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BOOK REVIEWS


Previews of this work have been given in a number of articles, seminars, and Kingsbury’s work on the Matthean task-force of the CBA. At the outset a word of caution is due: this is not an anthology of K.’s articles or talks; all these studies have been seriously revised and refined.

K. begins with a thorough investigation of the Gospel’s structure. He carefully and fairly confronts earlier proposed efforts into two broad categories: topical (e.g., E. Schweizer, Léon-Dufour) and structural (Bacon, Kilpatrick, et al.). The footnotes alone in this section are a rather complete Matthean bibliography. After analyzing earlier efforts to locate the Gospel’s structure, K. exposes his own work with the broadest divisions at 1:1 (“The Person of Jesus Messiah”), 4:17 (“The Proclamation of Jesus Messiah”), and 16:21 (“The Suffering, Death, and Resurrection of Jesus Messiah”). This study does not significantly break down the Gospel beyond these three sections, but K. promises to do that in a later study. In his division he gives attention to the fivefold formula, various summary statements, and the geographical shifts which occur and have been the basis for so many prior divisions.

After setting forth his structural pattern, K. moves to an analysis of salvation history, locating two broad epochs: the time of Israel (OT) and the time of Jesus—from his birth until the Parousia. Above all else, K. sees Mt as a Christological document with the concepts “Son of God” (12 occurrences in Mt) and “Son of Man” (31 occurrences) as the two most important. “Son of God” is the title for this (our) age, while “Son of Man” is Jesus’ identity at the Parousia. The “gospel of the kingdom” (4:23; 9:35; 24:14; 26:13) serves to integrate Mt’s Christology with his concept of the kingdom of heaven. While “gospel” refers to the news revealed by Jesus that in himself the rule of God has approached man, “kingdom” refers to that very rule of God itself which will save or damn—depending upon one’s response to Jesus’ news in discipleship.

Methodologically, this work is a Musterarbeit. K. moves from point to point, allowing Mt to reveal his message. Virtually every verse in the Gospel appears in some context, and never extraneously. K. avoids the “Synoptic trap” of arguing from another Gospel account to Mt’s mind. His mastery of Matthean studies is almost staggering. My own disagreements are very minor; we have a contribution to NT studies which will be essential for any Matthean research. No library can afford to be without it, no serious student of Matthew should want a copy beyond arm’s reach.

The “Recapitulation” is one of the most precise, closely-argued, and
succinct presentations of Matthean theology I have ever read. K. has
given further evidence that there is emerging a real "American school" of
composition criticism second to none.

Marquette University

J. ALEX SHERLOCK

Jesus and the Law in the Synoptic Tradition. By Robert Banks.  

In many ways this is a challenging study. The opening sentence of the
Preface, "This book has its basis in a doctoral dissertation accepted by
the University of Cambridge early in 1969," does not prepare the reader
for the task undertaken. Evidently English universities follow different
principles than American for doctoral theses. The scope of the topic is so
broad that adequate supporting evidence would require several volumes.
As a result, although the work makes interesting reading, its contribution
to the important question it treats lies more in the possibilities it
suggests than in definitive solutions.

Among his strong points, B. evolves the far-reaching principle that
Jesus' relation to the Mosaic law is the result of his view of himself and of
his mission. The method employed is not to develop this principle
systematically but to state it in a variety of ways. For example, Jesus'
healing on the Sabbath illustrates this "extraordinary new principle... as
a further call to decision with respect to his own person and work" (p.
125). According to B., the way Jesus treats ritual defilement "neither
attacks nor, even in a qualified sense, affirms the Law." On the contrary,
Jesus follows a principle "that moves in a different realm altogether, for
it expresses an entirely new understanding of what does and does not
constitute defilement" (p. 141). In other words, B. rejects expressing
Jesus' attitude toward the Mosaic law in such categories as exposition,
completion, radicalization, sharpening, or even abrogating. A correct
statement of the attitude is complex and involves three elements: Jesus
transcends all OT laws; he lays down a new Torah; and he fulfils the law
by his obedience to the cross (p. 172).

In addition, B. affirms that the three Synoptic Evangelists remain
faithful to this self-understanding of Jesus and his attitude toward the
law. They simply adapt for their audience according to their individual
aims. Mark shows a universalizing tendency by expressing the authority
of Jesus in short, bold sayings. Matthew exalts his authority and
pinpoints the legal issues Jesus raised by the arrangement and presenta-
tion of material. Luke's seeming lack of interest in legal matters is his
way of focusing upon the person of Jesus. All three adopt a kerygmatic
approach that presupposes the teaching of Paul.
On the weaker side, B.'s arguments to back up his statements are spread thin. He cites many authors but his footnotes do not make clear the position of works cited. In fact, his method of proving his thesis is fundamentally intellectual and shares the weakness of the intellectual argument that Bergson pointed out long ago. The point to be proved must be assumed as hypothesis. If it is true, then the reasoning hangs together. But the reasoning itself does not prove the assumption.

In presenting his topic, B. begins with a 73-page exposition of how the law was understood at the time of Jesus in terms of the OT and of intertestamental and later Jewish literature. He shows that it is impossible to reduce this understanding of the law to any simple formula. His justification for this long preliminary section is to acquaint the reader with "important comparative material for the study of the basis and authority of Jesus' words on the Law" (p. 85). This point is well taken. Unfortunately, B. does not focus on materials that best illustrate the attitude of Jesus himself and seldom refers to this part in his study of the Synoptic tradition.

The main part treats briefly of "incidental sayings and actions" of Jesus, then dwells on the approach of Jesus in his extended teaching and in controversies related in the Synoptics. Here the chief critical defect is failure to give adequate evidence for distinguishing what comes from Jesus and what is the Evangelists' contribution. But the overview provides moral theologians with a good starting point for further research.

St. John's University, N.Y. JAMES M. REESE, O.S.F.S.


Menoud became a doctor of theology of Union Theological Seminary in 1930 at twenty-five. Thereafter he was professor of NT at Lausanne, Neuchâtel, and Montpellier; he died in 1973. This book is a memorial, a collection of 1940-70 articles. There is also a "portrait" by J. L. Leuba and a preface by Oscar Cullmann.

The twenty-four articles have been grouped by categories: four on Pauline theology, ten on Luke-Acts, two on Johannine questions, eight on various aspects of NT theology. I was reminded constantly of the consensus that broadly obtained in NT studies when I first assembled my class notes for teaching in these areas years ago. Further reflection, however, reminded me of something else: that studies like these were what created the consensus and were not, like the class notes, derivative from it. There is still much of value to be gained from these articles in content and in sound method. The reader will have to know, however,
that he must allow for the occasional premise that the progress of research has rendered questionable if not invalidated entirely. The "Council of Jerusalem" is regarded here as a decisive event in the apostolic Church, a watershed of doctrinal development, without much allowance made for the creativity of the author of Acts in constituting it such. Rather heavy reliance is placed on the notion of *disciplina arcani* to account for the lack of a doctrine with one biblical author that is emphasized by another. In fact "the authors of the NT" sometimes seem to be thought of as drawing on some common compendium or otherwise having easy access to one another's thinking.

Perhaps the best thing is to summarize the contents. (1) Marriage and celibacy in Paul discusses the positive aspects of both states. (2) Paul's "thorn in the flesh" was not an illness but his lack of success with the Jews. (3) The influence of Paul's conversion on his theology; Paul's conversion was "theological" while Luther's was "spiritual" and Augustine's "moral"; thus the union of revelation and tradition in Paul's thought. (4) *Porthein* in Paul: Paul is more severe on himself than Luke is on him in respect to his persecution of the Church. (5) The Western text of Acts is anti-Jewish, it "domesticates" Paul among the apostles, and its emphasis on the Holy Spirit and the titles of Christ is also anti-Jewish. (6) Acts and the Eucharist: allusions to the Eucharist in numerous contexts, some of which may judge questionable. (7) The ascension in Lk-Acts: Acts 1:6 originally followed Lk 24:49; the ending of Lk and the beginning of Acts are later additions. Thus there was an ascension but no forty days in Lk-Acts. The function of the ascension is that of Jn 20:29: apostolic witness renders further theophanies superfluous. (8) With Torrey, two parts to Acts: 1:1—15:35 up to the Council of Jerusalem, and 15:36—28:31 from Jerusalem to Rome. (9) Additions to the twelve apostles in Acts: Judas but not James is replaced; Paul represents a new type of apostle—to the pagans; thereafter the Twelve remains an ancient symbol. (10) Jesus and his witnesses, (11) "During forty days," and (12) the Lucan Pentecost and history are part and parcel of the preceding several articles.

(13) *Bizetai* in Lk 16:16: a passive. (14) Salvation by faith in Acts: Luke has faithfully echoed Pauline doctrine; an attached discussion with von Allmen, George, and Neirynck is very engaging. (15) The originality of Johannine thought: Jn is totally nonsyncretic, in contrast with Ignatius. (16) Johannine studies from Bultmann to Barrett: literature up to 1957. (17) *Mia ekklesia*: not a biblical term but neither was it needed, since the Church is by definition one. (18) The unity of the Church according to the NT: rather more of the same. (19) Infant baptism in the early Church: a patristic study; the NT silence is no argument against the practice, whose apostolic origin was unchallenged
in antiquity. (20) The Church and its ministries: a *cahier théologique* of 1949: fairly *doctrina communis*. (21) The nascent Church and Judaism: Christology inevitably separated the two religions despite their cultural and political bonds. (22) The Christian meaning of death and Christian victory over death: Christian theology makes death an abnormality: man is destined to live forever, not by nature but by grace. (23) The people of God in primitive Christianity: God has but one people, but the newness of the gospel leads to a separation whereby both Israel and the Church can be meant. Still, if Paul had read the Fathers, he would probably have responded to them as he did to the Corinthians and the Romans: this division is not of God. (24) Preaching the gospel and celebrating the sacraments in the infant Church: discusses baptism and the Eucharist in relation to the apostles, asks who presided in Jerusalem after the Twelve or in the Pauline churches after Paul. The only firm conclusion is that preaching of the word went hand in hand with administering the sacraments.

*DePaul University*

BRUCE VAWTER, C.M.


This well-written volume remains faithful to G.'s tradition of profound, erudite historical-theological scholarship. Amid a wealth of information and copious footnotes, G. has once again demonstrated his ability to enucleate with critical reverence the true instinct of faith at work in the dynamics of the Catholic tradition and to underscore the valid elements in the main currents of this tradition in a way which speaks to today's Church situation.

Part 1 proffers a penetrating analysis of the problems besetting early Christian art, "The Son of God in the Realm of the Dead," "The Inheritance of the Sons of Adam in Melito's Paschal Homily," and the patristic "Mary as Prophetess" theme. Although OT prohibitions against images dominated the early Church at first, G. stresses that the strong relationship between Christocentric faith, symbol, and image, especially after Chalcedon, paved the way for an authentic Christian art as an "epiphany of the divinity in the face of Christ." G. emphasizes, too, that the patristic soteriological and Christological understanding of the very difficult 1 Pt 3:19 ff. progressed from Ps.-Hippolytus' rather inept description of Christ's Pneuma going to the Father, his soul to the underworld, and his body to earth to the later tradition's sound view of the unity of Christ’s divinity with the separated body and soul. G.’s exposition of the beautiful *Theos Logos empsychos* notion is especially
fine. G. then explicates Melito's thoroughly Greek approach to original sin, which contains all the elements of the Church's later position, though with different emphases and nuances. Finally, the Fathers saw Mary as the Spirit-gifted Virgin who was overshadowed by the Holy Spirit, who prophetically and pneumatically uttered the Magnificat, who contained the Word of revelation in her womb and eventually gave birth to the new Spirit-man.

Part 2 shows G. at his best. G. persuasively argues that despite Nestorius' rash rejection of *Theotokos*, he still affirmed the traditional unity and difference in Christ and perhaps had a much better speculative grasp of the Christological problem than Cyril. G. demonstrates an uncanny ability to uncover the "moment of truth" in heretical positions and warns against facile "genealogies of heretics." G. also maintains that even though politics, passions, geographical distances, language differences, and legitimate pastoral concerns perhaps made the 431-41 Church split inevitable, the Church was actually more united in its belief in Christ, the Son of God made man, than it realized.

Part 3 skilfully focuses upon the German history-of-law notion of Rezeption (an exogenous and epidemic process by which a people receive and accept cultural elements they have not produced and make them their own in such a way as to change their cultural "horizon") and its application to Church councils, especially Chalcedon. G. emphasizes in this context the insufficiency of simply recognizing the validity of a council. Its definitions must also be recognized, assimilated, experienced, and lived as a good. He notes, too, that a "council" is hardly a univocal reality, enucleates several different historical models, and sees the need for a certain nuanced "demythologizing" concerning them. He clearly explicates the kerygmatic, spiritual, and theological moments in Chalcedon's Rezeption. His fine exposition of the so-called Codex encyclius (458) brings out the incredible spiritual-religious authority (even the application of Mt 16) bestowed upon the emperor by the bishops for the sake of unity.

Part 4 proffers a detailed exposition of "Hermeneutics and Christology." G. first examines the "Hellenization" and "Judaizing" concepts employed by a host of authors from the Reformation to the present day to explain the history of dogma. Especially fine is his section dealing with research from Harnack to the present day. Despite the various authors who emphasize Hellenization as a falling away or as progress in Christianity, G. correctly notes that revelation is never "pure," but always enters into human spiritual history. Hellenization, therefore, represents Christianity's legitimate fight with and accommodation to the world. The second section's excellent exposition of Gadamer, Ebeling, Pannenberg, Moltmann, Löwith, Habermas, and various contemporary
Catholic authors dealing with hermeneutics underscores that dogma does indeed live, that the hermeneutical problem is to face the historicity of revelation without making everything relative, and that the whole history of dogma must be as closely studied as the Scriptures. G. correctly stresses the need for a concrete hermeneutics flowing from a new praxis which translates Jesus’ relationship to his community through the Church’s intuitive grasp of the whole saving mystery of God in Jesus Christ.

G.’s fine Part 5, “Systematic Christology Questions,” penetratingly reveals an incipient scholastic method in Scripture itself. Scripture necessitates theology, for the move from the “economy” to theology is intrinsic (though only implicit) to Scripture. G. carefully enucleates the theological methods and insights of Origen, Augustine, Ps.-Dionysius, Boethius, and especially the inner connection between Fulgentius’ *De fide ad Petrum* and the *Summa sententiarum*. Less satisfactory is G.’s sketch of the main Christological problems in contemporary Catholic theology. His emphasis upon the “mysteries of Christ’s life” for contemporary theological reflection should be heeded.

Finally, the next edition and the English translation of G.’s book ought to eliminate unnecessary repetition to cut down its excessive length. Then, too, G.’s own position is not always clearly delineated from those authors he is explicating, although he does present excellent summaries of certain difficult sections.

*Boston College*  

**Harvey D. Egan, S.J.**


These essays focus on three areas which have been crucial in Rahner’s work as a systematic theologian. The first, “Theology as Science,” encompasses in a way the whole of R.’s lifework; it begins with a reflection on the importance of Aquinas for Catholic theology and ends with a discussion of the relation between theology and the sciences. It includes an essay on the nature of truth in Aquinas (a lecture given in 1938) as well as recent analyses of the future dimensions of theology in dialogue with other disciplines. Two broad themes emerge: the provisional and mystagogic character of theology as its rationality is directed toward ultimate mystery, toward the ultimate human question of God; and the inexorable pluralism that marks contemporary theology, pluralism within itself and within philosophy and the other sciences with which it strives for harmony. Citing Vatican I, R. signals the importance of philosophy as a separate knowledge from theology; their unity lies in God and not in any external authority. While theology and philosophy are
inseparably related, their "monogamy" with regard to dialogue is over. Theology has direct and critical connections with the other sciences today which, like philosophy, engender particular images of the human and contain intimations of the transcendental experience which only theology can explicate adequately.

The second section, "Anthropology," furthers R.'s exploration of, e.g., freedom, guilt, the experience of God. In each essay a dialectic is proposed: between freedom and social institutions (the creations of freedom), between guilt and Christian hope, and between the experience of self and the experience of God. While human institutions truly make freedom possible, they are inherently ambivalent as well. Nevertheless, there is a dimension of freedom which transcends this ambivalence: an implicit or explicit transcendental hope in the absolute future which in God is the condition which prevents despair of the everyday freedom which is continually subjected to institutional frustration. Between the experience of guilt (or despair) and the experience of Christian hope, however, no higher synthesis is possible. Each gives rise to ineluctably different lived interpretations. Theology is required to include both dimensions lest guilt be considered as innocuous in the affirmations of Christian forgiveness. Finally, R. develops his previous reflections on the experience of self as a unity (not identity) with the experience of the neighbor and the experience of God. Such experience is nonthematic, "present from the outset in everyday life, even though the individual may be interested in everything else but God" (p. 125). Philosophically, this relation can be explicated in transcendental reflection on human knowledge and freedom as reaching toward mystery, the basis not only for love and responsibility but also for the "objectification" of the self as subject. Theologically, this unity is the basis for the unity between love of God and love of neighbor. R. concludes that the experience of a "loss of identity" is also "a loss of the experience of God or the refusal to accept the abiding experience of God" (p. 132).

The last section, "Christology," testifies to R.'s concern to relate his earlier transcendental Christology to the findings of contemporary exegesis. He delineates the difference between a metaphysical Christology and a Christology of saving history, corresponding to the two dimensions of humanity as transcendence toward God and as freely achieving itself within the determinations of history. Convinced of the necessary connection between history and dogma as well, he raises two fundamental questions for Catholic exegesis about Jesus' awareness of himself as universal bringer of salvation and about his resurrection as an event prior to the disciples' faith. Is not some such historical evidence, however formulated, R. asks, necessary if a schizophrenic relationship between faith and reason is to be avoided? These Christological
questions exemplify R.'s undiminished skill as a theological questioner, "the courage to be unmodern" which he suggests to theologians in his appreciation of Aquinas. At the same time, he extends the notion of the anonymous experience of God to the implicit affirmation of Jesus in his quite modern analysis of love of neighbor, death, and hope. The two approaches demonstrate R.'s characteristic categorical and transcendental methods in Christology.

University of Chicago Divinity School

Anne Carr, B.V.M.

The Case Against Possessions and Exorcisms: A Historical, Biblical, and Psychological Analysis of Demons, Devils, and Demoniacs.


Cortés' and Gatti's contribution is perhaps the most comprehensive and authoritative study of its kind to appear in many years. It is not an impartial review of recent controversies; the title accurately conveys the authors' attitude toward reported cases of possession and the practice of exorcism, both past and present. Yet, despite its admittedly antagonistic perspective, the book should be studied by everyone concerned with the theological or psychological aspects of the "possession problem," as well as by anyone seriously interested in exegetical research into paranormal events in the NT, especially miracles of healing.

Heavily loaded with notes from practically every serious investigation in this little-known field, the book is intended primarily for educated and interested readers "in general." However, the author's evident scholarship perhaps obtrudes too formidably for a general audience. The specialist will not be put off unduly, on the other hand, by what in other situations would have seemed unwarranted sorties into basic scriptural and psychological propaedeutics. General theological analysis and interpretation, however, is somewhat lacking.

Uncompromising in their contention that demonic possession was never a reality, C. and G. conclude that all exorcisms should be abolished as unnecessary, misleading, and often dangerous—a position much like that of a group of leading Anglican theologians critical of the increase in exorcisms in England. Reported cases of possession from NT times to the present, the authors argue, are in fact naive descriptions either of psychotic or hysterical states structured by cultural expectations, or of organic brain disorders as manifest behaviorally. "Possession," in short, was ascribed to certain pathological conditions whose causes were heretofore unknown and mysterious. (In the NT, the authors claim, "ordinary" diseases, such as leprosy, paralysis, blindness, etc., whose causes, symptomology, and even cure were better known or at least
perceptible, were never attributed to demons.) Hence exorcism, understood as the act of ritually driving away a demon, is never called for and never was, because demons do not exist. Jesus, therefore, was not strictly an exorcist—indeed, the word is never used of him or of the disciples—and he did not mandate the Church to continue the practice, especially as it has developed. Nevertheless, Jesus’ ministry of healing the “possessed” was truly miraculous, insofar as neither brain disorders nor psychoses are curable by simple verbal commands. There is no reason to deny Satan’s existence, however, as an implication of the nonexistence of demons, because a clear distinction is always made in the NT between the (one) devil, Satan, and demons. Satan, the authors correctly point out, is never credited with possessions in the NT. The devil’s function is far otherwise, and “his” reality cannot be dismissed on the same grounds as can that of demons.

The case against possession rests upon two critical bases: modern biblical scholarship and psychological theory and practice—areas in which the competence of the senior author is unquestionable. The central criterion operating axiomatically throughout the entire study, however, is theological—the principle of parsimony, as articulated by de Guibert: “A supernatural explanation of the facts may be accepted only when every natural explanation is impossible and has been proven to be so”—which means, in effect, never. Modern science has shown, the authors attempt to demonstrate, that contemporary cases of “possession” are fully explicable in terms of natural causes unknown to the ancients as well as to our own ancestors of a few generations ago. Further, the “possessed” of the NT manifest the same behavior as contemporary cases in all important aspects, even as substantiated by exegetical scrutiny.

Several difficulties arise in the book which are not entirely resolved, such as the problem of Jesus’ apparent exorcisms. As C. and G. note, almost all present scholars agree that Jesus did in fact “cast out demons.” If, however, Jesus did miraculously drive two thousand swine into the sea to prove to a pseudo-possessed psychotic that he was no less miraculously cured, as the authors maintained (p. 216), it would seem that Jesus, who did not hesitate to correct his contemporaries’ errant views concerning God, morality, or his own mission, participated in a deliberate fraud or was himself deceived. Further, miracles of healing and the mass slaughter of pigs surely could not be less difficult than correcting a delusion. The authors also fail fully to appreciate the fact that, as a religious phenomenon, possession states are not uniformly demonic, i.e., destructive, or that they are not always second-hand reports. For many, being “possessed” is a valid religious experience and a real psychological event not accurately describable as a psychotic
reaction or a brain-lesion syndrome. Again, much contemporary research in parapsychology indicates that certain paranormal states may involve levels of awareness and transactions that transcend ordinary understanding of natural causality, some of which are plainly malevolent. As William James cautioned in 1901, we should not too prematurely close off our account with reality. But if the authors err on the side of scientific rationalism, which claims that in principle there is nothing that science will not one day explain, it is a minor failing compared to the vast horror of the witchcraft mania and possession scares of the past thousand years and contemporary follies regarding demons and exorcisms. Indeed, the authors' openness both to the reality of Jesus' miraculous healing powers and to the possible influence of angelic beings indicates a willingness to resist a completely naturalistic reduction of NT incidents to either faulty reporting, superstition, or deceit. These latter topics, unfortunately, are not well developed in the present volume.

Whether demons and possession are in any respect real will be decided, if at all, by further experience as well as by expert theological and psychological analysis. One serious and noteworthy example is this volume, which, despite its cumbersome style and massive critical detail, is an invaluable contribution as a psychological and exegetical source book.

*Loyola University, Chicago*  

Richard Woods, O.P.


This is a disturbing book. Using the words of T. K. Oesterreich, it will tend to perpetuate immutably the "demonological theory of primitive Christian times." The latest Harris poll on these matters (April 1974) reported that a substantial 36% of Americans believe that "people are sometimes possessed—taken over in mind and body by a demon or the devil." A total of 5% of Americans 18 years and over—one in every 20—reported to the Harris survey that either they themselves or someone close to them have actually been possessed by the devil. "In the aggregate, that comes to over 7 million adults in this country."

*Possessed by Satan* was published originally in 1963 under the title *Die dämonische Besessenheit.* In the English translation the footnotes have been avoided and the presentation kept as popular as possible. The book is divided into four parts: the image of possession, the proof of possession, the structure of possession cases, and individuals in possession. Although many historical cases are referred to, discussion centers mainly on the Illfurth boys and Germana, an African girl. The boys, Joseph and
Theobald, were born in 1855 and 1857 respectively, in Illfurth, near Mulhouse, Alsace. Joseph died at sixteen, his brother at twenty-five. R. takes the material for this case from a book published almost a century later (1954) by P. Sutter and acknowledges that “it must be assumed that the report in the pastoral archives” was written by the local priest, Karl Brey. The Germana exorcisms took place in 1906-7 in the South African province of Natal. “As she was said to be born about 1890, her age at the time of possession must have been approximately sixteen years.” Again R.’s account is based on another book, published in 1925. He considers these two examples the best documented, although no official records are advanced.

Throughout the book R. reveals a very naive and uncritical mind and no first-hand knowledge of any case of possession. He was eyewitness to none of the cases he mentions, shows no awareness of this century’s advances in biblical studies, clinical psychology, psychiatry, or even parapsychology. He does mention some of these matters by relying on very weak secondary sources, but he does not seem aware that, as R. Woods points out, “Even conservative commentators such as Corte, Lhermitte and Maquart are thoroughly skeptical that there have been any indisputable cases of possession since the Apostolic Age.” We may add that J. de Tonquédec, a Jesuit psychiatrist and official exorcist of the Diocese of Paris for twenty years, affirmed that throughout his tenure in office he had never come across a case of pure possession.

Part 2 discusses the signs of possession set forth in the Rituale romanum: knowledge of foreign languages, knowledge of secret and hidden things, and unusual powers. R. mentions in passing that since the revision of the Rituale in 1952, these signs are listed only as symptoms that may point to a state of possession. However, after paying lip service to the difficulties involved in these signs, R. proceeds to refer to numerous instances, mostly from the past eighteen centuries, in which they were supposedly found. The truth is that today we do not possess any clear-cut or unmistakable criteria of possession. The author dedicates a chapter to another sign: aversion to holy and consecrated things, which he had discussed in a previous article (Verbum Domini, 1960). But we must note that the hysterical person who takes himself for an instrument of Satan also shows a horror for all religious things, an inclination to evil, gross speech, licentious attitudes, and all kinds of bizarre behavior, which at times consists precisely in what is most repugnant to the explicit feelings of the subject: blasphemies, revolt against God, insults hurled at priests, at religious persons, and sacrileges carried out with every kind of sadistic refinement.

Although R. occasionally recognizes that possession began after exorcism, one’s impression throughout the book is that he believes the
best sign of real possession is the fact that the person was actually exorcised. His position seems to be that there is never any risk involved in exorcising, even if the matter turns out to be sickness and not possession; for if the exorcism does no good whatsoever, it will never do any harm. Such a position is mentioned in the book by de Tonquédéc, listed in R.’s “Selected Bibliography,” and is answered there (pp. 82-83) by the French Jesuit: “Exorcism is an impressive ceremony, capable of acting effectively on the unconscious of the sick person. The adjurations addressed to the demon, the sprinklings with holy water, the stole passed around the patient’s neck, the repeated signs of the cross and so forth, are very capable of creating a diabolical mythomania in word and deed in a psyche already weak. Call the devil and you will see him; or rather not him, but a portrait made up of the sick person’s ideas of him. It is for this reason that certain priests, due to their inconsiderate and imprudent practice of exorcising, create, confirm, and encourage the very disorders that they wanted to suppress.” Nothing similar to this cautionary warning is found in R.’s book, which is simply a reflection of the primitive and credulous way of thinking of authors of many centuries ago.

The book has no indexes; the Selected Bibliography contains seventeen rather dated items, thirteen of which are in German, Latin, Italian, or French. Such books as this should never have been written, much less translated.

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JUAN B. CORTÉS, S.J.


For medieval theologians, the tradition which formed the basis of their intellectual work was almost wholly Latin. Indeed, over 90% of the citations from Peter Lombard’s Sentences are from Augustine. In the last several generations, inspired by men such as Daniélou, some theologians have begun to read the Greek Fathers as sources for contemporary theology. More recently, a growing interest in Syriac Christianity has prompted extensive historical examination (e.g., Arthur Vööbus) and the publication of critical texts and translation (e.g., E. Beck), but to date most studies have been devoted to attempts at historical reconstruction. M.’s work is a self-conscious attempt to examine the Syriac writers theologically, based on a thorough acquaintance with the sources and modern studies. Though the work is historical in conception and execution, the topic, the Church in Syriac thinking, is shaped by contemporary Christian concerns.
under Nestorius and Cyril is reflected in an altered exegesis of Hebrews, as is Theodoret’s attempt at reconciliation.

In a loose sense, G. may be said to have demonstrated his hypothesis. But on close examination, the whole presents some difficulties. The Fathers, as G. recognizes, did not distinguish between exegesis and theology: “exegesis and theology were largely indistinguishable in the patristic period. This means that no distinction is made between what the text ‘meant’ and what it ‘means.’ The patristic writers were engaged in a theological venture rather than an historical investigation. They assumed that their theological beliefs, expressed in rules of faith and in creeds, derived from Scripture” (p. 2). In other words, when interpreting the Bible, the Fathers aimed at the “true” meaning of the text, and assumed that they had found it. Thus G.’s attempt to define the influence of patristic theology upon patristic exegesis is almost a contradiction in terms. From a practical point of view, it might have been more satisfactory to analyze first the exegetical passages from the Fathers on Hebrews, and then to point out the various factors, historical, philosophical, or personal, which influenced the different interpretations.

This volume, though written in a ponderous and prolix style, is still a valuable work, which mediates a fair amount of information about the exegesis of Hebrews in the early Church.

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MARGARET SCHATKIN


The subtitle of this study of Augustine’s interpretation of 1 Jn is certainly justified in terms of the use Augustine made of it. Dideberg does not confine himself to Augustine’s commentary (or tractatus) on the letter, but draws on the entire Augustinian corpus for passages in which texts from the letter have been summoned to support or construct A.’s theology. What D. has accomplished is to show how well A. used the letter in developing his own theology, specifically in reaction to the Donatists and the Semipelagians. He certainly is not concerned to show how well Augustine interpreted the letter itself but points out repeatedly how, on the one hand, A. has misread (or read into) 1 Jn (pp. 80–85, 105–6, 136, 160, 164–5, 171) and, on the other, how he has read and interpreted 1 Jn in the light of other biblical texts (73, 96, 153, 233). The book, consequently, will be of great interest to students of A., but will engage Johannine scholars only insofar as they are interested in the history of the exegesis of the letter.
I think it is true to say that there is no passage in 1 Jn which Augustine does not in one way or another relate to fraternal love, and of course this is the major theme of the letter. Unlike Jn, however, A. attributes this love to the operation of the Holy Spirit within us. The Holy Spirit is Love, and this is why, A. teaches, Jn can say that God is love. One of the most interesting chapters in the book (6), “Le Dieu-Amour, mystère de l'amour des croyants,” reveals that A. was attacked for his theology of the Holy Spirit on the grounds that Love is not a substance and therefore the Holy Spirit, who is God, cannot simply be Love. A. rejoins by asking: "If this love is nothing, how is God Love (1 Jn 4:8, 16)? If it is not a substance, then how is God a substance?" A. seems prepared here to abandon or at least to modify the Neoplatonic concepts which controlled his thinking of the basis of the words of Scripture, which would, of course, have taken precedence if they could not be made to fit into accepted categories.

D.'s exposition of Augustine's analysis of 1 Jn 4:18, "There is no fear in love, but perfect love casts out fear," is also worth singling out for notice, because, as D. says, "in patristic literature, the bishop of Hippo seems to be the only one to have analyzed, with such psychological penetration, on the basis of 1 Jn 4:18 and Ps 18:10, the relationships between fear and love in the Christian soul" (p. 200). A. insisted that, inasmuch as the Psalm teaches that "The fear of the Lord is pure [castus in the African Psalter] enduring forever," there must be a kind of fear which is compatible with perfect love, and he accordingly distinguishes between servile fear and pure or chaste fear; the latter refers to a state of mind by which we resist sin, not with the uneasiness which arises from a weakness when exposed to it but with a tranquil assurance born of love. What is distinctive of the *timor castus* is that it springs from love.

Throughout the book runs A.'s preoccupation with schism, which he viewed as the unforgivable sin. Those who cut themselves off from the Church have in effect denied that God is Love and thereby expelled Him from their hearts, no matter what they may say and no matter how many seemingly charitable acts they may perform. One can understand why he found 1 Jn a rich quarry from which to construct this proposition, even if he often goes beyond its thought. Certainly most theologians will forgive him for that.

*Notre Dame Seminary*

J. Edgar Bruns


In his Conclusion, R. remarks that "the whole tradition of the just war
from ancient Greece to the modern period forms a seamless if intricate web” (p. 292). The lasting utility of the volume, which developed from a doctoral dissertation at Johns Hopkins University and might more accurately be entitled “The Just War Tradition in the Middle Ages,” lies precisely in its painstaking account of the intricate relationship among the various classical, biblical, legal, canonical, political, and military threads which go to make up this tradition. Particularly useful is the exhaustive study of the civil and canonical legal contributions to the tradition in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. These central chapters (2–5) on the legal aspects of the question are preceded by an Introduction which traces the classical, biblical, and patristic antecedents to the Augustinian synthesis and by an able presentation of Augustine’s own thought. Following the detailed treatment of the legal tradition, R. turns his attention to the medieval theological tradition on the just war which preceded the work of Thomas Aquinas and finally to Thomistic thought itself. The Conclusion ineffectively essays an evaluation of the contemporary relevance of the tradition.

R. makes a profound and urgently needed contribution to the task of historical investigation of the intricate intellectual construction of the theory. His efforts at interpretation, while less sophisticated than his historical scholarship and frequently misleading, are easily separable from the historical account and do not seem to have prejudiced the inquiry itself nor substantially distorted the presentation of the various elements of the tradition.

Among the enlightening observations offered by R. on Augustine’s version of the theory is the distinction drawn between individual and group actions taken in self-defense. A. refused to accept the moral legitimacy of killing by an individual to protect his own life, even though he endorsed the legitimacy of national (political) self-defense. R., relying principally on the work of R. Hartigan, claims (pp. 19–20) that A. failed to recognize any moral validity to the distinction between soldiers and civilians as objects of military attack. More detailed examination of the texts themselves and of the historical context of their writing might suggest to future scholars the necessity of nuancing this rather crucial judgment. An even more problematic interpretation offered is the claim that “A. absolved the individual soldier of moral responsibility for his official actions” (p. 22). While the reviewer cannot definitively dispute this rather startling claim, an examination of the texts cited in support of the interpretation yields no evidence whatsoever that A. held such an untraditional view.

After a review of the twelfth- and thirteenth-century Roman civil law of war, R. examines the status of warfare in the canonical codes, beginning with the Decree of Gratian, which largely echoed A. Gratian’s
understanding of warfare as an extraordinary means of pursuing a juridical process has the utility of placing war in its properly political context. The chapter on Gratian is marred only by R.'s characteristic and misleading claim (à propos of Gratian's omission of the Second Lateran proscription of the crossbow) that "if a war was necessary and just, then all possible means to victory must be employed including the use of more effective weapons" (p. 71). The same misunderstanding is repeated on pp. 124, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159, 272, 307. Such statements might lead the unwary to forget that R. has previously admitted (p. 70) Gratian's insistence on maintaining a moral distinction between soldiers and civilians as legitimate targets of violence.

Both the Decretists, who commented on Gratian's Decree between 1140 and 1190, and the Decretalists (after 1190) who commented on subsequent canonical legislation are presented as bearers of the tradition in the interval between the great theological syntheses of A. and Thomas. Of these commentators the most outstanding was Innocent IV, who sought to restrain the frequency of war by insisting on the right of vassals to exercise two rights: conscientious objection to an unjust war and compensation for service and losses in war. Since initiators of unjust wars were not morally entitled to seek spoils after victory, such lords would not have the means of compensating their vassals without bankrupting themselves. Hence, Innocent hoped, lords would think more carefully before declaring war. Despite considerable confusion in the volume on the subject of noncombatant immunity, R.'s statement of the prominence of this restriction in the canonical traditions is unequivocal.

Aquinas' contribution to the tradition is perceptively presented as the product of the Aristotelian renaissance, which allowed him to restructure theological methodology. Thus Thomas' understanding of war as an instrument to attain the common good allowed him to attain a greater independence from the canonical style of the tradition as it existed up to his time. Given the chance to rethink the problem of the morality of war, Thomas proposed three conditions of its moral legitimacy: authority, just cause, and right intention. R. denies that Thomas held a clear theory of noncombatant immunity from attack (p. 275), although he also cites a passage in which Thomas proscribes attacks on women and children (p. 284).

With the few exceptions mentioned, R.'s historical investigation is careful and comprehensive. His attempts at interpretation and evaluation, however, especially in the Conclusion, are less sure. Two examples of such questionable interpretation will suffice to suggest caution in adopting the author's evaluative judgments: "With necessity and Providence as escape clauses, the concept of the just war is emptied of its meaning. Within the theory there is simply no way to prevent a
successful war from being treated as a just war” (p. 306). “For the past 3000 years, just war theories have had the dual purpose of restraining and justifying violence, essentially a self-contradictory exercise. . . . It remains an open question whether just war theories have limited more wars than they have encouraged” (p. 308).

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FRANCIS X. WINTERS, S.J.


Edwards makes a valuable contribution to understanding Luther’s polemics with his Evangelical opponents, i.e., “the false brethren” or “fanatics” as Luther called them. He considers primarily not the theological issues which divide Luther from the false brethren, but rather the style and tactic which Luther and his antagonists adopt in the debate. The concentration is decidedly more on Luther’s angle of vision than on those of his adversaries. He describes, in sufficient detail to illuminate his theses, the successive conflicts with the original fanatics, Carlstadt, the Zwickau prophets, Müntzer, then with Zwingli, Oecolampadius, and the sacramentarians, Agricola and the antinomians, and finally, at the end of his life, Schwenckfeld and once again the Swiss sacramentarians.

E. contends that Luther argued differently with his Evangelical than he did with his Catholic opponents. With the Evangelicals he takes advantage of his generally acknowledged leadership in the Reformation movement to assert his own authority. He does so for two principal reasons: (1) to make it easy for his theologically unsophisticated followers to discern between his doctrines and those of other Evangelicals; (2) to make sure that his own movement was not tainted by being associated in the eyes of the public with the other similar yet different Evangelical groups.

Luther therefore adopted a tactic (1) of asserting his own authority and (2) of attacking not only the doctrines of his opponents but their persons as well, accusing them all of being false brethren, heretics, and emissaries of Satan. According to E., it was perhaps fateful that Luther’s first Evangelical opponents were the genuine Schwärmer; for Luther tended to stereotype all his later Evangelical adversaries on the same basis.

Luther supported both his claim of special authority and his maligning of the Evangelical enemies as false brethren by setting forth a world view founded on his reading of the history of salvation in Scripture and the Church. This view held that ever since Cain and Abel there was a persistent struggle between the true Church and the false, between true
and false prophets and apostles, between Christ and Satan. Luther came increasingly to understand himself in his battles with the fanatics as the true spokesman for God after the model of Paul, who had had similar experiences in having to endure the attacks of false apostles who sought to subvert his doctrine and authority.

Luther's opponents were, in his eyes, damned if they did and damned if they didn't. If, on the one hand, they refused to budge from their position, he accused them of satanic perversity and obstinacy. If, on the other hand, as with Zwingli and Oecolampadius at Marburg, they showed a willingness to compromise, he regarded that as a sign of weakness and proof that they were lacking in true faith.

According to E., Luther's Evangelical opponents, with the exception of Müntzer, did not respond to Luther in kind. They did not indulge nearly as much in a blistering *ad hominem* attack. Although they were most critical of portions of his theology and regarded his characterizations of them as grossly unfair, they nevertheless acknowledged their debt to him as the first to restore the gospel, an acknowledgement which put them at a tactical disadvantage in their argumentation with the Wittenberg Reformer. The adversaries of Luther did not accuse him as he did them, namely, of heresy; they merely averred that he was not so great as to be free of error and not to require correction. E. posits three possible reasons for this manner of response from Luther's opponents. He suggests, first, that their responses were tactical, deferring to Luther's exalted position and comparatively lightly criticizing him for errors, in order not to alienate those among the Evangelicals who might be recruits for their cause. Secondly, he points out that many of Luther's opponents shared a common humanist training which taught them modesty and temperance in argumentation. Third, E. believes that the "qualified deference to Luther" of such men as Zwingli, Oecolampadius, Bucer, and Bullinger was sincere. They paid him respect "because they sincerely agreed with a large part of what he had taught and done" (p. 203).

E.'s research data for these latter conclusions is not nearly as extensive as is that for his judgments concerning Luther's attitude vis-à-vis his opponents. E. does not sufficiently take into account Zwingli's sense of independence over against Luther and his increasingly caustic attack upon him before the Marburg Colloquy, though his vituperation does not quite equal that of Luther. Likewise, one might have wished for greater attention to the humanist coloring of the argumentation of some of Luther's Evangelical opponents. In addition to promoting a greater civility and moderation of argument, this humanism likewise may have encouraged a greater degree of tentativeness in theological formulation, a more willing acceptance of error even in the most notable of theologians, and a more open and broad understanding of the Church. Although E.
states that it was not his intention to deal primarily with the theological issues which separated Luther from his opponents, he does deal clearly and accurately with such issues as the real presence in the Eucharist, the two kingdoms, and law and gospel. He might also have given some consideration to the issues of the authority of the word vs. spirit, and of the nature of the Church, which are only alluded to (e.g., pp. 88, 97, 119, 123–24, 155, 201) but not really discussed. Nevertheless, this is a solid work resting on careful research which illuminates a neglected side of the mature Luther's personality.

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JOHN B. PAYNE


The specific contribution that Parker brings to this biography of Calvin is his redating of the Reformer’s years at the University of Paris and at Orléans, and his conversion to Reformed thinking. Differing from earlier biographers by two years, P. has Calvin arrive in Paris in 1520 or 1521, at a time when C. was 11 or 12, and at Orléans in 1525 or 1526. Since C. was reticent in revealing details of his early years, biographers are forced to piece together the little data they have with what is generally known about student life in Paris. P. does this admirably, and his description of C.’s years in Paris is more detailed than that of other biographers, but still somewhat brief. For this reviewer, the most interesting portrait of Parisian student life for this particular period may be found in Georg Schurhammer’s *Francis Xavier: His Life, His Times* 1 (Rome, 1973) 77–107.

C.’s first stay at the University was given over to courses in grammar and philosophy. P. maintains, correctly, that at this stage of his training C. had not yet begun theology. When the time came for him to begin such studies, his father withdrew him from Paris and sent him to Orléans to study civil law. The father’s reason, as recorded by the son, was that he saw more money in a legal career. P. mildly disagrees with this accepted story, and interestingly suggests that to the father, who was a clear-sighted lawyer in touch with the times and witnessed the advance of the Reform movement in France, “the Church may well have seemed...to offer a less glittering prospect for his son” (p. 13).

It was at Orléans, as C. records, that “out of obedience to my father’s wishes, I tried my best to work hard, yet God at last turned my course in another direction by the secret rein of His providence.” God redirected C.’s interests. And when C. speaks of a *subita conversio*, a phrase that has tested the ingenuity of many in attempting to establish the exact date of this “sudden conversion,” P. prefers to translate the passage in
this way: "What happened first was that by an unexpected conversion he
tamed to teachableness a mind too stubborn for its years" (p. 163). To P.,
the divine redirection of C.'s course of studies, which resulted in a cooling
of interest for law and a growing ardor for theology, was totally
"unexpected" and unforeseen rather than "sudden." Hence P. situates
C.'s conversion sometime during his stay in Orléans, ca. 1529 or early
1530. This would likewise mean that C.'s first study of theology was
privately done, an interest he pursued on the side while working for his
licentiate in law.

Biographies are usually written by historians, but the present one is by
an accomplished theologian, and thus P. is understandably less inter­
ested in recording cold chronological data than in portraying the reality
of the man who lived through these events. Throughout the book, C. the
theologian is paramount, and P. usually interrupts the historical flow of
events to give the reader either a résumé of C.'s doctrinal teaching in the
Institutes, or his view of church polity as formulated in the Ordinances,
or his manner of commenting on the Scriptures. There are also intimate
vignettes interspersed in the book, e.g., C. as preacher, or at home, or as
churchman caring for the Church whether it be in Geneva, London,
Frankfurt, or Cracow.

P. brings great erudition to this biography, and his previously
published works serve as its backbone, e.g., The Oracles of God: An
Introduction to the Preaching of John Calvin (London, 1947), Calvin's
Doctrine of the Knowledge of God (Edinburgh, 1969), and Calvin's New
Testament Commentaries (Grand Rapids, 1971). In view of such a
scholarly background, it is no wonder that Parker, a theologian, has
produced a theological biography of the Reformation's leading theolo­
gian.

Washington, D.C.

JOSEPH N. TYLENDA, S.J.

Reformation and Resistance in Tudor Lancashire. By Christopher

This remarkably detailed study traces the ecclesiastical history of
Lancashire from the Late Middle Ages to the Elizabethan period. The
book's thesis is that Lancashire was a unique area at this time, not just
because it was reluctant to accept both the Henrician reform and the
Pilgrimage of Grace, but also because so much of ecclesiastical life was
determined by nonreligious factors, such as geography.

The size of the Lancashire dioceses and the remoteness of many
smaller towns and villages made it virtually impossible for the bishops to
govern properly, and in many cases archdeacons represented diocesan
government. Infrequent visitations gave rise to abuses, which H. well
documents, although these abuses, such as child marriages, were hardly limited to Lancashire. These geographical barriers also hindered the progress of the Henrician reform and certainly contributed to Lancashire’s noted conservatism.

H. makes it clear, however, that the primary forces in Lancashire’s ecclesiastical life were religious. Late-medieval forms of devotion and piety were popular with the people, and much of the resistance to Anglicization and the Elizabethan settlement resulted not from opposition to the royal role but to the church services which many Lancashire-men avoided. Perhaps the most important application of this religious emphasis is to the Pilgrimage of Grace. H. rejects, or rather reinterprets, the views of A. G. Dickens on economic grievances as the cause of the movement. The Pilgrims gained little for themselves but did restore dispossessed monks and canons to their houses. A natural leader of the Pilgrimage, Edward Stanley, Earl of Derby, let his fear of royal power overcome his Catholic sympathies, only to find that many Lancashire-men still joined the movement despite its apparent hopelessness. (Ironically, after the Pilgrimage had failed, the Earl’s closet Catholicism helped to mitigate the reprisals.) H. does not minimize the economic factors but chooses to emphasize the religious.

H.’s method is almost Baconian. He has amassed and sifted enormous amounts of primary source material, especially the records of local churches. Many of his conclusions about Lancashire ecclesiastical life are based upon financial records, and frequently he cites petty figures down to the pence. Similar exactness is applied to marriage certificates, clerical appointments, and the like. This makes for some dull reading, and the statistical trees occasionally obscure the historical forest. On the other hand, this barrage of facts makes H. very difficult to disagree with, and he has done an admirable job in keeping the footnotes clear and helpful.

One of the more significant conclusions obtained by this approach is that Catholic sentiment was far more enduring than previous British historians wished to acknowledge. “A final, tentative suggestion might be made: despite current historical opinion, it is just possible that Lancashire was not an exception, merely an extreme case of what existed elsewhere, a sizable, if largely undetected, recusant population” (p. 267). H. regularly links events in Lancashire to the larger English scene.

This book is brilliant institutional history but pays little attention to Geistesgeschichte; the deficiency is noticeable. H. writes: “Attendance at mass was of the greatest significance” (p. 64), and then provides names and dates for Lancashire chapels. The reader learns that “Another aspect of the cult of the saints was the adoration of relics” (p. 67) and then the what, where, and when of the chief Lancashire relics.
But H. never explains, or even tries to explain, why people attended Mass or adored relics or why they practiced any form of devotion, Catholic, Anglican, or Protestant. In light of his stress on the religious nature of Lancashire resistance and recusancy, this omission is doubly surprising. Occasional references to Catholicism have an unfortunate tone: “Other aspects of popular Catholicism were intruded into the [Anglican] Church” (p. 219); [the Earl of Derby] stopped Anglican services in his household and was visited by popish priests” (p. 253). Possibly the author deliberately uses sixteenth-century terms.

The nature of the book will probably guarantee its being used only by scholars, and since only bits and pieces of Continental Protestantism reached Lancashire (and even these had to pass through an Anglican filter), the book has relevance only for students of the English Reformation. Within that limited framework, this can be a helpful and even valuable work.

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JOSEPH F. KELLY


For all his fame, Caesar Baronius (1538–1607) has been served sparsely and poorly by historical literature in English; and so a special welcome can be extended to this brief work (178 pp. of text)—well researched (as the notes [pp. 179–206] and bibliography [pp. 207–16] attest), though stylistically pedestrian and frequently repetitious. There is a question whether this study intends to be a biography, as the contents suggest, or a specialized monograph, as the subtitle and Preface indicate. Actually the book straddles both categories. Thus most of the pages recount the events in B.’s very laborious and ascetical life from cradle to grave, with considerable attention to his personality and spirituality (Benedict XIV declared him a Venerable). “He had a great share in shaping the religious character of the post-Tridentine era” (p. 89), and not uniquely as the author of the Annales. On several counts his activities merit the attention of posterity. E.g., in 1593 he succeeded his mentor St. Philip Neri as superior general of the Oratorians. From 1596 he was a curial cardinal, a trusted confidant to two popes, very actively and influentially involved in the Vatican’s handling of the dispute over Molinism (B. did not favor Molina), the conflict culminating in a interdict on Venice, and other major ecclesiastical issues of the time. In two conclaves he missed out on election to the papal throne (solely because of Spain’s opposition to B.’s historical writings on rival Church and state claims in Spanish-controlled Sicily). As a member of the Congregation of the Index, B. had
a decisive voice in determining the contents of the Index of Forbidden Books. In the Congregation of Rites, his was the lion's share in the historical labors resulting in revisions of the Roman Martyrology, Roman Missal, Roman Pontifical and Ceremonial of Bishops, and Roman Ritual. His publications included lives of St. Ambrose and St. Gregory of Nazianzus. These matters, B.'s zealous pastoral activities, and other elements of a varied career are all duly recorded; but the treatment of much of it, even of the historical efforts, is tantalizingly brief; and there is no assurance that paucity of sources is responsible.

Protracted attention is reserved for the *Annales ecclesiastici*, whose twelve Latin tomes, extending to 1198 A.D., one volume per century, appeared between 1588 and 1607. This massive Church history won worldwide contemporary renown and remains B.'s most enduring monument; yet it was undertaken only at the persistent prodding of Neri. B. was self-taught as an historian; even as a theologian his formal training was minimal; and his own inclinations were pastoral. Chap. 9, “Baronius the Historian: His Contributions to Modern Historiography” (pp. 144-78), concentrates on the *Annales*; and so do many previous pages. In this ledger debits far outweigh assets in the *Annales*. Well explained are the genesis of the project, its apologetic aim as a refutation of the Protestant Centuriators of Magdeburg, and its deliberate selection of annalistic form and arid style. B. is taken to task for numerous errors in facts and chronology, for ignorance of Greek and consequent reliance on translators, for uncritical use of sources, for extensive borrowing from books by others, and for being “the perfect example of a biased historian” (p. 176). As a historiographer, he is faulted for failure to analyze cause and effect relations, for a priori assumptions about the course of history, and for not turning to Renaissance historians as exemplars. Praise is meted out for B.'s erudition and diligence, especially in his search for documents and incorporation of them *in extenso* in his text. But so lavish are the criticisms and so stinting the accolades that the author might almost seem to have taken his cue from Shakespeare’s Mark Antony: “I have come to bury Caesar, not to praise him.” “The father of modern church history” (p. xii) has, therefore, in this book’s view, bequeathed to his progeny treasures of dubious value in his “legacy for Church historians of at least the next three centuries... and the chief inspiration of Catholic historians through the nineteeneth century” (p. 177).

Readers might well appreciate the inclusion of a description of the contents of the *Annales* and the type of topics included, excluded, or minimized. A more nuanced judgment is needed on B.'s views about the Donation of Constantine. It would have been useful to compare B. with Pagi, Raynald, Laderchi, and Theiner, his continuators whose volumes
brought the Annales to 1585. There is evident a failure to substantiate the statement that "the Annales was...to touch off a literary polemic unprecedented in history" (p. 48). Some recent Catholic historians have insisted that the Annales still retains value. This might apply to the numerous reproductions of hard-to-find documents. An estimate on this point would have been helpful.

Weston School of Theology

JOHN F. BRODERICK, S.J.


With this small volume the Catholic Theological Faculty at Sydney has launched what it projects as an annual series in Church history and historical theology. This first book is a printing of journal notes kept by John Acton in Rome from November 1869 to January 1870. The journal was found by a librarian in 1966 among the books of the Acton library at Cambridge. Its publication complements data we already have on Acton's stay in Rome from the second volume of Victor Conzemius' superb edition of the Döllinger-Acton Briefwechsel. That Acton had a role in promoting contacts among bishops opposed to a definition of papal infallibility we already knew. The journal entries do not materially increase our knowledge of how he operated, nor are they particularly helpful in aiding an assessment of his true influence. He comes across as a frequently snobbish, often surprisingly uninformed gatherer of ecclesiastical gossip of the kind perennially available to almost anyone in Rome energetic enough to look for it. It takes him an astonishingly long time, e.g., to realize that "the papal court" were not all all-out partisans of the definition of infallibility, and his information on the scheming that went into election of the Council's deputation on faith is sketchy. He never seems to have run across the trail of the first president of the Council, Cardinal Filippo de Angelis, whose role here was primary.

The journal is hardly evidence that we are dealing with a man really engaged as "chief whip" in building a "disciplined political machine" of opposition bishops (pp. x, xi). It is true that these are only occasional jottings, not necessarily to be taken as more than the simple apprehensions of the moment. It is also true that there is other evidence for Acton's influence, including the statement of Odo Russell that "both Dupanloup and Strossmayer admit that the opposition could not have been organized without Lord Acton" (p. vii). But one has to wonder how Acton, always so ready to criticize others, would have reacted to the judgment on him of Dupanloup's confidant, Albert du Boys: "His
position was certainly false. In the service of a Protestant minister [Prime Minister W. E. Gladstone] and government he abused the reputation he had until then enjoyed, and his position as nephew of an English cardinal who had died at Rome almost in the odor of sanctity,” and to what extent this testifies to a role for him less significant than generally supposed.

The body of the volume consists of journal text and generally spare footnotes. Some of the latter need revision. Students at the American College did not at that time attend the Gregorian University (n. 14). Ignaz von Wessenberg, Febronian proponent of a “German Church” loosely tied to Rome, with rules on celibacy considerably looser than those generally accepted, etc., is inadequately described as a “Catholic humanist who discounted popular piety while being strongly religious” and whose “ecclesiastical career was handicapped by the Roman Curia” (n. 49). Harry von Armin’s mistaken judgment on Dupanloup’s involvement in the statement issued by bishops present in 1867 at the anniversary celebration of the deaths of Sts. Peter and Paul might profitably have been corrected in the footnote (n. 56). The bishop of Orléans was responsible for elimination of references to infallibility; he did not acquiesce in a declaration implying that it would be accepted. Instead, the footnote is used to editorialize on “the presumptive anniversary” of the double martyrdom. Justice is hardly done to Carlo Passaglia’s stature as a theologian by saying that he “wrote chiefly on canonistic and constitutional themes” and leaving it at that (n. 83). Another unnecessarily editorialized note (n. 91) describes Febronius’ attack on “the pretensions” of the papacy such as primacy and infallibility. The notes on Jesuit Generals Beckx and Roothaan and on Victor de Buck (nn. 109, 10, 11) could be more sophisticated.

John Acton is always fascinating. It is useful to have these jottings available, but difficult to understand why they merit publication more than any number of the countless other unpublished items he has left for students to peruse at Cambridge.

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JAMES HENNESEY, S.J.


This is an argumentative and, in many respects, perceptive book in which H. takes on nearly all previous contenders in the arena of Bonhoeffer interpretation in order to challenge what he believes to be the exaggerated claims of those who would carry Bonhoeffer’s thought to their own somewhat questionable conclusions or would reduce that thought to edifying biography. H. aims criticism and corrective at
previous efforts to systematize B.'s theology into a whole, patterned after some recognizable thread, such as Christology or ecclesiology. In the end, he questions the long-range durability of B.'s "radical" writings for charting new directions in theology, even as he acknowledges the importance of B.'s more "traditional" theology to nurture the Church's faith. H. hovers over his assessments and critique like an investigative reporter. Very little escapes his scrutiny. Whether his own contentions will stand up under the same kind of questioning remains to be tested.

Nearly the entire first part of H.'s analysis is spent on a lengthy status quaestionis of published Bonhoeffer studies. This reveals nothing new to those familiar with Bonhoeffer literature. However, H. does call into serious question many aspects of the "continuity hypothesis" which would see B.'s early theology as elucidating and helping systematize the more fragmentary prison writings. H. notes serious methodological divergences among the most important of contemporary interpretations, which vary from the dialogical ontology of Ott, to Dumas' Hegelian-structural ontology, to the systematic-existential analyses of Müller, Mayer, Phillips, and Ernst Feil. Their methodological disagreement has, in fact, led to a deeper rift over B.'s ecclesiology, Christology, and ultimately over the issues of concreteness and worldliness. Much of this scarcely reconcilable divergence has already been documented by Feil in his Die Theologie Dietrich Bonhoeffers, a systematic tour de force which H. himself recognizes as the possible beginning of some sort of scholarly consensus regarding B.'s central focus. Even here, though, H. feels that Feil is captive to his own systematic constraint and consequently is guilty of neglecting the anthropological elements which would show more clearly B.'s fluctuations over ecclesiology and worldliness as well as his own personal struggle for unity in faith. H. detects "impulsiveness and unexpected turnings in B.'s thought," which he traces to the important strength/weakness motif dominating B.'s life and writings. The corollary to this is his aristocratic outlook expressed in a courageous exercise of quasi-elitist responsibility for the gospel.

In this connection, H. quarrels with Feil and Bethge over their failure to emphasize sufficiently the importance of B.'s decision to return to his troubled homeland in 1939. It was this, according to H., more than the so-called "conversion experience" of 1931-32, which marked the most crucial turning point in B.'s life. If H. is correct, the decision marked B.'s definitive move away from the inner wavering of his "Cost of Discipleship" phase in order to become fully involved in the fate of Germany.

H. has aptly titled his book a "dissent." Its strength lies in his ability to conduct a coherent debate with the major interpreters of B.'s thought. H. has shown, e.g., that to say B.'s theology is Christocentric is not thereby to establish "unity" in that theology, nor even to demonstrate
that his Christology is fully developed. Further, H. cautions constraint in appraising B.'s theological assessment of the significance and consequences of World War II. H. argues that B.'s aristocrat ethos hindered his understanding of the full historical meaning of the wars which took place during his lifetime. If the operative assertion is that B. lacked a full understanding of the war event, then H.'s contention appears safe enough, even though there is equally significant evidence that B.'s political insights were often perceptive and prophetic. Admittedly, B. "did not know the event of World War II in its entirety," as H. contends. It seems wholly inaccurate, however, to conclude that he appears "not to have arisen [in his grasp of historical reality] above his own involvements" (p. 140).

H. has sharpened our focus on B.'s decision to return to Germany, showing how this was crucial for the resolution of the strength/weakness, faith/action motifs of his entire life. Like any sharp focus, on the other hand, the clarity of the image in one section tends to blur out other sections of the whole picture. H.'s study, e.g., makes of Bethge's description of the 1931–32 experience in the biography a point of arrival rather than a point of departure. Bethge himself calls the earlier experience—the well-documented decision by B. to pattern his life on the Sermon on the Mount—a "turning point," implying a new beginning in a lifelong quest for real commitment in faith. One wonders if the 1939 decision could ever have been possible without that earlier turn from the "phraseological" of academe to the "real" world of Christian discipleship. This is not to downplay the momentousness of the 1939 return to Germany. A case could just as well be made for concluding that the 1939 decision was the expected outcome of B.'s "Cost of Discipleship" phase rather than a "turning away" from that phase. H. describes the middle period of B.'s life as a "break with the world," to be contrasted with his more unified attitude toward reality in the Ethics. However, H.'s failure to accentuate B.'s more dialectical understanding of Church and world, hardly an antiworld stance or "reversal" into a more individualistic piety, in this period weakens his case against the underlying coherence of B.'s theology even amid its ambiguities.

As H. himself observes, the "discipleship" period reflects B.'s own uncertain quest for inner strength and unity. This latter point is the single most important insight which H. has contributed in his analysis of B.'s central motif. H. has stressed the need to probe into B.'s personal crises and the consequent anthropology in which his writings took root, but has failed to add to this insight enough relevant psychological-autobiographical detail to show how this anthropology is based on his personal experience and, in turn, undergirds his entire theology. The reader is left wondering, after all has been said, whether H., in his
delineation of the strength/weakness motif, has not perhaps made a case against himself. If one adds to H.'s anthropological findings the inner relationship of B.'s Christology and sociality, one would perceive enough intersecting conceptuality throughout B.'s theology to argue more convincingly that the fragmentary prison writings were of a piece with his earliest efforts to resolve the inner conflict between strength and weakness in the pursuit of faith through responsible action for others.

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GEOFFREY B. KELLY


One of the most paradoxical elements of Barth's thought is his continual use of the words "ontic," "ontological," and "ontology" in the Church Dogmatics, despite his long-famous disavowal of any use of abstract speculation in theology. How could Barth both reject and employ ontological categories at the same time? How does his ontology of grace, or Christocentric ontology, significantly depart from a more general ontology of being? Härle pursues these important questions at the core of Barth's thought structure in a most thorough, clear, and logical fashion. Using a method which has become customary for Barthian scholars, precisely because it remains objective and faithful to Barth's own thought, H. devotes almost his entire book to an exposition of the ontology of the Church Dogmatics, although he does so by posing his own objections to the material and by answering them as Barth himself would. At the very end of his study H. judges Barth's ontology to be too exclusive, and questions whether an ontology which centers around the divine principle of free and loving grace can really take history, human experience, and human freedom seriously. H.'s knowledgeable presentation of the massive amount of material, his precision and balance throughout the expository sections, and his poignant critical remarks at the end nominate this work for a truly deserved place in the already large Barthian library.

H. rightly discovers that the silver thread in Barth's whole ontology leads back to God's eternal election of grace, by which He freely chooses to love all men in His eternal Son, Jesus Christ. This theme runs through the five main expository chapters, which deal respectively with the Being of God, Covenant and Creation, the Being of Man, Analogy and Being, and the Being of Nothingness. In all these chapters H. pinpoints grace as the key to Barth's understanding of being itself; without grace there is no being in the real sense. For God's triune being itself is not an abstraction, but is grace, that is, being-in-act, being-in-relation and being-in-free-
dom. At the center of God's being is His free decision to express His love outside Himself in an unwarranted act of loving grace towards creation. The eternal covenant of God with Himself, which centers on Jesus Christ, grounds the temporal covenant with man, which is the real meaning of creation. Although created being is graced from the very beginning, it is the incarnation of the Son of God in time, the central, historical, and economic manifestation of God's own self in Jesus of Nazareth, which alone reveals the immanent, intradivine nature of God as grace, as well as the ever-actual, relational, and free nature of man as "being-graced." Thus grace is the real meaning of being.

H. can therefore conclude that, since God's being is grace, and this concretely means Jesus Christ, man's being is "graced being," because it is in ontological relationship to the being of Jesus Christ. On the other hand, the being of nothingness is "grace-less being," because it is a negation of God's eternal plan for man in Jesus Christ, and has in fact been denied by Him. Thus Barth's ontology is not, properly speaking, an ontology of being, but an ontology of being-in-relation. There can be no analogy of being between God and man, but only an analogy of relation: God is related through grace to man, just as He is related through grace to Himself. All being is essentially constituted by its character as "being-in-relation-to-God" (In-Beziehung-zu-Gott-Sein). Barth's ontology, according to H., is an ontology of the second article of the Christian Creed, a Christological ontology, an ontology of grace.

Only a few times in his exposition does H. explicitly criticize Barth and thus foreshadow the conclusion of his study. H. does not seem, however, to apportion his criticism consistently. In the two chapters dealing with the being of creation and the being of man, H. questions seriously whether Barth successfully brings both God's omnipresent activity and man's freedom together (p. 121); and twice he expressly agrees with other critics that Barth's understanding of creation seems too "docetic" (Schöpfungsdoketismus), because the world is seen by Barth simply as a "symbolic language which has prepared the way for the history of redemption" (p. 98) and because man himself is seen as having God's image "not as a possession, but only as an act of hope in the being and action of the one man, who is perfectly God's image, that is, Jesus Christ" (p. 167). Thus Barth's ontology of creation and of man seems, because of its pure actualism and its relational character, to be "tendentiously docetic" (ibid.). But this key critique is not adequately followed through when, e.g., H. fully accepts Barth's denial of the analogy of being, which, to the mind of this reviewer, likewise takes away from creation any significance which is truly its own apart from its relation to God.

In his summary and conclusion, H. correctly identifies the narrowly
Christocentric character of Barth's ontology. However, H. himself
ironically becomes more Christocentric on one point than Barth himself
does in the Church Dogmatics; for, when H. describes Barth's "noetic,"
which follows from his "ontic," as being "exclusively christological" (p.
287), he seems to disregard Barth's central distinction between Jesus
Christ as the divine Ontic and the Holy Spirit as the divine Noetic. What
is objectively true for all men in Jesus Christ becomes for the believer
subjectively true by the power of the Holy Spirit (cf. CD 4/4 116). This
characteristic ontic-noetic, objective-subjective, and de jure-de facto
dichotomy in Barth's thought seems to be missing whenever H. discusses
the nature of the relationship between the ontic and the noetic (e.g. p.
273). There is, as a result, a certain exaggerated Christocentrism in H.'s
presentation, although Barth leaves room for the Third Person of the
Trinity precisely in his noetic, by which man's ontic relationship to Jesus
Christ through grace becomes known to him through grace. This
surprising openness to the work of the Spirit in Barth's generally
Word-centered framework, as problematic as it is in itself and as
overshadowed as it admittedly is by the primacy of the Christological,
has been overlooked by Härle. Otherwise, one can be thankful that a
book explicitly dealing with Barth's ontology has become available to the
public.

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PHILIP J. ROSATO, S.J.

CHRISTIAN ETHICS: A PRESENTATION OF GENERAL MORAL THEOLOGY IN
THE LIGHT OF VATICAN II. By C. Henry Peschke, S.V.D. Alcester: C.
Goodliffe Neale, 1975. Pp. 293. $7.00; $4.25 paper.

Presumably the least incompetent judge of a new handbook on moral
theology is one who has been trained in part on the older and more
outmoded texts. Those texts looked upon moral experience as something
easily penetrable by the mind because there was a fundamental order in
moral reality that could be reached by the natural light of human reason
and especially could be investigated by the mind enlightened by grace.
Characterized by a legalism, a negativism, and a minimalism, these
texts presented an essentialistic view of human nature, relying more
upon the compatibility or incompatibility of such a conception of human
nature with the known essences of specific acts. The relation studied was
between human nature and human acts, between the object of the act
and rational human nature, and to this extent much of older Catholic
moral theology was wedded to an outmoded scholastic moral philosophy.
There was little if any room for an approach positive in spirit, fully open
in its claims, and designed on the notion of a covenant of God's relations
with man. Since Vatican II the renewal in moral theology has changed its
priorities and now the outlook is upon existential man in relation to Jesus Christ, the Holy Spirit, the sacramental system, and Scripture. If moral theology is more pluralistic now, it is also more authentic and more open, more convinced of the ambiguity of moral acts than of their certitude, more given to change and variation than to the multiplication of universal negative prohibitions.

This new manual may satisfy many professors in seminaries who are looking for just such a text that presents the biblical foundations and the historical development of Christian ethics as well as a systematic outline of general moral theology. The moral teaching of the OT is seen as a covenant of man with God both dialogic and providential, and as a basic response of Israel to the God of the covenant manifested in fear and love. The determining factor in this response was the communal sense in Israel’s relation to their fellow men. The distinction and limitation of OT ethics are seen in contrast to the moral teaching of the NT, the ethical teaching of Jesus according to the Gospels, the unity of religion and morality in that teaching; the style and literary character of Jesus’ doctrines; the main concern of his morality and his attitude towards the Jewish law. The ethical teaching of the early Church with its unity of kerygma and didache continued the spirit of Christ’s moral teaching, and the principal motives of Christian ethics of reward and punishment bore the eschatological reason of sharing in God’s kingdom through an imitation of Christ achieved in a community of like-minded lovers of Christ.

P. examines the evolution of moral theology from the period of the Fathers (until 700) through the era of the Christian European universe (700-1300) towards the scholastic synthesis and the separation of dogmatics and moral. The period of the penitential and pastoral summas (13th–16th century) was followed by the classical period of Thomistic commentators (16th century) and the emergence of the institutiones morales. The modern epoch (since 1800) is a quest for a new synthesis, with at first a continuation of traditional manuals followed by the new approaches in the nineteenth century and the current trends in moral theology of Joseph Mausbach (1861–1931), Frederick Tillman (1874–1953), Bernard Häring, and the Vatican Council (1962–65).

In Part 2, P. gives an outline of general moral theology, the nature of morality and its ultimate end, the moral law, conscience, the realization of the moral value in human acts, sin, conversion, virtue, and perfection in holiness. The development is traditional, the positions taken are cautious and defensive, the departures from older and more classical arguments are few and nondetailed. A philosophical ethicist would dispute more fundamentally on several points than a theological ethicist,
although both might agree on some general criticisms. Let me give just one example.

P. discusses the crucial question of moral absolutes in theology, and while he admits that "as a whole there are not many absolutes in traditional Catholic moral theology, i.e., actions whose object is considered as always and under all circumstances evil," he is wary about this disposition to question all moral absolutes. On p. 202 he says: "the questioning of all moral absolutes as far as external actions are concerned is a momentous innovation of great consequences. This dispute certainly requires more careful and responsible study." P. is right, and when he comes back to the same problem in the context of the admissibility of indirectly-willed evil effects, he puts off the investigation because "it would lead too far in this context and must be left to the respective treatises" (p. 211). His general observations and remarks are confined to a paraphrase of his former position: "one can notice that the number of moral absolutes has slowly decreased in the course of time." P. does honestly see the problem when he remarks that "life would be unbearable if we were never allowed to admit of indirectly-willed evil effects because much good could not be done and because it would be unreasonable to act contrarily." He then asks: "would this argument not hold true also for some instances of directly-willed evil effects?" (p. 213).

John Rawls of Harvard makes the distinction between the summary rules of the act-deontologist and the constitutive rules of the rule-deontologist. Moral absolutes are constitutive rules and P. is a theological rule-deontologist until the end, but he sees the problem and is well aware that the number of theological act-deontologists, given to summary rules, is increasing among responsible Catholic moral theologians. The major dispute in contemporary moral theology is precisely this dispute on summary and constitutive rules.

Southeastern Massachusetts University  THOMAS A. WASSMER, S.J.


The twentieth-century ethos of Western civilization is anchored perhaps as much on the Darwinian and Einsteinian revolutions as on any other major contribution to the history of ideas. Process philosophy and theology seek to incorporate these contributions, building on the foundational efforts of Whitehead. In Bioethical Decision-Making, S. undertakes the ambitious project of establishing a methodology for ethics within the process framework. These who appreciate how much we need
to bring ethical reflections into co-ordination with technologized modern culture will find her book of great interest. Unfortunately, they will also be disappointed by the unevenness of her work.

S. asserts that plurality of religious systems must be reduced to some sort of unification, because our current diversity of viewpoints does not "serve the ethical demands of our time." So, "religion must be reshaped into a holistic concern for the total man in the world." But her caricatures of various religious traditions suggest that she has neither understood nor adequately attended to the real contributions of plurality, or to the real differences among the major religious traditions.

The stated desire to "release" religion from the spiritual raises some doubts. Many of us have thought that religion was precisely designed to incarnate spirituality into social structures. This reviewer, for one, would argue that the following statements are mutually exclusive and concurrently exhaustive: (1) The realm of religion is strictly spiritual, and that of practical ethics is separate from it. (2) Authentic religion has always been and must always be holistic in its view of human life. But S. seems to hold both positions and consider them compatible.

A central Whiteheadian process principle which S. upholds consistently is that man is what he does; man is in a constant state of becoming whole. The way in which something becomes reveals what it is, not vice versa. Further, the human person is constituted by relationships rather than by an a priori principle of personhood. Relational categories are fundamental to process ethics.

At least two important, perhaps contradictory implications attend such a series of assertions. It will be very difficult ever again to suggest that ends may justify means. But there is also the possibility that means must justify ends, or that any decision is acceptable provided it emerges from a predetermined decisional methodology. Will all human acts then be morally adequate?

S. looks to the sciences for several cues in developing her system. For example, the useful notion of "construct" is borrowed from physics. But her understanding of some scientific materials is not always clear. Two references to DNA are both a bit muddled (pp. 36, 99). It would be better not to invoke as evidence things one does not grasp. Certainly, it says little for her respect for the scientific community that she gives notable attention to an article in *Time* as an appropriate source of scientific insight. She is usually more careful about her sources. In fact, she quotes, frequently and at length, from many authorities; perhaps too many, too often. One gets the impression that she has not fully appropriated the materials or reached enough of a synthetic viewpoint to express her major ideas in her own words. Indeed, her own words are frequently tortured,
with occasionally bizarre word usages, in sometimes improperly framed sentences and paragraphs. Chapters (up to 44 pages of densely packed text) have no internal subdivisions whatever. The absence of a glossary in so complex a work as this is lamentable, but the lack of a subject index is inexcusable. There is a complete absence of reference to Max Scheler, whom some consider the "father" of process ethics (cf. A. Deeken, *Process and Permanence in Ethics*); S. calls on any number of other authorities whose contributions are less obvious.

*Bioethical Decision-Making* is addressed to a crucially important project: the modernization of ethical methodology, toward an adequate process ethics to deal with increasingly complex and numerous life questions. The hope of securing this on ecumenical territory is admirable. By the publication of this book, S. has taken upon herself the responsibility to unpack the problem further. The text needs to be expanded into a series of articles that will clarify her message. This will entail, at least, substantially improving her prose, so that sentences are used to convey rather than to confound ideas.

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ROBERT ROGER LEBEL, S.J.

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"Christian education has broken out of the classroom." Richards helps the reader realize that God never intended us to restrict the lifelong process of growing up in Christ to a hothouse setting, and he continually probes for natural means through which God's supernatural work of transforming the believer is accomplished in the Body of Christ. Basic to R.'s understanding of the goals of Christian education and the processes for their attainment is his belief in the priesthood of all believers, sharing the Word in the realities of life, modeling (a key concept) their lives after Christ's, becoming "models" to others, loving and thereby freeing one another to grow. Affirming that "Scripture assumes a world of limited possibilities and reveals Truth in full harmony with reality," R. says we must not only verbalize the truth in traditional, formal educational settings, but live it together as a workable life-style.

In the first 125 pages R. sets down from his studies of Scripture some theological premises about the Church, how these shape what it does, and how Christian education necessarily differs from secular education in concern for the whole person. The seventeen chapters of Part 2, "Implementing Christian Education in the Local Church," give refreshing insights for living out our various ministries: the pastor-preacher as servant leader, model for individuals; a group of lay leaders being a
mini-body of Christ; the home as the critical location for nurturing; the
teacher as learner-friend; the small group as a powerful setting for
mutual ministry, modeling, and identification to be experienced.

Educators are always concerned with curriculum. For R., a vitally
important criterion by which we evaluate curricula ought to be “the
process they encourage as well as the truths they deal with.” Furthermore,
he speaks of the “hidden curriculum” as the most powerful
educational force with which Christian education deals, meaning all
those elements of every setting in which believers interact which support
or inhibit the transformation process. He stresses the nonformal setting
as the one in which the most significant teaching takes place.

Not all of R.’s suggestions will seem natural or even possible to
implement in the average parish. The woof thread in the weaving of
success is that of great commitment of time and energies. Relations of
“love, trust, openness, honesty, acceptance, caring, support, forgiveness,
correction, and affirmation” are not easily fabricated in the time limits of
formal class and worship hours. He speaks of church officers, e.g., getting
together for three-hour Saturday breakfasts where prayer and sharing of
faith replace the agenda of church business. His point is well made: if the
Church seeks to transform lives, we need to make the experiences equal
to the importance of that holy purpose.

At the end of each chapter, R.’s “Probe” sections offer students
suggestions for research, creative thought provokers, case studies,
discussion questions—all potentially rich, none mere busy work exer-
cises. His book “is written as a theology of Christian education... It is
exploratory. It often gives mere glances at themes that deserve book-
length treatment in themselves. It is meant to be a seed bed—a source
from which richer and fuller understandings can be developed by
others.”

To me, writing out of a lifelong participation in the Body of Christ, this
book communicated easily and vibrantly a theology of Christian educa-
tion which reinforced principles I have been coming to grips with over
years of teaching and learning, in and out of church classrooms—in
committees, church kitchens, around my dinner table, at the bridge
table, on the playground, on the telephone, in congregational meetings.
R. is not the first to say “teach life,” but his statement should be
stimulating to clergy and laypersons seeking to design all of church life as
a process of becoming.

Bethesda, Md. SYLVIA A. ZEITLER

Pp. 230 + viii. $14.95; $4.95 paper.
This interesting and valuable work is a collaboration between a Protestant systematic theologian (McC.) and a nonbelieving analytic philosopher (S.). It represents a serious effort to move beyond the postpositivist accounts of religious language offered by Braithwaite, Hare, and Ian Ramsey in a way which does not sacrifice religious convictions and claims to the demands of scientific and philosophical rationalism, and yet does not lapse into a relativism or "hard perspectivism" that would effectively exempt religious convictions from rational criticism and from serious encounter with factual knowledge, with the human experience of personal and social change, and with the plurality of convictions and beliefs present in the world.

The authors, clearly learning from their own dialogue with different convictions and viewpoints, make a good case for their via media. They take as their central notion the idea of conviction, which they define as a persistent belief such that it cannot be relinquished without making the person or community that held it significantly different. A conviction as such is topic-neutral and can vary in its object from person to person. After reviewing some recent accounts of religious language, McC.-S. then propose a speech-act theory of religious language, derived Austin and Searle. Here they put special emphasis on the importance of both representative (factual) and affective conditions for the performance of happy or successful speech acts. They then argue for a close parallel between the conditions for happy speech acts and for the justification of religious beliefs. They propose a threefold division of religious convictions into particular, doctrinal, and presiding; and they insist on the need to examine convictions as parts of conviction-sets and in relation to each other rather than in isolation. They offer three main criteria for religious convictions: truth, coherence, and moral effect. They contend against both religious and philosophical rationalists that no conviction-free assessment of religious convictions is possible, and yet they insist that considerations of truth and consistency must enter into the process of justification. They are also sensitive to the social aspects of the process of justification, especially in religious reform and in the encounter of persons of different convictions. In conclusion, they propose a brief account of theology as a science of convictions, i.e., as a careful examination of convictions and the processes of justifying them.

All this comprises an enlightened strategy for both philosophical theology and interconvictional dialogue, a strategy that avoids the rashness and condescension of much positivistic philosophy of religion and does not involve a fideistic retreat to commitment. In proposing this strategy, McC.-S. are actually rather close to the procedure followed by William Christian in his two admirable books Meaning and Truth in Religion (1964) and Oppositions of Religious Doctrines (1972). The main
steps they take beyond him are their use of speech-act analysis of language, and their strong emphasis on affective conditions in the process of justification of religious convictions. On this last step they run into some difficulty, for they tend to confuse being sincerely convinced of a belief with willingness to act on that belief. But *akrasia* or moral weakness does not really alter the cognitive status of either our religious convictions or our moral principles.

More fundamentally, McC.-S. are vague about the relevance of ontological claims to the justification of religious convictions. It is not clear whether they regard such claims as themselves disguised convictions or as somehow providing criteria for determining the truth of religious convictions. I do not see how theistic religious claims could be said to be true or even intelligible without the acceptance of ontological affirmations of some sort, and so I would think that there is need for an account of the way in which ontological claims enter into the justification and interpretation of religious convictions. This evasion of metaphysical issues is perhaps the result of the authors’ concern with linguistic, psychological, and epistemological issues. These issues they cover in a way that should be enlightening for students of both philosophy and theology, and helpful for anyone who works on the interpretation and reform of religious convictions.

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JOHN P. LANGAN, S.J.


There is a parable about a man whose unclean spirit leaves him, wanders about without finding a place of rest, and so returns with seven spirits more evil than itself. “Thus the last state of that man becomes worse than the first” (Mt 12:45). The Church, Ellul feels, has made two phenomenal mistakes which constitute its original demon. The first is Constantinism, or the desire to win over to Christianity the rich, the powerful, and the centers of control. The second is the cultural mistake in which the Church tries to become the receptacle of all the cultural achievements of the past, and so loses its own stark and austere proper identity. Time and the acrid fumes of change have driven these demons out. Now, however, they threaten to return with a set of friends that constitute the new demons E. proceeds to study.

E. is a layman of the French Reformed Church, a former leader of the Resistance, a lawyer, and something of the Calvinist conscience of France. An earlier book, *The Technological Society,* appeared in 1954 in its French edition and stands as a classic work from the point of view of reflective social analysis directed at a world in which efficiency (tech-
nique) has become the master. His theological ideal is Karl Barth, a fact which immediately makes his stance clearer. His bête noire, at least in the present work, is Harvey Cox, whom he characterizes as "our most important witness today for theological nothingness" (p. 165).

The new demons that threaten to make the state of the Church worse than it was before center on the misapprehension that this age is lay, secularized, desacralized, demythologized, scientific, and rational. Such a false appraisal tends to persuade Christian thinkers to fashion a neo-Christianity for a situation that does not exist. Desacralization has not occurred in our world, he maintains, but the sacred is found in a different place. No doubt, one thinks immediately of Khrushchev's statement to Nasser back in 1961: "I am warning you in all seriousness. I tell you that communism is sacred."

The sacred was once associated with the forest, the moon, the ocean, the bull, and the buffalo. But nowadays our deepest experiences swim in the artificial world where our whole life is lived. So the sacred changes its location, because life's experiences have changed theirs. But the inexorable law holds: what destroys the old sacred becomes the new sacred, since sacrality is a human need.

The sacred likes to define itself in terms of polar opposites: pure/impure, holy/blemished, respect/violation. For E., the new polar opposites are technique/sex, and nation-state/revolution. Sex, for instance, is sacred because it is seen as the one method of violating the unrelenting grip technology exercises on modern society. Technology is sacred because it is the unquestioned interstate to salvation. Now that which violates the awesome is itself awesome and the two are always to be associated. The devil is as sacred as God. It never leaves God's side save for a time. No wonder, as McLuhan earlier pointed out, the automobile is never pictured without a beautiful woman lounging enticingly on it. The nation-state is sacred, as even a casual review of Nazism, Stalinism, and Maoism reveal, and E.'s review is profound even if not original in this area. That sacred is violated by revolution, a word and a reality that has almost the exact sense of conversion in classical religion.

So the sacred surrounds us on all sides and what seems most secular, such as politics, becomes exactly where you expect to find the prophets. It is not within the walls of the Temple that Jeremiah preaches his sermon but rather from a hole on the White House lawn. For the Christian in the circumstances of this confusion, E. holds, what stands out supreme is the lordship of Christ. No more rightfully desacralizing (where is the priestly caste in the Sermon on the Mount?), secularizing (what did Christ care about the emperor?), demythologizing (what is less myth-tolerant than the biblical demand to throw out the idols?) imperative can be set before us.
It is hard to convey the intense, driving, convoluted, sometimes even gloriously opaque style of Ellul's analysis. It is also difficult to mention a single work from his tradition that speaks with more authority and suasion.

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FRANK R. HAIG, S.J.

**NEW WOMAN NEW EARTH: SEXIST IDEOLOGIES AND HUMAN LIBERATION.**


Gary MacEoin, in his address to the American bishops in February 1975, summarized his arguments in this way: "What I am saying...is that the church continues to hanker after an ahistorical role. It lives a myth, modeling attitudes and behavior on a series of preconceptions of reality, not on the reality expressed in the sign of the times. But all of us, including the church, are in history, and history...imposes concrete choices to each era." The operative phrase in this quotation is "preconceptions of reality." What R. in her latest book shows are exactly some of these preconceptions that have dominated and distorted reality as it has been reported to us through history.

The subtitle might prejudice those readers who carry on a conscious or unconscious battle with the notion of linking liberation with theology. But if any subject might be labeled "ivory tower"—at least over the past four hundred years—it is theology. It is as ahistorical as the Church it is striving to reveal. What this book is doing is throwing up a rope ladder to those imprisoned in their contemplative eyrie and challenging them to descend from their ahistorical nest to see how they might mix theological praxis with thought in the world that is.

*New Woman New Earth* is a reworking of materials drawn from four sets of lectures delivered from 1973 to 1975. The chapters have been divided into three groups. Part 1, "Religion and Sexism: The Unholy Alliance," is the most explicit theological treatment. It describes and explicates through anthropology and the study of myths the hierarchical relationship between man and woman which developed throughout history. The middle section, "Strange Bedfellows: Women and Other Aliens," lays bare the chilling story of witch-hunting and the complex position of the black woman vis-à-vis her history as a slave and her present position—a position which is filled with resentment of the white woman at this moment in time. "Women: The Last Revolution," explores psychoanalysis, feminism in radical socialistic contexts, and ecology.

On an initial introduction, one might be inclined to criticize the diversity in this book. The temptation is to wonder if the author is not
reaching too far too fast. But closer reflection shows that, despite this multiplicity, the unifying theme of feminism is so well grasped that it easily enables R. to indicate with rapier-like precision exactly those "preconceptions" that have blinded men in their descriptions of reality.

The most provocative chapter is the last. To link the feminist movement directly to the ecological crisis might appear far-fetched — until the logic of woman's relation to nature and to the home is unfolded in terse narrative. R. begins by stating that "women in western culture have been traditionally identified with nature, and nature, in turn, has been seen as an object of domination by man." Turning to William Leiss's *The Domination of Nature*, she observes that "Leiss regards the ecological crisis and the collapse of faith in scientific technology in the twentieth century as the result of this relationship of 'use' of nature to social domination." Throughout the Judeo-Christian tradition the language associated with the social and the natural is so integrated that one tends to regard them not as two different relations but "as parts of a single socionatural covenant that binds the creation into one community." Until the Industrial Revolution, women were part of the producer society and integrated their work at home with male work. Now, when the home ceases to be a producing unit and becomes a consumer unit in society, this consumer society pours forth "a continual stream of garbage... in increasing quantity, destroying the earth. Yet the home and women are not the originator but the victim of this system," because of their systematic exclusion from the productive world. How these events have led to the dichotomization of morality is just one spicy irony added to the deterioration.

To correct and to heal this social canker, R. has bold measures to suggest. Not all readers will take kindly to her proposals, perhaps; but at least she sees a solution — a refreshing condition compared to the sluggish sterility one almost invariably encounters in solving today's problems.

Woman is as much subject to the flaws of humanity — whatever their origin — as man. Consequently, it is impossible to envision a utopian existence even if women were completely "freed." R. in no way hints that the millennium is at hand. In this pioneering study she is merely pointing to all the areas where distorted generalizations have become so accepted as "truth" or "the way things are" that it seems almost impossible to conceive reality in any different mode. She exposes social flaws and suggests that the use of feminine sensibilities would act as a corrective and supplement male perceptions. *New Woman New Earth* is not only a model of how theology must come to terms with historical reality; it is also an example of what women can contribute to its understanding. No male insights, at least at present, would be able to perceive, much less
generalize, the insights she grasps. The two directions of sensibility are complementary, not inimical.

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M. Cleophas Costello, R.S.M.


Cone's latest and most impressive book is an amplification and refinement of his basic theme first set forth in Black Theology and Black Power and restated in A Black Theology of Liberation. His argument now as then is that the meaning of the gospel is the identification of Jesus Christ with the poor and the oppressed in their struggle for liberation; that in our society black persons constitute the largest and most visible oppressed group; that Jesus therefore is black; that the experience of Christian faith and reconciliation is impossible apart from the experience of blackness. C. writes this particular book because he has unfinished agenda items from the first two. They include questions on the meanings of liberation, whether Christ or blackness is ultimate reality, how black experience and Scripture relate to each other as sources of black theology, whether black theology is anything more than the ideology of an oppressed group, whether a Christian ethic (especially an ethic of violence) is possible for black theology, and what the prospects are for reconciliation between blacks and whites (practically nil).

Few persons outside C.'s cheering squad will be satisfied with all of his responses, but few will deny that he has handled most of the issues with intellectual power, imaginative argumentation, and clarity of presentation. Nor can one fail to appreciate his skillful use of resources from what he calls "the seemingly endless fertility of the black experience" (p. 7)—autobiography, story, prayer, sermon, song. His writing is no mere articulation of argument. It sings, shouts, preaches, prays, anathematizes, insults, rejoices. This is vital, readable theology—a rarity.

Yet C. is wrong where he also is so right. God does identify with the poor and oppressed and brings the rich and powerful under judgment. But that is a tactic in the divine strategy for the renewal of the entire fallen creation. It is not the strategy itself. Even the tribalism of the OT gives way to a more inclusive concept of divine concern, and certainly the NT does not represent the membership of the early Church as having been drawn specifically from the poor. Poverty was no test of membership. Neither was Jewishness, after Paul's arguments prevailed over Peter's. If we substitute the tests of poverty and blackness in that controversy, we must assume that C. would have stood with Peter against Paul. One must be circumcised and become a Jew in order to become a Christian.
There really is no scandal in C.'s gospel, for it is not scandalous to say that God loves and identifies with the poor and oppressed. What is scandalous and heretical to him is the claim that God, while condemning the callousness and rapaciousness of the fat and mighty, nevertheless suffers for them (not only because of them) in redemptive love. I find it scandalous also, but I cannot say it is unscriptural.

Such comments may be pointless in view of C.'s bristling defensiveness and closed-circle method of protecting his argument. But one should note that his interaction with critics is ambivalent and not singular. The agenda for C.'s first book was essentially his own. The agenda for this one was set largely by the critics, who have pointed to the problems which need further work. They have taken him seriously and he has taken many of them seriously, his rhetoric to the contrary notwithstanding.

However, the theological productivity generated by the discussion over black theology and ethics would be enhanced greatly if C.'s approach to theological conversation were more collegial and less brittle, if he were to deal publicly with contrary arguments more on their merit (as he seems to do in the isolation of his study) and less ad hominem. Conversely, this purpose would be served better also if those white theologians who regard C. with an attitude of mixed adulation and intimidation would put the mea culpa bit in its proper perspective and engage in tough, unrelenting argument with this bright and challenging black man. Cone rightly demands that white theologians not try to define his identity. There is no reason why they should allow him to define theirs.

_Candler School of Theology, Atlanta_  
_Theodore R. Weber_  
_Emory University, Atlanta_

**SHORTER NOTICES**


The fifth printing of K.'s very useful running vocabulary for the Greek NT. Words occurring more than fifty times in the NT are listed in an appendix; other words occurring more than five times in a given book are placed alphabetically in a special vocabulary at the beginning of that book. All other words appear in order of chapter and verse. This obviates time-consuming turning of pages of a lexicon, but thus fails to introduce the serious student to the semantic range of a word. Particularly helpful are the numbers which follow each word, indicating how often the word occurs in a given book and in the entire NT. There is also an appendix of Greek verb forms in alphabetical order. The Translation Guide has been added as a special section to the third and subsequent impressions as a handy grammatical summary with helps for translation. This section leaves much to be desired. The gram-
mar is oversimplified (e.g., alternative forms of the imperfect of the verb "to be" are omitted on p. 293), forms of words are given which occur neither in the NT nor elsewhere in Greek (e.g., the second aorist passive of the verb "to leave" on p. 290), there are wrong rules (e.g., "the time of action of the aorist participle is antecedent to that of the main verb" on p. 304—what about Mk 14:39, Lk 15:23, Jn 11:28, etc.?), and some suggested translations are slavishly literal (e.g., "Your Father who is in heaven" for "Your heavenly Father" of Mt 5:45 on p. 296) or miss the meaning (e.g., "There appeared a man" for "A man was sent" of Jn 1:6 on p. 309). But the lexicon part with its frequency data remains a helpful and practical tool.

Francis T. Gignac, S.J.


A survey of interpretation of the Sermon on the Mount and 147 pages of partially annotated bibliography. The author and compiler is an ordained minister in the Church of the Brethren and a professional librarian. The survey covers some thirty-five authors in chronological order from patristic times to the present. Particular attention is given to Reformation and twentieth-century works. The entries are succinct and generally quite accurate, but there is only a minimal amount of critical assessment and only occasional efforts to interrelate various interpretations. K.'s own brief conclusion emphasizes the enduring spiritual value of the Sermon but does not evaluate the history of its interpretation as a whole, nor does he broach the question of developing methodologies in exegesis of the Sermon.

The bibliography is divided into three headings: (1) texts of the sermon, including numerous translations; (2) a broad category encompassing "Sermon on the Mount Criticism, Interpretation, Sermons, Meditations, etc."; (3) a section on works devoted exclusively to the Beatitudes. The nucleus of the bibliography was the library of the late W. Harold Row, whose lifelong hobby was to collect works on the Sermon. K., Row's friend and colleague, has greatly expanded the original list and updated it to include works published in 1975. The bibliography is limited "to studies that have the Sermon on the Mount and/or the Beatitudes as their major emphases." Works which treat exclusively the Lord's Prayer or the Golden Rule have been eliminated. It includes both periodical literature and monographs. Thus the bibliography is quite complete and, as such, makes this book a useful tool for specialists in Matthean studies.

Donald Senior, C.P.


Large issues have a way of suggesting still larger ones. H.'s book is an admirable example of this. His stated intention is to study Paul's technique and theology, but very early in the discussion, at least two broader questions begin to form on the horizon: the NT interpretation of the OT and the relation between the two Testaments. One may suspect in advance that questions of such magnitude and complexity will not lend themselves to easy or particularly satisfying conclusions. And in H.'s book they possibly are not resolved to everyone's satisfaction. Still, one is compelled to say that the treatment is quite worthwhile, all apart from the conclusions reached.

H. proceeds with flawless method. He begins with a close study of texts
from Romans and Galatians and rises from the evidence uncovered in these chapters to deduce his main thesis. He manages to register some rather damaging points against Bultmann. He takes exception quite justifiably to Bultmann's contention that Paul interprets the OT exclusively in terms of law (p. 226). Bultmann is also censured for his objection to the notion of hypostasis and his view that Paul did not entertain such a conception of Christ (p. 242). Bultmann is scored for his assertion that the history of Israel is not the history of revelation and that the OT, whatever values it may possess for Christians, cannot be seen in terms of revelation (p. 269). H. is less convincing in his strictures on Cullmann's salvation-history approach to the OT (p. 271). One cannot praise too highly the common sense H. displays in his discussion of Hellenism and other non-Hebrew currents that make themselves perceptible in Scripture (p. 274).

The grand conclusion H. reaches from his study of Paul's method of exegesis bears on the relation between the OT and the NT. However unusable we may find Paul's and the NT techniques of exegesis generally, we cannot but approve the NT intention to offer a consistent picture of God, one that takes the revelation of the OT into account and is judged by the criterion of Jesus Christ. The connecting element between the two Testaments is, in fact, the revelation of God's character. In Christ, God is not encountered for the first time. The God who is revealed in Jesus is the same God who was known to Israel of old. The objection that the picture of God projected in the OT is not always consistent with itself and surely not always compatible with God's character as recorded in the NT is tidily disposed of by pointing out that within the OT itself one can perceive the notion of God undergoing a constant purifying and clarifying change. Furthermore, the revelation of God in Jesus Christ set out in the NT when employed as a criterion, as is done by Paul for instance, serves as a corrective and serves further to make emerge what is truer rather than what is less true knowledge of God in the OT. H. has produced a solid book that can be read with very great profit.

James C. Turro


Drane, lecturer in Religious Studies at the University of Stirling, has written a compact and dense work on the problem of the adversaries represented in Galatians and the two letters to the Corinthians. In other words, he attempts to answer the question of why Paul, in Galatians, seems such a strong advocate of revolutionary freedom in Christ, but then, in 1 Corinthians, lays down a legalism of his own, though in 2 Corinthians he seems to present a more balanced view.

D. rejects the view that these letters were written at a later date (especially 1 and 2 Cor, which in their present form were done toward the end of the first century) and that they presuppose a rather developed Gnosticism that Paul refutes. Rightly does D. maintain that Paul did not contradict himself from one letter to another, but that he betrays different tensions because of different adversaries. Paul did not work from an academic chair, but from field experience in his pastoral work. In Gal, Paul is attacking a stronger Judaizing influence; in 1 Cor, a more influential Gnosticism. In 2 Cor he tried to bring more balance into his thought to avoid being misinterpreted by both Judaizers and Gnostics. However, it is really in Romans that he will try to give a more balanced
theology, so that he will give occasion to neither side for misinterpreting him.

To bolster that explanation, D. espouses the view that Gal was written to Southern Galatia shortly after Paul’s first missionary journey. That theory would, of course, make it simpler to explain the differences in Paul’s letters, but the arguments are not convincing. And I believe that D.’s basic contention of different adversaries and different tensions can stand up very well in the North Galatian theory with a later date for Gal.

Throughout D. presents solid positive reasons for or against a position; he is always cautious not to overstate his opposition to other views, or his own view. Although there is need for further corrective study in these matters, I think D.’s work is a worthwhile contribution, headed in the right direction with a sound methodology.

Dominic J. Unger, O.F.M. Cap.


These five essays were originally lectures by a scholar who needs no introduction. The first two, on “Crises in Theology,” appeared in periodicals shortly after they were delivered. The next three, under the general heading “Crises in Ecumenism,” have not been previously published. A brief appendix contains, along with B.’s comments, key passages from recent Roman Catholic magisterial teaching on biblical and dogmatic studies.

Crises are moments of judgment, and these essays offer the reflections of a distinguished biblical scholar to that household of God with which judgment begins. The Church is judged by the ways in which she teaches about God and His Christ. Thus B.’s first essay is on the critical relationship between current Catholic theological reflection and the catechetical enterprise, the communication of Catholic doctrine. He then surveys some of the current methods of analyzing and explaining the Christ of the Gospel tradition. The essays under “Crises in Ecumenism,” after a brief introduction on the quest for unity among Christians and its relation to NT studies, survey questions on the ordination of women, Peter and the pope, and the Virgin Mary. B.’s careful fairness in reporting out these storm centers is itself heartening. A proleptic glimpse of some of his original studies soon to be published promises much for the Christological inquiry.

One always would like one more essay by B., and the title of this collection, “Biblical Reflections,” reminds one that the first theological and ecumenical crisis of the Church was the relation of Jesus and those who first believed in him to their own brothers and the Scriptures of Israel, i.e., the OT. How was all that happened “according to the Scriptures”? The way the first Christian generations attempted to answer that question has something to say about the way we meet the challenges of theology and ecumenism now.

Jerome D. Quinn


With evangelical simplicity M. sets out to extract from the NT the minimum of agreed content of what constituted early Christian worship. He refuses to say anything more about worship than can be conclusively established by his exact and thorough biblical exegesis. He always begins with the experience of Jesus himself and moves to the corporate prayer of the Church. Much of this work deals with passages which flow from the practice of early Christian worship: prayers, hymns and spiritual songs, credal statements, the reading of
Scripture, even the collection of money. Smaller than expected space is given to baptism and the Lord’s Supper, but what does appear is a concise and exact treatment. In every instance M. argues for what is certain and indicates what is open to different interpretations. His bibliography leads the curious to further discussions.

The value of this work is felt on two sides. M. gives a solid biblical base for those traditions which are venturing into liturgical experimentation for the first time. His exegesis demonstrates that the early Church already had a rich liturgical life which functioned according to well-established patterns. On the other hand, M. calls to task those who wish to see evidence of liturgical activity behind every verse of the NT. An improper use of biblical evidence will lead to liturgical adaptations beyond the scope of the NT, and kills any hope of ecumenical dialogue on this matter.


Emmanuel J. Cutrone


The intention of this volume is to bridge the gap between “Catholic theology on the one hand and linguistic philosophy, of the late-Wittgensteinian variety, on the other.” Using the method of ordered models, i.e., “looking at simpler forms of everyday speech and life,” H. traverses the path from clear, straightforward meaning to meaninglessness (“assertions for which no intelligible content can be found, either because the clues are too few or because, though plentiful, they conflict”). From simple factual assertions H. passes to a discussion of the possibility of meaninglessness in moral discourse and concludes to the “serious possibility of ultimate incoherence in moral discourse” because of ultimate incoherence in the reasons behind the moral statements.

Continuing his pursuit of meaninglessness through the realms of philosophical and theological discourse, H. shows by several examples that there are even greater possibilities of assertions lacking any clear meaning when one tries to discuss “transcendent reality.” He then concludes to his thesis: the meaningfulness of magisterial statements is not guaranteed, and indeed it is very likely that some magisterial statements are meaningless. This on the a priori basis that language “is such that we should expect even intelligent people to get lost in it,” and, a posteriori, by examples he offers from the Council of Vienne and *Casti connubii*. Some assertions from these two magisterial statements lack significant intelligibility, H. argues, and hence are meaningless. He suggests, however, that recognizing this possibility is no more harmful to the magisterium than was the application of historical and form criticism to the Scriptures.

H.’s conclusion is neither as threatening nor as significant as he seems to think. That theologians and authors of magisterial statements have not always been as careful in their use and analysis of language as they ought is hardly news. That there are now and may have been in the past theological statements that are unintelligible or ultimately incoherent is not surprising. When attempting to deal with matters of ultimate significance, human language is stretched beyond its already fragile capability, as any knowledge of the nature and function of religious symbols indicates. That the later Wittgenstein is helpful in dealing with this fragility others have pointed out long
before this (cf. the work of David Burrell, John A. Hutchison, and Dallas High, for some examples), but such a simple assertion does not justify the lecturing tone that pervades this volume.

_T. Howland Sanks, S.J._


A fresh and thoughtful book which confronts a fundamental question. M.'s point of departure is the contemporary theological problem, on "what critically responsible terrain can the historical dependency of Christian theology now be grounded?" A contribution to the answer can, in M.'s view, be discovered by examining the origins of Christian theologizing witnessed in the NT writings. More directly: what can be learnt "concerning how earliest Christians thought they should go about making up their minds as to what belongs to Christian truth."

M. pursues this quest with skill and sensitivity through most of the major NT traditions: Paul, the Synoptics, Acts, John, and later NT writings. Each of these traditions reveals distinctive norms of recognizing and understanding truth, but some common elements become apparent: an absolute confidence that "Jesus is the One," enabling history and the universe to be interpreted Christologically; a firm sense of tradition and of the authority of witnesses, teachers, and apostolic leaders; the conviction that genuine truth and genuine righteousness are inevitably linked; above all, a trust that the Spirit's presence in the community of believers would lead to an eventual communal discernment of Christian truth.

M. refrains from drawing any moral for contemporary theologizing until the very end. He suggests three lessons from earliest Christianity's struggle with normative understanding: (1) "truth can be discerned only with reference to its being piously lived"; (2) the Church's power of communal discernment can work only in the context of the whole Church; an individual community can still "lose its head" despite the presence of the Spirit; (3) the early Church's evolving understanding of what it meant to confess Jesus as the One warns us (or encourages us) to expect "substantive reordering of thought arising from mutual reflection on Christian experience."

M.'s reconstruction of the "way of the Word" is valuable not because it leads to novel conclusions but because it is derived from a careful and accurate analysis of NT evidence. His studies of Paul, Luke, and John seem to be the most perceptive. Matthew, and particularly Mark, are viewed too much from a Lukan perspective, and M. fails to exploit sufficiently the Markan theme of "misunderstanding," which has received so much attention in recent redaction criticism. But these are scarcely defects in what is an undeniably good book.

_Donald Senior, C.P._


An updated and biblically based presentation of Christian apologetics, H.'s study embraces three parts: history of apologetics, object and method, theologico-historical events demonstrating the validity of Christian faith. People engaged in pastoral ministry who are increasingly aware of the need for an updated apologetic will find the book of value.

The historical section is sketchy and therefore of limited value. The third section is more ample and more interesting. H. determines the object of apologetics to be the personal entry of God into human history. The supreme en-
try, of course, is the Incarnation. He presents persuasive evidence that according to prepaschal sources Jesus did know of his unique relation to the Father. H. analyzes Jesus’ self-awareness in the kingdom texts, the 82 Son of Man usages, the Son of God titles, and the hymn of jubilation (Mt 11:25–30; Lk 10:21–22). As for Jesus’ self-description, H. explains that he could not have used the Greek metaphysical theos, since neither he nor his listeners thought in Greek. Nor could he have called himself Yahweh since this was the personal name of the Father. Nor would El or Elohim have indicated much unique or unusual in his personality. Thus the various ways in which Jesus did reveal his divinity, the ipsissima verba, would have to be transformed by the apostolic Church in order to communicate in changing times who he really was.

H. recognizes the apologetic value and intent in Jesus’ miracles and resurrection (a healthy corrective to recent neglect), and he finds many indications that the historical Jesus did intend to establish a Church that was itself to be an actuation of his presence among men until the end of time.

Thomas Dubay, S.M.


In an earlier work, Political Theology, S. laid the theoretical foundations for a “political hermeneutic,” an interpretation of the Christian myths which would demonstrate their significance for the transformation of society. In her latest work S. gives us her own political hermeneutic of the cross.

S. accepts as axiomatic that “the only humanly conceivable goal is the abolition of circumstances under which people are forced to suffer” (p. 2). But who will work toward such a goal? Not those formed by the tradition which views suffering as coming from God, for this leads to Christian masochism and theological sadism. Nor will freedom from religion guarantee a commitment to alleviate suffering. What S. terms “post-Christian apathy” has turned from the very question in a search for freedom from pain which results in a loss of the capacity to feel. Only those capable of suffering can work to abolish it, S. maintains. She seeks, then, to reinterpret the Christian teaching on suffering as an affirmation of life and to see in Christ’s death God’s identification with the oppressed. Like Christ, human beings can make of suffering a “work,” can “take it up” rather than be turned from their determination to side with those who have been cast out. “Resurrection” is to be understood in terms of this world; it means that the struggle against enforced suffering will not be overcome.

By recasting the question, S. has shown that suffering can create human solidarity, and she has given life to the argument by selecting examples from our recent history. What remains unclear, however, is her understanding of “God.” She seems most often to use the term as a symbol for the human capacity to believe that there can be a better world if we are willing to suffer for one another—surely more a departure from than an interpretation of the Christian tradition.

Mary Aquin O’Neill, R.S.M.


A thorough study of the meaning of human life from a Christian viewpoint. It covers most traditional topics, including the creation, origin, and predestination of man, as well as more contemporary issues such as man and nature. The reader can, moreover, enhance his knowledge of the subject by
referring to the comprehensive, up-to-date bibliographies given at the end.

Yet for a book which starts with the statement that “the behavioral sciences are continually expanding their insights into the meaning of human life” (p. 1), the text is rather disappointing. There is little evidence in the text, and practically none in the bibliography, that O’G. has consulted primary sources relating to the behavioral sciences. Many of the problems which the social sciences have brought to the fore are either bypassed or treated rather naively. (1) O’G. has been influenced by the theories of Teilhard on evolution. But it is hard to grasp the basis for his idea that 

\textit{homo sapiens} stood “at the pyramid of life” (p. 95). He seems unaware that many of the views on physical and cultural evolution held in Teilhard’s time have been revised or discarded. Human evolution is a very complex process, making it impossible, with our present knowledge, to determine where exactly full humanity appears. (2) O’G. is unaware of the fact that the major problem which social and cultural anthropology have brought to the fore is the relation between man and culture. Treatment of this problem might have thrown some light not only on the meaning of human life but also on several questions discussed, e.g., relationship between male and female.

O’G. deals with a philosophical and theological anthropology which developed in a specific cultural context, mainly that of the Western world. In spite of the excellent presentation of this position, his treatment is so culture-bound that one wonders how Christian anthropology can be presented to other peoples with different cultural backgrounds.

\textit{John A. Saliba, S.J.}


This volume contains all but one of the papers delivered at the Conference, but neither responses nor reports of the discussions. The publication does not advance the purpose of the Conference itself, the comparison of Augustine and Chrysostom, since it simply juxtaposes papers on each of them. Only the examinations of the use of the wisdom literature by la Bonnardière and Malgingrey actually provide the reader an opportunity for fruitful comparison. The companion piece of Kannengiesser’s study of the Christ of the paschal mystery in Chrysostom is omitted. Only Bobrinskoy’s fine essay on the Spirit of Christ in the sacraments undertakes a comparative study of both authors. Not all the papers achieve a significance which transcends their original presentation, but some do merit this wider publication. Claude Lepelly’s study of municipal life in Roman North Africa shows how narrow Augustine’s base for political influence actually was. Both studies of monastic life are perceptive. Luc Verheijen shows the influence of Paulinus of Nola on Augustine’s use of the model Christian community of Acts. Jean-Marie Leroux demonstrates that Chrysostom was in the tradition of Basil of Caesarea in requiring social service of the monks.

Given the limitations of publishing resources, one must question the judiciousness of such a volume. These acta follow an earlier set on Athanasius and may be presumed to precede those of subsequent conferences at Chantilly. A broader base for selection and more aggressive editing will be necessary to justify this series.

\textit{J. Patout Burns, S.J.}

These volumes are the first results of a computerized approach towards the vocabulary used in the decrees of general councils from the medieval through the modern period and are the products of the Centre de traitement électronique des documents de l'Université Catholique de Louvain (CETEDOC). The texts utilized are those found in the third edition of Alberigo's Conciliorum oecumenicorum decreta (Bologna, 1973). Each volume has a sixfold structure. First, there is an all-inclusive list of the basic vocabulary employed in the conciliar documents under study. Secondly and most importantly, there follows a concordance of nouns, adjectives, verbs, and selected adverbs. Under each entry are to be found its variant forms together with a readout of the adjoining words and phrases. Citations from the OT and NT, previous councils, and medieval authors are generically indicated, but legal sources are not identified. Distinctly medieval words are also easily identifiable and distinguishable from classical and early Christian vocabulary. The third part consists of an index which lists auxiliary verbs, prepositions, conjunctions, and those adverbs not included in the concordance. This index, however, merely indicates their location in the conciliar sources; it does not provide a readout of the words in their precise context. The fourth section includes alphabetically arranged tables which list the frequency with which a word is used, first in all the councils under study, then in each particular council. A brief index of words which are distinctively medieval in origin constitutes the fifth section. The sixth division is an arrangement of conciliar vocabulary according to decreasing frequency of occurrence in each council.

As the first computerization of the vocabulary of medieval general councils, these volumes will surely become a basic reference for subsequent studies in conciliar history. While of immediate and obvious scholarly value, they also open up the possibility of a wide variety of imaginative studies. Scholars in all medieval disciplines, especially history and theology, should be indebted to the editors. Subsequent volumes in the series will not, I hope, be too long delayed. Similar projects for the late medieval councils are greatly needed and will be especially appreciated.

Louis B. Pascoe, S.J.


The choices that concern this brief, interesting, orderly, clear, and closely-written synthesis are those of the French secular clergy, bishops, and priests (but not the religious clergy) during the French Revolution (1789-99) and the first few years of Napoleonic rule. These turbulent years effected the overthrow of the Old Regime religiously as well as politically, economically, and socially; and they confronted the clergy repeatedly with the option of supporting or opposing the ideals and measures of succeeding revolutionary regimes, which became more and more antireligious. Evident, too, is the author's endeavor to reveal the clergy's enthusiasms and perplexities, since their decisions involved, among other things, the retention or loss of ecclesiastical posts and means of livelihood, exile, prison, even death.

What the book comes down to is a partial religious history that treats the main religious topics of the period. Successive chapters focus first on the chasm dividing the higher and lower clergy in 1789, and then on the very important impetus given by the
priestly members of the Estates General of 1789 to the start of the Revolution; the nationalization of ecclesiastical properties; the Civil Constitution of the Clergy, and the resultant formation of a government-supported schismatic Church; the various oaths to uphold the governments demanded of the clergy; official advocacy of clerical marriage and its results; the Concordat of 1801; and Napoleon's accompanying Organic Articles, which retracted much of the Concordat's contents. At the close the clergy is found docile to the new order.

All this is a field that others have tilled frequently and expertly. Freshening the present reploughing are the copious apt quotations and concrete examples. In the light of today's world it would have been enlightening had some furrows been dug in the secular area too, exposing, e.g., the clergy's reactions to the new ideals of liberté, fraternité, égalité; and its connection with resistance movements such as the civil war in the Vendée. There is no index; the bibliography will appear in Vol. 2.

John F. Broderick, S.J.


For more than a decade, the subject of priestly spirituality has commanded the attention of theologians, behavioral scientists, and priests themselves. Is there some privileged perspective from which to view the ministry and life of priests? A significant contribution to this ongoing dialogue has been made by C.'s doctoral dissertation, which maintains that the notion of service-awareness is the dominant horizon or cluster concept around which the lived experience of both Jesus and his followers can be crystallized.

C.'s immediate intent is not to give practical solutions to contemporary problems but to determine the ministerial consciousness of Jesus and how he communicated this to his disciples through an interactive process. C. rejects the traditional style of deducing spiritual truths from an essential definition of priesthood, because it provides clarity but fails to do justice to the lived reality of priesthood. He also finds the experiential and personalist approaches faulty; his critique of a representative sampling of postconciliar authors—Rudd Bunnik, Hans Küng, and Carl Armbruster—finds their concept of service inadequate.

The bulk of this biblical-spiritual study is devoted to a treatment of four scriptural passages taken from different strains of the Gospel tradition: Mk 10:35-45; Mt 20:20-28; Lk 22:24-27; Jn 13:1-20. As is to be expected, the careful structural analysis of the Greek texts and the detailed exposition of the particulars therein (facilitated by convenient foldouts of the Greek text) is fully intelligible only to professionals. The average reader, however, can appreciate the general synthesis of this Gospel material (pp. 167-73), and many of C.'s seminal observations provide avenues to further reflection and practical insights. Especially noteworthy are the introduction on the method of doing spiritual theology; the section on the Church's diaconal nature, structure, and style as the life-blood of the remembering community; his description of the dynamic of the gospel as "service generating service"; his application of Gilles Cusson's spiritual pedagogy to the priest's deepening, expansion, differentiation, and integration of his faith-experience.

This excellent study could have been more useful if it had included indices of material, authors, and scriptural passages. It would have been more satisfying if more than passing
reference had been given to the mystery of the Eucharist, not only as a ritual act over which the priest presides, but as an embodiment of the consciousness Christ communicates: his total and utterly gratuitous self-giving.

Dominic Maruca, S.J.


References to the Spanish mystic in T.'s writings are relatively infrequent but extend over a period of thirty-two years. T. clearly felt a certain affinity for J.'s way but at the same time was troubled by what he perceived as an unduly negative attitude towards the role of creatures in the spiritual ascent. T. also considered J.'s approach too static. The work at hand devotes itself to a careful textual comparison of the two spiritual guides on a very limited but quite fruitful issue: the relationship of J.'s "nuits passives" to T.'s "passivités." N. is able to demonstrate (1) that T.'s understanding of J.'s spirituality is not entirely accurate; (2) that J.'s spirituality is in fact more dynamic and affirmative than T. suspected, even if hardly in the same ways or to the same degree that T.'s spirituality is; (3) that there exists a remarkable convergence between the two on the specific question of the passivities.

N. concludes that the Carmelite reformer and the Jesuit paleontologist are best viewed in their complementarity and that the study of the two together leads to a deeper comprehension of the diverse but not mutually exclusive possibilities inherent within a common Christian mystical tradition. In short, N. is concerned to show that T. has a solid standing within the great tradition of Christian spirituality, at the same time that he has made his own unique contribution to its development. Originally a doctoral thesis written under Henri de Lubac, the book has been painstakingly re-searched and is lucidly executed. It is projected as the first installment of a larger work dealing with other aspects of T.'s mysticism.

Donald P. Gray


This scholarly yet popularly written study should be well received by Merton experts and the general public. It is a much-needed detailed analysis of an important aspect of M.'s thought, ably complementing the general work of John J. Higgins, S.J., Merton's Theology of Prayer (1971). As director of the Thomas Merton Studies Center at Bellarmine College, Louisville, Ky., for several years from 1967 on, B. had the unique advantage of having ready access to many primary sources of M.'s thought still unedited and unpublished, such as his teaching notes and journals, and most notably The Inner Experience, which previous scholars had been prohibited from quoting directly. M. had reworked this treatise on religious experience at least four times between 1961-68 and considered it incomplete. He stated in his will that The Inner Experience was not to be published. B. has a forty-eight-page analysis of this work, giving twenty-eight rather long direct quotations and ten shorter quotations with the permission of the Merton Legacy Trustees. He uses this treatise as the matrix for his evaluation of M.'s mature thought on mysticism. This part of B.'s study is a distinctly original contribution to Merton scholarship.

B. is to be commended for his historical and biographical approach to the subject, rather than a topical one, since M.'s own inner development as a mystic is central to any study such as
this. He shows a mastery of the entire corpus of M.'s voluminous literary output and has worked almost exclusively from primary sources. His thirty pages of Notes include references to practically all of M.'s published books, including his ten volumes of poetry, which B. has gleaned for apt insights into M.'s deepening mastery of the life of a mystic.

B.'s analysis includes many references to standard and classical works on mysticism, ably tracing many of the literary sources of M.'s ideas and his assimilation of these into his own inner development. He presents a lengthy examination of the purpose of asceticism as a preparation for the mystical life. The chapter arrangement is felicitous, aptly delineating the stages in M.'s growth. His last, summary chapter, "The Unfinished Journey," is especially recommended for the many insights into M.'s life and the continuing impact of his thought.

Frederic J. Kelly, S.J.


E., a priest of the Church of England, explores what is realistically and practically involved in saying yes to God in today's world. His scope is wide and marked by a very incarnationally oriented and personalist spirituality. He calls for what he refers to as the prayer of openness to full engagement with God's world; for he stresses that the prior condition of rich prayer is an openness of heart and mind, and an absence of any defensive rigidity in dealing with experience. His thesis is that a spirituality not open in this way is being starved of its necessary nourishment and becomes misshapen. E. uses von Hügel's illustration of a confluence of rivers that has run through and drained a wide expanse of countryside as the proper image of a rich spiritual life. Prayer should not be approached only through certain specialized channels, and E. pleads for a much fuller use in prayer of what the artist and the poet, the teacher and the parent, the philosopher and the lover can give us to help in our assimilation of the experience of human life today. We need them to tell us what they have seen and heard if we are to succeed in a faithful yes to God.

This book consists of eight chapters which explore these openings in a rather poetic and moving style. To illustrate his somewhat provocative and challenging points, E. ranges far and wide and makes use of various witnesses to help awaken the reader to the full dimensions of the world in which we live.

Charles J. Healey, S.J.


"Be still and know that I am God," God's exhortation voiced by the Psalmist (46:10), is the invitation M. extends to his readers in his attempted synthesis of the Eastern Christian "prayer of the heart." This exploration of deep inward prayer, which he convincingly shows is not only possible but necessary for actively involved persons, is far more coherent and unified than his earlier book The Breath of the Mystic.

A Jesuit priest of the Russian Byzantine Rite and founder of the John XXIII Institute for Eastern Christian Studies at Fordham, M. is well qualified, academically and spiritually, to illustrate the richness and relevance of Christian mysticism. His elucidation of transcendental prayer is most appealing, because he responds to today's quest for true inwardness and altered states of consciousness with the wisdom of the ancient Christian mystics. Using insights of Fathers like Origen, Basil, and Augustine, he handles the haunting, age-old problem of "praying
always” while concentrating on one’s daily tasks; this he does by making clear the distinction between concentration on God and consciousness of God. With excerpts from the early Fathers and modern writers, he succeeds admirably in explaining a phenomenon which would seem otherwise incomprehensible to contemporary persons—“the gift of tears.” And, “for a society that has allowed man to do anything else but pray during the night,” he makes meaningful the seemingly “impractical and utterly insane” practice of prayerful night vigils.

M.’s approach to asceticism is Teilhardian in its positive and processive aspects: in its positive appreciation for the world and matter as “a meeting place with the Divine,” and in its intrinsically processive, and therefore dynamic, movement towards a more conscious relationship to God. In his introduction to a process eschatology, it is exciting to find him referring to the thought-provoking and sorely needed insights of Gregory of Nyssa, one of the most brilliant and most neglected of the Church Fathers.


K. is concerned with the psychological predispositions of a mature moral life. Attitudes toward moral questions must come from within the conscience of the person, not be imposed from without. Americans looking for a new moral sense will find it, provided they develop their sensitivities concerning life, sin, and values. As long as men confuse neurotism with sin, they will not understand sin. Sinning is not something done by an alien force outside our person, but by ourselves. The confusion is compounded by the prevalent mood of alienation which prevents persons from facing up to themselves in the depths of their being. There is need to regain a sense of wholeness, in which common sense will be the principal ingredient. In developing such a sense, an important ingredient will be an increased sensitivity in relating to other humans, knowing how to listen to others, and refusing to manipulate anyone.

If one develops an inner sense of the meaning of life, as revealed through the Christian message, he sees law as a guideline, not an onus. “People who live from within themselves are not anxious to banish law...” (p. 183). Unfortunately, many churchmen continue to teach the moral law as if it were some kind of club. Without compromising essential principles of morality, they would do better to encourage the development of mature consciences. Although this is no easy task, it will bring many benefits in terms of Christians who have an appreciation of the law of Christ and their full freedom to live by it or to violate it, that is, to sin. “Real sin is an achievement made colder and more deadly by the fact that we do it; it is our product” (p. 185).

So much for K.’s thesis. Where I would have reservations is in its application to the level of many Christians who are de facto adolescent in their attitudes of conscience and unlikely to mature to the point where they can accept this thesis. But there are many other Christians, generally younger and better educated, who will benefit by K.’s attempt to describe a middle position between Fletcherian liberalism and an extreme conservatism allowing no exceptions to church law. Like the present writer, the reader of this book will still have many difficulties discerning good from evil, but at least he will benefit by its helpful suggestions.

A HANDBOOK OF SYMBOLS IN CHRISTIAN ART. By Gertrude Grace Sill. New

Everything from angels to zodiac is the scope of this pocket-sized handbook of symbols in Christian art. Comprehensive, yet succinct, it fulfils its claim, making it a vade mecum for the traveler, museum-goer, and student of Western art. S. records the origins of her basic reference guide in the Foreword: “Countless times, whether in a famous museum or a remote Romanesque church, I have desperately needed a small handbook of Christian symbols to consult.”

S. has arranged the symbols into fifty alphabetical categories, in each of which there are objects, items, and scenes that appear in Christian art. The book is illustrated with 162 works of art from every age, right up to Picasso and Matisse. It is enlightening to learn that the olive branch which appears in Gabriel’s hand in some paintings of the Annunciation, rather than the traditional lily, is a characteristic of the Sienese paintings, since the lily was the symbol of Florence, Siena’s deadliest enemy.

Although the major themes of Christian art revolve around OT and NT scenes, the lives of Jesus and Mary, there are some symbols that seemingly have no particular association with the Bible. The peacock that appears in some Nativity and Last Supper scenes is a multifaceted symbol, and can be interpreted as meaning immortality, or the all-seeing Church, or as an allusion to resurrection. These symbols, one after another, are imaginatively explained, so that the book provides interesting reading even before you take it with you to the art gallery. The format is handy, the printing clear, the illustrations apt and well worth the price asked.

Henry J. Bertels, S.J.


This work documents precisely the prominence of typology in seventeenth-century British literature. Typology is more than a method of biblical exegesis “which relates persons and events as types and anti-type, shadows and fulfillments of each other. It represents a world view... persons and events [seen always] in the light of theology and history...” G. documents the use of typology as a technical device in the tradition of Eastern and Western Scripture study. Its elements, historical realism and the essential correspondence between type and antitype, the relationship of shadow to fulfilment, “divine resonance and Christic correspondence of type and antitype within the biblical theology of history,” make typology more than a method of spiritual interpretation of Scripture or imagistic evocation in literature. Typology postulates a theocentric vision of history that includes the pre-Christian past, the Christian present, and the consummation of history in eternity.

English seventeenth-century literature, from Donne through Dryden, demands typological interpretation in any work related to a biblical element or person, to a Christian idea or ideal, or to any historical attitude. Seventeenth-century England knew the Bible and lived in an eschatological sense of history. Because exegesis was then so suspicious of allegorical interpretation, it insisted on a careful use of typology in Scripture study and demanded its precise use in literature. G. shows how such types as the Second Adam, Eve and the Garden, Exodus, “Jacob’s Pillow and Pillar,” Noah and the Temple, are frequent in practically every major poet. Milton, particularly Books 11 and 12 of Paradise Lost, receives detailed attention.

G.’s lucid textual analysis of literature, richly sustained by reference to
scriptural and literary scholarship, makes this work particularly valuable for any literary student, especially one whose Scripture study is limited or dated.

Richard W. Clancey


The Nazi Holocaust was a central event in Jewish history and, as an increasing number of Christian scholars are recognizing, a turning point in Christian self-understanding as well. In this volume F. surveys what has happened to Christianity's perception of Judaism, which inevitably involves a perception of itself among German Christian theologians since the end of the Hitler era. One early observation from her research was the fact that relatively few of Germany's name-Catholic theologians have seriously dealt with the question of Jews and Judaism. To her knowledge, only H. Küng has given evidence of serious grappling with the issue, while the works of J. Metz, W. Kasper, and K. Rahner are marked by virtual silence in this regard.

Most of the authors considered in this volume are not especially well known to non-European audiences. Hence the value of F.'s book for the North American theological community lies primarily in the issues she discusses as part of her overview of the German scene. Among these issues are whether Christians are the only true People of God in the full sense of the term, whether Christ is to be regarded as the sole and universal way of salvation, and what is the basic meaning of Christian mission. The vehemence of the controversy she has uncovered among the German theologians on these issues constitutes for her a sign that there is no longer one single, simple answer to them to which anyone claiming to be a Christian must subscribe.

F. comes out quite strongly on the need to confront the Christological question in the Jewish-Christian dialogue—something that is too frequently avoided even among dialogue-orientated theologians. She is to be commended for linking the Christian-Jewish dialogue to the Church's general dialogue with non-Christian religions. The volume also carries a short but thought-provoking Foreword by Krister Stendahl.

John T. Pawlikowski, O.S.M.


O. is a professor of Catholic theology and religious education at Saarbrücken University. His book is an abridged version of a course given in the winter semester of 1971-72 at the University of Saarland. The German title is Brauch die Kirche einen Papst? The English title suggests that the book offers reasons in support of the papacy. Paradoxically, however, the main thesis of the book seems to be that the papacy ought to be abolished. According to O., the papal office cannot be derived even in an incipient way from the NT. Jesus had no idea of a permanent Church and primatial office, because he expected the advent of the kingdom in his own lifetime. Actually, papal primacy is only one way of maintaining ecclesial unity which has developed out of historical contingencies. There are other ways too. What is needed today, O. writes (p. 123), is the development of new ways of maintaining ecclesial unity that incorporate the much-lauded "emancipation of the laity." The laity are no longer satisfied to delegate their responsibility to
others. There is need to establish democratic forms of ecclesial authority.

In the course of his discussion, O. traces the gradual assertion, recognition, and implementation of papal primacy from the beginning to Vatican I. He emphasizes the human factors contributing to this development. Unfortunately, he fails to deal with Vatican II's vigorous reaffirmation of papal primacy. But O.'s book does raise the question which is crucial for the Church and ecumenism: Is the papal office essential to the constitution of the Church or not? O. thinks it is not; this reviewer thinks it is.

Edward J. Gratsch


Teilhard was not simply a mystic; he was also a very down-to-earth Christian striving for a vision of Christ, the world, and God under the influence of the cosmic Christologies of St. Paul and St. John and directed by a belief in the scientific theory of evolution. It is no surprise that he has much to say to the modern Christian about what sanctity means in our age. It is this wealth of spiritual theology that F. opens up for his readers in this book.

F. is perhaps at his strongest at the beginning, in the middle, and at the end of this work. In the first chapter, he discusses the role and meaning of theology today. Modern society moves forward with a belief and even an experience of progress. Yet this progress now threatens to be destructive. The older societal forms that gave stability are being swept away by a process of secularization as modern society strives in certain sections of the world for greater personal freedom. Teilhard sees this picture and sweeps us off our feet with his optimistic vision of a present that has meaning because it points to a future that pulls together under the eschatological attractiveness of the Christ who has come and yet is to come. In the fourth essay, F. treats of secularization, particularly as seen in the Bible. Although he is no more willing than other prophets of secularity to face the enormous damage to people secularization has brought, his insights, especially when biblically based, are profound. Finally, in chapter six, F. treats, with a real emotional uplift, of sanctity in our age as a follower of Teilhard would view it.

There are obvious problems with Teilhardian thought from a scientific point of view. If one accepts evolution fully, then one accepts the springing up of life wherever the proper conditions are met. Modern science assumes that these conditions are met in the universe in very many locations. If so, what happens to the cosmic role of Christ, his identification with the Omega Point, and the connection between creation and redemption Thomas so carefully distinguished. Perhaps we will never have to cross that bridge, but, to change the metaphor, theologians had best be wary of building a house of cards to be blown away by the first whisper of an intelligent message from outer space. At least, a follower of the science-loving Teilhard will have to note this possibility at the risk of restricting T.'s science to the nineteenth century.

F.'s book is excellent as a supplementary text for courses in theological anthropology.

Frank R. Haig, S.J.

BOOKS RECEIVED

SCRIPTURAL STUDIES
BOOKS RECEIVED


DOCTRINAL THEOLOGY


HISTORICAL


PASTORAL AND ASCETICAL


SPECIAL QUESTIONS


