BOOK REVIEWS


About 2300 years ago Aristotle devoted the fifth book of his Nichomachean Ethics to the subject of justice. Nearly sixteen centuries later St. Thomas Aquinas used this exposition as the basis and point of departure of his own treatise on the subject. And though its application was subtly analyzed and enormously developed, especially during the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries, the theory thus evolved and perfected remained in its broad outlines unchanged.

But other things did not stand still. Political theories came and went; economic systems succeeded one another; and in the nineteenth century the world found itself facing a crisis. The hierarchic, organic structure that society had once known was no more; the French Revolution had given it its death blow, and in its place was an all-pervasive spirit of liberalism and individualism. The industrial revolution brought about more change in the manner of men’s living in a single century than had been experienced in a previous millennium. And underlying all this restless change was a deplorable decay of the spirit of religion. As a result of these and other causes, order had yielded to chaos, rule to anarchy; more and more men lived in a constant state of poverty, misery, and helplessness, while thoughts of revolt stirred within them.

In the face of such conditions the Christian world was neither silent nor inactive. Many were the proposals of reform, many the devices attempted. Yet the situation seemed only to grow worse. Then in the last decade of the century something new happened. In a message that reverberated throughout the world Leo XIII “boldly attacked and overthrew the idols of liberalism,” and raised the banner of a Catholic social counter-revolution. Forty years later another authoritative spokesman caught the attention of the world with the brilliance of his message—Pius XI had entered the lists. Like his predecessor, he emphasized the role of private justice and charity in the solution of the problem. But even more insistently did he dwell on its social aspects. And he kept using, with growing clarity, a term rather new and hitherto vague—social justice. His aim was the reconstruction and perfection of the social order, and one of the greatest means to this end would be a better understanding and greater activation of social justice and charity. Social justice forbids one class to exploit another. Social justice
is the norm to which the distribution of the world's goods must conform. Social justice demands that all be given the opportunity to work. Social justice demands that reforms be introduced to make possible the payment of a just wage. Social justice must build up a juridical order able to pervade all economic activity.

To understand the teaching of Pius XI, then, one must first of all understand this new term. Does it indicate a new species of justice, called forth by the new complexities of modern society? Or is it simply a new name for one of the traditional forms of justice known to philosophers? If so, has this traditional form undergone any significant alteration or development at the hands of Pius XI? Catholic scholars have been far from unanimous in their answers or in their reasons. But the urgency of the matter demands that this confusion be, if possible, resolved. This is the task to which the book here under consideration is directed.

Fr. Ferree announces at the outset that he feels justified in taking social justice to be nothing but the legal justice of traditional analysis (though reasons supporting such an identification appear in the course of the discussion). The new name is apt, and has been called for because of the neglect or undue restriction of this kind of justice under its old name. If it be asked why so many scholars have hitherto failed to grasp this, he finds the answer in their too exclusive attention to final causes with a consequent neglect of the material element. Now it is in regard to this material element that the writings of Pius XI have made the greatest contribution, so that it is now possible to solve a vexed question of long standing, namely, whether legal or social justice has a proper and immediate act, and if so, what it is. This problem, therefore, is the principal one which Fr. Ferree investigates; and the conclusion reached, he believes, leads to a deeper understanding of social justice and of some related topics as well.

It is necessary first of all to recall the Aristotelian theory of justice, and to see what modifications it received at the hands of St. Thomas Aquinas. Aristotle's treatment has the merit of being a pioneer venture in the field, but it is surprisingly meagre and obscure. Justice for him, in its proper signification, is virtue with regard to another; only metaphorically can there be justice towards oneself, in the sense that right order is preserved between one's appetites, the lower being subordinate to the higher or rational. A distinction is introduced between general and particular justice. General justice is not a special virtue but the whole of virtue with regard to another. Particular justice, which is a special virtue, is therefore a part of general justice, and while it is not clearly defined, it is shown to be of two kinds, one of which regards the right distribution of honors and other goods of the
community, while the other rectifies the actions of man to man. The object of justice arises either from the nature of things or from the disposition of law. Only vaguely at best is general justice identified by Aristotle with what later came to be known as legal justice; only incidentally does he connect it with law or with the common good.

It is instructive to see how this inchoative analysis evolved at the hands of St. Thomas. Precision was introduced. General and particular justice were sharply distinguished, and the latter was resolved into what may be called its subspecies, distributive and commutative justice. The associated virtues were fitted into their proper niches, and what had been merely a framework became an edifice. Perhaps the most notable achievement of St. Thomas had to do with general justice. For him it ceased to be the whole of virtue and became a specific habit marked off from all others by its formal object, the common good. It could be called general both because its object was general and because it could use or command acts of all other virtues in the pursuance of this object. It was the greatest of virtues not so much by its inclusiveness as by the pre-eminence of its end. And all this, as one might gather from reading the Commentary on the Ethics and appropriate passages from the Summa Theologica, was really to be found in Aristotle. Such a conclusion, however, would give the Philosopher far more credit than he deserves, and the Saint far less.

Subsequent writers did not always note the metamorphosis of doctrine which had occurred; hence we find some of them still disputing, as Lessius notes, whether legal justice is the whole of virtue or a special virtue. Such misunderstanding apparently was rare. The real difficulty was rather this: Did legal justice have a proper and immediate act? For virtues are specified by their acts, and it is not easy to see how there can be a special virtue unless there is a proper act apart from commanded acts. Yet St. Thomas seems to have been unaware of this problem, and nowhere to have assigned or attempted to assign such an act. In fact, some writers maintain that he excluded the possibility of such act; but this Fr. Ferree ably disproves.

Well, at any rate, can such an act be discovered? This question is considered in Chapters III and IV, which contain Fr. Ferree's most valuable contribution to social thought. A detailed investigation is made of the usage of the term "social justice" in the writings of Pope Pius XI and also in various letters written under his influence by Cardinals Gasparri and Pacelli. It will be useful to cite here a few instances. "Social justice—that virtue which ordains to the common good the exterior acts of all the others—acquires a more practical efficacy" when, under the influence of social charity,
"the true sons of the Church strive without ceasing, by means of institutions most wisely planned, to find a better organization of society." "Social justice demands that changes be introduced as soon as possible" to make possible the payment of a family living wage. "Social justice demands that wages and salaries be managed, through agreements of purposes and wills." "Loftier and nobler principles—social justice and social charity"—are needed to govern economic life; "hence the institutions themselves of people, and particularly those of all social life, ought to be penetrated with this justice, and it is necessary that it be truly effective, that is, establish a juridical and social order..." There is the insistence, too, on the need of professional and vocational associations, and the principle of subsidiarity according to which "it is an injustice and a grave evil and disturbance of right order to assign to a greater and higher association what lesser and subordinate organizations can do." From these and similar passages Fr. Ferree concludes that social justice is the same as legal justice, since it has the same formal object, and that Pius XI has himself supplied the answer to the principal question proposed above, by indicating an act of social justice that is entirely proper to it and falls under no other virtue—the organization of social habits or institutions which are necessary in order that society may attain its common good.

Such a conclusion truly clarifies what to many seemed obscure; and in the light of the evidence submitted it seems justified, at least so far as it goes. But it may be observed that to organize is really a part of a wider function, that is, to govern. One governs by creating institutions which exercise social control; and when private citizens create such institutions they participate, as is their right, in the government of the society of which they are members. But government is not confined to organization, unless the latter term is endowed with great elasticity.

Various points of lesser importance occur in this volume, not all of which deserve the same approbation as does the main thesis. Incensed at what he calls the "abstractionism" of those who define society as ens rationis cum fundamento in re, the author insists that it is an operation, not a thing, and has therefore a real if accidental existence. Whether it is called real or intentional does not matter much; but to call it an operation or a community of action will not do; such a notion is too much like the psychological error of identifying personality with consciousness. A society exists for the sake of action, it is a principle of operation, and not therefore the operation itself. In the midst of this discussion one is surprised to be told with the greatest assurance that "the whole controversy about universals from first to last is
enclosed in the formal confines of logic, and has nothing to do with ontology.”
Such views suggest that the author does better when he confines himself to the main question he is investigating.

Nor is it particularly “monstrous” to call commutative justice “justice in the fullest sense” or “the most perfect form of justice.” For since the common note of all forms of justice is that of virtue which regards another, that form of it which supposes the most complete distinction of persons, the most perfect “otherness,” embodies this note most perfectly and can with logic be called the most perfect form. The person as a member of society is not adequately distinct from this society, and its good is also his own good; so that legal and distributive justice, though they may be more perfect as virtues, are somewhat less perfect an embodiment of what characterizes justice.

The suggested revision of the structure of the virtues to make room for a fifth moral virtue, natural charity, whose formal object would be the value of personality, is interesting. Disregarding the grandiose claim that in this way “we would have linked up the whole vast and wayward field of psycho-analysis to the traditional moral doctrine,” it may be conceded that there should be a place for such a virtue, though whether it should be classed as a moral or as a natural theological virtue is not so evident. At any rate, the suggestion is not quite novel; it will be found discussed in Suarez’ treatment on the virtues in general, and included in many modern manuals of ethics.

The most unfortunate thing about this work is its persistent bellicosity; Fr. Ferree evidently regards himself as a member of the Church belligerent. He is quite aware of this habit of his, referring to it with a certain complacency on more than one occasion, and explaining it by the fact that his book is addressed to students of the social problem. Preachers, who seemingly tend towards individualism; philosophers, who are either uninterested in external action or hold themselves above it; radio speakers on the Catholic Hour, whose utterances are “stupid”; all who differ from him in any way and hence “have not caught the vision”; even, by implication, Pius XI himself, who refers to commutative justice as strictest justice—all come in for sneers, administered in a heavy-handed manner and by such tried and true techniques as sarcastic quotation marks and (of all things) exclamation points. Underlying all this is the assumption that Catholic interest in social organization has hitherto been just about at a standstill. In fact, of course, Catholics have been deeply concerned about the practical aspects and techniques of organization, whereas this study is essentially theoretical, dealing as it does principally with the proper heading under which to classify organization. Now it is not the unfairness of the criticism that matters
much, nor the fact that the author exposes himself to ripostes of penetrating asperity at the hands of some who may handle this weapon more dangerously and skilfully than he. What matters most is that this manner of writing is considerably boring, and may cause readers to put this book aside with a yawn. And that would be regrettable, because for all its deficiencies it is a useful and stimulating contribution that should be widely read. Unfortunately, there are scores of typographical errors to test the reader's alertness.

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The study of the symbolism employed by the Church in explaining and visualizing her doctrines is a part of the investigation into the inner life of the Church herself. The first steps in the development of this mode of instruction must be of particular interest to all who wish to understand the growth of the organic spiritual structure which we know as vital Christianity. If we would understand the language which the products of early Christian art spoke to the faithful of those days, we must know the symbolism as it was then accepted. In many cases, we cannot gather this from the artistic works themselves; we must learn it from contemporary literature. The attempts at interpreting the artistic products by themselves alone has often led to arbitrary statements and to endless controversies. It is from this standpoint that we must welcome and judge the study of Fr. Plumpe. It is concerned with the literary evidence for the meaning and development of one figurative expression which is applied to the Church herself and is used in the explanation of her character. The time covered is the first three centuries, wherein we find the first products of Christian art and the earliest manifestations of the higher mystical life. The interest of this inquiry is not merely historical but also theological and religious. In other words, it does not merely explain how this epithet began to be associated with the Church, but also circumscribes the thought content which it conveyed and the sentiments which it expressed. The reading of this study will make clear how words as well as symbols which are common to us and to the early Christians may convey different meanings or have a different emphasis.

The following authors are examined on the subject: the Epistle of the
martyrs of Lyons and Vienne, St. Irenaeus, Tertullian, Clement of Alexandria, Origen, St. Cyprian, and St. Methodius of Philippi. Preceding the chapters on the individual authors are two chapters dealing with the scriptural prototypes and the first adumbrations of the usage in apostolic times. Both East and West are represented. However, it must not be overlooked that the Epistle and St. Irenaeus represent Oriental thought, and that, in consequence, Tertullian and St. Cyprian alone speak for the West. Rome and western Europe find no representatives.

Briefly stated, the conclusions of the study are the following. Historically, we can trace the use of the term to the Orient and to Asia Minor, perhaps Phrygia. Up to the end of the period covered by the study, Rome, and with it western Europe, refrained from employing the designation. Both Egypt and western Africa adopted and used the term freely from the first years of the third century. It is a matter of conjecture whether Asia Minor originated the title or received it from Syria or Jerusalem. Regarding the theological content of the term, slight differences from our present day usage may be noted. When we use the metaphor, the ideas of maternal solicitude and charity, of education and provident care seem to be uppermost. While such ideas are not excluded from early usage, the emphasis was on the begetting, the childbearing, and the nourishing at the mother's breasts. On these aspects of motherhood the early Fathers spoke with surprising frankness. Begetting, with its accompanying labor, is applied, not merely to the first birth in baptism but also to regeneration after a fall into mortal sin. Nourishing at the breasts is extended at times even to material support of needy members. In this discussion we must not expect all the precision and consistency of doctrine which a scholastically trained theologian looks for. Here are the beginnings of an ecclesiology which a later process was to clarify and develop into a more harmonious intellectual structure. Yet it is also true that in this later process some pearls of Christian thought were cast aside which may be newly garnered. For example, in developing the description of the woman in the twelfth chapter of the Apocalypse, St. Methodius has some beautiful and profound thoughts on the transformation into Christ through baptism (pp. 109 f.).

Various mystical considerations are suggested by the parallel between Adam and Eve, and Christ and the Church. The sleep of Christ's death, the nuptials of the second Adam and Eve, the conceiving and giving birth in sacramental baptism, are treated as ever present and living processes which bring out strongly the dynamic side of the Church's existence. Here also there comes into play the question of the co-operation of those within the Church, especially of the more perfect, in the begetting of new members.
Origen speaks of the "perfect" who are wedded to the Logos, who form the true Church on earth; St. Methodius at times seems to identify the Church with the "more perfect." Tertullian repeatedly dwells on the spiritual nuptials between Christ and the Church, and the una caro which results. These and similar considerations can well supplement our present-day treatment, which tends to emphasize the institutional, and hence the more quiescent, aspect of the Church.

In the course of his inquiry the author was brought to treat briefly several connected questions; for example, the personification of faith as mother (pp. 15 f.), the pre-existent Church (pp. 22–24), the personification of the Church as Virgin, and the co-ordination of this image with that of Mother (passim). Similarly, he briefly discusses the controverted question of Origen’s concept of the Church. His position is that from scattered passages enough can be gathered to show that Origen did admit a visible Church on earth, though his chief preoccupation was with the glorious society in heaven (p. 70).

The author has made diligent use of earlier studies that fall within his field. The pertinent passages from the Fathers are given in the original and in parallel translation. A carefully made general index and four special indices complete this excellent monograph.

The various references to the usages of later authors in patristic times, which are scattered through the notes, tend to distract and confuse the reader. It would have been better to omit these as irrelevant to the chosen theme, or to give them in an appendix. Readers who are unused to the German method of packing their pages with footnotes containing varied bits of information will find the book hard going. We are more habituated to the English method of introducing into the text itself as much as possible of pertinent discussions, and of making the notes little more than source references. There is a tendency in this book to be somewhat overthorough, to omit no point of information, however remotely connected with the subject, which the author may have garnered during his preparatory work; a little sacrifice in this matter would have made a more readable book.

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Approximately half of the fifth volume of *Mediaeval Studies* is devoted to the hitherto unpublished *Le livre du ciel et du monde* of Nicole Oresme, a French translation from a Latin version of Aristotle’s *De Coelo* by the learned fourteenth-century scientist, together with his important commentary on
the text. The first two books of the text and commentary appeared in the two preceding volumes of Mediaeval Studies. The present volume contains the other two books, along with a critical introduction to the work by A. J. Menut and J. Denomy, C.S.B., the editors. Both have a fine critical sense, and painstaking scholarship is evidenced in their publication; they have made accessible to modern students a rich source book of late mediaeval thought in its development along rationalistic and scientific lines, following the teaching of William of Ockham. Nicole Oresme is credited with having made the earliest known complete versions of authentic Aristotelian treatises, but the erudite Dean of Rouen and future Bishop of Lisieux has also been hailed as the precursor of Copernicus, Galileo, and Descartes by no less an authority on the Middle Ages than Pierre Duhem. Though his most noteworthy scientific contributions are contained in other writings (for instance, he was the first to represent graphically the coordinates of a variable), yet his glosses on Aristotle are more than a mere commentary; they constitute a sustained criticism of the Stagirite's doctrine on the motion of heavenly bodies and of many of his explanations of natural phenomena. Since Oresme was the leading French scientist of his day, the present publication furnishes us with a valuable key to the most advanced scientific thought of the time, that of the late Parisian Nominalist School, and to its reactions to the teaching of Aristotle on questions of natural science.

The article entitled "The Handbook of Master Peter, Chancellor of Chartres," by V. L. Kennedy, C.S.B., contains an analysis of the liturgical parts of the Manuale de Mysteriis of Peter of Roissy, the full text of his tract on extreme unction, and a list of the questions treated on the other sacraments. The whole is prefaced by a brief introduction to the life and writings of this early thirteenth-century theologian and liturgist. According to the author, the Handbook "is quite unique, since it is the only known example of a mediaeval treatise that deals both with the church offices and with the seven sacraments."

M. Jacques Maritain contributes an article, "Sur la doctrine de l'aséité divine." In it he compares the Thomistic doctrine that God's essence is His existence with a form of modern idealism which holds that God is an existence without essence, an error which the author finds in "beaucoup de tendances plus ou moins secrètes, plus ou moins cachées de la métaphysique chez les modernes," and which, he believes, is a development of Cartesianism. The formula that God is an existence without essence seems on the face of it meaningless; as M. Maritain remarks, it would make God "un esse sans intelligibilité." Yet, according to M. Maritain, it is not simply the intelligibility of God quoad nos which the formula denies, insofar as it derives from
Descartes. In this qualified sense, namely, that God is completely inaccessible to our minds and indefinable by human categories, it is employed by certain Platonici, as St. Thomas points out in his commentary on the Liber de Causis, and by the aliqui philosophi (most probably Avicenna and his disciples) of the De Ente et Essentia. The formula, which M. Maritain contends is a logical issue of a certain aspect of Descartes' thought, "bien que Descartes ne l'ait pas explicitement proposée," is one that "signifie dans toute la force du terme: Dieu n'a pas d'essence." He finds its source in the exaggerated voluntarism or "libertisme" which characterized Descartes' conception of God and which is represented by such philosophers as Secrétan and Lequier.

That Descartes has been interpreted along such exclusive lines can hardly be denied (v.g., by Secrétan in his Philosophie de la liberté); but is one justified in tracing, even to the "virtualités secrètes" of his thought, a formula which numerous texts from his writings explicitly deny? Descartes taught that ideal essences are an expression of God's creative liberty, but, despite the ambiguity of some of his assertions, he never maintained that God generates His own essence. He uses the formula, it is true, that God is causa sui, but his conception of causality differs radically from that of the Scholastics and he is careful to restrict the meaning of the phrase. "In his Reply to the First Objections (Adam—Tannery, VII, 110-11) he writes: "Quamvis enim dicere non opus sit illum esse causam efficientem sui ipsius, ne forte de verbis disputetur, quia tamen hoc, quod a se sit, sive quod nullam a se diversam habeat causam, non a nihilo, sed a reali eius potentiae immensitate esse percipimus, nobis omnino licet cogitare illum quodammodo idem praestare respectu sui ipsius quod causa efficiens respectu sui effectus, ac proinde esse a seipso positive." According to M. Maritain, "Dieu, si on peut ainsi parler, est au sommet, au comble de l'absence de nécessité, il existe sans aucune nécessité, par un pur acte de libre arbitre, par conséquent il pourrait s'anéantir, assurément, il faut aller jusque là! comme il pourrait faire des montagnes sans vallées et des cercles carrés." Unfortunately, M. Maritain does not indicate any text of Descartes to support this extreme interpretation, and it would surprise us if he could find one. Far from being even a remote adumbration of the Fichtean God "qui se pose par sa propre volonté, en posant le devenir," the God of Descartes exists necessarily by reason of His very essence: "Etiamsi Deus numquam non fuerit, quia tamen ille ipse est qui se revera conservat, videtur non nimis improprie dici posse sui causa. Ubi tamen est notandum, non intelligi conservationem quae fiat per positivum ullum causae efficientis influxum, sed tantum quod Dei essentia sit talis, ut non possit non semper existere" (loc. cit.). Need we
recall Descartes’ use of the ontological argument to prove that the idea we have of God’s essence implies His existence?

Descartes at times seems to interpose infinite omnipotence as a necessary intermediary between the divine essence and the divine existence, and by his none too well defined doctrine on the eternal truths he seems completely to dissociate the essences of created things, the intuited objects of a divinely conferred human intelligence, from the divine essence itself, apparently identifying the latter with a rationality absolutely transcending that same intelligence. Now the error that God is an existence without essence M. Maritain rightly ascribes to the failure of so many modern metaphysicians to grasp the analogical character of the notion of essence. Yet in his Reply to the Sixth Objections (op. cit., VII, 435-36) Descartes explicitly asserts that no essence can belong to both God and creatures in a univocal sense (cf. Principia, I, 51; op. cit., VIII, 24), though he does seem to confuse analogy with equivocation. His statement is certainly inconsistent with his insistence that our innate idea of God’s infinity is a positive idea and that we cannot know God by any concepts based on human analogy. Hence modern doctrines of agnosticism about God’s nature may readily be traced to Descartes. It seems farfetched, however, to this reviewer to ascribe to him even by implication the doctrine that God is an existence without essence. The most we can attribute to him in this connection is an apparently irreconcilable antinomy in his conception of God as perfect essence and complete rationality, and his peremptory affirmation that He is absolute power and utter indifference. No doubt this latter notion is what M. Maritain means by “une des ‘coupes’ de la pensée de Descartes” as source of the doctrine, but in similar “coupes” we could find almost any aberration of the modern mind to be derivative from the father of modern philosophy.

M. Maritain’s detailed explanation of the Thomistic doctrine of analogy when applied to God as ipsum esse subsistens is developed with his customary firm grasp of the principles of St. Thomas’ metaphysics. Another feature is the abundance of references to the text of the Angelic Doctor, a fact which emphasizes the absence of even one such gesture to the text of Descartes.

“The Logos as a Basis for a Doctrine of Providence,” by M. M. Marcia, I.B.V.M., is a scholarly and amply documented summary and analysis of the doctrine of the Logos as it is developed by the Stoics and Plotinus. Stress is laid on some interesting points of comparison and contrast in their respective viewpoints. The author succeeds in bringing into sharp relief the deficiencies of a notion of providence in which the universe is conceived as the work of rational design but not of planning intelligence, and she indi-
cates the conclusion that the problem of physical and moral evil, as well as that of freedom and determinism, cannot adequately be solved on the basis of a necessitarian conception of providence. As the author points out, some of the later Stoics tried to introduce a personal element into this essentially pantheistic notion. Was this merely a concession to religious sentiment, or could it be at all justified on specifically philosophical grounds? The author advances the plausible suggestion that the Stoics' adoption of the traditional gods was not altogether inconsistent with the logic of the system in view of their doctrine of a hierarchized manifestation of the all-embracing Logos. She also discusses the Platonic background of the doctrine of providence in the Timaeus and in the tenth book of the Laws. In view of the title of her paper, however, she might have touched on the question whether Plato ever used the word logos in the sense of reason. Burnet, in his edition of the Crito, denies that he did. Apparently ignoring the fact that much good ink has been spilt over the question of Plato's God, the author rather dogmatically identifies God with the Demiurgos of the Timaeus, nor does she ever advert to the distinctive roles of mind, psyche, the forms, and the world soul in that dialogue. Since she alludes to the question of a connection between the Stoical and the Johannine doctrine of the Logos, it is regrettable that she dismisses it with the remark that the text, "In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God; and the Word was God," "materially speaking is quite apt to signify the Stoic view," and with a footnote in which the relative competence of J. Burnet and B. A. G. Fuller to judge on such a matter is in no way indicated.

"The Conception of Substance in the Philosophy of the 'Ikhwan as-Safe' (Brethren of Purity)," which is analysed by Emil L. Fackenheim, is important in the history of philosophy because of the influence it exercised, especially through Ibn Gabirol, on so many mediaeval thinkers. Thus prime matter is conceived by the Brethren as a positive spiritual principle, mediating between soul and "first body" in the Neo-Platonic process from the One to the many, therefore more simple than body and prior to it. The author tries to show how the distinctive elements in their conception of substance derive from their attempt to merge the general Aristotelian analysis of substance into matter and form with the Neo-Platonic conception of a cosmic hierarchy of emanation and to assign in their cosmology definite places not only to matter and form but also to the various stages of their composition. Not satisfied with tracing vague historical antecedents of the doctrine, as it was evolved by the Brethren, he analyses the conception in terms of the system itself, pointing out its inconsistencies. The article does not make easy reading; perhaps too much is condensed into too few pages.
I. Th. Eschmann, O.P., contributes an exhaustive glossary, culled from the works of St. Thomas, relating to the principle, "Bonum commune praeferitur bono privato"; he prefaces this with an introduction dealing with the history of the tradition on which St. Thomas draws. This tradition, he claims, was Romano-patristic, determined independently of Aristotelian philosophy. The author’s contention, however, that Aristotle’s philosophy played “a decorative rather than a constructive role” does not seem to be established and is difficult to reconcile with the almost invariable reference made by St. Thomas to Aristotle as the author of the explicit expression of the principle. An article containing conclusions based upon the material presented in the present study is in preparation.

The present volume also contains a list of photographic reproductions of mediaeval manuscripts in the library of the Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, prepared by Robert J. Scollard, C.S.B., as well as a continuation of the catalogue of Greek works translated directly into Latin before 1350, by J. T. Muckle, C.S.B.

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The writings of the New Testament have always been and must ever remain the noblest and most fruitful study for mankind. Manuals that direct and further such study have appeared from time to time in Latin and other foreign tongues; but a satisfactory introduction to the New Testament in English was tardy in making its appearance. Hence the present volume has the best of all justifications for its publication—it answers a long-felt need. Though primarily intended for clerical students, it will be very useful also to lay students of the Bible in our parish study clubs.

After presenting a very copious bibliography, which represents the latest publications of Catholic and non-Catholic scholarship, the author devotes a chapter to the manifold attacks made on the historical value of the books of the New Testament. The Gospel narratives in particular have been subjected to repeated and minute scrutiny, not for the purpose of understanding them better, but of undermining their authority. The argument against them has been elaborated in a dozen ways by avowed unbelievers in the supernatural, to whom the Sacred Writings are literature, but nothing more, and to whom Christianity is like Judaism, Buddhism, and Mohammedanism.
—one of "the many manifestations of the religious spirit of mankind," one of the leading religions of the world, but nothing more.

Approaching the Gospel accounts from this point of view, and with the fixed persuasion that miracles, prophecy, and immediate divine revelation are impossible, each successive theory is built upon assumptions that have no other basis than their own philosophical presuppositions. Tradition, however ancient and well founded, is set aside as worthless, and even the facts of history are discredited, when they contradict the preconceived plan. Such arbitrary procedure, however, leads to no satisfactory results; hence the long succession of theories to account on its own principles for a life like that of Jesus Christ, and for a religion like Christianity.

It is easy to see how the average Protestant, whose faith rested on the infallibility of the Bible, abandoned entirely his belief in the supernatural when the leaders of his Church undermined his faith in the inerrancy of the Bible. For if the Sacred Writings, and particularly those of the New Testament, are merely successive revisions of unauthenticated traditions and myths, if the unknown authors and redactors wrote to deceive posterity or were themselves victims of hallucination, if the narratives, as we have them, are no longer to be considered as plain historical fact, how can they be a trustworthy record of revealed doctrine?

One inevitable conclusion stands out. We cannot read nor appreciate Sacred Scripture aright without reference to the tradition by which the Word of God was communicated to men. We must rely on an infallible interpreter both for what constitutes divine revelation and how it is to be understood. God Himself must have provided a reliable guide, as well as a trustworthy guardian, for the sacred deposit of revelation which He deigned to communicate to the human race. The Catholic Church has always claimed to be the divinely constituted guide, guardian, and interpreter of the Word of God.

In view of these facts, how important is a manual that presents in clear and orderly fashion all the traditional evidence for the origin, integrity, and authenticity of every New Testament writing; how valuable the handbook that furnishes us with references to all that has recently been written from Catholic and orthodox points of view on vital biblical questions; how convenient to have on hand a ready reference book that tells us what statements have been issued by the Pontifical Biblical Commission on controverted scriptural points. In this third volume, Father Steinmueller has carefully gathered all the external and internal evidence that exists regarding the authors of each New Testament writing, and explains the conditions, as far as they are known, under which each work was composed, for what class of
readers it was intended primarily, when and where it was written. He furnishes us with seventy-five pages of bibliography, representing the most recent and most authoritative books on New Testament subjects, as well as references to articles that have appeared in the best and most readily available Catholic biblical periodicals. He reproduces in full nine decisions of the Biblical Commission on controverted matter in the New Testament.

The discussion of the Synoptic problem, as well as of the Johannine question receives rather full and adequate treatment; but in reviewing the various defenders of the hypothesis of written documents, the excellent defence of the interdependence of the first three Gospels made by Dom John Chapman, O.S.B., in Matthew, Mark, and Luke, seems to have been overlooked.

Other topics that receive special treatment are: the influence of Christ’s life and teaching on the history of the world, the relations of Jesus with John the Baptist, the sources of Christ’s preaching, the language of Jesus, the parables of the Gospel, the miracles of our Lord, the year of His birth, the duration of His public ministry, the year, day, and hour of His crucifixion, the life and activity of St. Paul, the characteristics of the Pauline Epistles. The author defends the North Galatian theory, rejects an intermediate visit of St. Paul to Corinth between the two canonical Epistles, places Colossians first among the Epistles of the captivity, characterizes Ephesians as a circular letter addressed to various Asiatic Churches, and ably defends the Pauline origin of the Epistle to the Hebrews, as well as of the Pastoral Epistles. The principal dates in the history of the New Testament, and the approximate dates of the composition of the writings of the New Testament are furnished in an appendix. Finally, there is an excellent topical index covering fifteen pages. A special word of praise is also due to those responsible for the production of the three volumes, for the typographical excellence and accuracy.

St. Mary’s College

HENRY WILMERING, S.J.


The author, Honorary Lecturer on History in Peking’s Yenching University, adds this monograph to the imposing catalog of his previous studies in the teachings of Jesus. It would be more logical to speak of two monographs, since “the Son of Man has no kingdom and the Kingdom of God has no Son of Man” (p. 89). Asserting this surprising opinion, the author completely dissociates the one term from the other in his treatment, with what critical plausibility we shall presently see. St. John being ruled out,
for reasons unexpressed, as a source of information on the Son of Man and Kingdom of God, Synoptic texts exclusively are considered. For these latter, Professor Sharman still holds the same theory which he adopted thirty-five years ago in his *Teaching of Jesus about the Future* (of which he considers the present work a belated appendix). Matthew and Luke, that is to say, are reduced to the rank of "copyists" and "ultimate compilers" from Mark and from "nonMk Source." The last name is a convenient alias for the rather discredited will-o' the-wisp document Q. Nor may we assume that we necessarily find the true teaching of Jesus even in Mark and nonMk, since they leaned on an interpretative and transforming Christian tradition. Further clouds of uncertainty are generated by Matthew's messianic preoccupation and Luke's habit of supplying glosses where the records are obscure or jejune. It thus appears that the book's critical method is the familiar one of jettisoning the adequate external evidence for the Gospels' authorship and historicity, that room may be made for tenuous speculations and the diverting game of internal criticism.

The sixty-nine Synoptic occurrences of "the Son of Man" are all quoted with sufficient context to make the setting clear. Not a few Matthean and Lukan uses of the term are discounted as editorial additions, especially where parallel Markan passages do not contain it. Throughout the author's treatment, orderliness and simplicity of statement greatly temper the "not altogether welcome discipline" of close textual criticism. Yet admiration for the scholarship displayed is likewise tempered by regret that prejudgement of the case for the supernatural is allowed to bias and often quite to distort interpretation of the Synoptic text. Certainly one inescapable conclusion from the Gospel record is that Jesus focused in the title Son of Man all the stupendous claims which He made for himself. To it He transferred the content of other messianic titles employed in the Old Testament. With it He associated His functions of Prophet, Thaumaturge, Redeemer, and Judge. A severance of the title Son of Man from all these senses attached to it by Jesus is the aim of Professor Sharman's textual criticism. Denial of the Son of Man will not entail condemnation at the Last Judgement (Luke 9:26 and parallels); nor is it blasphemy to speak against him (Matt. 12:32) nor are they blessed who suffer persecution for his sake (Luke 6:22); for in all these passages we are to consider that idealizing Christian tradition and editorial recasting has obtruded the person of the Son of Man in some "less spectacular" (p. 13) ethical utterance of Jesus. Conceivably, Jesus did possess keen ethical insight, but that is all; He was no lawgiver nor had He power to forgive sin. "The Son of Man is lord even of the sabbath" means in its context merely a declaration that sabbath regulations must not be
interpreted unreasonably (p. 69); while in the cases of the forgiveness of the palsied man and of Mary Magdalen "it would surely be captious to assert that this declaration involves the assumption of the prerogative of God. It seems rather to stand as a natural and justified deduction from the observation of attitudes, acts, and their inward implications" (p. 68).

Textual criticism essays to rob the soul-stirring revelation of the Last Judgement of meaningful content. Christ could not have made conduct toward Himself or His members a basis for final salvation or retribution, for in Luke 9:52–56 He shows how free He is from such a vengeful spirit. What we read, therefore, in Matt. 25:31–46 is not the mind of Jesus, but only a reflection of the "overwhelming intolerance" of the Sons of Thunder (pp. 56–62). No less destructive is the criticism of other prophetic utterances. The seed from which grew the remarkable predictions of His sufferings, death, and resurrection must be understood as some chance conjecture of Jesus that His enemies would do away with Him. But in regard to the minutely detailed predictions put into His mouth by the three Synoptics, "it would seem critically justifiable to advance the theory that what is here set down as forecast by Jesus represents not any known foretelling by him (other than possible death) but rather what was recalled, as events subsequent to, and the product of the actual detailed occurrences" (p. 22). The prophecy of His resurrection doubtless "had its genesis not with Jesus but rather in that which, subsequent to his death, became assuredly the conviction of his disciples" (loc. cit.). In the great eschatological discourse (Matt. 25, and parallels) we have a repetition of the Old Testament description of the Day of the Lord, "into the midst of which the wholly alien figure of the Son of Man has been projected" (p. 51). Words therein interwoven anent the fate of Jerusalem and the Jews are well grounded conjecture, "for any man would have been an extraordinarily dull and obtuse observer of events and trends in the days of Jesus who should have failed to foresee precisely this ultimate outcome" (p. 79).

What residue of meaning is left in the title Son of Man after the texts have been so dehydrated? What sense did Jesus attach to it? Not that of the Davidic-political deliverer; that was the first error of the disciples cherished during his life. Not that of the Danielic-apocalyptic renovator of the earth; that was their second error, evolved from certain illusory experiences after His death. Not that of a supernaturally commissioned and accredited Messias; that sense Professor Sharman has labored to argue out of court. There seems open only the supposition that the term Son of Man as employed by Jesus was an arresting but otherwise insignificant circumlocution for the first personal pronoun.
The author examines seventy-three Synoptic occurrences of the phrase Kingdom of God. Nineteen more he relegates to an Appendix and rejects as evidence, either because they are not spoken by Jesus Himself (the acclaim of the people on Palm Sunday), or because they are interpolations (the promise of the keys to Peter). Again, just as in the discussion on the Son of Man, the problem is to determine what was Christ's understanding of the Kingdom of God. His rejection of the two erroneous views of the disciples (cf. preceding paragraph) is certain, being explicitly stated as well as symbolized in His resistance to the second and third temptations. However, if one accepts the author's deeply subjective method of criticism, these errors everywhere obscure the record of the genuine mind of Jesus. "The records of the life and teachings of Jesus apparently became, most naturally but unfortunately, one depositary for some of the striking vagaries about the Kingdom of God" (p. 137).

Absurdly enough, the words about "drinking the fruit of the vine new in the Kingdom of God" are said to mean that the Kingdom is to be of the material order, and the words about the gentiles "coming from the east and west to sit down in the Kingdom" are said to mean that the Kingdom is wholly a thing of the future (p. 129). Obviously, it is to the parables that one must turn as the chief document of Christ's thought on the Kingdom, and the author's treatment of these is in many respects admirable. Fundamentally sound are the two reasons he assigns for the choice of this literary device: prudence, which avoided the offense which too plain statements might have given the Jewish and Roman authorities; and charity, which sufficiently taught the well disposed the way of salvation. For our own understanding of the true meaning of the parables there is at hand "one commanding control, namely that the truths deduced from them must stand corrective of, and in direct opposition to, contemporary concepts" (p. 116). Professor Sharman's critical scruples partly obscure the clarity of his treatment of the parables. For "the vicissitudes of transmission" are supposed to have damaged not only the interpretations which occasionally are given but the very body of the parables.

In the final analysis (pp. 135-38) Jesus is pictured as faced with a choice between the two contemporary and conflicting concepts of the Kingdom of God. Subjecting them to "that same gentle scrutiny as was given by him to lesser problems," He reasoned to what was "genetic" and basic in them, putting aside what was racial and political. There thus emerged in His mind the "concept, ultimate in nature, commanding and alluring in character, of God as Direction, Purpose or Will and of man as the possibly adequate discoverer of that Direction, Purpose or Will and the potential chooser of
complete conformity to whatever is discovered” (p. 138). This view of God, this attitude toward Him, was the whole of Jesus’ personal religion, nor had He anything further to teach men. The Kingdom of God would be among them as soon as God would be recognized as the Norm and they themselves would become Loyalists toward that Norm (p. 138). True as far as it goes, but a concept which hobbles along on the level of natural religion, and is essentially defective if proposed as the concept of the Kingdom of God which Jesus reveals in the Gospel record.

St. Mary’s College

GEORGE C. RING, S.J.


Dr. Grant is an enthusiastic advocate of form-criticism, or, as he prefers to call it, tradition criticism, and in this his latest book he undertakes to explain the system and to tabulate what he considers its valuable contribution to our knowledge of Christianity. Since this type of criticism has already been discussed in THEOLOGICAL STUDIES and its futility and vagaries exposed, it is sufficient here simply to note that Dr. Grant follows the customary lines and ends with the conclusion that, as the Modernists put it years ago, “the Christ of history” is quite different from “the Christ of faith.”

It is difficult to decide just what Dr. Grant thinks of Jesus or of Christianity. He clouds his meaning in rhetoric, perhaps partly because he developed the topics first in the form of public lectures; and in later pages he often throws in modifications that seem to contradict previous statements. In one place (p. 154), he asserts that in the earliest tradition Jesus “became” the Messias at His resurrection, and he devotes much space to showing that St. Mark took a step in advance when he declared that it was at His baptism that Jesus “became” the Messias. Support for this view of the earlier tradition is sought in the opening words of St. Paul’s Epistle to the Romans, and yet in his epilogue, when he refers again to this idea, he writes “became—or was manifested” (p. 253).

This may stand as a sample of the vagueness that clouds most of the exposition and makes it hard to say whether he believes even in such fundamental truths as the Incarnation. He dwells at length on the growth of the tradition through its interpretations of the facts, and (p. 84) he praises these interpretations as legitimate and inspired by the Spirit, but most of his book is taken up with trying to show that these interpretations misunderstood Jesus and in some instances diverted Christianity into disastrous channels.

Faithful to the liberal view that St. Mark’s is the first of the written Gos-
pels, he finds perversion even there. St. Mark portrays Jesus as an apocalyptic hero who would soon return on the clouds of heaven (p. 173). Again, he is anti-Semitic because he places the blame of the crucifixion not on Pilate but on the innocent Jews and so opens the ways for the recurrent persecution of the Jew that has marred Christian history (p. 209). In this Dr. Grant ignores the strong words in the Acts where both St. Peter and St. Stephen lay the blame for the crucifixion squarely on the Jews.

St. Mark, or the earlier tradition which he is recording, is likewise censured for substituting the person of Jesus for the Kingdom of God and bringing in what is called "Jesuolatry" (p. 256). The world will be saved, Dr. Grant thinks, by going back to this idea of the Kingdom in the form in which Jesus really presented it (p. 264), and in that presentation he seems to think of Jesus as merely re-enacting the role of Jeremías in calling upon the people to return to God in repentance and to submit in loving meekness to the military power of their enemies.

Throughout, Dr. Grant has much to say about the Spirit. Here he seems to lift Jesus above the old prophets, and to accept as facts both the resurrection and the continuous influence of the Spirit of Jesus on believers. The reality of the Spirit he holds as a fundamental truth of Christianity (p. 84), and he bewails St. Mark's fatal mistake in steering the Church away from the course St. Paul would have laid out for it in the exaltation of the Spirit. The Spirit, he maintains, works through individual religious experiences, and in our hope of saving the world from its present dangers we must wait, to quote his closing expression, "for fresh light to break forth from the Word of God." We may ask what is this "Word of God"? Is it the written word which Dr. Grant has been laboring to describe as full of errors and deception, or is it the Incarnate Word with Its full revelation of God, as St. John expresses it?

Here as elsewhere in his book Dr. Grant, like his teachers—for most of his chapters are summaries of the books of others—misses the obvious fact that from the earliest days of His ministry Jesus took care to appoint authoritative teachers, whom he commissioned to bear His message of salvation to all men and to whom He gave the Spirit to enable them to preserve that message in its purity and to apply it to the varying needs of successive generations. The early Christians were not, as he imagines, merely restless groups playing with the facts about Jesus, growing up into group acceptance of this or that set of interpretations, and living in daily expectation of the parousia. As described for us in the Acts and Epistles, they "continued steadfastly in the teaching of the apostles" and were controlled in doctrine and practice by their appointed teachers.
How far Dr. Grant is from understanding the official position of St. Peter and the other apostles may be illustrated from the remarks with which he ends his discussion of the authorship of St. Mark's Gospel (p. 73). Having whittled down the external testimony so as to make it prove merely that somebody named Mark wrote the Gospel, he invents a Mark of his own, a busy office worker in Rome who in his few spare moments wrote down the traditions of his local Church. Then to reassure those who might feel that something had been lost by substituting such a dream child for the living figure of the interpreter of St. Peter, he says: "In place of the testimony of one man, we have the 'social' tradition of a whole community, the widely shared possession of a whole group—of two groups, in fact, the Palestinian and the Roman. In place of one individual's interpretation of Christ we have a tradition which shines like a shaft of light through the refracting, expanding prism of a rich and varied religious experience, and by its many-splendored radiance begins to prove how much was contained in the apparently simple and single, but really complex and manifold, manifestation of the divine mystery—the revelation of the mystery hid from past ages, the message of God through Jesus Christ, his Son, our Lord." Comment on such a passage is needless; the Gospels and the Acts make it clear that St. Peter was far from being merely one among the members of the first Christian communities.

St. Mary of the Lake Seminary

William A. Dowd, S.J.


Professor Scott presents the thesis that in the New Testament there is no one body of consistent doctrine, but that the different books give us varieties of religion, each author speaking as the Spirit inspired him. Later there came a process of unification of belief. The varieties of religion found in the New Testament books are not something to be deplored, but rather a boon to knowledge, since they portray the various aspects of truth, and gradually lead to fuller truth. Professor Scott is a zealous advocate of religious unity, and to his mind many former doctrinal disputes were of minor importance. His guiding principle, upon which insistence is more than once laid, is this: "Liberty is inherent in the Christian faith, and liberty always makes for difference. If the church is ever to be truly united, it must leave men free to differ. It must take its stand on no formal creed but on the New Testament, which lends its sanction impartially to many varieties of thought." The whole work is evidence of the fact that the tradition of individualistic liberal-
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ism in religion still has a hold on certain sections of Protestant scholarship, in spite of the grave criticisms of it that have been voiced of late by more advanced Protestant scholars.

Weston College

JOHN J. COLLINS, S.J.


Despite an unpromising main title, this booklet is of very special value and interest for seminaries and scholasticates and all those concerned with the history of the Mass and the liturgy in general. The series, Problems of Worship, herewith inaugurated is designed by its non-Catholic editors to provide specialized treatment of all the problems involved in linking public worship more closely with the other social aspects of modern living. To provide a sound and broad approach to these problems it was decided to preface the series by a brief survey of the vast literature dealing with all the Christian forms of public worship in use in Great Britain. The editors happily secured the services of Mr. Stanley Morison, one of England's foremost typographers, a one-time lecturer at Cambridge on bibliography, now serving as historian of The London Times. The result is a short, very readable, very understandable survey of the books of public worship, four-fifths or so Catholic, of course, but also embodying accounts of all service books published by the Anglicans, the Presbyterians, and all manner of derived sects. No other one survey covering the field is known to the reviewer, and no survey of the Catholic field that one can recall packs so much in so few pages.

With a scholar's modesty the author speaks of the "presumption in undertaking a compilation even of the present limited range, in war-time": "Like most writing in these times, the work has been sandwiched in between jobs of a very different character.... An unwillingness to send readers to books I have not sometime personally handled, combined with the prudent closing of libraries, and war damage to others, has been responsible for some omissions" (p. 127). Such omissions would seem to be limited almost completely to the photographic facsimiles of liturgical codices made available in recent years.

The author's uncompromising restatement of the troubled history of public worship in England in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries well illustrates how free from bias his non-Catholic editors are. Take for instance, this
summary: “There is no evidence in the sixteenth century that the people wanted their service-books changed. Their religion was altered for them by the monarchs. Henry VIII made them Anglican in 1531; Edward VI forced them into a more up-to-date and Protestant brand of Anglicanism in 1549; Queen Mary turned them back to popery in 1553; Queen Elizabeth back again to Protestantism in 1559. Parliament made Presbyterians of them in 1643 and Charles II Anglicans once more in 1662. In 1688 the English, growing tired of changing their religion at the will of their monarch, changed their monarch rather than put up with any more of it. Since then their religion has been ‘Protestant,’ that is, a religion chosen by the individual according to his personal ‘feeling’ ” (p. 107).

If the Editor of THEOLOGICAL STUDIES had been editing Mr. Morison’s valuable little volume, he would doubtless have added a note in a few places to voice the saving caution on intercredal co-operation in sacris, but, since Catholics are in no danger of embarking on such programs of intercredal services, it is hardly worth stopping here to make the insertion. Of very special interest to Catholics, I should hope, will be the question dealt with by Mr. Morison’s last sections, the desirability of providing and arranging services for special corporate groupings of modern life. It might be mentioned that the Catholic promoters of the liturgical movement in Europe are exploring the same question; and it is pleasant to recall that Father Jungmann, S.J., formerly of Innsbruck, has worked out the basic historical pattern for such special services. It is with our current Rituale Romanum before him that Mr. Morison argues: “If all these services for the things, the tools, why not services for the groups who use them? . . . The current Rituale Romanum, for instance, provides hundreds of blessings for every ‘blessed’ occasion and thing the layman qua layman experiences and needs in his, or her life. But, while the Rituale is not rich in vocational blessings, the religious and social value of work is recognized. . . . It is obvious that a rite which already authorizes blessings with proper collects and responses as a benedictio navis, and viae ferreae, and telegraphi; also of officinae librarieae et machinae typographicae, of machinae itineri aero destinatae, and of machinae ad excitandum lucem electricam, will not refuse it to services drafted. . . for mariners, book-sellers, printers, telegraphers, air-pilots, electricians; in short for separate and ‘direct’ services for men and women organized according to their occupations and crafts” (p. 112).

It is the author’s conviction that liturgy has come to stay, and now it must be made to come to life. This booklet will be of great help for all studying the problem.

*St. Mary’s College*  

Gerald Ellard, S.J.
The report of the fourth National Liturgical Week, held at Chicago, October 12–16, 1943, is here presented by the secretary and editor, Dom Michael Ducey, O.S.B. The contents of the volume fall naturally into three parts, corresponding to the three days of the meeting: (a) The Meaning of Sacrifice; (b) Sacrifice and the Individual; (c) Sacrifice and Society. We note from the editor's preface that a number of papers are included here which could not be given at Chicago, since the original schedule had to be curtailed owing to war-time restrictions.

In his introductory address welcoming the visitors to Chicago, Archbishop Stritch has some pertinent and timely remarks. For instance, he points out that, although liturgy is something more than rubrics, "it is also true that there can be no right liturgical action unless the rubrical prescriptions of Holy Mother Church are adhered to." He also warns against the "tendency to follow fads and fancies and overemphasize practices which are merely tolerated by the Holy See." These words of one who has always shown a keen interest in the liturgical movement will be welcomed by all who have at heart the true aims of that movement. We feel confident, too, that the newly organized Conference will give serious consideration to the Archbishop's suggestion that some intensive study be devoted to the text of the liturgy and in particular to the meaning and history of the Ordinary of the Mass.

Space does not permit an analysis, or even a complete listing, of the papers contained in this volume. In the field of Eucharistic theology, there are a number of excellent papers; we note particularly Father Gerald Ellard's, "Our Sacrifice Prefigured," a well organized and clearly presented exposition of the manner in which the sacrifices of the Old Law prepared the way for the Sacrifice of Christ. Worthy of special mention in the realm of ascetical theology is a paper not given at Chicago: Dom Lambert Sorg's, "Asceticism and Liturgical Sacrifice."

Coming to the practical order, Fathers Hanrahan and Gressle show how the principles of the liturgical revival have been applied in city parishes; Father Shanley of South Dakota explains his method of approach to this form of the apostolate in a rural section.

For the final day of the meeting, devoted to sacrifice and society, Monsignor Hillenbrand makes a clear statement of the principles involved, with special reference to the recent encyclical on the Mystical Body. The racial problem, the rural problem, and the labor problem are capably, if somewhat summarily, dealt with by Monsignor Morrison, Monsignor Ligutti, and Dom Lambert Dunne, respectively. To round out the volume, Father Harry
Koenig outlines the papal pronouncements on a just peace, and Don Luigi Sturzo shows how true peace must be based on the spirit of sacrifice.

The above summary gives a very inadequate idea of the richness and variety of the contents. The volume is well worth reading; it should prove an inspiration to those engaged in the liturgical apostolate and a source of information to clergy and laity alike.

Toronto, Canada

V. L. Kennedy, C.S.B.


On the dust jacket of this book is the comment: "Not in many years has so heartening a voice been raised in Christian intellectual circles." Not all will agree. It is rather to be feared that this voice will find its echo in an increased moral scepticism in a world already cynical.

In his first chapter, Dr. Knudson professes to investigate the province of Christian ethics. To this end he indicates the distinction between "natural" or "philosophic" ethics and "Christian" ethics. In simplest terms, the former seems to be a system of morality without theistic or theological foundation, a system of personal autonomy, validated by the undeniable moral nature of man. The latter is, in the understanding of the author, an ethics, which "in its method of validation... does not differ from philosophical ethics. But it emphasizes, as the latter does not, the ethical teaching of Scripture and of the Christian church." The relationship between these two, as exemplified in the teaching of different moral philosophers, is that of "absorption," "elimination," or "supplement."

Dr. Knudson holds verbally with the supplementary theory of Christian ethics (p. 34), but in reality his whole book is an exposition of a rationalistic absorption of the "Christian" religion and the "Christian" morality which that religion proposes. "Theonomy" (a distinguishing mark of the author's "Christian" ethics) "may be defined as an autonomy filled with religion" (p. 286).

The process of absorption begins in the second chapter, "The History of Christian Ethics": "In a sense it may be said that the permanent element in Christianity is its ethical teaching. Changes have frequently taken place in doctrine and in forms of worship that have disrupted the unity and continuity of the church. But through all these changes the Christian moral ideal has in principle remained the same. This has been due to the fact that it was once for all set forth by Jesus both in word and deed. He laid down moral principles and set up ethical standards that are still valid for all sec-
tions of the church...." (p. 35). This statement would seem at first glance to lay a solid foundation for Christian morality. But closer consideration shows the opposite. The permanent validity of the ethical principles taught or authorized by Christ stands or falls with the permanent validity of His doctrine. Christ is not a great and authoritative moral teacher unless He is also what He claimed to be—God. His divinity establishes the inerrancy, the authority, and hence the permanence of His whole teaching. To accept "changes" in doctrine derived from Christ is to undermine specifically "Christian" morality.

That the author vaguely senses this is indicated in a later passage of the book: "The two hundred and more denominations in the United States are a manifest scandal. There is no rational justification for such a large number. They confuse the public mind...." (p. 241). This confusion arises not from the "large number" but from any number.

The rejection of the divinity of Christ, here implicit, becomes clearer as we go on. On page 43, speaking of the theory which regards the moral teaching of Jesus as an "interim ethic," Dr. Knudson remarks: "In this theory there may be some truth. Jesus' teaching concerning property and self-renunciation may in some respects have been conditioned by the apocalyptic hope of his day, and other phases of his teaching may also have been thus affected. But this relativism manifestly does not apply to his fundamental moral principles, to his ideals of love, purity, truth, goodness. These were independent of the current apocalypticism. They apply to all ages and to all moral beings. They are universal and absolute." If this be true, then the permanence of Christian ethical teaching cannot be "due to the fact that it was once for all set forth by Jesus." There must be some other standard than the word of this teacher whose teaching was partially infected by error.

What the other standard is appears in the chapter on "The Validity of Christian Ethics": "We have had seers and prophets throughout the ages who have proclaimed what they believed to be the divine will; and in some cases their convictions have, we think, been justified. But in no case did their message have an external credential that guaranteed its truth regardless of its content. In every instance there has been legitimate ground for question as to whether the prophetic word spoken was of divine origin; and the question has been one that could be settled only by an inquiry into the ethical or spiritual character of the utterance. Its divine source and validity could only be determined by the strength of its appeal to the enlightened conscience. There is and can be no other test of the moral will of God. We cannot, therefore, erect the divine will into a purely objective moral standard, nor can we find in it an authoritative basis for the moral law. Our necessary
uncertainty with respect to the content of the divine will makes this impos­
sible” (p. 285).

The validity of the ethical teaching of Christ is thus watered down to its
appeal to that comfortable, undefined, “enlightened conscience.” How this
“enlightened conscience” is to determine and judge the content of any pro-
phetic word is, to say the least, problematical. One may hazard the guess
that the “enlightened conscience” is somehow or other identified with
what the author calls man’s “moral nature,” his capacity for “moral experi-
ence” (p. 73), involving fundamentally “the ability to distinguish between
right and wrong and to recognize one’s obligation to do the right and avoid
the wrong” (loc. cit.). But the law of which we are thus conscious is purely
formal: “It bids us to do the right but gives us no concrete guidance in deter-
mining what is right” (p. 75). To give a “certain general content to the
moral law” we must turn to three other “fundamental elements in our moral
nature ... the principle of good will, the conception of a more or less binding
human ideal, and the recognition of the sacredness of human personality”
(pp. 75–76). The principle of good will defines the right in terms of good or
wellbeing; the conception of the human ideal (“there is in man a moral ideal,
an ideal of humanity”) conditions the application of the principle of good
will; and the sacredness of human personality (based on man’s moral task,
on the absoluteness of the moral ideal whose attainment constitutes the true
end of his being) is the deeper principle implied in these two ingredients of
the moral nature. From these elements are derived the duties “to obey the
law of love, to seek the moral ideal and to respect the sacredness of personal-
ity both in oneself and in others.”

Even supposing that from these subjective norms the divine origin of the
教学 of Christ or any other moral teacher can be judged, the question
still remains, why man is bound by that teaching. To this question the
author replies, adhering to his Kantian rationalism indicated above: only
because that teaching has the approval of our moral nature. “Even if we
knew the full divine will with respect to our own conduct, it would not be
morally authoritative unless it awakened within us a moral response.... If
a command does not commend itself to our conscience it has for us no moral
authority. The moral law is by its very nature autonomous. The moral
law must be self-imposed. If it is not, if it is imposed by an external divine
will, and derives its entire authority from this source, it loses its ethical
character. Moral authority necessarily comes from within. It cannot be
grounded in an external will, even though this will be divine and our knowl-
edge of it adequate.”

Greatly desired here is a clarification of philosophic ideas; an indication of
the distinction between subjective and objective morality; of the difference between physical freedom and moral autonomy; between psychological control and moral supremacy; between the psychological perception of "ought" and its ethical justification.

Philosophically, the thesis of Dr. Knudson finds its refutation in the rejection of Kantian autonomy; theologically, from the source which the author, however illogically, admits, it is in patent contradiction with the words of Christ: "Not my will but Thine be done." Indeed, it would take from the whole redemptive action of Christ—which, according to St. Paul (Phil. 2:8; Rom. 5:19), was essentially an act of obedience to the will of God—all moral value.

Dr. Knudson does state: "In the view of the prophets and also of Jesus it was not an arbitrary divine will that established the moral law; it was rather the moral law that defined the divine will" (p. 286). This is a device which the author uses frequently throughout this book. By the insertion of a word (here, "arbitrary") he sets up, as though for refutation, a statement which misrepresents his adversary's opinion, and then, because this is manifestly false, illegitimately concludes to the truth of his own unsupported assertion.

The conclusion of his rationalistic absorption of Christian ethics is: "We may claim then for Christian ethics, at least in its essential nature, as valid a basis as that of philosophical ethics. Indeed they have a common rational basis." Parturient montes....

Above was noted the similarity of Dr. Knudson's ethics with the system of Kant. But in one respect, at least, they differ. Kant would never identify his law-making reason with the "modern mind." Yet it is by the tribunal of the "modern mind" that Dr. Knudson tries and finds wanting many doctrines of traditional Christianity.

Thus, though "Christian life has been generally regarded as consisting in the 'imitation of Christ' rather than in obedience to general rules and precepts" (p. 157), still, because "Jesus spoke not to us, but to the people of his time"; because "he shared the apocalyptic hope of his day and in not a few instances his moral judgments were no doubt colored by this fact"; because "he did not seek to have a universal human experience, one that would make him master in all the main spheres of human activity...."—for all these reasons, "His life seems too narrow and circumscribed in its interests as compared with ours. The modern mind, consequently, has difficulty in finding in him an adequate moral pattern." We must recognize, concludes Dr. Knudson, "the limited respect in which Jesus could be an example to us.... it is in his motives alone that Jesus can be a universal and authoritative
example, and here it is not so much his specific motives that are normative for us as it is the quality or spirit of his life as a whole. This spirit is not easily definable, but we perhaps come as close as we can to its essential content by identifying it with 'agape' in the predominant New Testament meaning of this term... It cannot be reduced to a code of laws..."

Again, speaking of Christian hope, the author states that this was at first "predominantly eschatological." "It had to do with the life to come." This eschatological hope is less vivid with us, but there still remains a modern "Christian optimism": "... the intramundane hope of an improved social order is much stronger with us than with Paul, and the modern Christian is also less burdened than the early Christian with a more or less fatalistic conception of sin as an objective and impersonal power. There are thus special forms or sources of optimism in modern as well as ancient Christianity" (p. 172).

In the same vein, the perfection aimed at in the asceticism of the monastic movement "from our modern point of view would be regarded as a pseudo-perfection." It must be noted here that asceticism is grossly misrepresented as being founded on a dualistic philosophy, according to which matter was regarded as inherently evil (pp. 143 ff.). And this misrepresentation is the fundament of numerous facile equivocations.

It is not surprising, therefore, to find in the section of the book that deals with the practical application of the principles of ethics a justification of: (1) suicide (and euthanasia) for the incurable invalid: "... its moral justification in certain extreme cases can hardly be regarded as excluded by the Christian ethic" (p. 188); (2) lying: "In the last analysis the good to be attained must decide what is right" (p. 192); (3) divorce: "When the union of husband and wife has lost its moral purpose and become revolting to both of them, there is no good reason why they should be compelled to live together. The result would be evil rather than good" (p. 207). However, "this does not affect the absoluteness of the Christian ideal with respect to the permanence of marriage"; and when Jesus allowed no exception in his condemnation of divorce, "he was speaking not as a law giver, but rather as an upholder of the moral ideal"; (4) birth control: "Accommodation to the spatial and financial limitations of city life is necessary if the standard of living is to be maintained, to say nothing of its being improved; ... as a result of better medical attention, infant mortality has been greatly reduced. ... Under the circumstances the population would increase with undue rapidity if some limitation were not placed on the natural fertility of the race. ... Again there is a revolt on the part of women against the older conception of their place in the world which made of them hardly more than breeding machines. They
recognize that their primary obligation is that of motherhood, but they want it to be a ‘responsible motherhood’—a motherhood to which they give their consent, not a motherhood due to impulse and to chance” (pp. 208–11). Such “conclusions” are not surprising, but to some it will always be surprising that they are defended in the name of Christianity.

Weston College

William F. Drummond, S.J.


These two books have been prepared for practically the same audience. They are handy manuals to assist Lutheran seminarians and laity in acquiring a ready, accurate knowledge of Lutheran doctrinal teaching. They are, as a matter of fact, complementary. Dr. Kerr’s volume provides at least a bowing acquaintance with Luther’s style and subject matter. Luther, however, wrote no systematic theology, and the organization of his religious thought was left to others. It is an understandable introduction to that organized body of thought that is provided in Dr. Little’s volume.

Catholic theologians and students of Luther will be interested in these two books chiefly because they contribute to an understanding of present-day conservative Lutheranism. In so far as that position can be official in a group that in theory admits no vivum magisterium, Dr. Little’s volume especially may safely be considered as presenting it. Thus both Catholics and non-Catholics are enabled to discuss Lutheran teaching without inadvertently misrepresenting it.

Dr. Kerr, Associate Professor of Systematic Theology at Princeton, in the present book follows the same general plan as was used in preparing his Compend of the Institutes of John Calvin. He has arranged his selections (gathered exclusively, be it noted, from those works of Luther that have already appeared in English translation) in such a way “as to suggest a sequence of thought so that the passages will seem to hang together in a unity and not give the impression of a disjointed anthology” (p. x). Further, he disclaims any attempt at maintaining the chronological order of Luther’s writings, because “in the consideration of Luther’s main doctrinal contributions no importance attaches to change and development since these, wherever they occur, are not of a radical character” (p. xi). The fact is, however, that a careful study of Luther’s works reveals a considerable evolution in which the Wittenberg theologian moves, through successive
stages, from an early entanglement of pessimism to a tentative acceptance of the certainty of damnation, then to a growing persuasion of not being inevitably lost. And his "faith," or persuasion of not being accounted by God the sinner he remained in reality, constantly tends to become more a matter of sentiment and less an assent to a body of God-given truths. Surely this significant evolution is of importance in understanding Luther's theology. And his increasing insistence on the need of "feeling right" with God makes him the logical forerunner of those modern Protestants who feel no obligation to believe definite doctrines as long as they "feel right" with God. Further, Luther's rejection of the authority of Pope and Councils was surely of a radical character, yet its development was not complete until well on in 1519. Until that time Luther considered himself an obedient son of the Catholic Church.

As a final comment on this book, it is more than a little bewildering to find so apparently trustworthy a scholar as Dr. Kerr making the statement: "It has been justly said that the only concerted rebuke against Nazism has come from the Lutheran Church" (p. xv). Without in the least taking from the glory that rightly belongs to heroic Pastor Niemoeller and Bishop Berggrav, surely such names as Fulda, Faulhaber, von Galen, Schulte, and von Preysing cannot be ignored when the subject of "concerted rebukes" is once raised.

Turning now to the volume by Dr. Little, Professor in the Evangelical Lutheran Seminary of Canada, Waterloo, Ontario, we find that it sets forth with brevity and clarity, and in nontechnical language, "the sense of the various articles of the Augsburg Confession as also the teachings in the Formula of Concord." In each instance there is the positive statement of true Lutheran doctrine fortified by copious quotations of Scripture texts, following which comes the brief statement of opposing doctrinal positions (Roman Catholic very frequently) together with their condemnation in unmistakable terms.

It is indeed consoling to find so forthright an adherence to not a few revealed truths that have been the common heritage of Christians since apostolic times. Outside the Catholic Church, adherence to these truths is rapidly becoming a thing to be looked for in vain. As for the specifically Lutheran doctrines, these too are enunciated in terms as apodictic as any to be found in the definitions of the General Councils. Considering the fact that the authors of these Lutheran symbols were very human and admittedly fallible, as were and are all subsequent expounders of the doctrines contained in the symbols, it is surprising to note the dogmatic finality with which these teachings are imposed on all faithful Lutherans. It is
indeed stated that these symbolic writings are accepted and professed because they contain nothing but the true scriptural doctrine. But one is prompted to ask: If the Scriptures are the sole rule of belief, is not their meaning clear to all sincere followers of Christ? Whereas, if one must be told what the Scriptures mean, then the credentials of the voice claiming authority must be scrutinized lest one be victimized by an imposter. Nothing less than a divine guarantee of infallibility in propounding God's Word would seem to suffice.

Dr. Little is undoubtedly highly qualified to explain Lutheran confessional theology, but Catholics cannot fail to regret the caricatures which he condemns as Roman Catholic teachings. The cause of mutual understanding is not served by such distortion of fact. As samples illustrating the point just made, the following are offered:

"Has God, then, who made full provision for man's redemption, failed to provide for its application, or for its appropriation by man? This seems to be the idea of the Romanists, who endeavor to supplement this supposed defect in God's plan of salvation by priestly sacrifices and intercessions and by the sinner's own efforts in the sacrament of penance" (p. 35). "Finally, the Roman Catholics are condemned, as those who require that grace be merited through satisfactions which penitents themselves perform in the so-called Sacrament of Penance" (p. 73). "The condemnation is directed against the Romanists, whose doctrine is that the Sacraments justify by the work done or by mere outward performance and who do not require faith in the use of the Sacraments" (76). "Under the 'others' mentioned in this Article reference is made to the Roman Catholics, who are Semi-Pelagians and teach that man can by his own natural powers begin his conversion, but needs divine grace to complete it" (p. 100). "It is a wrong use of the Sacrament when it is taught that sins are remitted by the mere outward acts connected with the Mass... If justification is wrought by the mere performance of the Mass, then it takes place by the work of masses and not by faith, as the Scriptures everywhere teach" (p. 124).

St. Mary's College  
CLEMENT DEMUTH, S.J.
DESCRIPTIVE NOTICES


Again we express our gratitude to The Newman Bookshop for reprinting translations of three classics of ascetical literature.

The Spiritual Conferences of St. Francis de Sales were originally spoken to his Daughters of the Visitation of Holy Mary. A number of the nuns wrote down the words of the saint, afterwards compared notes and compiled them most carefully. Though directed to the nuns of the Visitation, these conferences are so full of the love of God that all—clergy, religious, and laypeople—will find in them a source of priceless spiritual treasures.

With a heart on fire with zeal for the spiritual growth of his seminarians at Mechlin, Cardinal Mercier in these conferences to them held up the lofty ideals of their God-given vocation. In addition to the years spent at Mechlin, the Cardinal spent fourteen years at the Seminary of Leo XIII in the training of seminarians, the work dearest to his heart. Not only clerical students but all who are in any way connected with the important work of training future priests will find true inspiration in this volume of seven conferences.

The Dialogue of St. Catherine of Siena, dictated by her while in a state of ecstasy to her secretaries, belongs to the mystical literature of the Church. It is a dialogue between God and Catherine. In spite of the extraordinary circumstances of its production, it is nothing more than a sublime exposition of what every one of us learned during our catechism days. The volume is enhanced by the addition of an eye-witness account of the saint's death.

Woodstock College


Many will be happy to know that Father Blunt's book on the Holy Ghost is about to go into its second edition. The same simplicity and warmth which have recommended the author's other ascetical writings are to be found in his treatment of this very difficult subject.
Father Blunt's object is to help bring men to a better knowledge and love of the Holy Ghost, and to a more conscious co-operation with the Spirit of the Father and the Son. After an introductory section in which he reviews the revelation of God's plan for the sanctification of men by adopting them in Christ, and the precise part of the Holy Ghost in that plan, the author pursues his main object in accordance with the directive of Leo XIII that "what should be chiefly dwelt upon and clearly explained is the multitude and greatness of the benefits which have been bestowed, and are constantly bestowed, upon us by this Divine Giver." There is a section entitled "The Holy Ghost in Us," another on the infused virtues, and a third, taking up more than two-thirds of the book, on the gifts of the Holy Ghost. In this treatment of the messianic gifts enumerated by Isaías, Fr. Blunt is perhaps at his best. He keeps always in view the relations of the Christian to Christ, and the possibilities for growth towards perfection by reason of the facility in action which the Holy Ghost confers in His gifts. The chapter on the gift of piety is extraordinarily good.

The author is at pains throughout to make himself clearly understood by all. It is right, then, that he should avoid the theological subtleties connected with his subject. But it might be questioned whether some of his colloquial expressions do not detract from the high tone and dignity which he otherwise maintains with all his simplicity of style.

Auriesville, N. Y.

JAMES ALF, S.J.


It is not difficult to indicate the content and value of this book. Besides the preface, it contains twelve Encyclical Letters, three Apostolic Letters, and one Apostolic Constitution of Leo XIII on the rosary; a summary of indulgences; and an index. It does not include letters of the same Pontiff to particular dioceses or institutions, nor the relevant letters and decrees issued in his time by the various Roman congregations. It is a convenient and most ready means of finding out the Leonine doctrine on the rosary. In the course of so many documents the Pope could hardly avoid discussing such subjects as the origin, nature, and advantages of the rosary; its use and history in the Church; its special appropriateness in times of difficulty and distress; the universal mediation of the Blessed Virgin Mary; the necessity and importance of prayer, vocal and mental, private and public; the place of Mary in the Incarnation and redemption; and the value of the rosary for personal
sanctification, for social renewal, for the building up of the Mystical Body of Christ, and for the whole world, especially in times of extraordinary disorder and need. The Apostolic Constitution, *Ubi Primum* (October 2, 1898), gives the legislation for the Confraternity of the Rosary.

One cannot read this collection of Leo's public official utterances on the rosary without being impressed by the magnitude, the tenderness, and the filial confidence of the Pope's own devotion to the Mother of God. The book should do much to enlighten private persons in the most authoritative manner on what we might call the theory of the rosary, and to inflame their hearts with zeal in reciting it. Its utility as a source book of material for preachers is evident; to them particularly the index will be useful. Finally, the last pages offer a clear, definite, and reliable summary of the indulgences attached to the rosary.

*St. Mary's College*  
G. Augustine Ellard, S.J.


Ten sections embracing sixty-four chapters, with added critical bibliography, glossary, and index, form this practical guide to liturgical ceremonies. The author has bridged the gap between the ordinary handbooks and the more complete liturgical treatises to give the student a complete textbook and the priest a handy reference work. His aim has been to tell not only what to do but how to do it. This is the newness of the approach and the reason for its publication.

The first section deals with ceremonial appointments, and the second section, "Principles of Ceremonies," describes and illustrates in a clear and concise manner the general rules that govern liturgical actions. The remaining sections consider the individual services in detail, e.g., Low Mass, Solemn Mass, Services for the Dead, Divine Office, Exposition of the Blessed Sacrament, Occasional Ceremonies, The Liturgical Year, and a Musical Supplement. Only Holy Week is omitted from the list of usual parish ceremonies; it is promised treatment in a future volume. Each section, when possible, contains a chapter on the principles that should regulate the specific ceremonies. The functions of each participant are treated separately as a unit so as to enable one quickly to master his part in any service.

The tone of the work is simple, and marked by a clarity of direction that reflects the experience of the author. Constant references are given to accepted authorities and doubtful matters are adequately handled in generous footnotes. The critical bibliography does not aim at completeness but will
serve as an adequate guide to those who would seek further enlightenment on the why of certain liturgical customs. The Glossary will be helpful to those who do not have a liturgical dictionary handy when consulting Latin caeremonialia. The Book of Ceremonies will make a welcome gift to seminarians and busy curates.

B. A. M., S.J.

BOOKS RECEIVED


Benziger Brothers (Catholic University of America Press), New York: Two Basic Social Encyclicals: On the Condition of the Workers—Leo XIII, and Forty Years After on Reconstructing the Social Order—Pius XI, Latin text and English translation (pp. 195, $2.50).

Bruce Publishing Co., Milwaukee, Wis.: My Father's Will, by Francis J. McGarrigle, S.J. (pp. xii + 323, $2.75).


Franciscan Institute, St. Bonaventure, N. Y.: The Tractatus de Successivis Attributed to William Ockham, edited by Philotheius Boehner, O.F.M. (pp. xi + 122, $2.00).


Holy Cross Press, West Park, N. Y.: The Theologia Mystica of Saint Dionysius, by Alan W. Watts (pp. 40).


Newman Book Shop, Westminster, Md.: Cardinal Mercier's Conferences Delivered to His Seminarists at Mechlin, trans. by J. M. O'Kavanagh (pp. xxiv + 206, $2.00); Lourdes Interpreted by the Salve Regina, by Bede Jarrett, O.P. (pp. 97, $1.00); National Patriotism in Papal Teaching, by John J. Wright (pp. liii + 358, $3.50).

Sheed & Ward, New York: *The Four Gospels*, by Dom John Chapman, O.S.B. (pp. vi + 85, $1.25); *The Reed of God*, by Caryll Houselander (pp. 192, $2.00); *What Is Education?*, Edward Leen, C.S.Sp. (pp. 288 + $3.00).

St. Anthony Guild Press, Paterson, N. J.: *The Priest in the Epistles of St. Paul*, by the Most Reverend Amleto Giovanni Cicognani (pp. xii + 119, $1.00); *Addressed to Youth*, by Sister M. Madeleva (pp. ix + 60, $1.00).