BOOK REVIEWS


The list of authoritative Scriptures became a problem for Jews in the Samaritan rejection of non-Mosaic books in the second century B.C. (if not earlier in the claim of pseudonymous writings to be inspired), and for Christians in the second century A.D. in the Gnostic rejection of the whole OT. Patristic tradition shows both a broad list of inspired books, comprising all Jewish works read in the Church for edification, and a restricted one, comprising only the Hebrew Bible (used by Origen and Jerome among others). The restricted list persisted through the Middle Ages to its adoption by the Protestant Reformers, a factor in Trent’s canonizing of the broad list. In the 19th century the view of F. C. Movers became popular, that the early Church had taken over a Hellenistic Jewish canon more inclusive than the Hebrew Bible and still open (on the basis of LXX inclusion of the apocrypha, and of rabbinic disputes about the canonicity of certain books). H. H. Graetz in 1871 suggested that the Council of Jamnia finally closed the canon ca. 90 A.D. Many of the above views can be found in the somewhat dated but still standard work in English, H. H. Ryle’s THE CANON OF THE OT (2nd ed., 1909). For Ryle, the OT was recognized as authoritative in three stages, corresponding to the three divisions of the Hebrew Bible: the Pentateuch in the fifth century B.C.; the prophets in the third century, too soon for late historical and oracular works like Chronicles and Daniel to be included; and the Hagiographa in the late first century B.C.

Roger Beckwith, warden of Latimer House and lecturer in liturgy at Wycliffe Hall, Oxford, dismantles the above reconstruction with his encyclopedic volume, 20 years in the making, laying in its stead a persuasive synthesis based on ancient evidence freshly considered and on recent research. The book sketches the question, reviews the sources in detail (including rabbinical sources), the emergence of the concept of canon and its various titles, its threefold structure of law, prophets, and writings, the order and number of the books, and the nature of the dispute about what was included and excluded. There are five appendices, indices, but no bibliography.

B. demonstrates that the Sadducees, Pharisees, Essenes, and Hellenistic Jews all held the same canon, which was the same as the present Hebrew Bible, and that the canon was closed at least by the middle of the second century B.C., possibly by Judas Maccabeus’ reassembling the war-scattered Scriptures in 164 B.C. In proving his thesis, B. examines
in painstaking detail the relevant texts, and draws especially on two groundbreaking studies, A. C. Sundberg's *The Old Testament and the Christian Church* (1964; against the supposed Hellenistic canon), and S. Z. Leiman's *The Canonization of Hebrew Scriptures: The Talmudic and Midrashic Evidence* (1976; against any significant role for the “council of Jamnia”).

B. concedes that various groups within Judaism favored certain books, which they transmitted and used in their self-understanding. Each of the traditional parties in Palestine in NT times, the Pharisees, Sadducees, and Essenes, had its own tradition of exegesis but a common canon. The Sadducees accepted the whole canon; Jesus’ arguments with them on resurrection centered on a Pentateuchal text, not because they accepted only the Pentateuch as inspired but because rabbis customarily used the Pentateuch for such discussion.

Beckwith is now the definitive textbook on the subject.

*Weston School of Theology, Mass.*  Richard J. Clifford, S.J.


This book is the first of a trilogy being written by Prof. G. Luedemann, of the University of Göttingen in West Germany, on Paul and his theology. The first volume is a translation of his Habilitationsschrift, *Paulus, der Heidenapostel 1: Studien zur Chronologie* (FRLANT 123; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1980). The translation has been “supervised and authorized by the author” (iv) and can be “regarded as a second edition” of this chronological study, as the postscript makes clear (289). The postscript not only explains some of the changes but also reacts to more than a dozen reviews of the original German.

Before publishing this book, L. had taught in the United States and Canada and was influenced by the writings of Profs. John Knox, who contributes a foreword to this publication, and D. W. Riddle, Knox’s teacher. Both Knox and Riddle are known for their attempts to work out a Pauline chronology on the basis of Paul’s letters alone, without depending on or harmonizing it with the Lucan story of Paul’s activity in Acts. The studies of Knox and Riddle in this area have been little known outside of North America and little used even here. L.’s book is now a full-scale treatment of Pauline chronology worked out on the principles of Knox and Riddle and fitted out with pertinent secondary literature, largely German.

The book has eight chapters. The first is devoted to a critical survey of the conventional reconstruction of Pauline chronology based on Paul’s
letters and Acts. Chapter 2 reconstructs a different chronology based solely on the seven undisputed letters of Paul. Chapter 3 integrates some Lucan traditions of Acts (mainly from chap. 18) into the framework reconstructed in chap. 2. The fourth chapter is a summary of chaps. 1–3. Chapter 5 contrasts the eschatological statements in 1 Thess 4:13–18 (about first-generation Christians expecting an imminent Parousia) with 1 Cor 15:51–52 (the resurrection and transformation of the more numerous Christians who have died) and uses the contrast to confirm Paul's early Macedonian mission (i.e., a missionary activity in Greece prior to the Jerusalem Conference). Chapter 6 supplies a chronological chart of the new reconstruction, and chap. 7 is bibliographical. The last is the postscript.

A brief summary of L.'s chronology follows. (Actually, he uses two dates for each item, depending on whether the starting point, the death of Jesus, is dated A.D. 27 or A.D. 30. To save space here, I shall use only the latter [the alternate would be three years less in each case], but my choice will also make clear a problem that L. passes over.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>Jesus' death</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33</td>
<td>Paul's conversion (Damascus); Arabian sojourn; return to Damascus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36</td>
<td>First Jerusalem visit (Gal 1:18)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37</td>
<td>In Syria and Cilicia (with Barnabas)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39</td>
<td>Independent mission in Greece</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41</td>
<td>Claudius' edict about Jews in Rome; Paul in Corinth; writes 1 Thess</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Galatian churches founded; Antioch incident (Gal 2:11–14), the occasion for next item</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50</td>
<td>Second Jerusalem visit (the Conference, Gal 2:1–10); journey to organize collection for the poor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>summer 51</td>
<td>Paul in Galatia; collection attempted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>fall 51 to spring 53</td>
<td>Paul in Ephesus; Timothy sent to Macedonia and Achaia to organize collection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51–52</td>
<td>Timothy in Macedonia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>spring 52</td>
<td>Corinthian query about collection (1 Cor 16:1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Easter 52</td>
<td>1 Cor written from Ephesus (16:1, 8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>summer 52</td>
<td>Intermediate visit to Corinth; return to Ephesus; writing of &quot;letter in tears&quot; (2 Cor 2:4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>52–53</td>
<td>Deadly danger in Ephesus (1 Cor 15:32)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>spring 53</td>
<td>Paul goes with Timothy to Troas, then to Macedonia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>summer 53</td>
<td>Paul meets Titus in Macedonia; writes 2 Cor 1–9; then 2 Cor 10–13 and Gal; sends Titus ahead to Corinth to see to the collection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>winter 53–54</td>
<td>Paul in Macedonia (collection taken up)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51–52</td>
<td>Gallio proconsul in Achaia</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
L.‘s work in reconstructing this new Pauline chronology contains many good things that all future students will use with profit. But the reconstruction itself is highly questionable. No one will contest the principle that one should work first with the undisputed Pauline letters (1 Thess, Gal, Phil, 1–2 Cor, Rom, Phlm) to fashion such a chronology or deny that there are genuine historical traditions in Acts about Paul’s movement. In this regard L.‘s treatment is basically sound. But what he has done to the Pauline corpus itself is simply unacceptable. It is impossible to enter here into an extended debate about many of the arguments that L. has proposed; a few details will have to suffice.

1) L. recognizes the “arbitrary nature” of his dating of Paul’s conversion “three years” from the death of Jesus (171); we shall tolerate that for the moment. But he takes as his starting point the death as happening in either A.D. 27, 30, or 33 (ibid.) because of the coincidence of 14–15 Nisan with a Friday. Yet he says not a word about the difference between the Synoptic and Johannine dating of Jesus’ death. In his chart he works with both 27 and 30, dating Paul’s conversion etc. to 30 (33). Yet the only starting point that works in the long run is A.D. 27, because L. dates the Gallio inscription to A.D. 51–52. In using his second choice (A.D. 30) above, I have highlighted how his reconstruction fails at a crucial point. His whole discussion of Gallio needs serious revision, which we cannot discuss here.

2) Unacceptable is L.‘s alleged “demonstration” (165) that the two traditions recorded in Suetonius’ Vita Claudii 25 about the expulsion of the Jews from Rome and in Dio Cassius 60.6,6 “derive from the same incident.” Even though Orosius’ dating of the expulsion to Claudius’ ninth year (i.e., A.D. 49) has some problems, it is still a better dating for that expulsion, and this edict cannot be equated with the edict of A.D. 41, because Dio Cassius says explicitly that Claudius “did not drive them [the Jews] out.” It is simply gratuitous to identify the two Claudian edicts and to argue that Dio Cassius was correcting Suetonius.

3) L. inverts the order of the Jerusalem Conference (Gal 2:1–10) and the Antioch incident (Gal 2:11–14). I agree with him when he follows H.-D. Betz’s analysis of Galatians as an “apologetic letter,” written according to the ancient rhetorical rules for apologies. But to base on such a rhetorical analysis the claim that Paul followed the ordo artificiorum instead of the ordo naturalis, i.e., that he preferred to invert the order of these occurrences for an artificial, rhetorical purpose rather than follow their natural, chronological order, is just too much. Indeed, it is again a
gratuitous argument, and none of L.'s analysis of the rhetoric sustains his contention. The Antioch incident, when Paul rebuked Peter publicly over a dietary matter, could conceivably serve as a background for the Jerusalem Conference. But L. fails to note that in Gal 2:1-10, the account of the Conference itself, Paul never once hints that a dietary problem was the issue—nor does he mention the "law," which is only introduced after the account of the Antioch incident. The issue under debate at the Jerusalem Conference itself was circumcision of the Gentile converts. L.'s discussion of the Conference is vitiated by constant reference to the so-called Apostolic Decree, a matter that Paul never mentions in Galatians and that L. has imported from Acts (15:23-29).

4) As reviewers of the German original have pointed out, Paul had been "preaching" in Syria and Cilicia prior to the second visit to Jerusalem for the Conference (1:21-23), but there is no mention there of any activity in Greece. Why is L. so sure that Titus must have come from such an area of Pauline activity simply because he was a Greek-speaking Gentile Christian who was not forced to be circumcised at the Conference (Gal 2:3)? The region of Syria and Cilicia was sufficiently Hellenized at the time that Titus, as a Greek-speaking Gentile, could well have come from that area. The fact that he is never mentioned in Acts says nothing about his provenience. He may well have come from Hellenized Syria or Cilicia, and his presence at the Jerusalem Conference along with Barnabas is no argument for a preconference mission in Greece.

5) The question of a preconference mission of Paul in Greece is likewise quite debatable. In Phil 4:15 Paul admits that the Philippians knew that "in the beginning of the evangelization, when I left Macedonia, no church entered into partnership with me in giving and receiving, except you alone." That could mean "no church in Macedonia," but it might also mean "no church" in any of the other places where Paul had been "preaching" (Gal 1:23), i.e., in "Syria and Cilicia," or elsewhere in Asia Minor. That Paul was engaged in a preconference apostolate in Syria and Cilicia (and thus in a part of Asia Minor) has to be admitted; that one may extend that to Greece (Macedonia or Achaia) is simply gratuitous, and L.'s arguments for such an inversion of the Pauline order of events are not convincing.

6) L. rejects the criticism of some reviewers that he depicts Luke as "having written a kind of novel about Paul" (290) and insists rather that he does admit "the historical value of the material in Acts" (ibid.). But what L. really means is that he admits the historical value of some of the material in Acts. He would not accept that characterization of Acts 13-14, the Lucan story of the evangelization of Asia Minor prior to the Jerusalem Conference. Nor does he accept the data of Acts 15 as reflecting
the historical Conference. Moreover, he regards the mention of Pauline visits to Jerusalem in Acts 11:30, 15:3–4, and 18:22 as multiple references to the same visit (what he calls Paul's second visit—for the Conference). That Luke's account of Paul's visits to Jerusalem is conflated is widely admitted today, but more historical value has to be accorded to some of them than L. is willing to accept.

I must bring such criticism to an end here. The basic problem in this difficult book is its wordiness, repetition, and contorted arguments. One reads for pages about details spelled out in extenso that have little relevance to the main argument that L. is making (e.g., the lengthy rhetorical analysis of Galatians or the tortuous exegesis of 1 Thess 4:13–18). Besides all this, there is the tone of the discussion. L. complains about the tone of some of the criticism leveled against him by reviewers (291–92), but he is cocksure of himself: he has refuted this and demonstrated that; “we are able to conclude with a degree of probability approaching certainty . . .” (87). What L. has given us is an interesting hypothesis that needs more study. Lastly, the book has been badly translated; the English solecisms are inexcusable. Though the author “supervised” the translation, he was not in a position to sort out the slang and jargon from proper English.

Catholic University of America

JOSEPH A. FITZMYER, S.J.


In 1776 J. S. Semler suggested for the first time that 2 Corinthians was composed of distinct fragments. Since then there have been several dozen different suggestions about the chapters that composed these fragments, the order in which they had been sent by Paul, and the interposed visits by Paul and Titus to Corinth. This book, however, may be another first as a full-scale commentary on two of the proposed fragments. In Betz's theory (if I understand correctly—it should be set out in a schema that is clearer), Paul's plan for a visit to Corinth to amass the collection, as spelled out in 1 Cor 16, was frustrated by a major crisis at Corinth which challenged his apostolic authority. Paul's response, the First Apology, is found in part in 2 Cor 2:14—6:13; 7:2–4. This letter was not successful, and so there was a Second Apology consisting of 2 Cor 10:1—13:10, which was effective. Titus brought news of this success to Paul, who then wrote a Letter of Reconciliation, consisting of 2 Cor 1:1—2:13; 7:15–16; 13:11–13. He then resumed his plans for the collection. 2 Cor 8 is a letter written by Paul to Corinth (the beginning and the end have been removed) that formally constitutes a mixed letter-type, with vv. 1–15 serving an advisory function by
presenting arguments for the resumption of the collection, and vv. 16–23 serving an administrative function by authorizing a delegation. 2 Cor 9 is a letter written by Paul to Achaia (with which he had less-strained relations than with Corinth) and is entirely advisory about the collection.

This commentary volume illustrates Betz’s great strengths. The 33-page history of theories partitioning 2 Corinthians, running from Semler to the present day, is meticulous. Although Betz admits that the diversity of theories is frustrating, he obviously feels that some recent commentators are taking a wrong path by commenting on the letter as a unit. His greatest concern, here as in the past, has been detecting exact literary genres through his splendid knowledge of Greco-Roman rhetoric. This volume is replete with parallels to show that chaps. 8 and 9 would have made quite intelligible letter units. Betz is also extremely interested in structure, and his outlines of the two letters are minute. He has clearly contributed to the understanding of individual passages by his attention to how they fit into the chapter (or letter unit). In my judgment, Betz devotes less attention to theology, and often one finds as much or more pertinent theological comment in Furnish or Barrett (where 8 and 9 are treated in a commentary on the whole letter). I found this true in relation to 2 Cor 8:9.

Moreover, I was left with two question. First, why is it so important to posit that these are separate letters? If Paul tacked on to his Letter of Reconciliation some words to Corinth and Achaia about the collection which he was resuming, would the content or form of chaps. 8 and 9 really be much different from what Betz posits them to be as separate letters? Second, while it is perfectly appropriate to devote a monograph to two chapters of a letter, is it appropriate for a commentary series such as Hermeneia to deal with 2 Corinthians in this way? Presumably one or two more volumes will be needed for 2 Corinthians, and how will they relate to this volume? How will the whole treatment be used by students and preachers? While I find B. Childs exaggerated, a commentary volume like this makes patent the need for a dimension of canonical criticism, so that somehow our scholarship is more usable to the ongoing community which is the heir to the first recipients.

Union Theological Seminary, N.Y.C. RAYMOND E. BROWN, S.S.


In 1979 French moral theologian Pohier was deprived of his right to preside publicly at the Eucharist, to preach, and to teach theology. This was the response of the Congregation of the Doctrine of the Faith to his 1977 book Quand je dis Dieu, which the Congregation claimed contained a broad range of deviations from Church teaching. Many suspected that
his public advocacy of changes in France’s abortion laws played a significant role in the condemnation.

The present book first appeared in France in 1985. It represents essentially P.’s intellectual journey since the 1979 condemnation, and in that capacity is a moving and often powerful narrative. There is considerable pain evident in the text, but little bitterness and no recrimination. The threefold deprivation robbed P. of his ability to function as a Dominican, a priest, and a theologian. Eventually it led him to leaving the order.

However, the book is more than a personal narrative. It is in many ways a deconstruction (P. prefers the term “decomposition”) of traditional understandings of Christ, death, sexuality, guilt, and God. Deconstruction is a process whereby a gap is opened up between signifier (dogmatic teaching or symbol) and signified (that which the teaching or symbol is intended to represent), thereby showing what forces and ideologies skew the relationship. P. appeals especially to contemporary experience and to psychoanalysis in his decomposition procedures. The results are insights into Christology, death, and sexuality more attuned to contemporary Western experience. At the same time, it is easy to see how such explorations can easily be misconstrued by more essentialist theologians. P. admits to their exploratory character—he is never dogmatic, always willing to change his mind.

In the sections on guilt and on God, P.’s achievement is less convincing. What he is running up against is the problem of the absolute in religion. He decomposes absolute formulations—his central insight into God is “God is God, so God is not Everything”—but does not really escape the symmetry-driven thinking which led to the extrapolation of the transcendence of God into the absolute in the first place. Here somehow the subtlety of the previous sections breaks down; perhaps, just as language tends to inflate as it approaches its limit, so too deconstruction tends to become a mirror image of that which it tries to deconstruct.

The section on God fails ultimately, but we have much to learn from the failure. This book is an extraordinarily creative attempt to deal with some of the most thorny issues contemporary theology faces, and there is much which the professional theologian can profit from in reading it. Its conclusions are potentially disconcerting but are meant to be heuristic in nature; they can lead us to a new and more adequate composition.

Despite his departure from the Dominicans, P. assures his readers that he wants to keep working on the “God business.” I certainly hope that will be the case.

_Catholic Theological Union_  
Chicago

ROBERT J. SCHREITER, C.PP.S.

Jennings, theologian in the Seminario Metodista de México, draws another blueprint for rebuilding religious language after the "collapse" of modern philosophical theism. The weakening began when Aquinas separated de deo trino from de deo uno. This made possible the later displacement of the Trinity as the keystone of Christian doctrine by monotheism (which equated God and Creator, and left God as Redeemer and Sanctifier in limbo). As modern masters of suspicion unmasked the flaws in the new keystone, and theologians could not solve the problem of evil or prove the existence of God, the theological arch fell. Subsequent "reverse apologetic" strategies of making people aware of "the religious situation itself" or converting them to metaphysical positions as preludes to full faith obliterated the need for the next step of "interpreting and applying the distinctive perspectives and faith of Christianity" (32). Such strategies failed to bridge the chasm between contemporary secular experience and the claims of Christian faith.

Hence J. proposes a different approach, using a Heideggerian philosophy of language (which sharply dichotomizes the explosive Word from structuring and smothering Language), structural linguistics, and a sprinkling of Wittgensteinian and Austinian terms. He develops an account akin to Ebeling's word-event theory. He finds two secular uses of God-language: expletive ("Oh, God!") and predicative ("It is a god when friends meet"). These can be evoked by some experiences in three domains (ontological, aesthetic, historical). The experiences are "radical affections" (126) of peace, despair; awe, wonder, joy, terror; dread, hope, abandonment, love. He then constructs a grammar for Christian uses of "God," showing how different talking to, talking of, and talking about God are. The language-games of prayer, proclamation, and explication must be distinguished to avoid confusion and misunderstandings introduced by presuming that "God" follows the same rules in each realm. A concluding chapter describes unfinished work needed to relate various secular, religious, theological, and philosophical uses of "god."

While I accept this historical diagnosis, sympathize with J.'s refusals to consider God in isolation from other doctrines and to isolate Christian believers from friends and fellow travelers, and support attempts to find practical links between Christian faith and secular life rather than to use foundationalist strategies to "defend" Christian faith, I find this project seriously flawed. The radical separation of Word from Language, the neglect of recent relevant work in American analytical and linguistic philosophy, and the failure to discover any connections between what is said in one context (e.g., liturgical) with any other (e.g., dogmatic) lead
him into many problems. He tends to treat "god" as a regulative/grammatical/formal term without content, a strategy which denies any material truth to Christian claims about God. For instance, he denies that ascribing omnipotence (or any other attribute) to God in prayer implies anything about describing God as omnipotent in dogmatic theology (206). So do Christians believe God to be omnipotent or not? J. seemingly can't say.

_Beyond Theism_ attempts its own "reverse apologetics" of getting theologians to accept a controversial theory of language as a new structure for Christian god-talk. It would be far better to begin with Christian uses of god-language, to relate (and, as necessary, reform) them, and to display their appropriateness in Christian communicative and strategic praxis. Christian theology needs no more foundation in _Wortmystik_ theories than does Christian faith in metaphysical systems.

*St. Michael's College, Vermont*  
TERRENCE W. TILLEY


In March 1983, at the University of Notre Dame, a group of philosophers, theologians, biblical scholars, and one geneticist, Francisco Ayala, convened at a conference on the controversial topic of evolution and creation. This anthology is the result. The contributors take it for granted that there is no contradiction between current theories of evolution and a properly understood doctrine of creation. Accordingly, there is no sustained attempt to argue this point. Instead, we are presented with eleven very diverse presentations in philosophy, theology, science, and biblical interpretation that have moved far beyond the tiring creationist-vs.-evolutionist polemics usually suggested by the book's title. This handsome collection can be considered an important contribution to theological and cosmological discussion. Even though it fails to represent the important contributions of process thought, most of the essays are of considerable value for contemporary discussions of science and religion.

The contributions of Dianne Bergant, Carroll Stuhlmueller, David Kelsey, and Nicholas Lash all make significant biblical and theological clarifications concerning the meaning of creation. These papers summarize the best recent thinking on creation and in some cases make novel contributions as well.

Ernan McMullin provides a solid introductory chapter on the history of the controversy of creation and evolution, Philip Sloan gives a useful historical summary of the meaning of "natural purpose" in the context
of evolutionary theory, and Christopher Mooney sketches a brief sum-
mary and defense of Teilhard’s thought.

The other papers are not all of equal significance. Two of the philo-
sophical papers attempt to engage issues in theology and science without
sufficient awareness of contemporary nuanced theological discussions of
the meaning of God’s activity in the world. To the theologian they may
therefore appear somewhat quaint, misdirected, and needlessly contorted.
John Leslie’s difficult discussion of the design argument in terms of what
others have called the “anthropic principle” challenges the idea of a
personal God and substitutes for it the idea of God as “a creative ethical
requirement.” This is an idea that Leslie has developed elsewhere, but in
his paper here it receives only several puzzling pages. William Alston’s
essay illustrates what pseudo problems exist for the philosophical mind
that has not dipped very deeply into biblical studies or has tasted only
lightly of recent theology. His essay is an attempt to defend the idea that
God can produce in the world “particular effects” of the sort that
Bultmann found theologically offensive. Apparently Alston is attempting
to defend the freedom and transcendence of God, and he sees theologians
like Tillich, Macquarrie, Kaufmann, and process thinkers as enemies of
this enterprise. He seriously caricatures his opponents, fails to see clearly
the distinctions they make between nature and history, and at one point
completely misinterprets Tillich’s notion of “ecstatic” experience.

James Ross’s paper is of more interest and value. In discussing the
“emergent” character of the universe, he posits the presence of a “new”
kind of energy undetectable by cosmic physics. This energy he correlates
with “meaning” and, using an analogy previously employed by Michael
Polanyi, states that such “meaning” is no more apparent to the physicist
than the meaning of this page is apparent to the physics and chemistry
of ink and paper. Yet, Ross argues, one must acknowledge that meaning
is a real energy distinct from the purely physical. It is questionable,
though, whether “energy” is the most appropriate term for what might
better be called “nonenergetic” formative causation.

William Austin provides a fine, fair, and informed critique of E. O.
Wilson’s sociobiology. For those seeking a clear summary and erudite
evaluation of sociobiology, his essay can be profitably read.

McMullin’s historical discussion of some of the issues surrounding the
notions of creation and evolution concludes that the “relaxed” approach
of Augustine, which understands time as God’s creature, teaches us that
“God can work as easily through evolution as through a sequence of
interventions to bring about his ends . . .” (38). McMullin classifies
Teilhard’s thought as “evolutionary philosophy” and seems to question
the theological integrity of all “evolutionary philosophy,” including the-
ological construals of it such as "process theology": "The God of evolutionary philosophy is, almost necessarily, an immanent one and thus not at all the transcendent Creator of traditional Christian belief" (43). Precisely in what way does process theism jeopardize divine transcendence?

Though a couple of the philosophical contributions to this volume are not noteworthy, the scientific, historical, biblical, and theological papers make it very worthwhile.

Georgetown University

JOHN F. HAUGHT


This comprehensive introduction to Roman Catholic doctrine and discipline is addressed to all in whom the modern loss of the ability to ask ultimate questions about human destiny is not complete. It is addressed as well to pastors and preachers, for whose convenience there are not only biblical and thematic indices but one keyed to the lectionary readings for the Sundays and feasts of the liturgical year.

Pagé's description of his book as a "series of theological meditations" does not do justice to its systematic character. Following a standard but nicely-executed location of those places in man where ultimate questions, the questions that end in God, arise (chap. 1), the biblical doctrine of God, culminating in an exposition of the doctrine of the Trinity, is presented (chap. 2). Pagé avoids, however, any reduction of theology to anthropology; God as revealed does not so much simply satisfy a natural desire for the infinite as evoke and deepen that desire (44), and revelation (as even the natural knowledge of God) is received not so much by reason as by a love that is the true organ of self-transcendence (12, 24, 43-47). The God of Christianity is thus beyond the gods of both myth and philosophy, and this argues His reality (77).

The "face" of God, the Christ, is examined in an "ascending" Christology (chap. 3). Christ is the definitive revelation of the love of God in that he shows God's love, not simply for what is other than but for what is contrary to God, namely, the sinner (von Balthasar).

The most interesting and powerful part of the book is to be found from chaps. 4 to 7 and in their organization, which is loosely sacramental and explicitly sexual. Chapter 4 treats of man the image of God, created and supernaturalized. But Pagé locates the image of God especially in the bipolar sexuality of human personality, and careful analogies are thoughtfully worked out between man and woman and the Word and the Spirit, as well as between the child of man and wife and the Holy Spirit who
proceeds from Father and Son. Hence, while the supernaturalization of the image of God is begun in baptism and confirmation, it finds a special fulfilment in Christian marriage, the presuppositions, conditions, and ethics of which Pagé treats with the help of Pope John Paul II's conferences on sexuality and marriage.

The union of man and woman announces and prepares the union of man and God; congruently, the Church is presented as the bride of Christ in chap. 6. Chapter 7 is devoted to the Eucharist, the nuptial banquet of Christ and his spouse. These two chapters are joined by a chapter on Christian priesthood, baptismal and ordained, concerning which Pagé persuasively presents the dogmatic inheritance of Roman Catholicism. The book concludes with a treatment of eschatology (chap. 8) and an essay on Christian morality (chap. 9).

While those outside of Quebec could desire more abundant engagement with Protestant thought, the author does take up the conversation with Marx and Freud. Apologetic in an honorable sense, this is a calm but energetic introduction to Roman Christianity. It does not shirk the sometimes difficult problems which Roman dogmatics seems to pose to contemporary faith (e.g., the Virgin Birth, hell), but seeks always a way to make us understand. The large and properly theological space given to sexuality and marriage is especially welcome in a one-volume, comprehensive, and informed introduction to Christianity.

St. Meinrad Seminary, Ind.       GUY MANSINI, O.S.B.


With the publication of the Martin C. D'Arcy Lectures, held in Oxford in 1983, Dulles has produced yet another fine ecclesiological monograph. In a sure-footed Introduction, he defines his theme, takes issue with Tillich's "Catholic substance and Protestant principle," and suggests a corresponding "Catholic principle." The discovery and development of this principle, comprising acceptance, mediation, and conformity (163), is the book's unifying agenda. Four chapters explore the "dimensions" of integral Catholicity: its height (God's fulness in Christ), depth (nature's aspirations), breadth (mission and communion), and length (tradition and development). Two further chapters discuss Catholicity's "structures"—sacramental, hierarchical, and primatial; a special chapter treats the relationship between Catholicism and Protestantism. A Conclusion sums up the discussion. Two appendices provide an anthology of representative texts on the Church as Catholic and a sensible listing of the meanings of "catholic."

The Catholicity of the Church is made attractive by the intellectual
virtues we have come to associate with its author. His method is, again, inductive and dialogical. D. is never too eager to pronounce; he typically treats an issue not by being didactic but by appreciatively listening to the conversation. His own considered opinions are conveyed by indirection, or stated tersely at best; it takes an attentive reader to catch and savor them. The same was the case with *Models of Revelation*, with which *Catholicity* has features in common; witness the statement: “Catholic unity... must be verifiable on the level of utterance and deed, and must be embodied in symbols accessible to all” (176). Yet for all his indirection, D. has a firm *Leitmotiv*: the form of Catholicity is “reconciled diversity” (24), “not homogeneous but heterogeneous unity” (101), “identity in diversity” (133).

D. becomes the very Catholic teacher he is by drawing his reader into a wide-open conversation. He treats, with a familiarity that makes learning look easy and with a considerateness that fosters rather than avoids critical assessment, the major documents of Vatican II, a variety of Protestant confessional writings, many key names and issues in the history of the ecumenical movement and modern theology, and many significant authors, including a number of traditionally suspect ones: von Harnack, Loisy, and especially Tyrrell. Thus he shows in practice, and with characteristic fearlessness, not only how Catholicity can inform theological hermeneutics but also how “the ecumenical movement might also have been called the Catholic movement” (171). In the process he succeeds in enriching the theological sensibility of Roman Catholicism by recognizing and welcoming catholicizing tendencies found elsewhere, especially in Anglicanism and Orthodox Protestantism. With a frankness only loyalty can beget, he worries about Roman Catholicism’s slowness to recognize that the Christian faith has a true history (99) and its tendency to get caught in “ecclesiastical totalitarianism” (159).

There is a reticence to D.’s style of theologizing. He operates best in the *quaestio disputata*; like Bonhoeffer, it appears, he prefers to move in the center, among the symbols, where the mediated encounter between God and humanity-cum-cosmos occurs. Though obviously familiar with the encompassing vistas of systematic synthesis, he tends to treat the heights of Trinitarian theology, Christology, and pneumatology, and the depths of humanity’s transcendental orientation to God’s mystery, as landmarks rather than as central themes. Curiously, he compares the two with the confluence of two streams (68), rather than relating them, with the tradition, as fulfilment and capacity.

There are weaknesses here and there. The very promising and truly spiritual discussion D. conducts in chapter 8 is limited to Catholicism and Protestantism; a stronger presence of Eastern Orthodoxy, with its
emphasis on pneumatology and worship, could have deepened and unified the results. Not surprisingly, D.'s rendition of Trinitarian theology (66) is too Western. There is some tendency to overlook historic complexities. Simply to attribute the formation of a truly international church to the dissolution of the barriers between Jews and Gentiles (70) overlooks the tragedy of the early disappearance of Jewish Christianity. I also wonder if the conclusion “Rome is the centre, the principle of unity; Catholic is the periphery, the principle of diversity” (146) does not strike too neat a balance. Other details could be mentioned.

Moderation dominates the book. One typical phrase runs: “Deviations in this direction have undoubtedly occurred, but the necessary correctives are at hand” (158). Would that the impatient prophets of the fast and easy (and allegedly authoritative) answer, on both the modernist and the reactionary front, would read, listen, and, especially, learn!

Finally, so handsome (and frankly, so expensive) a book should have contained fewer, and less disconcerting, errata. Not counting typos, I found the following serious errors not identified on the list of corrigenda already furnished by the publisher. On p. x, l. 10, “on the Church” should be “on Divine Revelation”; on p. 31, l. 4 from below, “aspiration” should be “spiration”; on p. 69, some words are obviously missing in l. 18; in two footnotes on pp. 18 and 93, if Dr. W. A. Visser ’t Hooft’s first name must be spelled out, it should be “Willem,” not “Walter”; on p. 90, n. 5, the final reference should be to Conclusion, note 18, not 8.

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FRANS JOZEF VAN BEECK, S.J.


The genial Professor Grant from the University of Chicago was the obvious choice for this first volume in a new series on early Christianity. He does not attempt to rival specialist studies on Greco-Roman religion, such as R. MacMullen’s Paganism in the Roman Empire, or on the ways in which Christianity gained ascendancy, such as MacMullen’s Christianizing the Roman Empire: A.D. 100–400; nor is this a book of detailed essays on particular topics, like Stephen Benko’s Pagan Rome and the Early Christians. Rather, he provides the nonspecialist reader with an account of early Christian beliefs in God as they existed in the midst of Greco-Roman beliefs, traditional, philosophical, and exotic. This book summarizes scholarship, based on personal knowledge of the ancient texts; it also contains many of the intriguing and informative asides for which G. is famous.

G. compares what Christians say about the religions they encounter with data about those religions, and he confronts Christian attacks on
idolatry with the broader controversy within the Roman world about the status of the gods and the meaning of acts of worship. He alerts the reader to the variety of opinions which the ancients held on these matters, and to the fact that popular religion often ignored intellectual trends; one of his sections is headed “What Did People Generally Think?” But more than half the book is devoted to theological doctrines about God in the first three centuries of Christianity and their context in Roman philosophy and religion. Christians had to try to explain themselves in terms already in use among their contemporaries. This affected the way they expressed their beliefs in divinity, in Christ, and in the Spirit of God, and throws light on the development of Trinitarian theology and credal orthodoxy.

This book will be a very helpful introduction, especially for students. Its value as a status quaeestionis for working theologians or classicists is more limited, however, as G. avoids complicating this book with references to scholarly controversy on a number of important points. He is suggestive rather than comprehensive, and aims to take the reader as quickly as possible to ancient sources. In the process a few puzzling things creep in. For example, G. says: “The first Christian theologians after Philo to echo and use Middle Platonic theology (after Philo) were the Gnostic teachers who, like the major Middle Platonists, flourished in and after the reign of Hadrian” (86), i.e., 117–138 C.E., yet he notes the strongly Middle Platonic character of the doctrine of God in the contemporar 

Preaching of Peter (52, 125, and see 150 for The Shepherd of Hermas, mandate 1), not usually considered to be Gnostic. “Both Antioch and Nicaea used creeds for the first time as doctrinal tests” (161) looks odd next to the less misleading “These creeds and their antecedents in ‘rules of faith’ were highly important from the time when churches began testing the beliefs of their members. We see the process in effect at Rome at least by the year 140 . . .” (167). Chapter 10, “Divergent Christologies at Antioch,” makes a little evidence work extremely hard to yield what I consider an inconclusive result; the space would have been better used for the examination of subordinationism and Sabellianism.

Certain passages have a slightly dated air: “Jesus did not clearly identify himself” (100); Phil. 2:5–11 “makes it plain that before Christ Jesus emptied himself he was not human but divine” (105). It would have been good to note in chapter 3 that the Greeks and Romans did not refer to their statues as idols, and to point out that Clement of Alexandria shows not only “traces of earlier Docetic ideas” (110) but also Theopas-chite themes. The statement that the Apostles’ Creed “contains no explicit reference to trinitarian belief and in fact does not support it” (168) appeals to Kelly’s Early Christian Creeds for corroboration, but I
have not found such a bald claim made in the current edition of Kelly. Part of the problem lies in G.'s decision to treat Trinitarian doctrine as a set structure of metaphysical relations, rather than as a way of coping with and expressing belief in God Father, Son, and Spirit; as a result he can say: "The first Christian author to deal with the specific problems of trinitarian doctrine was Athenagoras . . ." (157), a statement I could accept only if "deal with the specific problems" is taken in a limited and anachronistic sense.

Space does not allow me to give proportionate attention to the excellent things in this book. It is a good start to this new series, in which the boundaries between early Christian and classical studies are being undermined. Any libraries which serve a college-educated population will want Gods and the One God.

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MICHAEL SLUSSER


William of Auxerre (+1231) was the most important theologian of the early 13th century. His Summa (later qualified as aurea), composed between 1215-25, greatly influenced the next generation of theologians like Hugh of St. Cher, Alexander of Hales, St. Albert the Great, Odo Rigaldi, St. Bonaventure, and St. Thomas Aquinas.

The preliminary research towards the critical edition of this colossal work (six volumes totalling 2792 pages) was initiated by R.-M. Martineau over 50 years ago. After Martineau's death, J. Ribaillier pursued the project until his death in 1974. By that time he had established the critical text of all four books on the basis of a dozen (out of ca. 120) judiciously selected manuscripts. The critical apparatus to Books 2-4 was completed partly by Ribaillier's colleagues at the Centre de Recherches sur la Pensée Médiévale, partly by the members of St. Bonaventure College in Grottaferrata (Rome). It is due to the collaboration of J.-G. Bougerol, of the same College of St. Bonaventure, that the manuscript was made ready for the press and printed in a short time (1980-86).

In Book 3, as in the other three books, William of Auxerre follows the general outline of the Sentences of Peter Lombard (+1160), but while Book 3 of Peter Lombard is contained on 229 pages, Book 3 of the Summa aurea takes up 1067 pages, and out of these only about 100 pages
are dedicated to Christ and to the mystery of Incarnation; the rest is taken up by the virtues, divine worship, gifts of the Holy Spirit, natural law, vows, etc. William is considered the first medieval theologian to develop a systematic treatise on the virtues. Also, the five chapters on natural law (368–85) constitute a new (at the time) and important contribution.

In this volume, as in all the others, the most frequently quoted authority, after the Bible, is St. Augustine, followed by the Glossa interlinearis and ordinaria and Peter Lombard's Glossa in psalmos, Collectanea in epistolae Pauli, and Sententiarum libri 4. William shows also a more than rudimentary knowledge of the works of Aristotle. In fact, he was one of the three scholars who on April 23, 1331, were appointed by Pope Gregory IX to correct the works of Aristotle.

Book 4 parallels more closely the fourth book of Peter Lombard's Sentences. The sacraments of the Old and New Testaments are treated very extensively on the first 450 pages. The last 90 pages deal with resurrection, last judgement, damnation, and purgatory. The resurrection is considered as one of the effects of the sacraments.

Another volume, Introduction générale, entirely redacted by the late J. Ribailleur, will follow, on the formation of the text of Book 3. Scholars interested in the historical development of theology will be grateful to Ribailleur and his colleagues for the preparation and completion of this important edition.

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GEDEON GÁL, O.F.M.

LA TRINITÉ DIVINE CHEZ LES THÉOLOGIENS ARABES (750–1050).

Western historians of Christian theology have had a tendency to ignore the thought of the scholars of the churches in the Middle East, especially after the Islamic conquest. One suspects that after they have given an account of the doctrinal developments during the centuries of the first six ecumenical councils, the interest of most historians turns exclusively to Byzantium and to the West, largely because there they are studying the roots of their own theological traditions.

In the East the barrier of Islam came to divide the traditional "Oriental patriarchates" from Rome and Constantinople alike. And after the ninth century there was little if any thoughtful communication between the five traditional patriarchal sees. The military and missionary episodes of the Crusades did nothing to restore communications in the eleventh and twelfth centuries. So, nothing was heard in the West of the thought of
the churches in the homelands of Christianity until the political move­ments of the modern age brought the colonial powers of the West once again into the affairs of the peoples of the Middle East. Since then there has been a steady stream of scholarly studies devoted to the churches in the several language communities of the East: Armenian, Syriac, Coptic, and Ethiopic. But the Arabophone Christian communities remain almost unknown, especially in English-speaking academic circles. Arabists have for the most part been interested only in Islamic history and religious thought, and until relatively recently they have mostly ignored Christian texts in Arabic.

Haddad's book introduces the reader to the thought of the Arabic-speaking theologians of the first age of Christian theology in Arabic, from the inception of the Abbasid caliphate to the very eve of the Crusades. To put it more personally, John of Damascus, a well-known Arab theologian who died ca. 749 A.D., still wrote in Greek. But his disciple of the next generation, Theodore Abū Qurrah (ca. 750–825), wrote in Arabic, and from his day onward the Arabic-speaking Church flourished in the Islamic caliphate. It is fitting that Haddad brings his survey of the first age of Christian theology in Arabic to a close by the year 1050. By that time the major writers have all appeared; the Crusades, which began at the end of the century, had a fracturing impact on the indigenous churches in the territories of the caliphate, to the effect that their subsequent histories more and more isolated them from one another, in spite of the common employment of the Arabic language.

There are two major sections in H.'s book. The first of them comprises the material presented in chap. 1, where he passes in review the several Arabophone controversialists and theologians who wrote sometime during the span of years covered by the study. Major figures among them are Theodore Abū Qurrah (d. ca. 825 A.D.), Ḥabīb ibn Khidmah Abū Rāʾīṭah (fl. 828), Ṭāmūr al-Baṣrī, Ḥunayn ibn Ishaq (d. 877), Yaḥyā ibn ʿAdī (d. 951), Severus ibn al-Muqaffaʾ (d. ca. 1000), and ʿIsā ibn Zurʿa (d. 1008), and many others. These are the names of writers who composed original theological treatises in Arabic. Their works became classics in later generations of their respective confessional communities.

In addition to bibliographical references to published material, a particularly useful feature of H.'s review is the information which he provides about the works of these early writers that survive only in unpublished manuscripts. It is clear that he has carefully combed the several collections of Christian Arabic manuscripts in Europe as well as in the Near East, where the collections are practically inaccessible to most Western scholars. This service alone is a valuable one for the scholarly community.

The second section comprises the next three of the total of four
chapters. It is a systematic review of the discussions of the doctrine of the Trinity which one might find in the works of the apologists and theologians named in the first chapter. H. studies in turn their approaches to the doctrine of the Trinity, the philosophical concepts they employ in explaining it, and the theological insights which their arguments might afford the modern reader. H.'s own system of thought sets the structure of the discussion, and he moves back and forth across the three centuries he has chosen to cover, to cite first one and then another Arab theologian to illustrate the point he is developing. He means, of course, to report their opinions, even in their own words, with numerous quotations from often unpublished manuscript sources. But the fact remains that H.'s own systematic agenda obliterates any view of the general methods of reasoning adopted by any one of the early Arab authors whose works he cites.

One cannot emphasize too strongly the importance of the earliest Christian responses to the religious challenge of Islam—from within the very Christian communities, most of whose members eventually became Muslims. Although Western theologians often still ignore the fact, it remains true that Muslim thinkers have over the centuries provided the most radical critiques of Christian doctrines—from a religious, even a scriptural, perspective—of any of the rivals of the Church for the religious allegiance of people around the world. The doctrine of the Trinity is a primary case in point. Not only must Muslim objections to this doctrine be taken seriously in the modern intrareligious dialogues; the intellectual challenges of Islam must also be taken seriously for the sake of the Christians' own self-understanding of the doctrine. And this is precisely the enterprise in which the Arab theologians studied by H. took the first steps. Their testimony should be the starting point for any modern dialogue with Muslims. H.'s book begins to make this testimony more available to the Western scholarly community.

The weaknesses of Haddad's book are several. The first is that it is more than ten years out of date from the bibliographical point of view, since it is the publication of a virtually unrevised doctoral dissertation presented to the Sorbonne in 1974. It is a pity that the editors of Beauchesne Religions saw no need for revision. Secondly, the systematic account of the thought of the Arab theologians offered by H. is filtered through the author's own modern theological preoccupations. The early authors speak for themselves only in short quotations meant to support H.'s allegations about their ideas, without reference to the contexts in which the early writers structured their responses to the challenges of Islam. Finally, little attention is in fact given to the explications of the Islamic challenges, which shaped much of the thought of the early
Christian Arab theologians. Nevertheless, the fact remains that H.’s study is a welcome publication. In spite of its flaws, it puts the thought of the first generation of Arab Christian theologians within the reach of modern Western scholars. Perhaps they will be inspired to search for more of it. A good place to begin is with the bibliographies which appear in the annual issues of Islamochristiana, a publication of the Pontifical Institute of Arabic and Islamic Studies in Rome.

Institute of Christian Oriental Research
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This volume of essays in honor of the late Beryl Smalley reflects her great interest in medieval exegesis, which, for all practical purposes, she founded as a medieval discipline in the English-speaking world. This volume contains 17 studies (14 in English, two in French, one in German) on medieval exegesis and an opening essay by R. W. Southern on “Beryl Smalley and the Place of the Bible in Medieval Studies, 1927–84.” Regular readers of Festschriften, memorial or otherwise, will not be surprised that the essay dealing with the scholar so honored is the most interesting entry of all. Southern attributes Smalley’s interest in the Bible to a 1927 lecture by F. M. Powicke on Stephen Langton as a scholastic thinker, and from there he traces her career, especially her difficulties in convincing others that the study of exegesis was important. Her “discovery” of the virtually unknown exegete Andrew of Saint Victor, the major figure of her The Study of the Bible in the Middle Ages (1941), made her reputation, and she lived long enough (d. 1984) to see medieval exegesis become a major discipline. One would have liked to know how she reacted to the publication, from 1959 to 1964, of Henri de Lubac’s four-volume Exégèse médiévale, the work which has since become the standard study.

Most of the essays deal with the Later Middle Ages, the focus of S.’s interest, although five deal with earlier periods. Of these the most valuable, to a wider audience, is Karl Leyser’s “Liutprand of Cremona, Preacher and Homilist” on an important Ottonian bishop little studied in English. Leyser works with a newly-discovered sermon and demonstrates the biblical basis of Liutprand’s homiletics.

David Luscombe performs a similar task but in a broader vein for “Peter Comestor,” who was last given a generalized study in English in 1957. Luscombe concentrates on Comestor’s relation to Peter Lombard
and to the debate about which works attributed to him are authentic; he closes with a welcome but too brief section on Comestor as a classroom teacher.

The last six essays deal with the 14th and 15th centuries; the last three deal with Wycliffe and his movement. Perhaps the most important is Diana Wood's exoneration of the Avignonese pope Clement VI (1342–52) from Cola di Rienzo's charge that he adulterated the understanding of Scripture to support the political claims of the papacy. Wood examines Clement's use of Scripture and concludes that while the pope certainly forced the text on occasions, his general method was typical for his age and that Clement indeed had "his own conviction that the pope could not alter Scripture because of its divine authorship" (249).

The best of the chapters on Wycliffe is by G. R. Evans, who sets the context for Wycliffe's logic and its relation to exegesis. He emphasizes the application of scholastic logic to literary texts and Wycliffe's belief that Scripture had its own logica subtiles (296).

A bibliography of Smalley's writings, excluding reviews, closes the volume.

John Carroll University, Cleveland

Joseph F. Kelly


Apart from its obvious worth as a contribution to the history of thought, Wolter's volume is apt to fill a threefold need. First, the state of Latin studies, particularly in seminaries, renders many students incapable of going back to the sources of their tradition. The translation-facing-text format will help the struggling Latinist. Secondly, the very methodologies of certain modern philosophies—phenomenology and logical analysis come to mind—often render them incapable of dealing with the "scientifically gray" areas of ethical problems. Contemporary ethicists will find that the moral principles elaborated by Scotus and their application to specific problems are more than medieval curios. Thirdly, there is an atmosphere of anti-intellectualism today which would make emotions and feelings the primary criteria for judging ethical goodness. The fog in this atmosphere might well be burned off by reading the likes of John Duns Scotus.

W.'s selections from the writings of Scotus amply demonstrate that for the medieval theologians there was a deliberate and concerted effort to base morality on human nature, putting them on common ground with those who espoused the Jewish and Muslim faiths. Positive law, whether divine or human, was meant to corroborate and specify "right reason" as
it surveyed the natural panorama.

Another worthwhile contribution lies in the fact that this presentation of Scotus' ethical thought should bury—without hope of resurrection—all delusions and fantasies about Scotus (and Ockham as well) espousing a whimsical, arbitrary, capricious, disrupting-the-course-of-nature God who constantly bewilders the reflective human being who seeks moral goodness.

While for Scotus (Wolter 18), and Ockham as well, God could do otherwise, by creating another universe in the order of nature, or another way of salvation in the order of grace, man the wayfarer and pilgrim must use his right reason to search the de facto book of nature and the de facto book of Scripture for the norms and precepts of morality. These, for Scotus, must be taken as the primary manifestation of the divine will, unless obviously (again according to recta ratio) contravened by subsequent divine precept.

Using the dictum cherished by conscientious text-editors, i.e. "one ought not to attribute nonsensical statements to authors unless the manuscripts are adamant" (Scotus applied this to his predecessors; cf. Wolter 36), one should say that following the de facto orders of nature and grace is the only way a human being can make orderly decisions (ordinate velie).

One of the fascinating questions in this anthology of texts is the relationship between liberty and necessity (14-16). It is apparent that human freedom does not involve the actualizing of infinite possibilities after the fashion of a God-creator. Human freedom does not operate in a void but upon the bases of pre-existing necessities. There is some suggestion of this in the discussion of the tendencies of human nature to which the will assents or dissents. Scotus' discussion of the mutual "causality" between liberty and necessity and their fundamental compatibility may throw some light on debates between behaviorists and Gestaltists.

The importance of the ethical move from what is to what ought to be can hardly be overemphasized. The tedious and strained efforts of positivism to anathematize "ought" can only be refuted in the same way as skepticism: it cannot be sincerely lived.

Philosophical, and a fortiori theological, treatments of morality require a great deal of patience and an eye for detail which was singularly present in medieval masters. Readers might find Scotus' treatment of slavery particularly interesting, since it was a long-established and widely-accepted institution which Christian ethicians had begun to find immoral in some respects.

Wolter's prolegomena, like the texts of Scotus, are divided into eight
sections: (1) the will and the intellect; (2) the will and its inclinations; (3) moral goodness; (4) God and the moral law; (5) the moral law in general; (6) the intellectual and moral virtues; (7) the love of God, self, and neighbor; (8) sin.

W. has taken pains to get to a good Latin text where the critical edition is not yet available, in order to bypass, where possible, the omissions and accretions of the Wadding-Vives editions. As for the translation, the bilingual Latino-Anglicist will quickly perceive that W.'s version is into idiomatic English aiming at the author's intent rather than a word-for-word correlation with the original. In my opinion, this is both what ought to be as well as the sign of a mature translator. If the reader of W.'s translation catches himself saying to himself (as I did) "Oh, that's what Scotus meant," he will know how well W. has succeeded in capturing the mind of Scotus.

The text and translation are singularly clear of typographical errors. I was able to note the following which might need emendation: p. 156: respectu actus proprii/respectu actus propriis; 254: inordinate/inordinatae (adverb instead of adjective); 380: communitur . . . excellenter dicta/communitur . . . excellentis dicta; 380: circa delectabilia refrenanda/circa delectabilia referenda; 394: per partes/per parte; 394: intellectu practico/intellectu practica; 398: est evidens/ex evidens.

This volume is an excellent source book and should be the vade mecum of historians and philosophers interested in medieval ethical thought, as well as those interested specifically in the doctrine of the Subtle Doctor.

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Anyone who has carefully studied Scotus' subtle and intriguing analysis of human freedom will be frustrated in trying to review this work so replete with misinterpretations of his thought. Space prevents me from treating more than two. They concern what Langston himself (26) referred to as the "two principal texts" on this subject. For though L.'s initial aim is to analyze Scotus' proof for omniscience and its subsequent influence, he seems more concerned to show that the proof had the curious effect of negating its own starting point, the self-evident experimental truth that our will is free and extrinsically undetermined. Where human agents are concerned, L. argues, "there is a real question as to whether these agents are free" (32). The reason for his doubt is set forth most clearly on p. 46, in this curious paragraph, every sentence of which
Scotus would disagree with. “When a human will wills something, it can either will it necessarily or contingently. It wills something necessarily if it is not logically possible that it will something else, and it wills contingently if it is logically possible that it will otherwise. The divine will necessarily determines (or causes) a human will whenever it determines the human will to will necessarily. Whenever the divine will determines the human will to will contingently, the divine will contingently determines the will. Clearly, both contingent and necessary determination are forms of determination in the sense that God determines the human will to will as it does.” (For Scotus’ express statements to the contrary, cf. my recent book, *Duns Scotus on the Will and Morality* [Washington, D.C., 1986] 145–205, hereafter referred to as WM.)

If we ask how L. arrived at this curious idiosyncratic conception, we find it stems from a misinterpretation of the second of the two principal sources referred to above, i.e. in the several Scotistic commentaries on Book 2, dist. 25 of the *Sentence*. Though he raised but one question there, “Is the will the sole effective cause of its action?” Scotus’ answer was not always the same. At Paris he denied that the object (or its cognition) was anything more than a *sine qua non* condition for volition, whereas at Oxford he elevated it to the status of a partial but subordinate efficient cause. His disciple William of Alnwick tried to conflate the substance of the two lectures, since Scotus himself left a blank here in his final revision or *Ordinatio*. Balić, who edited both Scotus’ own Oxford *Lectura* and the Alnwick version, expressed doubts as to the latter’s accuracy because the wording of the two is so different (*Antonianum* 28 [1953] 287, n. 2). In his doctoral dissertation, L. Roberts translated both versions and argued correctly that Scotus’ view of the will is libertarian, since he rejects any extrinsic determinism. To disprove Roberts’ interpretation, which is clearly confirmed by the *Lectura*, L. appeals (36–37) instead to a portion of Roberts’ ambiguous translation of Alnwick, which he misinterprets. To show that “Scotus thinks the will can somehow be determined yet free,” L. italicizes this line: “if it were contingently determined by the other, then it is in its own power to determine or not determine.” The first “it” refers to an event that occurs contingently. The second “it” contains the ambiguity. Does it refer to the event or to “the other”? The Latin *eius* would refer it to the latter, and if we compare this text of Alnwick with either of Scotus’ own lectures, we find this “other” is God’s initial causal action. L., however, refers the “it” to the event, which he interprets as an act of human volition. Though he admits Scotus “seems to claim here that the will determines itself,” he rejects this obvious interpretation because “in the lines I have emphasized he allows the possibility that the will is determined.”
Scotus, however, insists "Where man is concerned, no human act, properly speaking, can be coerced, for it is a contradiction for the will to be simply forced to will" (WM 175). The will, he insists, is radically different from natural causes which are intrinsically or extrinsically determined, for its natural indeterminacy towards the several possible alternative choices is not based on any defect of actuality but on its own "unlimited actuality" or "superabundant sufficiency" to determine itself (WM 37, 153).

This brings us to L.'s second basic text. On p. 14 he makes this glaring misstatement: "In Ordinatio, Book I, distinction 38, part two, and distinction 39, questions one to five, Scotus explains how God knows future contingents." Not having read their introductory notes, L. seems unaware that the editors of the critical Vatican edition did not consider these questions part of the Ordinatio and suggest they may even be the work of a later disciple with access to notebooks of Scotus no longer extant. The master himself apparently was not ready to give his final opinion on this subject, and once again we find a blank space here in his own Ordinatio. Since what is said there accords generally with Scotus' earlier Lectura and his later Paris lecture, however, we need not simply ignore this set of questions relegated to an appendix in Vol. 6. But they need to be read in the context of other definitely authentic works, particularly the as yet unedited Paris report, since we have a version of it (Reportatio I A) that Scotus personally examined.

One of the things this reportatio examinata confirms is that if Scotus introduced the will of God as the primary cause of contingency in the world, he regarded this only as a necessary condition, not the sufficient reason for the will's radical power to freely determine itself. For over and above this initial condition for contingency, the human will has its own special contingency or freedom. As Scotus puts it in Rep. I A, dist. 40: "Est ergo voluntas divina prima ratio contingentiae. Sed aliquid potest dici dupliciter contingens ex parte suae causae, sicut actus voluntatis nostrae habet duplicem causam contingentiae; unam ex parte voluntatis divinae sicut causae primae et aliam ex voluntate ut ex secunda causa. A liquid est contingens tantum respectu causae primae et necessarium quantum est ex parte causae secundae et proximae ut illa quae possunt impediri a voluntate divina, ut sunt eventus rerum naturalium ex suis causis . . . Unde in nobis, i.e. in voluntate, a se et a Deo est contingentia . . . . In omnibus effectibus non inventur necessitas simpliciter, sed tantum secundum quid, quia in comparatione ad causam proximam aliquis effectus est necessarius, scilicet omnis effectus naturalis, sed in omnibus effectibus vel rebus a nobis volitis inquantum huiusmodi, nulla est necessitas sed tantum contingentia" (cf. Vienna, bibl. nat. lat. 1453,
Here we have Scotus’ famous distinction between nature and will. Natural causes “can be impeded by the divine will.” But only by removing the necessary (but not sufficient) conditions for its acting can God impede the will. A free agent can only be “coerced” in the sense that, given the circumstances, that agent freely chooses to do something, contrary to what it would prefer to do if such circumstances were absent. But “where man is concerned, no human act, properly speaking, can be coerced, for it is a contradiction for the will to be simply forced to will” (WM 175).

If “future events” refers to those dependent on our voluntary choice, and we can interfere with the course of nature, then one can question whether Scotus’ entire account of “God’s willing knowledge,” as L. calls it, was intended to give us anything more than an insufficient but necessary condition for any future contingent or will-dependent effect. In fact, the whole proof for God’s omniscience turns out to be rather a demonstration of the simple fact (demonstratio quia) rather than of the reasoned fact (demonstratio propter quid), and if this be so, then perhaps the real trouble with L.’s book is that it never gets over the mistake of his opening statement (14) as to what Scotus was trying to do, viz. explaining “how God knows future contingents.” At least Scotus never tried to do what Bañez, Molina, or Leibniz attempted, i.e. give some kind of a priori explanation of just how God knows what man will freely choose to do, and more explicitly, how He can co-operate with, but not determine, whatever choice a creature makes. All these questions arose explicitly later in the controversies between Bañez and Molina, but were not the concern of Scotus.

Old Mission, Santa Barbara, Calif. ALLAN B. WOLTER, O.F.M.


Breton presents a long assay on Surin, another on Eckhart, and a concluding chapter that compares their mystical theologies. While a young Jesuit, Surin (1600–1655) went as exorcist to Loudun during the town’s outbreak of possession (see A. Huxley, The Devils of Loudun). Later Surin became incapacitated; for 20 years he judged himself incurable and damned, and he once attempted suicide. B.’s account of these episodes is the book’s most striking section, especially in following Surin’s linkage of these experiences to a spiritual science expérimental. Encountering the demonic was central to the coincidence of opposites that Surin discerns in both the soul and God. The instability of these opposites underlies the dynamism in Surin’s thought. Thinking “before all of movements, of relations, of operations” (28), he develops an “odology”
rather than an ontology—a theology of the way, not of static being. As we exist toward God, our “instinct of grandeur” leads beyond created boundaries into God’s infinite grandeur. Here thinking and language become “excessive” as they approach God, who exceeds all limits.

Eckhart too is no stranger to excess. His life may lack the drama of Surin’s, but not his thought and preaching. B. sees Eckhart’s originality in his attempt “to free from being, and from its fascination, a protected space that we shall call mystical, where the ‘soul’s ground’ and the ‘deity’s ground’ exchange one for another in a reciprocity of life” (119). B. traces this attempt through three “languages” or stages: Echart’s metaphysics of being, his turn from being to intellect and work, and a mystical movement into the abyss (92). While B.’s analysis is generally clear and competent, problems remain. For example, B. seems unaware that Eckhart died prior to his condemnation in 1329 (148). More seriously, it is misleading to describe Eckhart’s second stage as a turn from Aristotle to St. John (116), since De anima and its Neoplatonic transformations shape the Dominican’s thinking about the Johannine Word and the human intellect. B. also cites only Ancelet-Hustache’s French translation of Eckhart’s German works, without references to the critical edition. On the whole, this chapter adds little to recent studies of Eckhart and could especially benefit from two of these. Zum Brunn and Libera’s Maître Eckhart (1984) would clarify the dialectic of being, intellect and word; and Schürmann’s Meister Eckhart (1978) describes the Eckhartian “wandering joy” in ways that suggest stronger parallels to Surin than B. draws.

In the final chapter, B. sketches a general view of mysticism. Surin and Eckhart develop complementary mystical “odologies.” Both are concerned with dynamic, directional being: being from, in, and toward God as other (169). Yet they represent different paths toward this common goal. Eckhart follows a “henological” or unitive path that emphasizes being in God and derives from Plato’s Parmenides and its Neoplatonic posterity. Surin represents “the mystics of the exodus,” who emphasize “the expansive force that hurls them beyond” (184) and toward God. These views of mysticism form a surprisingly tame conclusion to a book about two extraordinary men. It is scarcely news that mystics move Godward and exceed ordinary bounds. Nor is the typology of henôsis and exodus very helpful, since Eckhart’s detachment and breakthrough to Godhead are surely themes of exodus as well as unity. After his detailed, thoughtful exposition of Surin and Eckhart, B. owes them and his readers a more penetrating comparative study.

Guynedd-Mercy College, Pa.  DONALD F. DUCLOW

This is a significant book, since it is the first full study of the theology of the Swiss Reformer Huldrych Zwingli (1484–1531) in English. Stephens gives a comprehensive treatment of Zwingli's theological doctrines, beginning with his views on the Bible and ending with his perceptions of the state. Along the way, S. presents Zwingli on God, Christ, the Holy Spirit, man, salvation, the Word, sacraments, baptism, Eucharist, and the Church and the ministry. Initially, Zwingli's theology is set in the context of scholasticism, his patriotism, the influence of Humanism and Erasmus and the Church Fathers.

S. presents Zwingli in his own right. He sees him as an independent thinker who as a trained Humanist sensed a strong continuity between his work and that of Erasmus. Yet Zwingli went beyond Erasmus in the theocentric and evangelical nature of his theology. As a Protestant Reformer, Zwingli was highly influenced by the Church Fathers, especially Augustine. While Zwingli respected Luther, his views were never identical with Luther's and he rediscovered the essential Christian gospel independently of Luther.

Zwingli tried to ground his theology in Scripture, which he believed was the word of God through which God speaks. His entire theology was shaped by his sense of God's sovereignty and humanity's utter dependence on God. This led to strong doctrines of election and providence, which Zwingli saw as comforting doctrines reflecting God's goodness and leading to human gratitude. While Zwingli affirmed the unity of the person of Christ, his later Eucharistic controversies directed him toward stressing the distinction of the natures. Here he differed sharply from Luther. Zwingli had a lively doctrine of the Spirit, but over against the Anabaptists he closely linked the work of the Spirit to Scripture, which stood as the final authority.

Zwingli stressed the doctrine of original sin and the complete corruption of humanity in God's sight. Salvation comes through Christ, who, in the language of Anselm's view of the atonement, imparts true righteousness to those who believe by making satisfaction to God. Faith is fundamental to salvation and arises only from the Spirit of God, which works through the word of God in the gospel.

Zwingli's developing views on the sacraments are extensively treated by Stephens. Zwingli was concerned never to limit God's freedom or bind the Spirit of God, and thus believed that sacraments as outward "signs" of God's covenant can "represent" but not "present" Christ. Baptism does not give faith but is an initiatory sign of the beginning of a new life. Whereas for Luther the sacraments were a means of grace, for Zwingli
they were signs of grace already given. John 6 became dominant in Zwingli's understanding of the Lord's Supper, and he interpreted the phrase "eating Christ" as meaning believing in him. Thus the Eucharist is a symbol, with the "is" of "This is my body" really meaning "signifies." Christ is "present" in the Eucharist only through the "contemplation of faith." Christ is not present bodily in the elements. Zwingli preferred the term "memorial," Luther the term "testament," to describe the Supper.

Zwingli saw the Church as constituted through God's Word and Spirit and composed of the elect. God has established offices in the Church for the purpose of ministry. Government is necessary, according to Zwingli, because of human sinfulness. For the Swiss Reformer, there was a fundamental unity of church and society, since both should try to reflect and embody the will of God.

This detailed study, exhaustively documented, will surely become a standard source for understanding Zwingli's thought.

Univ. of Dubuque Theological Seminary DONALD K. MCKIM


This book deals more with popular religious ideas and attitudes than with theology, and represents another step in what has been the most important advance in historical studies of early modern Europe during the last 20 years: the writing of history from the bottom up. Most historians of popular culture base their studies on manuscript sources; R. builds his study on a close reading of 38 pamphlets or Flugschriften written by eight laypersons. He deliberately sought out writers who did not know Latin or have a higher education in hopes that they would reflect the viewpoint of the elusive "common man." He therefore barely mentions the most influential lay theologian in Christian history, Philip Melanchthon. His eight writers include the army paymaster Haug Marschalck, the weaver Utz Rychssner, the furrier Sebastian Lotzer, the shoemaker Hans Sachs, the painter Hans Greiffenberger, and three housewives, Argula von Grumbach, Ursula Weyda, and Catherine Zell (nee Schütz). They respectively produced six, four, six, five, seven, seven, one, and two pamphlets. Sachs is a well-known figure, and Lotzer and Zell are familiar to specialists. It seems that R. had to sift through the flood of early Reformation Flugschriften to isolate his eight common men and women, but the very fact that they wrote and published makes them uncommon, as R. is aware. This is simply a risk that the historian of popular culture has to run. More disturbing to me, the sample of eight seems untypical in that all eight are militant Protestants. Surely the old
Church had supporters among the common folk, and many people must have remained hesitant or uncertain about the great questions of the early Reformation.

R. begins with a fine introduction describing earlier work in the field, but then launches into a rather disorganized chapter on late-medieval religion that attempts too much. Slightly better is a chapter that surveys the teaching of Luther, Zwingli, and Erasmus, especially on the role of the laity in the Church. Later, Russell tries to relate his pamphlets to these Reformers, but since the pamphleteers devoted most of their energy to denouncing the old Church rather than to developing a theology, R. finds it difficult to trace specific debts to Luther, Zwingli, Erasmus, or earlier Waldensian attitudes. Throughout, R.'s sympathies are clearly with his lay pamphleteers, and he is critical of Zwingli and Luther, who, fearful of Anabaptism, gave too much authority to the clergy. Thus Luther's "ministers were still in exactly the same position as the priests had been and the laity were still subject to them" (63).

The four chapters that R. devotes to analyzing his pamphlets make a more solid contribution. Since he tries hard to relate his writers to their social, political, and religious ambiance, he devotes one chapter to Augsburg, where Rychssner and Marschalck lived, another to Memmingen for Lotzer, and a third to Nuremberg for Sachs and Greiffenberger. The three women pamphleteers have a chapter to themselves.

R. devotes a final chapter to conclusions. For the pamphleteers, the Protestant principle sola fide was much less important than sola scriptura. They were rather uninterested in the theology of justification but were remarkably adept at citing the Bible in their attacks on the old Church and its practices. All the writers were bitterly hostile to the old clergy, especially monks, friars, and the papacy. Typical was von Grumbach's denunciation of an abbot for "knowing less about Scripture than a cow about dancing." They were all proud of their lay vocation. They showed no interest in scholasticism or philosophical theology and sometimes displayed a delightful naiveté, as when von Grumbach warned the faculty of the University of Ingolstadt that she had it on good authority that Aristotle was not a Christian. The pamphlets have a strong apocalyptic flavor, and an imminent Second Coming weighed far more on these lay writers than on the magisterial Reformers. In many respects the writers remained conservative. "They seem to have had no difficulty in combining biblical conservatism, an important hallmark of Reformation theology, with a mystical anthropology and a vision of the city as sacred community that was very medieval" (219).

The text is enlivened by 58 illustrations, mainly contemporary woodcuts, but I could make little out of the seven figures, complete with
triangles, crescents, arrows, and Latin tags, that R. employs to explain the theology of salvation in the pamphlets. He fails to define adequately several slippery terms such as “mystical” and “humanist” and repeatedly calls the Dominicans and Franciscans monks. The error bonum communis appears seven times.

Marquette University

John Patrick Donnelly, S.J.


This revised version of the author’s 1980 doctoral dissertation analyzes and correlates two central components of Sanjuanist thought: the “noetics” of John of the Cross and his understanding of the communicative process. The first five chapters outline John’s epistemology, presented as “Aristotelian and Thomistic in its basic contours” (5). Drawing upon the Spanish Carmelite’s nocturnal imagery, the scholastic psychology of knowledge, and the Pseudo-Dionysian tradition “with its terminology of the viae” (20), W. distinguishes three modes of human consciousness in John’s doctrine, corresponding to progressive stages in the mystical ascent: (1) “twilight” or ordinary knowledge, involving the activation of our natural cognitive abilities through the images, forms, and figures of creatures (via affirmationis); (2) “night” or the “gradual negating” by faith “of one’s previous representational and conceptual knowledge of God” (38) in virtue of the disproportion between God and all our mental configurations (via negationis); and (3) “dawn” or mystical knowledge (via eminentiae), wherein “the infused presence of God is grasped directly by the knowing power itself, the passive intellect, in an act which bypasses all the lower active stages of human cognition” (66).

W. then devotes four final chapters to John’s understanding of the “communicative descent” from mystical experience to literary expression, which (she says) involves the same “triplux via of knowing,” as the mystic moves from the ineffable “affirmative” experience of union, through a “confrontation with the limitations inherent in human speech,” to “a supereminent stage, in which the poet elects and orders the images which will furnish him the raw material for his symbolization” (108). Here W. argues that John’s choice of metaphors is based not only upon the analogia entis between God and the physical cosmos, but also “upon a mysterious analogy between forms of spiritual cognition and cognition following perception through one or another corporeal sense” (163). The book ends with an analysis of the reciprocal relationship between John’s poetry and prose, and a valuable defense of the need for both genres.

The second half of W.’s study seems more original than the first, but also more problematic. Her account of the communicative power of the
Sanjuanist metaphors tends to be undercut by her insistence on the obscurity to the ordinary reader of the mystical term of John’s comparisons (see esp. 111–19). Likewise, W.’s reconstruction of John’s aesthetics puts enormous weight on what are in fact only a few scattered and ambiguous allusions to the “spiritual senses.”

The footnotes occupy almost half the book, but consist mainly of long passages from the Mystical Doctor and his commentators. W. ignores most standard English translations of the foreign and classical authors she cites, quoting them instead in their original languages. Much of the footnote material is probably unnecessary, since the secondary sources are often more accessible than the present volume.

Despite some minor inaccuracies (e.g., the “active” and “passive” nights are not properly aligned in the “Stages of Mystical Ascent” chart), this book offers a generally reliable synthesis of Thomistic approaches to John’s doctrine. Readers searching for something more, however, may be disappointed. Except for some tantalizingly brief comments relating John to Polanyi (46 ff.), W. rarely ventures beyond the neo-scholastic orbit. Maritain, Gilson, and Garrigou-Lagrange are her authorities on epistemological questions (Leonard Callahan and Thomas Gilby in the area of aesthetics), with divergent opinions and more recent developments seldom confronted on their own terms. W. invokes André Bord and Georges Morel, e.g., without ever noting their critique of Maritain’s attempt (which she apparently accepts) to reconcile John’s tripartite division of the soul’s higher powers with the Thomistic bipartite division. Again, she rejects Baruzzi’s notion of mystical union as a “symbolic experience” and the claim that John’s lyrics “infuse some sort of nebulous yet profound knowledge” (133) on the grounds that during actual union “the intelligence does not function by the mediation of phantasms” (96) and that “the meaning obtained from the poetry is a recall of what was previously assimilated and retained by the reader” (136), without involving any extension of knowledge; yet there are no references to Rahner’s theology of symbol and only passing mention of Ricoeur’s work on metaphor.

In short, this study displays careful scholarship and addresses important issues, but from a relatively narrow perspective; interpretations of John tend to be evaluated according to their degree of conformity with scholastic categories and principles. Though loyalty to the Angelic Doctor is no vice, this reviewer hopes the all-too-brief references to Polanyi presage a second volume in which W. can creatively engage a broader range of contemporary theological and philosophical voices.

Institute of Carmelite Studies, D.C.  
STEVE PAYNE, O.C.D.

In Schmitt's brief Foreword to this superb and enormously erudite work, he says that Juan Maldonado was the most eminent Catholic theologian, polemicist, and exegete in France at the time that the Protestant Reform was reaching its apogee, but because Maldonado was a maverick who aroused intense opposition, he has not yet, unlike so many others, been rehabilitated, but allowed to fall into oblivion (7–8). This judgment and the book's subtitle both suggest that Maldonado (Maldonatus, Maldonate) will be the principal object of study. Actually this is not the case. The title is really the basic content: "Catholic Reform." Maldonado is there, from the first pages, but only as a kind of recurring theme or motif beginning diminuendo and only becoming a resonant crescendo in the final movement of this historical masterpiece which can best be compared to a later Mahler symphony. However, since S. is right in wishing to rescue Maldonado from oblivion, let us, as best we can in a severely limited review, reconstruct the basic facts about him as herein presented.

Born to a noble family at Las Casas de la Reina in Extramadura in 1534, Maldonado was educated at the ancient and aristocratic University of Salamanca from 1550 to 1562. After completing his chosen studies in theology, he became a Jesuit novice in Rome (1562) and was ordained a priest there the following year, after which he went to Paris, where Ignatius Loyola, then deceased, had always wanted to found a college. France at this time was in the throes of a bitter and bloody religious civil war. Paris, insofar as it was a center of learning, was controlled by the Sorbonne, which cherished the old and now obsolete scholastic methods. As it had resisted the influence of Erasmus and Humanism, so it tried to inhibit the establishment of a Jesuit college. Nevertheless, at the beginning of October 1556, Maldonado was able to give his magisterial inaugural lecture, pertinent excerpts from which are given by S. (296–303). Among the reasons for the neglect of theology in his time, Maldonado stressed the virtual absence of heresy during the Middle Ages, with the consequent abandonment by its theologians of their true weapons (the Scriptures and the Fathers and the perfect knowledge of languages which a mastery of them demands) and their turning to game-playing with endless hypotheses, insoluble syllogisms, and similar linguistic gymnastics. When suddenly the adversary appeared, they found themselves bereft of adequate defensive weapons.

At this point in his career Maldonado decided not to use Aquinas, who
“though most learned, is too prolix,” but follow and comment on Peter Lombard. Six years later, after a year’s congé in Poitiers, Maldonado decided that neither Aquinas nor Peter Lombard would be the basis of commentary but rather his own views (365). He spared no one in his penetrating criticisms. Where the Reformers and their sola scriptura was concerned, he asked how, if the Spirit guides the reader of the Scriptures, there can be as many as 20 or 30 interpretations of a single text (305), and, where the Church was concerned, he asked: “Where are the great bishops of the past today?” Mediocrity is the current hallmark: “If there were today a number of Hilary of Poitiers heresy would not exist” (370). He gave an exposition of how the Mass can be a sacrifice that anticipated M. de la Taille by 400 years (318–19), and that during the period when he was instructing the future Henri IV in the faith.

It was during the second incumbency in Paris that the great “Affair of the Immaculate Conception” took place and eventually drove Maldonado into retreat and obscurity. The Sorbonne, that old thorn in the side, had demanded since 1389 that all its graduates profess the Immaculate Conception as an article of faith. The Council of Trent had refused to commit itself in this matter. France and the Sorbonne did not (of set purpose) accept the decrees of Trent until 1615, long after Maldonado’s death. Maldonado took and taught the view that Mary was conceived without original sin but that this was not a matter of faith (425–26). He was, of course, at that point in time perfectly correct, but this was the Sorbonne’s golden opportunity to deal Maldonado a lethal blow. Gondi, the archbishop of Paris, rallied to his support, but the papal nuncio and the pope himself played a very temporizing game, and Maldonado, at the pope’s request, was silenced by his superior (438–40). He was asked to leave Paris in March 1576, and the pope ordered him to Toulouse. Maldonado moved first, briefly, to Blois, and then to Bourges. At Bourges he dedicated himself entirely to his commentaries on the Major Prophets and the four Gospels. Two years later the pope ordered his return to Paris, but he preferred to remain at Bourges and did not leave it until 1580. In that year he returned not to Paris but to Rome, a very different Rome from the one he had known 20 years before, and it was in the cleansed Rome of Charles Borromeo and Philip Neri that he spent his last years. He continued to work on his Gospel commentaries, “sometimes shocking for his contemporaries, but confirmed by later exegesis” (523), and there he died on January 5, 1583, by our standards still a man very much in his prime.
So much for Maldonado, but, as stated earlier, this book is really a history of Catholic Reform from the end of the 15th to the beginning of the 17th century and as such is prodigiously informative. S. has certainly “rehabilitated” Maldonado, but he has also given us an in-depth account of two centuries of acrimonious political and religious chaos in Europe.

Archdiocesan Archives, New Orleans

J. Edgar Bruns


This monograph in the series of Cambridge Latin American Studies, despite its brevity, is an exceptionally important contribution to Hispanic American history. In the recent early death of the author, assistant professor of history at the University of Leiden, all students of Spanish America have lost a brilliant and productive historian. Van Oss researches here and sets forth a new subject scarcely alluded to elsewhere: the hundreds of parishes in Guatemala, both in the western highlands and in the eastern lowlands, from the earliest days (1524) to its independence (1821).

The author drew on the key manuscript sources in several archives and a wide range of printed materials. His one notable omission is the five-volume series of The Writings of Alonso de la Vera Cruz (Rome, 1968–76). Everywhere he shows that he is aware that the Indians’ native religions and complex rites could not be rapidly replaced by a radically different faith, ritual, and ethics. To be effective, the process had to take place very gradually and over a long period. In the evangelization of the natives, van Oss might have indicated more fully what Spanish legislation had to say about the languages to be used in the ministry and the actual practice of the missionaries. There are good monographs on the subject.

In a perceptive Introduction (1–8), the author expounds one of his favorite theses: Spain’s venture in the New World was a projection of the Catholic Church in medieval Europe. Readers of the present work will recall Luis Weckmann’s extensive treatment of the same subject in La herencia medieval en México (1982), not cited by van Oss.

This monograph deals very unequally with the parochial origins of the Guatemalan basic ecclesiastical structure (9–49). Each parish embraced the clusters of households—ideally, 400—grouped around the main “house,” the church. If the administering priest resided here, the conglomerate was termed a cabecera (headquarters). Dependent clusters or annexes visited occasionally by the parish priest were called visitas. The cabecera usually included several settlements. The multiracial natives had been gathered (reduced or congregated) from mountain and jungle
so they could be administered to more easily. Their make-up changed as the natives mingled with Spaniards and blacks.

Most of the parish priests were members of the three mendicant orders: Franciscans, Dominicans, and Mercedarians. A few were secular or diocesan priests. The Jesuits, scarcely mentioned in this book (e.g., 164–65), came late and devoted their main efforts to education in a well-knit chain of schools (colegios). Parish structure is studied (50–78) in great detail and clarity. Doctrinas, a preparish stage of these missionary centers, are discussed at length. Such aspects of the parishes as size, number, economic support, royal presentation, etc. are brilliantly explained.

Beginning in 1585, secular priests started to supplant the traditional regular clergy. Although parish finance (tithes and alternatives) is referred to throughout the volume, a special chapter (79–108) is devoted to it. Van Oss draws on a few manuscript and more numerous published materials, but he should have consulted the most extensive and thorough monograph ever written on the subject: Vol. 4 of Vera Cruz's Writings (Rome, 1976). The eminent missionary-theologian devoted nearly a thousand enlightening pages to the topic, with application to the situation in New Spain, written in 1554–55.

The author devotes briefer chapters to “The Village Church” (126–52) and “Secularization of the Regular Parishes and Attempts at Hispanization” (153–78). There are many excellent features that enhance the monograph and make readily available its rich contents: maps, charts, figures of statistics, and numerous tables that furnish important data summarizing the corresponding texts, and a good analytic index.

The information and insight given by van Oss are applicable to other areas of Spanish America, especially Central America and Mexico. This is an important contribution dealing with a subject hitherto untouched by other scholars in the field.

Jesuit Historical Institute, Rome

ERNEST J. BURRUS, S.J.


When in 1938 the Nazis took him into custody along with a number of other “non-Aryans” in Breslau, Fr. Hubert Jedin narrowly escaped being sent to Buchenwald. Released instead but thoroughly frightened, he decided to become an exile until better times returned to his native Germany. This resolve took him to Rome in November of 1939; there throughout the Second World War he labored on his monumental History of the Council of Trent.

Here J. offers reminiscences on his life and work. He devotes most attention to the nearly ten years spent in Rome (1939–49), his teaching
career at the University of Bonn (1949–65), his participation in the Second Vatican Council, and various other activities until shortly before his death in 1980. He comes through as a church historian of very strong convictions and intense loyalties. He expressed both in a forthright fashion. To cite but one instance, he was heartsick at what the Nazis did to Jews in his homeland, but outspoken as well in criticizing the disservice he thought the Vatican’s Ostpolitik did later to a part of Europe very close to his heart.

When he recalls trips he made to consult archives throughout Europe, it amounts to much more than a travelogue. He reports, for example, seeing a list containing judgments that Philip II wrote in his own hand with regard to various Spanish bishops at the time. The Catholic King applied to some the censure illiteratus; and this, readers are assured, sufficed to keep the individuals so described from attending the Council.

For the most part, J.’s recollections are presented here in summary form. Fortunately, however, full texts of letters that he wrote at various times appear at the end. In a pair of these dating to 1977, he offers his reactions to a discussion then under way with regard to a possible Roman Catholic recognition of the Augsburg Confession. He insists that the Augustana was not, even at the time of its composition, a complete expression of the Lutheran position. And to show that matters are even more complicated, he adds a quotation from Peter Canisius, who in 1557 told Bishop Pflug of Naumburg that Lutherans accepting the Confession have serious differences among themselves with regard to the meaning of some of its most basic articles. As to the content of the Confession, J. says that its teachings on original sin and justification do not contradict those of Trent and are not church-divisive. On the other hand, its treatment of church office (Amt) is insufficient, just as what it says about the Sacrifice of the Mass is inaccurate. When it comes to apostolic succession, the Petrine office, and the Church’s teaching authority in relation to the role played by Scripture, the Confession is silent. Only baptism and the Eucharist are presented unambiguously as sacraments. The cult of the saints is simply rejected. In short, the Augustana should not be accepted as a legitimate expression of Catholic faith!

A hard-line approach it is from a historian who in his later years did not at all like many of the postconciliar developments in his church. But coming from one who knew the period as few others in our century have, his guarded assessment of the Reformation deserves serious consideration from scholars. That applies not least of all to those of us who think Philip Melanchthon’s work at Augsburg is not only open to, but deserving of, a much more benign interpretation.

Catholic University of America  Carl J. Peter

Rahner gave half of these 30 interviews within the last three months of his life. Hence they can be read as concise, nuanced, engaging “short formulas” of faith, spirituality, and theology from the 80-year-old father of Roman Catholic theology in the 20th century. Some present new autobiographical information, especially the one on Rahner’s specific likes and dislikes. Another, on Aquinas, offers detailed information about Rahner’s intellectual formation.

R. views today’s tendency to reduce God to a God of human needs, to one who exists only for our sakes, as “anthro-egoism,” the “most dangerous heresy” of all. He insists that God must be loved and adored for God’s sake, even though this will not ensure the “good life” here. He deplores the attitude “What I find irrelevant is irrelevant.” Hence the Church can and should talk about the serious issues of our day only if she speaks first about God’s existence and the need to trust in His victorious love in Christ’s death and resurrection. This is Christianity’s essence. Therefore today’s priest must be neither a clerical bureaucrat nor an armed revolutionary nor only a social-political critic. He must be especially one who speaks about God and guides people into the experience of God.

For this reason, R. refuses to distinguish “scientific” theology from “kerygmatic” theology, for theology must be critical reflection on the Church’s preaching of the gospel—never art for art’s sake. Hence he considers even his “pious” books to be theological. Also, theology must actually speak about God and not allow itself to be reduced to clever “God-talk.” It is worship with the mind. Furthermore, he deplores today’s exegetical positivism and insists that theology cannot be done without philosophy.

One should note that Rahner considers his Foundations of Christian Faith to be his most important theological contribution. And he likewise suggests reading his “Ignatius of Loyola Speaks to a Modern Jesuit” as his last will and testament. The interviews on atheism, Marxism, liberation theology, demonic possession, Mary, and “realistic humanism” (What general human and moral presuppositions must be present to prevent a world catastrophe?) are especially compelling.

Several interviews underscore R.’s unconditional love for the Church. All difficulties he had and has with the Church he considers secondary to this loving relationship. Therefore he can and does criticize both the official Church and its critics. He detests the question “Should I remain in the Church?” He desired greatly to write a book Why I Am a Roman
Catholic that would emphasize Catholic identity, ecumenical considerations, and the dangers of confessional indifference. Rejecting a third Vatican Council now as premature, he insists upon a grass-roots transformation of the Church. While defending the ordination of women, married priests, the immorality of even the defensive possession of nuclear weapons, liberation theology, and the like, he refuses to brand opponents of his positions as unchristian. And although holding an optimistic view of salvation, R. still maintains that Vatican II may have passed too quickly over the concrete evils in the world. Furthermore, only the folly of the cross grounds Christian optimism.

R.’s wit comes through on occasion. He wryly denies that his brother Hugo could have translated him into German, because Hugo was not a good enough theoretical theologian.

Boston College

Harvey D. Egan, S.J.


Not even a lengthy article could do full justice to Taylor’s extraordinary dissertation, directed by Schubert Ogden. T. wishes to contribute to the contemporary discussion of the notion of God by way of a critical analysis of Rahner’s concept of God, especially his thinking on “God is love.” This first study of R.’s concept of God correctly shows the centrality of the notion of God as self-communication in R.’s theology; also that R.’s anthropology is more a metaphysics of human freedom, love, and the interpersonal than of knowledge. Moreover, he solidly demonstrates that R.’s theological anthropology emphasizes not only the transcendental, but also the historical, interpersonal, and sociopolitical dimensions of human existence. This dissertation could be profitably read merely from T.’s mastery of extensive R. material, of contemporary theological issues, of his own translation of numerous, important Rahner quotations, and his dialogue with significant R. commentators and critics.

Although basically sympathetic to R., T. nonetheless finds R.’s thesis that God is immutable in Himself but mutable in another to be merely a verbal solution. Moreover, T. rejects as inconceivable R.’s view that God could have remained the silent, aloof “Whither” of human transcendence and withheld His self-communication. For T., the divine gratuity means God’s unexpectedness, His not taking into account human standards, but not His freedom not to love others. Furthermore, if R. allows for no passive moment of love in God, i.e., if creatures do not make an essential difference to and for God, how can God be our Absolute Future, as R. maintains?

T. also contends that R. does not conceive God solely by using cate-
categories that derive from the basic experience that persons have of themselves. Hence he contradicts his own method of “turning to the subject.” Furthermore, if God does not constitute Himself in relation to free selves, is not essentially related to creatures, and loves only in a totally active way, then R.’s analysis of divine love, freedom, and relativity differs so significantly from that of his analysis of human love, freedom, and relativity that he predicates “love,” “freedom,” and “relativity” equivocally, not analogously.

Although T. agrees with R.’s analysis of our fundamental experiences as persons and shares R.’s concerns, he proposes to re-express them more coherently via process thought. T.’s fundamental disagreement with R. is that God, for T., can be conceived only as a free self-creator constituted by a real relatedness to creatures. Because God is essentially love of others who constitutes Himself only in relation to creatures, God cannot be conceived as refusing to communicate Himself to creatures. Although we need not have existed at all, to exist is necessarily to be the object of God’s love. Therefore, against R., Taylor maintains that love is the sole conceivable relationship between God and the world. Moreover, all theological themes are simply expressions of the one theological theme: God is essentially love of others.

Although I agree with T. that a tension exists between R.’s insufficiently radical turn to the subject and his scholastic categories, I am less sanguine than T. that R.’s conceptual incoherence can be corrected via the “syntax” and “grammar” of process thought. I would likewise disagree that God’s mystery can be reduced to the unknowability of the superabundance of His relationships to creatures. And I suspect that T.’s truly creative rethinking of the Trinity has produced a metaphysical unitarianism, but only an abstract Trinity. Also, I am less certain than T. that the NT supports his contention that God cannot be conceived except as love for creatures. Finally, does T. reject too quickly the notion that God must be essentially love in Himself, that there must be an essential passivity in the intradivine life itself? In this respect Joseph Wong’s emendations of R.s Trinitarian theology seem more apposite (TS 46 [1985] 735). And if God is love only in relation to creatures, is there not an ontological imbalance here? In short, can process thought provide the way out of the seeming impasse in some of R.’s approaches to the concept of God?

Boston College  

Community is surely one of the most widely used and yet most loosely defined words in the English language. Kirkpatrick, chairperson of the religion department at Trinity College in Hartford, Conn., proposes that there are at present three basic models of community operative in Western society upon which all the more particular definitions of community are based. These are the atomistic/contractarian conception of community derived ultimately from Thomas Hobbes and John Locke, the organic/functional model proposed by Hegel and later modified by Karl Marx, and the mutual/personal paradigm envisioned by Martin Buber and subsequently developed by John Macmurray in the Gifford Lectures of 1953–54 (published as The Self as Agent and Persons in Relation). His premise is that only the mutual/personal model corresponds to the full potentiality of human personhood, but that elements of the two other models have to be included in this third paradigm if it is to become a working reality within ordinary human life.

K.'s early chapters deal, first, with the contractarian approach to society made famous by Hobbes and Locke but still continued in the writings of contemporary conservatives like George Gilder and Michael Novak, and, then, with the classical organic approach advanced by Hegel and Marx and later espoused by sociologists like Ferdinand Tönnies and Charles Cooley. A more consistent "organismic" approach to reality, however, is set forth by Alfred North Whitehead and, partly in opposition to Whitehead, by "systems" thinkers like Erwin Laszlo and Edward Pols. K. finds quite congenial the hierarchical ordering of reality within the systems approach whereby higher levels of activity within a single organism subsume lower levels without destroying the functional integrity of the latter. Thus the self as agent gives unity and purpose to all the subacts within the human body on the level of organs, cells, molecules, etc. But, says K., the activity of human selves vis-à-vis one another is only rendered intelligible by the mutual/personal model of community in which mutuality is valued for its own sake and not simply for its functional utility in promoting the common good.

My reservations with this otherwise quite insightful and easily readable book have to do with the anthropocentrism implicit in K.'s and Macmurray's work. As I see it, not just human being but Being as such is intrinsically social. Hence there is need for ontological categories to describe the dynamic interrelation of parts within wholes (which in turn are "parts" of still greater wholes) on all levels of existence and activity within the universe. In this respect Whitehead's philosophy and systems theory seem to complement each other, with Whitehead's analysis of actual entities providing an explanation of ultimate "parts" and systems theory showing how these parts can be combined into progressively more
complex and interdependent wholes. In any case, the culmination of the hierarchical structure of the created universe in human community understood as "persons-in-relation" offers no suitable metaphysical explanation of human communities as ontological totalities which are themselves "parts" of a still more comprehensive cosmic reality. Community, in other words, is not just the indefinite extension of I-thou relationships, as K. and Macmurray imply (186), but a higher-level "system" or ontological totality in its own right which impresses its character or form upon its person-members even as they continually reshape it by their interpersonal encounters. Only thus are larger national or ethnic communities productive of language, various kinds of laws and institutions—in short, an entire culture or way of life. Finally, it should be noted that while F. refers to a "trinity" of models of community in the subtitle to his book, he makes no reference to the Christian doctrine of the Trinity as a community of divine persons. Nor is this surprising, since within his ontology individual selfhood or personhood is the ultimate ontological reality. Accordingly, God in his system must likewise be a transcendent Self. "Persons-in-relation" applied to God would mean tritheism, three gods, not one God.

Xavier University, Cinn. 

JOSEPH A. BRACKEN, S.J.


This volume completes a three-volume project which Leech began with the publication of Soul Friend in 1980. In Soul Friend L. attempted to describe the Christian tradition of spiritual direction in a way that relates to contemporary believers. In True Prayer he undertook a popular introduction to the life of prayer. In the present volume he attempts to introduce the reader to a broad range of spiritual writers within the Christian tradition.

Like Soul Friend and True Prayer, the present volume ambitions an essay in popular spiritual theology. Moreover, because it attempts a survey of Christian spiritual literature, it labors under the inevitable limitations inherent in such a project: while it alludes to a broad range of spiritual writers, it treats none of them in depth.

L., however, approaches his subject with enthusiasm and imagination. Instead of writing a dry historical tract in which he dusts off one spiritual volume after another, he has organized his survey of Christian spiritual writers into a fairly comprehensive thesis concerning the characteristics of a balanced Christian spirituality. I personally find his argument persuasive. He contends that a renewed Christian spirituality must recover a contemporary vision of God at the same time that it roots itself
solidly in tradition. From the OT he derives the notion that Christians live as pilgrims committed to the search for holiness and justice in both their interpersonal and social dealings with others. Meditation on the apostolic Church teaches the Christian to proclaim a message of light and of love, of unity and of freedom, of reconciliation and of salvation to all people. Christian spirituality, L. contends, needs to strike a balance between the cultivation of solitude and community involvement. A balanced spirituality includes an experience of a mysterious and purifying darkness. L. correctly portrays Christian spirituality as inherently charismatic, as radically incarnational, and as encompassing pain and the cross. A Christian approach to God includes a mystical component and fosters the ministry of spiritual direction. It resists the distortions of sexism and resonates to feminine images of God; and it eschews privatized piety, opposing institutional injustice and joining in the struggle against racism and every other form of domination and oppression. It consecrates Christians to the cause of world peace, to the search for nuclear disarmament, and to the fight against poverty and inequality.

While I find myself in fundamental agreement with L.'s vision of Christian spirituality, I find it more true than original. Nevertheless, this book succeeds admirably in what it sets out to do: to introduce lay Christians, in a way that engages them personally, to the rich resources which the Christian tradition offers those who seek a practical path for approaching God. Those unacquainted with that tradition will find it most helpful; but spiritual directors will also find here a useful, readable resource for enriching their personal lives and ministry. I would personally have preferred a less ambitious and more prosaic subtitle: perhaps, An Introduction to the Sources of Christian Spirituality.

Jesuit School of Theology at Berkeley

DONALD L. GELPI, S.J.


Much the way John Tracy Ellis' criticism of the lack of intellectual vigor in the Catholic community both challenged and proved to be a clarion call for Catholic scholars, James Gustafson's critique in 1975 of the contribution of theologians to the emerging field of bioethics served to stimulate renewed concern with the role of theology and medical ethics. While conceding that much of the writing done in the field was by persons trained in theology, Gustafson lamented the lack of explicit theological grounding for their work. A decade later Theology and Bioethics, Vol. 20 in the Philosophy and Medicine series, is a response to that criticism.

Some 20 Catholic, Jewish, and Protestant theologians, including such well-known authors as Langdon Gilkey, Stanley Hauerwas, Richard
McCormick, and William Frankena, analyze and explore various theological aspects of bioethics. The perspectives range from McCormick's position that "In Christian ethics, God's self-disclosure in Jesus Christ as self-giving love allows of no further justification. It is the absolutely ultimate fact" to Tristram Engelhardt's reductionist view that "God is known through reason, not through any particular revelation." To Engelhardt, we now live on the other side of a religious age—a side in which reason alone prevails: "The Gods once brought rain and cured diseases. Now there is meteorology and pharmacology." Religion is thus relegated to contributing "aesthetic suggestions of meaning and purpose" to moral discourse.

Given that range and diversity, the contributions, as is true of most collections, are of varied interest and depth. LeRoy Walters provides a superb and concise history of how, under the guidance of Andre Hellegers and Daniel Callahan, the Kennedy Institute of Ethics and the Hastings Center—the two institutions most responsible for the renaissance of medical ethics—were influenced by, and developed in part in response to, religious issues.

Margaret Farley's working out of a feminist theology of human embodiment for its implications on new developments in in vitro fertilization is evidence of the import theology can have even in a pluralistic setting in helping us to understand such fundamental concerns as the meaning and nature of the body, human relationships, and reproduction.

While there are some fresh ideas such as those presented by Farley, many of the contributions unfortunately bear the mark of overly-busy scholars who fulfilled their commitment by rephrasing well-worked themes into yet another 20-page essay. The result is material that is good but unoriginal and uninspired. Childress' careful analysis of the differences between Ramsey and McCormick on the use of children in non-therapeutic research, e.g., is surely the stuff of which fine lectures are delivered, but tedious and unrevealing when the subject of a chapter on theology and justice. It, like so much of the material in this collection, tells of where we have been, but it hardly indicates a direction for the future. What is lacking is the creative energy and originality of an H. Richard Niebuhr's study of responsibility or the theological struggle of a Paul Ramsey as he sought to apply the biblical notion of covenant to the relationship of physician to patient in his now landmark The Patient As Person. That task, the challenge presented by Gustafson, has been begun, but as this collection of essays makes clear, the effort is still preliminary and struggling for its identity.

*College of the Holy Cross, Worcester, Mass.*

*JOHN J. PARIS, S.J.*
SHORTER NOTICES


M.'s academic interests were as wide as the OT itself. Gifted with a rare sensitivity to literary form and a clear realization that the values of Scripture went beyond the results of historical-critical investigation, he reminded us that the word of God, in the last analysis, is a call to both repentance and hope. It is a matter for gratitude that James Swetnam, S.J., has seen this collection of his writings through the press. Three areas especially attracted the professor of OT studies at the Pontifical Biblical Institute in Rome. These were (1) covenant studies, stemming from his doctoral work at the Catholic Institute in Paris; (2) exegetical studies, which grew out of his talent for close, perceptive reading of the text; (3) biblical theology, which satisfied his need to give a more synthetic vision of God's presence and activity in Israel's history.

A few articles may be singled out. M.'s probing the process of inspiration in the formation of Israel's sacred literature represented pioneer work which was badly needed. The charism of inspiration had been far too abstractly conceived. We may be sure that this article made an impact on those who were responsible for the Constitution on Revelation in Vatican II. Insisting on the close relationship between the inspired writings and the community of God's chosen people, he worked out a dynamic and fruitful relationship between Scripture and tradition which we pretty much take for granted today.

An original and stimulating chapter on "Human Rights in the OT" adds to the growing bibliography on a topical issue. He gave a needed depth to the theme by stressing that men and women, as members of God's household, not only have access to God but are free persons truly and immediately ordered to God. Those who think of theology in static, black-and-white categories should meditate on the following: "Theology must be an enterprise in perpetual movement. It could be nothing else. No human understanding is really complete. How much more is this true when, by definition, its object is mystery." The breadth and incisiveness of these essays remind us how great was our loss when he died in Salamanca at the age of fifty-eight.

FREDERICK L. MORIARTY, S.J.
Gonzaga University, Spokane


An excellent book for M.'s intended audience: "educated laity who, in today's vortex of ideas, find their knowledge of Paul inadequate, and that inadequacy intolerable" (3). In two very clear and insightful chapters on Paul and his background and Paul's life and conversion, M. highlights the nature of Paul's conversion and how to treat Acts as a source for Paul's life and thought. Chapter 3 is given over to questions of the chronology and authenticity of the 14 epistles attributed to Paul. In the six chapters that follow, Marrow treats six of the seven (Philemon does not get explicit treatment) authentic Pauline epistles: 1 Thessalonians, Galatians, 1 Corinthians, 2 Corinthians, Philippians, Romans. He studies each epistle thematically, giving little attention to the social situation of the community. There are five maps, whose printing
obscures the exact location of Corinth
and Athens. Bibliographies and two in-
dexes conclude the volume.

M.'s description of Pauline themes is
well done. Especially noteworthy is his
consideration of law and freedom in
Galatians and of Pauline anthropology
and the Spirit of Holiness in Romans.
He is also concerned to show the rele-
vance of Paul's thought to today, and
throughout the book he makes "homi-
letic" comments about liberals/social
reformers, preachers, ecumenists, and
the institutional Church, e.g.: "This
statement [Gal 5:22-23] will not sit
very well with the lugubrious lamenters
of their lot in the Church, the proclaim-
ers of freedom who are in thrall to one
another's good opinion and shackled to
the current fashions in the clichés of
theological revolution" (238).

ROBERT J. KARRIS, O.F.M.
Catholic Theological Union, Chicago

KNOWING RELIGIOUSLY. Edited by
LeRoy S. Rouner. Notre Dame, Ind.: 
xvi + 213. $19.95.

This volume comprises 13 essays
first presented as public lectures to an
interdisciplinary audience at the Bos-
ton University Institute for Philosophy
and Religion in 1984, as well as an
introduction by the editor, a biographi-
cal sketch of each author, and author
and subject indexes.

The essays are presented under three
general headings. Part 1, "The Nature
of Religious Knowledge," comprises
"Knowing Religiously" by Eliot
Deutsch (from which the title of the
volume has been taken); "The Histori-
cist Turn in Philosophy of Religion" by
Cornel West; "Our Knowledge of
God" by Charles Hartshorne; "The Va-
rieties of Religious Knowing" by J. N.
Findlay; and "On Knowing What Is
Uncertain" by Ninian Smart.

Part 2, "Religious Truth Claims Re-
considered," contains Kai Nielsen's
"God and Coherence: On the Episte-

cological Foundations of Religious Be-

RATIONALITY, RELIGIOUS BELIEF,
AND MORAL COMMITMENT: NEW ES-
SAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELI-
GION. Edited by Robert Audi and Wil-
liam J. Wainwright. Ithaca: Cornell
University, 1986. Pp. 341. $42.50;
$12.95 paper.

These 13 papers originated in a 1984
Research Conference in Philosophy of
Religion funded by the NEH at the
University of Nebraska. Six focus on
issues in the rationality of religious be-

and the Question of God"; Langdon Gilkey,
"Religion and Science in an Advanced
Scientific Culture"; Leroy Rouner,
"The Meeting of East and West: Paul
Tillich's Philosophy of Religion"; and
Jürgen Moltmann's "Messianic Athe-

To my mind, none of the essays is
particularly noteworthy. Together they
reflect the disparate character of work
in philosophy of religion today, with
respect to matters of both criteria and
content.

PHILIP E. DEVENISH
Union Congregational Church
United Church of Christ

mological Foundations of Religious Be-

ment and the Question of God"; Anthony Flew's "The Burden of
Proof"; Naomi Goldenberg's "The
Body of Knowledge: Religious No-
tions in the Convergence of Psycho-
analysis and Feminism"; and Gordon
Kaufman's "Reconceiving God for a
Nuclear Age."

Four essays make up the final sec-
tion, "Philosophy of Religion and Con-
temporary Culture": Wolfhart Pannen-
berg, "Meaning, Religion, and the
Question of God"; Langdon Gilkey,
"Religion and Science in an Advanced
Scientific Culture"; Leroy Rouner,
"The Meeting of East and West: Paul
Tillich's Philosophy of Religion"; and
Jürgen Moltmann's "Messianic Athe-


alism of Aquinas (R. McInerney). Three center on practical issues, exploring how one can be totally devoted to God and yet enjoy and love others, given the problems with Augustine's account (R. Adams), how one might justifiably believe that religious demands and moral obligations might really conflict for one, with reference to Kierkegaard's discussion of Genesis 22 (P. Quinn), how queer is the status of morality whether one follows B. Russell or Jesus (G. Mavrodes). W. Rowe seeks to rehabilitate an empirical argument from evil against theism, and M. Adams offers an account of the problem of evil which rightly centers not on logical issues but on sin and redemptive suffering, especially the cross. The nature of God is addressed by Wainwright, who argues that theism reasonably tends to become monotheism, and J. Ross, who argues that the possible-world metaphysics currently in vogue is incoherent and that God is the creator of kinds and possibilities, not the instantiator of one of many possible worlds.

This book belongs in academic libraries, as it is of general interest to philosophical theologians, who could also read it with advanced seminars. Others interested in the topics mentioned would find specific essays valuable.

TERRENCE W. TILLEY
St. Michael's College, Vt.


T.'s little volume mounts an attack against process theology, which he finds incoherent and contrary to the Christian (Catholic) tradition. The first chapter criticizes Cobb and Griffin's Process Theology and agrees generally with W. N. Clarke's The Philo-

sophical Approach to God: plurality is never reduced to unity. Then T. shows how process theologians have erroneously confused the Christian tradition with Calvinism and refutes their charges. The third chapter examines Hartshorne's Aquinas Lecture of 1976 and, departing from tradition, T. rejects the notion of unrealized potentialities in God. Lest creation appear an arbitrary choice of God among infinite possible worlds, T. holds that God freely and necessarily created this world. The fourth chapter criticizes authors partially influenced by process theology: "fellow travelers" K. Ward, D. Tracy, J. O'Donnell, M. Rattigan, and some excesses of W. N. Clarke. Then T. considers sympathetically M. H. Suchocki's God–Christ–Church before returning to main themes repeated throughout the book: man enjoys a natural, mediate, preconceptual knowledge of God as the "beyond" of our experiences of hope, beauty, knowing, and morality, or the cause is known in the effect; this knowledge, more than mere inference, is a necessary preparation for revelation; God is active, constituted Trinity by personal relations of love, an eternal plenitude of being without the lacks implied by time. T. also defends the notion of personal immortality as God's gift rather than man's selfish reason for doing good.

Though raising good and necessary questions about process theology, T.'s somewhat scattershot approach leaves the reader wishing for a more systematic presentation of the debate. Actually, the polarities of unity and plurality, necessity and contingency, divine omnipotence and human freedom must be preserved in their entireities in the Christian mystery. A more comprehensive view preserves the just aspects of both sides (cf. Thomist 44 [1980] 219-50).

JOHN M. MCDERMOTT, S.J.
Fordham University

The underlying thesis of this valuable book is that there is an "intimate connection" between conceptions of time and conceptions of the self. Indeed, B. believes that the two dominant, and equally problematic, conceptions of the self in the West ultimately derive from an inadequate understanding of time. B. thus undertakes a phenomenological exploration of "the temporal conditions of self as the necessary foundation for a more adequate understanding of selfhood.

The problem with traditional empiricist and rationalist conceptions is that they both presume a substantiellst understanding of the self as a static entity that lies "behind" its concrete instantiations. But, argues B., the self should not be conceived as an object-thing "in" time. Rather, the self is pre-eminently a temporal process that manifests itself as dynamic activity.

As such, the self is not a pre-existent substratum that underlies personal identity, but rather is itself the emergent by-product of acts of originative self-creation. "I" do not first exist and then act; "I" exist only in acting—this being phenomenologically true even of the moment of birth, contrary to substantiellst interpretations. Furthermore, each individual act of self-creation is itself constituted by a tripartite structure of memory, anticipation, and decision—this being what accounts for the continuity of self-identity insofar as every "now" is situated within a bidirectional horizon of the retained past and the anticipated future.

It would have been valuable to have compared these conclusions with the Buddhist doctrine of "no-self," or to have explicitly drawn the negative implications of this understanding of the self for the survivability of personal identity beyond death. But the brevity of this clearly written and conceptually rich investigation is also one of its strengths in that its concentrated clearing of the ground has served to focus attention on critical substantive issues. For this reason, B.'s book may be recommended as an excellent point of departure for independent theological reflection, particularly for anyone interested in Christian anthropology.

ROBERT F. SCUKA
Georgetown University


The slimness of this volume belies the wealth of material and reflection it contains. Divided into three chapters, this treatment of grace and sin first considers sin in the many attempts to explain its origin, then explores disunity as the symbol of sin, and finally suggests community as the symbol of grace.

T. draws on Ricoeur's image of the fault, exemplified in the split between the voluntary and the involuntary, to illuminate the emergence of sin. "The human will is only a limited power, easily turned in upon itself and prone to self-deception. Furthermore, its moment of choice takes place against the horizon of a history of sin, a societal dimension of failure, and an evolutionary struggle" (47).

In an effort to overcome the deficiencies of the theological symbol of original sin, T. suggests "disunity" as a more appropriate expression. He argues that this symbol more adequately discloses the multiple aspects of conflict and dividedness in the human situation. In treating original sin and disunity as symbols, he seems to have identified the notions of symbol and concept. It strikes this reader that "disunity" has very broad denotative power, but its
connotative power is weak due to its abstractness.

T.'s treatment of community is designed as a counterpoise to his reflections on sin's origin and nature. Grace is marked by community, and healthy, living community is the best symbol of grace. By emphasizing the primarily social character of grace (which involves as well the interior graciousness of individuals), T. remains faithful to the Old and New Testament understandings of grace as covenant and kingdom. Grace takes many social forms: a community of goods, the community of humankind, fellowship in Christ, the monastic community, the city, and finally the eschatological community.

I recommend this small work for college or seminary use, thanks to its clarity and comprehensiveness.

BRIAN O. MCDERMOTT, S.J.
Weston School of Theology, Mass.


This volume, recording a world-wide Eastern and Oriental Orthodox consultation on the World Council of Churches' Baptism, Eucharist and Ministry (Lima, 1982), will be indispensable for ecumenists, ecclesiologists, and those interested in Orthodoxy. In addition to the questions of church and sacrament, the discussions among the Orthodox on questions of fundamental theology and of the theology of reception may be of interest to a wider audience of systematic and historical theologians. As the Roman Catholic Church explores what it means to "receive" the Second Vatican Council, it is called to make official responses to ecumenical documents. For the first time since the Council of Florence, the question of reception is raised in an ecumenical context. The negative consequences of the Council of Florence, and Lyons before it, make careful attention to the nature and context of reception of particular concern to both Orthodox and Catholic.

The book contains essays by known Orthodox scholars like Nissiotis, Hopko, and Stylianopoulos, as well as less-known but important Romanian, Armenian, and Russian scholars. A key essay by the director of the World Council Commission on Faith and Order, Lutheran Gunther Gassmann, supporting speeches by Orthodox leaders from Constantinople and the U.S., and a final formulation of an Orthodox response to the document round out the volume. In this moment, prior to the forthcoming Great and Holy Synod, such inter-Orthodox reflection, theologizing, and publications are extremely significant elements in attending to world-wide Orthodox theological developments. The statements to come out of such a consultation are as much a contribution to Orthodox participation in the 20th-century ecumenical movement as they are a record of where Orthodox theology is on particular issues—in this case, the sacramental life of the churches in ecumenical dialogue.

It will be instructive to the non-Orthodox reader to follow the development of how a church which sees itself in unbroken continuity with the apostolic faith can confront dialogues that call its faith and practice into renewal. Indeed, the self-critical approach of some of these essays could be instructive to the teaching organisms of other churches that claim no less apostolic continuity than the Orthodox. The Orthodox have more experience with the modern ecumenical movement than do Roman Catholics, but less experience in free and pluralistic environments. These factors color the care that must
be expended in Orthodox reaction to these ecumenical convergences.

JEFFREY GROS, F.S.C.
Commission on Faith and Order
N.Y.C.


Six articles and four "communications" make up this report from the international symposium on Marian theology held at the Marianum in Rome, October 1984, fifth in a series held at two-year intervals. Salvatore M. Meo, O.S.M., president of the Servite faculty, presents the volume and contributes an essay on the "Mary-Church" theme in recent magisterial documents: Lumen gentium; from Paul VI, Signum magnum, Marialis cultus, and Evangelii nuntiandi; from Puebla, 1979. S. Folgado Florez, O.S.A., studies Mary-Church in Ambrose and Augustine (in Spanish). J. Aldazabal, S.D.B., considers present Roman liturgy, e.g. its community thrust (in Spanish).

The major article is by Aristide Serra, O.S.M., on the ecclesial dimensions of the figure of Mary in contemporary biblical exegesis. Continuing his earlier doctorate research and writings, Serra explores the Bible and other Jewish and Christian literature, showing bonds between Eden and Sinai and the Annunciation, Calvary, and Pentecost. He has a section also on Cant 8:5 in Jewish/Christian reading, and in application to Jn 19:25-7. Cant 8:5 was referred to Sinai and the resurrection of the just, which Christians then related to the cross and resurrection of Christ, with the mother of Jesus a facet of the Johannine theology of consolation. Cant 8:5 reads: "Under the apple tree I awakened you..." From the tree of the cross Christ awakens the Church, in the persons of his mother and the beloved disciple.

The authors of the other articles are L. Sartori and C. Molari (both in Italian); for the communications, one is in Spanish (A. Molina Prieto), one German (H. Petri), and two Italian (D. Bertetto and P. Chiocchetta).

EAMON R. CARROLL, O.CARM.
Loyola University of Chicago


The Extraordinary Synod of Bishops at Rome in November/December 1985 was a little like Sherlock Holmes's "curious incident of the dog in the nighttime" in the Arthur Conan Doyle story "Silver Blaze." When Holmes's client objected that "the dog did nothing in the nighttime," the detective explained: "That was the curious incident." The animal's failure to bark proved that he knew the intruder. This provided the key to solving the mystery.

The Synod's announcement by Pope John Paul II on January 25, 1985 was hailed by reactionary Catholics the world over as a sign that their long postconciliar nightmare was over. Church progressives worried that the gathering would repudiate Vatican II and inaugurate the "restoration" called for by Cardinal Ratzinger. Few in either camp attended to Ratzinger's explanation that a restoration of the status quo ante concilium was as undesirable as it was impossible.

The Synod confounded the unrealistic hopes and fears of partisans on both sides. The Council was affirmed, not repudiated. The representatives of the world episcopate identified two principal obstacles hampering implementation of Vatican II: opposition from certain sections of the Church's central administration, and a worldwide cultural crisis which no one at the Council could have foreseen.
This modest book is the clearest and most balanced account in English to date of an ecclesial assembly significant less for what it did than for what it did not do. "The Synod ended in a euphoric mood," R. states in conclusion. His most notable achievement is to have enabled those who were not there to understand why this mood, not fully justified by the event itself, came about.

JOHN JAY HUGHES
Archdiocese of Saint Louis


This will inevitably strike the reader as a curious book. First, because it focuses on a curious work, which P. abbreviates to DNOA, in which Augustine writes to three distinct addressees. Young Vincentius Victor had published a screed, as wild as it was confident, criticizing Augustine's profession of ignorance on the origin of the soul; he had won the admiration of an old priest, Peter, who had then called the attention of a certain Renatus to the work; Renatus in turn sent it on to Augustine. So Augustine addresses one book to Peter, scolding him for not knowing better; another to Renatus, more soberly analyzing Victor's errors and self-contradictions; and a third and fourth to Victor himself, attempting to persuade him to confess his ignorance.

The heart of P.'s study (chaps. 3-5) examines Augustine's carefully differentiated manner in dealing with these three men. He was, P. shows, an accomplished rhetorician, clear about what he meant to accomplish, and astute in taking the measure of each addressee in turn. Victor obviously admired his own rhetorical skills, which had overly impressed Peter, but P. illustrates how far Augustine's mastery of the art excelled the young man's.

In her Introduction and earlier chapters, however, P. paints in the larger background of this relatively minor skirmish: the classical and Christian attitudes toward rhetoric and its relation to philosophy, of ignorance and persuasion as contrasted with knowledge and inquiry. She is more successful here than in dealing with the problem more centrally at issue: the origin of the soul. Vacillating on how this issue related to the Pelagian controversy, she purveys the thinking of a number of Augustine "authorities"—on A.'s attitude toward pre-existence, on the damnation of infants—without always perceiving that their varying viewpoints tangle her into inconsistencies. But that is only to say, perhaps, that she is in good company, since those issues are still far from clearly resolved. In sum, a more interesting and valuable book than its unpromising title might insinuate.

ROBERT J. O'CONNELL, S.J.
Fordham University


S.'s thesis is that ca. 1080–1150 there occurred an intellectual breakthrough similar to the ones earlier in ancient Greece and later in the Enlightenment. S. characterizes these movements as rational, deductive, and inductive, using math and an analysis of nature on its own as opposed to mere acceptance of traditional views. The intellectual background starts with the ancient Greeks, who began rational inquiry, i.e., an impersonal way of reacting to human experience, and S. then shows why that medieval era was comparable to the earlier one. The next chapters deal with the role of reason, new concept of science, critical examination of tradition, and the voices of opposition; how some writers viewed themselves as modern while others attacked them as
disruptive; why the movement withered, and some references to more recent trends.

There are stimulating and provocative ideas and comments in this study, and on the whole I enjoyed reading it, but I remain unconvinced by the main thrust. Too many questions were raised by sweeping generalizations and assertions. Were the preconditions for an "enlightenment" really applicable to the ancient Greek world? A number of L. White's insights into the medieval view of nature and the goal of science are overlooked. Were not the conditions—political, social, economic—ca. 1150 even more conducive to order, stability, and advances than the starting point of this study, and so why did the movement decline? Can one really say that the systematics that replaced the scientific mode met a psychological need? The translation "all letters is a whore" (78) is abysmal; there are typo problems with the bibliography (112). In general, a provocative but flawed work.

THOMAS E. MORRISSEY
State University College
Fredonia, N.Y.


A reworking of the seminary-professor author's doctoral dissertation. While it primarily constitutes a contribution to the discipline of the history of biblical exegesis, its four chapters present a fairly complete analysis of Bonaventure's life, works, method, and purpose in interpreting the Scriptures.

The book illustrates how B. always sought for a synthetic picture of the biblical message. While giving preference to the literal meaning of the text, as opposed to its figurative and spiritual meaning, he was ever aware that the sacred books are ordered to the salvation of mankind and to eternal happiness. Though not novel in his approach, B. was original insofar as he sought to integrate a valid interpretation into his theological system; and this latter involves the whole complex of doctrinal, moral, ascetical, and mystical dimensions.

To put these assessments to the test, the book then offers a detailed study of B.'s commentary on Luke 18:34—19:42. The interpretation of this pericope shows that, in the main, it is not a scholarly lecture for classroom work, but a practical one addressed to his fellow Franciscans for their own life-guidance and as a help in their preaching ministry to others. This section is a small fraction of B.'s exegetical work, but it gives a good cross section of his method and message.

This book will have many uses. Teachers of medieval thought will welcome the updated study of the life-and-works sections. Those constructing notes on the history of scriptural interpretation will be helped by the sections exposing the medieval mode of interpreting the sacred texts. The general reader will profit from the pastoral observations on the relative merits of wealth and poverty in the living of the Christian life.

RICHARD P. DESCHARNAIS, C.S.C.
Boston, Mass.


John Ruusbroec (1293-1381) created one of the richest mystical theologies of the Middle Ages. Yet English translations and commentary have been rare—which makes this book all the more valuable. W. translates four complete treatises that span R.'s career: The Spiritual Espousals, The Sparkling Stone, A Mirror of Eternal Blessedness,
and The Little Book of Clarification. These works display extraordinary range and subtlety. They patiently discuss psychological states, moral virtues, the gifts of the Spirit, and the Eucharist, and are informed by a consistent Trinitarian and Christological focus. Espousals considers the active, interior, and contemplative lives within a love mysticism centered on Christ the bridegroom. Here and elsewhere R.'s powerful descriptions of union with God "without intermediary" and "without difference" echo Eckhartian themes of emptiness, breakthrough, and the Word's birth in the soul; yet R. repeatedly affirms (as Eckhart occasionally did not) that "No creature can become God" (230). He maintains that we "feel ourselves entirely in God and entirely in ourselves" (172). Underlying this duality is a dynamic that R. frequently describes in images of light or water: "God is a flowing and ebbing sea which flows out into all his beloved . . . and which flows back with those upon whom he has bestowed his gifts" (103). This rhythmic motion expresses Trinitarian life and yields a "common life" that flows easily between contemplation of God and virtuous action (184).

The translations are literate and clear, and the rendering of Clarification compares well with the recent critical edition and accompanying translation (Leiden, 1981). W.'s Introduction discusses R.'s life and influence, and aptly describes him as "a superb phenomenologist of the mystical life" (18). W. comments perceptively on the volume's treatises and is especially helpful in analyzing Espousals, R.'s most complex work. In short, this splendid book gives us a direct and fresh look at R. the theologian and spiritual master.

DONALD F. DUCLOW  
Gwynedd-Mercy College, Pa.


This title recalls the humanist attacks on scholasticism and the bitter recriminations of the Reuchlin affair. O. gives the background to such disputes and places them in context. The German universities were a late phenomenon because of political and economic conditions; they arose at a time of acrimonious dispute within scholasticism—antiqui vs. moderni—and within Christendom—the Avignon papacy, the Great Western Schism, conciliarism—and thus had a troubled heritage from the outset. Any attempt at change or reform was bound to awaken both old and new quarrels. A simple proposal, changing the way grammar was taught, unleashed a flood of animosity. Most arts faculties followed the model and texts from Paris, and so grammar was really a part of logic, and speculative questions abounded. The new wave proposed to go back to the study of ancient authors; rhetoric, poetry, and oratory would be reborn. But this seemed to imply that elegant Latin style was more important than content, and so the Fathers and more recent schoolmen with their concern for truth and doctrine were demeaned and thus the conflicts grew.

O. goes into the many quarrels which often were tied to local politics and interests as well as personal antipathies more than to larger issues. Were not a number of those humanists merely spouters of Italian ways and ideas? At times scholastics defended humanistic ideas and practices while those decrying the new mode came from the Reformed circles; the lines were not clearly drawn and fixed. The political context, patronage issues, and personal relations were all too important.

O. has presented in great detail a number of petty squabbles, has shown the various phases and aspects of the problem: co-operation, détente, feuds,
pamphlets, wars, reforms, the Reuchlin case, leading to the final rout of scholasticism after 70 years of attack. Drastic changes were imposed on both subjects taught and texts used while at the same time the Lutheran Reformation began to have its impact on these schools and disputes. *Studia humanitatis* became dominant as medieval scholasticism became undefended and unmourned in many cases. Yet in most centers there was no simple dualism of Reformer vs. reactionary, humanist vs. scholastic, and it would not be long before the Reformation debates would bring their own forms of scholasticism into the schools of the different confessions.

O. argues that the Reuchlin affair was a dispute with far more overtones of an anti-Jewish crusade than anti-humanism. One slip has the author refer to the schools that taught the *trivium* as "trivial schools," which is not a felicitous phrase. In general, though, scholars interested in the state of intellectual life in the German schools for this era will find this study a mine of information and data.

**THOMAS E. MORRISSEY**
*State University College*
*Fredonia, N.Y.*


*Catholic Boston,* a collection of articles commemorating the 175th anniversary of the founding of the diocese, analyzes the development of the Boston Catholic community between 1870 and 1970 in six distinct areas: the attitude and involvement of Archbishops William O'Connell and Richard Cushing in political and civic affairs (James M. O'Toole); the development of Catholic charities as evidenced in the founding of the Home for Destitute Children, the St. Vincent de Paul Society, and the Catholic Charitable Bureau (Susan S. Walton); the relationship between the parochial and public-school systems during O'Connell's tenure (James W. Sanders); the significant role of communities of sisters in both the growth of the archdiocese and the encouragement of an alternate model for the role of women in Church and society (Mary J. Oates); the social origins, recruitment patterns, training, assignments, finances, and pastoral practices of the secular clergy (Robert E. Sullivan); and the changes in Catholic religious practices as reflected in the liturgical, civic, and devotional calendars of the community (Thomas E. Wanger). The essays are preceded by a fine synthesizing introduction by Thomas H. O'Connor and followed by a useful index. The work is notable for its attempt to write history from below and its incorporation of the methodological perspectives of feminist historical scholarship, sociology, and anthropology into the study of the Catholic community. In whole and in part the book could serve as a model for the type of diocesan history which needs to be written.

**JOSEPH P. CHINNICI, O.F.M.**
*Franciscan School of Theology*
*Berkeley, Calif.*


The story of the Chota Nagpur mission at the turn of the century is one of the most interesting chapters in Catholic mission history. Two characters dominated the scene: Constant Lievens, S.J. (1856–93), the zealous Flemish apostle, and John Hoffman, S.J. (1857-1928), the determined German organizer. Both loved the tribal peoples of the Chota Nagpur region,
but they demonstrated it in different ways. Lievens defended the tribals in the courts, baptized over 100,000 Catholics, and died at the age of 37. Hoffman studied the people and the language, helped change the land laws, founded Catholic co-operatives, and died at the age of 71. The Lievens story has already been told. The present work by Tete tells the Hoffman story.

Driven from Germany by Bismarck’s policies, Hoffman joined the Belgium Province of the Society of Jesus in 1877 and was immediately sent to India. After 15 years of Jesuit studies, he began mission work among the Mundas which was to last 21 years. Within those years he laid the legal groundwork for the Chota Nagpur Tenancy Act of 1908, founded the Chota Nagpur Catholic Co-operative Bank, wrote his Mundari Grammar, and completed all but the last volume of his 15-volume Encyclopedia Mundarica. Scholar, legalist, organizer, Hoffman brought the tribals into the modern world, while teaching the scientific world about the tribal language and culture.

Tete’s research on Hoffman is a valuable contribution to the history of the Chota Nagpur mission, but it is marred by more than the enclosed four pages of errata. A severely edited second edition could make this interesting work as readable as it is informative.

WALTER A. COOK, S.J. Georgetown University


This volume, modest in size, is rich in insight and elaborates an intriguing thesis. M., a teacher of sociology at the University of Georgia, explores the relationship between Christian faith and political action by studying the life and thought of Dietrich Bonhoeffer from the standpoint of sociopsychology. His thesis is that the proper context for interpreting Bonhoeffer, the German theologian martyred at the hands of the Nazi Gestapo for conspiring against Hitler, is neither the church nor his nation but his family, and, further, that family events inspired his ethic of discipleship as well as his political resistance.

M. argues that what motivated Bonhoeffer to become a theologian and an ethicist was the event of his brother Walter’s death during World War I. The 12-year-old Dietrich, witnessing the trauma and alleged guilt feelings of his pious mother and secular father, chose a church vocation in solidarity with his mother and in opposition to the authority of his father and older brothers. Thus was launched a religious quest in which the paradox of the costly grace of discipleship provided a way of dealing with the problem of death and of restoring broken social relationships. His ethic of discipleship led ultimately to political resistance and incarceration. In prison, M. proposes, Bonhoeffer transcended that ethic and its psychological antecedents and broached a political theory and theology for a religionless, totalitarian age.

This carefully wrought book is indeed provocative. I believe M. is correct in emphasizing the importance of the family in any assessment of Bonhoeffer’s life and thought. However, I think he goes too far in his psychologizing, especially in his leaning so heavily on the supposed opposition between Bonhoeffer’s mother and father. Also, I would want to balance the family’s influence with that of the Bible and the Lutheran tradition. Despite these reservations, however, I think this book deserves careful study by anyone interested in Bonhoeffer or in the question of the witness of Christians in the modern world.

JOHN D. GODSEY Wesley Theological Seminary, D.C.

In conjunction with the 20th anniversary of the conclusion of Vatican II, a variety of books has appeared examining the initial decades of the postconciliar era. O.'s work is a collection of revised papers originally prepared between 1982-84 as discussion pieces for a group of scholars and pastoral ministers from the Great Lakes region. The individual essays were intended to review the Vatican II documents and their implementation within the American Church.

Often with collections of this sort there is some inconsistency in quality among the various contributions. While the broad spectrum of perspectives brings richness to the work, the variation in style and completeness does detract somewhat from the overall impact of the book. The reader may wish that the editor had applied his own skill to arrive at a greater homogeneity in organization and presentation.

The work has many merits. Chapters focusing on Lumen gentium and Christus dominus (by J. Linnan) and Gaudium et spes (J. Gremillion) are especially perceptive and thoughtful. Kevin Irwin's analysis of Sacrosanctum concilium includes a solid analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of the charter for liturgical renewal and a clear vision of the challenges still to be faced by the Church in the U.S. Equally helpful are the discussions of the documents on divine revelation (D. Senior), religious liberty (Linnan), and ecumenism (A. Cunningham). Two related essays are also included: editor O'Connell surveys "Vatican II: Setting, Themes, Future Agenda," and J. Nilson reflects on "The De-Clericalization of the U.S. Church." Were this book to be selected for use in the college context, O.'s essay might be read first as a concise introduction to the Vatican II era.

This volume will be informative for those unfamiliar with the preconciliar Catholic experience as well as the Council's teaching. Even scholars versed in Vatican II thought will find stimulus for reflection in this 20-year retrospective.

DONALD J. GRIMES, C.S.C.
King's College, Pa.


This excellent book is a revised edition of Macquarrie's Dictionary of Christian Ethics published in 1967. It reflects the major changes which have occurred in Christian ethics in recent years. It includes entries on basic ethical concepts, biblical ethics, theological ethics, philosophical-ethical traditions, the ethics of major non-Christian religious traditions, psychological and other important concepts, and substantial ethical problems. "The main criterion for inclusion was the importance of the topic for Christian ethical reflection and, in general, the contributors wrote to highlight this importance" (vi). Approximately 40 percent of the entries are from the original edition, though most often these have been revised. New entries include a number on applied ethics, particularly on biomedical ethics.

The entries themselves are concise and to the point. They range from abandonment, through Aristotelian ethics, divorce, evangelical ethics, liberation theology, responsibility, and the Sermon on the Mount, to Zoroastrian ethics. The entries are cross-referenced and the longer ones have bibliographies. A helpful index of names concludes the volume.

The number of authors has "more than doubled since the first edition." They come from "Protestant, Anglican,
Roman Catholic, Orthodox, and Jewish backgrounds" (v). Their articles are generally well-balanced, with attention given to varied points of view on controverted topics. The authors own views shine through clearly at times, but generally balance and reserve are operative. Roman Catholic readers, however, may note the absence of contributors from the Grisez-May-Finnis school of contemporary Thomists.

In the coming years this fine dictionary should become the standard work in the field. Its lapses (e.g., reference to the Roman Catholic subdiaconate on p. 81) are rare and its strengths considerable. It will be a necessity for all theological libraries.

JOHN W. CROSSIN, O.S.F.S.
De Sales School of Theology
Washington, D.C.


S. is a professor of moral theology at the University of Münster, West Germany. This book makes available a collection of eight essays, prepared during the past decade. The volume has two parts. Part 1, "On Meta-ethics," includes three essays: on the specific character of Christian ethics, on the relationship between moral imperatives and knowledge of God, and on decisionism (prescriptivism). Part 2, "On the Language of Morality," includes five less closely related pieces: on the use of words such as "human" and "Christian" to signify presupposed moral standards, on the meaning of "neighbor" in the parable of the Good Samaritan, on the description of surgical intervention as "permissible bodily injury," on the maxim that the end does not justify the means, and on various meanings of "deontological" and "teleological." The translation is readable. Notes, grouped at the end of the volume, provide bibliography, and there is a brief analytical index. The volume is well produced.

Perhaps the easiest way to help readers of TS locate S. in current moral-theological debate is to note that Richard A. McCormick, S.J., has learned much from him and strongly commends his work in a foreword to this book. S. knows some analytic philosophy and uses analytic techniques in arguments with his German opponents. However, in these essays S. never acknowledges, must less answers, criticisms by English-speaking ethicists of views he espouses. For example, he offers no defense here of the practicability of proportionalism.

S. emphasizes his common ground with classical moral theology and ignores important differences. He also reduces Christian love to benevolence (153) and the opposition between morality and immorality to that between altruism and egoism (49, 98, 147). These positions are assumed without argument.

GERMAIN GRIZEZ
Mount Saint Mary's College, Md.


This volume combines 13 selections from the Victorian debates with three contemporary essays to explore the questions of what fundamental religious beliefs a person may hold, can hold, and ought hold, given the evidence to hand. W. K. Clifford, St. George Jackson Mivart, James Fitzjames Stephen, J. S. Mill, William James, John Henry Newman, Leslie Stephen, Richard Hutton, W. G. Ward, and Henry Sidgwick are the Victorian representatives. The Introduction provides a very helpful guide not only to the issues in question and the men who
debated them, but also to the factors in
the intellectual and cultural scene
which made the Victorian discussion
between British intuitionists and em-
piricists so intense.

The Victorian essays fall into two
groups. The first set centers on the
classical ethics-of-belief debate (Clif-
ford, James, Mill, et al.), and the sec-
don on exploring the relations of evi-
dence to belief and assent, as focused
by Newman in his Grammar of Assent,
with a final selection from Ward which
ties the two groups together. Among
the moderns, in original essays, George
Mavrodes argues that probability is not
necessarily the overarching guide for
belief, and James Ross that the Victo-
rian and modern debates have myopi-
cally ignored the real contributions of
Augustine and Aquinas concerning the
role of the will and faith in most know-
ing. Van Harvey's reprinted essay sup-
ports a Cliffordian ethics of belief, but
argues that its demands are role-spe-
cific.

M.'s excellent selections not only in-
vite the reader to participate in the
dialogue but also reveal some hidden
roots of many strategies in contempo-
rary arguments. The book will be most
useful to provoke discussion in philos-
ophy-of-religion seminars, but should
also be read by any interested in the
Victorian era or in the justifiability of
religious claims.

TERRENCE W. TILLEY
St. Michael's College, Vt.

AS I HAVE LOVED YOU: THE CHAL-
LENGE OF CHRISTIAN ETHICS. By
James P. Hanigan. New York: Paulist,

Hanigan of Duquesne University has
written a very helpful summary of fun-
damental moral theology. The book is
organized with discussion questions
and should prove a useful text for col-
lege courses and for adult-education
groups. H. has a refreshing writing
style and he treats a host of issues,
notably including a chapter on the
evangelical counsels and moral theol-
ogy. The book's nature is such that H.
does not get into detailed critiques of
the issues he treats. Thus my critical
suggestions will be directed to two
points about H.'s ordering of issues,
and two points he might have devel-
oped further.

In terms of order, from the beginning
of the book, I was looking for H. to
interrelate love of neighbor and love of
God. Eventually he treats this issue
well, but since it is his title topic, I
would have preferred more on it at the
beginning. Also in terms of order, I
think that conscience is more clearly
understood when it is treated after
rules and norms, instead of in the Han-
igan format, in which conscience is
treated before norms.

In terms of further development, I
believe the relation between external
actions and sin is an important and
difficult topic. I have no problems with
what H. says, but I wish he had said
more. Also, he could have done more to
address the relationship between hu-
man reason and the teaching of the
Church. He offers a nicely-balanced
formula on this theme (183), but recent
events may well make both theologians
and students wish for more exploration
of this issue.

In sum, while there may be some
questions about H.'s topical order and
development of issues, his book is a
valuable basic volume on fundamental
moral theology.

PHILIP S. KEANE, S.S.
St. Mary's Seminary, Baltimore

THE CODE OF CANON LAW: A TEXT
AND COMMENTARY. Edited by James
A. Coriden, Thomas J. Green, and
Donald E. Heintschel. New York: Paul-

Among the commentaries published
since the promulgation of the new Code
of Canon Law in 1983, this one, com-
misioned by the Canon Law Society
of America, occupies a significant place on the international scene and, certainly for the time being, a unique place in the English-speaking world. The Society's aim was to provide a mainly practical guidebook for the students and practitioners of canon law within a short time after the Code has entered into force; the aim has been abundantly achieved.

The commentary is the work of 24 contributors, all from the U.S., representing every aspect of the "word of canon law"; judges and administrators, researchers and teachers brought together their learning and pastoral experience. The commentary follows the Code in the distribution and organization of its material. There is a general Introduction (John Alesandro), with a perhaps all-too-short historical survey and rather concise doctrinal references. Its relative brevity is balanced in the case of several "books" and "titles" (the Code's terminology) by more detailed presentations of the development and theological significance of particular canonical institutions. The canons are quoted in English, in the translation published earlier by the Canon Law Society. Although virtually every canon is distinctly commented on, the comments are mostly overall explanations of the meaning of a norm; a text in translation does not lend itself to critical exegesis. At the end of various units, appropriate bibliographies are given, some short, some long, according to the judgment of the authors. At the end of the opus, there are two "concordances" to help readers bring together the canons of the old and new Code; there is also a well-structured analytical index referring to both topics and canons.

The typographical presentation of the rather complex and complicated material has been done with care; the manifold sections in the text and the types used for different emphases are well co-ordinated. Each individual contribution is precisely that: the work of one author, not the production of a team. Hence, on closer study differences are revealed. Some authors give more space to the historical background of the canons (e.g., Provost, Lynch, Doyle); some concentrate more specifically on the transition from the old Code to the new one (Green, Hill, Risk); some excel in handling contemporary practical problems (McManus for sacramental law, Wrenn for procedure). Overall, the contributors have made an effort to interpret the law with that "new attitude of the mind" (novus habitus mentis) that Paul VI urged so many times on canon lawyers. While this work may not be the last word in the application of new hermeneutical insights in canon law, it is certainly not a legalistic textbook on the preconciliar model.

There cannot be any doubt that the production of this commentary has been an extraordinary achievement in a relatively short time. It can be legitimately classified as one of the four or five best ones that have appeared hitherto in any language. It remains, however, principally, though not exclusively, a handbook for practical guidance in the application of the law. The need now is for more critical and constructive reflections not only on the legal rules expressed in the Code but even more on the values that the norms intend to uphold and to protect. While this commentary represents an important step in the development of canon law in this post-Vatican II age, many more steps must follow before we can say that the vision of the Council has fully permeated the legal life of the Church.

LADISLAS ORSY, S.J.  
Catholic University of America

THE FAMILY AND PASTORAL CARE.  
By Herbert Anderson. Philadelphia:  


These books continue the Fortress Press Theology and Pastoral Care Series, which is particularly committed to affirming, while also transcending, pastoral theology’s current dependence on secular theories of psychology and therapy. This objective, calling as it does for a critical correlational method of practical theology, constitutes a difficult task. Previous books in the series have met this objective; others have not. Like their companions in the series, these books, while useful in themselves and valuable contributions to the literature on pastoral care, are unequally successful vis-à-vis this methodological objective.

Anderson’s discussion of family therapy and pastoral care is the least successful in bringing together its two conversation partners in a mutually-critical theological dialogue. He helpfully surveys many insights from a systems approach to family therapy in ways that show sensitivity to the varied demands placed upon families today and upon clergy who counsel families. The theological tradition functions more as a sounding board against which themes from family therapy resonate with related biblical and/or theological themes.

Underwood’s consideration of the proper balance between empathy and confrontation makes the point that confrontation can be as legitimate a part of the pastor’s concern for his fellow Christians as empathy. U. makes this point in contrast to much of pastoral care’s reliance upon Rogerian approaches to counseling, which are often interpreted by pastors to exclude confrontation as unhelpful to the client and as theologically inappropriate. U. situates his discussion of contemporary pastoral care within the context of European pastoral theologies (e.g., those of Thurneysen, Faber, and van der Schoot) which are grounded in a theology of revelation which he finds basically ahistorical and monological (God reveals, humanity responds). However, U.’s constructive approach, while emphasizing dialogue, still derives its principal category—respect for persons in all modes of communicating the gospel—more from a psychological perspective than from that of Christian theology.

Lyon identifies and critiques foundational understandings which inform pastoral care in the contemporary context, which is marked by a deep ambiguity toward aging and an isolating individualism which negatively affects our views of human fulfilment. To this end L. explores three selected themes from the Christian tradition (John Calvin on old age as a blessing of God; John Chrysostom on old age as a period of growth; Richard Baxter on old age as expressive of a distinctive religioethical witness) and critiques the tradition for an inherent dualism that splits body and nature or spirit. Finally, he proposes a metaethical task approach which integrates concerns about aging from social psychology and the Christian tradition in terms of concern for the meaningfulness of the moral life. He draws upon the Christian heritage, but without simply repeating the insights of the past as though they are, or should be, necessarily adequate today. As a result, L.’s book succeeds in establishing the kind of mutually critical theological correlation which this series envisions as the method of practical theology most adequate for our day.

MICHAEL J. McGINNIS, F.S.C.  
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Theological Studies
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Presenting This Issue

We open Volume 47 with four distinct kinds of articles (ethical, systematic, historical, and methodological), the annual Moral Notes contributed once again by four scholars, and a short note on St. Paul and resurrection.

The Ethics of Nuclear Deterrence: A Critical Comment on the Pastoral Letter of the U.S. Catholic Bishops argues that the position taken by the bishops, which allows possession of nuclear weapons but seems to condemn virtually all use, is logically and practically incoherent. If the significance of nuclear weapons for warfare is rightly grasped, it can be seen that the considerations, notably an escalation risk, by which the letter rules out use have not the absolute force claimed for them. Sir Michael Quinlan, M.A. from Oxford, is Permanent Secretary, United Kingdom Department of Employment. Areas of his special competence and concern include defense strategy and policy, labor-market policy, and public administration.

The Church: Community of the Holy Spirit argues that the Church is primarily not a hierarchically structured society but a mystery: a community gathered in the Spirit. However, it is also essentially visible: a sacrament. But throughout all this the Church is a human institution, limited, time-conditioned, and always in need to reform. By reason of these many aspects one and the same person can simultaneously view the Church with dismay, gratitude, resentment, and hope. John H. Wright, S.J., S.T.D. from the Gregorian University in Rome, is professor of systematic theology at the Jesuit School of Theology at Berkeley. His particular interests include divine providence, ecumenism, and recent developments in Catholic theology. He is currently preparing a book on God's action in the world—a theology of providence.

Resistance to the Virginal Ideal in Late-Fourth-Century Rome: The Case of Jovinian claims that previous studies of the monk Jovinian, which have seen him as an antiascetical heretic, have failed to pay sufficient attention to the context of his views at that time in that city, and argues that Jovinian should be seen primarily as an opponent of Manichean and Priscillianist propaganda. David G. Hunter, Ph.D. from the University of Notre Dame, is assistant professor of theology at the College of St. Thomas, St. Paul, Minn. Areas of his special interest include fourth-century monasticism and asceticism. He has recently completed a translation of, and commentary on, two early monastic treatises of John Chrysostom, to be published by the Edwin Mellen Press.

Doing Theology by Heart: John S. Dunne's Theological Method systematizes and examines the singular, intriguing method of theologiz-
being employed by the American Catholic theologian John S. Dunne, whose work has been widely appreciated but rarely studied in depth and detail. Jon Nilson, Ph.D. from the University of Notre Dame, is chairperson and associate professor in the department of theology at Loyola University of Chicago. Theological method and political theologies claim his special interest. He is currently exploring the theological links between personal spirituality and social transformation in American Catholic traditions.

Notes on Moral Theology: 1986 divides its material among four authors. Richard A. McCormick, S.J., S.T.D. from the Gregorian University in Rome, currently the John A. O'Brien Professor of Christian Ethics at the University of Notre Dame, focuses on fundamental moral, with specific attention to the theological issues of dissent triggered by the declaration of the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith that Catholic University's Charles Curran may no longer teach as a Catholic theologian. Lisa Sowle Cahill, Ph.D. from the University of Chicago Divinity School, associate professor of theology at Boston College, discusses sanctity-of-life/quality-of-life/social-justice issues. William C. Spohn, S.J., likewise Ph.D. from the Divinity School of the University of Chicago, takes up the fascinating topic of virtue and character in North American society. John Langan, S.J., with a doctorate in philosophy from the University of Michigan, acting director of the Woodstock Theological Center in Washington, D.C., discusses the economic pastoral of the U.S. bishops and significant reactions thereto.

Paul and the Resurrection of the Dead adds an important note by Ben F. Meyer to his September 1986 article "Did Paul's View of the Resurrection of the Dead Undergo Development?" Prof. Meyer, who teaches in the department of religious studies at McMaster University, Hamilton, Ontario, finds a recent article that "has pioneered a well-focused and solid alternative" to a position which he himself continues to prefer.

Walter J. Burghardt, S.J.
Editor
BOOKS RECEIVED

SCRIPTURAL STUDIES

DOCTRINAL THEOLOGY

HISTORICAL


Gerkin, C. V. Widening the Horizons:


PHILOSOPHY


SPECIAL QUESTIONS


