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(ISSN 0040-5639)
Our September 1979 issue offers three articles (on Loisy's theological development, on symbol in Rahner, on parapsychology and theology), two bulletins (on conciliarism and on millennialism), and the usual critical appraisal of fifty books.

Loisy's Theological Development performs a precious service in tracing the evolution of the leader of the French Modernists from his lecturing days at the Institut Catholique to his excommunication in 1908. It serves us uncommonly well in revealing not only the mind but the man, and raises the question "how much Loisy's exclusion from the Church was due to his own unbelief, and how much to the insensitiveness or arrogance of the Roman curial officials." VALENTINE G. MORAN, S.J., B.A. with honors from the University of Melbourne, is lecturer in Church history at the United Faculty of Theology and at Catholic Theological College, Melbourne. His primary interest lies in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and he is currently researching the theological development of George Tyrrell.

On Being a Symbol: An Appraisal of Karl Rahner is a careful study of a highly important concept. It proposes the main conditions that must be fulfilled to evaluate Rahner's notion of symbol, then appraises an important segment of his thinking on the subject so as to introduce a critical caution in the use of the notion: "'symbol' might be retained, but its role as a warrant in theological arguments would be decentralized." JAMES J. BUCKLEY, Ph.D. in religious studies from Yale (1977), is assistant professor of historical and systematic theology at the University of Detroit. He is particularly involved in ecclesiology and Christology, with special regard to their interaction with the complex historical phenomenon sometimes called "modernity." He is revising for possible publication his dissertation dealing with Barth and Rahner on Christian community.

Some Implications of Parapsychology for Theology, asserting that parapsychology demands a new respect from theologians, discusses some of the recent work in the field, especially where it touches most closely on theological issues concerning life beyond death. The data considered are deathbed visions, out-of-the-body experiences, apparitions, and mediumistic communication. The article concludes with some indications on the type of influence which parapsychological investigation may have on future theological endeavor, particularly in fundamental theology. JOHN J. HEANEY, S.T.D. from the Institut Catholique in Paris (1963), is associate professor of theology at Fordham University. His specialty is fundamental theology, with certain favorite subdivisions: Modernism, nature of Christian revelation, dialogue between Christian revelation and the psychology of religion. His published works include The Modernist Crisis: von Hügel (1968), Psyche and Spirit (1973), and
a large number of articles. He is now working on parapsychology as it relates to Christian theology.

**After Six Hundred Years: The Great Western Schism, Conciliarism, and Constance** is a useful bulletin on recent contributions to this significant segment of the Church's life. The beginning is startling: "in some ways the vigorous and careful research has not brought us any closer to a solution of many of the questions and problems that confronted Christian society than the answers which the actual participants of that time had." **THOMAS E. MORRISSEY**, Ph.D. in history from Cornell (1973), is associate professor in the Department of History at State University College, Fredonia, N.Y. He is preparing a book on the political theology of Franciscus Zabarella (1360–1417), a leading conciliarist at Constance, exploring his views on the institutional and constitutional limitations upon authority in the Church and civil society.

**Millennialism in America: Recent Studies** works out from four important publications in such fashion that we are given a detailed picture of a vibrant movement with a fascinating history, the whole superbly documented. It is a story that has not received adequate attention from the Catholic community of scholars. **LEONARD I. SWEET**, Ph.D. from the University of Rochester (1974), is adjunct associate professor of American Christianity at Colgate Rochester Divinity School/Bexley Hall/Crozier Theological Seminary, also known as the Rochester Center for Theological Studies. He continues full-time duties as pastor of the Geneseo United Methodist Church. He has authored *Black Images of America, 1784–1870* (1976) and is finishing a book on *Women in the Ministry: The Minister's Wife in American Religion*.

It is gratifying to report that, at the annual convention of the Catholic Press Association in April, **TS** once again received the first-place award for general excellence among scholarly magazines. The judges commended **TS** to other editors as an "outstanding" professional, scholarly magazine. Said one: "The content, the form is exquisitely professional."

*Walter J. Burghardt, S.J.*

_Editor_
BOOK REVIEWS


This book is the unfinished legacy of a man who will go down as one of the great masters of OT learning in this century. With the deaths of de Vaux, Albright, and von Rad in the autumn of 1971, scholars were painfully aware that an era had passed, the torch had been handed on to a new generation. But what a standard they had set for their successors! V. had originally planned a massive work in three volumes, the first extending from the origins of the people of Israel to their settlement in the land of Canaan, the second from the period of the Judges to the destruction of the kingdom of Judah in 587 B.C., the third from the Babylonian Exile to the conquest of Alexander the Great. The second half of the second volume, comprising the history of the monarchy to the collapse of Judah, and the entire third volume remained unwritten at the time of his death. The second volume, then, contained V.'s study of the period of the Judges (cf. TS 35 [1974] 734 f.) and with this the volume under review, competently translated by David Smith, comes to an end. Here it is appropriate to note the devoted and painstaking work of a Dominican colleague, Fr. Langlamet, in deciphering and preparing for publication V.'s manuscripts dealing with the final chapters on the Judges.

The Prologue is a small book in itself, describing the geographical, historical, ethnic, and cultural environment of the people of Israel. It is written with the sure touch of a man who, for thirty-eight years at the Ecole biblique in Jerusalem, lived, observed, excavated, and reflected deeply on the background from which the people of the Bible emerged. No one saw more clearly than V. that Israel's history cannot be adequately explained by factors such as climate and geography, or even by the interplay of events which depend upon the free decisions of men. He repeatedly insisted on the unique quality of that history which has been told, almost exclusively, in a collection of religious books composed ex fide ad fide. In his own words, "A really impartial historian, working within the limits imposed by his special study, must avoid taking sides either for or against that faith. But, because that faith is an essential aspect of the history that he is studying, he must be at pains not to transform the religious history of the people of Israel into a purely profane history" (xv). It is the part of wisdom to recognize that we are standing on the threshold of mystery.

The origins of Israel properly begin with the patriarchal traditions to which V. returned time and again in his long career. A literary and historical analysis of these traditions leads to the conclusion that, at the
present stage of research, it is possible that Israel preserved reliable memories of her origins in the biblical traditions. Extrabiblical and archeological evidence is then examined to see if there is a real coherence between the patriarchal story and that of the Ancient Near East. The conclusions are very cautious and nuanced, resisting easy summary. There is a steady insistence on the distinction between the time when the Genesis narratives were edited and the age they are presumed to describe. While there is general confidence in the historical value of these traditions, V. will not give exact dates either to the beginning or the end of the patriarchal age. But he consistently leaned toward the nineteenth and eighteenth centuries B.C. as the more likely period for the first settlement of Israel's ancestors in Canaan.

On the religion of the patriarchs, the historian can only draw probable conclusions regarding the nature of that religion, though he should insist on the continuity between this religion and the religion of Moses. The Yahwism of the Mosaic age deepened and enlarged the religion of the patriarchs but did not mark a break with the earlier faith. While it would be premature to make sweeping judgments, there is no doubt that the remarkable discoveries at Ebla open a new chapter in the study of the Genesis traditions. Material already published boosts our confidence in the authenticity and antiquity of many of these traditions, and further research on the age of the patriarchs will have to look to Syria as well as to Mesopotamia. It is interesting to observe that V. thought it possible and even probable that the divine name Yhwh existed outside Israel and before Moses, though he believed we have no certain evidence of this. The tablets of Ebla may well supply the missing evidence for his intuition.

Pages could be written on V.'s detailed study of the traditions relating to the Exodus, Sinai, and the settlement of the tribes in Canaan. Finally, the value of this remarkable compilation of material is enhanced by extensive bibliographies, chronological charts, and four sets of indexes which facilitate reference to the text. For this vast and learned synthesis the world of OT scholarship can only be grateful; it is a monument to the memory of this genial and dedicated scholar.

University of San Francisco

FREDERICK L. MORIARTY, S.J.


To introduce this extremely valuable biblical bibliography to the reader, one has to sketch a bit of its history and development, for it is obviously the work of many years.

In 1958 the French-Canadian Jesuit theological and philosophical
faculties published *Bibliographie biblique* (see *TS* 20 [1959] 480–81). It was a useful compilation printed by offset from a typewritten original on \(8\frac{1}{2} \times 11\)-inch pages of varied colors. It was limited to twenty-eight periodicals devoted to Roman Catholic biblical studies from 1920–1957, written in English, French, and Latin.

In 1972 a vastly improved edition, which made no mention of the 1958 publication, appeared under the name of the compiler, P.-E. Langevin, with the same five-language title that the volume now under review bears. It covered the years 1930–1970 and analyzed the contents of seventy Roman Catholic periodicals with biblical contributions written in English, French, German, Italian, Portuguese, and Spanish, as well as "a certain number" of Roman Catholic books published in the same forty years in English, French, and German. Langevin apologized in his introduction for not having consulted "more periodicals and books, especially outside the field of catholic scholarship" (viii).

The stout tome that Langevin then published was a monument not only to his industry and dedication but also to the development of Roman Catholic biblical scholarship since 1930. As I pointed out in the note of 1959, not all the titles listed in the original publication of 1958 would have been representative of the best of Catholic biblical scholarship. That judgment was true of entries chiefly written between 1920 and 1943, when the dark cloud of reaction against Modernism, spread mainly by the responses of the Biblical Commission, settled over most of Catholic biblical and theological thinking and research. Even after *Divino afflante Spiritu*, issued in 1943, when the minds of most people were preoccupied with more urgent political problems involving most of the Western world, it took a decade or more before the effects of that encyclical were felt. Then Catholics began to study their own biblical tradition with the growing perception that many other Christians had been developing ever since the Reformation. In the post-World-War-II atmosphere the 1972 publication of Volume 1 of this bibliography appeared and made it clear that Roman Catholics had at last something to say about the Bible and its place in Christian history and tradition.

Now a new volume of this bibliography has appeared. It adds to Vol. 1 what has been published in the same seventy Catholic periodicals between 1970 and 1975. It also adds, however, the titles of contributions found in fifty other, non-Roman-Catholic journals from 1930–75, in addition to chapters in 812 books published in the same period (of which 325 are of the *Mélanges/Festschrift* sort, in which good articles are often buried). The two volumes constitute an excellent source of bibliographical information about biblical exegesis and biblical theology. They are not intended solely for scholars, for they can easily be used by teachers, pastors, and interested lay persons. The introductions are written in five languages (those used in the book's title).
The bibliography proper concentrates on biblical exegesis and theology. Though entries at times are included on epigraphy, Semitic and Greek philology, or archeology, such topics are not primarily those that the bibliography aims at covering. Rather, it supplies the reader with the maximum of information about exegetical and theological discussions contributed during forty-five years of study of the Bible.

After a list of abbreviations of periodical titles and a list of the books that have been analyzed, the bibliography proper presents its compilation of articles, chapters, and books in five main parts. Part 1 gathers the titles of general introduction to the Bible (listing them under numerous convenient subtitles); Part 2 lists articles and books about OT writings; Part 3, articles and books about NT writings; Part 4 is devoted to Jesus Christ; and Part 5, to biblical themes. In addition to the themes listed in Part 5, one can also find in the general introduction to various writers a section called "theology," where the particular theology of a given writer is further subdivided into themes (e.g., twenty-seven for John, fifty-six for Paul). The volume concludes with indexes, a list of authors cited, and five lists of subject headings (according to the alphabet in the various languages).

There is no doubt about the excellence of this bibliography. It gives much information that many people seek in the study of biblical themes, and its topical arrangement is well done. The only problem is that the price of it puts it into the category of books that only rich libraries can afford.

*Catholic University of America*  
*Joseph A. Fitzmyer, S.J.*


The first two volumes of this three-volume dictionary of NT theology were reviewed in *TS* 38 (1977) 560–63. There we described in some detail the difference between it and so-called Kittel (*TDNT*); whereas the latter is a thorough discussion of NT Greek words (and their cognates) in alphabetical order, this dictionary rather studies the related ideas of the NT, grouping together all words expressive of cognate concepts regardless of their order in the Greek alphabet. The advantage is obvious, and the decision to translate it into English with up-to-date bibliographical entries and revisions which cope with material neglected in the German *Begriffslexikon* can only be welcomed. Anyone who uses this dictionary alongside of kindred articles in Kittel will readily recognize how well they complement each other. For further details about the nature of the *NIDNTT*, see the review of the earlier volumes.
The third volume continues the format and study of the cognate ideas which were begun in the first and second. There are many important articles in this volume that will repay perusal and study (e.g., promise, prophet, resurrection, revelation, rock, son, spirit, temple, truth, woman, word, yoke, zeal). The bibliographies at the end of the various articles are of particular help, because they are often quite extensive—that on the resurrection covers more than four pages of fine print. An interesting feature of Vol. 3 is the appendix devoted to "prepositions and theology in the Greek New Testament" (1171-1215), written by M. J. Harris. Anyone who has worked with the Greek text of the NT soon realizes how pregnant the sense of various prepositions is in various books or groups of writings. In these forty-five pages one finds a detailed discussion of most of the features of NT prepositions. It is a welcome addition.

Vols. 1 and 2 each contained an index of Hebrew and Aramaic words, of Greek words, and of topics. Vol. 3 now has three similar indexes, but in a combined form that covers the data of the three volumes. Since they fill 263 pages of two or three columns (depending on the index), it is obvious that the indexes enable one to exploit the advantages of this dictionary. These indexes account in part for the bulk of this third volume.

The last paragraph of the preface notes that "no work of scholarship is ever final" (9) and goes on to add that it is the editorial policy to add supplementary material in an appendix to each volume, as and when it will become necessary to reprint any of them. And the last sentence reads: "This supplementary material will be made available separately to purchasers of the first edition of the dictionary." This is an excellent idea, and it should be kept in mind in the years to come.

As we pointed out in the review of the first two volumes of this dictionary, there is inevitably room for disagreement with details. The same must be said here again. For instance, why the writer insists (3, 614) on introducing the expression hahû' gabrâ', "that man," used in Aramaic targums or midrashim of about the fifth century A.D. or later as a substitute for "I," into the discussion of the Son of Man problem is simply baffling. It is a red herring that distracts from the real philological problem that the strange Greek phrase ho huios tou anthrōpou presents. The sooner we learn to forget about that Aramaic expression in this discussion, the better.

Or again, in the article on the resurrection, in which one will find many good observations about recent discussions of the NT data, and in which (pp. 294-99) a table is presented (from G. E. Ladd's I Believe in the Resurrection of Jesus), would it not have been better to separate chaps. 20 and 21 of the Johannine Gospel as representatives of separate early Christian traditions about appearances of the risen Christ? And should
not some mention have been made at least of what is found in Mk 16:9-20—possibly representing another ancient (non-Marcan) tradition? For, after all, we really have six different forms of resurrection narratives in the mss. of the four Gospels.

These are examples of details about which one has questions at times. But the general usefulness of this three-volume dictionary of theological ideas of the NT is obvious. It is a very worthwhile reference work to have available.

_Catholic University of America_ JOSEPH A. FITZMYER, S.J.


For years now we have been accustomed to think of the commentary on Luke in the Regensburger Neues Testament as Josef Schmid's. It first appeared in 1940, was revised in 1951, and then reprinted in 1955 and 1960. It offered a good, popular exposition of the Lucan Gospel, not overly technical. It was a companion to S.'s commentary on Mark (on which it heavily depended) and on Matthew in the same series. Along with much of S.'s other writings, his Lucan commentary was a good example of the quality of German Roman Catholic scholarship of the forties and fifties. Now S.'s commentary on Luke has been replaced by this new one from the pen of Josef Ernst of Paderborn. It is an independent work, almost twice the size of Schmid's commentary and incorporating much of modern redaction and tradition criticism of the third Gospel. Yet it remains within the tradition and format of earlier volumes of RNT, being neither so detailed nor so wordy as H. Schürmann's commentary (of which only Vol. 1 has appeared [1969]). Nor does it pretend to rival works of that sort.

An introduction of about forty-five pages discusses the usual preliminary questions: the literary and theological character of the Lucan Gospel, its sources (Mark, a sayings-source, a special source), its author (a Hellenistic-educated Gentile Christian who sought to present the story of Jesus and the beginnings of the Christian Church in a form appealing to the Hellenistic world of his day—but not the traditional "Luke"), its date (between A.D. 70 and 80, about a decade or so before the composition of Acts [A.D. 80–90, or even 90–100]), its relation to the tradition behind the Johannine Gospel, and a select bibliography (of which over ninety percent of the titles is of provincial German authorship).

The bulk of the volume is given over to the commentary on the Gospel proper, pericope by pericope. The translation of each passage is followed by paragraphs that discuss their general character, analyze their redaction and provenience, and explain exegetically their specific problems, verse
by verse. Comments, however, are not made on individual phrases or lemmata, except insofar as these form part of the problems. Discussion of the views of others is kept to a minimum and they are judiciously proposed; bibliographic information on the specific problems is given with restraint.

In general, Ernst's commentary is very good. He has sought to bring out the sense of the Lucan recasting of the Jesus-story, and his discussion is abreast of much of the modern treatment of Luke. It reads like a good synthesis of many current German views of this Lucan writing.

In a lengthy commentary, such as this is, it is inevitable that one will disagree with certain details of E.'s presentation. I shall single out only a few here. First, that salvation is understood in the Lucan Gospel as a significant time-period no one will contest. E. has made intelligent use of the Lucan adverb sëmeron, "today," to show the bearing of it on that period. But in opposing H. Conzelmann's proposal that Luke has presented a three-phased view of salvation history (the Period of Israel, the Period of Jesus [to which the sëmeron refers], and the Period of the Church), he has too quickly lined himself up with those who espouse only a two-phased view of it, governed by promise and fulfilment. But "promise and fulfilment" are not sufficient to characterize the Lucan view of salvation history. Those elements are found in Matthew too (recall his formula quotations), but he never tried to write a sequel to the Jesus-story, as did Luke. Moreover, "fulfilment" is already present in the Lucan form of the Jesus-story, i.e., in the Period of Jesus; and the double account of the Ascension (in Lk 24 and again in Acts 1), along with the reference to a new era as beginning in the question put by the apostles to the risen Christ in Acts 1:6 ("Is it at this time that you are going to restore the kingdom to Israel?")], clearly shows that Luke reckons with a break between the Gospel and Acts that has to be reckoned with in the phases of salvation history as he envisages it. We are all aware of certain inadequacies in the Conzelmannian interpretation of the three-phased view of salvation history (e.g., his misinterpretation of Lk 16:16; his misunderstanding of John's role, and of that of the Spirit as the Ersatz for the delayed Parousia), but fortunately the essentials of the three-phased view can be retained with important modifications. E. is preoccupied with a commentary on the Gospel and (at least implicitly) fails to reckon sufficiently with its sequel in Acts.

Second, the proposal that the Lucan Gospel was written about a decade or so before the composition of Acts (pp. 32-33) is asking too much. E. is right in rejecting the suggestion sometimes put forth that Acts was written before the Gospel, but that it came so long after it is simply not plausible. That proposal creates too many difficulties for the proper interpretation of the Lucan prologue (1:1-4) and its relation to the
prologue of Acts (1:1). As others have argued, the prologue and the Lucan infancy narrative were added after a first draft of the Gospel (chaps. 3–24), and probably Acts too, were already in existence.

Third, in various episodes dealing with John the Baptist, E. has rightly maintained (against Conzelmann and others) that John is portrayed in the Lucan Gospel as the precursor of Jesus, who is the Messiah. This is the generic thrust of the early episodes of the Gospel which present John as a preacher, rejecting the title “Messiah” for himself (3:15) and drawing attention to ho erchomenos, “the One Who Is to Come.” But at times E. formulates matters a bit carelessly. The phrase ho erchomenos is not a “disguised messianic title” (346); it has nothing to do with an expected anointed figure in Judaism prior to or contemporaneous with the NT. E. rightly cites Mal 3:1, 23 as the OT background of that title, where the expected figure is one sent by Yahweh. But what do Isa 40:10 or Zech 14:5 (which speak of Yahweh Himself coming) have to do with it? Moreover, I should hesitate to say that Luke has “completely eliminated” (148) the Elijah motif in his picture of John. He has reduced it, indeed, by suppressing Mk 9:10–13 (cf. Lk 9:36–37) and by omitting the identification of John as Elijah, such as Mt 11:14 has (probably an addition to the “Q” passage); but he still implicitly identifies John as Elijah in quoting Mal 3:1 of him in 7:27.

Fourth, E. retains in his text 22:43–44, the appearance of the angel during the agony scene on the Mount of Olives and the bloody sweat, but nowhere tells his readers that these verses are missing in our best and oldest text of Luke, P75 (Papyrus Bodmer XIV, dated A.D. 200, ± 25 years; see CBQ 24 [1962] 177–78). One may really wonder today whether we should continue to include them in a modern translation of the Lucan Gospel.

Finally, Ernst’s treatment of the so-called Western Non-Interpolations in the Greek text of the last chapters of the Lucan Gospel does not seem to be consistent. He still sets 24:40 in parentheses (666).

These are minor criticisms, and they could be multiplied; but they are almost inevitable in a work of this sort. Fortunately, they do not distract from the overall value of the commentary.

Catholic University of America

Joseph A. Fitzmyer, S.J.


Talbert brings together some of the results of the work undertaken by the Luke-Acts Group of the Society of Biblical Literature from 1972 to 1978. This review summarizes and evaluates each article and ends with some general observations.

In a carefully reasoned article, F. L. Horton concludes that the Semi-
tism of Luke-Acts should be understood in terms of the specialized religious Greek spoken for cultic purposes. J. B. Tyson summarizes the positions on source criticism in terms of the Synoptic problem and its present-day solution. He proposes that if we do not have reliable information about the sources of Luke nor acceptable criteria for a solution to the problem of sources, redaction criticism should be reconceived to treat Luke holistically. We should treat Luke as the author of the intentional unity of Luke-Acts and approach his Gospel as if we knew nothing about his sources. According to F. L. Cribbs, the Gospel of John has more parallels to Acts than to Luke’s Gospel (especially in the Passion narrative). But Cribbs may overestimate some of these agreements. For instance, “witness” for Luke means someone who has seen the resurrected Christ; this is not John’s meaning. J. D. Quinn views the Pastoral Epistles as an epistolary appendix of Luke-Acts; with the data available, Quinn argues his case well but hardly proves his thesis. A. J. Mattill Jr., like W. W. Gasque before him, calls for a much more serious acceptance of Luke as a historian. Doubtless, greater precision should be sought in the portrayal of Luke the historian, but Mattill, like Gasque, has really not come to grips with why the “German school” holds some of its positions. S. Brown shows the interconnection between the exegesis of the prologues and the principal hypotheses concerning the purpose of Luke-Acts. The weakness of Brown’s article lies in his assumption that Talbert’s statement of the purposes of Luke-Acts represents the principal hypotheses; for T.’s fourth point, “the solution of a theological problem,” remains much too vague.


R. Brown feels that in the first chapter of his Gospel Luke has combined traditional items with a credal formula about Jesus as the Son of God. The dramatis personae who appear in the Gospel (John the Baptist, Mary) were shaped from the Gospel portraits; those who do not (Zechariah, Elizabeth) were shaped from OT portraits (Abraham, Sarah, Hannah). A weakness in Brown’s impressive article is his “very tentative hypothesis” that the virginal conception originated in part to counter Jewish opponents who eventually accused Jesus of being illegitimate because Jesus was born at a noticeably early period after his parents began to live together; for an answer to the hope in the prophecy of Isa 7:10–14 and Jesus’ divine sonship can sufficiently explain the early
Christians' concern over Mary's virginal conception. And do we really have enough knowledge about betrothal and marriage in the time of Jesus to call for Brown's hypothesis? J. A. Fitzmyer claims that the episodes of Lk 9 between that of Herod's perplexity and the beginning of the travel account identify Jesus in terms of answers given to the question dramatically posed by Herod (9:9): "Who is this about whom I hear such things?" Luke surely has reworked Lk 9:7–9, but F. has not sufficiently established that Luke intends Herod's question to govern most of the episodes of Lk 9.

P. J. Achtemeier surveys Luke's perspective on Jesus' miracles. For Achtemeier, Luke of all the Gospels has the most unambiguous reliance on this possibility that miracles can serve as the basis for faith in Jesus and validate him as the one sent by God. In his Gospel Luke adapts Jesus' miracles, but not to his theological motifs as he does in Acts. But the interpretation of Jesus' miracles in Luke may be more difficult than A. feels, because the miracles benefit the underprivileged. Yet a main Lucan theological concern is that Christ is the savior of such people.

A. A. Trites has a very good article on the prayer motif in Luke-Acts. But T. does not sufficiently connect and interpret "prayer" in terms of God's salvific will, and for Luke latreuein basically means the acceptance of Christ and his resurrection (cf. Acts 24:14–15, 21; 26:6–8, 22–23). B. J. Hubbard's "The Role of Commissioning Accounts in Acts" makes a first-class contribution to the study of Luke-Acts. On the other hand, D. R. Miesner argues tendentiously for a chiastic structure for the missionary-journeys narrative (Acts 12:25–21:16). Many of his parallels are weak or can be explained in another way—e.g., Luke has a fixed pattern as to how Paul preaches in a given city. Although he relies heavily on the Odyssey and the Aeneid, V. K. Robbins summarizes well the comparative literature which helps an understanding of the we-passages. More questionable is his contention that the role of the we-passages is to orient early Christianity toward the sea that lies between Jerusalem and Rome, and that Luke-Acts has been designed to replace the Sea of Galilee of Jesus' ministry with the Mediterranean Sea of Paul's. F. Veltman rightly concludes that the defense speeches of Paul in Acts exhibit the same form, the same arrangement, and the same general elements which are characteristic of defense speeches in other narrative literature from ancient times. But V. could have mentioned Philo's description of the kind of defense trial he hoped to receive from Gaius (Legatio 350). More importantly, the defense speeches constitute a method of theological expression; e.g., in Acts 26, Luke has no real trial, no accusers, the actual charges are not named, no true consultation, and no verdict.

Typographical errors mar the appearance of the book, and the quality of typesetting is at times so weak that one cannot see the long marks on
the transliterated Greek. An index of Scripture references would have made the volume much more serviceable. Also, some of the authors lean too much in the direction of comparative literature. Nonetheless, Talbert and the SBL deserve considerable credit for the impetus they have given to studies on Luke-Acts. The articles make their points well and truly further Lucan studies, so that a student of this area cannot but benefit from reading their book.

Saint Louis University

R. F. O'TOOLE, S.J.


The author of this excellent commentary on the Epistle to the Romans is, alas, too little known in this country. Professor of NT for many years at the University of Bonn, author of two other notable commentaries on Pauline letters (Der Brief an die Galater [Meyerkommentar 7; 4th ed.; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1965]; Der Brief an die Epheser: Ein Kommentar [6th ed.; Düsseldorf: Patmos, 1968]) and of many articles and essays, he was honored at his seventieth birthday in 1970 with a Festschrift, Die Zeit Jesu, edited by G. Bornkamm and Karl Rahner. The double editorship (of Lutheran Bornkamm and Roman Catholic Rahner) betokens the esteem in which he has been held in Germany by his colleagues; for he began his scholarly career as a Lutheran and eventually became a Roman Catholic. In the foreword to Die Zeit Jesu the editors hailed him as "the gifted one of theological thinking" (Charismatiker des theologischen Denkens). Now in his retirement he crowns his long career with a stout commentary on what he calls in the first sentence of his preface one of "the most difficult writings of the New Testament."

In a relatively short introduction of sixteen pages S. discusses four questions: (a) the historical setting of Romans (the occasion of its writing: the end of Paul's missionary activity in the East and desire to evangelize the West, Spain; the date and place of its composition, probably Corinth, A.D. 57 or 58; and the addressees, the predominantly Gentile Christian community of Rome); (b) the purpose of Romans (a letter about the gospel [Evangeliumsbrief], a preparatory evangelization of the Roman community as a way of introducing himself and the gospel that he preaches with its especially important themes); (c) the integrity of Romans (S. is skeptical of glosses in Romans, considers the doxology of 16: 25–27 to be non-Pauline, but maintains that 16:1–23 was most likely an original part of the epistle itself); and (d) the progress of thought in Romans (or its outline).

S.'s outline of Romans agrees by and large with that used by many commentators today. After the praecriptio (1:1–7) and thanksgiving (1:
(1:16–17), which is then developed in four main parts: (1) 1:18–4:25, the gospel manifesting God’s righteousness to justify those who believe in Christ; (2) 5:1–8:39, this justification now brings to human beings five effects: peace with God and hope of glory (5:1–11), life eternal (5:12–21), freedom from sin in baptism (6:1–23), freedom from the law (7:1–25), and through the gift of the Spirit of life a hope of eternal glory (8:1–39); (3) 9:1–11:36, the mystery of Israel, or how Israel is related to this new manifestation of God’s righteousness; and (4) 12:1–15:33, the hortatory part of the epistle. S. is certainly correct in arguing for the division between Parts 1 and 2 at the beginning of chap. 5 (pp. 137–38). His analysis of Part 2 in five sections, especially with the second one (5:12–21) emphasizing the gift of life through Christ Jesus, is interesting. I am initially attracted by this analysis of that part of the epistle, since it removes it from the usual understanding of it as a paragraph dealing with freedom from sin and death. But then it is puzzling to see the section itself entitled on p. 158 “Adam and Christ.” The exegesis of this section follows more traditional lines and does not seem to carry out what the outline projected. Moreover, at one point S. was distracted in writing about Christ as “the second Adam” (p. 14). That is a patristic expression (see Athanasius, De incarn. ad Apoll. 1, 8); Paul rather speaks of “the last Adam” (1 Cor 15:45), which has its own connotation.

Schlier regards dikaioσynē theou, “the righteousness of God,” as the central theme (Zentralthema) of the whole epistle. In this he is close to E. Käsemann (An die Römer [HNT 8a; Tübingen: Mohr, 1973]). Indeed, S. even goes so far as to say that the hortatory section (12:1–15:33) closely coheres with this central theme (p. 16). This is a little too much to buy, since even he has to admit that it is not explicitly mentioned in that part. The relationship of the hortatory part of Romans to the rest of the epistle has always been a problem, but to assert now that its connection exists via God’s righteousness is hardly convincing. That the righteousness of God is the central theme of Part 1, everyone will admit; that it is as prominent in Part 2 (5:1–8:39) has to be shown, since 5:5 introduces another attribute: “God’s love has been poured out into our hearts through the Holy Spirit.” As I read it, this attribute gets more emphasis in this part than His righteousness. In any case, it is the grace or power of God that brings justification and new life in the Spirit to human beings, and not their own deeds.

The bulk of the commentary (439 pages) is given over to the exposition of the text of the epistle. A fresh translation of each paragraph or section in the epistle is followed by an analysis of it as a whole and by comments on individual verses. S.’s exegetical powers are well known, and one sees them manifested here. His German sentences are not overly long, and his
Comments are usually succinct. He is by and large abreast of the literature on Romans. In his preface he excuses himself for offering only a selection of the vast secondary literature on Romans and comments: “That might seem to be subjective, but in reality this ‘subjectivity’ is only that of every confrontation” [with this epistle]. Those who seek more of the secondary literature can find it in the commentary of Käsemann mentioned above. K.’s commentary on Romans is more critical than S.’s, but the latter’s often savors more of the theological sense of Romans.

When S. insists that dikaiosynē theou (1:17) is to be understood as that which brings salvation to the believer through the gospel as the power of God which at the same time presents itself as a gift of God (p. 44), he is certainly correct. But when he denies that God’s righteousness is an attribute or even an attribute efficacious in deeds (as it is in Qumran literature—and he cites 1QH 4:36–37; 1QS 11:12), I fail to follow him. How can it be an action of God or effect salvation, if it does not involve a divine attribute? Schlier seems to be splitting hairs here. Obviously Paul is not talking about something like God’s vindictive justice (as it was often misunderstood in the past) or about a righteousness that belongs to human beings. It is iustitia aliena, because it is brought about in human beings by God, or by His power—or better, by His righteousness. Yet in Romans Paul never says that “we become the righteousness of God,” as he does in 2 Cor 5:21. There he is speaking of it as a gift in us, whereas in the various passages in Romans it is always perceived as God’s gift or power proceeding from Himself. And for that reason one can speak of it as an attribute of God. The other aspects of dikaiosynē theou that S. singles out (p. 44) are acceptable: its nature as something “revealed,” its eschatological character, and its relation to the gospel.

I was happy to find S. adopting so many of the interpretations of crucial passages that I have been using over the years: e.g., the meaning of eph’ hō in 5:12 as “because, since”; the recognition of hēmarton in the same verse as referring to personal, actual sins; the interpretation of egō in 7:7 ff. as neither individual nor autobiographical, but rather generic; the interpretation of the doxology in 9:5 as referring to Christ.

This is a commentary that one can easily recommend, even though one may differ here or there in some detail.

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JOSEPH A. FITZMYER, S.J.

SOUFFLE DE DIEU: LE SAINT-ESPRIT DANS LE NOUVEAU TESTAMENT


This book is a fairly detailed study of the breath of God (sometimes referred to as the Holy Spirit) in the OT including the deuterocanonical books; in the Hellenistic world (this part is very brief, it covers the word pneuma, the Delphic oracle, Plato, and Stoicism in seven pages); in
Hebraic and Aramaic Judaism; at Qumran; in the pseudepigrapha; in Greek Judaism; in Gnosticism; in the Synoptic tradition and Acts, with special emphasis on Luke. Strangely, Johannine and Pauline literature are omitted even though the book is written in view of the new dialogue with the Orthodox Church with its rich pneumatology and in the light of the pentecostal or charismatic movement. The omission of Pauline pneumatology, which is used so frequently by the pentecostals, causes some admiratio. It is curious, too, that C. usually employs souffle rather than esprit. Even though he argues that the Hebrew ruach and the Greek pneuma are very often used in this sense of breath force, or wind, it seems that C. can hardly apply this to such occasions as the baptism of Jesus, where the Spirit descends in the form (bodily in Luke) of a dove, and Pentecost, where it appears like tongues of fire and in tongues (or the gift of interpretation [reviewer’s note]). However, he does speak of ruach as a human disposition at Qumran. In his work on the NT, C. does engage in quite successful redaction criticism.

With regard to the first part of the book, one may make the following remarks. C. avers, with Volz, that ruach is usually feminine when referring to things but masculine when it has traces of the conception démoniaque (personnifiée). He makes no note on the Shekinah (e.g., from the Targumim) or the Syriac Church, where the Spirit is Mother, nor does he refer to Qumran, where the Spirit of Truth is feminine. In speaking about the nebiim, he could have made good use of an old but very useful article by W. R. Shoemaker, “The Use of Ruach in the Old Testament and of pneuma in the New Testament: A Lexicographical Study,” JBL 23 (1904) 12–67. Shoemaker works in a chronological order and demonstrates that the “spirit of God” did not become a seemly phrase until well after the eighth-century prophets, when ecstatic prophecy had practically disappeared in Israel. This would hardly accord with C.’s statement: “Mais c’est surtout l’action d’inspiration d’hommes choisis, suggérée par le nebiisme, qui a reçu un grand développement dans le credo d’Israel” (30). The first classical prophets prefer to speak of the Word, not Spirit, of God as a rule. Curiously, when devoting a page to Josephus, C. mentions the zealot “false” prophets to whom Josephus refers in a time when it was generally believed that prophecy had ceased, but C. does not mention that Josephus believed himself to be a prophet, neither does he discourse on Josephus’ statement about the inspiration of Scripture. Despite my criticism, this first part is full of useful, if not original, information about the spirit or breath of God.

The second part deals with the Synoptics and Acts. C. prefers the translation of the Matthean first Beatitude “Blessed are the poor in spirit” in a psychological sense, but it seems that this is to omit regard to the definite article before pneuma, which is all the more striking as
pneuma is anarthrous when Matthew speaks about the virginal conception. I suggest that E. Schweitzer, “Observation of the Law and Charismatic Activity in Matthew,” *NTS* 16 (1970) 213–30, is significant because he suggests that the Sermon on the Mount is directed against the false prophets in the Christian community; thus the first Beatitude would surely refer to the Holy Spirit and those who were modest about their spiritual gifts. C.’s work on John the Baptist is interesting. He avers that, apart from two pseudepigraphical references, John is the first to associate the breath of God with the Messiah. He is a Messiah who comes to judge: Yahweh is no longer the judge. Mark represents a “Christianized” version of the Baptist’s message, because he does not mention the fire. C. compares the Prince of the Congregation from Qumran, who will also come as judge. Fire suggests judgment on the impious on the one side and grace for the pious on the other. C. sees the baptism of Jesus as a solemn enthronement of Jesus’ messianic ministry, but he does not consider Hebrews, where Jesus’ enthronement and ministry are placed after his ascension into heaven. *Pneuma* is used twelve times in Hebrews. C. agrees with E. Lovestam, *Spiritus blasphemia* (Lund, 1968), that the sin of the Holy Spirit is hardness of heart like that of Pharaoh, but later he takes it to mean a lack of boldness in preaching or missionary witness, although he does say that the Jews’ sin in delivering up Jesus (the Son of Man) is pardonable, but after Pentecost the intervention of God is so manifest that it is inexcusable not to believe.

C.’s discussion of Pentecost is good, but he does not give a reference for his assertion that 120 persons constitute a small Sanhedrin, for the Great Sanhedrin comprised 70 members and a quorum was 23. Another point which exercises the reviewer is C.’s use of xenoglossia and glossolalia. C. feels that the miracle at Pentecost was not glossolalia but xenoglossia. He seems to think that glossolalia is unintelligible ecstatic speech (contra R. H. Gundry, “Ecstatic Utterance,” *JTS* 3 [1952] 228–31) and that xenoglossia is intelligible speech. In fact, the contrary seems to be true. Ecstasy is never found in the context of glossolalia in the NT, tongues in Acts are quite different from tongues at Corinth (see F. E. Bruner, *Theology of the Holy Spirit* [Grand Rapids, 1970] 192), and xenophōneō is used of the Montanists indulging in strange, incoherent speech and paraecstasy (Eusebius, *H.E.* 5, 16, 7). But C. concedes that Luke is speaking of glossolalia in Acts 10:46 and 19:6. In conclusion, C. says that Jesus appears to use the “breath” (or “spirit”) of God for exorcisms but otherwise he does not appear to have the gift of the Spirit bestowed on the apostles except in the fact of special hostility.

C.’s book ends with some nonbiblical extracts from Plato, Philo, the Rule from Qumran, Jubilees, Psalms of Solomon, 1 Enoch, the Testament of the Twelve Patriarchs, and the Gospel of Truth.
All in all, C.'s book is interesting but not creative. It is informative for the student but not deep enough for the scholar. The bibliography given at the beginning of each section is very selective.

_J. Massynberde Ford_


Crowe successfully makes "an attempt to organize the history of reflection on the Christian word of God" (1). He recognizes that the history of theological reflection as it has unrolled over the centuries is infinitely manifold and complex. In order to make sense of that lived history, one must be wisely selective. One avoids the routine and looks for the key advances, for what was, in Lonergan's phrase, "going forward."

From an understanding of the dynamism of the human mind and from a knowledge of the data of theology's history, C. proposes a series of six key transitions in the development of theology. In the beginning there was simply the good news of salvation announced joyfully to all. The first transition came with the explicit recognition that this good news was the word of God in the technical sense familiar to the Jews; the second, that this word of God had a truth content; the third, that this truth had to be grounded in legitimating sources; the fourth, that the ancient word had to be understood and applied in new modern contexts; the fifth, that the word of God is not primarily a word spoken or written but the unfolding events of history whose meaning is focalized in the incarnate Son; the sixth, that it is the enduring presence of the Holy Spirit which enables the present believer to grasp the primary word and to live out the implications of that grasp.

C.'s original contributions are constituted by his setting forth this series of transitions as a hypothesis that unifies the historical data, by his utilization in a creative way of the detailed studies of others to support his generalizations, and by his own exploring of the past to uncover evidence that the transitions which characterized the thematizations of later theology existed in an unthematized way in the life of the Church at an earlier stage. Invariably the _vécu_ preceded the _thématique_. Thus, it was only with the Reformation that the need arose to make explicit the sources of theology; yet in the NT itself the use of the OT to show the validity and meaning of the Christian message manifested in a living way this need for sources.

Given C.'s purpose of providing a "big picture" of the history of theological reflection on the word, one cannot expect conclusive proofs of all that he says in a book of 180 pages. However, his insights are fruitful and provocative. The reasonableness of the preliminary evidence which he furnishes, the clarity of his presentation, the modesty of his claims,
and his acknowledgment of the need for more detailed investigations should encourage specialists to follow up the many clues and hints for further work scattered plentifully throughout. It is a pleasure to recommend this work of creative organizing.

I suggest a few items for C.’s further consideration. First, might not one consider the systematizing efforts of the medieval period as an additional key transition in reflection on the Christian word? Second, could not the present period be described as that transition period in which we are beginning to thematize the transcultural precisely because we recognize explicitly that all persons are culturally conditioned? Having grasped that all are culturally conditioned, are we not now in a position to thematize what is common to being culturally conditioned and thus to arrive at what is present in all cultures? Further, is not this transcultural dynamic at the root of the modern emergence of method in theology, so that we can talk about a methodological transition?

C.’s work depends for much of its language and conceptualization on the writing of Bernard Lonergan. Accordingly, a knowledge of the latter’s Insight and his Method in Theology would be helpful to the prospective reader.

St. Thomas Seminary, Kenmore, Wash. PETER CHIRICO, S.S.


The difficulty which O’Connell has with Augustine, as with Plato, is this: “How could so great a literary artist, in his passion for truth, become the very same man whose theory of art amounts at times to the banishment of art?” (2). The explanation offered is in part that Augustine was too much influenced by Platonism, and especially by the theory of the pre-existence and fall of the soul, which O. once again emphasizes, as he did in St. Augustine’s Early Theory of Man (1968) and in an earlier series of important journal articles. But he suspects that Augustine’s aesthetic theory did not merely grow out of his general theory of the human condition, but that the inverse is just as true: that Augustine’s need to “exorcise the spell of beauty” was what led him to his speculations (5). Philosophia must liberate her younger sister philocelia by drawing her from earth toward eternal Truth (C. Acad. 2, 3, 7).

Stoic theodicy had developed its own aesthetic, which O. terms “antithetical totality” (22); evils are justified as bringing the good in the world into higher relief, or in other ways having a harmonious place within the whole. In contrast with it, Platonism developed what he calls an “ascensional aesthetic,” which devalues sensible beauty as inferior, misleading, and distracting, and urges an ascent toward intelligible beauty. Here the
proper function of sensible beauty is *admonitio*, inciting the soul to seek a different realm, one which is only refracted in the sensible. There tends, therefore, to be an antithesis between the symbol apprehended by sense, a mere sign or reminder, and the reality apprehended by mind alone in immediate vision. One is called upon, therefore, to rise above “art” through the “arts” (the rational disciplines) to “eternal Art” (31–32).

Much of the book is an indictment of this “aesthetic for the fallen soul” (24), which O finds most expressly in *De musica*. He highlights the indications of a fall of the soul from its rest in eternity into a state of *distentio* through time, where it cannot apprehend the whole; it develops an excessive care for the world of sense, entraps itself in its own activity, and desires to subjugate other rational souls, precisely through signifying, through communication. Those features are present in *De musica*, to be sure; but that work is most impressive, in my reading of it, for its sensitive evocation of the varied ways in which order can be not only expressed but apprehended in the sensible, marvelous even when they may also be instruments of seduction or domination. In approaching the Platonist tradition, it seems to me, we must differentiate between the *valuational* trend toward a dualism of sensible and intellectual, which is perhaps excessively aware of the hazards of the former and the promise of fulfilment in the latter, and the *ontological* conviction that soul has the task of animating body and more generally that the sensible realm is the expression of intelligible order and purpose. This is a point which Augustine emphasized later in his career, and O. traces some of its manifestations, especially the remarkable comments on resurrection and the bodily vision of God at the end of *The City of God*; but he is so concerned with the theme of the fall of the soul that he overlooks its anticipations in the earlier writings.

His own account of the transition from the earlier to the later Augustine emphasizes something else, Augustine’s own artistry as a writer (with parallel comments on Plato and on Plotinus). There is a fine analysis of the *Confessions* as “a single, extended *exercitatio*” (101), setting up tensions which are resolved only in the final book. In the process, he thinks, Augustine came to terms with the opacity of human experience, even of Scripture, and found positive value in its ambiguity.

Both in Augustine’s artistic practice and in his increasingly “despiritualized” anthropology O. sees “the pale dawn of another aesthetic entirely” (141). Thus in the final chapter he seeks to extrapolate to “a contemporary Augustinian aesthetic,” one in which the spiritual is grasped not beyond but through and in the symbol, one in which geometry is replaced by poetic rhythm or living form, one in which the mind does not passively receive the self-disclosure of an intelligible object but “finds” it through its own articulation of experience, one in which words
are not simply the vehicle of pre-existing meanings but, through their tensions and strains, lead the imagination toward active insight, and one in which the beautiful gains a status distinct from the true and the good, commanding its own kind of wonder. This aesthetic, sketched more in imagery than in concepts, can probably claim to be Platonist, though rigorously demythologized. In its despair at finding the intelligible except through its expressions, it is akin to Proclus or his modern disciple Hegel. This may be the destiny of Platonism, and perhaps of Augustinianism; but Augustine fought hard against it. Which vector was the stronger—logically, psychologically, artistically—is the question posed by this book.

Divinity School, Vanderbilt University

EUGENE TeSelle


"The gentle if sometimes long-winded Paulinus is the clearest voice still heard from the early days of western monasticism" (141). This is the theme of Lienhard's study, and he has gone a long way towards proving his case. Amidst the colorful blaze of his great friends and contemporaries, Ambrose, Augustine, Jerome, and Martin of Tours, the steady but un-spectacular light of Paulinus has sometimes been taken for granted. While there is a respectable body of literature devoted to him (well reviewed by L.), this is the first systematic monograph in English.

Paulinus is the subject, but this is not primarily a biographical or literary study. The aristocrat turned ascetic is investigated as a source for the history of monasticism in the West from its origins ca. 370 to about 420. While Paulinus did not begin a full-fledged monastic career until 395, he was a friend or acquaintance of almost all the significant early monastic figures in the West, and his writings contain the earliest surviving description of a Western monastic community by one of its members. The new ascetic movement was what was dearest to his heart; hence to study Paulinus from this perspective is to reveal what was central to his own religious life and that of many of his generation.

L.'s study proceeds with admirable clarity and a philological care that betrays its origin as a thesis done at a German university. After a preliminary biographical chapter, a detailed study of P.'s accounts of the stages of his conversion sets the background for three chapters discussing his relation to monasticism and a final chapter summarizing his religious outlook (in addition, there are two brief chapters devoted to his relation to Priscillianism and Pelagianism). The chapter on P.'s understanding of monasterium and monachus and his description of life in the community he founded at Nola is central to the book; but the two comparative chapters, the first on the monastic world around Paulinus (Augustine,
Ambrose, Sulpicius Severus, and Jerome are surveyed), and the second on opposition to the monastic movement, are the most stimulating parts of the book. Going beyond such earlier surveys as that of R. Lorenz, L. offers an interpretation of the distinctiveness of early Western monasticism, centering on its urban, clerical, and aristocratic character, that is detailed and convincing.

The final chapter, on religious outlook, which might have been equally exciting, is in comparison less challenging, more for the areas that are not pursued than for the useful remarks on such matters as P.'s biblicism (where he seems to be an ancestor of the aural reminiscence characteristic of the use of the Bible in the later Western monastic authors). Throughout his book L. notes the extraordinary role that Felix, the martyr patron of Nola, played in P.'s religious life; but the summary on P.'s relation to Felix (145–51) is curiously flat. What kind of a patron was Felix? What could be expected of him? What was owed to him and by whom? A more detailed pursuit of these and similar questions would make P.'s spiritual world more manifest to us. Another issue that might well have been expanded upon is the role of coming judgment, especially apocalyptic judgment, in early Western monasticism, a theme stressed by Paulinus and Martin (at least according to Sulpicius Severus) but not shared by Augustine and Jerome. Finally, one also might have wished for a more detailed discussion of the role of poverty in Paulinus. Lienhard points out that the giving up of his great wealth "was probably for Paulinus the single most significant step in his own conversion" (137), but by the evidence of the letters and Lienhard's own admission P. did not give up everything and his poverty remained "relative." What types of relative poverty were compatible with early monasticism in the West? One may hope that the author of this solid and useful work will turn his attention to these and similar questions in the time to come.

Divinity School, University of Chicago

BERNARD MCGINN


This monograph is an abridged version of a dissertation written under the direction of Johannes Betz and accepted by the theological faculty of the University of Würzburg in 1977. It is the first of a new series of theological studies edited by members of the theological faculty of the University of Innsbruck. Other works included in this series for 1978 are W. Lambert, Franz von Baeders Denken, and U. Schwalbach, Firmung und Gemeinde. If the subsequent volumes measure up to this auspicious beginning, the success of the venture is assured.

Lies provides a comprehensive treatment of the Eucharistic passages
of Origen's writings. In this respect his work may be compared to the seventh chapter of Adolf Struckmann's *Die Gegenwart Christi in der hl. Eucharistie* (Vienna, 1905) 140-204. But it replaces the latter because of its superior historical-critical method. Drawing on the best of modern research on Origen and employing an excellent methodological approach to the texts, the author delineates the novel direction of the sacramental thinking of the great Alexandrian theologian.

At the risk of oversimplifying this dense and penetrating study, marked by very precise theological language and a consistently high quality of argumentation, L.'s thesis can be briefly stated. Origen considers the *eulogia* of LXX as the formal shape of the liturgical *eucharistia* as well as the comprehensive basic shape of the notion *eucharistia*. Hence, where he deals with a *eucharistie* reality he can interpret it in a eulogic way, and where he encounters a eulogic reality he can explain it eucharistically. As a whole, the Eucharistic celebration is thus understood as a symbol of the *eulogia* and shares in its descending, memorial, and ascending character.

Since the mode of mediation adequate to the *eulogia*—which ultimately connotes the Logos—is preaching, Origen interprets the traditional verbal dimension of the Eucharistic celebration as a ritual occurrence of preaching and the Eucharistic species as symbols of preaching. Ritual preaching is an actual presence of the Christ-event, and a verbal presence of the Christ-event is found in the symbols.

The spiritualizing tendency of Origen's Eucharistic thinking, influenced by a Platonic metaphysics of knowledge, an OT theology of word, and unsettled Christological questions, shows itself in two ways. First, it consists in a transference of the traditional sacramental concepts to verbal realities both within and outside the ritual Eucharist. In the former instance it leads to a depreciation of the material-earthly sacrament and to a dematerializing of the sacramental reality of the gifts (verbal presence). In the latter case a "eucharistizing" of preaching and Scripture results. Secondly, it consists in an internalization, since the Christ-event, and so preaching and sacrament, first attain their end in the souls of mankind as unification of the believing soul with the divine Logos.

L. indicates some ways in which Origen can contribute to current theological reflection on various dimensions of the Lord's Supper. Perhaps the most interesting is the suggestion that Origen's systematic approach to the modes of communication between the soul and the Logos could serve as an example for a modern theology of *communicatio in genere*: a unifying systematic reflection over all which is marked as "encounter with the Lord," arranged along the lines of the traditional *De sacramentis in genere*. The need of this is apparent within Catholic theology, as the struggle to articulate the relation between preaching and
sacrament shows. It is not sufficient to simply repeat the typically Origenist phrases: table of bread, table of the word. A great deal of reflection is needed to bring out the riches of the spiritual realities contained in such expressions.

Lies has made an outstanding contribution to the history of Christian theology. His work compares favorably with the very best studies recently produced in the wake of the renewal of interest in Origen. He shows again, and this time in the area of the theology of word and Lord's Supper, that Origen's writings can contribute significantly to modern theology both to stimulate reflection and to provide criticism.

University of Notre Dame

EDWARD J. KILMARTIN


This magnificent volume is a worthy successor to the two previous ones in Pelikan's *magnum opus*. Like these, it studies the history of official Christian teaching, thus prescinding from many movements and questions which would properly belong in a history of theology. With this carefully delimited scope, the investigation follows the chronological order in such a way that each period (a century or two) is centered on what seems to have been its predominant concern, other aspects of doctrine being seen as adjacent to this main feature. The history of medieval doctrines with which many theologians function is thus considerably corrected. Protestants will learn that there were no dark ages; Catholics will learn that there were important doctrinal movements before the thirteenth century.

As described here, medieval doctrine was dominated by the Augustinian synthesis inherited from late patristics (chap. 1). This synthesis prevailed through the adjustments brought about by the controversies of the Carolingian period (chap. 2). Interest in problems of redemption and grace prevailed from the ninth to the eleventh century, with its main focus in Christology (chap. 3) and with implications for sacramental doctrine and the cult of saints (chap. 4). The twelfth century defended "the one true faith" in encounters with Islam, with Judaism, with several heresies, and with the movements which led to scholasticism (chap. 5). P.'s topic and method forbade him to examine at length the struggling of theologians with the philosophy of Aristotle, so that chapter 6, dealing with the thirteenth century, is the shortest in the book. Two indices and a long bibliography will be welcome. Yet I would have expected more titles from the valuable *Handbuch der Dogmengeschichte* of Herder (Freiburg); and I am puzzled by an oddity: my volume on Bonaventure is cited in the form of an unprinted doctoral dissertation of 1949, while a

It is a refreshing feature of this book that it does not draw only on formally theological literature: *The Dream of the Rood* figures in good place in the account of soteriology. No doubt, specialists may find fault with some of the vignettes of medieval authors or some of the overviews of theological questions. This is hardly avoidable in a relatively brief summation of a long and rich period of intellectual growth. While I need not enter into details, I will mention some of these flaws or gaps.

Clearly, the selection of material and the successive foci of the story presuppose an interpretation of medieval history which, while it may be correct, is not self-evident. The stress on the Augustinian heritage tends to underemphasize the balancing influence of Greek thought, which was channeled to the West in great part through Pseudo-Dionysius (mentioned here chiefly in relation to the angelic and ecclesiastical hierarchies), which was enthusiastically accepted by John Scot Eriugena (treated as an extraneous, somewhat heterodox personage), and which is easily recognizable in the Trinitarian theology of Richard of St. Victor, in the scholastic and mystical synthesis of Bonaventure (these two barely skimmed in the present volume), and in the arts of painting and manuscript illumination (a source of theological information untapped by P.).

Considerable importance is given to soteriological questions. This is certainly correct of the theology centered on Anselm. Yet another, more balanced view of monastic theology in the eleventh and twelfth centuries would have been provided if Rupert of Deutz's Trinitarian presentation of the Christian mystery had not been omitted. And I am sure that predestination, hotly debated in the ninth century, never had the importance in the thirteenth that is given to it in chapter 6. Sacramental doctrine would have deserved, in my judgment, more detailed attention: no study is made of the evolution of the sacrament of penance, or of the passage of the anointing of the sick from a sacrament of healing to a sacrament of forgiveness for the dying. Yet some points are close enough to basic doctrine to warrant close examination.

The main gaps that I find, however, relate to ecclesiology. While it is true that no formal tractate *de ecclesia* was composed before the fourteenth century, ecclesiological doctrine was, throughout the Middle Ages, near to the heart of faith. But no reference is made to the ecclesiology of Hincmar and its conflict with that of the popes. As for the thirteenth century itself, reducing its ecclesiology to that of St. Bernard (as is done in chapter 6) does not do justice to Bonaventure or Thomas' originality (see, e.g., Yves Congar's *L'Eglise de saint Augustin à l'époque moderne* [Paris, 1970] or my contribution *Succession et ordre dans la structure de
l'église to the septicentennial volume S. Bonaventura, 1274–1974 (Grottaferrata, 1974) 421–46). I also miss, at the end of the volume, a deeper treatment of the crisis of Latin Averroism, which both Bonaventure and Aquinas, though Bonaventure more than Thomas, saw as challenging the Christian conception of the relations between God and creation. The problem did not touch only on whether there can be "two kinds of truth" (290). Averroism brought into question the real distinction and distance between God and the world which were essential to the Christian doctrines of God, of creation, of the Incarnation, of grace. And by the same token it denied both the theological use of analogy and the Christian mystics' experience of anagogy.

The book reads easily, despite the great number of translated quotations. But some of the translations tend to become paraphrases. And paraphrases can be misleading. To give one example, supermentales excessus, in Bonaventure's Itinerarium, cannot possibly mean to "be transported in ecstasy above the intellect" to the beatific vision (305); for it is Bonaventure's clear teaching that there is no beatific vision in this life. But these are only flaws in a major contribution to the history of Christian doctrine.

Ending the story after Thomas Aquinas but before John Duns Scotus is, though practical and theoretically justifiable, somewhat arbitrary; for if an obvious discontinuity separates Duns Scotus from Thomas, a good case can be made for the continuity of Franciscan theology. One will therefore be looking forward to Vol. 4 of The Christian Tradition.

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GEORGE H. TAVARD


Often historians of seventeenth-century Jansenism have limited themselves to the great figures, particularly the Arnaulds, associated with Port-Royal. The growing industry of Jansenist studies has also examined Jansenism's relationship with the Counter Reformation and, occasionally, the problem of dissemination. We now have Weaver to thank for re-focusing our attention to the heart of the movement, Port-Royal itself. She demonstrates that Port-Royal was above all a product of its Benedictine-Cistercian heritage rather than simply a French reaction to the theological and social currents of Counter Reformation Europe.

W. shows how a reform which adhered closely to the Rule of St. Benedict and the Cistercian spirit became a movement known as Jansenism. Part 1 offers an erudite textual analysis of several manuscript
versions and the first publication of the *Constitutions de Port-Royal*, paying careful attention to changes over time. W. convincingly concludes that much of what was castigated as Jansenist was in fact Cistercian. The attitudes expressed in the *Constitutions de Port-Royal* toward the Divine Office, private prayer, silence, abstinence, poverty, and monastic government were true to the nuns' Benedictine-Cistercian origins. W. claims that Port-Royal was closer to the Rule of St. Benedict and to the Cistercian spirit than other seventeenth-century Benedictine houses.

But the reform failed. In the first place, the Cistercian ideal of isolation could not long exist in Paris and especially in the midst of Parisian polemics. Then too the baroque, post-Tridentine religious scene altered the simplicity and the medieval nature of the Cistercian way. After failure, the reform of Port-Royal passed into myth.

To understand this transition, W., in the second part of her book, focuses on the figure of Angélique de Saint-Jean Arnauld d'Andilly, who had a great role in formulating the constitutions. Her life and writings provide entry to the personal and spiritual in Port-Royal. It was she who transmitted the Port-Royal legend and who embodied the ideals of Mère Angélique, the founder of the reform. W. was wise to adopt this stratagem, for the study of Angélique recreates for the reader the holiness and obstinacy of the nuns and counterbalances the rigorous discussion of the constitutions.

Indeed, through her sympathy for the nuns' mentality and her familiarity with the workings of monastic spirituality, W. has succeeded in writing a fascinating book, one which should become familiar to students of early modern religious history. But while her immersion in the sources forces us to re-examine the nuns in their own setting, this same immersion makes W., unknowingly perhaps, a partisan in the seventeenth-century debate on Jansenism. For her, the Jansenism of Port-Royal was a tragedy, not in that the Jansenist nuns heroically but futilely resisted persecution, but because the transformation to Jansenism subverted a reform movement which was rooted safely in the work of St. Benedict and St. Bernard (and which was therefore quite orthodox). Nowhere, for W., was the "reform so well begun in the tradition of Cîteaux" as clearly perverted as in the new and highly critical attitude toward mysticism at Port-Royal. Granted that mysticism colored the Cistercian experience of God, one could well argue that the spiritual ardor and sense of charity of even the later seventeenth-century Jansenists testify that reform, though deviating from its Cistercian origins, yet pervaded Jansenism. One could also argue, as W. does, that Jansenism became "a deviant and rigid brand of Catholicism." But this was not so much because of its theological positions, as she suggests, as because of certain political alignments and Machiavellian decisions by both the Curia and the French political-
religious establishment. In the history of Catholicism, what is orthodox in one generation becomes heterodox in the next.

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**Richard Golden**


More than a collection of unrelated essays, this volume is the uncommon *Festschrift* which honors its recipient not only in the efforts of individual authors but also in a unified thematic realization. The reason for this sense of focused wholeness is the explicit attention given, in almost every essay, to one or both of two concerns central to Crowe's own life work: Trinitarian theology and Bernard Lonergan's work on theological method.

Peter Beer's opening essay on "Meaning in Our Relation to the Trinity" provides an introduction to C.'s particular contribution to the Augustinian-Thomist tradition of Trinitarian theology. "Trinification" is C.'s way of specifying the presence of the Trinity in the world: the presence of pervading Understanding, Truth, and Love through the Father's sending of the Word and Spirit into the world. Beer shows how C., "by singling out the conscious and the intelligible procession, and by prescinding from the causal," transposes "the psychological analogy from the context of faculty psychology to the context of intentionality analysis," thus setting "one free from a prison of efficient causality to grasp each divine person's distinctive role in our process of self-transcendence" (11-13).

In "Phenomenology and Trinification," William Ryan takes on the task of showing that one particular type of intentionality analysis, the later phenomenology of Husserl's *Crisis,* is "an apt instrument for examining the trinification of the world" (97). Though granting that phenomenology's epoche may be theologically "neutral," Ryan still urges that the epoche, "insofar as it is the uncovering of the structure of intentionality, is at the same time the rejection of empiricist and idealist accounts of knowing and objectivity," and thus "very similar to what Lonergan means by intellectual conversion" (105). The reader is tempted to wonder how this last claim would be greeted by Philip McShane, whose essay on intellectual conversion among contemporary theologians tries to show that both Schubert Ogden and David Tracy misunderstand what McShane takes to be the marks of intellectual conversion—Lonergan's "positions" on reality, knowledge, and objectivity.

An impressive effort in the scholarly spadework connected with intellectual conversion is Frederick Lawrence's essay on "The Horizon of
Political Theology.” This attempt to provide a critical context for praxis-oriented theology moves from Plato, Aristotle, and Aquinas through the history of Western philosophy to Kant, Nietzsche, and Heidegger. It then reverses its direction as Lawrence follows Gadamer, Voegelin, Strauss, and Lonergan in their attempts to overcome the ambiguity of the modern anthropocentric turn to the subject through a critical recovery of the premodern achievement—especially Lonergan’s transposition into the contemporary context of “the normative implications of man’s nature as *imago Dei*” worked out by Aquinas (67).

The issue of intellectual conversion is also in the background of Matthew Lamb’s equally impressive essay on “The Exigencies of Meaning and Metascience: A Prolegomenon to the God-Question.” Ranging with easy competence over the whole of post-Kantian philosophy, Lamb first correlates Lonergan’s systematic and critical exigencies with the “Anglo-Saxon Logical-Empirical” and “Continental Hermeneutical-Dialectical” schools of metascience respectively, and then shows how Lonergan’s methodical exigence not only “offers a context for sublating any one-sided isolation of the LE and HD schools from one another” (27) but also raises questions which call forth the transcendent exigence and its God-question in an authentic manner. Lamb’s claim that the God-question of the transcendent exigence critically “recognizes the validity of religious experience” (37) is supported in Bernard Lonergan’s essay on “Religious Experience.” Lonergan continues his *Method in Theology* discussion of the topic here by asking “in what manner God’s love flooding our hearts is a human experience and just how it fits into human consciousness” (81).

Two psychological considerations explicitly rely on Lonergan’s thought in their attempts to clarify the concrete shapes taken by the reality of trinification in individual lives. Bernard Tyrrell explicates a Christotherapeutic view of neurosis and its healing in dialogue with major current alternative hypotheses on neurosis. And Robert Doran argues for a transformation of Jungian archetypal psychology through its sublation by intentionality analysis, with a consequent reinterpretation of individuation as religious conversion. A key to Doran’s reinterpretation is the anagogie symbol which witnesses to the incarnate subject’s transcendent origin and destiny. An explication of this anagogie symbol as it functions in Northrop Frye’s elaborate critical theory is the task of Joseph Flanagan’s helpful “Literary Criticism of the Bible.”

Interpretations of Trinitarian themes in Mt 28:19b, the fourth Gospel, and Clement of Alexandria are offered by Joseph Plevnik, David Stanley, and John Egan respectively. Studies by Joseph Gavin on predestination at “The York House Conference, 1626” and R. A. F. MacKenzie on “Ben Sira as Historian” and a bibliography of the “Writings of Frederick E.
Crowe" round off a solid volume of fourteen careful essays which readers sharing Crowe's basic concerns will find valuable.

Villanova University  WALTER E. CONN


This anthology includes a wide spread of views which might be grouped under a Christian philosophy or theology of history. With twenty selections it is impossible to give a review of each contribution. The editor starts by contrasting a modern Christian view of history with those of classical liberalism and Marxism from the nineteenth century. The Christian view(s) concern three major options: a theology of history, a philosophy of history, and the problems of historiography. The authors presented here have all been influential theologians, philosophers, historians, and writers. Their own interests and professions have in part dictated their approaches, while their varied religious traditions have also been important in this.

C. Dawson stresses the importance of the Augustinian view in which the world and human history appear as the arena where the powers of evil and selfishness work their way, but also where God is operative. This predicates an essential ambiguity for all human history; man's achievement, the state, is both Leviathan and the bearer of cultural values. K. Latourette points out that differences among Christians in their understanding of history have their basis in different views of the kingdom of God as preached by Christ and how it was to come about. Christians have also disagreed in their interpretation of human nature, but they do agree in seeing all human history as one and in emphasizing the historicity of the events by which Christianity was born. Christians, therefore, had to consider history and what men do in history as real and important, while always remembering that it was not the purpose of the gospel to serve any one culture. The danger of identifying any time period, human culture or achievement, any nation or individual with the divine purpose is stressed by R. Niebuhr with the judgment that none of these attains either moral justification or ultimate triumph. Continuing in this train of thought is E. Brunner with his emphasis on God breaking into time and giving it purpose and direction. Hence in his view the Christian sees all "progress" as ambiguous and so he is opposed to the Enlightenment, which saw sin as ignorance and undeveloped good. R. Bultmann brings the historian back into history, for he cannot stand obviously at the goal of history nor can he get outside of it, and so for Bultmann all of man's Weltanschauungen are relative in so far as they are all within that process.
Other theologians are represented. W. Pannenberg stresses the fact that revelation takes place in the human world and so is not “supernatural” in his special sense of this term. G. Gutierrez attacks the gap between sacred and profane history in his presentation of Christ as the liberator. P. Tillich outlines some of the nonhistorical interpretations of human life and history against which the Christian view must struggle: the tragic, the mystical, and the mechanical views. A. Toynbee presents a somewhat nebulous but sweeping perspective of human history in the context of Christianity in discussion with other world religions.

K. Barth reacts strongly to the attempt to define God’s action in human history. He stresses that belief in divine providence is exactly that, an act of faith, and so cannot be taken as an explanation or interpretation of historical events. Human history is the history of God’s glory, but this is a hidden history and can only be known by faith.

In reaction against historicism and determinism several authors offer a variety of suggestions. C. S. Lewis shows the various meanings of the word “history” and points out that historicism has the element of “must have been” and “must be.” For that reason usually a historicist has not been a historian (or at least not a good one), since the latter as a rule tends to be wary of such expressions. H. Butterfield, one of the professional historians in the group along with E. H. Harbison, A. S. Link, H. Marrou, E. Cochrane, and G. Florovsky, poses the question that most historians ask in the face of all these schemes: are there any laws or regularities in history? More pragmatic than theoretical because of their training and interests, most historians say no. They reject teleological plans and yet spend their lives studying and tracing origins, growth, development, decline and end of institutions, movements, ideas, and men. All of human activity and life comes under their scrutiny, and yet the question of the purpose of it all, of final answers and goals, is often dismissed as pertaining to the metaphysical, cosmological, or metahistorical and so not necessary or beyond their ken.

Some of the historians point out the danger of this dismissal. Marrou warns that with all the concentration on special histories—political, social, economic, cultural, etc.—there is a real danger that history will be lost in the forest of trees. Both he and Link emphasize in their own way the importance of the active role of the historian, of a human mind involved in an inquiry. Link urges that we realize that each of these historians is a man living under the law and by law, in bondage to the ego, for the man must seek the meaning of events for himself. Here he sees the great temptation of all these schemes in that they wish to assimilate and master history by reducing it to the finite. His cure for this temptation is to see the historian’s task as one of service to truth and hence service to God. He rejects any attempt to impose a Christian mold
on the complex of events as no better than any of the other schemes. Harbison poses this problem as: which comes first? Is the man first a Christian and than a historian? How do the two mesh? He points out the danger that historical objectivity and impartiality can be a delusion that would cut one off from the real issues and questions. H. Butterfield has often posed this problem in his writings. But Butterfield and Cochrane in their essays also reveal the danger of arrogance, that one can tend to impose a triumphalist scheme on human history which distorts it terribly. Cochrane's animadversions on some forms of "Catholic historiography" serve as good examples and can now be seen as a counterpart to the Whig interpretation, the progressivist or social Darwinist view, and as equally outmoded.

This quick overview can only touch the surface of the questions that are raised in this collection. We have not even brought in the problems raised by the excerpts from J. Maritain, H. Dooyeweerd, T. S. Eliot, and the World Council of Churches. The book is a rich feast that requires time and reflection and will well reward the reader. In addition, a bibliography for further reading is included. In the end the reader, if he takes the problem seriously, will be back with the problem faced since the early days of Christianity and expressed so well by Tertullian: what does Jerusalem have to do with Athens? It is a question whose answer needs to be rediscovered in each culture, generation, and person, as this book shows well.

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THOMAS E. MORRISSEY


"Worthy is the man . . .," and this case is no exception. On the occasion of Kuttner's seventieth birthday a group of American scholars who have been associated with him in various ways contributed to this collection. The result is a body of scholarship worthy of the man being honored both in the breadth of interests shown and in the value of the contributions included.

J. Goldin has a brief note on the Archangel Gabriel as he appeared and was interpreted in the rabbinical commentaries. R. Reynolds shows how the Pseudo-Alcuinian Liber de divinis officiis disagreed with the major writings of that era on the distribution and ranking of major and minor orders, and he then explains how this ranking was finally established. R. Somerville has traced the meanderings of a medieval text and from this has shown that the papal use of legates in the eleventh and twelfth centuries was both old and new. E. Peters has an interesting essay on the
image of the hedgehog as it was applied to the flight or exile of Becket. From this he develops the confrontation of the two views of episcopal duty, Gilbert’s case against Becket and the latter’s response. He concludes that while historical judgment remains negative on Gilbert and favorable to Becket, Gilbert’s arguments were actually closer to the law of the time.

S. Chodorow’s article reveals the tribulations of any legal system—the manipulation of the church courts from 1140 to 1198 by dishonest and unscrupulous litigants. They were aided by the burden of overwork placed on the court officers and the latter’s frequent lack of knowledge of earlier papal decisions. The article also adds bits for further investigation: e.g., that England had more married priests than any other province of the medieval Church; that indulgence was granted to let them stay on in their posts but there was adamant opposition to allowing their sons to succeed them, and that their precarious legal position left these married priests open to extortion at the hands of the dishonest and unscrupulous. S. Horowitz has studied how one decretal, Tua nobis, was handled and how a group of canonists, “the French School,” took their own path in including and excluding texts from the compilations that were being made in canon law.

Other studies are: U.-R. Blumenthal, who shows that the different interpretations of regalia were at the heart of the disagreement between Henry V and Paschal in 1111; J. H. Erickson’s study of oikonomia in the Byzantine canonical tradition and how this term opened the way to flexibility in that it had two streams of interpretation: (a) accommodation and (b) medicinal and penitential practice; P. Henry’s article on images of the Church in Nicaea II and in the Libri Carolini shows how important the concept of continuity and the attribution of action to the Holy Spirit were in the debates of this era. G. Constable stresses the importance of status in the twelfth-century writers but also finds that the traditional functional division of pray-fight-work is not at all expressed in these writers.

R. A. Aronstam uses a set of homilies to reveal Anglo-Saxon beliefs and religious sensibilities. T. N. Bisson studies an administrative expert from twelfth-century Spain; R. Brentano gives an analysis of the relationship of longevity and localism in one chapter (Rieti) of the thirteenth-fourteenth centuries, while C. McCurry does a study of Metz as a source of benefices for members of the papal curia of the same era. K. Morrison creates a form of sociological type by his analysis of holiness in two saints’ lives. T. Izbiicki discusses the question of infallibility and the erring pope in two key writers for this problem: Guido Terreni and Turrecremata. B. Tierney discusses the evolution of an idea: the important role that “reception” played in the decretalists and in Turrecremata. This essay raises the critical questions on what gives authority to an opinion
or teaching: who said it, or what was said, or the reasons given? Is it one or all of these or some combination?

Two other articles need to be especially noted. J. T. Noonan argues convincingly that the famous Rolandus who taught at Bologna and held certain opinions was not the same person as the Rolandus who became Pope Alexander III. Noonan goes through the writers who asserted the identity of the two and their evidence and shows the difficulties with this theory. He quotes C. Duggan that after 150 years the verdict is not proven identity and then gives the arguments for nonidentity. This excellent detective work helps to explain a mystery that had existed for so long, i.e., how it was possible that Alexander III could condemn an opinion at a council, an opinion which, if he were the same as the other Rolandus, he had been teaching for years. This article, if its argument is accepted, sheds new light on R. Somerville's own book *Pope Alexander III and the Council of Tours* (Berkeley, 1977).

The other article by K. Pennington makes a convincing case that the famous lawyer-pope Innocent III was simply not that; for he argues that Innocent had neither been a trained lawyer nor a student of Huguccio, as was so long believed. Therefore Innocent's decretals are not to be read as carefully articulated legal briefs but as rough statements of legal principles. P. argues well that this view of Innocent III makes him and his argumentation more realistic, that Innocent was not a particularly good theologian, and in fact his reasoning in *Per venerabilem* was not very telling, and so later canonists did not follow him but rather the ideas of Hostiensis.

This volume, then, is a splendid tribute to the man deservedly honored. The quality of the contributions and the importance of the problems raised make it a *Festschrift* worthy of the name and bring honor also to the editors and contributors.

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**THOMAS E. MORRISSEY**


The author of this posthumously published series, of which seven volumes are projected, was introduced to readers of this journal in the review of his first volume (TS 39 [1978] 360-62). Material for this volume was incomplete at Piepkorn's death. The gaps have been filled by a group of disciples whose contributions are identified (not always correctly: the erroneous chapter numbers signal a disconcertingly large number of errors and misprints throughout the book) by the editor of the series, John H. Tietjen. This considerable supplementary material draws, wher-
ever possible, upon P.’s published and unpublished articles, “attempting to say what P. might have said had he lived to write the material.” In the circumstances it seems appropriate, therefore, to apply to the book as a whole the convention invoked also for papal encyclicals, and take it simply as the work of the person in whose name it is issued.

Special interest naturally attaches to P.’s treatment of his own Lutheran tradition. P. is uncompromising in rejecting the label “Protestant” and in claiming “catholic identity” for both Luther and his followers. But he is honest enough to admit that “Lutheranism’s theology far outstrips its practice.” The presentation of Lutheran doctrine is well done, though the treatment of the twin themes of law and gospel is surprisingly meager, given their prominence in most Lutheran writing.

The treatment of Anglicanism and Methodism is on the same high level: accurate and warmly sympathetic even to positions not shared by the author. The presentation of Calvinism, by contrast, never really seems to come alive. The somewhat slender section on the Reformed tradition seems to have been written out of a sense of duty; one senses that P.’s heart was not really in his work. This may reflect the wounds inflicted in the long Lutheran-Calvinist battle.

The emphasis throughout is on the beliefs of the church bodies under discussion. But P. is too much of a historian to fall into the Neo-Scholastic trap of treating doctrines apart from the situations which produced them, and the people who held them. The patience with which he has traced the tangled pedigrees of the more than 175 church bodies described in this volume is characteristic of P.’s careful scholarship.

Prior to Vatican II’s decision in favor of ecumenism it was commonplace for Catholic controversialists to argue that the centrifugal tendencies of Protestantism proved the falsity of its principles. Like many arguments developed under the pressure of polemic, this one greatly oversimplified the complex data to which it was applied. It may seem out of place to revive this now seldom heard claim in connection with the work of an ecumenist as gifted and eirenic as P. But his merciless descriptions of the enormous number of denominations included in these pages, many with only a handful of adherents and no verifiable present headquarters, bring the old polemical argument forcibly to mind. Even the Protestant church historian Robert T. Handy writes in the Introduction that diversity of religious belief and practice on the scale here described “contributes to the trivialization of organized religion.” More significant still is his admission that the book “raises again ... important questions about the real sources of religious authority.”

P. would hardly be displeased to know that his life’s work was directing attention to an issue which he knew to be crucial, and in contending for which (as a host of friends and admirers believe) he gave his life.
Meanwhile, the five volumes still ahead of us promise ample occasion for further study and reflection.

St. Louis University  


Response to Jesus and American economic policy—any connection? And if there is a connection, how understand it? What scaffolding, what set of terms and relations, can link together religious living and the socioeconomic order? These papers, the first published from the annual Lonergan Workshop at Boston College (actually, the third such workshop, June 1976), employ Lonergan's conceptual and methodological model of world and human process as the linkage not only between spirituality and economics, but between psychology, literary criticism, and interdisciplinary philosophy as well. The proof of the pudding is in the tasting, and the proof of L.'s work lies in its ability to forge links with the ever greater variety and complex developments of human consciousness. These papers give promise of that achievement.

For example, Frederick Crowe, "Dialectic and the Ignatian Spiritual Exercises," uses Ignatius' masterpiece of spirituality as an example of L.'s meaning of dialectic in theology. Essentially, dialectic consists in "meeting persons, appreciating the values they represent, criticizing their defects, and allowing one's living to be challenged at its very roots by their words and by their deeds." In the case of the Spiritual Exercises, the person one meets, whose values one gradually appropriates and by whom one is challenged, is Christ.

The challenge of that personal meeting with Christ is brought out in a powerful article by Sebastian Moore, "Christian Self-Discovery." There he notes that the words of Christ in the Sermon on the Mount are, in Robert Frost’s phrasing, "just a frame-up to insure the failure of us all, so all of us will be thrown prostrate at the Mercy Seat for Mercy." The structure of Christian forgiveness involves promoting "good people to the status of sinners, who can then be promoted to the status of unfaithful lovers" (194). "Confess your sin so that God can reveal himself to your heart as your lover and friend and so your heart can come alive again, the lover in you can be reborn" (195).

But there are others who dialectically challenge our thinking and being and, in the case of this volume, other contemporary thinkers and writers. Joseph Flanagan analyzes Northrop Frye's Anatomy of Criticism, which refuses to treat literature as simply an aggregate of different types of compositions, comedy, tragedy, etc., but instead assumes that the various types of literature reflect an underlying human order. Such an order is the dialectic between human desire and human fear. "There is a deep
continuum of common cycles that flow back and forth in the human psyche generating a transcultural dialectic of desires and fears that is articulated in songs, stories and rituals that are celebrated and recollected throughout the course of history” (76). Getting in touch with the patterns of such desires and fears can be a way of relating literature to the moral conversion of the person and the community.

Then there are the psychologists. Bernard Tyrrell finds in the writings of modern psychologists elements congruent with the structures of human healing adumbrated in Christian revelation. And Robert Doran in an excellent article critiques Carl Jung’s psychology from the viewpoint of Lonergan’s intentionality analysis. According to Doran, Jung’s tremendous contribution toward the understanding of symbols in human life is of itself insufficient for an adequate theological, or indeed, fully human, analysis. “Psyche’s images are the most accurate ciphers of my relative self-transcendence or self-enclosure. They are, as such, utterly trustworthy, humbling, demanding and evocative. But to pursue them for their own sake is to lose one’s very self . . . . It dooms one to the endless treadmill of self-analysis” (130-31). Doran’s whole article on psychic self-appropriation as the basis for moral and religious conversion is a masterpiece. He has contributed to L.’s own arsenal of key terms the phrase “psychic conversion.”

What then of economics? Why bother with such a “secular” area? Why, in fact, has Lonergan’s own recent work been in this field of study? Matthew Lamb gives us some clues in his contribution: “No matter how pious individual executives and politicians may be in private, insofar as the expansion of productivity and unlimited growth are the ultimate concerns, the unchallengeable assumptions of the corporate structure are secularist” (284). “When growth is directed away from the cultural and spiritual values, it becomes cancerous quest for satisfaction in the mere accumulation of material goods” (289). Fred Lawrence would add the element of politics and in his contribution argues that the American form of liberal democracy with its emphasis on individual conscience implies a despair of rational agreement with long-term implications. Such an agreement is implicit in a faith commitment lived out in community over time.

The volume, then, is interdisciplinary within the context of Lonergan’s contribution to human thought. For Philip McShane, such thought represents an “axial shift” in the concerns of the academic community—from methods totally dependent on the natural sciences to a generalized empirical method that is open to all the expressions of human consciousness.

The final contributor is Lonergan himself. In an article on “Religious Knowledge” he analyzes the tendency among many to separate inner
conviction from objective truth. Scientists and philosophers tend to opt for objective truth. Activists, enthusiasts, and religious persons in general tend to emphasize inner conviction. L.'s solution, as always, is not either/or but both/and. "By inner conviction we have meant not passion, not stubbornness, not willful blindness, but the very opposite: we have meant the fruit of self-transcendence, of being attentive, intelligent, reasonable, responsible; in brief, of being ruled by the inner norms that constitute the exigences for authenticity in the human person" (327). On the other hand, by objectivity is not meant an "already-out-there-now-real," something to be handled, packaged, and manipulated, but rather the fruit of authentic subjectivity as persons seek meaning, truth, and value.

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Christian moral theology commands most respectability when, in addition to the sources of Scripture and tradition, it maintains delicate balances and walks gingerly in the resolution of crucial ethical situations between nature and nurture, extreme act teleology and formal rule deontology, physicalism and psychologism, the technologically possible and the ethically desirable. Peschke's first volume was reviewed here (*TS* [1976] 349-51) and it was recommended for its presentation of the biblical foundations and the historical development of Christian ethics as well as for its systematic outline of general moral theology. In this volume on special moral theology P. develops under the large area of Christian responsibility in the religious realm the three virtues of faith, hope, and love, as well as the nature of divine worship and the specific manifestations and duties of worship. The treatment here is traditional and the territory familiar, and if disputed points can be quarreled about, it is more likely that they would be raised by the theological ethicist than by the philosophical ethicist. The latter is more concerned with the second part of the volume, which develops the responsibility of the Christian towards the created world, his responsibility in fraternal love and justice, and his moral responsibility in the community life of the family, state, and church. A philosopher will be most attracted by those sections that touch upon responsibility for bodily life and health, medical treatments and operations, the destruction of human life, sexuality and marriage, truth, fidelity, and honor.

P. does not depart from the position maintained in his first volume that "as a whole there are not many absolutes in traditional moral theology, i.e., actions, whose object is considered as always and under all
circumstances evil," but he is still wary about the disposition to question all moral absolutes. On page 202 of the first volume he said: "the questioning of all moral absolutes as far as external actions are concerned is a momentous innovation of great consequences. This dispute certainly requires more careful and responsible study." On page 211 he put off the investigation because "it would lead too far in this context and must be left to the respective treatises." It is only proper, then, to search in this second volume for the evolution in P.'s thinking with regard to this crucial question of moral absolutes in theology, and for his advance upon what he finally held in the first volume. There his general observations and remarks were confined to a paraphrase of his former position: "one can notice that the number of moral absolutes has slowly decreased in the course of time." That P. did honestly see the problem was evident when he remarked that "life would be unbearable if we were never allowed to admit of indirectly-willed evil effects because much good could not be done and because it would be unreasonable to act contrarily." It is further evident that he sees the real problem when he asks on page 213: "would this argument not hold true also for some instances of directly-willed evil effects?"

P. confronts the heart of the matter in asking whether we might directly intend evil effects in order to bring about a significant amount of good. The philosopher is stimulated by this confrontation and wonders whether P.'s final position will be similar to the position of W. D. Ross, that while there are moral absolutes of prima-facie duties, there are no moral absolutes of actual duties. He wonders whether P. will express disappointment with an ethical principle of pure formal rule deontology, with a position of constitutive rules rather than of summary rules. This reviewer pointed out in commenting on P.'s first volume that "P. is a theological rule deontologist until the end, but he sees the problem and is well aware that the number of theological act-deontologists, given to summary rules, is increasing among responsible moral theologians. The major dispute in contemporary moral theology is precisely this dispute on summary and constitutive rules."

If we examine this second volume and search out indications of P.'s present thinking, the study becomes very interesting. On page 406 he cites several theologians who regard masturbation as objectively not more than a venial sin, at least in principle, and observes that "there are doubtless still other theologians who are of the same opinion, even though they do not have it printed." His conclusion seems to be that masturbation might resemble lying in that while each practice constitutes a disorder, unless aggravating circumstances are present, each is objectively not more than a venial sin. However, he does not rest satisfied with this position without adverting to the fact that "the Sacred Congregation for
the Doctrine of the Faith disagrees with such a conclusion, certainly in conformity with a long-standing tradition of the Church. It judges that every directly willed act of masturbation is objectively a grave moral disorder.” Finally, the reader is left to wonder what P.’s mind really is: is masturbation objectively grave matter or not? Is it always a moral disorder or can it be at times a mere physical evil, a nonmoral evil, or, in the language of some, a mere ontic evil? This reader would like to know P.’s mind.

P. argues against heterologous artificial insemination and for homologous insemination, agreeing with B. Häring that “there are no convincing arguments to prove either the immorality of ejaculation by the husband in view of fatherhood or the immorality of introducing that sperm into the wife’s uterus.” It seems that this same criterion that “there are no convincing arguments” can be used with caution and legitimacy against the universal prohibition of all directly-willed sterilizations, all directly-willed abortions, all directly-willed acts of masturbation. Is there not always a counterexample to a constitutive rule, say, one against all directly-willed abortions, if we just think long and seriously enough? Just hypothesize an extreme case of an incestuously impregnated nun, traumatized by the assault, with the possibility of bearing a traumatized child. If her directly-willed abortion takes place in an early period of the pregnancy, could it not be urged that “there are no convincing arguments” against proceeding with the abortion? Would anyone insist with reason that all such cases of directly-willed abortions are objectively grave matter? What would P. say? Would not a continued dialogue with this author prove exciting? It would enter into the amount of noncognitivism that survives in theological thinking that claims all the while to be eminently cognitive and rational.

Southeastern Massachusetts University Thomas A. Wassmer, S.J.


Twenty-five years ago Häring’s The Law of Christ constituted a watershed marking out the territory for a new and revitalized Catholic moral theology. In the intervening years so much has happened in the Church that The Law of Christ can usually be assigned to students only as a matter of historical interest, even though its basic spirit remains crucial for a renewed Catholic morality.

H.’s major new work, Free and Faithful in Christ, is being published originally in English and is projected to contain three volumes. Not simply a revision of The Law of Christ, it clearly has a continuity with its fundamental outlook.
Vol. 1 treats the whole area of fundamental moral theology. Much of
the early part is devoted to developing biblical and Christian notions of
freedom and fidelity. H. then applies the notions of freedom and fidelity
to many of the specific subjects he treats here, and he apparently intends
to make heavy use of the notions of freedom and fidelity in the subsequent
volumes. These themes thus unify H.'s new book in much the same way
that the theme "law of Christ" unified H.'s earlier major work.

Many strengths are present here. Perhaps the greatest value is the way
in which H. unites moral theology with spiritual/ascetical/mystical the­
ology. The volume is filled with allusions to the Scriptures and constantly
refers to the Christian faith-horizon which motivates moral actions. The
last chapter, on sin and conversion, is a particularly good example of H.'s
union of moral and spiritual theology. Many valuable Roman Catholic
works on moral theology do take a rather speculative or philosophical
bent. As in the past, H.'s faith-oriented approach is refreshing.

Another strength is that H. offers reasonably detailed treatments of
most of the major themes in fundamental moral theology, such as the
history of moral theology, fundamental option, conscience, moral norms,
and sin and conversion. On all these themes he successfully captures the
main thrust of moral theology today. Still another strength is the range
of sources he uses. Many of these sources (e.g., psychologist Lawrence
Kohlberg, major Protestant ethician James Gustafson) are not to be
found in The Law of Christ and they are indicators of H.'s development
over the years.

Two possible areas of weakness can be cited. First, one of the most
important discussions going on in fundamental Catholic moral theology
has to do with the interpretation of the double-effect principle and the
question of moral absolutes. Prominent Catholic moralists (Knauer,
Fuchs, Janssens, Schüller, McCormick) have argued for a new approach
to the double effect; other well-known Catholic moralists (Connery, May)
have rejected the new approach. In spite of the significance of this debate,
H. does not deal with it explicitly at any length.

A second possible weakness relates to the fact that many of H.'s
sections seem to be extended meditative reflections on the subjects
treated. Often these meditative reflections are very moving and powerful,
but the character of the sections as extended meditations is such that
some readers may not get a precise hold on the inner thrust of H.'s
thought.

I do not judge that this volume represents as major an accomplishment
as The Law of Christ. Nonetheless, it is a solid work with many valuable
insights into Catholic moral theology today. The book is surely worth
reading by the serious student.

The neglect of or, worse, refusal even to consider the impact and meaning of Christianity in political theory is notorious and curious among American and European academics writing in the history and nature of political philosophy. When Christianity is treated, it is almost always treated in one of its heretical forms. Rarely is Christianity's import ever adequately presented.

Fortunately, there are now two books written by American Catholic scholars which address themselves to the intellectual nature and import of this omission. Both of these were authored by men who had something to do with my old Alma Mater, the University of Santa Clara, the first at the end of his academic career, the second at the beginning of his. The first book is, of course, Charles N. R. McCoy's brilliant The Structure of Political Thought (McGraw-Hill, 1963), a book whose monumental importance was never understood by secular or by Catholic scholars. It remains perhaps the most seminal book about the flow and content of political thought as such. The second is Wilhelmsen's new Christianity and Political Philosophy. Needless to say, too, it reveals something about the sad state of the intellectual perception of Catholic publishing houses to note that both of these books were produced by non-Catholic organizations. That the University of Georgia Press, in particular, saw fit to publish this work of Wilhelmsen is the most refreshing thing to hit both the Catholic and secular publishing houses in years.

Current American Catholicism is practically incapable of understanding the crucial import to the faith of movements in political philosophy as such. Precisely because of the intellectual nature of modern political philosophy as it has evolved does Christianity find its greatest opposition. Modern metaphysics is cast mainly in political terms. It is to the meaning of this latter that these two books direct themselves. To be sure, certain other books are still pertinent, though difficult to come by: John Courtney Murray's We Hold These Truths, Jacques Maritain's Reflections on America and Man and the State, several of Yves Simon's books, and Heinrich Rommen's The State and Catholic Thought. Of these, only Murray was a born American. Certain other voices are now coming from unexpected places, notably John Senior's The Death of Christian Culture (Arlington House, 1978), at the University of Kansas. The breath-taking naïveté with which Catholic intellectuals in particular have pursued "action" programs for justice or Marxism or radical chic in recent years testifies eloquently to an abandonment of classical, Augustinian, and
Thomistic studies. For all intents and purposes this has cut main-line Catholics off from any genuine understanding of the intellectual tradition within which faith and its relation to public order find place. This justifies, in a way, The Wall Street Journal's biting editorial: "The last place anyone would look today to fill this longing is any of the mainstream religious denominations. They have little time for faith, being preoccupied with such issues as how to govern South Africa. Even the Roman Catholic Church, with its millenniums of experience in sorting evil and good in the religious impulse, is losing its power to touch the soul" (Nov. 3, 1978).

For some time it has been clear in political theory as a professional discipline that the crucial questions, as seen in both the schools of Leo Strauss and Eric Voegelin, the two schools most attuned to religious and metaphysical values in American political theory, after the demise of any precisely Catholic input, were those of faith and reason. This was just beginning even in Strauss’s Natural Right and History and Voegelin’s The New Science of Politics. Thus, Aquinas’ question (1-2, 91, 4) on the "necessity" of revelation was precisely to become the theoretical issue about which the hard work of political theory revolved.

Wilhelmsen has seen clearly the importance of this issue, and this within the whole tradition of Western metaphysical thought. For some time, too, it has been obvious that the most important discipline for the study of political theory is metaphysics. McCoy’s perception of this never failed, nor has Wilhelmsen’s.

Christianity and Political Philosophy is a restatement of the main lines of Christian philosophy with its roots in Greek and Roman thought, together with its own uniqueness. The failure to understand the Christian medieval contribution as precisely a metaphysical task has been at the roots of contemporary cultural and political crises. The main problem of Christian thought is precisely thought itself. The ease with which Catholic intellectuals in particular, lay and especially cleric, have abandoned profound reflection on precisely the uniqueness of the Christian credal tradition in its direct relation to political philosophy has probably been the most damaging blow to the Church and to the state in modern times. Voegelin was right, as W. noted, to call our modern temper “gnostic.” What W.’s book suggests is not only how Voegelin missed the import of Christian thought, but how many Christian intellectuals themselves have become rather “gnostic,” as any reading of the garden varieties of political and liberation theologies will note, following the perceptive guidance of either Strauss or Voegelin in describing them. W.’s book serves to remind us where the real political battles lie: in the metaphysics of gift and existence.

Georgetown University

James V. Schall, S.J.

The present book is the fruit of the work of a Commission on the Theology of the Monastic Life established by the General Chapter of the English Benedictine Congregation (EBC) in 1969 in compliance with the Church’s call for renewal of religious life in our time. The work of the Commission was initially presented in documents on particular aspects of monastic life which were sent to the monasteries of monks and nuns of the EBC, discussed and evaluated there, revised by the Commission many times and, finally, ably edited by Dame Maria Boulding of Standon Abbey for publication for a wider public. What we have here is a theology of the monastic life rather than a juridical organization of that life; although it does not represent the EBC’s “official and final standpoint” (xv), it does represent the best thought and consensus of many of its members. As the first part of the book, just one tenth of the whole, shows, the context of this theology is found both in the interaction of the Church with the world in our time and in the spirit of St. Benedict.

In this context the authors develop a practical theology of the central elements of Benedictine life. Varied ways of interpreting the Rule of St. Benedict are discussed, and the study concludes that “the real alternatives are: an insistence on the letter which cramps or destroys the spirit, versus a reinterpretation of the letter to preserve the spirit and even allow it to grow” (45). While for Benedict the Rule is indispensable and central, it is open to development and subordinate to the gospel and the Spirit; in fact, it is “a training in responsiveness to these two realities” (49). The Rule is considered here as “a working model for us, constructed to the scale of the simple world of the sixth century, a model in which we can see his principles at work” (55). In this framework the authors present a practical and problem-oriented theology of the Benedictine community, the abbot, vocation and growth in the community, and the freedom of the children of God to which monastic life should lead its members. This freedom is a matter of being more than of action, and it involves stages “of becoming free for things or persons beyond oneself, whether this means freedom for creative work, or availability for other persons in love and service, or the ultimate freedom and availability for God who creates our freedom” (94–95). Where appropriate, the authors develop a scriptural theology of a theme, show the strands that Benedict took from earlier monasticism and how he integrated them, indicate different ways in which the theme has been interpreted in later Benedictine (and specifically EBC) history, and pose the problems that our present culture puts to these traditional elements of Benedictine life. They offer answers
to these problems that are at times venturesome and are never facile; while honestly facing our vastly changed culture, they seek to be genuinely faithful to their Benedictine identity.

In later chapters of the book the authors treat the vows—the traditional Benedictine vows of *conversatio morum* or of faithfully living the monastic life, stability and obedience, as well as the vows of celibacy and poverty. They show their modernity in making the section on celibacy the longest one in the book and in treating such questions as the motivations for religious celibacy and its practical implications for heterosexual friendships. There are five chapters organized under the heading "Word of God" that treat respectively the Eucharist, the *opus Dei*, lectio divina or spiritual reading, personal prayer, and shared prayer. Each of these chapters reflects prolonged experience and theological reflection on this experience of prayer or listening and response to the word of God in the Spirit. Then there are four chapters on work, priesthood, hospitality and the autonomy of the monastery respectively. By the position of the chapter on work, it is clear that Benedictine life is not shaped by ministry to the extent that many modern orders and congregations are. Work's value depends upon its integration with prayer and community, what it contributes to the real Christian and human needs of people of our time, and the Christian spirit that animates it.

This review cannot do justice to the wisdom and appropriateness of the theology contained in this volume or to the simplicity, clarity, and directness of style in which its message is presented. The study was thought worthy of publication for a public outside the EBC because, as Cardinal Basil Hume writes in the Foreword, "Many of the issues raised in this book, . . . although discussed in relation to monastic life, are issues which concern all Christians today" (xi). The work represents a remarkable example of community discernment in our time.

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**GOD AND AMERICA'S FUTURE.** By Frederick Sontag and John K. Roth. Wilmington, N.C.: Consortium, 1977. Pp. 224. $11.00; $5.95 paper.

This is the sort of book that gives theology a bad name. It is yet another example of an essentially political argument presented in the guise of theology which can be taken seriously neither as theology nor as political analysis. It leaves the impression that theology is fast becoming a discipline which has lost its rigor and is now simply a vehicle for special pleading.

The argument brings together two currently fashionable themes: civil religion and liberation theology. Its general purpose is to make a case for
the authors' own version of liberation theology as a basis for the civil religion of the future in America. It starts from the premise that this country, because of its obsession with material well-being and its spiritual vacuity, is in need of a second revolution, a "new birth of freedom" which will revive dedication to the principles of 1776 but will be more consistent in the pursuit of equal liberty for all. It then proposes that religion has, or at least can have, an important role to play in preparing the way for such a revolution. If people are to make the sort of changes revolution entails, they must be motivated, and historically religion has been one of the principal sources of the inspiration behind revolution. But this can happen today, say Sontag and Roth, only if theology revises much of what it traditionally has taught. Religious faith can serve as a stimulus to the needed social and political change only if the image of God as a benevolent, all-powerful, and unchanging monarch is replaced by a more dynamic and democratic conception.

By far the most interesting and important sections of the book deal with theodicy. The authors correctly recognize that what liberation theologians have been saying about God poses the problem of evil in a particularly acute form, and that this is an issue which must be addressed if such theology is to be at all persuasive. The question is this: If God is in fact as committed to human liberation as He is said to be, why does He not intervene more decisively and effectively on behalf of the cause of liberation? Why has He allowed so much oppression and exploitation in the past, and why does He allow it to continue? S. and R. face up to the problem in a refreshingly straightforward way, saying, in effect, that the empirical evidence which history provides requires us to say that God is not a perfect liberator, that for unknown reasons His attempts at liberation are restrained, and that therefore He is implicated in responsibility for the evils which afflict our existence.

The problem even here, however, is that it is not at all clear why we should accept what S. and R. suggest. An alternative interpretation which is at least as plausible is that liberation theology starts out with some wrong assumptions. The key question these days about almost any theological assertion has to be the rationale for believing it, and S. and R. provide little in the way of an answer. Most of what they say theologically has the appearance of being speculative in the worst sense, because it is without a clear basis or method; and when they do approximate giving a justification, they come dangerously close to saying that the content of theology should be defined by the current cultural fashions and the demands of politics.

The book fares no better when judged as a political statement. Its recurring theme is freedom, yet at no point do the authors provide a sustained analysis of what freedom means. The meaning of freedom is
one of the most fiercely contested issues in modern politics, and it is
evident that S. and R. are not neutral in this debate. Their whole
argument has partisan implications, and yet they provide hardly any
basis for choosing the view which they favor. Once again, it is a matter of
one unsubstantiated—and unpersuasive—assertion after another.

Georgetown University                  R. Bruce Douglass

THE ARROGANCE OF HUMANISM. By David Ehrenfeld. New York:

Ever since Paul Ehrlich, Garrett Hardin, and Barry Commoner and
their friends elevated doomsday ecology, with its totalitarian implications,
into the exalted status of a new faith, we have been somewhat puzzled
about the "outlines of this history of its dogmas," to borrow from
Harnack. The traditional way to discover the content of a faith was to
find out just what it was against.

Ehrenfeld's book provides us with this needed service: If anyone should
say: "All problems are soluble," anathema sit. "Many problems are
soluble by technology," anathema sit. "Those problems that are not
soluble by technology, or by technology alone, have solutions in the social
world," anathema sit. "When the chips are down, we will apply ourselves
and work together for a solution before it is too late," anathema sit.
"Human civilization will survive," anathema sit. And this is only the tip
of the iceberg. But at least we know what E. is against: the dogmas of
scientific humanism—which has some roots in classical Christianity, to
be sure.

Nowhere, to be sure, does E. specifically embrace the totalitarian
suggestions of an Ehrlich or a Hardin, although logically there is no
reason he would not. Secular humanism, the new religion, the cause of
our worldly woes, however, is indeed properly bashed for its arrogance.
People like Pius XII and Eric Gill voiced many of E.'s worries, worries
about the limits of pure reason and the exaggerations of man's conquest
of nature. Yet I found this a profoundly anti-Christian book, even though
Maritain, Lewis, Tolkien, and Schumacher are cited favorably. It is a
world with no final causes— they only cause our troubles—and no trace
of transcendence. E. evidently has never been in a city, never loved the
rush of humanity, never exulted at what men have made. All he sees are
rats and decadence. He likes Chinese agriculture that has not changed in
forty centuries. When he sees the Mona Lisa, he seems to worry that
someone had to chop down a tree to make the frame to put around it; at
least, that is how his spirit comes across.

In short, E. does not know what the world is "for"; indeed, he insists
that even to ask such a question (Genesis, Aristotle) is to embrace the
hated humanist ethic. So if the world is not "for" man, what is it "for"?
This latter is an impossible question—or is it? E.'s earlier book, *Conserving Life on Earth*, gives a clue. Here "life" is presumably not just human life but all life. Even smallpox virus seems necessary to be preserved (209).

*The Arrogance of Humanism* seems to me to be another kind of arrogance, a kind somehow intrinsic to the ecology movement from the beginning. This is the arrogance of denying a transcendent purpose to man on earth, the very possibility that he is not merely here as a product of slow evolution. E., in fact, seems smitten by that intellectual disease Chesterton described, the one that believes that a qualitative miracle is more explainable if you make it happen slower—in this case, the nature of human life itself. Interestingly, too, when E. cites approvingly the OT idea of the Sabbath, it turns out to have mainly an ecological purpose: Yahweh wanted the grass to grow on Saturdays (264–65).

In a real sense, in spite of the illusion that the book is an attack on secular humanism as a religion, it is merely another version of the same dubious faith, though one probably more dangerous than the one attacked. The book is full of often justified attacks on the pretensions of modern humanism, whose god is indeed completely man-made. What substitutes for the man-made world of the modern secular humanist in E.'s version is the evolutionary humanism of the ecologist, in which man's vocation becomes merely one of letting the grass grow because we never know what will happen to the universe if we step on it.

The "humility" of this approach is, it strikes me, quite disarming; for it intends to tell us that the ongoing eco-systems are the norms of our well-being, that we have no purpose that transcends them. We are almost intruders, in fact, in this world, so that true humanity belongs to those who keep off the grass, so to speak. We must learn to live in a way that enshrines what nature has "evolved"; there are no final causes, so we cannot use our welfare as a criterion for the earth. The earth determines us.

Neither Judaism nor Christianity, nor Aristotle either, ever spoke this way. They did not because the cosmos itself had an end, both internal and external, so that even the destruction of man's world or the world itself was part of a drama that transcended the green grass growing on this earth and all it symbolized.

*The Arrogance of Humanism*'s own "antihumanist" ethic, this too is antihuman. There are three paradoxes in that sentence, I suppose, but taken together they pretty well define E.'s religion. At first sight, his anathemas sound like nothing so much as Augustine on original sin. E., however, has no city of God. What he has is the earth without the city, a planet on which it would have been better not to have placed man in the first place; he only fouls things up. If anyone still believes that the
absence of God is a neutral thing, let him be anathema—or let him read *The Arrogance of Humanism*.  

*Georgetown University*  

**JAMES V. SCHALL, S.J.**


Even a secular age lives by myths. Since Darwin's time, many of the enduring secular myths of the Western world have been taken from biology. The crowning myth, of course, remains Darwin's own theory of evolution. One of the many things Midgley does well is to dissociate the bogus mythmaking in evolutionary thought from what is of genuine philosophical value. She also pinpoints fallacies in the more recent biological myths associated with genetics, ethology, and sociobiology. Philosophical obfuscation is no less a target for her discerning observations. Rationalism, existentialism, egoism, humanism, all come in for criticism.

But M.'s aim is by no means to fill up the philosophical dustbin with discarded theories and beliefs. Her theme is the unity of human beings with the rest of animal creation and she ably advances that thesis. She argues rightly that philosophers of all sorts have denigrated the animal in human nature. Rationalists and existentialists alike have erred by making animals out to be not much more than machines hung with fur and feathers. To both the philosophical and common-sense despisers of animals, M. responds that only machines are made by human beings, and so only machines can be understood by reading their specifications off a blueprint. As with humans, so with animals, actions may not be explained by deterministic models alone. From the animal studies of Tinbergen, Lorenz, Goodall, Schaller, and Eibel-Eibesfeldt, she shows how alike human and animal behavior are. Animals, like humans, communicate, care for their young, save the helpless, bury their dead, solve problems and delight in play. We should not be scandalized by this. Human dignity "arises within nature, not against it." "Kinship," she notes, "is not identity."

The picture of human nature M. paints is moral in the old-fashioned sense of strength of character displayed in the midst of life's complexities. Her treatment of rationality is a tonic for those who find the abstract ideal of living for one's own ends, so popular with Anglo-American philosophers, indigestible and Kantian formalism unnourishing. Reason, she says, always means more than intelligence. It involves "a definite structure of preferences, a priority system based on feeling." Rationality can be expected "only where there are long-standing deep relationships." And so, in the name of morality M. makes vigorous defense of reliable relationships and lasting interpersonal commitments—in marriage, family
life, childbearing, and role responsibilities. She is unsparing in her criticism of libertarianism for isolating individuals "from all connection with others, therefore, from what gives life meaning: tradition, influence, affection, personal and local ties, natural roots and sympathies, Hume's sentiment of humanity." She worries that people behave "as if life were not worth living except at the top of the dominance hierarchy."

M.'s ethical conclusions may be upsetting to women's liberationists. But this book places her firmly in the front ranks of women philosophers. She stands in a tradition which runs from Simone Weil to Iris Murdoch. She shows the same sensitivity to the richness of life and the depth of human personality as the first two thinkers. Like them, she writes with clarity and color; and her mind is at home in literature, philosophy, and science.

Like Murdoch, too, M. seems to be a Christian atheist, or maybe a religious naturalist. She is agnostic about theological matters and conveys a decidedly post-Christian tone. But, with Murdoch, she seems to believe that the Christian tradition provides important clues to comprehending human nature in its full depth. Though naturalistic by design, Beast and Man concludes with a refutation of atheistic humanism which cites the words God speaks to Job out of the whirlwind. Man (her usage), she seems to say, is a religious animal who experiences wonder and awe. That wonder should inspire reverence for our fellow creatures. One could do far worse in composing a philosophical anthropology, and few have done better than Mary Midgley. In this era of biology, I expect Beast and Man will remain a landmark of excellence in scientifically informed philosophy for a long time to come.

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DREW CHRISTIANSEN, S.J.


Aware of the fact that religion is an important aspect of human life, and of the need to study its expressions and manifestations in an academic manner, the authors have collaborated to produce an introductory text to religion for the college student. The first part deals with the problem of defining religion and describes religion as a field of study, identifying both the appropriate data and the reasons for studying religion. The second outlines the varieties of religious expression: myth, belief, ritual, scripture, and art. Part 3 takes up several religious issues, including the problem of God, evil and suffering, death, and salvation. Finally, the editors consider commitment and objectivity in the study of religion.

This is a very useful text for college students. Written clearly and intelligently, it exposes the reader to the major religious dimensions of life and also
to some of the different perspectives from the many religions which arose and developed in the course of history. The questions for study and discussion, the suggested projects for student participation, and the selected bibliographies, all of which are appended to each section of Parts 2 and 3, make this volume even more suitable for class use. Unfortunately, the collection of essays contains no attempt to outline and compare the different disciplinary approaches to the study of religion; the material on Eastern religions in particular needs to be supplemented by other readings. But these are minor defects in an introduction to religion which is student-oriented and covers plenty of ground in an interesting fashion; in my opinion, easily the most recommendable introductory text on religion available.

John A. Saliba, S.J.


If there is one phase of biblical study which needs sound, informed, and accurate interpretation of data, it is biblical archeology. Its potential as a tool for illuminating the sacred text as well as the many-sided limitations inherent in the discipline must be kept in a nice balance if one is to exploit the real and substantial values of this exciting and thriving branch of biblical science. Neither the press nor popular lecturers have served the public especially well in evaluating the discoveries made in the Ancient Near East, many of which have a bearing on the biblical record. In view of this situation, it is gratifying to recommend without reservation this extraordinarily good and fairly priced textbook which brings into proper focus the rich, diverse, and occasionally ambiguous evidence turned up by the archeologist. Professor of Hebrew and Semitic Studies at the University of Wisconsin and a participant in Palestinian excavations, S. demonstrates an uncommon talent for clear, relatively comprehensive, and tempered presentation of archeological results. I cannot recall over the past twenty-five years a book which gives so much reliable information and sane interpretation in a little over five hundred pages.

The book is divided into three parts. The first, "Understanding Biblical Archaeology," defines terms, settles limits to what both the Bible and archeology can deliver, and sketches the development of the science. It was here (143) that I found, in spelling and photographic reproduction, two of the rare lapses which a careful reading of the book detected. Part 2 surveys about twenty-five significant sites, including the most recent, outside the Holy Land. The last part does the same for over twenty sites within the Holy Land, including Arad, Jerusalem, Qumran, and Hazor. At the end of each chapter S. has added suggested topics for further study, as well as selective and thoroughly reliable bibliography for the student. I wish this book the success which its responsible handling of archeological evidence merits.

Frederick L. Moriarty, S.J.


Few have not felt the summons to prophetic activity in the face of evils besetting contemporary society. But if prophetic ministry is to have specific meaning and direction, as against a formless do-goodism, we would do well to reflect upon the phenomenon of biblical prophecy, which remains the paradigm for both Jews and Christians. B., already well known for several stimulating, interpretative works on prophecy and wisdom, explores here the following hypothesis: "The task of prophetic ministry is to nurture, nourish, and evoke a consciousness and perception alternative to the consciousness and perception of the dominant culture
around us” (13). An oppressive community must be dismantled and a new, compassionate community must be energized. Prophetic ministry works in two complementary directions, negative and then positive.

The book is rich in fresh and challenging perceptions of Israel’s situation and our own; the two chapters on the prophetic work of Jesus, describing his gift of a new future to the marginal and dispossessed, commend this book to NT students as well. If I have any misgiving, it is that B. seems to make kingship the whipping boy of his treatment; the wicked monarchy is the big target of radical prophetic criticism. But the prophets were just as quick to excoriate venal judges, rapacious merchants, and unworthy priests as they were oppressive kings. And an institution which both inspired the royal psalms and provided basic symbolism for Israel’s Messianic hope cannot be all bad. But if he seems to have erected too much on the still fragile hypothesis of royal wickedness, there is no hesitation in recommending this compelling interpretation of prophetic ministry.

Frederick L. Moriarty, S.J.


This carefully argued essay provides an answer to those who too readily equated the crisis of biblical theology with its demise, forgetting that crisis always opens up fresh and creative opportunities. Professor of OT at Harvard Divinity School, H. explores a fundamental question: “is it possible, given full critical-historical investigation of Scripture, motivated by reverence for God and compassion for our fellow creatures, to evolve a model of viewing divine activity which brings our religious heritage into a meaningful and creative relationship with our experience as modern persons?”

The affirmative answer is worked out by proposing a model called dynamic transcendence, a perception of God’s activity as dialectically engaged in both heritage and new community experiences, with God appearing as the living, mysterious Reality at the heart of all reality. I would particularly recommend these reflections to Catholics who, in either pastoral or academic work, must come to terms with revealed truth as it impinges on a changing world. Our own tradition is best understood as a religious heritage, a living, self-renewing reality which assists us in coping responsibly with contemporary experience. The book is well worth the considerable effort needed to assimilate its argument.

Frederick L. Moriarty, S.J.


Dealing with religious language as used and evaluated by empirical philosophers is a difficult task. Not the least of the problems is the historical animosity that has existed between such philosophers and religious believers of all kinds. In recent decades, however, greatly influenced by the brilliant Austrian-born philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein, more and more theologians have become convinced that analytical-empirical philosophy can make some contribution to an understanding of faith and specifically to talk about God.

This little book is an introduction to the thought of a number of important empiricists about the possibility and the possible validity of “God-talk.” In writing it, T., who describes himself as a Catholic and an empiricist, has performed a valuable service, particularly for those unfamiliar with the empiricists. In addition to describing briefly the positions of a good number of important empirical thinkers on the subject of talking of God, T. has grouped them into categories which are gener-
ally helpful. The modern thinkers presented include men as varied as A. J. Ayer, Antony Flew, Paul van Buren, Dallas High, Ian T. Ramsey, and John Hick. After an exposition of each position, a criticism is given. A final chapter—the most interesting and tentative in the book—deals with a variety of approaches to the question “How to Justify Talking about God.”

This work is quite clearly an introduction. It does not pretend to give any final answer. As an introduction, it opens up the question and exposes a number of positions quite well. Its tentativeness makes it a good springboard for discussion and further research into the question and into the thinkers treated.

Walter C. McCauley, S.J.


This book is a “somewhat abbreviated” version of S.’s dissertation at Munich under the direction of L. Scheffczyk. His main thesis is that in the history of dogmatic theology insufficient attention has been given to the possible origins of dogma, even in the Scriptures themselves. Admittedly, this is a modern problem with roots in the liberal theology of Harnack, who contended that dogmas were the creation of a corrupting Greek influence in the Church; in reality, S. says, the sense of dogma must be conceived in a broader spectrum. There is a developing, though oftentimes contradictory, body of literature from both Catholics and Protestants on the history of dogma (S. provides thirteen single-spaced pages of bibliography), and, among other things, we know that the specific and controversial usage of the term today has its source in Melchior Cano and Vatican I. Behind this usage (characterized by a certain word selection and propositional order), there is a deeper historical residue: a decision and consensus of faith. S. illustrates this through a consideration of early confessional forms as found in the hymns of the NT; he is most influenced by H. Schlier’s understanding of the primitive faith’s content as praesymbola. Thus dogma’s true nature is marked by a fixity of content but not of formulas.

S. gives us a view of dogmatic development as a historical-critical process. I find this information helpful, but ultimately dissatisfying for two reasons. First, history will show us controversial dialectics at work, but I suspect that there are more theories abounding than the retrievable data will ever be able to substantiate (e.g., how would S. explain the Marian dogmas? In what way are they a part of the original faith’s content?). Secondly, dogmatic history per se will never convert me or make me a believer, regardless of how dogmas have developed.

There are alternatives. One would be Lonergan’s view (not included in the bibliography) of the permanence of dogmatic meaning: history plays a secondary role to the more central philosophical problem of the ongoing discovery of mind, i.e., there is an ever more profound differentiation of historical consciousness in the discovery of what is true. Dogmas thus become a part of the fascinating arena of both historical and personal conversion.

Jerome M. Dittberner


To one well versed in contemporary theology, these “meditations” make for quite provocative reading. In accord with the humility which M. attributes to God in the book’s title, he has himself produced a readable yet professional commentary on the entire Creed, and chosen to name this innovative compendium a series of reflections.
M.'s central concern is God's nearness and companionship, his down-to-earthness and immanence. The author seeks to aid Christians in "Christianizing" their concept of the God who is unveiled by Jesus to be not an apathetic sovereign on an emerald throne, but a compassionate servant at the heart of creation opening man's will up to himself through painful faithfulness and shocking vulnerability.

What is original here is not that M. tackles afresh the issue of the Father's passibility, but that he is careful to do so with great balance and even candid awareness of how radical his treatment is. The Christian can only learn the identity of the hidden Father through the stark weakness of His Son's venture on Calvary. M.'s approach is decidedly Christocentric, while it underscores the perennial need for a natural theology, and sympathetic with a quasi-Hegelianism, while it warns that transcendence is the other half of the bipolar truth about the lovingly near yet always distant God. M. settles on the concept of God's "serenity" as a better term than impassibility, since the former expresses the Father's infinite capacity to bear and absorb anguish.

Though one is accustomed to reading that God makes Himself vulnerable, it is a bit more disconcerting to be told that God "limits Himself" through creation (4). M. only employs such phrases at the start, and then speaks later more consistently of "humility," but the initial jolt is never fully softened. Another fault is that M. hardly disguises his dislike for liberation theology; his inveterately existential colors shine through radiantly. This would not be so reprehensible in itself, if M. did not make disparaging comments against the liberationists and then purposely leave out their names (50-53). The final analysis, however, must remain positive. Professors and pastors could locate few books which would expose modern Christians to a more extensive and yet compact approach to the Creed, which is as faith-shaking as it is faith-building.

Philip J. Rosato, S.J.


This volume first appeared in Brazil in 1972. An epilogue is added to the English edition, written later in an atmosphere of greater tolerance, which allows more direct use of liberation language and thought. In general, B. follows the pattern of several recent Christologies, emphasizing a historical and biblical approach. He begins with methodological considerations of the historical approach to Christology, and situates this view amid more cosmic, philosophical, and psychological approaches. He then moves through the life, death, and resurrection of Jesus to the traditional formulations of Christology. The final sections examine where we find Jesus Christ today, what can we call him, and what Christology says on the essence of Christianity.

While I find agreement with the broad movement of the book, and its attempt to set forth a Christology in a Latin American context, my overall impression is that B. tries to say too much, too quickly, often uncritically. Thus, one can find paragraphs which touch on major issues such as the sinlessness of Jesus, the meaning of the Trinity, the relation of Jesus to the Church, and the meaning of the Christological titles. But insights are presented as conclusions more than critically argued for. And in the use of Scripture, numerous texts are referred to, often in an uncritical, almost proof-text manner. At times one finds a curious mixture of modes of language. A subheading in chap. 12, e.g., speaks of "Christ as Conciliation of Opposites, Divine Milieu, and a Tremendous
High.” This makes the theological argument and logic of the book difficult or impossible to discover.

In light of the ongoing reflection on Christology in a Latin American context in more recent books such as Sobrino’s Christology at the Crossroads, the chief value of B.’s volume would seem to be that it is an early attempt to begin this process.

Peter Schineller, S.J.


These Gregorian theologians have again produced a fine work replete with a thorough bibliography, a survey of recent studies on pain and evil in psychology, sociology, and philosophy, and a historical study of the cross in theology from the OT to modern times. Distinguishing clearly the Catholic from the Protestant position on the theologia crucis, they refuse to absolutize the cross-paradox as God’s definitive self-revelation, but consider it within a theology of creation as a complementary aspect to a theology of glory. The cross is only fully understood from the Resurrection.

Rejecting a vindictive-justice explanation of suffering, they judge pain rather a “functional evil,” a stimulus to progress and the complete development of man. Christ’s cross is likewise understood within this anthropological, evolutionary framework as the concrete actualization of his total dedication to the Father. Thus he becomes the cause of our salvation, a cause described as instrumental, personal, and sacramental. Following Christ involves a cross for the disciple in combating or patiently bearing evils in order to continue Christ’s influence in a quasi-sacramental manner.

The authors wisely recognize that no explanation of suffering is completely satisfactory and that Christ’s choice of the cross remains a mystery. They even recognize that the love of the cross witnessed by the great mystics does not fit into their evolutionary categories. Paralleling the complementarities of ascending and descending Christologies and of objective and subjective redemptive influences, which F. and A. recognize, must not their dynamic view be complemented by a static view, so that there be hope and meaning for “misfits” crunched in the jaws of progress? Though pointing in the right direction, the authors must still explain how personal categories envelop and preserve ontic categories. This work is valuable for spirituality and speculative theology.

John M. McDermott, S.J.


The interplay between Scripture and theology is always a delicate task. Most frequently when authors try to wed both approaches into a single perspective, there is almost a total failure. It is refreshing to read B.’s work, since not only does he attempt such an enterprise but actually accomplishes his purpose. He does not try to give a biblical foundation to his thought and then present his theological conclusions. Rather, he integrates the findings of contemporary biblical research into the findings of contemporary theology, philosophy, and psychology.

The book is divided into two sections: “Man the Sinner” treats reconciliation, the breaking of the relationship with God and the possibility of sin; “Sinful Humanity” deals with the human situation before Christ and in Christ. B. also deals quite well with the Sin of the World and follows the contemporary theory on fundamental option.

Some notions merit mention. B. is careful to point out that scripturally the mercy and goodness of God is of
greater significance than human sin. Only grave personal sin fulfills the understanding of sin as expounded by B. Venial sin is not an opposition to God but rather a refusal of God’s grace. His anthropology is based quite heavily upon the approach of K. Rahner. He also treats quite well the question of violence. His comments on indignation as the first manifestation of liberty in the presence of violence is provocative philosophically and theologically. In short, the book offers a personal integration of many contemporary themes involved with the meaning of evil and sin.

John F. O’Grady


The chief problem with J.’s book is that it tries to do too much. In its fairly brief compass are at least parts of three books: a new theology of the sacraments based on Augustine, a discussion of Eucharistic history with suggestions for present practice, and a discussion of the history and practice of the sacrament of baptism with what he calls its two sacramental correlates, penance and ordination. The excuse for this overabundance can be found in the relative paucity of contemporary material, but it does make for a somewhat confusing whole.

The result is that the first six chapters, the theology of the sacraments, continually leave the reader asking just where all this is going, a question which is not helped by J.’s rather frequent assertion that he will be answering that question in the next chapter. A second result is that while in the historical sections J. gives full documentation of all the theories that have been advanced by responsible scholars, he gives little or no reason for the choices which he makes except to say “the arguments of Ferdinand Hahn are decisive” or “Classical Reformation theology worked this out with great insight and precision.” One is also surprised to find no real discussion of the theories of the late Gregory Dix, or in the presentation of the place of the narrative of institution in the Great Thanksgiving, no mention of the Liturgy of Addai and Marai.

Despite these negative comments, J. has given us a stimulating and exciting book. One may quarrel with the way in which he has reached his conclusions, but his insights are penetrating and thought-provoking. If the reader gets somewhat lost in the theology of the first fifty pages or so, he should persist, for better things are on the way and he will put the book down, as I did, happy that he persevered to the end.

Howard G. Hageman


An internationally acknowledged expert on ecclesiology and ecumenism, Père Dejaivre of the Pontifical Oriental Institute gathers in this brief volume five lectures illustrating shifts between Vatican I and Vatican II. After addressing in the first chapter the revival of the doctrine of the particular church, he then considers in the four remaining chapters the doctrine of collegiality, the status of patriarchates, membership in the Church, and papal primacy. Each of these questions is carefully traced through the acta of Vatican I, the Catholic theology of the interconciliar period, and the discussions of Vatican II, which are explained with abundant quotations from the schemata, the Council speeches, and the proposed amendments.

Frankly committed to a collegial or “communional” ecclesiology, D. finds this dominant in Vatican II, even though some of its documents, in his
estimation, still lie too much under the shadow of the more juridical ecclesiology of Vatican I. Especially interesting to this reader are D.'s remarks on papal primacy. Vatican I, in D.'s opinion, was excessively concerned with the wholly exceptional case in which a pope might find himself in opposition to the other bishops, and for this reason it neglected the ordinary case of collegial co-operation. A better ecclesiology would see the pope as exercising the "subsidiary" function of assisting the other bishops to discharge the pastoral task which they have received not from Rome but from Christ himself.

Without going beyond the rather narrow limits he sets for himself, D. makes a solid contribution that will be of interest to those concerned with the institutional changes in the doctrine of the Church registered by the two Vatican Councils.

_Avery Dulles, S.J._


This volume represents an excellent collection of working papers from the symposium held Feb. 9–14, 1977 in Vienna by the Institute of Indology of the Vienna University under the title "‘Transcendental Experience, Horizon of Attainment of Salvation: The Relevance of the Indian Spirituality and Mysticism for Christian Theology.’" The concerted effort of invited Indologists and Christian theologians was their preoccupation with the question whether there is any transcendental experience which can be the horizon of attainment of salvation before any Christian revelation and how one can have it. It is shown that the meditative transcendental experience of mysticism is possible only in two fundamental forms: transcendence can be experienced either implicitly in its mythical presence which results from the faith (this seems to be the case in the theistic meditation with appropriation structure) or it can become experience explicitly by eliminating consciously in the meditation any transcendence which was first experienced mythically (as happens in the Samadhi of the suppression yoga or also in the Advaitic meditation). Both types are noticeable also in Christian spirituality. All this is well explained by Oberhammer in his richly informing preface. The symposium has a twofold contribution, Indological and theological, and follows a logical line of a comparative science of religion, with its thorough conceptual explanation and holistic interpretation of adjacent meanings.

The initial study, "‘Transcendental Experience as Accomplishment Horizon of Salvation,’" is O.'s attempt to reflect the themes of the symposium retrospectively from the matter-of-fact standpoint. The contributions of the individual sciences take up the theme of the symposium in relation to a concrete form of Indian and Western spirituality by making it visible through philological-spiritual-historical interpretation as historical form. In contrast to the Indian contribution, only a limited number of contributions deal with Christian mysticism. This richly informative volume is warmly recommended to theologians, historians, and students of comparative science of religion.

_Ludvik Nemec_


Although the rear cover advertises "thoroughly updated" material, the reader familiar with K.'s book will find, probably with some relief, that little has actually been changed. The book basically remains what it has always been: an introduction to patristic theology which is competent, easy to follow, wide-ranging, heavily footnoted to
original sources, and, in spite of its length, concise. The most noticeable changes throughout are the updated bibliographies. Every reader will fail to find some item (s)he thinks important for a particular field, but only the most churlish would deny that K. has consistently consulted the major secondary works. The "Prolegomena" has a section rearranged; "Judaism" now appears before "Religious Trends in the Roman Empire," reflecting recent research on Jewish influence on the early Church. But if there are "sweepingly updated early chapters" (to quote the rear cover again), they were done with almost no revision of the use of original sources. For example, this reviewer compared the footnotes in chaps. 2 of this and the second edition (1960) and found exactly one change—an additional footnote (48, n. 1) in the new edition, while the other 130 notes remained unchanged. Unquestionably new material is the new, final chapter "Mary and the Saints." Although clear and heavily footnoted (78 notes), it is too brief (ten pages) to be effective and simply does not compare well with the other chapters. But this is a minor criticism of what remains a very fine work.

The publishers have "updated" the book in their own way: soft cover, poor-quality paper, higher price. These alone may make the earlier, hardbound editions preferable in many instances.

J. F. T. Kelly


It is generally well known that in the course of the centuries the popes have made determinations about the liturgy that have had a broad impact on the public worship of the Church. Hardly known at all is the importance of the liturgy in the functioning of the "papal court" or "Roman Curia." These very terms mislead us, in fact, by suggesting that the pope and his entourage viewed themselves primarily as princes or bureaucrats, rather than as ministers of word and sacrament. Besides its value for specialists in the history of liturgy, the texts D. has edited testify to this broader phenomenon: "Qu'on ne pense pas trop ici à une cour: autour du vicaire du Christ, c'est plutôt le culte divine qui est en jeu" (14).

The volume contains a critical edition, with introductions, of two major documents: the Ceremonial of Gregory X (ca. 1273) and the Ceremonial of Latino Malabranca (ca. 1280). There are also several shorter documents related to papal liturgies in the thirteenth century. In every instance the editing is meticulous; the introductions are sober and informative. D. thus continues with distinction the studies of Andrieu, Van Dijk, and others.

A second volume devoted to the Ceremonial of Cardinal Stephaneschi is already in press, and D. is now preparing an edition of the important liturgical texts compiled by Agostino Patrizi for Pope Sixtus IV in the late fifteenth century. The publication of this latter volume will be especially welcome, for the history of Renaissance liturgies has until now received practically no attention. D. deserves congratulations and our gratitude.

John W. O'Malley, S.J.


To the student of Reformation history, the name Cajetan brings to mind his encounter with Luther in Augsburg in 1518. The usual histories depict this as the conflict between authority and the freedom of the Christian in which Cajetan is not a theologian but an imperious autocrat. The present volume should help to change that one-sided portrait. W. offers eleven of C.'s trea-
tises (either in complete translation or in synopsis) written as responses to opinions he met either in dealing with or in reading the writings of the Reformers. Eight of the treatises are connected with Luther and they include: C.'s "Augsburg Treatises" (1518), composed while he was preparing for and during his meeting with Luther; his "Divine Institution of the Pontifical Office" (1521); the "Sacrifice of the Mass and Its Rites—against the Lutherans" (1531), in which he demonstrates that the Mass does not do away with the unicity of Christ's sacrifice on the cross. In his "Guidelines for Concessions to the Lutherans" (1531) C. indicates the items he considers negotiable and shows how far he would yield to effect unity with the Lutherans. One treatise, "Errors on the Lord's Supper" (1525), has Zwingli in mind, showing that the Supper is not a mere commemoration and that the words of institution demand a literal interpretation.

The two remaining treatises deal with Henry VIII and his divorce.

Though written in the sixteenth century, the treatises are unlike other polemical writings of that period. C. writes to instruct, not to ridicule. He does not demean himself by yielding to vituperation and insult but permits the clarity of his argumentation to carry the proof. His arguments are taken solely from Scripture, thereby turning the very proof-texts of his adversaries against them.

The book has an excellent introduction on Cajetan, the man, his works, and his relationship to the Reformation, and the treatises enjoy abundant critical notes. We owe gratitude to Wicks for conceiving and executing a source book that will prove important to historians and theologians alike. It would be of inestimable aid to the study of the Reformation if additional volumes, dealing with other Catholic theologians of the sixteenth century, were to follow.

*Joseph N. Tylenda, S.J.*


A shortened, revised version of T.'s 1974 Oxford doctoral thesis. It proposes to study San Juan's poetry and theology in the *Cántico* not only in themselves but also in relation to each other, thus distinguishing it from most books on San Juan, which deal either with his literary or his spiritual achievements.

T.'s study is divided into seven chapters, supplemented by an appendix, an English version of the *Cántico*. T. begins (chap. 1) by defining the literary and theological tradition upon which San Juan drew and to which he added. Turning to the *Cántico*, he first discusses its genesis (chap. 2) and then addresses the question of the relationship between its two redactions (chap. 3), arguing that the second redaction is authentic and that, while the first is the best guide to San Juan as a poet, the second is the final word of a poet who is also a theologian. Chap. 4 considers the *Cántico*'s literary sources: T. affirms the primacy of the Bible's influence and judges the influence of secular literature to be negligible. The next chapter offers what T. describes as "perhaps the most surprising finding of this study" (115): San Juan is not a poet by accident but by craft; he is a skilled master of poetic techniques and language. An equally significant point is made in chap. 6: it is impossible to distinguish neatly between the poem and the commentary, for they constantly interact. T. concludes (chap. 7) with an evaluation of San Juan's theology from the contrasting viewpoints of Tillich and Barth on mysticism. There is an ample bibliography and an adequate index.

One weakness is that, while T. makes much of the distinction between scholastic theology and mystical theology prior to and at the time of San Juan (see pp. 4–6), he nowhere mentions the
formal separation that occurred between dogmatic theology and ascetical-mystical theology during the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. Taking this watershed in the history of theology into account would have made more sharply focused this part of T.'s study. This criticism apart, T. has written an important and stimulating book which no serious student of San Juan can afford to ignore.

Joseph F. Chorpenning, O.S.F.S.


Borrowing insights from psychology, anthropology, and the history of religions, H. argues that the priest is a symbol in a community and cannot be adequately understood merely in terms of his actions, cultic, counseling, or administrative. Using a model of “bimodal consciousness” as a way of understanding our experience, the priesthood, he says, is rooted in the “receptive mode” as opposed to the “action mode.” The receptive mode is “holistic, nonlinear, analogical, and intuitive,” whereas the action mode is “analytical, linear, digital, and rational.” In other words, the priest can best be understood in terms of stories, symbols, and myths rather than in terms of logical analysis, rational principles, and organizational roles.

The discussion of the ordination of women has introduced the discussion of the priest as symbol but on a rather superficial level—that of mere representation of the maleness of Christ. H. suggests that the very nature of the priest, rooted in its shamanistic origins, is to be a symbol, a bridge-figure. The priest by his/her very presence in the community raises the consciousness of the community concerning the numinous. Contrary to much contemporary discussion, the function of the priest does not depend on personal qualities (although these cannot be ignored, especially in designating or training candidates for the priesthood), but the priest, just in virtue of being priest, represents God to man whether positively or negatively. It is difficult for people to be neutral concerning the priest.

In the shamanistic tradition (H. is careful not to identify the priest with the shaman, but merely to indicate that the priest as archetypal image is rooted in the shamanistic background) the priest “raises and expands the consciousness of those he serves,” illuminating their lives through the symbols, metaphors, and myths of the tradition he guards. But the priest not only preserves the symbolic tradition; he is himself a living symbol with all the illuminative and evocative functions of any symbol. He is thus a realistic (humble) servant, a servant of change, a discerning servant with a trained intellect, a “liminal” servant (a threshold figure) and an authoritative servant (one with the authority of Jesus, internal as opposed to external authority). The encompassing definition of the priestly function is a “salvific illumination.”

H.’s basic thesis is a refreshing addition to the current rather banal discussion about the nature and function of the priest, but it would be strengthened were it less anecdotal and less casual (at times even superficial) in its use of sources.

T. Howland Sanks, S.J.


An important book, which should be a great help in solving the problems of ecumenism in the world today; but one must continually remind oneself that M. is speaking about the Catholic charismatic movement (CCM) on an international level, as is indicated by the
impressive list of scholars at the beginning of the book. He must be considering the European and British scene rather than America. In Europe the CR seems to be more balanced, more Catholic, and more sacramental. M. deals with the renewal within various religious persuasions and comments on its astonishing power, much-needed evangelization, and community life. The Church has failed in so many ways even after Vatican II. In fact, one gains a very black picture of the contemporary Church from the book. For M. external profession of the faith and sacraments are not sufficient (21). He gives four case histories illustrating this failure of the Church, but not one case history to exemplify disillusionment about the CR, yet many could be quoted. This is not to say that M. is entirely uncritical about the CR (cf., e.g., abuse of conscience, p. 5). Yet surely it is the North American CR, acting in their assumed international leadership, not the Church, which has so little respect for personhood, so great a stress on conformity and censureship; e.g., the most influential communities in North America will have nothing to do with the journal Catholic Charismatic published by Paulist Press.

When referring to the communities in the CR, M. omits to mention that the communities in early Acts upon which the pentecostal communities partly base their principles were entirely Jewish, not ecumenical at all; the Gentile mission had not begun. We do not hear of such communities in Asia Minor. M. gives some good advice (59-97) on ecumenism in the CR, but he fails to mention that the central international organization has now dropped the word “Catholic” from its title, which reads Charismatic Renewal Services, and also that the Ann Arbor Life in the Spirit Seminars, which are internationally used, are completely religiously indifferent (cf. 91), whereas You Shall Find Power, written by Sister Sharon and Sister Phillip Marie (distributed by Pecos Benedictine Monastery and other places) is entirely Catholic. The LSS are anything but heavy with doctrine and theology (contra M. 91).

M.’s pastoral suggestions (98–113) are excellent and the reviewer hopes they will be implemented. However, all in all, even though the theoretical or academic aspect of the book is of high quality, M. still continues to write from his ivory tower, without reading the literature or listening to the tape recordings which pass through the hands of the average pentecostal Catholic in so many countries. Neither does he fully face grave practical issues, such as prearranged marriages always inside the covenant community, the wide use of fundamentalist books and tapes (but cf. 4–6). The book is documented with good academic but not popular sources.

J. Massyngberde Ford


M.’s book grows out of his six years of work for prisoners as a volunteer and a law student and his undergraduate studies in theology at St. Joseph’s College in Philadelphia. Despite numerous imperfections, the book is valuable because it is the work of an intelligent and compassionate person dealing in a spirit of faith with an area of life marked by numerous individual and social failures. One of his great merits is that M. is not afraid of the great theological and philosophical issues (sin, free will, the place of love in social ethics, the justification of punishment), while he keeps a concerned and charitable eye on the experiences of those who suffer in the American prison system. Unlike some earlier reformers, he is sensitive to “the difficulties involved in trying to remain true to an altruistic, religious ideal within the context of political and social reality” (42). The theological framework M. employs is liberationist; it calls for the solidarity of
Christians with the oppressed and affirms the need to relate Christian thinking on criminal justice to broader issues of social justice (129); but he does not attempt to meet this need in a systematic way. His work is more useful for the way in which it opens up the issues of criminal justice for theological reflection than for its resolution of these issues, which is often sketchy and fails to achieve a systematic unity.

John Langan, S.J.


This projected sixty-volume series focuses upon the great mystics, spiritual seekers, visionaries, and religious teachers of the Catholic, Protestant, Eastern Orthodox, Jewish, Islamic, and American Indian traditions. Because of content, broad influence, and wide-ranging influence, each volume has been critically chosen, lucidly translated, and excellently introduced by internationally acknowledged scholars. Paulist Press must be praised for its selectivity, over-all book format, original cover designs by contemporary artists, and indexes for each volume.

Julian of Norwich—Showings, translated and introduced by Edmund Colledge, O.S.A., and James Walsh, S.J., presents both the short and long text of the most difficult, most profound, and greatest of all medieval English spiritual writers. Her exposition of the God of love, Christ's humanity and passion, the “hazelnut vision,” the servant/master parable, contemplative prayer, etc., should be assimilated by contemporary spirituality.

Bonaventure—The Soul's Journey into God, The Tree of Life, The Life of St. Francis, translated and introduced by Ewart Cousins, offers a comprehensive picture of Bonaventure's ("the prince of mystics") Franciscan spirituality. The theological interpretation of St. Francis' life, the devotional meditations on Jesus' life, and the speculative-mystical treatise provide an outstanding blending of reverential piety, salvation-history devotion, speculation, and mystical experience.

Jacob Boehme—The Way to Christ, translated and introduced by Peter Erb, renders the best introduction to the final form of the thought, spirituality, experience, cosmic vision, and blending of Lutheran theology, alchemy, and theosophy of the "inspired shoemaker." This meditational guide, progressively more difficult to read as one advances, leads a person out of his sinfulness to an ecstatic visionary experience with divine wisdom.

William Law—A Serious Call to a Devout and Holy Life and The Spirit of Love edited by Paul G. Stanwood, delineates the need for forms and routine in daily prayer to combat the self-satisfaction of nominal Christianity, as well as a mystical treatise heavily influenced by Boehme.

Harvey D. Egan, S.J.


Metz's sermon "Encouragement for Prayer" emphasizes that those who pray are never alone but participate in a great historical-social drama. Rejecting the question-and-answer approach to prayer, he sees prayer as a total yes to God in the midst of contradiction, suffering, oppression, and death. He underscores the need to expand the all-too-optimistic language of liturgical prayer to include more fear, doubt, and crying from the depths. Jesus' prayer on the cross is the paradigm of good prayer. Prayer, too, must not be speech without responsibility, but must contain a social-political "moment" of praying with the poor and the oppressed. We ought, moreover, to ask ourselves frequently what we really expect from prayer and to what or to whom we are praying. Authentic prayer reminds us of our identity, dignity, and
responsibility by removing us from the lonely crowd. It contradicts, moreover, the banality and apathy inherent in so much of contemporary life.

Rahner's theological essay "Prayer to the Saints" links the theme of honoring the saints with praying to the dead. He attributes today's forgetfulness of the saints and the dead to an unchristian unbelief in immortality and the tendency to allow God's Mystery to swallow up everything individual and particular. Rejecting a crude notion of mediatorship, R. insists that honoring the saints explicates the universal intercommunication between all persons which intends all persons, even the dead, in every act of love of neighbor. Prayer to the saints, moreover, is prayer to God, and to pray to the saints is to have them pray with us. Their intercession, moreover, is their one, whole, saved, eternally confirmed history which stands before God and in which we participate. Dismissing the notion of the saints as one uniform mass, he emphasizes their different functions in salvation history by noting the qualitative incomparability of any completed existence. Neither parapsychology nor spiritualism, honoring the saints and praying to and for the dead are duties needing cultivation; for they explicate that we cannot say yes to God without saying yes to each other, that mediation is a moment of the person's structure for immediacy to God, and that no one surrenders to God's loving Mystery without calling into play the solidarity of all persons in Christ.

Harvey D. Egan, S.J.


It is striking and perhaps paradoxical that the religious communities which have most attracted the interest of secular people—Taizé, Mother Teresa's congregation, and the communities of the Little Brothers and Sisters inspired by Charles de Foucauld—are strongly traditional in doctrine and discipline. These conferences, from a retreat given to candidates for the Little Brothers and Sisters by the well-known leader of the community, are a good case in point.

The accents of this portrayal of religious life differ greatly from those which characterize the American communities, which have changed much since Vatican II. Religious life is described as sharply different from the life of the laity. The language of two worlds, even of two universes, is used to describe the relationship between faith and the terrestrial world. A sharp critique is addressed to the cult of human values. The need for discipline, regularity, and rule is emphasized. The question of evangelization and politics, particularly acute for the Little Brothers and Sisters because of their situation among the poor, is given a treatment that is nuanced but notably distant from, say, that of liberation theology in general.

All of which may be read in two ways: as descriptive of a particular religious call which, essentially, is a twentieth-century adaptation of the monastic tradition, or as a more general taking of position on life in the Church today. In the latter acceptance, it is more open to question, and only rarely speaks from and to the kind of experience of the Church in change had by American Catholics. Still, the authenticity of the faith and of the commitment to the poor of Père René and his community calls for a respectful hearing. It is precisely those religious who consider themselves progressive who may best profit by a reading of these impassioned pages.

Thomas E. Clarke, S.J.


Perhaps the most pervasive heresy in the Church and the world today is a denial of one's basic lovableness. This
lack of self-love, always somehow rooted in one’s past history, interferes with the person’s humble confidence in the face of all the decisions of daily life. This book provides a process for discovering the evidence in one’s past life for a healthy self-love. Its thesis is that “the appropriation of one’s unique history in faith resulting in the discovery of the pervading hand of God is important for authentic Christian decisions in today’s world” (12). Born of E.’s enormous experience, the book is much more to be done than just read, as evidenced by practical tips for spiritual directors and specific exercises for the reader after each chapter, by an abundance of appropriate Scripture references, and by the book’s whole focus.

This appropriation of one’s unique faith-history involves the four phases of remembering, searching for the pattern of God’s ways, seeing a wholeness to my history, and sensing an openness in hope for the future. After presenting the helpful example of his own life, E. describes the difference between meditating and contemplating one’s unique history, and then he gives a chapter to each of the four phases. After showing how this appropriation of past history enlightens present and future decisions both for an individual and for a community, E. concludes with an appendix formally relating this process to the Spiritual Exercises of St. Ignatius.

Although the whole book has references to the Spiritual Exercises, it does not lose its inspiration and effectiveness for someone not familiar with them. E. is careful to describe the signs that reveal a person’s experience to be ripe for this process of faith-appropriation. He also shows how this process has a somewhat different focus from either a psychological or a spiritual healing of memories. This process could happen as part of a prolonged prayer experience or as a follow-up provoked by such a formal retreat experience. The book is helpful in either situation.

The book’s special stress on the historical and developing nature of reality and of the spiritual life makes possible a much more concretely detailed realization of God’s unique love in daily life and avoids that complacent temptation of taking “the same old thing” for granted.

George A. Aschenbrenner, S.J.


This provocative book was written as “a profession of faith in the true God.” P.-E., a Venezuelan Jesuit, in an interesting intellectual maneuver, affirms a type of atheism in that he rejects false gods who are used to bolster unjust societies. The conception of God put forth in the Western world often demands a diminution of human freedom and dignity. Contemporary art, literature, and movies, as well as psychology, mirror this with their descriptions of alienation and pessimism. However, while giving form to this idolatry, the arts are at the same time a cry of protest against it.

The believer is faced with a paradox. New absolutes, such as science, sex, and consumption, are in control. The God worshiped is often an idol. Given this situation, P.-E. sets out to dialogue with modern atheism from the perspective of liberation theology. Offering the biblical conception of God as justice and love who calls us out of slavery to the risks of freedom and dignity, P.-E. surveys the views of Nietzsche, Feuerbach, Freud, Russell, Marx, Camus, and Merleau-Ponty. In spite of oversimplification, there is much clear and insightful discussion pinpointing where atheism can be a purifying agent for Christianity.

There are some shortcomings. The section on Sartre is weak and repetitious. The conclusion appears as a series of slogans and does not do justice to the implications of the text. P.-E., in a personal epilogue, states that the book needs more work. However, he chose to publish it in its present form
in order to say his good-byes to the intellectual world and its "phoniness," wishing "to live out its contents with the oppressed." In spite of limitations and P.-E.'s own disclaimers, the book provides clear insights into modern atheism and at times fascinating reading. This reviewer hopes that P.-E.'s good-byes are not too final.

John P. Hogan

BOOKS RECEIVED

SCRIPTURAL STUDIES


DOCTRINAL THEOLOGY


Buell, J., and O. Hydro. Jesus: God,
Books Received

The Eucharist of the Early Christians.
Stuenkel, O. We Are One in the Spirit.
Theological Foundations for Ministry.

Historical

Olszamowska-Skowron ska, S. Les accords de Vienne et de Rome entre le Saint-Siège et la Russie 1880-1882.

Moral, Law, Liturgy

Timpe, N. Das kanonistische Kirchenbild vom Codex iuris canonici bis zum Beginn des Vaticanum secun-
THEOLOGICAL STUDIES


PASTORAL AND ASCETICAL


SPECIAL QUESTIONS


