BOOK REVIEWS


Karl Rahner continues to be one of the twentieth century's great theologians. His latest volume, moreover, underscores his enormous theological creativity and prolificacy. In typical Rahnerian fashion he asks the basic question: "What is Christianity and why can one lead a Christian existence today with intellectual honesty?" The book attempts, therefore, to state and to justify intellectually the whole of Christianity through a "first-level reflexion." In this sense the Grundkurs is aptly subtitled "Introduction to the Concept of Christianity," because it proffers neither an intellectually cheap escape for beginners, nor a pious short-circuiting of hard thinking, nor a catechetical repetition of traditional terms, nor a thorough and utterly scientific examination of the various relevant disciplines. It does present an intellectual justification of the faith on a first-level of reflexion which demands exactness, can stand next to the individual disciplines, and should appeal to those not afraid of somewhat learned, strenuous thinking.

R. insists that theology must talk about the depths of human existence. A Christian already lives and knows what Christianity is before he begins to reflect upon it. R. presupposes, therefore, Christianity in its normal ecclesial form. Theology, for R., means reflexion upon the pregiven understanding of Christian existence which faces the unity-indifference between original Christian self-possession and reflexion. R. strives to explicate conceptually what we are prior to this conceptualization. He also maintains that theological concepts really explicate something already lived, experienced, and known in some way by all because of God's universal self-communication. R.'s method enables the "scientific" study of the legitimately unscientific: the lived, root unity of self-possessing knowledge penetrated by God's self-communication, but a knowledge prior to its division into the various sciences. For R., the "unscientific" element of the Grundkurs is found in the object, but not in the subject and his method.

R. insists that his Grundkurs not be taken as an introduction to Scripture. He disclaims any exegetical expertise, hopes to stay within the state of the question and results of today's exegesis, and uses only enough exegesis as is absolutely necessary. On the other hand, I have personally seen and heard R. discussing scriptural points with professional exegetes. His exegetical mastery and his over-all sense of Scripture are awesome, as the K. Rahner/W. Thüsing volume (to cite only
one of many possible examples), *Christologie—systematisch und exegetisch* (Herder: Freiburg i.B., 1972), clearly indicates.

R. firmly rejects the notion of his *Grundkurs* as a type of Bultmannian formal hermeneutic. He also rejects it as the final summary of his previous works. He does admit, however, its somewhat more systematic and comprehensive character. It specifically aims at credibly grounding the essentials of Christianity's good news within the horizon of understanding of contemporary man. The *Grundkurs*, therefore, concentrates upon the intrinsic unity of fundamental and dogmatic theology, because the fact of revelation cannot be grounded in a purely formal way, i.e., without simultaneously examining the contents of Christian revelation.

This book is essentially a reworking of lecture courses given in Munich and Münster and designed for the intellectual formation of future priests. This accounts for both the superb, tightly unified, holistic structure and the, at times, less than ideal allotment of space to individual topics. R. begins with a fine delineation of his presuppositions, methodology, scope, and goal. He then treats: the hearer of the good news (man as subject, person, responsible, transcendent, etc.); man before the absolute mystery (knowledge of God, God as person, creaturehood, etc.); man as the creature radically threatened by guilt; man as the event of God's free, forgiving self-communication (“supernatural existential,” Trinity, etc.); salvation and revelation history; Jesus Christ; Christianity as Church; remarks on Christian living; eschatology; a short formula of the faith.

R.'s exposition of the intrinsic homogeneity of the whole of dogma in relation to the one primordial and ultimate question lived and experienced by the graced, historical person is unusually appealing. By emphasizing the human person both as individual and as social, as spirit and as matter, as reference to ultimate Mystery and as reference to history (a point often overlooked by many R. critics), he has skilfully welded together “supernatural existential” and salvation history, the a priori and the a posteriori elements of theology.

Unquestionably, R.'s transcendental method runs through and unites the various theological themes. Because of God’s self-communication as the “whither” of man’s transcendental subjectivity which can accomplish itself only in and through history, theology’s subject matter is the one perfect totality of man. Grace as transcendental and salvation history are not simply juxtaposed, therefore, but condition each other. Transcendental method shows why salvation history is saving, i.e., why man as a totality must turn to the events of salvation history. Transcendental method illuminates the “necessary” in salvation history.

Although his method presupposes Christian revelation, R. still passes
theological "facts" through his transcendental critique. This explicates
the man-as-subject aspect of any theological statement. If nature is that
to which God communicates Himself, and if this nature has in fact
become the recipient of God's offer of Himself, salvation as man's perfect
totality is God Himself. Man is therefore the living question which only
God Himself can answer. Transcendental method views the various
dogmas of faith as the multiple aspects of the one answer given to man
as question. Transcendental method aims at the anthropocentric an­
choring of theological statements. Christian dogmas "relate" to the full
human person as the correct key opens a lock. What is intrinsic to the
full human person which allows any dogma to be understood at all?
What is it in full human experience to which a particular dogma speaks?
How does this dogma anchor itself in graced human nature and experi­
ence illuminated through revelation? Transcendental method focuses
explicitly on these questions. Rahnerian theology, anthropology, Chris­
tology, and ecclesiology are therefore in some way one.

To justify intellectually other Catholic truths, R. also employs an
"indirect" method. For example, after transcendentally grounding the
necessarily ecclesial nature of Christianity in man's intrinsic need for
intercommunication, R. admits that there are too many historical prob­
lems to legitimate directly the Catholic Church as Christ's Church.
Admitting the presence of Christ's grace and Spirit in other confessions,
but rejecting an ecclesial relativism, R. maintains that we can best find
the Church of Christ where the deepest, simplest, most palpable contin­
uity with primitive Christianity exists. Because only the Catholic
Church has the courage to claim to be in constitution and doctrine
Christ's historical representative, because she has the most tangible
links with the early Church and has not unmistakably fallen from the
gospel, and because she does proclaim in her own way sola gratia, sola
fide, and sola scriptura, her claim to be Christ's Church is credible.

R. demonstrates his full strength in the section "Jesus Christ." He
presents therein a fine summary of classical Christology, a theological
analysis of contemporary exegesis on the problem of the pre-Easter
Jesus, a Christology solidly rooted in the life, death, and resurrection
of Christ, a sketch for a new approach to Christology—and all of this with
an eye on today's evolutionary perspective and the questions raised by
world religions.

Working from an exegetically certain minimum, R. exploits to the
fullest Jesus' understanding of himself as the absolute and final bringer
of salvation. R. thereby fuses together a transcendental Christology
rooted in the fact that everyone already does a "seeking Christology" if
they are open to the experience of their own deepest mystery, with a
Christology anchored in the life, death, and resurrection of Jesus. "How
can I justify my faith in this Jesus as the Christ?” asks R. He then explicates the a priori principle of waiting, seeking, expecting, and hoping found within all of us. Jesus corresponds to this seeking; for the Resurrection is the highest identity of saving sign and reality, the final being-saved of concrete human reality by God. R. suavely shows that an “ascent Christology” should take precedence today, but that it necessarily implies a “descent Christology.” Likewise, Jesus “for me” and “in himself” cannot ultimately be separated. In this fashion, R. is convinced, the best apologetics ad intra is also the best apologetics ad extra because of the universal nature of a “seeking Christology.”

As an aside, I suspect that a closer examination of R.’s “seeking Christology” would break the implicit Kantianism of Jung’s analysis of archetypes as “psychic possibilities.” It could then be shown that a “seeking Christology” rests at a much deeper level than the psychic and that salvation history sublates all genuine archetypes.

R. has noticed that Scripture frequently contains not only what he calls the “original revelation event” but also its God-guaranteed interpretation. R. has made excellent use of the identity-in-difference of the Jesus of history and the Christ of faith to provide new orthodox starting points for other Christologies.

Other areas especially worthy of note are: the three ways of knowing God; God’s relation to the world; human freedom; Christianity as a mysticism of love; prophecy, signs, and miracles; the possibility of sin as an abiding existential; Mary as the radically saved one; the transcendental grounding of papal infallibility; the intrinsic unity between Jesus’ death and resurrection; resurrection as the ground of faith; eschatology seen from the perspective of the present experience of graced human nature; the early Church’s self-understanding.

Some of the book’s weaknesses are: a certain unevenness of methodology; much of the content is not new; the grace section should have preceded the “man as the creature radically threatened by guilt” section; unanswered is the specific causality involved in signs and miracles.

In summary, R. has produced another one-volume classic. It proffers a brilliant synthesis flowing from an incredible mastery of Scripture, the Fathers, the great medieval theologians, the “theology of the Schools,” and contemporary thought. His indebtedness to Ignatius of Loyola and the Spiritual Exercises should not pass unnoticed. Despite R.’s often difficult writing style, the clarity and tenacity with which he pursues an idea or line of thought must be emphasized. Reading R. is never a wasted effort. To think along with him is to experience that hard, sober, tough searching and questioning is a form of piety. No Denzinger theologian, no lackey for the ecclesial establishment, no hawker of the new, no superficial accommodator to the spirit of the times, R. is
nonetheless one who can explain the Church to the world and the world to the Church because of his amazing grasp of the "genuine" in his own tradition and his deep compassion for the tradition of others. The missionary, pastoral, and ecumenical aspects of his theology are never extrinsic additions but constitute intrinsic "moments" in his thinking. One commentator has called R. a "theologian of transition." I would prefer to underscore the classical in R.'s way of thinking, the powerful, tension-filled, dialectical, traditional, contemporary, nuanced mode of thought which always grapples with what is essential and substantive. He is not only one of the great theologians of this period of transition, but truly a theologian for tomorrow.

The English translation will be published by the Seabury Press in January under the title *Foundations of Christian Faith*.

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Harvey D. Egan, S.J.


Among many fine introductions to the OT available in English, such as Pfeiffer, Selby West, Eissfeldt, or Robert Feuillet, none matches Soggin's work for clarity and attractiveness. S., who teaches at the Waldensian Faculty of Theology in Rome, wrote this originally for the popular Italian market, synthesizing the fruits of modern research and debate. He has a gift for sketching a lively and exciting picture of ideas and theories in development. He makes the contests among the schools of Wellhausen, Gunkel, von Rad, Noth, and Albright come alive. He notes the origins, battles, triumphs, and inevitable eclipses by newer research. This approach readily communicates a sense of excitement and enjoyment in biblical research. And in a time when biblical scholars have come under heavy fire for dryly dissecting and embalming God's word, S.'s talent should be appreciated. Bowden's translation captures this flavor well.

The bibliography selection is a definite plus. It does not duplicate the exhaustive listings elsewhere, but brings the older lists up to date with choice articles and books from 1960 to 1973. Many are annotated with helpful explanations. Another good feature, especially for Catholic scholars, is the amount of space given to discussion of the deuterocanonical books (thus explaining the reference to the Alexandrian, i.e., Greek, canon in the subtitle). Again, treating the whole canon first rather than last, as in other introductions, provides a more cohesive outlook to the OT as religious literature. Such small details as the discussion of ancient Hebrew pronunciation (20 f.), the listing of princi-
pies in biblical criticism (29), or the appendix of Palestinian inscrip-
tions, are all welcome touches.

S. shows his greatest strength in the opening chapters on general
problems of biblical interpretation, and in his treatment of the Penta-
teuch and Former Prophets (Joshua through Kings). His explanations of
the canon, myth and history, preliterary stages of tradition, written
sources, and the Deuteronomic materials are all excellent.

Two sections are devoted to the prophets. A well-done overview han-
dles the modern questions of prophetic originality and their place in
Israelite life. S. even summons lessons from Mohammed to illustrate his
points. His handling of individual prophets, however, can be uneven.
Isaiah receives due attention, but Zephaniah less than one page. His
treatment of Ezekiel is quite complete but prosaic, missing the prophet's
return to stereotyped tradition, and devoting too much space to the
problem whether his symbolism reveals psychological aberrations.

When he moves into the Writings, especially the wisdom literature, S.
appears weakest. He has fashioned a good treatment of the nature of
wisdom, although he places excessive stress on a royal-court, rather
than a family, setting. Yet this whole section suffers from brevity.
Proverbs gets less than three pages and remains largely murky; Eccle-
siastes, which he mentions on p. 380 as one of the two best-known
wisdom books, receives only two pages. Because today's focus on plural-
ism and coping with secularity has drawn scholarly attention to the
contributions of wisdom, which already confronted these values, future
revisions must give more attention to this part of the OT.

Since this introduction addresses the layman, it often asserts as
definite what scholars still consider debatable. This can disconcert the
expert but will help the majority of readers. Also, some sections seem
less satisfactory than others, such as the discussion of inspiration (40-
44) or the assertion that nothing in the deuterocanonical books adds to
or detracts from the substance of the Hebrew canon. But even with such
caveats, S. has provided the general Bible reader with an excellent
introduction: handy, clear, and literarily delightful.

Washington Theological Coalition LAWRENCE BOADT, C.S.P.

The New International Dictionary of New Testament Theology
1: A–F; 2: G–Pre. Edited by Colin Brown. Translated, with additions and
revisions, from the German Theologisches Begriffslexikon zum Neuen
Testament, edited by Lothar Coenen, Erich Beyreuther, and Hans
$27.95.

These are the first two volumes of a new three-volume dictionary of
NT theology, and it is a welcome addition to the tools for the study of the
NT by English-speaking students. Now that the ten volumes of Kittel-Friedrich, *Theological Dictionary of the New Testament*, have appeared in English (see *TS* 38 [1977] 402–3), one may wonder whether there is need for still another one. There is, however, a considerable difference in the two works, and of such a sort as to justify the existence of both. "Kittel," as *TDNT* is usually called, was begun in 1933, and its first four volumes are really of pre-Second-World-War vintage. Much new data (e.g., from Qumran, Nag Hammadi, and other discoveries) had come to light, bearing on various NT passages, by the time Vol. 1 was translated into English (1964). The three volumes of the *Begriffslexikon* were published between 1965 and 1971 (Wuppertal: R. Brockhaus) and, even though their totality in German numbers only 1536 pp., they have incorporated the most important elements of such discoveries into the discussion of relevant words.

The English title of this new dictionary has failed to preserve an important word in the title of the German original which attempts to describe its character, *Begriffslexikon*, i.e., a dictionary of (theological) ideas. Whereas "Kittel" had ordered its articles according to the Greek words of the NT, along with their cognates (e.g., *theos*, *teotês*, *atheos*, *theodidaktos*, *theios*, *theiotêς*), following the order of the Greek alphabet, the *Begriffslexikon* grouped words expressing related ideas (e.g., baptism, wash [Greek *baptizô*, *louô*, *nipto*], or bishop, presbyter, elder [episkopos, episkeptomai, etc., presbyteros, presbeuô, proistêmi, kyber-ñêsis]). It thus presents the ideas of NT theology in a different, and at times highly desirable, context of discussion. Whereas "Kittel" tended to study the words of the NT in and for themselves (over against their rich OT, Hellenistic, Palestinian, and rabbinic backgrounds), the *Begriffslexikon* sought to relate them to other words akin to them within the NT itself. Thus its aim and purpose offset, in part, some of the criticism that J. Barr (*The Semantics of Biblical Language* [New York: Oxford Univ., 1961]) had leveled against the etymological and organizational approach of "Kittel," and its tendency to encourage "illegitimate totality transfer" (218), i.e., the tendency to predicate all possible meanings of a word of any given historical occurrence of it. However, even though "Kittel" will always remain indispensable, because of its vast coverage of material and its thorough scholarship, the *Begriffslexikon* has also been highly praised for what it has achieved. One notes its lack of the galaxy of names of German NT scholars associated with "Kittel," but that is in part explained by the fact that the *Begriffslexikon* was constructed mainly to aid theologians, pastors, and ministers, and many of the articles have been written by them. The stark, technical discussion of "Kittel" gives way to a more pastoral tone in the articles of the *Begriffslexikon*. The thrust is neither historical, archeological, nor geographi-
cal, but theological; yet it is not theological in the sense of descriptive synthesis. It is an exegetical dictionary, striving to point out the specific theological meanings of words in their given NT contexts.

The English translation, *NIDNTT*, is not a simple version of the *Begriffslexikon*. Its three volumes are to include all the articles of the German original, but in a different order. The articles still group the ideas associated in the original, but now with English word-equivalents; this has meant the reordering of them according to the English alphabetical order of the key words. Greek words are used only in the titles of articles and sections; they are also transcribed and appear only in the latter form in the body of the article, so that it is possible for Greekless readers to make sense of the discussion without much difficulty. Abundant cross-references have been used. Each volume is fitted out with indexes (of Hebrew and Aramaic words, Greek words, and general subjects), which are quite helpful for quick reference.

In the German original there were sections in many articles marked *Zur Verkündigung*, "For Preaching." They sought to slant the survey of the more technical discussion to the preacher's task. In many instances, these sections addressed themselves to a German evangelical context, and because of this slant they have been omitted in the English translation. But in some cases these sections handled hermeneutical and exegetical problems which are now left untouched. In their stead one notes in the various paragraphs that have been added in the English translation another evangelical thrust, one born more of a Calvinist concern.

The *NIDNTT* is a collaborative work, and like all works of this sort it has its ups and downs. The addition of the new bibliographical material by the editor and his colleagues—especially what is now available in English and had been neglected in the German original—is quite welcome. But it is also obvious that some of this material has not entered into the discussion in the articles themselves.

Additional paragraphs, added to the English version, are indicated by the name of the author of them set in brackets, thus [F. F. Bruce], and the whole is set in parentheses. These are sometimes corrective of what was said earlier in the translated article. Thus, in the article on the "Lord's Supper," B. Klappert says: "Since the phrase 'my blood of the covenant' (14:24) is supposed to be impossible in Aram., the Marcan version of these words, 'this is my blood of the covenant, which is poured out for [the] many' (14:24), has been thought to belong in the realm of Hellenistic Jewish Christianity" (2, 532–33). The added note by F. F. Bruce states: "The covenant idea is thoroughly Hebraic, and in any case one should treat with profound scepticism the suggestion that it was impossible to formulate in Aramaic certain expressions, such as "This is
my covenant blood' or 'This blood of mine is the blood of the covenant’” (2, 536). It would have been nice to learn why F. F. Bruce thinks that.

In any case, it is obvious that all students of the NT will want to consult this new dictionary of NT theology. Its advantages far offset any minor criticisms of defects that inevitably creep into works of this sort. Those who use it will learn in time to read it critically, and they will in the long run come away from it the better for having used it.

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Challenging contemporary scholarly consensus at many points, Robinson argues that all books of the NT—yes, that means not only all four Gospels, Colossians, and Ephesians, but likewise the pastoral and catholic Epistles—all were written prior to 70 A.D. In an illuminating way, he first shows the widely divergent dates assigned over the past century by various scholars to the writing of these books. He seeks also to show the weakness of the assumptions and arguments usually used in systems of dating.

For his own part, R. assigns considerable methodological significance to the absence in any of the NT books of explicit reference to the crucially important destruction of Jerusalem and its Temple in 70 A.D. Accordingly he finds quite unsatisfactory Norman Perrin’s use of this event to date much of the NT: “It is not enough to say, however loudly, that its ‘importance . . . is impossible to exaggerate,’ and that ‘much of the subsequent literature both of Judaism and Christianity took the form it did precisely in an attempt to come to terms with the catastrophe of AD 70’ and then to give no specific evidence” (342, citing Perrin’s *The New Testament: An Introduction* 40).

Dividing the NT into more or less naturally compatible groupings (beginning with the Pauline Epistles and ending with the Gospel and Epistles of John), R. devotes seven chapters to an analysis of the external and internal evidence he finds important for determining the date of composition of each book. He concludes that all genres of writing coexisted from early to late: though the Epistle of James was the first completed work (ca. 47–8), certain traditions of John’s Gospel were the first to be written (before 40, with the final form dating from ca. 65).

Though the pages of this book contain many intriguing surprises, perhaps the most significant is that R. has gone beyond his “New Look” and other studies from the 1950’s on the fourth Gospel. He now not only claims (in agreement with Dodd) that this Gospel contains very early and independent traditions; he argues (going beyond Dodd) that John,
Son of Zebedee, was the writer of practically all of the Gospel bearing his name.

NT scholars and readers alike will surely look forward to a healthy discussion of basic questions arising from this work. Regarding some NT books, many scholars will probably grant that the reasons usually given for late dating are anything but compelling. Regarding other books, those who will disagree with R. will nonetheless find themselves obliged to provide stronger and more explicitly developed arguments for their positions. At the same time, they may well expect that R. will give consideration to the kinds of arguments that are even now persuasively used for later dating of certain books. Redaction critics, after all, do not simply claim that long periods are required for the development of ideas or positions in the Gospels. Werner Kelber’s dating even of Mark after 70 A.D., e.g., is based on careful exegetical study of what Mark is seeking to communicate through the organization of his material. Possibly his conclusions are wrong; but a failure even to consider them (or those of similar studies) is a disappointing aspect of R.’s otherwise exciting work.

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DONALD J. MURPHY, S.J.


Farmer’s book, first published in 1964, marked him as the American leader of the campaign to resurrect the Griesbach solution of the Synoptic problem which is being waged by a small but very zealous group of NT scholars. The Griesbach hypothesis would solve the interrelationship of the first three Gospels by postulating that Mt was a source of Lk and that Mk was composed as a conflation and summary of both Mt and Lk. Were this hypothesis to be established, the foundations of modern form and redaction criticism would be shaken, and the reconstruction of the development of NT theologies, the crowning product of modern critical scholarship which accepts the basic elements of the two-source hypothesis, would be reduced to shambles.

F. devotes less than a hundred pages (199-293) to a positive presentation of his arguments for the Griesbach hypothesis. Two thirds of his book (1-198) is an analysis of the origin and growth of the scholarly consensus in favor of the two-source hypothesis. He contends that, in the final analysis, this scholarly consensus is the product of ecclesiastical circumstances and theological concerns. C. F. Baur and his Tübingen school employed the Griesbach hypothesis in the construction of their Tendenz Theologie. The "mediating" theologians in Germany found Holtzmann’s two-source hypothesis a useful instrument in their attack on the Tübingen school. "The real enemy was the Tübingen school and
only incidentally the Griesbach hypothesis, which Baur had accepted" (58). Such nonscientific factors may have influenced Weiszäker, B. Weiss, and even Sanday and other English scholars, as F. contends, but they exercise no influence on today’s scholarly consensus. The Catholic scholars who finally came to accept the basic elements of the two-source hypothesis (e.g., Lagrange, Vosté, Benoit, who are never mentioned by F.) were not motivated by the disputes of nineteenth-century Protestants but rather by a concern to show how the priority of Mk and the use of Mk and Q by Mt and Lk could be reconciled with the tradition on the origin of the Gospels. So they identified Q with a primitive Matthean writing called Logia by Papias. This reviewer finds quite interesting F.’s silence about the basic assumption of Griesbach (his dogma) that the Gospels which were written by apostles, eyewitnesses of the Lord’s life, namely, Matthew and John, are prior to Mk and Lk.

NT scholars today readily admit that we do not have a completely satisfactory solution of all the puzzles of the Synoptic problem. But the basic elements of the two-source hypothesis, namely, the priority of Mk and the use of Mk and Q by Mt and Lk, are strongly supported by the data which emerge from an unbiased comparison of the first three Gospels. F.’s presentation of his case for the reasonableness of the Griesbach hypothesis always assumes the acceptance of the solution which he is defending. He has not yet, either in this new edition of his book or in his recent article in NTS, given convincing responses to the objections to the Griesbach hypothesis formulated by J. Fitzmyer, S.J., at the Pittsburgh Festival of the Gospels (cf. Jesus and Man’s Hope 1, 131–70).

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Bailey attempts to delineate more precisely those aspects of Oriental culture—specifically, internal aspects of personal relationship and attitude—that inform the text of “four major Lucan parables” (the Unjust Steward [16:1–8], the Friend at Midnight [11:5–8], the Lost Sheep and the Lost Coin [15:4–10], and the Father and the Two Lost Sons [15:11–32]). He also addresses himself to literary structure, a “facet of the parables that has probably had less attention than any other.” These endeavors are intended to illuminate the theological teaching of the parables treated.
Methodologically, B. uses the standard tools of critical scholarship in combination with what he designates as "Oriental exegesis," the use of cultural insights gained from ancient literature, contemporary peasants, and Oriental versions. Inevitably in such a procedure, there is the risk that Middle Eastern peasants may have changed cultural attitudes during the run of the ages (B. would reject cultural attitudes whose evolution could be demonstrated), but other things being equal, B. sees the Middle Eastern peasant's cultural judgments as closer in thought to those of Jesus' time than are the cultural judgments of Western exegetes. B. also contends that the parables have referents (symbols) within the real world of the listener and a cluster of theological motifs that press the listener to make a single response to the parable.

B.'s analysis of literary structures in the materials he cites is often forced (see 52-53, 68, 84), but he is more successful in providing cultural insights which illuminate his chosen parables. His treatment of the Father and the Two Lost Sons (= Prodigal Son) is particularly thought-provoking. It is in these cultural insights that the chief value of his work lies.

Crossan's book takes a different tack. It "situated itself within this challenge posed by structuralist literary criticism to the monolithic ascendancy of historical criticism in biblical studies" (xiv). Viewing comedy and tragedy as variant formulations of modes of thought, attitudes, and ways of coping with the world, C. accepts play—strictly defined as make-believe and as-if—as a supreme paradigm for reality, reality as the interplay of worlds created by human imagination (28) and expressed in and through language. "Whenever and wherever humans bypass this perspectival obligation and attempt to speak, act or exist outside or apart from structures of the human imagination, comedy lifts its flaming sword and denies them any such passage or any such existence" (29). Thus it is the playful human mind which establishes and imposes structure. Anything outside or anterior to structured play strikes C. as unknowable and unspeakable (34).

In bringing together comedy and transcendence, C. describes "comic eschatology as the ending of endgame, the silent laughter at our invention of a divinity whose coherent plan is moving, imminently or distantly, towards some final consummation" (45).

Working out of this philosophical background, C. juxtaposes sayings and parables of Jesus with the works of the modern Argentinian writer Jorge Luis Borges. (Space precludes treatment of Borges here.) Without explaining adequately (but see 177) how he determines objectively what is authentically Jesus', C. explains the forms of Jesus' language as case parody, antibeatitude, paradox, and parable—all of these slowly but surely being transformed by Jesus' successors into case law, beatitude,
proverb, allegories, and examples. Specific instances are chosen to illustrate each point.

The reviewer finds C.'s book remarkable for its literary erudition but begs to differ scripturally. C.'s exegesis (e.g., 66) and reconstructions (e.g., 70), if not arbitrary, are at least without sufficient justification in the present work. And to assertions such as that we must accept the ridiculous (here, the meek shall inherit the earth) as the basis of morality (75), one must reply "Why?" And while there are passages where scholars think later tradition modified an earlier saying of Jesus (e.g., Mt 5:32), has this happened as consistently and frequently as C. seems to think (e.g., 71, 109-10, 127, 177)? Oddly enough, C. places remarkable confidence in the reporting of the Gospel of Thomas (158-59). In short, while the book may reflect the trend of the author's thought, it is not so likely to move the reader in the same direction.

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After an introductory formal statement of the problem of evil, G.'s work unfolds in three stages: (1) biblical and Greek sources, (2) a description and rejection of eleven "traditional" theodicies, and (3) the proposal of a nontraditional (process) theodicy.

The formal statement of the problem is set forth in eight propositions. This enables G. to describe the relevant characteristics of different theodicies through their way of understanding these propositions and their attitude toward them. But he finally finds them all wanting because of their inability to sustain three positions: the moral goodness of God, true creaturely freedom, and the presence of genuine evil in the world. This inability he finds rooted in their understanding of divine omnipotence. By introducing a new concept of divine power, process theodicy, he maintains, preserves these three positions and solves the problem of evil.

G. is convinced that for all traditional theodicies divine omnipotence means a monopoly of power, the total determination of all that happens, and hence the ability to exclude unilaterally all genuine evil from the world. Even when they expressly deny this meaning, he attempts to show that the denial is inconsistent with their central positions. Although this method is basically sound, it frequently seems that G. is more concerned to constrain other theodicies into a position he can readily demolish than to represent them as fully and fairly as possible.

G. is particularly concerned to refute Thomas Aquinas. His basic objection is founded on Thomas' notion of divine simplicity. Since for
Thomas God's knowing, willing, and omnipotent activity are all really identical, and since God is the infallibly omniscient first cause of all that is, God has a monopoly of power, makes creaturely freedom impossible, is responsible for all evil, and hence is not morally good. Unfortunately, G. fails to explore Thomas' own idea of divine simplicity or to deal with Thomas' replies to these difficulties at all adequately. For example, his treatment of the transcendence of eternal knowledge lacks precision and depth, and he reduces the issue of primary and secondary causality almost entirely to a consideration of the unusual dramatist-actor analogy of James Ross. May I refer the reader to my article in this issue of TS, where I deal with this cluster of ideas at greater length than is possible here.

The basic inadequacy of the book, however, is found not so much in G.'s treatment of other positions as in his own exposition relative to them. He maintains that recognizing God's inability to exclude unilaterally all genuine evil from the world enables us both to acknowledge this evil as present and yet to maintain the supreme moral perfection and goodness of God. What he fails to realize, it seems to me, is that this view of divine power is traditional, and that his criticism of traditional positions for denying genuine evil is founded on his own impossible definition of genuine evil, one he himself actually abandons in the end.

When most traditional thinkers speak of divine omnipotence, they expressly exclude the intrinsically impossible or contradictory from the things God can do. Hence Thomas teaches that the created free will's power of self-determination excludes the determination of its choices by God (C. Gent. 1, 68, 8), though not its dependence on God's causal activity. (G. fails to distinguish causing from determining.) G.'s own proposed limitation on divine power is essentially the same; but he extends the notion of self-determination to all finite agents whatsoever, making it contradictory to say that God completely determines anything that happens in the universe. This position on the freedom of all agents is Whiteheadean and is derived from the idea that all power to act involves the power of self-determination. This position is not self-evident; and it is merely asserted, not demonstrated by G. But all this does not change the conceptual limit on divine omnipotence: the intrinsically impossible.

G. defines genuine evil as "anything, all things considered, without which the universe would have been better." He contends that although such evil is incapable of proof, we all recognize its reality. Freedom in the universe makes it impossible that God should unilaterally bring about a world without genuine evil. Traditional theodicies, by saying that God draws good out of evil, turn all evil into apparent evil, and thus remove all genuine evil from the world.
But if to "consider all things" and then judge that "the universe would have been better" is required in order to recognize genuine evil, such evil is radically unknowable for us, since both these acts are clearly beyond our powers. May we not more simply describe genuine evil as the absence of any good which truly should be present, any real violation of value? Traditional theodicies have said that God can draw a compensating good even from an evil which comes about contrary to His intentions, as in the case of sin. In saying that this makes the evil only apparent and not genuine, G. is confusing an evil which is in some sense intended instrumentally for good (e.g., pain which moves us to avoid harmful situations, or the destruction of some living things for the nourishment of others) with an evil which is not intended but from which God can draw some good. For G. to establish his definition of genuine evil, he would have to show that there are some evils from which God can draw no compensating good. He does not do this. Indeed, he speaks of God "overcoming evil" (304), which is a very traditional concept, and one that undercuts his definition.

Process thought has alerted us to many important aspects of reality and given us significant insights into relationships which bind the world into a developing unity. G. in the last portion of his book presents a clear, brief summary of this system. One need not adopt the system as a whole in order to acknowledge its many merits. However, one of these merits does not seem to be providing us with a better theodicy.

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JOHN H. WRIGHT, S.J.


Galot finds, in this intriguing book, that Scripture has quite strong affirmations of the suffering of the Son and the Father, but that Thomas Aquinas and theologians generally have interpreted these in a minimalist fashion. For example, Scripture asserts that the Son suffered in His passion and death (Phil 2:7; Heb 5:8; Mt 27:46). And Scripture's teaching that the Father's gift of His Son is a sign of His love implies that the Father shares the suffering of the Son by His own compassion. Christ's willing acceptance of suffering would not be a revelation of the Father's love unless the Father shared His Son's suffering. However, theology in the West has generally passed over this question rather than treated it. This has been largely due to the fact that it has treated God's involvement in Christ's human actions and sufferings from the consideration of the divine nature which is impassible rather than from the consideration of the Son or Father as divine persons. Similarly, Scripture describes the offense to God that is sin in the strongest terms; Israel's infidelity to God is described in the OT as adultery. But theologians
have quite generally denied that man's sin touches God interiorly. Sin's offense is reduced to man's subjective disposition to dishonor God and to the harm one does to a person under God's providential care. Finally, while Scripture pictures God's mercy as a real disposition in God Himself, theologians have tended to ascribe only the alleviation of another's misery to God and not the sadness at the misery of another that belongs to the disposition of mercy.

G. argues that if we face the question of God's suffering from the perspective of the personal relations that Father, Son, and Holy Spirit freely adopt toward men rather than exclusively from the perspective of the divine nature, there is room to assert that God suffers. Sin, e.g., touches God interiorly, for it wounds or pains the love He has for us, although it does not affect the divine nature, which is impassible. As one human being who loves another is wounded by the other's rejection, so too God suffers from man's sin. G. holds that there is a real analogy between these two cases, since what is essential in the first relation is also found in the second. To suffer does not diminish God's perfection; indeed, He would be inferior if He were not free to take the risks of love that His engagement with free human beings in history constitutes. It is, of course, a mystery how God can be both supremely happy and suffering at the same time, but this mystery is not to be attenuated by suppressing one of its terms.

The acknowledgment that God suffers is necessary in our humanist age. The Father's part in the reparation that is offered to Him by His Son's passion and death seems cruel and egotistic unless we recognize that the Father is the first to suffer in the whole order of redemption. Suffering remains a scandal for the world as long as the appearance is given that God asks men and women to suffer when He Himself does not have to bear the cost. Perhaps a development of the theological theme of God's suffering that gives more weight to Scripture's teaching than traditional theology does can help to overcome this scandal and the spirit of revolt that sometimes results from it. Moreover, this acknowledgment of God's suffering gives us a perspective on the evil of sin that is more than anthropocentric. It also allows us to recognize the existence of real joy in God at the conversion of sinners and the conquest of His divine plan and grace in history. Finally, only this perspective can give us a true sense of the transcendence of the Christian God. For too long, this transcendence has been associated with a view of God as without passions or affectivity.

A number of theologians have turned from Thomas to Whitehead for an interpretation of God's relation to man that can do justice to Christian revelation. One difficulty, however, with a Whiteheadian view is that it attributes imperfection to God. G. makes an important contribu-
tion to a developing theology that tries to do justice to both God's perfection and his relation of mutuality with men and women. This book will be of great interest to all who face the mystery of suffering in theology and life.

St. Anselm's Abbey, Wash., D.C. John Farrellly, O.S.B.


Aulén's life spans 5% of all the years since Jesus, and half the years since historico-critical research into the life of Jesus began in earnest. He not only read but knew Harnack, Schweitzer, and their main successors. Therefore he brings to the study of historical-Jesus research since 1960 a long view which helps him discern the special and the important in this recent work. A. is content to summarize the findings of the authors he studies, pleading his own amateur standing in matters of exegesis; he leaves most of their disagreements unresolved and seldom expresses a preference of his own. His purpose does not require him to settle arguments between NT scholars or to achieve the definitive picture of Jesus. His aim as a systematic theologian is more modest, and yet in a sense more impudent: he contends that modern NT scholars are agreed on several significant points about the historical Jesus, even though their starting points are often far apart and their methods quite opposed. The picture of Jesus resulting from, as it were, a series of overlays drawn by different scholars is vivid and coherent at certain key points. This picture is not absolute or the full Jesus of Christian faith, but neither is it valueless, as some (A. names W. Schmithals) have said. The true humanity of Jesus requires that we envisage him as best we can in a human way; and Christian theology can hardly abandon its central figure to the secular historian alone.

A. groups his material loosely into five thematic chapters. He summarizes what modern scholars have to say about the ethical preaching of Jesus; the opposition he met, his teaching in parables, and his understanding of his suffering and death; the call to discipleship, Jesus's own style of life, and his attitude toward property; the place of apocalyptic in his proclamation of the kingdom and his identification with the kingdom he proclaimed; and the Resurrection and the problem of continuity between the earthly Jesus and postresurrection faith. The principal scholars A. cites are found to agree on at least three major points: Jesus's gospel was characterized by an unusual combination of radical moral demand and radical, free forgiveness; he identified himself personally in some way with his gospel and the kingdom of God which he preached; and the faith of the primitive Church was, in these important
respects, in continuity with the earthly Jesus and his ministry. That A. can find so much fundamental agreement among H. Braun, C. H. Dodd, J. Jeremias, and N. Perrin may well astonish anyone who has tried to reconcile different tendencies in NT scholarship; I have the feeling that he may have softened a few edges of disagreement without asking permission from the scholars concerned. But the historical probability of the points established even in the absence of unanimity among A.'s sources seems high enough to be worth the effort.

Besides those already named, A. has used, in appropriate places, the work of W. D. Davies and Gerhardsson, Roloff, Via, Wilder, K. Rengstorff, Linnemann, and Wilckens. The book consequently takes on a rather rambling character in places, and it is sometimes difficult to tell where an exegete's views end and A.'s interventions and summaries begin. But A. has shown that this sort of thing can be done, and the results should be interesting not only for systematists but also for the exegetes themselves. The style is accessible to the general reader, and students who are familiar with the methods of modern NT study might find this a very interesting textbook for a course in Christology. There are several misprints or mistranslations, and one complete breakdown in continuity (123), but the volume is well made and pleasant to use.

Perhaps only someone with the experience and background of A. could win a hearing for an attempt to mediate between German scholarship and the rest. His book should be acceptable, in its over-all thesis, to most students of the life of Jesus except those who advocate a thorough-going application of the criterion of dissimilarity.

College of St. Thomas, Minn. Michael Slusser


The context within which the author investigates what he considers to be two actual currents in the Thomistic analysis of faith is the relationship between grace and created signs in the genesis of faith. The study is limited to Thomistic authors of the first half of the present century, and a Thomist is defined as one who adheres to the "objective specification principle" in explaining the essential difference between natural and supernatural acts. According to this principle, an act is specified by its formal object, and the supernatural act of faith has a formal object that is different from the formal object of any natural act. S. sees the authors adhering to this principle sharply divided into two groups, and this division forms the two parts of his study.

The first group S. calls "dualists" in their explanation of the relationship between grace and created signs in the genesis of faith. They are so called because in their analysis of faith they maintain two separate
planes, the natural plane of the signs and the supernatural plane of grace. The signs stand in extrinsic juxtaposition with grace, and function not as causes but as sine qua non conditions of the act of faith. S. includes in this group A. Gardeil, M. de la Taille, R. Garrigou-Lagrange, H. Stolz, and I. Trethowan.

The second group S. calls "hylemorphists" in explaining the relationship between grace and created signs. These authors maintain that both grace and the created signs stand on one supernatural plane. In the genesis of faith they function synthetically in this supernatural unity, a synthesis that is analogous to the hylemorphic unity of matter and form. S. includes in this group P. Rousselot, J. Huby, E. Masure, K. Adam, and J. Mouroux.

In making this sharp division, S. does not deny significant differences among the individual authors in their respective analyses of faith, especially those in the first group. These differences are considered in his study of the individual authors, and there is greater emphasis, e.g., on the power of grace in Stolz and Trethowan than in the first three authors considered. However, they all share the common ground of a natural order of signs, and apparently feel that this must be maintained, as S. says in connection with Gardeil's analysis, in order to guarantee the rational element of faith and to avoid any kind of fideistic explanation.

There is more homogeneity among the second group, all of the authors adopting and developing the new approach set in motion by Rousselot in analyzing the relationship between grace and created signs. S. devotes his longest study to the work of Rousselot, and this is perhaps the most valuable part of his book. The basic features of Rousselot's metaphysics of knowledge, including the primacy of concrete over abstract knowledge, the role of the subject in objective knowledge, the intrinsic and reciprocal relationship between intellect and will or between knowledge and desire, and the Thomistic notion of connatural knowledge are treated with a view to their importance in the analysis of faith. This importance is spelled out in the application of Rousselot's theory of knowledge to the act of faith, especially with regard to the relationship between the supernatural and rational aspects of faith (grace and created signs), and between the freedom and certitude of faith. It is in the relationship of the "eyes" or the "light" of faith as formal cause and created signs as material cause that S. sees the dualism of the first group of authors overcome in a new hylemorphic analysis of faith.

Of the authors following Rousselot's analysis of faith, S. devotes most attention to Karl Adam and Jean Mouroux. He sees Adam's contribution in presenting the analysis of faith in nontechnical language, and in giving a fuller description of the influence of grace upon human feelings
and showing the contribution of these feelings in the genesis of the concrete act of faith. The value of Mouroux's work lies in its explicit emphasis on the personal nature both of God revealing and of the act of faith as response, and on the resulting personal relationship between God and the believer in faith. In his final section, S. attempts to present an analysis of faith which combines the contributions of the various authors who have been considered. His attempt does not include any of the developments which have occurred since the first half of the present century. This limits the actuality of his "two actual currents," as the dissertation format and style will probably limit his readership.

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This very substantial historical inquiry into the role played by the papacy in the unfolding story of clerical celibacy is prompted by Denzler's conviction that anyone who does not know how laws and institutions have come to be is in no position to assess the total significance of them (p. x). Denzler also believes that the ignorance of what clerical celibacy has been in the past is largely responsible for the fact that today celibacy is still a problem begging for a solution. This seems to mean that D. undertakes to re-enact the past of celibacy in order to mandate the direction in which the Church of today ought to move in order to resolve the celibacy problem.

As the historical inquiry gets under way, the opening declaration of intention moves quietly out of sight, and the inquiry takes on the severe mannerisms mandated by historical method. The accent is now on objectivity. D. sets out to tell his readers the story of celibacy as certified sources show it to be (p. xi). After a quick sketch of celibacy as it appears in the OT and NT, in the early Fathers and the symbols up to Nicaea, D. turns to the papacy and begins to chronicle the initiatives taken by the popes on behalf of clerical celibacy. Pope Damasus I (366–84) opens the series, and Pope Paul VI closes it. For the sake of historical understanding, the initiatives of the popes are collected under thirteen chapter headings which are intended to disclose their common thrust. Because of this technique, D.'s work turns out to be a mixed literary genre: history of laws and institutions, history of the popes, history of the Church. The usefulness of the work is enhanced considerably by the fact that D. assembles at the end of each volume the documents (102 in all) that have played a prominent role in the course of the volume, either as direct sources or in a contextual and hermeneutical capacity. At the end
of the second volume, twenty-two short paragraphs of text are supposed to deliver a synoptic view of the development of celibacy. The honor of speaking the parting word is then handed over to the well-known historian Joseph Lortz. The word is the one the readers have been overhearing all along during the inquiry: "We, the Church, its leaders and members, must be entirely open to much that is new" (337).

The readers who will labor through these two volumes of historical prose and multilingual documentation will earn twice over the right to decide for themselves whether the historical inquiry in which they have participated fulfills its stated objective and moves the celibacy problem any closer to a satisfactory solution. My view is that it does, but mainly in the sense that it affords readers the opportunity to form a realistic appreciation of what the problem is. If I am right, the problem is the one that plagues all the social institutions that emerge from acts of meaning and cannot, in consequence, survive except by preserving across time their fitness to be meant by those who live within them. Since people can change their minds (i.e., their meanings), and stop meaning what was once meant for them, or begin to mean it differently, these institutions are in for a precarious existence. They must resign themselves to live from legitimation to legitimation; often they will find themselves wondering where their next legitimation is to come from.

This, I believe, is the celibacy problem as it emerges from D.'s inquiry into its history. As the centuries go by and popes come and go, forceful statutes are enacted in an almost unbroken succession either to prescribe sexual abstinence to lawfully married clerics, or to invalidate their attempted marriages, or to visit admonitions, threats, and punitive hardships on clerics who are less than proficient in abstinence. This rather monotonous story becomes fascinating the minute we realize that the name of the game is not legislation but legitimation. We are being called upon to watch from the first row the institution of celibacy as it goes in search of its own legitimation. We also perceive why the task is interminable. The reason is that the task of legitimating celibacy is the responsibility of a more or less celibate elite steeped in the conviction that priesthood and sex do not mix, yet never quite able to make a convincing case for that very conviction. When the legitimation that is intended to make celibacy fit to be meant reaches its destination and registers in the consciousness of those who have a vital stake in it, it gives the dubious ring of all the things that make poor sense. And so the work that has been done will have to be done again.

D.'s historical inquiry also discloses the reason why a particular line of legitimation failed to carry the day in the past. In the days of Damasus I, the rightness and appropriateness of celibacy are argued on the strength of the supposition that married clerics in major orders
cannot afford the defilement which genital intimacy would inevitably visit upon them, since they must be ready at a moment's notice to perform sacred functions and touch sacred things. This is the so-called "cultic purity" legitimation of celibacy, at the core of which is lodged Damasus' equation "commixtio pollutio est" (141; cf. also 12–15).

Previous research, such as Martin Boelens' *Die Klerikerehe in der Gesetzgebung der Kirche* (Paderborn: Schöningh, 1968), and his two shorter pieces in the *Festschrift für K. Mösdorf* (Paderborn, 1969) 593–614 and in the *Archiv für katholisches Kirchenrecht* 138 (1969) 62–81 had already ascertained that this line of legitimation commanded enough plausibility to recur in the documents with amazing regularity for fifteen hundred years. And yet it is not difficult to see in retrospect that it was decrepit and impotent the very day it was born, for it inflicts upon the experience of intimacy a defamation to which that experience itself declines to submit. That defamation may indeed enjoy a long life in the documents, but in the lives of those for whose benefit it is meant it can enjoy no life at all, for it is being counteracted for them in their very consciousness by the experience it seeks to defame. Should there be any doubt about this, one need only consider the history of the punitive, corrective, and restrictive legislation issued to reinforce the cultic-purity legitimation. The fact that this legislation had to be issued exposes the irremediable weakness at the core of that legitimation. To put it bluntly, while sexual abstinence can be legislated, the sense of personal defilement cannot.

As the inquiry moves from the past to the present, we can hardly be surprised to find that clerical celibacy is still an institution in quest of a legitimation. But we also notice some significant changes. The quest has not grown more self-conscious, less triumphalistic, and indeed more responsible. The *commixtio-pollutio* equation and the freedom from defilement no longer appear in the documents, and the emphasis has shifted to a different kind of freedom, the freedom to live and work "pro Deo et hominibus" (Roman Synod, Nov. 30, 1971; cf. p. 435). The key legitimation is now being worded in keeping with Jesus' own legitimation in Mt 19:12. If the world-wide resistance evoked in our time by mandated celibacy be a valid indication, we may have to conclude that the new legitimation is, by and large, no more successful than the old one. And so, as we release ourselves from D.'s work to return to our own, we find ourselves face to face with a truly perplexing question: Why is it that the shift to the for-the-sake-of-the-kingdom line of legitimation does not resolve the celibacy problem?

The answer is no doubt more complex than anyone can imagine, but it may not be impertinent to suggest a tentative and partial answer. It
seems to me that Jesus' legitimation of celibacy is not successful today because we defeat its power to succeed by lifting it out of its native context and meaning, and making a reverse use of it. As I have tried to show in this journal (36 [1975] 223-30), Jesus did indeed legitimize celibacy by relating it to the kingdom of God, but he had his own determinate understanding of how that relationship is structured. In his mind, it is the kingdom of God, that is, God's lordship, that by its own happening within people makes celibacy happen to them in the act of dispossessing them of the ability to see in marriage a way of life viable for themselves. When the lordship of God is related to celibacy as that for the sake of which celibacy ought to be taken on as one's way of life, the logic of Jesus' legitimation is reversed and its power collapses. The reason for that collapse is that the experience of being claimed radically by the lordship of God is presupposed to the advent of celibacy, since the celibate life makes sense only because of that experience, that is, as a consequence of it. But if this experience be lacking, and celibacy be still demanded for the sake of the kingdom, the celibate way of life mirrors itself in consciousness as a harsh and arbitrary imposition. When this imposition is felt, there is no doubt that the legitimating effort has failed. As a consequence, the law that mandates celibacy is also bound to fail, since it legislates a mode of life that is experienced as an unnatural and unnecessary imposition. That law could only succeed if, in the act of mandating celibacy, it could also mandate the experience that makes sense of it, namely, the experience of being radically claimed by the lordship of God. This, obviously, no law can do. And so, when all is said and done, the new legitimation fails for the same structural reason that caused the failure of the old cultic-purity legitimation. The old legitimation failed because no law can mandate the experience of sexual defilement; the new legitimation fails because no law can mandate the experience of being radically claimed by the lordship of God.

These reflections are intended to show why and in what sense I believe that D.'s two volumes do constitute a contribution to the solution of the celibacy problem. The contribution is outstanding, but latent rather than manifest. A hermeneutic is required to bring it to light, and courage is required to bring it to fruition. As the mind re-enacts the past and the present by rethinking their thoughts, a message evokes itself within it, yet that message can only bear fruits to the extent to which there is courage to surrender to it. This courage is a commodity no historian can supply.

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ROGER BALDUCELLI, O.S.F.S.

The extent to which Origen was familiar with Jewish thought has been known since the work of Gustave Bardy in the 1930's. But except for an occasional article, and a series of studies in Hebrew by E. E. Urbach over the last generation, few scholars have pursued the subject further. This is all the more surprising since Origen's familiarity with Judaism is most apparent in his exegesis and it is this aspect of Origen's work that has attracted the greatest attention in recent years. Those studies which have considered Origen's exegesis in relation to Judaism have relied chiefly on the Hellenistic Jewish literature. The merit of de Lange's study is twofold: he knows the Jewish sources, e.g., the midrashim, which are contemporary with Origen, and he located Origen's acquaintance with Judaism to his years in Caesarea and his knowledge of the Jewish community there. Caesarea, the large Greek-speaking city on the Palestinian coast, was a thriving Jewish center during Origen's lifetime and the seat of a vibrant rabbinic school. The community there spoke Greek, worshiped in Greek, and its leaders no doubt argued with Origen in Greek.

The chief value of de Lange's book is to gather together an enormous body of material, much available in scattered places, but much new, and to relate it to several questions: Origen's biblical interpretation, Christian attitudes to the Jews, and Origen's acquaintance with Jewish practices and traditions. Along the way he discusses the place of the Jews in Origen's polemic against Celsus, showing that Christian apologetics was a three-cornered debate because pagan critics knew that the ongoing existence of the Jews was an embarrassment to Christians. But he also makes the further point that Origen was confident enough of his knowledge of Judaism to refute Celsus' arguments, which were allegedly based on Jewish criticism of Christianity. Origen could tell the difference between genuine Jewish criticism and putative criticism.

Although Origen exerted great labor on the study of the Hebrew text of the Jewish Scriptures, he did not come to the revolutionary conclusion of Jerome almost two centuries later that Christian exegesis must be based on the Hebraica veritas. He recognized the importance of the Hebrew, especially in debates with Jews, and he included it in the Hexapla; he preferred the Septuagint, considered it inspired, and, like Augustine, saw the Septuagint as the text which belonged to the Church. Nevertheless, Origen drew widely on Hebrew sources for his exegesis and de Lange offers fresh evidence, by a consideration of Origen's interpretation of Hebrew names, that he drew directly on contemporary sources, not earlier Christian or Philonic exegesis.
Once Origen is set firmly alongside contemporary Jewish exegesis, it is apparent that the distinction between him and his Jewish interlocutors is not one of method (e.g., allegory vs. literal exegesis or typology) but of the kind of meanings each seeks to derive from the sacred text. Origen accuses the Jews of undue literalism, but what he means by that is not that their exegesis is literal, but that it is not Christological. This point, often lost on students of patristic exegesis, comes through nicely and it helps de Lange to locate more significant lines of agreement and disagreement between Origen and the rabbis.

De Lange's method of presentation is somewhat plodding, but he works carefully and diligently. He calls his study preliminary, but he has brought together enough material to show the fruitfulness of approaching Origen in relation to contemporary Judaism.

University of Notre Dame

Robert L. Wilken


In these two volumes of Erasmus' letters in English, being published as part of The Collected Works of Erasmus by the University of Toronto Press in co-operation with the Killam Program of the Canada Council, the same superb quality of the translation and annotations is maintained as in the initial volume of the series. These volumes include the correspondence of the famous Dutch humanist and early Reformation theologian between 1501 and 1516. It was during these years that Erasmus laid the foundation of his future educational and theological achievements, which deeply influenced both Catholic and Protestant positions.

The volumes contain rich material for the Church historian as well as scholars in related disciplines by providing important insights into the context and sources of those issues which emerged in full force during the early 1520's. They also show how Erasmus himself developed a novel theological method which resulted in break-throughs particularly in scriptural and patristic studies. Strongly reflected in these writings, which likewise contain replies from theologians and important Renaissance personages, is the critical need for Church reform based upon a renewed spirituality and a type of scholarship capable of using the instruments of a new era.

In the volume containing letters 142 to 297 and spanning the years 1501 to the summer of 1514, the reader finds both personal and public observations about the theological enterprise and the general field of
late Renaissance scholarship. It covers the time in which the Dutch humanist and theologian gradually left his obscure origins behind and began to take his place among contemporaries as an international scholar and counselor to popes and kings. In this literature one can observe the early controversy develop over *The Praise of Folly*, written in honor of his friend Thomas More and seen as a devastating critique of theologians and prelates. Likewise, E.'s persistence against enormous odds in acquiring proficiency in Greek in order to use basic theological sources is admirably recorded and translated. His work in editing Jerome's letters and laying the foundations for the first published Greek edition of the NT is compellingly presented.

The historic characters that parade across E.'s intriguing correspondence begin with relatively minor Dutch ecclesiastics like Abbot Anthony of Bergen and Nicholas of Burgundy, provost of St. Peter's Church at Utrecht, to such notables as Thomas Linacre, John Colet, Thomas More, and the future Henry VIII, to whom he was introduced by More and who displayed a genuine interest in the new scholarship (Ep. 206).

The letters which survive from 1501 to 1510 unfortunately do not form a continuous record of the period and only sparsely reflect E.'s crucial sojourn in Italy in 1506-9, when he received his doctorate in theology and met important curial people and printers who would later support his new ideas. Nevertheless, from 1511 on, a substantial number of letters are included so as to give the reader a better view of life in London and at Cambridge, where E. taught Scripture.

The third volume of the series, which involves the correspondence from midsummer 1514 through August of 1516, has even more theological material. The authentic theological value of E.'s work begins to appear during this period. Moreover, this third volume reflects a greater theological perception in the accompanying notes. For example, Prof. McConica's introductions to E.'s prefatory epistle (373) to his scriptural annotations of the *Novum instrumentum* as well as the preface addressed to Pope Leo X for the entire *opus magnum* are very well done. Similarly, E.'s dedicatory letter to William Warham, Archbishop of Canterbury, prefaced to Froben's edition of Jerome's letters, deserves special note for its scholarly introduction.

In this same volume, E. also corresponds with several persons of theological interest including his perennial friend Thomas More, his patron at Cambridge John Fisher, Cardinals Raphael Riario and Thomas Wolsey, the Hebrew scholar John Reuchlin, the future reformer Ulrich Zwingli, and the Louvain theologian Martin van Dorp. In an important exchange of letters with the last-mentioned professor from Louvain, the reader can clearly grasp the impact of E.'s new theological method and his literary style as Dorp conservatively resists the insights
of E.'s *Praise of Folly* and his *Novum instrumentum*, which challenged the Vulgate in several key places.

In this edition of E.'s letters one can come to understand the observations of earlier historians acquainted with Allen's Latin edition of *Erasmi epistolae* that they are one of the most illuminating sources of the first two decades of the Reformation. These second two volumes of correspondence, never completely translated into English, span the critical years of E.'s development from an obscure Dutch scholar to a confident and internationally respected thinker who deeply loved theology and possessed a consuming desire for Church reform based upon a simple piety and a sound investigation of the scriptural and patristic sources. Fortunately, the scholarship involved in this new English edition does justice to the material and should serve a need for present-day historians and theologians to go back to the fonts of early Reformation thought.

Washington, D.C.  

DONALD CONROY

**Psychohistory and Religion: The Case of Young Man Luther.**  

This book is advertised as "a critical companion volume" to Erik Erikson's *Young Man Luther* (1958). Six essays constitute the critique: two well-known Reformation historians, Roland H. Bainton and Lewis W. Spitz, contributed "historical studies" dealing directly with Erikson's work on Luther; two "psychoanalytical studies" were contributed by a psychologist of religion, Paul W. Pruyser (Menninger Foundation), on "developments in the psychology of religion from Freud to Erikson," and psychiatrist William Meissner, M.D., S.J., on "faith and identity"; two college professors did "religious studies": Roger A. Johnson (Wellesley College) on "the demonic role of Hans Luther in Erikson's saga of human evolution," and Clifford J. Green (Goucher College) on "Bonnheffer in the context of Erikson's Luther study."

Editor Johnson announces the collective aim of the six essays to be an examination of Erikson's book "in a context larger than that of the psychohistory debate, with attention to specific claims rather than general methodological issues, and from the perspective of religion and theology as well as that of history" (5). Space forbids a detailed analysis of all six essays and Johnson's Introduction; a few observations must suffice.

The book was designed to start an interdisciplinary dialogue on the controversial issue of the historiographical assessment of young Luther. Unfortunately, Erikson seems to have chosen not to respond to his critics or to defend himself in this book (as indicated by the editor, p. 10).
Therefore Johnson felt obliged to do so. In particular, he discloses three "mistakes" Reformation historians make about Erikson's work on Luther. (1) They (especially Bainton) mistake his analysis of Luther's childhood to be the "cause" for his adult behavior, when Erikson rejects such a Freudian interpretation. (2) They misunderstand Erikson's definition of "motivation" in Luther's decision to enter the monastery when they home in on Erikson's parent-son analysis and do not come to terms with what Erikson calls "moratorium"—a term he created to describe behavioral patterns of youth. (3) They do not take seriously Erikson's clinical data on Luther, whom he regarded as neurotic. It would have been helpful to have Bainton and Spitz respond to Johnson's charges, to see where the dialogue might go. As it stands, the dialogue is reduced to Johnson's critical questions and his hope that the "dialogue" will produce a study of Luther which takes seriously Erikson's clinical data and avoids his historical errors (18).

While Johnson raises critical questions related to Erikson and Luther, labeling Erikson a "lay theologian and lay historian" (161), other contributors grind their own axes. Spitz's advice should be heeded: "it is time for a major work on the wholesome Luther, now that his personality complications and existential theological depths have been plumbed" (84). That task certainly transcends Erikson's psychological speculations based on a few of Luther's "Table Talks." To take such infinitesimal evidence as major clues for an assessment of Luther's personality is one thing; to plow through the gigantic Weimar edition of Luther's works is another. Luther scholars need to be reminded of the proper distinctions between history, psychology, and religion, as well as appropriate connections, in a biography of Luther. But, as Bainton aptly remarks, "the first step is to make the utmost effort to get the facts straight" (56).

Although the book may serve as a companion volume to Erikson's study of young Luther, it does little more. Interdisciplinary dialogue requires the discipline to stay with an interdisciplinary subject—in this case, with young Luther. But that is the fate of editions of "collected essays"—they collect a lot and leave it to the reader to cull out the best.

_Lutheran Theological Seminary, Gettysburg_  
ERIC W. GRITSCH


No theologian in history has been so immersed in politics as Huldreich Zwingli (1481–1531). Before coming to Zurich as preacher at the Grossmünster in 1519, Zwingli had cast off his scholastic training and
had earned a local reputation as an Erasmian humanist. Gradually his study of the Bible in the original languages led him to reject many traditional Catholic beliefs and practices, and his preaching gradually won over the majority of Zürichers to a more radical Protestantism than Luther was teaching in Germany, particularly regarding liturgical practice and the presence of Christ in the Eucharist. In theory the town council assumed complete control of religion, but in practice Zwingli's influence gave him the initiative even in politics and diplomacy. To forward the spread of his doctrine, Zwingli tried to build up a vast alliance system against the Catholic forest cantons and their Hapsburg allies. Driven to desperation by a blockade, the forest cantons attacked. Zwingli, fully armed, led out his townsmen to defeat at Kappel. He died on the battlefield, "wie ain ander Kriegsman," in the words of a contemporary chronicler.

German and Swiss scholars have produced an enormous Zwingli literature on which P. draws freely. Although richly footnoted, this book is not noteworthy for archival research or new interpretations; moreover, P. shows a distinct reluctance to discuss disputed questions or the previous literature. This is a solid, traditional biography that should remain the standard work in English for many years, although scholars will continue to rely for details on the monumental biography of Oskar Farner and the specialized studies. P. is masterful in explaining the complexities of Swiss institutions and diplomacy and the constant interaction of Zwingli's politics and theology, but Zwingli the politician so dominates the stage that his dealings with his family and friends and his relation with God in prayer are neglected. Zwingli did not have Luther's gift for phrases which in a flash illuminate a whole personality. Neither does his biographer.

P. gives a clear précis of each major writing as it occurs in Zwingli's life. This procedure has distinct advantages, since it makes clear the continuous evolution of his theology, the context of each idea, and the nontheological considerations which conditioned the expression of Zwingli's doctrine. P. argues that even in the diplomacy of Zwingli's last years, religious considerations remained paramount. Nevertheless, theologians will be less satisfied than historians. P. never attempts a synthetic description of Zwingli's thought. He never searches for a unifying theme beyond Zwingli's own claim that his doctrine flows from Scripture alone, studied with the best philological tools. P. agrees with most recent scholars that Luther exerted little influence on Zwingli's thought and suggests that the divergence of Luther and Zwingli on the Eucharist was rooted in their respective trainings in the via moderna and the via antiqua, but he never explains how this is so. Many scholars have termed Zwingli a spiritualist or a rationalist; P. indicates Zwingli's
tireless refrain of "Spiritus est qui vivificat, caro non prodest quidquam"; but the problem is not really faced. He shows Zwingli's attenuation of the doctrine of original sin but not how this can fit with his extreme teachings on predestination. Did Zwingli verge toward universal salvation, was he tinged with pantheism, as some scholars claim? These questions are not posed. In short, for Zwingli's theology we must still go to J. Courvoisier's English summary or to the substantial works of A. Rich, W. Köhler, and G. Locher in German.

P. is generally favorable toward Zwingli but not uncritical; he has some sympathy for Conrad Grebel, but little for Luther, and hardly any for the Catholics among Zwingli's opponents. There are some minor slips. Can Johann Brenz be called near-Zwinglian? P. discovers new concepts when Zwingli recommends silent prayer, individual reaching out of the heart, and prayerfulness at work for peasants; clearly P. is no expert in medieval spirituality. Since there are three maps and an index but neither illustrations nor bibliography, the book is more than usually overpriced.

*Marquette University, Milwaukee*  
**John Patrick Donnelly, S.J.**


Cairns's work on Bollani (1513–79) may initially appear as just another biography of a reforming bishop in Italy during the Tridentine period, but closer inspection will reveal that he presents Bollani's life in the context of a distinct thesis which considerably enriches our understanding of Tridentine reform movements in Italy. Bollani came to the bishopric of Brescia in 1559 after a distinguished career in the service of the Venetian Republic. He at first held minor offices in Venice but in 1547 was appointed ambassador to England. Two years later he secured entrance into the Venetian Senate. While senator, he also served as luogotenente of Friuli and podestà of Brescia. Because of his great success as podestà of Brescia, he was a logical candidate for the episcopal office of that city when the post fell open in 1558. While he had every hope of eventual membership in the Venetian Council of Ten, Bollani chose to enter ecclesiastical life as head of one of the most prominent northern Italian dioceses. His election as bishop came on March 14, 1559. Installed on April 17, 1559, he celebrated his first Mass in the cathedral at Brescia on August 15 of that same year.

C. argues that it was Bollani's extensive administrative and diplomatic experience before ordination that guaranteed his success as
bishop of Brescia. This experience served him well as he strove to implement the reforming decrees of Trent (1545–63). Bollani, moreover, came late to the ecclesiastical arena and consequently did not share the vested interests of many clerics who opposed the Tridentine reforms. His ecclesiastical formation took place completely in the context and spirit of Trent, in whose final sessions he was an active participant. Trent, therefore, provided the program for his episcopate; his previous administrative and diplomatic career supplied the skills with which he would strive to implement that program. In this combination, according to C., lies the success of Bollani's episcopate.

C.'s thesis is well argued and, for the most part, successfully sustained. The spirit of reform had begun to take hold in Brescia before Bollani's elevation as bishop, but what was needed was organization and leadership, qualities which he was well equipped to provide. His concern for the personal and social welfare of those under him, so characteristic of his earlier work at Friuli and Brescia, was now transferred to the pastoral domain. He resided in his diocese, inspected churches, preached sermons, inquired into the beliefs of his people, and heard their complaints. He was especially solicitous about the education and pastoral effectiveness of his clergy. This pastoral dedication made him the embodiment of the Tridentine episcopal ideal, and reached its culmination in the 1565 visitation of his diocese. Bollani's arbitral abilities were tested in his attempt to establish a seminary at Brescia in accordance with the Tridentine decree of 1563. Here he encountered the vested interests of the cathedral canons, who were unwilling to be taxed for the building of the seminary and even more unwilling to see ecclesiastical benefices transferred to the support of those teaching at the seminary. By the end of his stay in office, however, the seminary had become a reality. His diplomatic skills were demonstrated in his ability to sustain the reform ideals of Trent while maintaining his loyalty to Venice and her interests in the territory of Brescia.

In brief, then, the structure of Bollani's reform program was thoroughly Tridentine but the style of its implementation was essentially Venetian, in that it employed diplomacy, conciliation, and flexibility, traits which he had learned well in his earlier career. In this respect Bollani's style differed from the more absolutistic Roman tradition of reform. C. maintains that future studies of reforming bishops in Venetian territories will provide further proof of his thesis and will also demonstrate the varying approaches to reform manifested throughout Italy during the Tridentine period. C.'s study itself does much to illustrate the diversity at work throughout the Italian scene, especially in northern Italy, for he frequently compares and contrasts Bollani's approach with that of other episcopal reformers such as Gilberti in Verona,
Paleotti in Bologna, and Borromeo in Milan. C.'s work is indeed a welcome addition to contemporary scholarship on the implementation of the Tridentine reform program in Italy and goes far towards freeing us from the more commonly held views, which tend to see the implementation of that program in a more monolithic context.

Fordham University


When, on Feb. 22, 1977, Archbishop John R. Quinn was announced as the sixth prelate to serve as archbishop of San Francisco, he could take consolation in the fact that longevity is an outstanding feature of the position he now occupies. Since San Francisco became an archdiocese in 1853, the years of rule of the five former archbishops have been impressive in their length: Alemany, 1853-84; Riordan, 1884-1914; Hanna, 1915-35; Mitty, 1935-62; McGucken, 1962-77.

While Alemany's life has been written, it is strange, as is mentioned by Gaffey, that his successor has had to wait so long for his biographer. It would be difficult to improve on the quantity and quality of G.'s research. While preparing some years ago to write the life of Alemany, this reviewer necessarily became well acquainted with the riches of the Propaganda Fide archives in Rome; G. found these same archives meaningful and profitable. Riordan's long and successful rule (he died just one day short of filling out thirty years as archbishop) found him involved in so many activities that an extensive biography such as this was called for.

The interesting life of one born in Canada of Irish parentage (actually, he lived in Ireland as a young lad for a few years) includes the story of how his family moved to Chicago, where young Patrick decided on his priestly vocation. Much of his seminary training was had in Belgium, where he was ordained priest in 1865 (always there were fond memories of those European years). It was not long before the young priest became pastor of St. James Church in Chicago. His successful administration of this important parish undoubtedly contributed to his being considered for the episcopacy, and in 1883 he was sent to San Francisco as coadjutor archbishop to Alemany, succeeding him in 1884. The many activities that formed part of his busy life for three decades are spelled out in interesting detail here. Interwoven is the story of San Francisco itself, including the tragic events of the fire and earthquake in 1906, which forced Riordan to courageously face the tremendous task of restoring the many churches and other institutions which had been
destroyed. This task he and his associates performed with success, even with distinction.

G. gives a satisfying portrait of Riordan's personal qualities, including a few "defects" coupled with an occasional lack of frankness. Throughout, however, the essential greatness and even nobility of the man is made evident. The tributes paid to him when he died in 1914 were merited: he had proven himself a distinguished priest and bishop and among the truly worthy citizens of San Francisco. I could find no major points of criticism in these pages.

University of San Francisco

JOHN B. MCGLOIN, S.J.

PAUL TILLICH'S THEOLOGY OF THE CHURCH: A CATHOLIC APPRAISAL.

Over twenty-five years ago Gustave Weigel published sympathetic assessments of Paul Tillich that sparked considerable interest and comment. Later came the volume edited by O'Meara and Weiss, Paul Tillich in Catholic Theology (1964), followed shortly by Carl Armbruster's magisterial work. M. has realized the importance of returning at this stage of ecumenical research to Tillich's three volumes of Systematic Theology. The task may be arduous and painstaking, as he warns, but Catholics are now in a better position to absorb more of the total Tillich. The frequent references in Tillich to the ambiguities of life, the dangers of idolatry, demonic temptations, are still pertinent. His skepticism may be a healthy counterbalance to the optimism both of Teilhard de Chardin and of Gaudium et spes.

For Tillich, the Church is meant to be superior to any other religious symbol precisely because it is the radical negation of all idolatry, a means of counteracting the ambiguities of religion and overcoming the demonic. Christianity needs to keep in creative tension Catholic substance (with its appreciation of priesthood, sacrament, and authority) and Protestant principle (a vocation to protest "no" to Catholic absolutes). In support of T.'s dialectic, M. maintains that Protestants have often been guilty of the fault of Marcion, wanting to reduce Christianity to Paulinism, to a pure "gospel" or principle, whereas Catholics have succumbed to the mistake of the Gnostics, opening Christianity up to a number of extraevangelical elements in the name of development of unwritten traditions.

One Tillichian insight has particular pertinence to our current ecumenical theology: his repeated distinction between necessary functions in the Church and institutions that serve these functions. Only recently and slowly has Catholic theology comprehended this distinction, as,
e.g., instance, in the U.S. Lutheran–Roman Catholic study on papal primacy or even more tellingly in the latest study by the "Groupe des Dombes," *Le ministère épiscopale* (Taizé, 1976). In that consensus statement on the ministry of vigilance and unity in the local church, Catholic and Reformed theologians have used to great effectiveness this Tillichian insight by distinguishing NT episkopé from one of its specific historical embodiments, the "episcopate" today.

M. successfully distills, in the first part, which was Tillich’s explicit and implicit ecclesiology within his comprehensive dogmatics. In his second section, he shows certain parallel "radical" developments in contemporary Catholic theologians. Despite the applause he has for Tillich, M. raises several objections to his ecclesiology. He feels that (1) the aspect of horizontal relationship, interpersonal koinonia we might call it, receives little attention; (2) the tendency to emphasize the universal is done at the expense of the particular; (3) the Jesus of history is insufficiently stressed; (4) T. lacks a well-developed sacramental theology; (5) he neglects the centrality of the Eucharist.

M. draws from Tillich additional reasons for not confusing the Church with the kingdom of God. Here he adds to the work begun by Schnackenburg, Küng, and McBrien. The Church can not be identified with Jesus as the Christ, with the New Being, with Spiritual Presence or Spiritual Community.

I experienced two relatively minor problems with the present volume. M.’s explanation of Tillich’s four functions of the Church—constitution, expansion, construction, and relation—is far too cryptic (80–90). This material could well be expanded and clarified in a subsequent article. Secondly, M. seems to be arguing for a sort of canon within the canon of Scripture. This is not unlike what his mentor Küng stated in *The Church* (1967, p. 19), that the older writings of the NT are more relevant, and hence one should prefer sources such as Corinthians to James. M. carries this even further by saying that we need to “subordinate some NT doctrines to others” (p. 269). He finds the theology of John deeper and more comprehensive than that of Luke, the Gospels as more basic than Revelation, Romans more telling than 2 Peter. Now there may be something in this argument, but it strikes me as far too subjective and insensitive to the variant emphases of NT spiritualities often embodied in different Christian families today. I am not sure that it is helpful to apply a “hierarchy of truths” to the NT as a whole.

I agree heartily with M. that Catholics and Protestants are asked to remain in a “tension of polarity.” I wonder if M. has considered how difficult it is to identify, apart from reading the name on the door of the church where theologians worship, who is a Catholic and who is a Protestant.
M. wrote this book as his doctoral dissertation at Tübingen. It has none of the lackluster of some theses; it is brilliantly written and very interesting. One can sense the obvious delight of his Doktorvater Hans Küng, who praises the work lavishly in his preface. Küng has a well-trained colleague on this continent and to him we extend our congratulations for a well-balanced treatment of Tillich and Catholicism today.

Concordia University, Montreal

Michael A. Fahey, S.J.


E. C. Ratcliff (1896–1967) was an eminent British liturgical scholar, although he contributed no book to the field. His contribution lay more in numerous articles and book reviews as well as in the help and encouragement he gave others interested in liturgical studies. The editors wisely allowed R.'s own liturgical interests, i.e., the early liturgy, to be the primary norm of selection. As a result, the first three sections contain essays which, for the most part, deal with initiation, Eucharist, and orders in the early Church. A fourth section on the Book of Common Prayer forms something of an appendix.

Part 1 concerns itself mainly with an area which had a particular fascination for R., viz., the Canon Missae. As early as 1950, he argued that the Eucharistic prayer in the Latin version of Hippolytus did not really represent what Hippolytus had written. R. suggested that the Sanctus had been the climax and doxology of ancient anaphoras everywhere. He felt that he had thus given some explanation for its otherwise inexplicable appearance (14–15). He was to return to this position in an article published thirteen years later on the liturgical homilies of Narsai. On the basis of a closely reasoned analysis of key texts, R. concluded that a paragraph combining the themes of Dan 7:10 and Isa 6:3 and ending with Sanctus formed the original climax of Hippolytus' canon (32–33). Thus, while a considerable portion of this anaphora reflects the 2nd–3rd centuries, its general arrangement and one of its important elements, viz., the epiclesis, belong to the fourth century (26–27). The shape of Hippolytus' anaphora would then, according to R., have been: (1) thanksgiving for creation; (2) Christological thanksgiving; (3) a formal anamnesis of the paschal mystery with a presentation of bread and cup as a thanksgiving oblation (probably including a brief petition for its acceptance) followed by a final thanks for being able to join in the heavenly worship; (4) participation in the worship of heaven at the Sanctus; (5) Amen.

Throughout R. shows an ability to think independently. A case in point is his assessment, contrary to B. Botte, that "the Roman, or rather
African-Roman, is the one liturgical Institution Narrative which cannot be described as resting on a tradition 'indépendante des évangiles'" (63). Another indication of R.'s independence is his view that the Roman Canon is not the distorted form of an Oriental prayer pattern but a form earlier than that of Jerusalem and Constantinople. In an article completed by Couratin, R. seemed to see the Nobis quoque peccatoribus as originally leading to the Sanctus and thus forming the beginning of the end of the early anaphora, as he conceived it (cf. 103-4). Finally, R.'s examination of "Addai and Mari" led him to conclude that this anaphora was not a Mass but a Eucharist, i.e., it represents a third type standing somewhere between agape and Mass (89).

In Part 2, which deals with the early history of the baptismal liturgy, R. also provides the reader with some thought-provoking suggestions. For instance, arguing from Justin Martyr's Dialogue with Trypho, R. concludes that "the distinction which a later period recognizes in the terms 'baptism' and 'confirmation' is already present in Justin's thought, which, we may reasonably assume, was aligned with the practice of his day" (115). After examining Roman and Byzantine liturgies as witnessed by early mss. as well as by patristic writings, R. sees baptism and confirmation as a single initiatory action which makes present Christ's own baptism in the Jordan and his anointing with the Holy Spirit, so that the initiate can enter into this same mystery (131-32, 149).

Part 3 focuses on the liturgy of ordination. After studying the appointment of the bishop in Apostolic Tradition, R. draws two inferences: (1) the appointment of a bishop did not demand, as of necessity, the active assistance, or even the presence, of other bishops; (2) if Apostolic Tradition's author thought about apostolic succession at all, he did not think in terms of "sacramental succession" or even of a chain or a series. Rather, he thought in terms of an immediate appointment by the Lord of someone to an apostolic vacancy (159). This section concludes with a study of the enthronization of bishops and the position of the Ordinal of the Church of South India on the relation between Church and ministry, on who should ordain, and on the constituent elements of an ordination rite.

In Part 4 the reader will find a treatment of Cranmer, whose work on the Book of Common Prayer R. judges prodigious, given the problems which beset him and coming as they did from a man who "had the scholar's patience no less than the scholar's desire for exact knowledge." There is also a study on English Eucharistic consecration which leads to the conclusion that, while the doctrines connected with the usage of pronouncing the "words of institution" over the elements may have varied, the usage itself remains "uniform and 'Western'" (218). Finally,
there is a treatment of Puritan alternatives to the Book of Common Prayer, which, however unhappy the methods of preserving it, needs no apology for the fact of its survival.

The editors of this work, complete with two indices, are to be commended. They clearly intend it for a scholarly audience. Not all will agree with some of R.'s conclusions. This reviewer has, e.g., great difficulty with R.'s stance on the position and consecratory value of the Sanctus in the earliest anaphoras (cf. 73–75). The editors have done a great service, however, in making readily accessible the works of a painstaking scholar who was clear, thought-provoking, and refreshingly independent.

St. John's University, N.Y. John H. McKenna, C.M.


Today there exists a crisis in the missionary work of the Church. Vocations to missionary orders have declined sharply in recent years. New ideas on theological topics such as redemption, salvation, sin, and ecumenism have caused some to question the continued need of missionary work. There is also confusion about what the missionary should do when he reaches his mission post. Does he evangelize, liberate, humanize, or work to plant the Church? Spirituality for Mission offers some stimulating suggestions concerning the modern missionary and his work. R.'s thesis is that, since the nature of missionary work has changed in recent years and since the theology of mission is now in a state of development, the motivation and spirituality for the modern missionary must also change. In the first section, R. outlines the contributions to missionary work made by several outstanding missionaries from St. Paul to Charles de Foucauld. These men in their missionary concern were molded by the theological thinking of their day. They shared a deep love and trust in God, a personal holiness, and a spirit of humility and zeal which sent them out to foreign lands to share the good news of Jesus.

In the second section, R. discusses the theology of mission. He states that the agent and end of mission is the triune God, and the goal of mission is the glory of God, which includes the establishment of God's kingdom in this world. The motive for mission is love, and those who partake in missionary work partake in the life and work of God Himself. The missionary vocation is a call to holiness. The mission of God determines the mission of the Church, and the mission of the Church determines the nature of the Church. Salvation, which the Church
strives to bring to all men, is personal and cosmic. Thus salvation has spiritual as well as material dimensions. It is concerned with the present as well as the future. Salvation deals with justification, humanization, liberation, and development. It aims to complete God's plan for all of His creation, healing that which is broken and removing that which enslaves. Thus the missionary will be engaged in the work of evangelization, development, Church presence, and Church planting according to the needs of the local church. The missionary will be concerned with all phases of missionary work, although the local situation may demand that the missionary devote his time and talents to one aspect of missionary work. Today's missionary is a person who serves the world by announcing the good news of Jesus, living in and forming Christian community which embodies the blessings of the kingdom, and working in the world for the reconciliation and peace of all men. The missionary task rests with the total Christian community; this means a more active role for the laity in missionary programs.

Spirituality for Mission synthesizes much of the current discussion on mission work and the concerns related to missionary work. Much recent literature deals with missions, but the significance of this book is that it treats the person who is involved in missionary work. It sets forth the importance and value of the missionary vocation.

Bronx, N.Y.

MATTHEW H. KELLEHER, M.M.


Reviewing a volume of collected writings usually means reviewing the editors of these volumes. Normally this is quite difficult, since the editors reveal their thoughts only in brief prefatory remarks and by their selection of authors and titles for inclusion in the volume. Shannon's volume makes this reviewer's task much easier. In addition to a detailed introduction, S. has included its salient points and focuses attention on the author's position within the ethical debate. Thus S. reveals much about his ethical methodology.

In addition to the introduction, the volume has seven sections which present articles on major bioethical problems: abortion, treatment of severely handicapped children, death and dying, research and human experimentation, genetic engineering and genetic policy, the allocation of scarce resources, and behavior modification. Each section consists of four articles (the genetic engineering section has five). The authors are well known and the articles are representative of the major opinions and positions in the field of bioethics.
S. notes in the Preface the complications of the interdisciplinary nature of bioethics, the diversity of interpretations and proposed solutions to bioethical issues, and presents this work "as a contribution to the ongoing discussion of issues" which are central to all problems in bioethics, namely, "the constitutive elements of personhood, the rights of a person, the rights of society, personal integrity, consent and distributive justice." His selection attempts to present "a set of articles that are both critical and informative . . . and make an ongoing contribution to the analysis of problems in bioethics."

S.'s analysis of Roman Catholic medical ethics comprises the seven-page Introduction. Although brief, the review is succinct and indicative of S.'s methodology. He situates and identifies the sources of Roman Catholic medical ethics. After giving deserved tribute to Gerald Kelly for his pioneering work, S. names contemporary R.C. authors who are carrying on the medical-ethics tradition. Then he indicates his reason for presenting this survey of R.C. medical ethics: "to help recall the place and significance of such a tradition within Roman Catholicism so that the wisdom of the past can be meaningfully used in understanding and evaluating the problems encountered in our contemporary situations" (4).

S. proceeds to list the practical problems and ethical issues in R.C. bioethics. First, he notes: "Bioethics is at the center of the action and has an important role to play" (4). Consequently, bioethics cannot be a purely speculative discipline. Practical problems must be recognized and responded to by R.C. bioethics. These problems, as S. sees them, are: (1) the quality and quantity of advances in medicine from both a technical and scientific point of view, which must be comprehended and evaluated before significant bioethical development can proceed; (2) the evolution of circumstances, which S. feels many R.C. moral theologians did not fully recognize as extremely important to the theoretical development of moral theology and thus is undeveloped in R.C. moral theology and R.C. bioethics; (3) bringing the moral tradition up to the current state of the art, which S. feels demands "a real critical rethinking of the traditions from within as well as attempts to apply the re-evaluated tradition to new problems" (5); (4) the use of language in medicine technology and medical ethics, as well as the quality of language in science, medicine, and bioethics.

The ethical issues most of which S. sees as "inherent in the nature of R.C. ethical theory" are particularly significant: (1) the relationships between natural law and revelation; (2) Church authority; (3) a movement from principle to practice; (4) the confusing of ethics with strategy or the collapsing of the two into one reality. S. concludes the Introduction with some methodological considerations which he describes as part of a "responsible ethic": (1) ethical methodology must expose and pre-
cisely state all the dilemmas produced by the interdisciplinary nature of bioethics; (2) the specific values or ethical principles involved in the situation must be stated clearly and precisely and ordered coherently; (3) the positions adopted by the associations in which one has membership must be investigated.

S. states that "this book represents one part of the methodology suggested in this chapter," namely, presentation of a variety of views on a number of different topics which will stimulate the emergence of different values that can be examined critically in relationship to one another. Only then can an analysis of specific issues take place with a view to drawing specific conclusions.

S.'s book is welcomed as an attempt to emphasize the religious-ethical contribution to the bioethical analysis of medical-technological questions. It could serve as an upper-division or graduate reader. Its openness and perceptive choice of authors and articles are refreshing. However, as a R.C. religious-ethical methodological work, it should be supplemented by articles such as Charles E. Curran's "Present State of Moral Theology," TS 34 (1973) 446-67, and Daniel Maguire's chapter "Ethics: How to Do It," in his Death by Choice (1975).

John Carroll University, Cleveland


V. has added a valuable volume to the burgeoning literature on the ethical and policy questions related to death and dying. It is V.'s belief that "the best hope for gaining insight into the complex dilemmas posed by the technological and biological revolutions is an eclectic spirit combining contributions from many disciplines." In this spirit he considers the moral meaning of death, the definition of death, the choice not to prolong dying, the right to refuse treatment, and the policy issues related to all of this. He also discusses the patient's right to have the truth, and the moral and policy issues regarding the newly dead. V. states that his book is not primarily "a philosophical analysis of the ethics of death and dying," and this is somewhat true in view of the broad interdisciplinary range of the work. Still, he does develop some significant ideas in a way that is enriching to ethical theory.

For example, V. appreciates that the death question is foundational, that it poses anew the question of the meaning of the good life, since to ask the meaning of death draws us into the question of the meaning of life. He accosts the still regnant illusions of value-free science and is effective in showing the philosophical and theological judgments and values implicit in supposedly detached empirical analyses. He is also
good in elucidating the crucial ethical considerations involved in the doctor's decision regarding what the patient should be told. V. is not overawed by "the technological priesthood." In this and in other ways, V. illustrates two of the promising advantages of the current rush to bioethics: first, it can draw the ethicist to the foundations of ethical theory where his major contributions are due, and secondly, bioethics is constructing paradigms for the other hard and soft sciences which can aid them in investigating the value-laden content of their disciplines and in demonstrating their inherent need for inclusion in ethical discourse. Bioethics betrays its promise when it remains an issue-hopping exercise which eschews theoretical depth. There are other strengths in V.'s book: his analysis of the ordinary/extraordinary-means distinction is telling; he is strong on stressing the centrality of the patient's all-too-neglected interests; his proposed statute regarding the determination that a person has died advances that discussion; and his bibliographical richness regarding all issues treated is one of the decided values of the book.

I would take issue at some points. V. allows that there may be "rare cases where active killing of the dying might be morally justified." He also suggests that "we may want active killing of dying patients to remain illegal even in those rare cases where it might be morally justified." These positions, which are not self-evident, need more development than they are given. Indeed, the view that the instances of moral mercy death should be handled preterlegally seems to me a thesis that will not stand. V. concedes too much to the contention of the medical priesthood that "pain and suffering can virtually always be controlled." There are important differences between pain and suffering, and radical limits in the control of medicine over the latter. This distinction is often, as here, missed. V. finds it hard to see why there should be any moral distinction between stopping a treatment once started, and failing to start it in the first place. That distinction may, however, be defended on the critical grounds of the moral significance of consequences, both psychological and social. Valid distinctions are based on differences, and there are differences here. V. is also not on good ground when he speaks of the use of "probable opinion," probabiliorism, and tutiorism in deciding cases where "there is moral or philosophical doubt about whether someone is dead." These systems in Catholic moral thought were not developed to address questions of doubtful fact but only of doubtful liceity. Also, it is not correct to say that the "Roman Catholic Church stands firm" on the position that direct termination of innocent life is always morally wrong. The Roman Catholic Church is not theologically monolithic on this at this time; there are solidly probable alternatives to the older view. With all of this
said, however, V.'s book should be seen as a strong and significant contribution.

Marquette University

Daniel C. Maguire


This is an important and interesting book which suggests new lines of inquiry for political theorists, moral philosophers, intellectual historians, sociologists, and those who care to think seriously about issues of social justice. It represents a sustained effort to achieve a marriage between linguistic analysis and historical sociology. It is also, largely because of the ambition and scope that make it valuable, a disappointing book.

After an introduction mainly given over to the methodology of political theory, which M. regards as involving both conceptual analysis and an empirically based view of society, M. offers a preliminary account of the concept of social justice, which (unlike Rawls) takes just states of affairs rather than just institutions or procedures as fundamental. M. holds that social justice is a distributive notion applying to burdens and benefits and that Rawls's first principle of equal liberty is relevant to political and legal justice, but not to social justice. He argues that both utilitarianism and Rawls's contract theory fail to meet demands of our ordinary concept of social justice.

M. holds that there are in our notion of justice three distinct and conflicting principles: rights, desert, and needs. He devotes a chapter to the analysis of each, stressing the limited yet indeterminate character of each principle. The notion of rights brings us to "a legalistic area of morality" (56), and M. understands moral rights by analogy with legal rights (48). Rights arise from specific actions of persons (61), and they specify what is due to persons; they contribute to the security and freedom of persons in society (71). M. distinguishes between positive rights, which are socially or legally recognized, and ideal rights, which "are best analyzed in terms of the concepts of desert and need" (78).

M. holds that judgments of desert are always moral judgments (76) and fall under ideal justice (91), but that judgments of desert relevant to distribution rarely concern moral qualities of persons. Thus the two main bases of economic desert are contribution and effort. The main difficulty with desert as the basis of social justice is in finding clear criteria for applying the notion (120).

M. analyzes the notion of need thus: "'A needs X' = 'A will suffer harm if he lacks X'" (130). Harm is to be understood in relation to a
person's plan of life, which in turn depends on social conditions. M. thinks that there is a central core of needs that changes only slowly (138) and that egalitarianism involves as a first priority the satisfaction of everyone's needs and then the equal distribution of the surplus (146).

In the second half of the book, M. considers the theories of justice of Hume, Spencer, and Kropotkin, each of which takes one of the three principles of justice as central and each of which presupposes a certain view of society. Thus, Hume's concern with rights rests on a hierarchical view of society, Spencer's doctrine on desert arises from his understanding of the workings of a market society, and Kropotkin's stress on need finds its place in egalitarian communes.

From these cases M. moves to a general account of social justice in sociological perspective, in which he sketches ideal types of primitive, hierarchical, and market societies and points to the emergence of a new form of organizational society out of market society. He also makes some interesting suggestions on the social origins of beliefs about justice. After some further criticisms of Rawls and his "moral geometry," he concludes that there are no demonstrative arguments for one theory of social justice over another and that "our political theory is specific to a particular time and place" (343).

This relativistic conclusion is both welcome and disconcerting. It is welcome in that it reminds us of the complexity of political theory and social ethics and in that it points out our need to examine both the actual course of human society and our beliefs about society. It is disconcerting in that it moves away from the double search for the most general principles of justice and for the principles that are most appropriate to the evolving shape of organizational society.

M.'s relativism stems largely from his use of the method of ideal types. In choosing to focus on theories of justice in which one of his three concepts is clearly predominant, he slights the efforts of those theorists such as Aquinas, Hegel, and Rawls who set out to elaborate synthetic theories, and who endeavor to achieve a comprehensive ordering of the various elements in our ordinary concept of justice.

The method of ideal types also leaves out most of the historical complexity in the development of our ideas about justice. Nonetheless, his book, as it stands, should stimulate a great deal of important research; for M. has begun to bring together the techniques of conceptual analysis and the sociological and historical search for causes. Many details in his project are open to criticism, but it represents a major step in the search for a theory of justice that builds on social theory in a realistic way.

Woodstock Theological Center, D.C. 

JOHN LANGAN, S.J.

This remarkable little book develops the linguistic aspects of the concept of metaphysics sketched by Aquinas in the questions on the theory of science in his In Boethium De trinitate. The study was occasioned by the growing interest of analytical philosophers in metaphysical problems (Quine, Strawson, Geach). W. maintains that, just as analytical philosophy has come to recognize the metaphysical problems inherent in language itself, so must traditional metaphysics also become conscious of its linguistic foundations. This is the task W. wants to perform for Thomistic metaphysics. His work differs from other treatments of Thomas' thought about language (Manthey) and from other treatments of Thomas' theory of the sciences (Grabmann, Neumann) in that he wants to determine to what extent Thomas accounts for the linguistic components in thinking about reality.

The book is divided into two parts in accordance with the distinction Thomas makes between metaphysics and mathematics/physics. This distinction is based on the difference between the judgmental and abstractive activity of the intellect. The first part is based on the relation between In De trin. q. 4, a. 1 (which deals with the ground of multiplicity) and qq. 5–6 (which deal with the theory of science). W. recognizes that Thomas' metaphysics aims at ascending beyond the material things of this world to their immaterial causes. He accepts the traditional definition of metaphysics as the science of ens in quantum ens as separated from matter and sees the basis for this conception in the metaphysical judgment that a being, to the extent that it is a being, is not necessarily material. But he wants to go beyond this traditional Thomist interpretation in seeking the more fundamental ontological model which grounds this conception of metaphysics. This model he finds in a science of ens in quantum ens which is based on the intellect's judgment of separation—ens in quantum ens not as abstracted from matter but as necessarily separated from non-ens. Metaphysics is ontology when the logos concerning on (i.e., the ratio entis) it has attained is understood as necessarily separating the being of a being from opposed not-being. This separation is based on the linguistic judgment that it cannot be true to say of a being that it is not this, when it is true to say of it that it is this. Because this judgment defines the truth-conditions of our speaking about reality, it has rather a metalinguistic than a metaphysical character.

In the second part, W. turns his attention from the ratio entis formed in the intellect's judgmental activity to the ratio rei formed by abstraction. On the basis of a careful analysis of the texts from Aristotle's
Metaphysics (Z) used by Thomas in his In De trin., he argues that, whereas Thomas’ doctrine of abstraction is Platonic rather than Aristotelian, the theory of meaning he bases on it is nearer to Aristotle and to modern semantics. On the one hand, the ratio rei, which in Aristotle refers to the particular thing as to that which makes it be what it is (esse tali toti), is understood by Thomas as a ratio universalis formed by abstraction. Whereas Aristotle sought the “what it is for a thing to be” or form, Thomas sought the universal or ratio totius, so that his ratio rei differs from a Platonic idea only in that it is conceptually abstracted, and not actually separate from the individual thing. On the other hand, Thomas is more Aristotelian and modern in moving from the relationship between the thing and the ratio abstracta to the relationship between the ratio abstracta and the word which signifies it. Carefully interpreting Thomas’ dictum “Ratio quam significat nomen est definitio,” W. maintains that Thomas derives from this metaphysical conception of signification (“Peter is a man, because he is a rational animal”) a semantic rule governing the use of a word in language (“Peter is a man, if he is a rational animal”). Thomas’ theory of abstraction thus approaches a theory of meaning which states that a word may be used of a particular thing, if that “which it is for the thing to be” is verified of the thing. In thus understanding meaning as determined by verifiability, Thomas has implicitly shifted attention from the question of the signification of a word taken alone to the question of the supposition of a word in a sentence.

Twelfth-century Trinitarian and Christological theory opened the way to much speculation about the role of language in theology. The introduction of the complete Aristotelian logic provided a new structure for this speculation and led at the same time to the emancipation of linguistic philosophizing from the theological considerations. In the fourteenth century this evolution reached its high point, anticipating many modern analytic positions. Aquinas played a very important role in this development, one not usually recognized in treatments of his thought. Weidemann’s in-depth study of a few crucial questions of Thomas’ In De trin. shows how fruitful such research can be and should offer a stimulus to others to study the other phases of the tradition.

Freiburg i. Br.  

CHARLES H. LOHR

This accurate and up to date haute vulgarisation relates archeology (understood broadly as excavation material and as cultural and historical information) to the books of the Old and New Testaments. An ever-increasing wealth of illustrative material is available to supplement the biblical record, but it is often inaccessible to the interested nonspecialist. C. examines each book according to the order of modern editions, commenting briefly on each and showing the relevance of new data for the meaning of the author(s). By respecting the different character of the kinds of literature in the Bible, C. avoids the tendency of many books of this type to make the Bible into a history book exclusively. The treatment of the literature, however, is somewhat sketchy and unnuanced.

Books presenting biblical archeology popularly seem to fall in either of two categories. One group gives the history of excavated sites, with reference to the Bible. One thinks of the excellent Encyclopedia of Archaeological Sites in the Holy Land, edited by Michael Avi-Yonah (London: Oxford, 1975–76), two volumes so far; Archaeological Encyclopedia of the Holy Land, edited by A. Negev (New York: Putnam, 1972); the articles on individual sites in the IDBSup (1976). The second category, into which C.'s volume falls, interweaves archeological and biblical data into a coherent presentation of the history or the books of the Bible. G. E. Wright's Biblical Archaeology (2nd ed.; Philadelphia: Westminster, 1962) synthesizes successfully a variety of sources under one defined viewpoint. Views of the Biblical World, edited by B. Mazar (Jerusalem: International Publishing Co., 1959–60), is a magnificent four-volume work with outstanding plates and commentary, arranged according to the books of the OT. C.'s volume does not have the forceful prose of Wright or the photographic splendor of Views of the Biblical World. It nonetheless brings together valuable information intelligently and contains many excellent photographs and illustrations.

Richard J. Clifford, S.J.


Twenty-five years after his founding of St. Savior Monastery, Elmira, N.Y., and on the fifth anniversary of his death, admirers and fellow monks of Winzen offer this book to the public. The original appeared in the late 40's as essays prepared and issued separately. In Pathways these are collated and ordered as in the canon of Scripture.

Pathways should, in the primary meaning of "introduction," lead the reader into the books of Scripture. Why another introduction to Scripture? Just maybe this one will fall into the hands of those who have not seen the others; again, maybe its style and presentation will appeal. W.'s book is well written. Not every book of the Bible is included. Some background of a book or books (e.g., wisdom books, epistles) is presented, salient points of content are surfaced, the spiritual significance of the same is highlighted, and careful notation of references is made in every case. There is constant interlacing of OT and NT passages showing how the OT is hidden in the NT and how the NT reveals the OT (St. Augustine). There are clever
turns of phrase: the wise king (Solomon) was like a one-man university (p. 131); Tobias's little dog... fits into this happy picture like a dot on the i (143); Zophar belongs to those defenders of the faith who, in order to convert people, start off by offending them (167). However, this is not to say this is a chatty book.

The historical background on the writing of Daniel has not been brought into line with modern scholarship—a fact which does not interfere with the spiritual message as presented. There is a remarkably long passage paralleling Moses and the writer of the fourth Gospel—a new approach to this reviewer, yet not without its merits.

M. Alma Woodard, R.S.M.


It is not surprising that in so short a book someone as gifted as Mollat has been able to gather up all the richness of Johannine thought and present an elegant coffer of theological jewels. He has divided the material into three sections: the divine initiative, the human response, and the teaching of the Johannine letters. The book is far more than a consideration of points for spiritual reflection; it is a profound disclosure of the heart of Johannine theology. This M. effects in almost epigrammatic fashion. "One thing only is required of man: that he acknowledge his weakness, that he recognize his blindness (9:39), that he wish to be healed (5:36), that he come to him who gives life (5:40)" (p. 23). That is indeed what the Jesus of the fourth Gospel seeks. Again, in the chapter "Jesus, Revealer of the Father" he deals masterfully with the question, how does Jesus show us his own divinity in John's mind? The filial essence, he says, manifests itself in Jesus' absolute transparency as pure obedience to the Father and pure expression of the Father's love for the world (47-48), and he so rightly calls on Jn 8:28-29, "When you have lifted up the Son of Man, then you will know that I am he," as support (see my own very similar argumentation in The Christian Buddhism of St. John 36-38). In Part 2, the chapters analyze John's gnoseological terms and such key concepts as "abiding" and "loving." M. has some extraordinarily beautiful things to say about the way in which John appeals to the sense of smell: "perfume, then, seems to have been for John one of the means of expressing the glory of Jesus" (102-3). I have not seen this idea developed—though it has been touched on—elsewhere (cf. my Note on Jn 12:3 in CBQ 28 [1966] 219-22).

M. takes the proper position between Bultmann's antisacramentalism and Cullmann's pansacramentalism: in the fourth Gospel the sacraments have a significance between these extremes. Similarly, John does not ignore the Church as institution, but for him the Church is essentially Christ himself. A short but fine chapter on "The Mother of Jesus" shows how John points to her as a figure of the Church born on Calvary.

J. Edgar Bruns


Rost provides a valuable service to the general practitioner of biblical studies in this survey of the extracanonical Jewish literature of the intertestamental period. He opens with an essay exploring the relationship of the Hebrew canon of Scripture to those works which were excluded from it. Next he discusses each of the deutero-canonical books (a term which more and more should replace the polemical "apocrypha") found in the Septuagint. Finally, he treats the pseudepigrapha,
book by book, but grouped according to spheres of influence, e.g., those out of the Hellenistic Judaism of Egypt, or those with affinities to Qumran material. An appendix contains a good chronological chart of the different works treated.

R.'s explanations are short and clearly stated, if often minimal, and include bibliography of both the standard editions of the text and many of the more recent articles and books on the work at hand. Unfortunately, with few exceptions, the latest bibliographical items are dated to 1968-69. Some expected documents are missing, especially from the Qumran material. Comments on the Melchizedek text, the messianic Florilegium, and the Angelic Liturgy, among others, would have been valuable for their distinctive viewpoints. While the combination of documents by supposed affinity is a tantalizing innovation, it sometimes needs more solid argumentation to be convincing. One case in point is the alignment of the Book of Jubilees with the Qumran community.

The translation deserves high praise. Although this will not replace Eissfeldt's splendid Old Testament Introduction, it is much handier and more usable for the ordinary teacher and student. All in all, a worthwhile resource for the classroom.

Lawrence Boadt, C.S.P.


The original Dutch edition appeared in 1971. The translator, professor of historical theology at Southeastern Baptist Seminary in Wake Forest, N.C., judged that the book retains its full value today. It was written as an ecumenical "middle way" for overcoming the impasse created by the historical (critical) analysis of the Bible over against the old divine-authority approach.

According to this middle way, the Bible is to a great extent the faith narrative of what a community was experiencing. A modern community must read it in the light of its own experiences. Faith, one gets the distinct impression, is a kind of sharing in an osmotic experience of a community. G. rejects miracles and prophecies as having no value for the modern Christian. He also has a very queer notion of dogmas and their development. His description of the formation of the books of the Bible is full of mere hypotheses: it could have happened that way, therefore it did.

As presented, this middle way cannot be accepted by Catholics. It does not agree with the directives of Vatican II in the Constitution on Revelation (cf. no. 19). Nowhere is there any indication that there is need of the magisterium to control authentic interpretations; rather, each Christian community can and should read the Scriptures according to its own experiences. This middle way can contribute nothing to genuine ecumenism.

Dominic J. Unger, O.F.M.Cap.


This handsome volume offers many advantages. Whereas many dictionaries and compendia are printed in eye-straining type, this new compendium of Catholic information has large, handsome pages with a type size easy to read. Black and white pen-and-ink illustrations by the author's wife add to the beauty of the pages, as do the collections of photographs inserted at four places. The range of information is very wide. One of the chief features is the constant use of quotations from the documents of Vatican II. The tone of the articles is conservative: e.g., Moses is named as the "writer" of the Pentateuch, and Matthew the Apostle...
as the author of the canonical Gospel of Matthew, without any indication of the long debates over the authorship of these books and many others. The chief surprise, however, is the name of this book; it will certainly cause confusion with the well-known and widely-used Catholic Encyclopedia which has been on library shelves for many years.

In some cases, as in the article on "Church" the quotations from Vatican II are illuminating. In other cases, as in the article on "Exegesis," they are a disadvantage. Three quarters of the article is simply taken verbatim from the Constitution on Divine Revelation. Some readers will prefer more explanation and less quotation in such a complicated and important part of biblical studies.

Many dictionaries and encyclopedias of this type offer the reader some references at the beginning or end of the articles, so that the reader can follow up the information with further study; so, e.g., the Oxford Dictionary of the Christian Church and the Corpus Dictionary of Western Churches. This compendium does not and thus lessens its value as a reference tool. Many readers will remain hungry for more information after reading many of the articles in this new encyclopedia.

Joseph M. Moffitt, S.J.


In light of the absence of God from modern man's consciousness, the central theological question today is whether it is possible to experience God at all as the one who is not, like everything else, the product of man's own concerns and dreams. With this book M. has written the first of a series of volumes which will systematically treat the role of God in the secular world. This introduction consists of articles which, like the sides of a star, point to the same center. M. finds it imperative to approach such a large question from many different branches of theological research.

These fine articles center around the insight that God is the only answer to man's desire to surpass the now obvious limits of his own freedom. Human emancipation, the watchword of the Enlightenment, is only attainable if man allows himself to be the receiver of grace and not simply the fashioner of his own future. M.'s thought relies heavily on that of J. Maréchal and K. Rahner, a detailed study of whose works occupies a number of chapters. However, M. points out that their insights into the interpenetration of nature and grace may ironically have led more modern theology to an inadvertent denial of the need for God at all. For this reason M. attacks the creators of "Jesuologies," of "history as revelation," and of political theology for having left little room for grace, for mystery, or for openness to the "gift character" of faith.

M. is aware that his work may appear reactionary by calling for passivity in faith rather than activity (p. 152). Is M. falling back into the "intimacy language" which much modern theology is attempting to avoid for the sake of social relevance? Or is M. gingerly trying to find an elliptical balance between salvation as a gracious gift of God and as a temporal task of man? This reviewer thinks the latter. The next volume should be telling.

Philip J. Rosato, S.J.


A theologian at the Institut Catholique in Paris presents baptism as the sacrament of human history. Baptism is ritual incorporation into humanity's historical journey toward its future fulfilment. The first chapter develops
this notion of baptism. The notion rests upon an anthropology which stresses human historicity, both personal and communitarian. Personalism, existentialism, and Marxism provide categories for this anthropology. In Christ, the transcendent God enters into history to advance human progress from within. Jesus' baptism is his free acceptance of solidarity with humanity on its journey to its future. The Church is the witness to God's reign being established over creation in history in and through Christ. To be baptized into the Church is, then, to enter as a historical free being into humanity's pilgrimage toward its betterment.

This understanding of baptism is confirmed (chap. 2) by Scripture and the Fathers of the Church, though with greater clarity by some. Dualism or excessive stress on past or present tends to obscure periodically the initial historical anthropology of the Judeo-Christian tradition. Chap. 3 treats the implications of this understanding of baptism in dealing with current questions, such as freedom in being baptized, baptism in a world which accepts many ways of salvation, and parents' role in the baptism of children. In the process, familiar terms are interpreted, e.g., character, faith of the Church, royal priesthood.

The book offers an understanding of baptism which may be congenial to the more intelligent at the college level or beyond, though perhaps they should begin with chap. 3 (close to half the book) and return to previous chapters as the need arises for more background.

Christopher Kiesling, O.P.


Protestant theologians, suspicious of the theological treatment of the Virgin Mary in Catholic and Orthodox circles, have frequently neglected the place of Mary in the Church and relegated her cult to a medieval accretion. S. presents a rather refreshing and appealing reconsideration of the whole issue of Mariology and of the place Mary should have in Christian belief and practice. Starting from Vatican II, whose Mariology he considers of great ecumenical significance, S. sees the contemporary Mariological trends in Roman Catholicism as already reformed. The task now remains, he assures us, "to find an attitude towards the Lord's mother which will include the essentials of Catholic teaching and at the same time do justice to the central impulses of evangelical Christianity" (14).

Three major Mariological themes are taken into consideration. The first is Mary's relation to her Son. Admitting that the first conciliar statements, that of theotokos in particular, were Christological terms, S. maintains that they have a secondary meaning which "is very definitely Mariological" (52). He thus establishes a necessary link between Christology and Mariology. The second topic is Mary's place with her Son's people. Mary, the mother, had to become a disciple of her Son. She is, however, a unique disciple, since she may be looked upon as the prototype of the human being who has received and responded to God's grace. Finally, Mary's motherhood of the Church: S. thinks this area is fraught with emotional problems, and suggests that scriptural texts as well as early Christian art tend to portray Mary as a representative figure, as "mother in the Church," or "perhaps also mother of the Church's members" (91).

The result of S.'s at times sketchy treatment is a contribution to Mariology and ecumenism. Down to Earth restates much of Catholic teaching and attitudes towards the Virgin
Mother without the cultic and theoretical embellishments which have stood as barriers to Christian unity.

John A. Saliba, S.J.


This modest volume is based on lectures which L., of St. Edmund’s House, Cambridge, England, gave in New Zealand in the summer of 1974. It seems that the book’s principal concern is the quest for religious truth and the difficulties besetting it. L. believes that the doctor, not the holder of civil authority, is the proper human model of authority in the Church. Only the authority of truth is absolute. The voices of truth in everyday existence are irreducibly pluralistic. No particular authority—book, proposition, institution, or individual—can claim the absolute authority of truth. The words of the Church are subject to all the constraining conditions of the human quest for, and expression of, the truth. Christians have been repeatedly tempted to absolutize particular authorities. In reality, there is no group or combination of groups, whether they be church leaders or scholars or saints, of whom it can be simply said “They know.” Living faith is compatible with uncertainty, tentativeness, and provisionality in the quest for religious truth.

L.’s book is provocative. It deals with a subject of current interest and serious consequence. This reviewer, however, is more optimistic about the possibility of achieving religious truth than L. appears to be. Reflecting the traditional position of the Catholic Church, the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith in its Mysterium ecclesiae (1973) held that the dogmatic formulas of the Church express incompletely, but not falsely, the permanent reality; in other words, some do know.

Edward J. Gratsch


There is unquestionably a new awakening of interest within the English-speaking academic community on the issue of personal immortality and life after death. To mention just three recent books: Andrew Greeley’s Death and Beyond (Chicago: Thomas More, 1976), John Hick’s Death and Eternal Life (New York: Harper & Row, 1976), and Raymond Moody’s Life after Life (New York: Bantam, 1976). Now F., professor emeritus at the Jesuit School of Theology in Chicago, offers another. Unlike the other three authors, however, who take in varying degrees a nonsectarian stand, F. openly espouses a Roman Catholic position on all the questions he raises. That is, although he offers an impressive overview of the current literature on each topic, he has reference, wherever possible, to the pronouncements of the Church’s magisterium for the preferred interpretation of ambiguous passages in Scripture and to settle various points disputed by philosophers and theologians. Thus the book is effectively a compendium of what the Roman Catholic Church has taught, and still teaches, in the area of eschatology. Questions treated include death as the end of the period of probation, the natural immortality of the soul, the particular judgment, purgatory, the possibility of limbo, heaven, hell, the Parousia, the general judgment, and the likelihood of a “new creation” in eternity.

Joseph A. Bracken, S.J.


The relationship between Christianity and Marxism, often considered one of simple and unrelenting enmity,
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has been the subject of serious re-examination during the past several decades. G.'s book is a brief and generally successful attempt at summarizing both the widespread misunderstanding of Christianity, which allowed Marx's attack to be all too convincing, and the NT data on the proper relationship between the Christian and the world. In emphasizing the Pauline understanding of redemption through incarnation, an understanding which underlies recent ecclesiastical pronouncements on social justice and world transformation, G. renders a valuable service to a general audience interested in bridging an oft-felt gap between personal fulfilment and involvement with other selves. The only serious criticism which can be made is that, by emphasizing world transformation as the necessary means of achieving an ultimate self-fulfilment, G. still leaves the reader with a lingering suspicion that improvement in the material conditions of life has value only insofar as it contributes to self-fulfilment. G. has thus not entirely escaped the criticism of traditional Christian thought made so eloquently by Teilhard de Chardin in The Divine Milieu. G.'s book needs the complement of a theology of matter which emphasizes the intrinsic value of work in the world as well as that work's value in bringing about personal fulfilment.

G. Michael McCrossin


These volumes represent the continuation of S.'s repertorium of the incipits and explicits of the sermon literature of the Middle Ages for the period from 1150 to 1350. Having completed his inventory of the sermons of known authors in the first five volumes, he now turns to the anonymous material. This he classifies into Konzils-, Universitäts- und Ordendpredigten; Bibel-, Pastoral- und Titelpredigten; and anonyme Predigten (arranged according to libraries). Vol. 6 covers the first three of these types, Vol. 7 the second three. The incipits have been divided into four categories: sermones de tempore, de sanctis, de communi sanctorum, de quadragesima. Several additional volumes are planned to cover the rest of the anonymous material and the indexes. In the present volumes S. supplies convenient cross-references to the sermons already included among those of known authors and then gives the incipits for the anonymous collections found in various manuscripts. In this connection a regret may be recorded. Although S. provides detailed lists of incipits, he gives only the most summary indications regarding the manuscripts. While this may be defensible for sermons of known authors, it is a serious defect for anonymous sermons, where we would like to know how the works are to be arranged chronologically. Nevertheless, S.'s repertory fills an important need and—together with similar tools now available covering grammatical treatises, artes praedicandi, canonistic works, quodlibetal questions, commentaries on the Bible, Peter Lombard, and Aristotle—will remain an indispensable instrument for scholars concerned with the social, religious, and cultural life of the Middle Ages.

C. H. Lohr


This new translation of De consideratione ad Eugenium Papam, based
on the new critical edition, is the fourth volume of Bernard's works to appear in this series. Since earlier English versions (1908 and 1921) are dated and even difficult to find, this modern version by Anderson and Kennan is especially appreciated. Bernard wrote *De consideratione* when a Cistercian monk, a former disciple of his, was elected pope in 1145. Bernard perceived the tension that would exist in Eugene—a monk dedicated to prayer who now must live in the world burdened with the temporal responsibilities and administrative duties of the papacy. Throughout the books Bernard takes rhetorical advantage of this antithesis. Because he wrote his advice to Eugene in the manner of a concerned abbot for a beloved disciple, the intimacy of Bernard's heart and the sincerity of his love underlie every passage.

Besides having a share in the translation, Kennan wrote the introductory essay. It is an overview, situating Bernard in his time and *De consideratione* among Bernard's other works; happily, she gives the reader a preview of what is coming by outlining each of the five books. K. has written at least three other articles on *De consideratione*, but her scholarly understanding of it can only be hinted at in such an introductory essay. The appendices, by Bernard Jacqueline, treat very briefly topics such as the recipient, date of composition, sources used in its composition, and its influence through the centuries. Those who find enjoyment and beauty in the Bernardine writings will find them in this new translation.

*Joseph N. Tylenda, S.J.*


This book is a detailed study of a small book, barely sixty pages, published without the author's name on Nov. 24, 1520, and generally known in history as *Petrum Romam non venisse*. The first edition unleashed a violent debate among theologians within a few years of its appearance. Supporters and objectors regarded it as a direct attack against the established Church, because the author postulated that the Apostle Peter never went to Rome and was consequently not martyred there. In the heat of Luther's Reformation, hardly anything else would have provoked a more lively, even passionate debate than the burning question of papal primacy. V.'s clear and clever combination of eighteen positive statements or *persuasiones* and the seven *cavilli* or fallacious arguments lined up by the advocates of Roman primacy intrigued the minds and imagination of the theologians of the early sixteenth century. The fact that the booklet saw at least nine editions indicates that the interest it generated was not ephemeral. Lamping is even convinced that, despite the profound changes between the sixteenth century and our own time, there is much in common between the two periods. "The men of the sixteenth century were also searching for a new form of pastorate and a new interpretation of the faith proclaimed in the Bible, since they also had to find answers to the problems posed by their time."

A doctoral thesis at Leiden, the work has five parts. The first deals with the treatise itself—with a detailed analysis of the *persuasiones* and the *cavilli*. Part 2 is a study of authorship, L. reaching the conclusion that V. is without doubt the author of *Petrum Romam non venisse*; this is the most original section. Part 3 investigates the backgrounds and sources, while 4 and 5 deal with the reactions of V.'s contemporaries and of later writers in history. A survey of the different editions and the reprint of the Sylvan Otmar's edition of 1520 make up the appendices. A helpful bibliog-
raphy, an index of persons, and an index of subjects complete the work.

Historians will be interested in L.’s study. It is, however, possible that the present bilateral conversations between Anglican and Roman Catholic theologians, with their pointedly ecclesiological character, will rekindle interest in dealing objectively and constructively with historically conditioned arguments concerning papal primacy.

_Sabbas J. Kilian, O.F.M._


K. has rendered valuable service to serious students of Tudor history in this book, which provides the most thorough and authoritative examination of the facts relating to the divorce (and divorces) of Henry VIII. Based upon examination of manuscripts either ignored or barely touched upon by others, he traces the tortuous route by which the King and his servants sought to have his marriage to Catherine of Aragon annulled. The chief issue at first concerned a defect in the papal bull allowing Henry to marry Catherine. That bull “made no mention of public honesty (the impediment that arose from the marriage contract, as contrasted with affinity, which arose from the consummation of the marriage)” (27). K. shows that Henry was of the opinion “that public honesty in the Levitical degrees was a divinely imposed impediment against marriage” (67) and believed that Pope Alexander III was of the same opinion. The argument, emphasized at the beginning, was not pressed subsequently, because the king’s advisers found it wanting. In the end it was consummation which was the issue. Here we have an indication of this book’s importance; for since 1968, when Scarisbrick’s biography of Henry was published, it has generally been taught that the issue of public honesty was not grasped, except by Cardinal Wolsey. Of especial interest is K.’s account of the trials of Anne Boleyn and Catherine Howard, here presented fully and expertly. In all of the accounts Thomas Cranmer is found to be a major figure; thus this book will have importance for the continuing effort to understand Henry’s Archbishop of Canterbury.

_John Booty_


This publication is a baptism by words of the 34-volume Oxford edition of the works of one of Oxford’s most distinguished alumni. Finally freed from sources notorious for being crudely compiled, shabbily edited, and clumsily printed, an international array of Wesley scholars assembled at Drew in 1974 to witness five essayists from ecumenical backgrounds interrogating the subject and christening the project. True to form, sprinkling was the rite of the day. The celebrants splashed only a few droplets of new insight from the font of historical and theological inquiry onto the watershed issue of Wesley’s place in the Christian tradition.

In his helpful introductory essay, Rowe hints that the book’s title should not mislead one to expect a scrutiny of Wesley’s sources or of Wesley as a source per se. Instead, one finds a bias towards “Wesley as a resource for contemporary theology and churchmanship” (p. 6), a bent especially evident in the addresses given by E. Gordon Rupp, Martin Schmidt, and Michael Hurley. Rupp begs the question of the interplay between reason and emotion
in W. by emphasizing the Samuel Connection of logic (in contrast, by inference, to the Susannah Connection of sentiment) because rationality is imperative in our age of Armageddon anxieties and apocalyptic yearnings. Hurley indulges in classroom antics through an imaginary dialogue between counselor Wesley and counselee Synod of Bishops which exhibits less an interest in W. as a theologian than in W. as a therapist for theology today—although Hurley’s intriguing discussion of W.’s ideas of prevenient grace and their relationship to the salvific nature of other religions is brilliant. Schmidt’s examination of Continental Pietism’s impact on W. contains few surprises, as does his comparison of Luther with W., performed with one eye riveted in the direction of the relevant.

Albert Outler’s contribution towers above the rest, both for the majesty of its prose and for its preliminary appraisal of W.’s pedigree based on what W. read—a method Outler calls “form critical history.” A valuable twenty-five-page bibliography by Lawrence D. McIntosh is “selected” in the best sense, and Frank Baker’s spirited but skilful survey of the project inspires confidence in the difficult editorial decisions requisite to the undertaking and begets excitement about the future of Wesleyan scholarship, the needs of which are outlined by Outler: “The rescue of Wesley from his Methodist cocoon and his neglect by non-Methodists was part of the original vision of the Oxford Edition of Wesley’s Works. In my own view, it is still the project’s chief warrant and best hope” (33).

Leonard I. Sweet


B.’s exegetical, theological, and historical work occupied almost three quarters of a century. His massive, painstaking, and always scholarly work has generated some excellent evaluations, both positive and negative. The present book, unfortunately, is not one of these.

R. divides his polemical and inept presentation into three parts: foundations, hermeneutics, theological details. Part 1 is subdivided into the interrelation between freedom from the world and the liberation provided by the kerygma. Part 2 discusses science, mythology, language, meaning, and understanding. God, ethics, and faith constitute Part 3. Development of the outline is inadequate and characterized by misunderstanding that is virtually universal in extension and in intensity. Theoretically, the book is governed by the ingenuous and pretentious attempt “to do for Bultmann the service he has done the Apostle Paul: to understand him better than he understood himself” (18). The service remains unrendered. What one finds instead is a tissue of incomplete data, oversight viewed as insight, and downright erroneous interpretation.

Nor does the “literary” style exceed the expository development. Two instances from the introductory paragraph suffice. “But Bultmann has not ambled through his career sniffing every pole and fire hydrant of modernity for an object upon which to bestow his theological blessing” (9). The vulgarity of this image is surpassed only by the grotesque portrait concluding the paragraph: “The trumpeters of social change have failed to send Bultmann scampering back to his study to inquire after God’s gender or the color of Jesus’ skin” (p. 9). The choice of figures—scampering and ambling—applied to a man who had a lifelong limp—is an ironic symbol of the book’s inability or unwillingness to match the intellectual gait of its subject.

P. Joseph Cahill

The spiritual dimension of Rahner’s thinking remains an intrinsic moment of his theological profundity. This slender volume speaks simply and profoundly about the Christian message today, calling, Christian community, prayer, obedience, freedom, enthusiasm, growing old, and death. R. insists upon an “essential Christianity,” or the “hope that this frightful, sombre, apparently hopeless event called life will have a happy issue.” Drawing strength from the crucified and risen Christ, religious are a special sign of God’s love and mercy for the world and of the ultimate unity of love of God and neighbor, for “only the person who knows what is meant by God really loves his neighbor.”

Although insistent upon changes in contemporary religious life, R. none-theless says that “my insight and experience in other families, groups, social formations, parties, colleges . . . have convinced me that such a religious community as that to which I belong has nothing to fear from a comparison with these other groups as regards what is human, fraternal, and Christian.” He also cautions that no community can help those who cannot cope with the basic inadequacies and pain of human life.

Especially noteworthy are R.’s remarks on obedience (although I cannot accept his functional starting point), the beginnings of a theology of temporary vocation, prayer as “the most basic fulfillment of an explicit relationship of man to God,” a view on charisms as God-given if they intensify man’s basic openness to God, a study of old age as a special grace of mission and risk, and a fascination with Teresa of Lisieux because “I really trust that this death was successful . . . because the Church has understood and guaranteed this successful death.”

Harvey D. Egan, S.J.


For the first time in several centuries, Pentecostal piety has become a major element in Catholic asceticism. In only ten years since a small group at Duquesne University encountered the Holy Spirit in an exciting way, a powerful movement has emerged in the American Catholic Church. Is this a dangerous movement: toward fragmentation (generating a new sectarianism) or indifferentism (ignoring important denominational traditions)? Or is this a genuine renewal from within, to rekindle solid sacramental piety? Or is this powerful movement really two movements: one of each kind?

Ford thinks it is two; she demonstrates the distinctions and makes clear her preferences. F. is a Scripture scholar; but more, she is a Catholic Pentecostal. Her criticism, then, is from within. It is at once criticism and apologia. Unlike Gelpi in his books on Pentecostalism, F. is not plumbing philosophical and theological depths for the meaning of the Pentecostal experience. Rather, she presupposes the authenticity of that experience and engages in a clarification of the structural implications of the two organizational varieties it has adopted.

Type 1 Pentecostalism has strong affinities, F. suggests, with the radical Reformation. Type 2, on the other hand, is highly Franciscan and Dominican in its ascetical leanings. Type 1 seems to be moving toward dogmatism, male supremacy, fundamentalism and nonsacramental piety. Type 2 is more open-ended and has more the flavor of deepening old commitments to prayer and the works of agape.
The concluding chapter, "Pentecostal Poise," contains some suggestions on how the life-in-the-spirit seminars might be adapted in the Type 2 direction, and twenty practical pointers (basic wisdom) for making the whole charismatic renewal a creative element in the Church universal.

Robert Roger Lebel, S.J.


To adequately absorb the message of this powerful little book, one must read it with the heart as well as the head, for that is how it has been written. It reflects the thought of a spiritual man as well as a philosopher of religion. D. presents a wholistic vision of the person far fuller than the one-sided Western view which reduces man to an active, naturalistic being, and explores the depreciated qualities of passivity and dependence which belong to the deeper level of human existence. He concludes that the crisis of our culture is a spiritual one caused by a gradual erosion of genuine transcendence. He sees the epistemological picture of contemporary Western civilization as a physicomathematical model of understanding where objectivity dominates the scene, and the religious picture as a desacralized one. In a secularized society such as ours, D. observes, "the religious person has nowhere to turn but inward." If anything is "sacred" to today's believer, "it is only because he holds it to be so by inner conviction and free decision; not because he passively undergoes its sacred import." Hence D. challenges the dichotomy of sacred/profane firmly established by phenomenologists of religion such as Otto and Eliade, and maintains that the sacred does not function as a universal category today. The conclusion of his critique of the sacred in modern life is startling; he separates the sacred and the trans-scendent: "we must not tie transcendence indissolubly to the much more particular category of the sacred."

D.'s keen analysis of our gradual loss of transcendence leads to his exploration of the "various avenues through which the self attains transcendence from within." He considers the negative ways of alienation and suffering which impose upon people a sense of their own contingency and thus confront them with questions of ultimacy, and such positive ways as the aesthetic experience, and "peak experiences" in which intimations of immortality are attained.

D. contends that an adequate notion of selfhood cannot be reached unless we take into serious consideration experiences that fall outside the range of ordinary object intentionality; for, as the observations of psychologists and the testimonies of the mystics attest, the "deeper self" surpasses the sum total of psychic phenomena, and transcendence belongs to the very nature of the self. Without a realization of this reality, selfhood fails to reach its full self-realization.

M. Sharon Burns, R.S.M.


No one knows more about ecumenism than Visser 'T Hooft, and this book proves it. In these published lectures, delivered in Holland in 1972, he looks to the future by coming to grips with some of the hard questions faced by ecumenism today: Has the ecumenical movement lost its initial dynamism? Is it suffering from institutional paralysis? What should be its attitude toward the non-Christian religions? How can ecumenism be reconciled with the Church's missionary task? Should it engage in social criti-
cism, take sides in political issues? Not only in the opening chapter, in which he outlines the history of the ecumenical movement in this century, but throughout the book, V. makes constant appeal to a history in which he has played a major part for over fifty years. Unfortunately, the book is concerned almost exclusively with Protestant ecumenism. Problems are discussed primarily in terms of Geneva, although the theology and ecumenical experience have much to say to Rome and the Orthodox East.

For V., the private piety that reserved God for individual souls, taking Him out of politics, is a falsification of religious life. He attacks, too, the ecclesiastical institutionalism for which the overriding concern is continuity of traditional forms. To make systems and ideologies into absolutes is idolatry. He identifies as an increasingly greater challenge to Christianity the neo-pagan cult of Dionysus which worships life as an end in itself. An un-biblical Puritan distrust of eros has led to the caricature of Christianity as a negation of life being better known in some circles than the gospel of renewed life.

A wealth of information is packed into this book despite its conciseness. Its language makes it an easily read introduction to the ecumenical movement. If a period of malaise has given rise to questions about the future of ecumenism, it is not the first time. Difficulties have been met and overcome before; the elder statesman of Protestant ecumenism offers assurance that it can be done again.

Ronald Modras


With topical entries that range from "Language" to "Rousseau," devotees of K. will find Vol. 3 rich albeit familiar fare. Of obvious interest are those jottings, spread over the period from 1834 to 1853, which the editors have gathered under the title "Philosophy." In these, K. vents deeply felt convictions that elsewhere flower into major theses—to choose perhaps the most significant, that philosophy and Christianity can never be reconciled. To attempt to unite them, K. baldly insists, results in a rationalism ignorant of the necessity of a divinely initiated redemption. Indeed, this ignorance exposes the fundamental truth: man's intellectual as well as moral faculties must be transformed ab extra. But if the philosopher cannot comprehend the abyss between reason and grace, since it is recognized and traversed only by the leap of faith, "Christianity" provides little incentive to make the leap. As K. observed it, the Christian imagination, while exuberant in images of sin, is, in its portrayal of the life of grace and redemption, paralyzed by "asthmatic representations."

In Vol. 4, the editors have ranged topics from "Sacrifice" to "Zacchaeus." The miscellany "Subjectivity/Objectivity" reiterates a central Kierkegaardian theme: "Christianity is simply not the objective." It is, of course, "subjective," but in the rarest of senses. Infinite reality itself has become subjective—"existentially realized in . . . the God-man." By way of response to the God-man, genuine human subjectivity, either diabolic or saintly, is almost as rare. "Perhaps not ten in each generation" comprehend infinite reality, for in order to understand one must become what is understood. What is understood, however, is eternal, whereas our understanding is temporal and corrupted by sin and guilt. Nonetheless, faith saves precisely at the point of human despair; it is the narrow way that takes comfort in contemplating, not the love of God for all men, but the love of God for me.
The latter contemplation is fierce and also fiercely Lutheran. K. praises Luther's identification of the true Church with the despoiled little flock ranged against pope and Christendom. But to judge so apodictically that Christendom "is simply the outer garment of illusion" may be to claim a grace that has not been given. Pursuing this issue, however, could only raise Catholic protests against Protestantism.

Denis J. M. Bradley


The author (1) commences with a description of what constitutes a moral problem, (2) proceeds to survey views expressed by different schools of thought on population growth, and (3) "solves" the problem via a discussion of "contract theory" within the framework of justice. For G., a moral problem must "significantly cause evils for moral agents; it must be subject to control, and it ought to be controlled." Any phenomenon lacking any of these qualifiers, according to G., poses no moral problem. First, defining moral problems in terms of moral agents begs the question. Secondly, if the evil for moral agents is not significant, it would not be a moral problem, which is confining. After surveying the various views expressed on population growth, G. concludes that population growth is a moral problem—and primarily because scarce natural resources are at stake. Otherwise population growth would not have been topical and would not have been a problem of moral dimension. Claims over goods and opportunities by the present and future generations need to be resolved. G. finds the solution in justice, primarily in distributive justice.

John Rawls's A Theory of Justice serves as G.'s tool of analysis. G. chooses Rawls's conception of justice because it belongs to a "higher order" theory of justice. One of the features of this theory is that "it would have to be based on widely held, commonly accepted premises in order to elicit assent from all parties to the dispute." The "dispute" G. has in mind is, of course, population-growth problem. The basis for solving the dispute is a contract by parties concerned. The contract "negotiation" begins with a hypothetical "veil of ignorance" over all negotiators, who nevertheless know enough to seek the enhancement of self-interest. Everyone is permitted to propose principles of negotiation. But because of this hypothetical "veil of ignorance," all principles are assumed adopted. A seeming contradiction. Two fundamental principles manage to emerge from contracting parties: (1) basic political and social liberties, and (2) regulating the distribution of goods and authority within social institutions. This contract theory in a stretched sense becomes a "natural law" view of ethics for G., who subsequently uses it to settle the dispute over population growth.

From the contract-view perspective, G. first deems Roman Catholics' natural-law theory on sexual precepts unacceptable, barely missing rejecting Catholic natural-law theory in its entirety. G. then convinces himself that justice as applied to contract theory is the tool of analysis. His conclusion: family size cannot be left to the discretion of individuals. Child tax is one of G.'s solutions—the purpose being to limit population size, to equalize opportunities within and beyond this generation.

One is given the impression that G. (1) makes population growth a moral problem according to his understanding of a moral problem, (2) reduces divergent views on the issue to a dis-
pute over justice, and (3) borrows a theory of justice that is both confining and hypothetical to arrive at some pragmatic recommendations for policy makers.

Raphael Shen, S.J.


Intended as an essay in urban education, S.'s book could serve as a primer for one style of ecclesiology, the study of how a religious community takes form and shape and expresses in concrete institutions its values and priorities. It is readable and intelligent; it offers precisely the kind of historical data that is prerequisite for serious theological meditation on the state of the Christian community today. There was an initial century, rooted in economic deprivation, cultural ostracism, and religious rejection, and out of it a Catholic minority built the largest private-school system in the history of the world. Problems with Chicago's WASP rulers and their public-school establishment were compounded by the staggering internal ethnic diversity of the polyglot Catholic community. By the 1920's and 1930's, under the strong hand of Cardinal Mundelein, Catholic education had, as S. says, "become a way of life for many in Chicago," and that remained true until 1965, when the system enrolled 304,000 students, two thirds of Chicago's school-age Catholic children and thirty percent of all children in public or private schools in the tricounty area. Since then, Catholic elementary school enrollments have declined, down 43.5% by 1975. The reasons? Racial friction is a factor, although black enrollment is up fourteen percent. Finances, changing perceptions of the Church, disenchantment on the left and on the right, all play a part, but do not fully explain S.'s conclusion that "the Catholic school, whether as an expression of a distinctive counter culture or as a symbol of protest and defiance, or simply as a security blanket, had lost its meaning ... as a powerful cultural agent had ceased to exist."

James Hennesey, S.J.

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BOOKS RECEIVED


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MORAL, LAW, LITURGY


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Taylor, C. T. The Values. N.Y.: Philo-

SPECIAL QUESTIONS

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