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THEOLOGICAL STUDIES (ISSN 0040-5639) is published quarterly in March, June, September, and December by Theological Studies, Inc., at 428 East Preston St., Baltimore, Md. 21202. Second class postage paid at Baltimore, Md., and at additional mailing offices. POSTMASTER, please send address changes to THEOLOGICAL STUDIES, 428 East Preston St., Baltimore, Md. 21202.

YEARLY SUBSCRIPTION: U.S. $12.00; Canada and foreign $15.00. Single copies $3.50.

RENEWALS AND NEW SUBSCRIPTIONS should be accompanied by a remittance in U.S. funds and sent to Theological Studies, P.O. Box 64002, Baltimore, Md. 21264.

CHANGES OF ADDRESS and business correspondence should be sent to Theological Studies, Business Office, 428 E. Preston St., Baltimore, Md. 21202.

MANUSCRIPTS (normally the ribbon copy and a legible xerox), together with return postage, should be sent to Editor, Theological Studies, Georgetown University, Washington, D.C., 20057. Authors should certify that the article is not being submitted simultaneously to another journal.

BOOKS FOR REVIEW should be sent to Book Review Editor, Theological Studies, Georgetown University, Washington, D.C. 20057.

BACK ISSUES are available from the office in Washington, D.C.

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I am persuaded that the June 1983 TS ranks among the most significant issues we have published in recent years. Three major articles, a lengthy bulletin, and two shorter notes tackle theological and spiritual concerns that my distinguished predecessor John Courtney Murray would have designated “neuralgic.”

**Just-War Doctrine in a Nuclear Context** analyzes the problems of nuclear deterrence and defense under the categories of the just-war principle. It concludes that a counterforce nuclear deterrence/defense policy combined with new defensive systems such as space defense and civil defense could meet just-war requirements and provide a long-term basis for free-world security and arms control. WILLIAM V. O’BRIEN, Ph.D. from Georgetown University in international relations (1953), is professor of government and director of graduate studies in Georgetown’s department of government. Areas of his special competence are just-war doctrine, international law with emphasis on the law of war, and international relations with stress on security issues. Among his recent publications is *The Conduct of Just and Limited War* (Praeger, 1981). Work in progress includes “Israel’s War with the PLO: A Study in the Utility and Morality of Force.”

**Recent Historic Events: Jewish and Christian Interpretations** is an effort to probe some of the similarities and differences between contemporary Jewish and Christian theological thinking. The author suggests that the Jewish thinkers tend to focus their concern with history on recent events, whereas Christian thinkers seem more attentive to broad historical shifts. He then speculates that a possible explanation for this divergence may be found in each faith’s root experience. EUGENE B. BOROWITZ, with a doctorate in education from Teachers College, Columbia, is Univ. Professor of Education and Jewish Religious Thought at Hebrew Union College–Jewish Institute of Religion (N.Y.C.) and concurrently Albert A. List Professor of Jewish Studies at Harvard Divinity School. He specializes in Jewish theology, focusing particularly on contemporary systematic Jewish theology and rabbinic theology. Behrman House has just published his *Choices in Modern Jewish Thought*, and he is doing a Wittgensteinian study of the language structure in which the rabbis theologize.

**Angels Black and White: Loyola’s Spiritual Discernment in Historical Perspective** argues that the Erasmus-Luther controversy enlarges and clarifies the intellectual importance of Ignatius’ rule for the discernment of spirits and also his thirteenth rule for thinking with the Church; it thus appeals for historical method as an alternative to the hagiographical tradition on Loyola. MARJORIE O’ROURKE BOYLE, Ph.D.
in theology from St. Michael's College in the University of Toronto (1974), reveals particular competence in the history of theological method and hermeneutics, as well as in Renaissance humanism, especially Erasmus. Her most recent book is *Rhetoric and Reform: Erasmus' Civil Dispute with Luther* (Harvard, 1983); she is editor, with Charles Trinkaus, of the four volumes of controversies with Protestant reformers for The Collected Works of Erasmus.

**Jesus from the Other Side of History: Christology in Latin America** raises the question whether a Christology indigenous to Latin America is possible. In light of the methodological claims being made, the author finds inadequate the Christologies so far produced. Hence, in the language of the liberation theologians themselves, he seeks to articulate the conditions that would make such a Christology possible. Michael L. Cook, S.J., Th.D. from Berkeley's Graduate Theological Union (1974), on leave from his position as associate professor of systematic theology in the Jesuit School of Theology at Berkeley, is visiting professor in religious studies at Gonzaga University, Spokane, and rector-president of St. Michael's Institute there. His focus on systematic theology is evident in his *The Jesus of Faith: A Study in Christology* (Paulist, 1981).

**Episcopal Collegiality and Papal Primacy in the Pre-Vatican I American Church** indicates that the bishops and other sources of catechetical instruction in the U.S. Church taught a doctrine on collegiality and papal primacy that is more consonant with the teaching of *Lumen gentium* than with the generally perceived understanding of *Pastor aeternus*. Particular attention is paid to the writings of Francis Patrick Kenrick and Martin John Spalding. Paul K. Hennessy, C.F.C., professor of religious studies at Iona College, New Rochelle, N.Y., is most at home in ecclesiology, with special reference to the nineteenth-century American Church. He is currently working on the reception of doctrine as reflected in the post-Vatican II presentations of the teachings of *Pastor aeternus* in the United States.

**Action for Justice as Constitutive of the Preaching of the Gospel: What Did the 1971 Synod Mean?** examines the elusive term "constitutive" in the synod's document on justice, in an effort to determine to what extent it clarifies the spiritual and religious basis of the Catholic Church's commitment to justice. Charles M. Murphy, S.T.D. from the Gregorian University, is rector of the North American College in Rome and conducts a seminar in theological method for the Gregorian. The urgency of other significant articles has compelled us to omit from the June issue the third in a series of five essays in philosophical theology by the John Courtney Murray group. The series will resume in September.

This substantial book begins with an effort to determine what is distinctive in apocalyptic and thus to decide which works should be designated as apocalypses. Rowland then discusses the contents of the selected works in terms of the heavenly and the earthly, of the past and the future. The temporal range of the apocalyptic works considered runs from several centuries B.C. (1 Enoch, Daniel, Jubilees) into second-century Christianity and rabbinic Judaism.

The definition of “apocalyptic” is notoriously difficult. Although distinctive literary features are shared by many apocalypses, they are not universally present and are increasingly recognized as secondary elements. Excluding both literary features and subject matter as definitive, R. finds the common factor in apocalyptic to be “the belief that God’s will can be discerned by means of a revelation which unfolds directly the hidden things of God.” This element is more important for him than eschatology, and the absence of it leads R. to exclude from his treatment the Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs and the Sibylline Oracles. Although I have no substitute to propose, I find R.’s definition no less arbitrary than some of those he rejects. In the long run, he does not establish but merely affirms the defining factor. As for the range of works considered, I judge it more profitable to include Ezekiel, Trito-Isaiah, Zechariah, and Joel at the early end of the apocalyptic spectrum (thus starting the trajectory several centuries earlier than 1 Enoch or Daniel), whether or not those works meet the exact definition of an apocalypse—a definition that is always somewhat arbitrary. At the other end of the spectrum, I remain suspicious of R.’s inclusion of Slavonic Enoch because it remains uncertain how much of that work is truly of second-century A.D. provenance rather than of much later origin.

The heart of R.’s book is the study of the contents of the various apocalypses he has chosen to consider. A good bibliography and nearly seventy pages of notes (unfortunately bunched at the end instead of being distributed as footnotes) are evidence of his control of the subject. The detail of the treatment, which makes the book impractical for beginners, offers more advanced readers a mine of information. (My attempts to use the subject index warned me, however, that there are many more references to some listed topics than indicated therein.) The style is somewhat rambling, but that is more than offset by solid judgment and truly perceptive observations about the remarkable variations in
apocalyptic imagery and techniques.

I judge this a significant book, but inevitably there are differences of opinion. In his discussion of the Son of Man, R. draws considerably upon the Similitudes of Enoch, but only latterly (265) does he warn the reader that this section of Enoch is missing from the Qumran fragments of some dozen manuscripts. An assertion that such absence does not disprove Jewish origin is not an adequate caution in this highly disputed subject. Similarly, I would have expected more caution to the reader about the identification of the Son of Man from the Similitudes with Enoch, or the identification of a son of man from Daniel with an angel. There are serious objections to both identifications, and thus more detailed argumentation is needed, in my judgment. Yet, all in all, the solidity and scope of R.'s book are hard to rival in English.

Union Theological Seminary, N.Y.C.  
RAYMOND E. BROWN, S.S.


Oxford Professor Harvey first presented the substance of this book in his 1980 Brampton Lectures. With its basic theme of "respect for the basic historical reliability of the gospels," this book in many ways resembles and to some extent draws upon that recent scholarship characterized as the new search for the historical Jesus. In some aspects, however, it is quite different.

The particular approach advanced by H. is in terms of "the constraints of history" understood as the limits and/or options imposed on a person and the meaning of that person's actions within any given sociocultural milieu. H. argues that a great more can be known about a person's life from the bare facts of history than just the incontestable datum itself. Thus, he begins with the premises of four key historical facts: that Jesus was a teacher well known in Galilee and Jerusalem; that he had a reputation for miraculous cures; that he was seriously involved in controversies over the interpretation of Jewish religious law; and that he was crucified under Pontius Pilate. H. then expands the implications of these facts into what he believes is an equally unassailable overview of the significance of Jesus' life on the basis of the constraints which he terms political and legal, temporal, philosophical, linguistic, and theological.

In his discussion of the first two constraints, H. repeats the positions presented in his 1977 book Jesus on Trial. Surveying both the inconsistencies of interpretation presented by the Gospels as well as the controversies over Torah at the time, he concludes that Jesus was "delivered" or "handed over" out of political expediency on the charge of sedition.
This outcome was occasioned, paradoxically, by Jesus' breaking of all the usual constraints in the manner of a prophet of the end-time. Similarly, in regard to his miracles, Jesus seems to have deliberately risked his reputation to work signs that many were prone to attribute to charlatanry or even diabolic influence.

The fact that Jesus appears to have gone out of his way to break most of the constraints of his time brings us to the nub of H.'s book and to what may well be considered its most surprising theory. He claims that the appellation "Christ," often vulgarly thought of as a kind of surname for Jesus today, very possibly, perhaps even probably, was applied to him even during his lifetime in much the sense used of any person deemed to be specially gifted by God. H. claims that the case is not much different when it comes to the term "Son of God," although in this latter case, because of the constraint of monotheism, it would not actually have been used of him during his lifetime. But in both cases the experience of the Easter event seemed to vindicate his life and message so much that Jesus was immediately perceived as the Christ and the Son of God. H. cautions us, however, not to read the latter in an ontological sense, at least in the context of the Synoptics.

The book is admirable in its brevity and clarity despite some repetition. If not a completely fresh start in the search for the historical Jesus (in this case, the historical Christ), it nevertheless, in the style of much British theology, takes a rather independent approach to sometimes unpopular conclusions. Despite ample footnotes, there is no bibliography.

Johannesburg, Mich. Richard W. Kropf


The catechism is a venerable form of Christian literature. It is one of the earliest instructional media in Christian history and has served a variety of pastoral purposes through the centuries. At its best the catechism is a compendium of biblical and liturgical material, useful for orienting adults to the rich complexity of Christian wisdom shared in common. It moves gracefully among creeds, prayers, and Christian praxis, displaying the scope (not necessarily the depth) of the Christian heritage.

The greatest liability of the catechism is the tendency to reduce the richness of Christian experience to a thin selection of viewpoints. This tendency is reinforced by the standard format of questions and answers. Especially when the catechism has served primarily apologetic (even
polemical) purposes, the questions have been devised in order to introduce the answers rather than the answers being formulated to respond to the real questions people were asking. The result is a certain artificiality and a deceptive clarity about the meaning and diversity in the Christian faith.

The two catechisms under review here do little to offset these liabilities. Greeley's catechism is professedly reductionist, seeking “the bottom line” on 21 different topics. There is no significant rationale for the selection or the order of the topics. More substantially, the content supplies either G.'s own opinions or acknowledges in generic terms what “current research” or “colleagues” have to say. For those interested in what G. thinks about these matters (and who do not subscribe to his newsletter Bottom Line), this catechism fills the gap.

Hardon's catechism is professedly question and answer. Although it follows the classic pattern of creed-commandments-sacraments-prayer, the questions have an inescapable artificiality. Does anyone really ask, what is our duty toward the guardian angels (#150) or how is the virtue of humility portrayed in the Eucharist (#1234)? To be sure, there are more relevant questions discussed, but 1701 is more than four times the number of questions in the Baltimore Catechism.

These two works are not the best representatives of what a catechism today could be, but they do exhibit the extremes of style which are compatible within Roman Catholicism today. Greeley is brimming with bias, energy, investment, flippancy, edges, provocation. Hardon is measured, cerebral, linear, distant, precise, musty. But underneath the divergence of styles, behind the questions and answers, and before one reaches the bottom line, there is a reassuring similarity of belief: God is personal and triune; Jesus is divine and our Savior; he truly rose from the dead and founded the Church; there is a definite morality for Christians; worship and virtuous living are paramount; we are immortal and heaven is worth it.

Perhaps most important is that in their own ways both G. and H. affirm an ultimate confidence that is grounded in God’s desire to be with us. For example, regarding the central mystery of the resurrection, G. says: “we may not be able to explain the precise how of the resurrection of Jesus, and we may be even less able to describe the quality of our risen life yet to come. The bottom line is still the top: Jesus lives and so do we, or forget the whole Christianity business, because resurrection is what it’s all about” (90). H. gets at the same conviction more prosaically: “#288. What should we learn from Christ's resurrection? Christ's resurrection strengthens our faith in his divinity, because only God in human form could reunite his body and soul. It is the foundation of our hope in our own future resurrection from the dead. . . . Finally, Christ’s resurrec-
tion inspires us to love him by dying to ourselves.”

Both authors point to different indicators for belief and advocate different benefits, but both belong unequivocally to the Church of Jesus Christ and they tell us why. In-between them there is a good deal of room for the rest of us.

Catholic University of America

ROBERT L. KINAST


This book was first published in French in 1970. It is divided into two parts of unequal length. The shorter, first part is devoted to a history of ecclesiology; the longer, second part is a lengthy essay on ecclesiology. There are indices of names and subjects at the end. Apparently the book was written for theologians and students of theology. It is marked by Bouyer’s emphasis upon the centrality of the Eucharist in the life of the Church, by his profound learning and ecumenical spirit, and by practical suggestions for renewing the institutions of the Church. The translation reads smoothly, but B.’s style is somewhat prolix.

Sketching the history of ecclesiology, B. examines the views of both Catholic and non-Catholic thinkers. He attaches special significance to Moehler and Newman, devoting a chapter to each. Possibly this part of the book has been superseded by more substantial studies (at less cost) such as Eric Jay’s The Church, Its Changing Image (John Knox).

In his essay on ecclesiology, B. discourses upon many subjects; I can mention only a few of his conclusions. For one thing, he analyzes the data of Scripture and the contents of Lumen gentium. Among the deficiencies of LG, as B. sees it, are a rather poorly developed theology of the local church and the failure to treat the place of law and the Spirit in the Church. B. accepts the doctrine of infallibility as it was taught by the First and Second Vatican Councils. Speaking of the origin of the episcopacy, B. seems to suppose that we have more information about the activity of the apostles than we actually do. He believes that the bishop should give himself mainly to preaching, celebrating the liturgy, and personal contact, not to administration. The priest does not need another profession or a human family to be truly human himself. The Church should aim to produce mature personalities and not attempt to dictate practico-practical applications of Christian principles. Bishops and priests are not called to be organizers of sociopolitical structures.

B. holds that the Catholic and Orthodox Churches are really one Church because the schism between the two has never been consummated. The hypertrophy of authority in the Catholic Church was the primary reason for the Protestant revolt. B. objects to the unconcern
about evangelization on the part of some priests and religious who no longer wish to convert others to the Church but only to help them become more aware of the supernatural values they already possess. Finally, B. expresses himself upon a wide range of institutions in the Church, although, strangely, he pays little attention to Catholic schools and universities.

Perhaps the chief value of B.'s book is that it contains the reflections of an immensely learned theologian upon the Church he loves dearly.

Cincinnati

EDWARD J. GRATSCH


A rapidly growing body of literature on original justice and original sin, from Catholic as well as non-Catholic authors, has proposed a radical revision of the traditional history of these doctrines as a justification for the reformulation of the dogma of original sin, in ways quite contrary to the meaning of the received formularies and their contemporary reaffirmations by Popes Pius XII and Paul VI. Indeed, there have been calls for the simple abandonment of the dogma to the category of dated, no longer useful hypothesizing; for, it is claimed, the dogmas of original justice and of original sin at the time of their first appearance in theology never described any objectively distinct realities or crucial, historical events with specific, factual consequences in the moral and physical orders, but were merely culturally conditioned myths and symbols—in the case of original sin for the most part a by-product of the theology of Augustine, useful to explain the nature and necessity of grace in his polemic with Pelagius. Since the ends originally served by these "dogmas" can otherwise be attained with symbols more congenial to modern thought patterns, it is quite possible to abandon these when the logic of development should postulate such.

S. takes quite a different stand, viz., that the history of these doctrines not only provides no justification for any such radical reformulation or abandonment of the dogmas, but clearly supports the correctness of their traditional interpretation. At each critical juncture in the history of the dogma of original sin between the NT and the first doctrinal definition—the first encounter of the biblical teaching with Hellenism in the Apostolic Fathers; the reflections of the Alexandrians and Tertullian; the Eastern and Western patristic discussion immediately preceding the Pelagian controversy; the synthesis of Augustine and its relation to the first definition of the dogma typical for all subsequent ones—at each of these junctures the historical evidence, far from even suggesting, much
less proving, the doctrine of original sin to be the by-product of speculation on the religious nature of man, progressively shows that doctrine to have been a key fact of revelation by which that speculation was critiqued and to which that speculation tended progressively to give clearer expression. By Augustine's day the doctrine of original sin might be described as ready for definition when the opportune moment for such arose. In fact, that moment was the controversy of Augustine with Pelagius over grace. But the definition, when it came, was not simply the official recapitulation of theological speculation or polemic, but the more exact formulation of a truth already believed and whose content was hardly exhausted by that speculation. In view of this long and detailed history of the doctrine before the time of Augustine, S. observes how unfounded is the widespread assumption that the first formulation of the dogma originated in the controversy of Augustine with Pelagius and represented an innovation of Augustine vis-à-vis the tradition. That observation is exactly the view of history championed by Augustine himself.

At once competent as a dogmatic theologian and historian of dogma, S. is able to deal effectively with questions arising at the juncture of those two disciplines. These, rather than narrowly historical problems, are the kind presently central to the study of the dogma of original sin. In a brief but masterful introduction on the nature, methods, and limits of the history of dogma, S. clearly shows why the call for radical reformulation or abandonment of the dogma of original sin cannot be justified by an appeal to the history of that doctrine without in fact mistaking and abusing the nature of historical study; and why the careful exposition of that history in the case of a true dogma will always support that dogma without in any way constituting its dogmatic proof or formal apology. History neither proves nor disproves dogmas. These are proven (or disproven) on theological grounds and for the historian of dogma represent a given, with a history to be traced and with results which indeed may be of greater or less use to the dogmatician in confirming the sense of a dogma.

These insights are convalidated from beginning to end of this excellent manual. This is a major work of scholarship indispensable for any future study, doctrinal as well as historical, of this theme.

St. Anthony-on-Hudson
Rensselaer, N.Y.

PETER D. FEHLNER, O.F.M.CONV.

The frontispiece sets the tone for this theological dictionary: the papyrus fragment acquired in Egypt in 1917 and published by the John Rylands Library of Manchester in 1938, a Greek version of the prayer “We fly to thy patronage, O holy Mother of God.” The article Sub tuum notes that its date is disputed: some (as G. Giamberardini) put it as early as the late third century, others (as M. C. M. Roberts, who first edited it) in the fourth century. It is still used in the Byzantine liturgy, was quoted in Lumen gentium (n. 66), and is the oldest extant prayer calling on the Virgin Mary for help.

The concern of this book is strongly historical: over half of the five hundred entries are biographical, along with scriptural, doctrinal, and liturgical articles, and also some on devotion, as “Devotions,” “Devotions Forbidden,” and “Objections to Marian Doctrine and Devotion,” and a few on shrines (“Apparitions,” then Knock, Lourdes, and Fatima) and popular prayers (Rosary).

Early authors, especially from the East, are favored, although the selection spans the centuries to the present, even some writers still active. With theologians O’Carroll includes others who have added to the appreciation of our Lady. We find Teresa of Avila (d. 1582) between Tarasius, patriarch of Constantinople (d. 806, a figure of II Nicaea), and Tertullian of Africa (d. p. 220); and Thérèse of Lisieux (d. 1897) close by Thomas Aquinas (d. 1274) and Theophylact of Bulgaria (d. p. 1092).

In disputed questions, O. does not hesitate to take sides. He holds for a Marian interpretation of the second-century Abercius epitaph (with B. Emmi against A. Abel). In preconciliar theology Mary as Mediatrix/Mediatress got much notice. O. explores this subject at considerable length, with particular attention to the development from the twenties into Vatican II. Using the now published extensive documentation, he traces the “subdued drama” of the pros and cons of the Council fathers on the retention and modification of “mediatrix,” and finds the conciliar restraint on that term excessively cautious. He explains positively the Council’s emphasis on “spiritual motherhood”—“a central theme of Lumen gentium 8, almost dominant.”

Throughout, O. is alert to the Mary-Church relationship which the Council favored (“Christ-type, Church-type Theories”). Articles on medieval Cistercians include apposite quotations on the Mary-Church bond, e.g., Bernard (d. 1153), Isaac of Stella (d. ca. 1178), Adam of Perseigne (d. 1221), Aelred of Rievaulx (d. 1167), Amadeus of Lausanne (d. 1159), and Stephen of Salley (d. 1252). Stephen’s reflections on our Lady’s joys were edited in 1929 by André Wilmart (d. 1941), who also rates an entry, along with many other contemporary scholars.

An Irish branch of the Ecumenical Society of the Blessed Virgin Mary has just begun. H. Martin Gillett (d. 1980) founded the Society in England
in 1967, in the United States in 1976. Some entries reflect this interest: Anglicanism, Calvin, Luther, Zwingli and his Zurich successor Bullinger. There is a gem of an article on J. H. Newman, also on Newman's friend E. B. Pusey. A fistful of Irish selections introduces little-known names: St. Adamnan (d. 700), Cuimhe the Wise (d. a. 747), and especially the eighth-century Blachtmac, whose poems were edited by James Carney in the sixties. The poet speaks intimately to Mary about her Son, e.g., “Come to me, loving Mary, that I may lament with you your very dear one. Alas, that your Son should go to the cross, he who was a great diadem, a beautiful hero.”

Theotokos fills a big lacuna; at twenty years remove from Vatican II and the postconciliar confusion about the Mother of the Lord, this buoyant, well-written, expertly documented and attractively printed book comes at the right moment. For the professional theologian it will be a vade locum of recent studies (the bibliographies have over seven thousand references); the educated browser will enjoy a delightful journey in a rediscovered world of Christian thought.

Loyola University of Chicago EAMON R. CARROLL, O.CARM.


Mended Speech proposes a justification for religious studies in the secular university and outlines a conceptual scheme for coherently organizing the diverse operations within the discipline. The work, which originated out of Cahill’s efforts to develop a rationale for establishing a department of religious studies at the University of Alberta, argues against the widely accepted notion that the history of religions is non-normative, that theology is confessional, and that the two are mutually opposed. C. maintains that religious studies must include an operation that can and should properly be called theological, but that this theological operation cannot be pursued independently of the historical-critical method exploited so profitably in the history of religions.

C.’s justification for this thesis and the consequent scheme for religious studies appeals to human historicity, principally as understood by Heidegger (chap. 1), to cognitional theory (2), to hermeneutical theory (3), and to the interrelation of tradition and understanding (4). Brief histories of comparative religion (chap. 5) and of theology (6), and finally an overview of what C. calls “the hermeneutic field” of religious studies (7) provide him with the context for elaborating his understanding of the theological operation and its relationship with the other constitutive operations in religious studies.

C. contends that the “so-called disinterested approach may well dis-
close what was said or what happened but not what was meant” (66). If religious studies is to be more than “busy work,” it must go beyond exegesis of the subject matter to a criticism of the subject matter which ultimately seeks to determine the meaning of religion. This in turn requires that the interpreter’s relation to the subject matter be taken into account, since self-appropriation and appropriation of one’s own tradition, whether negatively or positively, ground the possibility of understanding other traditions. But this theological moment, C. cautions, must not be conceived as an apologetic or defense of a particular belief system, and it must not be subjected to any authority outside itself. As he sees it, the present crisis of religious studies and theology is rooted primarily in theology’s failure to fully and consistently adapt itself to the historical-critical method without which theology has been and “will obviously [continue to] be out of place in a university” (155). The operation he has in mind, therefore, is not simply an adjusted systematics. Relying heavily on Frithjof Schuon’s *The Transcendent Unity of Religion*, he argues for a “theology of religion” that goes beyond “the theologies of particular religions.” The latter he regards as only the “first stages of self-appropriation and the beginnings of a movement toward the one theology” (149).

The book works toward the conclusion that the field of religious studies is constituted by four specific mental operations: literary, historical, comparative, and theological. Most of the analysis is devoted to explaining C.’s understanding of these operations and their interrelation and to substantiating his contention that these operations are appropriate to the subject matter and elements which constitute the hermeneutic horizon of the discipline.

The crisis which this programmatic reflection seeks to clarify entails such fundamental issues about the nature of religion and religious truth that one could hardly expect definitive answers or an achieved “mending.” Although much light is shed on the problematic, readers may, like the reviewer, find many of C.’s assumptions questionable and many of his positions begging some of the most important issues. For example, his treatment of the truth claims of particular religions and theologies seems to underestimate the difficulty of resolving potential conflicts. The proposal for a theology of religions does not adequately explain how the various theologies of the religions are to be transcended without violating the fundamental historicity of their claims and the methodologies consequent to them. To satisfy the questions of many Christian theologians about his program, C. will have to offer a much more nuanced justification for his positions on conversion and authority. It is one thing to acknowledge the indispensability of the historical-critical method, quite another to specify how such an operation can be adequately appropriated. Finally,
to a practitioner of a supposedly dying discipline the book's initial premises about systematic theology's impoverishment and demise and about the prosperity of the history of religions seem not only "gloomy" but also gratuitous.

Marquette University

ROBERT MASSON


Studies of the Roman primacy in the patristic era usually do not linger long on the writings of Eusebius and Athanasius. Eusebius gave a list of the bishops of Rome. In his battle against Arianism, Athanasius took refuge in Rome, where he found support; otherwise Athanasius has very few references to any kind of Roman primacy. In this Regensburg thesis, Twomey sets out to contest such conclusions and to show that both authors have a more developed understanding of the Roman primacy than is usually assumed. The first third of the book concerns Eusebius, the latter two thirds Athanasius.

Eusebius' original ecclesiology is still visible in the earlier editions of the Church History. He stresses the apostolic successions of the principal churches as seen in the bishop lists, because for him the Church is built on the apostles. Within this framework the Petrine sees stand out. As Peter repelled the assaults of Simon Magus, so the Roman bishop is the supreme guardian of the Church against all heresies. However, Eusebius' faith in Rome was shaken by the apostasy of Marcellinus during the persecution of Diocletian. Later, when he himself came under suspicion of Arianism, his conversion away from the traditional view was completed and he transferred his allegiance to a novel ecclesiology vesting ultimate authority in Constantine. This developed into the "Eusebian heresy," which would shortly bedevil the Church in general and Athanasius and his Roman supporters in particular.

The latter segment of the book studies the events surrounding Athanasius' resistance to Arianism and his support by Rome and the West against the Eusebians. Pope Julius wrote to rebuke the Eusebians and was astonished to find them denying his authority in the East (which everyone up until then had taken for granted). When Constantius took power in the West, he increased the pressure on the bishops. Pope Liberius was finally beaten into submission after being exiled. T. studies in great detail the pertinent writings of Athanasius, especially the Second Apology and the History of the Arians. Eastern and Western documents
BOOK REVIEWS

are closely scrutinized. Whatever T.'s contributions to specific issues of Eusebian and Athanasian studies, and they are many, I must register my dissent from his general approach.

T. several times contrasts a historical with a theological approach. A remark of this type must give the historian pause. He states that he is attempting to penetrate to the deeper intentions of these authors, the theological presuppositions of their works, to see if he can find more than the usual meager yield concerning the primacy. I would compare this stated purpose to that of certain NT scholars of a couple of decades ago who found, e.g., a great wealth of Marian theology in the infancy narratives or a complex sacramental theology in the Johannine writings. This approach, originally so promising and even exciting, is now viewed with considerable reserve. In reading this volume, it must be asked whether eisegesis does not sometimes prevail over exegesis. Further, it must be noted that the views attributed to the earlier Eusebius are explicitly claimed to be the traditional views of the Church as a whole. Even if it is granted that Eusebius spoke in terms of an apostolically structured Church based on the chief sees (and there are some who would at least wish to nuance this: cf. T. Barnes, Constantine and Eusebius 132), the further conclusions about the Petrine sees are debatable. Why, e.g., is Alexandria, the see of Mark, more important than Antioch, where Peter himself stayed? Is the Council of Sardica really as decisive as later historians have tended to presume when the early fifth-century Africans had forgotten it completely and the Roman church (in good faith, presumably) labeled its canons Nicaean?

There is no question that the Roman church commanded respect and its bishop held a kind of primacy in the patristic era. The perennial problem is: What kind of primacy? Most relevant texts are patent of more than one interpretation. Even for pre-Constantinian texts, this book almost always chooses the stronger, primatial interpretation. But the explanations of areas that do not conform to the theory are weak. Did Athanasius in one place only allude to Mt 16:18? No problem. He had no need to be explicit because the monks to whom he wrote already took for granted the papal association of Peter's confession (550). The fall of Marcellinus under pressure shatters Eusebius' trust in Rome, but Liberius' fall under pressure not only does not weaken Athanasius' trust, it reinforces it!

In summary, my perception is that T. has begun by assuming as true what he set out to prove. He rejects the "altkirchliche Idee" of Girardet but seems very much to have one of his own. The contending parties are painted in black and white. The villains are clearly the Eusebiians, who have sold their souls to Caesar. The claim that the rank of a local church
should be based on the civil standing of the city is without precedent or legitimacy even in the East. What conclusion is one to draw about later Eastern ecclesiology? In general, then, the main lines of the book appear to be a step backward both methodologically—a return to history as apologetics—and ecumenically. The volume is seriously marred by a very large number of printing errors; I noted more than 260.

Catholic University of America

ROBERT B. ENO, S.S.


The present book is an outstanding achievement: it carefully studies a major theme in two difficult and prolific writers; then, although the writers wrote in different times, cultures, and languages, their ideas are sensitively compared. In addition, Lyons gives a detailed and nuanced history of "cosmic Christ terminology" from its beginning in Germany in 1830, through its entrance into English theology in 1857 (where it soon became involved with contemporary scientific questions), and its introduction into French theology in 1910. The terminology did not become common until the 1960's with the publication of Teilhard and the work of Joseph Sittler.

Origen is situated in the context of Gnosticism and Middle Platonism; the differences are concisely stated and the present debate on the orthodoxy of Origen is assessed. Teilhard is situated in the context of teachers, events, and readings that might have led him to speak of Christ's role in the cosmos: one of his Scripture professors wrote in 1910 of Christ as cosmic mediator; and the year before Teilhard arrived to begin theology at Hastings, there was a "Grand Act" that summed up all theology in the phrase from Colossians that Teilhard was to quote so often: "in quo omnia constant." L. cites Teilhard's carnet des lectures to show his readings in patristics and his comments on Origen. Many have compared the two authors for their cosmic optimism or their understanding of evil, but L. finds the most significant parallel in their "Christ-centered universalism." In spite of the many differences noted, they are seen to have been motivated by a common theological concern: Christ as creating medium between the absolute and the relative. This concern is what L. finds behind the subordinationist passages in Origen and the third or cosmic "nature" passages in Teilhard. Thus L. deals with the two controversial authors' most controversial points. L. defends the orthodoxy of both Origen and Teilhard; he attributes some of the controversy they provoked to the fact that they were exploratory thinkers in an area in need of exploration. L. finds that Teilhard's references to a third or
cosmic "nature" in Christ is universally criticized by his commentators: they claim that it is not found in Scripture or tradition. L. observes that the other two natures are not directly affirmed in Scripture and that after Nicaea Catholics were so intent on insisting on Christ's divinity that they did not continue to speak of his role as mediator to creation.

I wish L. had brought out that this mediator role to creation is more present in Teilhard's understanding of the human nature of Christ than of the cosmic nature. With the recent understandings of the cosmos that we have obtained, L. sees that the cosmic Christ calls for careful and sustained theological treatment. But L. will not be part of this venture. An Australian Jesuit studying at Oxford, he died before the final chapter was complete. This was completed by his director, M. F. Wiles, and his degree was awarded posthumously. One can only regret that L. will not be able to continue the line of thought he has researched so thoroughly and presented so well.

Georgetown University

THOMAS M. KING, S.J.


When in 1543 Copernicus proposed to colleagues that astronomy be made more symmetrical, and thus more worthy of the world's Creator, by reviving the ancient option of a static sun and a circumsolar earth, he wisely warned others that scientific answers to scientific questions are addressed to scientific inquirers (mathemata mathematicis scribuntur) and are therefore posted against poaching. But few Continental interpreters of the human predicament have heeded that advice.

This tract, for example, by a nonscientist theologian examines to what extent changes in the generally accepted world picture have influenced the development of Christian theology, particularly in the period from the Middle Ages to the present, and finds (214) that profound changes took place in all spheres of culture—except theology; for most theologians repeated medieval theology and Rome stifled any deep rethinking of Christianity. Hence only after Vatican II but quite independently of its ambiguous pronouncements can one discover (215) belated research for a new concept of Christ and a new concept of God to match a new experience of reality.

Part 1 (14-78) surveys the cosmological background to medieval theology by recounting (a) its sources: biblical, Greek, patristic, Arabian; (b) its content: a universe perfect from the start, immutable, hierarchical, anthropocentric; (c) its integration by Bonaventure, Aquinas, and others
into an interpretation of Christianity as order (creation), disorder (sin), and reorder (redemption). Part 2 (79–160) recounts the decline of the medieval world picture (a) from Copernicus (neither hierarchical nor anthropocentric) through Darwin (neither perfect from the start nor immutable), (b) as reflected in the religious crises of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries (pantheism, deism, atheism, naturalism), and (c) the present irrelevance of the order-disorder-reorder triad. Part 3 (161–235) distinguishes the Lebenswelt (self, body, other, I-thou) and the world of science (boundless, dynamic, organic); reports favorably the panpsychic and bioenergetic universe of Teilhard de Chardin, and ends with the current encounter between world picture and theology, as formulated in theologies of hope, liberation, and process.

It is, of course, regrettable but of no real concern to the many thousands of us who whistle while we work at extending the cognitive enterprise of mankind by exploring as best we can the wonderful world which God has made, that certain some trespassing dominies have eavesdropped on our shoptalk and hysterically reported to their coterie of timid divines (171) that man now feels completely lost in a boundless universe in which he does not seem to belong and which offers no support on which to base his existence. Balderdash!

Moreover, those of us in science who still remain alienated from Catholicism know very well that while it is counterproductive, or worse, for modern theologians to fuss, as here, about redressing the Infant of Prague in a scaled-down lab coat, the spiritually naked presence among us of many another Mother Teresa will confound our merely intellectual successes and crack the frail shell of cultivated moral indifference. Mathemata mathematicis scribuntur. But love conquers all.

Mathemata mathematicis scribuntur. But love conquers all.

Canisius College, Buffalo

JOSEPH T. CLARK, S.J.

NICHOLAS CUSSANUS: A FIFTEENTH-CENTURY VISION OF MAN. By

Nicholas of Cusa’s comprehensive view of man, God, and the universe is certainly a broad and important topic, and Watts takes us through the general background and various aspects of Cusa’s mind-set. After a bibliographical chapter, she begins with the metaphysical foundations of Cusa’s world view based on his writings from 1440 on, when he experienced a vision that changed his style of writing and his thought. De docta ignorantia was a turning point, and his thesis of the basic disjunction between the human mind on the one side and the divine nature and the divinely created universe on the other was decisive for all his later intellectual explorations, although he saw the Incarnation as the key to
bridging the gap. Cusa turned away from the medieval scholastic tradition to carve out his own path, e.g., switching from formal discourse to dialogues and letters. A number of telling metaphors and images were taken up and explored by Cusa and are discussed by W., e.g., the two levels of religion (popular cult and true faith) and how they corresponded with affirmative and negative theology; man as *imago Dei* and therefore as creative and active, forming and bringing into existence his entire mental world, and that the conjectures of man are the basis of his dignity, for in so doing he is most imitative of God. Man also creates in the external world, i.e., three-dimensional objects, and so artisanry rather than philosophy or book learning is at the heart of true knowledge. In all of this the role of the will is stressed, since creativity is a free act both of God in His relation to the world and of man in his ideas and artifacts. Finally, there are the images of the game and the hunt as creative and active functions that exemplify man’s fulfilling his role as image of God and that all of his activity takes place in a communal context.

Through this exposition there are constant references in Cusa’s texts and illustrations. A final chapter presents Cusa’s view as a Renaissance synthesis, a linking of metaphysics, soteriology, Christology, and epistemology. The result is a study that is provocative and on an important theme, given Cusa’s stature and influence in his own time and later. Still, in reading this book and when finished I had a certain uneasiness. W. stresses Cusa’s dissatisfaction with the scholastic tradition in which she sees him as steeped. But his major training was in canon law (six years); he studied scholasticism for only about 1.5 years when he was fifteen at Heidelberg and then for a few months more in 1425 at Cologne. How really well versed was he in that tradition?

W. asserts that Cusa broke with medieval thought in his doctrine that there was no true proportion between finite and infinite, but did not all medieval thought hold something like this in the argument from analogy? At times W.‘s translation of Cusa is so literal as to be awkward and obscure (Cusa himself was no help in some instances), but at other times she is quite free: e.g., the title of chap. 2 changes a dative singular to a nominative plural. She adds things that are not in the Latin: Where did the clause "All men (except Christ) are born through the sin of carnal pleasure..." (80) come from? W. translates (194–95) a perfect subjunctive as "would make" where the tense relationship demands "has made"; *comitalis* (111) is translated as "of the court" rather than "of the count." On p. 99, what does the Latin text have to do with the assertion made? An important clause in the Latin on p. 125 is ignored: "nisi ex affectu oraveris," which changes the meaning. On p. 84, n. 101, *impossibilitas* is translated as "possibility." When discussing Cusa’s treatment of measuring, numbering, weighing as especially human activity that imitates
divine action, L. White’s article on “The Iconography of Temperantia” would have been useful. Knowledge as food is an image that goes back beyond the Fathers to St. Paul. Cusa in stressing actions as unrepeatably seems to be echoing themes from Heraclitus, and his discussion of wisdom that has to be experienced rather than read about or defined appears to echo the Imitation of Christ. In conclusion, this is an important but flawed book that needs to be read very carefully.

State University College
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THOMAS E. MORRISSEY


The first in a projected two-volume set, this book contains a fine sampling of documents official and unofficial portraying American religious history from pre-European days to the U.S. Civil War. It is American religious history, not, as so often in collections, American Christian or American Protestant history. G.’s outlook is deliberately catholic, even if inevitably the lion’s share of attention falls to Protestant Americans, whose history provides also the general framework. “American” here means U.S.A., a rule bent only on behalf of French Jesuits in Huronia. Once the religions of Native Americans and the main European streams destined for North America have been documented, chapters follow on “Americanizing the Ways of Faith” in colonial times, “Revolution Political and Ecclesiastical,” “Liberty Unleashed,” and “Evangelical Empire: Rise and Fall.” The book is beautifully and clearly arranged, a succession of judicious introductions followed by documentation which bears out the judgments. G. emphasizes the seventeenth-century novelty of American religious pluralism and records Anglican and Congregationalist efforts to squelch it.

“Religion” in G.’s use throws a large net. There are segments on women’s rights, peace churches and the Revolution, black religion, white abolitionists and white apologists for slavery. Among the latter is Bishop John England. There are sample passages of anti-Catholic diatribe from the Awful Disclosures of Maria Monk and Samuel F. B. Morse’s Imminent Dangers. Archbishop Maréchal on trusteeism, exchanges between Brownson and Hecker, and good pieces by John England on Catholic obscurantism and on civil/religious liberty are included.

Addition of John Carroll’s succinct comments on the U.S. Revolutionary/Constitutional experience would have been a plus and might have lent clarity to the kindly-meant but slantly askew remark on p. 228 that post-Independence Catholics “learned to adapt to the Republic’s novel
ways." That may have been true of later-nineteenth-century immigrants, but Catholics of the Revolutionary generation were used to minority status, both in Britain and in America, and had worked out their accommodation with it. In Maryland (and in Virginia's Northern Neck and in Governor Dongan's New York), the instances when they held colonial power within the larger political context of a Protestant empire, they had long since learned not to "turn away from the unfamiliar and the unnerving." Treatment (112) of early Maryland could also be rephrased. Protestants and Catholics were there together from the beginning, the former more numerous, the latter enjoying the political favor of their coreligionist, the Lord Proprietor. The Act of 1649 was passed in an assembly where Protestants predominated. Its more restrictive clauses were a Puritan contribution. The actual practice of religious toleration in the colony had been better in earlier years. G. deserves congratulations for an excellent and most useful survey and a fine, balanced collection of documents.

Boston College

JAMES HENNESEY, S.J.


O'Meara's book examines the influence of Schelling's thought upon Roman Catholic theology in the south of Germany during the first half of the nineteenth century. That period was seminal in the history of modern Catholic theology, not only chronologically but also in the richness of its intellectual contributions to the tradition, and in recent years English-speaking scholarship has discovered its significance. O.'s book is the best general introduction to it to have appeared thus far.

O. centers his study on the lengthy career of the philosopher Friedrich Schelling (1775–1854), who began lecturing at Jena in 1797 as a young prodigy and completed his academic life in mid-century at Berlin. S.'s early years were his most fertile in terms of literary production. Nurtured in the spirit of early German Romanticism, he introduced the themes of process and history to the comparatively static Idealism of the Fichtean ego. His special contribution to the Idealist movement was made in his works System of Transcendental Philosophy (1800), Presentation of My System (1801), and Lectures on Academic Study (1802). O., moreover, carefully traces the progression of Schelling's philosophy by highlighting S.'s more voluntarist preoccupations in the Essay on Freedom (1809) and his sweeping efforts at speculative comprehensiveness in his later lectures on mythology and revelation.

O. argues that the twists and turns in Schelling's conception of the
Idealist project formed the matrix for a Catholic theological consciousness newly awakened to the historical character of faith and its symbolic expression. He cogently demonstrates that S.'s Idealism, with its imaginative marriage of intuition and revelation, presented the Catholic tradition with a philosophical model that could readily be employed in theological construction. The greater part of the book explores three generations of Roman Catholic thinkers who, between 1798 and 1848, worked at the theological application of the Schellingian categories. The first generation is represented by J. M. Sailer, whom O. portrays as a transitional figure standing between the times of Enlightenment and Romanticism; a man contemptuous of eighteenth-century rationalism, whose enthusiasm for the possibilities of Schelling's thought was nonetheless tempered by his suspicion of its subjectivistic tendencies. The second generation, typified by F. von Baader and J. S. von Drey, turned its attention to the developmental dimension of the God-world relationship—Baader through his interest in mysticism, theosophy, and politics, Drey as a systematician in search of a coherent theology of revelation. The third generation, which O. describes as devoted to the work of theological system-building, comprises the students of Drey who with their teacher made up the well-known Catholic Tübingen School: J. A. Möhler, F. A. Staudenmaier, and J. E. Kuhn. O. fills out his treatment of these principal figures with interesting and informative discussion of the role of more minor figures in the Catholic reception of Schelling, among them P. B. Zimmer, J. J. Görres, and F. Schlegel. By way of conclusion, O. examines the work of M. Deutinger and J. von Döllinger, who towards the middle and later years of the century were the last, and in many respects tragic, representatives of Romantic Catholicism, by then under attack by the growing conservatism of Rome.

O. is effective in capturing the spirit of challenge and commitment which permeated the theological endeavors of the Romantic Catholics. He enlivens his discussion by frequent references to contemporary developments in the arts, literature, and politics. The major shortcoming of the book is O.'s at times sketchy presentation of Schelling's thought. Often S.'s own philosophical positions find their way into the text only as terse introductions to the manner in which they were received by the theologians. In a work which employs Schelling's thought as a touchstone throughout, the reader expects a more rigorous analysis of the ideas which molded this theological era. This omission is most blatant in O.'s brief review of Schelling's early systems, the particulars of which are never presented. O., however, can only be commended for providing a very readable commentary on one of the most important exchanges between philosophy and theology in the modern period. His book stands
out among the secondary literature as a fine overview of an often overlooked period in the history of Catholic thought.

*Fairfield University*  
JOHN E. THIEL


"Hegel's Concept of God represents an attempt to encompass the global character of the Hegelian philosophical enterprise." With this remark out of the Introduction, the noted Hegel scholar Quentin Lauer makes clear that he is not presenting a study of Hegel's philosophy of religion, such as Albert Chapelle offered some years ago in *Hegel et la religion* (3 vols.; Paris: Editions Universitaires, 1964–71). Nor is he restricting himself to a careful analysis of one major work of Hegel, such as he himself accomplished in *A Reading of Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit* (New York: Fordham University, 1976). Rather, he is trying to synthesize the entire Hegelian system in terms of its central concept, that of absolute Spirit, which L. claims can be properly understood only as God. The results are quite impressive.

Chap. 1 takes up the issue of the relation between philosophy and religion in Hegel's thought. Speculative reason does not render religious consciousness otiose but rather illuminates the inner logic and coherence of its representations. This is possible because, as chap. 2 makes clear, the concretely real and the rational are identified in the Concept. The latter, however, is itself intelligible only in terms of God or the absolute Spirit (chap. 3). This raises the question whether the human mind can "think" the infinite reality of God (chap. 4). Hegel's response, according to L., is that human reason not only can think the Absolute but must also affirm the reality of what it thus conceives; for reason is not simply the finite activity of the human subject but the work of the divine Spirit in human consciousness "elevating" human knowledge of God to the level of its own self-knowledge (chap. 5). Does this imply pantheism? No, says L. (chap. 6); at most, it might imply pan-logism, the accusation that the truth of divine revelation is radically subordinated to the logic of his system. In point of fact, however, what Hegel was defending was the thesis that "in understanding faith we find logic confirmed—a logic that would really contradict faith would be a bad logic" (282). To establish this last point, L. sets forth in chap. 7 an overview of Hegel's theology in which revealed truth and speculative logic are inextricably interwoven.

In my judgment, this is a significant book for at least two reasons. First, it is a sympathetic treatment of one of the truly great speculative minds of the modern era, thereby revealing the beauty and power of
Hegel’s metaphysical vision. Second, and more importantly, the work poses some interesting methodological questions to contemporary philosophers, above all, those Roman Catholics who count themselves transcendental Thomists; for, as L. repeatedly notes, Hegel refused to accept Kant’s limitation of the power of human understanding to the organization of sense data, the world of phenomena; instead, he postulated the higher power of reason in human beings whereby they can do metaphysics, i.e., construct in imagination an a priori scheme to explain the multiple relationships existing between God and His creatures and among the creatures themselves. By implication, then, Hegel would reproach the transcendental Thomists for still accepting too much of the Kantian problematic, i.e., for only doing philosophical anthropology rather than genuine metaphysics; for the latter comes into being only through the exercise of reason or “speculative thinking” in constructing a cosmology, an a priori set of concepts for the understanding of all of reality. Naturally, such a scheme remains hypothetical (something which later scholars like L. realize better than Hegel did), but at least it enables human beings to ponder afresh the truly ultimate questions: What does it mean to be an existent? What is being itself as a result, so that both God and all finite existents can truly be said to be? Hegel’s answers to these questions, of course, even when presented in L.’s lucid prose, are far less important than the questions themselves.

_Xavier University, Cinn._

_Joseph A. Bracken, S.J._


This volume is the first in a series sponsored by the International Bonhoeffer Society, English Language Section, and provides a sound report of the Third International Bonhoeffer Conference held at Oxford University in 1980. But it is considerably more than the usual proceedings volume, thanks both to the lively state of Bonhoeffer studies around the world and to the able work of the editors. The editors have not only grouped the papers in such a way that good conversations are struck in the reader’s mind when moving from chapter to chapter within a section or across sections, but Godsey and Kelly have also provided an introduction for each section as well as an introduction for the book as a whole. Together the introductions capture the flavor and work of the conference and suggest the nature of Bonhoeffer’s ongoing relevance now thirty-five years after his death. The editors have thus given coherence to what were already good, highly varied, interacting pieces.

The eleven papers are arranged in three sections. The first is “Church
and State: Resistance to State Authority.” Of special note is Eberhard Bethge’s important and deeply moving essay on “Dietrich Bonhoeffer and the Jews,” here made available in English, together with a response by William Peck that matches in quality Bethge’s own pathfinding chapter. The second section is “Bonhoeffer’s Ethical Legacy: Responsibility and Liberation.” It underscores the international reach of B.’s life and thought. Chapters attend to the thematic appropriation of B. for Latin American liberation theology, for South Africa, for North America, and for West Africa, Cuba, and Korea. Since much of this reflects a real command of B.’s thought by persons reading it through the passions of their experience in their home settings, there is a liveliness here that is often missing in the published work of the churches’ professional thinkers. The last section is “Freedom and Discipline: Structures of Ethical Responsibility.” It nicely attends to the rhythms of spirituality and engagement in Bonhoeffer. But not only that—as a worthy subject in and of itself. It also shows both the biographical dimensions here (the chapter by Renate Bethge) and the profound play of spirituality and engagement throughout B.’s mature thought (the chapters by Roger Poole and Geoffrey Kelly).

Without doubt, this is a volume chiefly for those already acquainted with the corpus of B.’s writings. It has its place as a serious resource for those tracing the form and impact of his ethical theology. Yet it should not be overlooked that many of the chapters are highly profitable just as they stand and do not require preschoooling in Bonhoeffer studies. This is because they are topical (B. and the Jews, or Faith, Politics, and Secular Society: The Legacy of B. for Americans), situational (B. and South Africa), historical (B. at Sigtuna 1942: A Case Study in the Ecumenical Church Struggle), or because they supply sufficient exposition of B.’s thought along the way so as to recruit and outfit the reader for the journey. Thus, while this is primarily a guild volume in both production and readership, its value surpasses that.

_Wesley Theological Seminary, D.C._

LARRY RASMUSSEN


In expounding Przywara’s basic speculative insights and relating them to his spirituality, Zeitz’s study offers a welcome, much-needed English introduction to one of Germany’s leading Catholic theologians in the period between the World Wars. P. has long been recognized as Barth’s great adversary, but the difficulty of his style and his thought’s resistance to facile systematization have discouraged discipleship.
An introductory chapter locates P. in the movement to overcome the static, "two-story" understanding of the nature-grace relation and sketches central themes (perhaps too sketchily) and influences (Augustine, Thomas, Newman, Ignatius) on his development. The second chapter briefly indicates the principal emphases of P.'s spirituality: experience, spirituality as a way, service in the world, mystery. The third and fourth chapters constitute the heart of Z.'s study, examining the fundamental relationship between speculative theology, especially as summarized in *Analogia entis*, and its reflection in the spirituality of P.'s monumental commentary on the Ignatian Exercises, *Deus semper major*. Corresponding to P.'s method of seeing an "immanent synthesis" in great thinkers is his speculative vision of Catholicism as a "hovering" or balance in tension between the polar oppositions of created reality: essence-existence, a posteriori-a priori, consciousness-being, source-manifestation. No rational philosophy ever succeeds in absorbing one pole into the other. Their truth is found in tension, and the tensions point beyond themselves to a meaning transcending, yet immanent in, created reality: God in-above creatures. This "creaturely metaphysics" maintains these tensions as the vital room where divine and human freedoms meet, where God truly enjoys the initiative in self-revelation without crushing secondary causalities. The world then retains its significance while remaining open to the God revealing Himself in Christ as the "ever-greater" beyond human systems and claims. This is, for P., the basic structure of the Exercises. New, however, are the awareness of sin before the infinite God of love revealed on the cross and the response of service which transforms a hovering indifference before created realities into total dedication to Christ in his Church. The Church provides not only the objectivity of tradition in tension with the subjective experience of grace but also the locus of active love. The Exercises culminate in Ignatius' "Rules for Thinking with the Church" and the *Contemplatio ad amorem* finding God in all things which manifest the fundamental open-ended thrust of a love that recognizes its creatureliness in its binding to the concrete.

The fifth chapter traces P.'s late attempts to develop a biblical theology uniting all of Scripture around "parable" and *commercium*. The short sixth chapter studies P.'s definition of the central principle of Catholicism and the role of Mariology. The final chapter outlines some insights for scriptural hermeneutics, a Catholic theology of the cross, pastoral praxis, and P.'s method of *reductio in mysterium*.

Many of the subsidiary themes touched by Z. call for further explanation, and the concrete application of P.'s method should be examined critically. While delineating clearly P.'s fundamental insights, Z. only
whets the reader's appetite. Fortunately, the success of an introduction consists in referring readers to original texts. P. offers American Catholic thought an escape from the sterile debates between liberals relativizing all finite structures and conservatives absolutizing essences and institutions. His Catholic analogy of being is no closed system but a balance that must ever anew be incarnated in life.

Fordham University

JOHN M. MCDERMOTT, S.J.


As Lawrence notes in his brief preface, these essays are research of authors on the way to other books. Tracy on models in theology, Doran on psychic conversion, Tyrrell on Christotherapy, and Lamb on political theology all reflect their roots in Lonergan's thought and their later work in dialogue with contemporary culture. Each author indicates that (a) present-day cultures are crippled and in need of fundamental change; (b) L.'s thought is involved not merely with understanding the world but also with changing it; and (c) in conversation with contemporary thinkers, his work can offer considerable help in both clarifying and resolving global problems.

The common theme of transformation in all its facets unifies the essays. Each author is convinced that the human experience is in need of a therapeutic restoration which will not be a mere repetition of past legitimacies. Komonchak offers the only available attempt to understand the Church through L.'s quest for community as the ideal basis of society. His argument that the institution qua structure has a significant role to play in the social construction of the world is a significant critique of the aspected pluralism of models in ecclesiology. Quesnell describes and analyzes the problem of heresy in its ancient and modern forms. He recovers the possible cognitive spine in religious development by a foundational interpretation of error. Tracy offers the basic position now familiar through Blessed Rage for Order (1975). Flanagan interprets the history of Western morality through its doctrine of natural law and shows what occurs in culture when the concrete person developing in a particular historical context becomes the norm of nature. Doran provides one of the clearest expositions of L.'s notion of "affective conversion" and the functional therapy of symbol which will permit personal religious integration. He sees elemental, anagogic symbols as promoting the ultimate good of the universe. Tyrrell wants to apply the notion of a Christian psychotherapy to the public domain, especially to the healing of the American psyche. He relates his own work to a critique of contemporary therapists' positions on consciousness and outlines the issues shared with
liberation theology. A Christian therapeutic would transcend both empiricist and idealist misinterpretations of societal malfunction. Lawrence and Lamb, in two lengthy pieces (231–403), engage their often German partners (Gadamer, Habermas, Apel, Metz), describing the elements of a critical praxis which are available in L.’s works. Lawrence confronts Gadamer and Habermas for the sake of overcoming both in L.’s more nuanced interpretation of the postclassicist existential subject. Lamb offers his own models for theology and their applicability to the achievement of a theology of emancipatory praxis in economics, politics, technology, and the social sciences.

These are serious articles by theologians who have sharpened their wits on both Lonergan and contemporary analysis of society. Their wish to apply L.’s thought to both individual and systematic distortions witnesses not only to an important shift in Lonergan studies (from exegesis of the master and analysis of the past to possibilities for a future) but also to an earnest desire to converse with wider fields of knowledge. The reader needs acquaintance with L.’s vocabulary and his general interpretations of consciousness, cognitional theory, and theology, as well as a willingness to struggle through some difficult thought. But, on the whole, this volume of papers from the Workshop offers direct, clear presentations of the major themes found in Lonergan’s major collaborators.

St. Meinrad School of Theology, Ind.

Stephen Happel


In light of the recent papal visit to the United Kingdom and the publication of the “final report” of the Anglican/Roman Catholic International Commission, the three essays in this volume have appeared at an optimum time.

The essay of David Loades on the “Relations between the Anglican and Roman Catholic Churches in the 16th and 17th Centuries” focuses on the political and diplomatic relationships between the churches’ respective heads, the popes, and the English monarchs. If the reign of Henry VII (1485–1509) was a period of good will between England and Rome, it was also a time of papal acquiescence in the policies of the British crown. Thus Henry VIII had precedent for expecting from the pope a favorable handling of “the King’s Great Affaire.” “Apart from Cromwell, John Fisher and Sir Thomas More, it seems that very few people either in England or in Rome understood the true significance of
what was happening. Popes and English kings had quarreled before; sooner or later, many must have thought, a negotiated settlement would be reached and all the high principled language of the royal supremacy would be quietly forgotten” (10). Instead of tranquil oblivion, alienation (the short-lived Marian restoration aside) became institutionalized with the excommunication of Elizabeth I by Pius V. While subsequent popes also sought the reconversion of England through doctrinal apologetics and missionary activity, the papacy was party to plots utilizing less spiritual means. “It is not surprising that Englishmen of the seventeenth century associated the propagation of the catholic faith with violence and deception long after the Papacy had abandoned such schemes as unworthy and unreal” (3). Since such suspicions still survive, L.’s essay is a salutary reminder that Anglican-Roman estrangement is rooted in a legacy of unforgotten and perhaps unforgiven hostilities.

While alienation between England and Rome intensified at the upper levels of society, the pastoral clergy took a more accommodating approach. As Aveling’s study of “The English Clergy, Catholic and Protestant, in the 16th and 17th Centuries” observes, “the vast majority of pastoral clergy stayed put in their cures throughout the great changes of official religious policy” (82). Whatever the reason for this occupational tenacity—pastoral loyalty to local congregations or practical indifference to governmental decision, semieducated complacency about doctrinal and liturgical changes or prudential concern about job security—“the clerical body, and society at large, were so firmly wedded to acceptance of a traditional pattern of religion and Church organisation that by 1700 the explosive forces had been assimilated and contained, and the pattern still stood in its basic outlines” (140). Reflecting on this experience of plus ça change, plus c’est même chose, readers may wonder whether the clergy will help or hinder ecumenical rapprochement between the two communions.

On the doctrinal level, McAdoo’s essay on “Anglican/Roman Catholic Relations, 1717–1980” surfaces a number of recurrent themes. For example, the correspondence between Archbishop Wake and three Gallican theologians (Du Pin, Girardin, Le Courayer) early in the eighteenth century recognized both the need for, and the existence of, full agreement on fundamentals, while allowing for areas of legitimate diversity; in particular, Wake “could conceive of a primacy of order or dignity within a strongly collegial setting” (166). Decades later, the conversations between Viscount Halifax and Abbé Portal led to their advocacy of “union by convergence”; unfortunately, their choice of ministry and orders as a dialogue topic led not to greater openness, as they had hoped, but to the rejection of Anglican orders in Apostolicae curae. Thus the agenda of the
Anglican/Roman Catholic International Commission had to address the conclusions and concerns of earlier conversation attempts, such as those at Malines. In this respect, M.'s essay is most valuable in showing the continuity of themes, as well as in giving a firsthand account of the way consensus was achieved in the Windsor, Canterbury, and Venice Statements.

These three essays provide a wealth of historical information and theological insight about Anglican-Roman relationships and so form an important resource for ecumenical research; regrettably, given its price, this volume will not get the circulation it merits.

_Catholic University of America_  
JOHN T. FORD, C.S.C.


The purpose of Charles's "comprehensive textbook of Catholic social ethics," which grew out of a series of seminars which he and MacLaren conducted in the late 1970's at the Catholic Institute of Social Ethics, Oxford, is to consider the main points of the social teaching of Vatican II and examine the evolution of that teaching from the Scriptures and through the Church's experience in history. While this purpose is partly fulfilled, one has the impression that had the book been written before Vatican II, it would not have differed substantially from the present text. Accordingly, anyone who purchases the book solely on the basis of its title, thinking it to be a systematic, chapter-and-verse study of the social teaching of Vatican II, is likely to be somewhat disappointed. The average well-informed reader may also feel that, since all of the conciliar documents and all of the pertinent pre- and post-Vatican II papal statements are readily available in inexpensive pamphlet or booklet form, it was not necessary for C. to include 130 pages of selected extracts from these documents in his Appendix.

The plan of the book is very simple. There are five basic chapters followed by a Summary and Conclusions: (1) The Ultimate and Objective Norm: The Divine Law; (2) The Proximate and Subjective Ethical Norm; (3) The Ethics of Marriage and Family; (4) The Ethics of Political Life; (5) The Ethics of Economic Life.

C. has a thorough knowledge of the literature in the field, and his writing style is clear and readable and, on the whole, refreshingly non-polemical. In general, he has a good sense of history, but he tries too hard at times and too apologetically to prove beyond a shadow of a doubt that there has been absolutely no discontinuity, over the centuries, in the Church's treatment of certain moral issues, notably, e.g., slavery.

C. analyzes Catholic social teaching through the interpretive lens of
standard Neo-Scholasticism and does so rather inflexibly. His Neo-Scholastic approach is most evident in his first two chapters. The ultimate and objective norm, he argues, is the divine law. Conscience is the proximate and subjective ethical norm. These are the basic principles or norms found in all the standard pre-Vatican II Catholic manuals of moral theology. C. includes a section on "Modern Catholic Objections to the Classical Theory," but this covers only three pages and hardly does full justice to the subject. In assessing the newer approaches to moral reasoning in this brief piece, C. cites in particular one essay by Joseph Fuchs of the Gregorian University. C.'s description of the new or proportionalist approach is inaccurate. He says, e.g., that "The inference is that what is against the objective moral order, God's law, can be made objectively good by the intention of the doer of the act." It is extremely doubtful that any proponent of the revisionist position would agree with that statement.

C.'s analysis of Catholic social teaching on marriage and the family follows the traditional or classical Catholic approach. Many women will, predictably, be disappointed by his nuanced but, in the end, rather rigid emphasis on what he considers to be the inherently patriarchal structure of the family.

C.'s approach to political and economic life in chapters 4 and 5 can be described, in general, as intelligently conservative. It should be noted, however, that his critique of capitalism, past and present, is "liberal" by current standards and will not be to the liking of American neoconservatives, who in growing numbers are uncritically singing the praises of "democratic capitalism." C. is at his best in dealing with labor-management relations in Great Britain, which happens to be his academic specialty. His treatment of this subject is realistic and moderately progressive.

C.'s treatment of liberation theology is less than adequate and will undoubtedly strike many Latin American liberation theologians as being rather patronizing in tone. He dismisses liberation theology rather summarily, mainly under the heading of the use of violence. His discussion of violence in this context is curiously ambivalent. He admits that at times individual Christians or groups of Christians may legitimately resort to revolutionary violence, but argues unqualifiedly that the Church as such may never condone it. This argument may or may not involve C. in a logical contradiction. At the very least, however, it leaves unanswered the intriguing question as to whether or not C. would adopt the same attitude towards violence in the case of an armed conflict waged by his own country (or one of its allies) in what he would judge to be a morally justified war.

*Catholic University of America*  
GEORGE G. HIGGINS

The appearance of this, Dunne’s sixth book, requires something different from the sincere but unfocused appreciation which often greets his books; for his work and his way are one, a quest for insight along the human journey with God in time. It encompasses a wide range of human experience as illumining and illumined by Christianity. It engenders theology in the traditional sense, a speaking of God, unlike academic theologies content merely to interpret and to analyze what others have said of God.

Why, then, does D.’s work still go largely unrecognized among theologians? Is it not because its genre is so unfamiliar? Metz can help to orient us to it by his call for and description of a new way of theological reflection: “In the biographical mediation of theory and praxis, theological reflection is articulated as the mystical biography of a life of faith, as the history of its daily testing, without great changes and turning points, special illuminations and conversions” (Glaube in Geschichte und Gesellschaft 196–97). Obviously, such reflection does not move within or employ the conventional categories and jargon of academic or ecclesial theologicalologies. How, then, can it be interpreted?

Milan Kundera says that a novel’s unity derives “from several basic words, which gradually take on the force of philosophical categories... a novel exploits several basic situations or images.” Though D. is not a novelist, following these suggestions enables us to understand what he is about.

In the present book the “basic words” are many. Some have appeared in his previous book (e.g., circumstances, solitude, heart’s desire) and so their meanings are here expanded, deepened, and made more precise. They show this book to be a continuation of his move out of solitude “back again into the human circle,” a major theme of The Reasons of the Heart. Yet this book uses new “basic words” and exploits new images. They emerge from a voyage within his life’s voyage. In company with people from all the different classes of society, he traveled on a riverboat up the Amazon to Manaus. His destination was a small chapel, the Church of the Poor Devil; his purpose was to be present at the festival celebrated yearly there with singing, processions, candlelight, and the sharing of food.

D. took his journey as a image of life itself, and this echoes the images of journey that structure so much of his earlier work. Yet, meditating on it gave rise to new images, such as that of the festival and of the Church of the Poor Devil, and new “basic words,” such as “personal religion”
and "religion of the poor." They crystallize his insights into what our life is and what it could be, his discovery that we are all poor devils whose religion is the religion of the poor, his realization that therein lies our hope.

D.'s method of "passing over," coming to understand a culture or a person from the inside, as it were, has been a constant in his work. Here, however, its focus has notably shifted. Previously D. was passing over mainly to the dead who disclosed their souls in writing. On this riverboat voyage he began to pass over to the living and especially to the poor who disclose their souls in weeping, laughing, singing, celebrating, sharing, and building. What he discovers of the human condition—himself, Christianity, Christ, and God—resonates within the reader who is willing to accompany him on the way.

_The Church of the Poor Devil_ grounds even more firmly the claim that Dunne is one of the few genuine theologians among us, one who dares to speak of God.

_Loyola University of Chicago_  


There are two words coming down from ancient Greece that are central to an understanding of the universe: chaos and cosmos. Chaos would be a universe without intelligibility, without a form or structure or pattern open to understanding. Cosmos is a thing of beauty, a reality inspiring wonder and awe and even amazement. The creative scientist lives and works by means of the frequently unarticulated and often undefended conviction that our universe is a cosmos.

Why our universe should be a cosmos is an easy question for a theist. The basic explanation of our world is at or above the level of intelligence. The interior transparency of stars and atoms to mind is understandable because the root underpinning of these objects is an intelligent or superintelligent reality distinct from them. This root grounding to existence is called God. The universe is a cosmos because it has a creator.

J. has explored this theme before and now produces a short exposition of his past efforts. Again J. is convinced that the rise of science in the Christian West stems from the belief in the rationality of the universe, a conviction not shared in other traditions where science in fact did not experience the explosive growth it has in the West.

J.'s command of scientific and philosophic literature is enormous. He is not, however, a thinker who rejoices in the delicate wielding of a surgeon's scalpel. He prefers the battle axe and so delights in broad
swings that wipe out a herd of philosophers at a single pass. At times this style makes him sound like a pre-Vatican II apologist. At times it almost pushes him into the realm of religious obscurantism. Darwin, for instance, is a bête noire. Unfortunately, nonphilosophic thinkers are out after Darwin’s hide too, and J. only at the last moment pulls back from joining the antievolutionist camp in a simplistic sense. Obviously, if by evolution one means that the universe changes in time, every scientist agrees. If one descends to particulars and narrows the question to living beings and uses in biological processes natural selection as the mechanism of change, controversy is endless, even if very fruitful. No doubt, some evolutionists think that the discovery of a mechanism for evolution gets rid of belief in God. Such thinkers fail to see that the existence of a highly rational and formalizable process only more clearly leads to a recognition of intelligence undergirding such a reality. That must be pointed out to them, but without shouting.

J. struggles repeatedly with the question whether the world is what it is because it has to be so or is what it is because it has been chosen to be so. Neither chance nor necessity can be universal explanatory tools, he points out, if only because we experience freedom within ourselves and so know with certainty realities that are not explained by chance or necessity alone. Moreover, J. underlines the fascinating specificity of initial conditions in current big-bang cosmology. The original energy-matter soup assumed in big-bang models is very detailed and could easily be imagined to have been different. It is hard to see that it could be necessary.

Recalling one of his own major contributions, J. reviews Kurt Gödel’s incompleteness theorem. Briefly put, Gödel in the thirties proved that mathematical systems are such that it is always possible to raise a question within a system that cannot be answered in the system. By an obvious extension, no cosmological model can be constructed that is complete, that explains why the world is as it is. Some element of contingency must be apparent. J.’s work on the point has not yet been tested or developed by other thinkers as it should be.

J. treats for the first time the existence of intelligent life elsewhere in our universe. Anyone who takes the Copernican revolution seriously must believe in life on other worlds. Our planet earth is not the center of the universe and can scarcely be thought to be unique in its characteristics. Clearly, then, life must exist elsewhere or at least could exist elsewhere and will some day do so.

Unfortunately, J. gets sidetracked by some of the popularizers of the search for extraterrestrial life, such as Carl Sagan, who are at times abrasively nontheists. We cannot forget that why a scientist does the
work the scientist does, what prejudices may motivate a scientist, or what personal beliefs the scientist may have say nothing about the value or validity of the scientist's efforts.

This reviewer cannot help wishing that J. had seen the motion picture *E.T.* before writing his comments. His argumentative approach blocks him from discussing the interesting questions that abound in this area. Even Teilhard would have been illuminating on the point of how similar to us extraterrestrial life will be found to be.

J. remains one of the most knowledgeable thinkers in the philosophy-of-science arena. If only he did not like that battle axe so much.

*Le Moyne College, Syracuse*  
FRANK R. HAIG, S.J.


This is the second of three volumes (along with *Realism and the Aim of Science* and *Quantum Theory and the Schism in Physics*), written from 1951–56 but abandoned in galley proofs because of operations on Popper's eyes, which together comprise the *Postscript* to his *The Logic of Scientific Discovery*. In this volume P. criticizes "the commonsense arguments, the philosophical arguments, and especially the scientific arguments, which have been used in support of determinism" as a way "to make room within physical theory, and within cosmology, for indeterminism" (1, xxi). "This book is then," as he explains, "a kind of prolegomenon to the question of human freedom and creativity, and makes room for it physically and cosmologically in a way that does not depend on verbal analyses" (xxii).

P.'s constructive position is that we are part of an "open universe," in which "the creativeness of life does not contradict the laws of physics" (174). How can this be? Imagine a teakettle at the boil. The kettle "is an open system in the sense that a lot of energy flows into it from the bottom and out of it at the top and at the sides" (173). The system itself is intrinsically open; likewise, "every living system, and even the whole earth, with its developing and growing flora and fauna, is an open system" (172). Naturally enough, then, physical theory ought to reflect such a system. It ought, e.g., to be probabilistic (in order to account for physical "propensities") and indeterministic (to permit explanations of fluctuations in acceleration to be tested). Moreover, physics ought to reflect emergence: the "arrow of time" and the asymmetry between a closed past and an open future. Indeed, he shows how Einstein's special theory of relativity, at least, does so. In short, P. argues for a physical theory
not only compatible with, but also expressive of, indeterminism in that world, certain features of which it is designed to help us understand.

However, with this position contrast an alternative metaphor. Consider the world as a motion picture. The present is to be thought of as a frame taken from a reel, whose subsequent or future frames are as fully determinate as is its already projected past. Furthermore, suppose that what happens in these future frames can be deduced as precisely as we like from a sufficiently careful inspection of the present frame (the "initial conditions") and a knowledge that the speed of the projector will remain constant (the "laws of nature," understood deterministically). What about this other, deterministic metaphor for a closed system?

First, P. points out that only someone who is watching the motion picture could know it is not simply a still photograph. But we, and the scientists among us as well, are in the world, on the film. Therefore there is this crucial difference between the motion-picture metaphor for a closed universe and the predictions of scientists in particular. Such a metaphor may reflect what P. calls "metaphysical" determinism, but it has nothing whatever to do with science. Second, neither does science have anything to do with determinism; for, as P. explains, not only may an indeterminist theory of probability be better testable than a determinist one, but the very argumentative use of language in science may be incapable of explanation by means of a deterministic theory of language.

In sum, the result of P.'s hardheaded criticism is "the restoration of the naive view of the world" (109).

Hancock, Maine

PHILIP E. DEVENISH


Political philosophy has been fortunate in the past half century to have had first-class thinkers like Leo Strauss, Eric Voegelin, Jacques Maritain, and Hannah Arendt, who themselves were in direct contact with classical and revelational intellectual traditions. We are now beginning to see the many fruits of these teachings in the writings of Joseph Cropsey, Alan Bloom, Dante Germino, Ellis Sandoz, Gerhard Niemeyer, Charles N. R. McCoy, John Hallowell, and others. The meaning of political philosophy is, as Strauss suggested, itself a necessary context for discovering what philosophy and even revelation might be.

The notion of the open society, from Bergson and Karl Popper, has for some time come to be used as the end or purpose of man himself. But just what man is open "to" and who is to be included in this "openness" have become questions significantly "reduced" by specifically modern political philosophy itself. This reduction meant that any transcendent,
personal meaning or communication has been replaced by a this-worldly, social "universalism" that would include, at most, only those living on this earth at one time. Voegelin himself called it "immanentizing the eschaton," if that helps. Collectivities began to replace individuals. How this has come about from classical Greek, Jewish, and Christian origins is, in one sense, the burden of the history of political theory, provided, of course, that history itself is able to grapple with metaphysics and what Gilson called "the unity of philosophical experience."

From this background, Germino, at the University of Virginia, with likewise a skilful eye on Italian thought, has written an extraordinary and penetrating treatise, following the pioneering thought of Voegelin, about the actual meaning of an open society which would include precisely every human being and not merely some historical humans while in this world under some political regime. Since much modern theology has itself turned to politics as its chosen mode of analysis, it has been evident for some time that political philosophy, for its own integrity, would need to seek from its own authentic sources to re-establish the rightful place of the transcendent by regaining the universal prospective it had since its origins in Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle, a universalism grounded both in a human knower and in a First Mover or Good known at least to be.

What G. very brilliantly has endeavored to do, in many ways within the traditions of Augustine and Aquinas— with Voegelin, he does not hesitate to acknowledge the significance of Aquinas' "Question on Christ as the Head of All Men" (3, 8, 3)—is argue that a personal openness to the transcendent is what alone unifies mankind. Without a highest activity beyond politics we are not human. All merely political endeavors, all strictly innerworldly efforts are too narrow and usually seek to impose a purely manmade ideology as a substitute for the transcendent that establishes our greatness.

My only reservation with G.'s very penetrating thesis concerns his reluctance to give any principle by which we could judge the various "theophanies" we have in fact experienced in history or will experience. As his thesis stands, we have no protection from the demonic. This was one of the reasons for Aquinas' insistence that grace "built" on nature. In a sense, the liberal this-worldly principles G. rightly rejected in the open society reappear at the Godhead, so that mankind, in being happily "open" to the transcendent, might receive just about anything passing for the "divine."

Throughout the book G. resolutely inveighs against "dogma" and the dangers of institutionalizing revelation. He recalls many political abuses done in its name. Yet, if we can suspect that revelation, if it is authentic, might actually be directed to human intelligence, to make it more precisely "intelligence," then formulating what is and is not true is not
a threat to true theophany but precisely a consequence of it in the rational being, doing what rational human beings do. In any case, this is a very powerful book, worthy of widespread reflection and consideration.

Goergetown University

JAMES V. SCHALL, S.J.


This is the most intelligent approach I have met towards the understanding of a religious revolution in general, and of the religious revolution that has taken place recently in Iran in particular. Shayegan, former professor of comparative philosophy at the University of Tehran, also former director of the Iranian Center for the Study of Civilizations, has reached a depth in his search for causes and effects beyond which perhaps no one can go. Unfortunately, his explanation is encrusted in the philosophical jargon common in French universities and, in spite of the familiarity of the words, is hard to understand in the context of English and American thought. Moreover, while he displays a good knowledge of Greek philosophy, he appears less familiar with medieval developments. He also appears hesitant or too shy to take a firm position one way or another in the case of modern philosophical theories. The successive systems of Hume, Kant, Hegel, and Marx seem to him to be manifestations of a unified stream of thought, all together gradually unfolding the mystery of life. S. does not seem to notice the quite radical differences among them in spite of the obvious influence of one over another.

Notwithstanding such limitations, S. is able to show that any religious revolution takes place first in the minds of human beings, long before it becomes a movement or breaks out in a bloody event. There is the example of Iran for all of us to contemplate. S. invites his reader to penetrate beyond the facts reported in the media and see what has been happening in the minds of the Iranian people. Theirs was an ancient Islamic culture offering a transcendental, all-embracing vision of God, of man, of a cosmic order in the universe, not very different, in S.’s view, from the medieval Christian civilization. But with the waning of the Middle Ages and the rise of the new empirical sciences, the Western world has taken a new turn, which led to the death of ancient magic, myths, and divinities. (Or so S. claims; his perception of modern European history is somewhat one-sided.) No such transformation has taken place in the East. The mythical world of the Persians survived and came into head-on collision with the spiritual nihilism of the West. The result is the tragic conflict we all know something about. The Iranian people never assimilated the Western ideas. Their choice was, and is, either servile submission to an alien ideology which they cannot understand,
and which was represented by the regime of the last shah, or the uncritical return to ancient traditions, led by the ayatollahs.

The Iranian people find themselves in a world where their ancient symbols cannot mediate, still less explain, the universe which surrounds them, and they cannot handle the business of this universe with their restricted categories. Hence the simple slogans, e.g., “the children of God must fight the sons of Satan.” Their minds have become captive to sharply drawn alternatives, so that no room is left for an accommodation or for a reasonable compromise. S. concludes that nothing short of changing the minds of people on both sides, in Iran and in the West, can change the situation. How can this be brought about?

There is still a world of art and poetry, of beauty and belief, in the West, but this is not what the Iranians have come to know. There is room in the Islamic traditions for the understanding of astronomy, chemistry, and empirical sciences in general. Through such means, if not today, perhaps in some distant future, bridges can be built. So there is hope. But the transformation of the inner world of human beings has always been slow. As long as it is not accomplished, conflicting visions will separate nations and peoples from each other; they may even cause extreme violence if the flow of history brings one group near the other.

S. shows, with a sure touch, where the problem lies. I wish only that he could be heard the world over in a language that is more universal than the jargon he speaks. His work could be rewritten in English; to translate it would not be enough. His approach could help statesmen on all sides to penetrate more deeply into the cause of events and see remedies for so much violence. All in all, S. has written a fine study not only on the nature of religious revolution in general and of the religious revolution in Iran in particular, but on the very nature of the human mind. It takes a great philosopher to do that.

Catholic University of America

LADISLAS ORSY, S.J.


Two series originating from the Gregorian University deserve to be far better known in American theological libraries. Classical Hinduism is a good example of why both the Documenta missionalia and the Studia missionalia series ought be appreciated more widely. These works address interreligious questions with a thoroughness and theological acumen many other works simply lack.

Classical Hinduism is a vast and yet very sophisticated portrait of the Hindu religious tradition articulated in language and categories capable
of dialogue with theology. Indeed, it is a pioneering work insofar as it frames its study of Hinduism within such familiar categories as revelation, incarnation, salvation, worship, meditation, monasticism, and morality. Such classic theological categories invite to dialogue and fuller understanding.

A strength of the work is precisely this depiction of Hinduism within language which both safeguards the special character of the Hindu tradition and simultaneously presents itself to theology in anticipation of further and deepened conversation. Thus chap. 3, “Incarnation,” presents a thorough study of ten different forms of Hindu “incarnation” (avatara); it emphasizes the critical initiative of divine grace (prasada) to explain why Krishna chooses to begin the divine-human conversation of love (bhakti). When D. describes such divine-human “surrender” in terms of theism accompanied by strong leanings to practical monotheism, an apt starting point for conversation with theology has been located. Similarly, when dealing with the Absolute of the Upanishads, D. consistently points to this Brahman-param-atman experience as religious and not simply a brilliant philosophical insight. Such emphasis on religious experience promises to open theological doors. Moreover, when dealing with worship, rites, and “sacraments,” D. invariably goes to the heart of the matter by emphasizing the critical transformative importance of religious faith (sraddha). Ritual without such faith is simply empty and vacuous—still another point for deeper mutual understanding.

Yet, a unique and extremely valuable contribution is to be found in the last two chapters, which deal with salvation and redemption. Following an excellent etymological study of various Hindu understandings of “sin” (already an extraordinary source for the moral theologian), D. explains how the human ego (ahamkara) and imperfect human ways of knowing (avidya, ajnana) can be formidable obstacles to salvation for the Hindu. Then with scholarly precision, salvation as depicted in the Vedas, the Upanishads, the Mahabharata, and the Bhagavad-Gita is presented with appropriate distinctions. It is just such precise scholarship as this, reinforced by a variety of Sanskrit texts, that makes Classical Hinduism such a valuable source book for both Hinduism and theology.

Moreover, from still another perspective, this work promises to become just this needed source book of Hinduism. D. draws on German, French, English, and American scholarship to supplement his already vast command of the basic Indological sources. Thus, citations from Otto, Eliade, and Dumézil are accompanied by extensive quotations from the Hindu bhasyas of Sankara, Ramanuja, and Madhva as well as the more contemporary insights of Ramakrishna, Aurobindo, Gandhi, and Radhakrishnan. Moreover, Sanskritists will be delighted to find extensive pertinent quotations from Guadapada, Vyasa, Vijananabhiksu, and Vacaspatimiśra.
In summary, *Classical Hinduism* is a thorough theological source book for discovering and exploring the “immense and yet vast ocean” of the Hindu religious tradition; it is unique insofar as it invites contemporary theology to take up this book and consider more deeply. Such reflection promises mutual stimulation and enhancing enrichment.

*Seton Hall University*

**FRANK PODGORSKI**

**SHORTER NOTICES**


Gathered here are essays that were scattered in hard-to-find *Festschriften* and sometimes originally composed in foreign languages. The contributions do not simply reprint or rephrase observations made in the second edition (1978) of Barrett’s masterful commentary on John. Rather, we are given examples of applications to specific topics of three decades of B.’s wrestling with John—lucidly clear writing by one who knows the literature on John and has something perceptive to say about real problems. The price of the volume may put it beyond the range of most students, but it will be a library service to make available this convenient collection of *opera minora*.

Particularly astute is B.’s analysis of Jewish and Judaizing opponents in the epistles of Ignatius, a piece I found very useful in diagnosing the opponents of John (some twenty years before Ignatius) in *The Community of the Beloved Disciple*. The only previously unpublished essay (on Jn 21:15–25) is a sermon that illustrates beautifully how to use critical biblical knowledge in preaching. Without using what has been gained by critical study, B. says, “The preacher will lose, and deserve to lose, both the respect and the attention of the congregation.” In treating Jn 6, B. focuses on John’s reference to the (Eucharistic) bread as the flesh of the *Son of Man*. This draws attention to the eschatological aspect of the Eucharist: the bread from heaven is the flesh of the one who has come down from heaven. Moreover, it clarifies the relation of John to the Synoptics in portraying the Son of Man as one who gives of himself for others.

The first essay in the book suggests that theocentrism might be a better description for Johannine theology than Christocentrism because the Johannine Christ is essentially a revealer of God. Curiously, however, B. rejects the thesis that *egó eimi* (“I am”) reflects an application of the OT divine Name to Jesus. True, the name is not meant to make Jesus the God of the OT; but I would maintain that the idea of God’s giving His Name to His Son is a striking illustration of John’s thesis that the identity of God is now known (only) in and through Jesus. That very disagreement illustrates how Barrett makes all of us think, and he does so in a thoroughly enjoyable way.

*RAYMOND E. BROWN, S.S.*

*Union Theological Seminary, N.Y.C.*


This book constitutes the seventh volume in a series of annual bibliographies on Latin American theology, bringing the material through the year 1978. The vast majority of references
is to Spanish and Portuguese books and articles, but some books in other languages are referred to when they have relevance to the Latin American scene. Although the theological references constitute by far the greater part of the book, it begins with a briefer and more selective list of publications in the social sciences which provides background material for the theology. Included in this category are sections on economics, politics, history, sociology, culture, art, and psychology. Here as elsewhere in the book, short summaries are included in English, but I did not find these very helpful. Also, many but not all of the references are accompanied by brief summaries describing their contents.

The theological references are grouped under the major divisions of practical theology, history of the churches, the Bible, the biblical context, and systematic theology. Practical theology as here understood perhaps covers too broad a spectrum, ranging from liturgy, sacred music, religious life, and spirituality to evangelization, ministry, and church law. I found the section here on base communities very helpful in its analysis and references. In the church history section, the treatment of the evangelical churches was disappointing brief, although this may reflect the paucity of solid research in the area. Four detailed indices conclude the book, which certainly can be recommended as a valuable research tool for those interested in Latin American theology.

ALFRED T. HENNELLY, S.J.
Woodstock Theological Center
Washington, D.C.

FAITH AND THE MYSTERY OF GOD.

A sequel to Wiles's earlier The Remaking of Christian Doctrine. It is an attempt to indicate how traditional dogmas of faith can be intelligently understood today.

W. first evolves a framework of interpretation. A person's faith commitment may be absolute, but the human is always contingent and limited. This means that our beliefs can undergo real changes not merely in the way these beliefs are expressed but even in what is basically apprehended and felt. Religious language is then shown to be symbolic. It can both disclose what has always been a potential in God's world and create deeper reality for the believer.

W. then proceeds briefly but systematically to examine central Christian dogmas, such as the Eucharist, Incarnation, church, resurrection, and Trinity. While acknowledging an evocative value in their symbols, he believes that their traditional understanding is no longer intelligible and a new significance must be sought. He understands the above dogmas in a symbolic sense. Each in its own way discloses and creates for the believer a new awareness of how God is personally and actively involved in the world in the order solely of final causality and love.

W.'s approach to the relationship between faith and reason is to emphasize critical reason. Though he tries to counter the charge of reductionism, he seems to have ended up there. Granted the inherent difficulty in specifying what is essential to the "objective" content of dogmas, I believe that there are more enduring elements to the traditional dogmas than what W. proposes. The issue seems to center on whether and how far one can accept the dictum credo ut intelligam.

In brief, this is a well-written, insightful, and thought-provoking work that requires some theological sophistication to see where W. is coming from (a Liberal Protestant stance) and where he is going (a new and different
understanding of major Christian dogmas beyond what has been traditional.

FREDERICK G. McLEOD, S.J.
St. Louis University


Some of the more useful statements on contemporary Eucharistic liturgy and theology are found in the pages of Worship. Limiting himself to the articles which have appeared in that publication, S. has done a fine service in gathering together sixteen recent articles which address central Eucharistic concerns. The work begins with a treatment of Paul's teaching that the foundation of Eucharist is the Church as a community of faith (Murphy-O'Connor). A major portion of the selections deals with the Eucharistic prayer: its Jewish structure (Ledogar and Talley), its traditional and contemporary formulations in the Roman rite (Kavanagh), the roles of the congregation (Dallen) and the president (Legrand) in its recitation. The major theological issues of sacrifice (Power) and presence (Schillebeeckx and Gray) are addressed in a creative and ecumenical fashion. Other concerns treated here are the function of Eucharist in the forgiveness of sins (Quinn) and the meal aspect of Christian Eucharist (Rouillard). Pastoral concerns of concelbration (Taft), the Eucharist without priests (Leclercq), modes of celebrations (Seasoltz), and the order of worship (Smits) provide an overall balance to the collection.

These selections present liturgical scholarship at its best. Each article is at the same time attentive to technical, historical, theological, and anthropological concerns while it also offers a constructive commentary and critique of contemporary worship. The juxtaposition of these articles builds a coherent and consistent picture of the richness of Eucharistic worship and the ongoing pastoral demands to be faithful to that tradition. Overall, this work emerges as a most useful tool for students and a handy source for those entrusted with responsibility for Eucharistic worship. The editor also provides a welcome, though incomplete, index.

EMMANUEL CUTRONE
Quincy College, Ill.


Here we have Cobb at his best as a theologian of dialogue and co-operation, though not of compromise, calling both for the movement of process theology “for its own sake and for the sake of the gospel to become a political theology” and for the movement of political theology to become, in its own way, a process theology (152).

As C. sees it, process theologians need to respond to the call of political theologians such as Metz, Moltmann, and Sölle to take part in “the discussion of Christian responsibility for public affairs, especially as these are politically conceived” (vii). C. seems to affirm the basic methodological point of all political theology: “theory is in the service of practice” (14). He also accepts fully its demand for the “deideologizing” involved in political self-criticism, as well as its call for the “deprivatization of our understanding of human existence and of salvation” (15). Thus, process theology as political theology.

On the other hand, C. also argues that process theology can contribute to the task of developing a political theology which is theoretically sound by contemporary standards. For instance, he criticizes the anthropocentrism of German political theology, which re-
sults in a merely "sociological theology" exclusively attuned to urban and technological environments, and argues that process thought gives rise to an "ecological theology" which addresses both urban and rural, technological and traditional situations. Moreover, C. suggests that Whitehead's nonapocalyptic eschatology, according to which history, though open-ended, is continually finding its end in God, can serve as credible encouragement for realistic efforts at social justice in ways in which apocalyptic visions of perfect justice no longer can. Thus, political theology as process theology.

Perhaps C.'s work will so focus attention on common issues as to help undermine the distinct theological "movements" it presupposes.

PHILIP E. DEVENISH
South Bend, Ind.


This volume of essays summarizes the dialogue between the Eastern Orthodox and the Oriental Orthodox (non-Chalcedonian) churches which took place, in connection with World Council Faith and Order meetings, between 1964 and 1971. The volume includes the agreed statements from the four unofficial consultations held in Denmark, England, Switzerland, and Ethiopia, and a selection of eight of the more important essays in that dialogue.

It is noteworthy that the Christological controversies marking the long-standing divisions in Christianity are nearing resolution. The "remarkable measure of agreement" in Christology, particularly the relationship of the natures and person in Christ, warrant a recommendation that these churches move toward official dialogue leading to full communion. These agreed statements and essays are helpful, for they raise the canonical, liturgical, and jurisdictional problems involved when churches have remained divided for so long on fundamental dogmatic issues.

Since the Roman Church and its theologians are in dialogue with these churches, it is important for Roman Catholic scholars to be conversant with the content of the dialogues.

The Western scholar will be fascinated to note the evaluations given to Cyril, Leo, and other voices that influenced the decisions at Chalcedon. The discussions following the papers on the question of Cyril's and Leo's formulation, relative to the one incarnate nature of God the Word, are instructive for the scholar intent on catching the mood of Orthodox Christological thought. Historical developments at the time of Chalcedon and subsequent theological reflection were formed by the personalities, language, and culture of the moment as well as by the theological convictions of Orthodoxy.

Of special importance is the essay by John Zizioulas, "Ecclesiological Issues Inherent in the Relations between Eastern Chalcedonian and Oriental Non-Chalcedonian Churches." This essay goes beyond Christology to the questions of anathemas, position of saints in the life of the Church (especially when some saints have been anathematized by the other church), and the question of ecclesiological recognition. Locating the veneration of the saints in the context of communio sanctorum and relating it to the ecclesiological dimension of church life places the role of the saint in a wider context and makes the discussion important not only for inter-Orthodox or Orthodox-Roman reconciliation, but also for the Protestant community,
where saints have not been part of its tradition or experience.

JEFFREY GROS, F.S.C.
National Council of the Churches of Christ, N.Y.


Why would the bishop of Hippo have written a work composed of and entitled Eighty-three Different Questions? Augustine answered this query in his Retractations in a manner that was, evidently, convincing enough to inspire Mosher to undertake the arduous task of the first English translation of the text.

This volume, then, is composed of questions put to Augustine by his brother companions during his years (388-96) in the monastic community he had organized. The translator's Introduction provides information on the literary form, chronology, and doctrinal content of the Questions. Throughout the volume, footnotes provide scriptural references, the Latin underlying a difficult translation as well as alternate translations that merit consideration, explanatory notes supplying background to a polemical or doctrinal point, parallel texts in other works by Augustine, or references to scholarly discussions of some difficult or obscure passage.

The questions themselves are of the greatest variety in both subject and length. One of the shortest is answered in three lines; longer answers reach to seven and eight pages and cover topics in philosophy, biblical exegesis, Christology, good and evil. In reading the Questions, we find evidences of Augustine's Platonism and Neoplatonism, his knowledge of classical literature, and his number mysticism.

The volume's presentation will encourage use by students and scholars alike. There is a helpful General Index and an Index of Scripture. The quality and accessibility of the text argue in favor of the translator's application of his own criteria for the happy rendering of Augustine into another language (cf. xvii).

AGNES CUNNINGHAM, S.S.C.M.
St. Mary of the Lake Seminary Mundelein, Ill.


Boethius belongs—as one of the most important transmitters of the classical tradition—to the founders of the Middle Ages. On the occasion of the fifteenth centenary of his birth, a distinguished group of scholars gathered in October 1980 at Pavia, where he was executed in 524, to discuss various aspects of his life and works. This volume of the acts of this international congress contains 28 essays, divided into 20 relazioni and 8 comunicazioni. The essays cover Boethius' relation to Pavia and Roman history, theology, philosophy, the classical tradition, and the Middle Ages. The papers are so different in their approaches that a lengthy discussion of each is impossible here, but they are important because they show the complexity of B.'s influence during the Middle Ages. For a long time research concentrated on the De consolatione philosophiae, but many of B.'s other works also became standard texts for theology and the seven liberal arts.

Several of the essays deal with the philosophical and linguistic problems behind his reflection on the concepts "nature" and "person" within the context of the Trinitarian controversies of the fifth century. B.'s influence in medieval logic is well known, but an im-
Important essay (Stump) throws new light on the tradition of his *De topicis differentiis*, showing how the twelfth century came to abandon the attempt to find warrants in topics for categorical syllogisms (for Abelard, only the conditional propositions used in hypothetical syllogisms are dependent on the topics). Many of the essays treat B.'s place in the history of medieval science, one especially on the place of his treatise *De institutione arithmetica* in the development of mathematics from Roger Bacon to Thomas Bradwardine (Masi). Important is the hypothesis that Boethius composed—in addition to his treatises on arithmetic, music, and geometry—an adaptation of Ptolemy's *Almagest* (Lucidi).

Charles Lohr
Raimundus-Lullus-Institut
Freiburg


In the early eighth century the Lombards replaced the Byzantines as the dominant secular power in Italy. They remained so until the later part of the century, when the Franks under Pepin and Charlemagne dominated and finally eliminated the Lombard monarchy. As the inheritors of *Romanitas* in barbarian Italy and secular rulers in the Roman area, the popes had many and complicated dealings with the Lombards, especially in the eighth century. Hallenbeck has tried to explicate the nature of these dealings. I say "tried" because much of the evidence is sketchy and ambiguous, and H. must constantly hypothesize. This slows the book considerably, it involves regular reconsideration of the evidence. But those familiar with early medieval church history will appreciate and applaud H.'s efforts. He never stretches the evidence, and his hypothesizing is a model of sound scholarship.

H. concludes that papal-Lombard relations depended on the individual popes and kings and the contemporaneous political situation, which was complicated by the Byzantines and ambitious Lombard nobles. The kings, ruling from Pavia, wished to create a unified state, which meant dominating the southern dukes, which in turn meant occupying central Italy, surrounding papal territory, and cutting Rome off from the Byzantine exarch in Ravenna. Diplomacy was tried, but the inevitable territorial incursions destroyed the fragile peace time and again. When the popes finally concluded that any united Lombard kingdom would endanger Roman interests, they appealed to the Franks, who also tried diplomacy. To their credit, the Lombards strove to preserve their kingdom, only to lose it when the Franks resorted to force. H. concludes that there was simply no room in eighth-century Italy for a strong papacy and a strong Lombard state.

Joseph F. Kelly
John Carroll University
Cleveland


A modern translation of two of Calvin's lesser-known treatises. Calvin published his *Brief Instruction for Arming All the Good Faithful against the Errors of the Common Sect of the Anabaptists* in 1544, intending it as a response to Michael Sattler's *Schleitheim Confession* of 1527. When the Anabaptists began to show gains in the French-speaking cantons of Switzerland, the Reformed pastors became alarmed and urged Calvin to answer
shorter notices

the seven articles in Sattler’s confession. As expected, Calvin responds to the main tenets of Anabaptism, establishing the legitimacy of infant baptism and the ability of Christians to take oaths, use the sword, and participate in government. In addition, Calvin took the opportunity to refute Melchior Hoffmann’s teaching that the body Christ took in the Incarnation was not human but “celestial,” and added a summary of his previously published (1542) treatise Psychopannychia.

Calvin’s second treatise, Against the Fantastic and Furious Sect of the Libertines Who Are Called “Spirituals,” dates from 1545. The Libertines were an antinomian sect among the Protestants who disregarded Scripture, over-emphasized the possession of the Spirit, had a pantheistic understanding of God and Christ, and whose advocacy of Christian liberty approached license. Farley has translated both treatises from Calvin’s French text as published in the Calvini opera, and has provided introductory essays describing the background and origin of each treatise, and many clarifying footnotes. The translation is so smooth-flowing that the reader easily forgets that what he has in his hands is a translation.

Joseph N. Tyenda, S.J.
Georgetown University


O’Higgins attempts to reconstruct an intellectual biography of Yves de Vallone (1666 or 1667–1705), who started as a canon of St. Geneviève, went over to Calvinism, became a Calvinist minister, and probably ended as a libre penseur. The work is somewhat of a footnote to Hazard’s famous book. But rightly, O. modifies the thesis that between 1680 and 1720 the intellectual climate of Europe was radically and completely altered. The transformation in Vallone and in others like him was painfully slow, so that even at the end of his life Vallone had traces of the theism with which he had started his tortured spiritual odyssey.

The analysis of Vallone’s thought is based on two writings, a Profession de foi (1701) and an undated Religion du chrétien, a holograph with many corrections now in the Austrian National Library. From these two works and from other sources, most of them suggesting more than one probability, O. writes a chapter on Vallone’s life. This is followed by chapters on God, the soul, authority, Scripture, Christian religion, a consideration of Vallone’s unorthodoxy, and a final chapter in which the unorthodox writings of some authors, roughly contemporaries of Vallone, are discussed with the purpose of ascertaining Vallone’s degree of unorthodoxy.

Except for a rather massive misunderstanding of the causes for and the purpose of Jansenism and its location within the French Catholic Revival, O. has produced an admirable study of a subject whose checkered religious career must have been especially difficult to follow, particularly in an age when religious conformity was the rule rather than the exception.

Samuel J. Miller
Boston College


As we have now come to expect from
N., his *Místico* is not simply a Spanish translation of his 1979 book *Mystic, Rebel, Saint: A Study of St. John of the Cross* (see *TS* 41 [1980] 239) but a thoroughly revised and rewritten version of the English edition which includes much new material. The major additions include three new chapters (the introduction and chaps. 3 and 4), three appendices (Spanish translations of two of N.'s articles previously published in English and an anthology of St. John's poetry), and some eighty-four items to the bibliography. The onomastic index of the English edition is omitted.

C.'s book is a translation of his 1979 book *Saint Jean de la Croix*. This work, in the author's words, is "primarily philosophical, not theological" (1). Its purpose is to "respect John's thought...to let it be, not to question it" (9), while at the same time recognizing the power of John's writings "to alter the basic principles of philosophical study" (10). C. divides his study into an introduction, six chapters, and a conclusion. Each chapter is subdivided into two sections: "the first devoted to a theoretical account of [John's] thought, the second to how it worked out in practice in his life" (12). Among the topics treated are mysticism, God's absence, the desire for God, the world and the kingdom of God, the body. A particularly welcome feature of this book is its emphasis on John's activity as a spiritual director as a source of his thought and writings, something often overlooked. There is an ample index but no bibliography.

**JOSEPH F. CHORPENNING, O.S.F.S.  
Allentown College**


Following the practice established in the first volume of this annual publication (see *TS* 42 [1981] 519–20), the first part of *Carmelite Studies* 2 consists of four essays focused on a common theme, contemporary psychology and Carmel, while the second part is comprised of two essays, their only common denominator being that both treat Carmelite topics. In Part 1, four young American scholars, three Carmelites and one laywoman, who have done doctoral theses on either Teresa of Avila or John of the Cross, share the fruit of their researches in a series of essays which approach either Teresa's or John's descriptions of spiritual development from the perspective of the findings of such twentieth-century psychologists as Rollo May, Abraham Maslow, Carl Rogers, and Carl Jung. The results are well balanced and extremely illuminating. Three essays are devoted to John, one to Teresa. David Centner draws upon the work of several contemporary psychologists in his discussion of Christian freedom and the nights of St. John; Kevin Culligan does a comparative study of John as spiritual director and Rogers as psychotherapist; Russell Holmes offers a Jungian approach to forgetting and memory in John; J. Ruth Aldrich studies Teresa in light of Maslow's description of the self-actualized person and concludes that she was very healthy psychologically, thus defending her against some twentieth-century psychologists who have judged her to be hysterical.

Part 2 contains two items: an English translation of John Paul II's Latin summary of his doctoral thesis in theology on faith in John of the Cross, also written in Latin (the first English translation of this thesis was published under the title *Faith according to St. John of the Cross* in 1981 (see *TS* 43 [1982] 751–52), which was originally published in the Warsaw theological journal *Collectanea theologica* in 1950; and a most interesting original article
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by John Sullivan entitled “Mary, the Bees of the Exsultet and the Carmelites,” based on a paper read at the 1979 Eighth International Mariological Congress in Saragossa.

The Institute of Carmelite Studies is to be commended again for the high quality of its continuing effort to mine and make available to an ever-widening audience the rich tradition of Carmel. Carmelite Studies 3 will publish the proceedings of the symposium held at Catholic University in Washington, D.C., in October 1982 to commemorate the fourth centenary of Teresa’s death.

JOSEPH F. CHORPENNING, O.S.F.S.
Allentown College, Pa.


The Belgian author, founder of La Société Internationale Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, was one of a small group of friends that gathered around Teilhard during the confinement of the Japanese occupation of Peking. Teilhard often spoke of being “perfectly at home in good old Peking” and told of finding “a second family there.” The city was ravaged by war, famine, and disease during the Japanese occupation, the author’s husband was arrested, but Teilhard sustained a small group of friends by his vision of a new world that was forming. “Each war—and I know the undescribable horror—results in a binding and a mixing of the nations.” Beneath the events of the war Teilhard saw a wave of sympathy forming a united humanity. Such ideas are not new to those familiar with his thoughts; but the present book sets the ideas in the context in which they were developed. While friends spoke of Yin and Yang, Confucius and the Tai Chi, Teilhard expressed both his sympathies and reservations with Chinese thought: “Personally I love the cosmic sense and the intuition of the Chinese,” but their understanding of God is “dangerously assimilated to the firmament.” Teilhard tells of his own involvement with Peking Man: “My work was to supervise the excavations and classify and inventory the discoveries.” The author kept a daily record of the group conversations; this has been revised and edited to give the present book. With text, a map, and 26 pictures, she gives a feel for the man and for his adopted city.

THOMAS KING, S.J.
Georgetown University


An English edition of the Barth-Bultmann correspondence is a welcome addition to the literature on these giants and the theological history they shaped. Barth, the premier Protestant theologian of our century, and Bultmann, who enjoyed a similar eminence among Germany’s NT scholars, were at one time allies in the effort to leave behind the religious climate of the late nineteenth century and move toward a postliberal theology. Later their theological paths diverged, and their respective methods were championed by opposing sides in the mid-twentieth-century debate over demythologizing and existentialist interpretation.

This book, which includes all the available letters and postcards exchanged by Barth and Bultmann over more than forty years of correspondence, helps tell the story of twentieth-century theology in a vivid and illuminating way. Especially striking is the high regard the two men had for each other personally, in spite of the growing theological distance between them. The early letters show the difficulty of achieving a clarification of their agree-
ments and differences. When their correspondence resumes after the war, Bultmann argues for the necessity of translating the NT message into the language of human "self-understanding" (as opposed to the "objectifying" thinking of myth). Barth objects to Bultmann's existentialism as excessively anthropological and liable therefore to miss the real center of the kerigma.

In addition to exchanges between the two principals, the book includes Barth's reply to a bishop who had inquired about accusations of heresy being directed against Bultmann. Barth responds with both a critique and a defense of Bultmann—defending him against the heresy hunters, while pointing out the real problem with Bultmann's approach (unrecognized by his vociferous critics). This analysis of the charges against Bultmann is one of the best pieces in the volume.

One criticism of the translation: "de-secularization" (92) is hardly a helpful rendering of Entweltlichung, which for Bultmann means the surrender of human security in order to venture the authentic existence of faith. Since there seems to be no English equivalent, a paraphrase would have been preferable. Also, this English edition is somewhat abridged. In many instances we are given the translator's summary of a letter rather than the letter itself; the reader is referred to the original German edition for the full text and notes. Generally, though, Bromiley appears to have exercised sound judgment in his selections, and the bulk of the correspondence is in the words of the correspondents themselves.

RUSSELL W. PALMER
Univ. of Nebraska at Omaha

A METAPHYSICS FOR THEOLOGY: A STUDY OF SOME PROBLEMS IN THE LATER PHILOSOPHY OF ALFRED NORTH WHITEHEAD AND ITS APPLI-


The title of this dissertation leads the reader to expect that a constructive metaphysical proposal will emerge out of the critical consideration of Whitehead's thought. Instead, a careless treatment of W. merely serves as a springboard for the author's leap into the deep waters of analytic epistemology, where, however, he has yet to learn to swim.

P. claims that theology needs metaphysics, since "without a satisfactory metaphysics assertions about God will be unintelligible, and no assessment of them will be possible" (22). He thinks Whitehead's metaphysics may be regarded as "compatible with Christian theology," but criticizes W.'s theory of perception, with its alleged assertion of "a certain kind of deep, preconceptual experience," and his realism, according to which P. contends we are supposed to have "access to a position outside the world, which enables us to know, and speak meaningfully about, what reality is from a point of view external to reality" (72, 67, 88). P. argues that such realism is inconsistent with Whitehead's relational ontology, and he proposes a theory of "conceptual realism" as the solution to W.'s problems.

The work is an ambitious failure on both main counts. On the critical side, e.g., P. fails even to consider whether Whitehead's "causal efficacy" is better understood as a type of experience or rather as an aspect of experience in the mode of "symbolic reference," of which conceptual interpretation is the distinctive feature. P. also fails to observe Whitehead's own distinction of "realism" and "rationalism." Such carelessness is reflected in P.'s mere citation of uninterpreted passages as putative evidence for his own claims. On the constructive side, P.'s treatment of "correspondence" and "coherence" theo-
ries of truth fails to exhibit a firm grasp of the issue of how assertions are to be given experiential meaning. Finally, P. never refers to Whitehead’s thought at all in the course of presenting his own proposal. One senses that his passing interest in W.’s philosophy is also somehow beside the point.

PHILIP E. DEVENISH
South Bend, Ind.


H. sketches the most trenchant criticisms of Christian ethics since the Enlightenment, finding them in the works of Hume, Kant, Fichte, Hegel, and especially Nietzsche, Marx, and Freud. Together these indict Christian ethics for its denial of moral autonomy, its excessive individualism, its reliance on illusion and immaturity, and especially its disastrous social consequences, which range from impotence before evil to outright collusion with oppression. After a look at how more recent critics continue and deepen these attacks, H. responds by considering Christian ethicists who reject the quest for autonomy as itself illusory and dangerous, who balance a concern for the individual with other-regarding love, who stress the mature appropriation of the Christian vision of a good life, and who reject both the failure of Christian social ethics and the extravagances of Marxist-Leninist dogma. Of those considered, Dietrich Bonhoeffer and Reinhold Niebuhr predominate. H. also offers a provocative treatment of situation ethics and liberation theology as two sides of the same coin, a helpful look at Christian ethics among world religions and in Christian religion, and a curiously tentative “positive interpretation” of Christian ethics as conformity to divine love. Missing in the book are any specific discussion of a Christian ethicist since Niebuhr, and any mention of currents in contemporary ethical thought apart from those mentioned above. On the whole, though, this is a well-thought-out and readable book that will repay its use in an introductory class.

RICHARD BONDI
Atlanta


Like many others, H. sees a crisis in sexual morality. The change is from a rather restricted concept of sexuality, in which it was linked too closely to procreation, to a quite liberal view, in which it becomes largely an aspect of social life and a source of pleasurable experience. He traces this change to a number of factors: a new reading of Scripture, a more critical view of the historical tradition, the contribution of the social sciences, and the emphasis on the role of love.

Responding to this development, the Church, giving love a more central role, no longer considers procreation the primary goal of sex. On the other hand, it continues to teach traditional norms. At this point the birth-control controversy enters the scene. H. views this not as an isolated problem but in the context of a more extensive movement away from traditional norms. He discusses in detail the approach taken by the CTSA Committee in its book Hu­man Sexuality, in which “creative growth toward integration” is set as the goal of sexual activity. He then goes on to treat André Guindon’s appeal to the meaning of sex as opposed to legal norms as the basis for sex conduct. His third discussion centers around Philip Keane’s proportionalist approach. Fi­nally, he devotes some space to the work of Germain Grisez and other authors who do not depart from traditional norms but try to given them a rational undergirding.
As one may have already concluded, H. deals almost totally with American theologians, so his view of the crisis is limited to the American scene. Some may differ with his analysis of past tradition. There are authors, e.g., who do not agree that the love aspect of sex was as neglected in the past as some maintain. Ample evidence of this is found in treatises on the sacramental aspect of marriage and in the medieval sacramentaries. Looking into the future, H. sees greater recognition of the importance of sex, a closer identification of sex with love, growth in intimacy, and greater attention to the social importance of sex. The reader may not agree totally with H.’s analysis, but he will find it helpful.

JOHN R. CONNERY, S.J.
Loyola University of Chicago


This revised edition will be welcomed by those wanting a credible, coherent, and thorough presentation of Roman Catholic medical ethics. The book was originally well received and this revision merits a similar reception.

As with the original, the book is organized around several ethical principles clearly presented and cogently argued for. These are continually referred to in the analysis of problems. Thus the authors maintain a high level of principled integration. Nor do they restrict themselves to Catholic authors; the range of positions considered is ecumenical, though the primary focus is Catholic.

Areas of revision include more current discussion of the right to health care and the need for universal health care insurance, plus expanded sections on issues of sexuality, including contraception, sterilization, abortion, and sexual reassignment. A very helpful section on ethical theories has been added which helps set a better context for the authors’ position of prudent personalism. They continue, in a helpful way, the Catholic debate about proportionalism as a method. A more thorough account of prudent personalism is provided.

The section on contraception is significantly and carefully expanded, though the authors’ rejection of artificial birth control remains firm. Though careful and faithful to papal teaching, the description of the ethical difference between a natural and artificially induced period of sterility (God-given natural teleology) will remain unsatisfactory to many. The authors, on re-evaluating the evidence, now reject the use of DES as part of treatment for rape because it acts almost exclusively as an abortifacient and not as an anti-ovulant. Of particular disappointment is the absence of any reference, textual or bibliographical, to Susan Nicholson’s work on abortion, one of the most substantive critiques of the Catholic teaching in recent years. Ethical discussions must, I think, take her teachings into account.

This book remains a most welcome and substantive contribution to medical ethics. Although some will disagree with specifics, as I do, the book is an excellent text and presents a well-thought-through and integrated vision of Catholic medical ethics.

THOMAS A. SHANNON
Worcester Polytechnic Institute


This book is intended as a help for those who want to specialize in the ministry of spiritual direction. The authors speak from a rich background of experience at the Cambridge Center. They have progressively refined what
they have learned for over ten years and shared their reflections in numerous publications.

Part 1 consists of two chapters, one describing spiritual direction, the other emphasizing the centrality of the directee’s experience. B.-C. then take up the various spiritual-direction processes that promote communication between the directee and the Lord. Included among these are the contemplative attitude, receptive openness to the interior signs of the Spirit’s action, dealing with resistance to the latter, and evaluation of religious experience. A final section of four chapters is concerned with the relationship between director and directee. Topics include development of the director as a human being and the acquisition of professional knowledge and supervision. Spiritual direction and psychological counseling are carefully distinguished.

Among many admirable qualities, the book is authored by working directors who have the academic background to extract the significance and evaluate the pertinence of their experience. The second chapter, on religious experience, is especially insightful in its interpretation of the contemporary paradigmatic shift to interiority and theology’s current reconciliation with spirituality.

In The Christian Commitment Karl Rahner speaks of helping towards personalized Christianity: “It is obvious that this guidance of a Christian towards finding himself, towards assimilating Christianity through the discovery of its grace-given inwardness is essential...pastoral work” (106). After marveling that spiritual direction should have been regarded as an esoteric Christian concern, B.-C. echo Rahner: “It seems rather that it should be the core from which all the Church’s other pastoral care radiates” (44). For all who experience a call to pastoral ministry this book is highly recommended for reflective reading and re-reading.

T. GERARD CONNOLLY, S.J.
Loyola College, Baltimore


The Word of God Charismatic Community of Ann Arbor, Michigan, the largest primarily Catholic but ecumenical covenant community in America, provided the setting for this doctoral dissertation in psychology at the University of Michigan. In the tradition of William James’s Varieties of Religious Experience, this phenomenological research follows a seven-step process of analysis as outlined by the philosophical historian Herbert Spiegelberg.

Volunteer subjects, nine men and thirteen women who were “willing to share their experiences of healing and prophecy,” responded to the structured questions of the researcher for typically one and a half hours each. Encouraged to speak freely about all the spiritual gifts, they also reported their experiences—either as those who prayed for others or as those who were prayed for—of such gifts as deliverance, word of knowledge, and word of wisdom, which were included in this research.

The first third of the book thoroughly reviews the scientific literature relevant to the psychology and sociology of religion and to the paranormal experiences of miracles, prophecy, and faith healing. Scholars will be gratified by the clarity and depth in thought and expression of this summary of theological, spiritual, and psychological issues involved in the charismatic movement. The next half gives a thumbnail sketch of each subject and records the detailed, often verbatim, reports of the inter-
views. This section reads like a documentary. Most readers will find these stories fascinating and inspirational. The last part presents the phenomenological analysis and an extensive bibliography up to 1976. There is no intent to question the authenticity of the experiences. The primary focus is on meaning, understanding, relationships, modes of appearance, and development in consciousness. This section makes a contribution to constructive thinking about religious experiences which charismatics should find helpful.

JOSEPH E. BROWN, S.J.
Saint Louis University


This book addresses the problem of doing theology in a world filled with the victims of the oppression and alienation which result from society’s naive faith in practical reason and innocent theory—the victims, e.g., of militarism, sexism, racism, destruction of the environment. L. asks how theologians can work in effective solidarity with those victims and contribute to the establishment of genuine freedom, which is understood as praxis conforming to the transcendental precepts. L.’s response is threefold. First, he examines contemporary theology in light of critical sociology and finds theology insufficiently self-critical. Second, he demonstrates the centrality of the theory-praxis relationship to theological method and describes five basic types of that relationship. Third, he argues that only a political theology—by which he designates all those theologies which “acknowledge that human action, or praxis, is not only the goal but the foundation of theory” (103)—can contribute to such transformation. Only political theologies (which include, e.g., work of the liberation theologians, the later Lonergan, and Metz) can retrieve the radically subversive and thus socially transformative dimensions of the Christian experience of faith in the victim Jesus Christ.

MICHAEL J. McGINNIS, F.S.C.
Washington Theological Union, D.C.


Molnar argues that only three schools of political theory are considered respectable in the United States: the theory undergirding the Federalist Papers, the approach to theory associated with Leo Strauss, and the political theory elaborated by Eric Voegelin. According to M., none of the above makes known the Catholic view of man and politics, namely, that there is a “supernatural element in the makeup of man and political society.”

M. attempts to familiarize Americans with Catholic political theory or “politics in the light of Catholic doctrine.” He first reflects on various moments in the history of political theory, e.g., Aristotle, Plato, Augustine, Aquinas, Machiavelli, Hegel, and Marx. Then he summarily presents Christian principles on the state and politics and finally discusses present problems in the light of those principles.

M.’s main assertion is that the increasing secularization of the state and society is leading to the “desacralization” of many clergy, if not the very structures of the Church. Consequently, American Catholics must work for the internal restoration of the Church, so that it may resume its position as a moral and spiritual guide of society. He believes that modern society desperately needs the leavening influence of a renewed church.

While M.’s book contains many thoughtful insights, he does not suc-
ceed in presenting a comprehensive view of a Catholic political theory. His treatment of political philosophers and the Catholic view of the state is so brief as to be of little value to most readers. In addition, he sometimes is simply inaccurate in his brief summaries, e.g., arguing that Augustine elaborated an apolitical system of thought.

J. BRIAN BENESTAD
University of Scranton


Observers of the Latin American Catholic Church, faced with the task of explaining its persistence as an influential societal actor, have lamented the lack of descriptive, historical case studies upon which a more general theory of Church-state relations might be based. S.'s book is a major contribution to the historical literature. Although his primary focus is the Church’s potential to adopt the role of “prophetic voice” under the Pinochet regime, he argues that the Church’s success in meeting its current challenge must be understood in the light of its historical adaptation to sociopolitical challenges.

Beginning with the formal separation of Church and state in 1925, S. divides the twentieth century into six periods, each representing a particular challenge to which the Church had to respond. In attempting to show that the Chilean Church has successfully adapted to the forces of social change, he measures change along four dimensions: the degree of coincidence between the Church and societal norms; the pattern of authority flows within the Church (hierarchical versus decentralized); the configuration of Church membership according to class; and the availability of international resources (primarily theological, but also financial). S.’s use of voter surveys and interviews offers a number of interesting insights into the dynamics of Church behavior within each period; however, these dimensions are used inconsistently and often with little continuity across the six periods.

The book raises several suggestive questions. Does Church adaptation to societal changes signal institutional strength or weakness? To what extent do hierarchy members’ private attitudes explain institutional behavior? How does the Chilean Church compare with other Latin American churches which have faced similar historical challenges? Smith’s sound documentation of the sociopolitical trends in Chile as well as the corresponding changes within the Church provides a solid foundation for further research on these questions.

HANNAH W. STEWART
Duke University


In 1977 the National Council of Churches, because of a number of cases before various state and federal courts, decided it would be appropriate, in conjunction with its member bodies as well as with the Roman Catholic and other independent churches, to discuss together and publish a scholarly account of the main lines of concern wherein government intervention in religious affairs seemed evident. This volume is a very readable and thorough analysis of many of these issues. Some, such as a fuller treatment of the abortion questions and the use of the taxing powers on individual religious, could perhaps have been more thoroughly considered, but the general scope of interest is very complete. The authors are neither hostile to government as such, nor do they panic about the situation. But they are
concerned that through the taxing powers and information agencies, as well as in the area of political action and "deconversion," there is a growing tendency to encroach on religious freedom.

Charles Whelan's essay on "Who Owns the Churches?" as well as William Ball's "Government as Big Brother to Religious Bodies" are of particular interest to Catholic readers. The cases of Concordia College, the Worldwide Mission, and Bob Jones University deserve careful study from the viewpoint of religious freedom under the Constitution. Sharon Worthing's wonderment about the potential for "government surveillance of religious organizations" makes sober reading. William P. Thompson noted in his Introduction that none of these areas of concern is overly alarming, "but the pattern that they form when viewed together is an alarming one" (19). No doubt there are cases of religion's own excesses, to which the state legitimately addresses itself in the name of the public good, such as fraud or a Jonestown.

On the other hand, government agencies often do not realize the First Amendment implications of their actions. Reflected in these excellent essays is the healthy notion that religious bodies have a stake in their own freedom. They should support each other. They should actively protect their liberties even in small matters. Following a remark of Madison that it is best to defend liberties in the beginning, Kelley remarked that our system "envisions a minimal role for government with respect to religion, and that is the one we emphatically advocate for the (continuing) public policy of this nation" (190). What happens when "religion" politicizes itself, however, remains a question hardly touched in these essays.

Just what "legally" is a religion, what are its particular institutions and freedoms, its limits, these are things to be often hammered out in legal controversy. Do unions threaten religious liberty in religious schools? What must the clergy reveal about their various religious and secular activities? What is a seminary? Who is to pay taxes? Rendering unto Caesar is not a self-evident proposition when it comes to spelling out in detail what belongs to Caesar and what does not. This book is a most useful and insightful analysis of this process of defining what belongs where and why.

While William Lee Miller's essay took a rather benign position that none of these problems really were outside the state's oversight, in many areas it does begin to seem as if the churches had best look to their own interests precisely as a major aspect of the public good. As William Ball emphasized, "Religious liberty is part of the common good" (22). We need neither to apologize for it nor minimize it. Religion is the first limit on the state, but only by remaining itself.

JAMES V. SCHALL, S.J.
Georgetown University

BOOKS RECEIVED

SCRIPTURAL STUDIES


Boadt, L., C.S.P. Jeremiah 26–52, Habakkuk, Zephaniah, Nahum. Wil-
BOOKS RECEIVED


DOCTRINAL THEOLOGY


Arnold, D. W. H., and C. G. Fry. The


MORAL, LAW, LITURGY
DM 36.


**PASTORAL AND ASCETICAL**


**PHILOSOPHY**


**SPECIAL QUESTIONS**

*Les cahiers de recherches en sciences de la religion 4: Pathologie(s) et reli-


