# TABLE OF CONTENTS

## ARTICLES

*Humanae vitae* and Its Reception: Ecclesiological Reflections  
*Joseph A. Komonchak* ........................................... 221

Contraception and the Infallibility of the Ordinary Magisterium  
*John C. Ford, S.J.,* and *Germain Grisez* .................... 258

The Ontogenetic Ground of Value  
*Walter E. Conn* ............................................... 313
Presenting This Issue

Our June 1978 issue is largely a modest effort to commemorate theologically the tenth anniversary of one of the most discussed papal documents in the Church’s history. Since it was issued on July 29, 1968, the encyclical *Humanae vitae* has been a sign of contradiction. Its reaffirmation of the Catholic Church’s traditional condemnation of artificial contraception has roused professional passions pro and con, and has left the Catholic community dreadfully, at times bitterly, divided. But besides the moral issue with which it is directly concerned, the document has intensified research and discussion on the level of ecclesiology, especially the subject, nature, and role of magisterial authority in the Church. It is primarily the ecclesiological that is the concern of the first two articles, which present two very different approaches and conclusions. It is through intelligent discussion that theology makes progress; it is our hope that these articles will provoke the “civilized conversation” of which my predecessor, John Courtney Murray, was so fond.

*Humanae vitae* and Its Reception: Ecclesiological Reflections addresses two questions to which the encyclical has given rise in the past decade: (1) the authority of the document and of the tradition behind it, and (2) the character and quality of the internal argument employed therein. The article argues that the controversy over *HV* cannot be settled simply on the grounds of “formal” authority, whether of the encyclical itself or of the tradition behind it; and it outlines “one fundamental criticism” of the argument employed and the conclusion reached by Pope Paul. JOSEPH A. KOMONCHAK, Ph.D. from Union Theological Seminary in New York City (dissertation on the ecclesiology of the young Newman), is associate professor in the Department of Religion and Religious Education at the Catholic University of America. His areas of special competence are ecclesiology and ministry; his most recent publication, “Theological Reflections on Teaching Authority in the Church,” appears in *Concilium* 117.

Contraception and the Infallibility of the Ordinary Magisterium attempts to show that the conditions articulated by Vatican I for infallible teaching by the ordinary magisterium have been met in the course of the tradition, and so a divinely guaranteed teaching is involved. “Such teachings, once given, cannot later be contradicted by the Church as a whole.” It is argued that those who defended the legitimacy of dissent from *Humanae vitae* “proceeded directly from the nondefinitive character of Paul VI’s pronouncement to the possibility of licit dissent from noninfallible teachings, ignoring the possibility that the nondefinitive pronouncement contained a reaffirmation of a teaching which, even if never defined, was already infallibly proposed by the ordinary magiste-
rium.” After lengthy argumentation the final conclusion runs: “We think there is an extremely strong case for the position that the received Catholic teaching on the immorality of contraception has been infallibly proposed by the ordinary magisterium.” JOHN C. FORD, S.J., professor emeritus of moral theology at Weston College, Massachusetts, deserves well of Catholic theology. From his ground-breaking article on “The Morality of Obliteration Bombing” (TS 5 [1944] 261–309) in the midst of World War II, through his years of creative collaboration with Gerald Kelly, S.J. (see the two-volume Contemporary Moral Theology, 1958–63), to his research on alcoholism and personal work with alcoholics, he has been an impressive example of the Christian scholar and gentleman.

GERMAIN GRIZEZ, professor of philosophy at Campion College, University of Regina, with special competence in Christian ethics (he has worked particularly on human-life problems: contraception, abortion, euthanasia), has authored five books since 1965; soon to be published, in collaboration with Joseph M. Boyle, Jr., is Life, Death, Liberty and Justice: A Contribution to the Euthanasia Debate.

The Ontogenetic Ground of Value insists that any analysis of values demands a study of “the concrete forms that are in fact taken by the radical drive for self-transcendence, the transcendental notion of value, or conscience in a person’s development.” For this task, the work of three psychologists has been found especially helpful: Erikson, Piaget, and Kohlberg. They are analyzed in terms of the criterion of self-transcendence, to pinpoint the way in which the transcendental notion of value takes shape and functions in our moral life. That done, the article reveals how Bernard Lonergan, in his insistence on the concrete particularity of the personal subject, has not only shown the special relevance of developmental psychology to the question of value, but has highlighted the radical centrality of the personal reality of conversion to the question.

WALTER E. CONN, Ph.D. from Columbia University, is associate professor of Christian ethics and of psychology and religion at St. Patrick’s Seminary, Menlo Park, Calif. His areas of special competence are foundational theological ethics and developmental psychology. He has edited a collection of essays on conversion to appear in August, and is completing a book on conscience and conversion scheduled for 1979 publication.

Twenty-five full-length reviews and twenty-five shorter notices continue TS’s effort to appraise some of the more significant books of interest to theology and religion.

When this issue reaches you, the editorial offices of TS will have relocated at Georgetown University, 37th and O St., Washington, D.C. 20057.

Walter J. Burghardt, S.J.
Editor

In its literary dimension, redaction criticism, which has dominated Markan research for two decades, seeks the intention of the author from the modifications made in the tradition or from the composition of the whole Gospel. In its historical thrust, like form criticism, it seeks the setting of the material studied. Recent studies of Mark have concentrated on the setting or social location of the Gospel as a whole or of its major parts. The miracle stories are thought to be edited by Mark to counter false Christological enthusiasts in the community, and Mk 13 is seen as revision of earlier material to counter false community hopes of an imminent parousia. The work of K. represents the most comprehensive and thorough attempt to move from the text of Mark to a description of the community life and ethos out of which the Gospel arose and for which it was directed. As an advance beyond literary and theological criticism, K. proposes a three-way conversation between social, literary, and conceptual modes as a method for describing the Markan community. In effect, he argues for a sociology of literature in relation to Mark.

After the methodological statement (chap. 1), K. devotes two chapters to the literary horizon of Mark. The first of these (chap. 2) presents an excellent summary of the candidates for a Markan literary antecedent, e.g., aretology, tragedy, Hellenistic romance, Hellenistic chria, martyriology. Rejecting all these as models, K. finds that "gospel" is a wholly new genre with close analogies to the narratives of Jewish apocalyptic literature. The second study of the literary horizon (chap. 3) is a survey of different aspects of Mark's style (interpolation, framing) and structure, and concludes that Mark organizes his material in a thematic structure of the rule of God and its imminent and ultimate triumph over evil powers.

Since the literary horizon both in terms of analogous literature and thematic structure is similar to the literary horizon of Jewish apocalyptic, K. turns (chap. 4) to the central thesis of the book. Mark is a Gospel written for a group of Christians in southern Syria, sometime prior to A.D. 70, a group which is influenced by the "Jewish-Hasidic-Essene-apocalyptic tradition" (105) and by a Cynic-Stoic style of itinerant charismatic preaching. In arguing for such a social location, K. not only relies on the text of Mark but adduces exhaustive evidence from the history of the period on the basis of Josephus and first-century intertestamental documents. Coupled with this is the use of paradigms for the origins and nature of eschatological communities as developed by the
Having outlined the literary and social horizon, in the final two chapters K. turns to the conceptual horizon in his treatment of "Community and Christology in Mark" (chap. 5) and "Eschatology and Ethics in the Markan Community" (chap. 6). The study of Markan Christology is a rather mechanical recitation of the appellations given to Jesus in Mark. Here again the framework of Jewish apocalyptic determines Mark's thought. Like the Son of Man in Daniel, Jesus is seen as a corporate figure in whose life and fate the community was involved and who will return to achieve full identity with the community. In the final chapter K. shows how the eschatological horizon determines Mark's ethics. He wisely avoids the pitfall of sloughing off Mark's ethics as "interim ethics" and offers what may be the most creative treatment of Mark's ethics to appear in recent years.

This book is most successful as an entree to Jewish intertestamental literature (especially the Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs) and, because of its wealth of detail, is almost a Strack-Billerbeck for possible contacts between Mark and this literature. For this reason it will become a standard tool for Markan research. It is less successful as a treatment of Mark's Gospel. In this otherwise carefully researched work there are a surprising number of oversights of important studies of Mark. Most surprising is the neglect of the work of Rudolf Pesch, the author of one of the most thorough and often-cited works on Markan apocalyptic (Naherwartungen, Düsseldorf, 1968), and who in the intervening years has published more than twenty significant studies of Mark. Also overlooked are the important literary studies of F. Neirynck and virtually all recent studies of the Markan Passion narrative. While K.'s attempt to move from text to social setting is methodologically more careful than previous attempts, the method verges on "social allegorizing." For example, the occupation of those first called by Jesus is a sign of the economic status of the Markan community (90) and the secret instructions given the disciples (11:1 ff.; 14:13 ff.) are an index of the value the community places on esoteric instruction. Since Mark is a mixture of tradition and redaction, not everything in the final text is a cipher for the situation of the community. Nonetheless, Kee has offered a series of studies which open up new ways of looking at Mark and which offer guideposts for those who want to take the same path, a path which no student of the second Gospel should avoid.

The work is well written, is amply documented, and has fine indices. It is unfortunate in a book as scholarly as this—and with such a relatively high price—that the footnotes are at the end.

Vanderbilt Divinity School

JOHN R. DONAHUE, S.J.
This monumental volume by Boismard and Lamouille is a continuation of their *Synopse des quatre Évangiles* and it does presuppose the reader's familiarity with the previously published volumes, though not to such an extent that he or she could not clearly understand the treatment given here to the fourth Gospel. It is a long and complicated work to get through, and since the commentary is so largely taken up with a defense of the redactional theory set forth in the seventy-page Introduction, it would seem best to present that theory as succinctly as possible and make a few comments.

John I (Document C in the earlier volumes) was a complete Gospel beginning with the ministry of the Baptist (3:23, 25; 1:19, 21, 25, 26, 31-32, 29) and ending with the accounts of the risen Christ (20:11, 14, 18; 6:19; 20:20; 6:20; 21:9, 12, 13). It contained no significant discourse material and related only five "signs." It was written in Palestine and was strongly influenced by Samaritan thought. It is more ancient than Proto-Luke, who used it, and the intermediate stage of Mark. The date of composition was probably around 50. B. (who is responsible for the Introduction) thinks Lazarus the most likely author. John I was taken up and enlarged by an author designated as John II. This author kept the sequence of John I but added, among other items, the call of Andrew and Peter, two miracles found in the Synoptic tradition, and some of the discourse material. He wrote in Palestine about 60-65 (John IIA). Some thirty or forty years later this same author, John II, now in Asia Minor (probably Ephesus), confronted with new problems arising chiefly from a Jewish-Christian milieu, compiled a second edition of his previous work (John IIB). At this point he introduced the framework of Jewish festivals within which we find the present Gospel set (John I mentioned only one feast, that of Tabernacles), giving special prominence to Passover. Further discourse material was added. All of this required extensive reordering of the original textual sequence of the Gospel. This new edition also reflects the influence of Paul, Luke, and the scrolls from Qumran. Who was John II? B. thinks he was the author of the three Johannine letters (written shortly before John IIB) and is to be identified with that John the Presbyter about whom Papias wrote (and over whom so much ink has been spilled ever since). Irenaeus mistakenly identified this John with John the son of Zebedee. But the process of composition had not ended; for during the first decade of the second century a third author, John III, made still further additions to the Gospel. These were minor when compared to the work of John II, but their intent was to incorporate the futurist eschatology inherited from Daniel and to soften the anti-Jewish
tone of John IIA and IIB; it was he, e.g., who inserted the phrase "salvation is from the Jews" at 4:22. The identity of John III is indeterminate. B. suggests that he was a Christian of Jewish background who wrote at Ephesus and belonged to the "Johannine school."

Who could deny that this attempt to unveil the enigma of the fourth Gospel is an awesome tour de force? But does it carry conviction? The authors are not alone, of course, in finding a strong Samaritan influence in this Gospel nor even—though here their allies are few in number—that Lazarus is the beloved disciple on whose authority the Gospel ultimately rests. And if their account of displacements is even more audacious than Bultmann's, one wonders if it is as persuasive. Surely they are on safe ground today in positing a primitive fourth Gospel which underwent extensive redaction, but it seems, to me at least, that their John I is a less likely reconstruction than Fortna's Gospel of Signs and their account of its ongoing trajectory less satisfactory. There also seems to be, throughout, an evasive attitude towards the unique discourse material in the Gospel. It deserves an independent consideration which is not given it. It is not much help to be told that we owe it to the elusive John the Presbyter.

Notre Dame Seminary, New Orleans

J. Edgar Bruns


The best description of this comprehensive theological commentary is a "streamlined Spicq"; for it conjures up recollections of that writer's classic two-volume study now twenty-five years old. In fact, Hughes expresses gratitude to him "for his cordial encouragement in conversation and correspondence" (viii). H., too, writes as a churchman to aid fellow pilgrims grow in appreciation of the NT writing that celebrates the "absolute supremacy of Christ" (3). He refers to Spicq more often than to any other writer but does not hesitate to disagree with him.

After listing fifty major commentaries written between the fourth century and 1972, H. presents a comparatively short introduction of thirty-two pages. It serves as a state of the question for most areas in which critical opinion is divided, such as authorship, occasion, destination. Only on the question of date does H. take a strong stand: Heb was written before the destruction of Jerusalem. He marshals eighteen texts from the letter to back his position that it was written while Levitical priests were still functioning (31–32).

Then begins H.'s detailed exegesis supplemented by four long excursuses and eight short notes. These two series are not essentially different in purpose. Both elaborate reasons for positions or provide background
on such topics as Melchizedek, the Dead Sea sect, or covenant terminology. An important exposition of the priestly act of Jesus shows that his intercession is not a constant pleading in heaven (348). At times H. tends to overkill. Thus, he has a detailed note on Heb 2:10 to justify applying the phrase “bringing many to glory” to the Father. It could be explained simply as an example of agreement by sense.

His strong points are good theological background, familiarity with the whole history of interpretation, and sensitivity to the Greek idiom. His comments on “propitiation” in Heb 2:17 provide a good example of the last point. In a long note that summarizes various positions, he rejects the reading “apart from God” in Heb 2:9. Yet, his penetrating remarks about the “loud cries and tears” of Jesus in suffering (5:7) could support the position that the author did wish to picture Jesus as dying in desolation “apart from God.”

H. comments on the RSV text but modifies it in a few places in his comments. He follows the practice common in long commentaries of stating a variety of opinions only to reject them—a practice that adds length but not light for readers. He also cites other NT texts as parallel to passages in Heb. Such a procedure obscures the originality of the writing H. calls “the most extensively developed and logically sustained piece of theological argumentation in the whole New Testament” (35).

The one serious shortcoming is H.’s failure to take his own statement seriously and to devote his talents to penetrating the dynamism of Heb’s argumentation. He ignores newer approaches to uncover levels of meaning. His outline of the “structure” of Heb is a static outline of content. He fails to dialog with recent commentators like Vanhoye and Swetnam, who are searching to grasp the movement of the text. Both of them are cited only once—in footnotes. It is not enough to say “Vanhoye’s detailed study errs on the side of overstatement” (2), for the movement of the argument is essential to the message. What H. has done, however, will be savored by those who wish to meditate on Heb. The three indexes—subject, author, and Scripture—make it easy for them to do so.

St. John’s University, N.Y. 

JAMES M. REESE, O.S.F.S.


Glorification of Christianity by denigration of Judaism has for long been a favorite sport of many Christian theologians, especially those influenced by the German Lutheran tradition. S., in this brilliant study of the religion of Paul and Palestinian Judaism, shows convincingly how little support there is for such a derogatory attitude in the writings of the apostle of the Gentiles, despite the many harsh statements that Paul undoubtedly makes about the efficacy of the law.
S.'s thesis is this: the key to understanding Paul is not a doctrine of justification by faith alone, but a participatory sharing in the lordship of the risen Christ, whereby the believer comes to possess the Spirit as the first fruits of salvation; it is through his own experience of the Spirit, as well as through the evidence of the Spirit's action among Gentile believers, that Paul came to understand faith in Christ as the completion, not the denial, of his former Judaism. What Paul left was not something bad; only in the light of his new faith in Christ did Judaism appear as imperfect and transitory. Before his Christian vocation, Paul was not disillusioned with his Jewish way of life; this latter only appears as so much rubbish when God's promised Spirit is experienced. In short: when the perfect appears, the imperfect must give way.

I can only wholeheartedly agree with the main thrust of S.'s arguments and conclusions. The real novelty in his exposition is not so much the conclusions themselves—there is hardly anything completely new under the sun of Pauline scholarship—but rather the vigor and coherence of his reasoning and the abundance of his documentation. In fact, before discussing Paul's own teaching, S. presents in detail the positions and principles of the kaleidoscopic Palestinian Jewish world of the first and second centuries in the matter of soteriology: the Tannaitic literature, the Dead Sea scrolls, the Apocrypha and Pseudepigrapha. S. does not attempt to be exhaustive in his examples, but he does succeed in showing, through selected illustrations, that Judaism was not a religion of salvation through works, and that it therefore served as a very poor target for a supposed Pauline polemic in this regard. Judaism rather accentuated the mercy of God in His dealings with men, and it was Paul who saw a final act of this mercy in the sending of the Son to be Lord of all.

There are many points of detail in S.'s work which can be questioned; but even here one must proceed with caution, since he is eminently fair in his appraisal of previous scholarship and so meticulous in giving the nuances of his own positions. With this reservation in mind, I do feel that he could have given more attention to the influence that the Jewish doctrine of intermediaries had upon early Christianity and upon Paul in particular. Again, it is not really accurate to call the scapegoat a sacrifice (303). Finally, the interpenetration of "Palestinian" and "Hellenistic" Judaism could have been more fully assessed.

S.'s book was a long time in the writing; it is the product of mature thought, expressed with clarity in a limpid style of English. Not every scholar will agree with its conclusions, but it is a work which cannot be ignored. I do not hesitate to include it among the half-dozen most important books on Paul written within this century.

Holy Trinity Abbey, Utah

Casimir Bernas, O.C.S.O.

It should prove useful for one assessing Theology and the Gospel of Christ to understand the audience for whom it is intended. The opening sentences put Mascall’s purpose in context: “The four chapters of which this book is composed have more in common than may appear on the surface. They are the outcome of a conviction, reached with reluctance and distress and after long and anxious thought, that the theological activity of the Anglican Churches is in a condition of extreme, though strangely complacent, confusion and that this is having a disastrously demoralizing effect upon the life and thought of the Church as a whole and of the pastoral clergy in particular” (1). I take it, then, that although M. is writing in part at least for the academic community, the fundamental thrust of the book is to give encouragement to fellow Anglican clergymen and laymen who are distressed by the increasing literature of Anglican theologians representing a historically skeptical and theologically unorthodox point of view.

The principal target of M.’s critique is what he calls doctrinal empiricism or doctrinal positivism, and he has in mind biblical critics and systematic theologians such as Dennis Nineham and Maurice Wiles, both of Oxford, and fellow sympathizers such as Norman Ferrin and J. A. T. Robinson and the contributors to the symposium from which emerged The Myth of God Incarnate. M. is strongest in pointing out the vulnerabilities and logical inconsistencies in his opponents’ arguments. This is no doubt a polemical work; hence its obvious shortcoming is that an alternative constructive position is only hinted at. Nevertheless, anyone working to build a systematic theology would be well advised to consider M.’s demolition of current theological presuppositions before proceeding further.

In particular, two points from the two central chapters deserve serious consideration. The first concerns the prevailing historical skepticism of current biblical criticism. While drawing on a number of criticisms of the present method of biblical scholarship, M. is particularly effective in calling to our attention the impressive work of the Lady Margaret Professor at Cambridge University, Dr. Morna Hooker, especially her article in Theology 1972 “On Using the Wrong Tool.” There Hooker shows that the current criteria for judging what biblical material can be reliably attributed to the historical Jesus cannot be applied without contradiction. Thus, there is the criterion of dissimilarity, according to which no statement can be certainly attributed to Jesus that is not dissimilar both to the Judaism of his time and to the preaching of the Church. On the other hand, by another criterion an authentic saying of Jesus must be “at home” in first-century Palestine. Thus it would seem
that at one and the same time an authentic saying of Jesus must both be
dissimilar to contemporary Judaism and yet reflect the language and
style of Aramaic. But clearly these two criteria cannot be consistently
employed and the attempt to do so inevitably leads to greater historical
skepticism.

The other major front on which M. wages his campaign is contempo­
rary Christology. He correctly notes that the present discussion focuses
on two points: the humanity of Jesus and the static nature of the
Chalcedonian definition. He goes on to show, however, that the difficulty
may not lie in the Chalcedonian definition but in our highly questionable
modern presuppositions. Fundamentally, what is at stake is the assump­
tion that divinity and humanity are not only diverse in their metaphysical
basis but also radically incompatible in such a way that, if Jesus was fully
and completely man, he could not also be literally and personally God.
As an example he cites as evidence John Knox's statement that it is
“impossible, by definition, that God should become a man.” Finally, to
vindicate his contention that Chalcedon need not be understood in a
static way nor in such wise that the humanity of Jesus is eclipsed, he
introduces his English readers to the thought of a contemporary French
Christologist, Jean Galot, whose three volumes on Christology in the last
ten years have sought to explore the riches latent in Chalcedonian
orthodoxy.

M.'s thrust is critical rather than constructive, yet a book such as this
is timely especially for the Church of England. But beyond encouraging
his Anglican brethren, Mascall has also challenged all of us in the
academic theological community to re-examine the foundations on which
we build.

Campion Hall, Oxford 
JOHN J. O’DONNELL, S.J.

THEOLOGICAL METHOD AND IMAGINATION. By Julian N. Hartt. New

Hartt is concerned with the possibility of theological discourse. Are the
routes of access to the old truths so cratered that they must be aban­
donned? Are the new routes opened up by Bultmann and others through­
ways or deceptive dead ends? H. has the courage to take a fresh look at
the whole question and to think it through with erudition and high style.
He insists that respect for the metaphysical principles underlying the
theological enterprise must be linked to an appreciation of the role of the
imagination in man's quest for truth and understanding.

He calls his work an “essay.” It is certainly that in both senses of the
word. It is a carefully reasoned attempt to challenge the attitude and
presuppositions which push faith into a cognitional corner. It is also an
essay in a way not common to theological enterprises: it is a brilliantly written literary composition.

H.'s essay style, which occasionally lightens the argument with ironic bits of humor, allows him to get on with the task of determining the possibility of theological discourse without burdening the movement of his thought with a multitude of proper names and a great weight of footnotes. Although the reader may feel that a more rigid format is better suited to the intricate and difficult subject H. considers, and that the essay should be kept for shorter or more popular works, it must be admitted that H.'s approach keeps our attention focussed on the main issues. We are obliged, as it were, to lay aside our documentation and concentrate on the axial lines of the problem. In eight chapters he considers matters such as faith, authority, revelation, history, systematic theology, and story. But since, in fact, he is obliged to deal with the nature of proof and other basic matters, the work becomes a dense critique of the modern world view and its assumptions.

Theology has often tried to accommodate itself to this world view by abandoning metaphysics. With the tendencies of the liberal streams of Protestantism principally in mind, he insists that theologians must take metaphysics seriously even if they are wary of metaphysical systems. He is especially critical of a theological approach which reduces faith to a myth about man and detaches it from any objective truth-content. "Is it ever rational to decide that some metaphysical beliefs, such as that God exists and guides some people one way and some another, are false and 'meaningless' simply because regnant philosophical presuppositions are hostile to them?" (233). Relevancy does not excuse everything. On the other hand, he refuses to accept faith as a cerebral matter cut off from life. If he takes such care to show the weakness of much that we presume to be solid in modern thought, he does this because he believes that faith must be a world view. What is at issue is a course of life, not simply the verification of a truth-claim. Since this is so, H. balances his emphasis on the reliability of faith's truth with attention to the imagination—that faculty which goes beyond bare facts to historical meaning, and carries that meaning into the future as a continued story. He dynamically refuses the reduction of man to a mechanical mind. He would, I think, agree with Newman that "man is not a reasoning animal, he is a seeing, feeling, contemplating, acting animal." He might prefer, however, to insert "only" after the emphatic not.

H., who was a professor at Yale for many years and now teaches at the University of Virginia, has dealt with some of the matters discussed here in his earlier books: e.g., history in A Christian Critique of American Culture (New York, 1967). The value of the present book is the coherence and balance with which it embraces a large and serious question.

Ottawa

KENNETH C. RUSSELL

Gilkey, professor of theology at the University of Chicago Divinity School, is well known for such books as Shantung Compound and Naming the Whirlwind. This book was fifteen years in the making and it amounts to G.'s major statement on providence. It has three parts: a Prolegomenon concerned with the centrality of "historical passage" for the modern mind; an Entr'acte concerned with method; a reinterpretation of the Christian view of history in what are essentially process terms.

G.'s Prolegomenon deals with social change, the dimension of ultimacy or religion in historical and political experience, contemporary scientific views of history, and contemporary philosophical views of history. Social change is analyzed, with considerable reliance on the work of Robert Nisbet, in terms of five fundamental factors: "(1) cumulative changes in technology and in social forms; (2) human intentional, 'political,' responses to these changes to divert, direct, or refashion them; (3) the symbolic structures of our 'world' which maintain relative stability amid change, which are threatened by change, and which provide the ultimate basis for our creative or uncreative, conservative or radical responses to change; (4) the factor of power and with it the issues of security and well-being, a factor which interacts with the above three to render historical existence explosive and intense, and which continually raises the moral questions of justice and injustice, equality and inequality, freedom and order; and finally (5) the factor of nature and her resources upon which the existence of men and women, and of their future, depends" (32).

By careful phenomenology G. shows that the ontological structure of history is a polarity of destiny and freedom finally mysterious. This is the ultimacy or sacrality undergirding all history and politics, and it is what "scientific" views of the future, whether the optimistic projections of a Herman Kahn or the pessimistic projections of a Robert Heilbroner, miss. Finally, against positivistic philosophers of history, G. shows the inevitability of speculation, and the power of such speculators as Ernst Bloch and A. N. Whitehead to illumine the hope and flow on which history depends. In his first part, then, G. offers a sophisticated review of the state of the question regarding historical consciousness, to the end of trying to show that the ontological structure of destiny and freedom reveals the intelligibility and reality of a theistic interpretation.

The Entr'acte on method is a hinge between this elaboration of modern historical consciousness and a revised Christian doctrine of providence. It is erudite on hermeneutics, principally in dialogue with David Tracy's Blessed Rage for Order, and emphatic on the need for common human experience and Christian symbols to illumine one another mutually. From Reinhold Niebuhr and Paul Tillich, to whom the work is dedicated, G. draws his concern for the demonic at the center of history's "problem,"
and this perhaps gives his very open research a yet distinctively Protestant flavor.

Part 3 is the work's heart, though only its last three chapters are constructive. The first three chapters are a review of traditional notions of providence (Augustine and Calvin), a study of modern historical consciousness, and the swing in modern theology from the liberal theologians of the nineteenth century through the Krisis theologians of the twentieth century to the recent eschatological theologies. What G. finds lacking in the traditional notions is a concern for the meaning of the historical process itself. What he demands of current theology is a balanced appreciation of all factors: sin and grace, social and private realms, past and present as well as future. Throughout, his hand is deft and his judgments are fair.

In reinterpretation, G. first strives to save both the "naturalistic" principle of historical explanation on the level of secondary causes and God's "constitutive, critical, and renewing role." His final work is in good measure an adaptation of Whiteheadian metaphysics to the task of saving these two aspects of history-in-modern-Christian-interpretation. This means challenging Whitehead's separation of "creativity" from God and working out his own view that providence is "the universal divine activity of the preservation and continuity of createably being over time, as the ground of self-actualizing freedom and as the creative source of new possibilities in each situation" (264). Finally, in his new conception of God, G. argues for God's self-limitation in regard to finite being, the participation of the divine power of being in passage, and the modal distinction between actuality and possibility in the divine life. It is a balanced, winning interpretation of both providence and divinity, eccentric perhaps only in insisting that "There can be no dual destiny in this hope, if there is to be hope at all. No ultimate division between persons who are sheep and persons who are goats, those who participate in God and those condemned to hell, is admissible if the divine power is to be ultimately sovereign and the divine love the ultimate quality of that power" (298).

I have only praise for the book's learning and constructive skills. It is a major statement on providence and Christian theology of history. It does overlook such historical sources as the De auxiliis controversy, to which Lonergan owes a great deal, and such a present magnum opus as Voegelin's Order and History, whose philosophy of history is much more concretely engaged with past epochal events than is G.'s. The style is difficult, as the quotations may suggest, and while Seabury is to be praised for bringing out such scholarship, its decision to put more than five hundred words on each page makes G.'s argument that there will be
no goats very unpersuasive. The book has very full footnotes, bibliography, and indices.

Wichita State University

JOHN CARMODY


It is fitting that a scholar who has achieved so much (as indicated in the bibliography of Cheney’s works [275–84]) should receive such a worthy tribute. The list of contributors is an indication of the quality of this collection of studies on various themes on the Church and government in the High Middle Ages.

M. Chibnall studies the intertwining of charters and chronicles in the work of Norman historians. R. Foreville discusses the nature, composition, and functions of the synods held for the province of Rouen in the eleventh and twelfth centuries. R. C. Van Caenegem deals with the controversy over the process by which public prosecution of crime became a reality in England and so society no longer depended on private initiative. He also reveals how civil and ecclesiastical courts were moving along together and that the innovation in both areas was greeted with public outcry and criticism. C. Brooke’s essay on Geoffrey of Monmouth shows him as a historian who mixed facts, documented source material, legends, prophecy, propaganda, and a little fun into the telling of a good story which goes far to explain his popularity in the Middle Ages.

S. Kuttner presents a fine vignette on Gratian and Plato in which he discusses the question of private property as opposed to holding all things in common (including wives) that appears in the Decretum. Kuttner shows that the critical passage has to be traced back through the sources, translations, commentators, and texts to its ultimate origin in Plato. He reveals that what appears to be a clear statement of Plato could mean a lot of different things to later times. P. Stein’s study of Vacarius and the civil law attempts to separate the facts from the legends about his career and to establish Vacarius’ contribution to English law. M. Cheney studies William Fitzstephen’s life of Becket, explicates some of the idiosyncrasies therein, and gives some possible explanations of these. The next article, by D. Owen, is a straightforward account of the problem of establishing and evaluating the sources on the muniments of Ely Cathedral. J. Sayers contributes a study of that medieval anomaly, monastic archdeacons. She shows where and when they existed, what they did, and how they defended their rights and prerogatives. The social and church historian
will enjoy her details on how lucrative the correction of offenders could be to the God-fearing archdeacon. D. Luscombe deals with the influence of the ideas and language of Pseudo-Dionysius on Pope Boniface VIII and especially in *Unam sanctam*. He sets this account in the context of how this doctrine of celestial hierarchies as models for human life influenced both the mendicants and secular masters of that era.

W. Ullmann's brief essay on John Baconthorpe as a canonist reveals that Baconthorpe well deserves further study, since unlike most of his contemporaries he bridged the two specialties of theology and law. He tried to restore unity by returning to a "one and indivisible juristic theology," but the result was that his works were not quite what had come to be expected in either discipline. In addition, he lacked knowledge of Roman law, which was a singular failure for such an ambitious undertaking. Still, the mastery, skill, and breadth of his interests merit more attention compared with what has been given to many a lesser figure. As an example, Ullmann discusses briefly Baconthorpe's treatment of papal sovereignty and the question whether and which decisions of a pope were revocable. For Baconthorpe, sovereignty and the problem of revocability/infallibility had nothing to do with each other. For his ideas in this area alone, Baconthorpe deserves further attention and study. Finally, J. Denton discusses the career and actions of a royal bishop, Walter Reynolds. The study shows how the churchmen in England were squeezed between the king and the pope in the early fourteenth century. Reynolds' career also revealed the split in the Church in England between those who were Church-oriented and those who came to the Church from royal service and still leaned in the latter direction. Denton presents the dilemma faced by churchmen who stressed their independence from royal control by claiming papal protection and therefore immunity from royal taxation and levies, only to be at the mercy "of the pope's especial right to tax their income virtually at will." When it is added that often this money was remitted to the king, the aphorism "the more things change the more they stay the same" seems amply vindicated.

All in all, this is a fine collection of studies of high quality and worth a careful reading.

*State University College, Fredonia, N.Y.*  Thomas E. Morrissey


Hooker's *Of the Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity* was written in defense of the constitution and doctrine of the Church of England at a time when Anglicans and Puritans feared the consequences of a possible Catholic
restoration—in the event of Mary Queen of Scots succeeding Elizabeth I. The menace from Rome did not drive Anglicans and Puritans into an alliance. Rather, the Puritans wished to safeguard against a Catholic takeover by transforming the Church of England along the lines of the Geneva model, with all that this implied for Church order, doctrine, and ceremonial, not to mention the royal supremacy. H. wrote his work to provide a thoroughgoing defense of the status quo, a defense which has since become a lasting historical and intellectual apologetic for the Anglican Church.

H.'s genius, it has often been observed, lies mainly in his method. For content he drew widely on the works of lesser-known contemporaries and he was steeped in the thought of the ancient philosophers (Oxford, where he was educated, was a stronghold of Aristotelianism in the sixteenth century) and in the writings of the Fathers, Aquinas, and the Schoolmen. He also had a wide knowledge of sixteenth-century political thought and of English constitutional and legal theory. He made full use of his wide-ranging learning not merely in defending the Erasmian Anglican Church but also in advancing (in an interesting ecumenical fashion) its universalist claims despite the diverse challenges of the Counter Reformation and the Puritans.

The first four books of H.'s Of the Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity were published in 1593; Book 5 was published in 1597. Hooker died in 1600. The last three books (6–8) disappeared from view and did not appear in print until the beginning of the seventeenth century. When these books did appear, they were found to challenge the “divine right of kings” theory and they denied the episcopacy was of divine law—it was of apostolic institution and usage only.

The established Church was embarrassed by H.'s views on these matters and by his ecumenical attitude, which ill-suited an era in which rumors of Catholic plots on institutions, sacred and otherwise, were rife. Izaak Walton published a life of Hooker in 1665 in which he accused the Puritans of having altered the content of the books in question with the connivance of Mrs. Hooker, an ill-tempered shrew who was never a suitable wife for the saintly scholar and who proved her malice by allowing her husband's enemies to tamper with his writings. This myth (for such it was) survived until 1940, when C. J. Sisson ingeniously disproved it and in so doing shook the foundations of Hooker scholarship. Blame for the delay in publishing the three books lay with the Anglican ecclesiastical establishment and notably Archbishop Laud. Obviously, since Of the Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity is a unitary work and meant to be read as such, acceptance of the final books as authentic raised questions regarding the statement of first principles and foundational ideas in the earlier books and their correct interpretation.
A basic requirement for any scholarly reassessment is the provision of an authentic text, but important scholarly reappraisal of Hooker's writings was carried on prior to the textual emendment which is proceeding with such distinction under the direction of W. Speed Hill. In 1972 the same scholar contributed to and edited *Studies in Richard Hooker: Essays Preliminary to an Edition of His Works*, in which Egil Gristis writes that "the interpretation of Hooker's thought is in its beginning stages—the basic problems have, if not been solved, at least defined—and something like an agenda for further study is before us" (167), but the volume also contains substantial contributions to Hooker scholarship and from a wide variety of disciplines. It makes clear that the ongoing task of Hooker reinterpretation is both specialized and diversified. All who are concerned can only be grateful to the institutions which endowed and to the experts who are accomplishing the production of the definitive text of Hooker's writings in accordance with the highest standards.

The descendants of Hooker's Puritan protagonists are treating him well in the land to which he helped drive them.

*St. John's University, N.Y.*

PAUL SURLIS


This publication of the writings of John Carroll is both long overdue and premature. As its organizer and first bishop, Carroll guided the formation of the American Catholic Church in the critical period from 1784 to 1815. In American Catholic history no figure is more significant. Had it not been for the suppression of the Society of Jesus, Carroll would likely have remained in Europe, where he had gone for his higher education, had joined the Society, and remained to teach in the colleges at Liège and Bruges. With the promulgation of *Dominus ac redemptor* in 1773, Carroll returned to an America on the brink of revolution and to a church whose members were still under civil disabilities and whose clergy (all ex-Jesuits) were disorganized and dispirited.

By 1784 Carroll had reorganized the clergy under a constitution and the following year Rome named him prefect apostolic. Five years later his fellow priests elected him bishop. His diocese, he once remarked, was without boundaries. By 1803 it stretched from Vermont to Louisiana. For thirty years he administered it, traveling by coach and boat, working eighteen-hour days, penning without a secretary responses (including copies) to his mounting volume of mail.

These papers reveal him as the giant which American Catholic tradition has made him out to be: an intelligent, broad-minded, patient yet decisive leader. He was an excellent polemicist, as Charles Wharton learned in
1784. Carroll regretted his own “cramped” education at Liège and was determined that Georgetown, which he founded in 1789, be a truly liberal college as well as the “main sheet anchor” of religion. The narrow outlook of many of his fellow Maryland clergy was one of the reasons for Carroll’s uneasiness about any precipitous restoration of the Society of Jesus. A man moderately influenced by the Enlightenment, Carroll was convinced that any revival of the Society had to include some alterations in its philosophy and government that would suit it better for “the great revolution in political establishments & principles” that had occurred in his lifetime.

Carroll championed as a model for the world the civil and religious liberties that followed the American Revolution. Such liberty, he hoped, “by giving a free circulation to fair argument,” would be “the most effectual method to bring all denominations of christians to an unity of faith” (1, 140). He wholeheartedly supported the separation of Church and state in America. To Carroll, government was essentially secular in nature; the success of republican government rested on its preservation of the liberty and property of its citizens, not on its promotion of the religious doctrines of churches.

As the Church was to be independent of state control in America, so too, in Carroll’s vision, was it to be relatively independent of control from Rome. The Church in America could not ignore its culture. Carroll favored the use of the vernacular in the liturgy and administration of the sacraments. He thought that in a republic bishops should be elected, not appointed by a papal congregation. Although he acknowledged papal infallibility (he preferred to express it as the infallibility of the Church), he nonetheless wished to limit papal authority to the spiritual realm. “Remember,” he once wrote his friend Charles Plowden, the “iniquities and oppression of such popes as Ganganelli [Clement XIV], & you will be careful to obey & respect their orders, within the line of their rightful jurisdiction, but not to extend it farther, which sooner or later always does harm” (1, 475).

Carroll was an ecclesial republican who believed in limited local self-government. He was against any “ecclesiastical democracy,” as his many struggles with trustees in New York, Philadelphia, Baltimore, and Charleston clearly show. A solid Federalist, he was dead set against “the levelling spirit of the times,” but as the Church in America rapidly changed from a Church of Maryland gentry to an immigrant Church, Carroll gracefully led it through the period of transition.

It seems obvious that these volumes were rushed out for the Bicentennial summer. That decision in several ways compromised the editor’s attempt to locate Carroll’s writings and accurately present them. Letters have been unaccountably omitted. The frequency of errors in transcribing
the papers increases markedly from the first volume to the third. The headings tend to be misleading (in one case egregiously, so, when it is suggested that the First Provincial Council was held in 1810). The identification of individuals is haphazard; some important names are never identified.

More serious is the unreliability of the notes. The mistakes are too many to correct here. Much of this seems the result of hasty editing. Ambrose Maréchal, for instance, is reported in one note (2, 416) as having returned to France in 1803 and having remained there until 1812. On p. 536 of the same volume, however, an emigrant French priest working in Louisiana in 1806 is identified as Maréchal. (It is clear from other letters that the reference of Carroll is to John Olivier.) Louis William Dubourg and Richard Luke Concanen are at times referred to by their first names and at other times by their middle ones. Concanen, the first prelate of New York, is once identified as “Michael Concanen, future bishop of Philadelphia” (2, 446). The index accordingly has references to “Louis Dubourg,” “William Dubourg,” “Richard Concanen,” “Luke Concanen,” and “Michael Concanen.”

Worst of all, no fewer than six times documents are unwittingly repeated. Thus, the draft of a letter to the Sulpician James Emery is given in English and French (2, 332-36) and a different translation of part of the same letter is reproduced some twenty pages later (2, 358-59) as a different document. The same letter to Robert Molyneux is given under a date of March 27, 1807 (2, 13-14) and under a date of March 27, 1808 (2, 50-51). A pastoral on peace is offered under an August 1809 date (2, 88-89) and then under the date of Sept. 5, 1812 (3, 197-198), with explanations under each reproduction for the choice of that date. The same double dating and reproduction is given to a Carroll sermon (3, 101-5; 3, 192-95). A Lenten pastoral is also repeated (3, 166-68; 3, 214-17). Finally, the letter-press copy of Carroll’s pastoral on the liberation of Pius VII is given (3, 279-83), immediately followed by a John Gilmary Shea transcript of a portion of the pastoral (3, 283-84). The editor notes that “there may have been a printed version.”

Carroll deserves better than the present edition of his writings. Until a thorough revision occurs, caveat lector.

Georgetown University

ROBERT EMMETT CURRAN, S.J.


Only recently has an understanding of church-state developments at the state level won the attention of scholars that it deserves. Anson Phelps Stokes in the first of his three volumes used limited studies in this area to provide the Supreme Court of the United States with material for
its customary historical background references. He lacked special studies like the one under review here. As a result, lawyers pleading distorted wall-of-separation cases carried the day, until more recently. To the more general reader, the value of this book is found where it throws light on this constitutional development.

B. leaves no doubt that the Jeffersonian-Madisonian formulation of separation by the process he discovers and its acceptance came as a result of their political astuteness. It is not clear to this reviewer that they reflected the prevailing consensus on religious-societal relationships. A striking vein in the documentation, however, shows that both the separationists and their opponents were together in one basic agreement. Few among them denied the axiom that public morality without religion was impossible. They only differed as to how government could best foster religion for this purpose. And this is not to limit the choices to two: direct aid to denominations or no positive encouragement to religion. Rather, those who supported the Jeffersonian formula did so with the understanding that there would be legislation to foster public morality and religious life as necessary to it. The direct-aid position of a Protestant Episcopal segment against Baptists and others sought to accomplish this end with the traditional means of an establishment in modified form.

This latter effort went on in all of the other states. A modification was arrived at in most of them without being forced to the solution Virginia came to in 1787. Profession of belief in God, Christianity, Protestantism, and/or other similar elements of exclusion in requirements for public office continued into the nineteenth century.

It was not this, however, but the thrust of Baptists and other evangelicals in the south who later brought about a practical establishment of Protestantism, at least in the area of public-school education. William G. McLaughlin, whose studies of the Baptists B. uses, in a Bicentennial essay (published after this book was in press) traced this impact of the first constitutions of the states, to which Virginia Baptists and others were not impervious by the exceptionable law of their state. Rather than this, the author calls attention to the blue laws in his final chapter on the evangelical spirit. In this context neat separationist distinctions blur. Evangelicals only went the route of using legislation and a public institution to promote their tradition, rather than be concerned with assessment for the clergy and professions of belief for officeholders.

In going to the schools, they were no worse (or better) than Jefferson himself. B., among many fresh and enlightening observations on him, notes that he looked to education to accomplish what "Christian state" sponsors wanted in the area of fostering public morality by means of religion. Jefferson would make a church of the school, but one of the deistical variety. The academic teaching of theology was respectably provided for in his plan for the University of Virginia. He has since
become the hierarch who decides which understanding of religion is constitutional and which is not. At the present time, perhaps, these and other ironies have brought more maturity in judgments of courts and legislatures as they deal with tuition grants unrestricted, academic building appropriations, etc.

Apart from these matters of more general interest, B.'s fresh research revises earlier scholarship, which left many of these and other matters too simply explained. Especially his extensive use of petitions to the legislature becomes not only revealing of the broad religious feeling of the times, but an explanation of how Virginia diverged from the other states in its church-state provisions. Since as many as a thousand citizens might sign these communications from a county to the legislature, there is a significant type of quantitative research in the study. The scribblings and legislative writings of Madison and Jefferson have heretofore had to be our fare. B. lets us hear from lesser voices in the legislature and in the counties. As a result, his central concern is highly illuminated and avenues to new areas are indicated.

This, however, could have been an unbearable burden (even to a specialist) to share in print with the reader. Instead, we have bright prose, replete with characterizations of his own and from the times, and concise summations of ideology and law. It was a particular grace to this reviewer to find rhetorical Virginia gentlemen paraphrased and aptly quoted with brevity where they deserved it.

Loyola College, Baltimore  

THOMAS O'BRIEN HANLEY


For decades historians have moaned over Southern religion as a neglected chapter of American religious history. With the appearance of Mathews' book, their moans of disgruntlement and ignorance will turn to groans of fatigue and frustration from having to wrestle with such a sinewy, agile, shrewd, sophisticated, and controversial study. Like C. Vann Woodward, M. probes the inner recesses of the Southern mind with deftness and sensitivity, exploring the fontanelles of its faith while monitoring the strong pulse of its vibrant psyche and muscling into comprehension its powerful physique. The South has finally redeemed its promise to rise again—this time in scholarship and self-understanding, as it has already risen in politics, religion, culture, and self-esteem. Our understanding of American Protestantism will never be quite the same.

M. does just about whatever one would not expect the historian of
Southern religion to do. He uses the notoriously unco-operative and wearisome sources of local church records to great profit. He gives Southerners the benefit of the doubt without displaying defensiveness or groveling in guilt. He steadfastly insists that Southern evangelicalism be understood as a transracial phenomenon. Most surprising is M.'s featuring of the message of liberty as central to an understanding of Southern evangelicalism.

M. defines evangelicalism in sociological terms, which is both the book's greatest strength and its greatest weakness. Evangelicalism is what evangelicalism did, and what it did was to provide a rising lower-middle/middle class which saw itself as "Disallowed Indeed of Men, but Chosen of God, and Precious" (chap. 1), with mechanisms for legitimation amid a highly stratified class system and establishment religion. Evangelicals created new modes of social organization with standards of respectability and self-worth based not on the old distinctions of purse, power, or prestige but on the new distinctions of what it meant to be "An Enlightened and Refined People" (chap. 3), namely, liberty, purity, and community. The debate over evangelicalism's social boundaries constricted the concept of liberty until antislavery activity was either confined to the desire "To Set in Order the Things That are Wanting" (chap. 2) or to the belief that "We Who Own Slaves Honor God's Law" (chap. 4). Black evangelicalism, however, always kept a sense of "The Trumpet Sounds within—a My Soul" (chap. 5), thus serving both to develop and later to rehabilitate Southern evangelicalism to its original function, which was "To Proclaim Liberty to the Captives" (chap. 6).

M.'s functional definition of Southern religion provides numerous provocative insights. First, evangelicalism enjoyed a love-hate relationship with the world, rebuking "the world" not so much to repudiate it as to convert and control it through pious example, establishing Southern colleges and professionalizing the clergy. Second, evangelicalism was not an individualistic religion but a deeply social one, welcoming converts who stepped from a cold and chaotic world into the warmth of a caring, intimate, disciplined, and orderly community. Third, the gradual reduction of the community to the family enhanced the importance of evangelical women to Southern society. Fourth, evangelicalism was built not by revivalism but by pastoral care, preaching, and small-group support systems. M. sees conversion as an initiatory rite into the adult religious community, and the standard distinction between crisis and gradual conversions collapses in M.'s stress on the catechetics of conversion taught by evangelical parents, whose efforts most often culminated during revivals. Finally, boundary maintenance aided denominations in their "paradoxical roles as integrative and restrictive institutions." The estab-
lishing of a strong sense of group identity, loyalty, and self-confidence enabled evangelicals to reach without fear across denominational lines in co-operative ventures.

Unfortunately, the bloodlines and charts of M.’s genealogical expedition into the ancestry of Southern religion are almost exclusively sociological and behavioral, not theological. It is a matter of historical happenstance that blacks developed a “sense of ultimate justice” under Protestantism. M. believes the results would have been the same under other religions. Theological differentiation within evangelicalism is rendered unimportant, as is exemplified in his homogenization of evangelical views on holiness. Shoving aside Timothy Smith, M. argues that both the slaveholding and antislavery ethic were equally natural and logical extensions of evangelicalism—though how this could be if liberty were the central concept is left unclear. The recitation of socioeconomic changes alone is deemed sufficient to explain the shift in evangelicalism from a repudiation of old methods of climbing the socioeconomic ladder, to substitution of a new ladder for the upwardly mobile, and then to the return to the worldly ladder by the 1850’s, when evangelicalism shed its cell-group mentality for a Southern main-street religiosity.

One finishes reading this book with a relish for more, which is a high compliment to the author. M. might have made more of the lack of theologians or prophets within evangelicalism, and the filling of that vacuum by a star system of celebrity converts and a worship of “wowism.” He might also have developed further the narcissistic element in Southern religion, although it might have contradicted his argument against juxtaposing evangelicalism with individualism. The concern for personal security, self-discipline, insular accountability, pastoral popularity, and a general preoccupation with self within community suggests a community which exists for the individual, not individuals who exist for the community. Camp meetings receive unduly skimpy treatment, and M.’s dismissal of voluntaryism from his discussion is unsatisfying, especially his substituting in its place the unsubstantial concept of “participation.”

Two features of the book are particularly bothersome: the expectation that the reader will accept much on faith in the way of documentation, and the strange omission of most secondary sources except those dissertations which the author directed, most particularly the complete neglect of the work on Southern racism by H. Shelton Smith, the stimulating treatment of black evangelicalism by Milton Sernett, and the insights on the Great Awakening by Rhys Issac. Yet, for anyone who wishes to dig up the roots of two of the most powerful religious movements of our day, evangelicalism and black religion, this study is indispensable; for despite its weakness in acknowledging secondary sources, Mathews’ book is both a work of great synthesis and great originality.

_Rochester Center for Theological Studies_  
LEONARD I. SWEET

Hughes was not a man for all seasons but only for the one in which he was called to act. He perceived correctly that the task of an American bishop in the period 1840–60 was not to build cathedrals but bridgeheads. He saw that the Church in the United States must be firmly rooted; the full blossoming he himself would not witness.

So he fought, with zest, for the right of his dominantly Irish Catholic immigrant people to practice their religion unmolested in their churches. This right was being violently challenged. He fought to protect Catholic children from Protestant religious proselytism in the public schools. This danger was very real. He insisted that Catholics in this country be recognized as loyal Americans. He asserted strenuously the authority of the Church over its lay membership and priests. He gave to the Catholic Church, in the eyes of the American society, dignity and grounds for respect.

He was marked by a quality of rawness, but at that time so was the nation. In his polemics he often overstated, was ponderous, and lacked depth. But that was the most effective way to talk to Protestant Whigs and Democrats of the 1840's and 1850's, whose virtues did not include elegance and intellectual sophistication.

This biography is, all angles considered, a success. It provides a sufficiently in-depth portrait of Hughes and of several of his clerical and lay contemporaries, including his close friend William H. Seward and his opponents Horace Greeley and James Gordon Bennett. It evokes vividly the atmosphere of the age. It is a valuable commentary on the public-schools-versus-Catholics issue of the 1840's. (Hughes was here forced into the paradoxical position of opposing the teaching of religion in the public schools, since it was being carried on via the Protestant Bible and constant sniping at Catholic doctrine.) We are given also a running account of the parish-trustees controversy, and the continuing polemical battles occasioned by the incredible anti-Catholic bigotry. One might wish for a further exploration not made in the book: Hughes's achievements and manner set in comparison with those of other great American Catholic bishops, such as England and Spalding.

The book has some flaws of style, none of them fatal to its over-all competence. First, the frequent use of colloquialisms. My inclination here is to be liberal rather than conservative. It is important, however, that the colloquialism, if employed, be appropriate to the time and particular culture to which it refers. It is, e.g., not likely that an American Whig of 1840 would speak of someone "putting his money where his mouth was" (234), or of having "swung from the gut while fighting" (243). Occasionally, too, S. succumbs to the lure of the smart phrase: "The audience,
along with a great deal of hot air, was released from the [city] council chamber” (156). There are some overdramatizations: “He [Hughes] whipped [by a scolding sermon] the parishioners to the back walls” (227) or “he [Hughes] climbed into the ring with [his debate opponent, the Reverend Nicholas] Murray” (255).

A lesson derivable from this history? What is improper for one epoch is not necessarily so for another. The authoritarianism of John Hughes in disciplinary and doctrinal matters would sit ill with today's Catholics. But he was not performing today. He was the head of a fledgling American Catholic Church which, from within and without, was under vicious attack. The call was not for gentleness or ecumenism, but for strength and affirmation of Catholic identity. Hughes met that need.

Georgetown University

J. T. Durkin, S.J.


In this 1972 dissertation from McGill University, A. argues for a “foundational enquiry” as a critical base for theology and then outlines such an investigation based upon Polanyi's theory of cognition. The issue for the author is the validation of religious belief and the proper frame in which that may be accomplished. He asserts that the personal involvement which religious faith requires for its validation is not fundamentally different in kind from that demanded and entailed within other kinds of human knowing. It simply occurs at a different level.

The text falls into two parts. The first four chapters describe P.'s interpretation of human knowing, his critique of the “ideal” observational objectivity of the Enlightenment (chap. 2); his constructive cognitional theory (chap. 3); and the ontological referents entailed by that theory, a development ontology, and the consequent ordering of the levels of being (chap. 4). In chap. 5, A. briefly (155-87) argues for religion and theology as the proper outcome of the logic of the human condition. It is a daunting set of issues, given the occasionally shifting character of P.'s terminology and the philosophical clarity required to treat all these issues well. In a short space, A. succeeds at both, although the constructive section probably raises more questions than it answers and suffers from the narrowness imposed by the dissertation format.

According to P., human knowing is not simply a matter of an uninvolved subject quantifying an object “outside” the knower. Rather there is always, even in the “hardest” science, a “tacit” knowing which involves the subject in the intended object. All knowing is interpretation; and the ultimate frame of interpretation includes the tacit “personal ability” of the knower. The validation of knowing is within this tacit horizon, which
implicitly refers to the entire universe of knowledge. This personal frame encompasses all articulated positions: perceptual, historical, and linguistic. These articulations can themselves become "background" when a different focus is required. Articulated knowledge never exhausts the tacit dimension of knowing. One always knows more than one can tell.

The relation of this tacit knowing to the articulated formulations is the origin of human purpose. One intends the whole implicitly in all articulations; and this intending is in principle unending. This A. describes as a dimension of ultimacy. It is this teleology which is also the basis of P.'s notion of truth. Truth is the relation between the personal affirmation with universal intent (tacit) and the objective real (the various interpretive articulations). A. feels justified in describing this process as an ontology of cognition. One achieves the "real."

A. is aware that this notion of the real is somewhat slippery (131-45). It can be described as a historical heuristic isomorphism between knower and known, in which each is shaped by the other. In the natural sciences such correlation between subject and object is minimal; the enactment of the subject's being in knowing an inanimate object is only partial. But in human sciences, especially in religion, different aspects of "encounter" are the proper mode of knowing. Human knowing moves from the mysterious tacit background of a focal object to a focus upon the Mystery of the Unknown (and tacit) itself. This final movement raises the question of religion.

Just as each mode of knowing demands a personal ability for its achievement, so too religious knowing requires a commensurate frame. But to focus the Ultimate cannot be an achievement of the knower alone; religious faith, if it is to have a meaning, must be a "breaking out" to the Sacred, indeed a gift of the Sacred. Cognition declares an ambiguity in the resolution of this motion; only faith can provide both a proper content and frame. Because one cannot focus on the tacit except by indirection, religious knowing must be achieved in a concrete tradition. One knows the Sacred through a "fiduciary framework," such that religious knowing becomes conversion to a particular religious tradition.

The validation of this religious knowing is accomplished in the same way as in any other personal knowing; its ultimate frame is a "personal ability," here the gift of faith. Theology as a reflective understanding of a religious knowing examines the historical and empirical claims made by religion, but always refers to the experience of faith and its articulations as its final norm. Truth or falsity of religious referents, therefore, is not a matter of Enlightenment verification of extrinsic objects, but the authenticity or inauthenticity of the religious subject as claimed by the divine subject (172).

Even if one does not grant all of P.'s cognitional theory (this reader
finds problematic, e.g., the "tacit-articulate" teleology and its highly metaphorical expression [facing Kant's Critique of teleological judgment and its analysis of the sublime and the beautiful might have proven helpful at this point]), one must recognize that the discussion concerning the construction of foundational theology is here fairly joined. Does one need faith or not for the verification of religious referents? Is the performance of the interpreter involved in the process of interpretation, such that in religious interpretation and foundational theology the faith of the interpreter must be activated? If so, then interpreters can only "bracket" a particular religious tradition they may hold; or they can enter into a thoroughgoing dialectic with nonbelievers in which their interpretations are also at risk. But one must also ask whether the subject's performance within theology does bypass the question of referential truth, as A. seems to indicate. Is it necessary to place the question of truth/falsity primarily within the realm of the tacit?

The value of such a fine dissertation is that it begins a career. A. makes quite clear that the issue is a matter of cognitional theory. P.'s entire framework may not serve, but A.'s foundational theology recognizes the one significant moment in that argument: the ideal of knowing. That idea provides a clear alternative mode upon which to argue for foundational theology.

Catholic University of America

STEPHEN HAPPEL


The widespread respect and affection enjoyed by the author of this posthumously published work were evident at his funeral following his unexpected death in December 1973. This drew fully fifteen hundred people to St. Louis from all over North America. Prominent amongst the mourners was a large delegation of top military brass, paying tribute to Piepkorn's eleven years as an Army chaplain (including three years as senior chaplain in occupied Germany). The solemn requiem Eucharist was celebrated with the antique Catholic vestments and baroque ceremonial which Roman Catholics have consigned to the dustbin of history, and included a ringing panegyric complete with citations from Martin Luther in German and hailing the deceased as the first victim of the heresy hunt then approaching its climax in the Lutheran Church Missouri Synod.

An anima naturaliter catholica who was addressed by generations of
Copyright and Use:

As an ATLAS user, you may print, download, or send articles for individual use according to fair use as defined by U.S. and international copyright law and as otherwise authorized under your respective ATLAS subscriber agreement.

No content may be copied or emailed to multiple sites or publicly posted without the copyright holder(s)’ express written permission. Any use, decompiling, reproduction, or distribution of this journal in excess of fair use provisions may be a violation of copyright law.

This journal is made available to you through the ATLAS collection with permission from the copyright holder(s). The copyright holder for an entire issue of a journal typically is the journal owner, who also may own the copyright in each article. However, for certain articles, the author of the article may maintain the copyright in the article. Please contact the copyright holder(s) to request permission to use an article or specific work for any use not covered by the fair use provisions of the copyright laws or covered by your respective ATLAS subscriber agreement. For information regarding the copyright holder(s), please refer to the copyright information in the journal, if available, or contact ATLA to request contact information for the copyright holder(s).

About ATLAS:

The ATLA Serials (ATLAS®) collection contains electronic versions of previously published religion and theology journals reproduced with permission. The ATLAS collection is owned and managed by the American Theological Library Association (ATLA) and received initial funding from Lilly Endowment Inc.

The design and final form of this electronic document is the property of the American Theological Library Association.
finds problematic, e.g., the "tacit-articulate" teleology and its highly
metaphoric expression [facing Kant's Critique of teleological judgment
and its analysis of the sublime and the beautiful might have proven
helpful at this point]), one must recognize that the discussion concerning
the construction of foundational theology is here fairly joined. Does one
need faith or not for the verification of religious referents? Is the perform­
one of the interpreter involved in the process of interpretation, such that
in religious interpretation and foundational theology the faith of the
interpreter must be activated? If so, then interpreters can only "bracket"
a particular religious tradition they may hold; or they can enter into a
thoroughgoing dialectic with nonbelievers in which their interpretations
are also at risk. But one must also ask whether the subject's performance
within theology does bypass the question of referential truth, as A. seems
to indicate. Is it necessary to place the question of truth/falsity primarily
within the realm of the tacit?

The value of such a fine dissertation is that it begins a career. A. makes
quite clear that the issue is a matter of cognitional theory. P.'s entire
framework may not serve, but A.'s foundational theology recognizes the
one significant moment in that argument: the ideal of knowing. That idea
provides a clear alternative mode upon which to argue for foundational
theology.

Catholic University of America

Stephen Happel

Profiles in Belief: The Religious Bodies of the United
States and Canada 1: Roman Catholic, Old Catholic, Eastern
Pp. 324. $15.95.

The widespread respect and affection enjoyed by the author of this
posthumously published work were evident at his funeral following his
unexpected death in December 1973. This drew fully fifteen hundred
people to St. Louis from all over North America. Prominent amongst the
mourners was a large delegation of top military brass, paying tribute to
Piepkorn's eleven years as an Army chaplain (including three years as
senior chaplain in occupied Germany). The solemn requiem Eucharist
was celebrated with the antique Catholic vestments and baroque cere­
monial which Roman Catholics have consigned to the dustbin of history,
and included a ringing panegyric complete with citations from Martin
Luther in German and hailing the deceased as the first victim of the
heresy hunt then approaching its climax in the Lutheran Church Missouri
Synod.

An anima naturaliter catholica who was addressed by generations of
students as "Father," P. combined unswerving loyalty to the Lutheran "symbolical books" (credal statements), on which he was an acknowledged expert, with rejection of the label "protestant" as uncompromising as that of any Anglo-Catholic. At his death he left behind an unfinished manuscript of some three thousand pages on the religious bodies of North America. The task of editing and completing P.'s lifework has been undertaken, in a spirit of filial piety, by his erstwhile colleague John H. Tietjen, president formerly of Concordia Seminary and now of its offshoot, Christ Seminary-Seminex. The work under review is the first of seven projected volumes.

It is a curious book, neither a mere work of reference nor a conventional survey or handbook. Despite the limitations expressed in this volume's title, it describes the beliefs of no less than seventy-five religious bodies. These range from well-known groups such as the Roman Catholic Church and the major Orthodox bodies, all the way to the often exotic creations of recent decades, whose frequently grandiose titles attempt, not always successfully, to conceal that their sole place of worship may be a storefront in Brooklyn or Los Angeles, and that some of them lack even the most rudimentary infrastructure. P. takes the stated beliefs of all these bodies, no matter how bizarre, with equal seriousness.

Assembling much of this information has been in itself a task of enormous difficulty, as is evident from the repeated concluding notation: "Recent efforts to make contact with the church have been unsuccessful." P.'s resourcefulness in some of these forays into the ecclesial wild blue yonder is manifest in his acknowledgment, at one point, of assistance from the Anti-Rackets Branch of the Ontario Provincial Police in obtaining information about "His Holiness, Claudius I, Universal Patriarch" of "The Old Roman Catholic Church (Orthodox Orders)." (This colorful prelate was convicted of fraud and perjury in 1970.)

Catholic readers will be most interested in the ninety-five pages (almost a third of the book) devoted to their own church. In a well-executed Introduction, Harry McSorley clearly identifies the limitations and shortcomings of P.'s presentation, while paying deserved tribute to his accuracy and fairness. These qualities will be evident at once to anyone who reads the sections on papal infallibility and Mariology. Not once does P. yield to the temptation to score theological debating points. And he goes out of his way to include summaries of the most "reasonable" interpretations of papal and Marian doctrines by progressive Catholic theologians since Vatican II.

Opinions are bound to differ about the value of the severely compressed account of Catholic theologians and their ideas from twenty centuries. But the careful reader cannot fail to note the accuracy of P.'s presenta-
tion. How many teachers in Catholic seminaries are as well informed as P., this reviewer was forced to ask himself, even about their own tradition? This question indicates the magnitude of the task still confronting Catholic ecumenism, as well as an important cause of continuing inner-Catholic disarray.

St. Louis University

JOHN JAY HUGHES


A respected Catholic philosopher in Italy, T. has studied Scotus (Lo spirito cristiano della filosofia di G. Duns Scoto [Rome: Abete, 1975]) and written on the Christian-Marxist dialogue (Marx tra Dio e l'uomo [Florence: Città di Vita, 1974]; Marx e la religione [Rome: Città Nuova, 1976]) at a time when Eurocommunism offers a tempting political option. Many ultraconservative groups have criticized him severely for the latter involvement. The contention of this volume is that the classical, integralist vision of truth has been lost to Western culture, which can do no more than cope with a multidimensional approach. The various attempts (scientific, historical, phenomenological, etc.) unfortunately espouse exclusivist claims which tend to make them as irrelevant, vague, and ideological as their exclusivism of each other increases. An irenic and interdisciplinary approach should offer more fruitful heuristic results. To propose such a project, T. chooses criteria (chaps. 1–2) from three models (Popper's scientific epistemology, Marx's historical hermeneutics, and Heidegger's existential metaphysics), applies them to Bonaventure's system (chaps. 3–5), and finally suggests a form of historical hermeneutics (chaps. 6–7).

Popper's principle of falsifiability (a solution must be ready to demonstrate how it can be shown erroneous) and Hume's law (description does not warrant prescription) permit T. to insist on the principle of demarcation in all hermeneutical language. They serve to distinguish what is truly hermeneutical from what is ideological and empirically self-enclosed. Thus development and disclosure are assured and absolutizing tendencies revealed. Granted that these principles do not function univocally in the natural sciences and the humanities, they clarify nonetheless the subject-object relationship and help us understand that theory precedes observation. The Marxist reading of history is a good example of this. As a concrete hermeneutics, it takes seriously the worker's sociopolitical and economic situation, implying that ideas and symbols have created his condition. Heideggerian existentialism, unlike Marxism, safeguards reality from all self-serving ideologies.

Evaluating Bonaventure's system, T. concludes that his assumptions

The latest collection of Hauerwas' essays advances the discussion of a project central to his previous writings: the construction of an intellectually sound Christian ethics which can be both perceptive of the moral dimensions of issues in contemporary society and faithful to the message of the Gospels. H. locates the starting point for such a project in Christian convictions about God, Jesus Christ, and the nature of human existence. The work which a moral theologian does in a community shaped by these convictions is to show how they function as constitutive features for both the theory and the practice of the Christian moral life.

In the context of this understanding of the work of the moral theologian, H. focuses upon three issues through which he explores how Christian convictions can and should function as constitutive. The first is how they can help shape an adequate account of moral rationality; the second is how they enable us to understand the interdependence of community and truthfulness; the third is how the Christian conviction that life is a gift lived within the limits of finitude has consequences for the development of the moral skill to care effectively for the retarded and the dying.

H. conducts the exploration of all three issues skilfully; in my judgment, the discussion of moral rationality is of greatest import. H. develops the notion of "story" as a way of getting critical purchase upon the standard philosophical account of moral rationality. This notion enables him to make a convincing case that this account represents the philosophical version of the narrative which has dominated Western culture since the Enlightenment: the story of the solitary individual confronting decisions armed only with the power of free choice. H. takes moral philosophers to task for not seeing that the procedures they propose for insuring rational moral choice are dependent upon this narrative, which leaves no room for the historical and social features of human moral reason and which to that extent falsifies the nature of human existence.

The notion of story functions well as an analytic tool for locating major problems with the standard account of moral rationality; its use appears more problematic for determining—either in theory or in practice—which narrative or set of narratives has normative force for the stories which engage the lives of individuals and communities. H. seems on the right track for dealing with this issue when he suggests that such normative force should be connected with the possibility of making claims to truth for the distinctive shape and commitments of Christian life. It is easy enough to see what narrative has normative force for the stories of Christians, namely, the narrative which shapes Christian convictions, that of God’s dealing with his people of the Old and New Covenants. H. affirms the truth of that narrative, yet he is reluctant to extend its
normative force to those whose convictions have not been shaped by it. It nonetheless seems that one cannot present as fully plausible and adequate this alternate account of moral rationality unless it is legitimate to make normative for everyone at least those elements of the Christian narrative which challenge the convictions which shape the standard account. H.’s position has, in my judgment, the resources for dealing with this problem, but they need sharper focus and more extended development.

The essays which focus upon particular issues such as population control, euthanasia, the relation of the Church to politics, and the care of retarded children, all show clearly how attention to Christian convictions in the narrative context which shapes our lives is necessary to bring to light the features of those issues which are crucial for the formation of our moral judgments and practices.

Marquette University

PHILIP J. ROSSI, S.J.


The first two chapters of Human Sexuality deal with the scriptural and historical background of Christian sexual morality. Since the present reviewer is not a Scripture scholar, he is in no position to assess the interpretations of Scripture presented in the first chapter. Even an amateur, of course, can agree that the Scriptures are not a manual of Judeo-Christian sexual ethics, but this in no way implies that they have nothing to say about sexual conduct that would be pertinent. Scripture scholars, for instance, seem to be in agreement that the procreative and unitive meaning of sex, which the authors of the report abandon with surprising ease, are quite clear in Scripture. They refuse also to allow all condemnations of deviant sex conduct to be reduced to simple cultic requirements or to be so culturally bound as to be inapplicable to our times.

The chapter on the Christian tradition is enlightening as far as it goes, but it is so brief and sketchy that one wonders whether it does justice to the development that took place. If the history of Christian sexuality had been written, and this was presented as a summary, one would have felt more secure about it. But since no such history has been written, one can have legitimate misgivings about the reliability of the coverage.

The study of the empirical sciences in chap. 3 seems to show that although all cultures have had sexual taboos, there is no specific sexual behavior that has not been permitted in some culture. The authors would agree, of course, that one cannot construct a least-common-denominator
sexual morality, allowing any sexual conduct some culture in the past permitted. Before a specific kind of sexual conduct could be approved, its effects on the people would have to be studied. But the authors admit that there is “insufficient data even to begin answering this question.” It would appear, then, that one cannot expect much positive help, at least presently, from the empirical sciences in assessing sexual conduct. But I have the impression that the authors tend to exploit the lack of empirical data in dealing with such questions as adultery.

The key chapter is the fourth. It is here that the authors present their fundamental sexual morality. The most radical move they make, and the one which is basic to their whole approach, is to depart from the procreative and unitive meaning of sex, as set down in Genesis and emphasized anew in Vatican II, and to adopt for sex what they call a creative and integrative goal. They assert that this is justified by the broader concept of sex prevalent today. Most will agree with the authors that human sexuality transcends what is commonly called sexual activity, but there is considerable controversy over the influence of sexuality on other activity. There are some today who would want to say that gender, or psychological sex, is more closely related to culture than to physical sex. But even supposing that a person's sex affects his practice of justice, his religion, and even the kinds of love that exist apart from marriage, e.g., parent-child love, love of neighbor, etc., whatever moral problems arise in these areas will be problems of justice, religion, etc., not problems of sexual morality as such. But whatever the validity of the alleged reason for adopting a new norm, the authors are clearly not interested in the relation of sex to other activity. What they are interested in is sexual (genital) activity in the strict sense and the love that relates to it, and it is to make allowance for this kind of sexual activity outside of marriage that they depart from the more demanding norm of Genesis and Vatican II. The goal substituted by the report is meant to remove any essential connection between this kind of sexual activity and procreation, and even marital love. It is precisely by abandoning these ties that the authors of the report liberate sex and free it up for activity outside of marriage.

No one can fault creative and integrative growth as a moral norm, but by itself it is about as helpful as the norm that one must do good and avoid evil. Nor do the so-called second-level goals (sex must be self-liberating, other-enriching, etc.) throw much more light on sexual conduct. The authors profess to stand by traditional sexual prohibitions (against adultery, fornication, masturbation, etc.) but their shift away from the procreative and unitive goal of sex undermines them to the point that they are left hanging in mid-air. In the guidelines in chap. 5, the authors are hard put to find any kind of deviant conduct that will not at times contribute to growth. The only area where they show some
diffidence is bestiality. In another sense, however, they show more restraint in dealing with these prohibitions than their principles would demand, but this has to be due to a lingering psychological attachment to them more than any logical necessity.

In dealing with the traditional prohibitions, the authors claim to be following those theologians who maintain that such acts as fornication, adultery, etc., constitute ontic evil (because they go against the procreative and unitive norm of sex) but become moral evil only if engaged in without a proportionate reason. This is really not a valid claim. The authors of this report cannot consider such acts evil until they decide whether they contribute to growth, and once they decide that they do not contribute to growth, they look at them as morally evil. Nowhere do they imply that a proportionate reason will justify a sex act that does not contribute to growth. Their growth norm seems to be clearly an absolute norm.

More than half the report is devoted to a revision of the traditional prohibitions against deviant sex. This imbalance, unfortunately, gives a very negative cast to the report and lays it open to the charge of presenting a minimal morality. In making their revisions, the authors admittedly depart from past theological tradition and Church teaching, but they agree that the positions they take are tentative. One would not object if these opinions were presented to stimulate discussion among qualified people, but the prudence of offering such unsupported positions as pastoral guidelines has to be questioned. While one can appreciate and sympathize with the spirit of compassion motivating the authors, one can only fear that the report will accomplish little more than add to the bewilderment and confusion of the beleaguered pastors and troubled penitents they are trying to help.

Loyola University of Chicago

JOHN R. CONNERY, S.J.


This is an updated edition of a book entitled Counseling the Invert published by C. in 1966. Although he does not say so explicitly, the change in the title seems to be due to some current ambiguity about the meaning of the word “invert.” C. defines homosexuality as a persistent, preadolescent state in which the sexual object is a person of the same sex and in which there is a concomitant aversion or abhorrence, in varying degrees, to sexual relations with the other sex. To C., homosexuality is not a disease in the strict sense but a developmental disorder. He estimates, however, that there is a high incidence of psychiatric disorder among homosexuals because of the pressures they are under, so he
recommends that those engaged in pastoral counseling encourage their clients to seek psychiatric help. Given its present mood, the gay community (or at least its more vocal members) is not likely to welcome this recommendation.

This second edition of the book was written in collaboration with John F. Harvey, O.S.F.S. H. contributed the chapters on changes of nomenclature and contemporary theological views. The chapter on nomenclature deals with the recent vote of the American Psychiatric Association to remove homosexuality from its list of mental diseases. Although the vote in no way showed a consensus among psychiatrists, it was in favor of substituting a category called "sexual orientation disturbance." While this category is still directed mainly at homosexuals, it is limited to those who either are bothered by, are in conflict with, or wish to change their orientation. H. finds this change both a blessing and a curse. The blessing is that it will remove a reason for discriminating unjustly against homosexuals. The curse is that it may confuse the adolescent whose psychosexual development is still ambiguous and can be corrected. H. also sees the danger that the action of the APA will be overinterpreted. Some will want to argue that since homosexuality is not a disease, it is an optional way of life. H. maintains rightly that it is a mistake to confuse mental health with morality.

In the chapter on contemporary theological views, H. deals specifically with the opinions of John McNeill, Gregory Baum, and Charles Curran. All of these authors want to make some limited allowance for homosexual activity for those with a homosexual orientation. H. is critical of all three positions and holds to the traditional stance that sexual activity is permissible only in a context in which it can be related to procreation. C. himself does not make a moral statement, but it is quite clear that he is not in sympathy with the newer positions. He comments that he is "not sure of the psychodynamics" of Curran's allowance and that McNeill's book is "replete with rationalizations and wishful thinking."

Generally speaking, C.'s psychiatric views regarding homosexuality have not changed between the first and second edition. They clearly continue to be based on a traditional moral position. Treatment of the homosexual should not be satisfied with the goal of self-acceptance, but should be aimed at cure. As a lesser goal, he would accept an amelioration of the homosexual's attitude toward heterosexuality, even with no change in homosexual orientation. Self-acceptance could be a minimal goal, but only with the decision to remain abstinent. Pastorally, C. sometimes takes a harder line than the Principles to Guide Confessors in Questions of Homosexuality recently published by the National Council of Catholic Bishops. For instance, the Principles, recognizing the need the homosexual has for companionship, allow for friendships even with those of the
same orientation. C. argues that a friendship which involves a sexual attraction will be a source of anxiety and frustration even if the homosexual remains continent.

Counseling the Homosexual will be reassuring to those who have been disturbed or confused by the new thinking about the morality of homosexual activity. It is not likely to be popular in the active gay community.

Loyola University, Chicago

JOHN R. CONNERY, S.J.


The last year has witnessed a proliferation of anthologies in the relatively new field of bioethics. There have been virtually no works devoted to the task of reflecting on a range of new biomedical developments from a specific philosophical or theological viewpoint. M.'s book, therefore, is a welcome addition to this latter genre, taking its place alongside such earlier works as Häring's Medical Ethics and Nelson's Human Medicine.

M. offers his reflections on the meaning of human life in its beginning, its care, and its end, in the light of contemporary developments in the biomedical sciences. He does so by articulating his understanding of human existence and human acts grounded in Christian faith and taught by the Roman Catholic Church. While limitations of space preclude him from dealing with the entire field of bioethics, M. does discuss such crucial current issues as experimentation on human subjects; beginning human life; sterilization and contraception; screening fetuses and abortion; genetic therapy, genetic counseling, and responsible family planning; care of the dying (the ethics of euthanasia); and death, dying, and organ donation. All of these specific issues are discussed on the basis of principles laid down in the introductory chapter, "Christian Faith, Human Existence and Human Acts."

Basic to M.'s ethics are the following: (1) actions as revelatory of one's being and as shaping one's identity; (2) man as an image of a God who, while He may permit evil, never directly wills evil; (3) respect for the other as a being of moral worth; (4) the unitive and procreative meaning of all sexual activity; (5) a rejection of any latent dualism that considers the body as not a part of integral human nature; (6) a repudiation of the "proportionate good" ethics and consequentialism of some contemporary ethicists. On the basis of these and other principles, M. rejects such innovative procedures as artificial insemination (both AID and AIH), in vitro fertilization, and cloning. Artificial contraception, abortion (including during the preimplantation period), direct sterilization, direct euthanasia, and suicide are similarly unacceptable.
Throughout the book M. carries on a running dialogue with other contemporary medical ethicists. He generally finds himself more at home with the thought of Ramsey and Grisez than with that of Häring, McCormick, or Maguire. For example, M. severely criticizes Häring's article in this journal (37 [1976] 120-32) in which a relationship was alleged to exist between the exercise of periodic abstinence and the incidence of spontaneous abortions and genetically defective offspring; M. analyzes McCormick's position on proxy consent for nontherapeutic experimentation on children and finds it wanting; and he rejects Maguire's endorsement of euthanasia as a reprehensible example of a "proportionate ethics" run wild.

The reader is challenged to agreement or disagreement on every page. For example, on the Supreme Court of New Jersey decision in the Karen Quinlan case, M. says: "I believe the . . . ruling is a legalization of the ethics of euthanasia, or at least a step in that direction. . . . To establish (consciousness, cognitiveness, and sapientness) as absolutely determinative is a serious error" (151-52). On the treatment of the irreversibly terminal patient, M. is more explicit than many Catholic ethicists when he states that for such a patient further extraordinary treatment not only is not morally obligatory but that it would be morally wrong in such a case to begin or continue such treatment (150, 165).

Though M. breaks little new ground, the traditional Roman Catholic position is presented with clarity and logic. Even where one might on occasion disagree with M.'s conclusions (because one disagrees with his premises), it is always evident where he stands and why, a quality in short supply in some other current writing in bioethics.

King's College, Wilkes-Barre, Pa. JAMES J. DOYLE, C.S.C.


Abortion in America is largely a historical study of the development of legislation against abortion during the nineteenth century. The study shows that at the beginning of the century statutes against abortion were nonexistent. The basis for judicial procedure against abortion was English common law. This was interpreted to limit the crime of abortion to one induced after "quickening." M. becomes somewhat vague at this point, but the notion of quickening was initially associated by Aristotle with the presence of motus in the fetus, or with its formation, which he said could be verified in a male fetus aborted after 40 days. It was at this time, according to Aristotle, that the human soul was infused. M. says that the idea of "quickening" appears to have come into English common law
"from the tangled disputes of medieval theologians over whether or not an impregnated ovum possessed a soul." The notion did come into common law through the _Summa_ of Raymond of Penafort, but by that time the Aristotelian opinion was long accepted and not the subject of dispute. Nor could the "impregnated ovum" have come into any dispute occurring at that time, since the human ovum was not discovered until the early nineteenth century. Somehow, in English common law, "quickening" became associated with the pregnant woman’s first experience of fetal movements, which occurred long after the fetus was "animated" in the Aristotelian sense. This new meaning of the term may have served some legal function, but it had nothing to do with the beginnings of human life in the Aristotelian tradition. At any rate, the first abortion statute (Connecticut, 1821) did not punish abortion induced before quickening in this legal sense. A few states during this period did punish abortion without reference to quickening, but for the most part, whether by statute or judicial decision, abortion was not punished unless induced after quickening. In this early period, abortion does not seem to have been a common practice and was limited largely to young women out of wedlock who got into trouble.

The second wave of abortion legislation in the country, which was sponsored, according to M., mostly by so-called regular physicians, tended to drop the limitation to the quickened fetus and penalized all abortion, although perhaps grading the penalty according to the development of the fetus. By the beginning of the twentieth century abortion was generally proscribed throughout the United States. Another development that took place was the introduction of statutory law that would penalize the mother herself as well as third parties for inducing abortion. During this latter half of the nineteenth century abortion appears to have become a more common practice resorted to even by married women as a means of family limitation.

What comes through quite clearly is M.’s own feeling about abortion legislation. He does not like it. His tendency, therefore, is to cast those promoting it in the role of adversary and to emphasize ulterior motives more than a possibly genuine concern for the evil of abortion and its impact on the welfare of the country.

One does not like to criticize an author for what he did not do, but a failure that can lead to a false impression deserves mentioning. Except for a brief reference to English common law, M. presents American legislation in a kind of vacuum. He fails to see the development that took place as part of a larger context. One easily gets the impression, e.g., that legislation against early abortion was mostly of late-nineteenth-century vintage, whereas such legislation existed in the Western world from the
third century. One will even find it in the Septuagint version of Exodus (21:22–25). Also, the movement away from quickening in American legislation was a reflection of a larger movement that began in Western Europe during the seventeenth century, abandoning the Aristotelian theory of delayed infusion of the human soul. In no way can it be considered simply as a movement from a liberal attitude toward abortion to a more rigid one.

It is quite misleading to say that the initial Connecticut statute against abortion chose to preserve for American women “their long-standing common law right to attempt to get rid of (an early) pregnancy. . . .” English common law makes no mention of such a right. Nor can one conclude to it from the silence of the common law about abortion before quickening. English common law was preoccupied with the problem whether and when abortion constituted homicide, not when it constituted a crime. This was left to statutory law. It would indeed have been surprising if the jurists behind the common law, knowing that legislation against abortion before quickening was common, would even think of trying to establish such a right. It would also be surprising that the British statute of 1803 should go against it. Statutory law complements and completes common law; it does not contradict it.

Mohr obviously did his homework in researching for this history, but this reviewer would have felt more at ease about the objectivity and accuracy of his work if he had shown himself a little more detached.

Loyola University of Chicago

JOHN R. CONNERY, S.J.

REASON AND RELIGION. Edited by Stuart C. Brown. Ithaca; Cornell University, 1977. Pp. 315. $15.00; $6.95 paper.

This collection of essays originated at a conference sponsored by the Royal Institute of Philosophy in 1975. Divided into five groups, the papers treat the intelligibility of the universe, the problem of evil, the rationality of religious belief, meaning and religious language, and immortality. Each grouping begins with a position paper, usually a more or less iconoclastic one, continues with a response generally from a more traditional point of view, and closes with additional comments by the chairman and the essayists.

As one might expect, the essays are eminently readable in the sense that these philosophers use language with a grace but rarely found in writings whose source lies across the Atlantic Ocean or North Sea. And while no collection of papers by different authors can be uniformly interesting to a given reader, it is also true that the essays are readable for the specific arguments advanced or attacked. A brief review cannot
third century. One will even find it in the Septuagint version of Exodus (21:22-25). Also, the movement away from quickening in American legislation was a reflection of a larger movement that began in Western Europe during the seventeenth century, abandoning the Aristotelian theory of delayed infusion of the human soul. In no way can it be considered simply as a movement from a liberal attitude toward abortion to a more rigid one.

It is quite misleading to say that the initial Connecticut statute against abortion chose to preserve for American women "their long-standing common law right to attempt to get rid of (an early) pregnancy...." English common law makes no mention of such a right. Nor can one conclude to it from the silence of the common law about abortion before quickening. English common law was preoccupied with the problem whether and when abortion constituted homicide, not when it constituted a crime. This was left to statutory law. It would indeed have been surprising if the jurists behind the common law, knowing that legislation against abortion before quickening was common, would even think of trying to establish such a right. It would also be surprising that the British statute of 1803 should go against it. Statutory law complements and completes common law; it does not contradict it.

Mohr obviously did his homework in researching for this history, but this reviewer would have felt more at ease about the objectivity and accuracy of his work if he had shown himself a little more detached.

Loyola University of Chicago

JOHN R. CONNERY, S.J.

REASON AND RELIGION. Edited by Stuart C. Brown. Ithaca; Cornell University, 1977. Pp. 315. $15.00; $6.95 paper.

This collection of essays originated at a conference sponsored by the Royal Institute of Philosophy in 1975. Divided into five groups, the papers treat the intelligibility of the universe, the problem of evil, the rationality of religious belief, meaning and religious language, and immortality. Each grouping begins with a position paper, usually a more or less iconoclastic one, continues with a response generally from a more traditional point of view, and closes with additional comments by the chairman and the essayists.

As one might expect, the essays are eminently readable in the sense that these philosophers use language with a grace but rarely found in writings whose source lies across the Atlantic Ocean or North Sea. And while no collection of papers by different authors can be uniformly interesting to a given reader, it is also true that the essays are readable for the specific arguments advanced or attacked. A brief review cannot
hope to go into the individual essays in any depth, but this is possibly no major lack, since there are certain large issues raised by the collection as a whole which may well be the greatest value here.

In his introduction Bambrough suggests that the main division running through the essayists is between "those who might be called grammarians and those who still think of theology and religion as being concerned decisively, though not only, with the world or the universe or reality or how things are" (14). I am inclined to think that Phillips, in his essay on the problem of evil, puts the division better when he approvingly quotes Kierkegaard's point that a source of confusion in philosophy is thoroughly investigating details of a road one should not have turned into in the first place. When theists and their positivist critics do civilized battle, there is a tacit agreement that philosophical inquiry is a means at least theoretically capable of assessing the meaning and, frequently, the truth of religious beliefs. The game is thus played on a philosophical field, and it is perhaps not surprising that there is a suspicion of futility in the enterprise for all those but the professional players. Believers are not often led to lose their faith because of philosophical attack, nor are nonbelievers led to embrace a faith because of a worthy apologetics. In the world of philosophical argument the destruction of a particular offensive or defensive move calls for the deployment of new forces and countervailing strategies rather than admission of total defeat.

The underlying issue raised here, either explicitly or implicitly, is not, then, whether theists or nontheists are right. Nor is it the proper alternative, as Bambrough suggests, for theology to discuss which religious beliefs are true and which false, unless he means something much more restricted than a discussion among theists of the merits of various opposed religious beliefs where the criteria are provided by philosophical inquiry. In the past the great theologians used philosophy both to defend and to explore their religious belief. But they did not allow their philosophical tools to gain an independence from that belief. Their ability to judge the difference between controlling that powerful tool and being controlled by it was surely among their greatest achievements.

By pushing towards the limits of contemporary philosophical inquiry into religion, this collection of essays does better service than many of the essayists may have intended; for by making it ever more clear that uncontrolled philosophical inquiry, of any variety, can do no more than endlessly extend discussion of religious beliefs, this collection encourages raising a question about the underlying assumption of that inquiry. And that question may in turn lead to a theology wedded to, rather than separated from, the religious experience of both the believing individual and the believing community.

Brentwood, Tennessee

G. MICHAEL McCROSSIN
BOOK REVIEWS


L. is secretary general of CELAM, the Latin American Episcopal Conference. He is concerned about the use of liberation theology and the incompatibility of Marxism and socialism with Christianity. He makes some valid points: Christian liberation is not coterminous with political and economic revolution; the Biblical anawim are not synonymous with the proletarian class; the official Church must maintain an independence from political parties; some Christians accept Marxism as a scientific method and socialism as a desirable model without critical analysis of either; the adoption of unmitigated class conflict as a pastoral method by priests is naive and dangerous.

On the whole, however, the book is rather unfair and guilty of some distortions. All liberation theologians are accused of implicitly favoring violent revolution in a classical Marxist-Leninist style. They are also accused as a group of surrendering transcendent elements of Christian faith. Both of these sweeping accusations are unfair. Leading proponents of this school of theology, such as Gustavo Gutiérrez (A Theology of Liberation) and Juan Luis Segundo (A Theology for Artisans of a New Humanity, 5 vols.) do not endorse violent Marxist revolution. Rather, they emphasize (as do many Latin American bishops) the compatibility of various forms of socialism with Christian values, and denounce the institutionalized violence of existing types of capitalism in Latin America—as did the Latin American hierarchy in the Medellin documents. Furthermore, both Gutiérrez and Segundo recognize that the kingdom of God cannot be reduced to political and economic liberation, and that the sacraments are a vital part of the Church’s total liberating mission.

L. also criticizes all major Latin American priest movements of social change for what he considers their undue involvement in politics. It is true that some members of groups such as Golconda in Colombia and Christians for Socialism in Chile did engage in partisan political actions in the early 1970’s. Many priests in these two organizations, however, did not resort to such strategies. Instead, they focused their energies on offering a prophetic critique of the values and assumptions underlying unjust economic structures. In the case of other clerical movements, such as ONIS in Peru and Movement of Priests for the Third World in Argentina, the focus of their activities in the late 1960’s was primarily geared to influencing policy within the Church as much as in secular politics. They maintained communications with their respective hierarchies, and subsequently the episcopal conferences in these two countries incorporated the ideas and criticisms of these movements into their own
pastoral letters. Hence, in several instances members of socially concerned priest movements in Latin America over the past decade did not choose the route of direct political involvement but rather helped awaken a critical consciousness among their own people, and especially among some bishops.

L. believes the priest does have a role to play in the face of social injustice, but he defines this almost exclusively in terms of formation of conscience—especially the conscience of those with power. The prophetic thrust of the Medellín pronouncements is clearly downplayed, and no acknowledgement is given to the heroic work for human rights that priests are carrying out now in several countries of the continent—humanitarian assistance, literacy training, workers' co-operatives, training of new religious and social leaders. Nor does L. admit that liberation theology is now being applied very creatively (even in very repressive contexts) to sensitize the consciousness of the poor and produce a sense of religious and social solidarity among them.

L. would have us believe that the relatively small number of priests who were involved in some direct political activities, or who too readily adopted Marxist methods in their pastoral work in the early 1970's, are a threat to the unity and integrity of the contemporary Latin American Church. The real threat—the repression of civil, religious, and economic rights of the vast number of Christian poor in Latin America by the national security state (closely allied with international capitalist structures)—is totally ignored in the book.

Finally, the translation of the original Spanish text of the work into English is awkward and at times overliteral, with the result that in places the meaning is unclear and the reading is tedious.

Woodstock Theological Center, D.C. BRIAN H. SMITH, S.J.


For theologians in North America and Europe, it has been a difficult task to keep abreast of the surprising efflorescence of theology in Latin America since Vatican II. In part, the difficulty involved the ad hoc nature of many of the texts and the impossibility of locating others in even the best libraries. Another problem was attitudinal: we have long been unaccustomed to looking south of the border for theological creativity. And the Latin Americans themselves have manifested a certain reserve concerning dialogue because of the suspicion that their work will inevitably be misinterpreted or—worse—domesticated by theologians in the developed world.
pastoral letters. Hence, in several instances members of socially concerned priest movements in Latin America over the past decade did not choose the route of direct political involvement but rather helped awaken a critical consciousness among their own people, and especially among some bishops.

L. believes the priest does have a role to play in the face of social injustice, but he defines this almost exclusively in terms of formation of conscience—especially the conscience of those with power. The prophetic thrust of the Medellín pronouncements is clearly downplayed, and no acknowledgement is given to the heroic work for human rights that priests are carrying out now in several countries of the continent—humanitarian assistance, literacy training, workers’ co-operatives, training of new religious and social leaders. Nor does L. admit that liberation theology is now being applied very creatively (even in very repressive contexts) to sensitize the consciousness of the poor and produce a sense of religious and social solidarity among them.

L. would have us believe that the relatively small number of priests who were involved in some direct political activities, or who too readily adopted Marxist methods in their pastoral work in the early 1970’s, are a threat to the unity and integrity of the contemporary Latin American Church. The real threat—the repression of civil, religious, and economic rights of the vast number of Christian poor in Latin America by the national security state (closely allied with international capitalist structures)—is totally ignored in the book.

Finally, the translation of the original Spanish text of the work into English is awkward and at times overliteral, with the result that in places the meaning is unclear and the reading is tedious.

Woodstock Theological Center, D.C. BRIAN H. SMITH, S.J.


For theologians in North America and Europe, it has been a difficult task to keep abreast of the surprising efflorescence of theology in Latin America since Vatican II. In part, the difficulty involved the ad hoc nature of many of the texts and the impossibility of locating others in even the best libraries. Another problem was attitudinal: we have long been unaccustomed to looking south of the border for theological creativity. And the Latin Americans themselves have manifested a certain reserve concerning dialogue because of the suspicion that their work will inevitably be misinterpreted or—worse—domesticated by theologians in the developed world.
Against such a background, this book must be considered as an important contribution to mutual understanding. In examining in detail theological developments in Latin America from 1966 to 1976, O. adopts an approach that is both historical and theological. That is, he situates the major (and a number of minor) works in the framework of their evolution during the decade; at the same time, he seeks to evaluate critically their positive accomplishments as well as their drawbacks and lacunae from a theological perspective. It should be made clear from the outset that O.'s own stance is one of basic sympathy, and that his interest lies in furthering the maturation of the theology of liberation as well as in contributing to the development of a socialist society.

O. manages to achieve a certain measure of clarity amid a welter of material by dividing his work into five major sections. His analysis is often detailed and complex; thus I will focus next on more general themes that appear to be of greater importance.

In the first section, O. begins with a brief survey of Latin American history, then devotes special attention to the antecedents of the historic bishops' conference (CELAM) at Medellín in 1968, including a detailed analysis of the preparatory conferences and documents. I found this data to be of great utility in understanding both the links and especially the differences between Medellín and Vatican II (which in Latin America is often criticized as reflecting the optimistic and irenic perspective of the First World).

O. next considers the period from 1968 to 1971. This includes an analysis of the final documents of Medellín, wherein O. discovers three "privileged theological themes": a turning toward the vast masses of the poor; love of neighbor understood as the struggle for justice in a situation of sin and institutionalized violence; and the historical dimension of the life of faith and political action. He also presents a helpful survey and critique of theologians who developed these and other insights in the three years following Medellín, including José Comblin, Juan Luis Segundo, Rubem Alves, and Hugo Assmann.

An entire section is then devoted to the work which O. considers (justifiably, I would say) a milestone in the development of liberation theology, Gustavo Gutiérrez' Liberación de la teología (1971). O.'s admiration for this work is abundantly evident in what is perhaps an overly lengthy analysis of more than a hundred pages. Among the limitations noted in the book are the lack of a clearly defined moral theology, the need for a deepened understanding of the points of unity and difference between Christianity and Marxism, and the necessity for a more profound and detailed spirituality of liberation that would expand Gutiérrez' brief sketch.

A fourth section considers the criticisms leveled at the theology of
liberation and also treats of some different currents within the movement, such as the renewed interest in "popular religion." O. discusses and replies to the objections of both Europeans (e.g., H. Lepargneur and G. Thils) and Latin Americans (e.g., Carlos Bravo and Alfonso López Trujillo). Oddly, no reference is made to the prolific bête noire of liberationists, Roger Vekemans.

The final section delineates the advances made in the years since the publication of Gutiérrez' book. O. sees these as occurring principally in the areas of method, spirituality, Christology, ecclesiology, popular religion, and the rereading of Latin American history. I agree with his assessment (453) that the most profound contribution during these years is the Cristología desde América Latina of Jon Sobrino (Mexico City, 1976).

In general, the book would have profited from a more careful editing and the proofreading is, bluntly, atrocious. At times, also, one becomes almost surfeited with quotations, along with rather generalized comment. However, O. has managed to create a coherent mosaic from an enormous range of material. He has both clarified the past and pointed to the future of a maturing movement that theologizes from the viewpoint of "los pobres de la tierra," a phrase that recurs like a symphonic theme throughout the book. The importance of this process has been succinctly stated by Ignacio Ellacuria in his recent Freedom Made Flesh (Maryknoll, N.Y., 1976): "The full and integral salvation of the Third World, of the world of the poor, is a great historical challenge. Responding to this challenge should be regarded as the fundamental charism of the Latin American Church" (148). Such a charism, in my judgment, could be of incalculable benefit to the universal Church.

Le Moyne College, Syracuse

ALFRED T. HENNELLY, S.J.

SHORTER NOTICES


This carefully-argued thesis summarizes the state of the question and then moves on to a fresh analysis of the form and function of biblical genealogies. To a subject in which one's interest may pardonably be limited, W. has brought clarification and new light. This has been done, in part, by broadening the basis of the research to include genealogical material from the Ancient Near East, chiefly Mesopotamian, along with judicious use of comparable data provided by anthropological studies of tribal societies.

We report the three questions to which W. addresses himself and the tentative answers he offers in the last chapter. Are genealogies constructed for the purpose of giving historical information? Normally they are not intended to be historical records, even though a tendency to understand these genealogical lists as providing accurate historical information may be detected...
for man's language about God are critical. Plato's God is subsistent, Aristotle's immanent, Bonaventure's eschatological. Thus, past, present, and future can be related by Bonaventure through exemplarism and contiuition, both of which permit an ongoing enlargement of the historical horizon. Particular elements of reality, rather than analytically explicable of the vertical-horizontal rapport, become significant through symbolical analogy.

In the concluding chapters, T. proposes that hermeneutics and epistemology must be continually aware of the unitive sense of concrete existence, so structured that each approach to truth permeates the others horizontally without losing its own vertical teleology. If hermeneutics maintains the unity of vertical and lateral thought, it will be more than problem-solving, because it will not surrender its inventive task. The synchronic and diachronic stages of development come to be guaranteed, because no hermeneutic statement loses its provisory nature. The hermeneutic circle illustrates that the historical horizon does not precede consciousness nor vice versa. The historicity of truth means that subject without object is emptiness, and object without subject is silence. Thus, hermeneutics cannot fail to create interdisciplinary openness even in the face of the denial of metaphysics, the split caused by Cartesian dualism, and the divorce of culture from everyday concerns. These explain the secularization of religious language and the replacement of the scientia divina by the scientia naturalis. One could add that they imply the immanentization of the eschatological.

Certain critical observations must be made. Ricoeur's studies of the symbolical are treated positively, but one would like to suggest that T.'s plea for a historical hermeneutics would benefit from Gilkey's discussion of religious language and Lonergan's theological method. Their voices should be added to Pannenberg's claim, accepted by T., that theology is capable of playing the unifying role in the universitas of learning. The Latin American theology of liberation as a concrete hermeneutics may have served to exemplify certain acceptable Marxist postures.

_Seraphicum, Rome_  
BERNARD J. PRZEWOZNY, O.F.M.CONV.


This sensitive and probing collection of essays on the relation between Christian faith and social justice by seven Jesuit theologians is an important contribution to the development of a theology of social change. The editor of this collection is to be congratulated for planning an anthology broad enough in scope to permit significant contributions from
various theological disciplines (biblical, patristic, systematic) with sufficient unity of design to allow each of the essays to relate itself not only to a central theme but to the other articles in the book. The chief value of the anthology is in the depth and perception of the articles themselves.

The anthology is divided into three sections. The first is an assessment of the present theological situation in the Church by Avery Dulles and William Dych. Dulles' article is particularly helpful as he highlights the contribution of liberation theology to earlier intellectualist and fiducialist understandings of faith. He points out the limitations of this theology and the need to balance its approach with the wisdom gained from earlier ages. Faith can transform society. The challenge to the Christian and the Church is the reading of the signs of the times, no easy task in itself, and living this insight without being co-opted by social and political theories and systems. Dulles rightly insists that this can only be done when the individual interior moment of faith in the revelation of a transcendent God is recognized as being as essential as the communal and social dimensions of faith. Dych analyzes the attempt of the Church in the Second Vatican Council to overcome a persistent dualism in Christian faith which leaves the believer with the idea that there are two histories or two societies in only one of which does salvation occur. In his judgment Vatican II failed to overcome this tendency toward dualism, and Dych suggests it can only be overcome by a recapturing of a biblical faith which sees the finite not simply as a springboard to the infinite but the permanent basis for our knowledge of the infinite.

The five essays of the second section reveal how the Church in different historical moments has understood and lived the relationship between faith and justice. These treatments of biblical, patristic, Tridentine, and modern perspectives on the meaning of faith and justice are balanced and scholarly and indicate the depth of the Church's tradition on social consciousness. For this reviewer, the outstanding article of this section, indeed of the book, is by Walsh and Langan, "Patristic Social Consciousness—the Church and the Poor." It presents a methodological approach to the social attitudes of the Fathers which may be expanded to other areas of patristic studies. It also demonstrates the clarity that patristic studies can bring to our thinking about modern problems.

The final section comprises two essays directed toward future lines of development of Christian faith and action. Both authors speak of the need of reimagining Christian faith: Hollenbach in terms of liturgical celebration, Haughey in terms of Christology.

The faith that does justice demands the attention of every serious theologian working in the field of social ethics, and teachers on the seminary and graduate school level are certain to find some of the articles worth assigning to be read.

Belmont Abbey, N.C. JEROME R. DOLLARD, O.S.B.
among the later tradents of the material. However, the biblical genealogies may be used as sources for historical research, but not uncritically. Do the genealogies have the same form and function at both oral and written levels? The evidence suggests that both oral and written genealogies share certain formal and functional characteristics. Yet differences exist between the two, especially in the matter of function. Oral genealogies change more readily and therefore function more efficiently in cases where rapid formal change is required. Do genealogies in fact ever grow out of narrative traditions? While portions of some of the genealogies studied seem to have been drawn from narrative sources, in no case was this true of the entire genealogy. Guidelines are then given for future analyses in which this problem of source arises.

An appendix relates W.'s study of oral genealogies to several important methodological questions in current biblical scholarship, involving especially the oral transmission of material. His bibliography is comprehensive and reflects the broad gauge on which he has conducted the research for a valuable study which closes one era and lays the groundwork for future work on biblical genealogies.

Frederick L. Moriarty, S.J.


Christians often focus on the Hebrew Scriptures as praeparatio for the gospel and miss the internal dynamism of the OT, which led to the equally vital faith community of Judaism. B. seeks to redress the balance by showing that the self-understanding of the Jewish faith is reflected in the very process of formation of the Hebrew canon.

The key role in the process is played by the prophets. Free prophets (as distinct from court prophets) insisted that their authority came directly from God. Besides permitting contradictory assertions, this also posed a direct challenge to the institutional leadership. The Levitical-priestly response, represented by the Deuteronomistic and P(riestly) sources, was to systematize the mass of ancient tradition into the rough form of our present Pentateuch. In this schema prophecy was reduced to the role of comment on the Mosaic law.

In the Exile and soon after, a canon of prophetic books emerged alongside the Torah as a partial counterweight. Then a third stage of development began with the postexilic writings. Apocalyptic forms and wisdom speculative theology were among the tools forged that allowed Judaism to emerge with a law of universal significance and an appeal oriented clearly to the future. This growth of the tripartite canon leads B. to conclude that the principle of canon formation does not exclude development in tradition alongside internal tensions, nor refuse the remodeling of tradition to meet new needs.

This study is systematic in approach and yet views the OT from within itself and not from purely Christian perspectives. Much of the reconstructed history of transmission remains speculative and often juxtaposes unassimilated redactional theories without satisfying adequacy. But it does form an imaginative and very scholarly reconstruction of the process of canonization that provides a badly-needed ecumenical dimension to the question of scriptural authority.

Lawrence Boadt, C.S.P.


Among the current critical studies underway in the OT, traditio-historical research offers highly promising results. This methodology calls for a renewed investigation of oral traditions
and the *Sitz im Leben* in which those traditions were born and developed. The current volume brings us the work of thirteen OT specialists from widely-separated theological centers. Canada, the U.S., Scandinavia, and Germany are represented. The project has been organized by Douglas A. Knight of Vanderbilt, who gives us an introduction on the general topic “Tradition and Theology” as well as one of the thirteen essays which follow. I think it well to note that this volume is not one of those collections of earlier essays written by these scholars, but rather fresh insights on specific aspects of traditio-historical research.


This volume presents a wide-ranging and highly stimulating analysis of the numerous facets of current tradition-historical research.

*John E. Huesman, S.J.*

---


No scholar has so far succeeded in providing a definition of structuralism which is universally acceptable. It is not a philosophy, though it has sometimes been called an epistemological point of view. It has no one distinctive methodology and is not concerned so much with the meaning of texts as with the semiological structures generated in the interaction between a text and a reader. P.’s introduction to biblical structuralism is divided into three parts: the first provides a description of structural analysis; the second is a structural analysis of Job; the third examines Wellhausen’s *Prolegomena*, von Rad’s *The Form-Critical Problem of the Pentateuch*, and Noth’s *History of Pentateuchal Traditions* from a structural point of view. Each part concludes with “bibliographic remarks,” and there is also a general bibliography. P.’s treatment of structuralism is in some respects different from that of earlier writers on the subject. He does not put the same emphasis on the synchronic-agenetic approach, as do practitioners of Lévi-Straussian and Greimasian methodologies; on the contrary, he rightly maintains that the analyst should concentrate on diachronic or synchronic structures, depending on the type of relationships he wishes to explain. He also avers that a truly inductive hermeneutics does not exist: it implicitly follows that the so-called inductive approach of Todorov and his disciples is actually inductive only to a degree.

P.’s methodology in his analysis of Job appears to be eclectic: models, descriptions, and operative distinctions drawn from Todorov, Jakobson, Lévi-Strauss, and Barthes are utilized in various places. P.’s discussion of the framework of Job, arranged in four “movements,” is simultaneously thematic, syntagmatic, and synchronic, while his
treatment of the “code” of Job is paradigmatic.

Some scholars may feel misgivings about P.'s conclusions on the works of Wellhausen, von Rad, and Noth, examined in the third part. They are all diachronic and, in his view, clearly structural. Noth’s Pentateuchal Traditions is the most structured of all, yet Noth was, according to P., “least aware of the significant relationship between the structures he constructed and the ‘structures-structuring’ within himself by which his hypotheses were formed” (200). In other words, Noth had a serious lack of that form of self-awareness which Roger Poole called “deep subjectivity.” Whether one agrees or not, P.’s work constitutes a significant and provocative contribution to the contemporary literature of structuralism.

David Greenwood


The aim of this 1977 Uppsala University doctoral dissertation is “to use 2 Peter to illustrate the development of one branch of the Church during the period 70–180 A.D.” (7). F. focuses predominantly on 2 Peter (its use of Petrine and Pauline traditions, 9–32; of Jude, 33–59; its eschatological material, 60–93; ethics, 94–110; environment, 111–148) and then seeks to extend the conclusions drawn from his analysis “to apply to a Church which carries the imprint of approximately the same historical situation as does 2 Peter” (7). In particular, the careful word-by-word comparison of the similarities and differences of 2 Peter and Jude represents the most extensive and instructive analysis to date. In general, however, the study breaks no new interpretive ground.

2 Peter, according to F., represents, like Ignatius and Diognetus, a Hellenistic “translation” of the “main stream” (12, 14) Christian tradition formulated for a predominantly Hellenistic audience. Composed “at a fairly late date” (142) in the interior of Asia Minor (42, 103, 125, 147), it was addressed to Christians there who, under the influence of a syncretistic culture and of apostate Christians in their midst, were in danger of losing their eschatological hope and their Christian moral standards (101–10). The adaptation of material from Jude is marked by an elimination of Jewish traditional examples and imagery unfamiliar to a non-Jewish audience and by an accentuation of the interrelation of eschatology and ethics (58–59). This pseudograph is attributed to Peter because “the author of 2 Peter was a disciple of the Apostle, in the sense that he regarded Peter as setting the norm, and was wont to use him as a mainstay of Christian tradition” (17). F. has recognized that a consideration of the cultural environment is essential for the understanding of 2 Peter. However, his observations are admittedly “vague” (8) and much too general to illuminate the social setting and strategy of 2 Peter, let alone the wider ecclesiastical situation of which F. suggests 2 Peter is representative.

Any attention to this relatively neglected NT document can only be welcomed. This study should prove useful to subsequent analysis of the relationship of Jude and 2 Peter. Toward the accomplishment of F.’s broader aim, however, more research on 2 Peter, especially its specific social situation and its relation to other Christian literature beside Jude, still appears to be necessary.

John H. Elliott


These essays, deeply rooted in the liturgical, cultural, and historical mission of the Church, treat three major
themes: the role of the prophet, the transforming power of the liturgy, and the challenge of the apostolate. The prophet is one whom God raises up from the community to champion a personal, interior response to God at a time when the community is endangered by external formalism. Prophets are so much at the heart of the community that they are able to articulate its highest ideals and its most cherished goals. The complete fulfilment of the prophetic role will occur only when all men and women of all time are united in Jesus. Until that time no truth is completely true, because it lacks the perspective or balancing factor of other truths.

For those who have imbibed the true spirit of the liturgy, concern and care of the poor, the sick, the imprisoned, the alienated, etc., are but the necessary expressions of ordinary Christian life. By their life in Christ, rooted deep in reality, Christians are capable of transforming the universe into the new creation of the risen Christ. This transformation, however, requires that people be accepted as they are—with all their sinfulness—and yet be continually challenged to reach for their hopes. A study of the biblical process of harmonization leads to the conclusion that only when the goodness of a culture can be appreciated from within can God's greater expectations be preached so that it may rise beyond human expectations to newness of life in Christ Jesus.

This book, which presents theology both firmly grounded in Scripture and in touch with contemporary reality, deserves to be widely read. S. has already made valuable contributions to biblical studies and needs no introduction. The art work by Lillian Brule, however, deserves special comment. Over a dozen delightful pen-and-ink sketches greatly enhance the contemplative orientation of the biblical themes presented in these essays.

Priscilla Snell, O.P.


More than a decade after the Council urged that the "scientific exposition [of moral theology] should be more thoroughly nourished by Scripture teaching" (Optatam totius, no. 16) there is still a dearth of worth-while writing on Scripture and ethics. Nor does there appear to be agreement between exegetes and theologians on a methodology by which scriptural teaching can be applied to current moral problems. The hermeneutical question is no less acute in the domain of moral theology than in the realm of systematics, but it is surely far less studied in moral, with a resultant confusion that is seen at its most pernicious when "fidelity to the teaching of Christ" is appealed to especially to outlaw innovations in teaching and pastoral practice which enlightened, critical, committed Christians advocate in response to acute human problems.

Of course, valuable work available to scholars has been done in Scripture studies. One example is Houlden, who, in this brief book, has provided an extremely valuable study of the shape of ethical thinking in the NT—not of the NT, since, as H. clearly shows, one cannot correctly speak of the ethical teaching of the NT. The NT authors were concerned with correcting and superseding and not simply complementing one another (31-47). Unlike Schnackenburg, who proceeded from the moral teaching of Jesus, to a study of the early Church in general, and then to the individual writers (in The Moral Teaching of the New Testament, 1965) H. first studies the writers individually, then selected moral issues, and finally (and somewhat diffidently) he discusses the teaching of Jesus, whose radical critique of the law is seen as central. H.'s reason for reversing Schnackenburg's order is to allow the NT to convey more adequately what it has to teach.
Critical readers will be aware of areas of disagreement on exegetical issues where H. has his own preferences. They will also observe his tendency to lapse into an understanding of ethics as an individualistic concern and at times to separate the ethical too radically from the theological issues in the NT. This would make an excellent text for use in a graduate class in ethics and the NT. It was first published by Penguin Books in 1973.

Paul Surlis


We must be grateful to Paulist Press for making this major work in contemporary Christology available in English (the original German edition was reviewed in this journal in December 1975). K.’s remarkable study is a lucid, if very compact, exposition of a wealth of material from the history of doctrine, biblical exegesis, and modern and contemporary philosophy and systematic theology; it is also a creative synthesis which judiciously evaluates approaches and positions other than K.’s own.

Part 1, “Jesus Christ Today,” is an analysis of the trends and tasks of Christology, the quest of the historical Jesus, and the contemporary context of faith in Christ. Part 2, “The History and Destiny of Jesus Christ,” treats the life of Jesus—his activity, message, miracles, personal claim and death; a second section is devoted to the basis and content of faith in the Resurrection. Part 3, “The Mystery of Jesus Christ,” treats the person of Christ as human and divine, always in relation to his saving mission.

Part 3 is especially challenging because of the difficult issues involved and the compactness of K.’s brilliant analysis. He makes a significant contribution in his discussion of the role of the Spirit in the Incarnation and the importance of pneumatology in defining the universal significance of the unique Christ. This discussion is another indication of how difficult and how necessary is a renewed theology of the Trinity.

K.’s “summa” of contemporary Christology from a Roman Catholic point of view is a most valuable resource. It certainly merits a second, more careful English edition in which unnecessarily obscure sentences are reworked and misspellings, omissions, and transpositions are corrected.

Otto Hentz, S.J.


In this short book, R. divides her treatment of Mary into two major parts. The first deals with Mary in the Bible. Starting by drawing some analogies between the figure of Mary and portraits of ancient mother goddesses, R. then examines some biblical themes, like Mary and Israel and the Wisdom of God. The emphasis throughout is on the feminine symbols, common in Judaism, which are used to describe human relations with God. The second part sketches the development of Mariology in the Church. Traditional topics, e.g., Mary as the New Eve, her perpetual virginity, and the Immaculate Conception, are briefly considered.

The main difficulty one encounters is that R. tries to cover too much ground. The result is often superficiality. Thus, the way Scripture is interpreted leaves much to be desired. Since the book is intended for discussion sessions, one would have expected some references to help students in their reflections on the exegesis of biblical passages and on the historical material outlined in the chapters. Further, short comments on Cybele and Isis are not very helpful without reference to larger sources to which the reader can refer for in-depth understanding and discus-
sion. The reader is also somewhat frustrated; for just when R. touches on an interesting point, she breaks off to move onto another topic. Probably the most enriching insights are her suggestions that Mariology can help foment male/female reciprocity and promote the humanization of the Church. Theological reflections along these lines might help towards a reinterpretation and cultural adaptation of Mariological symbols, thus giving Mary an important role in the Church's self-understanding and relevance for our times.

John A. Saliba, S.J.


There is little doubt that college teachers of early Christian thought feel the need for a comprehensive, competent, and readable introductory textbook. W., author of The Teachings of the Catholic Church, a handbook of patristic texts arranged according to dogmatic themes, has come close to satisfying this need in the present volume.

The general approach is laudable; for W. includes a brief study of the NT writings and traces the development of early Christian thought concretely through a study of the actual thinkers, concluding with John Chrysostom in the East and Augustine in the West. He does not, therefore, deal with the Christological controversies of the fifth century, and thus highlights a problem which is perhaps inevitable in books of this type: the subject matter is ultimately too complex to be encompassed in a single volume.

The technical terminology of such intricate problems as the Trinitarian controversy of the fourth century is, on the whole, well integrated into a comprehensible summary, and there is a liberal sprinkling of terms in Latin and Greek. But an oddly recurring use of colloquialisms tends to disturb the scholarly tone of the book: Christians fell in persecution "when the heat was on" (69); the Octavius was a "come on" and Minucius Felix was a "front man"; Gregory Nazianzus (sic) felt that Basil "sold out to worldly ambition" (280); Gregory of Nyssa feels that man's nature has a "propensity toward evil, and that the dice are loaded against him" (288). One hesitates to cavil, but such phrases do jar. The bibliography is, as Willis says, "a short list of suggested books" (12), but one still feels that it might have noted a larger selection of contemporary literature, especially for the NT.

If its price is not prohibitive, this book could be used, with an updated bibliography, as an introductory survey, on the undergraduate level, of the first four centuries of Christian thought.

Gerard H. Ettlinger, S.J.


The title is self-explanatory. Abbot Aelfric of Eynsham (ca. 955-ca. 1020) and Bishop Wulfstan II of York (bishop ca. 1002-1023) were two of the most important figures in the late Anglo-Saxon Church. Both were preachers whose vernacular sermons were classics of the genre. G. contends that they were also theologians whose theological achievement has been overshadowed by their homiletic triumphs, and also because the history of medieval theology is the history of Latin theology and thus vernacular writers are overlooked. G. hopes to rectify this situation by an examination of their eschatology as presented in their sermons, since eschatology was a prominent theme in early medieval theology. He concludes that both men were basically conservative theologians who drew from the patris-
tic tradition but who contributed particular insights and emphases so that their theologies were individual if not unique. This is important because histories of theology regularly ignore pre-Scholastic theology as too monastic and conservative and unworthy of attention. Works such as this demonstrate that it is frequently solid, competent, and worthy of greater study. Conservative theology and good theology are not mutually exclusive terms.

G. provides the background to his subject with a chapter on "Carolingian Preaching," touching on the organization of the homiliary by Paul the Deacon, the uses of homiletic material in monastic and secular preaching, and the development of prone, the vernacular office which was usually the setting for vernacular preaching. G. then analyzes the eschatological preaching of Aelfric and Wulfstan, concentrating on the former and more important of the two, and he reaches the conclusion mentioned above. The book has a good bibliography, very full footnotes, and translations of all the Old English passages cited in the text. It might have been helpful if in his discussion of the sources G. had considered the apocryphal Gospel of Nicodemus, known early in England, the Irish devotion to OT saints, and echoes of pagan Germanic concepts of the "last things."

Joseph F. Kelly


Building upon his earlier anthology, Death in America, S. provides in his present work a scholarly and fascinating account of how the American Puritans viewed death and how this view eventually succumbed to the dominant views of the wider society.

After two survey chapters on "Death in Western Tradition" and "The World of the Puritan," S. mines a wide variety of sources from sermons and schoolbooks to funerary art and deathbed accounts, to examine in detail the New England Puritan ethos surrounding death. The thought of death was ever present to Puritan adult and child alike, with little consolation offered by the Puritan theological views on personal depravity, the gratuity of salvation, and the reality of hell. S. shows how, beginning with the Great Awakening and culminating in the early 1800's, as Puritanism went into decline, the people's views about death shifted radically from fearful anticipation to eager longing, from abhorrence to romanticization. S. concludes with a brief epilogue contrasting the Puritan view of death with modern American views, and offers an analysis of the "inner sense of bankruptcy" of today's American facing the perennial mystery of death. This analysis is less than satisfying: to deal adequately with such a complex topic is simply too great a task to be accomplished in so few pages.

In addition to the very many interesting details unearthed and the generally successful synthesis, S. skilfully demonstrates how a way of life is a direct response to a way of death, that is, how death cannot be abstracted from life and still retain its meaning. To understand the Puritan experience is to make one more aware of today's cultural predicament in the face of death.

James J. Doyle, C.S.C.


This book is less directly concerned with Ricoeur than it is with the question of how theology should read and understand Freud. If one attends to the logic and structure of Freud's thought and suppresses the mechanistic meta-
psychology which many critics have seen operative in psychoanalytic theory, Freud may be seen as the guardian of mystery. If one works through rather than around Freud, and if an adequate philosophy is available to articulate the logic of psychoanalysis, theology will have a congenial partner in Freud. A study in rather than of the thought of Ricoeur leads to this interesting conclusion.

Following Marcel, L. situates the concept of mystery between two irreconcilable viewpoints or perspectives (149). The ambiguity and duality of psychoanalytic language may then represent a sense of the mystery and unspecifiability of the psychic. Freud's theory as clarified by Ricoeur and the logic of Ricoeur's own works together display a duality which for L. points to mystery. Simplistic attempts to revise Freud by eliminating the duality of his perspectives on the psyche are criticized as themselves reductionistic.

The title of this work should not lead prospective readers to expect an introduction to R.'s thought like those of Don Ihde and David Rasmussen. This is a work only for those already closely acquainted with R.'s writings. L.'s oblique and undeveloped chastisement of Freudian "revisionists," a perspective already expressed by Peter Homans, is puzzling. The demand for a philosophy like that of R.'s to mediate between psychoanalysis and theology so as to avoid a shallow and hasty revision of Freud's theory is an appealing aspect of L.'s work. However, L. seems to overlook the fact that revision of Freud's theory is not always undertaken in order to reduce the duality and ambiguity in psychoanalytic theory and thereby to repress the mystery of consciousness. Rather, revisionism is often simply a search for a metapsychology which adequately thematizes psychoanalytic practice. John F. Haught


Thousands of students of the NT have long valued the help they receive from the philological, historical, and exegetical works of Dodd. Many of these same readers will now rightly rejoice at being offered a well-informed and balanced, a richly sympathetic though judiciously critical biography of the renowned British scholar who died, in his ninetieth year, in 1973.

From early childhood in a devout and strict Dissenter (Congregationalist) family in Wales to assiduous work in his eighties as general editor of the New English Bible, D. shows us many facets of Dodd's personality and achievement. Without entering into detail, D. summarizes the over-all spirit and standpoint of each of Dodd's works—those on the Letter to the Romans, on the fourth Gospel, as well as on numerous other parts of the NT and on the Hellenistic world out of which it grew. Interspersed with such summaries are found highly illuminating treatments of Dodd's personal, family, and professional life that in many ways influenced his scholarly work. There can be no doubt, e.g., of the effect that Dodd's devout faith—consistent throughout his life—had on his approach to NT interpretation; his basic judgment that the life and teaching of Jesus can be known in considerable detail shows the influence of the particular background of faith and piety that nurtured him throughout his life. Likewise, D. makes it clear that the psychological struggle that Dodd experienced in his personal life as well as the ideas of the psychologists he consulted in the midst of his struggle played an important role in his interpretation of Pauline thought—perhaps nowhere more clearly than in his treatment of Romans 7.
D. succeeds admirably in communicating the spirit of Oxford, Manchester, and Cambridge which provided the ambience in which Dodd worked so prodigiously in the quiet of his study or communed so graciously with his friends during long walks. He lets us feel the beauty of Dodd's conjugal and family life, the excitement of his various visits abroad (as on lecture trips to the United States), the intensity of his interaction with fellow scholars and with students from Britain and other countries. This biography is a worthy tribute to its subject.

Donald J. Murphy, S.J.


The ninth in a series of volumes generated by Fordham University's biennial "Pastoral Psychology Institutes." The umbrella theme of Human Life encompasses eight major areas of thought, in each of which three articles are provided. The introductory session on "The Worth of Human Life" includes Judeo-Christian perspectives, life evaluation in developing countries (focus on Africa) and in technological society. "Problems of Birth: Population" includes an excellent discussion of methods and morality of population control (C. Curran) and a fine exposition of the notion of responsible parenthood (S. Callahan). Genetic engineering (M. Lappe), genetic screening and counseling, and eugenic abortion (J. Connery) are addressed under the heading "Problems of Birth: Eugenic."

"Problems of Living" is also divided into two sessions. The first deals with basic human freedoms (R. Johann) and personal development. The second is concerned with severe limitations: physical handicap, psychological disability, and poverty. The quest for a definition of death, considerations of artificial life-prolongation, and the problem of truth-telling with terminally ill persons come under "Problems of Dying"; in the second session on that area are included essays on euthanasia, capital punishment, and suicide.

The concluding session is entitled "Life Beyond Death: Expectations of Immortality." The seminar's token atheist (P. Kurtz) definitively disproves the existence of the soul and the usefulness of immortality notions. Then two Jesuits analyze Buddhist and Judeo-Christian approaches to the question.

These essays are well written and thoughtful. Many specially interested in one area will find themselves stimulated and enriched by remarks offered on other topics. As a human geneticist, I can in particular commend the three articles of the eugenics-session.

Robert Roger Lebel, S.J.


Sterilization, for B., is paradigmatic of a number of practical ethical problems currently facing Catholics and Catholic hospitals, particularly in North America. On one level, sterilization raises questions of institutional policy, given the increasingly public character of these facilities; on another level, sterilization is paradigmatic of the differences in moral reasoning that currently divide many in the hierarchical magisterium from a significant portion of the scholarly theological community and the larger body of the faithful. It is to this latter issue of past and present moral reasoning that B. devotes most of his attention.

Not until the early twentieth century, B. notes, when Catholic moralists began to reflect on the newly-gained information regarding the true func-
tioning of the human reproductive system, was there systematic reflection on the morality of surgical sterilization. While not rejecting sterilization as a punitive measure for criminals, sterilization for contraceptive purposes has been consistently condemned as always immoral. Here, for B., is the crux of the matter: to assert this is one thing, to demonstrate it is quite another. Saying something loudly and often is no substitute for reasoned analysis.

Noting the widespread recent dissatisfaction with basing moral arguments on a restricted notion of both natural law and the principle of double effect, and the growing insistence among moralists on the need to distinguish between "physical" or "ontic" evil and moral evil, B. concludes that just as not all killing is judged murder, not all sexual intercourse adulterous, and not every taking a theft, so not every suppression of human fertility can be judged immoral (45).

What ought to be the policy of Catholic hospitals regarding sterilization? Utilizing principles of formal and material cooperation, B. suggests that a judgment must be made whether the goods being sought are proportionate to the ontic evil which institutional cooperation with sterilization would bring. The answer may clearly be positive, B. concludes. Could one follow the same moral reasoning to justify cooperation in abortion? Almost never, Boyle maintains, because of the difficulty in locating other values which would be commensurate with life itself.

Joseph A. La Barge

THE WING-FOOTED WANDERER:
CONSCIENCE AND TRANSCENDENCE.

M. is perplexed by the complex dynamic of the human conscience. Some in the Western world have accepted conscience as "the voice of heaven within the person, the deputy of God within the human breast, or the sense of the universal moral law directing all who will pause to listen." Others, impressed by the data of the social sciences, suggest "that the sense of obligation may be evidence of illness rather than righteousness," and that "the dictates of conscience simply reflect the customs and traditions of the society within which we live" (11). In support of conscience's moral authority against further erosion, M. undertakes a reinterpretation of conscience, using those very views that have offered the greatest challenge and rendered its authority questionable.

M. devotes chapters to the theories of Freud (The Accusing Conscience), Erikson (The Sponsoring Conscience), and Piaget and Kohlberg (Conscience and Reason). In subsequent chapters M. attends to the formation of conscience and to the view of conscience as a way of life. In a final essay he highlights those concepts related to conscience in the various psychological theories which appear to him as "points of transcendence" and which are evidences within human experience of God's coming in Christ.

Reservations about the methodological legitimacy of M.'s enterprise aside, this reader was never quite sure where M. was going. He pays great attention to the details of street signs and crossroads; the city and country are the puzzles. I am sadly unconvinced that conscience can rest any easier now, knowing that the tide against it has been reversed and that its moral authority has indeed been buttressed by the intimations of transcendence uncovered by M.

Vincent J. Genovesi, S.J.


What enhances the interest of this book on the parish is the fact that its author has long been a parish priest;
his reflections are grounded in practical experience. A brief reflection on the emergence of the notion of the parish from the early town-parishes in Gaul through the Council of Trent and in the Code of Canon Law sketches the historical roots from which later emerged the elements of a theological notion of the parish. The work of Moehler, the Tübingen School, and Scheeben; the contribution of the liturgists of the 1920’s and the 1930’s; the influence of such theologians as Yves Congar and Karl Rahner—all are credited with setting the stage for the texts of Vatican II that are significant for the theology of the parish. If the previous official view of the parish was heavily legalistic, Vatican II made it clear that the parish is not a mere administrative unit of church government but a theological reality, a place where people gather for the sacramental celebration of Christ’s presence in the world.

Five theological models of the parish are offered: (1) a community gathered together to hear the word of God; (2) a community gathered together to celebrate the Eucharist; (3) a local organization of the universal Church; (4) a community restructured into small subcommunities; (5) the American parish; the agent of change.

There is here an explicit concern about the importance of the Church and the parish speaking to, and meeting the needs of, people in their human situation today. One senses that these theological models of the parish are applications on their own level of the more universal models of the Church suggested by Avery Dulles. The most interesting parish model is perhaps that of the American parish; its insights are largely those of a man who knows the American parish from the inside.

Francis M. O’Connor, S.J.


The shortage of priests today is a world-wide phenomenon. This book begins with a statistical analysis of two German dioceses deemed typical not only of Germany but also of other nations in regard to the age of the clergy, currently and projected for the future. The expectation is of fewer and older priests for pastoral ministry. The consequences are illustrated by the Pirker-Studie conducted in Karnten, Austria: namely, a noticeable decline of church membership and participation in those places which were without a local pastor/priest for any length of time. This datum is supported by the latest (1972-75) polls investigating the attitudes of Catholics in Germany, which indicate that “the majority of Catholics have priestly-oriented expectations of the Church” (18).

The rest of the book consists of more theologically oriented considerations on the nature of ordination, priesthood, ministry-service in the Church, and the precise declension of what is essentially priestly and what is not. The latter question is critical for the evaluation of attempts at supplying traditional priestly/pastoral services through other than fully ordained priests: i.e., deacons, catechists, pastoral or parish assistants, nuns, lay theologians, etc. There is a twofold problem inherent in these “ersatz priests”: (1) whether they actually supply what really needs to be supplied pastorally; (2) whether they obscure the nature and meaning of ordo, ordination, and priesthood. Anyone familiar with the confusion reigning and raging about the role and status of permanent deacons in the U.S. knows these two problems at first hand.

The contributions, by specialists in dogmatics, pastoral, and canon law and by the director of lay theologians in the diocese of Münster, are wide-ranging
and well documented. The book should be studied by bishops and all other ecclesiastical administrators of whatever rank and position, and by all seminary personnel. Corporations dedicated only to profit are aware that any corporate entity thrives in great measure by reason of its "managers." It is time for the corpus mysticum to show equal awareness and imagination in arranging for its managers—whether they are called shepherds, bishops, pastors, or priests.

Robert Kress


This Benedictine monk, associated with a Christian community given to Hindu life and thought, has lived in India for over twenty years. His book presents an excellent contemplative "mini-course" in Buddhist, Christian, and Hindu spirituality and is partially successful in pushing Buddhist, Christian, and Hindu ideas to their irenic limit. G.'s main thesis is that the way of Truth, "the one Spirit in all religions," is via return to Mystery; to live, moreover, as if we were our own Ground is today's root evil.

G. develops especially well "The Mystery of Love"; "Myth and Reality"; the unity of all things and their reference to their Source; the persons of Buddha, Christ, and Krishna; maya as a Source-separated view of reality; reincarnation in terms of Christogenesis; the Virgin Birth as calling all to be married to God. Combining insights from Teilhard and Aurobindo, he stresses that "matter and life and consciousness in man are seen to be evolving towards the divine life and consciousness in which they are not annihilated but fulfilled," in a cosmic resurrection whose seed is the risen Christ.

Despite nuances, G. unacceptably makes the senses, reason, and science enemies of the Center. Is modern civilization truly a fall? Was "primitive man" really closer to the Source? Does real evil begin only with the Renaissance? G. views all religions as a pathway to the One, but fails to note any dead ends. He asserts that every myth and ritual of primitive man was a revelation of divine Mystery, but does not bring out the human evil often revealed therein. All revelations may complement each other, but does not Christ sublate them all? Are Brahman, Nirvana, Tao, Allah, Yahweh, etc. really only different names for the same reality? Is there only one mystical vision obscured by various dogmas? Do not one quotation from St. Thomas and a seemingly similar quotation from Sankara, e.g., reconcile essential differences too quickly?

Harvey D. Egan, S.J.


It is not news that "without contemplation the people perish"—philosophers and prophets have always said so—but it needs to be periodically preached. McNamara has done much to promote the special kind of spiritual challenge one finds in the desert: he founded a group of hermits in Sedona, Arizona; he writes articles and books, and crisscrosses the country giving retreats, preaching that the saving experience of contemplation lies in a "desert experience." He speaks with wit and conviction, sometimes like an Irishman, more often like a desert man, daring and a little impatient.

In Mystical Passion, M. argues that we must all break out of our flimsy existences and reach for the mountain-tops of spiritual passion. It is explosively written and uneven, better in the middle than at either end. The first and last chapters are meant to provide the theoretical foundation and logical conclusions about mysticism as passion.
The chapters are marred by the peculiar use of words and concepts pertaining to sex. One must deal with sexuality when dealing with spirituality, but not without careful definition of terms. It is not clear what M. means by erotic, sexual, or passionate; they are often used as if they mean the same thing. These chapters are full of "thrusts" and "penetrations" and nonsense about "feminine archways" (119). It may be that there is no appropriate language for the notion of passion he wishes to articulate, but that problem is exacerbated by using common words in ways that can be misleading. Passion, for M., is the thirst for God, the driving force of the spiritual life. It is unfortunate that he chooses to try to explain this with sexual/erotic language—it is an almost impossible task.

The middle chapters are easier to follow and more helpful. It may be surprising to think of Yahweh as "a passionate God, panting in hot pursuit of the man He loves," but it suits M.'s purpose of trying to convince the reader that real passion lies in the life of the spirit. He writes glowingly of St. Paul, Elizabeth of Hungary, Joan of Arc, Therese of Lisieux, and John of the Cross—all passionate lovers of God. One middle chapter, "Pretty Poison," rails against tepidity and nonsense in the forms of Love Story and Roman Catholic pentecostalism. If your biases coincide with his, you will laugh aloud at this and wish for more.

M. has a penchant for overstatement, a trait he shares with the prophets. Flannery O'Connor once said that "for the hard of hearing you shout, and for the nearly blind you draw large and startling figures." Her words were meant to explain the violence of her stories. If some of the excesses of M.'s language need an explanation, it is much the same. Imagine yourself being spiritually tested in the wilderness. If you cannot imagine it, his point is made. He quotes John L. McKenzie:

"If men will not return to the desert to find God, He will make their cities a desert where no sound drowns out His voice."

Mary Jo Weaver


For those unwilling or unable to read R.'s often difficult theological writings and for those interested specifically in the spiritual dimension of his thought, these small volumes present an excellent, readable summary of several key Rahnerian themes. The leitmotiv therein seems to be that "I am encompassed by an everlasting love, even in all the emptiness of my disappointments."

Meditations on Hope & Love offers translations of two German booklets, What Ought We to Do Now? and God Has Become Man. R. meditates upon four Advent readings in the light of our daily experiences of mini-deaths and God's radical nearness. Especially well done is the Christmas meditation viewed from Jesus' death and resurrection as well as from "the experience of real life." The most important section, however, delineates a nontechnical, exegetically sound summary of R.'s "ascend Christology" which begins with the "experience people of Jesus' time had of him." The nuanced presentation of Jesus as a human person and the sense in which he is a divine person should be noted. In view of Jesus' consciousness of himself as the absolute bringer of salvation, R. rejects all views which reduce Jesus to a superprophet or religious genius; he unhesitatingly speaks, moreover, of a "descent Christology." On the other hand, R.'s resur-
rection theology (the Father's full acceptance of Jesus' total self-gift), unless seen in the context of his other theological writings, can be and is kerygmatically misleading.

R. presents his "Copernican revolution" view of the sacraments by enucleating them as the historical and ecclesial manifestations of God's self-communication, which is always and everywhere at work in the world. Because God's self-communication has reached its irreversible highpoint and eschatological victory in the historical person of Jesus Christ, he is the primal sacrament. Because the Church witnesses to and is an inner moment of the Christ event, she is the fundamental sacrament. These mediations link, therefore, a universal sacramentality of daily life to its Christological and ecclesial foundation. The seven sacraments and final vows are presented as the various manifestations of God's love, which enfolds everything and which must unfold in individual and communal history.

Harvey D. Egan, S.J.

AN UGLY LITTLE SECRET: ANTI-CATHOLICISM IN NORTH AMERICA. By Andrew M. Greeley. Kansas City: Sheed, Andrews and McMeel, 1977. Pp. 120. $6.95.

Greeley, a priest-sociologist at the National Opinion Research Center, has as his thesis in this small but compact volume that anti-Catholicism is the anti-Semitism of the intellectuals. To G., anti-Catholicism is the form that nativism assumes today as it surreptitiously attacks the greater part of the population that is Catholic, so insidiously that this prejudice is not consciously rejected. G. fears that his readers will see him as paranoid in his denunciation of anti-Catholicism, but he may have a basis in fact. His empirical data are weak. The South and Eastern European Catholic ethnics are underrepresented in high prestige segments of American life: e.g., in university life, in economics, in law firms, to mention a few. G. is exercised mostly, not by the fact of their underrepresentation, but because no one of importance cares. Ignorance is another area cited to indicate the nativism present among the American elite. For instance, the important journal Science ignored pro-Catholic data in an article on the intellectual or the biases of one's own past. The anti-Catholic racism of the nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries was a continuation of the Nordic myth of WASP superiority. Today the anti-Catholicism is shown by the dual standards by which the Catholic hierarchy and other religious leaders are differently judged. Admittedly, the examples that G. uses to bolster his argument that the ignorance of many intellectuals is wilful are weak. Examples of residual biases are culled from the New York Times and journals like the Christian Century. Again, G. takes umbrage not at the slurs, but that they were not recognized as such. It is often assumed by Americans of non-Catholic background that Catholicism is a barrier to intellectualism. G. also wonders why Jews have not studied their anti-Catholicism as Catholics have their anti-Semitism. Finally, it is G.'s belief that Catholics themselves must make serious demands that anti-Catholic nativism stop.

This work is a good beginning of an idea that should be investigated more fully.

James J. Conlin, S.J.


S. is quite successful in a sizable task: to establish a world hunger problem, a biblical response, and the need to act as Christians. Using references, charts, and statistics, he shows that Lazarus is at our doorsteps, and the West's failure to respond may lead to collapse of its social structure. Marshaling about three hundred biblical quotations, he establishes that God identifies with the
poor and prompts us to do likewise. The jubilee principle, sabbatical year, and laws of tithing and gleaning teach us to desire justice and not mere charity.

Jesus' message of hope includes transformed economic relationships, symbolized by the disciples' common purse and concretized by an early Christian communality which involved genuine economic security. Pauline economic koinonia must extend to the world hungry or else our Eucharistic celebration remains imperfect. The Church's early concern for the poor, manifested through schools and hospitals, has now been institutionalized by secular governments. New models of Christian economic sharing are demanded which must subordinate property rights to the obligation to care for the hungry. Excessive material possessions, the West's cardinal vice, encourage unconcern for the poor, strife, and infidelity. The Bible does not romanticize the curse of poverty, but says prosperity may be a reward of obedience. However, prosperity as sure sign of righteousness is a Western heresy.

Modern Christians must challenge the institutionalized evils of today. S. offers examples of changes needed ranging from simpler lifestyles through tithing to new patterns of communal living. Unfortunately, no mention is made of reduced use of excessive food-packaging and overprocessed foods.

A number of national groups striving to implement societal change in areas of international trade, new food policies, and reduced military spending are listed. All in all, the book is an excellent application of biblical reflection to modern problems.

Albert J. Fritsch, S.J.

BOOKS RECEIVED

SCRIPTURAL STUDIES


Harvey, A. E. Jesus on Trial. Atlanta: John Knox, 140. $6.95.


**DOCTRINAL THEOLOGY**


**HISTORICAL**


Proja, G. B. *Mons. Marco Antonio


**MORAL, LAW, LITURGY**


**PASTORAL AND ASCETICAL**


Scharfenberg, J. Christliche Identität:
THEOLOGICAL STUDIES


PHILOSOPHY


SPECIAL QUESTIONS