence from instinct into consciousness. Her women have escaped Jacques Lacan’s “imaginary” world of connectedness for a more limited world where choice yields as much loss as fulfillment. Citing Kristin Luker, she identifies the pro-life landscape with Lacan’s “imaginary” world, immersed in transcendence, trusting that all the surprises of experience have a grace in them. The pro-choice worldview, bereft of this blessed assurance, inherits Lacan’s “symbolic” order, ready for the long arc of reasoned thought toward the best possible choice.

Wilt’s vision of maternity is ultimately nostalgic, mourning the loss of graced instinct even as it celebrates conscious choice. Her landscape is more lost Eden than postapocalypse, where the gates of instinct are shut against the new order of maternal consciousness. Grace must now be filtered through the mechanism of choice since nature can no longer be trusted. What Wilt overlooks is that our bodies were chosen for us long before our minds took heed of it and that grace comes both from being chosen as well as from conscious choosing. Instinct may not be so much a wreck as in eclipse, awaiting the reunion of the imaginary and the symbolic in fruitful conversation.

J. Pat Browder, M.D.
Duke University


Neville, dean of the School of Theology and professor of religion, philosophy and theology at Boston University, is one of the most prolific writers on the philosophical scene today. Yet all of his works reflect an underlying metaphysical conceptuality which he first set forth in God the Creator in 1968 and then refined and elaborated in subsequent books. The present volume is no exception.

N. applies his metaphysical scheme to the interpretation of divinity or Ultimate Reality within various world religions (Christianity, Confucianism, Taoism, and, to a lesser extent, Buddhism). His conclusions allow him to make certain generalizations about the interrelation between philosophy of religion and comparative theology. Whereas comparative theology is inevitably concerned to find the truth of one’s own religious tradition (e.g., the truth of the gospel) in the belief systems and practices of other religious traditions, philosophy of religion searches for those broad metaphysical conceptions which are further specified in the belief systems and practices of all the major world religions.

Many, to be sure, would dispute the possibility that such a metaphysical common ground for the different world
religions can be established. But N. makes a strong case that his ontology of creation with its three interrelated determinants (the world created, the source of creation, and the activity itself) can be used to compare and contrast with one another the Christian notion of God, Buddhist Emptiness, and the Tao. Key to his scheme here is the assumption that the source of creation is indeterminate in itself and becomes determinate (e.g., the triune Creator God of Christian theology) only in the act of creation.

One may, of course, dispute this and other metaphysical assumptions made by N. But he has in any event provided for a new and highly imaginative way in which to compare and contrast the various world religions.

JOSEPH A. BRACKEN, S.J.
Xavier University, Cincinnati


Gray, professor emeritus of history in the School of Oriental and African Studies at the University of London, has long been interested in the development of Christianity in Africa. He here presents two series of essays which offer correctives to common generalizations on this topic.

The first series is about Catholicism in Congo (present day Angola and Zaire) during the 17th century. Historians often overlook the fact that Propaganda Fidei and the Holy Office, responding to petitions by an Afro-Brazilian layman and by Capuchin missionaries from this area, then condemned the Atlantic slave trade. Tragically, owing to the politics of the patronato and other factors, their decrees had almost no practical effect. Often, too, historians say that the Church here disappeared in the 18th century largely because traditional cultures had remained unchanged beneath a mere veneer of the missionaries' Christian perspectives. There is evidence, however, that at least in the region of Soyo (near the mouth of the Zaire River) the local culture had truly incorporated key aspects of Christianity.

The second series of essays reexamines conventional explanations of Christianity's rapid expansion in Africa during the 19th and 20th centuries. Missionary linkage with the colonial apparatus was only part of the story. Other important factors included the roles played by African Christians themselves, and the ways in which Christian perspectives helped Africans to cope with technological revolution. Especially noteworthy were the liberating convergences of Christian with traditional African understandings of evil.

Numerous points of detail in the presentation effectively counter other oversimplifications of the African encounter with Christianity. G. could usefully have differentiated more clearly between syncretism and genuine religious synthesis. He could also have treated more carefully the problem of defining the border for permissible dialogue between culture and revealed religion. This is, nevertheless, a thoughtful and informative book, well worth reading.

JOSEPH C. MCKENNA, S.J.
Fordham University


Using the Ebira (Nigeria) word Ozovehe ("the human person is life") as a metaphor, E. proposes a Christian humanism based on his critique of Western materialism and a reinterpretation of the classic imago Dei in light of Ozovehe and nuances in African traditional culture. The book's six chapters
describe modern Western society (but not its thought), European biases about African culture, and a constructive proposal for an African Christian humanism. In addition there is a bibliography, an index, and a lexicon for various names from the Ebira ethnic group and other African tribes.

E.'s critique of the West is a generalized kind of homiletical assault on its consumerism and materialism, largely based on media accounts and clichés. He summarizes various biblical arguments for the doctrine of imago Dei, attacks familiar arguments of missionary Christianity about the moral and religious worth of traditional African culture, and offers an overly long excursus on some of the nomenclature of African cultures: the significance of names, proverbs, songs, folktales, and habits.

The book contains several typographical errors, employs a fairly idiosyncratic format for documentation, and spends a great deal of space describing secondary sources which repeat familiar biblical and theological arguments. Even the section dealing with E.'s own tradition, for some unstated reason, spends more time citing authors outside that tradition than it does providing the reader with a theological analysis of that tradition—one little known in circles concerned with theology and the history of religions.

It is not clear for whom this book is intended or even whether it is a doctoral dissertation. Its lack of lucid methodology and clear organization of material, together with its peculiar documentation, renders it difficult for the reader to follow its arguments. Efforts, particularly by Africans, to enlarge and diversify the very intellectual ideas and processes within Christian doctrine, now under the domination of Western thought, are however, to be encouraged.

ROBERT E. HOOD
General Theological Seminary, N.Y.
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Hatab, L. Myth and Philosophy. La Salle, Ill.: Open Court, 1990. Pp. 383. $34.95; $18.95.

SPECIAL QUESTIONS