
Two years ago, in From the Stone Age to Christianity, Dr. Albright reviewed in constructive synthesis the contribution of modern archaeology in the Near East to the cultural history of that eventful region. He now gives us a complementary study of Israel's religion from the same sources. The style of this book, though of course scientific and concise, is somewhat easier to follow than that of the former one, perhaps because the data are more concrete and colorful. There is the same wide acquaintance with pertinent literature, the same abundance of notes on each chapter, separate from the text, and a complete index of biblical citations as well as one of subjects. The work is a helpful and welcome addition to its predecessor.

Naturally, the witness of archaeology to Israel's religion would be mostly indirect. It might supply our only information upon some religious phenomena within limited periods, especially in earlier times. But Israel's religion on the whole is so fully exhibited in the Old Testament, even in the setting of its history, that the proper service of archaeology chiefly consists in clarifying and illustrating the scriptural record. This, again, it cannot be expected to do completely, but only in those particular features of the religious system of Israel which it happens to exemplify.

While these are obvious reflections, their appreciation from the first may obviate any disappointment which a reader might feel in the comparatively limited scope and proportions of this book as compared with those of FSAC. Another restricting circumstance is that some of Israel's outstanding religious characteristics were decisive factors in its cultural history, and that these subjects (especially monotheism), having been fully treated before, are not now directly discussed. But that much still remained to be said of archaeology's proper bearing on religious phenomena is evident from the quantity of material here presented without any repetition from the former work, although with rather frequent reference to its pages.

Whether one studies the religion of a people as a matured system, or traces its history (as here) through successive stages, the value of the results must be somewhat qualified by the limitations of method and approach. With St. Thomas we regard religion as that virtue by which man's life is regulated with regard to God (ordinatur ad Deum). Regulation or
direction applies to deliberate action, thus supposing motives apprehended as such by reason; and among such motives, man's rational conception of what God is and what is due to Him cannot fail to be essential. Furthermore, if we confine ourselves to what a critical judgment approves as stable and final in religion, it will follow that since God, as conceived of by any standard, is beyond the reach of sensile experience, His effectual guidance is indispensable to our formation of true and valid notions of His nature and of our relations to Him. Thus religion, though it terminates in a human way of life, has consisted of two essential parts: objective divine revelation, and our apprehension of, and active response to it. The Old Testament writers have recorded both together, and that in the framework of their temporal history. They give us their account of a graded series of divine lessons and of Israel's successive responses to them.

Dealing with archaeological evidence, it is natural for Dr. Albright to approach his subject from the viewpoint of the second factor, the religious thoughts and actions of Israel the learner. Such a method neither affirms nor denies the objective reality of a divine initiative, but simply prescinds from it to discuss the history of what we should call Israel's concurrence with God's direction. In justice to the author, this should be borne in mind in reading his statement of his aim: "What we have in mind is nothing less than the ultimate reconstruction, as far as possible, of the route which our cultural ancestors traversed in order to reach Judaeo-Christian heights of spiritual insight and ethical monotheism. In this book we are concerned with the religion of the Old Testament, of which the religion of the New was only the extension and the fulfillment" (pp. 4-5).

At the same time, the objectivity of this homocentric approach might not have suffered by the preliminary clarification of a few fundamentals. A definition of religion itself was perhaps deemed superfluous, but more attention to the difference between religion, mythology, and magic would have been of much assistance in following the argument. In Chapter I, "Archaeology and the Ancient Near-Eastern Mind," we feel placed in mediis rebus without quite enough of introduction.

To comment more positively, some of the positions assumed in this chapter seem rather insecure. The archaeological data are grouped under man's cognitive forces classified as the aesthetic and imaginative, the affective, and the reasoning faculties. Since man's vital principle is the ultimate source of all his consciousness, manifesting itself in the specific potencies which we call phantastic, appetitive, and intellective, "it must be emphasized that these categories are not mutually exclusive, but often overlap; and we must stress the fact that two or three of them are generally
brought into operation together” (p. 6). This truth makes just allowance for concomitance, but hardly warrants the intrusion of one faculty into the place of another in the ensuing argument. This appears to have occurred in the treatment of primitive man under the third category, the evidence of his use of the reasoning faculties; but first of all, this topic raises deeper questions. The author adopts in substance Lévy-Bruhl’s hypothesis of a development of man’s reasoning powers in three distinct stages or periods—prelogical, empirico-logical, and logical. He affirms that, allowing for its modification by writers such as Preuss, Boas, and R. R. Schmidt, “Lévy-Bruhl’s analysis, developed in a long series of studies, remains standard” (p. 26). This, however, is doubtful. Lowlie (The History of Ethnological Theory, p. 220), in avowing “serious objections to Lévy-Bruhl’s conception of the primitive mind,” claims the concurrence of “such diverse thinkers as Pinard de la Boullaye, Schmidt, Goldenweiser, and especially Thurnwald, whose masterly critique we endorse in every point.” Murphy (Primitive Man: His Essential Quest, pp. 88 ff.) and Radin (Primitive Religion: its Nature and Origin, pp. 269-71) also dissent more or less radically. An opinion thus contested can hardly be called standard among anthropologists.

Further, in tracing reason from an assumed state of infancy to one of maturity, the terms of comparison from age to age should be uniform in level. If for the moment we follow Lévy-Bruhl and, with our author, extend the prelogical age from man’s beginning to about the third millennium B.C. (p. 30), and the ensuing empirico-logical period to the sixth century B.C., when the logical or philosophical age is said to have begun, in what types of thought are we to recognize and appraise each in turn? Dr. Albright seems to rely upon what he calls the functioning of the mind at its best in each period. But here two obstacles meet us. First, without wishing to be captious or merely dialectical, it springs to mind that the criterion of what is best must be partly subjective. Today, for instance, we are soberly invited to accept the mind at its best achievement in the idealist, who advances reasons for the objective invalidity of reason, or in the pragmatist, who ascribes absolute truth to the axiom that all truth is relative. Nor does the added appeal to either learning or mental vigor quite avail to stabilize the standard. Dr. Albright justly observes that “prelogical thinking is not, of course, restricted to savages or to the ancient world; it also appears constantly in the civilized world of today. Much current superstition is essentially prelogical; the intellectual reactions of moronic or uneducated people are apt to be prelogical” (p. 28). But of these only? The nascent physical science of the Middle Ages was in the hands of
men who pursued the quest of the philosopher's stone through the period from Anselm to Albert the Great. They were not entire strangers to the learning of their time. The drawings of animals in prehistoric caves may have been due to sympathetic magic; but sympathetic magic of precisely the same type was a firm conviction of the Puritan witch-hunters of eighteenth-century New England, who at the same time were conducting college examinations by the Scholastic method of disputation, and were more familiar with the writings of St. Thomas than many a modern Catholic. It is hard to imagine them as either moronic or uneducated. If generations must elapse before the best thought of a period can be sifted by posterity, it would seem that we must find some firmer standard, or else exclude our own age from comparison.

The other obstacle which confronts the criterion of thought at its best is the absence of record of speculative thought during the long ages before the earliest literary remains. Two classes of data are available for the prehistoric period. There is the vast field of practical (empirico-logical) intelligence, as revealed by cultural remains, and the much narrower one of aesthetic and imaginative activity, as exemplified by the artistic excellence of the best prehistoric drawings. From the first of these sources Dr. Albright justly concludes that the true primitive (apart from comparison with the modern savage) was predominantly empirico-logical in his thinking. But there we are obliged to stop in our investigation of his reasoning powers. The author, however, instead of stopping here, falls back upon a different category of cognition, appealing to the aesthetic and imaginative in primitive man, and then (if we do not misunderstand him) appears to cite this phase of mental activity as witness to the highest achievement of the primitive mind. It is under his discussion of the reasoning faculties that the following paragraph occurs:

"With primitive man it is, accordingly, empirical logic that governs almost everything he does. It is only when he leaves the world of everyday activity, controlled directly by the senses, that he enters the magical world of prelogical thought, a world where the logical principles of identity and contradiction are flouted constantly, but a world in which man can rise above the petty limitations of his daily routine into a new and wonderful region of direct contact with the superhuman and the divine. Without his prelogical probation there would have been no poetry, no folktales—in short no imaginative literature. There would have been no science, since science arose from primitive magic. Above all, there would have been no religion to distinguish man from the beasts and carry him into the presence of God" (pp. 29–30).
Of course, the author here speaks of active or creative imagination, since brutes, too, possess the faculty of eliciting internal phantasms, else their sensile memory could not exist. Nor does it seem certain that even an active imagination may not somewhat influence the instinctive construction of the bird’s nest or the beaver’s dam. An imaginative faculty is hardly diagnostic of humanity. But in any case, to find in primitive man’s imaginative flights the functioning of his reason at its best, and even his religious capacity itself, is to make a strange detour around territory which archaeology is not yet able to survey, and to lose oneself in something else than reason. We know something of early man’s aesthetic qualities, and much about his practical reason, but nothing whatever about the same faculty in its application to issues beyond those of individual and social necessities. In the latter sphere it was highly developed. Language, moreover, from its first traces expresses powers of abstraction, as the author pertinently notes. If these powers preceded and helped to form the earliest articulate speech, why should they not have characterized the earliest thinking?

To pursue the question into later ages, the distinction here maintained between empirical and formal logic is chiefly an artificial one. The logical achievement of Greek philosophy was merely a check imposed by analysis on the logic of the common man. For critical ends it investigated and codified the natural process by which the normal mind advances from the known to the unknown; and it began in the empirical method of Socrates. Dr. Albright, however, invests it with the proportions of a new discovery: “The modern mind functions at its best along logical lines which are very different from the best efforts of the ancient Near East. That there is such a difference is due mainly, perhaps entirely, to the fact that the Greeks forged the logical tools which we still use and which enable us to surpass our ancestors without having any appreciable change in the capacity or the structure of the brain to thank for our progress” (p. 28). This last observation seems to identify the organ of concrete mental images with that imponderable faculty which derives abstract concepts from those images by divesting them of every material adjunct, and which in itself still eludes experimental observation. But, apart from this, do we surpass our ancestors in either vigor or soundness of reasoning, or only in the vaster field of research discovered by the invention of improved means of inquiry? Take an uneducated man today, and try to confuse his reasoning with (let us say) the fallacy of a four-term syllogism. With no knowledge of formal dialectic, he will unerringly point out that the middle term “does not mean the same thing” in both premises. The truth is that the Greeks catalogued
and arranged the logical processes of nature itself as they found them existing, in order to secure the support and test of stable rules of criticism. They invented no discursive process that was new in itself or fraught with facilities or compensations for mental exertion. Indeed, wherever modern knowledge may invest a term in our own reasoning with wider implications, the more care must be given to its analysis and definition, and the more numerous are the consequences of accidental error. We may well surpass our ancestors in the crop of specious mistakes which our wider field is ever yielding.

A too much simplified approach to this complicated subject might prove as far wrong as the fitting of the data into some tentative formula of interpretation. But if one sound postulate for the whole inquiry can be indicated, it would seem to be the principle that normal adult men have in every age reasoned in essentially the same way. The current hypothesis of man's biological derivation from a brute ancestry must bridge the chasm between instinct and intelligence. This it cannot do by simply assuming a primitive state of intelligence barely superior to instinct, in the absence of independent evidence of any such state, in our impotence to conceive of its functioning, and in defiance of the fact that the two classes of phenomena cannot be satisfactorily reduced to mere degrees of one and the same capacity. Moreover, the only comparisons possible within the sphere of reasoning tend the other way. As compared with the best thinking of the ancient Near East, it may be doubted whether our own differs chiefly in logical perfection. It rather differs chiefly in our immensely enriched supply of factual premises, and in our methodic axiom that the only really fruitful thinking is rigorous induction—a postulate far from self-evident, and one in which our practice too often deviates from its theory. As compared with primitive man, we, in our first impressions, are as dependent on sensile apprehension, as sensitive to aesthetic attractions and repulsions, as susceptible to affective influence, and as liable to error in judgment as the crudest of our forebears whose thinking has left us any traces. If the demand of conformity to fact compels us to check our first impressions for approval or rejection, on what reasonable evidence do we doubt that they did likewise? There is no trace of mental immaturity in their mastery of slender opportunities.

If, in particular, it was not reason, but imagination, that made their deepest religious insights possible, were they not able, as we are, to draw from its raw material the finer product of reason? Our best theology consists of concepts whose expression is rarely if ever more than analogical. If our religious ideas do not terminate in the imagery of their expression, what
evidence have we that the primitive mind rested in the mere symbols which were all that it could leave for our inspection? We may know no more of its best attainments than some future investigator might learn of our own by reconstructing our angelology from the fragments of a stained-glass window. We cannot decide these questions with such assurance and finality as if archaeology, even in league with modern comparative ethnology, had already made us fully acquainted with the mentality of primitive man.

Tracing down the three successive periods adopted as a framework, Dr. Albright finds that the best thought had passed from the prelogical to the empirico-logical stage within the third millennium B.C. In the next 2,000 years (to the rise of Greek philosophy in the sixth century B.C.) he emphasizes five notable intellectual achievements. (1) Didactic literature can be traced back in Egypt to at least the twenty-fourth century. In about a thousand years it had reached its zenith. Then, “during the first half of the last millennium B.C. the Israelites collected and sifted Egyptian, Mesopotamian, Aramaean, and especially Phoenician wisdom, producing the incomparable book of Proverbs, which has never been surpassed for practical wisdom” (pp. 30–31). Certainly, affinity to one Egyptian source appears in a fairly continuous passage (Prov. 22:17–23:11); but some very definite and coherent norm of selection would be required to produce a work so homogeneous in moral character from the sifting of a field so wide as that alleged. (2) Codified law can be traced to Babylonia in the end of the third millennium; on that region’s legal relation to later Israel we ventured some comment in a former notice of *FSAC*. (3) “Closely related to the development of formal law is the emergence of individual [rather than collective moral] responsibility, which we can best trace in Egypt, and which reached its culmination in Israel under the great prophets” (p. 31). (4) Early science “goes back to the third millennium in both Egypt and Mesopotamia, but our oldest extant documents belong in both countries to the period between 2000 and 1600 B.C.” (p. 31). Mathematics, astronomy, medicine and philology are specified in detail. (5) Finally monotheism is enumerated, and with the brevity due to its fuller treatment in *FSAC*. “Here also the Egyptians and Mesopotamians approached monotheism by intuitive application of the methods of empirical logic, and Israel attained it—humanly speaking—by the same methods. The theologians of the Near East simplified the confusion of deities which they had inherited from their prelogical ancestors by wholesale identification, a process which was bound to lead, sooner or later, to pantheism or monotheism. Similarly, continued empirical observation was likely to attribute the major phenom-
ena of nature to one God, a tendency which may be traced back to very remote antiquity” (p. 33).

In the absence of some positive norm of direction, the tendency last mentioned ought to have led to pantheism. As to Israel, the above account of its arrival at monotheism (more explicit, perhaps because of the need of brevity, than anything we recall in FSAC) appears more like a plausible inference than a conclusion from a comprehensive view of history. Wholesale identification must have undergone a radical change before issuing in Israel’s axiom that “the gods of the nations are no gods,” and the accompanying persuasion that one universal and only real God had revealed Himself to Israel from the beginning and had always been “jealous” of His exclusive sovereignty. In the prophetical period Israel possessed what Egypt and Mesopotamia were not to share until the Near East had become divided between Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. As early as the ninth century Elisha could understand Naaman’s petition for “two mules’ burden of (Israelite) earth” on which to found a private shrine to Yahweh in the alien soil of his homeland. But the prophet neither attempted to enlighten his distinguished client as to Yahweh’s actual dominion over Syria, nor to quell Naaman’s moral scruple about his official religious duties by suggesting the ultimate identity of Rimmon with Yahweh. Rimmon to him was nobody. On the other side, Greek philosophy, instead of eventually reaching monotheism, rather took the pantheistic turn.

We seem to stand between two alternatives. Either Israel at a relatively early period possessed a vigor and keenness of perception denied to peoples much further advanced in material and mental culture, and as difficult to account for as it was unique, or else we must conclude that ethical monotheism was not the goal of a reflective process, but a matter of hereditary tradition. Modern writers such as Kittel are given to explaining the best attainments of ancient Semitic thought by postulating “a few choice spirits” whose ideas surpassed those of the masses. The biblical history, on the other hand, virtually affirms this as a fact, except that it makes the chosen few the least among the peoples of the earth (Deut. 6:7), and that for spiritual discovery on their part it substitutes their conservation of earlier knowledge which the many had not cared to conserve, especially at the price of isolation. The transit of expanding forms of “the covenant” from one successive stock of custodians to another, whatever may be thought of its historical validity, was as essential a note of the Old Testament’s religion as anything in its whole content. It was as peculiar to Israel’s thought as monotheism itself; but it connotes no consciousness of discovery attained through reflection.
This first chapter has provoked extended comment by laying broad foundations in which (to borrow another's phrase) we venture to think there are "some loose stones." It ends with a long paragraph of somewhat fluctuating value. The author well says: "In fundamental ethical and spiritual matters we have not progressed at all beyond the empirico-logical world of the Old Testament or the unrivalled combination of prelogical intuition, empirico-logical wisdom and logical deduction which we find in the New Testament" (p. 33). In a footnote to this remark (p. 184) he disavows any nuance of objective invalidity in his use of the term "intuition." Here he says (in part): "It follows from my theistic standpoint that prelogical intuition may be a much more direct and satisfactory means of divine revelation than any amount of logical ratiocination." Whatever part intuition may play in the acknowledgment of revelation, it is not, of course, a means of revelation itself; and as to the lesser value of ratiocination, that depends initially upon the point to which reasoning is applied. In any theistic conception a truth recognizable as divinely revealed is the proper object of unquestioning belief. What men have to verify for themselves is not its content, but its source. The modern delusion that final assent to a religious doctrine must await its critical establishment on intrinsic evidence, is just what has obscured both the need and the nature of belief itself, and is leading our intellectual classes ever deeper into skepticism. The course of Anglican theology in Cambridge circles during the past fifty years is a vivid example of this process and its outcome. On the other hand, a logical establishment of the extrinsic evidence for an alleged truth of revelation—that is, of the identity and competence of its authentic witness—is the mental operation which leaves belief still possible and at the same time makes it rational. For belief—on which Christ and His first followers above all insisted—is the acceptance of another's testimony on the ground of his competence to speak; and the investigation of this competence is the true function of what we have learned to call private judgment. Dr. Albright's estimate of ratiocination has this measure of truth. Reasoning can mediately justify belief, but cannot immediately constitute it: our logical conclusions are not beliefs. But, just as apprehension of revealed truth cannot possibly have been made to depend on the degree of any one's learning and dialectical skill, so neither, on the other hand, can it have been left to the individual vagaries of intuitive impression. Revelation must be worthy of the name.

In the ensuing context Dr. Albright justly points out that certain novel modern standards in art, literature, morality and religion were better left in the graves of discarded errors than revived in fresh disguises as an inspiration to progress. At one turn, however, his thought again becomes cramped
by Lévy-Bruhl's artificial scheme. He writes: "With the same brains and affective reactions as those which our ancestors possessed two thousand years ago, increasing sophistication has not been able to teach us any sounder fundamental principles of life than were known at that time. That the change from empirico-logical to logical thinking is not dependent on any process of biological or psychological evolution, but solely on the discovery of the tools by which empirico-logical principles may be changed into scientific induction and deduction, is clearly proved by the example of Japan, which shifted in a few years from one world to the other. In half a century Japan became a modern nation; in three generations it became strong enough to challenge the supremacy of Europe in the scientific and technological fields which Western civilization had arrogated to itself. That this progress in logical habits, with concomitant material advance, can only lead to disaster when combined with a pagan mentality, made up in equal parts of prelogical and empirico-logical components, is now evident" (p. 34).

Considering that empirico-logical principles naturally lead in practice to both induction and deduction in the mere progress of discovery and invention, the process involves no evolution in man's capacities. But the author's thesis is sounder than its proof. Our "progress" employs both induction and deduction (as did early man in passing from stone to bronze, and from bronze to iron) while capable of remaining quite content with material results. Technology, however fully developed, is still an instrument for any ulterior purpose. Material advance may be not merely concomitant, but paramount. If a disposition to identify it adequately with human progress is what is meant by a pagan mentality, there is plenty of that outside of Japan. Those of our own modern scientific leaders who remain philosophical bankrupts need not have their poverty ascribed to any taint of the prelogical. The Japanese, like other human beings, have always been logical. What they have learned from the West is not a new intelligence, but a multitude of new practical methods. Apt pupils indeed in our technology, they have merely made it serve their own ideal of social ethics, which was always totalitarian. The Japanese subject remains the same old impersonal atom in a newly equipped organism. The weakness of Dr. Albright's analysis seems to lie in a strangely common assumption that better physical science ensures a truer philosophy; that the mental discipline of pursuing any inquiry to a state of scientific integration must somehow dispose men to inquire into ultimate realities and fit them to do so to good effect. Unhappily, it has no such innate tendency.

Chapter II, "The Archaeological Background of Old Testament Religion," is a special introduction following the general one. Its greater part reviews
the archaeological sources for the religion of the ancient Near East" through Syria and Palestine, Mesopotamia and Persia, Egypt and Ethiopia, Asia Minor (the Hittites), Arabia, Cyprus and the Aegean. Evidence is both written and unwritten. The written evidence comprises Ugaritic literature, Accadian and Egyptian texts, Canaanite and Phoenician inscriptions, Aramaic inscriptions from Syria, and early Hebrew inscriptions from Palestine. "Unwritten data may be summarily classified under the headings: temples and shrines, cult objects, plastic and pictorial representations" (p. 37). A sketch of the chief sources of both kinds occupies twenty interesting pages. The second part of the chapter, "on the use of archaeological data for the history of ancient Near-Eastern religion," reviews some of the demands of scientific method, and shows the author's thought at its best. "There are," he writes, "a great many significant problems where method is of prime importance, but where a discussion would involve many side-issues. We select a number of problems from Ugaritic, Egyptian and Accadian documents, in order to illustrate the necessity of a critical approach—an informed critical approach, since caution or negation without knowledge seldom merits the name 'criticism.' We shall restrict ourselves to two problems from Ugaritic, one from Egyptian and a complex group of examples from Accadian cuneiform sources" (p. 59).

This critique deals with written sources. In the Ugaritic field Dr. Albright first analyzes Virolleaud and Dussaud's elaborate construction of a joint Hebrew and Canaanite prehistory, and exposes in detail its total lack of foundation in the Ras Shamra documents. "The hypothesis," he concludes, "is now virtually extinct in serious scholarly circles. Meanwhile it was naturally enough adopted by many scholars of second rank and was widely popularized, finding its way into handbooks and books on archaeology" (p. 60). A group of supposed parallels to Israelite sacrificial rites from the same source is next examined and found wanting. Passing on to Egyptian narrative literature of the second millennium, the author's theme is that "in using Egyptian tales the student of comparative religion and culture is seriously handicapped unless he knows exactly the type of literature with which he is dealing" (pp. 61–62). The need of discrimination is illustrated by contrasting the characteristics of two narratives with those of three others. The conclusion is that "while Sinuhe and Wen-amân belong to the domain of history and may be used with requisite prudence by the historian, the other tales which we have mentioned belong to the field of the student of comparative literature and mythology, who can use them without apprehending the existence of any historical nucleus. Other stories are both historical and folkloristic at once" (p. 63). Finally, "as our Accadian
example we shall consider the complex problem involved in alleged occurrences of the name \textit{Yahweh}, 'the Lord,' in cuneiform sources' (\textit{loc. cit.}). A detailed critique serves to show the uncertainty of several examples of this class.

Turning to the use of unwritten sources, Dr. Albright reviews some classes of objects whose earlier interpretation as religious in purpose has been revised as a result of further progress. The first is that of stones discovered in an erect position. The early tendency "to find temples and altars everywhere" assumed for such relics a cultic significance, often as structural parts of a sanctuary. Other purposes are now recognized in the majority of cases. A number of instances are cited, including the stall-posts for horses in the stables at Megiddo. The same need of comparative study applies to a religious interpretation of "the motifs on Palestinian bronzes, ivories, seals and gems." A number of examples show that "each case or category of motifs must be analyzed by itself, but results can seldom or never be considered as more than tentative, in the present state of our knowledge" (p. 67). These investigations conclude the second chapter.

Chapter III discusses "archaeology and the religion of the Canaanites," much of whose territory Israel conquered shortly after the middle of the second millennium. They were the same people who soon afterward made Tyre and Sidon famous as the source of their commercial expansion, and who thus became better known to the West as the Phoenicians, while continuing for centuries later to call themselves Canaanites, even in their maritime foreign colonies.

Evaluation of this chapter may profit by some reflections, even if rather trite ones, by way of orientation. While it is a commonplace that some gestures, postures, actions and objects suggest themselves as natural symbols of religious aspirations, and are therefore common to the rites of peoples far apart in space, time, and culture, it is equally natural that other cultic features of more particular type should owe their specific patterns to sources near at hand. This, of course, is the reason for Canaan's especial pertinence. At the same time, the symbol borrowed from an older source may be made to express a new conception, not only diverse from its original meaning but even exclusive of it. This, in the next place, brings us to the reflection that religion is always both speculative and practical. It comprises both theology (not in the exact Catholic use of the term, but as broadly signifying one's conception of God) and conduct, including both divine worship and ethical norms. In the archaeology of religion it is natural that unwritten sources should reflect the practical rather than the speculative, and thus be capable of quite different theological interpretations, whereas written
sources, while conveying some knowledge of both the speculative and the practical aspects of religion, are, on the whole, of more value for the former. Dr. Albright's use of unwritten Canaanite sources is left to later chapters, where the particulars appear in their appropriate contexts. In the present chapter his attention is centered on the written records of pre-Israelite Canaan as drawn from their richest source, the Ugaritic literature. Before the discovery and decipherment of the latter in 1932, almost all that was known of Canaanite theology from any extra-biblical written source depended on Philo of Byblus and his account of the writings of Sanchuniathon as reported by the patristic writers Porphyry and Eusebius—a somewhat obscure and fragmentary source of information which could not be checked. The mythological documents of Ras Shamra, extensive fragments of epic poems, have substantially altered that situation, and it is natural that the matter of this chapter should be drawn chiefly from them.

But while religion and myth may have a common factor in the identity of the gods, they handle this subject so differently that a people's religion may be quite as much obscured as revealed by its mythology. The ancients themselves must have partly realized this, since the Greek philosophers directly attacked the problem of reconciling the two subjects or at least explaining their mutual relation. Some would have it that mythology had either humanized gods or deified men; others had recourse to symbolic or allegorical interpretation of the myths. Neither of these explanations has satisfied modern students of comparative religion. The late Père Lagrange devoted a long introductory chapter of his Études sur les Religions Sémitiques (2e édition, 1905) to a discussion of this question. He wrote long before the Ugaritic sources had filled the Canaanite gap, but with ample knowledge of other ancient myths and wide acquaintance with modern systems of comparative study. In the course of an extended critique of mythology itself, he observes: "The real stumbling-block, for the ancients themselves, is religious myth properly so called, or especially myth which profoundly stifles religious sentiment as well as reason, by attributing to the gods absurd or obscene actions and even a nature contradictory to all of humanity's notions of what is divine" (p. 31). After discussing modern theories at length, he adopts the conclusion that the grotesque element in mythology arose from the efforts of early man to account for the unseen efficient causes of major natural phenomena. It was, Lagrange believes, primitive physical science with a first premise influenced by animism. Motion presupposed intrinsic life; motions of the universe must have the gods for their animating principles; yet, whereas the effects were constant, the gods must not be hampered by mechanical necessity, but must control nature at their own will and
pleasure; hence their liberty of action must be emphasized. He points out that the nature-myths common to antiquity were still preserved by the Greeks at an advanced period of their own development, chiefly, as he thinks, because their subjects had at the same time a religious identity. "In this way it is possible to explain satisfactorily how myth is at once so mingled with religion and so devoid of real religious sentiment. It is not religious, because it is merely an attempt at scientific explanation; it blends with religion, because it attributes physical phenomena to the same supernatural beings to whom it renders religious homage" (p. 36). Whatever may be the merits of this explanation, the very discussion and its history serve to show the need of caution in attempting to derive a people's religion from its myths.

While Dr. Albright in his third chapter devotes no space to these considerations in principle, neither does he imply that myth and religion were quite identical in early Canaan. He uses the Ras Shamra texts to exhibit "the Canaanite pantheon" and "Canaanite mythology," at the same time candidly exposing the latter's grossness and inconsistency. The two sections, covering more than twenty pages, are highly interesting. Here and there some light is thrown on the original Canaanite value of a few terms which reappear in Old Testament Hebrew. Finally a section is devoted to "some aspects of Canaanite religious practice." Here it is possible to utilize the Ugaritic myths for lists of sacrificial animals, and to compare these allusions with some findings of Palestinian and Carthaginian excavation. The author finds human sacrifice nowhere mentioned in Ugaritic sources, and believes that this practice of the later Phoenicians was gradually abandoned after the eighth century and had disappeared by about the fifth. From the indirect evidence of a gradual refinement in the symbolic qualities of Astarte figurines, he infers that the grosser features of the worship of goddesses of fertility were discontinued in late Phoenician times. However, he adjoins: "It is very improbable that the evolution which we have indicated had seriously begun when the Israelites conquered Palestine. The sedentary culture which they encountered in the thirteenth century seems to have reflected the lowest religious level in all Canaanite history; just as it represented the lowest point in the history of Canaanite art. Against this religion the Israelites reacted with such vigor that we find only the scantiest traces of it surviving in Yahwism—many of these traces belonging, moreover, to later waves of Canaanite (Phoenician) influence" (p. 94).

Dr. Albright sums up this chapter with a paragraph that should be reproduced entire: "In the preceding pages we have made no attempt to give an exhaustive sketch of Canaanite religion. We have not tried to list all
known deities nor to describe all the elements of mythology which are now available. We have omitted all detailed treatment of places of worship and cult-objects, since we shall have occasion to deal with these subjects below. Enough, however, has been said to accentuate the significance of Israel's borrowings from Canaanite religion. These adaptations lay almost entirely in the domain of religious architecture, cultic symbolism and sacrificial practice, poetic language and temple music. But the God of Israel was so far superior to the gods of the pagans, both conceptually and ethically, that theological borrowing from Canaanite sources was scarcely thinkable—at least until much later times, when the elements in question had become dissociated from their crude polytheistic background" (p. 94). While some adaptations of the types here mentioned would be natural, it does not seem quite clear how their significance has been illustrated by the preceding account of the themes of Ugaritic mythological literature.

There remain Chapters IV and V, which present the chief positive matter of the book. One covers the period from the conquest of Canaan to the end of David's reign, the other from the temple of Solomon to the Exile. The method of both chapters is announced by the author: "We shall focus our attention on the religious side of early Israelite history; but since religious practice is seldom intelligible without adequate understanding of social, economic and political history, it will be necessary to go into more detail than in Chapters IV and V of From the Stone Age to Christianity, where emphasis was laid on the development of monotheism, other aspects of religious history being strictly subordinated" (p. 95).

Chapter IV, "Archaeology and the Religion of Early Israel," has three sections. The first, on "Israel and its religion after the Conquest," is largely devoted to constructing, from archaeological results, what the author considers a correct mise-en-scène for concrete ideas of the religious factor. It is consequently much concerned with the interpretation of the Old Testament record of the period from Moses to David. Holding, in the first place, that "the Israelite conquest of Canaan reached its climactic stage during the second half of the thirteenth century, probably about 1230 B.C.," the author believes that the sequence of events is presented in two varying traditions, and that the witness of archaeology, while rather favoring the summary account in the beginning of Judges, is "quite enough to disprove any radical reconstruction" even of "the standard tradition" of the book of Joshua. Further, "we are in a more favorable position with reference to Israelite religion just before the invasion of Canaan than we are with regard to its external history. The Mosaic tradition is so consistent, so well attested by different pentateuchal documents, and so congruent with our
independent knowledge of the religious development of the Near East in the late second millennium B.C., that only hypercritical pseudo-rationalism can reject its essential historicity” (p. 96).

The first eight pages, about half the section, are given to orientation. It is emphasized that “the nomadic Hebrews [of the Exodus and the Conquest] cannot be compared exactly to any modern Arab society,” since they antedated extensive domestication of the camel, with its effect on mobility and on tribal conservatism. It is also stressed that at the time of the Exodus “they formed a body of very mixed origin, as explicitly admitted by Israelite tradition,” though unanimous in acknowledging Yahweh. “The clans and groups which had escaped from the Egyptian corvee were certainly not typical ass-nomads. On the other hand, such Negebite clans as Caleb and Kenaz were probably ass-nomads of normal character. It is, accordingly, unlikely that the latter were actually part of the main Israelite body, since we have good reason to suppose that they invaded Canaan from the south. In view of the tenacious Kadesh tradition, it is most unreasonable to deny their Yahwism” (p. 99). After contrasting in fuller detail the social state of peoples long habituated to typical nomadism and that of the early Israelites, Dr. Albright emphasizes the conclusion that such “nomads and semi-nomads” as the latter, “destitute of cultural traditions, must have borrowed continuously from their sedentary neighbors. Sharp differentiation between sedentary and nomadic culture would, therefore, be quite impossible, in religious matters as elsewhere” (p. 101). That the Israelites were not typical nomads appears also from their rapid adjustment to sedentary life after the Conquest.

This part of the discussion (which is replete with interesting comparisons) appears to be charged with two practical tendencies. One (which is not very positively emphasized) would convey the impression that the Israelite conquerors of Canaan were not very tenacious of convention, but rather inclined to imitate their neighbors. The other tendency is to discredit the genealogical value of tradition, as not comparable to similar record among typical nomads. “The stereotyped filiation which we find in the Israelite tribal organization of subsequent centuries, where all the tribes are neatly divided into clans, each with its patriarchal subdivisions, is undoubtedly of later origin. . . . It is quite possible that the framework of twelve tribes antedates the Conquest, but the variations in the biblical lists, though slight in themselves, prove that the individual names were never so important as the framework—a deduction which other evidence renders virtually certain” (p. 102). However, in a state of society where so many claims rest on appeals to an immemorial past, genealogy would be exposed to the risk of practical challenge at every artificial point.
With this adjustment of the background, the religious topic is directly approached. "The central religious institution of Israel after the Conquest was the system of twelve tribes grouped around a central shrine" (p. 102). Parallels from Mesopotamia, Greece, and Italy, some of them from the second millennium, are mentioned. Israel's chief sanctuary, at the same time its political center, was at Shiloh; this biblical record is fully confirmed by archaeology. As a focus of annual pilgrimages Shiloh compares with similar centers in other Eastern regions. It was not, however, the only recognized sanctuary of Yahweh in the Judges' day; Gibeon, Bethel, Gilgal, Dan, and possibly Beersheba were centers of some repute. These were the principal bamoth, or "high places," of which lesser examples existed in many localities. Dismissing a number of supposed archaeological specimens of bamoth, Dr. Albright turns to Petra for the best examples. "The Conway high place, excavated by the writer in 1934, belongs to the circular processional type, and is comparable to pre-Islamic sanctuaries recorded in Arab literary tradition. The others, though different in detail, were undoubtedly meant as places for sacrificial feasts, where the animals vowed to a god might be eaten in an appropriate sacred place. The so-called Great High Place of Petra, discovered by George L. Robinson in 1900, and a number of other less impressive sites were clearly intended for sacrificial feasts in the open; several of them possess rock-cut triclinia (dining rooms with three couches) which will not admit of any other explanation. . . . There is no reason to suppose that the religious uses in vogue at the bamoth in the time of the Judges differed in essential respects from the practices described by Hosea three centuries later. . . . Gifts were made either to the priests or Levites who had charge of the place, or they were consumed in picnic fashion by the worshippers" (pp. 106-7).

This leads directly to the discussion of "cultic personnel," a subject which Dr. Albright believes "has been sadly complicated by unnecessary assumption." The civil subordination of the high priesthood during the later monarchy does not justify the claim that the institution did not even exist in the age of the Judges. Contemporaneous Egypt and Ugarit and slightly later Phoenicia attest the political importance of a high priesthood; and the unmodified phrase "the priest," frequent in the biblical accounts of the Judges and Samuel, is a natural equivalent for "the great" or "high priest" (pp. 107-8). "The question of the Levites is still obscure and involved." Radically the name seems to mean "person pledged for a debt or vow"; it may thus denote a "tribe" segregated as a functionary class rather than a line of descent, and receptive of individual accretions. "Seen from this point of view the question of whether Moses and Aaron were members of the tribe of Levi loses all significance; they were Levites by virtue of their
priestly function. In other words, one could either be born into the Levite tribe or one could be adopted as a full member of it” (p. 108). Somewhat similar was the status of the priests themselves as descendants of Aaron. “In short, we are not justified either in throwing overboard the standard Israelite tradition regarding priests and Levites, or in considering these classes as hard and fast genealogical groups” (p. 109).

The second section of the chapter deals with “the conflict between Yahweh and the gods of Canaan.” For several generations Mosaic standards had to contend with Canaanite degeneracy, owing (as Joshua and the Judges often point out) to the fact that the invaders did not always faithfully execute their commission to purge the land, but often compromised instead. The candor with which this age of conflict is chronicled in Hebrew Scripture has always seemed to us one of the strongest proofs of the latter’s fidelity to historical fact. A later official class of annalists, merely interested in making out a case for the supremacy of their own cult, would have drawn a very different picture of its earlier fortunes.

The enigmatic “teraphim” are discussed in a passage not quite equal to its author’s best abilities. Just what these objects (or this object, always pluralized) were is still uncertain. Selecting a single passage which has been much discussed, Dr. Albright assures us that “archaeology can now give a negative answer to the traditional view that the teraphim of I Sam. 19:12–17 were an ‘image’ or images of idols. That the word sometimes had this sense is undeniable, but the context absolutely precludes it in this passage. No ‘idols’ of comparable size have ever been found in Palestinian excavations, and the representations of divinity from Canaanite temples are all carved outlines on stelae; all known copper or clay plaques and figurines are much too small” to present the outlines of a human body when laid in a bed (p. 114). Every statement here made is accurate, of course, except the main conclusion about a “negative answer,” which does not follow. A complete summary of the biblical facts yields a different impression. Outside the passage here considered, the word “teraphim” occurs thirteen times in seven other contexts. In all of them it clearly denoted a religious object, usually associated with divination, and never mentioned with Israelite approval. Were they images? In Gen. 31:30, 32, they are twice called “gods,” and in I Sam. 15:23, Saul is admonished that “stubbornness is (as bad as) idolatry and teraphim.” Archaeology finds nothing of human size among images of stone and clay; but the Old Testament alludes to idols of wood in passages too many to enumerate here. Archaeology has doubtless found no wooden idol of human proportions and of three thousand years of age; it probably never will. But in confessing this limita-
tion of its natural capacities it gives no "negative answer"; and the context of I Sam. 19:12-17 is fully satisfied by supposing a wooden figure of human proportions, a thing at least possible on positive grounds, as we have just remarked above.

Astarte figurines of Israelite manufacture, continues the author, are rare in remains of this period, except "on the periphery of Israel, where contact with non-Israelites was more frequent and where Yahwistic tradition [against all religious images] was not so strong." Even where they are found, there is no reason to interpret them as anything more than amulets for the benefit of pregnant or nursing women. "In no case can we label them with the name of a goddess" (pp. 114-5).

The section closes with a suggestive passage on Israel’s theological exclusiveness. Presupposing the Mosaic conception of Yahweh—"belief in the existence of only one God, who is the Creator of the world and the giver of all life; the belief that God is holy and just, without sexuality or mythology; the belief that God is invisible to man except under special conditions and that no graphic nor plastic representation of Him is permissible; the belief that God is not restricted to any part of His creation, but is equally at home in heaven, in the desert, or in Palestine; the belief that God is so far superior to all created beings, whether heavenly bodies, angelic messengers, demons, or false gods, that He remains absolutely unique; the belief that God has chosen Israel by formal compact to be His favored people, guided exclusively by laws imposed by Him"—the author shows why this belief, naturally speaking, was not likely to tolerate or to fuse with the Canaanite allegiance to Baal. A marked social feature of the Early Iron Age was a tendency to "increasing particularism, when contrasted with the universalistic and international tendencies of the Middle and Late Bronze Ages." Such a Zeitgeist would dispose the Israelites in Canaan to "become increasingly conscious of their peculiar religion, which set them and their land apart from other, surrounding nations" (p. 117). On the other hand, after illustrating from the Song of Deborah the familiarity of the idea that Yahweh, on His own part, was equally at home in Edom, Dr. Albright explains that the words ascribed to Jephthah in Jdg. 11:24 do not warrant a henotheistic interpretation of the chieftain’s own mind. He concludes with some interesting observations on the special association of Yahweh with Canaan (I Sam. 26:19) as His peculiar territory and the appropriate place of His worship, showing that this phase of particularism was merely convergent in appearance with the henotheism of other peoples, and not a true example of it.

The third and final section of this chapter treats of "David and the religion of Israel in the early tenth century." It appeals chiefly to general
summaries of archaeological data. Dr. Albright finds the early ecstatic prophets at this age a more potent Yahwistic agency than the priesthood itself, though not officially supplanting the latter. He emphasizes David’s new consolidation of the political structure after the disunion resulting from Philistine domination. Both Levitic towns and cities of refuge are to be regarded, he believes, as mainly Davidic institutions. So too the boundaries of the tribal territories. David’s eminence as promoter and organizer of liturgical music, which looms so large in Old Testament tradition, receives due emphasis, though the arachaeological evidence alleged for this must be mainly indirect.

The fifth and final chapter of the book, “Archaeology and the Religion of Later Israel,” leaves us on the eve of the Exile. Of its three sections the first sketches “the economic and political background of the age of Solomon” as the milieu of its religious institutions. First pointed out is the advantage enjoyed by Israel in the tenth century, of temporary surcease of Egyptian and Assyrian aggression. The author defends the biblical description of the extent of the territory inherited by Solomon. This monarch’s fuller development of his realm by industrial and commercial means, especially in alliance with the Phoenicians at sea, and the overland development of camel transportation and caravan routes, is presented in an interesting and convincing way. Interest is enhanced by special attention to two particulars. One is the triennial voyage of the king’s trading fleet, “called oni tarshish, which probably means ‘refinery fleet,’” to Ophir, “which was apparently on the African coast [of the Red Sea] in the general region of Somaliland” (p. 133). As the voyage consumed a year and a half each way, it “cannot have been restricted to the African coast but must also have extended to the Arabian, unless we are to assume a highly adventurous voyage to East Africa, for which there is not a shred of evidence.” Further, “we may safely connect the famous visit of the Queen of Sheba to Solomon with these voyages to Ophir and suppose that they had stimulated the Sabaeans to extend their incipient caravan trade far to the north.” Another biblical feature, capable of more direct archaeological confirmation, is that of Solomon’s trade in chariots and horses. The streets of stables uncovered in the tenth-century ruins at Megiddo are briefly described, and reference made to the pertinent biblical passages.

The metallurgy of Solomon’s reign occasions an interesting page on the recent excavation of the copper refinery at ancient Ezion-Geber. Circumstances show that this industry “must be bracketed with the Temple of Solomon and Solomon’s stables at Megiddo as an example of Syro-Phoenician (Canaanite) influence on Israel about the middle of the tenth
Further, the spot east of the Jordan which is mentioned in 1 Kgs. 7:40-46 as the site of the casting of some of the ornaments destined for the temple, is near to some ancient copper workings not yet fully explored.

These sources of wealth, even with the revenue derived from subject peoples, were not sufficient for the growing expenses of Solomon's lavish establishments. Direct taxation and the drafting of labor appeared for the first time in the national history. A new and extra-tribal class grew up within a commonwealth striving to balance royal centralization against tribal autonomy. Royal officials, members of levies, court retainers all had the political status of 'ebed hammelek, "a slave of the king," which title continued in use to the Exile. "During the united monarchy Jerusalem was thus a symbol of the superiority of the crown to the old tribal amphictyony" (p. 138). David, before the temple existed, had "attached the chief priest and his family directly to the court" (p. 138). We should prefer to say, to the capital, now their appropriate dwelling-place; but in any case, Dr. Albright seems to push this idea too far when he follows Alt and Möhlenbrink in regarding Solomon's temple as "primarily a royal chapel, attached to the palace" (p. 139). The biblical account of Solomon's dedicatory prayer ascribes to the temple from the first a strongly public and national destiny. It was to be the focus of personal petition for all classes and needs of the people, "towards" which any Israelite should address his supplication to Yahweh; and this is commemorated as Solomon's own conception of the temple. Had it been a royal sanctuary by title, and a place of prayer for the people by mere privilege, no scribal historian could have placed in Solomon's mouth a prayer in which the people's access to Yahweh in His earthly dwelling outtops all else. The words ascribed to the king reflect that deepest of Mosaic convictions, born of the Exodus, and ever the theme of the Prophets, that every member of Yahweh's people was inalienably His "man," in spite of age or social condition, and therefore entitled to equal welcome at His house. Whatever pagan analogies may be invoked, we have here the Israelites' own conception of their central sanctuary.

Much, however, that Dr. Albright has assembled around this point has its own significance. "By identifying the religious focus of the tribal confederacy of Israel with the court of the king, David and Solomon forestalled the most serious threat to national unity, and prevented the high priest from setting himself up as the head of the state. How effective an element in the constitutional tradition of Judah their innovation became, may best be illustrated by the fact that the house of David continued to occupy the throne for four centuries and remained the center of Jewish national aspira-
tions for many centuries more” (p. 139). Yet, after all, once given the political demand for a monarchy, its close local and practical union with the head of the religious system was no profound innovation. Of course it would restrain the priesthood from exercising supreme civil power so long as the throne endured; yet the short-lived Maccabean independence was to return, as though instinctively, to priestly rulers of the state. The nation never lost sight of its religious dedication and character.

After some remarks upon Solomon’s administrative system, the religious subject is directly reapproached in the second section of the chapter, “The place of the Temple of Solomon in the history of Israelite religion.” Archaeological reconstruction is possible only in part. As to the type of architecture employed, it appears that only one strictly parallel example of contemporary age and of Syrian origin has yet been discovered; but this points to Canaanite prototypes from which both Phoenician and Greek temple architecture may have stemmed. As to interior detail, “recent finds of carved ivories at Megiddo (early twelfth century), Samaria (ninth century) and elsewhere, together with the discovery of proto-Aeolic pilaster capitals at Megiddo (tenth century on), Samaria (ninth century) and elsewhere, have thrown a great deal of light on the interior decoration of the Temple, which turns out to have been characteristically Phoenician, just as one might expect from the fact that it was built by a Tyrian architect” (p. 143).

The nature and function of the two front pillars (I Kgs. 7:21) receives several pages of interesting discussion from many archaeological sources. In brief, they appear to have been tall and relatively slender standards whose tops supported burning lamps at night, and possibly also incense in daytime. Their symbolic significance is matter of several plausible conjectures. Their “names,” Jachin and Boaz, whether inscribed on the shafts or transmitted by memory, Dr. Albright thinks (p. 139) to have been the first words of formulas of benediction addressed to David’s dynasty. Parallels have been found for several of the interior furnishings and cult-objects of the temple. Dr. Albright gives detailed attention to the copper ‘sea’ described in I Kgs. 7:23–26, which “has been universally recognized as having cosmic significance of some kind. In function it cannot be separated from the Mesopotamian *apsû*, employed both as the name of the subterranean fresh-water ocean from which all life and all fertility were derived and as the name of a basin of holy water erected in the temple. . . . Scholars of the pan-Babylonian school have falsely interpreted the Sea as the heavenly ocean and the twelve oxen (properly bulls) which supported it as the twelve signs of the zodiac. . . . It is much more probable that the
twelve bulls (which the ‘oxen’ must have been intended to represent) are partly symbolic, partly decorative in origin. . . . The fourfold arrangement in groups of three clearly represents the four seasons of the year. . . . The arrangement in four groups was presumably also connected with the four directions” (pp. 148-150).

The altar of holocaust, being built in three square stages, remotely resembled the conventional structure of a Mesopotamian temple-tower; the “platform” (kiydr) on which Solomon stood while praying before the altar is now believed to have been the cover of a slightly elevated laver. These two identifications are discussed in full detail. Summing up the conclusions of this section, Dr. Albright believes them to prove that the temple of Solomon “possessed a rich cosmic symbolism which was largely lost in later Israelite and Jewish tradition.” Thus the newly established monarchy reasserted in the emblems of its time the universal sovereignty of Yahweh. “The cosmic monotheism of Solomon’s Temple makes Mosaic monotheism a sine qua non for the comprehension of early Israelite religious history, since there is no suggestion in any of our sources that a paramount spiritual leader had arisen between Moses and David” (p. 155). At the same time, the borrowing of alien religious symbolism incurred a natural risk of syncretistic interpretation. Solomon himself later increased this danger by erecting nearby shrines for the imported idolatries of his pagan queens. Moreover, “there were still undoubtedly many vestiges of Canaanite cult which survived among the people, and Solomon’s concessions can only have encouraged the partial relapse into paganism with which Deuteronomic tradition credits the next two generations.”

The final section of Chapter V, on “archaeology and the religion of the dual monarchy,” is able to bring some recent data to bear upon the biblical account of the long struggle, begun at Solomon’s death, between the religion of Moses and David and the corruptions of neighboring pagandom. The northern kingdom began its career of two centuries with the superstitious worship of Yahweh installed at Bethel and Dan by Jeroboam I, but was soon immersed in genuine idolatry. While ba‘al (“master”) was a common title of greater and lesser divinities, the Baal of the ninth century dynasty of Omri, with whom Elijah so valiantly contended, appears to have been the high god of Tyre, since his consort was that “Asherah of the Tyrians” who appears in the Ugaritic epic of Keret. As for paganism in the South, “much less is known about the situation in Judah which led to the drastic reformation of Asa” about 894 B.C. He had to deal with “high places” throughout the country, and he abolished the cultic employment of male prostitutes, a subject which receives a page of discussion. The temporary
triumph of Yahwism just after the middle of the ninth century made no change in the Bethel cult of the two calves in the North, and perhaps no appreciable improvement in the official worship of Judah. After the fall of Samaria and the end of the northern kingdom in 721, the dominance of Canaanite influence over Israel's religion gave way to that of Assyria and Syria. However, Ahaz could only introduce into the temple an altar of Damascene pattern for his own personal devotions, while the original altar of Yahweh continued in ritual use.

In connection with Ahaz' reign Dr. Albright carefully discusses the leading opinions on the meaning of the phrase "passing a child through the fire to Moloch," which, he concludes, denotes "the Syrian custom of sacrificing children to confirm a solemn vow or pledge" (p. 163). As to later conditions in Judah, he regards II Kgs. 18:4 and 23:3–14 (with 21:2–7) as furnishing "our clearest evidence for the nature of the pagan practices which reforming kings, like Hezekiah and Josiah, were intent on extirpating from Israel." However, "none of these objects can be illustrated directly by archaeology" (p. 164).

This period furnishes two centers of Jewish syncretism, Jerusalem and Elephantine. The first appears in the "abominations" listed in the eighth chapter of Ezekiel. The "slab of jealousy" is mentioned in 8:3–6 as erected within an entrance of the temple. "Carving and painting cultic and mythological scenes on upright slabs (orthostates) set against the wall or built into it, were characteristic customs in northern Syria, southeastern Asia Minor, and northern Mesopotamia between the twelfth and the seventh centuries B.C.," in which several sites of discovery are named. Ezekiel's description of certain secret rites in 8:7–12 "points to a syncretistic cult of Egyptian origin, probably containing strong magical elements," which most likely "had Osirian features and was calculated to ensure its votaries a blessed existence beyond the grave." The third practice denounced by Ezekiel (8:13–14), that of the women weeping for Tammuz, is of Sumero-Accadian origin, "yet there is no trace of the Babylonian god in Syria before the Neo-Assyrian period, and we may safely suppose that the cult was imported into Palestine by Mesopotamian deportees in the eighth and seventh centuries." "The greatest abomination" mentioned by Ezekiel (8:15–16), the worship of the sun, already had an occasion in the cosmic symbolism of the temple's orientation. "It may have been precisely Ezekiel's zeal for pure monotheism which led him to consider this practice as relatively worse than the others" (p. 168).

The other instance of syncretism, the military garrison of Jewish mercenaries at Elephantine, in southern Egypt, fills four pages with comparisons
of archaeological data which, interesting though they are, we cannot follow into particulars. In the temple of these Aramaic-speaking Jewish soldiers, Yahweh Himself was worshipped together with others. Analysis and comparison with other Aramaean sources, chiefly linguistic, tends to show that Bethel, Harem, and Eshem were names of divinities at Elephantine. From all the evidence, Dr. Albright concludes that "we are here confronted with Aramaic syncretism, arising about the seventh century B.C. in Jewish circles which were under strong pagan influence" (p. 171). The question of its provenience involves two more pages of still more interesting data. In fine, "it would appear that the cult of the Bethel temple flourished again, even after the time of Josiah, and we may conjecture with much plausibility that refugees from Bethel played an important role in the development of the syncretistic cult of the Jewish colony at Elephantine." At the same time, "none of the divine names can be explained simply by supposing direct adoption of pagan divinities as figures in a polytheistic Jewish pantheon." That these soldiers still considered themselves Jews in religion is well established by several features mentioned in particular.

The closing paragraph of this chapter is worth seeing entire: "With the victory of Judaism over the heresies of Ezekiel's and Nehemiah's day the long conflict between the faithful followers of Yahweh and the paganizing world around them was substantially won. The history of Israel's religious evolution can be understood only in the light of this bitter century-old struggle. Every conflict with paganism brought with it new spiritual insight and new ethical rigor. The religion of orthodox Jewry had travelled a long distance since the earliest days of Yahwism. In essentials, however, orthodox Yahwism remained the same from Moses to Ezra. From first to last ethical monotheism remained the heart of Israelite religion, though there were many crises through which it had to pass during the slow change from the primitive simplicity of the Judges to the high cultural level of the fifth century B.C. The foregoing pages illustrate the significance of modern archaeological discovery in reconstructing the details of this development." This last observation is most true, and its truth ensures the value of such works as this one.

A "Postscript" of three pages concludes the book. It emphasizes the historical character of both the Jewish and the Christian religions, and the indispensable service of modern archaeology to ancient history. Specially noted is the value of archaeology for a right understanding of the ministry of the Prophets. They were before all else spiritual leaders of the individual conscience, a purpose from which flowed all their service to their own age and to posterity.
Recurring to monotheism, the heart of Israel’s faith, Dr. Albright defends its essential identity from Moses to Christ, but allows his problem to be complicated by the preconceived necessity of reducing the concept of monotheism to empirico-logical and logical stages. His corresponding division between “practical and implicit” versus “intellectual and explicit” monotheism is too much cramped by an historical formula of mental development concerning which, as a principle, enough has been said above. The Deuteronomic formula, “The Lord is One,” even by critical dating was still too ancient to have profited by Greek methods of analysis and comparison, yet its predicate was more than implicit. A concept may be explicit without being comprehensive. It is said to be rendered distinct by definition; but descriptive definition may suffice, and it has to suffice the untrained mind instead of scientific analysis.

The reader lays aside this interesting volume with a keener view of perpetual moral and spiritual warfare, and a firmer conviction that, however hardly won, the light is assured of eventual triumph over the darkness.

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EVALUATIVE REVIEWS


Non-Catholic Christians in many lands are experiencing these last years their own liturgical movements, marked by a vigorous and growing literature. One can state without offense that the books being created by this non-Catholic liturgical movement in the United States hardly compare as yet, for depth and scope and familiarity with the rich heritage of the Christian past, with such works produced in England as Clarke’s Liturgy and Worship (1932), Hebert’s Liturgy and Society (1935), and Underhill’s Worship (1937). Nevertheless, on the genuinely American home-front this literary product is (to an outsider) surprisingly rich in content, variety, and freshness. The last years have seen such works as A. Blackwood’s Fine Art of Public Worship (1939), A. W. Palmer’s Art of Conducting Public Worship (1939), J. O. Dobson’s Worship (1941), C. Seidenspinner’s Form and Freedom in Worship (1941). To these now comes Doctor Stafford’s Christian Symbolism in the Evangelical Churches.

For the generality of the readers of Theological Studies, Stafford’s volume will be interesting chiefly as a striking witness to the fact that, in his own words, “Today we find a considerable number of Presbyterian, Congregationalist, Baptist and Methodist churches introducing enriched
forms of worship, altars, crosses, candles, vestments and other ecclesiastical equipment that would have been darkly frowned upon, even as late as the beginning of the century” (p. 24). We read of an unnamed “denomination that is now showing a lively interest in putting altars in the sanctuary, albeit with due regard for simplicity of effect” (p. 23); a Baptist minister’s testimony: “Our people never tire of the simple, impressive beauty and orderliness of the sanctuary” (p. 25); or the Methodist’s: “Already there is evidence of the wisdom of the church in making the change. The attendance at the service has almost doubled.”

In another passage Doctor Stafford states: “At present, the movement towards more liberal use of traditional Christian forms and symbols in Protestant churches is in a somewhat chaotic state. In America, until comparatively recent years, Liturgics and Symbolics have received very limited attention in the training of Protestant ministers, except, of course, in the Protestant Episcopal and the various Lutheran bodies. In a good many theological seminaries this condition has been changed already and considerable stress is being laid on the study of the proper conduct of worship and acquaintance with the historic forms” (p. 28).

It is doubtless with an eye to both seminarists and clergymen already in the field that Stafford has produced his clear, orderly manual. After general introductions, he presents by illustration and short explanation symbols of the Three Divine Persons (twenty-four in all), twelve of the monograms of Christ, twelve of the Passion, sixteen of the Cross, etc., etc.

Chapter Ten, “On the Symbolism of a Church,” would, we venture to say, be regarded by its author as the heart of his book. It is a reasoned and eloquent plea for the ordered beauty of God’s house, even though in the Evangelical churches there are “no sacerdotal connotations” in the worship. The plea for an altar, under the circumstances, could go no farther than this: “As Christ’s death is the one full, perfect and sufficient sacrifice for all subsequent time, a Christian altar is a perpetual reminder of the oblation of God’s only begotten Son and therefore, fittingly, a place where we, in gratitude, offer our “gifts” unto God: bread and wine to be sanctified for “remembrance” of the Savior’s sufferings and triumph; money to be consecrated to the building of the Kingdom which He ushered in; flowers in thanksgiving for the beauty of the world, and as memorial symbols of our departed loved ones, who have entered eternal life through Jesus Christ” (pp. 114, 115).

The volume is further enhanced by photographs of recent Baptist, Christian, English Evangelical, Methodist, and Presbyterian churches. May the study of beauty be rewarded with ever fuller knowledge of truth.

St. Mary’s College

GERALD ELLARD, S.J.

This book is being heralded in non-Catholic theological circles as the most significant contribution to theological literature during the past ten years. As fairly representative of current evangelical thinking, therefore, it should be of considerable interest to Catholic scholars.

Dr. Robinson, recently retired from the principalship of Regent’s Park College, Oxford, offers the present volume as his second contribution to the Library of Constructive Theology (of which he is one of the two editors) and as the third of his trilogy on the Christian faith. His first work, *The Christian Doctrine of Man* (1911), used the approach of psychology. Its successor, *The Christian Experience of the Holy Spirit* (1928), extended the psychological emphasis to its philosophical and theological background, while *Redemption and Revelation* concentrates on the media of revelation and especially on the redemptive act of the Cross, as based on the actuality of history. These books represent an effort “to think out anew, in the light of modern knowledge, the foundation affirmations of our common Christianity,” having in mind the fact that Christianity can no longer be served by “apologetics,” and “that the number of people who are content simply to rest their religion on the authority of the Bible or the Church is steadily diminishing, and with the growing effectiveness of popular education will continue to diminish” (p. v). Stress is therefore to be laid on the value and validity of religious experience, and theology is to be developed on the basis of religious consciousness.

The present work, which testifies on its every page to the patient industry, the sustained and careful thinking, and the deep reverence of its author, has its fourteen chapters grouped under three main headings: The Actuality of History, The Media of Revelation, and The Fact of Redemption. It also contains a General Introduction, a Preface, a Summary of the Argument of the entire book, in which each chapter is compressed into a paragraph, a special Introduction on the meaning of history (axioms of a Christian interpretation), and an excellent triple index covering Names, Scripture References, and Subjects.

The author’s theme, which is declared, re-presented, varied, amplified, and illustrated in symphonic fashion, perhaps finds its pithiest presentation in the following passage from the Preface: “In the actuality of human life the divine purpose finds a new and unique category of achievement, reached through the exercise of human freedom. The abuse of that freedom which
human history displays is beyond man's power to atone; it requires the divine "redemption," and the actuality of that redemption in Christ supplies the supreme revelation of God, which itself becomes the cardinal factor in changing the hearts and lives of men" (p. xi).

It is immediately evident that an exposition of the three words, "actuality," "revelation," and "redemption," should serve to unfold the central theme.

**Actuality.** History is the "continuous methodical record" of events, with emphasis on the fact that the significant events are the products of moral agents, acting under, but in no way forced by, divine control. Actuality, belonging to the volition as well as to the external event, means that something has taken place actually, once for all—has gone from potency to act; that the deliberate choice, the considered intention of the divinely controlled yet free moral agent has passed beyond the possibility of being reversed. It belongs to history as something definite. Now, the deeper and more inclusive realm of spiritual actuality is the peculiar sphere of moral responsibility; while experience testifies to the existence of moral good, inescapably there is the practically universal sense of moral failure. And "the sense of obligation which underlies morality points beyond itself to spiritual reality, which man does not invent, but slowly discovers" (p. 68). And experience bears witness to an important difference between man's initiation of evil and of good. "The evil man is ready to boast of his achievements when his character is sufficiently depraved; the good man is more and more ready to give glory to God for whatever of good he has been able to accomplish, of which God is the ultimate initiator and supporter" (p. 70). This aspect of religious experience serves to prepare the way for the author's development of the concept of revelation, received through media available to experience, that is to say, embedded in the actuality of history.

**Revelation.** "The will of God is the ultimate explanation of the world, and the purpose of God in creating, maintaining and redeeming it can be known to man only in the actualities of experience" (p. 75). Revelation is the divine initiative making contact with man through all nature, through external events, through the mediation of inward thoughts and emotions, through all the live points at which there is contact between the divine and the human and at which there is experience of an inflow of spiritual knowledge or energy, with the saving reservation that the theist should expect that "God has other modes of activity besides those with which He has familiarized us in Nature's 'laws'" (p. 79). Outside the Christian belief in the Incarnation, the prophetic consciousness in Israel, slowly evolved
from dim primitive antecedents, affords the supreme point of contact between God and man to be found in history. Going a step further, it is declared that the point at which the transcendent God reveals Himself to us must be a point at which He becomes intelligible to us, that is, a point at which there is kinship between His nature and ours (p. 165). Revelation is no mere dictation; rather, it is after the fashion of the work of the true teacher who thinks more of training his pupil than of communicating knowledge.

The Scriptures, in this view, are no mere text book containing a "deposit of truth" divinely communicated. Rather they are the historical source book witnessing to the divine activity whereby the Spirit of God makes contact with, and brings pressure to bear on, the spirit of man. This is the central fact. The recorded events are "sacramental" in that they symbolize this activity, which is in need of continual re-interpretation to meet the demands of changing time and place and culture and general development. In the "manward" direction, the divine activity is externalized and concretized in the Incarnation. "Godwards", the response is by intuitive faith. "This act of trust and love, which interprets the actuality of the events as the sufficient evidence of God entering history, is the essential moment in the intuition of evangelical faith. It is reached by no merely historical evidence and by no merely rational inference. The Christian explanation of such an intuition is that it comes by the Spirit of God, which is the theological way of saying that God is present, and therefore active, to the believer through his experience of Christ... Christian faith is the free response of the human personality in its full unity to the disclosure of divine personality in Christ" (p. 185).

Redemption. There is need for an individual and a racial redemption both from the power and from the guilt of sin. Finding kinship between God and man at the point of personality gives us the possibility of a divine Incarnation, and in Christ we have to do with the redemptive personality of God. It is God Himself who suffers for sin. Christ on the Cross is the externalization of the divine passibility, which is God's supreme revelation of Himself and of His unlimited love for man. "God Himself, suffering both in His Son and beyond the historical suffering of His Son, is the ultimate Redeemer." "However blotted the record of human history, however much of discord it has brought into the symphony of God's purpose, His way of dealing with it all transforms its meaning and constitutes the ultimate fact about it. The blot is worked into the finished design of the picture, the discord is resolved into an enriched harmony. The sin-marred world, viewed as a whole, is transformed into a realm of victorious and for-
giving love. This transformation is in the deepest sense a redemption, for it ransoms history from its bondage to the irrevocable. . . . The whole world is redeemed, for its meaning is transformed” (p. 276).

What may be said of the book as a whole? Its prevailing tone is that of modernism. The author has due regard for the standard objection that religious experience is open to the charges of subjectivism and an exaggerated individualism. He is forceful in underlining the objective aspect of experience, and he strives to highlight the corporate character of all human experience massed together in the continuous record that is history. If he requires, or even admits, anything like the strict inspiration of the Scriptures, or indeed of supernatural revelation, he is at great pains to conceal the fact. But his veneration for the authority of the “Higher Critics” and of “modern knowledge” makes him too ready to toss into the discard such “old-fashioned” beliefs as the fall and original sin, the historicity of Adam, the last judgment, the positive punishment of hell; and he is influenced unduly by the high-priests of evolution. He is highly allergic to the “baleful” influence of Greek thought on theology. Consequently, he tends to eschew all sharpness of distinction, and offers instead a blurred, shadowy, out-of-focus kind of “no man’s land” that may or may not indicate a difference between natural and supernatural, normal and abnormal, humanity and divinity, nature and person, time and eternity, matter and spirit, subjective and objective. The abstract intellectual concept yields place to the vital reality, and “the actuality of history, up to and including the Incarnation, is God’s supreme medium of utterance to man” (p. xxxv).

St. Mary’s College

Clement Demuth, S. J.


This book is satisfactory from every angle. Being a “harmony,” it gives the Gospels in four parallel columns, the text being that of the Revised New Testament, for which the author had the permission of the Archconfraternity of Christian Doctrine. To the text are added explanatory footnotes, comparatively few and printed in rather small type, so that they do not obtrude on the eye.

The author, however, calls his book a “chronological” harmony, for good reason. Not only are the dates of the events narrated in the Gospels indicated throughout, but the reader is provided with other means of acquiring a clear picture of the succession of events. In the beginning of the book there is an “Outline of Chronology,” in which all events are listed in their chronological order, though without dates. Then there are “Preliminary
Notes," scattered through the book, in which the author discusses at greater length the dates of Christ's birth, of the beginning and duration of His ministry, of His death. Of the ministry itself, a one-page "Outline" is given by year and month at the beginning of the book. If we add that there is a table of "Contemporaneous Events," all will admit that completeness could hardly go further.

One might perhaps suggest that the title of the book is incomplete. As a matter of fact, the author is not only interested in chronology, but also in topography. In many footnotes he gives us the exact place where events occurred, and three maps close the book.

The scholar is apparent throughout. Anyone who is at all acquainted with the problems of chronology and topography in the Gospels knows that caution is the watchword. Many answers can only be approximate or probable. The author shows himself fully aware of this fact; he refers to it in his Preface and phrases his own solutions accordingly. May I add that one of the very few footnotes on which I do not see eye to eye with the author occurs on page 154; I set forth my reasons in an article in the Catholic Biblical Quarterly, 1939.

All in all, this is a work of which Catholic scholarship in America can justly be proud. Also the Press that published it is to be congratulated on the format, the readable type, and the excellent paper.

Weston College

A. C. Cotter, S.J.


The present work is a reprint of the work which Father Jarrett published in 1926. In it nine topics are selected for discussion: Law, Education, Women, Slavery, Property, Money-making, War, Christendom, and Art. The sources studied were, for the most part, the great Dominican moralists, St. Thomas and Humbert de Romans in the thirteenth century, St. Antonino and Savonarola in the fifteenth. A good deal of use is made of other Dominicans, such as Vincent of Beauvais, St. Albert the Great, and John Bromyard. Although the first actual quotation (p. 9) is from the Summa Theologica of Alexander of Hales, comparatively little account is made of Franciscan writings: St. Bonaventure is quoted only in connection with the Augustinian notion that the law and lordship have their roots in sin; Scotus is quoted once in connection with property—but by a curious confusion the Index attributes the quotation to John Scotus Erigena; Ockham is three times referred to, but never cited. Occasional and happy use is made of a
few purely literary sources; the author of Aucassin and Nicolete is twice quoted to illustrate feudal relations; there are two quotations from Langland's Piers Plowman, one from Christine de Pisan's Trésor de la Cité des Dames, and one from Chaucer. The name of Dante appears here and there; but there is little evidence that his ideas on society or art were studied at first hand: the reference to sculpture as "visibile parlare" (Purg., X, 95) is borrowed from Bethaby's Mediaeval Art; the meaning of "dolce stil nuovo" is misunderstood; and such important matters as Dante's attacks on the feudal conception of "nobility" are passed over in silence.

The chapter on Law is valuable by reason of the obvious contrast between the rational and human conception of law elaborated in St. Thomas (Summa Theologica, I–II, qq. 90–97) and the earlier Christian view of law as merely "the constraint of evil," on the one hand, and the Stoic conception, on the other, that "the law of nature is that which all beasts follow." The influence of St. Thomas was likewise decisive in the theory of education. Little by little, it ceased to be merely the taming of the beast in the growing boy, and became the positive pursuit of the moral and intellectual virtues, with a view to rational happiness; so that with Maefo Vegio (whose work De Liberorum Eruditione is analyzed at great length) education becomes mainly a matter of "the development of each boy's individuality."

It took a long time for the Middle Ages to reach the point at which Robert Holcot, the Dominican, could speak of a man who "has lost all sense of the personality of his wife" (cited on p. 77). In the matter of the conception of woman, Dante and the other poets did more than the theologians. There is in St. Thomas nothing of the rather brutal anti-feminism of many of the earlier monastic writers; but the Christian world had a long way to go beyond such a lowly view as that of the Summa: "Woman was created as a helpmate for man, not indeed as a helpmate in other works, as some maintain, since man can be more efficiently helped by other men in other works, but as a helpmate in generation" (I, q. 92, a. 1). Happily, social progress moved faster than social theory. It was the same with slaves as with women. Even St. Thomas takes over from Aristotle the horrible idea that some men "cannot follow reason and are fitly slaves...; others are slaves by the fortune of war" (quoted on p. 100). The Shepherd in the Towneley Plays was in closer touch with the social conscience of Christendom when he complains: "That men say is for the beast—we fynde it contrary" (quoted on p. 107).

The chapters on Property, Money-making, and War are further illustrations of the lag of moral theory behind historical fact. To take but a single example: the peoples of the new nations in the late Middle Ages were al-
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ready acting on the conception that their nations formed moral unities when St. Antonino invokes the principle of the nation as a corpus mysticum (p. 203) in order to justify certain types of war reprisals. The chapter on Christendom is disappointing, but the last chapter on Art is an admirably clear account of St. Thomas’ theory.

Fordham University

GERALD G. WALSH, S.J.


The author of this book is professor and head of the department of Rabbinics at Dropsie College, Philadelphia, and professor of Jewish History at Yeshiva College, New York. The book is a popular presentation based on a series of articles which appeared in the Jewish Quarterly Review in 1941–42.

In evaluating the author’s argumentation for absolving the Jewish nation of the responsibility for the death of our Lord, two considerations arise in the mind of the reader. First, there must be accepted such a truth as the moral responsibility involved in any act of co-operation, for on page 164 it is definitely stated that the Sanhedrin delivered over Jesus to the authority of the Roman Procurator. Secondly, may the guilt for this act be fairly imputed to the nation as a whole? That history has not been unfair in so doing would seem to follow from a principle enunciated by Dr. Zeitlin himself on page 210: “But to set the blame on a party of the Jewish people cannot exonerate the whole Jewish people from responsibility for the crucifixion, any more than an act by a Republican President and Congress or by a Democratic President and Congress frees the entire American people from total responsibility for such act.”

Palliation for the part played by the leaders of the Jewish people is offered by the author on several counts, chiefly that of attaching the verdict of condemnation not to a religious Sanhedrin but to a separate body called a political Sanhedrin. The distinction between the two bodies is not always clear, either as to personnel or jurisdiction. Expediency is frankly acknowledged to have been the motivation for this judicial action: “The high priest who actually delivered Jesus to the Roman authorities either was compelled to do so to save himself so as not to be accused of being an accessory to the rebels; or, most likely, Caiaphas, the high priest, played the role of a Quisling who proved ready to sell out Judea to the Romans for personal gain” (p. 172). Pilate himself is partially freed from even the author’s condemnation, on the grounds that “men are oftentimes the victims of their own system” (p. 210). Indeed, were we to follow the author’s style of
reasoning we would be compelled to say that not Pilate, but the Roman soldiery who carried out the sentence of execution, incurred the guilt of the crucifixion.

Apart from difficulties familiar to students of the synoptic problem—together with the two genealogies of Christ, the date of the Last Supper, as well as the general charge of tendentious writing on the part of the Evangelists—no new grounds for dismissing the Gospel account are found in this book other than the above-mentioned distinction between a political and religious Sanhedrin. The first hundred pages are devoted to a discussion of the origins of the political and religious parties in Israel at the time of Christ. Based largely on the “Tannaitic sources” in Rabbinical literature, this disquisition issues in a disclaimer of the title “hypocrites” when applied to the Pharisees and in a disavowal of the popular acceptance of the Davidic origin of the Messias. To reject certain passages of Holy Scripture because of the existence of variant readings would be more convincing were the author to cite the actual manuscripts (a procedure which may have been observed in the original articles).

In this whole question a certain mise au point seems to be necessary, though it is not clear whether it applies to this particular book. There has been a lot of effort expended in allocating to the Romans rather than to the Jews the responsibility for the death of Jesus; the latest contribution, indicating the fashion, was the historical frivolity of Mr. Lloyd Douglas. The supposition not infrequently seems to be that such a procedure will remove the sole root of all difficulties in Christian-Jewish relationships. The supposition behind the supposition is harder to reach; perhaps Mr. Everett R. Clinchy recently suggested it: “... if one listened to the garden variety of Jews he would conclude that the only thing about Jews that Protestant Sunday schools impress upon children is that Jews are Christkillers” (The Growth of Good Will, p. 48).

At all events, to keep things in perspective, several things must be held in mind. It is true that the question, who crucified Jesus, is of considerable importance to the historian and moralist. But for Catholic scholars the question is principally related to the problem of the historicity of the Gospels, wherein the fact of Jewish responsibility—falling primarily on a small organized minority—is plain. Secondly, the Church, following St. Paul, has never accepted the theory of a sort of theological curse laid on the whole nation in consequence of its historic act; nor is this implied in the classic theory with regard to Jewish history sketched by Augustine and developed in the Middle Ages. The historical roots—and they are multiple and complex—of the Jewish problem are more advisedly sought in the implications
of Constantine's famous phrase about the "inimicissima Judaeorum turba." Finally, to the question, who crucified Jesus, the Catholic answer that is religiously vital and operative in personal and social life is: "I did, and so did every man who ever sinned."

Georgetown University

PHILIP S. HURLEY, S.J.


Having expounded in a previous work the psychology of St. Thomas Aquinas as developed in the first part of the Summa Theologica, Dr. Monahan embarked upon a presentation of the moral system of St. Thomas. The first part of this study is now available. It is intended primarily, the author explains, for members of the Church of England who have not time to study the numerous volumes of St. Thomas which are compressed into this work.

Dr. Monahan is profoundly appreciative of the close relationship between speculative and practical theology, or, as he puts it, between doctrine and morals: "Morals in the last resort depend on doctrine. The intellectual inertia which goes by the name of Agnosticism was first applied to doctrine of which it made havoc; while the agnostic was preoccupied with doctrine morals were temporarily safe. The time came when morals suffered the same treatment which had moved the foundations of doctrine, and with disastrous results; for the doctrine is the foundation of morals, so that when doctrine was abandoned, morals soon followed suit and perished." Nor is he in any doubt where to turn for help: "A study of St. Thomas's Moral Theology shows the way by which the foundations both of theology and of morals can be restored. That way is the Word based on the twin illumination of reason and revelation."

The present volume is based on the first seventy questions of the Prima Secundae. Each of the sixteen chapters is a condensation or digest of a group of related questions; the first, for example, embraces the five questions with their forty articles on the last end of man. Little is added by way of interpretation or illustration; the author is content to set forth in reduced compass the thought of Aquinas as he grasps it. Real skill is displayed in combining into a unified exposition not only the main current of thought contained in the body of the articles but also many of the illuminating additions to be found in the answers to objections. The method adopted has its advantages; for one thing, the reader is very often
made to feel that he is in close contact with the mind of St. Thomas himself. But there are disadvantages also. There is a choppiness of style; there are what seem to be discontinuities—the result of compressing into a paragraph or two what has formed the material of separate articles in the original; and there is throughout a sense of mere accumulation rather than of the admirably integrated structure of the \textit{Summa} itself. In these respects this work is inferior to another book with which it inevitably invites comparison, Father Walter Farrell's \textit{Companion to the Summa}, Volume Two.

Nevertheless Dr. Monahan deserves credit for a splendid achievement. And the fact that he is a clergyman of the Church of England may give his work a special usefulness: it may be the means by which many of his fellow churchmen are first introduced to, and interested in, the timeless wisdom and erudition of the great medieval doctor.

\textit{West Baden College} \\
\textbf{PAUL V. KENNEDY, S. J.}


In ten chapters of very unequal length the author, after some general considerations on the study of theology and a very summary account of Aristotle's "spirituality," examines the influence of Aristotle on the theologians of the Church of England. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries the works of "the ten Schoolmen" were in a general way familiar to most Anglican theologians, and "passing from mediaeval to modern times is more in the nature of subtraction than alteration and innovation" (p. 24). To mention that the Index contains about 315 proper names (exclusive of those found only in the notes), is to say that the great majority of the divines mentioned receive very brief notice. A few are treated more in detail, for example, Richard Hooker, Thomas Hobbes, Henry Hammond, Ralph Cudworth (out of whom "it would be easy to reproduce the philosophy of Aristotle, except for the \textit{Organon}"). and Joseph Butler, who "may well be considered the most significant Aristotelian in the Anglican Church." From a wide reading in Anglican theology the author brings many an interesting detail, and the little book as a whole accomplishes its purpose, "to see the touch of Aristotle, and to exhibit the signs of his influence in representative thinkers of the Church of England." After briefer chapters on the eighteenth (Pusey's "saeculum tepidum") and nineteenth centuries, the author ends on a note of hope: "Doubtless another generation will inform itself with his philosophy, and thus eventually the Church may be refreshed with a more productive pursuit of dogmatic theology and metaphysics, moral theology and ethical theory."

\textit{Woodstock College} \\
\textbf{NEIL J. TWOMBLEY, S.J.}

This is the eleventh in the series of doctoral dissertations published by St. Mary of the Lake Seminary. It offers a solid and well balanced study that is decidedly worth while.

After a brief consideration of the fall of man, the nature of original sin, and the need of a Redeemer, there follows a thorough investigation of Leo’s theory of the priesthood and sacrifice of Christ, the effects of the sacrifice of the Cross in the work of redemption, and finally of the function of the Mystical Body of Christ as the means of salvation for all men.

Especially in his popular writings, Leo undoubtedly favored the theory of the “rights of the devil,” and the loss of these “rights” through their abuse in the death of the sinless Christ. The author insists, however, and quite correctly, that Leo’s theology of the redemption probes much more deeply into the heart of the dogma than his emphasis on the popular presentation of this “marginal theory” might suggest. The redemption was pre-eminently the work of divine love, not merely because it proceeded from God’s love for the sinner, nor merely in the sense that Christ’s love for the Father is the ideal towards which sinful man is to strive in his effort to rise above sin, but fundamentally because it was through love for man that Christ, the High Priest, chose freely to offer Himself as victim in our stead to God the Father in the sacrifice of the Cross. The redemption was objective. The sacrifice of the Cross truly brought about the reconciliation of man with God, the remission of sin, and the return to man of the supernatural sanctification he had lost in Adam. We were saved through Christ, and in Christ. Christ the Redeemer was essentially Christ the Priest; we were redeemed through the sacrifice of Calvary. And it is by our union with Christ the Redeemer in His Mystical Body that we may hope to participate in the fruits of the redemption.

It is refreshing to see the emphasis in St. Leo on the elements of obedience and charity for mankind on Christ’s part, on the function of love for the Father in the history of the redemption of fallen man. Surely one of the least happy effects of St. Anselm’s *Cur Deus Homo* has been the latter day insistence on “satisfaction,” in its more unfortunate juridical interpretations, as the be-all and the end-all of our Redemption. It is hardly too much to hope that such studies as Dr. Mozeris’ will point the way for theology in our day towards a more satisfactory synthesis of the various aspects of the dogma of the redemption.

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*Woodstock College*  
*J. F. X. Sweeney, S.J.*

The apologetic value of martyrdom, evident throughout the ages of the Church and succinctly expressed by Tertullian in his famous sentence: "The blood of martyrs is the seed of Christians," forms the point of departure for this doctoral dissertation. With the idea in mind that this apologetic value can be fully appreciated only with correct ideas of the nature of martyrdom, the author proceeds to give the correct ideas in an orderly theological treatise.

The work is divided into two general divisions: I. The Etymological and Historical Notion of Martyrs; II. Dogmatic and Moral Analysis of the Nature of Martyrdom.

The first general division contains an historical study of the evolution of the term martyr (witness), from the Apostles, whom Christ styled His witnesses, to the idea of a suffering witness and lastly a dying witness. The author then goes on to describe the place of the martyrs in the early Church, the honors given them both before and after their martyrdom.

The second general division contains a dogmatic analysis of the nature of martyrdom, treating in successive chapters the final, efficient, formal, and material causes of martyrdom. Interspersed in these chapters is a discussion of moral problems, such as the precept of suffering martyrdom, flight from martyrdom, spontaneous self-offering for martyrdom, prayer for martyrdom, etc. The book is concluded with a long explanatory definition of martyrdom based upon the dogmatic analysis. Then follows a good bibliography and some one hundred pages of notes.

This book is a valuable addition to the literature of Apologetics and should be on the reading list for that course in Catholic colleges and seminaries. Much of the documentation in the notes is unnecessary, but the author had the grace to put it in notes and not foot-notes, for which the reader can be grateful.

West Baden College

C. L. Firstos, S.J.


Père de la Taille's monumental work, Mysterium Fidei, brought to the fore the inquiry, whether and in what way Christ in heaven remains a priest and a victim. Did the redemptive sacrifice completely terminate on Calvary, or does it somehow continue on the celestial altar alluded to
in the Apocalypse? And if Christ is still a victim in heaven, is there any need or even possibility of a real immolation in the Mass in order to constitute Him in a state of victimhood? Many theologians had taught that Christ is victimized anew in every mass. Not so, replied De la Taille, in accord with outstanding pre-Tridentine authors, for Christ abides a victim in heaven, and at the words of consecration, already a formal victim He is present on the altar. In the Mass there is only a symbolic immolation, but there is a real priestly oblation.

Though the Fathers have left us many statements bearing, in varying degrees of remoteness, on the problem above delineated, it seems correct to say that they did not envisage the precise question under consideration. Thus St. Ambrose is cited for the belief that in heaven Christ actively and actually continues His sacrifice. Others would not so understand the Saint, though they readily allow that he upholds a passive sacrifice in heaven, or that Christ perseveres in a state of victimhood before His eternal Father.

The contribution at present under review, one of the latest worthy accessions to the rapidly growing series of doctoral dissertations issuing from the school of theology of St. Mary of the Lake, Mundelein, is a logical, thorough, gratifying investigation of the mind of St. Ambrose apropos of the heavenly sacrifice. After a discerning reading of the Saint’s writings, the author has failed to find in them any compelling evidence pointing to an active celestial sacrifice, though he has discovered at least one context in support of the passive sacrifice. This conclusion is the outcome of a clever piece of argumentation, adequately documented and formulated with attractive modesty and precision.

Woodstock College

D. J. M. CALLAHAN, S.J.


The author presents an interpretative, not a biographical, study of Jesus of Nazareth, with a view to uncovering the aim and motivation of His life; both of these merit for Him the title of “Man of the Hour.” The style is highly colored—rather good rhetoric, with a feminine touch. Perhaps these sentences give the general tone: “In our modern ecclesiasticism quite as hostile as the ancient to all freshness of approach, we lose sight of the splendid magnetism of the Carpenter as he moves to and fro in his tragic brevity, across history. Yet there is not a page of the old record which does not reveal him as a dominating person” (p. 34). Chiefly praiseworthy is the accent on this dominating quality; it could well be imitated by Catholic
devotional writing. Moreover, the impact of Jesus on His contemporaries is accurately (though only in part) realized: men were “pulled up to human stature by his mere presence there among them” (p. 40); feeling the power of His creative love for them, and His confidence in their future, they were released unto new gladness and new growth.

There seem to be two premises for the book’s attempt at a “fresh approach”: first, Jesus “is so familiar we cannot see him” (p. 47); and more significantly: “We of today have to fumble through heavy accretions of dogma to find Jesus” (p. 53). The author seems to trust the Gospel portrait as real, “despite all the obscuring later accretions” (p. 30). The problems are dismissed—for instance: “Today we do not believe in miracles, yet no one dreams of questioning that Jesus put out his hand and saved [Peter sinking under the waves]” (p. 59). The serenity of these mutually destructive affirmations is quite fascinating.

The author’s mental pattern is, of course, furnished by “liberal” theology. Jesus is “God,” in that He somehow reached the divine in himself—the divine that is immanent in every man, and that ultimately is identical with the best that is human in him. Jesus’ religious genius showed itself in His sublime “guess” that there is beneficence in heaven toward man on earth; and His work was the “establishment upon the visible world of the kindness boldly guessed to exist in the invisible world” (p. 125); this is the Kingdom of God, the “kingdom of kindness” (p. 46); “Christian means kind, selflessly kind” (p. 105).

A Catholic reviewer’s verdict would doubtless be judged irrelevant in the circles for which the book is destined. He must, therefore, be content to hope that it will awake its commensurate response in those circles.

JOHN COURTNEY MURRAY, S.J.

DESCRIPTIVE NOTICES


The new edition of the Code will be welcomed by all the clergy; it will be particularly useful to seminarians in the study of canon law since it contains Gasparri’s Preface and references to the sources. It is published in the United States with the special permission of the Holy See. The book itself is well made—clear print, good binding, and manageable size (4½” x 6½”). The Newman Book Shop deserves much gratitude for its enterprise.
NOTES FOR CONTRIBUTORS

All manuscripts should be typed on one side of the sheet, double spaced, in lines averaging six inches in length, with not more than twenty-six lines to the page. Interlineations and corrections should be avoided. An accurate carbon copy of the manuscript should be kept by the author, for use in revising proofs, and also as a protection against possible loss of the original.


QUOTATIONS

Direct quotations of less than five typewritten lines should be run into the text, within double quotation marks. Longer quotations should be set off from the text in a separate paragraph, and indented four spaces, as a sign that they are to be set in smaller type; quotation marks are omitted. The superscript reference numeral is put at the end of the quotation, not after the introductory colon.

Ellipses within a sentence are indicated by three spaced periods ..., and at the end of a sentence by four spaced periods.... Interpolations are enclosed in square brackets. The spelling, etc., of the original should be exactly reproduced. When italics are introduced into the original, the fact should be noted.

A careful paraphrase with a footnote reference (in the form: "Cf. etc.") is generally preferable to a long quotation. A condensed summary, if necessary with a footnote reference (in the above form) is preferable to quotation of a source to which the writer is not indebted, but which he merely cites approvingly, or in a matter on which there is general agreement, or by way of further explanation.

Quotations from works in modern foreign languages should ordinarily be translated in the text; if the original must be put before the reader, it may be given, either entirely or in its significant part, in a footnote.

FOOTNOTES

Footnotes should be numbered consecutively through an article, and typed in series on separate sheets, double spaced, twenty-six lines to a page.
Upon first reference, titles should be given in full, with that amount of bibliographical detail which seems necessary; in succeeding references, a conventional or easily intelligible abbreviation should be used, and thereafter consistently maintained.

In general, all references are made in footnotes. Exceptions: (1) single references to Scripture should be enclosed in parentheses and run into the text, the terminal punctuation being set outside the parenthesis. But when parallel passages must be cited, they, together with the principal reference, are given in a footnote. (2) Parenthetical reference in the text may also be made to different pages of a single work, when a running exposition of its argument is being made. (3) Necessary references in book reviews are made parenthetically.

In repeated references to the same work, the special forms, *ibid.*, *loc. cit.*, and *op. cit.* should be used, with careful distinction of meaning. *Ibid.* is used when the reference is to a different page, or volume and page, of a work cited in the immediately preceding footnote; it is never preceded by the author’s name, title of the work, etc.; it must always be followed by the proper page, or volume and page, reference. *Loc. cit.* is used when the reference is to the same page, or volume and page, of a work previously cited, whether in the immediately preceding footnote or not; it is never followed by further data; it is preceded by the author’s name, except when the two footnotes are consecutive on the same page. *Op. cit.* is used when the reference is to a work previously cited, but not in the immediately preceding footnote; it is preceded by author’s name and followed by the proper page, or volume and page, reference. Ordinarily, however, *op. cit.* and *loc. cit.* should not be used to refer farther back than the preceding page; exceptions to this rule occur when no ambiguity would ensue.

With respect to the repetition of digits in references to consecutive pages, the following are the forms: pp. 31–35; 131–35; but 101–5, and 100–105.

**ABBREVIATIONS**

Ordinarily, abbreviations are followed by periods; but exception is made for the titles of certain well-known theological sources, handbooks, and collections, which are cited by initials only (in italics): *OT, NT, PG, PL, AAS, ASS, DB, RJ, CSEL, DTC, DAFC, CIC.*

Books of the Bible should be referred to by the standard literary abbreviations (in roman type): Gen., II Kings, Isa., etc.; Matt., Mark, Luke, John, Acts, Rom., I and II Cor., etc. However, in articles wherein such references abound, the shorter technical forms may be used, as, for instance, in A. Merk, S.J., *Novum Testamentum Graece et Latine* (Roma, 1935).
The form of scriptural citation is: Mark [or: Mr] 15:21; 13:1–3; 12:4, 8; 5:4 –6:11.

The following are the abbreviations for certain works of St. Thomas: *Sum. Theol.*, I–II, q. 4, a. 5 c [or: ad 2m]; *C. Gent.*, III, 56; *In III Sent.*, d. 5, q. 4, a. 6; *In Met. VI*, lect. 6; *Quodl. IX*, q. 4, a. 7; *In Rom. V*, lect. 1; *De Pot.*, etc.

**CAPITALIZATION**

The use of capitals is restrained. Lower case is used for the following words: bishop (when the reference is indeterminate; but: “the Bishop of Rome”); papal, episcopal; faith, grace, redemption; original sin; ecclesiology (but: Christology); biblical, scriptural; patristic (but: Scholastic); canon, canon law; sacrament, baptism, confirmation, penance, holy orders, matrimony, extreme unction (but: the Holy Eucharist); passion, death, resurrection of Christ (but: the Incarnation).

Pronouns of the third person referring to God are capitalized; divine attributes (wisdom, providence, etc.) are not capitalized.

**ITALICS**

The use of italics merely for emphasis is distinctly exceptional, and should rarely occur.

Italicize (underscore in manuscript) all foreign words and short phrases not in common English usage; but all complete sentences, unless they are aphorisms, should be roman quoted.

The following Latin forms are italicized: *vide, circa (ca.), infra, supra, passim, ad fin., q. v., s. v., sic, idem, in h. l., ibid., loc. cit., op. cit.* Do not italicize: etc., e.g., i.e., cf. (the form “cp.” is never used).

Italicize lower case letters used to mark subdivisions: *(a), (b)*; also letters used to designate a fractional part of a verse: Rom. 3:25b.

**PUNCTUATION**

In an enumeration of three or more elements, put a comma before “and,” “or,” and “nor” connecting the last two.

Quotation marks always stand outside commas and periods, inside colons and semicolons. Superscript numerals stand outside punctuation.

At the beginning of a paragraph, a single parenthesis is put after the letter or numeral that introduces an enumeration; within the paragraph, double parentheses are used.

Square brackets are used for parentheses within parentheses.
FORMS OF REFERENCE

For volume, book, and part, Roman numerals (caps) should be used; for section, number, and page, use Arabic numerals.

In the titles of French, Italian, and Spanish, and of ancient classical and patristic works, capitalize only the first word (or the first two words, when the first is an article).

Titles of books and periodicals are set in italics; titles of periodical and encyclopedia articles, and of parts and chapters of a book, are roman quoted. Titles of book series (e.g., The International Critical Commentary, Textus et Documenta, etc.) are set in roman, not quoted.

When the reference includes the volume, the page number is not preceded by "p."

The following models will indicate the (unabbreviated) forms of reference for various types of literature; special forms may sometimes be necessary.

Footnote Forms


Suarez, De Trinitate, V, c. 1, n. 4; Disputationes Metaphysicae, disp. V, sect. 3, c. 3, n. 9.

L. de Grandmaison, Jesus Christ, trans. Dom Basil Whelan (2d ed.; New York: Sheed and Ward, 1940), II, 75 f. [the following page]

W. Reinhard, Das Wirken des hl. Geistes im Menschen nach den Briefen des Apostels Paulus (Freiburger Theologische Studien, XXII; Freiburg im Breisgau: Herder, 1918), p. 47 ff. [the following pages]


Umberg, "Confirmatione baptismus 'perficitur,'" Ephemerides Theologicae Lovanienses, I (1924), 505.

Bibliographical Forms


Umberg, J. B. "Confirmatione baptismus 'perficitur.'" Ephemerides Theologicae Lovanienses, I (1924), 505–517.

Form for Book Review Head