BOOK REVIEWS


Sternberg is professor of poetics and comparative literature at Tel-Aviv University and has published extensively on both biblical and modern literature. Well respected as a major contemporary literary critic, he has set himself the task of delineating nothing less than a foundational theory of biblical narrative literature. He chooses the term "poetics" carefully because it requires a systematic study of the biblical narratives primarily as literature. This approach takes the literary art and aesthetic dimensions of the text seriously. But S. goes far beyond a superficial analysis of rhetorical devices and structural elements that so often have passed as "literary criticism" of the Bible. For him, narrative is marked by a functional structure of communication between narrator and audience in which an author chooses strategies to produce the desired effects on the reader. Biblical narrative is treated as a complex, multifunctional discourse built on three principles: ideological, historiographic, and aesthetic. They co-operate but in subtle and often tricky ways. That the Bible as religious writing involves both ideological and historical ends has long been acknowledged, but few have truly accredited a strong aesthetic dimension as a partner in the purposes of narrative.

To develop how these three principles interrelate, S. devotes considerable space to analyzing narrative models, especially one which purports to reflect divine inspiration. He investigates the ideology of narratives that claim to be from an omniscient and omnipotent God and what that signified for ancient writers. He also examines viewpoints within texts, the threefold play of perspectives between God and narrator, between narrator and reader, and between God and the characters of the narrative. He does a superb job bringing out the myriad ways in which ambiguity and irony are used, as well as the effect of gaps in texts, suspense, temporal discontinuity, proleptic announcements, and portraits. He then studies the role of repetition as a strategy of persuasion. The book ends with two chapters on the art of persuasion: one on the appeal to conscience, the other on the problem of justifying God to humans. He focuses on the strategies used to move an audience from one stance to another. These are never, however, merely external to the narrative; rather, the narrative itself requires the movement by its aesthetic presentation.

S. has written a very important book, both for his comprehensiveness and for the clearly-avowed faith stance from which he understands and interprets the strategies of the biblical narratives. Sometimes he over-
analyzes his text, as, e.g., in the story of Dinah in Gen 34, leaving this reader with the suspicion that modern literary critics may have better imaginations than the original authors and often devise too much from a close reading of the text. In any case, the many analyses of texts that he offers truly explore every possible dimension of his three principles. To work through them all is an exhausting task. But no one can lose by giving the extra effort required by this study; it not only opens up hundreds of new insights into the literary art of the Bible, but offers a superb overview of the function and artistic power of its narratives.

Washington Theological Union, Md. LAWRENCE BOADT, C.S.P.


Cohen, professor of Jewish history at the Jewish Theological Seminary in New York, interprets ancient Judaism by identifying its major ideas, salient practices, unifying patterns, and relationship to Israelite religion and society. Thus he treats Judaism's history not as preparatory to Christianity but as the whole in which early Christianity began.

C. rejects as biased any periodization of the standard chronology from 587 B.C. to 500 A.D. but the political. He characterizes Second Temple Judaism as democratized, with emphases on private worship, theodicy, priestly role, apocalypticism, and book religion. He finds Jews related to Gentiles politically after the model of Jer 25: Jews must support the state until Yahweh sees fit to redeem them. Culturally, all Judaism was Hellenized, and so he avoids the tag "Hellenistic Judaism." Socially, conversion to Judaism became possible only when Israel was no longer a nation, but rather a religion (after Ezra).

The Jewish religion stressed practices more than beliefs. In this period the synagogue supplemented the temple, prayer supplemented the sacrificial cult, and scribes supplemented priests. The doctrines of sin, retribution, and repentance were individualized to sanctify everyday life. Individuals found justice in a resurrected life, and the nation found vindication in an eschatological new order.

The most important chapters seem to be on sectarian movements and on canonization of Tanak. C. defines sect phenomenologically as "a small, organized group that separates itself from a larger religious body and asserts that it alone embodies the ideals of the larger group because it alone understands God's will" (125). In the Persian period he finds protosectarianism in Ezra's "congregation of the exile" (cf. also Neh 10) and in the chosen ones of Isa 65. In the Hellenistic period emphasis on
prayer and Torah study produced the scribes, new social organizations (synagogues), and new social elites (rabbis). The first true sectarians are the Essenes, while the Sadducees and Pharisees never achieved the exclusivism of sects. After 70 A.D. C. finds the Christians originally a Jewish sect, but evidence is insufficient to decide whether the Zealots, Samaritans, or Therapeutae were truly sects.

As a historian, C. finds the reason for canonization in the Jewish community's judgment that these separate works were existentially meaningful and eternally valid. The canon as a body fixed in time had to be reinterpreted (C.: misinterpreted) to address existential problems of Jews centuries later, and they accomplished this by allegorical and typological exegesis in paraphrases and commentaries. In a final chapter, C. traces the development of the rabbis from the Pharisees and argues that it was not rabbinic creation of the birkat ha minim at Yavneh which effected the separation of Christianity from Judaism.

This excellent book presents the nonspecialist with a clearly written, beautifully proportioned and organized historical survey from the standpoint of reform Judaism. C. bends over backwards to be “fair” to Christianity in his discussion of anti-Semitism and other disputed points between Judaism and Christianity. I single out only three major areas of debate. (1) Granted that first-century rabbis did not have such institutional control over local synagogues that they could mandate the birkat ha minim, does this exclude the possibility that a practice begun locally could spread from synagogue to independent synagogue and become the process by which Judaism separated Christianity from itself? (2) In an era of sociological analysis in biblical and historical studies, I am amazed that C. did not make use of Troeltsch's analysis of sect. Especially where historical evidence is meager, careful attention to method can make stones speak. C.'s definition of sect is too loose to be effective even where evidence abounds. (3) Most importantly, C. identifies himself as a historian and so eschews theological judgment. Nevertheless, he inevitably makes judgments which only a theologian should make: first, about the nature of theology (“Theology does not demand consistency” [81]), and second, about the relation of faith and reason (“a confession of faith [is] not susceptible to rational inquiry” [135]). My point here is not that these statements are wrong (they are), but that when one is dealing with phenomena like Judaism and Christianity, the historian must have theological skills, just as the theologian must have historical ones. C. may present a particularly pungent example of a historian's ignorance of theology, but actually very few of us have done enough thinking about how the theologian uses history and how the historian uses theology to write methodologically-grounded monographs.
in these overlapping areas. With this caveat, I nevertheless recommend this book for those who are not graduate students in these areas.

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*L. John TopeI, S.J.*


This commentary completes the Gospels for the Anchor Bible. Its author is already familiar from his earlier co-authorship with W. F. Albright of the Anchor *Matthew* (see *TS* 33 [1972] 580–82). While maintaining positions from the previous work, M. offers a distinctive interpretation of the Gospel of Mark. Most noteworthy is his alignment with that handful of contemporary NT scholars who call for a return to the Griesbach hypothesis that Mark is written last and uses Matthew and Luke.

The 190 pages of introductory material cover the nature and composition of the Gospels, relationships among the Synoptics, the date, purpose and method of composition of Mark, Jesus and the kingdom in Mark, principal texts and word usage of Mark, with an appended suggestion on the arrangement of Mark by L. F. X. Brett—which is at variance with the arrangement followed by M. himself. The body of the book comprises the author’s translation, general comments on each pericope, and notes on specific verses. While M. holds that Mark originally ended at 16:8, he treats 16:9-20 and the other proposed endings (e.g. the “shorter ending” and the Freer Logion).

According to M., the Gospel of Mark was composed in Palestine by Mark, a disciple and interpreter of Peter who returned to Palestine after Peter’s departure from Rome c. A.D. 55 (based on a suggestion by T. W. Manson, which M. admits has not been generally accepted). Mark’s original composition, complete by this time, drew largely on reminiscences of Peter, so that Mark returned, according to M., with “a narrative like the one in Mark 1-14” (80). This material was then written down c. A.D. 66 with Matt as the principal and Luke as the secondary source. Mark’s purpose was to provide a “conflated digest” of the deeds of Jesus with stress on his suffering for a community threatened by the clouds of war and the revolutionary activity of the Zealots. A corollary of this view is that the complete Gospels of Matt and Luke would have been in circulation in Palestine prior to the composition of Mark.

Major problems attend M.’s proposal on the development and setting of Mark. Though stating that Mark had at hand Matt and Luke, in the vast majority of the pericopes Mark does not merely follow them, but also has access to other traditions which M. names a “reminiscence
source" (278). Virtually all the miracles are derived from eyewitness reminiscences or other sources, independent of Matt or Luke, as are narratives such as the Temptation and the Transfiguration which derives from one of the eyewitnesses (358). Mark 13, which “reproduces what are substantially the words of Jesus” (498) also contains traditions not found in Matt or Luke, and Mark also had access to the Passion Narrative, prior to encountering Matt and Luke. Mark, according to M., turns to Matt primarily for the order of events and less frequently to Luke for details not found in his own source. What is offered is thus a confusing mixture of the 1783 Griesbach hypothesis which affirmed the priority of Matt, with the early 19th century “Marcan hypothesis” which argued that Mark, as the first Gospel, contained the earliest authentic traditions about Jesus. M. has presented an internally inconsistent appropriation of the Griesbach hypothesis, and, in effect, has argued for sources and traditions used by Mark which are both earlier than his Gospel and independent of Matt and Luke. He never explains how Matt and Luke had access to those “reminiscences” (especially those derived from Peter) nor why they incorporated them in their Gospels often in different form than Mark. It is precisely the dominant “two document hypothesis” (Mark and Q as the sources for Matt and Luke) which better explains such phenomena in the Synoptic Gospels.

A commentary written from the perspective of the Griesbach hypothesis which offered a consistent interpretation of Mark as a redaction of Matt and Luke, could have been a positive contribution to the discussion of the Synoptic problem. M. offers no such study. His comments on Mark’s alleged redaction of Matt and Luke are limited mainly to editorial matters and he shows little awareness of contemporary developments in the theologies of Matt and Luke, or even of Mark. His understanding of Mark’s composition ultimately raises more problems for advocates of the Griesbach hypothesis than for the majority who hold the “two document hypothesis.”

While the translation is fresh and idiomatic, it is quite idiosyncratic and raises serious problems. Most disconcerting is the constant translation of euangelion (gospel) throughout Mark as “the Proclamation,” as in 1:1, 1:15, 13:10, and 14:9. This is a poor translation because it confuses gospel (euangelion) with proclamation (kêrygma), and because readers who do not know Greek will never realize that “gospel” as used by Paul in many important passages is the same term found in Mark.

The constant translation of ho huios tou anthrôpou as “the Man,” with its interpretation as “representative Israel,” is inaccurate on both philological and exegetical grounds. Equally questionable is the translation of lytron anti pollôn (10:45) as “a ransom for the community” and of
hyper pollon (14:24) as “for the Community” (capitalized here but not in 10:45). Even though M. cites the use of the term “the many” (harabbim) as a designation for the community at Qumran, in Mark the definite article is absent, and most commentators and translations still prefer “a ransom for many.” The citation of Isa 61:3, “A voice in one crying in the desert: ‘Prepare the way of the Lord’” (Mark 1:7, NASB), in contrast to virtually every translation is rendered: “A voice calling, ‘In the desert make ready the Lord’s road!’” Mark 2:14 is rendered as “he saw a Levite, son of Alphaeus” (rather than “Levi,” in contrast, again, to virtually every modern version). And in 2:21 we read “a piece of unshrunk cloth on an old himation” which M. justifies by saying that there is no modern equivalent to himation (cloak, or garment). Yet there is no modern equivalent to krabbaton (pallet or mat, 2:9, 11) which M. translates in 2:9 as “bed” and 2:11 as “stretcher.” Prospective readers should use M.’s translation and notes with another standard translation in hand.

The theology of Mark as M. describes it is fundamentally the theology of the tradition behind Mark (not Matt and Luke, but the oral sources). The section on Mark’s Christology is really an exercise in the quest for the historical Jesus and the eschatology of Mark is “realized eschatology,” which was that of Jesus. The picture of the doubting and denying disciples (though differently depicted in Matthew and Luke) reproduces historical events as do the texts where Jesus imposes secrecy (the “Messianic Secret”). In his comments on Mark’s theology, M. relies mainly on conservative British scholarship of the fifties and sixties and, for the most part, ignores the past two decades of redaction critical work on Mark.

While the overall conception of the work presents major problems, its strength lies in comments on the meaning of specific terms and phrases in the Greek of Mark, and on specific issues such as Jesus’ teaching on possessions (4:4–6). M. also synthesizes well secondary literature on certain complex issues such as the debate on the “Secret Gospel of Mark” (422–29). The author is attuned to subsequent theological debate on issues such as the saying on divorce (10:11–12) and “the words of institution” (14:22–24).

While M. includes extensive bibliographies, works published after the mid-seventies are in short supply; e.g., there is no critical engagement with the major commentaries of Rudolf Pesch and Joachim Gnilka. It is also difficult to know how the commentary can address the audience envisioned by the editors’ statement that “the Anchor Bible is aimed at the general reader with no formal training in biblical studies” (ix). Its inconsistent and problematic reconstruction of Mark’s composition and setting, along with its idiosyncratic translations and questionable theo-
logical interpretation, render it ill-suited for the general reader or the theological student. Specialists may find discussion of particular issues and terms helpful in confronting a work which, though the subject of extensive research in the last quarter century, still remains the "mysterious Gospel."

Jesuit School of Theology, Berkeley       JOHN R. DONAHUE, S.J.


As its subtitle indicates, this commentary has a specific exegetical objective. It is written for the nonspecialist, and while it wants to give a careful reading of the text, its concern is more for the "big picture" of Pauline thought than for the minutiae of the Corinthian correspondence. Talbert is well aware of the issues which have plagued interpreters of these letters, but has chosen not to burden the reader with a technical discussion of them. Also, he has not loaded the book down with footnotes. When it is necessary to cite primary sources or secondary literature, he does it parenthetically within the body of the text.

A manageable introduction brings the reader up to date on some of the recent developments in the study of Pauline letters, and especially of the Corinthian correspondence. Four of these are noted: the current thinking on the relation of ancient rhetoric and epistolography to Paul; recent studies on the city of Corinth; the consensus on partition theories relative to the Corinthian correspondence; and an update on the identification of Paul's opponents. Space does not permit an extensive discussion of these topics, and T.'s intention is not to give a comprehensive summary of Pauline scholarship. Rather, he wants to highlight some recent scholarly trends that may attune the reader to his stated purpose: to understand Paul's letters to the Corinthians in terms of "what is said and how it is said" (xiii).

A welcome feature of this commentary is the attempt to integrate Jewish, Greek, and Roman sources into the discussion of key texts of these letters. A good example is the wealth of information on views of marriage and divorce among Jews, Greeks, and Romans, included in the discussion of 1 Cor 7:25-40. Here T. provides a glimpse of the ways some ancient authors viewed marriage and divorce in the society of their day. The result is a clear grasp of Paul's advice to the Corinthians on these matters. In general, the amount of information packed into the pages of this commentary goes a long way in helping T. to achieve the first half of his purpose, to understand what Paul wrote.

Achieving the second part of his stated goal, to elucidate how Paul
wrote, is less successful. The emphasis on ancient rhetoric, its structures and devices, is an interesting and necessary adjunct to understanding Paul. Unfortunately, T. has not provided enough information on ancient rhetoric itself, or how it functions in Paul’s letters, to help an untrained reader evaluate what he is saying about its place in the Corinthian correspondence.

Attention is called to the rhetorical features of Paul’s writing style throughout the commentary. This is helpful for getting a sense of Paul’s writing style, but in some cases the attempt to fit sections of the letters into particular rhetorical patterns may be confusing for the reader unfamiliar with ancient rhetorical technique. The discussion of 1 Cor 11:2–16 offers an example. At first this text is identified as part of a larger ABA’ unit, chapters 11–14. Then it is treated under its own ABA’ pattern made up of 11:3–10 (A), 11:11–12 (B), and 11:13–15 (A’). The first component, 11:3–10, is discussed in detail, showing a further abca’b’c’ structure. But the remaining two sections are treated without any mention of structure. Some explanation of why the structure of the first element is more significant than that of the next two would have helped. For the unskilled reader, merely calling attention to rhetorical devices, without providing basic information about them and how they function in the Corinthian correspondence, may impede a clear understanding of Paul’s purpose.

Trying to integrate the literary and theological issues of the Corinthian correspondence in a commentary of this length is a challenging task. Despite the difficulties writing this kind of commentary presents, T. has done an admirable job in helping his reader to grasp what was at stake in the conversations between Paul and the Corinthians.

Georgetown University

ALAN C. MITCHELL, S.J.


These two volumes constitute a superlative collection of primary texts in philosophical and theological hermeneutics. In addition, Klemm provides an excellent 53-page “General Introduction” on the history and nature of hermeneutical inquiry, as well as analytical introductions to each selection that helpfully explain its context and its relationship to other selections.

From the General Introduction, I would especially commend K.’s typology of four distinct forms of hermeneutical theory: as theory of interpretation, as practical philosophy, as speculative ontology, and as theology. Recognizing the differences among these four distinct modes is
essential not only for the proper understanding of individual thinkers and projects, but also for grasping how these different modes of inquiry complement one another. It also is essential in order to avoid fruitless argumentative confrontations which result from one or both sides of a debate not understanding what the other side is arguing and why—something that has not always been avoided by the principal protagonists of these debates.


What sets this project apart, however, is the way in which Vol. 2 augments and complements the first, both thematically and by including selections from eight of the ten authors represented in the first volume. The two volumes thus maintain a valuable consistency by allowing the reader to follow an individual thinker’s progression from “theory” to “practice,” i.e. from his understanding of what is involved in the interpretation of language and texts to his sometimes analogous, sometimes divergent understanding of what is involved in the interpretation of human existence and existence as such.

Included in Vol. 2 are the opening theoretical sections of Schleiermacher’s The Christian Faith, Dilthey’s influential essay “The Types of World-View and Their Development in the Metaphysical Systems,” sections 31–33 from Heidegger’s Being and Time, Bultmann’s pivotal essay “The Historicity of Man and Faith,” “The Basic Ontological Structure” from Tillich’s Systematic Theology, Ricoeur’s programmatic essay “Existence and Hermeneutics,” Gadamer’s “What Is Practice,” and Scharlemann’s “Being Open and Thinking Theologically.” These are supplemented by three essays that expand the horizons of this collection significantly: Edmund Husserl’s “Phenomenology,” thereby providing the immediate context for, and contrast with, Heidegger; and two essays by Jürgen Habermas, “On Systematically Distorted Communication” and “Towards a Theory of Communicative Competence,” thereby including both sides of the famous Gadamer-Habermas debate.

Together, these two volumes constitute a cornucopia of some of the most important texts on hermeneutical theory and practice from the past
200 years. Add to this the valuable contribution of the General Introduction and the introductions to the individual selections, and this set would serve admirably as the cornerstone for graduate courses in theological hermeneutics.

One caveat. If these volumes require a second printing, no effort should be spared to replace the translation of Bultmann's "The Problem of Hermeneutics" by the new one recently published by Schubert Ogden (Fortress). The original English translation of this essay, included here, really is an abomination and could well be accused of being significantly responsible for a general misapprehension in English-speaking countries concerning Bultmann's theological intent.

Georgetown University

ROBERT F. SCUKA


McGrath modestly presents his history of the doctrine of justification, of which the present volume is the first half, as a "bibliographical essay." His analytic organization of the topics central to and surrounding the doctrine, from Augustine to the eve of the Reformation, well supported at every step by judicious bibliographical notes, certainly makes this a more than ordinarily useful scholarly tool. But this small volume does truly undertake to write a large history. Its smallness, however, is deceptive: with an admirable economy of expression that brooks no loss of clarity, M. provides skilful introductions to notoriously difficult and controverted positions both historical and theological.

Chapter 1 addresses itself to an explanation of how the metaphor of justification came to capture so much of the soteriological thinking of Western theology, and to the problematic relation of the Latin justificare to the OT notions of righteousness and acquittal. Chapter 2 tackles Augustine. Chapter 3 follows select issues (the nature of justification, the justice of God, merit, predestination, etc.) from the 12th century to the eve of the Reformation. Those who face the thicket of medieval theology after Duns Scotus with alarm and dismay will especially appreciate the clarity with which the late medieval positions are mapped out. Chapter 4 summarizes the medieval heritage according to the diverse schools, explains the uselessness of speaking of a "nominalist" doctrine of justification (since there is no correlation between the difference between realists and nominalists and the different theological positions relative to justification), and discusses the senses of "Augustinianism."

M. defends two important historical assertions. First, from Augustine to the eve of the Reform, there is agreement on the nature (if not process
or mode) of justification as working an inherent change in the justified. "The entire medieval discussion of justification proceeds upon the assumption that a real change in the sinner is thereby effected. This observation is as true for the via moderna as it is for the earlier period" (51). The catholicity of the Reform distinction between justification (forensic) and regeneration cannot be defended by appeal either to Augustine or to any of the diverse late-medieval theological schools.

Second, the charge of Pelagianism against, e.g., Gabriel Biel and other thinkers of the via moderna cannot be sustained. Change there is in the medieval theology of justification: from an ontological causal analysis that places the ratio iustificationis in the created habit of grace to an analysis in terms of "covenantal causality" in which the formal cause of justification becomes the extrinsic denomination of the divine acceptance; and from an intellectualist to a voluntarist context, according to which there is or is not an intrinsic connection between an act and its merit. This double change occurs with Scotus. Certainly, Thomas' denial of de congruo merit of justification is more straightforwardly anti-Pelagian. But M. argues with some persuasiveness that, properly understood, the admission of the possibility of de congruo merit of justification on the assumption of God's free and prior decree (ex pacto divino) so to reward such merit cannot be labeled Pelagian. And although it may be replied that Biel's position nonetheless amounts to a kind of practical Pelagianism, according to which we can on the basis of the pactum comport ourselves toward God much as Pelagius said we could, I think the most important issue M. raises in this discussion is whether the shift from ontological to "covenantal" (personal) causal analysis really indicates a break with rationalism and a return to the biblical concept of God (126). I think this very much depends on what one makes of God's wisdom, asserted in the Bible with as much force as His power and freedom. But the above remark is ungenerous for a book the clarity and conciseness and utility of whose expositions (e.g., on the two powers of God, absolute and ordinate; on Anselm's notion of justice) cannot be conveyed in a review.

"There never was, and there never can be, any true Christian church without the doctrine of justification, for the community of faith cannot exist without proclaiming, in word and sacrament, the truth of what God has done for man in Christ. It is this truth which called the church into being, and it is this truth which must be expressed in her life and doctrine" (1). Those who continue to hold that justification is the articulus stantis et cadentis ecclesiae will want to study this splendid volume and will eagerly look for its promised companion.

Saint Meinrad Seminary, Ind. GUY MANSINI, O.S.B.

The history of the Apocalypse (Revelation) of John in the early Church is unique among the histories of NT books. In the second century Rev 20:1–5 gave rise to widespread millenarianism. In reaction, the Eastern Church came to distrust the Apocalypse: its place in the canon there was not finally assured until the ninth century or so, and, apart from a commentary (lost) that Melito of Sardis is said to have written and some scholia on the Apocalypse that may perhaps be Origen's, the first Greek commentaries on the Apocalypse were written in the sixth or seventh century (Oecumenius and Andrew of Caesarea). The situation in the Western Church was quite different: there the Apocalypse was early considered canonical and commentaries abound: perhaps Hippolytus of Rome (lost); certainly Victorinus of Pettau (before 304); Tyconius the Donatist (ca. 385; original lost); Jerome (a revision of Victorinus); Caesarius of Arles and Primasius of Hadrumetum (both sixth century); and later Ps-Jerome, Bede, Ambrosius Autpertus, and Beatus of Liébana (all eighth century).

Virtually all Latin patristic commentaries on the Apocalypse after Tyconius' depend on his: they either cite him by name or stand under his influence. Tyconius himself is a fascinating figure: a Donatist who was expelled from his church but never joined the Catholics; the author of the first Latin manual of biblical hermeneutics, the Liber regularum, which became enormously influential because Augustine paraphrased a long excerpt from it in De doctrina christiana 3, 30–37; and the one who established the principles for interpreting the Apocalypse for centuries afterward.

For all these reasons, the idea that Tyconius' lost commentary on the Apocalypse might be reconstructed has captivated more than one scholar's imagination. The most recent is Steinhauser; he wrote his book as a doctoral dissertation under the direction of the distinguished Prof. Karl Suso Frank, O.F.M., at Freiburg in Germany. It should be said immediately that S. does not reconstruct the commentary. In the body of his book he examines, one by one, the writings of the nine authors who had immediate access to Tyconius' commentary (it was still in the library at St. Gall in the ninth century) and two manuscript fragments, and evaluates the usefulness of each for reconstructing the commentary. He concludes that a reconstruction is possible, with some reservations, but an actual reconstruction must await the critical editing of several texts that are available now only in wholly inadequate editions. Instead S. offers a synopsis: in 50 pages he lists, one by one, the verses of the
Apocalypse about which Tyconian material can be found and gives the precise location of that material in the commentaries, manuscripts, and Liber regularum. This synopsis should enable a patient student to reconstruct at least the sense of what Tyconius had to say, and sometimes even his wording.

S.’s work is meticulous. He is in full command of the literature. The chapters are concise and not overloaded with extraneous detail. The conclusions are careful. The book says very little about Tyconius’ interpretation of the Apocalypse or about his theology, but it was not meant to treat these topics. Since he is often dealing with little-known Latin texts, S. might have identified them by their numbers in the Clavis Patrum Latinorum, which then allow one to locate them in H. J. Frede’s Kirchenschriftsteller: Verzeichnis und Sigel from the Vetus Latina project; these are the two standard indexes to Latin patristic literature. The book is a prolegomenon, as S. admits; but it is also a well-defined but important contribution to the study of patristic exegesis, from which our own age may have much to learn.

Marquette University

JOSEPH T. LIENHARD, S.J.


These two quite different works, the one written in Latin about A.D. 197 by the first great theological figure in North African Christianity, the other in the Greek “East” a century later by the so-called father of caesaropapism, have important intrinsic and extrinsic elements in common. Intrinsically, each is a deeply apologetic work from the position of a minority Christian reaction to perceived pagan threats. Tertullian, in what has become one of the founding documents of the Christian contemptus mundi theme and of extreme Christian negativity towards theater, art, and secular culture, in his typical rigorist manner exposes the dangers he sees to Christian faith, Christian discipline, and Christian truth in the pervasive popularity of the games, plays, and shows (some 200 days per year in the Carthage of his time). Eusebius, on the eve of toleration, is concerned about the threat of the increasingly popular (apparently even to Christians) cult of the pagan wonder-working “divine man” Apollonius of Tyana, apparently martyred as a philosopher under Domitian in A.D. 93, immortalized in Philostratus’ Life of Apollonius (A.D. 217), and now, as theological support for the last great wave of
persecutions, programmatically presented by the Philalèthès of the pagan governor Hierocles as a divine figure more than worthy to rival the claimed divinity of Christ. Extrinsicly, these works now appear in Sources chrétiennes editions which, in terms of both text and commentary, constitute the indispensable starting point for any serious study of them.

Tertullian combines personal knowledge and experience, scholarly research in the philosophical antiart polemic that descends from Plato, some apparent familiarity with the moral writings of the Jews, and the demonology of the Bible and other early Christian writings (there is no direct treatment of this theme in the Bible) to produce a work of "astonishing originality," as Daniélou described it. There has been a general lack of agreement about the structure of the work, but Turcan argues convincingly for the structure proposed by R. D. Sider: chaps. 1–4, introduction; 5–13, the threat to faith; 14–20.1, the threat to discipline; 20.2–28, the threat to truth; 29–30, conclusion containing a description of what are in this world and will be in the next the games and shows of true Christians. Turcan's text represents some important critical advances which make it the fourth principal edition of this work (Dekkers 1954, Marra 1954, Castorina 1961) since the last English translation (T. R. Glover, Cambridge, 1953). Thus this edition is the place where serious readings of this work must begin.

Eusebius' somewhat neglected work aims not at a theoretical but at a practical apologetic level. Although Hierocles was apparently the one to develop the Apollonius-over-Christ theme, it is not Hierocles but Apollonius, the wonder-working divine man protrayed by Philostratus, who dominates Eusebius' attention. He mounts a historical, philosophical, and theological attack on the so-called miracles of Apollonius, points out that the true divine man (Christ) did not ascend to divinity but descended from it, and ends by fiercely attacking Apollonius' fatalism and defending the Christian notion of free will. The originality and significance of this work comes from it being basically an ad hominem argument (against Apollonius, not Hierocles), and from the fact that it does not use traditional Christian apologetic methods but turns against the pagans the very arguments developed by their polemicists. This provides an illuminating glance into a concrete, practical Christian apologetic stance vis-à-vis paganism at the outbreak of the last great persecution before toleration. The text of this edition makes significant advances, and Forrat's introduction and notes culled from her doctoral dissertation, the most significant recent major study of this work, make this edition too the indispensable starting place for serious study.

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ROBERT J. DALY, S.J.

These first two volumes of a new bilingual Latin edition and Italian translation of the works of St. Bernard of Clairvaux will be indispensable for students of Bernard and the 12th century. The Latin text presented is a revised and corrected version of that of the Editiones Cistercienses, published from 1957 to 1977. Although some scholars may need to refer to both editions, primarily because the notes on alternative manuscript readings have been dropped from this revised edition, for most purposes the new edition, with its new extensive explication notes, becomes a standard text. The claim that the misprints which teemed in especially the first volumes of the earlier edition have been attacked with care cannot yet be judged, because neither of the volumes under review corresponds to Vols. 1 and 2 of the earlier edition; misprints still occur, but in fairly modest number. The Italian translations, each with an introduction and notes, have been done under the direction of an editorial committee composed of Bernardo Crippa, Ferruccio Gastaldelli (the general editor of the project), Jean Leclercq, Maurizio Mattioli, Giovanni Maria Rosavini, Policarpo Zakar, and Pietro Zerbi.

Volume 1 begins with a Prologue by Gastaldelli and a splendid General Introduction, especially strong on the principal themes of Bernard’s thought, by Leclercq, one of the editors of the earlier Latin critical edition. This is the essay of a mature scholar, summarizing in great part a lifetime of his own contributions to the study of Bernard. Much fascinating work has been done on the spiritual sense in recent years, and L.’s presentation of Bernard’s understanding of inspiration as the continued communication of the wisdom of God through the reading of Scripture, in which a universal message is appropriated in a spiritual sense specific to the individual, is full of interest. One might note, for readers familiar with Brian Tierney’s Origins of Papal Infallibility, that both L.’s comments on Bernard’s place in the history of the development of papal infallibility, and G.’s note on p. 789 of the second volume under review, suggest that the last word on this subject has not yet been written.

The Liber de gradibus humilitatis et superbiae is given an excellent introduction by I Deug-Su, and is translated and annotated by Antonio Traglia. Especially valuable is Deug-Su’s discussion of the sense in which Bernard changed his ideas on things like the valuation of the human body. The introduction, translation, and notes to the Apologia ad Guillelum abbatem are by Romano Amerio, followed by a bibliography by Gastaldelli. Amerio shows, against Leclercq, that this work was originally two, and is not shy in pointing out such things as the incoherency of
Bernard’s esthetic ideas. Ermenegildo Bertola provides ample, precise introduction and notes to, and Ettore Paratore translation of, Bernard’s masterpiece, the *Liber de diligendo Deo*, and Manlio Simonetti does the same for the *Liber de gratia et libero arbitrio*.

Cosimo Damiano Fonseca provides a concise introduction and notes to, and translation of, the *Liber ad milites templi, De laude novae militiae*. The *De praecippo et dispensatione* also receives a relatively brief introduction, as well as notes, by Giorgio Picasse, and a translation by Marta Cristiani. Orientation to the *Vita sancti Malachiae episcopi* is provided by B. W. O’Dwyer, while this work is translated and annotated by Alessandro Pratesi. The *De consideratione* is introduced, with a substantial bibliography, by Zerbi, and translated and annotated by Gastaldelli. Many of these works are, of course, available in English translation, but those who read Italian will find that these new translations—and that of the *De consideratione* is an example—often show greater understanding of the Latin than do available English translations. Volume 1/1 closes with an index of names.

Volume 6/1 is introduced by Leclercq, translated by Paratore, and given rich historical comment by Gastaldelli. Theologians will find the sections of L.’s introduction on Bernard’s spiritual development and on his doctrine as seen in his letters of special usefulness. As in the first volume, while for the most part the notes inform the reader of the state of at least fairly current scholarship, on a number of points an independent scholarly contribution is made. Anachronism or imprecision (p. 495 n. 1 says Bernard “parla ... di sviluppo pieno della personalità nel done a Dio”) only occasionally intrudes. Very famous letters, such as the dossier against Abelard, are found in this volume, but few subjects of interest to the theologian, church historian, or historian of spirituality are not touched on.

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**GLENN W. OLSEN**


M. studies political ideas from the patristic age to Marsilius and Ockham, with a later volume planned to cover the rest of the medieval era. He links the three key terms with the fourth element, law, in his outline of parliamentary democracy. While warning against simplistic or anachronistic reading of medieval texts and disclaiming any expectation of coherent and internally consistent theories to be found in these early writers similar to what one might expect from contemporary theorists, he intends to show the medieval contribution to the evolution of modern
ideas and practices. Many questions remain: Is (popular) consent to be seen as active or passive? Does not all rule have to possess coercive power, and is this presupposed because government has to deal with sinful human nature? Must there not be a limit to what political authority should or can do?

Christian writers took scriptural texts as authoritative pronouncements ("Render to Caesar") but they followed these according to their interpretations. These were influenced by the language of Roman law, which the Vulgate embodied. Ambiguity and tension were at the heart of the interpretative process, since Christians were bound to obey both civil authority and God. Gregory the Great, Isidore, and above all Augustine impressed their ideas on the evolving outlook; it is no surprise that a variety of views developed and survived, since theory and speculation coexisted alongside diverse practices and customs, e.g. in the selection of church leaders. Medieval choosing of leaders was not the same as modern elections, and yet both involve the idea of consent. For the early medieval world, the presence of the people embodied the consent of the people. John of Salisbury introduced refining and nuancing in his discussion of flexible and inflexible law, in his stress on the king as above the law and yet bound by it. The people's consent was passive, and designation by God was the key element in selection of kings, but John also stated a limit to the obligation to obey and a right to react against a ruler. The Gregorian Reform and the revival of canon law pushed the development along, so that Gratian contained a genuine theory of ecclesiastical polity on which subsequent generations built.

Certain themes became the subject of extensive discussion and commentary: quod omnes tangit, representation, plena potestas, and royal prerogative, to mention a few. Electoral practices began to influence and structure theory: majority rule (maior pars, sanior pars), medieval monastic elections, urban democratic practices. The great age of theorists, theologians, and speculators—Aquinas, Henry of Ghent, Giles of Rome, John of Paris, Dante, Marsilius, and Ockham—showed the diversity and complexity of the various approaches and solutions that were proposed for the problems discussed.

This study takes up many topics for which few definitive answers can be given; inevitably questions arise. The major study, Der Begriff der Repräsen­tatio im Mittelalter, ed. A. Zimmermann (Berlin, 1971), does not seem to have been consulted, nor the recent volume of studies edited by M. Wilks, The World of John of Salisbury (Oxford, 1984). How were the electoral and deliberative practices the Church had evolved for selecting leaders, which were seen as models and admired by all, related to the new dimension of political theory and practice introduced by the
growth of towns? M. sees Marsilius as both innovating and yet reflecting typical medieval views—a tension that was never ultimately resolved. Ockham is contrasted with Marsilius in his nationality, academic career, and the fact that he came to discuss polity only incidentally and at the close of his career; in fact, M. stresses that Marsilius and Ockham consciously opposed each other on some points, especially on the right of the majority to act for the whole body.

One major error slipped through: Wilks’s study, “Corporation and Representation,” is consistently cited as “Coronation and Representation” in the notes. In general, this is a balanced but conservative analysis of a complex development done from the traditional perspective elaborated by G. Post, G. Lagarde, H. Pirenne, et al. It will, I hope, lead to further dialogue on the contribution of medieval thought and practice to the evolution of our modern democratic systems.

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THOMAS E. MORRISSEY


To convey to the Chinese of the Ming dynasty (1368–1644) some of the philosophical and theological views of Catholicism was the task Matteo Ricci (1552–1610) undertook not many years after he had successfully entered China in 1583. The publication of a pamphlet about the Ten Commandments generated an intense interest among scholars in southern China, so that Ricci understood the impact the printed word had on a society whose scholarly class memorized large quantities of written materials. When an earlier compendium of Christian doctrine by his companion Michele Ruggieri (1543–1607) needed revision, Ricci began the project of translating the Four Books (Ssu shu), which was required reading of all candidates in the civil-service examinations. This led him to write a treatise that did not cover all the mysteries of the faith, “but only of certain principles, especially such as can be proved and understood with the light of reason.” Written in the form of a dialogue between a Chinese and a Western scholar, the True Meaning of the Lord of Heaven discussed God as the creator and ruler of the universe, showed that the human soul is not extinguished but is different from the souls of birds and beasts, refuted the Taoist and Buddhist views of nothingness and the void, and explained how man, distinct from God, does not share one body in the world, yet must seek self-cultivation and
worship Him above all. Called a "pre-evangelical dialogue" by the translators, this Chinese book became one of the most celebrated works in the history of Christianity in China. In it Ricci developed terminology for Christian concepts and faced the formidable task of explaining them with many citations from and allusions to classical Chinese texts.

An English translation of such a work requires a skill in those who are to offer a thoroughly accurate and reliable exposition reflecting the intent of the original and a feeling for its style. The translators have clearly demonstrated such learned competence, although those who read Chinese may raise a number of questions about the punctuation of the text added to the original Chinese version that appeared in Peking in 1603, the accuracy of some phrases in the translation (e.g., p. 161, no. 155) or the translation of certain key words (chün-tzu as "superior man" but sometimes as "gentleman," p. 64, note 2).

Several footnotes and some sections of the translators' introduction constitute the chief shortcoming of this work. Within the laudable goal of keeping footnotes to a minimum, the translators at times diverge from explanation of to commentary on the text, without a consistent pattern. Only a few examples can be discussed in a brief review. Indicating that they will use Confucius, "the more common Western usage" of his Chinese names K'ung-tzu and Chung-ni, the translators are apparently unaware of the reason why Confucius and Mencius have consistently been used in such latinized forms, namely, that Ricci saw their philosophy as compatible with Christianity. He did not latinize the names of other Chinese philosophers because he did not readily accept their views. In citing the statement of "certain Confucian scholars" who assert "Have no troubles, no good and no evil," they claim that this is "no doubt" a reference to the Analects of Confucius, but that "it is obvious that Ricci misunderstood" and "then further added" "no good and no evil." Such a claim is not warranted, since Ricci clearly notes not that Confucius made the statement but that "certain Confucian scholars" had done so.

In their introduction the translators attempt to present a contemporary evaluation of the True Meaning. In their view, Ricci rejected "the thought of Mencius." Such a sweeping statement in a work for a general reader is astounding, not only because Ricci correctly cites Mencius (351) but also because Ricci in this and other works indicates his long discussions with Chinese scholars about the goodness or evil of man's nature—one of the key elements of the Mencian tradition. Moreover, they fault Ricci for holding that the concept of reincarnation came from Pythagoras to India and that he really did not understand the concept of T'ai-chi (Great Ultimate) of Chu Hsi (1130-1200). These same views are reiterated in several footnotes. A careful reading of the Latin summary of the True
Meaning which is appended to this work shows that if the Chinese understood it as the first substantial, intelligent, and infinite principle, then he would agree that this is none other than God. In his other writings Ricci indicates (Fonti Ricciane 1 [Rome, 1942] 123) that beyond the doctrine of reincarnation taught by Pythagoras and which might have come into India through him, there were also rites, headdress of the Buddhist monks, and their custom of celibacy that were very similar to those of the West.

On a plaque placed on Ricci’s tomb the mayor of Peking had inscribed: “To one who attained renown for justice and wrote illustrious books.” The True Meaning is unquestionably one of those “illustrious” works that over time became available in Manchu, Korean, and Japanese versions. Through the ecumenical efforts of the translators it can now reach an even larger audience of those interested in the efforts of Ricci to inculturate Christianity in China.

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JOHN W. WITEK, S.J.


The 100th anniversary of Tillich’s birth was celebrated in 1986, and these volumes are among the first commemorating that event. S.’s study on Tillich’s early philosophy of God, a Trier dissertation, explores some worthwhile, unfamiliar areas. Although there have been other studies of this area (and G. Wenz’s Subjekt und Sein remains particularly valuable), S.’s analysis of the basic working concepts of T.’s early thought gives a helpful and detailed analysis of religion and philosophy. This philosophical approach to God is centered in the movement from psychology to metaphysics, from the knowing self to the transcendental horizon or ground of human life. Tillich aims at a “world view,” which, he concludes, is the key to the various areas of science and faith, ethics and metaphysics. Marked by a similarity in both structure and content to the 19th century, every dualism in the realm of God and revelation should be avoided. Revelation at this point is one of metaphysical life and access to depth. This "glaubiger Realismus" intends to let consciousness disclose, if not fashion, any religious revelation, and to let the divine and the demonic emerge from levels where within the depths of spirit they are visible. What is striking is how his theology, as the 20th century
progresses, becomes more sympathetic to and appropriative of the content and symbols of Christianity.

A second section looks at the sources of Tillich's thought during the first decades of the century. Preceded by a rare treatment of relationships to Ernst Cassirer, Plotinus, Schelling, Otto, and Barth are considered. Curiously—but others have preceded him—S. focuses upon the influence of the Schelling of the transcendental systems, while T.'s dissertations were on the later Schelling. S. argues that Otto's influence will inspire T. to search for a theology of culture. The consideration of sources ends with the dialogue between T. and Barth. This book, in fact, concerns not just T.'s "early work" but its subsequent stages. In so doing it asks about the perdurance of the 19th century and about the objectivity of Christian revelation distinct from symbol and human consciousness, faith and language.

S. has published T.'s attempt in the 1920s to produce a system—a manuscript which was basically his lectures in the summer semester of 1925 at Marburg. This dogmatic theology is composed of brief explanations of 67 propositions. An introduction on the nature of dogmatics is followed by two sections: the first treats created being (being, creation, nature, the demonic); the second elects the leitmotif of history (the history of religions, God as Father and Son, grace, Christ). Students of T. will find in these pages principles retained and approaches discarded; there are similarities to the Systematic Theology but also a structure and content considerably different from this later project. S.'s conclusion is that these two systems are sufficiently distinct that one should see in T.'s intellectual career two systems: one emerging from his German professorships, one from his America years (19).

One might wonder if this work from T.'s Marburg years shows signs of contact with Martin Heidegger. If we look at the entries touching upon "existence," it is not possible to distinguish clearly the role of the writer of Sein und Zeit. Nevertheless, T. wrote, past abstract dogmatics now yield to a more existential view of the relationship to the unconditional, and yet—in perhaps an incipient imprecision—this new approach is also called vital and concrete, while nature and history are described as existential. S.'s view is that this work makes clear that T. is already choosing an existentialist method as the meaningful form of theology for his age.

In a subsequent article (Theologie und Philosophie 62 [1987] 243 ff.) S. records his discovery in the Tillich archives at Harvard of two other manuscripts related to the Dogmatik and of an announcement of the (unrealized) publication in 1930 of the Dogmatik by a publishing house in Darmstadt. All this research contributes to the history of T.'s devel-
opment of his early project to write a system. Not all will agree with S.'s conclusion that the earlier system is independent and genial, but all will be grateful for this labor on the development of a great systematician of modernity.

Paul Tillich: *Sein Werk* is a collection of essays arranged to present a chronological picture of T.'s life and writings. Two final chapters are exceptions, since they treat two works, *Systematic Theology* and the sermons. The resulting survey offers interesting interpretations by German scholars and is a sign of the current hermeneutics of T. among this generation of Germans. But the collection (whose authors have been placed by time or geography outside of T.'s career and culture) is not particularly original and not of special value to those familiar with the American literature.

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THOMAS O'MEARA, O.P.


This book was occasioned by Rahner's suggestion that the modern development and meaning of the term "person" might have rendered this term unacceptable for theological descriptions of God as the Trinity since it could easily lead to a sort of tritheism. H.'s *Habilitationsschrift* at the University of Mainz (1984–85) investigates and evaluates R.'s original suggestion and finds it worthwhile in its intent, but wonders whether R.'s description of the problem is entirely accurate and whether his proposed solution, i.e. to speak of "drei distinkte Subsistenzweisen" and "drei distinkte Gegebenheitsweisen" in regard to the immanent and salvation-historical triune God, is entirely satisfactory—indeed, whether it is really an improvement over the person terminology. The key proposition, the one which dominates the entire discussion, is R.'s axiomatic statement that "Die 'ökonomische' Trinität ist die 'immanente' Trinität und umgekehrt" (12). This contention, as well as the suggestion of "person's" inappropriateness and its replacement by "Subsistenzweise," are from R.'s contribution "Der dreifaltige Gott als transzendenter Urgrund der Heilsgeschichte" in J. Feiner and M. Lohrer, *Mysterium salutis: Grundriss heilsgeschichtlicher Dogmatik* 2 (Einsiedeln: Benziger, 1967).

H. suggests that the term "person" may and must be retained, and that it can be protected against possible tritheistic tendencies by attending to the concept of person already present in Tertullian's theology, especially the *Adversus Praxeum*. There he finds an understanding of person that avoids the overly individualistic understanding that dominates the mod-
ern understanding, which emphasizes the individual person as a center of distinct, independent, and separate awareness and self-consciousness. Tertullian's "kommunikativer Personbegriff" includes both "Selbstand" and "Relation" (294, 329). To get to this understanding, H. investigates R.'s Trinitarian theology, the meaning and development of the term "person" from ancient days until our own, and the theology of Tertullian in detail, with detailed discussion of the various interpretations of Tertullian's thought. A constant theme is the tension between thought that is more being/substance-oriented and thought that is more transcendental/subject-oriented. I found the book both interesting and insightful.

However, one still wonders. First, R. himself did not really push his original suggestion about the inadequacy of person and its replacement with "Subsistenzweise." In fact, 15 years after the suggestion was made, Ch. Schütz could say that it had not been developed at all (Mysterium salutis, Ergänzungsband, 1982, 311). There is a simple reason for this. Although, as H. correctly points out, R.'s suggestion was rooted in both his systematic and his pastoral concern (76), it was primarily pastoral (12, 40-42). And however exotically "pastoral" might be defined by various pastoral theologians, "drei distinkte Subsistenzweisen/Gegebenheitsweisen" do not readily strike one as richly helpful pastorally. Furthermore, it is not immediately clear that a communicative concept of person is really going to be any more helpful in avoiding either tritheism or modalism than the traditional concept of person. In any case, one expects that not only those whom an improved pastoral theology of the Trinity is supposed to help, but also those who are supposed to develop this improved pastoral theology, both tend to spend their time thinking of the God-Father-Son-Holy Spirit as people and that this triune God does not take umbrage at this. Of course, one should try to find as many ways of thinking about and describing God as possible. But one must always remember that any adequate way also contains the potential to become inadequate. For this reason I do not think it fair for H. to require of R. that his suggestion avoid "die Gefahr [emphasis in text] des modalistischen Missverständnisses" (37), especially since he notes that accusations of modalism against R. are quite out of place (36).

H. correctly quotes W. Kasper to the effect that the surrender of person language and its replacement with "Seins-bzw. Subsistenzweisen" places one in danger of replacing the concrete freedom of love with an abstract metaphysical concept of being as the ultimate, whereas the meaning of God as Trinity is to show that reality is, at its deepest, personal and interpersonal (326). Indeed, but there is also a need for the development of a Trinitarian ontology, acknowledged by H. himself (318). In this approach, which need not be unpersonal or antipersonal, one would
emphasize that the Trinity reveals to us that being itself is a communion, diversity in unity and unity in diversity.

This, as much as the personal structure of being, is the meaning of the biblical proclamation that "God is love."

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ROBERT KRESS


Whatever one thinks of Marty's theological or philosophical position as a historian, the charm of his friendly circumspective approach to American religious history is irresistible. Over the past quarter century he has tutored a generation of theologians in interpreting the past in the light of present reality. M. is a synthetic historian who carefully puts disparate things together in a whole that is holistically meaningful for the present. He builds on the monographic and analytical work of other historians; his notes are a thesaurus of references to the most important recent literature. He is probably the most broadly informed of contemporary historians of American religion, and he puts this virtue to excellent use. In this first of a projected four volumes on American religion in the 20th century, he begins with the 1893 World's Parliament of Religions, which appropriately sets the stage for the long and variegated line of actors and actresses (only the spiritists seem to be missing). Of special note is the discussion of significant philosophers of religion—above all, William James.

What makes the present book especially distinctive is something that always distinguishes a work by Marty: the ever-evolving concepts, metaphors, and images he uses to organize and express the meaning of his history. In The Irony of It All the important concepts are "irony" and "modern," while the key images are "cocoon," "canopy," and "carapace" (i.e., shell, as the carapace of a turtle). Irony expresses the contrast between intention and result in the various religious movements of the time. Modern generally designates the period's progressive or liberal self-understanding (in the religious sense). Cocoon, canopy, and carapace (collectively called "huts") characterize three different kinds of communal religious response to modernism. The protective nature of the three relates to modernism as a "hurricane" or "storm." The modern or progressive-liberal religious thinkers, who by definition are not placed within one of the three shelters, were not blown away because they experienced the hurricane from within its eye.

The main difficulty in the book is that "modern" is not and cannot be clearly defined. The image of modernity as a hurricane is taken from J.
M. Cuddihy’s dramatic description of the relationship of culturally-alienated Jewish immigrants to the city around them, and it refers to a cacophony of rapidly-changing sights and sounds collectively understood as modernity or modern life. M. does not write about modern life, the hurricane itself, but about religion in the modern world. The shift in focus immediately calls the imagery into question. The “cocoon” for the American Indians or for the black community may appropriately be said to have withstood hurricane-force winds, but in this case it seems inappropriate to name the hurricane modernity. Various modern religious ideas were often inherent in European immigrant groups at the same time that these groups were sheltered against outside influences by their own inwardness. The Finns fought among themselves about Marxism, and in some areas there were sizable numbers of religious “freethinkers” among the German immigrants. In each case Marxism and free thought did not creep under the canopy from modern America but were imported with immigration and thrived in the immigrant subculture. There were Protestant Germans who came to America explicitly for the freedom to be “inward” in opposition to what was in effect the influence of progressive and ecumenical dogmatics in the German Church. Had they been confronted with the choice, conservative Lutheran German immigrants may well have said that Germany was oppressively modern, not America.

A related problem is encountered in the last part of the book, where an arbitrary procedure is used to separate what M. sees as the individualism of modern ideas and movements from what he calls “transmodern” ideas and movements that have heretofore been falsely identified as modern. The transmodern tends toward “wholeness” and, in a more general or more specific sense, retrieves models of wholeness from the past. (Could Comte and Marx not be included?) For example (287), seeing the kingdom of God as essential to a Christian social order is transmodern. If that is the case, then all of German liberal theology in M.’s designated time period will have to be renamed, in spite of the fact that it was generally conscious of being “modern theology.”

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Plé employs the canons of Freudian analysis to “attempt a diagnosis of the neurosis affecting the West and especially of its ethics” (vii) and rediscover an ethic of pleasure. In Part 1 he presents a historical review of the “morality of happiness,” which extended from classical to Christian ethics at least until Augustine. Christianity had broken from the “illusory
assurances" of the OT but was itself transformed into a deformed and
deforming legalistic code by an early medieval "crisis." In Part 2 Plé
attempts to establish a morality based on pleasure rather than duty.

The most infelicitous of Plé’s misrepresentations appears in his early
discussion of scriptural ethics, especially the ethics of the Hebrew Scrip­
tures. He opens with the assertion that “the New Testament is concerned
with the good news of human liberation from judgment by a God who
plays the spy” (3). Later he will support his implied (and then explicit
[30]) disparagement of the Hebrew covenant with an exegesis of the
Adam-and-Eve story which reduces Torah to totem, and mitzvah to
taboo.

In contradistinction, Plé is impressed with the makarios of the Greek
philosophers (Plato, Epicurus, Aristotle), the NT, and Augustine. But
his presentation suffers because he ignores Aristotle’s distinguishing
between good and bad pleasures, and among diverse pleasures. Nor does
he attend to the frequent commands of Jesus in the NT, e.g. “Take up
your couch and walk.”

According to Plé’s narrative, the “happy” state of Christian ethics
continued until "the Crisis": the famine and the Black Death of the early
14th century created in the populace an obsession with death. That,
coupled with the need for security by unlanded and profit-hungry mer­
chants (46), led to a neurotic need for centralized power with laws—and
for the “duty” morality. Culminating in the philosophy of Kant, the duty
morality leads to various “mutilations of the human person” (67 ff.) and
“inevitably” falls into the hypocrisy condemned by Jesus (73).

In addition to being frustrated with Plé’s unnuanced presentations of
deontological ethics, I cannot accept the dubious historical premise that
the desire for centralized authority began in the 14th century. I suspect
countertransference when he accuses duty morality of the narcissism he
himself must later so strenuously resist (107 ff.).

Plé’s own definition of pleasure is so undifferentiated (“happiness, joy
... consolation, security, comfort ... and so on” [87]) that in Part 2 he
needs to import paidagōgoi to assist it to move from “lower” to “higher
levels, and to be open to transcendence. Some of those are: Freud’s
“reality principle” (94, 103), education (98, 173 ff.), facing death (106),
making a distinction between happiness and pleasure (113), getting laws
from society (137), and finally, even renunciation (174).

Overall, Plé evinces no familiarity with the modern “virtue ethicists,”
nor with the important “virtue/obligation” debates chronicled from the
first issue, e.g., of the Journal of Religious Ethics (1973). His attempts to
adduce Aquinas in support of Freud must ultimately founder, because
Aquinas begins his treatment of desire with the inherent attractiveness
of the *object*, while Freud and Plé resolutely insist that the object only has the value *invested* in it by the subject. Even though he castigates duty morality for being too individualistic, he never mentions the role of the community of believers in his ethics. And even though he states that "the virtuous" provide the best criteria for choosing pleasures (158), he never considers a personal relationship with Jesus—and him crucified—as the nexus of Christian moral reflection.

Perhaps that last failing is because P. feels that we should be "endogenous," not "exogenous" (autonomous but heteronomous?) in our morality, since the moral person "must be the 'cause of himself' " (130), "must oblige himself" (131). In fact, I find that Plé's final version of "tamed pleasures" sounds remarkably like Kant's. "Et, comme Jacob dans son corps à corps avec l'Ange, il finit par adorer ce contre quoi il luttait" (*Le milieu divin*).

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G. Simon Harak, S.J.


This collection of nine previously-published articles has two foci: the first four essays explore factors that have influenced moral theology's development in the U.S.; the five remaining essays deal with social issues confronting the American Church and society. C. considers such important matters as just taxation, filial and social fiscal responsibility for the elderly, religious freedom and human rights in society and within the R.C. Church, and the difference between personal morality and public policy. In addition, there is a methodological analysis of the second draft of the American bishops' pastoral letter on the economy.

In general, the first part recounts now-familiar themes: moral theology's movement from classicism and physicalism to historical consciousness and serious consideration of the person; C. attends, as well, to three ongoing debates focusing on the existence of a specific Christian morality, the place of universal moral norms, and the possibility of dissent from authoritative fallible Church teaching. Many of C.'s observations are timely and well targeted. He pleads that the broadly consultative and largely inductive method used by the U.S. bishops in their pastoral letters on nuclear arms and the economy should be applied to sexual and bioethical issues (41). He suggests that the Catholic Church will embody no real collegiality until she applies the principle of subsidiarity to her own internal structure (47). He denies that theology is simply the orthodox mouthpiece of the hierarchical magisterium (46); rather, "theology very definitely is in the service of the church, but it is also an
academic discipline as such" (38). Precisely for this reason, theology best serves the Church only when it preserves its own intellectual integrity.

Regarding the social issues presented in Part 2, I found C.'s treatment of taxation and filial responsibility for elderly parents most interesting and illuminating. Acknowledging that "God intended the earth and all that it contains for the use of every human being and people," C. maintains that "a person has a right to that measure of external goods which is necessary for living a basically decent human existence" (104). Bound by the requirements of distributive justice to assist in meeting people's basic human needs, governments have a right to levy taxes. Distributive justice likewise calls "for a proportionate and progressive distribution of the tax burden" (114). C. concludes that citizens are morally obliged in conscience, based on the demands of legal or social justice, to pay taxes, provided they are just.

C. adopts the standard view that adult children have no legal fiscal responsibility for aged poor parents; nonetheless, there is undoubtedly a moral duty to assist elderly parents "if this can be done without disproportionate harm to one's own spouse, children and self" (135). Finally, in discussing the relationship between personal morality and public policy, C. stresses the need for, and validity of, prudential judgments; it is not to be expected that a pluralistic society's civil legislation will reflect the highest forms of personal morality. If an omnipotent God permits preventable evils to occur, says C., so governments "can tolerate certain evils lest greater good would be impeded or greater evils would occur" (197).

C., as usual, is clear and provocative. His work is helpful not simply because of his conclusions but also in light of his ability to expose tradition's contributions to the various positions he articulates.

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VINCENT J. GENOVESI, S.J.


At last we have a serious attempt to defend on secular philosophical grounds the view that all human life is equally deserving of respect and deserves to be preserved regardless of judgments of the quality of that life. Sherlock, associate professor in the Department of Languages and Philosophy at Utah State University, argues a position that probably most closely resembles the staunch "preserve-life-at-all-costs" view of some Orthodox Jewish scholars such as David Bleich, a position that has not had an adequate secular spokesperson.

The great strength of S.'s volume is that it is grounded in a carefully-
developed analysis of what he calls the liberal regime, the community of belief and commitment of modern liberal political philosophy. He devotes two detailed chapters to examining the classical foundations and modern manifestations of liberalism. He argues that they are grounded in the "postulate of equality" and the rule of law. From these he derives the notion that all human lives are to be viewed as equal in their worth. So far so good.

He then, however, tries to argue that because all lives are of equal worth, all life is to be preserved. "Liberal democratic regimes begin with the belief in the equal worth of every human being, from whence they derive a commitment to individual liberty. . . . In liberal theory the proper ends of the political regime become reduced to the preservation of human life" (38–39).

This movement from the premise of the equal worth of every human being to the conclusion that every life is to be preserved is the great weakness of the volume; it is here that the argument gets muddy. The totally prolife position cannot be sustained by any reasonable person, at least aside from religious premises available to Talmudic scholars.

S. realizes this and spends the rest of his book carving out exceptions to his initial position. First, he acknowledges that competent patients have the right to use their liberty to refuse treatment even though that refusal will predictably lead to their deaths. In a liberal regime liberty is an important principle, a fact S. does not overlook. He therefore grants the acceptability of treatment refusal by competent patients saying "It is too much to ask law and policy to override liberty in these cases, however much the case may, in theory, resemble suicide" (169). At least in this case equal respect does not, apparently, require equal rigor in preserving life. Of course, if the only end of the regime were the preservation of life, this could not happen.

Having carved out a liberty-based exception to the conclusion that all life is to be preserved, S. goes on to add an even more controversial second exception. He also makes clear that life that is inevitably coming to an end does not command preservation. He relies here on the often-used fiction that preserving the life of one who is terminally ill does not count as preserving life (155, 161). The end of the political regime apparently does not reduce to preserving life when that life will be short. While this seems like a reasonable position to take—one that is accepted by Catholic moral theologians as well as by the mainstream of secular analysts—it is an exception to the linking of respect for persons to the preservation of their lives. After all, preserving life for a short time is nevertheless preserving life, as the Talmudic scholars assert.

That is about as far as Sherlock is willing to go with the exceptions.
The puzzling question, however, is why he does not also carve out the other standard exceptions to the preservation of life from Catholic moral theology and secular commentators. These traditions recognize two additional cases in which life need not be preserved in order to show equality of respect: cases where the treatment would be useless and those where treatment would be useful but “gravely burdensome” (to use Pius XII’s term). There are cases where these traditions would justify omission of treatment of even incompetent patients on the ground that treatment would serve no useful purpose. Cases such as Karen Quinlan’s come to mind, or any others in which the patient is in a coma (or a permanent vegetative state, to use the more correct terminology). Catholic moral theology has long recognized that there is no moral imperative to preserve mere vegetative life. Likewise, if a life could be preserved but only by inflicting severe agony on a patient, such treatment has been viewed as supererogatory by Catholic moral theology as well as by secular commentators. It is these moves that Sherlock insists on resisting. Karen Quinlan has not explicitly exercised her autonomy to refuse treatment, nor is she terminal; her life should be preserved (152). To do otherwise is to make quality-of-life judgments that violate the principle of equality of worth.

S. is on to something very important when he resists quality-of-life judgments. He misses, however, an important opportunity to do some serious analysis of the concept of quality of life. He is very resistant to the notion that life can be of poor quality because of its impact on others. We should resist with all the passion we can muster the idea that lives can be terminated because they are unpleasant, unproductive, or inconvenient for others in the society. S. makes as good a case for this as I have seen. We should also resist the idea that life can be ended just because outside observers reach the conclusion that if they had to lead the life of the patient they would find it of insufficient quality. S. also makes that point well. When the term “quality of life” is used in either of these senses, it is an inadequate basis for deciding that life should not be preserved.

Where S. and many other critics of the quality-of-life concept fall short is in failing to distinguish these unacceptable quality-of-life judgments from more humane and more reasonable judgments that are more purely patient-centered. Sometimes it is necessary to assess whether a life has adequate quality to the individual himself. The tradition of Catholic moral theology has acknowledged that a life in insurmountable pain does not. It has also conceded that a life in permanent vegetative state does not. Only the most courageous commentators, such as Richard McCormick, have had the nerve to call these quality-of-life judgments. Sometimes they have not been adequately distinguished from other, more
social quality-of-life decisions (based on the value of the life to others or how others would value the life of the individual if they had to lead it). It would be better to avoid calling the purely patient-centered judgments quality-of-life judgments, in order to avoid confusion with the more malicious kind. But to fail to withdraw a treatment that, according to our best estimate, leaves the patient in perpetual agony is cruel even if the patient is not autonomously refusing the treatment or terminally ill. In that special set of circumstances respect for the equal worth of persons actually requires omission of the burdensome treatment rather than imposing life preservation on the patient. If exceptions to preserving life are made for autonomous decision-makers and for those who are terminal, they should also be made for these cases as well. S. never argues explicitly that these kinds of quality-of-life judgments (in contrast to the more social kinds) can never be made in the name of the liberal regime. He provides a volume that has been needed: an almost all-out defense of preserving life. He misses the chance to do some serious analysis of the concept of quality of life.

Kennedy Institute of Ethics, Georgetown Univ. ROBERT M. VEATCH


Genovesi's In Pursuit of Love is but one of several recent and welcome Roman Catholic works on human sexuality. The book is very clearly written. It contains a fine overview chapter on human sexuality, as well as chapters on many of the major issues in sexual ethics (premarital sex, contraception, homosexuality, masturbation, and abortion). It presents very helpful summaries and critiques of many modern Catholic writers on human sexuality. It contains much useful technical information, including a valuable summary of the current medical and ethical data on the various contraceptive devices. For all of these reasons, serious students of Catholic sexual morality will find G.'s book a highly readable and worthwhile text.

Along with these positive comments, three critical reflections are in order. First, from the point of view of organization, I wondered about the inclusion of a 130-page opening section on fundamental moral theology. Generally speaking, this part of the book is well written. My concern is that this section seemed too short to be adequate for the reader who has no knowledge of fundamental moral theology, and so lengthy that it might seem unnecessarily repetitious for the student well versed in fundamental moral theology.

Second, and based on the entire book, I found G.'s use of two or three
key terms in fundamental moral theology unclear. E.g., he quite regularly uses the term "moral evil" as a subjective term (and therefore as equal to personal sin), whereas the Roman Catholic tradition tends to understand moral evil as an objective term which may well be present in a person's life even when the person is not guilty of personal sin.

Similarly, I think some of G.'s comments tend to imply an overly physical understanding of natural law. One example can be seen in his presentation of the natural-law position on homosexual actions. He states the natural law's critique of homosexual acts exclusively in terms of the closure of homosexual acts to procreation. He then goes on to present the larger human objections to homosexual actions found in authors like Malloy and Barnhouse, but he does not connect these larger objections to the natural-law tradition. Regardless of where one stands on the morality of homosexual actions, and granting that some strains of natural-law theory may have been overly physical, the natural law's essential stance on sexual morality should be seen as involving more than a concern about procreation and related physical issues.

Third, while there are places where G. quite clearly states his own views on specific issues, there are other places where his summaries of the arguments leave the reader guessing exactly where he stands on a given point. Circumspection may well be desirable and necessary at times, but for the sake of theological growth and dialogue it can be a great help for an author to state clearly his own evaluative judgment on an issue, even if that judgment has to be stated tentatively.

Besides these areas of criticism, I also regretted that, except for a brief footnote, G. was not able to address the Vatican's recent homosexuality document. This is in no way his fault, since his book was prepared for printing when the document appeared. But it would have been interesting to see him apply to the Vatican's text his skills at summarizing and critically evaluating contemporary materials on sexual ethics.

My criticisms should not obscure my basic conviction that this book is a most significant and worthwhile contribution to the literature which deals with Catholic morality and human sexuality.

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PHILIP S. KEANE, S.S.


This is a collection of first-rate essays which represent a scholarly, interdisciplinary attempt, from the just-war perspective, to inspect current ethical and strategic doctrine.

One question which the collection forthrightly addresses is the legiti-
macy of an "ethics of distress" or "supreme emergency," a position advanced by Michael Walzer, but which contributor David Hollenbach also detects in both the French and West German Catholic bishops' 1983 letters on war/peace. This theory contends that nuclear weapons have exploded the just-war tradition, since the principle of noncombatant immunity currently collides with a proportionalist calculus which calls for the comparative weighing of the relative goods and evils involved in deterrence strategy. The current situation, in which fundamental values of civilization are in imminent danger of being destroyed or overthrown, justifies a deterrent threat to attack civilians which Walzer understands to be immoral, and yet yields an action which is morally right at the same time, since one could argue that threat prevents use of nuclear weapons.

Hollenbach correctly points to the ethical contradiction inherent in such a theory, i.e. that an action is justified and unjustified at the same time. While pacifism, as presented by Stanley Hauerwas, provides one alternative to such an ethical contradiction, Hollenbach cites an inherent dualism in its approach; it therefore lacks the principles to guide political policy in a historically incremental way. Hollenbach's conclusion is to move in the direction of the other alternative to supreme-emergency ethics: just-war theory, especially as utilized by the U.S. Catholic bishops in their 1983 letter on war/peace, since this approach presents the real possibility of transforming the human condition from what it is to what it could be.

Chapters by John Langan, Gerald Mara, and William O'Brien highlight other weaknesses in Walzer's theory. Both Langan and Mara raise questions concerning the duration of what constitutes a "distressful" or "emergency" situation, since certain features of deterrence seem to be semipermanent aspects of the international landscape. O'Brien also notes that such an ethical method too frequently succumbs to the temptation of selective use, since supreme emergency as understood by Walzer and others justifies deterrence but not actual nuclear war fighting.

In contrast to the deterrence-only strategy which a supreme-emergency ethic supports, chapters by James Johnson, James Dougherty, and William O'Brien endorse deterrence-plus. Convinced that limited nuclear war remains a theoretical possibility and that certain values are worth defending with them, these scholars call for the development of nuclear weapons systems which would likely keep the levels of exchange restricted, and thereby adhere to just-war principles. They are not, however, unaware of some problems entailed in such a proposal. Both Dougherty, whose chapter focuses on the technological developments in nuclear weapons systems, and O'Brien, in his chapter on deterrence, admit the
importance of developing a survivable control, command, communications, and intelligence system, so that the military/government chain of command can operate within the horrendous environment of a nuclear war. They also acknowledge the challenge of training military/government personnel to resist political and psychological pressures to escalate the war, especially against a strategic nuclear attack, and recognize the dilemma of convincing the adversary that the action is indeed limited.

Several chapters place the nuclear debate squarely within the political context. Mara contends that a supreme-emergency ethic too sharply separates morality from politics; he suggests a return to the classical notions of Aristotle and Plato as a remedy for this unhappy divorce. It is the task of Langan's chapter on religion and politics to argue forcefully against abstract considerations of nuclear strategies apart from the concrete political and historical considerations which shape them. Walzer, rather than elaborating on his supreme-emergency position, a topic which would have been especially appropriate in this volume, chooses instead to argue that the current political situation is an example of "nuclear autocracy" rather than nuclear democracy, since secrecy is such a structural necessity.

Finally, the collection includes examination of the frequently-overlooked question of conventional wars, either by testing certain wars against just-war principles (Johnson's chapter) or as hampered by the nuclear shadow (John Keegan's contribution).

In sum, this volume is exceptionally important for two reasons. First, it carefully analyzes methodological questions and, in so doing, presents some of the major difficulties with Walzer's contention that nuclear weapons have exploded the just-war theory. Second, by raising these major methodological questions, as well as certain difficulties with deterrence-plus theories, current political analyses, and recent uses of conventional weapons, the collection offers key issues for the future agenda in the nuclear debate.

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JUDITH A. DWYER


Professor of spiritual theology at the Gregorian University in Rome for 25 years, Bernard is well known for his teaching and writings. He has written a work which is the fruit of his long teaching career and applies the theological progress of the last decades to the spiritual life.

B. states: "The pivotal point of my work is the concept of spiritual experience." He means that the personal living of a life of faith oriented by gospel values is essential to the spiritual life. At the same time, there
is an experience of the Holy Spirit. The active presence of this Spirit and the central role played by the virtue of charity are essential to growth in the spiritual life. In reality, the Spirit is love and the “love of God has been poured into our hearts by the Holy Spirit” (Rom 5:5). This is not substantially different from saying “The Holy Spirit is the principal agent of our spiritual life” or “charity is the immediate principle of the spiritual life” (107; translations here are mine). In reality, the Spirit holds an important place all through this work. B. writes in regard to the importance he assigns to the Spirit: “We find him at the outset since he is present in all the spiritual life; we find him in the study of the Trinitarian mystery, the source of all life; we again encounter him in the presentation of charity; finally, the last chapter considers again the different aspects of the Spirit’s decisive function in our general spiritual developments” (9).

B.’s development is typically French. The first part establishes the relationship in the spiritual life between the methodology of spiritual theology and dogmatic and moral theology; this part also describes the Christian condition of the spiritual life based on the Trinitarian mystery and its realization in light of the mystery of Christ. The second part studies the relationships between the anthropological structures and the supernatural realities in which they are operating. The third part brings to light the actualization of the dialogue between God and man. It treats the sacraments, prayer, action, and discernment of the spirit. The notion stressed is that every life is development; the spiritual life possesses this quality. Important in the spiritual life, therefore, is the notion of spiritual itinerary. The mystical life as such is studied at length in the fourth part.

B. integrates themes from other writings of his in some excellent passages on the relationship between our affective life and the spiritual life. Particularly appreciated is the chapter on the evolution of forms of contemplation in the history of the Church; the contemplation of the Fathers of the Church is not exactly that of the medieval authors, to say nothing of the modern period, which has another type of vision. B. considers the relationship of action and of contemplation as strongly influenced by the Society of Jesus. He points out that we must not forget that the beatific vision is the ultimate form of activity to which we are called in terms of our itinerary. However, this has nothing to do with Greek philosophy; contemplation is a supremely theological activity.

This very fine treatise will certainly take its place with those of Garrigou-Lagrange and Louis Bouyer.

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WILLIAM C. MARCEAU, C.S.B.


Classicists, NT and patristic scholars, historians of religion, and theologians with an interest in the history of spirituality (pagan or Christian) should not fail to examine carefully the two books under review. Owing to its length and composite nature, the Armstrong volume will receive the greater part of my discussion. This is not meant to imply, however, that Meyer's volume is any less valuable.

Edited by Armstrong, distinguished scholar of Plotinus, Classical Mediterranean Spirituality contains 20 essays from scholars on both sides of the Atlantic. Covering a period of nearly 2000 years, from Pharaonic Egypt and archaic Greece to the end of antiquity, the volume is divided into two parts: "Histories" (treating individuals and periods) and "Themes" (treating selected topics of importance). Reflecting the bias of its editor, the volume focuses heavily on the philosophical tradition in the Greco-Roman world, especially the Neoplatonists. But this emphasis by no means spoils the book's general usefulness.

A few comments on some of the more notable essays are in order. After two very interesting studies of Egyptian spirituality in the classical and Hellenistic periods by J. Gwyn Griffiths, Armstrong himself sketches the background for the other essays with an article "The Ancient and Continuing Pieties of the Greek World." He rightly emphasizes the centrality of ritual and the traditional piety characteristic even of philosophers who criticized common notions of the gods (see esp. 68-69).

Another outstanding essay, "Roman Spirituality," by J. Pinson, deftly uncovers the Roman religious sense of pietas found not only in the philosophical works of Cicero or Seneca but also in less likely places such as the love poems of Catullus (167-71).

An important glimpse into the everyday spirituality of the Late Empire is provided by H. D. Saffrey in "The Piety and Prayers of Ordinary Men and Women in Late Antiquity," in addition to describing the better-known forms of civic cultus, S. finds in Book 6 of the Palatine Anthology examples of the prayers and offerings rendered to the gods by people of all ages and classes: a woman's girdle given in thanksgiving for safe childbirth, a child's toys committed to the gods upon entering adolescence, an old man's tools when he was no longer able to work. "In return for this, deign to nourish ever the one who was your servant." As S.
notes, such gestures and sentiments presuppose a feeling of friendship and intimacy between the person and the god whose protection extended to every detail of human life (204–5).

For those interested in the Christian mystical tradition, the essays of P. Hadot and Saffrey on “Neoplatonist Spirituality” provide a useful discussion of the tradition that influenced the Pseudo-Dionysius and subsequent Christian mysticism. The thematic essays of W. Beierwaltes (“The Love of Beauty and the Love of God”) and R. T. Wallis (“The Spiritual Importance of Not Knowing”) also treat the Platonic and Neoplatonic material.

Perhaps the most illuminating and entertaining essay of the collection is Patricia Cox Miller’s “In Praise of Nonsense,” an erudite treatment of the “nonsensical” formulae of Gnostic documents and of Greek magical texts. She exposes the jumbling of vowels in magical incantations as evoking “an invisible inscription on the soul” (489), whose ultimate meaning “dwells in the breaking of form” (487). In other words, to speak the unspeakable the language itself must be incomprehensible. In the course of her exposition Cox Miller also sheds light on Christian religiosity, most notably Pauline glossolalia.

In sum, Armstrong’s volume should help scholars to correct stereotyped views of “pagan” religion inherited from the Christian apologetic tradition. The spirituality reflected in these essays is rich, varied, and infused with genuine religious feeling. As the article of J. P. Kenney (“Monotheistic and Polytheistic Elements in Classical Mediterranean Spirituality”) explicitly argues, there is much of enduring value in the spiritual traditions of Greco-Roman antiquity.

Meyer’s The Ancient Mysteries is a valuable one-volume collection of primary sources on the Greco-Roman mystery religions, the first of its kind in English. While most of the translations are borrowed from elsewhere, there are occasional firsts, such as the “Rule of the Andanian Mysteries” (51–59). Theological scholars will take special notice of M.’s final section, “The Mysteries within Judaism and Christianity.” The brief introductions and bibliographies which accompany each text provide an excellent orientation for the beginning student.

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DAVID G. HUNTER


In spite of its inviting title, this book ultimately disappoints for a number of reasons. The thesis, basically, is that Ignatius was the product of an oral culture and one must therefore understand the “reading
technology” of orality to understand a work like the Exercises. In oral cultures the “primary focus is not information, and memory is not used to store and recall that information. In an oral culture information becomes secondary, the involvement with the present primary, and reading is a memory activity to make present the past or in some ways to predict the future” (14). The past that is recalled through an Ignatian use of memory and imagination is, ultimately, the primal call into being of creation imbedded deep in our neurophysiological systems. This may or may not be true; but the book certainly makes a poor argument for such a sophisticated, if not arcane, position.

Part 2, “A Plurality of Texts in Translation,” is simply N.’s translations of Ignatius’ Spiritual Exercises, Spiritual Diary, Autobiography, and selected Letters. Since excellent contemporary translations of all this material are readily available, and since N. admits his translations do not differ substantially from them, one is left wondering why they are included, constituting three quarters of the book, as anything more than a labor of love of superfluous convenience. This is particularly true because they are appended to, rather than integrated into, the 94-page essay that precedes them.

That essay, titled “Text of Imagining,” consists of five chapters. In the first chapter N. describes the world of Ignatius, relying heavily, if not excessively, on Marcel Bataillon’s Erasmo y España, which is, e.g., cited five times on one page alone (18). N. attempts to explain the concept of an oral and aural (he calls it “audial”) culture, but strangely enough defers mention of major theorists on orality until his final chapter. The second chapter attempts to explain the difference “between the two reading technologies of cognition and imagination.” One must assume that by “cognition” he means reason, for imagination, of course, is also cognitive. We are from this point in the essay introduced to a reading of the Exercises that continues through the next two chapters. This “reading” stresses inner formation rather than acquisition of information, all of which seems to differ very little from the known and accepted interpretation of the Exercises as something to be performed rather than studied or read in the normal sense of that word. The final chapter, “Consequences of Hermeneutics,” is a bit of a catchall, a rather general and sketchy survey of the relationship between reason and imagination throughout the course of Western philosophy. It has little to do with the previous focus on Ignatius and certainly adds nothing new to this well-explored topic. After alluding to some eight experts in orality, N. makes the following outlandish statement: “From Plato (Seventh Letter) to Walter Ong cautionary notes have been issued as to the dangers of writing. The technologizing of the word has been seen as a danger against
thought. Writing, printing, and electronics are seen as in some indefinite way causing thought to be biased and narrow, arbitrary, imperialistic" (85). Such a wrong conclusion drawn from the writings of Parry, Havlock, Lord, Ong, and others suggests a certain bias on the author’s part and is typical of the careless and inaccurate scholarship that characterizes the book as a whole.

To list all the flaws in this study would be tedious, but the reader deserves to be forewarned. The overall organization is loose and the exposition unclear, leaving key concepts underdeveloped or unexplained. The essay reads, in fact, like class lectures. Many of the ideas are derivative, as is clear from N.’s excessive reliance on secondary sources. In an extended treatment of Plato, e.g., he cites the Republic repeatedly from a secondary source. In citing the Exercises, he mysteriously uses translations that are different from and inferior to the ones he himself has provided in Part 2: e.g., “Take one or two steps before the place of meditation” (51) rather than “a step or two from the place where I am going to meditate” (120); “When the enemy of human nature is thus felt and known by his serpent’s tail and bad end it leads to” (55) rather than “When the enemy of human nature has been felt and recognized by his colorful serpent’s tail, and the bad end to which he leads” (167). N.’s own prose is often quaintly unidiomatic. One “makes” rather than does penance; a decision is “taken” rather than made; something “makes” rather than causes a furor. We read, too, about “laxed religious.” The text is full of esoteric expressions like an “agonic task” and “mysterious koan,” or trendy critical jargon like “logomachy” and “reading technologies,” which beg for fuller explanation.

There are, finally, inexcusable inaccuracies and inconsistencies in format and citation. A given book or author is cited inconsistently, sometimes in a footnote, sometimes in a parenthesis in the text. John Bremer’s study of Plato is cited in a footnote as On Plato’s Polity and in the bibliography as The Polity. One time a page reference is given for a citation, another time it is lacking. These are not picayune or random examples; they are characteristic of the book as a whole. One can only conclude that the author has approached his topic with more affection and enthusiasm than accuracy of statement and cogency of argument.

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PHILIP C. RULE, S.J.


This sizable and handsome book of 17 essays and more than 500 reproductions, over 100 of them in color, originally served as the catalogue
for the enormous exhibition of the same name that opened at the Los Angeles County Museum of Art in late 1986. The show has since completed its tour, but the book of essays remains as an impressive contribution to "rethinking" the meaning of the last 95 years of Western abstract painting. The intention of book and exhibition's principal organizer, Tuchman, and his collaborators was to reassess the dominant formalist approach to modern abstract painting that asserts that the use of materials, the arrangement of shapes and colors, the surface textures, and other related matters are the principal concerns of abstract painters. What emerges from this reassessment is a very convincing demonstration (at least for the years 1890 to approximately 1950) that the painters of abstract art not only were interested in having "meaning" or "content" in their paintings but also intended this content to be "spiritual" in its essence.

It is important to point out that the term "spiritual" as developed in the book and exhibition includes "spiritualism," as the term mainly reflects esoteric, mystical, and occult beliefs in which turn-of-the-century figures like Helena Blavatsky and Rudolf Steiner and movements like theosophy and anthroposophy play important roles. Hence the catalogue's glossary of spiritual and related terms is absolutely essential for most readers.

For those interested in the state of abstract painting at the beginning of this century, the book will prove especially valuable, as there are informative and well-documented essays on the French and Dutch Symbolist movements, the early work of Piet Mondrian, three essays specifically devoted to the early-20th-century Russian abstract artists and to the occult literature in Russia at that time, and several discussions (including a very fine essay by Sixten Ringbom) of Wassily Kandinsky (whose classic treatise on art and the spiritual is the source of the title of this book of essays). Also, Charles Eldredge traces the American brand of abstract spiritual art from the late-19th century into the 1930s, and W. Jackson Rushmore discusses the influence of Native American art on the 1940s work of Abstract Expressionists Jackson Pollock, Richard Pousette-Dart, and Adolph Gottlieb.

The thoroughness evident in the first 60 years of the time period covered by this book is not sustained in the final 35 years. Almost the entire burden for the period between 1950 and 1985 is assumed by a single essay on contemporary art by Donald Kuspit. While interesting, the essay is more theoretical than historical and not terribly comprehensive in its scope, as it deals with only seven artists in any depth at all. Clearly, additional essays for this period—reflecting what has been happening in North America and in Europe—are badly needed to give
Tuchman has given us a very helpful and lengthy introductory essay to this large book, but in trying to correct the formalist approach to abstract art he may have overstated the case about abstract art's emerging out of a desire to articulate spiritual ideas. As art critic Thomas McEvilley has perceptively noted, abstract art was arising anyway, and the early "spiritual" abstract artists saw in this emerging abstraction a way to express their own nonmaterial beliefs.

Also, in trying to establish a lineage for abstract "spiritual" art, T. looks almost exclusively to esoteric belief systems, Jungian archetypes, and Native American and non-Western cultures. As the book looks at art that moves from representation to abstraction, it does not deal with artists who remained in figuration; hence the omission of artists such as Rouault, Nolde, and Chagall, who dealt with religious themes. Not only were these artists involved in figuration, but they also dealt with themes in the mainstream Judeo-Christian tradition.

Are we to assume, from this book, that no abstract artists have been inspired by Judeo-Christian themes? We need look no further than the powerful, abstract "Stations of the Cross" by Barnett Newman for an answer. Perhaps Newman's greatest series of paintings, these large canvases have also been called the most profoundly spiritual (in the deepest sense of that word) series of abstract paintings of this century. They are not narratives of Christ's passion; rather, they universalize his cry of agony from the cross "to stand witness to the story of each man's agony." Although Newman is included in the book, this aspect of his art is not mentioned—a strange omission in a book claiming to be comprehensive. Furthermore, within the past ten years there has been a new generation of abstract artists, such as Barry X. Ball, Michael David, Tobi Kahn, and Daniel Smajo-Ramirez, for whom Judeo-Christian themes are central to their work; again, this dimension is not addressed in the book.

Still, the book is a major contribution to our understanding of a large body of abstract art. It persuasively demonstrates that some of the most significant abstract artists of our century have explored, through their art, the major questions regarding our origins, our nature, and our destiny. It shows that these artists have felt representation to be too limiting for such an exploration. Finally, it underscores that these artists have seen their own artistic callings, not as means for self-advancement, but as missions to help humanity combat the materialism and fragmentation that have been so much a part of this century's experience.

Graduate Theological Union, Berkeley TERENCE E. DEMPSEY, S.J.

RELIGIOUS THOUGHT AND THE MODERN PSYCHOLOGIES: A CRITICAL

The key to understanding this book lies in identifying the two moments of the critical conversation referred to in the title. Browning conducts the first moment of the conversation with selected representatives of modern depth psychologies and therapies: Freud, Skinner, the humanistic psychologists (represented by Rogers, Perls, and Maslow), Jung, Erikson, and Kohut. First, B. analyzes the ways in which the theoretical frameworks of each of these psychologists suggest or imply metaphors of ultimacy and principles of obligation—in other words, metaphysics and ethics. This suggestion of ethical and religious dimensions takes place even when the psychology's presuppositions question or reject the validity and/or possibility of philosophy and ethics for being nonempirical—as in the work of Freud and Skinner—or when the psychological framework ignores their presence—the situation in the humanistic psychologies and Jung, and to a lesser degree in Erikson and Kohut. The conversation next proceeds to a critical correlation between the metaphysics and ethics implicit within these depth psychologies and visions of ultimacy and obligation derived from selected representatives of the Judeo-Christian tradition of theology and philosophy, i.e. Reinhold Niebuhr, William James, and Paul Ricoeur.

There are clear limits to this aspect of the conversation, limits which B. acknowledges repeatedly. First, he is not dismissing the project of developing a truly scientific, i.e. empirical, psychology. B. understands and respects the need for a psychology which generates models for understanding observed data of human behavior and motivation. He directs his critique, rather, at the ways in which this necessary scientific psychology slides over into the realm of a quasi religion and suggests normative visions of the good person and society, which normative visions are left unthematized, unexamined, or denied. He notes that it is inevitable, indeed necessary, that such normative visions develop as these psychologies generate therapies—or, in terms that are perhaps more familiar to contemporary theologians, as psychology ventures into the realm of praxis. Secondly (in the way of limitations), B. cautions that this conversation is illustrative and not exhaustive. As a result, the critique is not vitiated by its relative selectivity (why these psychologies and not others), by possible misinterpretations of elements of the psychologies, and so on. Rather, he intends to illustrate that psychologies do indeed venture into the realm of the religious—perhaps because of the complexity of life today, the relative weakness of religious language, and the demands for meaningfulness abounding in our world. Whatever the reasons, this quasi-religious character of therapeutic psychology
should be acknowledged and subjected to critical analysis.

B. situates this first moment of conversation within the horizon of a second, broader moment of conversation. This second moment would need a second type of psychology, not to supplant the scientific, i.e. empirical and explanatory, psychology, but rather to provide a critically self-conscious partner in multidisciplinary conversation about the nature of the good society and the normative moral visions needed to effect and sustain it. Here the influence of the Frankfurt School of Social Research is quite evident in B.'s presuppositions, (1) that completely value-free science is not possible today and (2) that the task for the human sciences (psychology and the social sciences, as well as theology and philosophy) is to be as self-consciously critical as possible in order to enhance the possibilities for human and societal transformation.

Psychologists and theologians will find B.'s analysis controversial. Psychologists and practicing therapists may find his approach dismissive, especially if they do not observe his distinction between the scientific and self-critical, “normative” psychologies needed in the present and for the future. Theoreticians and practitioners outside of psychotherapeutic traditions may find his discussion focused too narrowly on the discipline’s past and insufficiently attentive to contemporary developments, including, but not limited to, social-learning theories and interaction with biology (though B.’s discussion of Jung makes some references to this area). Theologians, too, will find the book challenging and even controversial, because it requires them to articulate the praxis dimensions of their own discipline and, further, to explore the correlations between their own visions of practical action and those implicit and explicit in other powerful cultural “theologies.” Theologians and psychologists should note that B. subjects theological positions to critique, just as he does psychological positions. His search for an adequate and meaningful articulation of the Christian notion of agape, precipitated by Freud's misinterpretation of that concept, is an indication of willingness to pursue critically the praxis implications of all theological positions.

B.’s recognition of the ethical and metaphysical dimensions of all practical action differentiates this book from his 1973 work Generative Man, in which he first explored Erikson’s work, along with that of Philip Rieff and Norman O. Brown. B. described the earlier book as an essay in cultural, not theological, analysis, and it definitely reflects a 60s and 70s optimism about culture’s internal resources for change and transformation. The present book has come a great distance from the spirit of that time, which envisioned remaking culture from the standpoint of First World nations, and it coheres well with the chastened spirit of the late 80s, a time of solidarity in thought and action with victims and
marginal persons. Finally, this book is an invitation to an interdisciplinary method based on mutually-critical conversation—a method with great potential for developing visions of practical action adequate to the challenges to freedom and social justice that are so tragically apparent in these last years of the 20th century.

La Salle University, Phila. Michael J. McGinniss, F.S.C.


Conversion, a personal, cultural, and political phenomenon in contemporary life, is suffering a popularity crisis: it can mean almost anything anybody wants it to mean. Seeking to remedy such unclarity, C. has written a masterful treatment of foundational moral theology, a well-integrated interdisciplinary study which combines Lonergan’s philosophy of self-transcendence with a critical interpretation of developmental psychology. He thus attempts to establish criteria for evaluating today’s many conversion claims. This work builds on C.’s earlier analysis of conscience (1981) as the radical personal drive for self-transcendence realized in creative understanding, critical judging, responsible deciding, and generous loving.

C.’s approach is threefold. (1) He discloses the fundamental connection between an adequate understanding of conscience and a normative interpretation of conversion. (2) He situates the various dimensions of conversion within a pattern of personal development. (3) He demonstrates how a critical understanding of conversion can be philosophically grounded in a theory of self-transcendence and empirically controlled by a psychology of development. Then, having sketched the main lines of the stages of development and the dimensions of conversion, C. reviews the life of Thomas Merton as an example richly illustrative of the realities of specifically Christian conversion.

Sixty-nine pages of endnotes and parenthetical commentary testify to the broad range of C.’s erudition and penetrating scholarship, but this wealth of learning is not C.’s greatest strength. Rather, C. is a master teacher. The structure of his presentation is dialogical. To read C. is to listen in on a discussion among some of the wisest thinkers, ancient and modern. Thus, the literature review concerning various notions of conversion with which the volume opens is no mere juxtaposition of viewpoints set side by side in an endless chronological array. C. engages the reader at once in an exciting critical, reflective weighing of the strengths and weaknesses of his sources. Next C. focuses on conscience with conversations among Paul Lehmann, C. Ellis Nelson, Daniel Maguire,
and John Macquarrie, to show that conversion and conscience can be adequately understood only in relationship to each other. He introduces Lionel Trilling and H. Richard Niebuhr with their stress on authenticity and responsibility as dominant criteria for philosophical and theological considerations of the moral life. He moves the discussion through self-fulfilment and self-sacrifice to a self-transcendence, the latter as detailed and articulated by his favorite author, Bernard Lonergan.

Similarly, C.'s treatment of personal development through the life cycle is presented dialectically: the theories of Erik Erikson, Jean Piaget, Lawrence Kohlberg, James Fowler, and Robert Kegan are not simply passed in review but studied together and interactionally for the stages of childhood, adolescence, and adulthood. How these stages lead to authentic self-creation, and why they demand for their fullest realization a fourfold conversion—affective, cognitive, moral, and religious—is the burden of C.'s most challenging fourth chapter. Again, Lonergan serves as guide.

C.'s treatment culminates with the exemplification of his theory in the life and writings of Merton, whose experiences are interpreted as illustrating the development of genuine autonomy (of the true self) and religious surrender (through a radical falling in love with God). This perspective on Merton, a spiritual pilgrim and hero of our times, represents a new, thrilling appreciation of his achievement and significance.

A book-reviewer's task usually demands that one point out deficiencies and signal shortcomings in an author's work, but this writer can only offer praise for C.'s opus. He modestly predicts that Christian Conversion will stand the test of time as a landmark psychotheological interpretation of the nature of human spiritual development.

Loyola College, Baltimore

WILLIAM J. SNECK, S.J.


Modern pastoral counseling has been an interdisciplinary profession, and Augsburger has contributed significantly to it through his previous publications and teaching. With this book, however, he enters a much larger arena and expands pastoral counseling accordingly.

The aim of the book is to allow the diversity of cultures to broaden the scope and practice of pastoral counseling. It is a massive task for one author, but A. displays a rich grasp of cultural pluralism and a consistency in alerting the reader to the limitations of a monocultural approach.

The basic thesis reinforces a core theme of pastoral counseling: enter the world of the counselee. A.'s contribution is to demonstrate what that means in an intercultural situation and to conscientize the counselor to
the challenges of doing it and the risks in forgetting it. In keeping with this purpose, there is no attempt to evaluate different cultures but to appreciate them and to see what adaptations have to be made if intercultural counseling is to be effective for the counselee.

The book begins with an engaging presentation of this view and an appeal for interpathy, "an intentional cognitive envisioning and affective experiencing of another's thoughts and feelings, even though the thoughts rise from another process of knowing, the values grow from another frame of moral reasoning, and the feelings spring from another basis of assumptions" (29). Interpathy characterizes a culturally competent counselor and helps to create the presence and dialogue required by effective counseling.

In subsequent chapters A. keeps the horizons wide as he discusses levels of cultural experience, individuality and solidarity, controls, and values. In each instance he includes a sampling of scholarly opinions, which are often set side by side without much comment or synthesis. Frequent charts and lists provide a handy summary of the text and are especially welcome because so much material is packed into each chapter. Case studies and folk tales help to bring the different cultures alive, although A. does little more than refer the reader to them.

After setting forth this conceptual basis, A. examines family, women and men, ethics, healing, and mental health. The treatment is both intriguing and enlightening, because these are such major themes and contexts in pastoral counseling. The perspectives on family and healing are especially striking, because they differ so much from one culture to another. The concluding chapter presents an array of 11 metaphors which contribute to a final description of pastoral counseling. This cluster reaffirms the basic orientation of the whole book: "These key elements are integral to the effective work of the intercultural pastoral counselor and caregiver. The counseling and giving of care will take many forms with richly varied content. We end this study not with the construction of a single integrative model but with the recognition of the need for as many models as there are cultural contexts, and the call for pastoral counselors to work creatively, flexibly, humbly, and redemptively on the boundaries, where crossing over and returning enrich and transform our vision of human life and destiny" (373).

In addition to the collection of information and the helpful reminders in each chapter, there is a valuable bibliography, which might be more useful if grouped by topics, and there is a succinct summary at the end of each chapter. There is also a theological reflection on each topic which serves as a subheading for the chapters (e.g., a theology of culture, a theology of grace, a theology of the family, etc.). Usually this is a
translation of the main themes into theological terms, often in a reduc­tionist way that renders the theology more of an appendage than an integral component. The theology does not appear to arise from the intercultural data that is offered and even tends to have an intracultural, Western flavor. In any event, it is neither a foundational nor a critical theological appraisal of the topic, which makes the subheadings some­what misleading.

Finally, the book is written as if the reader does intercultural counsel­ing in a variety of countries or cultural settings. It is more likely that the reader will periodically encounter persons from other cultures who are currently living in the U.S. This does not lessen the importance of the overriding concern of the book, but it does call for more nuanced of how to be interpathic while counseling within one's own dominant culture.

Even so, the enlightenment offered here via other cultures inevitably helps a counselor be more sensitive to the variations in each counselee’s world, and that is a helpful contribution in any culture.

Washington Theological Union, Md. ROBERT L. KINAST


One of the most serious problems faced by all contemporary theologians concerns the question of how their theological work can be integrated with the data of the social sciences in a symbiosis that preserves the dignity of both disciplines. Anyone with some experience of interdiscipli­nary collaboration will be aware of how much frustration results as each interlocutor clings to deeply-ingrained methodologies and defends established academic frontiers. One escape route from this impasse is for the researcher to become expert in both fields of knowledge and thus to achieve the desired synthesis within a single intellect, a solution which appears to demand outstanding ability as well as the capacity for labo­rious effort. Fortunately, Azevedo, a native of Belo Horizonte, Brazil, possesses both these qualities, with advanced degrees in theology and cultural anthropology, along with extensive academic and pastoral ex­perience in both First and Third Worlds.

The integration of theology and the social sciences is, of course, especially essential in ecclesiology, both for a more profound understand­ing of the Church’s structures and dynamics ad intra, as well as for clarification of its appropriate relationship to the very diverse forms of civil society in which it is incarnated. A.’s study focuses on the phenom-
enon of basic ecclesial communities in Brazil—a wise decision, considering the wide divergences in BECs in the different nations of Latin America. But it must be remembered that Brazil is by far the largest Latin country in population and land mass, and that it also has the longest experience with, and the greatest number of, BECs in the world.

After an introduction, A.'s book consists of four lengthy chapters, all with extensive documentation, especially in the Portuguese literature, but also in its references to sources in the U.S. and Europe. The first chapter provides a historical perspective on the origins and development of the communities, in line with A.'s objective of presenting a diachronic (1956–85) as well as synchronic analysis. I found it quite interesting that at the Medellin bishops' conference (1968) the BECs were commended as sociologically significant, and that it was only after a decade of grassroots experience that the conference at Puebla confirmed the theological and pastoral importance they now possess throughout the continent.

The second chapter is concerned with semantics, i.e., a careful analysis of the meaning of the three words that comprise the title of the communities. In the third chapter A. moves more explicitly into the realm of theological or, if you will, missiological understanding, studying the communities precisely as evangelizers, i.e., "as bearers and proclaimers of the kingdom of actual persons and environments in Brazil." This includes a study of how the BECs evangelize their own members (where there is already a large amount of extant material); but much more importantly, it presents many illuminating and balanced ideas on how they can evangelize the nation of Brazil itself and the entire region of Latin America.

In chapter 4, concerned with "ecclesiological dimensions," one can mine many veins in the richest lode of this extraordinary book. An impressive survey of ecclesiology on the world level serves as a backdrop for what A. believes is a genuinely "new way of looking at the Church." This Latin ecclesiology highlights what is less clear or even lacking in other ecclesiologies, especially in the following ways: (1) the Church is consistently viewed in its concrete reality of specific sociocultural contexts; (2) these factors not only affect the Church but also place limits on it and its own understanding, so that it cannot lay claim to a "universal ecclesiology." Finally, A. makes very judicious use of Avery Dulles' well-known "models of the Church" to bring out in clear relief the salient features of the BECs.

A very important feature of the entire book is A.'s contribution of a number of salutary and well-balanced criticisms of the BEC pastoral strategy—which should win serious consideration because of his overall
positive approach. In summary, A.'s book constitutes an essential way station which future theologians and social scientists will have to visit before proceeding to further explorations of this new way of being church.

*Fordham University*  

**ALFRED T. HENNELLY, S.J.**

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### SHORTER NOTICES


Few concepts in the Bible are as confusing to the reader as that of justice. Not only can several Hebrew words be translated as “justice,” but the Hebrew words can be translated according to context as “righteousness,” “victory,” “judgment,” and “statute.” More difficult to many is the very notion of God’s justice, which is often seen as harsh and excluding. Walsh, assistant professor of Old Testament at Georgetown University, finds a thread through the lexical confusion and successfully shows how power, true and false, is a constant theme of both Testaments. He begins by distinguishing *mišpat*, “having the say,” and *šēdeq*, “consensus (what people accept as right).” Fundamentally different understandings of power and right were involved in the Canaanite worship of Baal and the Israelite worship of Yahweh. The good in the former system was Bread, i.e. physical survival, and the means to it was “the say” of the Canaanite kings, vicars of their divine patron Baal. In Yahwism the good was the covenant community of the marginated, and “the say” Yahweh’s. The people had to choose between the security of the Baal religion and the freedom and insecurity of the kingdom of God. The need to choose between justice systems is a theme of the Deuteronomistic History, the prophets, Job, apocalyptic literature, and the NT.

Walsh shows with great pedagogic skill how theologically fruitful is recent scholarship on Canaanite religion and on the Hebrew conquest. Instead of word studies of Hebrew words for justice to demonstrate his point, he relies on the coherence of the topic in the OT books and on its productivity. Some of his points may raise eyebrows, e.g. his aligning the Synoptics with Paul regarding justice, but the book is a stimulating volume in the Overtures series.

**RICHARD J. CLIFFORD, S.J.**  
Weston School of Theology  
Cambridge, Mass.


An expansion and adaptation of three books by Drane: *Paul* (1976), *Jesus and the Four Gospels* (1979), and *The Early Christians: The Life of the Early Church* (1982). The result is not so much a classical introduction to the NT writings as a companion to the study of basic historical, literary, and theological issues arising from the NT.

The presentation is divided into eight major sections: setting the scene (historical background), Jesus as God’s promised deliverer, the kingdom is here, knowing about Jesus, into all the world (Acts), Paul the evangelist extraordinary, Paul and the Christian message, and unity in diversity. The
discussion is illustrated by charts, maps, and black-and-white photographs. Cross references to pertinent NT texts are supplied in the ample margins. Controversial or technical matters are treated in smaller type. A five-page general bibliography is included.

D. has taught in the department of religious studies at the University of Stirling in Scotland since 1973. His critical stance is moderately conservative, much in line with the British evangelical scholarship represented by F. F. Bruce and I. Howard Marshall (to whom the book is dedicated). D. is optimistic about what can be known about Jesus, uses Acts as the framework for studying Paul’s letters, and hesitates to view the deutero-Paulines and 1 Peter as pseudonymous compositions. On disputed issues he lays out the evidence clearly, presents the arguments on both sides, and generally draws conservative conclusions.

Daniel J. Harrington, S.J.
Weston School of Theology
Cambridge, Mass.


V., of the department of philosophy at Pennsylvania State University, makes a foray into the theological interpretation of the Sermon on the Mount. The book consists essentially of lessons he taught in Sunday-school class. The result leaves me with mixed feelings.

In a popularization such as this, there are many obvious positive elements. V. is correct in seeing an anti-Judaism in Matthew’s Gospel—contrary to a modern-day false irenicism which looks to ecumenical goodwill rather than historical truth. The Christian in Matthew is asked to turn his own cheek; he cannot force others, or the state, to do the same. Loving one’s enemies does not imply having affection for them; it is to simply act gratuitously on their behalf.

Beside the positive features in this treatise, there must be numbered many shortcomings, in both content and methodology. The work makes a superficial appeal to scholarship, but it is not really scholarly; it is rather the sincere musings (almost in stream-of-consciousness fashion—a modern-day midrash) of a dedicated amateur who wishes to share his spiritual and psychological insights with others. Often he is on the mark, often not. V. wrongly uses the Johannine tradition or Romans to illustrate Matthew. He adds the accretions of pious legend to the episode of Simon of Cyrene. No attempt is made to explain the statement that “Jesus is God himself.” The words of Matthew are taken for the most part as being the words of Jesus.

Any final evaluation of the work depends, of course, on the audience for which it is intended. There is little here for the scholar; such is not V.’s intention. Those engaged in religious education on a popular level may find herein the sort of spiritual gleanings which can inspire them to further personal study and reflection.

Casimir Bernas, O.C.S.O.
Holy Trinity Abbey
Huntsville, Utah


A brief but comprehensive introduction to Paul’s life and writings. S. describes on a popular level the principal debates in Pauline studies, following especially the approach of Käsemann, Martyn, and Beker and their treatment of Paul in an apocalyptic perspective. Seeing the need to integrate a study of Paul’s life, letters, and theology, S. outlines his book in three parts around
these three topics. In the life of Paul he finds the influence of Hellenism, rabbinic Judaism, and apocalyptic Judaism, with the last providing the key element for interpreting the Christ of Paul's conversion experience. While his emphasis on apocalyptic may provoke some debate, S. shows good balance in not overstating his case and in recognizing multiple influences on Paul.

A study of the epistles first treats the seven undisputed works and then treats the others as of Pauline heritage. A consistent set of topics is discussed for each of the seven epistles: Paul's relationship to the Church; the problem that elicited the letter; the opponents and their thinking; structure of the letter bearing Paul's response; Paul's solution; the theological key to the letter. The distinction between categories is not always clear, especially for the last topics, but the points covered highlight the letters well.

In his summary of Paul's thought, S. touches on the themes of God's righteousness, Christology, the law, eschatology, the Spirit, anthropology, ecclesiology, and ethics. If this section bears any criticism, it is that of its brevity, a point applicable to the other sections as well. Nevertheless, S. is at home with Paul and, through a crisp overview and a charming style, invites the stranger to Paul to become at home with the apostle as well.

ANTHONY J. TAMNASCO
Georgetown University


K. is well versed in contemporary work on the Apocalypse. He selects from various commentators as he takes the reader through the text. Most of the book is devoted to paraphrase and comment on the Apocalypse. It is well written and should be easily followed by the nonacademic. The bibliography and subject index permit such readers to find further material on any topic that interests them.

K. adopts fairly standard positions. The visions are literary creations based on OT imagery, not visionary reports. They are set out in repetitive cycles with delays in unfolding the action, not a linear sequence designed to correlate with historical events. Apoc gives little attention to correlating its visions with historical events beyond the basic vision of imperial Rome as a power doomed to fail. Though the community may not have experienced wholesale persecution, the fate of some martyrs serves to exemplify the faithful witness which will bring the power of evil down. K. uses the emphasis on the role of the Word of God and the faithful martyr to downplay the vindictive, warrior elements in Apoc.

K. refers to the critique of Rome, yet does not mention the problem of social and economic participation in the imperial system over against sectarian isolation. Apoc calls for a rather harsh isolation. K. also tries to avoid the dualism of Apoc by claiming that the author's visions represent the foundations of this world and not a heavenly one. Yet the function of such dualism is to provide a perspective outside the apparent reality of life. Apoc clearly expects its readers to view events on earth "from above."

This book makes a clear case against millenarian and fundamentalist readings of Apoc. It shows how rich the traditions of interpreting Apoc have been down through the ages. It is an excellent source for private Bible study, study groups, or college undergraduates.

PHHEME PERKINS
Boston College

NATÜRLICHE THEOLOGIE: GRUNDRISS PHILOSOPHISCHER GOTTESKENNTEIS. By Henrich Beck. Munich:
Beck, professor of philosophy at the University of Bamberg in West Germany, offers a philosophical defense of the existence and activity of the triune God in the modern world. His thinking is grounded in the philosophy of Aquinas, but he expands the Thomistic categories to include the insights of Martin Buber, Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, and others into the interpersonal character of the divine-human relationship. Of the three proofs for the existence of God, e.g., two are clearly Thomistic: God as the ultimate source of “motion” or change in the universe, and God as the supreme orderer in its progressive evolution to more complex forms of existence and activity. The third, however, is based on God as the absolute Thou within every interpersonal encounter. In the next section, B. analyzes the metaphysical essence of God as both subsistent being and interpersonal community; here he is mainly dependent on an earlier analysis of the dynamic character of the act of being (cf. his Der Akt-Charakter des Seins [Munich: Huber, 1965]). In the third and last section, he deals with creation and divine providence in the context of modern evolutionary theory.

The book is evidently directed against contemporary philosophers who deride metaphysical ways of thinking (cf. an appendix dealing with issues raised by positivism, atheistic materialism, etc.). Even so, one might question whether any metaphysical system can be strictly derived from appeal to the principle of sufficient reason. B.’s natural theology, in other words, would seem more dependent on Christian beliefs than he himself cares to admit. Granted these limitations, his work deserves a respectful hearing, if only because of his thoroughness in dealing with the issues involved.

JOSEPH A. BRACKEN, S.J.
Xavier University, Cinn.


“It is not because things are what they are that God knows them, it is because He knows them that they are what they are” (Augustine, De trin. 15, 13). This classic statement of the doctrine of divine omniscience, whereby God’s knowledge of finite reality is conditioned upon God’s concomitant willing them to be one way rather than another, is challenged by K., assistant professor of philosophy at Texas A. & M. As he sees it, within such a scheme human freedom is logically impossible since the human being has no choice but to do God’s will. Nor does he resort to the further argument that God knows and wills the free decisions of human beings “in their presentiality,” as they are happening. Instead, he opts for a modified version of scientia media first proposed by the Jesuit Luis de Molina in the 16th century. That is, he suggests that God in creating a human being knows all the free actions which it could possibly take in its lifetime. God thus keeps the future open by allowing the creature to actualize one series of decisions rather than all the others; at the same time, God is never surprised by the decision of the creature since it was already known to God in virtue of scientia media or what K. calls “subjunctives of freedom.”

While K.’s defense of human freedom over against divine predestination is certainly commendable, it involves some liabilities of its own. Chief among these would be the presupposition that in knowing the essence of a given individual, God would simultaneously know all the free decisions which that person would make under any conceivable circumstances. Many contemporary philosophers, on the contrary, would argue that the free decisions of the person over a lifetime progressively
determine his/her essence or "character"; hence that even God cannot know the essence of the person until the moment of death. In other words, K. implicitly endorses a strongly essentialist (as opposed to a more existential) understanding of God's knowledge and of human freedom in order to "save" the doctrine of divine omniscience.

Joseph A. Bracken, S.J.
Xavier University, Cinn.


Ignatius Press continues to make the work of Henri Cardinal de Lubac accessible to an English-speaking audience with this translation of La foi chrétienne (1969). The subtitle accurately characterizes the contents: in these essays L. argues that the structure of the Creed is threefold and addresses such philological questions as the use of the expression credere in followed both by the names of the Trinity and the accusative case sanctam ecclesiam, in order to develop the theological implications of the Creed's structure and to differentiate between belief in God and belief in the Church. Although he begins with an examination of structure, his purpose is to probe such themes as the economic Trinity and its relationship to dogmatic statements about God, the nature of belief and faith, and the role of the Church in the profession of faith. Students of L. will find this book an especially valuable resource for his Trinitarian theology, his concept of the task of theology, the nature of faith, and his vision of the unity which encompasses the Christian mystery.

Copious references to the Fathers and the scholastics as well as to more contemporary writers characterize L.'s style. In the midst of painstaking references to the tradition, his own reflection results in interesting suggestions, such as the idea that the creed begins "credo" rather than "credimus" because it represents the Church's profession of faith. Also of interest is his identification of the movement of faith as oriented to the future within the order of foresight and the objective recognition of its intellectual content as posterior to the experience of faith within the order of retrospection. Throughout, L. the theologian is inseparable from L. the man of faith.

Susan Wood, S.C.L.
Saint Mary College
Leavenworth, Kan.


This volume comprises a debate on its title question between Flew and Habermas, essays in response by Wolfhart Pannenberg, Charles Hartshorne, and James Packer, and a response to these essays by Habermas. Habermas was chosen to have the final word on the basis of his victory over Flew in the eyes of a ten-judge panel: five philosophers asked to judge the content of the debate (Habermas four, Flew none, one draw) and five professional debate judges asked to judge the argumentation technique (Habermas, three to two).

The debate itself is not conducted at a high level. As Packer points out, "To have the first speaker [Flew] spend all his strength negating in advance what he expects the next speaker to say is never the best way to open up a subject" (147). Moreover, as Pannenberg observes, there is "a lack of sophistication in [Flew's] way of dealing with the biblical texts" and a "reluctance to enter
into serious discussion of the historical detail" (127, 134). In the absence of such discussion, Flew's position can but seem a dogmatic agnosticism: while the issue is a historical one, he will not take the historical task seriously enough to assess the evidence. Habermas does not treat the relevant texts critically enough to help the matter.

Pannenberg's reply will be of the greatest interest to most readers. Twenty years after his defense of the historicity of a literal resurrection of Jesus, he holds once more that "the argument for a literal Resurrection depends on the convergence of the reports on appearances with the empty-tomb tradition" (130). However, P. does not take account of his critics in the meantime.

Whatever it may have been like as a media event, the debate and discussion of it do not advance the state of the question of the meaning and truth of the resurrection of Jesus.

PHILIP E. DEVENISH
Univ. of Chicago Divinity School


Teaching Sacraments is a purposefully ambiguous title, "sacraments" functioning as both the subject and object of the verb "teaching." To limit this book's audience to teachers would be a mistake, since students will find S.'s chapters on the anthropological, theological, Christological, ecclesiological, and eschatological foundations of sacramental action equally instructive.

Each chapter consists of three sections: orientating questions and readings, reflections, and a brief annotated list of selected readings. In the first section S. unfortunately limits herself to two brief activities generally inappropriate for undergraduate students, since they presuppose knowledge and terminology which would only be acquired later rather than inductively proceeding from the experience of the example of the students. E.g., one question asks: "What is your understanding of eschatology?"

The second section, the major portion of each chapter, develops a theology of the chapter and is a rich resource for anyone interested in the sacraments. S. treats such themes as the human roots of ritual, symbolic activity, biblical insights, historical developments, pastoral implications, ecumenical concerns. Her discussion of the Christological foundations of sacraments is particularly good. S.'s approach to the sacraments rests firmly in the tradition of Rahner and Schillebeeckx without parroting them. Her own insightful contributions, e.g., include her discussion of validity and fruitfulness in terms of the covenant structure of God's initiative and human response.

Although the brief annotated bibliography lists the major classical texts, the emphasis is on contemporary studies of the sacraments, many of which are accessible to undergraduate students. The merits of this book far outweigh any deficiencies. It is a welcome addition to the growing literature in sacramental theology.

SUSAN WOOD, S.C.L.
Saint Mary College
Leavenworth, Kan.


An obvious teacher, O. writes for those engaged in teaching Christian sacraments and in preparing others for their celebration. His arrangement is a bit different: a selected English bibliography comes first, followed by the teachings of the Roman Catholic Church, NT data and analysis, changes and development through Church his-
tory, and contemporary concerns and emphases.

With the best from Rahner, Schillebeeckx, and Vatican II theology, O. stresses Jesus as the “first”/primordial sacrament of God; in his humanity Jesus is the baptized, the one filled with the Holy Spirit; the Church is the fundamental or basic sacrament of Jesus Christ, the locus of the Spirit’s activity. Baptism-(confirmation)-Eucharist constitute full initiation into the Church. The controlling issue in sacramental preparation, especially on matters of confirmation, should be the presence of the Spirit, suggests O., not age.

With clarity and ecumenical sensitivity, O. proffers an explanation of the Eucharist as “the sacramental sacrifice of Christ,” which is consonant with Catholic, Orthodox, and Protestant theology; he thus overcomes divisive arguments about “sacrifice” from the Reformation and Tridentine periods.

With equal sensitivity and fidelity to biblical and Catholic theology, O. reasons that acceptance of baptism in the Christian Church is already acceptance of faith in the Eucharist. After delineating the requirements for intercommunion in the Catholic Church, he lists what is not mentioned: acceptance of the pope as pope and the authority of the Roman Catholic magisterium. Consequently, he suggests a wider practice of intercommunion as a means of the unity still to be attained.

O.’s emphasis on the action of the Holy Spirit in Jesus’ life, in the Christian Church, in the whole process of Christian initiation, and in subsequent Christian living makes this book a helpful one for those teaching sacramental theology in this ecumenical age.

PRUDENCE M. CROKE, R.S.M.
Salve Regina College, R.I.


In a relatively short space H. provides a concise intellectual history that does a credible job of explaining the historical roots and decisive issues that have shaped the development of modern theology. (A second volume will deal with various constructive theological responses to these issues.) H. is particularly good at describing the changes in our common taken-for-granted assumptions that have had a profound impact on the way we think and the questions we tend to ask. This book should thus prove especially useful for undergraduate and first-year graduate students in theology.

Chap. 1 describes the impact of the beginnings of modern science. Focusing on developments in astronomy—with an evenhanded account of the contemporary theological reaction to Galileo that shows what was perceived to have been at stake—and the shift from theoretical explanation to empirical experimentation and mathematical description that characterizes modern scientific method, H. shows how the notion of God acting in the world has become one of our characteristic “modern” theological problems.

Chap. 2 turns to the beginnings of modern philosophy. Here H. provides a succinct and informative account of the shifts from Cartesian rationalism to British empiricism, followed by a discussion of Kant’s attempt to resolve the dilemmas inherited from both traditions. H. also shows how Kant’s attempt to provide a new “critical” foundation for scientific knowledge contributed to a shift away from propositional understandings of revelation.

Insightful discussions of the “continuing scientific revolutions” represented by Darwin’s theory of evolution and “the new physics” are the focal point of chap. 3. In the case of the former, H. forcefully presents the radicality of the challenge posed to traditional under-
standings of divine activity, whereas the lucid discussion of contemporary physics brings out its implications for a new understanding of reality.

The book concludes with a serviceable discussion of modern psychology (chap. 4) and a helpful overview of modern biblical scholarship and its impact on our understanding of the Bible as a historically conditioned document with an essentially kerygmatic purpose (chap. 5).

ROBERT F. SCUKA
Georgetown University


A collection of articles and conference papers published or read between 1977 and 1982. As with most such collections, there is an unevenness in the degree to which individual pieces relate to G.'s overall thematic project as expressed in the title.

Most valuable are the first four articles, which G. includes under the section heading “Theology as Hermeneutics.” He lucidly examines the by-now-dated crisis presented to traditional dogmatic theology by the rise of historical consciousness, and then turns his attention to the recent crisis presented to the hermeneutical theology of historical consciousness by the reading strategy of deconstruction. G. is balanced in his presentation of deconstructionist thought, aware of both the negative and positive dimensions of its challenge to theology, and finally eloquent in his defence of hermeneutics as a model for theological inquiry and dialogue. He continues his discussion of hermeneutics by considering the nature and responsibilities of the theological vocation. He emphasizes the role of the theologian as a mediator between the magisterium and the community of believers, and insists upon “creative faithfulness” (75) as an indispensable criterion of authentic theological activity.

If the first section gives account of G.'s principal title, the third and last section, “The Practice of Christians Reinterprets Christianity,” elucidates his book's subtitle. Here the reader finds interesting studies on the relationship between Catholic thought and modern culture (the latter represented by the themes of secularization, ideology critique, human rights, and world religions) which continue G.'s commitment to a dialogue through which Christianity and culture are mutually transformed.

G.'s second section, “The Interpretative Testimony to Faith,” includes more discrete studies which, though in dialogue with the thought of Ebeling, Bloch, Jüngel, Levinas, Teilhard, Ricoeur, and Moltmann, fail in their efforts to address the broader issues of interpretive dialogue considered in the first and third sections and, as such, detract from the coherence of an otherwise solid volume.

JOHN E. THIEL
Fairfield University, Conn.


In March 1984 the University of Santa Clara sponsored a symposium to examine the contributions of Lonergan to our knowledge about the relationships between religion and culture. The results are this book, containing 24 papers presented during the event. It was also to be a Festschrift for L.'s 80th birthday, although he died three weeks prior to the actual December 17 date. Like previous investigations of his thought (Spirit as Inquiry, 1964; the Florida International Lonergan Con-
gress, 1970; Marquette, 1980; annual Lonergan workshops at Boston College), diverse Lonerganians attempt to help us understand better what that producer of an *organum novissimum* (F. Crowe's term) was up to in his seminal projects.

The perspectives presented range anywhere from mysticism (Johnston and J. Price) to such contemporary issues as nuclear war (G. Price and Melchin) and storytelling (T. Dunne). They give some indication of the state of Lonergan studies or, depending on one's viewpoint, an initial indicator of what his version of transcendental method has generated. E.g., there are different interpretations (Vertin and Hosinski) on whether L.'s understanding of God can correct or be enhanced by process thought. Titles such as “On Not Neglecting the Self in the Structure of Theological Revolutions” (Quesnell) and “The Spiritual Authority of the Bible” (McEvenue) rephrase well modern theology's “turn to the subject.” The same is true of four papers dealing with the human sciences; they must not be simply empirical, but also critical. Those interested in L.'s work in economics (the unpublished *An Essay on Circulation Analysis*) will find trenchant explanations of his solution for recurring economic crises: once again education in critical thinking through his transcendental axioms (be attentive, intelligent, reasonable, responsible, and loving).

The overarching concern for the subject marks the majority of the papers. Two, however, stand out for other reasons. Crowe frankly admits that the symposium topic is premature. L. himself should be interpreted first; we still need, e.g., to know more about the relationship between his method and the objective theology he taught. Toulmin's “Pluralism and Authority” probably asks the best question: How are we to decide between novel ideas and scholars speaking with authority? In a word, “which ‘arrows of change’ point in the most fruitful directions?” The same question can be put to the entire book.

JEROME M. DITTBERNER
St. Paul Seminary, Minn.


E.'s anthology is distinctive. The title indicates, correctly, that E. has wisely chosen not to separate Christology from soteriology; the texts he translates say as much about how Christ accomplished his saving work as they do about the constitution of his person. He deliberately omits texts on the Christological controversy, usually (but inadequately) taken to mean the events around the Councils of Ephesus and Chalcedon; such texts are readily available in other anthologies. E. selects homilies, letters, and less formal treatises to show how the Fathers spoke habitually, rather than polemically, about Christ and his work. The texts he chooses are not necessarily in harmony with the doctrine of Chalcedon; he stresses several times the theological pluralism of the early Church. All the translations in the volume are E.'s own.

E. made a good decision in avoiding polemical or synodal documents; his anthology is even and consistent. His selections from the Greek writers of the later-fourth and fifth centuries are especially good. His decision to omit extraneous material but not to mark the omissions with ellipsis points may be a shortcoming. E. also selects paragraphs from different places in a work, but they are printed without spaces between selections, so that the reader might think he has a continuous text when he does not. Some of E.'s attempts to unsex the language are not quite successful. “Whenever God wished to make what God had decided
to make, God begot the Word" (p. 55) is confusing; "the same person who is both totally human and God" (114) is unbalanced.

E.'s anthology needs to be taught; the prefaces alone do not explain the theology involved. This fine book would enrich and enliven any course in Christology.

JOSEPH T. LIENHARD, S.J.
Marquette University


The apostle of Ireland has been studied for a variety of reasons, but too rarely as a spiritual writer, much less a mystic. O.'s book has taken a step in the right direction, but the step is too large.

Patrick's writings are brief and rather confusing, largely because of his poor Latinity. He rarely develops a point, and when he does, it usually relates to the situation of his call and his mission. He has left no large passage describing his spiritual life in any detail. This is not unusual for early medieval Ireland, and so O. has followed a tried and true method: to take the surviving fragments (or paragraphs) and place them against a larger background—in this case, the wider Christian mystical tradition. The results often illuminate particular Patrician passages: e.g., "Throughout all Patrick's references to the Divine presence and presents there is a sense of delicacy, intimacy and vulnerability . . ." (55). I know of no other writer who has caught this note of delicacy, or even used the word in relation to Patrick. On the other hand, one often has the impression that Patrick has been forced into a Procrustean bed. O. believes that the unaffected simplicity of the Latinity belies a spiritual writer of considerable range, and he finds systematic understanding where none appears to exist, e.g. on the Holy Spirit; occasional chapters go far from the Patrician base, e.g. chap. 3, "The Discovery of Jesus Christ." The superstructure is too great for the foundation.

This is a stimulating book, and one which should be read as a corrective by all who treat Patrick solely as a source for the ecclesiastical history of the British Isles, but this reviewer must conclude reluctantly that Patrick's Christian greatness must still derive solely from his remarkable ability as a missionary and not as a spiritual writer.

JOSEPH F. KELLY
John Carroll University, Cleveland

Baldwin joined the Cistercian monastery of Ford in Dorset around 1170 and became archbishop of Canterbury in 1184. In 1190 he died on crusade during the siege of Acre. His 16 Tractates are presented here in English, mostly for the first time. "On the Most Holy Sacrament of the Eucharist" is prescholastic but already uses the term "transubstantiation." To set this theology in the context of the time, see Gary Macy, The Theologies of the Eucharist in the Early Scholastic Period (1080–1220) (Oxford: Clarendon, 1984).

The longest and most important discourse is "On the Cenobitic or Common Life." It is an application of the text "The grace of our Lord Jesus Christ, the love of God, and the fellowship of the Holy Spirit" to the community life of the monastery. It is unique in the medieval corpus. Bell concludes that Baldwin here depends closely on Aelred and more remotely on Augustine; yet it is not mere dependence, it is a unique doctrinal synthesis. But it seems to me
that we must say more than that. Baldwin can be so decidedly "cenobitic" only because he consciously eschews the contemplative, "eremitic" theology so prevalent at the time. Among the others are four beautiful treatises on the Beatitudes. Meekness towards one's neighbour has its place, he says, but meekness towards God is more important. Perhaps we see here how the meek monk could become a convinced crusader.

Eoin de Bhladraithe  
Bolton Abbey, Ireland


This attractively printed and bound volume proposes to offer "an introduction to Catherine as friend, sister, and guide in the journey of mysticism meant for each of us" (14) by a recognized authority on the saint. After an initial chapter which presents an overview of Catherine's life in the context of the turbulent 14th century, F. devotes the remaining nine chapters to the saint's central mystical themes, e.g. the will of God, prayer, the blood of Jesus, the relationship between the active life and intimacy with God, the Trinity, etc. The book is rounded off with two appendices (an outline chronology of Catherine’s life and significant texts, editions, and translations of Catherine's writings), a selected bibliography, and two indices (name and subject). F.'s presentation is clear, well organized, and straightforward.

F. bases her introduction to Catherine on nearly all primary sources, such as the saint's Dialogue, letters, and prayers, and the biography by Catherine's confessor and close friend Raymond of Capua. In view of the book's aim, this seems appropriate. Nonetheless, I think that any writing on Catherine, or any other medieval woman mystic for that matter, neglects at its own risk the recent important work of social historians like Rudolph Bell, Donald Weinstein, and Caroline Walker Bynum on these mystics and their milieu. E.g., although Bynum's Holy Feast and Holy Fast: The Religious Significance of Food to Medieval Women (1987) was published too late for F. to consult, F.'s discussion of the centrality of Jesus' blood in Catherine's religious experience must now necessarily be supplemented by Bynum's treatment of this topic, not simply for the sake of scholarly completeness, but because Bynum makes a major contribution to our understanding of this element in Catherine's spirituality. This reservation aside, F.'s book can be recommended with confidence.


This book supplements McGinn and Colledge's Meister Eckhart: The Essential Sermons, Commentaries, Treatises, and Defense (Paulist, 1981). Among English translations of E., these alone include balanced selections from both his Latin and German works. Here M. presents the complete Commentary on Exodus, excerpts from the commentaries on Wisdom, Ecclesiasticus, and John, and six Latin sermons. Tobin translates 24 German sermons, and in an appendix Borgstädt translates the Eckhartian treatise Sister Catherine. The biblical commentaries richly document E.'s teaching, which, as M. notes, "is the source and often the necessary gloss for what he preached" (2). E. must therefore be seen as both "teacher and preacher." Not that this approach simplifies E. Rather, he emerges as a more complex figure who moves between school and pulpit, and
whose works can now be understood accurately and as a whole.

Especially valuable is the Exodus commentary, where the text "I am who am" (Exod 3:14) leads E. to state his doctrine of existence, and Exod 15:3 and 20:7 yield E.'s most detailed analysis of God's names. By emphasizing grace, intellect, and charity, the Latin sermons provide an important bridge between E.'s academic work and vernacular preaching. The German sermons are central to E.'s reputation and have been translated before (most recently by Walshe). Yet Tobin renders these texts with care and clarity that sacrifice remarkably little of their astonishing power (see, e.g., "Like a Vessel of Gold," 275–79). Sister Catherine indicates E.'s influence; long attributed to him, it instead reflects a "feminist" disciple's assimilation of Eckhartian themes, e.g. radical detachment and the soul's establishment "in the pure Godhead" (361).

This splendid book richly complements Paulist's previous E. volume. This complementarity is evident in the glossary of Latin and German terms keyed to both books. In this volume we also see how much that is "essential" was omitted from the first book. Taken together, these volumes provide the most substantial and reliable collection of E.'s works available in English today.

DONALD F. DUCLOW
Gwynedd-Mercy College, Pa.


A wide-ranging collection of studies to honor an eminent scholar of catholic interests for the late-medieval and early-modern era. Hence only a few of the fascinating details and intriguing insights can be touched upon here. The parish fraternities of medieval London are presented as communal counterparts to personal chantries; the latter were only for the rich who could afford them, while the former were open to "middle class." These associations also gave control to laity, men and women, over chaplains and expressed their concerns with preaching and neighborhood solidarity (Barron). Anticlericalism in 15th-century Prussia was triggered in large part by the highhandedness of bishops and prelates (M. Burleigh). Among late-medieval English queens, Elizabeth of York, wife of Harry VII, stood out as a model for her practical piety and charity (A. Crawford). A look at the decline and end of Cleeve Abbey shows how quickly an institution could come into difficulties (R. W. Dunning). G. R. Dunstan provides a translation of a major address by Jean Gerson in 1409 on the Great Western Schism. J. N. Hare looks at two options chosen by monks in southern England: direct cultivation or leasing of the estates and what each involved. Harper-Bill examines complaints by inhabitants of English religious houses concerning their diet and the quality of food.

M. Harvey investigates the comments of John of Whithamstede, abbot of St. Albans, on conciliarism and the Councils of Pisa, Constance and Basel. M. Hicks give a close and detailed look at the bequests and foundations of one family over more that a century, while R. I. Jack examines the distinctive characteristics and controversies found in a Welsh deanery. The relation between the city of Lichfield and the area controlled by the cathedral is the concern of A. J. Kettle. F. O. Logan takes another look at Thomas Bourghchier, archbishop of Canterbury, who was studied some time ago by du Boulay. Church issues and national hostilities are seen by M. C. Rady as tied together in the disputes between Germans and Magyars in medieval Buda. J. T. Ro-
shorter notices

senthal continues his studies of benefactions by upper class in the Late Middle Ages, specifically the case of the Lancastrian bishops and what they did or did not do for education. E. Russell looks at the role Oxford was intended to play and did play in the attempts by Mary Tudor and her supporters to roll back the changes brought in by her father and brother.

In all, there is much to feast on in this collection worthy of the one being honored.

**Thomas E. Morrissey**

*State University College*  
*Fredonia, N.Y.*


S. presents the Jesuit college program as the pursuit of all the liberal arts: Latin grammar, classical rhetoric, and scholastic philosophy as a link to the ultimate goal of Christian humanism, theology. The chapters treat education in the Late Middle Ages; the Reformation; Jesuit colleges and their organization; those in Italy; in France; and the case of Savoy. The book is manifestly the result of unusually extensive reading and research in many archives, including the Jesuit archives in Rome. The bibliography lists 14 pages of primary and 18 pages of secondary sources, to which the copiously documented pages refer. Thus S. furnishes valuable leads to anyone desiring to pursue some topic further. There are 18 pages of illustrations.

In so wide a field some opinions expressed will inevitably be controverted. To this reviewer, the appraisals are generally sound, always at least a plausible view. While the chief focus is on the humanities, the teaching of philosophy and theology receives interesting if passing mention, with references helpful for further investigation. Interesting examples are the Jesuits' struggle in Savoy, against other colleges, the university, and the state, to add philosophy and theology to their curriculum; some efforts in Spain and Germany to add history as a branch to the curriculum; details of physical education in France. Unfortunately, the lack of an index, of headings, and of a detailed table of contents makes much of its new information hard to find later on. A valuable contribution to the field.

**George E. Ganss, S.J.**

*Institute of Jesuit Sources*  
*St. Louis University*


Finney, "the most noteworthy evangelist of the pre-Civil War period, is a figure of epic stature in American history." This statement from the cover of H.'s scholarly biography is undoubtedly true, yet historians have found it difficult to establish what exactly in F.'s stature is epic. His "new measures" in conducting revivals were only relatively new. He was not a great theologian; in fact, he never attended a theological school, yet during his 40-year tenure as professor of theology at Oberlin he was one of the most influential theologians of his time. Like the young "Jacksonian" republic, he was aggressive, self-confident, democratically iconoclastic. His interest lay in the future, not in what the Church was but in what it must become, in its obligation to convert and reform the world for the thousand years of peace and justice prophesied in Revelation. He was the common-sense technician of the means of grace: apply the means and the result must follow. The revivalist, the "educator," speaks the truth that convicts of sin and converts to holiness, indeed to sinlessness with regard to all that the penitent recognizes as sinful.
H., professor of philosophy and religion at Ursinus College in Pennsylvania, masterfully presents the extensive results of his research (some previously unpublished) in an interesting and lively narrative. The book contains important discussions of controversial theological issues from the period itself, but it does not (as a biography should not) purport to portray or to summarize F.'s entire theology. Although he disagrees with F.'s views on important points, H. has given him a loving and even moving treatment. The book fills an important gap in American religious history.

JOHN E. WILSON
Pittsburgh Theological Seminary


The history of the worker-priests is a fascinating account of an apostolate radical in ministry and methodology. Theirs was a special ministry launched by Cardinal Suhard et al. to liberate the working classes from the forces of injustice and oppression. A. has written an intimate portrait of the life-style of these priests, whose mission created a climate of controversy for the clergy and laity; for embracing the working classes in the concrete situation of the factory meant a radical departure from the more traditional perceptions of both priesthood and proletariat.

A. surveys the characteristics and statistics of these priests in working-class blue who were articulating and practicing a new paradigm of faith-sharing. This paradigm shift was based on the assumption that the gospel gave them the mandate or special ministry to embrace the world and world view of the workers in their concrete everyday situation. Not unlike the advocates of the earlier Social Gospel and later liberation theology, they wished to experience poverty and injustice firsthand. So effective was their witness as a leaven in the field that the initial calm turned into controversy when they achieved solidarity with the workers. Given this result, it is not surprising that an atmosphere of confrontation followed.

While it is not surprising that questions and anxieties concerning the proper roles of ministry and pastoral life would surface, it is disconcerting to learn the fate of the few who chose to share the lot of the workers. Their spirit and adopted spirituality of solidarity brought them into conflict with the hierarchy in Paris and the Curia in Rome. With a different model of the apostolate, the prophetic vision of the worker-priests tried to knock down the wall which separates the Church from the masses. Those in sympathy with their cause need only to read this chapter of contemporary church history to sense the heroism throughout their ordeal. For those who are skeptical and suspicious, the legacy of the priest-workers lives on in the pages of the Catholic Worker in this country, wherein the preferential option for the poor remains a permanent gospel paradigm.

PHILIP S. KILEY, S.J.
Needham, Mass.


What makes K.'s work on issues of human reproduction most attractive is not so much the subject matter, or the way in which he presents it, as rather its call for an expansion of ecumenical dialogue. Whereas ecumenism generally revolves around doctrinal concerns, K. calls for a dialogue of ethical concerns. His work not only makes a contribution to that but can serve as a guide as well.

The Christian sources K. uses in his
discussion are limited to those of Great Britain. Also, the book was published just before the Vatican released its own ethical analysis of this issue. This does not, however, make the work self-limiting. Documents such as the "Warnock Report" have had an impact on Christian ethical thought in other countries. Further, by coming out before the Vatican statement, it allows K. to situate the dialogue almost entirely within the context of the local church, where, many would suggest, it belongs.

As a work in the ethics of human reproduction, Life and Love focuses on key issues with candor and competence. A significant contribution is an overview of the feminist perspective, one which is greatly needed in this discussion. The net result is a challenge to the different Christian perspectives to be better focused, more clearly articulated, and more sensitive to each other.

As a professor of ethics, I have often found that my students' own religious perspective is more easily heard when it is joined with the perspective of other Christians. For this reason alone, I hope that K.'s initial work of an ecumenical ethical discussion will lead to others. Ecumenical dialogue needs to be broadened beyond doctrine to include other areas of concern, and needs to be done with the critical honesty and integrity which typifies this work.

JOHN F. TUOHEY
Catholic University of America


The CLSA has produced an excellent volume of studies on diocesan governance conceived as a special ministry. The ten papers, given by canonists, theologians, and historians at a symposium in November 1984, are of high quality, clear, informed, and scholarly, with abundant valuable references. Thomas Curry discusses factors in 19th-century American history that shaped the development of the Catholic hierarchy's penchant for a strongly centralized control structure. Gerald P. Fogarty offers an excellent history of successive phases of development of diocesan governance in this country in the late 19th century, focusing on the steady Romanization of the American hierarchy. John E. Lynch has written an interesting and helpful survey of several major systems of governance in American Protestant churches.

There are three valuable studies of theological aspects of Church administration. Agnes Cunningham's paper on spiritual power and ecclesiastical authority in the early centuries shows how much is being learned about these subjects from modern patristic study. John M. Huels goes through many key images of the Church in Vatican II's Lumen gentium, showing the significance of each for canon law, and concluding with a beautiful summary in nine points of how canon law ought to be fashioned in view of the spiritual enterprise that the Church is. In another excellent study Michael A. Fahey sees considerable ecclesiological development in the 1983 Code. He presents some leading theological perspectives on episcopacy and diocesan government in the last 25 years, and details the incorporation of these in the revised Code.

Eugene F. Hemick summarizes much current information, followed by thoughtful comment, on religious life, the permanent diaconate, lay volunteers, and diocesan pastoral councils. Robert A. Willis, a psychologist, offers insights from developmental psychology on relational growth and church governance. Roland-Bernhard Trauffer of the diocese of Basel, Switzerland, provides interesting current information on structures adopted in recent years in many European dioceses.
James H. Provost’s conclusion to the volume is a 43-page comprehensive and valuable examination of a number of canonical issues, ranging from basic ways of thinking about church government to the relationships of bishops to persons and groups.

Richard F. Costigan, S.J.
Loyola University of Chicago


This third collection in the continuing series of articles edited by D. for CLSA presents seven substantial studies mainly dealing with issues in the theology of marriage. Concern for matters more properly pastoral and canonical was better served in the previous volumes of this series.

Well over half the book is taken up with two lengthy essays. Mackin’s “Ephesians 5:21–33 and Radical Indissolubility” convincingly discounts use of the scriptural passage to support the doctrine of the absolute intrinsic permanence of a sacramental marriage. The second and longer study, Rincon’s “Doctrinal Implications of Civil Marriage between Catholics,” is a translation of an article which appeared in Spanish in 1979. It is basically an overstated defense of the International Theological Commission’s 1977 reaffirmation of the inseparability of contract and sacrament in the marriages of Christians. The author’s European, civil-law mentality renders his presentation educative, but also less relevant to the more pastoral concerns of North Americans.

The remaining scriptural-theological studies represent a more or less conservative viewpoint, consolidating accepted positions rather than breaking new ground. One presentation of current statistics on marriage, divorce, and families in the U.S. by a lay sociologist (Glick) is followed by brief but suggestive comments by a noted canonist (Wrenn). It is perhaps worth noting that this article and one by a woman-religious psychologist (Breitenbeck) from the second volume are the only pieces in the entire series thus far which were not authored by clerics.

John F. Martin, S.J.
Regis College, Toronto


S.’s purpose is “to help presiders and all who work with the liturgy become more sensitive to authentic liturgical tradition as found in the present Roman Rite” (87). He does not limit his audience to presiders, nor does he address himself to those wishing to adapt the Roman Rite to a better form. His method, as the title indicates, is the via negativa. By using negative rules, examples, and principles, he hopes to lead the reader to a positive appreciation of the revised liturgy and its celebration.

After offering some thoughts on symbols and cautioning against overwhelming, disguising, or reducing a fundamental symbol to a bare minimum, S. offers reflections on presiders: e.g., do not usurp another’s proper part (by saying the “Amen”). He then provides some general liturgical principles followed by an individual treatment of the Entrance Rite, Liturgy of the Word, Liturgy of the Eucharist, and the Concluding Rite. S. ends up with sections on Varia (concelebration and funerals) and on what to do, e.g. presiders might “risk” having themselves videotaped and once a year reread the “General Instruction of the Roman Missal” and the detailed rubrics in the Order of Mass. S. does not display the crispness of style of Aidan Kavanagh’s similar study, Elements of Rite, and might have helped the reader at times
by giving the positive side as well as the negative. E.g., ex opere operato had a healthy, Christological sense as well as its admittedly distorted understanding. On the other hand, readers will learn much from S.’s novel approach. This book could serve as a handy tool for improving liturgical celebrations and realizing William Blake’s words: “He who would do good to others must do it in minute particulars...” (9).

JOHN H. MCKENNA, C.M.  
St. John’s University, N.Y.


Walter Burghardt has done it again! He has published another great book of sermons. From Tell the Next Generation to Sir, We Would Like To See Jesus to Still Proclaiming Your Wonders (all Paulist Press), Burghardt has preached the gospel from the written page.

In his introduction he writes: “For the most part, preaching presupposes a parish. A parish that should be shaped, in large measure, by preaching. A parish that normally comes together on Sundays in congregation.” All of that is true. But what B. may or may not know is that his parish extends throughout the world because of his books of sermons. Perhaps their birth in “the parish” gives them the great authenticity that still lives on the page.

As in his previous works, so in Grace on Crutches, B. is crisp, to the point, witty, timely, exegetically “on target,” and theologically responsible. Structurally, he tends to follow the three-point approach. The book is organized by seasons, with sermons from Advent, Lent, Easter, and Ordinary Time. There is also a section called “Medley,” which is a homiletical potpourri of wedding and baccalaureate homilies as well as sermons dedicated to Saint Teresa of Avila and commemorating the Armenian Genocide and the Jewish Holocaust.

B. has a marvelous way of blending colloquial expression with profundity of thought. E.g., in “Well Done, Faithful Servant!” on the parable of the talents, he has been talking about the importance of risk and says: “Very simply, did you always kick on fourth-and-one?” B.’s use of literary allusions bespeaks his extensive knowledge of novels, plays, and short stories. These are used judiciously so as not to overwhelm but enhance the sermons. All in all, Grace on Crutches measures up to B.’s high standards and will, no doubt, prove to be an excellent resource for clergy and laity alike.

WILLIAM J. CARL III  
First Presbyterian Church, Dallas


In 1980, when S. was about to embark on a study of conversion, he went to California for a three-week field trip to collect illustrative data from Hare Krishna devotees. This experience shifted his focus to an in-depth study of the Hare Krishna movement and to a serious concern for the harm done by dangerously uncritical stereotypes of the “cults.”

Indeed, this concern shapes the structure of the entire book. After an introduction on “The Great American Cult Scare,” the book is organized as a response to the main assertions of the anticult movement: that “A greedy or power-hungry guru (chapter 2) or his successors (chapter 3) seduces new converts into a completely submissive (chapter 4) faith (chapter 5) and life (chapter 6) by brainwashing them (chapter 7). The only avenue out of the cults for a member, therefore, is to be deprogrammed so that the spell can be broken (chapter 8)” (24).
Most of the chapters begin with lengthy personal interviews with Hare Krishna devotees, and S. constantly draws on his immediate experience with them. He also shows a wide acquaintance with the literature on deprogramming, pro and con, and on the psychology of conversion. He emphasizes that not all cults are the same, and that not all are dangerous or destructive. He concludes that neither the Krishnas, which are an authentic and traditional Indian religion, nor the Moonies pose the danger to society that the reading public has been led to believe.

One final conclusion of the book is that, in the end, the anticultists, often inspired by a Freudian view of religion as infantile regression, show a real fear of any full commitment to a religious life. The book is a well-informed, nuanced, and readable account of the Hare Krishna movement and its anticult critics.

Daniel J. O'Hanlon, S.J.
Jesuit School of Theology
Berkeley
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Presenting This Issue

Volume 49 focuses its first issue on orthopraxis, Jesus’ resurrection, political theology, and the annual survey of moral/ethical concerns.

On Doing the Truth: Orthopraxis and the Theologian, adopting a stance contrary to the claims of some liberation theologians that orthopraxis always requires a taking of sides and active involvement in current struggles, argues that the “doing of truth,” as an exercise in Christian liberty and a participation in ecclesial division of labor, leaves the theologian room for a certain amount of neutrality and academic aloofness. BERNARD J. VERKAMP, Ph.D in historical theology from St. Louis University, is professor of philosophy at Vincennes University in Indiana. His areas of special concern are the Protestant Reformation, the philosophy of religion, and ethics. Perhaps his most significant single production has been *The Indifferent Mean*, a study of adiaphorism in the early English Reformation (1977).

The Origin of Faith in the Resurrection of Jesus: Two Recent Perspectives presents in detail recent writings in this area by exegete Rudolf Pesch and fundamental theologian Hansjürgen Verweyen, summarizes the critical reception given their work, and concludes with an assessment of their contribution to the contemporary discussion of the resurrection. JOHN P. GALVIN, with a doctorate in theology from the University of Innsbruck, is associate professor of systematic theology at the Catholic University of America. Of particular doctrinal interest to him are Christology, ecclesiology, and the theology of Karl Rahner. His most recent article in *TS* (Dec. 1986) dealt with papal primacy in contemporary Roman Catholic theology; he has just published his translation of Gerd Theissen’s *Psychological Aspects of Pauline Theology* (Fortress, 1987).

The Political Theology of John Donne examines how that remarkable preacher, admired poet, and little-appreciated theologian (1572–1631) used political and social models to fashion a Trinitarian theology in which the three “persons” are pictured as relating harmoniously to one another as do the groups and corporations in a pluralist state. DAVID NICHOLLS, Ph.D. from Cambridge University, vicar of Littlemore in Oxford, focuses much of his research and publication on the relation between theology and politics, and on issues of race and color in the Caribbean, especially Haiti. He expects to publish, in 1988 and 1990, two volumes on *Deity and Domination*, the first treating images of God and the state in the 19th and 20th centuries, the second dealing with divine analogy and political rhetoric in the 17th and 18th centuries.
Notes on Moral Theology: 1987 divides its material among four authors. DAVID HOLLENBACH, S.J., Ph.D. in religious ethics from Yale and associate professor of moral theology at Weston College, Cambridge, Mass., confronts the intersection of religion, morality, and politics, concentrating on the "new Christian right" and what has been called "the Catholic moment," with special stress in the latter area on recent publications by William Lee Miller of the University of Virginia and Lutheran pastor Richard John Neuhaus. WILLIAM C. SPOHN, S.J., Ph.D. from the Divinity School of the University of Chicago and associate professor of theological ethics in the Jesuit School of Theology at Berkeley, reflecting on the moral dimensions of AIDS, focuses on the crises that have arisen in health-care systems, in politics and the legal system, and for the churches. EDWARD V. VACEK, S.J., Ph.D. from Northwestern University and associate professor of moral theology at Weston, analyzes in depth the 1987 Instruction of the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith on reproductive technologies. His four sections parallel the four parts of Cardinal Joseph Bernardin’s commentary to scientists at the University of Chicago: (1) overall context, (2) dignity of the embryo, (3) heterologous reproduction, and (4) homologous fertilization. JOHN Langan, S.J., Ph.D. from Michigan, Rose F. Kennedy Professor of Christian Ethics at Georgetown University's Kennedy Institute of Ethics, senior fellow at the Woodstock Theological Center, and member of the philosophy department at Georgetown, takes up recent literature on the perennial question of the distinctiveness of Christian ethics. It is a question intimately related to the public relevance of Catholic social teaching, to the relationship of the Church to the world, and to theological disputes about nature and grace, faith and reason, Christ and culture.

Full reviews of 31 books and shorter notices of 29 more continue our effort to acquaint our readers with some of the significant publications of the past two years—biblical, historical, systematic, ethical/moral, pastoral, and spiritual. For such a distinctive service we have been blessed, close to half a century, with a corps of reviewers difficult to surpass in competence and generosity.

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Walter J. Burghardt, S.J.
Editor
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<td>Pollard, J. F.</td>
<td>The Vatican and Italian Fascism, 1929–32.</td>
<td>N.Y.: Cambridge Univ., 1985.</td>
<td>xiii + 241</td>
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