Loisy's Theological Development
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JOHN J. HEANEY

The Great Western Schism
THOMAS E. MORRISSEY

Millennialism in America
LEONARD I. SWEET

BOOK REVIEWS SHORTER NOTICES
TABLE OF CONTENTS

ARTICLES
Loisy's Theological Development
Valentine G. Moran, S.J. .......................... 411

On Being a Symbol: An Appraisal of Karl Rahner
James J. Buckley ................................. 453

Some Implications of Parapsychology for Theology
John J. Heaney .................................. 474

CURRENT THEOLOGY
After Six Hundred Years: The Great Western Schism, Conciliarism,
and Constance
Thomas E. Morrissey ................................ 495

Millennialism in America: Recent Studies
Leonard I. Sweet .................................. 510
BOOK REVIEWS

Terrien, S.: The Elusive Presence 532
O'Toole, R., S. J.: The Christological Climax of Paul's Defense 535
Marliangeas, B.-D.: Clés pour une théologie du ministère 540
Holmer, P. L.: The Grammar of Faith 541
Lobsky, V.: Orthodox Theology 543
Meyendorff, J.: Living Tradition 543
Koschorke, K.: Die Polemik der Gnostiker gegen das kirchliche Christentum 544
Brown, P.: The Making of Late Antiquity 546
Kremer, U. M.: Die Reformation als Problem der amerikanischen Historiographie 548
Kreider, A.: English Chantries 549
Yerkes, J.: The Christology of Hegel 551
Momose, P. F.: Kreuzestheologie 553
Disskussion über Jürgen Moltmanns Buch Der gekreuzigte Gott (ed. M. Welker) 553
Morse, C.: The Logic of Promise in Moltmann's Theology 556
Jetter, W.: Symbol und Ritual 557
Little, D., and S. Twiss: Comparative Religious Ethics 559
Maguire, D. C.: The Moral Choice 560
Ashley, B. M., O.P., and K. D. O'Rourke, O.P.: Health Care Ethics 562
Schulze, W.: Zahl-Proportion-Analogie 563
Hopkins, J.: A Concise Introduction to the Philosophy of Nicholas of Cusa 563
Walzer, M.: Just and Unjust Wars 564
Gutiérrez, G.: Teologia del reverso de la historia 567
Harrington, M.: The Vast Majority 568

SHORTER NOTICES 571

Breton, S.: Ecriture et révélation 586
Topel, L. J.: The Way to Peace 586
Balasubiyat, T.: The Eucharist and Human Liberation 586
Kloppenburg, B.: The People's Church 586
Macquarrie, J.: Christian Hope 586
Vogüé, A. (ed.): Grégoire le Grand: Dialogues 586
Marnell, W. H.: Light from the West 586
Posthumus Meyjes, G. H. M.: Jean Gerson et l'Assemblée de Vincennes (1329) 586
Bernstein, A.: Pierre d'Ailly and the Blanchard Affair 586
De Jong, G.: The Dutch Reformed Church in the American Colonies 586
McLoughlin, W.: Revivals, Awakenings, and Reform 586
Ngindu Mushete, A.: Le problème de la connaissance religieuse d'après Lucien Laberthonnière 586
Carroll, J., et al.: Religion in America 586
Weber, K.-H.; Karl Rahner; Fairlie, H.: The Seven Deadly Sins Today 586
Greeley, A.: Crisis in the Church 586
Verkuyl, J.: Contemporary Missiology 586
Dunne, J. S.: The Reasons of the Heart 586
Dreuil, M. de: From East to West 586
Bruce, C., and W. Jones (ed.): Black Theology 586
Norman, E.: Christianity and the World Order 586
Dixon, J.: Art and the Theological Imagination 586

BOOKS RECEIVED 586

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Our September 1979 issue offers three articles (on Loisy's theological development, on symbol in Rahner, on parapsychology and theology), two bulletins (on conciliarism and on millennialism), and the usual critical appraisal of fifty books.

**Loisy's Theological Development** performs a precious service in tracing the evolution of the leader of the French Modernists from his lecturing days at the Institut Catholique to his excommunication in 1908. It serves us uncommonly well in revealing not only the mind but the man, and raises the question "how much Loisy's exclusion from the Church was due to his own unbelief, and how much to the insensitiveness or arrogance of the Roman curial officials." **VALENTINE G. MORAN, S.J., B.A.** with honors from the University of Melbourne, is lecturer in Church history at the United Faculty of Theology and at Catholic Theological College, Melbourne. His primary interest lies in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and he is currently researching the theological development of George Tyrrell.

**On Being a Symbol: An Appraisal of Karl Rahner** is a careful study of a highly important concept. It proposes the main conditions that must be fulfilled to evaluate Rahner's notion of symbol, then appraises an important segment of his thinking on the subject so as to introduce a critical caution in the use of the notion: "'symbol' might be retained, but its role as a warrant in theological arguments would be decentralized." **JAMES J. BUCKLEY, Ph.D.** in religious studies from Yale (1977), is assistant professor of historical and systematic theology at the University of Detroit. He is particularly involved in eclesiology and Christology, with special regard to their interaction with the complex historical phenomenon sometimes called "modernity." He is revising for possible publication his dissertation dealing with Barth and Rahner on Christian community.

**Some Implications of Parapsychology for Theology**, asserting that parapsychology demands a new respect from theologians, discusses some of the recent work in the field, especially where it touches most closely on theological issues concerning life beyond death. The data considered are deathbed visions, out-of-the-body experiences, apparitions, and mediumistic communication. The article concludes with some indications on the type of influence which parapsychological investigation may have on future theological endeavor, particularly in fundamental theology. **JOHN J. HEANEY, S.T.D.** from the Institut Catholique in Paris (1963), is associate professor of theology at Fordham University. His specialty is fundamental theology, with certain favorite subdivisions: Modernism, nature of Christian revelation, dialogue between Christian revelation and the psychology of religion. His published works include *The Modernist Crisis: von Hügel* (1968), *Psyche and Spirit* (1973), and
a large number of articles. He is now working on parapsychology as it relates to Christian theology.

After Six Hundred Years: The Great Western Schism, Conciliarism, and Constance is a useful bulletin on recent contributions to this significant segment of the Church's life. The beginning is startling: "in some ways the vigorous and careful research has not brought us any closer to a solution of many of the questions and problems that confronted Christian society than the answers which the actual participants of that time had." THOMAS E. MORRISSEY, Ph.D. in history from Cornell (1973), is associate professor in the Department of History at State University College, Fredonia, N.Y. He is preparing a book on the political theology of Franciscus Zabarella (1360–1417), a leading conciliarist at Constance, exploring his views on the institutional and constitutional limitations upon authority in the Church and civil society.

Millennialism in America: Recent Studies works out from four important publications in such fashion that we are given a detailed picture of a vibrant movement with a fascinating history, the whole superbly documented. It is a story that has not received adequate attention from the Catholic community of scholars. LEONARD I. SWEET, Ph.D. from the University of Rochester (1974), is adjunct associate professor of American Christianity at Colgate Rochester Divinity School/Bexley Hall/Crozier Theological Seminary, also known as the Rochester Center for Theological Studies. He continues full-time duties as pastor of the Geneseo United Methodist Church. He has authored Black Images of America, 1784–1870 (1976) and is finishing a book on Women in the Ministry: The Minister's Wife in American Religion.

It is gratifying to report that, at the annual convention of the Catholic Press Association in April, TS once again received the first-place award for general excellence among scholarly magazines. The judges commended TS to other editors as an "outstanding" professional, scholarly magazine. Said one: "The content, the form is exquisitely professional."

Walter J. Burghardt, S.J.  
Editor
BOOK REVIEWS


For the twenty years of its existence, few contributions to the prestigious series Religious Perspectives, planned and edited by Ruth Nanda Anshen, meet the objectives of the series more directly and effectively than this magnificent volume by Samuel Terrien, Emeritus Professor of Old Testament at Union Theological Seminary in New York City. Dr. Anshen sees her series as an attempt "not only to ask dispassionately what the nature of God is, but also to restore to human life at least the hypothesis of God and the symbols that relate to him." The interplay of the human and the divine is the focus of T.'s patient effort to find a dynamic center in the OT capable of holding together the richly diverse literature which grew out of Israel's historical experience.

He finds this center in a series of epiphanies whose impact is sustained by the memory of a presence once experienced and the hope in a more perfect presence at the end of days. Since the theme of divine presence carries over, not to say culminates, in the apostolic experience of the risen Lord, T. sees divine presence as a unifying theme for OT and NT, all the while safeguarding the continuity and discontinuity between both Testaments. "It was a new theology of presence, drawn from the Hebraic complex of cultus and faith, which presided over the emergence of Christianity from Judaism" (5). To this extent the book has become a prolegomenon to a comprehensive (OT and NT) biblical theology which respects the uniqueness of both Jewish and Christian experiences of the same God.

The method of developing this theme consists in examining the biblical traditions of encounter with God. They unfold in chronological succession, beginning with the epiphanic visitations to the patriarchs, followed by the Sinai theophanies, the divine presence in the Jerusalem Temple, the visions of Israel's prophets, the psalmody of presence, Wisdom's invitation to communion with the transcendent One, and ultimately the hope of a final epiphany on the Day of the Lord. T. sees the fall of Jerusalem in 587 B.C. as a caesura in the experience of divine presence, neatly summarizing it all in the lapidary sentences: "Hebraism had been founded on divine presence. Judaism arose from divine absence" (390). However one may wish to nuance this judgment, it is still true that, in the long spiritual journey of this remarkable people, the Deus absconditus atque praesens, sometimes overwhelmingly present in theophany, sometimes terrifyingly present in historical adversity, is at the center of OT traditions.

There are ten chapters; the last two, "Presence as the Word" and "The
Name and the Glory,” take up the NT theme of divine presence. It shows an original and radically new interpretation of the Hebraic theology of presence. A Man is now the bearer of the presence. “Presence is articulated in the Word, but the Word is heard only by those who recognize the promise and already live by its fulfillment. In this sense, Torah is Logos made flesh” (477). These two chapters compress an immense amount of NT scholarship with abundant reference to the literature. In this connection it should be noted that the bibliographical material throughout is both discriminating and exceedingly rich.

Readers will wonder why T. has chosen presence rather than covenant as the guiding motif through OT and NT. He gives his reasons very briefly (3), resolutely rejecting the covenant idea as an adequate reflection of Israel’s or the Church’s responses to the sense of their historical destinies. Instead of dichotomizing the two competing motifs, I think that T. might have developed at greater length the covenant relationship as a form of the divine presence, thus assimilating covenant into the primary and inclusive field of force. In chapter 3, “The Sinai Theophanies,” I am somewhat surprised at the neglect of Exod 34:5-9, the self-revelation of Yahweh and His presence among the people of His choice. The book invites both critical observations and citation. It is beautifully written and will stand as a monument for a genial and learned scholar who has shared with us his harvest-time wisdom.

Loyola University of Chicago

FREDERICK L. MORIARTY, S.J.


In 1957 W. F. Arndt and F. W. Gingrich published a translation and adaptation of the fourth edition of Walter Bauer’s internationally acclaimed NT dictionary, Griechisch-deutsches Wörterbuch zu den Schriften des Neuen Testaments und der übrigen urchristlichen Literatur (Berlin: Töpelmann, 1949–52). The English translation, however, was scarcely off the press when Bauer began to issue in fascicles a considerably revised fifth edition of the Wörterbuch during 1957–58. Within a month after the publication of the English translation Arndt died; and Bauer passed away in November 1960. Gingrich was subsequently joined by Danker in the preparation of a revision of the English translation, at which they have worked for over fifteen years. What now appears as the second English edition is not a translation of Bauer’s fifth but a revision of the original English adapted translation of the fourth German edition. It makes use, however, of the changes that Bauer
introduced into his fifth edition and adds many, many new items that the English editors amassed over the years of their own work. The result: an excellent revised edition of what we used to refer to as BAG (Bauer-Arndt-Gingrich), which surpasses even the fifth German edition and will easily win its own deserved place among the tools for the study of the NT as BGD (Bauer-Gingrich-Danker).

The book has been completely reset. The print has been reduced so that the body of the book, with all its additional material, now occupies only 900 pages in contrast to the 909 of the first edition, set in larger type. The typeface of the second edition is quite readable, despite its reduced size, but it is not as elegant as that of the first edition. That used in the front-matter of the second edition, however, is another matter; it is almost boldface in character and distracting to the eye. It is presumably just another “bug” in the infancy stage of photocomposition; something should have been done to lighten it. The much cheaper price of the first edition was made possible because of funds allocated from the centennial thank-offering (1947) of the Lutheran Church, Missouri Synod. There is no indication in the second edition of a similar subsidy. But, in any case, given the inflation that we are facing, the book is still a bonanza because of its obvious worth.

One surprising feature in the new edition is the appearance of new entries in the lexicon of NT and early patristic Greek. One would have thought that by now the vocabulary would have been set. And yet there are fifteen new entries, three of which had been introduced in Bauer’s fifth edition. These are introduced, in part, because of variant readings which have turned up in more recently discovered or published MSS of early Christian writings. Thus, there is an entry Neuēs, the name that the rich man bears in P75 (Papyrus Bodmer XIV, the oldest MS of Luke) in the parable of Lazarus in 16:19–31. They are also, in part, the result of improved studies in Greek lexicography. The other new entries are: aponeuō, “withdraw, turn away from,” gorgos, “vigorous,” ethelo-compounds, eimi, “shall go,” thereia, “summertime,” koinōs, “in the common dialect,” lepraō, “become leprous,” Libanos, “Lebanon,” neikos, “victory,” podoniptēr, “basin for foot-washing,” presbeutēs, “ambassador,” pyrkaïa, “funeral pyre,” hyperaspizō, “protect” (hold a shield over), and ἱγγύσσο, “javelin.” Another surprise is the introduction of the obsolete letter of the Greek alphabet stigma, between epsilon and zēta, because of its use as a cipher for “six” in the Mandate of Hermas and as part of the variant reading in some MSS for “666” in Rev 13:18.

One area in the Lexicon that needs a thorough check for a future revision is the list of abbreviations. Abbreviations are at times used in the body of the book that are not explained in the list on pp. xxxii–xxxvi. E.g., under euangelion (317) reference is made to “Phoc. 16, 8; 23, 6 al.”
and to "Ps.-Lucian, Asin. 26." But neither of these abbreviations is explained in the list on p. xxxv. Similarly, "Anton. Diog. 3" under adelphos (16); "Epil Mosq 1" under kanôn (403).

The article on Kêphas, "Cephas," should have called attention to the important occurrence of the Aramaic personal name kp', now clearly attested in pre-Christian times: 'qb br kp', ‘‘Aqab, son of Kepha,’’ in a list of witnesses in a fifth-century B.C. Elephantine papyrus (see E. G. Kraeling, The Brooklyn Museum Aramaic Papyri [New Haven: Yale University, 1953] 226 [BMAP 8:10]). For further discussion of the importance of this occurrence, I may be permitted to refer to a forthcoming article, “Aramaic Kepha’ and Peter’s Name in the New Testament,” in the new Festschrift for Matthew Black (to be published by Cambridge University Press).

The entry on porneia (693) could have been a little better nuanced. It refers to an article by B. Malina, "Does Porneia Mean Fornication?" NovT 14 (1972) 10–17, which tries to establish that the word does not mean premarital intercourse. But it should also have referred to rebuttals of that view by J. J. O’Rourke, TS 37 (1976) 478–79, or J. Jensen, NovT 20 (1977) 161–84. Again, is porneia in the Matthean exceptive clauses (5: 32; 19:9) simply to be booked under the rubric “of the sexual unfaithfulness of a married woman”? That sounds as if porneia in these passages is simply to be understood as “adultery.” But, as J. L. McKenzie pointed out years ago, “If the verse is translated ‘He who dismisses his wife, except for adultery, makes her commit adultery,’ the saying sounds quaint, to say the least; the divorced wife commits adultery unless she has already committed adultery” (JBC, art. 43, §38). For another meaning of porneia that should have been entertained at least as a possibility in BGD, see TS 37 (1976) 220–21.

But these criticisms are minor and almost inevitable in a work of this sort. All of us are indebted to Gingrich and Danker for the immense amount of work that they have put into the revision of what had already been recognized as “an outstanding contribution to New Testament scholarship” (Times Literary Supplement). Their skill and competence has improved that work immensely; and the care with which it has been printed and published makes it yet another monument to fame of the University of Chicago Press.

Catholic University of America

JOSEPH A. FITZMYER, S.J.


This study of Acts 26 is based on O.’s dissertation at the Biblical
the Messiah he had to suffer and die—beliefs not at all attractive to the Pharisees.

All of this bears on the description of Paul's Agrippa speech as the "Christological climax" of Paul's defense. Such a description represents a significant interpretative decision. O. is aware of the need to reveal his reasons for adopting this title and devotes pages of explanation throughout the volume. Much of this, though, is in connection with the exegesis of particular sections, and there is never a complete synthetic statement of the total Christological significance of the chapter. The ingredients are there, definitely, to warrant the title, but the structural weakness of the presentation is that they are stacked up rather than sorted out.

Jesus' resurrection as the fulfillment of Jewish messianic hopes is the (Christological) basis of Paul's defense. The risen Lord is united with his followers: "I am Jesus, whom you are persecuting" (26:15). His resurrection is somehow the cause of their resurrection, though Luke's thought here, as O. points out in analyzing Acts 3:15 and 26:23, is admittedly vague. (Another pertinent text would be Lk 2:34 keitai eis anastasin.) Jesus describes forgiveness as coming "through faith in me" (Acts 26:18), a more direct usage than the customary "in the name" (3:16; 4:12). The light in Paul's vision is Christ himself, possessing the transcendent qualities exhibited by Yahweh in the Old Testament theophanies. At another level the Christological theme is working in the identification of Paul with Christ. The two trial processes are paralleled; in both cases there is a strong emphasis on a verdict of innocence. Paul, as a disciple of Christ, is the model for persecuted Christian witnesses. The risen Lord passes on to Paul his own mission of preaching to the nations.

O.'s intention in this study is clear and his outline serves his purposes well. One could wish, as mentioned, for a more complete synthesis of the results of the careful thematic and terminological investigations. There are the customary drawbacks of the repetitions and stilted language of dissertationese, and annoying printing flaws (e.g., capitatio for captatio, climatic for climactic). But overall, this thoroughgoing analysis of Acts 26 is a valuable critical study.

New Subiaco Abbey, Subiaco, Ark.  
Jerome Kodell, O.S.B.


Encouraged by the success of Peter in the New Testament, the editors of that earlier work reassembled and enlarged their ecumenical, scholarly task force for an assessment of Marian texts in the NT. Twelve participants guided by a steering committee of four editors have produced, via
successive drafts, a "collective study, one truly representative of discussions by a group of scholars. The end product is often not what anyone of us would have written individually; yet each member of the group contributed to it in various ways. In the publication of our collaborative effort, individuals have at times agreed to the serious consideration of views that they would not choose to make their own. The norm was not total agreement, but a consensus about reasonable limits of plausibility. The editing, which consisted largely in giving intelligible expression and order to this variety of views, has also respected the collaborative nature of the project."

This is an important work, one that will remain influential for many years. It is well researched, closely reasoned, carefully phrased, generally prudent in its affirmations, and often very wise in its judgments. As a work of consensus, however, it tends to be minimalist in its Mariological assertions, but always from the laudable desire not to add false lines to the NT portrait of Mary.

Since this book speaks not only to scholars but to parish clergy and laity as well, the authors initially state their collective position regarding historical-critical methodology, the origin and compository nature of the NT sources, and various theological perspectives on the biblical canon, its "pluralism," and postbiblical Mariology.

Successive chapters then study the birth of Jesus in Pauline writings, Mary in each of the Gospels and in Acts, the woman in Revelation (= Apocalypse) 12, and Mary in second-century literature. A final chapter sums up the conclusions reached in the study.

The authors conclude: (1) Pauline literature says nothing indicating an unusual part given to Mary in Jesus' birth. (2) The Matthean infancy narratives say little about Mary apart from her virginal conception of Jesus. (3) Luke's infancy narratives present Mary as obedient and believing. (4) Mk 3:20–35 views Mary during Jesus' ministry as not yet believing in him, as one outside the eschatological family of his disciples. (5) Matthew and Luke offer less negative parallels to this Marcan passage. Luke can be read quite positively, classifying Mary as a believer. Matthew occupies middle ground: Mary is not excluded from the eschatological family. (6) John's overall view of Jesus' mother is positive, although not quite so approving as Luke's. At the foot of the cross, Mary is clearly among the community of believers. (7) Gospel evidence for the historicity of the virginal conception is so slight that "one's attitude towards church tradition on the matter would probably be the decisive force in determining one's view whether the virginal conception is a theologoumenon or a literal fact." (8) The woman of Rev 12 is primarily the people of God—Israel and the Church successively—and only possibly, secondarily, Mary
as mother of the Messiah. (9) Early postbiblical literature stresses Mary’s virginal conception of Jesus and begins the Eve-Mary typology so favored in later Christianity.

The collaborative composition of this book makes it difficult for a reviewer to know with whom or with how many he disagrees, particularly when “the end product is often not what anyone of us would have written individually.” But one may comment on the views of the “book” as it stands: (1) It seems to have an inadequate concept that equates facticity with history, thus allowing “history” only at Stage 1 (Jesus’ ministry) of the Gospel material’s transmission and relegating Stages 2 and 3 to mere theology, not historiography (11, 27–28). (2) It seems excessively sceptical about the author of the second Gospel. The ancient testimonies as to how he worked are not so clearly in conflict with modern critical studies as to exclude identifying him as Mark (16). (3) It takes no account of the nuanced argument given elsewhere for using the criterion of historical presumption. Thus, the book speaks of a “false supposition that historicity is to be presupposed unless disproved. Such a presupposition is invalid in writings that do not have historicity as their primary goal.” Since the Gospels are admittedly historical in globo and according to their proper mode, use of this criterion cannot be ruled out a priori. There is room for its careful application to particular instances. (4) The book concedes too much to “canonical criticism” (30–31). Unless one allows biblical inspiration to the act of assembling the NT canon, any “catalytic action” [?] would not result in a biblical meaning inherent in the text but would be eisegesis or, in a kinder view, theologizing upon the text. (5) The book’s case for a negative view of Mary in Mk 3:20–35, while well reasoned, may not be as convincing to the reader as to its author. Too many suppositions intervene. If, as the book says, farther on, “a negative attitude of Mary toward Jesus seems irreconcilable with Mary’s having known that this was a miraculous child conceived without a human father” (63), and if in fact Mary did know, then she had no such negative attitude, and the book should explain more clearly than by supposition how Mark arrived at his negative attitude toward Mary. (6) There is a similar need to argue more convincingly, given the importance and sensitivity of the subject, why “a likelihood arises that (according to Matthew’s understanding) Joseph did come to know Mary after Jesus’ birth and that they begot children” (87). (7) Luke 2:19, 51 may well suggest that Mary pondered over Jesus’ words “trying to interpret them” (150), but it is a bit much to find that her attitude in these texts is one that will lead her into the believing post-Easter community (152).

One might go on disagreeing with particular points of this book, but to do so would be a disservice to its authors; for they have produced a most
informative, provocative, and useful treatise, from which the theologian, particularly the Mariologist, can derive much profit.


The twentieth-century Roman magisterium expresses the status of the ministerial priesthood by in persona Christi—nomine ecclesiae, terms borrowed from scholastic theology. This dissertation undertakes the investigation of the origin and development of these expressions within Latin theology with a view to determining the stable meaning which they eventually acquired and the extent to which this is received in recent texts of the magisterium.

At the risk of oversimplification the main results of this study can be quickly summarized. The patristic use of ex persona in biblical commentaries and the interpretation of the literal translation of en prosōpō (=in persona) in the early Latin versions of 2 Cor 2:10 provide the background for a thirteenth-century development. Initially the expression in persona is linked to the forma sacramenti of the Eucharist in the Dominican School to affirm that it is spoken in the name of Christ. Subsequently St. Thomas refers it to the status of the minister because of the implications of the sacerdotal character. The parallel expression in persona ecclesiae is first used by P. Lombard when he argues that a priest separated from the Church cannot consecrate the bread and wine. In his Commentary on the Sentences St. Thomas rejects this opinion, which cannot be harmonized with the permanency of the sacerdotal character. In the Summa he works out this formula: by reason of the sacerdotal character the priest participates in the priesthood of Christ and so acts in persona Christi in all sacramental activity. For the same reason he also acts in persona ecclesiae in all public cult as organ by which the Body of Christ prays and professes its faith.

A later sixteenth-century development bears on the substitution of nomine (in nomine) ecclesiae to express the ecclesial dimension of the ministerial priesthood and to designate those deputed for the official prayer of the Church. Twentieth-century Roman documents use in persona Christi and nomine ecclesiae to describe the cultic activity of ordained ministry. Here the representative functions are related in this way: the priest acts in the name of the Church because he first acts in the person of Christ the Head of the Church. When referring to the pastoral charge, however, nomine Christi is preferred.

Such are the main conclusions of the author's study with respect to
ministerial priesthood. He offers a detailed and accurate account of the history of two theological expressions, keys to the scholastic theology of ordained ministry. Also included are some important observations on the changes which have taken place in the application of *nomine ecclesiae* to the official prayer of the Church.

Y. Congar supplies a preface which situates this Thomistic theology of ministerial priesthood in a proper perspective. It is based on an exclusively Christological ecclesiology and theology of sacerdotal character, conceived as a participation in the priesthood of Christ. From this viewpoint, through ordination the priest acquires a *potestas spiritualis* over the true Body of Christ, which enables him to consecrate the bread and wine, and by extension is qualified as head of the Body of Christ, the Church. Congar suggests another approach. The priest is qualified to be liturgical leader because he is ordained to preside over the organization and life of the community. Among the ministries which Christ, through the Spirit, confides to his Church there is the particular ministry of pastor. He is given the responsibility for word and sacrament, the harmonization of other ministries, the care for the unity of the community and its union with other communities. In this capacity he represents the Church, which is the integral subject of the liturgy. At the same time he represents Christ: he alone fulfills the ministry of the one who consecrates the Eucharistic elements and so he is “icon, the representative of Christ: he plays the role of him on the level of the visible celebration” (13). This presentation, while correct, needs to be qualified.

At the “level of the visible celebration” the priest, as head of the local church, acts *nomine ecclesiae*, since the fixed prayers approved by the Church, including the *forma sacramenti*, are a profession of faith of the Church. This is what is denoted in the liturgical celebration. But as head of the local church the priest is servant of Christ through the Spirit, who creates the Church’s ministries. Hence in his official capacity the priest connotes, for the eyes of faith, the activity of Christ working through the Spirit. Thus he can be said to act *in persona Christi per Spiritum* and, incidentally, to participate in the Spirit of the priesthood of Christ. So from different viewpoints one can say either that the priest represents the Church because he first represents Christ, or represents Christ because he first represents the Church. These sentences will seem contradictory only to those who are insensitive to the various levels of signification of sacramental rites.

*University of Notre Dame*  
EDWARD J. KILMARTIN, S.J.

These polemical essays (5/9 previously published) in philosophical theology display the deeply passionate position of this Lutheran thinker strongly influenced by Kierkegaard and Wittgenstein. Holmer seeks to dissuade theologians from thinking that repairing theological foundations will make moribund religious faith viable. Neither the facts delivered by questing historians and investigating scientists nor the vague abstractions proffered by neologizing metaphysicians can save religious concepts from their alleged meaninglessness. Concepts do not receive their meaning from their fit in some well-founded system. Rather, the meaning of religious concepts will appear in their use, i.e., when religious people put “the language to work as hard and as thoroughly as possible” (128). Any meaninglessness in religious concepts results from their believers’ failure to mean them, not from the failure of the concepts to mean—for concepts cannot fail, only people can.

Theology does not build systems. Not only is rationalistic theism irrelevant to faith, the “logical moves constituting it are dubious” (162). Theology is the grammar of faith: the set of rules and criteria by which the faithful learn to speak and live their faith. Learning theology, then, is learning how to speak and live. Learning “God’s grammar” (23) entails a person moving from learning about to learning how, from talking about God to talking of God, from being uninvolved to becoming divinely impassioned. Neither the traditional faith nor its grammar needs intellectualist renewal. Rather, faith needs to be taught and learned not as a compendium of truths but as the time-honored Christian way of living—partaking in Jesus’ life, death, and resurrection, pioneering a new humanity, being sons of light, not darkness, and cofounding a new kingdom of righteousness (cf. 36).

While H.’s strident polemics against those who seek historical or ontological foundations or explanations for religious faith occupy much of the book, his central concern is the Christian concept of God. A concept is a “realized capacity,” a “ruled ability with which an individual uses words” (121). To understand a concept means to have developed certain abilities and functions. Thus, if “one knows how to use the word God in prayer and worship, then one has the concept” (152). But is this claim necessarily true? Could one understand the concept “God” if one knew quite well how others were trained to use it and how they did use it, although one did not use it oneself? If not, then analogously one could not understand, and thus neither accept nor reject, the concept “devil” without living a diabolically sinful life, or “promiscuity” without becoming sexually wanton!

H.’s philosophical analysis unhappily conflates one criterion for someone’s understanding a concept (the ability to use it) with one’s having or acquiring that concept. This misstep suggests that H.’s theological posi-
tion is radically fideistic. But his point is not that religious concepts are unreasonable; rather, the correct way to see how reasonable they truly are is not to construct systems but to live them to the hilt. The meaning of a concept will appear in its use. Further philosophical analysis is needed to clarify the significance of these claims for philosophical theology.

Foundational theologians must take H.'s challenge seriously. While fighting through his occasionally dense text may not change one's mind about the scope or intent of philosophical theology or convert one to H.'s traditional Protestantism, one will understand why the theologian cannot neglect to attend closely to faith-as-lived in all theological enterprises. While one may not want to end there, one must begin with the grammar[s?] of faith[s?].

Georgetown University

TERRENCE W. TILLEY


Lossky (1903–58), author of The Mystical Theology of the Eastern Church, was one of the most creative of Orthodox theologians. Forced to flee his homeland at the time of the Russian Revolution, he became one of the leaders of the Orthodox Institut St. Serge in Paris. The present volume contains lectures, translated from Russian and French, dating back to the years shortly before his death, in which he attempted a systematic overview of Orthodox systematic theology. For this he organizes his work about four topics: monotheism, creation, original sin, and Christology. The discussions are judicious and interesting. L. shows a good command of the patristic period and displays special affection for St. Maximus the Confessor. His treatment of Nicaea is a model of conciseness and rigor. Much of the book, especially because of the absence of a strong historico-critical approach to the Bible, has a markedly archaic flavor. Though generally not polemic, L. occasionally cites some tired shibboleths, such as the claim that Roman or Latin thought defined persona through “juridical relationships” (42). He shares the negative view of other Byzantine theologians regarding relations of opposition within the Trinity. The translation is well done, even elegant, but on p. 48 the expression “scholarly” theology should have been rendered “scholastic.” This book can be used with profit for a college course to acquaint students with one major thinker of the modern Russian Orthodox Church.
Meyendorff, born in 1926, currently professor at St. Vladimir's School of Theology near New York City, also has roots in that émigré Russian community near Paris. The title of this collection of eleven essays alludes to a work published in Russian as Zhivoe Predanie at Paris about 1930. This volume, in my judgment, is more successful than his Byzantine Theology (1974). M. has both feet on the ground; he shows that Orthodoxy is not a museum piece but a reality in existential dialogue with contemporary society. Since many of these essays were given as addresses at various international ecumenical meetings, it is disappointing to read his rather pessimistic and possibly exaggerated assessment of the minimal impact of Orthodoxy on ecumenism (9). Several neuralgic areas in ecumenism today, such as tradition, authority, papacy, church, and world, are treated with sensitivity. Especially useful are the essays “What Is an Ecumenical Council?” and “Orthodox Theology Today.” Some of M.'s essays here, together with publications by the Greek theologian Demetrios Constantelos, destroy the myth that Orthodoxy is aloof from questions of social responsibility. Contemporary Orthodox theology is often at its best when, as here, it is elaborated in the setting of international and ecumenical exchange.

Concordia University, Montreal

MICHAEL A. FAHEY, S.J.

Die Polemik der Gnostiker gegen das kirchliche Christentum.

This is a careful study of the anti-“orthodox” polemic of two Nag Hammadi treatises, with a view toward defining more precisely the relationship between Gnostic- and Church-Christianity. Hitherto our understanding has been shaped largely by the perspective of the anti-Gnostic polemicists of the second and third centuries; Koschorke tries to see things as they appeared to the Christian Gnostics.

Much of the book is given to exegesis of often very difficult and poorly preserved texts; and though here and there one might disagree with K.'s interpretation, he is never arbitrary and is usually convincing. In a brief review it may be more useful, therefore, to focus on K.'s overall interpretation rather than the exegetical details. I might sum up K.'s conclusions in the following assertions, each of which seems to me substantially true, but perhaps not quite so simply the case as K. seems to suggest: (1) Gnostic Christianity is not opposed to (gegen) Church-Christianity but is a higher form (über) of it; (2) the common Christian tradition is the starting point of Christian (opposed to merely Christianized) Gnosticism; (3) the details of the system are not at the heart of Christian Gnosticism—at the heart is the endless striving for a deeper and world-renouncing understanding of the common Christian tradition.
1) Christian Gnosticism stands *over*, not *against*, Church-Christianity; corollary to this is the claim that the Christian Gnostics constituted an elite within the larger community rather than a different community. This is true, I think, if it is seen as a description not of the way things were *an sich* but as they would be seen from the Gnostics' perspective. If this is not borne in mind, then we are simply substituting one absolutized perspective for another. Perhaps because K. is writing to change a long-standing way of seeing things, he sometimes seems to be suggesting that the patristic, more antithetical conception of the relationship was *incorrect*. The view that the Christian Gnostics were not opposed to the beliefs of the Church-Christians but only to the absolutizing of those beliefs needs very careful qualification: the absolutizing involved is the Church-Christian claim that the God of Israel is the one and ultimate God, not, as the Gnostics would have it, the one who tries to imprison us and cut us off from the light. It seems to me that it was not simply theological hubris that led many Church-Christians to see this as a radically hostile counterposition and not simply a deeper understanding of the common tradition. K. has succeeded admirably in laying out the other perspective, but he could, I think, be clearer in identifying it as just that and not (at long last!) the truth of the matter.

A similar qualification is called for relative to the question of the existence of Gnostics within rather than over against the Church-community. That the Gnostic self-understanding called for existence *within* is, I think, clear; that a line of exclusion was not always, everywhere, and uniformly drawn is also clear; but equally clear is that by and large a line of exclusion was drawn. K. seems at times to take the fact of continued contact or continued Gnostic influence as evidence of continued Church-community. Since in the third century the orthodox hierarchy was unable anywhere to control the public space, such continued Gnostic propaganda and influence would have been ineradicable and need not imply coexistence within a single Church-community.

2) The common Christian tradition is *the* starting point of Christian Gnosticism. One might object that this assertion is a tautology; i.e., any mix of Christianity and Gnosticism that does not have this starting point is, by definition, Christianized rather than Christian Gnosticism. But beyond that, it is also important to understand both the value and the limitation of this assertion. Its value lies in the fact that it stresses that the faith of a larger Church-Christianity seems to be the presupposition of most of the Christian Gnosticisms known to us. This in turn forces upon us a reconsideration of the Walter Bauer model of early Christianity: if K. is correct, can we make sense of the idea of a purely Gnostic Christianity existing independent of and antecedent to Church-Christianity? Its limitation lies in the fact that it overlooks or marginalizes the
role of the demonization of Yahweh in Christian Gnosticism; not that Yahweh is equated with Satan, but that he takes on important negative and oppressive features and is not worshiped as the saving God. This hermeneutical key does not (at least in any obvious way) simply emerge out of the common tradition, however powerful a tool it may be for resolving many of the tensions within that tradition.

3) By insisting that the characteristic feature of Christian Gnosticism is its Entweltlichungstendenz and its never-ending Suchen und Finden, K. counters the patristic emphasis on the cosmogenic myth of system. He points to several matters in which his texts are curiously self-contradictory and from this rightly infers that the details of the system are not taken to be literally exact descriptions of the divine realities. A corollary of this is that not every difference between one document and another need correspond to a different Gnostic community. But though I think that K. is correct in relativizing the importance of the often rather leaden myths, it seems to me that he goes too far toward eliminating them. Though the details of who-generated-whom seem to have been of less than ultimate importance, and perhaps even more a matter of fancy than conviction, it seems to me that it is still possible and exceedingly probable that the general structure of the myth—the divine descent, in some of the myths for example, into plurality, then ignorance, then evil—was taken with the utmost seriousness and as a nonnegotiable expression of truth. K. considers the alternatives too simply, and in consequence gives us too simple and too pure a picture of the Christian Gnostic.

Though I have focused almost entirely on issues which I consider to have been treated a bit too simply by Koschorke, I hope that I have at the same time managed to suggest that this is indeed a carefully researched and thought-out book by a writer who promises to contribute a great deal to our understanding of the character and interrelationships of the varied forms of second- and third-century Christianity.

University of Iowa

JAMES MCCUE


In these published lectures, originally delivered at Harvard in April 1976, Brown returns to concerns which animated his previous work. He is dissatisfied with attributions of the specific character of Late Antiquity to a “failure of nerve,” a “decline of rationalism,” or a vague response to a general third-century “crisis” because of their simplistic and hasty generalizations and their tendency to impute, inaccurately, “modern” feelings and perceptions to ancient people. In an attempt to let those people speak for themselves, B. returns to the texts. As usual, his
interpretations are sensitive, vivid, and strongly persuasive. He offers a fascinating sketch of the distinctive configurations and interactions of religious, cultural, and social factors which gradually came to define life in the Mediterranean world of the late fourth and early fifth centuries.

For B., the key to the religious changes that typify Late Antiquity is a shift in the locus of supernatural power from sacred things to sacred persons. Such power had once been seen to reside in temples, oracle sites, and other established institutions, but in the period between 200 and 400 it came increasingly to be “represented on earth by a limited number of exceptional human agents, who had been empowered to bring it to bear among their fellows by reason of a relationship with the supernatural which was personal to them, stable and clearly perceptible to fellow believers” (12). That analysis is doubly significant. First, it provides a clear and specific measure against which B. can plot the changing tides of Late Antique religious life. Second, with its focus on power, it enables him to uncover what was really at stake in the universal “debate on the holy” and to show how that debate had direct consequences for daily life. Thus he can alter our perception of the familiar debate between “rational” philosophy and “irrational” magic by showing that a hotly contested distinction between legitimate and illegitimate supernatural power was at its core (60). He also demonstrates conclusively in his treatment of Egyptian monks how the possessor of supernatural power could wield impressive social influence (86, 93).

The heuristic value of B.’s concentration on sacred persons as the keys to the religious life of Late Antiquity is evident in each chapter. He first describes the rise of those “agents of the supernatural,” the responses of society to them, and the ensuing complications, especially the strong social need to distinguish saints from sorcerers, and legitimate from illegitimate uses of power. Next, he shows how the intensified competition among claimants to supernatural power stemmed from the disintegration of the “model of parity” which governed social relations in the second century. Then B. traces the development of martyrs, prophets, and inspired teachers as alternative sources of spiritual power, primarily within the Christian tradition. Finally, he discusses the strong concentration of spiritual power in the ascetic monks of the Egyptian desert. Throughout the book B.’s treatment of the Christian tradition is of particular interest, since he details both its catalytic function in the creation of Late Antique culture and the traits it shared with competing religious traditions.

Because of their limited scope, these four lectures, like E. R. Dodds's *Pagan and Christian in an Age of Anxiety*, do not constitute a full and definitive history of the period. Those unfamiliar with Brown's topic might require supplementary information. But for those already ac-
quainted with Late Antiquity, he has, by judicious use of analytic concepts and graphic vignettes, captured the "feel" of the religious life of the period at least as well as any of his predecessors. To ask for more is imprudent.

*Connecticut College, New London*  
EUGENE V. GALLAGHER


This book gathers together much interesting material dealing with the Reformation and/or with Luther, and as summary it makes interesting reading. However, its overall organization is weak. At least part of its thesis is open to question (i.e., that what Reformation scholarship and the American self-understanding need is a sobering dose of Luther’s theology); and the rest of the thesis is mainly supported by faulty perspective (i.e., that American Reformation scholarship is focusing on Luther’s theological development, following in this the European-German example).

As to the organization, the framework provided by several of the chapters is simply not very helpful. “The Beginning of American Reformation Historiography” puts together writers as disparate as Joseph Priestley, Philipp Schaff, A. C. McGiffert, and Williston Walker. The next chapter, “The American sozialgeschichtliche Interpretation of the Reformation,” brings together a diverse collection of major and minor writers—e.g., Erik Erikson and Jacob Schapiro—who have in common the failing that they do not see Luther’s religiosity as the key to, or even a very important part of, the Reformation. There follows a chapter on “American Catholic Historiography of the Reformation.” Some of the writers here may be considered Reformation historians, but some have simply written something about Luther without any effort to relate their study to the Reformation as a whole. Implicitly, K. seems to identify history of the Reformation with the study of Luther. The next chapter, “American Reformed Historiography of the Reformation,” lumps together a turn-of-the-century theological liberal, a Unitarian, some Presbyterians, and George Williams. Their common feature seems to be that they failed to take Luther seriously enough. Finally, we have a chapter on “American Lutheran Historiography of the Reformation.” Some of the writers here are clearly writing histories of the Reformation; others just as clearly are presenting interpretations of some aspect of Luther’s theology. Whatever the shortcomings of any of the writers surveyed in this chapter, they at least have the advantage that they are discussing what is essential—Luther.

The thesis that Reformation scholarship ought to be focused on Luther
is open to serious question. Basically, there is an ambiguity here which K. does nothing to clarify. Is the Reformation to be viewed primarily as the creation of significantly new, powerful, and perhaps still valuable theological alternatives? Or is it to be viewed primarily as a massive transformation of the texture and organization of the religion and culture of sixteenth-century Western Christendom? Obviously, the place of Luther will be different in these two different approaches. K. takes the first approach. Many of the writers whom he criticizes take the second. To criticize the second approach on the basis of the first, one would have to develop an account of what values can be derived from the study of history; but K. is content simply to lecture the not-sufficiently-Lutheran historians as though they acted simply in ignorance of Luther’s theology, blinded perhaps by their oft-referred-to American utopianism and optimism. Moreover, it is at least questionable whether Luther is the key to the English Reformation, no matter how one conceives the matter.

The thesis that Reformation scholarship is actually becoming more Luther-centered is derived primarily from a self-induced optical illusion. By putting the chapter on Lutheran scholarship at the end, K. is able to suggest that the writings which he analyzes of Krauth (1854), Fife (1928), Forell (1954), Spitz (1963), Pelikan (1950), and Pauck (1946 and 1950) represent a new direction in Reformation studies. Actually there has, not surprisingly, long been an interest in Luther among American Lutherans; but K. never really examines how or whether this has led to a transformation of Reformation scholarship in general. Somewhat similarly, he is able to report a transformation in American Catholic Reformation scholarship by focusing exclusively on writers such as Harry McSorley and simply ignoring the more reserved work of someone like Jared Wicks.

In summary, this book does not provide a convincing, full, or accurate account of American Reformation scholarship.

University of Iowa

James F. McCue


The writing of the church history of England was for centuries strongly influenced by the fact that its purveyors were Anglicans, and therefore under some compulsion to accept a reading of the Reformation of the sixteenth century which reflected the opinions of a High-Church party illuminated, for example, by Archbishop William Laud and by the enthusiasts of the Oxford Movement. The result was a minimizing of the ecclesiastical revolution and an effort to depict the modern Church of England as, in all essential matters, maintaining an unbroken continuity with the ancient and medieval Church.

With the opening of English universities to Catholics in the last
hundred years, other views have found expression, but not before non-Anglican historians had made the fact of the ecclesiastical break with the past irrefutable. As Kreider writes, "much though he might protest the contrary, after 1536 Henry VIII was the defender of a different faith" (124). It must, however, be acknowledged that, before this was done, Catholic pioneers thought it necessary to trumpet exaggerated views in order to gain a hearing. Thus it has since been fashionable to cry scorn at Cardinal Aidan Gasquet's roseate picture of English monasteries on the eve of the dissolution and on Hilaire Belloc's imaginative and stimulating hypotheses. Happily, these excesses are no longer thought necessary, and the Cardinal's Benedictine enthusiasm has been tempered by the overwhelming erudition of his successor, Dom David Knowles.

The dissolution of English monasteries in Tudor England has always attracted much attention and been the subject of much learned investigation, particularly with regard to its results. What happened to monastic lands and buildings has provided material for many books, though the fate of individual monks and nuns has been little explored. Likewise, the suppression of the chantries has provoked small interest; and yet it has been thought by some recent writers that their destruction made a greater impact on the beliefs and practices of English folk than the spectacular collapse of the abbeys, priories, and nunneries.

Since the medieval founders of monasteries, chantries, schools, hospitals, and other charitable foundations required those who benefited from them to pray for the souls of their founders, it is convenient to regard such establishments collectively as intercessory institutions. Nevertheless, the monks and nuns were actuated by other purposes in adopting their religious manner of life. Accordingly, when the English Reformers denied the existence of purgatory, it did not make monastic institutions idle, nor indeed chantries, in so far as the latter also supported incumbents with additional occupations. Too great attention to the obligation of intercessory prayer has, perhaps inevitably, colored K.'s views.

The book is divided into three parts. First comes a statistical study of English chantries, defined as "ecclesiastical benefices endowed with lands or rents by its founder, who hoped to be the beneficiary of the prayers and masses offered by an endless succession of chantry priests ... presented by a patron, instituted by the bishop of his diocese and inducted by an appropriate local ecclesiastical official" (5). The statistical base is formed by the records of four counties—Essex, Warwickshire, Wiltshire, and Yorkshire—in part because of "the excellent quality of their surviving ... chantry certificates ... pensions certificates and continuance warrants" (3). K.'s conclusions are that by the mid-1540's some chantries "were flourishing, with burgeoning rent rolls and able incumbents; others, whose endowments were decaying and whose priests were non-resident
or incapable, had deteriorated to the point at which even the essential function of each foundation—the intercession for the souls of its founders—was no longer being performed” (37).

In the selected counties the work beyond their duty of intercession done by the chantry priests (or cantarists, as K. calls them, presumably because they were required to sing Mass) is examined, and also the attitude of the people with regard to intercessory prayer; and K. concludes that “as late as the early decades of the sixteenth century the doctrine of purgatory was still intensely important to a large number of Englishmen” (71).

With this thought in mind, the second part of the study deals at length with the intense governmental and Protestant effort to abolish that doctrine in England. Of course, its economic value as justification for the confiscation of the lands and properties of monasteries and chantries was of fundamental importance.

The third part examines in detail the two acts encompassing the official decisions on chantry suppression: the act of 1545 in Henry VIII’s reign and the Edwardian act of 1547. For ten years before 1545, the religious disturbances of the time had in fact raised the question of chantry suppression; and K. gives a list of those suppressed between 1540 and 1545. His notes and references are abundant; there is a bibliography and an index.

The study concludes with these words: “thereafter, for better or for worse, the chantries and other intercessory institutions, in which many late-medieval Englishmen had given fervent testimony to their faith, would recede into the mists of the English past” (208).

Georgetown University

ERIC MCDERMOTT, S.J.


Yerkes’s book, originally his doctoral thesis at the University of Chicago, narrates Hegel’s interpretation of traditional Christology. Hegel, it is well known, regarded the doctrines of the Trinity and the Incarnation as the primary analogues, expressed in the quasi-imaginative language characteristic of religious belief, to the purely rational doctrine of the self-othering Absolute Idea, the famous Begriff, or—to use its theological patronym—the Absolute Spirit. Hegel contended that the Absolute Idea, which is Infinite Thought thinking Itself, nonetheless preserves, as necessary “moments” of differentiation within the process of unification, both nature and finite spirits. But whether the Absolute Idea does genuinely preserve nature and finitude, or whether these so-called necessary moments are finally submerged in a monism of Thought, is the
dilemma which bedevils every reader of the *Logic*. The history of post-Hegelian philosophy is the history of that bedevilment and, for the most part, disenchantment with the outcome of Hegel's argument. Y., however, does not attempt to explore, much less to resolve, this perennial Hegelian dilemma. Instead, he concentrates on the clue to the Absolute Idea that Hegel found in Christian faith and theology.

Religious faith proclaims a knowledge of an infinite object, God. Hegel's idealist theory of consciousness prevented him from ignoring or dismissing this fundamental claim of religious consciousness; for idealism demonstrates that consciousness produces its own objects; therefore, consciousness must be in some sense infinite. In fact, Christian religious consciousness implicitly recognizes the infinity of consciousness—not, of course, in the terms of idealist logic, but under the theological guise of the Incarnation, the unity of God and man in Jesus Christ. By making explicit what faith holds implicitly, Hegel spelled out exactly how Athens deals with Jerusalem: philosophy demonstrates that Protestant Christianity, when properly demythologized, that is, when grounded in a logic of the self-othering Absolute, can still remain, at the level of imaginative thinking (*Vorstellung*), the rationally necessary or ultimate form of religious consciousness.

While only the Hegelian philosopher can keep reason and religious imagination so sweetly in concert, Hegelian ontology, far from being a grotesquely elevated Protestant chauvinism, is as universal as reason; for the sequence of historical religions instantiates in history the logical unfolding of the *Begriff*. Thus the *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion* do not develop a phenomenology of religion, as did Hegel's earlier work, the *Phenomenology of Spirit*. Rather, in the *Lectures* philosophy views religion from the standpoint already attained in the *Phenomenology* and explicates in the *Logic*; as Hegel puts it, his “method is the self-unfolding *Begriff* and nothing else.” Since the Hegelian philosopher possesses the *Begriff*, he is able to grasp that the incarnation of Christ is the only particular religious symbol which adequately embodies the meaning of world religious history. What is the status and function of this symbol?

The crucial and much controverted issue in Hegel's system is the relationship between logic and phenomenology or, in other words, the relationship between ontology and history. In presenting Hegel's Christology, Y. draws on but does not significantly advance Emil Fackenheim's magisterial exposition of this difficult but central theme. Indeed, Y. obscures the philosophical foundations of Hegel's interpretation of Christ. The historical necessity of Christ, from the point of view of the *Logic*, is the demonstrated necessity of a universal instantiating itself in a contingent particular. Otherwise, the consequent assertion of the supremacy of Protestant Christianity would be, Hegel himself admits, merely the pious
affirmation of one particular religious commitment in competition with others. But Y., who is preoccupied with his teachers’ current debates, turns the Logic into a hermeneutic and Hegel into a fundamental theologian. These turns may be salutary if Hegel is to remain viable for contemporary theology, but they seriously diminish Hegel’s own aspirations and perhaps achievements.

To suppose that “hermeneutical ontological first principles . . . are argued from and not for” (286) is either to misconstrue or to abandon the Logic as the norm for the philosophy of religion. Y.’s version of Spirit’s inner witness to the paradigmatic truth of Christ relies on intuitive or unproved first principles of the sort that Hegel specifically repudiated. Admittedly, Hegel’s claims are extraordinary: the Logic, in its starting point, method, and categorial development, is totally comprehensive. No categorial content that can be rationally apprehended remains yet to be discovered or expressed. Just for that reason the categories of the Logic are the unsurpassable dogmas of rational theology. Doubtless, Christian theologians may and should continue to exercise their imaginative thinking in response to the needs of their age. But for Hegel, the ultimate meaning of these historically rooted Vorstellungen has already been grasped. It is questionable, however, whether the Christology that Hegel sublated in the Logic fully corresponds to the theological doctrine expounded by Nicaea and Chalcedon. Curiously enough, this basic question is nowhere pursued in Y.’s book.

Georgetown University

DENIS J. M. BRADLEY


The appearance of Moltmann’s The Crucified God in 1972 has provoked a lively discussion of the theology of the cross on the Continent, in America, and even in the Third World. The breadth of the discussion can be gaged by the fact that the book has already been translated into seven languages. The connection between the theology of the cross and the theodicy question, the link between the crucified God and Moltmann’s political theology, as well as Moltmann’s advocacy of a reinterpretation of the classical Trinitarian doctrine have all contributed to serious reflection concerning the place of the cross in Christian theology.

The most recent contributions to the dialogue are Momose’s Kreuzestheologie and Diskussion, a series of critical reviews including a reply to the critique by Moltmann himself. Momose is a Japanese Jesuit whose
book was originally written as a doctoral dissertation in the Jesuit Hochschule Sankt Georgen in Frankfurt. For the most part, the book is a *Darstellung* of Moltmann's theology of the cross. Only in the last chapter does Momose enter into critical argument with Moltmann's basic positions. Of special interest is that Momose writes from the standpoint of the Catholic theological tradition. The critical questions he poses are the ones we would expect from a Catholic questioning a strongly Lutheran-oriented theologian. Momose is uncomfortable with what he takes to be a discontinuity between nature and grace reflected, e.g., in Moltmann's apparent repudiation of knowledge of God from creation in favor of a cross-centered epistemology and his insistence on the discontinuity between human achievements and the coming of God's kingdom.

Momose is also disturbed by Moltmann's challenge to classical theism. He finds that Moltmann too closely identifies God's being with the history of the world, thereby endangering either the transcendence of God or the reality of human freedom. Moltmann wants to say that God's being is in suffering because God's being is love. Momose argues that this only follows if suffering and love are identified. But such an identification undermines the necessary prerequisite of all thinking about God, namely, His unchangeableness. For Momose, to think of God as love is to think of God's self-emptying of His absolute fullness.

In my opinion, Momose has no doubt touched on the central issue in the current debate on the doctrine of God, though I am not convinced that Moltmann's doctrine leads to the cul-de-sac that Momose fears. It seems to me that one disadvantage of Momose's critique is that, writing strictly within the framework of the classical Catholic tradition, he is less open to Moltmann's option than he might be. The question Moltmann poses is whether the biblical doctrine of God does not force us to break out of all our traditional categories, whether ontological or theological.

In the second book the range of issues raised by the discussion partners is naturally wide. We can only touch on a few salient points.

Dorothee Sölle raises what I believe to be the most critical question for Moltmann's doctrine of God. All the commentators are agreed that Moltmann is trying to develop a theological system that responds to the protest of atheists of our time who conclude that the suffering of the world is argument enough against the existence of God. For Moltmann, Christ's God-forsakenness on the cross is the mark of his identification with us, but God's identification with Christ is the mark of His involvement in the suffering of the world. God is the fellow sufferer, as Whitehead once remarked. But Moltmann believes he must go further and in accordance with the biblical tradition (e.g., Rom 8:32) affirm that God also gave up His Son to death. Sölle believes the whole system founders on this point; for in the last analysis God is identified, at least in the case
of Jesus, with the executioner rather than with the victims. To my mind, Moltmann has yet to give an adequate answer to this objection.

The second point raised by various authors is Moltmann's panentheism. Moltmann proposes a dialectical hermeneutic according to which a thing is recognized in its opposite. Thus, God reveals Himself in the God-forsakenness of Jesus on the cross. This principle as such, however, is at least ambiguous, as Richard Bauckham points out. What does it mean to say, as Moltmann does, that love is known only in hate? Surely not that hate is the revelation of God's love. It must mean, then, that God's love is revealed in the context of hate. Reflecting on the same difficulty, Kasper argues that Moltmann is in the danger of having to affirm that hate is necessary for love to exist. Kasper fears that a dialectical hermeneutic leads logically to the conclusion that God needs the world to be Himself. Such a conclusion would mean that God's freedom is dissolved in history.

Although Moltmann remains convinced that some form of panentheism is necessary to do justice to the biblical affirmation that God is love (1 Jn 4:16), he does come some way in his reply to clarifying his understanding of divine freedom. For Moltmann, it is a false alternative to say that God is either absolutely free or a prisoner of history. This alternative is rooted in the long Western tradition that freedom consists in Herrschaft (mastery) or liberation from Knechtschaft (slavery). According to this tradition, freedom means primarily freedom of choice. Moltmann sees another tradition of freedom which is embodied in the concept of friendship. Freedom then consists in Gemeinschaft (community). Moltmann believes that we must view God's freedom vis-à-vis the world in terms of the overflowing of His goodness. If God is love, it is inconceivable that God could be God without a world. Nonetheless, God's relation to the world is eminently free; for His creation of the world corresponds to what He Himself is.

This doctrine is naturally linked to the problem of the relation between the immanent and the economic Trinity. For Moltmann, God's relating of Himself to the world is the history of the Trinity. Because of his understanding of divine freedom, Moltmann rejects the classical distinction between "God in Himself" and "God for us." Such a doctrine he finds too dualistic. Nevertheless, the distinction between the economic and immanent Trinity is an attempt to express the essential point that in the history of God with the world we have to do with God Himself. The greatest danger in the Trinitarian doctrine lies in modalism, a danger Moltmann finds in Barth and Rahner, where the three "Persons" are "modes of being." When the doctrine of the Trinity is formulated in this way, the uniqueness of each person is lost sight of and the concrete history bypassed.
role of the demonization of Yahweh in Christian Gnosticism; not that Yahweh is equated with Satan, but that he takes on important negative and oppressive features and is not worshiped as the saving God. This hermeneutical key does not (at least in any obvious way) simply emerge out of the common tradition, however powerful a tool it may be for resolving many of the tensions within that tradition.

3) By insisting that the characteristic feature of Christian Gnosticism is its Entweltlichungstendenz and its never-ending Suchen und Finden, K. counters the patristic emphasis on the cosmogenic myth of system. He points to several matters in which his texts are curiously self-contradictory and from this rightly infers that the details of the system are not taken to be literally exact descriptions of the divine realities. A corollary of this is that not every difference between one document and another need correspond to a different Gnostic community. But though I think that K. is correct in relativizing the importance of the often rather leaden myths, it seems to me that he goes too far toward eliminating them. Though the details of who-generated-whom seem to have been of less than ultimate importance, and perhaps even more a matter of fancy than conviction, it seems to me that it is still possible and exceedingly probable that the general structure of the myth—the divine descent, in some of the myths for example, into plurality, then ignorance, then evil—was taken with the utmost seriousness and as a nonnegotiable expression of truth. K. considers the alternatives too simply, and in consequence gives us too simple and too pure a picture of the Christian Gnostic.

Though I have focused almost entirely on issues which I consider to have been treated a bit too simply by Koschorke, I hope that I have at the same time managed to suggest that this is indeed a carefully researched and thought-out book by a writer who promises to contribute a great deal to our understanding of the character and interrelationships of the varied forms of second- and third-century Christianity.

Univeristy of Iowa

James McCue


In these published lectures, originally delivered at Harvard in April 1976, Brown returns to concerns which animated his previous work. He is dissatisfied with attributions of the specific character of Late Antiquity to a “failure of nerve,” a “decline of rationalism,” or a vague response to a general third-century “crisis” because of their simplistic and hasty generalizations and their tendency to impute, inaccurately, “modern” feelings and perceptions to ancient people. In an attempt to let those people speak for themselves, B. returns to the texts. As usual, his
interpretations are sensitive, vivid, and strongly persuasive. He offers a fascinating sketch of the distinctive configurations and interactions of religious, cultural, and social factors which gradually came to define life in the Mediterranean world of the late fourth and early fifth centuries.

For B., the key to the religious changes that typify Late Antiquity is a shift in the locus of supernatural power from sacred things to sacred persons. Such power had once been seen to reside in temples, oracle sites, and other established institutions, but in the period between 200 and 400 it came increasingly to be "represented on earth by a limited number of exceptional human agents, who had been empowered to bring it to bear among their fellows by reason of a relationship with the supernatural which was personal to them, stable and clearly perceptible to fellow believers" (12). That analysis is doubly significant. First, it provides a clear and specific measure against which B. can plot the changing tides of Late Antique religious life. Second, with its focus on power, it enables him to uncover what was really at stake in the universal "debate on the holy" and to show how that debate had direct consequences for daily life. Thus he can alter our perception of the familiar debate between "rational" philosophy and "irrational" magic by showing that a hotly contested distinction between legitimate and illegitimate supernatural power was at its core (60). He also demonstrates conclusively in his treatment of Egyptian monks how the possessor of supernatural power could wield impressive social influence (86, 93).

The heuristic value of B.'s concentration on sacred persons as the keys to the religious life of Late Antiquity is evident in each chapter. He first describes the rise of those "agents of the supernatural," the responses of society to them, and the ensuing complications, especially the strong social need to distinguish saints from sorcerers, and legitimate from illegitimate uses of power. Next, he shows how the intensified competition among claimants to supernatural power stemmed from the disintegration of the "model of parity" which governed social relations in the second century. Then B. traces the development of martyrs, prophets, and inspired teachers as alternative sources of spiritual power, primarily within the Christian tradition. Finally, he discusses the strong concentration of spiritual power in the ascetic monks of the Egyptian desert. Throughout the book B.'s treatment of the Christian tradition is of particular interest, since he details both its catalytic function in the creation of Late Antique culture and the traits it shared with competing religious traditions.

Because of their limited scope, these four lectures, like E. R. Dodds's Pagan and Christian in an Age of Anxiety, do not constitute a full and definitive history of the period. Those unfamiliar with Brown's topic might require supplementary information. But for those already ac-
quainted with Late Antiquity, he has, by judicious use of analytic concepts and graphic vignettes, captured the "feel" of the religious life of the period at least as well as any of his predecessors. To ask for more is imprudent.

Connecticut College, New London EUGENE V. GALLAGHER


This book gathers together much interesting material dealing with the Reformation and/or with Luther, and as summary it makes interesting reading. However, its overall organization is weak. At least part of its thesis is open to question (i.e., that what Reformation scholarship and the American self-understanding need is a sobering dose of Luther's theology); and the rest of the thesis is mainly supported by faulty perspective (i.e., that American Reformation scholarship is focusing on Luther's theological development, following in this the European-German example).

As to the organization, the framework provided by several of the chapters is simply not very helpful. "The Beginning of American Reformation Historiography" puts together writers as disparate as Joseph Priestley, Philipp Schaff, A. C. McGiffert, and Williston Walker. The next chapter, "The American sozialgeschichtliche Interpretation of the Reformation," brings together a diverse collection of major and minor writers—e.g., Erik Erikson and Jacob Schapiro—who have in common the failing that they do not see Luther's religiosity as the key to, or even a very important part of, the Reformation. There follows a chapter on "American Catholic Historiography of the Reformation." Some of the writers here may be considered Reformation historians, but some have simply written something about Luther without any effort to relate their study to the Reformation as a whole. Implicitly, K. seems to identify history of the Reformation with the study of Luther. The next chapter, "American Reformed Historiography of the Reformation," lumps together a turn-of-the-century theological liberal, a Unitarian, some Presbyterians, and George Williams. Their common feature seems to be that they failed to take Luther seriously enough. Finally, we have a chapter on "American Lutheran Historiography of the Reformation." Some of the writers here are clearly writing histories of the Reformation; others just as clearly are presenting interpretations of some aspect of Luther's theology. Whatever the shortcomings of any of the writers surveyed in this chapter, they at least have the advantage that they are discussing what is essential—Luther.

The thesis that Reformation scholarship ought to be focused on Luther
is open to serious question. Basically, there is an ambiguity here which K. does nothing to clarify. Is the Reformation to be viewed primarily as the creation of significantly new, powerful, and perhaps still valuable theological alternatives? Or is it to be viewed primarily as a massive transformation of the texture and organization of the religion and culture of sixteenth-century Western Christendom? Obviously, the place of Luther will be different in these two different approaches. K. takes the first approach. Many of the writers whom he criticizes take the second. To criticize the second approach on the basis of the first, one would have to develop an account of what values can be derived from the study of history; but K. is content simply to lecture the not-sufficiently-Lutheran historians as though they acted simply in ignorance of Luther’s theology, blinded perhaps by their oft-referred-to American utopianism and optimism. Moreover, it is at least questionable whether Luther is the key to the English Reformation, no matter how one conceives the matter.

The thesis that Reformation scholarship is actually becoming more Luther-centered is derived primarily from a self-induced optical illusion. By putting the chapter on Lutheran scholarship at the end, K. is able to suggest that the writings which he analyzes of Krauth (1854), Fife (1928), Forell (1954), Spitz (1963), Pelikan (1950), and Pauck (1946 and 1950) represent a new direction in Reformation studies. Actually there has, not surprisingly, long been an interest in Luther among American Lutherans; but K. never really examines how or whether this has led to a transformation of Reformation scholarship in general. Somewhat similarly, he is able to report a transformation in American Catholic Reformation scholarship by focusing exclusively on writers such as Harry McSorley and simply ignoring the more reserved work of someone like Jared Wicks.

In summary, this book does not provide a convincing, full, or accurate account of American Reformation scholarship.

University of Iowa

James F. McCue


The writing of the church history of England was for centuries strongly influenced by the fact that its purveyors were Anglicans, and therefore under some compulsion to accept a reading of the Reformation of the sixteenth century which reflected the opinions of a High-Church party illuminated, for example, by Archbishop William Laud and by the enthusiasts of the Oxford Movement. The result was a minimizing of the ecclesiastical revolution and an effort to depict the modern Church of England as, in all essential matters, maintaining an unbroken continuity with the ancient and medieval Church.

With the opening of English universities to Catholics in the last
hundred years, other views have found expression, but not before non-Anglican historians had made the fact of the ecclesiastical break with the past irrefutable. As Kreider writes, “much though he might protest the contrary, after 1536 Henry VIII was the defender of a different faith” (124). It must, however, be acknowledged that, before this was done, Catholic pioneers thought it necessary to trumpet exaggerated views in order to gain a hearing. Thus it has since been fashionable to cry scorn at Cardinal Aidan Gasquet’s roseate picture of English monasteries on the eve of the dissolution and on Hilaire Belloc’s imaginative and stimulating hypotheses. Happily, these excesses are no longer thought necessary, and the Cardinal’s Benedictine enthusiasm has been tempered by the overwhelming erudition of his successor, Dom David Knowles.

The dissolution of English monasteries in Tudor England has always attracted much attention and been the subject of much learned investigation, particularly with regard to its results. What happened to monastic lands and buildings has provided material for many books, though the fate of individual monks and nuns has been little explored. Likewise, the suppression of the chantries has provoked small interest; and yet it has been thought by some recent writers that their destruction made a greater impact on the beliefs and practices of English folk than the spectacular collapse of the abbeys, priories, and nunneries.

Since the medieval founders of monasteries, chantries, schools, hospitals, and other charitable foundations required those who benefited from them to pray for the souls of their founders, it is convenient to regard such establishments collectively as intercessory institutions. Nevertheless, the monks and nuns were actuated by other purposes in adopting their religious manner of life. Accordingly, when the English Reformers denied the existence of purgatory, it did not make monastic institutions idle, nor indeed chantries, in so far as the latter also supported incumbents with additional occupations. Too great attention to the obligation of intercessory prayer has, perhaps inevitably, colored K.’s views.

The book is divided into three parts. First comes a statistical study of English chantries, defined as “ecclesiastical benefices endowed with lands or rents by its founder, who hoped to be the beneficiary of the prayers and masses offered by an endless succession of chantry priests . . . presented by a patron, instituted by the bishop of his diocese and inducted by an appropriate local ecclesiastical official” (5). The statistical base is formed by the records of four counties—Essex, Warwickshire, Wiltshire, and Yorkshire—in part because of “the excellent quality of their surviving . . . chantry certificates . . . pensions certificates and continuance warrants” (3). K.’s conclusions are that by the mid-1540’s some chantries “were flourishing, with burgeoning rent rolls and able incumbents; others, whose endowments were decaying and whose priests were non-resident
or incapable, had deteriorated to the point at which even the essential function of each foundation—the intercession for the souls of its founders—was no longer being performed” (37).

In the selected counties the work beyond their duty of intercession done by the chantry priests (or cantarists, as K. calls them, presumably because they were required to sing Mass) is examined, and also the attitude of the people with regard to intercessory prayer; and K. concludes that “as late as the early decades of the sixteenth century the doctrine of purgatory was still intensely important to a large number of Englishmen” (71).

With this thought in mind, the second part of the study deals at length with the intense governmental and Protestant effort to abolish that doctrine in England. Of course, its economic value as justification for the confiscation of the lands and properties of monasteries and chantries was of fundamental importance.

The third part examines in detail the two acts encompassing the official decisions on chantry suppression: the act of 1545 in Henry VIII’s reign and the Edwardian act of 1547. For ten years before 1545, the religious disturbances of the time had in fact raised the question of chantry suppression; and K. gives a list of those suppressed between 1540 and 1545. His notes and references are abundant; there is a bibliography and an index.

The study concludes with these words: “thereafter, for better or for worse, the chantries and other intercessory institutions, in which many late-medieval Englishmen had given fervent testimony to their faith, would recede into the mists of the English past” (208).

Georgetown University

ERIC MCDERMOTT, S.J.


Yerkes’s book, originally his doctoral thesis at the University of Chicago, narrates Hegel’s interpretation of traditional Christology. Hegel, it is well known, regarded the doctrines of the Trinity and the Incarnation as the primary analogues, expressed in the quasi-imaginative language characteristic of religious belief, to the purely rational doctrine of the self-othering Absolute Idea, the famous Begriff, or—to use its theological patronym—the Absolute Spirit. Hegel contended that the Absolute Idea, which is Infinite Thought thinking Itself, nonetheless preserves, as necessary “moments” of differentiation within the process of unification, both nature and finite spirits. But whether the Absolute Idea does genuinely preserve nature and finitude, or whether these so-called necessary moments are finally submerged in a monism of Thought, is the
dilemma which bedevils every reader of the *Logic*. The history of post-Hegelian philosophy is the history of that bedevilment and, for the most part, disenchantment with the outcome of Hegel’s argument. Y., however, does not attempt to explore, much less to resolve, this perennial Hegelian dilemma. Instead, he concentrates on the clue to the Absolute Idea that Hegel found in Christian faith and theology.

Religious faith proclaims a knowledge of an infinite object, God. Hegel’s idealist theory of consciousness prevented him from ignoring or dismissing this fundamental claim of religious consciousness; for idealism demonstrates that consciousness produces its own objects; therefore, consciousness must be in some sense infinite. In fact, Christian religious consciousness implicitly recognizes the infinity of consciousness—not, of course, in the terms of idealist logic, but under the theological guise of the Incarnation, the unity of God and man in Jesus Christ. By making explicit what faith holds implicitly, Hegel spelled out exactly how Athens deals with Jerusalem: philosophy demonstrates that Protestant Christianity, when properly demythologized, that is, when grounded in a logic of the self-othering Absolute, can still remain, at the level of imaginative thinking (*Vorstellung*), the rationally necessary or ultimate form of religious consciousness.

While only the Hegelian philosopher can keep reason and religious imagination so sweetly in concert, Hegelian ontology, far from being a grotesquely elevated Protestant chauvinism, is as universal as reason; for the sequence of historical religions instantiates in history the logical unfolding of the *Begriff*. Thus the *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion* do not develop a phenomenology of religion, as did Hegel’s earlier work, the *Phenomenology of Spirit*. Rather, in the *Lectures* philosophy views religion from the standpoint already attained in the *Phenomenology* and explicated in the *Logic*; as Hegel puts it, his “method is the self-unfolding *Begriff* and nothing else.” Since the Hegelian philosopher possesses the *Begriff*, he is able to grasp that the incarnation of Christ is the only particular religious symbol which adequately embodies the meaning of world religious history. What is the status and function of this symbol?

The crucial and much controverted issue in Hegel’s system is the relationship between logic and phenomenology or, in other words, the relationship between ontology and history. In presenting Hegel’s Christology, Y. draws on but does not significantly advance Emil Fackenheim’s magisterial exposition of this difficult but central theme. Indeed, Y. obscures the philosophical foundations of Hegel’s interpretation of Christ. The historical necessity of Christ, from the point of view of the *Logic*, is the demonstrated necessity of a universal instantiating itself in a contingent particular. Otherwise, the consequent assertion of the supremacy of Protestant Christianity would be, Hegel himself admits, merely the pious
affirmation of one particular religious commitment in competition with others. But Y., who is preoccupied with his teachers’ current debates, turns the *Logic* into a hermeneutic and Hegel into a fundamental theologian. These turns may be salutary if Hegel is to remain viable for contemporary theology, but they seriously diminish Hegel’s own aspirations and perhaps achievements.

To suppose that “hermeneutical ontological first principles . . . are argued from and not for” (286) is either to misconstrue or to abandon the *Logic* as the norm for the philosophy of religion. Y.’s version of Spirit’s inner witness to the paradigmatic truth of Christ relies on intuitive or unproved first principles of the sort that Hegel specifically repudiated. Admittedly, Hegel’s claims are extraordinary: the *Logic*, in its starting point, method, and categorial development, is totally comprehensive. No categorial content that can be rationally apprehended remains yet to be discovered or expressed. Just for that reason the categories of the *Logic* are the unsurpassable dogmas of rational theology. Doubtless, Christian theologians may and should continue to exercise their imaginative thinking in response to the needs of their age. But for Hegel, the ultimate meaning of these historically rooted *Vorstellungen* has already been grasped. It is questionable, however, whether the Christology that Hegel sublated in the *Logic* fully corresponds to the theological doctrine expounded by Nicaea and Chalcedon. Curiously enough, this basic question is nowhere pursued in Y.’s book.

*Georgetown University*  
DENIS J. M. BRADLEY


The appearance of Moltmann’s *The Crucified God* in 1972 has provoked a lively discussion of the theology of the cross on the Continent, in America, and even in the Third World. The breadth of the discussion can be gauged by the fact that the book has already been translated into seven languages. The connection between the theology of the cross and the theodicy question, the link between the crucified God and Moltmann’s political theology, as well as Moltmann’s advocacy of a reinterpretation of the classical Trinitarian doctrine have all contributed to serious reflection concerning the place of the cross in Christian theology.

The most recent contributions to the dialogue are Momose’s *Kreuzestheologie* and *Diskussion*, a series of critical reviews including a reply to the critique by Moltmann himself. Momose is a Japanese Jesuit whose
The critical question, then, seems to be whether Moltmann can further develop his concept of the Trinitarian history of God without surrendering the divine transcendence or reducing God to the history of the world in a Hegelian fashion. This problem is presently the focus of Moltmann’s seminars and lectures in Tübingen and he promises to express himself more fully in print in a forthcoming book on the Trinity in the not too distant future.

Tübingen

JOHN J. O’DONNELL, S.J.


The book is well written, which makes its reading a joy. The brief text (132 pp.) is made more voluminous by 42 pages of footnotes and 5 pages of index material. The method used is quite simple. The first 60 pages summarize very well the pivotal points in Moltmann’s theology. Then M. signals four problems in Moltmann’s theory which may become more solvable if we follow the author’s selection of studies in analytic philosophy. Three such sources, Austin, Evans, and Searle, are introduced for their analysis of promissory language. Indeed, students of hope theology will be helped by the observations presented. However, they will not find it easy to follow M. in his efforts to correct Moltmann’s language and theory according to analytic philosophies. Moreover, M. does not turn the tables around by trying to correct these analytic philosophers in terms of Moltmann’s insights.

In chapter 3 the debate is a one-way street. Chapter 4, “The Experience of History,” portrays Moltmann as a theologian who respectfully withstands some of his critics, e.g., Cox, Gilkey, and Van Harvey, who did not properly understand the complexity of his theology. But then M. repeats his method of chapter 3 and places Moltmann’s theology in the context of two other analytic philosophers, Gallie and Danto. They are to enlighten the reader regarding two basic questions, “What makes an event significant as history?” and “What part does a sense of the future play in narration?” We learn about the characteristic differences in the logic of “descriptive sentences” and “hope sentences” (I do not agree with the author’s statement “What Moltmann, for his part, fails to make clear in this connection is that Hoffnungssätze appear in Christian proclamation only in conjunction with Lehrrsätze” [106]. M. fails to recognize that the belief in the Resurrection is based on appearances of Jesus and their descriptions.) M. takes his analytic philosophers too decisively in his judgments of Moltmann’s theology. On the other hand, M. criticizes Gallie and Danto for not properly accounting for such methods as used by Moltmann. Moreover, most of M.’s analytic references are more than
a decade old. One wonders how students of Austin, Evans, Searle, Gallie, and Danto have improved on the theories of their teachers. The more recent names in the New Hermeneutics are painfully absent in this book.

The last chapter, "The Question of Eschatological Ontology," presents very informative insight regarding the designation of God's reality (1) as Future, (2) as Person, (3) as Crucified, and (4) as Triune. E.g., in God as Future the point is made that "the role of language essential to both promise and narrative can be uncovered" (114). However, it appears that M. wants the revelation aspect of promise more in tune with language analysis than Moltmann's concern for the Novum would permit. M. holds that the analytic philosophies of narrative and promissory language are more substantial than is understood by Moltmann. This is indicated in the sections "God as Person" and "God as Crucified" (114–19) and more clearly demonstrated in "God as Triune" (119–27).

M. presents challenges which deserve Moltmann's response. I am sure that such a response will indicate that Moltmann's theology is more complex than M.'s references to analytic philosophies want it to be. Personally, I am very appreciative of M.'s outstanding contribution, because he truly places hope theology in a challenging context. At times, however, his arguments need clarification.

University of Dayton

William P. Frost


This study of the anthropological elements of worship, inspired by G. van der Leeuw's classic Religion in Essence and Manifestation, originated as a commentary on the findings of a questionnaire on worship distributed by the Evangelical Lutheran Church Germany. J. recognizes the role of ritual worship in the overall process of religious socialization as well as its actual function in liturgical communication. Conversant with the behavioral sciences, he is attentive to symbol-making as approached by comparative religions, psychology, sociology, linguistics, and aesthetics. Symbolic communication is elemental and primary, more complex than purely verbal communication, shifting and flexible, and anticipative or pointing beyond itself. A brief chapter considers the anthropological input from a theological standpoint, stressing the relationship with experience, the interplay of explicative word and symbolic expression, imagination and religious expression.

The book begins to come to life in the fourth chapter, where J. discusses worship as ritual. Not only the sermon but the entire service of Christian worship constitutes the communication of the gospel. J. analyzes ritual
as an expression of religious behavior, as undergirding religious discourse and a place for beautification, as an aid to religious behavior and piety, as conveyer of tradition, a guarantee for order and meaning. Initiation and communion rituals are a median and indication of a religious group's sense of community, history, and values. J. makes a historical digression in a chapter devoted to the meaning of worship, where he honestly shares the Protestant misgivings regarding the place of ritual worship: primacy of the gospel over ritual, fear of ritual uniformity, yet in all a balanced appreciation of ritual in communicating and intensifying faith.

J. begins to tie things together in a sixth chapter on worship as symbolic communication. Symbolic communication is a sense-directed activity—an observation which serves as a healthy corrective to both an overly cerebral, academic approach to religion and an overly objective, functional one. He considers symbolic communication as a prearranged situation (format), symbolic place, symbolic time, symbolic roles (ministries). Along with the traditional liturgical model of the celebration of a meal with the crucified and risen Christ, he advances another ritual model of the teaching Christ who heals, calls his disciples, and sends them forth. He makes some telling distinctions between presentative (Roman Catholic tradition) and discursive (Protestant tradition) symbolism, analogal (more affective) and digital (more intellectual) communication, restrained and elaborative code or manner of celebration.

In a lengthy concluding chapter J. assesses the situation and chances of worship today, candidly admitting the discrepancy between the theology of worship and actual practice. An age of ideological pluralism has resulted in decreasing participation and increasing isolation. People come with a variety of motives and expectations. There is the wider challenge of the very credibility of the Christian Church. He would favor a more conciliar concept of church which has room both for small groups searching for a more intensive experience of community, and for the conventional large-church concept which has a more extensive appeal in providing a common home of faith. Christian worship is the liturgical God-talk of Christian faith; it is "narrative liturgy." So as to facilitate the symbolic passage of hearing-prayer-action, he proposes three future directions for this gift of God symbolized in the cross and expressed in Christian worship: a universality which recognizes the grace of God at work among all peoples; a flexibility and openness (adaptation) where the "passion for the possible" is a *vestigium resurrectionis*; and a diaconal solidarity at the service of our Mitmenschen.

The book is well documented with notes and a rich bibliography. One would have hoped that it could find a place among the outstanding volumes of *Leiturgia* contributed by German Lutheran liturgical scholars as a much-needed supplement on the relationship between the behavioral
BOOK REVIEWS

SCIENCE AND WORSHIP. Unfortunately, such is not the case. While not without insight, *Symbol und Ritual* would be tedious to read in any language. Its repetitious style could well profit from a better ordering of ideas and a more disciplined editing. In the last analysis, Christian ritual worship defies an overly exhaustive rational analysis and needs no apologetical explanation: it is the response of praise and thanksgiving for the mystery of the love of God revealed in Jesus Christ.

*Darlington Seminary, N.J.*

CHARLES W. GUSMER


Studies of religious ethics are always problematic because of the difficulty of elucidating the core elements of the religion and their personal and social implications. Such problems escalate in doing comparative religious ethics, because one needs to determine what core concepts are comparable. This new study aims at resolving some of these difficulties. The first part focuses on the careful laying out of the methodology; the second is an application of this to the religion and morality of the Navaho, the Gospel of Matthew, and Theravada Buddhism. The general orientation, choice of problems examined, and definitions selected come from the use of analytic philosophy as a basic background. Because of this, e.g., definitions focus on moral, religious, and legal action-guides. Also because of this, the authors focus almost exclusively on definitional issues. On the other hand, the volume picks up on many current ethical and religious discussions and uses sources that are up to date. The book is also a splendid example of co-operative scholarship ranging over several years. An excellent set of references follows each chapter and a general bibliography is included at the end.

One working hypothesis is that many efforts in comparative religious ethics fail because the problems of definition are not faced. Therefore the first part of the book, proceeding from a social-science and cross-cultural perspective, addresses this fundamental issue. The first chapter discusses methodological issues and focuses on explication and rational reconstruction of statements of practical moral reasoning in different cultural settings. The next three chapters address definitional issues. The final chapters are concerned with application of the methodology. In general, each chapter focuses on definitional issues and through the process of critiquing other definitions arrives at and justifies the proposed definitions. Additionally, each of the methodological chapters contains a diagram of the major issues discussed; this helps one perceive the unity of the chapter, as well as the integration of different elements of it.

A moral statement is defined as "a statement expressing the acceptance
of an action-guide that claims superiority, and that is considered legitimate, in that it is justifiable and other-regarding‖ (29). A religious statement is "a statement expressing acceptance of a set of beliefs, attitudes, and practices based on a notion of sacred authority that functions to resolve the ontological problem of interpretability" (56). The reasons for choosing these critical definitions are well organized and clearly presented, with opposing points of view used critically. The chapter on religion is especially valuable, because it deals with sacred authority and how action-guides can be derived from religious statements.

A chapter on laws is included because of the importance of defining the concept but also to provide a means of separating law from ethics. This chapter, too, is most helpful in specifying the ways in which a law ("a directive taken as authoritative in that it is officially both legitimate and enforceable"[80]) is authorized, justified, and related to religion and ethics.

The chapter on justification of ethical statements is interesting and cogent. The format, addressing both teleological and deontological issues, provides a methodology very useful for justification. Many examples are provided and the discussion is closely and cogently related to the preceding chapters. It is a well-integrated summary of the process at work in the methodology of the book, as well as an excellent presentation of a fruitful research tool.

The final chapters are applications of the definitions and method to the three cases previously mentioned. In addition to demonstrating how the method works, the authors also show how points of contact between different systems can be discerned and serve as points of departure for future research.

This volume presents a practical method for fruitful comparative research in religious social ethics. Disagreements about specific definite issues, while justified in some instances, need not detract from the significance of the method and its research potential.

Worcester Polytechnic Institute

THOMAS A. SHANNON


This is a study of the morality of the human act. M. analyzes all the ingredients of the act and points up the various problems that can arise in moral discernment. He deals with ethical norms, but only in so far as they enter into the judgment of the individual act. The book really comes closer to a treatment of the virtue of prudence than of ethics as such.

M. illustrates the process of moral choice by a wheel model. At the hub of the wheel are all the reality questions one must ask about the human act: quis, quid, ubi, etc. The moral relevance of these questions will, of
course, vary from act to act, but the responses to them will influence the final moral choice. In dealing with the question "what?" M. seems to take the stand that one cannot judge an act good or bad apart from the circumstances, and cites St. Thomas in support of this stand. In fairness to St. Thomas, it should be noted that he also looks to the object of the act and the intention behind it as bases for moral judgment. He clearly admits that the goodness or badness of an act can come from the circumstances, but he maintains that the first goodness or badness comes from the object; so his support for M.'s position would be questionable. M.'s own reliance on circumstances as decisive in moral judgments becomes less clear when he is dealing with the current debate between deontologists and teleologists. Although recognizing the importance of effects (circumstances), he seems unwilling to endow them with the decisive role teleologists would give them in the moral estimate of the human act. He wants to maintain that there are some acts morally wrong in spite of the overriding good effects they might produce, e.g., putting babies on bumpers to cut down the accident rate. This does not seem consistent with his previous position.

M. rightly found fault with the utilitarian pleasure-pain principle as a basic moral norm, and even with the somewhat less objectionable "greatest good of the greatest number" principle. In the opinion of the present reviewer, he did not distinguish carefully enough between the latter and the principle of the common good. Admittedly, there is more to morality than pursuit of the common good, although it is a perfectly authentic dimension of morality. But the common good is the good of everybody, not just the "greatest number." A law against homicide, e.g., is meant to protect everybody in the community against homicide, not just the greatest number. Pursuit of the common good should not be confused with pursuit of the greatest good of the greatest number.

M. continues to use his wheel model and sees the other ingredients of the moral act as spokes of the wheel. Chapter by chapter he explains the role of creativity, consistency and surprise, reason and authority, affectivity, common and individual knowledge, and comedy and tragedy in the moral choice. He admits that comedy and tragedy play a less important role than the other ingredients. The reader will find that the chapter headings do not always correspond with the list of ingredients on the wheel model itself, but the discrepancies do not seem significant.

*The Moral Choice* is cleverly written and as far from dull as ethics can be. The display of erudition may at times seem a little excessive, but readers will find the treatment of the moral act quite thorough and helpful. They will undoubtedly be challenged by some of the illustrative choices M. himself makes.

*Loyola University of Chicago*  
*John R. Connery, S.J.*

A. and O'R. have coauthored a massive and erudite work that must be recognized as a major contribution to contemporary bioethics. Characterized by breadth of coverage, a refreshingly balanced approach to controversial issues, and a highly readable style, Health Care Ethics reflects the authors' familiarity with a wide range of literature—medical, sociological, psychological, legal, ethical, and pastoral. Indeed, much of the book consists of a survey of the literature on various ethical and bioethical topics, with extensive quotations, followed by a critique of opposing viewpoints and a clear statement of the authors' own position.

Employing a cleverly conceived approach to a highly complex field, A. and O'R. move from questions relating to the person seeking health (Part 1) to the healing professions (Part 2), to the logic and norms of bioethical decision-making (Part 3), to difficult bioethical decisions, among them abortion, experimentation, sexuality and reproduction, reconstructing human beings, psychotherapy and behavior modification, suffering and dying (Part 4), to pastoral ministry in health care (Part 5). Along the way just about all significant bioethical questions are raised, from triage to the meaning of mental illness, from health-care fees to transsexual surgery.

A valuable contribution is the theological analysis of bioethical issues, i.e., the authors' success in isolating the ethical principles involved in bioethical decision-making not only by drawing from generally acceptable humanistic principles but, more importantly, from the gospel and the living tradition of the Christian community. Their approach cannot, however, be labeled either liberal or conservative. The liberal reader will predictably take issue with the authors' defense of exceptionless norms (192) and their opposition to proxy consent for nontherapeutic experimentation (254); the conservative reader will take issue with the authors' favorable view of the use of DES for rape victims (296) and their analysis of the binding force of Humanae vitae (270). A. and O'R. see themselves as exercising "the intellectual independence, combined with respect for authority and tradition, which seems to us one of the chief features of a Catholic and Christian value system" (4).

Among the many excellent discussions in Health Care Ethics, several particularly impressed this reviewer: (1) the analysis of health and sickness and the delineation of a holistic view of health care (chap. 2); (2) the careful treatment of conscience formation and of the relationship between official Church teaching and theological inquiry (63 ff.); (3) the examination of the medical profession, its education and its role (87 ff.); and (4) the critique of duty ethics and consequentialism, and the proposal of
prudential personalism as an alternate ethical system (chap. 7). On the other hand, the authors' treatment of the right to health care (52, 129-31) is somewhat less successful. The current debate on this alleged right and in particular the question of a correlative duty to respond to the alleged right need far more sorting out than is found here.

Overall, A. and O'R. have admirably achieved the purpose they set for themselves, viz., to deal with "the broader and major issues affecting human health and the health care professions" and, second, "to be of assistance to Christian, and especially Catholic, health care professionals . . . faced with the difficult . . . responsibility to give witness to a long tradition of humanistic health care, while working with other professionals and government agencies committed to diverse systems" (1). With the almost simultaneous publication of Health Care Ethics and the Encyclopedia of Bioethics, the new discipline of bioethics seems to have come of age.

King's College, Wilkes-Barre, Pa. JAMES J. DOYLE, C.S.C.


Werner Schulze's Zahl–Proportion–Analogie is an endeavor to analyze the interrelated concepts of number, proportion, and analogy in Nicholas of Cusa's metaphysics. S. shows how Cusa's use of the concept of proportion is determined by his understanding of number and analogy. The author proceeds to analyze simultaneously each of the three key terms in Cusa's metaphysics and to explain their development from classical thought through the Middle Ages. S.'s carefully drawn distinction between the Thomistic doctrine of analogy and Cusa's development of the same concept reveals the extent of St. Thomas' influence upon Cusa, even though Cusa avoids the term "analogy." S. also develops an important analysis of the influences of Pythagorean philosophy, the School of Chartres, and Raymond Lull upon Cusa.

With respect to the theological concept of the Absolute, S. argues that Cusa's concept of analogy is derived from his Neoplatonic view of proportionality and participation. This line of analysis leads S. into Cusa's philosophical-theological psychology, in which an analogy is set up between the mind of God as the absolute creative measure of the cosmos and the mind of man as its finite re-creative measure. This doctrine implies Cusa's theory of number. The mind measures the cosmos by its
concept of number. Since the concept of number applies to God, the creative measure of the cosmos, as well as to man, S. discloses the metaphysical dimension which links psychology and metaphysics in Cusa's thought. In a very interesting section Schulze explores Cusa's "quadrivial theology," i.e., the use of the quadrivium as a model for doing a theology based upon a mathematically-oriented structure.

S. establishes his analysis of Cusa's text with very precise scholarship. Although he often neglects to explain why Cusa chooses one line of thought over a historical alternative (as, e.g., the displacement of the traditional "trivial" by a "quadrivial" theology), he always supports his interpretation of texts with convincing and revealing analysis.

It was hoped that Jasper Hopkins' *Concise Introduction* would have updated and expanded Henry Bett's *Nicholas of Cusa*, which was published in 1932 and which is the only general monograph on Cusa in English. Unfortunately, H. fails to meet this expectation. His book on Cusa is not what its title suggests. Rather than an introduction to the philosophy of Cusa, it is in reality a translation of Cusa's *De possest* with a brief introduction tacked on.

The Introduction is concise to the point of obscurity. Plunging *in medias res*, H. prefers to pick at minutiae of Cusa scholarship instead of providing an explanation of the general concepts of Cusa's philosophy. Besides the obscurity due to the highly compressed analysis, H.'s Introduction contains several notable errors. For example, he categorically states that Cusa was educated by the Brethren of the Common Life at Deventer; R. R. Post has refuted this thesis in his *The Modern Devotion*. Again, when identifying primary sources for Cusa's philosophy, H. fails to cite the influence of the Augustinian School of Cologne, which especially influenced Cusa through his friend Heimerich de Campo. Finally, failing to take account of the tradition of late medieval spirituality which influenced Cusa, H. misconstrues the theological intention of many of Cusa's texts.

The translation of *De possest*, while somewhat stiff and marred by an excessive use of hyphenation, is reliable. The choice of this particular text is somewhat puzzling, however, because it is one of Cusa's most difficult treatises and hardly suitable for introducing the general reader to Cusa's thought.

*Augsburg College, Minneapolis*  
M. L. Fuehrer


Walzer, a professor of government at Harvard, ends the preface to his
book with the revealing comment: “For war is the hardest place: if comprehensive and consistent moral judgments are possible there, they are possible everywhere” (xvii). W.’s work, then, is an important manifestation of the renewal of interest in rational argument about the fundamental normative issues of political life. The recent revival of political philosophy in America, in which the work of John Rawls and Robert Nozick has been central, has been marked by a turn away from emotivism and utilitarianism in moral theory and by the recovery of such central notions in the liberal tradition as social contract and human rights. W.’s work does not deal with the fundamental issues of justice and the state, but the morality of war that he expounds “is in its philosophical form a doctrine of human rights” (xvi). He does not rely explicitly on recent political and ethical theory but draws on the wider historical tradition of the just-war doctrine as elaborated by theologians and philosophers and as embodied in the international law shaping the war convention. This is, in W.’s view, a tradition whose continuing moral vitality and applicability has been shown by the arguments arising from the Vietnam war. W. is less interested in the philosophical bases of the just-war tradition than in its application to the difficult choices to be made in war. Hence his argument relies heavily on historical cases, which he treats not as a historian but as a practical moralist.

W. deals primarily with *jus in bello*, the waging of war in a just manner, rather than with *jus ad bellum*, the justice of making war. So he devotes the first part of his book to defending the possibility of making moral judgments about the conduct of war against cynical and relativistic objections and to justifying his reliance on what he terms the war convention, “the set of articulated norms, customs, professional codes, legal precepts, religious and philosophical principles and reciprocal arrangements that shape our judgments of military conduct” (44). This gives his work a conservative cast, but W. does not wish to maintain all the features of the war convention in its present form. Thus he argues for revising the law of siege warfare so as to allow for freedom of exit for civilians (169). This argument rests on the principle of noncombatant immunity and so is an effort to achieve greater consistency within the war convention.

W. also adopts a revisionist stance with regard to the legalist paradigm of international relations, which provides the basic justification for waging war as a response to the crime of aggression—a response which defends the right of citizens and their political community against attack by another political community (61). The main revisions of the legalist paradigm that W. offers have to do with the justification of anticipatory strikes (e.g., Israel’s attack in 1967) and with intervention across international boundaries in order to preserve individual lives and communal
liberty. In his discussion of intervention and counterintervention, W. follows John Stuart Mill in assigning a very high value to national self-determination, which he interprets to include not merely the expression of the national will through free political processes but also the outcome of armed internal struggle. Thus he denies that intervention can be undertaken to alter the outcome of such a struggle. This provides a basis for fundamental criticism of the U.S. involvement in Vietnam, but it grants a moral standing to organized and resolute armed minorities that is not warranted and it allows the forcible imposition of oppressive regimes on unwilling majorities in the name of national self-determination.

The most controversial feature of W.'s position is his division of war situations into two types: situations where the war convention holds and those situations of supreme emergency where the necessity of national survival requires even good people to do evil when this can be justified by utilitarian calculations. On the practical side, W. attempts to limit the recourse to the realm of necessity, which is marked "by a conflict between collective survival and human rights" (325). Thus he acknowledges that nuclear deterrence, which involves the making of immoral threats, "may fall for the moment under the standard of necessity" (283); but he concludes that this imposes on us an obligation to extricate ourselves from the situation of necessity and does not justify acquiescence in it. W.'s acknowledgment of a realm of necessity, combined with his clear-eyed detection of the subterfuges by which this realm is extended, is likely to produce morally better conduct of military operations than would a refusal to admit the preponderant weight that considerations of national survival have in military decisions. But on the theoretical side, the result is confusion in the name of "moral realism" (326) and the failure of W.'s initial project of arriving at a set of "comprehensive and consistent moral judgments" (xvii) about the reality of modern warfare. As a consequence, some actions will be both right and wrong, and it will be appropriate to ascribe guilt to some agents for decisions that they ought to have taken. This manifests an acceptance of moral perplexity that is more often found in Protestant ethicists, especially those influenced by Reinhold Niebuhr, than in Catholic and secular moralists. Suggestions for ways of moving beyond W.'s theoretical impasse can be found in two recent books: Doing Evil to Achieve Good by Richard McCormick and Paul Ramsey, and The Theory of Morality by Alan Donagan. W.'s book will, however, despite its ultimate theoretical failure, remain a morally sensitive and intellectually stimulating exploration of some of the hardest places in our moral lives.

Woodstock Theological Center, D.C. JOHN Langan, S.J.

In this brief work G. attempts to underline the differences, even the break, between the method of liberation theology and that of the progressive wing of Western theology. He acknowledges forthrightly that more serious attacks from conservative factions and ideologues of the establishment threaten both positions, but that is not his focus here. His overall conclusion: "The point of departure of liberation theology is not only distinct from progressive theology but is actually contradictory to it" (59).

To achieve his objective, G. analyzes briefly but acutely the "historical subject" or interlocutor of the two approaches. The first half of the book is thus devoted to "the modern spirit" which permeates progressive theology. This modern spirit is seen to be marked by bourgeois individualism and rationalism, so that the historical subject is "the new dominant class, the bourgeois class," largely atheistic or sceptical. He concludes that the choice of this battlefield has influenced all of contemporary theology.

The second half of the book attempts to delineate as accurately as possible the differences that surface when theology speaks from an opposite perspective, i.e., from "a world of oppression." After a survey of the historical evolution of a social consciousness in Latin America (with special attention to the prophetic voice of the sixteenth-century Dominican Bartolomé de las Casas), G. judges that at the present time the historical subject of liberation theology comprises "the sectors of society that have been exploited, the races that have been despised, the cultures that have been marginalized."

Before commenting on this dichotomy, I will mention other ideas in the book that could be of interest to North American theologians. First, in the context of retrieving "fertile areas" in Western theology, considerable attention is given to the writings of Dietrich Bonhoeffer. G. quotes texts concerning the "suffering of God" and viewing history and theology from the viewpoint of the poor and oppressed, but concludes that Bonhoeffer did not have time to make these insights central to his theology. Again, G. notes with approval the socialist perspective (in practice if not in his theology) that Karl Barth maintained to the end of his life, contrasting this with Rudolf Bultmann's adhesion to a bourgeois world view. Lastly, G. is of the opinion that David Tracy's Blessed Rage for Order is lacking in "concrete insertion" into the wider processes of history.

Turning to the Latin American scene, G. is intent on challenging certain myths, lest they become history. One such myth is the assertion that liberation theology and Medellín were born in "years of euphoria
and enthusiasm,” while an opposite plight of captivity and oppression prevails today. He insists—with no paucity of personal experience—that the years 1965–68 were marked by intense struggle, involving successes as well as failures, and not by any euphoric mood. Along the same lines, G. argues that the Medellín conference is inexplicable without taking into account the experiences of the base communities in the years preceding it. He also gives considerable attention to the scriptural references in his Teología de la liberación (1971) in order to dispel the myth that liberation theology restricts its scriptural foundations to the OT event of the Exodus. Finally, G. observes that the theological approach from the perspective of the poor is only in “its first stages,” and ends, characteristically, by insisting that the really important goal is not the producing of theology but the effective liberation of the poor. It may be noted in passing that throughout the book there is an effort (perhaps influenced by G.’s frequent trips to North America) to avoid sexist language, so that we now hear of the need for a “new person” and a “new man and woman” rather than the familiar “new man.”

G.’s analysis of the different historical subjects is incisive and well argued. However, since the same points have been made recently, perhaps in greater depth, by colleagues such as Jon Sobrino and Juan Luis Segundo, it seem appropriate now to move on to some further questions concerning the future of the north-south dialogue.

First, since G. himself admits that conservative or reactionary theology is the principal enemy of both approaches, is it not time to search also for areas of agreement between progressive and liberation theologies, e.g., the importance today of the struggle for justice? Also, is it really true that Latin Americans do not have to give serious attention to the problem of the unbeliever? Has not the massive urbanization of the poor created problems in this area, as well as the rapid integration of all of Latin America into the web of a consumer culture that relativizes all profound issues, including the question of the existence of God? Finally, what future does G. envision for the relationship of liberation theology with the theological movements burgeoning in Africa and Asia as well as with those in the various “third worlds” existing within the developed countries? The problem now, in brief, is the one posed by Martin Luther King Jr. in the title of his last book: “Where do we go from here?”

Le Moyne College, Syracuse

ALFRED T. HENNELLY, S.J.


This is a spiritual autobiography, in part at least, of much personal emotion, of a kind of corporate guilt which, as P. T. Bauer remarked,
affects so many Western intellectuals. On the surface, its terms are economic and political. At bottom, however, they are theological, another indication that faith or ideological persuasion determines economics mostly and not the other way around. Harrington is the leading American socialist intellectual, but, by his own admission, of a socialism that exists nowhere on this earth. Like Plato, he tells us “in speech” what ought to be if we would be just.

Probably no book better describes today the spiritual position of many Christians and former Christians who wish to place the alleviation of the poor as the essential issue not only of politics but of faith. For some time now, I have felt that not Marx but Knox—Ronald, not John—is the best guide to what has happened to social thought in our time. H.'s Marxist-based broodings and self-revelations are almost classic reminders of Enthusiasm and what happens to the spirit when it seeks a Christian-inspired, this-worldly alternative.

H.'s The Other America is still well known. He is a graduate of Holy Cross and the Catholic Worker. His “compassion” has led him out of the Church. What has taken its place is a kind of social Manicheanism. The Vast Majority is full of the good poor and the bad rich, though some individual poor cheat and Robert McNamara is a good man. H.'s goal is pure Enlightenment—“a libertarian, democratic and humane communitarianism” (254).

There are no actual “sinners” in H.'s world. The evildoers of apocalyptic proportions—American and other capitalists—are personally pious folk. And “the vast majority” are just that, a mass of people, not individuals. H. caught a glimpse of a poor lady in India who seemed happy bathing her child (100); but this seemed simply astonishing. And the Marxists, for their part, have betrayed Marxism, except for a chosen few who really understand the Master (253). The world is unjust. Optimists like Herman Kahn, Norman Macrae, or Irving Kristol are dangerous or frivolous. Our mission is to make the world just. This means closing the gaps and redistributing the goods between north and south (good and bad). But H.'s actual encounters with the poor—his journey—make him very much less sanguine than he once was. There will be no Leninist battle (254).

H. is the sort of man who rereads The Phenomenology of Spirit in New Delhi, not to put him to sleep but to “fight sleeplessness!” (29). He cites Augustine—a distorted Augustine, as he admits—to tell us where he is going: “At my most optimistic moments, I think that the pilgrimage leads, not to the City of God, but to the City of Man” (90). His worst moments lead, on the contrary, to more capitalism.

But once we accept H.'s pilgrimage, his journey to the world's poor, as the city of man, his problems about faith and social reality follow necessarily. Some kindly labor-school-type Jesuits show him about Jam-
shedpur. The poor, he confesses, led him to think “blasphemies about Christ” (95). His religious reflections sum up undoubtedly the greatest and most widespread temptation in the world for a Christian: “Though I left the Catholic Church long ago, I have always had an affection for Christ—which is to say the Christ of the Catholic Worker, of the Sermon on the Mount, of compassion and gentle love. But now I want to curse him. Who is he to set up his anguish as a model of meditation for the centuries? He was crucified only once, that is all. If you assume that he was God, which I do not, then you can say that he must have felt a terrible psychological loss as they nailed his divinity to the cross. But only one time; only for a matter of hours” (95).

At this point, of course, H. is both Harnack’s simple Jesus and a monophysite. H. continues: “In Calcutta, I think, people are crucified by the thousands every day, and then those who have not died are crucified again and again and again. If he were half the God he claims to be, he would leave his heaven and come here to do penance in the presence of a suffering so much greater than his own, a suffering that he, as God, obscenely permits. But he does not exist. There is no easy transcendental answer to this agony” (95). H. thus follows that school which once cried “If thou be the Christ, come down from the cross!”

This is, no doubt, a kind of logic: what happens when one does not follow Augustine’s city. Ironically, H. is in Calcutta. It haunts him, the city of suffering. He continues his group orientation. That what Christianity might be essentially about may not be the alleviation of the poor never seems to occur to him. John Paul II’s address to Puebla was essentially to remind Christians similarly tempted that Harrington-type compassion and logic are not Christianity. H. only thinks of the poor in terms of redistributing the world’s wealth, sophisticatedly to be sure. That the poor’s God may also address them in their poverty escapes the parameters of his grief. H.’s Christ is a selective one. Christ never led us to believe justice would be the highest virtue in this world, nor if we did not have it, we could not believe.

When he began his trip to India, at the Frankfurt Airport, H. recalled Ivan Karamazov, about the problem of evil, about his rejecting a God who would torment a child (55). *The Vast Majority* shows no sign of H.’s having recalled the end of the Grand Inquisitor, when Dostoyevsky prophesied that in the end men would be tempted to give up all else if only they could have bread. “I don’t want noblesse; I want justice,” H. cries, by contrast (64).

This is a theological book which recounts, in my view, where a man who has a good heart, but who denies Christ’s mode of redemption by the cross, *must* go. This is a classic, basically Manichean position, though argued with all the nomenclature of economic theory. H. really has
nothing to say to the poor as persons except an economic analysis of capitalism as original sin, a faint hope his socialism may make them richer. He does not want a “single day of suffering”; that is, his problem is spiritual, not economic.

H., no doubt, is still Christian enough to know that “the happiness of numberless generations down the ages does not pay the people back for a single day of this suffering” (95). But this is Christian, Augustine. Yet, since God’s ways are not those of The Vast Majority, he will not accept them. “Blasphemies.” H. has transferred the cross from Golgotha to Calcutta; then, having deprived the vast majority there, or anywhere, of the real message of Christ to each, he offers in its stead a “libertarian, democratic, and humane communitarianism,” which he doubts will ever really come to pass, due to the impersonal evil of American capitalism.

The Book of Genesis was in part written to refute the theory of a God of good and a God of evil. In rejecting the kind of cross, the kind of redemption, in fact given to men, Harrington has refounded in a contemporary setting of income distribution and GNP what Genesis rejected.

Georgetown University

JAMES V. SCHALL, S.J.


A very perceptive study of how the OT should be understood in the canon of Scripture. G. has set for himself the task of “describing and giving a critical evaluation of the different and often contradictory possibilities of understanding the Old Testament as part of the Christian canon—or even of rejecting it altogether” (1). He organizes his treatment chiefly by themes. Thus there are chapters on the OT as law and covenant, as a document of an alien religion, and as a history book. This approach often causes marked overlapping and forces him to divide the thought of individual authors among different chapters. The result is a difficult book to read, but one which allows considerable depth to discussion of important questions. He investigates typology, promise and fulfilment patterns, allegorical interpretation, law and grace contrasts, and finds them all wanting in the light of modern biblical criticism’s historical methodology. He is particularly effective in revealing the hermeneutical problems raised by salvation-history approaches to the OT. Because of the diversity of OT material, no consistent history of expectation or of interpretation leading to Jesus can be traced without dogmatic hindsight. G. suggests that the only way out of this impasse is to appreciate the larger religious continuity at work between OT and NT: the strict monotheism and proclamation of Yahweh’s action. Indeed, the Christian gospel is framed in and dependent on the OT as revelation, and Jesus and the NT presuppose it as Scripture. Without the OT language and its affirmations as Scripture, the Church would “lapse into silence and find no way of fulfilling its calling to proclaim the testimony to Christ” (236).

In this G. balances the approaches of
history and kerygma and calls both sides back to sharper realization of the hermeneutical issues involved. He acutely poses the question of theological understanding of the OT and dismisses attempts to substitute a "history of Israelite religion" for doing theology. If there is any weakness in this book, it is the overwhelming concentration on the modern critical approaches and a slighting of the values and theological fruitfulness of the spiritual senses so beloved of fifteen hundred years of Christian interpretation.

Lawrence Boadt, C.S.P.


Anyone who has worked with R. Young's Analytical Concordance to the Bible . . . (22nd ed., rev. by W. B. Stevenson; New York: Funk & Wagnalls, [1955]) and learned the value of that sort of concordance will welcome this new one fashioned along the same lines. Whereas the Young concordance was based on the Authorized Version (KJV), this analyzes the RSV and limits itself to the NT. An analytical concordance not only gives in alphabetical order the words in their immediate context, usually a short phrase, but also groups them according to the original (Greek) word that they translate. Thus, the entry under "branch" on p. 71 not only lists the 17 instances in the NT where the word occurs (along with its contextual phrase) but also groups the occurrences according to the Greek words baion, klados, and klema; it also lists one passage (Rom 11:24) where there is no Greek word in the original but where "branch" is demanded by the context. The work is thus a boon to persons who may know a little Greek but not enough to use the usual Greek concordances of the NT. In addition to the main concordance of English words thus analyzed, there is also an index-lexicon (661–754) which lists the Greek words alphabetically in transcription and tells in how many ways a given word has been translated in the RSV NT. Two useful appendixes are included: one giving notes on the analysis of RSV NT, and the other listing former readings of the RSV NT. The concordance is based on the 1972 edition of the RSV; but Appendix II very usefully lists the ways in which various passages were translated in the editions of 1946, 1952, 1959 and in the Catholic edition of 1965. It is instructive, indeed, to study a list such as this and see how the translation has varied. In a word, this is a useful and welcome concordance to have available.

Joseph A. Fitzmyer, S.J.


The author, professor of philosophy at the Institut Catholique de Paris, examines the relationship between Scripture and revelation, utilizing a concept he calls "scriptural space," the extended, dynamic milieu in which the Scriptures were written and appeared. There are too many steps in his carefully argued position—the Bible's unity, its unicity, the Christological omnipresent, the ecclesial reader as judge and contemplator, the written object as semantic figure and its modes of presentation—to attempt summary of it here. To do so might distort the author's thought. The reviewer, however, was left with the general impression that B. does not place enough emphasis in his work on the meaning intended by the human authors who originally produced the biblical books and allows too much scope to diverse contemporary perceptions of the Scriptures (and their content), even though these perceptions take place within an ecclesial context. (B. thus invokes the usual safeguards of church authority and the
analogy of faith.) The way seems too open to eisegesis, the reader ultimately deriving what he needs from the Scriptures. In a way, this is a very old view of scriptural interpretation. The book's merit, however, lies in its attempt to integrate the insights of modern philosophical thought with a deep faith and a lively conviction of the worth of the Scriptures for contemporary needs.

Neil J. McEleny, C.S.P.


The author wrote this as a textbook for the middle section of a three-part course for undergraduates in the theology of liberation. It covers the biblical material. Taking the student carefully through the OT and NT, it shows by abundant quotations and explanations of the law and the prophets, the Psalms, the Gospels, and the Epistles that God has a special love for the oppressed. In the Epilogue the reader will also find an excellent summary of the tenets of liberation theology itself, as developed by modern Latin American authors and others. Although no formal bibliography is provided, any reader can find abundant material for further study in the references given in the excellent chapter notes. These notes, gathered in the back of the book, clarify and qualify debatable elements in the text itself; they are unusually informative, giving much more than the too-usual page references only found in so many footnotes.

In the theology of liberation there are many areas of disagreement, such as the nature of original sin, the implications of the Sermon on the Mount, and the strange silence of Christ and St. Paul on the oppressive sinful structures of their own day, e.g., human slavery and wars of aggression. This book examines many of these problems, giving various modern explanations, together with that preferred by the author. The book would make an excellent text for a course on the biblical background of liberation theology for college students and adult study groups.

Joseph M. Moffitt, S.J.


W. has indeed "remade" Christian doctrine in this series of lectures given some years ago at Cambridge University. Unfortunately, his principles of economy and coherence are used so effectively that little of what has been understood as Christian doctrine for almost two millennia remains. He does retain belief in God (though in a somewhat attenuated form) and in some kind of life after death. Little else remains. Gone is the Trinity, the Incarnation, grace, and special providence. Presumably prayer, too, is of no importance and the Eucharist could hardly be more than a memorial service. Despite his disclaimer, W. seems to have reduced Christianity to a vague religiosity, reminiscent of eighteenth-century deism. Perhaps the book should have been called The Unmaking of Christian Doctrine.

If this judgment seems overly critical, it should perhaps be added that the reader may find certain redeeming qualities in the book. It is a remarkable example, if a rather radical one, of what has come to be called in recent years "revisionist theology." While it is doubtful that some of the present practitioners of this theology (particularly David Tracy) would rejoice in the comparison, there seem to be certain basic similarities in methodology if not in results.

No doubt there are positive elements in the book; yet the overall impression seems to be a negative one, particularly in terms of those central doctrines which, from earliest Christian times,
have been considered essential elements of the faith. Whatever needs to be done in reformulating or “remaking” Christian doctrine for the modern world, W.’s approach appears to lead finally to a dead end.

Walter C. McCauley, S.J.


Since Eucharistic worship is at the center of Christian life, B. insists that the Eucharist must affirm and promote the biblical imperative of human liberation. But in a cursory survey of liturgical history, B. concludes that almost without exception the Eucharist has been a place where the oppressor joins the oppressed with impunity. The Eucharist, furthermore, has been used in co-operation with and support of colonizing powers. Even today liberating movements do not find affirmation in Eucharistic worship. With strong sympathies for socialism, B. recommends that the Eucharist should take up issues of social reform wherever they are found. He suggests that Eucharistic themes and the liturgical year should be expanded to include the basic issues of human rights and the Christian vision of human liberation.

This work is both exciting and disappointing. The excitement comes from the clarity with which the Eucharist is connected to social reform. B. places liberation theology within the context of sacramental celebration and forces the Christian community to ask how it is possible to celebrate Eucharist if it is not addressing the real issues of human oppression. Even though the most concrete and positive suggestions are directed toward his native country, Sri Lanka, B. uses principles which have universal application. The work is disappointing because his vision, history, and theology of Eucharist are often incorrect and almost always too simplistic. B. is unrealistic in blaming current problems on Eucharistic worship, and utopian in his hope that a special type of Eucharist will bring a certain solution to social injustice. But the positive contributions of casting liturgical reform within the context of social justice and cultural adaptation outweigh these limitations.

Emmanuel J. Cutrone


In view of Puebla and John Paul II’s pronouncement at the opening of the Third General Conference of the Latin American Episcopate, this book could have been an important contribution to the dialogue between representatives of the people’s Church and the defenders of traditional Roman Catholic theology. It is even possible that it was written with Puebla in view, to help those who were determined to administer defeat to the advocates of the theology of liberation. The structure of the book seems to indicate this. Section 1 is devoted to “Generalities” gathered from the documents of Christians for Socialism and Related Movements (3-33). Section 2 deals with “Specifics” by clarifying such concepts as people, liberation of consciences, reinterpretation of the faith, rereading the Bible, reappropriation of the liturgy; it also deals with serious accusations against the Church and with the option for Marxist socialism (35-74). Section 3 draws conclusions from the material presented on the previous pages and formulates some unanswered questions regarding the praxis of liberation (75-132). The Appendix is a study of evangelization and liberation in the documents of the 1974 Synod of Bishops (133-72). Pages 173-84 offer detailed notes and further references to the interested reader.

Though the book is amply documented, it is regrettable that certain
issues have been overdone, others simply overlooked owing to K.'s emotional approach to the problem. E.g., he should have evaluated and classified his sources more judiciously. Carefully developed thoughts of recognized, serious theologians should not be mixed with statements by political opportunists. Furthermore, K. wrote this book more as reporter than as theologian, and this fact explains its lack of depth. Finally, the relationship of divine revelation and the human condition requires a serious study of incarnational theology, not the easy dismissal of the question for fear of "praxology."

Sabbas J. Kilian, O.F.M.


M. begins his reflections on Christian hope with a phenomenological investigation of human hope in general, both as an emotion and as a virtue. He expands this to include the religious understanding of "total hope." He then pursues the biblical understanding of hope, devoting one chapter to the OT and one to the NT. Hope for a believing Israelite issued in an eschatology—an ultimate hope for the nation, the world, and the individual. This eschatological hope involved a special consciousness of time which was not merely linear as opposed to cyclic but whose center of gravity lay in the future, though always balanced by and in tension with the great events of the past. It is possible to use the promise-fulfilment schema to describe this only after the notion of divine promise has been carefully analyzed and the meaning of fulfilment spelled out.

In the NT Jesus appears as both fulfilment and promise. He transforms and brings to realization OT promise, and he grounds our own hope for fulfilment. He does this especially in his resurrection from the dead. M. sees in the resurrection appearances an essential continuity with the ongoing experiences of Christians in all ages of the living presence and power of Jesus Christ. The future hope, expressed in the NT in terms of second coming, resurrection of the dead, and establishment of the kingdom of God, is far from clear and invites much thought in order to be made intelligible today. The last two chapters bring us up to date. The first deals with the many forms Christian eschatology has taken and continues to take: cosmic, individual, future, realized, evolutionary, revolutionary, other-worldly, this-worldly. M. suggests that each of these contains an element of truth that needs to be incorporated into a contemporary synthesis. In the final chapter he offers his own statement of how this may possibly be done: the movement of world evolution to a further stage already begun in Jesus, and the participation of the individual in the larger development not precisely through the immortality of the soul or the resurrection of the body, but by a third way—the conception of a temporal self that relies on insights of modern relativity theory.

This is a very thoughtful and thought-provoking book. It treads at times a very thin line between a contemporary interpretation of Christian faith and reductionism (which M. certainly wishes to avoid), as, e.g., when the resurrection appearances of Jesus become scarcely more than every Christian's awareness of him, and the individual's hope of eternal life is found in the abiding reality of all things as present to God who continually acts to enrich the meaning of the past. Still, M.'s effort to speak intelligibly about the faith to a modern scientific mentality is an admirable example of how theology must be done today.

John H. Wright, S.J.

Gregory the Great's *Dialogi de vita et miraculis patrum Italicorum* (593-94), a work of profound influence on the Middle Ages, has been available to scholars of recent generations in the fine edition of Umberto Moricca (1924), published in a series that envisaged the *Dialogues* primarily as a "source for the history of Italy." V. sees the principal contribution of this new edition (two volumes of text, translation, notes, and indexes will follow) not so much in the realm of the "historical" (in Moricca's narrow understanding of the term) as in the exploration of an area which M. completely overlooked: the literary background of the *Dialogues*. Here is "a relatively late specimen of the large hagiographic output initiated by the oldest Passions of the martyrs, the Lives of Antony and of Martin, the History of the monks in Egypt, and the Apophthegmata" (11). V.'s major concern is to identify this background, while giving attention to two other areas neglected by Moricca: the literary structure of the work and the *Dialogues*’ relationship to Gregory's other works.

In six chapters, V. (1) situates the *Dialogues* within Gregory's life, work, and milieu; (2) analyzes its purposes, structure, organization, dialogue form, and style; (3) explores its content; (4) uncovers its literary background and "historical reality"; (5) researches its medieval influence and reflects on what it says to us today; (6) tells how the text has been established and sketches a number of facets pertinent to the edition, translation, and notes.

V. feels that, for all his own efforts, the richness and complexity of the *Dialogues* have not been exhausted. "Experts in Gregory and Augustine, as well as experts in the Lives of saints and the Passions of martyrs, will doubtless discover therein copious material for fresh rapprochements" (12). Of course; but it is equally clear that V.'s introduction and edition will cast new light, needed light, on a work "as engaging as it is amusing," on a talented raconteur, on a man who "is above all a saint and a master of sanctity" (12).

Walter J. Burghardt, S.J.


This is the second general study on early Irish Christianity to appear in recent years, the first being John McNeill's *The Celtic Churches* (TS 36 [1975] 347-48). Marnell's emphasis differs from McNeill's, being more concerned with the Irish rather than the Celtic peoples generally, and with the expansion of Irish Christianity to the European continent than with the development of Christianity in the British Isles. Where the two books overlap, McNeill's is more academic, Marnell's more readable. The latter is an admitted popularizer and has done his job well. For example, his division of the world into Rome and Not Rome marvelously sums up the ancient Roman Weltanschauung, while his explanation of nepotism in abbatical appointments rightly stresses the simple fact that only members of noble families received the training necessary for administration (111).

In general, this book presents the material clearly and lucidly for the nonspecialist reader. But therein lies the problem. M. has made some complicated material very clear, apparently because he is unfamiliar with some important studies or is simply unaccustomed to handling such material. He blithely identifies Coroticus, whose soldiers received a letter from St. Patrick, as Welsh (18), although most Patrician scholars say such an identification is currently impossible or say that Coroticus came from Strathclyde in North Britain. M. presents a *dictum Patricii* as authentic (22), although the major-
ity of Patrician scholars argue against its authenticity. The *vita Patricii* are in the Rolls Series *Tripartite Life*, not *Book of Armagh* (26). The Patrician material is notoriously difficult, but similar inaccuracies appear elsewhere. That “invading tribesmen” overran “every corner of the far-flung Roman Empire” (77) simply overlooks the existence of East Rome, and the citation “As [R. P. C.] Hanson puts it (p. 69):” never indicates which of Hanson’s works is being cited (68). The knowledgeable reader finds Mameli unsure of his material and finds himself uncomfortable with the author’s handling of that material. This is a book for the layman; the scholar—any scholar—should use it with care.

*Joseph F. Kelly*


The purpose of this book seems to be twofold: (1) to provide a commentary on Gerson’s *De jurisdicctone spirituali et temporali*, which appears in a critical edition by the author at the end of the volume, and (2) to elucidate by means of the commentary Gerson’s ideas on the temporal jurisdiction of the Church. A considerable amount of discussion is devoted to proving that the *De jurisdicctone* is an authentic work of Gerson, to dating it, and to showing how it is consonant with what we already know about Gerson’s views. The author establishes that Gerson’s point of departure is the discourses by Pierre Bertrand, Pierre Roger (the future Pope Clement VI), and Pierre de Cugnières at the important Assemblée de Vincennes called by King Philip VI in 1329.

The book is clear and convincing. It shows that the *De jurisdicctone* is the earliest statement (1405) from Gerson on the relationship between the two powers, and provides evidence that he remained faithful to the *via media* position thenceforth (108–10). This *via media* was a rejection of extremes of both the hierocrats and the regalists. Gerson once again is vindicated as a moderate, in viewpoint and in temperament, and our understanding of his position on the eve of the Council of Pisa and the Council of Constance is more firmly grounded, thanks to this study.

Gerson’s conception of the Church, his views on the role of canon law in the Church, and his appreciation for St. Bonaventure emerge in the course of the book, and suggest themes of Posthumus Meyjes’s more systematic study, *Jean Gerson, zijn Kerkyllie en Ecclesiologie* (The Hague, 1963). Otherwise, the present work will be of interest only to specialists, who will particularly welcome the edition of the brief (123–31) *De jurisdicctone*.

*John W. O’Malley, S.J.*


Even for students of medieval history, the “Blanchard Affair” at the University of Paris in the late fourteenth century is an event with which they may not be familiar. The merit of B.’s book is its employment of this incident to illuminate the structure of governance in the University, the teachers’ perceptions of their function in realm and Church, and the general ecclesiological assumptions prevalent at the University at the beginning of the Schism. More pointedly, it uses the incident to explore the emergence of the young Pierre d’Ailly, leader of the attack on Blanchard, and to disclose con-
ciliar and even Gallican assumptions latent in d’Ailly’s arguments. The book concludes with critical editions of two speeches d’Ailly made against Blanchard.

Blanchard, the capricious and self-aggrandizing chancellor of the University, managed to offend many parties by his financial exactions and his disregard for protocol and established usages. But his offenses were viewed—more or less correctly, in B.’s judgment—in a larger framework of violations of the very constitution of the University and as threats to its proper role in the Church. B., without overlooking weaknesses in d’Ailly, shows that the prejudice of older scholars such as Denifle and Rashdall against him for his part in the affair is unwarranted (119–20).

The book is clearly written, precise in detail, slightly repetitious. It shows how big issues and little (local) issues are intertwined and throw light on each other. The University of Paris was responsible, in part, for much of what transpired during the Schism, and B.’s book provides good background for understanding the professors’ attitudes and actions. But despite its success in relating the Blanchard Affair to larger problems, the book remains a study of interest almost exclusively to specialists in canon law and in late medieval ecclesiology and education.

John W. O’Malley, S.J.


One of the paradoxes of American church history is that one of the oldest denominations on this continent is today one of the smallest. That paradox, however, can in large measure be understood when one realizes the very limited beginnings of the Dutch Reformed Church in this country, the very short life which it enjoyed as part of the Netherlands colonial enterprise, its sharp struggle for survival in an alien culture, and the bitter internal controversies which marked its development in the eighteenth century.

All of these are themes which Prof. De Jong of the University of South Dakota has developed in his book, written to mark the 350th anniversary of the founding of the Dutch Reformed Church in this country. It is, of course, a very different story from the development of the church in New England. As De Jong points out, the story of a church which serves a colony that is commercial in its conception is bound to differ markedly from that of a church which is part of a wholly religious enterprise.

That fact alone should interest readers beyond the narrow circle of the Reformed Church in America today, especially since the development of the Church in a secular society has been much more the American experience than that of Zion in the wilderness. Also, the struggles of the Dutch Reformed Church with the Americanization process in the years leading up to the Revolution should not be without their interest to the general student of American church history. De Jong tells his story interestingly, accurately, and well.

To be sure, a Dutch Reformed history buff can find many small points with which to quibble, but with one exception they are not worthy of mention here. That one exception must be the failure of this book to connect the Leisler Rebellion with the rise of sectarianism in Dutch colonial New York. To this reviewer it seems that all the material for such a connection is there, but with the exception of the late Adrian Leiby no historian has really tried to put it together.

Howard G. Hageman

Revivals, Awakenings, and Reform: An Essay on Religion and
M.'s focus is on “awakenings,” his concern with “the social functions of religious systems” and with “achieving a historical perspective on their periodic transformations.” Awakenings are distinguished from revivalism. The latter (xiii) is “the Protestant ritual (at first spontaneous, but, since 1830, routinized) in which charismatic evangelists convey ‘the Word’ of God to large masses of people who, under this influence, experience what Protestants call conversion, salvation, regeneration, or spiritual rebirth.” Awakenings are “periods of cultural revitalization that begin in a general crisis of beliefs and values and extend over a period of a generation or so, during which time a profound reorientation in beliefs and values takes place.” M. identifies five such periods: (1) the Puritan Awakening (1610–40) in England and America, creative of distinctively American culture and with its secular result in constitutional monarchy; (2) the first Great Awakening (1730–60) leading to revolution and the American republic; (3) the Awakening of 1800–1830, which solidified the Union and introduced the era of participatory democracy; (4) a third Awakening, which he dates from 1890–1920, and in which he includes the efforts of Liberal Protestants, Social Gospelers, etc., concerned with rejection of unregulated capitalistic exploitation and with the beginnings of the welfare state; (5) a fifth Awakening, 1960–90, focused on rejecting the exploitation of humankind and nature and with the conservation and optimal use of the world’s resources.

M., the foremost living expert on the history of revivalism in America, sees each era of Awakening as succeeded by an era of social and institutional reform. He is persuaded, with Robert Bellah in *The Broken Covenant*, that the latest Awakening will culminate in a “new vision of man . . . new sense of human possibility and new ordering of liberty” derived not “from Marxism or the Orient but from our own cultural past” in “some form of Judeo-Christian socialism.”

*James Hennesey*


Laberthonnière (1860–1932) was one of the leading figures in the Modernist movement in France, and this work is the doctoral thesis of an African theologian who examines the center of L.’s thought, his conception of religious knowledge. After a biographical sketch, N. outlines Laberthonnière’s philosophical presuppositions. Negatively, L.’s position appears in his criticism of a variety of other philosophical options: most important here is his trenchant critique of Aristotelian-Thomistic thought as at bottom incompatible with Christianity. Positively, N. situates the heart of Laberthonnière’s anthropology in his “moral dogmatism,” an epistemology that integrates responsibility, freedom, and especially love into a person’s most basic perceptions of and affirmations about reality.

N. then presents the heart of Laberthonnière’s theology, his understanding of the nature and structure of faith as a unique form of knowledge. This knowledge, however, is carefully distinguished from scientific or other forms of knowing. In this view of religious awareness, the “natural” and “supernatural” dimensions of faith and revelation are unified, and the intellectual (knowing), moral (loving and willing), and practical (acting) aspects of faith are integrated. Finally, this whole understanding of faith rests on an explicit theology of God’s presence and opera-
tion within the person by grace and its effects of charity. In all of this one sees the extent to which many of the positions accepted today because of the work of Karl Rahner were anticipated in the Modernist period by Laberthonnière.

Around this center, N. also presents Laberthonnière's balanced and still instructive views on religious authority, dogma and its development, the problem of faith, doctrine and historical method, and mystical religious experience.

This work is carefully done by one who is clearly sympathetic to Laberthonnière's position. It represents another step in reconstructing the liberal Catholic theological tradition latent in Modernist writings. It is recommended not only to those interested in historical theology, therefore, but to all dealing with fundamental questions in systematics.

Roger D. Haight, S.J.


Anyone looking for a fine statistical approach to religion in America, with some brilliant essays to interpret the data, can do no better than consult this fine volume to ascertain the present religious situation in the United States and its likely future. Well aware that facts and figures often do not tell the whole story, Carroll, with the assistance of David Roozen, interprets the trends which show continuity and change, growth and decline, strength and weakness in not only the mainline denominations but in new groups as well. Thirteen full-page color-coded and shaded maps along with twenty-two tables indicate where the denominations flourish or are weak, and what their adherents believe about God, afterlife, church-giving, and organized religion. Marty helps to make sense out of these patterns of religious pluralism, and Johnson suggests some possible trends and issues which may shape the future.

This book is not easy to appraise, because it has both strengths and weaknesses. The fact-finding is impressive if not overwhelming, and the best interpretative and most readable essays are by Marty, whose felicitous style brings to life the great quantity of data. It is with the maps themselves that one feels uncomfortable. They need to be larger to be effective, and the coloring needs to be much more diversified. For instance, purple clearly dominates blue on the map (as in the case of the Baptists), yet the legend indicates that blue represents a greater percent of total population than does purple. But these are very minor flaws for a volume which surely will become a "must" for everyone interested in the religious complexion and spiritual potential of a truly great nation.

John Randolph Willis


Weger, professor of philosophical anthropology at the Jesuits' Hochschule für Philosophie in Munich, has written previously on original sin (cf. TS 38 [1977] 478–82). The book under review is a brief introduction to the theology of Karl Rahner, designed to aid students overwhelmed by the volume and complexity of his writings. Successive chapters treat method, theological anthropology, the doctrine of God and of creation, the theology of grace, anonymous Christianity, Christology, and the ecclesial dimension of Christian faith. While W. is clearly sympathetic to Rahner's views, the book is primarily expository rather than evaluative. Only with regard to anonymous Christianity is criticism of Rahner's thought discussed at any length.

W.'s selection of topics is judicious
and his presentation is usually accurate and informative. He rightly stresses Rahner's conception of the relationship of nature and grace, and clarifies the key notion of the supernatural existential quite effectively. Numerous well-chosen quotations from Rahner's own works enhance the book's value as an introduction. More space could profitably have been devoted to ecclesiology. There are a few errors: a "nicht" is omitted on p. 85, line 18; the reference on p. 94 to an encyclical of Pius XII should be to *Humani generis*, not *Mystici corporis*; and p. 130, line 17 repeats a confusing misprint in the cited text (read "unbeabsichtigt" for "beabsichtigt").

Not intended to rival the detailed investigations of such authors as Klaus Fischer, Bert van der Heijden, and Elmar Mitterstieler, W.'s work is a useful addition to the earlier introductory studies of Herbert Vorgrimler and Karl Lehmann. Yet it does not supersede these; for W., while considering Rahner's most recent writings and providing more extensive background information on the major issues, matches neither Vorgrimler's biographical sketch nor Lehmann's penetrating analysis of the development of Rahner's thought. W.'s book will be helpful to its envisioned German audience and to those who teach introductory courses on Rahner's theology.

*John P. Galvin*

**The Seven Deadly Sins Today.**


This book is written by a self-affirmed "reluctant disbeliever." When we put it down, we are not just sure it was not inspired by the Holy Spirit. Moreover, if this book had been written by a medieval monk—men Fairlie has pondered well—we would probably put it aside with a banal dullness, no longer alert to the real dramas of life. But when it comes from the *New Republic*, from a widely-read, literate, popular journalist, an Englishman, we must begin to feel a bit uneasy. This is a straightforward book about the reality of sin, its weavings and pathways, its failure to be recognized in modern culture for what it is. F., furthermore, is especially hard on clerics and psychologists, those he holds most responsible for teaching confusion about sin.

F.'s preferred guides through this classical mine field—Scripture, Augustine, Aquinas, Chesterton, Dorothy Sayers, Auden, C. S. Lewis, the old moral textbooks—are recollections of a vital sanity. About a quarter of a century or so ago, e.g., most Jesuit scholastics (myself included) and professors put down Henry Davis with a sigh of relief that it was out of date. We leave it to James Hitchcock and Philip Gleason to record the result. F.'s laconic "For an exposition of the sins in moral theology, I found most useful the four volumes of Henry Davis, SJ's *Moral and Pastoral Theology*" must be the most ironic judgment of where we have been in our times.

The importance of this book can hardly be overestimated, both because it calls to public attention what the Christian heritage is about and also because of its detailed and delightful—if I might call it in this deadly context—analysis of the reality of sin in all its varieties. The most important chapter is probably the first, on "The Fact of Sin." F. realizes that by inattention to the fact of sin we come very close to turning our lives into dull determinisms. He ends with a lovely, consoling chapter on the opposite kinds of love.

The impression this book leaves is of a man searching—and finding—that something is indeed wrong, because our sinful choices abound. Chesterton said that original sin was the one Christian doctrine that we did not need to prove; all we had to do was go out in the streets and open our eyes. What this book lacks, I think, is also from Chesterton. Once we know of our sins in
detail—what then? When asked why he became a Catholic, Chesterton said: "To get rid of our sins." "The reluctant disbeliever" has been alert out in the streets, with eyes open where most of us have had ours closed. He has not yet discovered where to go with the knowledge. *The Seven Deadly Sins Today*, in this sense, struck me as poignant. Ironically, in Christianity our sins normally make us reluctant believers, so we must be beholden to such wise disbelievers, reluctant though they be.

*James V. Schall, S.J.*


In this new work based on national survey data, priest-sociologist Greeley studies why in the United States religion is popular but the churches are not. First he deals with the alienated Catholics, who tend to be younger, from less religious families of origin, and married to less religious spouses. With these persons, there was a closeness between the Church and marital satisfaction which cannot be alleviated by evangelism. Nor can the enthusiasm of the evangelists convert many of the unchurched, who tend to be nonreligious in belief, liberal in morality, and lacking religion in the family of origin and procreation. The third group, the dissatisfied, are those disaffected by sermons, counseling, and leadership, which obviously can be improved. Another group, the disidentified, refers to those who have withdrawn from the religious body in which they were reared. The largest number of the disidentified have left the Catholic Church in religiously mixed marriages. Another 34% who have not left are in a mixed marriage and may be a target for evangelization, but some have been divorced, resent the clergy, question life after death, and are suspicious of all large social institutions. G. does not find the crises in the Church due to secularism, since most Catholic Americans pray and believe in God and the hereafter. Nor can evangelization have any long-term effect on the disaffected. For the author, what needs support is marital satisfaction and intimacy.

A well-documented work, that perhaps could have placed more of the charts, statistics, and operational definitions in a separate appendix. I recommend it highly to the searching reader.

*James J. Conlin, S.J.*


V., chairman of the Department of Missiology and Evangelism at the Free University of Amsterdam, offers some reflections on the missionary enterprise for the current era. The age of colonialism and the domination of the world by the Western powers is over. Nationalism, emerging nations, religious pluralism, and an international exchange of personnel and theological views are the norm of our present era. V. examines a wide range of topics from mission history to motives, goals, and means to accomplish the task of missionary work. He is primarily concerned with the work of the Protestant communities, but brief mention is also given to Roman Catholic missiology. The first section of the book contains a fine summary of Protestant mission history, outlining the contributions of different European and American theologians.

One excellent feature of this work is that V. offers a brief summary of much of the recent literature published by the theologians of Africa, Asia, and Latin America. While his summary listing is not definitive, it does serve to expose the reader to the insights and views of those Third World theologians.
who are assuming more of a voice in current missiology discussion. The work also contains a fine chapter on the theology of religions and summarizes much of the current discussion taking place in that field.

V. takes issue with the advocates of “anonymous Christianity” and questions whether all religions have a “revelatory character” entitled them to be acknowledged as a means of salvation. He is very much in favor of ecumenical dialogue, but emphasis must always be given to the important role of Jesus, in whom the Father has revealed Himself. For the students of mission studies, Contemporary Missiology would serve as an excellent supplement to the Concise Dictionary of the Christian World Mission. It summarizes much of the past and current developments in the field of Protestant missionary work.  

Matthew H. Kelleher, M.M.


Continuing his assault toward a more viable contemporary description of spirituality and theological mapping, D. provides us with a provocative and engaging account of the journey to spiritual maturity. While one may list D. among other theologians of story or personal autobiography, he is more a theologian of the way, not a map maker as much as a trail blazer. He charts here the dangerous trail into the deeper recesses of the self or, more properly, the soul, where one is led not by intellectual doubt but by the desires of one's heart. The cost of this trek is heavy, because one must walk straight into one's fear of being left totally alone, which is exactly the opposite of that which is one's hope, which is for a self greater than the self found in total intimacy. To reach this, one will confront the seeming paradoxes of human existence: death and life, despair and hope, solitude and intimacy.

The reader will be reminded of the stages of maturity described by both Erikson and Fowler, which point to the movement beyond paradox toward synthesis. One will also note the few who seem to reach that terminus. What D. has done is to enflesh those structuralist maps with the inner workings of its resolution. He blends passages from the Christian tradition with philosophical and poetic selections in a creative and exciting manner. This work may merit an eventual listing with spiritual classics of our contemporary period. What appears an advance in D.'s thinking is a rather strong emphasis on the return to “the human circle,” which is his way of describing the return to human community both in deep relationality and in a communicative posture. One proclaims the insights gained along the journey. D. has laid a foundation for a promising theology of ministry based on a mature spirituality which lives not by withdrawal but by entry into the self and into the other, which is also an entry into God.

David M. Thomas


This is a book whose chief certainty is the assertion that monks of all religions are searching for the Absolute and encountering like obstacles in their quest. D. offers as substantiation for this assertion a concatenation of charming snippets from monastic writings as varied as Bhakti is from Benedict. He careers through Hindu theism, both forms of Buddhist monasticism (Theravada and Mahayana), the pre-Christian Egyptian monks, through St. Anthony of the Desert, the Gregories (Nazianzen and Nyssa), St. John Chrysostom, the Pseudo-Macarius and Ev-
agrius the Pontic, and ends with a view of Augustine and Benedict's Rule. He concludes that all monks are converging on the same goal.

The snippets are well chosen, but neither the unnamed translator nor the typesetter has served D. well. In concluding what he has assumed, without demonstrating it, D. is guilty of begging the question. Had he used the methodologies of his twin disciplines (history of religions and theology) rigorously, he might not have fallen into the trap of assuming that what he seeks was sought by others as well. The desire for religious convergence is a laudable thing, but we must take the other religions seriously—i.e., at their word—in order to see what is there. Lacking such rigor, we force all religions into our own categories. To say that all religions agree on anything is a tall order; and this charming little book did not fill the order.

William L. Newell, S.J.


Essays by five white and six black scholars, who attempt to demonstrate the evolutionary quality of black theology. Five essays in Part 1 sift the literature for clearer insights into the roots, basic assumptions, and methodologies of black theology; six essays in Part 2 demonstrate some of the cutting edges of the movement and suggest possible new engagements with white theologies, humanism, African and Third World thinkers, and process thought. All the essays were written for this volume, and cumulatively the book does give the reader an interesting and sound perspective on where black theology has been and where it is going.

Sadly, the book has limitations. Bucknell University Press held the manuscript for nearly three years before it was published late in 1978. Most of the essays were obviously written before the newer wave of books in black theology opened up impressive dimensions of black thought. One thinks of Cone's God of the Oppressed (1975), Mitchell's Black Belief (1975), Roberts' A Black Political Theology (1974). Several of the essays are dated; particularly disappointing in this regard is Clyde Holbrook's essay on "Black and White Theologies: Possibilities for Dialogue," which cites no work of black theology written after 1973.

The book does, however, have its strong points. The most creative essays are those by William Jones, DeOtis Roberts, Letty Russell, and Randolph C. Miller. Jones seeks to establish the legitimate and unique contribution of black humanism in a theological tradition which is basically biblical, confessional, and theistic. Roberts fears that black theology may become too academic and elite, thus limiting its guiding influence in black churches. His style is irenic and his argument for a broad base for black theology is persuasive. Russell pleads for closer ties between feminist and black theologians within the broader umbrella of liberation theologies, and Miller demonstrates how the conceptual framework of process thought solves some problems for black theologians regarding theodicy, suffering, liberation, freedom, and reconciliation.

John J. Carey


These 1978 Reith Lectures on the BBC are a needed and welcome antidote to the kind of "politicized" Christianity that has come to dominate a good portion of religious thought, Catholic and Protestant. Fr. Norman, Dean of Peterhouse and Lecturer in History
at Cambridge University, holds that contemporary Christianity has tended to drop its own dogmatic and traditional claim to a real independence and, instead, taken up contemporary moral and political values, liberal or socialist, without ever realizing either the one-sidedness of this process or its danger to the Christian religion. Thus the result is, ironically, that "Christianity [is] among the leading influences making for the demoralization of received values throughout the world" (19).

This little book has already raised considerable flack about its target. The reason for this is clear. N. refuses to identify Christianity with values that are not Christian in either origin or import. This target obviously includes liberation theology, Marxism, secular liberal views of development, and naive theories of human rights. N. is concerned that Christianity be not converted into a worldly morality whose sources are anything but Christian, or even "natural" in the Thomist sense (79). If Christianity be concerned mainly with this world defined in liberal or socialist ideological terms, this means not only a new kind of Western imperialism imposed on the rest of the world, again in the mistaken name of Christianity, but also the deprivation for the ordinary believer of the true substance of the faith. "Both in daily life and in the worship of the Church, the prevailing emphasis on the transformation of the material world has robbed men of their bridge to the eternal" (84).

N. represents a critical stance that has long been too absent in the Christian Church, that which understands that politics is not religion and that faith is not dignified by translating its mission into social-action forms. The enthusiasm of becoming politically relevant has made many a churchman oblivious to the import of the whole tradition of classically Christian political thought that might have cautioned him in his newly found public zeal.

*Christianity and the World Order* is a clear warning that the crisis of Christian social thought is very deep, because today all the classical heresies are found in social-action movements presented as authentic examples of the gospel seen as identical with contemporary morality. The abandonment of Christian intelligence, in other words, forces us precisely to return to intelligence.

*James V. Schall, S.J.*


D. begins this study with the crucial question: Does theology have a right to exist in the twentieth century? And if so, in what form and to what purpose? Chap. 1 is an articulation of a set of guidelines brought together to discern and examine the relationship between theology and art. Clearly, the role of the reason in the human has overplayed its hand, both theologically and artistically. Let us re-enter the world of human sensibility through an understanding of the polysensuous nature of the arts.

Starting with chap. 2, D. takes on the Herculean task of analyzing the role of art in human society from classical Greece through contemporary America. Sadly, the book's preliminary argument suffers from the competition. The attempt to condense so much material in such a limited space creates confusion. This unfortunate situation results in too much emphasis placed on that type of analysis favored by art historians but questioned by theologians.

Readers of D.'s earlier book, *Nature and Grace in Art* (1964), will find continuity in his thought and consistency in his examples. However, there is a similar weakness in his indirect manner of approaching what could be the key principle for relating theology and art: the nature and role of human creativity. What, e.g., is the relationship be-
between the product of human creativity (the art object) and that of divine creativity (the human)? Can artistic creativity be understood as some form of ritual activity? What is the relationship between aesthetic experience and religious experience?

The critical discussion on imagination never materializes in a clear fashion. However, the interpretation of art as the fundamental language of the human and therefore as the primordial embodiment of faith statements offers a solid ground to develop a new understanding of the relationship between theology and art. And this is the insightful contribution of D.'s new book.

Diane Apostolos Cappadona

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