TABLE OF CONTENTS

ARTICLES

Christian Apophatic and Kataphatic Mysticisms
   Harvey Egan, S.J. 399

Just-War Theories: The Bases, Interrelations, Priorities, and Functions of Their Criteria
   James F. Childress 427

CURRENT THEOLOGY

Orthodox Ecumenism and Theology 1970–78
   Michael A. Fahey, S.J. 446

Responses to Peter Berger
   Langdon Gilkey
   Schubert M. Ogden
   David Tracy 486

NOTES

Origen Studies and Pierre Nautin’s Origène
   Robert J. Daly, S.J. 508

“Charisma veritatis certum”: Irenaeus, Adversus haereses 4, 26, 2
   Jerome D. Quinn 520

What Price Indulgences? Trent and Today
   Peter J. Beer, S.J. 526
BOOK REVIEWS

LÉON-DUFOR, X., S.J.: Les miracles de Jésus selon le Nouveau Testament 536
VAHANIAN, G.: God and Utopia 537
SCHILLENBECKX, E.: Gerechtigkeit en Liebe 539
VILLALÓN, J. R.: Sacraments dans l’Esprit 540
Daly, R. J., S.J.: The Origins of the Christian Doctrine of Sacrifice 541
METZ, J. B.: Glaube in Geschichte und Gesellschaft 543
LADARIA, L. F., S.J.: El Espíritu Santo en San Hilario de Poitiers 544
TENTLER, T. N.: Sin and Confession on the Eve of the Reformation 546
SCHUTTE, A. J.: Pier Paolo Vergerlo 547
DELUMEAU, J.: Catholicism between Luther and Voltaire 548
DALY, R. J., S.J.: The Origins of the Christian Doctrine of Sacrifice 549
METZ, J. B.: Glaube in Geschichte und Gesellschaft 551
VILLALÓN, J. R.: Sacraments dans l’Esprit 552
BISHOPS AND WRITERS (ed. A. Hastings) 553
DIECKMANN, B.: “Welt” und “Entweltlichung” in der Theologie Rudolf Bultmanns 555
MARCHESI, G., S.J.: La cristologia di Hans Urs von Balthasar 557
CURRAN, C. E.: Themes in Fundamental Moral Theology 558
PERSPECTIVES ON MORALITY (ed. K. E. Goodpaster) 560
RAMSEY, P.: Ethics at the Edge of Life 561
HICK, J.: Death and Eternal Life 563
MOL, H. J.: Identity and the Sacred 567
BIGO, P.: The Church and Third World Revolution 570
POPULATION POLICY AND ETHICS (ed. R. M. Veatch) 571
KLEIN, C.: Anti-Judaism in Christian Theology 573
MICHALCZYK, J. J.: Ingmar Bergman 575

SHORTER NOTICES 578

KIERNE, P. F.: The Tabernacle of God in the Wilderness of Sinai 579
GUINAN, M. (ed.): Gospel Poverty Lopez Rivera, F.: Biblia y sociedad 580
POHIER, J.: Quand je dis Dieu Cormier, H.: The Humor of Jesus 581
HINTNER, D.: Die Ungarn und das byzantinische Christentum der Bulgaren im Spiegel der Register Papst Innozenz’ III. 583
CARMAN, P.: The Lost Paradise 584
MULDER, J. M., AND J. F. WILSON (ed.): Religion in American History 585
LACROIX, W. L.: Meaning and Reason in Ethics 587
BENNETT, J. C., AND H. SIEFERT: U.S. Foreign Policy and Christian Ethics 588
SMITH, M.: An Introduction to Mysticism 589
MOLTMANN, J.: The Monastic Journey 591
CHITTISTER, J. (ed.): Climbing along the Cutting Edge 592
VER EECKE, W.: Negativity and Subjectivity 593
BROWN, M. L.: Louis Veuillot 594
LA CROIX, W. L.: Meaning and Reason in Ethics 595
BENNETT, J. C., AND H. SIEFERT: U.S. Foreign Policy and Christian Ethics 596
MALLORY, M. M.: Christian Mysticism 597
RAHNER, K.: Meditations on Freedom and the Spirit 598
MERTON, K.: The Monastic Journey 599
CHITTISTER, J. (ed.): Climbing along the Cutting Edge 600
DAVIES, M.: Liturgical Revolution 601
MARTIN, M.: An Introduction to Mysticism 602
MOLTMANN, J.: The Passion for Life 603
VER EECKE, W.: Negativity and Subjectivity 604
FAITH OF OUR FATHERS 605

Published in March, June, September, and December at Mt. Royal and Guilford Avenues, Baltimore, Md. 21202. Second-class postage paid at Baltimore, Md. 21202 and additional mailing offices.

Yearly subscription: U.S. $10.00; Canada and foreign $11.00. Single copies $3.50.

Renewals and new subscriptions should be accompanied by a remittance in U.S. funds and sent to Theological Studies, P.O. Box 64002, Baltimore, Md. 21202. Changes of address and business correspondence should be sent to Theological Studies, Business Office, 428 E. Preston St., Baltimore, Md. 21202. Send manuscripts to Editor, books for review to Book Review Editor, Theological Studies, Georgetown University, Washington, D.C. 20057. Back issues available from offices in Washington D.C.

Copyright © THEOLOGICAL STUDIES, INC. 1978
ISSN 0040-5639
Our September 1978 issue traverses broad theological territory: mysticism, the just war, Orthodox theology, secularity, Origen, Irenaeus, indulgences.

**Christian Apophatic and Kataphatic Mysticisms**, with its springboard in varying attitudes toward mysticism within the Catholic Church and outside, argues that any genuine Christian mysticism must contain apophatic as well as kataphatic elements. It makes its point by analyzing two classics of Christian mysticism, the fourteenth-century *Cloud of Unknowing* and the *Spiritual Exercises* of Ignatius Loyola, an analysis that reveals the strengths and the weaknesses of the two traditions. **Harvey D. Egan**, S.J., Th.D. from the University of Münster (1973), is assistant professor of systematic and mystical theology at Boston College. His areas of particular competence are the theology of Karl Rahner (who directed his doctoral dissertation) and Christian mysticism, especially Ignatius Loyola and John of the Cross. His book *The Spiritual Exercises and the Ignatian Mystical Horizon* appeared in 1976.

**Just-War Theories: The Bases, Interrelations, Priorities, and Functions of Their Criteria** starts from our “historical deposit” of just-war criteria and tries to determine what questions we need to answer in order to develop a coherent just-war theory and, indeed, to have usable criteria for policy-makers. **James F. Childress**, Ph.D. in Christian ethics from Yale, is presently Joseph P. Kennedy, Sr., Professor of Christian Ethics, Kennedy Institute of Ethics, Georgetown University. He is especially interested in issues of social ethics on both a theoretical and practical level—in particular, in the ethical issues that arise in politics and biomedicine. His *Biomedical Ethics*, coauthored with Thomas Beauchamp, will be published by Oxford University Press later this year or early 1979.

**Orthodox Ecumenism and Theology: 1970-78** reports (1) on Orthodox ecumenical dialogues especially with Roman Catholics, non-Chalcedonians, Anglicans, and Protestants, and conversations with Jews; (2) on ten theological topics frequently studied by the Orthodox in the last eight years. **Michael A. Fahey**, S.J., Dr. Theol. from Tübingen (1970), is associate professor of theological studies at Concordia University, Montreal, and a consultant theologian for the North American Orthodox and Roman Catholic Bilateral Conversations. In recent years he has concentrated on historical and doctrinal issues separating the Christian churches. Author of a number of articles in ecclesiology and ecumenism, he has recently coauthored, with John Meyendorff, *Trinitarian Theology East and West* (1977).

**Responses to Peter Berger** comprises three replies by American theologians whose theologies were criticized in these pages (TS 38 [1977] 39–56) by Peter Berger as “yet another variety of reduction,” specifically,
"the moderate (as against the radical) wing of American theological reductionism." LANGDON GILKEY and DAVID TRACY teach at the University of Chicago Divinity School, SCHUBERT M. OGDEN in Southern Methodist University's Graduate Program in Religious Studies. All three are authors of important books: see, e.g., Gilkey's Naming the Whirlwind and Reaping the Whirlwind, Ogden's The Reality of God, and Tracy's Blessed Rage for Order. Since each claims that Berger's characterization of his theology bears little resemblance to the reality, and since each presents his case in a fashion that makes a legitimate demand on a scholarly journal, I have judged it only fair to open our pages to them. I believe the Responses will clarify some basic stances.

Three shorter notes deal with historical issues that have contemporary pertinence. ORIGEN Studies and Pierre Nautin's Origène sketches the major moments in the history of Origen research, then analyzes critically a recent volume that is surely a milestone in the attempt to recapture perhaps the most significant theologian between Paul and Augustine. ROBERT J. DALY, S.J., Dr. Theol. from Julius Maximilians Universität, Würzburg (1972), is associate professor in Boston College's Department of Theology. He expects that his research in the history and theology of Christian sacrifice will be a lifelong task. Fortress Press has recently published his book The Origins of the Christian Doctrine of Sacrifice.

"Charisma veritatis certum"; Irenaeus, Adversus haereses 4, 26, 2 argues that the Latin version of this passage "supplies a very ancient, Western explanation of a Greek text that has vanished. The translator understood the presbyterate/episcopate of his day as endowed through ordination with a prophetic gift that made their teaching of revelation certain." Whether the Irenaean original meant that is another question calling for further research. JEROME D. QUINN, S.S.L. from the Pontifical Biblical Institute (1961), is professor of OT, NT, and Hebrew at St. Paul Seminary, Minnesota, has for many years taken part in the Lutheran-RC dialogue and contributed to its volumes, and is preparing the Pastoral Epistles for the Anchor Bible.

What Price Indulgences? Trent and Today tries to uncover the theology out of which came the Catholic Church's most authoritative position on indulgences, and discovers that the understanding gleaned from this study lends support to the interpretation given to an indulgence by Poschmann and Rahner. PETER J. BEER, S.T.D. from the Catholic University of America (1971), is on the staff of a theological consortium, the Union Theological Institute of Sydney, Australia. He has published in the Australasian Catholic Record and in TS (Sept. 1974).

Walter J. Burghardt, S.J.
Editor
BOOK REVIEWS


Miracles occupy a large place in the NT, especially in the Gospels. This collection concentrates on their thirty-two different ones, excluding summary statements. Miracles create a problem, because our contemporaries do not understand these Gospel narrations. Hence Léon-Dufour introduces this volume with a historical survey of the three common approaches: the dogmatic that becomes apologetic, the critical, and the literary. He then explains the new method of this collection, which is hermeneutical in the sense of maintaining a living dialectic between text and community. To orient readers to this approach, he evolves a phenomenological description of miracle (38).

The next thirteen chapters are by twelve authors: J.-N. Aletti, L. Beirnaert, J. Calloud, M. Carrez, G. Combet, J. Delorme, A. George, P. Grelot, K. Hruby, P. Lamarche, S. Légasse, and X. Léon-Dufour. They are divided into three parts, each preceded by the editor's introduction. Part 1, “The Situation,” deals with the forces out of which the Gospels grew and which influenced their treatment of miracles. Grelot admits that the question of demonology causes problems for moderns, but stresses that Jesus experienced real contact with a Presence that was more than abstract evil. His so doing was a revelation that “God takes charge of our confrontation with Evil, whatever it is. This is an essential aspect of redemption” (72). In an article on the widespread belief in miracles in the Hellenistic world, George puts the “divine man” theme under the heading of wisdom rather than that of miracle worker. Légasse concentrates on difficulties in affirming the historicity of miracles. “The historian arrives at only a relative degree of probability” (144). Both he and L.-D. recall that the dialog between Jesus and Peter over the temple tax in Mt 17:14–27 does not affirm a miracle.

The three chapters of Part 2 are examples of using different methods to analyze the narrative of Mk 5:1–20. They provide observations on the strengths and weaknesses of each approach. The psychoanalytic method shows that a text has more than one meaning. The classical approach affirms the continuity of the written text with tradition. Semiotic and semantic analyses demonstrate the necessity of active participation of readers to arrive at the depth of communication inherent in every communication experience.

By contrast, Part 3, “Perspectives,” is more systematic and explains how the four Evangelists viewed miracles. Lamarche shows that Mark presents miracles in a complex and paradoxical way, both revelatory and
polemical. They "reveal the inseparable link between divine power and weakness" (225). The chapter in this section on John as well as all of Part 4 and the book’s conclusion are by L.-D. John presents Jesus’ signs as symbols that the eternal Word is in the human activity of Jesus (274).

Undoubtedly the most provocative part of the collection is the editor's comprehensive overview dealing with the structure, production, and function of miracle narratives. He incorporates findings from sociology, structuralism, and generative poetics to formulate a theological definition of miracle. It demands both a religious horizon and some form of redemption.

The book’s conclusion explains the relationship of miracles to prodigies, mystery, and Christian life. It is an appeal to read the NT “in its totality,” that is, being sensitive to all its levels of meaning. This set of studies arises out of the hermeneutical crisis through which NT studies are going. As a search for more interdisciplinary treatment of miracles, it deserves critical attention. Since nothing of comparable scope exists in English, a careful translation is needed.

St. John's University, N.Y. JAMES M. REESE, O.S.F.S.


To deal with the rather persistent and common tendency to formulate religious meaning on the fringes of human life, Vahanian has countered with imagination and vision to resituate authentic religion in the center of the process of human development. Dominant in this century is the emergence of a culture more and more adept in transforming itself by an enhanced empowerment of its own making. Supported by its technology, humankind pulls away from a world of childish fears and misdirected dependencies.

Earlier religious people tended to fashion in their own minds worlds apart, utopias, where the defects of the present situation would be taken away and the deeply-sensed destiny of the real self would be achieved. Religion was quite satisfied to underwrite that kind of transcendence. The earthly churches filled with people celebrating the fact that their real existence was elsewhere. But eventually they began to realize that the act of pure waiting was a waste and the churches began to empty. Nevertheless the desire for utopia remained. It took on other forms which nevertheless told the same story: move away from where you are right now and from the path you now tread to the other place. Go to another world.
V. does not provide a critique of technological society, but rather a critique of religion and the churches because of their tendency to sidestep the demands of radical faith by falling into contrived theological escapes. At the risk of being overly simple, I read V. as demanding that religion return to a position of supporting the fundamental human endeavor of building the truly human city. The problem surfaces because religion tends to submerge humanity and the human spirit into a predefined historical or natural pattern of explanation, thereby reducing freedom and creativity to secondary status. This submergence is allowed in order to preserve intact the integrity of God's supposed rightful position. The theory holds that the human must be tamed so that God can reign in uncluttered supremacy. With the human adequately domesticated, the world becomes safe and secure. Experiences are predictable and the world remains right where it is.

V. rightly senses that the very nature of the kingdom is then destroyed as its fundamental eschatological movement is thwarted. God has empowered the human to be on the move. The open future calls the human to activate itself in creative activity, to employ its resources in the building of that future city. I sense that V. is bringing forward with more nuance and delineation Bonhoeffer's acknowledgment of and call for maturity. V. adds an excellently construed and sustained argument against the many creeping forms of theological ideology, especially those which attempt to create all kinds of imagined finalities of the future. It is the future at a reduced price, because it is fabricated out of old images drawn from either history or nature. The future slips into an apocalyptic form at the expense of dropping divinely-supported human transcendence and robbing it of the range and variation it deserves. The real meaning of time and history is known too soon and the full meaning of the sacred is lost or simply missed because the very particularized portrait of the sacred has already been drawn.

Written more for the professional theological community, V.'s critical appraisal of the state of religion today deserves a wide audience for both critical comment and discussion. His style is packed tightly. Reading him is a slow, heavy task. He is on the leaning edge of theory formation as he strives to make sense of and give direction to the movements of the human spirit in our time. More must be said about the kind of critical judgment called for in a time of rapid cultural movement. There are hard questions demanding an active human response. The blending of praxis and theory saturates V.'s method and thought. The content of this work is provocative and timely. What he discusses must be discussed and it must continue.

St. Meinrad School of Theology

David M. Thomas

This is the second volume of S.'s proposal for Christology (the first was reviewed in TS 36 [1975] 169–71). The first volume explored the early NT response to the person of Jesus as reflected in the pre-Synoptic materials; S. describes this second volume as "a first approach toward a modern Christian soteriology." He combines NT study with contemporary ethical concerns, and so tries to establish continuity between contemporary Christian identity and its roots.

Part 1 discusses the relation of the normativity of experience to the authority of the NT. This reflects a widespread concern that the institutional Church often fails to mediate between biblical revelation and contemporary experience. S. brings his sensitivity to the role of interpretation in experience to bear on this issue and warns against a modern fundamentalism.

Part 2, more than half the book, presents the meaning of grace and salvation in the NT canon (except for the Synoptics). The same exhaustive use of exegetical resources characteristic of the first volume is reflected here. S. provides a lengthy distillation of his research under fifteen headings. The Christian is adopted by God in grace and so becomes born from God. This being graced by God leads the Christian in turn to the task of freeing all people from every type of bondage. S. then takes up a number of NT ethical issues—the relations of early Christianity to social structures, to political powers, to cultural and moral norms, and to the synagogue—to indicate how Christians, in response to the salvation experienced in Christ, worked out their concrete identity in the world.

A short Part 3 draws out the structural elements of NT theologies of grace, and shows how these might be related to our own belief and behavior in the manifold cultural situations of our world.

Part 4, while drawing upon the NT study, stands somewhat apart from the rest of the book. It brings together a number of issues in contemporary social ethics. After a brief section on utopias and rational planning for the future, S. presents a useful summary on evil and suffering as seen by the great religions of the world. This is followed by an attempt to develop an ethical theory from his anthropology. This anthropology is defined as a system of interlocking relations: of the human person to corporeality, nature, and environment; to human community; to social structures; to culture; to theory and praxis. Then he takes up a number of social and political ethical questions: belief and politics, liberation theology, confessional political parties, action and contemplation, and the social meaning of eschatological salvation.

At the end of all this, S. notes that ethics, and the larger question of
Christian identity, can only be developed properly within an ecclesiology. Whether this is an indication of yet another volume is hard to say.

S.'s book is remarkable in the breadth of its concerns. Its close study of NT sources will be helpful for liberation theologies and for social ethics. It is also helpful to have a theologian such as S. take up the question of foundational ethics, however short his presentation. His willingness to address concrete issues in political ethics can provide some guidelines beyond the European context in which they were conceived and written. And the constant effort to correlate NT and contemporary experience offers important hermeneutical guidance.

Because of its wide range of concerns, the book could have used a tighter organization. Likewise, S. may be putting too much weight on the word charis as the key to the NT understandings of salvation. The book is by no means a complete soteriology; but this does not seem to have been S.'s intention. Nonetheless there is much to learn from this long and varied work on the meaning of Christian identity.

Catholic Theological Union

ROBERT SCHREITER, C.PP.S.
Chicago


This research on the role of the Holy Spirit in the economy of salvation involves three methods of investigation. The longest section is taken up with a detailed exegetical study of the action of the Spirit in baptism and is limited to the effect which scholastic theology calls the sacramental character. Three passages of the Pauline epistles which employ sphragizō are selected which affirm of the Christian what Jn 6:27 seems to affirm of Christ: 2 Cor 1:21–22; Eph 1:13–14; 4:30. Following this, Christological and ecclesiological analogies of the sacramental structure of the encounter between Christians and the Spirit are discussed, using the method of biblical theology. The concluding section offers a systematic presentation of the role of the Spirit in the sacramental mystery, clarification of a number of theological problems by means of a pneumatological vision of the history of salvation, and theological perspectives on the reciprocal conditioning of anthropology and pneumatology.

The reader of this journal will perhaps be more interested in the systematic presentation offered in the last section. Here V. enters into direct confrontation with a traditional scholastic approach to Christology, ecclesiology, and sacramentology.

The discussion of the sacramental character is well developed. After considering its Trinitarian, Christological, and ecclesiological aspects, he
concludes by describing the sacramental character as a permanent possibility of understanding and desiring solidarity of one humanity which forms a project for the whole world and which is realizable according to the logic of Jesus Christ. It is acquired by the existential acceptance of the Spirit which Christ bestows (443). This presentation is shown to be in accord with the basic demands of the official Catholic teaching on the subject.

V. attributes a personal mission of the Spirit to Jesus but does not discuss whether and how the Spirit along with the Logos sustains Jesus in existence. Here the perspective remains that of H. Mühlen. His Spirit Christology does not provide more than an appendix to Logos Christology. Like Mühlen, V. also opts for a view of the Church as continuation of the unction of Christ by the Spirit and correctly judges that the concept of Church simply as continuation of the Incarnation cannot adequately explain the role of sanctifier attributed to it. His understanding of the Spirit as the "internal sign" of the sacramental celebrations and the preaching of the word (this writer would prefer to speak of the Spirit as protosymbolizer in this context) and the consequences which he draws deserve careful consideration.

The importance of introducing pneumatology into an adequate approach to the theology of mysteries, the presence of the saving acts of Christ in the liturgy, is briefly considered. The development could have been improved by making use of the various contributions to this theme which have appeared, especially in French, over the last ten years. The reflections on the relationship of the laity to the ordained ministry and the latter's function as mediator are useful. The attempt to integrate the role of the Spirit into the Eucharistic celebration is partially successful. This theme still remains badly integrated in the modern Catholic theology of the Eucharist.

On the whole, this book provides a synthesis of modern insights developed by Catholic theologians who have become increasingly conscious of the marginal place which the Holy Spirit has had in the systematic presentations of Catholic doctrine. It is a welcome contribution which, it may be hoped, will provide the incentive for further research, especially in the areas which V. was not able to develop more fully.

*University of Notre Dame*  
**Edward J. Kilmartin, S.J.**


The author promises a further, documented book on Christian sacrifice for 1978. Until that appears, this brief popularization is hard to judge when one is looking for precision. Although the major part of the book
covers the biblical period, it is a theological treatise, with the Bible consulted in light of later issues. Crass misuse of the Bible is avoided, but I would have to judge that the author does not exhibit the sharp critical sense demanded by biblical scholars in such a disputed area. (Others will have to evaluate the patristic section.)

It is startling to be told that (the historical) Jesus repeatedly emphasized the free and voluntary character of his death, a statement seemingly made on the basis of the much-disputed Mk 10:45 and some Johannine passages! What Jesus thought about his death is an extremely difficult question. In citing rabbinical evidence pertinent to the notion of sacrifice in Jesus’ time, D. simply assumes that he may cite the Palestinian Targums despite Fitzmyer’s strong contention that the evidence points to a date after A.D. 200, and D. mixes into the evidence such late works as the Targums on Chronicles and Canticles and Leviticus Rabbah. In the study of sacrifice in the OT, he puts no real emphasis on the crucial necessity of the involvement of Levitical priests from the monarchical period on; and even in discussing a Qumran text pertaining to the community as temple, he does not call attention to the Aaron motif in the passage and at Qumran. Consequently, when he discusses sacrifice in the NT, he does not wrestle sufficiently with the number-one obstacle—the lack of Levitical priests: an obstacle for seeing the Eucharist as a sacrifice, and even for seeing Christ’s death as a sacrifice, as Hebrews eloquently attests. Of course, eventually that obstacle was overcome, but the reader needs to be alerted to its presence.

D. judges that Heb 13 probably had a Eucharistic meaning, with the hint that views pro and con generally follow confessional lines. However, M. Bourke (JBC 61:69) states bluntly, “There is no convincing reason for taking this as a reference to the Eucharist,” citing O. Kuss. In fact, one may press farther and argue that the author of Hebrews was trying to discourage an emerging strain of neo-Levitical thought which tended to speak of Christian priests and Christian sacrificial offerings. On p. 64 D. says that Paul “could hardly have found a more Semitically flavored word than sôma (body),” and elsewhere he argues that “body” and “blood” in the Eucharistic language do not correspond primarily to the Hebrew sacrificial terms “flesh” and “blood.” Besides the apparent assumption (incorrect) that there was one Semitic anthropology interpreting “body,” the author does not seem aware that in the datable Hebrew and Aramaic texts up to and including Jesus’ time no word for a living body (as distinct from corpse) is attested. A Semite would speak of flesh and blood, and that is probably what Jesus did.

I want to reserve opinion till I see the detailed book, but unhappily I must report that this popular book does not greatly advance the discus-
sion of the NT notion of sacrifice (and especially of the Eucharist as sacrifice).

Union Theological Seminary, N.Y.C. RAYMOND E. BROWN, S.S.


This volume recapitulates the development and refinement of Metz's political theology since the programmatic statement in his 1969 Sacramentum mundi article. Part 1, "Concept," insists that fundamental theology begin from a global analysis of the contemporary situation as a metaworld constituted by two competing systems: the evolutionary thought of bourgeois society and the dialectical materialism of socialist states. Each system claims to sublate religion, so that fundamental theology necessarily takes on an apologetic character, and the proving ground becomes not pure theory but praxis. Fundamental theology thus draws near to biblical apologia, inseparable from the life of discipleship.

As apologetic-practical, this theology would correct other currents—phenomenological, existential, etc.—as inadequate responses to the Enlightenment. On the basis of a theory-praxis dialectic, Metz charges that modern theology has enthroned an abstract human subject, one in fact defined by nature-domination and need-satisfaction, and thus fosters a privatized service religion which reflects and furthers the dynamics of a technical, manipulative society which robs history of its substance and heads towards the extinction of the subject. Theology needs the "Enlightenment of Enlightenment" offered by postidealist forms of philosophy which stress the primacy of practical reason.

Part 2, "Themes," offers two new essays and reworks four others which appeared from 1970 to 1974. Metz defines Church as the bearer of the memory of God's eschatological, liberating act in Jesus. This memory can generate a transformed political consciousness which counters the drift to subordinate politics to the momentum of anonymous technological and economic processes. As a memory of suffering, it mobilizes protest against ideologies of progress which write off the excluded and oppressed, and because it identifies God as the subject of history this faith-memory relativizes all totalitarian claims.

The centerpiece of this section, "Redemption and Emancipation," warns against any facile theological identification of the two terms. Emancipation, a summary of Enlightenment aspirations, falls short before the realities of guilt, finitude, and mortality. By no small irony, the modern cult of autonomy erects new, irrational heteronomies when it...
claims progress for man's achievement while ascribing the negativities of human existence to such reified abstractions as nature or historical process, thus avoiding the full responsibility which real autonomy would impose. Theology faces a problem of its own, that of mediating the fact of redemption with the ongoing reality of man's history of suffering. Purely theoretical soteriologies (Pannenberg, Moltmann, Rahner) reconcile the two prematurely, selling one or the other short, a failure which Metz believes can be avoided only if theology takes a narrative form.

Part 3, "Categories," draws together four previously published articles and adds one new essay. Metz designates three categories as foundational. Memory, the first of these, serves as more than a source of data; it functions as an inner moment in the constitution of critical consciousness. As memory of freedom and suffering, it renders reason practical. Second, memory has a narrative structure. Narrative, as a self-verifying signum efficax, has an event-character by which it provides the medium of salvation. Finally, memory and narrative serve the interests of solidarity, a solidarity in hope before God which extends universally even to the dead and vanquished.

The book witnesses to the unfinished, "sporadic" status of Metz's project. His call for theology to move into the context of the "second Enlightenment," his creative appropriation especially of the Frankfurt School's Critical Theory, and his intimations of a foundational historical anthropology integrating the aesthetic and the political confer on that project uncommon significance.

Catholic University of America

WILLIAM P. LOEWE


Originally a Gregorian dissertation under A. Orbe, this book is a model of clarity, precision, and insight which should remove St. Hilary from Augustine's shadow and dispel prejudices about his "confused pneumatology." The Bishop of Poitiers stands revealed as the creator of a dynamic Spirit-Christology without previous peer. His defense of the Son's divinity presupposed a developed doctrine of the Spirit's role in Jesus' life. Time is taken seriously. The Incarnation does not culminate God's salvific plan; it rather initiates a process that strives for its temporal completion in the Resurrection, the total glorification (spiritualization) of Christ's body enabling the unrestricted donation of his Spirit to men.

In the opening chapter L. lays bare Hilary's fundamental understanding of Spiritus as the infinite, eternal, simple, divine nature, especially when considered a dynamic, vital force. The second chapter examines the work
of the Spirit in creation and the OT. Clearly distinct from Father and Son, he directs men toward the Son *incarnaturus* through prophecy, law, and the whole spiritual meaning of the Scriptures. The Spirit-Christology is developed at length in the third chapter. Contrary to previous patristic opinion, the Spirit present in the OT does not leave the Baptist to pass over to Jesus; for the Spirit active in Jesus' life is the divinity itself, the paternal Spirit in which the Son participates, self-engendering at the Annunciation, manifest at the baptism, effective in teaching and miracles, constantly striving to penetrate totally the assumed body (flesh). Only when the Resurrection constituted Jesus Son of God in plenitude did he pour out his Spirit upon all. This *donum* or *munus* describes the essential post-Easter function of the Spirit as distinguished from Father and Son.

The fourth chapter examines the notion of gift in reference to the beneficiaries: apostles, Church, individual believer. Again L. underlines the Spirit's dynamism encouraging growth from baptism to the final resurrection, when the Spirit's task of assimilating us to Christ will be perfectly accomplished. Hilary's understanding of the distinct Spirit is primarily functional, *munus in usu* (*Trin.* 2, 1), within salvation history. His Christological reference unites both Testaments and leads to the eschatological fulfilment, when all bodies will be perfectly "spiritualized." A final chapter is devoted to innertrinitarian relations. Hilary always considered the Spirit divine but had difficulty in defining His relation to Father and Son. Generation as the basis of natural equality (*natus-natura*) could not apply. Instead he characterized the Spirit as *res naturae*, divine but somehow distinct from the *Spiritus* common to Father and Son. Though by the end of *De Trinitate* the "divine gift" was recognizably "personal," the lack of a clear notion of "person" led to vacillations. The more Hilary distinguished the Spirit from Father and Son as "persons," the weaker became their substantial unity; the more he emphasized their unity, the less clear was the "personal" juxtaposition. An especially fine summary crowns a whole series of *resumens* which render L.'s argument clear to the reader every step of the way. The complete indices are invaluable for further research.

L.'s control of the text is, in general, magistral, combining close analysis with comprehensive synthesis. In *Tractatus super psalmos* 118, iode, 12 (pp. 219-20), however, L. mistakenly interprets faith as the temporal sequel to wisdom and knowledge, whereas Hilary maintained that there is "something more in knowledge than in faith." Thus the listing of wisdom, knowledge, and faith constitutes not a temporal sequence but ontological priorities. This interpretation accords better with Hilary's doctrine elsewhere. One might have desired a more detailed analysis of the relation among corpus, anima, spiritus, and Verbum in *Trin.* 10, 48-71, that amazing section where Hilary approached the notion of
person before drawing back. Likewise, an explanation how Christ’s corporeal glorification removes the *offensio unitatis* in God (Trin. 9, 38) would have been most stimulating. Does time enter God’s infinite life? Yet the fulfillment of these wishes would go beyond the wisely established limits of L.’s study. They remain goals for future research, which must rely on L.’s indispensable foundation.

**Fordham University**

**JOHN M. McDERMOTT, S.J.**


This is an important, carefully researched study of a subject that is clearly central to late-medieval piety and to the Reformation. Tentler bases his work not on the theologies of the late-medieval period but on the humbler genres of summas and manuals for confession. He has to provide some structure for the analysis of these works, and this he does by focusing on what he judges to be the two primary functions of sacramental confession: consolation and social control. Granted that these two functions may be the ones that enable us most easily to make sense out of penance, it is not at all obvious that these functions were intended—that the penitential system was “designed” to attain them—and at least questionable whether, intended or not, they were always the principal consequences. In my opinion, T. tends to suppose that the sense of anxiety characteristic of the late-medieval sense of sin was prevalent over a longer period of time than was actually the case. It would appear, for example, that some of the earlier penitential books are more concerned with community purification than with guilt; but T. fixes so single-mindedly on social control and assuaging guilt that he does not find a way adequately to conceptualize and to describe an evolving sense of sin. He is correct, in my opinion, in seeing the great change in the history of penance to lie not between the patristic era and the age of the penitentials, but between the penitentials and the much more individualized world of the later Middle Ages. But he does not explore the many dimensions of this change. For example, he never explores the significance of the shift from doing penance before reconciliation to doing penance after, apparently supposing that penance, after all, is penance. Yet it would appear to have functioned differently in the two different settings.

This issue aside, the book is very well done, insightful and carefully nuanced. By focusing on some of the problems that grew up within penitential practice, T. is able to show how medieval piety was related to certain central Reformation—and especially Lutheran—concerns. At the same time he attempts to show how sixteenth-century Roman Catholicism continued to find sacramental penance spiritually meaningful. The
book gives rise to many questions. One of the more interesting would be how it was that late-medieval sacramental penance could survive the polemics of the Reformation for more than four centuries within Roman Catholicism and then, so abruptly and quietly, largely disappear.

University of Iowa, Iowa City

JAMES F. MCCUE


This excellent study of Pier Paolo Vergerio (1498–1565), the first to appear in English, covers V.'s career to the year 1549, when he left the Roman communion for Switzerland and the Reformation. S. does not include V.'s years as an active Protestant; perhaps she plans a companion volume.

V. was born in Capodistria, enjoyed an early humanistic training, and then studied law. He entered papal service in 1533 as nuncio to Austria and Central Europe where he encountered, for the first time, the Lutheran challenge to the Catholic Church. To learn what Luther was saying, he began to read his works. Some would like to date the beginning of V.'s disaffection with the Catholic Church at this early period (54). S. is more cautious; she shows that V. read Luther with the intention of refuting him. In November 1535, V. met Luther at Wittenberg; he left an account of the meeting but his judgment of the reformer is far from flattering (94).

As nuncio, V.'s task was to promote the coming council among the German-speaking princes. As early as 1535 he pointed out to Paul III the advantages of having the council at Trent, a city acceptable to the Germans. He worked indefatigably for this council; unfortunately, he was barred from attending it.

In 1536 V., though not yet a cleric, was appointed bishop of Capodistria; he continued his study of Lutheran writings, preparing himself to be a future anti-Lutheran controversialist. He attended the Diet of Worms and that of Regensburg (1541), and some have suggested that it was his experience at these colloquies that constitutes the decisive turning point in his religious attitude (154). However, S. maintains that on V.'s return to his diocese he was still no Protestant; rather, he was a reforming bishop. His goal was to reform the clergy and reorient the beliefs and practices of his people in accordance with the simple Christianity of the gospel. The response to his four years of reform activity was the charge of being "Lutheran." Even though his contemporaries saw V. more Lutheran than a reform-minded Catholic, S. claims that V. was still no Protestant. And when the Council of Trent (1546) refused him admittance
because he was under suspicion of heresy, V. did not turn to the Reformation but returned to his diocese intent on defending himself against the charges, an investigation that lasted four years.

What did bring V. to leave the Roman communion? According to S., it took place in late 1548. A certain Spiera, once interested in the new theology, was brought before the Inquisition and recanted. Thereafter he fell ill and viewed his illness as divine punishment for going against his conscience. V. visited him on many occasions and spoke to him of God's mercy, but to no avail, since Spiera was convinced that he was numbered among the reprobate. V. soon began to think that God had indeed struck down Spiera and that God was trying to speak to him through the sick man. He was assured that he was among the elect, and so far he had successfully survived his persecutors. Keeping Spiera's case in mind, V. realized that even the elect can break under strain and that there is always the possibility of renouncing true religion. Fearing that this could well happen to him, V. decided to act, and on May 1, 1549, he crossed the Alps.

Schutte has written a remarkably interesting biography of a rather minor reformer and has put the available records, especially letters, to excellent use so as to make V. come alive. If the book is weak in giving V.'s theological opinions, the fault is in V. himself, since his theological writings were composed after he left for Switzerland. The Spiera incident may have been the proximate cause of Vergerio's departure from Italy; nevertheless, it seems that this incident did not make him into a Protestant; rather, it brought him to the realization that he could no longer continue in his new beliefs without danger to his faith. Flight was the only proper course to take so that he could preserve what he already believed in.

Washington, D.C.

Joseph N. Tylenda, S.J.


Delumeau's book has several features which sharply distinguish it from other recent general studies of the Counter Reformation. First, it extends chronologically into the eighteenth century. This means that the book treats topics such as the suppression of the Jesuits, which happened more than a century after the conventional dates for the end of the period. Secondly, it manifests no interest whatever in the political and diplomatic maneuvers of the Catholic and Protestant parties; the French Wars of Religion, the Thirty Years' War, and the English Civil War are bypassed without mention. D. thus distances himself completely from the more
conventional histories of the Counter Reformation such as Zeeden's and O'Connell's, where these interests dominate. Thirdly, he views the Catholic revival as "a great spiritual history" (39) but, unlike H. Outram Evennett, his concern is directed much more towards the popular piety of the "masses" and the efforts to evangelize them than towards the formation of a spiritual elite. Finally, the Roman Curia, the Inquisition, the Index of Forbidden Books, the Consistories of Geneva—the author simply excludes these institutions from consideration.

The book has been recognized since its publication in French in 1971 as an important contribution by a distinguished historian to a field where comprehensive visions still founder on confessional, national, and methodological prejudices. In accordance with the format of the Nouvelle Clio series in which the book first appeared, the first part is simply a summary, in almost textbook style, of the classic corpus of knowledge about the period. Here the book offers a good overview of events, and is especially perceptive in the chapters on "Holiness" and "World Religion." Otherwise it is undistinguished, except for its geographical and chronological breadth and its firm determination of Trent as the great watershed.

The second part, "Historians' Disputes and Directions of Research," is where D.'s theses emerge. There is a long chapter on Jansenism, on which D. renders the apodictic judgment (100) "This problem was the drama of the Roman Church between Luther and Voltaire." The next chapter, on "Religious Sociology and Collective Psychology: Aims and Methods," is based on D.'s conviction, shared with most of his colleagues in France, that "from now on every religious history is necessarily sociological and as far as possible serial and quantitative." His aim: to know the "average Christian" of the past. His conclusion (159–60): the peasants of Western Europe in the Middle Ages were never Christianized; massive efforts of both Catholics and Protestants in the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries were directed towards the proper evangelization of this group; the defection of the masses in the nineteenth century shows that the process was only superficially effective (224–31). Christianity has not failed, one must sigh, it has never been tried.

The book is provocative, rich with information, sensitive to the complexity of the issues it raises. It is also given to brash overstatement and to a bias for problems peculiar to French Catholicism. The fine Introduction by John Bossy suggests some of its limitations while praising its considerable accomplishments.

University of Detroit

JOHN W. O'MALLEY, S.J.

D.'s introductory essay to this innovative book points to one of the reasons why the dustjacket can claim that it is "groundbreaking." An immediate relationship is established between the famous Presbyterian revivalist Charles Grandison Finney and the later Paulist and parish missioner Clarence Walworth. The latter was a convert of an extraordinarily successful revival held by Finney at Rochester, N.Y. Years later the two met in London. Finney discovered that his convert had so far adopted "peculiar views" as to become a Roman Catholic and a priest, but they passed over that area lightly. He was happier to learn that Walworth was "laboring among the Roman Catholics to promote revivals of religion." D. has ferreted out a good story, and he has a hook on which to hang his thesis that revivalism in the United States was not a uniquely Protestant phenomenon. His thesis goes on: "the religion of revivalism ... swept through Catholic America in the second half of the nineteenth century and in the process shaped the piety of the people and strengthened the institutional church."

This thesis is developed in a context rare for studies of American Catholicism, that of general American religion. The perspective provides fresh insights and is in itself a welcome contribution to American Catholic historiography, which has for too long treated its topics either in isolation or in the context of European Catholic history. All are valid perspectives; it is simply good to have another on the scene. While he studies an aspect of American Catholicism within the over-all setting of American religion, D. remains conscious that he is dealing with a hybrid, the American branch of a church which was in the period of his study very much European in membership and even more in corporate psychology. The parish mission, he knows, was not simply the Catholic version of evangelical awakening "down by the riverside." It had roots deep in the Europe of the Counter Reformation, and by the eighteenth century was an extraordinarily flourishing devotional form.

D.'s capsule analysis of early-nineteenth-century American Catholicism is good. He emphasizes, in the Emmet Larkin tradition, the religious illiteracy and apathy so many of the immigrants brought with them from Europe. His study of the mission as remedy to this situation focuses on three groups: Jesuits, Redemptorists, Paulists; and he ends his study with the century, convinced that by then the parish mission had achieved a form and style from which it did not thereafter depart. Representative sermons are analyzed and the thesis advanced that the Catholic style can be termed "sacramental evangelicalism." Discussing impact on individuals and on the church community, D. discovers the persistence of individualistic anti-intellectual pietism. He might have proceeded more cautiously here and perhaps explored the extent to which the mission movement was merely reflective, not causative, of Catholic attitudes. If
ethical legalism springing from a tendency to see life as a series of moral problems became the public face of the community, still it is risky to overemphasize, even with ritual disclaimer, a single cause for the phenomenon. A half-dozen final pages on the relationship of Catholic revivalism and the contemporary pentecostal movement, which are seen as something along the lines of evangelical cousins, seem to be in the nature of a relevant afterthought. Or perhaps they foreshadow another book. This one is a good contribution to understanding of the Catholic and American church community.

*Boston College*  
JAMES HENNESEY, S.J.


This is a very good book. It is also in some places a difficult book, in which at times it is not clear whether it is primarily a study in history or in method. For the present reviewer, it gives the added pleasure of illuminating some of his hypotheses and verifying some of his conclusions.

McCool sees as the central thread in the tangled history of nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century Catholic theology the search for a single all-embracing method. To find that method, theology had first simply to attempt to reconstitute itself—in every sense of the term—after the Enlightenment triumphs and revolutionary catastrophes and in the midst of a religiously appealing romanticism.

The dry-as-dust *adversarii* of the theology manuals of yesteryear come alive in M.'s book. Traditionalists and ontologists and semirationalists, Hermes for example, receive the serious, thoughtful, and illuminating consideration they deserve. The Tübingen School especially receives the extended treatment and the credit due to it. A renaissance scholasticism had long put them into the shade.

That nineteenth-century scholasticism, too, is dealt with, on its own terms and in the context of a later history. M. contends that the two men most influential in shaping it were Matteo Liberatore in philosophy and Joseph Kleutgen in theology. It is especially in his treatment of these two men and of their coworkers in Rome at the Gregorian University, and in his demonstration of their extraordinary importance in shaping Catholic theology up to Vatican II, that M. illuminates hypotheses and verifies conclusions. Of course there were politics, but there should be no surprise in that. Much more importantly, there were serious problems and questions of theological assumptions and method, especially in the areas of faith and reason, to which these men addressed themselves seriously. Their solutions and answers eventually received the over-
whelming approval of both the Apostolic Constitution *Dei Filius* of Vatican I (1870) and the Encyclical *Aeterni Patris* of Leo XIII (1879). From then on, one unitary and seemingly all-inclusive method reigned with little chance of opposition until close to the years of Vatican II. Thus far somewhat more than half the book.

M. then devotes three chapters to a methodical exposition of Liberatore's philosophical synthesis and Kleutgen's theological synthesis. These are the most difficult chapters in the book; they are dense, detailed, and intricate; at times they may attract only the professional philosopher or theologian. They also maintain that Liberatore and Kleutgen unwittingly built into their systems a philosophical pluralism and that this led—later but eventually—to a theological pluralism. A tenth chapter deals with *Dei Filius* and *Aeterni Patris* directly.

The most tantalizing chapter is the Epilogue, "The Reemergence of Pluralism." It is also the one which M. might well have developed in much more detail; but that may be another book. "The glaring weakness of nineteenth-century Thomism had been in the area of history and positive theology." Yet, M. says, once Neo-Thomism, under powerful ecclesiastical encouragement, had put down firm roots, the way was open to serious historical research into the scholastic doctors and into the plurality of their views. Also, the unsuspected philosophical and theological pluralism of Liberatore and Kleutgen helped lead beyond the Neo-Thomism of the early twentieth century to a transcendental Thomism, while at the same time an evolved Tübingen theology has emerged as another current alternative.

In a few instances interest in the book flagged in the face of detail and involved explanation. With some of those details there may be vigorous disagreement. There should also be vigorous approbation of a total work which is exciting, insightful, and important.

Weston School of Theology, Mass. John W. Padberg, S.J.


Peruvian society possesses a degree of complexity akin to that of the weavings that have been produced in the Andean region since before the coming of the conquistadors. This work is an attempt to provide an overview of the interaction of two strands of that reality—the evolving religious conceptualizations embodied in elite attempts at sociopolitical reform and the popular religiosity of the lower classes. The author concludes that there was a mutual adaptation whereby bourgeois ideas and prejudices were modified or even gave way in the face of the strength of traditional religious beliefs and behavior on the part of the great mass of Peruvians, who in turn absorbed some of the political views of the
The nature of this process is elucidated via examinations of the works of such opinion molders as Manuel Lorenzo de Vidaurre, Francisco de Paula González Vigil, Francisco Javier Mariátegui, and Manuel González Prada, and such phenomena as the Indian rebellions of the nineteenth century, the emergence of indigenism, the evolution of the reformist party APRA, the revolution initiated by the military in 1968, and the emergence of a new church.

K. concludes that reformist zeal, and more especially political realities, led the liberal bourgeoisie to greater estimation of the revolutionary potential of popular beliefs. In addition, he argues, these served to maintain and even increase the loyalty of the lower classes to the Catholic Church, particularly as some of the clergy became more socially conscious in the 1960's and 1970's. K. contrasts this with the lesser success of the present military government in attracting the loyalty of the lower classes and mobilizing them. This work tends to ignore countervailing forces within the military and the Church which claim to have a purer vision of God's plan and which hark back to medieval concepts of integrated societies organized along organic and functional lines. Examination of such elements might have helped explain the retreat from the reforms initiated in the late 1960's by the government, as well as the retreat within the Church from some of the Medellín initiatives and the growing hostility towards liberation theology.

This work would also have benefited from more rigorous analysis of socioeconomic and political developments in Peru, as they affected religion in general and the Catholic Church in particular. Failure to do so results in much of the data remaining inexplicable or only superficially explanatory. In addition, popular religiosity is used in a relatively unilinear and static fashion as an explanation of a dynamic process. Further, much of the recent literature on this topic suggests that rather than promote social justice it oftentimes serves to reinforce conservative political behavior. Beyond this, the weight K. gives to liberal and progressive elements within the Catholic Church distorts the actual potential of that institution to promote change. Such defects stem, in large measure, from the fact that his vision is very much determined by that portion of church work that he is caught up in, rather than by systematic analysis of the interplay of Peruvian reformism and popular religiosity as a whole.

Woodstock Theological Center, D.C. MARGARET E. CRAHAN


Three important essays by Fr. Garrett Sweeney, which the present reviewer is glad to have had an opportunity to read, are reprinted from
the Clergy Review in this paperback. The first two deal with important aspects of the First Vatican Council (1870), and the third the recent centralization of episcopal appointments at Rome. The fathers assembled for Vatican I were well aware of most of the possible objections to a doctrine of papal infallibility. Nor were they prepared to proclaim it; indeed, they promulgated something quite other. The Dominican cardinal said that "infallibility must not 'appear to be some personal or habitual property or prerogative' of the pope; and that the church must not lay itself open to the calumny that it 'attributed to a man that which belongs only to God and the truth he has revealed'" (167). In fact, the Council never declared the pope to be infallible; that was a popular summarization which came later. What "the fathers said was that papal definitions were irreformable . . . that and nothing more—the definitions were irreformable, not the pope infallible; when they said that this irreformability was due to the infallibility which Christ gave to the church, they meant what they said—and not that it was due to something that should be described as papal infallibility" (168).

It is stated by the writer that papal definitions are a solution of last resort, available at a time of great stress in the Church. "The petrine prerogative is not a glory of the church; it is a disagreeable necessity, like the skill of the surgeon" (174). In contrast, however, a very recent writer has suggested that the pope's significance is one of witness. "The pope succeeds to Peter in his role as fundamental witness for Christ's resurrection. The key becomes primacy of witness rather than primacy in some legal authority"; and the writer, Gerald O'Collins, emphasizes the strong scriptural support for such a reading of events ("The Easter Witness," Tablet [London], March 25, 1978, pp. 297-98).

Fr. Sweeney aptly quotes the present pope's own words on his primacy spoken in 1967: "Should we try once again to present in precise terms what it purports to be: the necessary principle of truth, charity and unity? Should we show once again that it is a pastoral charge of direction, service and brotherhood, which does not challenge the freedom or dignity of anyone who has a legitimate problem in the church of God, but which rather protects the rights of all and only claims the obedience called for among children of the same family?" (179-80). The essays, however, show how the officials of the papal court and the bishops of Italy have continually sought to promote the pope's sovereignty rather than his pastoral solicitude.

The book is intended as a tribute to Sweeney, who was master of St. Edmund's House at the University of Cambridge from 1964 to 1976. His own essays are preceded by seven written by past and present members of the house. The first, by John Coventry, S.J., is a good summary of recent developments in church thought, particularly as it concerns the
papacy. Later articles deal with Cardinal Newman and liberal Catholicism on the eve of Vatican I, with Lord Acton, the first editor of the multivolume Cambridge Modern History, with modernism, with the conversations at Malines between Cardinal Mercier and Lord Halifax, and, finally, with two essays assessing English Catholicism in the last forty years. The subtitle of the book does not reveal that the various studies provide a useful introduction to the history of the Roman Catholic Church in the last hundred years.

Georgetown University 

Eric McDermott, S.J.


I have not yet decided whether it is a peculiarity of the writer or the reader which rendered the first part of D.'s dissertation rather pedestrian reading. Enthusiastic effort never quite eliminated what I experienced as inertia. But the second and main section of the book provoked thought and reaction at an ever-accelerating rate. Assuredly, the first part, the ontological structure of existence and the problematic constituted by man's orientation to the world and by his historicity, are accurately presented. While D. does not add much there to the already existing body of theological comment on Bultmann's delineation of objectifying thought and its contrast to a more intersubjective, existentiell self-appropriation, he does deliver data illustrating B.'s dependence on Wilhelm Herrmann. And Bultmann's distinctions between objectifying thought procedures (Denken) and historical understanding (geschichtliches Verstehen) do not really need more elaboration. Perhaps the author himself felt this as he prepared the ground for his second section, in which he presents the paradox of the believer—orientated on the one hand by a scientific type of thought which seeks mastery of the world, and on the other by a revelation which is really the abandonment of all self-security and which demands a distance from the very world to which the believer is oriented. Hence the title of the present work.

I cannot quite agree with D. that the duty of the Christian to shape the world is not really a theological theme in Bultmann (36) except in the very obvious sense that Bultmann has no social programs. It would lead to quibbling to suggest that Bultmann's introductory lecture, in the summer session of 1933 at Marburg, and his extensive and forthright notes on the Arierparagraph did have some formative influence on at least a part of the world. Nonetheless it is quite accurate to say that Bultmann's primary intention is to form the Christian and not the world.
I realize, of course, that some concerned and generally younger German theologians are occupied about both the political and social issues burdening Europe and therefore seek to relate Christianity more directly to these affairs. This is a tempting movement and one currently in the ascendancy. But one wonders if it is not an attempt to retrieve an earlier but lost innocence.

Basically the world is a mode of being in which the natural man must exist. Revelation suggests that this mode of existence, with its endless solicitations, can be a form of captivity. So the believer exists in the state of "as if not;" he maintains a Christian distance; he lives with the indicative and the imperative. The inviting certainties of the world must be constantly dismembered. In a sense, therefore, Bultmann is dealing with the problem of science and religion or culture and religion.

One of the benefits of D.'s work—and it casts its retrospective light back on the first part of the book—is that it moves at a deeper level than common theological discussions of the believer vis-à-vis the world. D. does see the vision of Bultmann's interpretation of Christianity and its relation to behavior and the ethical demand. But the compelling nature of the demand is not its location in philosophy, existentialist or otherwise, nor its foundation in a departed dialectical theology. Rather, the noble vision of Bultmann has its residence in the NT and derives whatever force it has therefrom. I mention this because Bultmann's extraordinary competencies sometimes lead D. (as Boutin before him) to suggest that Bultmann is primarily a philosopher or wide-ranging commentator. But these are relatively minor points in a book that is generally good and occasionally superb.

In the elaboration of Bultmann's theology of the Christian life, D. makes quite clear, if indirectly, a thesis of Bultmann: that much of what passes for Christian ethical thought or moral theology owes far more to Epictetus, Marcus Aurelius, and the Stoics in general than it does to the teaching of the NT. This is unfortunate—not because Stoicism is not a viable human stance, but rather because the Stoic presuppositions tend to supplant, obscure, distort, and finally absorb the Christian ethic. This unknown and unrecognized process is one feature of the world which Bultmann's literary, historical, comparative, and theological procedure seeks to uncover.

D.'s book is worth reading not only because he selects a theme central to the NT, to Christianity, and to Bultmann but also because it opens new questions. And it is by these new questions, this new angle of vision, that a classic such as the NT manifests its power and its capacity to enlighten every contemporary situation.

University of Alberta, Edmonton

P. JOSEPH CAHILL

Whatever difficulties a doctoral dissertation on a living theologian has to surmount, his approbation offsets them all. Such has been the success of M.'s study. B.'s preface acknowledges that, although his Christology must be further elaborated in Theodramatik and beyond, M. has correctly interpreted his previous essays. The magnitude of that feat becomes apparent in M.'s contention that the figure of Christ occupies the center of B.'s thought.

The first two chapters define B.'s method and object. All is centered on the figure (Gestalt) of Christ, the harmonious synthesis of parts, the concrete universal, the living analogia entis joining God and man. No analysis can grasp the concrete universal, the living whole; thus B.'s method imitates the Johannine vision, which circles ever higher in order to reveal to meditation the unity of the multiplicity. To this lofty vision corresponds B.'s insistence on the primacy of a descending Christology. Man's mind cannot set the measure for God's free love but must let it be revealed as glory (Herrlichkeit), the pulchrum that necessarily involves the perceiving subject while surpassing him in its objectivity. The clearest testimony to Christ's objectivity is the perfect internal consistency between sending and response in filial obedience. To God's self-emptying in the Incarnation corresponds man's ecstasy toward God, the basis of every ascending Christology, the measure of every anthropology. Love joins the extremes, and the divine initiative remains primary.

The next two chapters develop B.'s descending and ascending Christologies, seeing in Jesus' human nature the perfect expression (Ausdruck) of the Father and the Son. Perfect correlation exists between revelation and revealer. So B. prefers to designate that humanity, the homo assumptus, God's expression rather than God's instrument. All his words and works reflect the Father and reveal in time the eternal obedience of the Son: Trinitarian love completed in the Spirit's embrace. In this Trinitarian revelation human nature attains its highest actualization. Obedience's perfect response in prayer and faith corresponds to the entrusted mission and serves as the final ground of Christ's authority. Chap. 5 studies B.'s revelation-concealment dialectic, which owes more to Heidegger than to Hegel or Barth. Reality is neither a necessary nor an idle play of concepts but a supreme love that unites opposites and can only reveal itself adequately in their tension. From Incarnation to cross, in miracle and parable, Jesus bore witness to the authority and poverty of love. The final chapter continues this theme through Christ's cross and resurrection, a fine commentary on B.'s mystical meditation Myster-
ium paschale. God's mutability is reconciled with his immutability. Kenosis culminates in glorification, and the identity of crucified and resurrected Lord is preserved. Indeed, as the resurrection alone allowed the disciples to understand Christ's earthly life, so his earthly life prepared them to recognize their glorious Lord.

For all its success, however, M.'s study suffers the fault of many a dissertation: verbal overkill. Not only are some themes repeated in different contexts, but also M. habitually strings together whole sets of synonyms. However rich B.'s vocabulary may be, M.'s reader may suffer intellectual indigestion. Moreover, M.'s treatment of "person" (178–82) seems inadequate. Though Maximus Confessor had labored to expound that central notion, B.'s Kosmische Liturgie was not cited here. All the greater pity because M. left indications elsewhere of its meaning: the point of synthesis between extremes (21, 278 n. 5), of ultimate identity (349), of continuity between being and manifestation (329—but not a quid or essence), of difference in unity (389). Here is B.'s great contribution to Christology. Likewise unfortunate is M.'s reluctance to criticize B. Has B. overcome the exteriority of the potentia obedientialis merely by considering it "a quality, as it were, of the natural subject (potentia naturalis)" (394)? While correctly reacting against modern Christologies of "becoming," has B. sufficiently explained Christ's ignorance? Finally, the necessity of the cross did not become clear to this reader. Why this expression of love rather than another? Did the cross effect a change in God's mutability? If time enters into eternity, is it not proper to consider at greater length Christ's humanity as "instrument of salvation" (205 n. 159) somehow effecting God's eternal decree? But let not this critique detract from M.'s fine achievement. He deserves praise.

Fordham University

JOHN M. McDERMOTT, S.J.


Reading Themes reminds us of the extent of our indebtedness to C. for his sensitivity and perceptiveness in the field of Christian ethics over the last fifteen years. Of the book's eight chapters, only the last, on conscience, is new. Two chapters, one on the relevancy of the gospel ethic and one on the role of Church law, appeared in C.'s A New Look at Christian Morality (1968); four chapters, dealing with natural law, ethical methodology and Church teaching, sin, and sexual morality, present material from Contemporary Problems in Moral Theology (1970). Both of these books are now out of print. The chapter "Utilitarianism, Consequentialism, and Moral Theology" appeared in Concilium, December 1976.
Themes may be recommended both to people seeking an introduction to C.’s thought and to those desiring a refreshing overview of the insights and suggestions he has urged from his vanguard position: that renewed moral theology is verified by its sensitivity to Scripture, tradition, contemporary understandings of human and Christian existence, and the eschatological pull of the future; that the relevance of Christian ethics is highlighted insofar as it continually reminds us that, however much we grow in responsiveness to the absolute claim laid on us by the presence of God’s reign inaugurated in Christ, we will always need divine mercy and forgiveness; that the natural-law tradition must be criticized for its tendency toward biological reductionism and its inclination to use only the physical structure of an action as the determinant of moral evaluation; that Church legislators are to be servants both of the Spirit and of the community, even as Christ is servant of the Father and of his people; that just as there are both a ministerial and a universal priesthood, so also are there a hierarchical and a universal magisterium; that to live in grace or in sin is to make a fundamental option to live either for God and others or for self; that in the area of sexual morality there is indeed “parvity of matter.”

The chapter from Concilium includes clarifications of two points made in earlier writings. The first has to do with C.’s theory of compromise, which he sees as a solution only to those conflict situations arising from the presence of sin in the world. C. notes, however, that the compromise theory does not apply in other situations where conflicts stem from the difference between the subjective and objective aspects of human acts, from creaturely finitude, or from eschatological tension. The second clarification focuses on C.’s contention that once the dying process has begun, the distinction between “letting die” (omission) and “killing” (commission) is no longer of decisive moral significance. C. had argued earlier that “the dying process can be identified as the time that extraordinary means could be discontinued as now being useless, since there is no hope of success in thus treating the patient”; in developing the idea, C. now suggests that the presumption is that “the death of the person will follow certainly, inevitably, and with about the same degree of immediacy from either the act of omission or commission” (126). One must wonder about this suggestion; for either there is no point to killing the patient rather than letting him die, since the immediacy of death is presumed to be the same regardless of one’s decision, or in fact some hastening of death is implied and intended in deciding to intervene actively.

The new chapter on conscience weaves together several important historical themes: a critical analysis of the Pauline view of conscience, the distinction and relationship between synderesis and syneidesis, the
Thomistic teaching regarding the binding power of conscience, and the controversy concerning resolution of a doubtful conscience. In order to develop a more adequate theology of conscience, C. proposes that we use the relationality-responsibility model of ethical reflection, in which the person as agent is stressed and actions are viewed in relation not to extrinsic norms but to the person acting; we ought also to realize that conscience has an affective as well as a cognitive dimension. Given both the risky challenge of personal responsibility and the inevitable reality of human limitation and sinfulness, C. acknowledges the Church's important contribution in the formation of conscience. Over-all, it is a helpful chapter—more, I think, for its vision of the past than of the future.

St. Joseph's College, Phila. VINCENT J. GENOVESI, S.J.


This is a welcome and valuable anthology of sixteen of the most important essays in moral philosophy—including essays in the philosophy of education—of the distinguished American philosopher William Frankena. Beginning with F.'s early, trenchant essay "The Naturalistic Fallacy" and concluding with recent essays on defining moral judgments and on Sidgwick's ethics, this collection is a balanced representation of F.'s influential work in both normative ethics and metaethics. The book closes with a nice touch, a "Concluding More or Less Philosophical Postscript" in which F. himself comments on the development of his ideas in these essays and discusses some of his most recent work. A complete bibliography of F.'s publications concludes the volume.

Readers already familiar with F.'s work through his well-known Ethics (which he refers to with characteristic modesty as "the little book") will find here again the same admirable qualities which distinguish F.'s writing: analytic precision coupled with an astounding and skillfully-deployed knowledge of the history of ethics, and a carefully-crafted conciseness that disdains verbosity yet is eminently lucid and tempered with a graceful wit and honest candor.

The wide-ranging set of topics represented here includes naturalism vs. intuitionism, the ethics of love, justice, the "is-ought" controversy, moral education, the concept of morality, and the question "why be moral?" A number of these topics concern metaethics, but it is a salient feature of F.'s work that even in the context of metaethical questions he is keenly interested in issues in normative ethics and in promoting interest in normative ethics. (Consonantly, F.'s most recent work includes essays on respect for life and on world hunger.) Readers might feel some
frustration, however, that in his incisive analyses of alternative positions F. does not more often make bold and detailed statements about his own positions. I think it is fair to say, though, that where a facile statement of opinion would be easier, F.'s circumspect approach is a judicious reminder of the difficulty of the issues confronted here.

In his own normative ethics, F. regards two moral principles as foundational: beneficence and justice. The principal difficulty here is that which attends any such pluralistic rule-like position—viz., the resolution of moral choice situations involving a conflict of prima-facie duties. This first difficulty is related in turn to a second set of issues regarding F.'s metaethics; for F. argues that morality or moral judgments are to be distinguished from other action guides or normative judgments by the point of view taken. Thus, central to F.'s work is the seminal notion of a "moral point of view" (MPV). Now the hope is that one can solve conflicts of prima-facie duty through a rational, informed taking of the MPV. But this raises additional questions (which F. addresses): e.g., how can one provide a definition—especially a material definition, as F. does—of the MPV which is not a mere circular exclusion of opposing normative positions? And how do we convince others to share the MPV?

However these questions are eventually answered, it seems to me that F.'s own methodology suggests a general framework for inquiry. As much as we might desire one, perhaps there is no straightforward, algorithmic means for solving all conflicts of duty. Likewise, perhaps there will never be a sure way to convince others to share the MPV. But in both cases it may well be that the issue is not one of determining the single rational course of action. Rather, it may well be that any agreement on prima-facie duties and on the MPV can only be decided in terms of which alternative is the most rational course of action. If so, it is a persistent and penetrating analysis like F.'s of alternative ethical positions which would make such a determination possible.

These essays are an invitation to, and a model for, careful reasoning in ethics. Those more exclusively concerned with theological ethics might have liked to see the inclusion of more of F.'s work directly related to that area—e.g., F.'s "Is Morality Logically Dependent on Religion?" Even so, in view of the serious approach to theological ethics in the work of this outstanding analytic philosopher, these essays of F.'s should be of special interest to those who are interested in theological ethics.

Chapman College, California

Joseph Runzo

Ethics at the Edge of Life: Medical and Legal Intersections.
In the introduction, R. states that this book, a revision of his Bampton Lectures at Cornell, is to be his last book in medical ethics. One can assume, however, that it will not be his last word.

The book, which examines ethical issues at the beginning and end of life, is a detailed commentary on several court cases (Roe v. Wade, Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, Edelin, Quinlan and Saikewicz), recent articles or books on the ethics of treating (or not treating) infants with defects, and the California natural-death act. Conceptually, the book is unified by R.'s sustained argument against basing medical decisions on a quality-of-life argument and his problems with substituted judgment based on such qualitative judgments. In doing this, R. develops his own basis for such judgments: a medical-indications policy. R. also addresses topics such as abortion in relation to a theory of marriage, the distinction between ordinary and extraordinary means of treatment, euthanasia—especially what R. calls nonvoluntary euthanasia—and implications of these topics for public policy. R. carries these discussions forward by, in addition to commentary on court cases, addressing the writings of R. Veatch, A. Jonsen, R. McCormick, C. Curran, and D. Maguire. The arguments are extremely up to date and R., through using his past work as a reference point, advances his own arguments against these individuals. Many contemporary problems are picked up and carefully analyzed.

R.'s analysis is based on his perception that many have collapsed the distinction between the dying and the incurably ill. Consequently, questions concerning either withholding or withdrawing treatment are answered the same for both the dying and the incurable, who may or may not be dying. This has led, in R.'s opinion, to a growing practice of the benign neglect of some categories of infants with birth anomalies or to the practice of nonvoluntary euthanasia. Thus R.'s task is to steer a middle course between a policy of the relentless treating of the dying which refuses to let them die and the hastening of death through the neglect of voiceless, incurable patients.

R. does this in two ways. First, he argues for a medical-indications policy for determining whether to treat a patient when life could be improved. The premise is that there are some treatments a competent and a conscious patient has no right to refuse. What R. is attempting to do here is to determine what the objective condition of the patient is and what can and cannot be done. Treatment indicated or no further treatment indicated should be an objective medical determination. In moving this way, R. attempts to counter subjectivism and voluntarism, which he argues cannot be the basis of an ethic. Consequently, R. also argues against the standard of the reasonable-person criterion as proposed by Veatch. Second, R. argues against decisions to withhold treatment based
on quality-of-life criteria. Here R. stresses that no treatment is indicated where none exists that can do more than prolong dying. But he sharply distinguishes this from the situation of those who die because no treatment is given, even though some treatment is indicated. Thus R. argues against quality-of-life criteria on two grounds. First, philosophically, justice demands that the standard of letting die must be the same, for example, for normal children and children with defects; otherwise we are adding injustice to injury. Second, theologically, R. recalls that God is no respecter of persons and that God rains on the just and the unjust. The inference is that quality-of-life perspectives should not influence medical judgment or decisions. Third, R. argues that the practice of medicine should be based on neither the attempt to rid life of the tragedies that are present nor on criteria of personhood. The criteria of medicine are physiological, and to go beyond these is substantively to change the practice of medicine.

Many will be offended by R.’s polemics and bluntness. However, he does indicate inadequacies in arguments and demands serious attention. Though the style is a bit thick at times, the material is worth while. A major problem with the book is that one almost needs to have the copy of either the case or article on which R. is commenting next to one as the arguments are read. Although one can read the book in itself, one is better off for doing such cross-referencing. Nonetheless, the volume is a most helpful contribution to the literature in that it points out many problems with respect to public policy that have not received the full attention R. gives to them. The book is a fitting conclusion to R.’s work in medical ethics.

Worcester Polytechnic Institute

THOMAS A. SHANNON


The great popularity of the exhibition of artifacts from the tomb of Tutankhamen currently touring the United States reflects not merely the public fascination with gold objects of great antiquity and high craftsmanship but also the perennial interest in what life beyond the grave might be like. In important respects the conclusions that H. proposes in this massive assessment of Western and Eastern religious reflections on life after death are closer to the views of the ancient Egyptians than to those usually held in the citadels of analytic philosophy and demythologized theology; for the most prominent feature of H.’s account of life after death is his belief that the process of human soul-making is to be carried on in a series of embodied existences in a series of worlds beyond this one. This series of afterlives terminates, however, in a condition
beyond embodiment and time, a condition in which considerations of ego have yielded to a personal community of love, a condition in which God is all in all—in short, a condition quite similar to the beatific vision of classical Catholic theology. It is also a condition which, H. believes, is pointed to by the dominant nonmonistic elements in Hindu and Buddhist piety.

The juxtaposition of theological notions from different traditions and of speculative hypotheses is not a mere eclectic fantasy but is part of H.’s effort to develop a global theology of life after death. This is a project that he carries out both by a critical assessment of traditional Christian and contemporary secular beliefs about death and the afterlife and by an extended dialogue with the Indian religious tradition. As a result, he has produced a book that is both a valuable survey of a great deal of important material and a vulnerable systematic construction. H. is able to combine these two elements because he does his systematic work not by rigorously elaborating a single position but by comparing and criticizing hypotheses proposed by others. The method that H. employs accords no special place to Christian tradition as such (369) and stresses the principle of openness to all data, especially the inconclusive results of psychical research and the “apprehensions of the Eternal” (32) present in other religious traditions. His manner of argument is more like that of analytic philosophy in its less rigorous phases; but the range of topics sympathetically considered is more like what one finds in treatises in comparative religion.

The general position that H. works from includes philosophical monotheism, interactionist dualism in his account of the relations of mind and body, moderate libertarianism in his account of human agency, and universalism in his theory of salvation. He also relies heavily, as in his earlier Evil and the God of Love (1966), on what he refers to as an Irenaean theodicy. Thus he affirms the universal growth of human beings through encountering the evils of this world to ultimate union with God as part of his strategy for resolving the problem of evil, for preserving human freedom, for supporting his pareschatology of gradual extended transformation in a series of lives, and for supporting his rejection of the Augustinian theodicy with its doctrine of the uniquely decisive character of our choices in this life.

H.’s pareschatology differs from the Indian doctrine of reincarnation because it is a series of different lives in different worlds, but it is intended to serve the same function of gradual moral and spiritual purification prior to full union with the ultimate and transcendent reality. While H. is clearly right in thinking that there is a great gulf between the holiness of God and the lives of the great majority of human beings and that therefore some kind of purification is necessary before the human person
can be united to God, H. needs to offer a much more systematic account of what moral growth and spiritual purification are and of just what divine and human freedom can do in bridging the gulf between divine holiness and human sinfulness before we accept the drastic revision of both ontology and soteriology that his pareschatology requires. It is noteworthy that H.'s theology of death and the afterlife never refers to such central theological notions as grace and salvation by faith and that H. makes only one passing reference to Luther. H. affirms the freedom of human persons but he does not explore the possibilities for radically transforming the saving relationship that are present in the exercise of both human and divine freedom. As a result, he thinks of salvation and sanctification along the lines of a continuous natural process.

H.'s arguments need more detailed criticism than can be given here, but the inadequacy of his argument for universal salvation should be pointed out. In the first place, H. supposes that human rejection of God is incompatible with God's omnipotence since it frustrates God's saving will (243); but this overlooks the possibility that God's saving will is conditional, not absolute. Secondly, it simply does not follow from God's continuing the work of salvation in indefinitely many future lives and from the logical possibility that God can fulfil His saving purpose without overriding human freedom that all persons will in fact be saved (248–59).

H. shows a certain sympathy for the traditional Catholic doctrine of purgatory and treats Catholic thinkers in a fair-minded, though uneven, fashion. Thus he offers some acute criticisms of Rahner's view that the soul enters into a panocosmic state after death, though he also makes the questionable move of criticizing this proposal as an empirical hypothesis (231–34). Elsewhere he makes the astonishing claim that the Platonic notion of the soul as a simple and perpetually existent substance was "adopted into the thomist theology of the catholic church" (339). Whatever problems there may be in Thomas' doctrine of the soul, it is certainly not the case that his doctrine is purely platonic or that it includes pre-existence.

Similar criticisms could be made of many other parts of H.'s work, but they should not blind us to the fact that this is a venturesome and large-minded book which considers many important issues in a systematic fashion and should provoke interesting discussion.

Woodstock Theological Center, D.C.

JOHN LANGAN, S.J.


This must be regarded as a well-intentioned but unfortunate book. In terms of style it has much to commend it. The format consists of vignettes
about clinical material followed by brief discussions of the points raised by each case. The material is well chosen, clearly presented, and without the usual encumbrance of psychiatric or psychological jargon. But in terms of positions taken and evaluations made of the clinical material, the book leaves much to be desired.

The hero throughout is the fictitious Chaplain Lee, who appears to be the paragon of all pastoral-counseling virtue. In fact—at least from this reviewer’s perspective—poor Chaplain Lee ends up mucking around in territory that he would be well advised to avoid. For Chaplain Lee to take on flesh, he would have to be a highly-trained professional therapist in order to carry off all the functions the authors ascribe to him. In many of the cases, he takes on responsibilities that would make even the best-trained psychiatrist think twice. I found myself having to question the authors’ judgment and recommendations on practically every page.

The basic difficulty with the book is that it blurs distinctions between professional roles, a common failing in the literature on pastoral counseling which can have unfortunate results. This reflects an underlying lack of definition of the role of the pastoral counselor. It is essential for effective pastoral counseling that the minister have a clear idea of what he is doing, why he is doing it, and what particularly religiously related objectives are pertinent to his function as counselor. Corresponding to these clarifications, there should evolve a clearer notion of what specific techniques and approaches are appropriate in relation to specific patients. Since it is impossible to discuss these issues in detail, I simply offer a list of recommendations for when the pastoral counselor should refer to a psychiatrist: (1) when there is the slightest reason to suspect any form of organic involvement; (2) whenever there are psychological symptoms, particularly anxiety or depression, and especially if they are of such degree as to interfere with the patient’s functioning to any extent; this is particularly important regarding depression, since the differential diagnosis of depression is a matter of considerable sophistication; (3) whenever there is suicidal ideation or intent; and (4) whenever there is question of unusual or bizarre thought-content, experiences, or behavior.

An additional, and I think more important, question to which the authors could have addressed themselves is not the question of when to refer but the broader question of when to consult. Another and more useful book might well have been written entitled “The Clergyman and the Psychiatrist—When to Consult.” Many of the problems that come to the clergyman’s attention are matters of normal human problems in living and in getting along through the difficulties of life. Frequently enough such problems require little more than sympathetic and attentive listening, along with a somewhat more objective sorting out of the individual’s options and feelings about particular difficult circumstances. These problem areas which yield relatively readily to a problem-solving
approach are well within the competence of the average pastoral counselor, who is usually intelligent and reasonably informed, and generally has the capacity to be a sympathetic and objective listener.

When psychopathology enters the picture, however, the difficulties are cast in an entirely different order. The pastoral counselor should consult whenever he feels uneasy about the patient’s emotional reaction or thinking about a problem, or whenever he is uncertain as to what is going on in the patient and what might be done about it. My guess is that frequently enough consultation may result in the return of the individual to the pastoral counselor with some advice and perspective offered by the psychiatric or psychological consultant. Then the counselor has a clearer idea of what is at issue and what is appropriate in helping the individual with it.

The model of consultation I would suggest is that of a small group of pastoral counselors who hire an experienced and well-trained clinician—whether psychiatrist, psychologist, or social worker—to meet with them on a regular basis in order to discuss problem cases. Such consultation does not imply that the professional person has the answers; it suggests that the pooling of their respective resources can generate a situation of mutual exchange and learning. The professional person should be engaged (hired, paid) for his services; otherwise the terms of a professional working situation do not obtain.

The important thing is for pastoral counselors to engage someone who has an adequate background of knowledge and experience in the management of clinical difficulties. There was a time when one could be assured that a psychiatrist would have adequate training and experience for such an undertaking, but recent developments in psychiatric residency programs lay such an assumption open to question. Even the board certification in psychiatry does not offer such a guarantee. Whatever professional person is engaged, of whatever professional background, the important ingredients are that he be reasonably well trained, that he have a solid degree of clinical experience and clinical practice, and that he be someone in whom the group of counselors can place confidence and whose judgment they respect. Therein lies, to my mind, the most meaningful and useful path for deepening one’s knowledge and skills in the realm of pastoral counseling. Follow the above suggestions and you can readily forgo the present volume.

Harvard Medical School

W. W. MEISSNER S.J., M.D.


No book has appeared until M.’s that presents a new, forceful, and comprehensive sociological theory of religion since the publication, in
1970, of Roland Robertson's excellent *The Sociological Interpretation of Religion*. M. comes to his theory honestly, having won his empirical spurs with earlier survey research on religion and patterns of immigration, religion and prejudice, and religion in Australia and New Zealand. Although M., presently a professor at Canada's McMaster University, is not well known beyond the confraternity of sociologists of religion, his book deserves a wider readership.

M.'s central argument is a functional one. Religion represents the sacralization of identity. With Durkheim, M. contends that religion is a permanent dimension of social life because it is rooted in a functional prerequisite for societies and an anthropological need of persons. Unlike Durkheim, however, he sees how the religious integration of personal and group identity is often actually and always potentially at odds with the integration of the social whole. M. postulates two polar sets of forces in tension in any society: forces of differentiation which embody the human need for mastery over changing environments, and forces of integration which provide both stable definitions of reality for the human need for identity and the order necessary for meaningful adaptation.

Only with difficulty can change, as such, be sacralized, although particular changes can be religiously legitimated by charismatic appeals which recast sacred tradition. Indeed, social change presupposes some such appeal. Social change also engenders new forces of integration. "There is a tendency for personal and social identity to become sacralized and this is particularly so when changes, upheavals, injustices and uncertainties make a specific identity both fragile and precarious."

While religion favors the forces of societal integration, it reacts to the processes of social differentiation. Like the oyster to the irritant of sand, however, it reacts creatively. "Religion always appears to modify or stabilize the differentiations it has been unable to prevent." Charismatic movements within societies and conversion in individuals are the typical religious processes for engendering new identities which cope with and channel change.

Drawing upon both Max Weber and Robert Park, M. contrasts charisma with marginality. Although marginal groups and people are the radical source of innovation in society, their creativity is paid for at the price of alienation. Charismatic figures or movements "contrary to marginal people are not so much the instigators as the catalysts for the kind of change that, for numerous other reasons, is already in the air."

M. sees little warrant for employing secularization as a basic concept in sociology; for "man's enhanced capacity for adaptation has in no way modified his need for integration and identity." The concrete phenomena which secularization is invoked to cover—the privatization of Western religion and a decline in traditional indices of church attachments—point
less to a reduced quantum of religiosity in society than to a changed situs where it is located. "Secularization . . . is the outcome of differentiations exceeding the capacity of religious organizations to integrate them, in the traditional frame of reference, with the result that, on all levels, identities and systems of meaning are becoming sacralized by agencies other than those organizations." As M. is quick to note, in treating Troeltsch's typology of church-sects-cults, "religiosity is a reality prior to and independent of religious organization."

M. has little sympathy for secular humanists who predict the eclipse of religion. He scores their naive reliance on reason to the detriment of myth and ritual, which help to generate commitment and emotional attachment to causes. An overemphasis on objectivity blinds the secular humanists to the fact that religion, far from being a source of alienation, is part of its solution.

M.'s theory is elegant and powerful in explaining a comprehensive range of sociological issues, authors, and topics. Thus, he is able to explain why in highly industrialized, strongly differentiated societies, the least "secularized" religious bodies are likely to increase more in strength than the more secularized ones. They provide a buffer between the amorphousness of the larger social whole and the anomie of self-orientations. He is also able to refute facile generalizations about urbanization and the decline of religion by appealing to an alternate theory about the weakness of national church religions to deal with new identities for urban immigrants. M. also shows why religion has peculiar affinities to family and class (forces of integration) and less close ties to science and economics (forces of differentiation). The political order is intermediate. He has a theory of universal religions, national civil religion, and sectarianism. His treatment of the four mechanisms of sacralization (objectification, commitment, ritual, and myth) is especially good.

The book is rich in illustrative examples. Its strength is the forceful way in which M. states his case for seeing religion primarily as the sacralization of identity and the comprehensiveness of the material he integrates under this rubric. There are two major theoretical flaws in the book. M. neglects to treat religion itself as a potential source of alienation. He seems insensitive to the ambiguity in religion. Secondly, he falls into the trap which awaits every purely functional view of religion. Despite his disclaimers about reductionism (M. is a Calvinist believer and a former graduate student of theology), M.'s theory ultimately allows religion to sacralize identities provided by other social forces, e.g., family, ethnic group, nation, while neglecting the unique contribution provided by experiences of transcendence. While M. uses phrases like "the otherness, the independence or transcendence" of religion, he nowhere gives them substantive definition. In order to deal with religion as a substantive
phenomenon, M. would need to leave his functionalist frame to turn to phenomenology as Thomas O'Dea did, e.g., in his brilliant *The Sociology of Religion*. In doing so, he would discover, as Robert Bellah argues, that religion both provides identity and breaks it up in moments of ecstasy. M. gives us much about the process of sacralization and not enough about the sacred as such. Despite this one-sided functionalism, the book is a rich lode of insight and would repay a careful reading. It contains one of the strongest functionalist treatments of religion available.

*Jesuit School of Theology, Berkeley*  
**John A. Coleman, S.J.**


This volume covers much more than its title indicates. The situation in the Third World calls the entire world into question. That call is especially pertinent for the Church. B.'s whole life as worker-priest, economist, director of Action Populaire in Paris, and for many years active in Latin American development programs, eminently qualifies him for the task he assumes.

Part 1 is a social-science analysis of the Third World, emphasizing marginalization and dependency in Latin America. Chap. 3 is crucial to B.'s approach. He outlines three revolutions that have shaped and are shaping the modern world: the political or democratic revolution, whose goal is freedom; the economic or socialist revolution, whose goal is equality; the cultural or communitarian revolution, whose goal is “the brotherhood that the first two failed to produce.” The complexity of the Third World situation is due to the confluence of these revolutions.

Part 2 traces some of the political dimensions of faith. It is here that B.'s differences with liberation theologians are most apparent. Jesus' message precludes neutrality. It has political implications “but it proposes no ideology, no strategy, and is not a political message.” B. limits his reflections to the three great “biblical contestations”: eros, power, and wealth. He has some excellent remarks on human existence as symbolic and sin as the denial of that. Jesus' radical emptying without identifying with any ideology provides the key to sexual, political, and economic liberation. The political realm has its own laws and is not derived from ethics or the gospel. Following Jesus, the Church can be neither party nor pressure group. B. seems to endorse the negative-critic role.

In Part 3, Marxism and its impact are discussed. Admitting the positive contribution of equality, B. emphasizes that a rigidly planned socialist economy demands dictatorship. Equality might be achieved but freedom is lost.
The last section attempts a reading in the future. A society must be sought which avoids the pitfalls of both capitalism and Marxism. Behind the dilemma caused by the need for freedom and equality, B. locates a cause. This cause is not, as Marx claimed, in the struggle between capital and labor, but in the division between salaried workers and independent workers. Harmony between these two groups is the key to a new society. B.'s response to the disharmony present in the freedom-equality split is not, he claims, to offer "some third way" but to indicate some possibilities toward a solution. An alternative model will have to protect individual freedom and assure equality, at least in some measure. Such a model will have to include the cultural contribution, a communal dimension involving joint management; the socialist contribution, the public organization of the economy involving planning on a global and national level which respects local communities; and the democratic contribution, public liberties. In practice, neither capitalism nor Marxism is of much help for such a model. "Some form of international authority is necessary." Until such an authority is established, the present jungle will remain.

B. terminates with two chapters on violence. Capitalism and Marxism both end in violence. Only a society which incorporates the three revolutions—democratic, socialist, and communitarian—can hope to overcome violence and forge a more human future. The values represented in each revolution are fundamentally Christian. The Church can be a forger of that future if it awakens to its "primordial function—the education of social conscience. . . ."

B.'s book is clearly written, balanced in its criticisms, and well documented. It deserves a wide reading. Two points come to mind in response. First, his work in Latin America from before Medellín to Puebla has long involved him with the theological developments there, yet he barely mentions liberation theology. The book's value would have been increased had he engaged in more of a dialogue with liberation thinkers. Second, B. treats us to an excellent summary of the values and defects of capitalism and Marxism but states that he offers no third way. A more concrete illustration of how his insights might be applied without opting for an existing model or offering a third would have made the discussion more cogent.

*Loyola College, Baltimore*  
**John O. Hogan**


In 1970 the United States Congress passed a law establishing a National Commission on Population Growth and the American Future. The Commission contracted with the newly formed Institute of Society, Ethics
and the Life Sciences to study the ethical dimensions of American population policy. By September 1971 the Institute’s research group had produced nearly a score of papers. When the commissioners published their report, however, the work of the Institute seemed to have had disappointingly little influence on them, and when the Government Printing Office released the background papers prepared for the Commission, they contained only a summation of the Institute’s study. Now those oversights have been remedied by the publication of the full study. Over-all, it represents a solid, though somewhat colorless, contribution to the field even after a passage of more than six years.

The papers wear well. For one thing, they are a relatively integrated set of studies, built around four primary values: freedom, justice, welfare, and survival. Though not all the essays refer to these four values and others make only loose connections to them, by and large the study has a consistency lacking in other anthologies on the topic. For another, while working for a relatively clear logic of ethical evaluation built around these values, the essays are sensitive to the variety of understandings of these norms in American history. Lastly, the general coherence of these studies represents a model of interdisciplinary study in that scholars from various fields examine their materials through a single optic, asking a related set of questions. In this respect Emily Moore’s “Native American Values” stands out for its lucid exposition of minority-group values which overlap but do not coincide with the dominant American tetrad.

The opening essays examine the four American values. Donald Warwick treats freedom from the perspective of the distinction between negative and positive liberty. His contribution is most helpful in relating positive freedom to a sense of personal efficacy and in proposing the inherent weakness of government-imposed population policies due to their curbing of personal responsibility. Editor Robert Veatch looks at justice in the Rawlsian manner and lays out a taxonomy of fairness considerations. By far the most interesting piece of the four is Peter Brown’s “The General Welfare.” Brown distinguishes three types of welfare theories: preponderance, common-interest, and unitary models. Rejecting the last as “operationally useless,” he argues that from the point of view of welfare those population policies will be acceptable which (a) concern common interests and vital needs, or (b) do not conflict with the interests of the preponderant number of citizens. Martin Golding writes about “security/survival.” Other worthwhile contributions include a historical analysis of legal and legislative precedent relating to the value tetrad, a study of procreative attitudes among Spanish-surname Americans, and a logical examination of environmentalist rhetoric. In addition, Veatch provides an excellent assessment of five different types of fertility policy (voluntarist, incentivist, sociocultural, compulsory, distributional) which cashes out the analyses of the previous chapters.
This journal's readers will find Arthur Dyck's comparative study of Jewish, Protestant, and Roman Catholic stands on fertility and population control, though dated by late publication, a useful reference piece. Generally balanced and fair in his treatment of various views, Dyck is severe in his criticism of the "crisis wing" of American Protestantism for "a too great tendency to separate [this] concern for distributive justice . . . from their deliberations on population policy," and for confusing the "urgent problems associated with pollution and those that result from population growth."

The greatest single drawback of this study is its price, which makes it inaccessible except to libraries and a few specialists. Astute editing might have led to a lower price and wider distribution. In terms of content, two weaknesses need to be noted. First, the reliance of the authors of the sociological studies of special group attitudes on literary sources makes for soft data, and this softness becomes mushiness when outspoken dissidents are cited as if they were proven bearers of value. Secondly, there is a tendency on the part of some of the authors to leap to conclusions about acceptable population policies, even where the first conclusion to be drawn is that the "population problem" is an irrelevant matter for the subgroup in question. Conclusions on the acceptability of demographic programs are warranted, of course, by the design of the study. But it seems wrongheaded not to acknowledge the low interest of potential target groups in population planning. That, of course, points up the bias of population studies generally to the interest of elite groups. Failure to examine the values of population activists is perhaps the single notable oversight in the volume. On the whole, however, this is a useful and sober volume.

Woodstock Theological Center, D.C. DREW CHRISTIANSEN, S.J.


Much progress has been made since Vatican II in Christianity's understanding of biblical and postbiblical Judaism. This is especially true with respect to Christian educational materials and teacher retraining. And some Christian theologians such as Gregory Baum, Rosemary Ruether, Monika Hellwig, and A. Roy Eckardt have challenged fundamental Christian assumptions about Judaism on a theological level. Very recently, major systematicians such as Hans Küng and Edward Schillebeeckx have at least begun to raise the question of the Church's link to Judaism in their writings. But the general conclusion of K.'s new volume is that such theological rethinking has on the whole remained on the outer fringe of contemporary Christian reflection and biblical scholarship.
Her study clearly indicates that the vast majority of significant Christian scholars, especially in Continental Europe, have continued to put forward stereotypes of Judaism as theological facts. This has in turn affected the perspectives of students who use the volumes written by these authors.

K. divides her study into four thematic areas: how Christian theologians view (1) late Judaism and Jewish religious community; (2) law and legalistic piety in Judaism; (3) the Pharisees and scribes; (4) Jewish guilt in the death of Jesus. In these chapters her focus is exclusively on Continental Europe. She adds a short survey of Anglo-American authors at the end of this English edition of the study. In chap. 6 she records the attitudes of her university students to the Jewish question as they appeared on course examinations. Her purpose in doing so is to show how, in spite of class lectures that seriously questioned traditional Christian stereotypes of Judaism, the students reaffirmed these stereotypes in their examination responses. This disturbing phenomenon she attributes to the pervasive hold that the inaccurate views of scholarly writings still exercise on the students. It is difficult for an individual teacher to break these stereotypes when the overwhelming body of supposedly scientific scholarship continues to propagate them as gospel truth.

The overwhelming impression which emerges from K.'s catalogue of authors' views on Judaism is that the theological/biblical community, at least on the Continent, has made very few advances in rethinking the Christian-Jewish relationship on a theological plane. The names that still dominate the scene in terms of biblical interpretation, Bultmann, Dibelius, Eduard Meyer, Emil Schurer, Benoit, Jeremías, Bornkamm, to name just a few, continue generally to depict the centuries between the Babylonian exile and the emergence of Christianity as a time of decadence, of internal and external decline for Judaism. It ceased to have any history properly speaking, its faith had become externalized and rigid, its God had distanced himself from the people, and the prophetic message was forgotten. In short, Judaism misunderstood and failed in its real task and consequently destruction came as a just punishment. K. attributes this scholarly distortion to the almost universal reliance by Christian biblical scholars on Strack-Billerbeck for knowledge of Judaism and the virtually total lack of acquaintance with serious Jewish scholarship on the period.

The picture in the Anglo-American world she finds considerably better. Instead of Schurer and Strack-Billerbeck, English-speaking scholars are familiar with the works of R. Travers Herford and G. Foot Moore. John Marsh, W. D. Davies, Norman Perrin, J. C. Fenton, G. B. Caird, and others show less of an a priori bias toward an unfavorable interpretation of Judaism than their German and French colleagues. Their approach to the Gospels is more critical with respect to the portrayal of Judaism. They likewise display a better knowledge of Jewish sources and, most
importantly, a consciousness of a living Jewish community to whom an injustice has been done by the deicide charge. But one still finds traces of the traditional stereotypes in several of the Anglo-American authors such as William Barclay.

K. makes some passing references to the views of theologians such as Paul Tillich and Karl Rahner on the Jewish-Christian relationship. She finds these as deficient on the whole as the views of the biblical scholars. But the volume lacks any comprehensive examination of the attitudes of theological figures, confining itself overwhelmingly to the world of biblical scholarship.

This volume marks an important contribution to the process of Christian theological rethinking of the Church's relationship to Judaism. While its catalogue style of viewpoints makes it a bit heavy reading at times, the over-all conclusion of the study cannot be ignored: the biblical scholarship that has shaped much of modern Christian theological reflection is severely deficient in its understanding of Second Temple Judaism. This requires immediate and profound correction.

The book's title is somewhat misleading, since K. does not do justice to the range of Continental or Anglo-American theological scholarship, focusing almost exclusively on the biblical world. Another drawback is K.'s failure to lay out, at least in summary fashion, her own understanding of what Christianity's theological perception ought to be ideally. She claims her task is only to surface the problem. But it would have been valuable for her to include, at least in outline form, the perspective from which she judged the deficiencies of the scholars in question.

Along with the earlier study by Eva Fleischner, Judaism in German Christian Theology since 1945, this volume will serve as an important steppingstone in the construction of a new Christian theological understanding of Judaism. It expresses the problem and does it well. It leaves to others the actual task of new construction.

Catholic Theological Union
Chicago

JOHN T. PAWLIKOWSKI, O.S.M.


Swedish director Ingmar Bergman began making films in the period immediately following World War II. The nearly forty films which he has directed over the past thirty-three years not only reflect his personal evolution as a man and artist but also bear witness to the problems and preoccupations of modern man. M. examines characteristic Bergmanian themes and shows how they have developed over the years. Relying upon
the director's words, the judgments of Bergman's critics, and his own interpretations of the films, M. assesses the role which God, religion, solitude, and love play in B.'s works, in his life, and in modern sensibility.

M.'s point of departure is that Christian values and traditions are a key factor to an understanding of B.'s films: "One would . . . gravely limit Bergman's intentions if one were to interpret his entire production from the Christian point of view; but on the contrary, by correctly evaluating the importance of Christian elements in his early development, one is in a much better position to understand most of his films" (14). Throughout his book, M. underscores B.'s relation to religious traditions and values, mentioning his early training (his father was a clergyman), his familiarity with the Bible (which often provides titles for his films), and his penchant for traditional Christian symbols.

The author conveys the Christian spirit which imbues B.'s production by means of the word "passion" used in the subtitle and by means of quotations from the Scriptures which begin each chapter and are interspersed throughout the text. Perhaps inspired by his long familiarity with the works of André Malraux, M. organizes his book around an image taken from the plastic arts. He compares B.'s oeuvre to a triptych and divides his films into three groups which correspond to the three shutters of a triptych.

In its center M. situates those films which B. directed between 1956 and 1963, works which dramatize man's search for God. Such films as The Seventh Seal, Wild Strawberries, and Winter Light—those which one immediately associates with B.'s name—present pastors, knights, pilgrims, or travelers searching for a divinity who is either silent or dead. As B. himself notes, after this period of intense investigation of metaphysical issues he and God "parted company." In subsequent films (which M. places in the third shutter of the triptych) religion becomes the background against which the director explores noncommunication among men and the fragility of love. From Persona (1966) to Face to Face B. examines the female soul and the disintegration of human relations.

But even when religion ceases to be the express subject of his films, B. continues his quest for transcendent values. In this he resembles other contemporary writers and filmmakers whom M. frequently mentions—Sartre, Camus, Kafka, Malraux, Beckett, Bernanos, Bresson, Godard, Rossellini, and Robbe-Grillet—all of whom have attempted to express the malaise of modern man. M. shows the rapport not only between these men and B., but also between B. and theologians ranging from Harvey Cox to Tillich and Bonhoeffer. He even explores the impact which recent social and political events have had upon B., and thereby
places his analysis "in a human context, one that is universal as well as Judeo-Christian, because these two aspects ultimately go together" (16).

M.'s Ingmar Bergman, filled with beautiful still photographs which "bear witness to the artist's [Bergman's] ability to carve faces out of stone" (12), is a monument not only to the Swedish director but to man's continuing search for permanent values.

University of Southern California, L.A. KATHERINE S. KOVÁCS
SHORTER NOTICES


One may approach a study of the Tabernacle or Tent of Meeting, symbol of Yahweh’s presence during the Exodus and later, from two different, though related, points of view. Most scholars choose to examine the rich and complex Pentateuchal sources of this liturgical object, distinguishing a later and elaborate description of the Tabernacle from that which appears in the simpler JE portrayal of the Tent of Meeting in Exod 33:7–11, Num 11:16–17, and elsewhere. That the JE Tent of Meeting is not identical with the Priestly Tabernacle seems quite clear, but recent studies tend to integrate the two traditions which reflect different stages in the development of Israel’s cult of the divine presence.

A second approach concentrates on the reflections of Tabernacle ideology in the NT, with Hebrews providing the most elaborate Christian interpretation of the Tabernacle as “copy and shadow of the heavenly sanctuary” (Heb 8:5). This is the route taken by Kiene, who, with the evangelical fervor of a staunch conservative, aims at elucidating “the types of Christ in the tabernacle. This holy, unique construction speaks of Him in all its details.”

While acknowledging the legitimacy of this approach, one must constantly be on guard against the arbitrary, not to mention the trivial. It is somewhat surprising to find only one fleeting reference to Jn 1:14, which points the way from the OT to the Incarnation under Tabernacle imagery. The King James Version is used throughout, apart from a few citations of the American Standard Version. Over thirty strikingly beautiful color prints depict the Tabernacle and its appurtenances. The text is faultlessly printed on quality paper; the bibliography needs updating with the studies of Cross, Haran, and others.

Frederick L. Moriarty, S.J.


This collection of essays by biblical scholars was presented at a symposium sponsored by the Franciscans in Rome in 1970. It is an effort to discover biblical roots, to clarify one’s sense of identity as a Christian. What did the authors of the Bible have to say about riches and poverty? What does authentic Gospel poverty mean for today’s Christian?

Augustin George studies the OT understanding of poverty and identifies the three main routes by which God led the people of Israel along the way towards evangelical poverty: by a gradual discovery of the insufficiency of wealth, by renunciation of human self-sufficiency and acceptance of dependence upon God, and by a greater realization of the supreme value of God over and above His gifts.

Jacques Dupont can find in the Gospels and Acts no explicit discussion of poverty. What he does find is that they champion an ideal of fraternal charity: aid the poor in every possible way. They issue a sharp warning as well: wealth is the most formidable roadblock to the gospel ideal of “total and absolute confidence in God”.

Simon Ligasse analyzes the episode of the call of the rich young man. What light does it throw on the traditional understanding of the religious vow of poverty? There is no direct evidence for the vow in the text, he concludes, although the germ of the idea is there.

578
The members of a religious order institutionalize an aspect to which the Scriptures attach great importance. More precisely, members of orders are not content to wait for the crisis situation where renunciation of wealth is demanded of any Christian who is caught in an emergency where one must choose between God and mammon. However, one makes such a choice only after discovering in practice that God is granting the charism to lead a life of consecrated poverty.

Philip Seidensticker searches the Epistles for Paul's view of poverty and can find no mention of it. Paul, he concludes, is not interested in poverty as an ideal so much as in the genuineness of Christian love in the communities he founded. Thus the word "poor" is not in Paul's vocabulary nor does he preach voluntary poverty. For him, moreover, freedom from dependence upon material possessions is not a human achievement, but a God-given charism. He does, however, make a start at a theological justification for the self-renunciation he practices by an appeal to Christ's kenosis.

In a concluding chapter, Beda Rigaux sums up the book by focusing attention on the basic NT view of poverty as it is found at the most ancient layer of the gospel tradition. There the meaning of discipleship is said to lie in a radical summons to an even greater love of one's neighbor—a love that will inevitably lead to conflict. The disciple is called to lead the same life as Jesus, who was a poor man, and his demands can take precedence over the disciple's other most fundamental religious and human obligations.

The book is a helpful synthesis of the biblical approach to poverty and wealth. Especially the chapters of Dupont and Rigaux will assist Christians in their search for solutions to the vexing problems posed by the explosive tensions between rich and poor in today's global society.

William J. Walsh, S.J.


It has often been noted that contemporary Latin American theology is in need of a more profound foundation in Scripture. In this brief work L. (with a degree from the Pontifical Biblical Institute) makes a modest but significant contribution to that task. The common denominator that links together his four studies is the search for a biblical social morality. In the texts he seeks light to illumine the correct Christian response in his own situation of widespread inequality and injustice.

The first study examines Gal 3:28 (and par.) to determine the Pauline principles concerning a classless society. L. concludes that, while there are obviously certain differences among persons, the texts impel the Christian to work toward a society without class, i.e., without any difference which is unjustly a source of division among human beings. Next L. turns to the episode of the tower of Babel (Gen 11:1-9). After a detailed analysis of current exegetical scholarship, he understands the passage as asserting that true human unity cannot be achieved (e.g., by various imperialisms) without taking God into account in the process. The third and longest study uncovers a number of interesting themes relating to social justice in Proverbs. Lastly, he analyzes the difficult relationship between reconciliation and political struggle in the light of Eph 2:11-22.

Throughout the work L. effectively utilizes the best resources of contemporary scriptural scholarship, although there might be disagreement on some of his conclusions. His approach is more measured and less rhetorical than other Latin American exegetes (e.g., José Porfírio Miranda) and may thus be more effective in sharpening the sensibilities of theologians to the social implications of the Bible. At present, L. is
Jesuit novice master for the province of Mexico; it would be unfortunate if this work were to prevent him from contributing further studies. At any rate, he has already produced a few concise models for the enormous task of a “social hermeneutic” of both Old and New Testaments.

Alfred T. Hennelly, S.J.


P., who has written on subjects involving the interrelation of theology and psychology, offers an extended theological reflection on what we must know about God if we are to reclaim our humanity in a Christian way. The God we proclaim is One who comes, as He did to Abraham and the Israelites. He comes to us through the promises He offers us on our pilgrimage as individuals and as a people. Thus His presence to us is constituted in part by all that is singular, contingent, and historical in us and by the faith with which we respond to Him. In Israel God’s presence was conceived in a privileged way as that presence in the Temple above the ark and between the cherubim—a presence extremely localized and yet symbolized by an open space. His presence in His promises and in His Shekinah thus preserves the distance between man and God that allows God to be God and man to be man. Two interpretations of God’s presence that have been all too commonly accepted in Christian history fail in this regard. To think of God as so transcendent that He is simply everywhere results in man’s failure to take his unique history seriously. To overconcretize God’s presence as fundamentalists at times do in Scripture and some Catholics do in the Eucharist or in the hierarchy is to make a fetish out of these mediations of His presence and to distort the focus of man’s life.

P. draws out this theme in his reflections on creation and on the life, death, and resurrection of Jesus. He offers us a fresh view on these subjects that contributes to our understanding of how to live humanly and Christianly in our time. However, imbalances current today call for more attention to the humanistic distortions of Christianity than P. has given in this book.

John Farrelly, O.S.B.


The first problem is establishing the book’s genre. The prologue, with footnotes, seems to promise a serious study of Christ’s humor, but the sources are few (and mostly French) and the text shows no knowledge of the comic theory of Bergson, Meredith, Freud, or even Lynch’s fine Christ and Apollo. The body of the book is a survey of Christ’s humor, but it never gives a clear definition of humor, finds humor in strange places (e.g., the Baptist’s “He must increase but I must decrease”), and often wanders off the subject. By the end one considers the book simply a pious retelling of Christ’s life (with frequent colloquies), emphasizing Christ’s use of humor. The book clearly lacks focus.

The points C. urges are these: Christ had a sense of humor, frequently used irony, never used mockery, probably laughed, used “double meaning,” and based his humor on a sense of the absolute and the relative. C.’s sincerity is genuine, but I do not find the book enlightening. His definitions are unclear or incorrect (he calls one who founds a society a “sociologist,” and one who brings good news a “journalist”). Most troubling, though, is the a priori manner in which C. thinks: Jesus is “number one in humor” because he is “the number-one psychologist,” “the number-one psychiatrist,” pedagogue, sociologist, journalist, worker, boss, caricaturist, etc. To begin with, I do not think these statements are true. Fur-
thermore, C. grounds his position in a misreading of Col. 1:18. The Humor of Jesus, translated from the French (by the author?), is not recommended.

Joseph J. Feeney, S.J.


Since the controversy about the ordination of women has arisen, it has been extremely difficult to find the official and reasoned arguments against its possibility. These nine commentaries, originally published in L’Osservatore romano, together with the Decree itself, are now conveniently gathered together in one volume. This is a good service. The essays are all of worth; those of Bishop Deschamps, Hans Urs von Balthasar, Gustav Martinez, and Cardinal Ratzinger are of particular importance. The tone is calm and reasonable, yet with a strict attention to the theological nature of various current positions. Objections are stated and answered in terms of the arguments developed.

The primary value of the essays is to clarify the precise issue, to explain why ordination of women is to be rejected, the relation of the magisterium to the issue. Essentially, the question is one of fidelity to what has been revealed and handed down, the effort to make precise why ordination of women is not merely a question of culture or discipline. The Old and New Testaments reveal a special liberating of womanhood, contrary to the customs of their times. There is, further, a plan of concrete revelation that is not a political or cultural model. In all of this, women were not considered candidates for orders, except perhaps in those Reformation sects that changed the meaning of orders.

This leads to a consideration of orders as such, whether a right or a privilege, whether the priest acting in the person of Christ partakes of something fundamental to revelation and to Church, the bride of Christ in the symbolism, so that a woman could not bear this office.

Cardinal Ratzinger’s essay is of special import because of the philosophical and theological context in which he placed the issue. From political philosophy he stressed the difference in human “rights” from Christian as opposed to Enlightenment-French Revolutionary tradition. From theology he recalled the abiding pertinence of the Manichean controversies, with the Church’s concern for the legitimacy and uniqueness of the feminine as such.

The broader issue behind the non-ordination of women is the extraordinary diversity that exists in the concrete human race because man is not an abstraction but “created” male and female. Whenever human nature is seen as an abstraction, so that either sex is indifferently human, the concrete needs particularly of the normal woman are betrayed, especially in the symbolic and actual values represented by the real diversity. In this sense the ordination of women becomes a threat to the very being of womanhood as such.

The Order of Priesthood, I suspect, will become the major presentation for the arguments against the ordination of women on the basis of tradition, sacrament, ecclesiology, and culture.

James V. Schall, S.J.


The Contra Noetum (CN), attributed to Hippolytus of Rome (died 235), is a short work written to refute disciples of the modalist (Patripassianist) Noetus of Smyrna (late 2nd cent.). It is important for the history of Trinitarian
doctrine. Until now the Greek text has not been easily accessible, and the only English translation available was Salmond's, published in 1869. In his valuable and very welcome book, B. has provided an entirely fresh approach to CN. His volume contains the Greek text newly edited from the (only) MS, a lively English translation with section headings and marginal summaries, a history of scholarly opinion and scholarly error on CN, and chapters on structure and style, with a bibliography and good indexes.

CN is usually assumed to be part of a longer, lost work by Hippolytus; but as a result of his study, B. concludes that "CN is not a fragment of a longer heresiological treatise, but a short and popular sort of discourse," "a hitherto unacknowledged example of the Christian adaptation of profane diatribe for anti-heretical and teaching purposes" (141). B. makes a good case for both theses. But even if he is somehow proved wrong, his book is of lasting value. It is a pleasure to have a solidly established text and a good translation on facing pages; and B.'s history of the scholarly treatment of CN is fascinating. B. deliberately excludes questions of authorship (although he hints [p. i] that the attribution to Hippolytus could be doubted), of the relation of CN to other writings in the Hippolytean corpus, and of the theology of CN. This rigorous exclusion is perhaps unfortunate; his opinions would command respect. But B. has performed a valuable service and proved again the worth of re-examining old assumptions.

Medieval scholars always have known how deeply involved Innocent III was in the political, religious, and diplomatic action of his day. This study adds another dimension to this story. H. presents the complex triangle of relationships: Bulgaria-Hungary-papacy as they are revealed in the papal registers. It is more than the account of the pope arbitrating between the two kings in their disputes; for Bulgaria stands more as a symbol of the Byzantine world of politics, cultural and linguistic associations, and religious traditions, as well as being an individual kingdom with its own concerns. In negotiating with Bulgaria, the pope was entering into another world with ties different from those to be found in the West. It is clear that the pope hoped to use the political interests of Hungary to further the apostolic mission to the East and to develop the possibility of reunion between the two churches. At the same time, Hungary wanted to use the papacy's legation to improve and strengthen its political and military position on its eastern frontiers. Bulgaria was willing to play off both for its own interests. The results of such dealings were often not fully pleasing to all involved.

The story is a complicated one and the details are at times hard to follow. For a better understanding of the breadth of Innocent's vision and of his role as father to all, and for information of the politics in the Balkans in the early years of the thirteenth century, this study is a valuable addition. It is only to be regretted that, as the Foreword reports, the author died so prematurely in a traffic accident in 1976, and so we are deprived of further work after so promising a beginning. The loss is a tragedy, for one can wonder how often a scholar will be found with the expertise to bridge such disparate fields as the papal registers and the Hungarian and Bulgarian political and diplo-

*The Lost Paradise* by the English Jesuit Philip Caraman is an interesting narrative of the Jesuit republic in South America in general and in colonial Paraguay more particularly. It is a story of an old subject which proposes to trace this republic in its foundations, early failures, and eventual success. The fascinating period covered in the course of little more than a century and a half of conflict recounts a life style and a life interest on the missions of the Rio de la Plata which was based on a collective and co-operative enterprise system. An initial nucleus of Indian communities under the direction of the martyred Fr. Roque González was to expand into a network whose frontiers would stretch from Panama to Patagonia. In fact, by the time of the eventual expulsion of the Jesuits in 1767 it is no exaggeration to claim that there existed “a vigorous civilization comparable with that of the Incas.”

That such a perfect society and successful enterprise was realized in so short a time span is a tribute to the genius of these early Jesuits. However, their very ingenuity generated its own share of resentment and distortions in Paraguay and Portugal alike. The distortion of facts surrounding this prosperity and the publicity of overexpansion militated against the common good of both the Indian population and the mission itself. A campaign against the missions at home and abroad ensued, ranging from the claim that there were palaces in the desert to the myth of the creation of an independent state. The stage was finally set with the publication of the Marqués de Pombal’s polemic against the kingdom of the Jesuits, the struggle of the Guaraní War, and the climax of expulsion in 1768. These crises are well described by Caraman, and the net effect suggests that the loss of the Society set the continent back a century.

In view of these themes, Caraman’s chronicle will be compared with earlier accounts of the missions, R. B. Cunninghame Graham’s *A Vanished Arcadia* and G. O’Neill’s *Golden Years on the Paraguay*. The present volume deals in an omnibus way with mission life in general, covering such diverse areas as medicine and music, as opposed to the former concentration on the question of economy. The concern here is more the treatment of a primitive people preparing to take a place in a more developed society. For this reason it may well be the best and most up-to-date general survey on the Jesuits’ work in Paraguay. So it is not surprising that its script is soon to be made into a screen presentation, replete as it is with the themes of innocence, tragedy, and tradition.

Philip S. Kiley, S.J.


A collection of twenty-seven essays drawn from books and journals published between 1932 and 1973. The oldest is an abridgement of Arthur Schlesinger Sr.’s interpretation of the period 1875–1900, the latest Lois Banner’s argumentative piece on motivation in the Benevolent Empire, from the 1973 *Journal of American History*. Seven chapters deal with Puritan New England, while another four treat themes in late Colonial and Revolutionary-era Protestantism. There are two fairly out-of-date essays on religion among American blacks, a nod to Judaism in

Roman Catholicism is thinly represented by the late Thomas McAvoy's 1948 article on the formation of the Catholic minority and by David O'Brien's schematic report in the 1972 *Journal of the American Academy of Religion*. Chapters on immigration and labor are inadequate to represent American religious involvement in those areas. There is an essay on fundamentalism and its roots, and a final wrap-up in now somewhat dated articles by Robert T. Handy (1960) and Sydney E. Ahlstrom. All the chapters are accompanied by footnotes.

James Hennesey, S.J.


This volume concentrates on some of T.'s more significant writings from the neglected *Gesammelte Schriften 2*. Morgan's substantial essays make the case that, despite dialectical theology's premature burying of T., he was remarkably aware of the key problems facing theology today: metaphysics, social ethics, historical consciousness, pluralism, and Christology. Pye's final essay points out T.'s contribution to the establishment of religious studies as a field in its own right distinct from theology.

The book mainly corrects common misunderstandings. T. did not abandon theology for cultural philosophy, but tried to broaden theology's task by inserting it into the broad stream of history in general, quite unlike the exclusively supernaturalistic dogmatics of his time. Although a Christological relativist, he cannot be described as a theological relativist, but sought to overcome relativism through "ontological speculation concerning history" rather than through "ahistorical rationalism" (5). Though preferring an individualistic and almost "mystical" approach to religion, he did recognize the social-psychological role of the Church, community, and cult. The book cogently argues that T. was largely forgotten until recently because of dialectical theology's ascendancy. The latter generally sought to emphasize the more "modern" elements in Luther, while T. saw him as more medieval and catholic. For T., the great turning point was not the Reformation but the Enlightenment.

The fine translations cover T.'s essays on the inadequacies of nineteenth-century theology, the science of religion, Christianity's essence, and Christology. The piece on Christianity's essence is an excellent example of T.'s historical hermeneutics, while the Christology piece sounds surprisingly contemporary. One wonders: if the so historically conscious T. had viewed God in more radically historical terms (rather than the idealist terms he preferred), might his Christology not have been more substantial?

William M. Thompson


Veuillot, editor of *L'Univers*, is usually remembered as the Parisian counterpart of W. G. Ward, editor of the *Tablet*: both were eloquent campaigners for the proclamation of infallibility at Vatican I. V.'s papalism was a particular facet of his "Catholic-before-all-else" stance that brought him into periodic conflict with the French government, which responded by placing him under police surveillance and by suppressing his paper (1860-67; 1874). Similarly, his uncompromising attitude led to controversies not only...
with atheists and anticlericals but also with liberal Catholics.

Although both adversaries and admirers acknowledged his literary skill, this self-designated "sergeant of Jesus Christ" graphically "wielded the crucifix like a club." It is hardly surprising, then, that most historical judgments on V. have been unfavorable. The present work is an exception; Brown, relying almost exclusively on V.'s voluminous publications and extensive correspondence, unveils a portrait that is realistic, if not quite attractive. On the favorable side are V.'s affection for his family and friends as well as his devotion to the pope; even V.'s ideological intolerance is softened by highlighting his attacks as matters of principle, not of personality. On the negative side, V. never seemed to realize the vitriolic effect of his polemics; even Pius IX's admonition to be more charitable went unheeded.

B.'s presentation is helpful in appreciating V.'s long-standing quarrels, such as those with Dupanloup and Montalembert. The treatment of Vatican I, however, is disappointing: one is left wondering whether V. really understood the theological implications of the doctrine that he so ardently championed. Finally, not only did a number of misprints survive the proofreading, but a number of historical inaccuracies indicate an unfamiliarity with collateral material.

John T. Ford, C.S.C.


LaCroix parts company at the outset with those thinkers who despair of a philosophical investigation into a rational basis of moral experience and who restrict themselves to the problem of how people talk about moral experience and the rules that would make such talk internally consistent. This might limit his appeal to cognitivists and noncognitivists who would insist upon what in metaethical philosophy has been referred to as the good-reasons approach. This position calls upon a special kind of reasoning peculiar to ethics or at least to reasoning concerning values—evaluative reasoning, it might be called. Stuart Hampshire's seminal article "Fallacies in Moral Philosophy" (Mind, 1949) developed this viewpoint. It was further articulated in Stephen Toulmin's 1950 book An Examination of the Place of Reason in Ethics, and recently defended by Carl Wellman in his 1971 book Challenge and Response: Justification in Ethics. Roger Hancock in his critical evaluation of the theory in Twentieth Century Ethics concludes that while the good-reasons approach is "highly plausible, more so I should say than intuitionism and the emotive theory, it has not been shown with complete success that ethical reasoning cannot in some cases be ordinary deductive or inductive reasoning, especially inductive reasoning."

At first L. gives the impression of doing metaethics, but as he goes on his interests in normative ethics become evident and his deeper concern for a metaphysics of morals and not a mere phenomenology of morals has control in the choice of topics. Egoism, consequentialism, utilitarianism, deontology, axiology, the principle of double effect—all these are considered with a view to normative ethics, either deontic or aretaic. Natural law, person, considerations of fundamental principles, certain theoretical and epistemological problems evidence a dissatisfaction with conventional approaches to the philosophical bases of ethics. It is this area of the metaphysics of morals that most contemporary ethicists avoid, especially those in the noncognitivist tradition. It may be true that someone can present an adequate theory of moral knowledge without specifying the nature of the objects of knowledge, for
example, but it is certainly philosophically unsatisfying. A welcome departure from such unwillingness to penetrate ontology and metaphysics is Henry Veatch's excellent text *For an Ontology of Morals: A Critique of Contemporary Ethical Theory* (Northwestern University, 1971).

L. raises the problem of the exceptional situation with regard to a summary rule ethic and expresses the caution that perspectival and personal judgments may play an unbalancing role in the decision-making. His conclusion is that the exceptional decision must, in respect of persons, remain private. Paradoxically, these private exceptional decisions may be the most moral and ethical ones in our lives.

*Thomas A. Wassmer, S.J.*


This collaborative volume, in which B. and S. set out to update their earlier respective works in this area, will be of interest principally to those who desire a summary of B.'s reflections on the political developments of the 1970's. B.'s five "solo" chapters (and one chapter coauthored by B. and S.) contain his reflections on Vietnam, nuclear deterrence, and human rights, among more general reflections.

B. condemns American involvement in Vietnam because it was unjustifiably interventionist in a revolutionary situation (uncontaminated, presumably, by any prior intervention there on the part of northern forces, which, according to the just-war theory advocated by B., might justify such intervention) and disproportionately violent. Major nuclear war is judged immoral, as is any arms-control effort that would cede "nuclear monopoly" to the Soviets. Human rights must be defined with precision, so that genuinely universal human rights may be advocated while chauvinistic attempts to replicate U.S. political institutions abroad are avoided.

B.'s essays will be of less interest to the foreign-policy practitioner, whose calculations must penetrate more deeply into the particularities of policy. Moreover, some of B.'s premises, such as the one that "the cold war as such belongs to the past" (ISI), tend rather to cloud than to clarify policy options, e.g., in the pivotal area of European collective security, which is left untreated. Even for churchmen, charged with the responsibility (among others) to inform and activate religious consciousness on issues of public policy, B. falls short of intellectual advances in policy analysis, and even of organizational advice for more effective "conscientization" of church groups.

The four essays of S. reflect current unnuanced assumptions about the obsolescence of the nation-state, and hence give little promise of illuminating the possible role for churches in shaping U.S. foreign policy.

*Francis X. Winters, S.J.*


This short reprint on mysticism, formerly entitled "An Introduction to the History of Mysticism," deals mainly with mysticism in the West. Besides chapters on Hebrew and Jewish mysticism and on mysticism in classical times, the authoress gives an account of mysticism in the New Testament, in the early Church, in the Middle Ages, in England, Germany, Italy and France. Modern mysticism takes us as far as Robert Browning who, we are assured "was also a mystic, believing in a perfect spiritual world, towards which we look, and in a universe ruled by Love, the essence of which is self-sacrifice" (114). Mysticism in the East, including Taoism, Hinduism and Islam (!), are all dealt with confusingly in one chapter.

This book can be more realistically described as a series of somewhat su-
perifical comments on selected writings of mystics and on the mystics themselves. Certainly, S. cannot be recommended for her original treatment of mysticism nor for her profound understanding of the subject matter. There is no attempt to pull the various sources together and give some general appraisal of the place of mysticism in religious life. When one bears in mind that 20th century mysticism and especially the recent rise of interest in the subject are not treated, then one honestly wonders why the book was reprinted at all.

The intelligent reader, who is even slightly aware of the many books on mysticism which have been published in the last decade, would find An Introduction to Mysticism out-of-date and uninspiring. The publishers inform us that the book was originally published under the title mentioned above, but give us no clue as to its date of publication. The most recent work referred to in the bibliography is Underhill's Mystics of the Church, published in 1925. Further research of this reviewer discovered that Smith's book was first printed in 1930. It is a pity that no justification is given by the publishers for reprinting this old, inadequate treatment of mysticism. And it is unfortunate indeed that the uninformed reader might be easily deluded into thinking that this was a useful, contemporary treatment of mystical experience.

John A. Saliba, S.J.


Inspired by the pioneering work on contemplation by the late H. M. M. Fortmann, a Dutch psychologist of religion, this fine dissertation attempts to reinterpret St. John of the Cross for a contemporary lay spirituality. The first chapter focuses on John's strict affective asceticism, which allegedly rejects all bodily pleasure and suppresses all except love for God, as well as his via negativa, allegedly infected with Augustinian pessimism. Employing five psychological inventories, an extensive questionnaire on prayer, and EEG recordings, the stronger second chapter proffers an empirical study of fifty-four Carmelites. M.'s hypothesis is that John's dualism is not essential for mystical prayer. Good prayer is openness to God's love, must involve the reality of the body, and has little to do with John's asceticism, which is basically unsound.

Focusing upon the roots of the via negativa in John, chap. 3 amazingly offers no analysis of John's scriptural foundation. M. does emphasize John's failure to assimilate Pseudo-Dionysius' antidualistic, extraverted, cosmological, eros-centered mysticism. Unfortunately, according to M., John had to rely upon Augustine's hamartiology and his pessimistic view of human nature. M. asserts that the real via negativa is faith, hope, and love, antitechnique, and optimistically receptive to the divine force of love. M. underscores John's weak Christological basis.

Emphasizing that the search for bodily pleasure is not egotistical, chap. 4 centers on the need for "Christological and pneumatological eroticism" during prayer. M. thereby argues for affective redemption through a form of desire striving for union which has somatic repercussions. M. perceptively notes that John failed to indicate why we are ignorant of our infinite desires, although her treatment of desire in John is weak.

Harvey D. Egan, S.J.


The writings of the great spiritual
masters are intriguing because they are often either invaluable coaching manuals for prayer and asceticism or precise phenomenological records of inner experience. Here we have a generous selection from the writings of Christian spiritual masters presented in chronological order and grouped in a way to highlight key figures and movements from Ignatius of Antioch to Thomas Merton. The anthology will serve as a source book for a survey course in the history of spiritual theology or as a companion volume of readings to accompany Louis Bouyer’s modern classic, _A History of Christian Spirituality_. No Protestant authors are included. Perhaps the single most serious omission is Origen, who was surely the most eminent and influential spiritual theologian in the early Church.

_William J. Walsh, S.J._


This short but theologically fecund volume presents three essays: “Faith as Courage”; “Freedom and Manipulation in Society and the Church”; “Toleration in the Church.” R.’s first essay emphasizes Christianity’s simplicity in being the practical expression of “courage,” a type of word which concerns the mysterious unity of human existence. Frequently found anonymously in the full trusting acceptance of daily life which knows that love, not death, has the last word, this courage bridges the gap between our experience of infinite desire and radical finitude and is supported historically by the crucified and risen Christ’s total powerlessness in death, yet final saving victory.

The second essay underscores the ultimately mysterious quality of genuine theological freedom. Because of the intrinsic relationship between religious and social freedom, R. rejects the notion that even the man in chains is free. Moreover, because of the finiteness of the space wherein freedom operates, one man’s act of freedom necessarily changes and restricts another’s operational sphere. Morally neutral or sinful, individual or institutionalized, manipulation must exist, but must be overcome asymptotically. R. also stresses “functionality” as the whole meaning of Church office, the need for more grass-roots communities, a time limit on the holding of office (even papal), the laity’s co-operation in the appointment of office bearers, a division of power within the Church, etc.

R.’s third essay defines toleration as “patiently and hopefully bearing with the unintegrated and the unintegrable historical contingency of a Church which is not yet the perfected Kingdom of reconciliation and unity.” R. contends that legitimate freedom of conscience cannot justify teaching and doing everything and anything in the Church. Urging more reforms especially in the Church’s use of its formal authority, R. also exhorts theologians, in the name of authentic theological pluralism, to be self-critically flexible in their own formulations and to respect the special character of the Church’s teaching office. Epikēia and “the non-reception of a law by the people,” however, should play a greater role in today’s church life. Finally, love is the ultimate authority, and only the Lord of history will bring about our final reconciliation.

_Harvey D. Egan, S.J._


Toward the end of his life the American contemplative Thomas Merton (1915–68) wrote: “Our real journey in life is interior, it is a matter of growth, deepening, and an ever greater surrender to the creative action of love and grace in our hearts.”

Brother Patrick Hart, Merton’s sec-
SHORTER NOTICES

589

retary, has done a considerable service in making twelve of Merton's less accessible essays on this interior journey, written during the last decade of his life, available to the many of all faiths who are seeking guidance on their own quest for a deepening spirituality, for a better understanding of the process of building community, and for a more satisfying personal experience of the presence and action of God in their lives. This collection traces the development of M.'s thought on the monastic vocation and on a variety of monastic themes, including the centrality of the humanity of Christ in contemplative prayer and the overriding purpose of the solitary life, to its roots in simplicity and openness to the Spirit. All pilgrims on the journey to a deeper spirituality should appreciate M.'s reflections on the demands and disciplines which the journey requires, his honest appraisal of the basics of life, the religious values of prayer, silence and solitude, the constant conversion of heart and interior renewal which openness to the Spirit makes possible. Evident throughout the essays is M.'s deepening compassion for others because of his appreciation of the world as loved by God and his own experience of God's mercy toward himself. Evident also is the expansion of M.'s horizons of social concern for justice to his brothers in the entire world. He emphasizes throughout the qualities of heroic honesty and unbelievable courage which the interior journey demands of those who would undertake the quest for God in contemporary life.

Perhaps the most personally revealing summary of M.'s thought on the nature and purpose of the interior journey toward God can be found in the hastily written five-page letter, previously unpublished, of August 1967, "A Letter on the Contemplative Life" (169–73). Having this testament of M. in one's possession for frequent reading and prayerful reflection is well worth the price of the book.

Frederic J. Kelly, S.J.


Five Benedictine women of the Federation of St. Scholastica here analyze what happened under the impact of Vatican II to the two thousand sisters in their twenty-three convents in the United States and Mexico. Each of the five essays relates to the major instrument of the study, a questionnaire sent to each of the one hundred fifty-eight delegates of the five renewal chapters that took place between 1966 and 1974.

Each of the essayists deals with the data yielded by the questionnaire from a distinctive standpoint. Ernestine Johann succinctly describes the before and after of "life style," the movement from horaria, required common recreation, multiple choir prescriptions, etc., to flexible scheduling, enlarged personal decision-making, personal budgets, contemporary dress, etc. Stephanie Campbell deals with the processes of change and with the demographic and personality profiles of the delegates. Mary Collins contributes the theologically most significant essay. After outlining the movement from Vatican I to Vatican II, she reflects on several key theological ideas of the renewal: the nature of the Church; authority; religious life; personhood; community; eschatology. Johnette Putnam's essay is also theological, but confined to the theology of monasticism that emerged in the post-Vatican II chapters. Finally, Joan Chittister, director of the research reflected in the volume, reports on and analyzes the change which the participants see themselves as having undergone.

Because all five authors are reflecting on the same material, certain cadences are repeated. The resulting portrait of the old and the new is not startling to anyone who has tried to keep abreast of change in religious life. The past is here not denounced, though both the authors and the chapter del-
legates are clearly of the opinion that much of the past was harmful. The present is viewed as desirable, but there is a sobriety touching the new risks and chances of monastic community.

To my knowledge, the work is unique in kind, and it might well be emulated by other communities, both for the appropriation by their own membership of the extensive changes of the past decade and for helping others in the Church to a balanced interpretation of what has happened, why and how it happened, and what are the present dispositions and prospects of religious communities at the end of the most challenging decade of their history.

_Thomas E. Clarke, S.J._


A third volume is to follow: _Pope Paul’s New Mass._ The subtitle of Vol. 1 provides the clue to the series: _The Destruction of Catholicism through Liturgical Change._ Volume 1 contrasts key doctrinal differences between Roman Catholicism and Protestantism in general and then in reference to the Eucharist. It then recounts the story of Thomas Cranmer’s liturgical reforms culminating in the Prayer Book of 1549. D. implies that a parallel course of events has occurred in the recent reform of the liturgy. Vol. 2 regards Pope John’s calling of the Second Vatican Council a mistake. The Council having been convoked, however, the Holy Ghost protected it from formal error. Such protection, nevertheless, did not prevent ambiguous and conflicting expressions as well as omissions which have produced havoc in the Church. The “spirit of Vatican II” must be distinguished from the “event of Vatican II.” The former is corrupt with liberalism, Modernism, Marxism, and Freemasonry. In the event, we must distinguish what is of real value in the documents, namely, that which accords with tradition, and what is the result of the “spirit of Vatican II.”

Absent from these volumes is appreciation of historicity. The Protestantism portrayed is that of the sixteenth century. Very many Protestant theologians today do not generally talk in terms of Luther or Calvin or their seventeenth- and eighteenth-century heirs, or when they do use that language, it now bears developed meanings or is complemented by other words. What happens between Catholics and Protestants in the twentieth century is not simply a rerun of the sixteenth century. D. shows no appreciation of the development of liturgical forms from the Last Supper to the Sarum Missal and what that development implies. Nor is there much awareness of contemporary historicity—that scholarship goes on to modify our understanding; the chief historical source for the liturgy of the Mass in these volumes is not Jungmann’s _Missarum sollemnia_ but Adrian Fortescue’s 1917 study of the Roman liturgy. The interpretation of the Council I can attribute only to nonrational presuppositions, such as pessimism, paranoia, distrust. The Council was not perfect, but then no council has been or ever will be.

_Christopher Kiesling, O.P._


Meeks characterizes Moltmann’s promotion of the Christian community as genuine, passionate, evangelical, diaconal, ecumenical, charismatic, and esthetic (life style). These adjectives indicate the various units of this booklet, where Moltmann becomes like the Fathers of the primitive Church, who admonished the faithful to grow in Christ.
Jesus exemplifies the passion for life as the power by which we can counteract the apathy of our idolatrous lives. Great emphasis is placed on the virtue of acceptance of those who are different from us. This is fundamental for the community of brothers and sisters. Later in the book this idea is extended to international relationships. M. wants Christians to integrate the vitality of Christian virtues, which go beyond the law and are rooted in a creative activity and the cry to God for hope (prayer). Other Christian aspects are portrayed in refreshing biblical discussions of our open, joyful friendship with God in Jesus.

An analysis of the feast of freedom (liturgy) becomes critical in reference to forms of alienation, but discerns its center in Christ's resurrection—a celebration of God's faithfulness to life. Ecumenical concerns are placed within the context of God's love in search of His image on earth—the story of suffering. "Hope in the Struggle of the People" is a most genuine chapter, because M. relates to his own experiences as a POW. He holds hope to be real when found in the people's commitment to make their own history. Thus congregations and parishes are urged to "come of age" and assume the responsibility of a universal priesthood of all believers, who hold the Church's authority in their assembly.

In this inspirational book a famous theologian formulates his concerns simply and convincingly—which deserves praise.

William P. Frost


The author starts from a detailed discussion of Freud's article "Die Verneinung." In this article Freud proposes that denial is a creation whereby the Ego in struggle with the repressed unconscious gains a greater independence. Through an analysis of the psychological aspects of no-saying it is shown how through it a reversal is made in the mother-child relation. The child acquires its independence from the mother through a no-saying period. The mother plays an active role by an overcoming of her own narcissism and by wishing that the child become independent. Thus the no-saying destroys the symbiotic relation between the mother and child, which is made clear through the presence of the father. The father through his relation with the mother is the main obstacle for the child in recapturing the symbiotic relation.

Linguistic analysis indicates that no negation succeeds in eliminating the denied content. Thinking, in so far as it stands in service of desire, can raise this linguistic mechanism and use it to construct a negation which is not authentic, which denies without truly denying the demand for omnipotence. Thus, instead of a normal negation, we have a denial. V. clarifies this in an interesting Freudian analysis of Hegel's master figure. The master's absolute power to command and limitless desire to enjoy remain on the level of self-consciousness. He is a figure without content. He cannot work, because this would imply recognition of the impossible demand for omnipotence. Neither can he enter the world of intersubjectivity, because no true confrontation with the other is possible when the person identifies himself with himself. Thus we have a denial judgment in which the subject of the judgment cannot be revealed, instead of a negation which is a true confrontation with the other.

What is most instructive about this somewhat difficult study is that it introduces the epistemological problem of the relation between thinking and perceiving on the one hand and desire
on the other hand. It shows how the human search for truth is a struggle to come to a constructive confrontation and incorporation of human passions.

Rene F. de Brabander


A multivolume history of American Christianity designed for the general reader and which takes into account the relationship between religion and culture and the impact that religion had on the national experience.

The first volume, Jesus Christ, by E. Glenn Hinson, explores the roots of Christianity and discusses the early Church up to the third century. In Reform and Renewal, J. Patrick Donnelly, S.J., takes the reader from the Dark Ages to the sixteenth century, stressing the period of the Reformation when Protestantism was born, when Catholicism was revived, and Christianity spread from Europe to the New World. Following with The Pilgrims, Dewey D. Wallace Jr. relates how religious patterns were transplanted in the seventeenth century from the Old World to the New, and how the established churches adapted themselves in the colonies. Martin E. Marty describes, in Religion, Awakening and Revolution, how the eighteenth century was the "hinge of the revolution" on which later American history depends. The fifth volume, A New Christian Nation, by Louis B. Weeks, details how the Christian Churches (e.g., Catholic, Methodist, Baptist, Presbyterian) multiplied. Next, in The Church Goes West, Myron J. Fogde narrates the story of the maturing of American religion—the time when American Christianity was forced to face up to the challenge of social justice. Destiny and Disappointment, by Raymond H. Bailey, covers the years 1900 to 1950 and views religion as a stabilizing and unifying force during a time of progress and radical change. Finally, Jonathan A. Lindsey, in Change and Challenge, brings the history to the seventies and looks back upon the past two decades, exploring their impact on American Christianity.

The series is written by eight competent historians of different religious backgrounds and thus has an ecumenical perspective.

Joseph N. Tylenda, S.J.

BOOKS RECEIVED

SCRIPTURAL STUDIES


**DOCTRINAL THEOLOGY**


Morreall, J. S. *Analogy and Talking...*


HISTORICAL


MORAL, LAW, LITURGY


Horner, T. Jonathan Loved David.


---

**PASTORAL AND ASCETICAL**


---

**PHILOSOPHY**


---

**SPECIAL QUESTIONS**


