BOOK REVIEWS


When Professor Coppens' little book, L'Histoire critique de l'Ancien Testament, appeared in 1938, it was at once acclaimed by Old Testament scholars everywhere as the best available brief presentation of its subject. An illustration of its favorable reception in objective Protestant circles is the appreciative review by Fleming James in the Journal of Biblical Literature (1940, pp. 523 f.). For a highly prejudiced review from a radical Protestant position the reader may be referred to W. A. Irwin in the Journal of Religion (Chicago, 1939, pp. 382-86), where Coppens' stand is said to be intellectually dishonest and is labeled "Hitlerizing" of the human intellect. In passing it may be observed that Professor Irwin's own publications give a good idea of the opposite tendency, in which both facts and logic are thrown away in a scramble for novelty.

In view of the excellence of Coppens' book, it is extremely fortunate that Fathers Ryan and Tribbe have been able to publish this English translation. The translation is clear and accurate; my chief criticism is rather captious, given the difference between the idiom of the two languages: it is that the distinction between the critics' views and those of the author is often obscured, e.g., in the first paragraph of p. 33. In the next edition one would also like to see such adjectives as "evolutional" and "Deuteronomical" changed to the more usual "evolutionary" and "Deuteronomic." Misprints are few and seldom embarrassing to the reader.

In Chapter One the author deals with the history of O.T. criticism, stressing the importance of Wellhausen's work and the development of the Wellhausen school since his retirement from O.T. studies in 1895. It is very well done, with extremely useful references to the literature of the subject. My chief criticism of this chapter would be that the author is sometimes inclined to be a little undiscriminating in his judgments of the significance of recent work in the field, mentioning first-class investigation and second- or third-rate research side by side. However, this is a small matter indeed, when compared with the wealth of information from many lands and circles which Coppens includes in his survey. Mistakes are inevitable in dealing with such scattered material, seldom accessible in any one library. For instance, the author has completely misunderstood Torrey's curious theory of Ezechiel (p. 44). The actual hypothesis of this distinguished but subjective investigator, presented in his Pseudo-Ezekiel and the Original Prophecy
(1930), is that "the original 'Ezekiel' . . . was a pseudepigraph purporting to come from the reign of Manasseh, but in fact composed" about 230 B.C. A few years later an editor converted it by extensive revision and interpolation into a "prophecy of the so-called 'Babylonian Golah.'" No hint of this astounding solution of the existing problems is given by Coppens, who identifies the view of Torrey with the entirely different position of Hölscher. The reviewer, who holds that the book is authentic throughout (though the text has been corrupted by careless transmission in Babylonia and the conflation of variant readings), may be pardoned for referring to his own discussions of the subject (Journal of Biblical Literature, 1932, pp. 77-106; From the Stone Age to Christianity, 1940, pp. 246-50; The Biblical Archaeologist, 1942, pp. 49-55), where very strong new evidence for the historicity of Ezekiel is marshalled.

In Chapter Two the author describes the recent reaction against the school of Wellhausen, its causes and results. He begins with a compact and clear survey of the field of Near Eastern archaeology and its general results. The reviewer cannot gracefully criticize the picture which Coppens presents, since the latter "has drawn extensively upon" the reviewer's presidential address before the American Oriental Society in 1936 (p. 55, n. 6). The author is too pessimistic, however, in saying (p. 60) that the excavations in Palestine have yielded no written documents except for the Lachish Letters. He inadvertently overlooks the Ostraca of Samaria, which are historically more important than the Lachish Letters, despite the great significance of the latter. Moreover, the value of hundreds of ostraca, graffiti, stamped jar-handles and seals is by no means negligible and will rise steadily as their dating and interpretation proceed. The Gezer Calendar, from the tenth century, is exceedingly important, as the reviewer will try to show in a forthcoming essay. Cuneiform tablets from the Amarna Age, discovered in Palestine, now number some sixteen, besides several tablets from the seventh century B.C. It is true that most of the cuneiform tablets in question have been only partly understood, as the reviewer is showing in a series of papers in the Bulletin of the American Schools of Oriental Research (where the Lachish Letters and other alphabetic inscriptions are also treated).

On pp. 80-102 the author sketches the principal new literary results of the anti-Wellhausenist reaction, with which, for convenience, he includes much matter which might perhaps better have been put into Chapter One. The reviewer is unable to agree with the author's extremely high estimate of the work of Mowinckel, especially in the interpretation of the Psalms (pp. 83 f.). Brilliant Mowinckel undoubtedly is, but his acumen is rivalled only by his subjectivity, while he seldom employs the rich material unearthed by archaeologists. His revolutionary interpretation of the Psalms, which Coppens
praises, has been partly disproved already by the texts of Ugarit (Rās Shamrah). It is true that Mowinckel’s reaction against the Machabaean speculations of Duhm and Haupt has been most wholesome, but there is no warrant for his new festival of the enthronement of Yahweh or for his view that terms like *'awen* refer primarily to magic. In a forthcoming article the reviewer hopes to demonstrate that the Oracles of Balaam belong to a homogeneous corpus, dating from the thirteenth-twelfth century (i.e., from the probable time of Balaam), and not to the tenth and seventh centuries, with post-exilic additions, as elaborately set forth by Mowinckel in 1930.

The author’s high estimate of the work of Alt, von Rad, Noth, and other members of the Alt school (pp. 94 ff., 99 ff., etc.) is fully shared by the reviewer, who believes that Alt and his pupils have accomplished more of enduring value in O.T. historical criticism than all other European biblical scholars of the past quarter-century together. This does not mean that either author or reviewer is inclined to follow Alt and his pupils slavishly. In general, however, the method of Alt is far superior to that of any other contemporary scholar in the field (cf. the reviewer’s remarks, *Journal of the Palestine Oriental Society*, 1932, p. 252; *From the Stone Age to Christianity*, 1940, passages referred to in the index under “Alt, A.”).

In Chapter Three, the author sketches the present situation in the field of O.T. criticism and suggests prospects for the future. He wisely keeps his personal reactions in the background, pointing out only that fruitful synthesis must utilize the results of the best non-Catholic scholarship, though examining them with caution and restraint. He correctly observes that the decrees of the Pontifical Biblical Commission have been of great service in keeping Catholic biblical scholars from the wild divagations which have characterized so many competent Protestant investigators during the past generation. To the reviewer, for example, the original work of Loisy in imitation of Protestant precursors seems fantastic. Particularly welcome are the prudent observations of the author on the subject of the “substantially Mosaic” origin of the Pentateuch, with which the reviewer is happy to concur from a strictly independent scholarly point of view.

There are many more things the reviewer would like to say in commendation and illustration of the book. Author and translators have alike merited well from all serious biblical students, whether Catholic or non-Catholic. The reviewer would like in conclusion to express the hope that review copies have been widely distributed among standard Protestant and Jewish organs, as well as among Catholic, since the author’s sane conservatism cannot but exercise a wholesome influence wherever men are interested in the interpretation of Scripture.

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This book is a translation of the original Hebrew work of Dr. Klausner, Professor in the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, which was published in 1939. It continues the work Klausner began in his life of Jesus.

Dr. Klausner's idea of Christ and His work is known from his previous book. He repeats it briefly in this new publication. Jesus certainly existed and was crucified (p. 107). But He was a "thorough Jew" (p. 4), although He pushed Pharisaic ethics to extremes. The ill effects of this are illustrated from the well-known principle of optics that light can increase in intensity until it becomes darkness (p. 5 and again on p. 559). Jesus thought He was the Messiah, but He believed that He was sent to preach to the Jews only. He had no idea of founding a distinct religion, much less a world-religion. Jesus was apprehended and crucified as a false messiah. How then explain that He was not forgotten as were all the other false messiahs?

To Mary Magdalene goes the "honor" of saving Him from oblivion. She, "a woman hysterical to the point of madness," reported that she had seen Jesus. And from this first "vision" arose the idea of a resurrected Jesus (pp. 255–56).

But how could such a vision be the foundation of a religion so strong and enduring as Christianity? Jesus was afterwards seen in visions by a number of disciples. The women and disciples actually saw Jesus after His crucifixion—in a vision which appeared to them, "enthusiastic to the point of madness, and credulous to the point of blindness, as a complete reality" (p. 256).

There is still to be explained why this happened in the case of Jesus and not in the case of the others who claimed to be messiahs. Jesus was different. He had "a remarkable personality," "did remarkable deeds, and spoke remarkable words." Hence His disciples cherished His memory "to the point where they saw him in their imagination as risen and alive" (p. 261).

Klausner explains the order of events as follows:

1) After the crucifixion the disciples, scandalized, disappointed, and fearing persecution, scattered. But they carried the idea of the resurrection in their minds, because in those days all Jews (except the Sadducees) accepted the idea of the resurrection of the dead (p. 264).

2) Mary Magdalene had her vision, but the disciples fled to Galilee—"the news of what had happened in Jerusalem had not reached there" (p. 264–65).

3) In Galilee Peter had his vision. "He also was incurably emotional and visionary" (p. 265).
4) Peter returned to Jerusalem, and the upper chamber became a meeting place for the disciples.

5) Jesus' mother and at least two of His brothers joined the disciples. (They had previously opposed Jesus.)

6) James, the brother of Jesus, eventually had a vision "of his imagination."

7) Then the Twelve and many of the brethren had visions. Thus the personality and teaching of Jesus coupled with the memory of His horrible death led them, "enthusiastic visionaries as they were," to see Him in vision.

What explanation does Klausner offer for this mass hallucination? A rhetorical question: "Is it an unusual thing for tender-hearted men under the stress of grief to see in imagination their beloved wives or children who have died before their time, as though they were alive?" (p. 267). Klausner is evidently satisfied that there is but one answer to this question, and that that answer explains all the visions of Jesus. How many of such people think that their visions are actually a seeing of a person really alive, Klausner does not discuss. Nor does he give examples of those who would be ready to die for their conviction that their visions had objective reality. Nor does he explain how so many different people, under so many different circumstances of time and place, could have had such an abiding conviction with regard to a person who had by his terrible death definitely put an end to their fondest hope.

8) Then Isaiah 53 was applied to Jesus. This was easy, according to Klausner.

9) All political implications were removed from the idea of messiahship. Jesus' kingdom will be triumphant in the last days. This was done to avoid any charge of rebellion against Rome, and to show that Jesus was not like the false messiahs, who had favored force to establish their messianic kingdoms. Klausner is satisfied that the idea of a political messianic kingdom was the only idea until Jesus died, because of the question with regard to the establishment of the kingdom that is asked in Acts 1:6 (p. 268; cf. p. 563).

10) So the enthusiasm of the disciples and their power of imagination, coupled with their new interpretation of biblical verses, attracted other enthusiasts and imaginative people like themselves (p. 269).

Peter was the leader of this little community. His sensitive feelings and strong imagination were needed to give "impetus to an irrational religious movement based on the belief that a crucified Messiah not of the house of David had risen from the dead and after a little would come to judge the tribes of Israel." Peter was "fickle," but of unquestioning loyalty (p. 270–71).
Then on Pentecost came a psychopathological phenomenon (pp. 273-75): a breaking forth of disconnected utterances from the mouths of highly emotional people at a time when they were greatly excited and their imaginations were stirred to the point of ecstasy. It seemed to the hearers that they heard words in their own languages. More enthusiasts joined the small group. According to Klausner (arguing from the passage on the resurrection apparitions in I Cor. 15:6, to correct the number 3,000 in Acts) 500 converts were made on this day. These people were Hellenistic Diaspora Jews. Were it not for them there could have been no world-Christianity.

The “Nazarenes” (the Palestinian converts from Judaism) were largely poor and penniless (pp. 276-78), hence not strong. But the Sadducees made the mistake of arresting and freeing Peter and John, for as a result of the incident more followers joined the weak little sect (p. 283).

So much for the origin of the first small body of Christians. They had already taken three steps that Christ had never dreamt of:
1) They had brought Him back to life from the dead.
2) They had made His messiahship spiritual, not political.
3) They had explained His death as the way in which the Messiah had to bring salvation.

But this still does not explain how Christianity could get a permanent foothold in the world. The first three books of Klausner’s volume prepare the ground for the explanation of this. The way was paved by the Jews of the Diaspora. They were uprooted, half-assimilated Jews. Besides, there were numerous proselytes and “God-fearers” from among the Gentiles who were conditioned for the new doctrine (pp. 3-49). Another element which set the stage for the spread of Christianity was the wide-spread, well-organized Roman Empire. The ease of travel made the spread of ideas also easy. These ideas (Jewish and pagan) prepared the way for Christianity. Pagan philosophy as well as the spirit of syncretism in religion made the minds of men ready to accept what Paul and his companions came to preach (pp. 53-119). Pagan philosophy prepared the way because in some cases the philosophers aroused a spirit of skepticism (as Lucretius), or because in others they spread “Christian” ideas before Christianity came onto the scene (Epictetus and Seneca).

Hellenistic Jewish thought also (pp. 123-205), as exemplified in the Wisdom of Solomon, Fourth Machabees, the Sibylline Oracles, and Philo Judaeus, had its share in preparing for, and contributing to, Christian thought.

We can discuss only a few of Dr. Klausner’s opinions here; but we strive
to pick out the most important. According to Klausner syncretism was rife in the days when Christianity spread. Gods and beliefs were exchanged, exported, and imported. This had a negative effect in preparing the way for Christianity in that it diminished respect for the pagan gods and goddesses. It weakened and diluted religion (p. 103), and made it easier for men to turn to Christianity. Positively, it helped by spreading abroad the pagan resurrection myths. After recounting the various resurrection stories, Klausner comes to what is the crux of the Christian resurrection story (p. 107), and says, "We have a certain amount of information that a god was sacrificed as a propitiation-offering for the people and their sins; yet the god rose again...." Up to this point, Klausner has been generous enough with reference and detail; but for this statement he leaves us with a reference to E. Dujardin, adding, "This book, in its main thesis, cannot bear critical examination." But for Klausner "there can be no doubt" that the general influence, "however remote and obscure," of these pagan stories was responsible for a Jewish Messiah's becoming the Son of God. Besides this the Oriental mystery religions promised to the individual deliverance and salvation from his woes and particularly from sin (p. 113). (One wonders that Christianity with its preaching could have made any headway against such religions, which thus had all the attractive traits of Christianity, and none of its burdens, which Klausner later condemns as oppressive and impossible.) However, in spite of such fine promises in these pagan religions the world was yearning for a savior (p. 376), and was in psychological dejection (pp. 447-49).

Another practice of the pagans helped Christianity considerably, the custom of apotheosizing men, which was well established at that time (p. 109). Klausner enumerates examples; but he neglects to mention that these deifications were introduced by the strong arm of rulers, and that they deified members of ruling families; or else they elevated heroes from the misty past. They were not the work of a handful of obscure preachers, speaking of a despised and crucified Jew, whose history was recent enough to be checked. And one can doubt how seriously many of these deifications were taken.

As to the Hellenistic Jewish writings, that the Wisdom of Solomon influenced Christianity can be admitted. But even here Klausner does not seem to be quite sure what he thinks of Christianity; for on page 130 he says that Christianity "was altogether not of this world," and on page 136 he says that it was a "middle path between polytheism and monotheism... between Greek mundane wisdom and Jewish divine wisdom." In the Fourth
Machabees (6:26–29; 17:11–22), as Klausner asserts, there is an idea of vicarious atonement (pp. 137–40). But this does not prove that the first Christians depended upon it (if they knew it) to explain Christ’s death.

Klausner’s treatment of the Sibylline books is quite full, but it proves nothing new. It is generally recognized that in some sections of these books there are proofs of pre-Christian apocalyptic and messianic belief. That such sections could have prepared the way for the Christian messianic belief (p. 177) cannot be denied. This can be asserted of all the vague messianic hopes of the time, with proper qualifications as to how many were actually reached and influenced by these ideas. But Klausner insists on the fact that the Sibyline messiah was a political messiah. And we must ask how, if the Sibylline concepts had any great hold on the Hellenistic world, they could be brought to accept the Christian messianic teaching. The question will always remain, in any case, how many were reached by these writings. That they were addressed to a wide audience does not prove that a wide group actually read them, at least before Christianity gained a foothold.

The Sibylline books insist on the ethical aspects of the Jewish religion, “without any specific mention of the ceremonial laws,” as Klausner says (pp. 162, 170). But Klausner is wrong in asserting that Paul’s preaching followed the same method. Paul makes frequent mention of the ceremonial laws—and generally to oppose them.

It is mystifying also to find Dr. Klausner attempting to prove the dependence of Christianity on the Sibyllines by asserting that in opposing idolatry early Christianity in the days of Paul “insisted only on the requirements between man and man (and not those between man and God)” just as the Sibyllines did. One has but to read Paul (especially Romans) to see how untrue this is. Klausner himself paints another picture when he repeatedly asserts that early Christianity was altogether otherworldly, and did not insist enough on the social relationship of man and man.

The universalism of the Sibyllines, as that of the prophets and that of Hellenistic Judaism, doubtless did prepare the way for Christianity to some degree. But if the mentality and tendencies of the Jewish world of that time were as universalistic as Klausner would have them, it is very difficult to explain the great measure of opposition that Christianity met from the Jews. Loyalty to the ceremonial laws is not a sufficient explanation, because Klausner holds that the Jews (especially the Hellenistic Jews) were ready to compromise here. And those who defended the ceremonial laws did so because they saw in them a bulwark against universalism and consequent assimilation.

The chapter on Philo Judaeus (Bk. III, chap. iv) follows the modern tra-
ditional lines that Christianity (especially John and Paul) took much from Philo. But Klausner holds that Philo was "thoroughly Jewish" though immersed in Greek culture (pp. 198-99). In proof of this he praises on page 197 Philo's idea of the messianic era ("political and worldly," favoring "war and conquest . . . and even violence and terror. . . .") as a "thoroughly Jewish point of view." Also the "Jewish national separateness and all the territorial and nationalistic aspirations contained in the Jewish Messianic conception" were Philo's (p. 198).

Moreover, despite the fact that Philo calls the stars gods, he was a "thoroughly faithful and monotheistic Jew" (p. 200). Still it was "impossible" for this man so immersed in Hellenistic Judaism to be a thorough Jew (p. 200). Clearly Professor Klausner cannot quite make up his mind on Philo, or rather his mind wavers as he seeks to turn every fact to fit his theses. For Klausner recognizes that Philo could hardly have been such a thorough Jew, if Christianity found so much of its doctrine in him, and Judaism meantime ignored him.

So was the ground prepared for the seed of Christianity as a world-religion, according to Klausner. In Palestine was a weak little group of victims of hallucinations and psychopathological phenomena. In the world at large were Hellenistic Jews with their mentality already conditioned by their contact with the Gentiles and such books as the Sibyllines and Philo's works. The pagans were ready, because on the one hand their philosophers had prepared them either by spreading deep skepticism or by preaching "Christian" ethics (although Klausner on p. 80 says that the pagan philosophers of the first century saw in both Judaism and Christianity "a faith of folly" and opposed their spread with all their might); and because on the other hand syncretism had weakened the belief in the old gods, while spreading the idea of dying and rising and savior gods. Still men were yearning for a savior god (pp. 354, 358, 376, though on page 378 Klausner accepts as true the Athenian rejection of Paul).

So Christianity set to work. Klausner makes the Lord's Supper a mixture of the Jewish Passover and the feasts of the mystery rites (p. 114). Baptism was a mixture of the Jewish ablutions and the pagan taurobolium, where "sacrificial gore" was poured over the initiate, and there was the idea that this gore was given in ransom for many (pp. 114-15). But not by compromising ritual alone is the spread of Christianity to be explained. The Acts of the Apostles definitely flatters the Romans and Gentiles, and blames the Jews for the ills that Christians suffer (pp. 214, 358). This is strange, since Klausner does not deny that the Jews did cause many of these ills. Moreover, he himself quotes many sections of the Acts where the author definitely
accuses the Gentiles of persecuting the infant Church (e.g., p. 358). And finally Klausner himself comes to the defense of Festus when the Acts accuses him of prolonging Paul’s imprisonment in hopes of receiving a bribe!

But the real explanation of the spread of Christianity is Paul. Paul was the real founder of Christianity. He changed it from a little Jewish sect to a world-religion. Paul was a Jew, a Pharisee, who had studied in Jerusalem under the rabbis. He was, however, influenced by the pagan philosophies and mystical religions.

Now Paul at first opposed Christianity fiercely. He saw Christ crucified (p. 316) and witnessed the death of Stephen. These sights “haunted” Paul and caused an involved psychological process which was apt to bring on a vision (p. 316; all this went on in Paul’s subliminal consciousness, p. 322, n. 14). In such a state of mind Paul was hurrying to Damascus to persecute the Christians there, when he was struck down by an epileptic fit. There is no doubt in Klausner’s mind concerning Paul’s epilepsy (pp. 326–29, 442). He alleges as proofs the “facts” that Mohammed, Augustine, Bernard, Savanarola, Napoleon, Jakob Boehme, Swedenborg, Julius Caesar, Peter the Great, Rousseau, Pascal, and Dostoiewsky were epileptics, and by implication says that epilepsy explains their great accomplishments. Klausner does not bother to mention that there is little or no evidence for the epileptic affliction of some of those he cites, or that competent medical men deny or doubt the epilepsy of many of those he mentions. Nor does he refer to the fact that medical men who have studied the records about Paul deny that he could have been an epileptic; so definite is medical opinion that Paul Wendland in the third edition of his Die Hellenischromische Kultur abandoned the theory of epilepsy with the words: “It is a thesis of historians ignorant of medicine, and of medical men ignorant of history.” In passing it is interesting to note that Sholem Asch, the Jewish novelist, in his recent novel on Paul presents Paul in the same light as Klausner does.

Paul as a result of this epileptic fit and its accompanying vision goes on to Damascus and meets Ananias, who persuades him that the new religious movement is good, thus removing the “scales” from his eyes (p. 331). If ancient commentators can be accused of allegorizing to avoid difficulties in the sacred text, our modern commentators can rival them when there is something supernatural to be explained away.

After a three years’ stay in Arabia, “where he [Paul] attempted to clarify to himself the great change which had taken place in his soul” (evidently not knowing that it was all the result of a temporary fit), Paul proceeded to Jerusalem to see Cephas (pp. 332–33). And now his real preaching is to
begin. But before we consider his preaching let us see what manner of man Klausner makes Paul.

Paul was half Jew, half Hellenist (p. 312). Though the opinion that Paul and Epictetus exchanged letters does not meet with favor from Klausner, he has no doubt but that Epictetus influenced Paul (p. 62), and hence Paul’s preaching of certain aspects of Christianity was made easy (p. 94). Of course we cannot determine definitely when Paul first purposely studied Greek philosophy. But in Tarsus his world-view was formed (p. 345). Nor do we know when he first began to study deliberately the mystery religions of Asia Minor (p. 344; on p. 463 Klausner speaks differently: “To be sure, Paul the Apostle did not formally study ‘Greek learning’”; but he absorbed it unconsciously and against his will; however on pp. 482 and 485 he says that these ideas “hovered in the air,” but then he comes back, on p. 582, to his original view that Paul was conscious of all that he was doing). The result for Klausner is Paul’s composite character of Hellenist (pagan), and Jew. This explains much in Paul’s character.

Paul was of “unstable temperament” (p. 320), a visionary (p. 324), and “a diplomatic politician” (p. 355, and again on page 556, because Paul wished to be “all things to all men”), an appeaser (p. 506), a hypocrite (p. 398), “passionate and inclined to sin” (p. 423), even of “untrammeled passionateness” (p. 587), though he “sometimes” overcame his passions (p. 423), “lacking in humility” and an emotional zealot (p. 424), “a thorough melancholic” (p. 425, quoting part of Romans 8:19–26, referring to the world groaning for salvation, though Klausner himself calls this same passage “sublime” on page 526).

Paul, moreover, had a sense of inferiority to the other apostles who were with Jesus during His lifetime (p. 134), and he opposed Peter to the end (pp. 418–20). He was hard to work with, a tyrant, selfish, hated, and alone (pp. 425–26, though on page 587 Klausner, discussing the evidence of Paul’s letters, says “he won friends and helpers for himself everywhere”).

Naturally these characteristics showed themselves in the content and method of Paul’s teaching. For instance, Paul’s insistence on the “spiritual” or “heavenly” Christ as against the “earthly” (flesh and blood) Christ was due to the fact that Paul wanted to destroy the superiority of those who had known Jesus in the flesh (p. 314, though on page 470 the author says that the “spiritualizing” of Christ was due to Paul’s fear of spirits: Christ had to be a spirit to overcome the evil spirits).

And Paul’s opportunism influenced the new religion in many ways. He set aside the ceremonial laws to win the Gentiles (p. 320, though on page 321,
Klausner notes that there was in Judaism the belief that these laws would be set aside in the messianic age; in his chapter on the proselytes and "God-fearers," he indicates that Judaism had already compromised on these same laws; and finally asserts that when Judaism becomes the world-religion, the laws will be mitigated).

Paul's hypocrisy is further evidenced by his having Timothy circumcised (p. 355), and by his own observance of the Nazarite law (pp. 399, 506). So also, to keep his favor with the Palestinian Jews, he made the frequently mentioned collections of alms to be sent to the Church of Jerusalem (p. 383, n. 4, though it is Klausner's contention that a similar practice had already among the Jews of the Diaspora, out of charity). Again on the question of eating food sacrificed to idols (I Cor. 8:4-13), Paul's wise and clear distinctions are labeled "opportunist" (pp. 564-65). Similarly his enunciation of the principle of obedience to secular authority (Rom. 13:1-4) is called "a recital of praise for the tyranny of Caligula and Nero, or of Ges-sius Florus. One is forced to see in it flattery of the rulers...." Paul also favored slavery, when he insisted that slaves should be obedient to their masters (I Cor. 7:20-24), a passage that Klausner should reread, along with Edgar J. Goodspeed's clear statement on the subject in the Journal of Bible and Religion, XI (1943), 169-70. The doctrine of Paul and of Christianity certainly changed the status of the slave radically.

Again Paul is opportunist when he tells wives to be subject to their husbands, as the Church is to Christ (p. 567), but here Klausner neglects to complete the quotation from Eph. 5:21 ff., which would have shown how lofty Paul's concept was. Paul's acceptance of the pagan evaluation of women is also seen in the insistence by Paul that women should cover their heads when praying or prophesying (I Cor. 11:4-7; 13-15), though Klausner indicates that the Talmud taught that women should always have their heads covered when in public (pp. 566-67). The equality of all in Christ, which was a doctrine dear to Paul and which answers many of Klausner's strictures, receives a mere mention (p. 569). Klausner inserts in this section (pp. 570-72) Paul's advice on virginity, but this is far from proving Paul's low idea of women, or Paul's opportunism. Neither Jew nor pagan would be easily won by such a doctrine. But in trying to prove that Paul considered marriage "a necessary evil," he does not handle Paul's words fairly. It is a case of good and better, each according to the "gift of God," not of good and evil.

Paul's pessimism is proved by Klausner not only from Paul's "low idea" of marriage (only the sex impulse is considered according to Klausner; again cf. Eph. 5:21 ff.) but especially from Paul's "identification" of flesh and sin
(pp. 521–22, 573). If Klausner has read far, even in Romans, he should realize that Paul was far from being a pessimist. He had unbounded hope in Christ and His Gospel. In fact, Klausner admits elsewhere that Paul held that Christ had won saving grace for all mankind (p. 140).

Paul's doctrine of predestination is "hate-filled" (p. 524). That again would be true if Paul did not insist that Christ had won and offered to all men salvation. For Paul, according to Klausner, repentance is of no avail (p. 548; but cf. p. 554 where Klausner quotes Paul on repentance). On the other hand because of Paul's doctrine on sin and salvation Klausner holds Paul responsible for the sins Paul condemns in his letters (p. 592).

On pages 558–61 Paul's doctrine on charity is praised, especially the passage on "love" in I Cor. 13:1–13. But the triad of faith, hope, and love "comes from Greek sources." Moreover, according to Klausner, this love is imperfect because truth and justice are lacking. But see vv. 6–7 and Klausner's own contention on pages 602 and 603, where he says, "There is no religion like Judaism in holding the good heart superior to the rest of human virtues; there is none like it in considering the love that wells up from the depth of the soul better than the utmost virtues, better even than knowledge."

Klausner's treatment of Paul's belief with regard to the parousia follows the now traditional rationalistic lines; namely, that Paul believed that Christ was to come in judgment soon. But Paul is misrepresented as saying that belief in the imminence of the parousia is so fundamental that without it Christianity is "mere foolishness," and Christians the most "pitiable" people in the world (p. 592). For proof of this Klausner refers us to I Cor. 15:13–29, where Paul insists on faith in the final resurrection, not in the imminence of the parousia.

Dr. Klausner's treatment of "The Life in Christ" (Bk. VII, chap. iv) is caricature. But a similar stricture could be put upon much of his treatment of Paul's doctrine.

Solomon Zeitlin, Professor of Rabbinical Literature at Dropsie College, reviewing the original Hebrew edition of this work in the Jewish Quarterly Review, XXX (1941), 309–14, charges against Klausner's treatment of rabbinic sources, "The rabbinical sources which he quotes are not correct, and the quotations are wrongly interpreted, which shows that he has not penetrated deeply enough into rabbinical literature." Zeitlin gives several examples (cf. also his brief review of the English edition in the same quarterly, July, 1943, pp. 117–21). A similar criticism must be given of Klausner's treatment of the Gospels and Paul as well. One must further agree with Zeitlin, "In this book... the author shows that he is eclectic, not an
original thinker.” In the case of his work on Paul, he has drawn on the opinions of the extreme rationalists, or at least accepted opinions of the extreme type from all sources. He has selected his material to prove a thesis. Indeed, in spite of the years that Klausner spent preparing this volume, one feels that not enough time was spent directly on Paul’s writings, but the author’s attention was directed towards finding what others said about Paul (usually, too, those who spoke adversely). For there are many texts that are only half interpreted, and many that are not fairly quoted. Some I have noted already; others I omit, for this discussion is already too long.

The conclusion must be that Dr. Klausner, in spite of his labor in preparing his book, and in spite of his expressed desire to be the objective historian, has misunderstood Paul. Hence, while those who are advanced in the study of the New Testament may find Klausner’s point of view interesting in some matters, still the book is not one that can be recommended as a fair introduction to St. Paul.

Weston College

James E. Coleran, S.J.


“The use of the literary sources will be, as far as it may be, objective.... Without some subjective sense as to what is possible, probable, credible, and the reverse, we could not carry through any effort to reconstruct the past.... Nor can it be denied that subjective considerations always bear some impress of the ‘personal factor’, and that there is no absolutely reliable rule-of-the-thumb whereby we can make sure that our subjective machinery of judgment will never in any way mislead us” (p. 9).

Beginning with the above quoted premise, the author strives to reconstruct the principal teaching of the historic Jesus as seen in the Synoptics, apart from the influence of the Fourth Gospel and the later Christian community. He places the actual teaching of Christ somewhere between the totally eschatological theory of Schweitzer and the realized eschatology of Dodd.

After an introduction in which he explains the work already done on the eschatology in the Synoptics and deprecates the influence of Form-Criticism, the author divides the main body of his work into four parts: I. The Bringer of the Kingdom of God. II. The Nature and Presence of the Kingdom of God. III. The Future of the Kingdom as First Envisaged. IV. The Future of the Kingdom as Last Envisaged. A chapter of more general conclusions follows. The body of the book is arranged in thesis form, the
conclusions being stated in bold-faced type at the head of each chapter with supporting texts from the Synoptic sources arranged in order as proof of the various contentions.

Jesus is portrayed as becoming conscious of His Messiahship at His baptism and thereafter committing Himself to self-sacrificing service of His fellow men "to save them from sin, ignorance, illness, and sorrow, and to lead them into the same enjoyment of God's love as He Himself possessed." Christ strove to accomplish His purpose by leading men into the Kingdom of God, which in essence includes all men who are loyal to the will of God, their King and Father. This Kingdom was already present on earth in the persons of Christ and His disciples and was destined to include all men. This universalistic idea Jesus deliberately kept obscure until He could eradicate Jewish hatred of the Roman overlords by His doctrine of pacifism.

Jesus began His ministry expecting Israel to receive, honor, and follow Him to a future "golden culmination" which He spoke of as the Coming of the Kingdom. A future beyond the grave is dimly foreseen and obscurely foretold, consisting mainly in a division of all men into those within and those without the Kingdom.

In the latter days of His ministry, Christ began to realize with deep disappointment and sorrow that the Jewish people would not follow Him. He realized that this rejection meant death for Himself and destruction for Israel. Instead of fleeing the approaching evil, Christ accepted His death, hoping that it would bring about widespread repentance and possibly save Israel from repudiating His pacifist policy toward Rome and thus preserve them from the horrors of Roman conquest. He expected to depart for Paradise immediately after His death, whence He would return after a brief period (not to exceed the lifetime of a generation). His return would inaugurate the great Coming of the Kingdom of God, involving the resurrection of the dead, the last judgment, a fiery gehenna for the wicked and the Kingdom of Heaven for the just.

Thus Dr. Cadoux depicts the historical mission of Jesus—a mission mistaken in some of its doctrine, especially the prediction of an eternal Hell, which no one can admit as compatible with a God of love, and in the time and nature of the parousia. Nevertheless, Dr. Cadoux claims for Jesus that unique spiritual union with God in filial love which makes Him the outstanding man of history and the Master of us all.

What can be said of such a book? Certainly, we must admire the author's evidently sincere purpose in writing it. We must applaud his conservatism and his rejection of the conjectures of Form-Criticism. For the rest, we
cannot consider a story of Jesus obtained by subjective juggling of supposed sources of the Synoptics as even distantly bordering on history.

West Baden College  

C. L. Firstos, S. J.


In 1921 Fr. Brosnan published a complete textbook of natural theology, written in Latin and entitled Institutiones Theologiae Naturalis. Later he began to publish a similar text in English, divided into three volumes, of which the present book is the third and last. The first of these volumes, God and Reason, appeared in 1924 and dealt with questions concerning the existence of God. The second volume, God Infinite and Reason, published in 1928, studied the divine essence and attributes. The present volume is concerned with the relations of God to the world. It discusses the problems involved in divine knowledge, creation, conservation, concurrence, and providence.

This present book, like its predecessors, is in general noteworthy for its strict adherence to Scholastic method (not however in problem, but in thesis form), for its precise expression of ideas, for its scrupulous care to prove each step in the argument, and for its relegation of points, which are in dispute among Scholastic philosophers, to scholia, separated from the exposition of matters on which Scholastic philosophers agree. Noteworthy too is a lengthy Introduction, in which the author gives careful consideration to modern non-Scholastic thought on the matters treated in the book, together with abundant quotation from representative writers. The book's final thesis, on the problem of evil, is very thorough and is deserving of special commendation.

There are several defects of form, which recur throughout the volume. One of these seems to arise from the author's striving for precision and clarity of expression. So great is this striving that many sentences in the book are labored, involved, difficult to read, and even more difficult to understand at a first reading. There are times when this effort, though it result in expressing clearly the mind of the author, does not succeed so well in clarifying the subject matter. An unusual English phraseology is also of frequent occurrence in the text. Such expressions as "to say a relation to," "to put an action," "to place an action," the "viciousness" (p. 114) of an adversary's opinion, may find place in a literal translation from some Latin text, but they are rather unexpected in an originally English composition. Moreover, the proofs of theses are repeatedly stated in the form of the con-
ditional syllogism and this custom at any rate does not lend interest to the argument. It seems also that the author does not always do full justice to the opinions of his opponents, when these are Scholastic philosophers. He gives his own interpretation of what they hold, but he does not quote them. This practice is quite in contrast to his treatment of non-Scholastic adversaries and it can hardly be satisfactory to students who would use this text. Sometimes, too, in the case of disputed points, the author mentions or develops only that opinion which he prefers; and on occasion he appears to be overattached to doctrines which are not more than probably true.

In doctrinal content this book presents material similar to that found in other undergraduate Scholastic texts of natural theology. It follows the customary textbook practice in the division of the subject matter and in the selection of theses. The author is aligned with the Molinist doctrines of God's foreknowledge and concursus. He does not offer any new contribution to the development of these or other matters; but his treatment of them suggests the specific remarks or criticisms which follow.

In the discussion of God's foreknowledge it is argued that free futuribles are knowable from eternity because "their objective truth is independent of any definite time" (p. 40). Is it not, however, dependent upon a contingent condition and a contingent choice, which would occur in time?

The author holds that there can be no objective medium in which God can know man's future free act, prior to man's free action, and which determines the objective truth of the action known in it (pp. 49 ff.). This opinion does not well agree with the author's first thesis (p. 37) that God "decrees . . . the existence of the world, and, consequent on this decree, knows . . . all things in the world, man's free actions included . . .", nor with his statement (p. 55) that God knows free futures "in his essence including his creative decree, as in an objective medium which irrevocably determines their ontological truth as acts which will be. . ." And indeed it is quite logical, in the Molinist system, to say that God knows free futures in His absolute decree, as in an objective medium which determines their ontological truth. For in this system the divine decree to give a man that concursus, with which God, by His middle knowledge, foresaw man would co-operate, is a decree which determines that a futurible human choice shall have actual being; and it determines this even before human consent occurs in the absolute order.

The author's reason for rejecting an objective determining medium, in which God may know free futures, is that the free act of man can be determined only by man, when he acts freely, else it would not be a free act (pp. 49 ff.). This reasoning again does not agree with the author's statements cited above; and it seems to imply that the divine decrees regarding the free
futures are not determined prior to man's actual consent to them and that they derive their efficacy from that consent.

In connection with this same reasoning of the author, one notes that he denies (p. 62) that, if God foreknows man's free acts, these would necessarily exist, with a necessity antecedent to the act of the will; but that he does not here distinguish between the futurible and the future act of the will. Now in the Molinist system God's knowledge, decree, and concursus induce no necessity antecedent to a futurible act of the will; but once God has decreed that a futurible act shall have being, that act necessarily will be, and this necessity exists prior to man's future consent.

In regard to free futuribles, the author holds that they are known by God in the divine essence, as in an objective medium, a medium, however, which does not determine their objective truth, but which represents it, supposing it to be determined by man (pp. 51, 54). It is to be regretted that the reader is not told that, though some Molinists are of this opinion, many of them reject any objective medium for God's knowledge of free futuribles, as logically incompatible with the Molinist system. This omission is the more surprising because the author, in answer to an objection (p. 60), concedes that a free futurible cannot be known with certainty in its cause, but can be known in itself by an infinite intellect. One recalls also that, in his *Institutiones Theologiae Naturalis* (p. 264), the author teaches that God knows free futuribles *sine ullo omnino medio*.

One further point to remark is the author's identification of the formal object of God's knowledge with its primary object (p. 54). There seems to be here a confusion of ideas. For the primary object of a knowledge faculty is a subdivision of its material object, while the formal object must be found in both the primary and secondary material objects. The formal object of a given faculty is that in things which renders them attainable by that faculty, as color in things renders them perceptible by the power of sight.

In his thesis on creation, when handling the difficulty of reconciling God's immutability with a free creation of the world, the author rejects (p. 87) the explanation which he gave in his *God Infinite and Reason* and proposes another one, as better suited to show that God can be intrinsically immutable in every sense and yet be free in creating the world.

The point of the controversy between Bannesians and Molinists, concerning the nature of divine concursus, is said in this text to be to determine whether God's decree of concurrence results in a concursus which is simultaneous only or also predetermining (p. 102); and there follows the thesis that God's concursus cannot physically predetermine man's free actions (p. 124). This statement of the controversy and of the thesis as well is like
to that of many writers on this subject, but it seems to this reviewer to be misleading and to obscure the real point at issue. Both Molinists and Bannessians agree that, once God has absolutely decreed that a man shall freely choose to perform a given action, that decree and the subsequent concursus are infallibly empowered to secure that definite choice, even prior to the making of that choice by man in the course of time; so that this determined power is not derived from, but is antecedent to the future consent of man. Once this absolute decree is given, it becomes determined that the action so decreed shall take place. Hence both Molinist and Bannesian may truthfully say that God's absolute decrees in regard to future free actions predetermine which shall have being—and this in fact more than once seems to be the mind of the author (pp. 37, 55, 113, 132 f.). The real point at issue, therefore, is not whether or not God's decrees regarding free futures are predetermining. The question is rather this: Whence does God's absolute decree and His concursus in regard to a future free act of man derive its infallible power to secure that act, prior to man's act of choice and without detriment to his power of choice?

Against the Bannesian doctrine of physical predetermination the author advances the standard argument that it is incompatible with human freedom (pp. 52, 142, 144 f.); but, and this may be a consequence of his conception of the problem, he does not seem to establish this point too well. He shows that if God's concurrence, prior to man's actual exercise of the power of choice, predetermines what the human will is to choose, then infallibly the man will choose the action God has decreed; but he does not show so clearly that the man has not at the same time the power to choose otherwise.

No formal thesis is devoted to a presentation of the author's positive teaching on the nature of divine concurrence. This omission is a serious one, for the reader must search through scattered sections of the volume in order to piece this positive teaching together and even then will not find any adequate proof of it nor sufficient consideration of the difficulties involved in it. Moreover, in his positive explanation of the nature of concursus (and this too may be the result of the manner in which the problem is conceived) the author does not come clearly to the point of showing how, with the will remaining free, God's absolute decree and concursus in regard to a future act are infallibly determined to obtain that act, even prior to the consent of man. Rather there is frequent reference to these decrees as non-determining (pp. 49 f., 109, 127, 135 f., 136, 138 f.); and there are times when it seems to be implied in the text (pp. 136, 138) that God's absolute concursus is determined by actual consent of the human will. God's absolute decrees and concursus in relation to future free acts can not be called simply non-determining in the
Molinist system. Even prior to the actual consent of the will they are determining, although their determining power is derived from external sources. Nor can anyone who affirms the doctrine of divine providence conceive God's absolute decrees regarding future events other than as determining what shall be. In his positive exposition of these matters the author gives considerable attention (pp. 113, 131 ff.) to the distinction between an offered and a conferred concursus. The distinction is a familiar one, but of what avail? It is the latter concursus which must be reconciled with the power of choice. The problem lies precisely in reconciling power of choice with the fact that, for the actual exercise of choice, there is needed a concursus which is conferred, physical, immediate, which is determined for a particular free act, and which is so determined prior to the exercise of that act by the will.

The thesis on divine providence introduces (p. 167) a description of antecedent and consequent will, which is acceptable only if one accepts the opinion that man's use of freedom is the dividing line between the two. This opinion, however, is by no means universally admitted by Scholastic writers, nor, among them, by non-Bannesians.

Further in his study of providence (pp. 168 ff.), the author outlines a system of predestination and reprobation, but with no reference to the fact that Scholastic writers would not agree in many of its details. The outline is defective, too, in that it fails to distinguish between the orders of intention and of execution.

The author views the divine purpose in creation as the manifestation of God's glory rather than as the sharing of the divine goodness; and not from this, but from the former viewpoint he handles the difficulty of reconciling the eternal loss of a soul with infinite goodness.

Several times, when there is question of moral evil, the statement is made that God does not will or intend sin (pp. 65, 141, 170, 197). This is certainly true in many senses; but does not God will and intend to permit the commission of sin by man for the intention of the good which may be derived on the occasion of it? May one not say that God, foreseeing that if a man were in these circumstances he would sin and on the occasion of his sin this good would be accomplished, wills absolutely to have that good and hence intends to permit the commission of the sin?

In the course of the book there are a few digressions from the field of metaphysics into that of dogmatic theology and in these some statements occur to which exception must be taken. We read (p. 105) that "those who have not been drawn by God to the light of supernatural faith can perform only naturally good actions." This assertion on its face value is not correct,
for various supernatural actions are performed by an adult prior to the first making of an act of supernatural faith, e.g., those actions which are called the preambles to faith. In the same context (p. 105 f.) it is implied that in this providence actions do occur which are only naturally good, and that for them therefore there is in fact a natural moral divine concursus. That such actions do occur, however, is an opinion which is not commonly admitted. The Holy Spirit is mentioned (p. 106) as the author of the supernatural enlightening of the mind and movement of the will of man, but it should be noted that only by appropriation are these effects attributed to the Holy Spirit. We read also (p. 163) that man’s proper use of natural means to live conformably to his nature “will surely be rewarded by the gift from God of the supernatural means...” In this connection “reward” is not the correct word.

This review has made numerous criticisms of Fr. Brosnan’s book. These criticisms, however, express for the most part only a variance of opinion, which is itself open to criticism, but they do not imply depreciation of the substantial value of Fr. Brosnan’s work. On the contrary, this book, like its predecessors, gives every evidence of painstaking labor by a sincere scholar. And the writer of this review acknowledges himself much indebted to Fr. Brosnan for help derived from the works which he has published in natural theology.

Alma College

Francis L. Sheerin, S.J.


This book begins a series of studies projected by the Theological Faculty of the Dominican House of Studies, Washington. Not aiming at a systematic survey of the whole of theology, the new series of Thomistic Studies will cover a wide variety of subjects with the dominant purpose of revitalizing the spirit and precious heritage of Catholic doctrine and of applying the truths of faith to modern life. The editors are convinced that until a return is made to the undiluted traditions of the Fathers and Doctors of the Church we may not hope for a harvest of Christian life and virtue.

In the first of the new Thomistic Studies, Fr. James C. Osbourn, O.P., takes for his subject the modern problem of positive imperfections. His ambition is not to find a solution based on new arguments, but to present the old arguments in a new and more convincing light.

The investigation starts in reaction to the teaching of modern moralists, that positive imperfections are not sins but are displeasing to God. The
author is not alone in branding this teaching as illogical. It may be ac­ceptable to those who are content to regulate their opinions by the number of authorities that can be summoned, but the inquisitive mind will be left ill at ease.

The author, writing for the negative side of the debate, states the ques­tion in the following words: “Must there be granted, between full-fledged sins and morally perfect actions, the existence of another, third type of moral action differing from both of the aforementioned types in moral lineage and meriting in all theological rigor the title, moral imperfections, which the authors reserve for it?” (p. 6). With the question thus stated, the author divides his book into three parts.

In the first part Fr. Osbourn gives us a brief survey of the history of the controversy. He is preoccupied throughout with shaking the founda­tions on which the affirmative side have based their teaching. Against those who try to gain authority for the doctrine of positive imperfections by ascribing its origin to DeLugo, the author insists that it is John Sancius who must receive the doubtful honor of being among the first, if he was not the first, to formulate the distinction between venial sin and moral imperfection. Not a great deal, however, is gained from this point since DeLugo did maintain the existence of moral imperfections and differed from Sancius only on the question of whether such imperfections ought to be confessed. The Salmanticenses went into the problem with their usual thoroughness but they are not entirely satisfying when they talk about a law of propriety which induces no obligation, and when they describe the positive imperfection as something which is “not entirely negative nor strictly privative but partly negative and partly privative, i.e., privative after a fashion and in a certain sense” (cited on p. 30). The author finds in Fr. Passerini, O.P., the most dangerous opponent of the doctrine of positive imperfections, and wonders at the solemn silence which has surrounded his name.

In the second part Fr. Osbourn examines three theories which would attribute the origin of the doctrine of positive imperfections to the teaching of Suarez, or to the teaching of the spiritual masters, or to the teaching of St. Thomas. Though Suarez himself never explicitly formulated a dis­tinction between venial sin and positive imperfection, his teaching, espec­ially his teaching on law, is judged by the author to be fertile soil for the development of the doctrine which maintains the existence of positive imperfections. Textual difficulties and difficulties of interpretation beset the path of the theologians who try to find the doctrine of positive imperfections justified in the writings of the spiritual masters. If any conclusion is to be drawn from this source, it must be a conclusion unfavorable to the
positive moral imperfection. Nowhere in St. Thomas is there an ex professo treatment of the problem. But scattered references, in conjunction with fundamental Thomistic principles, give hope of discovering the authentic mind of St. Thomas. And thus we are led to the third part of the book, five chapters on the thought of St. Thomas and his great commentators.

Fr. Osbourn contends that St. Thomas has attacked and solved the problem of positive imperfections, not from the precise angle of imperfection, but from the viewpoint of the better good as related to the law of finality and the law of Christian perfection.

Does St. Thomas judge that in virtue of the law of finality we are bound to choose what is concretely presented to us as the better good? This is the point which the author must prove. St. Thomas tells us that the creatures of nature choose what is the better good in the long run. Does St. Thomas transfer this rigorous metaphysical law to the moral order? It is the opinion of Fr. Osbourn that he does.

More convincing is the argument drawn from the law of Christian perfection. The totality of charity is given to us as a command and as a goal possible of attainment. The deliberate choice of an inferior good is a willful delay on the pilgrimage to perfect charity, and it does not seem that such a willful delay can be excused from all culpability.

This carefully written book is an auspicious beginning for the new Thomistic Studies. Readers will heartily concur with the principle that sound practice follows upon sane theory and they will look forward eagerly to the coming publications in the Dominican series.

Shadowbrook, Mass.


This work, originally composed as a doctorate dissertation, enters into a highly detailed investigation of the moral and legal principles that control the custody or justify the disclosure of the professional secret. Not so many years ago, the number of the fiduciary professions was quite limited, but the ever expanding orbit of new activities has effected the admission of groups engaged in work hitherto unhonored by the name "profession." The impetus given to social enterprises has borne fruit in the ever increasing importance of the social worker in the community. Conscious of the importance and the dignity of this adolescent profession, the author has judiciously devoted a full chapter to a study of "The Social Worker's
Secret," carrying us well beyond the limits of so many manuals of moral theology.

The introduction supplies us with an ample synopsis of what is to follow in the body of the work. The treatise falls into three parts and is subdivided into thirteen chapters. The first part contains an examination of the moral law regulating secrets in general. A thorough analysis of the professional secret, the heart of the dissertation and extending over five chapters, comprises the second part. The last part is devoted to a penetrating inquiry into the obligation of secrecy incumbent upon members of the medical and legal professions, upon the priest in his extra-sacramental role of confidential adviser, and lastly upon the social worker operating in a fiduciary capacity. The uniform pattern followed by the author in treating the professional secret as binding the individual professional man makes for clarity of concept throughout.

An abundance of source-literature constitutes the matter out of which Dr. Regan has fashioned his integrated study. The principles of the natural law, the appropriate prescriptions of canon and civil law provide the thoroughly orthodox background. Discrepancies existing between the civil and natural laws are pointed out. The classics of moral theology, the legal sources embracing modern codes of civil law, general works touching in one way or another professional obligations, and finally miscellaneous articles that lend some service to the author comprise the sources whose close examination has borne abundant fruit.

The memory of the reader is frequently refreshed by the oft-repeated enunciation of the fundamental principles which govern the solution of the problem stated. The complexity of the matter justifies this repetition, yet an increase in the number of examples in the first part of the study would serve to sustain the interest of the reader. Short cases and illustrations would surely produce this effect. The thoroughness and satisfaction that characterizes the discussion of the medical secret in Chapter X calls for special commendation, while a maturity of scholarship stamps the entire work. The eminent practicality manifested in the consideration of the different professional secrets will serve to direct the conscience of the professional person in many an actual problem.

In the light of the principle expressed on p. 176, dealing with the conflict between the right of the client to his secret and other rights and duties of the client himself, how would the following case be solved? A young man so given to excessive drinking as to jeopardize his future success as well as his spiritual welfare seeks extra-confessional advice from a priest-friend but positively refuses to follow the advice to avoid the occasions of his
excesses. May the priest be allowed to manifest the spiritual plight of the youth to his parents, who could easily remedy the situation? Does the spiritual welfare of the youth in question outweigh the *damnnum commune* that might follow from the frequent application of the principle that a priest, functioning as an extra-sacramental adviser, may disclose the confidence committed to him by a client, when the custody of the secret would result in the *damnnum spirituale grave* of the client? The hallowed role of the priest-counsellor, it would seem, might suffer considerably in the eyes of the faithful, if it were generally known that under the circumstances just described he would be liberated from the obligation of maintaining secrecy. It appears that the necessity of reckoning the possible scandal in such a case, as the author well cautions us, would almost always persuade us that the course of silence would be preferable and even obligatory. The statements of the authorities cited to substantiate the principle do not seem to be unequivocal on the point.

Dr. Regan stresses the need of an ethical code for the guidance of the professional social worker, a need long crying for fulfilment, but which to date has met with an inadequate response. Given a favorable opportunity, it is hoped that conscientious social workers, aware of this same deficiency, will co-operate in providing this much needed instrument of social action. The Legion of Decency was able to provide a code for the film industry because it had behind it the well established principles of our Catholic morality. The Catholic social schools would seem admirably equipped to make a similar contribution in the social field. Freed from the deformities of a positivistic philosophy and the ambiguity so characteristic of unprincipled "liberals" and based upon the unshakable foundations of the natural law and the inherent dignity of man, such a code might well prove to be the exemplar of other formularies of social action and by its integrity might tend to raise the standards of many a social agency.

The production of Dr. Regan merits wide circulation among, and careful study by, the clergy and especially by members of the professions specifically considered in the dissertation. It is an instrument that should contribute greatly to the re-establishment in our own country of professional idealism.

*Weston College*

JAMES E. RISK, S.J.


This book neither offers nor claims to offer a complete exposition of
Catholic morality. As its subtitle indicates, it is a summary, similar to the summary of Catholic dogma which the distinguished author published a few years ago. Perhaps it is misleading to say absolutely that this book does not achieve completeness; for it does present us with a fairly complete resumé of Catholic moral teaching. It gathers together in brief compass the fundamental principles and conclusions of ethics and moral theology.

The title *Catholic Morality* is most accurately descriptive of the contents of the work, since the author does not confine himself to ethics. He gives us a summary of the moral teaching of the Church, and therefore he draws the contents of his book from revelation, the authoritative pronouncements of the Church, the common teaching of moral theologians and principles of conduct embodied in canon law as well as from reason. Moreover, bits of pastoral advice are interspersed throughout the exposition of moral principles.

Professors of moral theology will scarcely derive any increment of knowledge from a perusal of this book; it has not been written for their benefit. In the case of the non-expert, however, a reading of *Catholic Morality* will serve to refresh knowledge of moral principles. The book can likewise be of value to the Catholic college student, especially in his study of ethics. In fact, it could very well serve as the textbook for a course in morality. If used as a textbook, it would offer this advantage, that, it would allow the teacher ample opportunity to develop and supplement its contents, while at the same time it would provide the student with a clear and readable outline of the course.

The argumentation throughout is discursive rather than syllogistic. The style is simple, quiet and dignified. Errors are refuted without bitterness, and the whole is suffused with a note of sureness and calm possession of the truth. The book, however, is not one that can be read without effort, since His Eminence has not attempted to smash sales' records with a *Morality for the Millions*. The translator is to be commended for a smooth rendition.

Readers will find the section on Justice and Right altogether too sketchy even for a summary, since these realities are of superior importance, especially today. The virtue of modesty excepted, the treatment of the sixth and ninth commandments is so brief, in proportion to their significance and pertinence, that its usefulness approaches dangerously close to the vanishing point. In the chapter on "Duties of Social Economy," however, we find a very neat précis of the papal encyclicals *Rerum Novarum*, *Quadragesimo Anno*, and *Divini Redemptoris*. This book is, on the whole, a good summary, with all the virtues and usefulness of a summary, but also the shortcomings.

*Woodstock College*  
*Cornelius A. Eller, S.J.*

*What Is a Mature Morality?* is an obviously sincere, and in most respects a sound effort to state, to rationalize, and to apply the moral ideals of Protestant Christianity. The book is popular or, at least, semipopular in manner and content.

Dr. Titus opens with a survey of the profound moral confusion that exists today in both theory and practice. This confusion arises in part from varying philosophic theories culminating in ethical relativity, in part, also, from the failure of "the church" to keep up with the times and maintain an integrated view of life. This failure has resulted in the divorce of moral practice from religious belief. Ethical relativity and similar theories have destroyed the notion of an objective criterion for moral judgments and values.

On the constructive side Dr. Titus analyzes the notion of the "good" somewhat in the vein of Professor Stace in *The Destiny of Western Man*, to whose work he refers. The conclusions of these men are essentially the same: namely, that moral good is the real or reasonable good of man and of society. This establishes a criterion for moral judgments and is the basis for a system of immanent, as against the imposed morality of authoritarian Christianity. The italicized words belong to Professor Stace, but the idea behind them carries through in Dr. Titus' book.

From this notion of the good the conclusion is drawn that for men who acknowledge the supremacy of reason there exists the moral necessity to seek the good. Sheer self-consistency demands this. That our moral duties are duties to God follows from our fellowship with God. Towards the close of the fourth chapter Dr. Titus says: "Stated in religious terms, man is conscious of fellowship with God and reinforcement from Him . . . . Christian morality is distinctive in interpreting the duties of man as duties to God. Thus religion and morality are brought together as integral to human nature. Whereas secular ethics is likely to talk about the highest good, the Christian is likely to talk also about the will of God."

In the second half of the book, from page 106 on to the end, Dr. Titus makes various applications, both individual and social, of the ethico-religious standards he has set up. Much of this is timely and to the point, yet unfortunately weighted down in spots with the clichés of the press and the jargon of the pulpit.

There is clearly discernible in this book the conflict which necessarily arises in the reflective mind when it strives to extract from the amorphous content of emotional faith a pattern of life about which it can be said: this
is the true pattern; follow it. Dr. Titus rather acutely presents his moral ideas as "mature."

There is a failure here to make reasonable the essential notion of moral obligation. Apparently Dr. Titus is innocent of any extended contact with traditional Christian ethics, else he could hardly fail to be aware of the very definite and clear basis for moral obligation implicit in his belief in an intelligent Creator.

Finally, in his treatment of ethical relativity, which he sees as a dangerous theory, Dr. Titus leaves himself open to the answer which Westermarck made to Dr. Rashdall: "It is needless to say that a scientific theory is not invalidated by the mere fact that it is likely to cause mischief. The unfortunate circumstance that there do exist dangerous things in the world, proves that something may be dangerous and yet true."

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WILLIAM J. MULCAHY, S.J.


Some Christian pacifists seem to think that the question of the morality of war can be settled merely by quoting the biblical command, "Thou shalt not kill." They seem to forget that there are many other passages of the Bible in which God explicitly commands the Jews to wage war, and promises that He will help them to victory. They seem to forget, too, that the great leaders of the Jews who are glorified by the Bible as the special friends of God, men like Moses, Josue, Samuel, Samson, David, and the Machabees, to mention but a few, were all great military leaders who sometimes slew their thousands and their tens of thousands. It is rather difficult, then, to understand how anyone who reads the Bible carefully could come to the conclusion that it condemns war as something intrinsically wrong.

It may be objected, of course, that war, like divorce, was merely permitted to the Jews by reason of the hardness of their heart (Matt. 19:8), and that it is no longer lawful for the follower of Christ. Such an opinion can be supported only by the feeblest of arguments. It is true that Christ tells us not to resist evil, and to turn the other cheek to him who smites us, but it cannot be proved that he intended this injunction to apply beyond the sphere of personal quarrels, and it did not prevent Christ himself from exercising violence when he scourged the money-changers from the temple. It is true that Christ rebuked the violence of Peter in the Garden of Olives with the words, "Put back thy sword into its place; for all those who take the sword will perish by the sword" (Matt. 26:52), but surely it is of great significance that Peter was still wearing a sword after three years spent in the company of Christ.
Among Catholics, who accept the Church as an authority divinely instituted to interpret the truths revealed by Christ, there has been but little debate as to Christ’s teaching on war. We are agreed that war may be resorted to as a means of defending a nation’s rights, but that it may not be waged with the unscrupulous methods with which it is all too often conducted.

Among Protestants, however, whose basic principle is that the Bible, privately interpreted, is the unique source of Christian truth, it is only natural that there should be more uncertainty in explaining the slight clues which the Gospels give us as to Christ’s attitude toward war. There have been, therefore, whole sects, like the Quakers, and a large minority of the members of other Protestant Churches, who have taught that war of any kind is intrinsically immoral, and who have thus helped considerably to promote the tragic state of military unpreparedness which prevailed before 1939 in countries like Norway, England, and the United States, and thereby paved the way for Hitler's career of conquest. For them the problem of pacifism is a very serious question, and it is for such as these that Dr. Lee has written this book.

He shows in the opening chapters how feeble are the arguments of those who would prove that Christ and St. Paul were pacifists. There follows a series of chapters on the attitude of Christians towards war before and after the conversion of Constantine, another on the teaching of the monks and medieval heretics, others on the views of the great Catholic and Protestant theologians of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, and a fuller discussion of the ideas of the Quakers and the modern pacifist propaganda. The work is very well done, though the omission of a chapter on the Old Testament attitude to war is a notable defect. Dr. Lee does not try to prove any thesis of his own, but allows Tertullian, Origen, Augustine, Aquinas, Vittoria, Suarez, Luther, Calvin, Wesley, and others to speak to us freely in their own words.

Though the work is not entirely free from the minor inaccuracies that are inevitable in an attempt to cover such a vast subject, there is little that a Catholic could object to and very much that will be of interest and profit to any Catholic who is interested in the problems of war and peace.

*Alma College.*

JOHN J. HEALY, S.J.


This book was first published in the prime of the so-called liturgical movement, which we at Maria-Laach preferred to call the restoration of Christian life through the spirit of the liturgy. Romano Guardini had already written
his famous booklet, *The Spirit of the Liturgy*, as the first of the series *Ecclesia Orans*, edited by the inaugurator of the liturgical movement in Germany, Abbot Ildefons Herwegen of Maria-Laach. At this time of the "liturgical spring," the booklet was greeted as the outstanding publication on the liturgy, and its importance for the life of Catholic intellectuals was very great. Reading today Guardini's beautiful essays, one will still be attracted by his fine and clear-cut definitions, but will also notice a certain coldness, due to the somewhat "classicistic" (to use an un-English word) style of the Guardini of those years.

The opposite must be said of von Hildebrand's book. It is written with all the spontaneity and exuberant enthusiasm of a faithful Catholic rejoicing in the greatness of the Church and her *laus divina*. But there is also genuine proof of its being designed by a philosopher, whose logical thinking protects him from any trace of irrationalism. For supernatural reasons, the phenomenologist takes the liturgy as it exists here and now, without concerning himself with the historical and theological questions involved. His aim is to explain the supernatural values contained in the liturgy, and to prove them as necessarily complementing the noble virtues and affections of the human soul. He expounds a doctrine on the virtues not in the abstract but in the concrete, exemplified by continuous references to the liturgy. He would create the persuasion that our virtuous efforts can be purified, exalted, and made fruitful by our active participation in the liturgy of the Church. The book is the best *apologia laici pro liturgia* of which I know, though it does not pretend to be such. On the contrary, it disclaims explicitly and implicitly any apologetic or educational purpose, and emphasizes rather the existential value of the liturgy.

If one considers the merits of von Hildebrand's book, the few points on which there is a certain divergence of opinion do not mean too much; but I may mention them for friendly consideration, in view, as I hope, of later editions. Dr. von Hildebrand includes in his definition of the liturgy the sacraments and the sacramentals, as we do in the West. But is it, then, right to say that the liturgy is not primarily intended as a means of sanctification? I agree, of course, with von Hildebrand that the liturgy, like anything pertaining to the economy of salvation, has for its final goal the glorification of the Triune God. But the principal and very noble aim of the sacraments is the sanctification of man—sanctification taken not so much as our personal effort, but as the *dispensatio salutis* as effected by God, the principal agent. I willingly concede that this fundamental aspect of the liturgy is still more visible in the Eastern liturgies and in Western liturgies other than the Roman, from which it disappeared to a great extent during the period from Leo
the Great to Gregory the Great. But I hold against von Hildebrand that the essential and direct aim of all sacramental actions, the Holy Eucharist included, is the divinely operated transformation of man's soul and body through participation in the holy mysteries of the Church. The love of God as an inspiring motive (to which the author gives so much importance) is included in such a participation, and is also the ever growing effect of it. Another point of divergence is the term, "the classical man," which von Hildebrand uses with preference to describe the perfect man, whose natural and supernatural qualities are developed by the liturgical life. It seems to me that this term, so familiar to a German, has a too peculiar and too restricted meaning for it to be used aptly to describe the ageless type of Christian redeemed by Christ, and through Him and with Him adoring the Eternal Father.

In spite of these minor criticisms, I repeat: Liturgy and Personality is the eminent achievement of a Christian philosopher, and deserves to be read and meditated by every Catholic intellectual in this country.

St. Paul's Priory

THOMAS MICHELS, O.S.B.


Dr. Lowrie, Hon. Canon of Trinity Cathedral, Trenton, N. J., and former rector of the American Episcopal Church in Rome, has published under the above title three interesting papers on the Eucharist and the proper performance of that rite in his church. One cannot but praise the purpose of this short but well written book; any attempt to improve the beauty and the dignity of a Christian service must meet with the approval of all. Dr. Lowrie has this noble aim in view and his work should prove both an inspiration and a guide to his fellow ministers.

In the first of these papers, the author discusses certain aspects of the evidence for the Lord's Supper in the New Testament. The second, which is entitled, "Essential Aspects of the Liturgy," deals with the various parts of the Eucharistic service and their relationship to the whole rite. The third, and by far the longest part of the book, takes up the practical questions: how to perform the liturgy. There is an excellent index, a glossary of liturgical terms, and a series of plates illustrating early Christian altars, vestments, etc.

In treating of the New Testament evidence for the Lord's Supper, the author does not pretend to exhaust the subject; he selects and emphasizes certain phases of that evidence. For example, he lays special emphasis on
the miracle of the loaves and fishes, a miracle which, he says, St. John regards as the origin of the Eucharist (p. 4). As evidence that St. John was not alone in placing the origin of the Eucharist earlier than the Last Supper, he points to the earliest pictorial art of the Roman catacombs, where, he says, "the Eucharist is commonly represented, not by a picture of Christ and His apostles seated at a table in the upper room, but by groups of Christians, which by the presence of baskets of bread and two fish are clearly associated with the multitude in the wilderness." The traditional view that the miracle of the loaves and fishes, as well as that of Cana, merely fore-shadowed the Eucharist is not likely to be abandoned in favor of Dr. Lowrie's thesis. In the sixth chapter of St. John there is a clear antithesis between the bread of the miracle in the desert and the "bread that I will give... my flesh for the life of the world." If St. John regarded this miracle as the origin of the Eucharist, how can we explain that he has Our Lord, the very next day, reproaching the crowd for seeking Him "not because you have seen signs but because you have eaten of the loaves and have been filled. Do not labor for the food that perishes, but for that which endures unto life everlasting, which the Son of Man will give you"? The evidence from the frescoes of the catacombs brought forward by Dr. Lowrie to support his theory is not convincing; at the Pontifical Institute of Christian Archaeology, we were taught that such banquet scenes represent, not the Eucharist, but the *refrigerium*. On this point, of course, Dr. Lowrie was simply following the interpretation of the DeRossi-Marucchi school of archaeology; the tendency of that school to read a dogma into every fresco finds little favor with present-day scholars such as Josi and DeBruyne.

In dealing with the Last Supper, and at other points in his book, Dr. Lowrie brings up what seems to be his favorite thesis, and, incidentally, his chief point of disagreement with the Catholic position. For him, it was not in the first instance, and it is not now, the words of institution which consecrate the elements; at the Last Supper it was the blessing of Christ, now it is the whole Eucharistic prayer. Of St. Mark's account of the institution, he notes "the surprising statement that only after they had all drunk of the cup did Jesus tell his disciples what it meant." He comments further: "But more astonishing is the inference we must draw from this: that the words, 'This is my blood' (and, by parity of reasoning, 'This is my body') were not the formula which consecrated the first Eucharist, seeing that the wine was drunk before these words were pronounced, and that consequently they cannot well be regarded as essential for the consecration of subsequent Eucharists." Here the evidence of the other Gospels and of St. Paul is
simply disregarded; the mere order of the words in St. Mark's narrative is sufficient confirmation for what is apparently a predetermined position.

Dr. Lowrie returns to this point again in his second and third essays when dealing with the consecration. He argues against the practice of genuflecting and of elevating the host at this point in the Mass on the grounds that it is the whole Eucharistic prayer, and not the mere words of institution, which consecrates. The real difficulty, we think, for Dr. Lowrie is the presence, in his liturgy and in the great Eastern liturgies, of an *epiclesis*, an invocation of the Holy Spirit that comes after the words of institution. Whilst admitting the reality of the difficulty, we cannot see that it solves the problem to say that the whole prayer consecrates. That merely raises another and a greater one: When does the bread and the wine become the Body and the Blood of Christ? It is not conceivable as a gradual process lasting throughout the length of the Eucharistic prayer. When does the change occur? At the *epiclesis*, or at the moment that the very last word of the prayer is said? It is instructive to recall that, when confronted with this difficulty at the Council of Florence, Bessarion and the other Greek delegates readily accepted the traditional Latin solution.

Dr. Lowrie has frequent words of praise for the liturgical movement and for the liturgical reformers of the Church of Rome. He tells us that he has followed that movement with interest since the days when, as a student at Rome, he assisted at the reunions of the *Cultores Martyrum*. Although they may be grateful for the learned writer's kindly comments, we doubt that Catholic liturgists will appreciate the remark that "the liturgical reformers in the Church of Rome are disquieted by this emphasis upon the Words of Institution, recognizing as they do that the prayer of thanksgiving as a whole is the act of consecration" (p. 153).

Dr. Lowrie's suggestions for the proper performance of the liturgy of his church are marked by sobriety and good taste. His knowledge of the history of the Eucharistic rite gives him a special competence to deal with the problems which arise. His remarks on altars and vestments are particularly good and the illustrations inserted at the end of his book add a great deal to his comments. His long sojourn at Rome has given him an understanding of, and a sympathy for, Catholic practices; it leads him, as he frankly confesses, to "romanize" on many points. He suggests, for example, the adoption of our prayers at the foot of the altar, since "nothing could be more natural and nothing more appropriate than to begin the Mass with a humble approach and a confession of sin" (p. 25). His explanation for the absence of these prayers from the Anglican Prayer Book is, however, not quite accu-
rate. He states that they were regarded as the private preparation of the celebrant and the server in the Roman Church at the time of the Protestant Reformation, and for this reason were excluded from the Prayer Book. It is quite true that these prayers were originally private in character, but by the thirteenth century they form an integral part of the Ordo Missae in the Roman curial missal.

To conclude this review, we wish to quote at some length from Dr. Lowrie's Epilogue. His apologia for the study of rites and ceremonies and for the reverent performance of the Eucharist is a masterpiece and one that may be read with profit by everyone who lays claim to the title of priest. After speaking of the role of Christ as Priest and King, and of His interest in ritual and liturgical reform, he continues: “I will conclude here with the remark that the Christian minister, regarded simply in his capacity as a preacher, might be expected to devote all his time to the preparation of his sermons. Indeed he would be well employed in that. But he must not forget that he is also a pastor and perhaps must devote very much time to the personal care of his flock. And surely he must not forget that he is a priest. I do not lay special emphasis upon the sacerdotal implication of that title; I am thinking in this instance of the minister as the Liturg, the leader of his people in worship. It is in this capacity preeminently that he is formally distinguished from the flock. That is what a presbyter essentially is. It cannot therefore be thought incongruous with his office that he should be seriously employed, sometimes together with other presbyters, in considering how he may best lead his people in worship. In teaching them how to pray and leading them together in common prayer he will edify them more than by his sermons, or even his pastoral calls.”

Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies


In the design of his excellent Preface, Archbishop Stritch reveals the great importance of this book. In the words, “It must not happen again,” he formulates the determination of “the common man” with reference to the present war. Then he points out the weighty fact: “Let any student in full calmness and impartiality examine the proposal of the Axis and study the philosophy which inspires it, and he will be compelled to conclude that
it holds out no promise of world peace" (p. viii). On the other hand, our aims are phrased “in the language of honest peacemakers” and involve “the recognition of basic native human rights under the moral law” (ibid.) These aims, however, are “enunciated only in large outline” (p. x); at all costs, they must be “complemented and supplemented by the papal plan” (p. xi). From this I draw the conclusion that perspectives of particular responsibility open before American Catholics. If our peace aims need clarification, at least they are capable of it. “There is no opposition,” said Pius XII, “between the laws that govern the life of faithful Christians and the postulates of a genuine brotherly humanitarianism, but rather unity and mutual support” (n. 1444). Our task, therefore, is to give our national peace aims a genuinely Christian definition, and strenuously to see to their embodiment in the social structure of national and international life. We must set right aims before “the conscience of the world” as Pius XII has done (n. 1859), and win all men of good will to their acceptance. Principles for Peace illuminates the colossal responsibility that we should incur by failure in this task; for it makes piercingly clear the fact that we have all that is needed for success. In a very real sense, the riches of the book are terrifying.

Included are 451 documents of the Holy See; all but 69 from the Secretariate of State are utterances of the five last Popes. They vary in length and character. Some are brief devotional exhortations of the Common Father to groups of his own children. Others are solemn public pronouncements to the whole Church and the whole world. From their totality there emerges a portrait of Man in modern society—a startlingly vivid portrait of a Face marred with great sin and still greater ignorance, from whose eyes, nevertheless, there looks out that immense, unclarified longing for redemption that is the perennial claim of man upon the mercy of God and of his fellows. From their totality, there likewise emerges an imposing plan of social redemption for this strange race, whose sin merits just condemnation, but whose suffering calls for an unmeasured compassion.

The plan, as the Editor points out in his Introduction, has four characteristics: it is universal, integrated, radical; it is a unity, and developed in its details; it is shot through with prophetic insight into the reality of things; and, above all, it is practically possible of realization. This last note is most marked in Pius XII. Standing amid the ruins, himself inwardly devastated by the world's devastation, his farther vision is of victory: “there will come not the terrors which the timid fear, but the brilliant fulfillment of the hopes of faithful and magnanimous souls” (n. 1783). I should wish this vision
above all to be caught by everyone who reads the book or hears it interpreted.

This periodical need not be expected to analyze in detail the papal program for peace and reconstruction. We might, however, comment on the book as a source for its study. Little fault could be found with the selection of documents (one, incidentally, is wrongly entitled [p. 229]: Benedict XV's famous letter of August 1, 1917, was issued "Aux chefs des peuples belligérants"). What of the translations? Confessedly, they have been "gathered from many sources; they are not all of the same quality" (p. xxiii). A few are the official English versions printed in the Acta; these are rightly used, though not all are of good literary quality; the Sertum Laetitiae is unfortunate in its rendition. New translations were made of 151 documents, filling 170 of the book's 806 pages; for the most part these documents are of secondary importance. The rest are presented by the Editor as "the best available at the moment" (p. xxiii). This is doubtless true; but for purposes of argument the student will still have to refer to the originals in many cases. And for the general reader an old difficulty remains. I have known non-Catholics to be put off completely by the papal style, so as never to reach the papal ideas. And the same happens to Catholics, even to the courageous few who really consider that these documents were written for them. Translation of papal documents is a genuine problem; something still has to be done about the stylus curiae, which still further complicates the native involution of Italian sentence structure.

The only serious defect is that a satisfactory translation was not made of the Christmas Allocution, 1940. In the one used (from the Tablet), the first four numbers are not a translation at all, but a summary of a much longer section; and in the following numbers there are several serious departures from the original, omissions, and mistranslations (notably, the third and fifth "points" are badly weakened). Yet this document is of cardinal importance. Canon G. D. Smith's version of the Christmas Allocution, 1939, is used; its general excellence is marred, I think, in the famous text on the Christian ideal of universal love, which "may serve as a common ground also for those who have not the blessing of sharing the same faith with us." The Italian reads: "che . . . getta un ponte anche verso coloro, i quali, etc." The point may seem fine, but I should prefer to retain the Italian metaphor, since the phrase "common ground" has its own connotations. Needless to say, the case for cooperation with non-Catholics is too strong to need the coloring of this phrase. In another place a Tablet translation makes Pius XII speak of "doctrines and practices of a disruptive and destructive character that find civic and human progress in the severance of natural law from
divine revelation”; which is nonsense. The Italian reads: “... nella separazione dai vincoli del diritto naturali e della rivelazione divina”; which is quite different.

The seven-page bibliography will be very useful. One might, however, wish to see included these books: Charles de T'Serclais, Pope Leo XIII (New York, 1903); Eduardo Soderini, The Pontificate of Leo XIII, and Leo the XIII, France, and Italy, translated by B. B. Carter (London: Burns, Oates, and Washbourne, 1934); and especially Friedrich von Lama, Die Friedensvermittlung Papst Benedikt XV und ihre Verleihung durch den Reichskanzler Michaelis (Munich: Köstel u. Pustet, 1932).

The Index is tremendous—sixty-eight pages of entries, done in phrases long enough to be descriptive and highly useful. I confess I only sampled it for accuracy; but I did miss a reference to the co-operation with non-Catholics which has been shown to be an important part of the papal plan. This is the more remarkable as the Editor very pertinently says: “The heart of the papal plan, the sine qua non of its success, is a spirit of Christian cooperation; no plan for peace, no matter how wise or sublime, can ever pass into the realm of reality unless nations are willing to co-operate with nations, groups with other groups, men with their fellow men” (p. xiii).

The book offers material for a number of needed studies. Let me suggest just one, by giving two quotations. In Summi Pontificatus Pius XII said: “... the new order of the world ... must rest on the unshakable foundation, on the solid rock of natural law and divine revelation” (n. 1436). In his Christmas Allocution, 1941, he said: “Such a new order ... must be founded on that immovable and unshakable rock, the moral law, which the Creator Himself manifested by means of a natural order and which He has engraved with indelible characters on the hearts of men” (n. 1757). The second text does not mention divine revelation, in a context where its explicit mention might well have been expected. Is there a significance, an “economy” in the omission? I merely ask. But I suggest that the explanation and harmony of these two texts (parallels for each could easily be given) would lead to an interesting and valuable discussion, into which would be drawn not only issues like the functions of justice and of charity in the constitution of the social order, the meaning of “instaurare omnia in Christo” as a practical social program (and its relation to “instaurare omnia in iustitia”), the co-operative relationships between Catholics and non-Catholics in the work of world pacification—but also ultimately the whole question of how the Catholic concept of temporal society and of its unity is to be formulated and promoted, rightly and with appositeness to the highly confused present-day scene.
I must remark on one final value of the book. For many decades the Church has falsely been made to appear, as once in her earliest years, somehow *inimica humani generis*; today, at a moment of "deep spiritual crisis" (n. 1402), when there is engaged "a fight for the human race" (n. 1863), she is discovered to the eyes of all men of good will in her true light, "Madre commune di tutti." Pius XII's Christmas Allocution, 1942, is wholly dominated by the idea of the "personal values of man as the image of God" (n. 1835); and it is to the defence of man that he, in the tradition of his predecessors, would rally all the energies of the Church, and the aid, too, of "all unselfish and great-hearted men" (n. 1498). This portrait of the Church as the Mother of Man emerges no less clearly from the book than does the portrait of man himself.

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**JOHN COURTNEY MURRAY, S.J.**


Those familiar with Giordani's excellent *Il Messaggio sociale di Gesù*, which made its appearance in 1935, will rejoice in the publication of Dr. Zizzamia's translation by which the book becomes available to a wider circle of readers. The excellence of the translation itself is further cause for rejoicing. It reads smoothly and renders the Italian faithfully. Indeed, the only divergencies between the original and the translation which the reviewer noticed were instances in which errors in the original had been rectified by the painstaking Dr. Zizzamia.

Giordani's treatment is refreshingly broad in contrast to some of the older books on the same subject which confined themselves to the collection of texts on a rather narrow range of subjects and which often failed to place the social thought of the New Testament in its proper relation to the social conditions of the first century. Giordani opens with an introduction on Christian social thought in general. Then follows a chapter on the historical background. Succeeding chapters consider such subjects as the relation of Christianity and Judaism, the human person, justice, charity, the family, political authority, economic problems, labor, and war. A concluding chapter discusses "the essential characteristics of the new social feeling."

Topics like these which concern the social doctrine of the Church have in the past awakened only a rather moderate interest in the mind of the average theologian, but there can be no doubt that now the trend is toward a greater interest in them. The reviewer once had the curiosity to go through Denzinger's *Enchiridion* to see when the bulk of the Church's social teaching
had been expounded in official pronouncements. It was remarkable to see how few formal declarations on such subjects appeared during the first eighteen centuries of the Church's history. In the middle of the nineteenth century they began to be more numerous. With Leo XIII they came in great numbers and since his time they have continued to increase in frequency. In the history of the development of doctrine first one dogma and then another has been unfolded and expounded by the teaching authority of the Church. Each century seems to have its peculiar and characteristic interests. Certainly interest in Catholic social doctrine is the mark of our own age. In their treatment of this doctrine theologians must be grateful to Giordani for his clear, accurate, and scholarly examination of the fonts. They will await impatiently the promised translations of the two companion volumes which treat the social thought of the apostles and the early Fathers respectively.

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PAUL HANLY FURFEY


The place of interest in a capitalist economy is so pivotal that one is not surprised to find perennial controversy about its nature and functions. Economists endlessly recast their explanations, without seeming to satisfy either themselves or their critics; moralists, distinguishing between interest and usury, have not found it easy to decide just where, in the modern business world, the one ends and the other begins. The difficulty arises partly from the fact that moralists are not necessarily equipped with economic knowledge any more than economists are able to formulate or even recognize the moral judgments often implicit in the programmatic phases of their science. Adam Smith, economist and professor of moral philosophy, might have bridged the gap; but he abandoned the attempt upon discovering, as he thought, an invisible hand leading private utility to a rendezvous with public interest.

How the two disciplines can be employed jointly, to the advantage of each, is ably illustrated in Interest and Usury, where the result of a keen economic analysis is studied in the light of moral principle, and conclusions are reached which are of profound significance to economist and moralist alike.

The first half of this book is a study of modern interest theory, as found principally in the writings of Knut Wicksell, Irving Fisher, Joseph Schumpeter, and John Maynard Keynes. This analysis constitutes a valuable
contribution to the subject. There follows an examination of Scholastic thought on this question, as found in the *De Jure et Justitia* treatises of three representative writers of the late sixteenth or early seventeenth century: Luis Molina, Leonard Lessius, and John DeLugo. Copious citations enable the reader to understand the nature and subtle variations of the *mutuum*, or fungible loan; why these writers condemned as unjust all usury, that is, gain arising directly from a *mutuum* contract; and why they approved of interest, or gain which, while it might occur in connection with such a contract, was attributable to some concomitant extrinsic title (these titles were reducible to the emergent loss of the lender by reason of the loan). The clear and ordered exposition in this part of the book will be a revelation to those who have neglected the contribution of the late medieval Scholastics to moral science, especially in its economic applications.

Comparison of these two bodies of doctrine reveals a remarkable degree of correlation, especially when the differing purposes are recalled, the Scholastics being concerned with what ought to be, the modern writers with what is or what is economically expedient. In general, the modern explanations of interest and the Scholastic justification of it are equivalent, natural interest, alternative opportunity, etc., being obvious instances of emergent loss incurred by a lender.

The question of bank credit is worthy of note. For the modern writers, the introduction of funds newly created and without cost is a disturbing factor which distorts the pattern of distribution, causes erratic price movements, and through "forced savings" or the depreciation of the value of existing units of money levies a tribute on the whole community to give value to the new funds. The older Scholastics, of course, were not confronted with this problem. But have their principles any application? Father Dempsey thinks they have. He suggests that since the only moral title to interest is the emergent loss incurred by the lender, and since the loan of newly created bank credit involves no such loss, the process is in terms of Scholastic principle usurious. This is in fact the principal conclusion which he derives from the whole inquiry: usury is today commonly a process and is institutional rather than personal.

Other conclusions, sometimes surprising but always well argued, are suggested; but the main conclusion is undoubtedly the most significant. Against it one might object that in the interest and usury analysis of the Schoolmen the only emergent loss considered is that which is identical with an alternative opportunity for profitable investment, not a loss involved in the origin of the funds. If this be true, may it not be irrelevant to the problem of usury whether funds arise from savings, or from the discovery of a new mine, or through the operations of the banking system? (This
latter method may be objectionable on other grounds.) All that is necessary to justify interest is that the controller of the funds, however he obtained them, be confronted with possibility of loaning them or profitably investing them. Whatever may be said on this score, let it be remarked in conclusion that the fact that this book provokes such questions and also provides the apparatus of principle, both moral and economic, for their answer, is one of the reasons why the author so well deserves the warm encomium he receives in Professor Schumpeter’s introduction.

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PAUL V. KENNEDY, S.J.


The Yale University Press has just published The Devil and the Jews, the work of Dr. Joshua Trachtenberg, officiating Rabbi of Temple Covenant of Peace, Easton, Pa. From the blurb we learn that the author asked himself “why the Jew has been feared and hated.” He “found a good many answers among the mores and superstitions of other generations,” but none of them were to his liking, as he found the “Middle Ages the magnifying mirror” that reflected the hostility toward the Jew that is witnessed today. This accounts for the subtitle of the book, “The Medieval Conception of the Jew and Its Relation to Modern Antisemitism.”

The belief that the Jew is considered to be the “devil incarnal”; the “antichrist”; has “horns and tail”; is “full of sorcery”; has a “distinctive and unpleasant odor”; is a “host and image desecrater”; “ritual murderer”; “magician”; “infidel”; “heretic,” etc., is attributed to the Church by word and reproduced illustrations throughout the book. There is a word here and there about Luther’s “bitter and foul denunciation of Jews.” Though Luther “broke the hold of Catholic doctrine upon large masses of European peoples” (p. 109), he is held to have remained with the Church in his opposition to the Jews, being “as intolerant of heresy, charged against Jews, ... as his Catholic opponents, though he preferred to call it blasphemy” (p. 217).

Rabbi Trachtenberg, being of the “Reform” division of Jewry, views the doctrines, decrees, and practices of the Church, in relation to the Jews, with a disbelief in a personal Messiah, miracles, angels, good or evil, and revelation in the Orthodox Jewish and Christian sense of the term. In addition to this false standard of judgment, he is filled with the usual rabbinical hostility towards things doctrinally Christian. Therefore it is no surprise to see that he spurns belief in Satan as a “distinct personality” to whom “the proficiency of the Jews in magic” was attributed that caused much of the opposition to them during the Middle Ages.

It is necessary to read the Rabbi’s Jewish Magic and Superstition (1939),
of which *The Devil and the Jews* “is an outgrowth” (p. xi), to understand properly this phase of the subject. It is a “study of the folk religion of Jews,” their “many superstitious usages” and “practice of magic,” based upon a demonology that “was distinctively Jewish”: “of this sort were the beliefs concerning demons and angels, and the many superstitious usages based on these beliefs, which . . . actually became a part of Judaism, and on the periphery of the religious life, the practices of magic, which never broke completely with the tenets of the faith, yet stretched them almost to the breaking point” (p. vii).

Again we read: “The Rabbis [are said to have] sought to eradicate these practices, or at least to transmute their offensive features; but their efforts met with only indifferent success . . . and therefore they were often obliged to accord it a grudging recognition and acceptance” (p. viii). One may glean from Rabbi Trachtenberg’s books, written in defense of the Jews at the expense of the “superstitious” adherents of the Church, that the hostility towards Jews during the Middle Ages was intensified by the known secrecy of Jewish magical, superstitious, anti-Christian activities, which were “sheltered from Christian eyes by secrecy and the impenetrable wall of a strange tongue and an even stranger mystical vocabulary and method peculiar to itself. There flourished in Jewish circles a magic lore as extensive as any known to the non-Jewish world, yet markedly different in character and technique” (p. 11).

One does not need to go further in his investigation than the Rabbi’s books to conclude that the beliefs and practices of the Jews were provocative of hostility on the part of the populace during the Middle Ages. Those were religious ages despite their unjustifiable abuses, just as our age is a great industrial age despite its inequities. The Middle Ages were Christian in principle and form of worship. The Judaism of those ages, being more Talmudic than Mosaic, being anti-Christian in spirit and practice, stood continually in hostile contrast. This in itself caused conflicts that it is difficult for opponents of the Church to appreciate in our age of indifference, when blasphemy, for instance, is considered to be uncultural rather than one of the greatest offenses man can commit, and when trial for heresy by any Church is considered to be obscurantism.

There is a lack of appreciation in the book of the fact that while the actions of the people during the Middle Ages were at times far removed from the principles they professed, they deserve to be commended, rather than condemned, for taking the word of the great moral hero of the twelfth century, St. Bernard of Clairvaux, “who informed his congregation in a sermon: ‘While we pray for the Jews, they persecute and curse us’” (p. 181).
The Devil and the Jews enforces this assertion when it tells us that “this conception [was] dignified with the authority of Justin Martyr, Jerome, Origin, Agobard, [who said] that Jews curse Jesus and all Christians daily in their prayers.” Besides being acquainted, somewhat, with the Talmudic curses, the people of the Middle Ages were no doubt aware of Minim (heretics, strangers), though not by this name, which became the twelfth of the “Eighteen Benedictions” in which God is called upon to punish Judeo-Christians, Nazarenes, Samaritans, Sadducees, Gnostics, and others. It is true that, “in order to avoid Christian displeasure, once the Church reached a position where it could make its displeasure felt, the offensive term (in the twelfth Benediction) was changed to malshinin, slanderers” (p. 182), which is the same thing hidden under an all-inclusive designation.

The Devil and the Jews utters a word in commendation of the Church here and there for defending the Jews against the false charge of “ritual murder,” “well poisoning,” etc., though without making any impression upon the multitude, save “in the seat of the papacy” (p. 103). “The Church” is held to have been “two Churches,” in the sense that “the hierarchy (one Church) was often inclined to be humane and to extend a degree of protection to them,” whereas “the people, inspired usually by the local clergy (the other Church), were not equally disposed to exercise the restraint demanded of them.” This was very likely true in some localities. But, concludes The Devil and the Jews, “whether they [the two Churches] were in agreement or not, the practical consequences of Christian principle are justly attributable to ‘the Church’” (p. 7).

One wonders, while reading the incidental commendatory things said of the Church, whether they are not intended to pave the way for more effectively penetrating the minds of readers with the mass of charges in the book. The practices of the Church itself are set forth as being deliberately at variance with her principles. One instance of a doctrinal nature, that was of advantage to the Jews, will suffice. The Church is rightly declared to hold that Jews are not heretics, as heretics are persons belonging to the Church who have deviated from her teachings: “Jews were not and had never been Christians, and could therefore on no logical premise be accused of deviation from a doctrine that they never espoused.” Hence “the Church recognized the right of the Jewish community to persist and to maintain its institutions in the very midst of Christian society.” But, says Rabbi Trachtenberg, this was an “anomalous lenity evolved by medieval canon jurists,” for they held “mankind as a whole,” the Jewish community included, to be “the mystic body of Christ,” the Church (p. 176). Thus the Jews—unbaptised—were doctrinally members of the Church, hence devia-
tors, heretics, in that they denied Christ and attended the Synagogue instead of the Church. The authority presented to substantiate this strange concept of the Mystical Body of Christ is *A Social and Religious History of the Jews* (1937), written by Prof. Salo W. Baron, one of America's leading Jewish historians. The Rabbi and the Professor go on to say that "this formula is more and more remarkable, the more uncontested the general theory and practice of intolerance became in the Christian world"—which would be so if true.

Only a few of the many charges, misrepresentations, and misunderstandings have been mentioned that appear in *The Devil and the Jews*, called by the Jewish press "a brilliant and challenging book that demonstrates how the utterly irrational hatred of the Jew of today stems from a conditioning process, created by the Church, which for centuries has made the Jew and the devil synonomous" (*American Hebrew*, N.Y., Aug. 13, 1943; cf. *The B'nai B'rith Messenger*, Los Angeles, Sept. 10, 1943).

As one reads on and on through the pages of *The Devil and the Jews*, the thought grows as to what purpose the book will serve, save to besmirch the reputation of the Catholic Church. There is nothing in the book that is likely to rally any persons, save "anti-Romanists," to the support of the Jews against the abomination of antisemitism as it exists on the continent of Europe, or when, as expected, it becomes sonorous in Great Britain and the United States after victory comes to the United Nations.

If, as Rabbi Trachtenberg said in his essay on "How to Combat Antisemitism in America," it is "not politic to press an argument which might alienate a great many non-Jews," especially when Jews "must turn to their Christian friends, for defenders of democracy, for an effective force behind its program," then why rummage through a mass of old anti-Catholic charges for *The Devil and the Jews*? What other than an anti-Catholic purpose is served? What effect will it have but to alienate the Catholic part of our American population that stands unitedly for safeguarding the right of Jews to the free exercise of their natural rights?

Had Rabbi Trachtenberg heeded the "self-conscious twinge of guilt to be caught rummaging in musty medieval texts, at a time when the world is tortured with bloodshed and tyranny, when our culture and perhaps civilization itself is in jeopardy and men pit their lives to preserve them," as he says in the opening paragraph of his book, there would be less material extant for the antisemite to use in order to sustain his contention that the devil and Jew are "two-in-one."

All the charges presented in the book to try and prove that modern antisemitism stemmed from the Church, even were those charges true, do not
sustain the Rabbi's concept of the source of things anti-Jewish, for, as he declares in the closing paragraph of his dissertation, "Antisemitism today is 'scientific'; it would disdain to include in the contemporaneous lexicon of Jewish crime such outmoded items as satanism and sorcery. To the modern antisemite, of whatever persuasion, the Jew became the international communist or the international banker, or better, both."

It is not to the Middle Ages, nor to our Hitleristic age, but rather to the Jews themselves that one must look for the cause of the affliction they suffer. A little intelligent "rummaging" into the first twelve chapters of the Book of Isaias will bring the cause of Jewish affliction to light, and the cure as well.

Boston, Mass.  

David Goldstein


It is easy for a reader seeking brilliance to underestimate the work of Jacques Maritain. He so mixes the elementary with the profound that, conscious of the former, one may fail to appreciate the latter ingredient. Then too, Maritain's expression is uniformly abstract, devoid of Platonic recurrence to the technician, the scribbler, the politician, the ants of our actual world and their industry. Unaided by things evoked from stored experience, the attention flags. Indeed, with a lesser author, the mind would suspect the process, prospecting in a shuttered labyrinth. But Maritain's clarity illuminates his problem, and his light is his own. He does not merely quote, even Aristotle.

Christians, clerical and lay, ought to study carefully the essay in political philosophy entitled, The Rights of Man and Natural Law. In it many questions are left untouched but what is put down is fundamental. Maritain bases his political philosophy on man's relationship to the Creator. To follow him here, one had better be a student of Scholasticism and understand that philosophy's stress upon relations, because "man ... is, in his entirety, engaged as a part of political society." But "man is not ordered to political society by reason of himself as a whole and by reason of all that is in him. A good runner is in his entirety a runner, but not by reason of all the functions nor of all the aims of his being. ... The entire human person is a part of political society, but not by virtue of all that is in it nor of all that pertains to it." Maritain's social bodies would strive ever towards perfect fellow-
ship as towards an ideal to be increasingly approximated. One must be actuated by faith to entertain perseveringly such a view of life. Maritain believes in “the historic vocation of mankind.” He adopts, therefore, that theory of improvement in human affairs, despite losses and cycles, which, for brevity, I shall call the running wheel of advancing history. Human progress, in Maritain’s conception, is, to be sure, advanced and hampered by free human activity. He abhors, of course, any polity that founds the love of comrades and fellow citizens in a common hatred of the barbarian without the gates, whether in the empires of long ago or of today.

Considering the State and conscience, Maritain says: “The universe of truths—of science, of wisdom and of poetry—towards which the intelligence tends by itself, belongs by nature to a plane higher than the political community. The power of the State and of social interests cannot impose itself upon this universe.” Our author will later use this distinction in argument not only against totalitarian forms but to reject any notion of the State prescribing beliefs for the strict inner forum of conscience. His treatment, in its entirety, of this delicate question, including the relation of the State to religion, deserves consideration.

By deduction from its view of man’s complete nature, the essay rejects identification of the political with the economic, not only as exhibited in the industrial concept of Communism but in the economic society envisaged by extreme corporatism. Such distinctions of importance affecting practical life are offered in the essay. The author furnishes philosophical encouragement for universal equal suffrage, and condemns the single party system established in the totalitarian States. The book contains as an appendix the *International Declaration of the Rights of Man* adopted by The Institute of International Law in its session in New York, October 12, 1929.

In the longer essay Maritain complains: “... the surprising thing is that many Christians... while remaining attached to the dogmas of faith, put aside the inspiration of faith when it comes to judging human things.” In the briefer *Twilight of Civilization* he dwells upon the radical conflict between the Gospel view of human relationships and worldliness. This unhappily titled book is the text of a lecture given in Paris on February 8, 1939. There are four parts. Part I, “The Crisis of Modern Humanism,” points out that human nature is “open,” not “shut up” in itself or absolutely self-sufficient. Maritain offers the term, “the humanism of the Incarnation,” “which sets no a priori limits to the descent of the divine into man...” Historical treatment is very brief but refreshingly kindly. In the second part, “The Great Anti-Christian Forces” are the two schools of totalitarianism. “To sum up, although Nazi racism is more irremediably destructive
and constitutes simply the worst plague for our world, there is no human regeneration to be expected either from Communism or from Nazi racism."

Part III, "The Gospel and the Pagan Empire," contrasts friendship for one's own built on hatred of the others, the outsiders, with Christ's definition of neighbor. Maritain implicitly urges Christians to search their hearts lest they know not of what spirit they are. Reflecting upon the insidiousness of racism, he quotes with some feeling the words of Pope Pius XI "... spiritually we are Semites." There is a quotation also well worth while from Cardinal Cerejeira, Patriarch of Lisbon. Part IV, "Christianity and Democracy," reminds us of the legitimacy of the phrase, "Christian democracy." And this it is of which it treats. Maritain mentions the distinction, which has in recent days happily been made by a number of writers, between the tradition of Rousseau and that of American democracy.

The style of this lecture, naturally enough, still reverberates somewhat from the platform. In rhythms it is Ciceronian rather than Demosthenic. It does not seem imaginative.

*Monroe, N. Y.*

Hugh McCarron, S.J.
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