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Presenting This Issue

The September 1975 issue features four articles in diverse areas: fundamental theology, anthropology, historical theology, and process thought. Two notes focus on the evolutionary language of Vatican II and on the legitimacy of organ transplantation.

**Toward a Subjective Theology of Revelation** insists that only an understanding of revelation that moves within human subjectivity offers us a fundamental theology which can respond to urgent questions about world religions, countercultures, mysticism, and social change. Revelation's beginning (and goal) is "the individual personality surrounded by an active atmosphere of divine presence disclosing ultimate reality and meaning." **THOMAS F. O’MEARA, O.P.,** with a doctorate in theology from the University of Munich, is professor of systematic theology at Aquinas Institute, Dubuque, Iowa. His latest book, *Loose in the World* (1975), probes God, man, and belief in a shaken world.

**The Virgin-Birth Debate in Anthropological Literature** discloses the main positions taken in a recent lively, at times acrimonious, debate involving leading anthropologists on both sides of the Atlantic, evaluates the methodological procedures followed, and asks whether theologians and exegetes can profit from anthropological methods. **JOHN A. SALIBA, S.J.,** Ph.D. in religion and religious education from Catholic University in Washington, D.C., with a diploma in anthropology from Oxford, is assistant professor in the Department of Religion and Religious Studies at the University of Detroit. His area of special competence is the anthropology of religion; Brill in Leiden will soon publish his "*Homo Religiosus*" in Mircea Eliade: *An Anthropological Evaluation*.

**Leontius of Byzantium: A Cyrillian Christology** is a closely argued historical study that takes issue with David Beecher Evans' claim that Leontius' Christology was totally unorthodox, in the tradition of Origen and the Origenist Evagrius of Pontus. **JOHN J. LYNCH,** priest of the New York Archdiocese, Ph.D. in classics from Fordham with an advanced degree in divinity from St. Joseph's Seminary, Dunwoodie, N.Y., concludes that in modern terminology Christ is, for Leontius, one person.

**Paul Tillich and Process Theology** traces the areas of agreement and disagreement between two great traditions as embodied in Tillich and (especially) Hartshorne, isolates the fundamental issues, and poses a consequent question for today: If the two traditions cannot be brought together, which is more intolerable: to deny that God is a being, and so be unable to apply directly any predicates to God, or to make literal statements about God as a being, but be unable to distinguish absolutely God from all other actual being? **TYRON INBODY, Ph.D.** from the Univer-
University of Chicago, is assistant professor of religion and philosophy at Adrian College in Michigan, teaches philosophical theology and systematics, and has a special concern for the issues raised by process thought.

**Was Vatican II Evolutionary?** asks whether the language of the Council indicates in any way that the fathers were speaking in terms of the emergence of something truly novel in Christianity? Or was it "only the world" they were seeing in a new way? Is it possible to have a new vision of one without seeing the other anew as well? Leo J. O'Donovan, S.J., holds graduate degrees in philosophy and theology from Woodstock College and a doctorate in theology from the University of Münster, where his thesis was directed by Karl Rahner. He is now associate professor of systematic theology at Weston School of Theology, Cambridge, Mass.

**Transplantation of Organs: A Comment on Paul Ramsey** takes courteous issue with the Princeton professor's objections to a broadening of the principle of totality such that organ donation could be justified by the spiritual and moral wholeness of the donor. Richard A. McCormick, S.J., one of Catholicism’s foremost moral theologians, is the Rose F. Kennedy Professor of Christian Ethics at the Kennedy Center for Bioethics at Georgetown University. As always, his intervention is at once perceptive, incisive, and gracious.

Reviews of twenty-five recent books and shorter notices of twenty-five more, each by a carefully selected expert in the area, round out a solid issue. Our next number (December) will be a theme issue on Woman, an effort to insert a theological dimension into International Women's Year.

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**NOTICE OF PRICE CHANGES**

We regret to announce that constantly rising costs (printing, postage, paper, personnel) compel us to increase the price of *TS*, our first increase in more than three years. Beginning with the first issue of 1976, the following prices will be in effect: One-year subscription (four issues) within U.S. and possessions: $10.00; Canada and foreign: $11.00. Single copies: $3.50.

The increase in price will enable the editors (whose services, by the way, are contributed) to increase the significance and usefulness of *TS*, which recently received from the Catholic Press Association the first-place award for scholarly magazines.
BOOK REVIEWS


The great Theologisches Wörterbuch zum Neuen Testament of Kittel and Friedrich had always lacked an OT counterpart. Many pages in it were indeed given over to the discussion of the OT background of NT words or word-groups. But there was nothing that really attempted to give a discussion of the ancient Near Eastern background of the Hebrew and Aramaic words of the OT and to relate the data from Sumerian, Akkadian, Egyptian, Ugaritic, and general Northwest Semitic literature to the theological use of the words in the OT. In 1970 the Verlag Kohlhammer of Stuttgart undertook such a publication, Theologisches Wörterbuch zum Alten Testament. It is being issued in fascicles; so far nine have appeared for Vol. 1 and three for Vol. 2. TWNT had to wait more than thirty years to find an English translator, and by the time that G. W. Bromiley's first volume of the Theological Dictionary of the New Testament appeared (1964), “Kittel” had become a household word among NT students. TWAT is thus, in this respect, off to a good start; it has not had to wait thirty years to find an English translator. TDOT 1 is, however, a translation of only fase. 1-4 of TWAT 1; whereas the latter covers the words 'āb, “father,” to gālāh, “uncover,” the former is limited to the words from 'āb to bādad, “isolated, alone.” Whereas the original German edition is printed in two columns of quite readable small print, the English uses large print and only one column per page: 518 cols. have become 479 pp. Though beautifully printed, the books will cost a fortune to acquire at this rate. The tour de force achieved by Bromiley and Eerdmans in the translation of TWNT, wherein even the pagination of TWNT was almost retained exactly in TDNT, has not been repeated in TDOT. Even so, English-speaking students of the OT will welcome this translation of what has already become a handy tool in the study of OT theology.

Whereas the vast majority of the contributors to “Kittel” were German (with only an occasional Swiss, Dutchman, or Frenchman among them), the list of contributors to TWAT is quite international and interconfessional. It is a real galaxy of renowned scholarly names.

As in TWNT, the words (or groups of related words) are listed according to a basic form alphabetically in either Hebrew or Aramaic. Neither TWNT nor TDNT sought to aid the Greek-less reader. But Willis, whose translator’s preface explains that TDOT is intended to make technical work “more useful to the minister and layman who has
not had advanced training in Old Testament studies” (p. vii), has added to the Hebrew title of each article a transcription of the word in Latin characters. There was a liberal sprinkling of Hebrew and Aramaic words in the German text of *TWAT* as well as transcriptions to substitute for them. Willis, however, has used Hebrew characters only for the titles of articles, for cross references within the articles, and for other rare instances when they are indispensable. For the rest, all Hebrew and Aramaic words have been transcribed.

The order of material in each article is not always uniform, but in general it runs like this: the etymology or meaning of the word, its use in ancient Near Eastern literature, its use in the OT (often broken down into various subdivisions); and in some instances Qumran usage is added, or paragraphs are appended that deal with the theological significance of a term.

The treatment of the OT usage of certain words should, theoretically at least, resemble that found in the OT sections of the treatment of NT words in “Kittel.” For instance, the first article in *TDOT* 1 is devoted to ’āb, “father,” and invites comparison with its counterpart, *pater*, in *TDNT* 5. The former devotes 19 pp. to the discussion of the word, its use in ancient Near Eastern literature, and in the OT; the latter, without the related words (*patrōs, patria, apatōr, patrikos*), gives 69 pp. to the word, of which 15 pp. of much smaller type are devoted to the “Father Concept in the Old Testament.” Since 6½ pp. of the *TDOT* article are given over to introductory matter and the ancient Near Eastern material, “Kittel” has actually a more extensive treatment of the OT matter (written by G. Quell). It is obvious that the material used in *TDOT* is dependent on more recent sources than were at times available for the corresponding articles in “Kittel,” and the great advantage is to have the OT material set in the ancient Near Eastern framework. But I miss the detailed work that characterized the contributions in “Kittel.” On the other hand, the *TWAT/TDOT* article on ’āh, “brother,” discussing the use of the word in the ancient Near East, occurrences and meaning in the OT, its legal and theological use, and its part in proper names, far outstrips the meager treatment of the OT usage of ’āh and its bearing on NT *adelphos* in *TWNT/TDNT*. The result is that biblical interpreters, whether of NT or OT leaning, will have to consult both of these dictionaries and use them in tandem.

*TDOT* 1 contains some basic and important articles that are well constructed and succinctly written (e.g., those of F. M. Cross on ’ēl, O. Bissfeldt on ’ādōn, A. Jepsen on ’āman, H. Cazelles on ’ašrâ). Each article is accompanied by a helpful bibliography of recent contributions on the subject (and some additions have been made in the English translation that are not found in the original German text).
Unfortunately, Willis does not have the expertise as a translator that characterized the work of Bromiley. Though slight slips were eventually found in *TDNT* at times, it is a reliable translation of *TWNT* by and large. The same cannot be said about *TDOT* 1. Perhaps because of his concern for "the minister and layman who has not had advanced training in Old Testament studies," W. has often expanded the text with explanatory phrases, added translations of Semitic words, and simplified the text. While the translation reads smoothly enough in general, there are spots where the reader is drawn up short by an odd expression that makes him reach for the German original. E.g., in the article on 'ebyon, "poor," Botterweck discusses the Qumran use of the word and mentions that in the *Manual of Discipline* the synonyms 'nuym and 'bywnym have "keinen ökonomischen oder sozialen Aspekt." This becomes in *TDOT* 1 "no ecumenical or social dimension" (p. 41). Given the well-known esoteric and standoffish attitude of the Qumran community, that one really sent me to the original. This may appear to be a mere typographical error; but there are enough other instances in the volume to warn the users of *TDOT* 1 about the quality of the translation.

The same sort of comment has to be made about W.'s translation of Semitic words. Sometimes he has simply gone to his dictionary and selected a meaning that simply does not fit the context, having mistaken two homonyms: 'ebhen shethiyah is translated as "stone of drinking" (p. 51), whereas it really should be "stone of foundation" (see G. H. Dalman, *Aramäisch-neuhebräisches Handwörterbuch* [Göttingen, 1938] 436). Again, the *Vorwort* of *TWAT*, found at the end of fasc. 9, has been shortened in W.'s foreword by the dropping of two paragraphs. The dropping of one is understandable because of the proper names involved and the desire to substitute others more significant for the English translation. But the first one, which is the second paragraph of the original, sought to explain why the dictionary could not get involved in discussions of generative linguistics, linguistic analysis, etc. And the third began: "But in this context, what is meant by 'theological' [i.e., in the title of the dictionary]"? Now that the context has been lost by the dropping of the paragraph on linguistics, the question about "this context" is puzzling. The translator's preface explains, moreover, that editor Ringgren made available to W. the original manuscripts of articles that were submitted in English. This may account for some differences at times between the English and the German, but in the articles of certain English-speaking contributors one finds expressions that are undoubtedly due to W.'s translation of the German rather than to the contributors' style itself.

Questionable indeed is the system of transcription that has been
BOOK REVIEWS

adopted. Willis calls it nontechnical. This means the use of $h$ to denote the spirant forms of the $b\ast g\ast d\ast k\ast pat$ consonants, so that one finds such ridiculous combinations as 'ebhyone phedhuthe[khah] (p. 41); $ch$ for $h$ (with no indication whether one should pronounce this like English $ch$ or German $ch$), so that one wonders how the "minister and layman" would find this more helpful: pisseach (p. 35) instead of "technical" pissee$h$; $ts$ for $s$, $t$ for both $t$ and $t$. The extreme consequence of this nontechnical usage is found in the confusing order of titles in the running heads of the pages in this volume. One finds such sequences as 'ahabh, 'ohel, 'abh, 'avah, 'uil, 'aven, 'ôr, 'ôth, 'ach, 'echadh, etc. Here W. would have been better advised to use unpointed Hebrew characters or the simple transcription of the consonants (without the vowels). As it is, the present running heads are a bane even for the scholar.

It is to be hoped that the further volumes in the TDOT will remedy some of these defects. Some of them are minor, but they detract from the value of this translation. For detailed work, TWAT is not the rival of TWNT, and yet the translation of it is a valuable tool not only for the OT scholar, who needs a succinct summary of current research on OT vocabulary, but also for the NT interpreter who seeks to learn more about the Semitic and OT background of NT vocabulary. A more careful translation of the further volumes in the series would be a boon to English-speaking scholars and teachers, ministers and laymen.

Weston School of Theology

JOSEPH A. FITZMYER, S.J.


This is a book of some very real strengths and a few weaknesses. The latter cannot be ignored, but their presence should not be allowed to color one's view of the entire book. In twenty-five short chapters, covering three general sections (The Being of Man, The Time of Man, The World of Man), W. attempts to present the OT view on a wide range of topics related to anthropology. The basic distraction is inevitable: How valid is the attempt to present something from the viewpoint of the OT in globo? W. occasionally adverts to the presence of a theme in the "Priestly Source" or the "Deuteronomic Source," but that is as far as he goes. (He is a bit more precise in his chapter-length treatment of four Hebrew words: nepes, bâsår, rûâh, and lêb(âb).) This leaves the reader puzzled on the process of attempting to derive a quintessential meaning from a concept that occurs, let us say, in the priestly narrative and in some of the wisdom literature. Is it possible to derive a common-
denominator meaning for “Old Testament Concepts” that prescinds from a given audience?

There is a second distraction. W. writes movingly and reflectively at times on thoughts that have certainly been suggested to him by the OT or have at least had their starting point in the OT: “Early Christianity showed theological wisdom in decreeing that the first day of the week was to be the day of rest instead of the seventh. For liberated man, man who is the receiver of God’s gifts, the week does not end with the day of rest, it begins with it. The working days can then take on rather more of the character of play—even the character of protest against the principle of judging performance by results and against the demand for those results” (p. 138). If that is honest enough, presented simply as a reflection without sober effort to found the reflection too deeply in Scripture, the passage that follows is distressing. We are told that God rested on the seventh day, that He “took breath,” which meant that He had to rest because He was exhausted and that this exhaustion is understandable only in the tetelestai, “it is finished,” of Jn 19:30.

But the pluses are considerable. The twenty-five themes cite great amounts of text, often in sprightly translation. W.’s treatment of the OT’s views of human sexuality is extremely well done, though some may disagree with his finding of a dynamic in the OT leading “towards a monogamous marriage as a legal institution” (p. 170). The rich bibliography is up to date, with citations from periodical literature into 1973. The bibliography is easy to use. The material is scrupulously footnoted, insight by insight, with references to the comprehensive bibliography at the end of the work. The works cited are largely German and Dutch, but English versions are also cited where available. There is a complete index of Hebrew words cited, a brief subject index, no author index at all—this last probably understandable in light of the enormous use of secondary material and the comprehensive bibliography. The translation is graceful and flowing.

Marquette University

JOHN F. X. SHEEHAN, S. J.


Goppelt conceives the area of NT theology covered in this volume as the attempt to gain from the Scriptures an accurate and orderly account of Jesus’ teaching and action. Since the activities of the earthly Jesus prepare for and flow into the Easter message, NT theology must deal with the Jesus who presented himself to his followers during his days on earth as well as the Jesus who continues to work in human history even
now. The critical foundations for this position were laid by Roloff, who was G.'s student, in *Das Kerygma und der irdische Jesus* (Göttingen, 1970). Among the most interesting features in G.'s description of Jesus' teaching are the present and future aspects of the kingdom of God, *metanoia* as a summary of Jesus' ethical doctrine, attachment to riches and self-righteousness as obstacles to accepting that teaching, the radical absoluteness and all-inclusiveness of Jesus' view of the law, and faith as the way in which *metanoia* is practiced.

When G. comes to other aspects of Jesus' ministry, the theme of continuity between the OT and Jesus and between Jesus and the Gospel tradition is prominent. The OT and Jewish notions of rabbi, prophet, son of David, messiah, son of man, and son of God were imbued with new meaning by Jesus; their pre-Easter sense must be seen as part of the hiddenness of revelation (cf. Mk 4:11; Mt 11:25–26/Lk 10:21). In each case the post-Easter meaning has firm roots in the work of the earthly Jesus. Through his disciples Jesus' life and teaching become accessible to all. His practice of sharing meals with outcasts and sinners is continued in the Church as the pledge of his return. His questioning attitude toward foundations of Judaism issued in his death, but the Easter event brought to fulfilment his life's work and indeed all of biblical revelation. After G.'s death in late 1973, Roloff accepted the task of editing and preparing the manuscript for publication. A second volume will follow soon and will contain the subject index for both volumes.

The last few years have seen the publication of NT theologies by some of Germany's most distinguished scholars. Each has been valuable in its own right: H. Conzelmann's for revising and updating Bultmann's synthesis, K. H. Schelkle's for elucidating central themes and motifs, W. G. Kümmel's for presenting the theological views of major NT figures, and J. Jeremías' for bringing together his detailed studies on the proclamation of Jesus. The present volume is distinctive for its portrayal of the earthly Jesus within his historical and religious milieu and for its emphasis on the continuity of the OT, Jesus, and the Gospel tradition. The presentation of Jesus' teaching and activity is concise, full of insights, and often inspiring. The author is frequently in dialogue with Bultmann (and his school), whom he criticizes for not taking seriously enough what the Gospels ascribe to Jesus and for relying too heavily on Heidegger's individualistic existentialism as his hermeneutical standard. This aspect of the book is stimulating, but the lack of interest in non-German scholarship is regrettable, especially because G.'s views on the continuity of the OT, the earthly Jesus, and the Gospel tradition are close to those of many American, British, and French scholars. His isolation is strikingly illustrated by the description (p. 21) of *Humani generis* rather than *Divino afflante spiritu* as the great impetus to
Catholic biblical scholarship during the pontificate of Pius XII.

A far more serious issue and one that casts doubt on the validity of the whole enterprise is G.'s optimism about the possibility of recovering the sayings of the earthly Jesus. We admit that G.'s concern, the Wirken of Jesus, is a broader concept than that of the "historical" Jesus, and that he does make extensive use of the principle of dissimilarity in determining the general thrusts of Jesus' teaching. Yet his willingness to attribute specific sayings to the earthly Jesus seems almost cavalier in the light of alternate form- and redaction-critical explanations.

Weston School of Theology


Arguing primarily from the use of Is 53:10 in the NT and Jn 17 (with special reference to parallels found between this text and the Jewish liturgy of the Day of Atonement to support his interpretation), the noted Sulpician biblical scholar concludes: (1) Christ thought of himself as a priest, (2) prayed that the apostles and their successors be given a share in his consecration as priest and victim, and (3) thus established a priesthood distinct from that of all believers. The link between Jn 17:17-19 and 20:21-23 suggests to F. that the power of forgiving sins is awarded to the ministerial priesthood in the latter text. Moreover, he finds evidence in the NT for the exclusive competence of the apostles and their successors in the exercise of the Eucharistic ministry. With respect to the priesthood of all believers, he views the ministerial priesthood as occupying the same middle position as the Levitical priesthood.

A careful reading will reveal that F. is more concerned with affirming than testing a theological position through the analysis of biblical data. Readers who want to find in the NT support for the traditional Catholic theology of ordained ministry, which takes its point of departure from the concept of priest reminiscent of Levitical priesthood, will surely appreciate this study. However, on the basis of the arguments presented, F. has not proved his conclusions.

Consistently he proceeds from what might be implied in the text to the affirmation that it must be implied. He refuses to consider the possibility that the use of a metaphor to express a likeness between two things under one aspect does not necessarily imply a likeness under other aspects. His treatment of the two texts which are crucial for his conclusions shows this. In the case of Is 53:10, he first attempts to establish that the Hebrew text should read as though it is a prophecy of the Servant's offering of his life in sacrifice (p. 35). Even if one grants this questionable version, is it
Although it is correct to conclude, as F. does, that this implies the Servant is a priest, the laws of language do not allow this. One must look to the rest of the context for such an affirmation. But in this case the Servant's righteousness points to the source of competence (v. 11). Moreover, if one is disposed, as F. is, to identify the Servant with the one mentioned in Is 42, then a prophetic consecration comes to mind. In short, the tertium comparationis which justifies the use of sacrificial language appears to be the fact that God recognizes a vicarious value in both institutional sacrifice and the work of the Servant. All this applies, mutatis mutandis, to the use of Is 53:10 to explicate the meaning of the death of Jesus. F. insists that wherever the text is used of Jesus, it implies that he is a priest (pp. 33, 204). Yet this conclusion cannot be supported either by the priestly interpretation of the Servant's competence in the setting of Is 53:10 or by the contexts in the NT where it is employed. The Epistle to the Hebrews states that Christ is a priest and explains his competence in terms of a divine investiture as priest linked with his self-offering (5:4-10). But this appears to be the result of reflection on the fact of Jesus' death, viewed as sacrifice, replacing all ritual sacrifices and so the Levitical priesthood.

In the case of Jn 17:19, F. reasons that because Christ consecrates himself as victim, his consecration by the Father in 10:36 must be priestly (pp. 39-42). However, even granting this interpretation of Jn 17:19, the analogy with the sacrificial institution does not necessarily extend from function to competence. Moreover, Jn 10:36 is more clearly analogous to the consecration and mission of a prophet (Jer 1:5): a consecration linked with the mission of revelation.

A more serious difficulty, perhaps, arises in the interpretation of Jn 17:17-19. According to F., Christ petitions the Father to consecrate the apostles as priests in view of succession in ministry (pp. 123 ff.). The context does not support the use of sacerdotal attributes for their mission, nor is the principle of succession in ministry envisaged in the pericope.

F. finds in Jn 20:21-23 "the complement of the priesthood that Christ had bestowed on the apostles" (p. 178). While the mission given to forgive sins recalls a function of OT priesthood, it is more in line with the ministry of the prophets announcing forgiveness of sins and the bestowal of the Spirit. Even less convincing is F.'s argument for the exclusive competence of the apostles and their successors in the exercise of Eucharistic leadership. He states that the Eucharist is a true sacrifice (1 Cor 10:21) and so Christ must be recognized as the "true celebrant." This implies that those who represent the gestures of the Last Supper in the assemblies must be "living signs of the invisible presence and mediatorial action of Christ the priest" (p. 128). Thus F. affirms that one
of the “essential purposes of the consecration (of the apostles) . . . is to enable them to act in the person of Christ and to consecrate him as victim under the signs of bread and wine . . .” (p. 127). Here again F. reads too much into the texts. Finally, his presentation of the relationship between ministerial priesthood and the common priesthood of all believers calls for comment. He should have called attention to the fact that the priesthood which makes the faithful apt to offer spiritual sacrifices does not, of itself, demand a particular ministry in order to exercise its prerogatives in this order: the order of existence and not of rite.

In a book concerned with aiding priests to understand the peculiar role they should play in the life of the Church, more attention should have been given to the concept of pastoral office. This would have been more useful for explaining, e.g., the relationship of the priest to the Eucharist. The leadership of the Eucharist does not derive from a power of orders which can be conceived apart from pastoral office; it is the liturgical dimension of pastoral office. Because pastoral office is a structure intrinsic to the Church with the function of building up the Church and because the Eucharist effects this building in a special way, pastoral office is ordered to the Eucharist. The ecclesiological dimension of ecclesiastical office, and so its authority with respect to the leadership of the Eucharist, can only be secured if it is represented as a pastoral office but not if it is viewed as an office of priest independently of pastoral office.

Scriptural justification can be found for calling the ordained minister a priest: e.g., Paul’s transfer of sacrificial language to the ministry of the gospel (Rom 15:16). But it is doubtful whether the stress on the vocabulary of priesthood helps today for the understanding of the role of ordained ministry. The NT vocabulary of service corresponds more to the particular style of life which should characterize the Christian community: mutual service and interdependence. Moreover, the accent on priesthood in the definition of ordained ministry hardly does justice to the fact that ministries are not divided in the NT according to the tripartite scheme of royal, prophetic, and priestly service. Consequently it does not allow for the clear recognition that ordained ministry is called to a threefold service in pastoral office which can be distinguished to some degree but not separated.

Weston School of Theology

Edward J. Kilmartin, S.J.


This well-planned study, “conceived and composed in Christian faith” (p. 245), is the best scholarly biblical study of the resurrection and
exaltation of Jesus available. The original, published in 1971, sold out and was reissued in a revised version that incorporated important suggestions from another Jesuit scholar, E. Pousset, whose name is ironically mispelled in the Preface.

The work is divided into four parts of approximately sixty pages each. These parts unfold the four stages involved in the Church's task of formulating and communicating the Easter mystery. The first part, "Stage One: The Affirmations of Easter Faith," treats the earliest formulations of the mystery of Christ's new status. L.-D. finds both formulas, "Jesus is risen" and "Jesus is exalted," to be parallel primitive expressions of the mystery. The statement "Jesus showed himself" is an early attempt to combine the two thrusts of continuity and discontinuity intrinsic to the mystery.

The complexity of the Easter mystery appears in the difficulty manifested in Paul's efforts to communicate his experience of the risen Lord. For Paul, this was the decisive eschatological event that transformed his whole existence. He did not cling to one mode of expression but wrote about the event with great freedom. The dimensions of the Easter mystery that emerge in this first stage are the divine initiative, the progressive recognition of the risen Jesus, and the mission involved.

The second stage of the exposition deals with the narratives of the empty tomb and the appearances of the risen Lord to his disciples. L.-D.'s goal here is to determine how and why these forms arose from the primitive formulations of the mystery. In analyzing how Acts deals with the apparitions to Paul, he concludes that Luke's theology and desire to edify control the accounts. Luke composed these three narratives according to the form of appearances found in the Hebrew Bible, in order to distinguish Paul's experience from that of the Eleven.

The Gospel accounts of the appearances belong to two types: Jerusalem and Galilean. The structure of the Jerusalem type consists of three elements: initiative of the risen Christ, recognition, mission. Each of these elements serves a specific function in showing how the mystery is an event that links past, present, and future. By contrast, the Galilean type puts the emphasis on mission. The three elements of its structure are self-presentation, mission, promise. But it also contains the note of doubt (L.-D. suggests the reason on p. 232). He sees the Galilean type as more primitive, but the Jerusalem type is not a simple "translation" of it.

Stage three is a skilful unfolding of how each Evangelist integrated the Easter event into his Gospel. The study concludes with the ongoing fourth stage: how to develop a hermeneutic for proclaiming the mystery today. Its aim is "to locate the problems and to open the way to a new understanding of the mystery and its communication" (p. 194). This
understanding enables believers to avoid "the escapism of false contemplation" and "earthly activism" (p. 236). L.-D. provides twelve pages of examples for communicating the Easter mystery before closing with a valuable glossary and bibliography.

Readers will find a variety of new insights into Christ's resurrection and exaltation competently treated. The book cannot be too highly recommended. However, the translation, which was obviously not carefully checked, is another story. On the one hand, by sticking too close to the French syntax, the translator produces many phrases that are not idiomatic English. At the same time, the English is often simply erroneous: e.g., omissions on pp. 91, 136, 240, including a schema and paragraph on p. 162; confusion of text and argument on p. 145 and the last five lines of p. 236; inaccuracies on pp. 147, 199, 206, 232, 241-244, 258, 320; poor handling of the key French word "langage."

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JAMES M. REESE, O.S.F.S.


This volume in the series of Hermeneia commentaries (see _TS_ 34 [1973] 152-54) is still another translation from a German original. Conzelmann did his volume in 1969 in the prestigious _Meyer Kommentar_ to replace the work on Corinthians by Johannes Weiss (1910). I shall not repeat what I said about Hermeneia format in the above-cited review, except to note that in the Introduction it is visually difficult to find subsections. For instance, see "The Date of Composition" on p. 4, with the added peculiarity that the date is finally given not in the text itself but as a passing reference in one of the endless footnotes (n. 31).

C. has a genius for brevity, and those familiar with Corinthians will generally read with great profit his incisive judgments. I suspect students will often miss what he is hinting at, and sometimes be confused when he comes to no clear conclusion, e.g., the discussion of 7:36-38. At times his brevity results in his dismissing a serious opinion almost with ridicule. In a work that fails to offer a comprehensive discussion of the general Pauline concept of the body of Christ (and ignores the major contributions of John A. T. Robinson and E. Best), C. gives a one-word evaluation of the serious opinion of L. Cerfau. The Belgian scholar held that Paul understood baptism as making the Christian part of the real body of Christ in a mystical way. C. disposes of that by remarking "Mystical!" I am one of those benighted people who think that Paul is talking about the body of Jesus that died and was raised from the dead and that he is saying that in some way we are made part of it. "Mystical" may be an
awkward term; but if C. had a better suggestion, it would have been more helpful if he had given it. The fact that scholarship has not totally shed various denominational prejudices is seen in C.'s handling of J. Blinzler's discussion of the "brothers" of the Lord. In relation to 1 Cor 9:5, C. says: Blinzler "marshalls a wealth of resources in order to turn them into cousins — to no purpose, as always" (p. 153, n. 23). One may contend that Blinzler is wrong (but not easily); yet one can scarcely say that a question which has so divided Christians on the popular level as that of Mary's perpetual virginity and hence the identity of Jesus' "brothers" is studied "to no purpose, as always."

These are minor flaws that caught my eye, mentioned only because it may be helpful to a major scholar to know that his obiter dicta detract from his work. By way of more substantial comment, let me list with occasional remarks some of his views on crucial or disputed points. There was no developed Gnosticism at Corinth, but some of the exaggerations (doctrinal and liturgical) may have resulted from insufficient care on Paul's part in presenting his gospel. There was a fourth, Christ party at Corinth, whose mistake was to take as a divisive slogan the general Christian confession of belonging to Christ. The existence of a Peter party at Corinth leaves it an open question whether Peter had been there. C. does not deal with the hypothesis that Paul's rejection of a foundation other than Jesus Christ (3:11) is a challenge to the Church's having been built upon Peter. Paul himself is unmarried and his stress on virginity (7:1) is not purely eschatological. The command of the historical Jesus against divorce (7:10) is treated as a word of the exalted Lord and thus supratemporal. The combination of baptism with spiritual food and drink in 10:2-3 shows that Paul has a comprehensive concept of "sacraments," even if he has not yet a vocabulary for it. The Eucharist is compared with meals eaten after sacrifice in 10:18 (and thus, I would presume, Paul did not necessarily think of the Eucharist as a sacrifice). Offense in the Eucharist against the body of the Lord is offense against the community which is his body (11:28; but what about offense "against the blood of the Lord"?). "Body and blood" are not constitutive parts of the Lord, as in the later conception when "flesh and blood" (John, Ignatius) became the constitutive pair — but, if I may interrupt, is not "flesh" closer to the usage of Jesus and of the Semitic-speaking church than "body"? The "women should be silent" passage in 14:33b-36 is a non-Pauline interpolation. The pre-Pauline resurrection formula in 15:3 ff. probably, but not provably, stopped with v. 5 and the appearance to the Twelve. Being baptized for the dead in 15:29 is a reference to vicarious baptism, from which Paul drew conclusions but to which he gave no adherence.

English speakers are indeed fortunate to have Conzelmann made
available as a rival to C. K. Barrett in the Black/Harper series (1968). For few NT books do we have in English two first-rate recent commentaries of differing viewpoint, the comparison of which constitutes an education in exegesis.

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The term “religious experience” is one that is commonly evoked today under a variety of guises from the major world religions. The Catholic response to this growing need for man has been spoken of historically as “graced existence,” and it is precisely in this light that the two books under review seek to recover the authentic dimensions of our tradition. If the reader is searching for a contemporary understanding of his own experience of grace, then he will not find a direct answer here. Rather, these are studies of theology in oratione obliqua; for if one is to be authentic about his relationship with God, then he must deal first with his past roots in order to avoid any relativizing illusion.

Philips’ book is the more readily comprehensible and I would not hesitate to recommend it as perhaps the best history of grace available today. He analyzes the Catholic tradition from the viewpoint of a well-researched historical theologian. As the title would indicate, the Catholic understanding of grace has been largely dominated by the context of “created grace,” a term which should be familiar to those who studied their theology prior to Vatican II. Although due credit is given to this understanding, P. is not overwhelmed by it, as unfortunately are some authors still today: ‘e.g., E. Yarnold, The Second Gift (Slough, England, 1974); for it was on this particular conceptualization of the transformation of man (through infused virtues etc.) that the Catholic doctrine of grace was largely theorized and preached.

Explicitly, the term “created grace” dates from 1225, but its implicit roots are to be found in Augustine’s long domination of Latin theology, in which there was obscured the scriptural emphasis on a merciful God and the active presence of the divine Persons (uncreated grace); thus the source of real transformation in man is to be found first in personal union with the Trinitarian God.

When one emphasizes the condition of man, rather than the union
with God, as Augustine did, the ground is already set for the Scholastic stress on permanent disposition and sanctification *secundum habitum* (identification of the Holy Spirit with infused charity). It would appear that the High Scholastics (notably Bonaventure and Thomas) tried to maintain a balance between uncreated and created grace in psychological or dynamic terms, but the Scholasticism of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries shifted to metaphysical categories, with emphasis on a static, permanent, nonfluctuating essence, far removed, for all practical purposes, from the original biblical thought.

P. would contend that the resulting gap between Luther with his radical Augustinianism and Trent with its Scholastic underpinnings is still with us today. Catholics too ardently defend the doctrine of *habitus* and leave to the side the relations with the divine Persons, while the classical Lutheran is too entangled with man as a sinner whose justification rests on pure exterior imputation of the merits of Jesus Christ. P. correctly emphasizes that the way out of the malaise is through a renewed historical theology (already recognized by such notables as Petau), and we are gradually witnessing the diminishing returns of the Augustinian monopoly. Factually, this is being accomplished by a return to the foundational dogma of the Trinity and its dynamic function, as well as a somewhat uneven mystical tradition in the Church—a tradition which never did or could succumb to the metaphysical Scholastic categories (I am reminded of Thomas Merton's comment that a good monk could not be a Scholastic).

In conclusion, P. indicates that we must abandon any semblance of dualism between uncreated and created grace, for too much emphasis on the latter runs the risk of Pelagianism. In reality, there are not two graces, but the one unique grace presents a double face; in other words, they are but two sides of the one coin.

To P.'s excellent comments I would only add that more study needs to be given to underlying philosophical positions (e.g., Augustine's Platonism and Thomas' Aristotelianism) in order to complete his work. Also, the contextual scriptural category of "relationship," rather than "gift," needs to be stressed if we are to construct a contemporary systematic of grace. There is yet to be written a "definitive" new approach to grace which would incorporate the recent findings of philosophy and psychology, but P.'s background provides for the foreground to be developed.

In light of my above-mentioned historical comments, it is easier to comprehend Laporte's book on the Thomistic dynamics of grace. This study is a reworked doctoral dissertation presented at Strasbourg in 1971; but since so much work has already been done on a renewed Thomas Aquinas over the last several generations, one initially wonders what could possibly emerge as a new insight. In this light L. does not
offer a noteworthy discovery, especially to those who know their Thomistic theology; what is interesting, however, is the use of a contemporary hermeneutical instrument, structuralism, to illustrate the development of Thomas' thought regarding the structural dominance of certain categories of his anthropology and its relationship to grace. This has both positive and negative results: positive, insofar as one is better able to appreciate the precise significance and implications of a unique Denkform which dominated Church thinking for many centuries; negative, insofar as one might be tempted to believe that Thomas had found the eternal perspective, although L. is cautious in rejecting such a claim.

More specifically, by analyzing Thomas in structural categories L. hopes to tell us something about a conceptual relationship between supernatural and terrestrial values: there is an elevating role for the former (enabling one to reach the supernatural good) and a medicinal role (correct ordering toward the natural good) for the former. Given the distinction of these two roles of grace, two modalities of graced action by God subsequently arise: sanatio mentis, whereby God touches the most vital element in man, and the submission of the spirit to God is established; and sanatio carnis, a mediated healing of the body in its relationship to the soul that re-establishes the submission of one's lower faculties to soul and spirit.

Then, at length, in the first part of the book man's natural capacity for the good is discussed—the Thomistic conclusion being that of man as naturally inclined ulterius and the significance of habitus. Part 2 is directed to the complementary and fulfilling operations of sanatio and elevatio, with greater emphasis put on the former. The work concludes with some excellent diagrammatic considerations of Thomas' circular egressus a Deo and reeditus ad Deum, as well as two appendices comparing the present study with those of Bouillard, Flick, and Lonergan. L.'s rather modest conclusion is his hope that he has more clearly illustrated the mysterious character of the synergism of the exterior and interior movements of God's grace, i.e., by using the structural tool for interpretation he has added something over and beyond the authors previously mentioned.

My problem is whether L. has really accomplished his goal by using Aquinas. Are not the Thomistic categories already too static in their metaphysical concerns to really contribute a perennial element to the contemporary dialogue about the religious/graced experience? Furthermore, one must ask whether Thomas' structurally dominant categories are really all-inclusive. Certainly they are vital, but what of the contribution of subsequent thought in such categories as depth and reality psychology, personalism, and history itself? I do not think it
would be an exaggeration to say that Thomas' concerns are of an intellective order; but is not grace primarily a factor which envelops the whole man? I have no reason to doubt L.'s ability to apply a linguistic structural approach to the text of Thomas, but cui bono? Does this constitute meaning? How does one move from past historical event to present lived reality? I believe that one might ask whether the Thomistic categories are adequate for this uniquely contemporary problem.

Finally, the philosophy behind linguistic structural analysis needs some comment. It would appear that one of the principal achievements of structuralism has been to remind us that so much of our accepted way of doing things (including our relationship with God) is really not "natural," as in an eternal code, but rather societal and cultural. Beyond this accomplishment structuralism loses its vitality, and other more vital sciences must show man the dynamism of his graced existence.

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Jerome M. Dittberner


This volume is a collection of seven articles, dating back to 1969, on theological hermeneutics, which S. defines as "the question of how the Christian message should be interpreted nowadays." Its main concern is to establish the possibilities and limits of an understanding of faith that is both creative and faithful to the gospel. Of the two major questions involved here, that an interpretation be legitimate in the sense of genuinely Christian, and legitimate in the sense of credible in the light of modern thought and criticism, S. devotes most of his attention to the former.

Three main hermeneutical principles emerge from and unify the articles. First, although theoretical elements are involved, there is no purely theoretical solution to the question of genuine interpretation or the continuity of the faith. Secondly, hermeneutics has a political and social aspect: institutional structures can interfere with free dialogue and thus obstruct the hermeneutics of mutual understanding and agreement, so that changing structures can be an essential part of the hermeneutical process. Thirdly and consequently, we must re-examine the relationship between theory and praxis, or the relationship between social policy and a really Christian understanding of the faith. S. defines a theology based on such principles as "the reflective and critical self-consciousness of Christian praxis."

The first chapter takes up the question of the credibility of the
Christian message today, expressed by S. as the belief “that the living God showed the uniqueness and power of his unconditional love for man in Jesus Christ, and thus revealed himself as man’s salvation.” His main point is that a credible interpretation of this is possible only through constructive Christian activity. Belief in eternal life becomes plausible when Christians in their praxis show that they believe in an earthly, historical life that is truly life and is stronger than death. S.’s “logic of faith” proceeds more in the context of a theologia gloriae than a theologia crucis here—a context perhaps more reminiscent of the early sixties than characteristic of the mid-seventies—but a more balanced logic emerges in later chapters.

Chap. 2 addresses the question of meaning, and two main points are made. First, the linguistic symbols in which faith is expressed must have meaning on the basis of their relationship with lived experience and must express that experience; secondly, all theological truth must have doxological value, i.e., it must give praise to God for what he has done in human history. These criteria of meaning are more basic than logical consistency, which by itself allows theological truth to lose both its religious and its existential significance.

The purpose of chap. 3 is “to provide clear information” on the various schools of hermeneutics current today. S. gives summaries of the main principles of structural linguistic analysis, phenomenological linguistic analysis, and logical linguistic analysis, pointing out the contribution each can make to theology and the limitations of any one taken by itself. A section is devoted to the “ontological aspect of language,” based mainly on Heidegger and stressing the reality of the referent of what is meaningfully said.

Pluralism is the subject of chap. 4, and S. sees pluralism rooted in the fact that what we have received (fides ex auditu) transcends all attempts at expression, that God’s word is expressed in but never exhausted by human words. Hence to absolutize one orthodox expression is heresy, for it does not admit the totality of Scripture with its pluralism. However, pluralism is not absolute and can be transcended (not removed) by the awareness that one’s own point of view is limited and one-sided. Hence the criterion of orthodoxy is not an unchangeable formula but is proportional, “consisting in the relationship between the intentionality of faith and a given (and changing) referential framework.” It is the relationship which remains the same in different referential frameworks. What is common in a pluralism of positive views of man is a negative dialectic, “commitment to the threatened humanum,” and thus ortho-praxis or the “authority of authentic events” is a norm of orthodoxy.

The question of “negative dialectics” comes up again in chap. 5 in the
context of natural theology and the "question-answer correlation." S. asks whether the question of God is a serious and meaningful one in contemporary secular culture, and if so, under what conditions. His main concern is to show the cognitive significance of God-talk. He asserts that human questions require human answers, not religious answers, otherwise God becomes a "stopgap" to the atheist and a "category mistake" to the linguistic analyst. Only indirectly and negatively is God related to human questions, a relationship S. describes as "critical negativity" or "negative dialectics." In the pluralism of contemporary views of man (= human answers to human questions) there is a unity: resistance to whatever threatens the genuinely human (which, to be sure, implies some consciousness of human integrity), and here the gospel touches modern, secular views of man. This resistance is first praxis and then theory. But Christianity insists that the ultimate, positive emancipation and redemption of man lies beyond man.

A second step in the method of correlation focuses on positive and meaningful experiences, the good in the midst of evil, the fact that, despite everything, people continue to trust that goodness and not evil must have the last word. "Christian revelation extends this 'must have' to a 'will have,'" but this "will have" receives its intelligibility from the "must have" of human experience.

The last two chapters focus on the "new critical theory," chap. 6 giving a clear summary of the position of Jürgen Habermas, and chap. 7 a critique and an evaluation of its importance for theological hermeneutics. S.'s main criticisms are three. (1) Critical theory is not based exclusively on scientific analysis, as it claims, but depends on a fundamental ethical option in favor of emancipation and freedom. Its scientific analysis and critique of society makes sense only on the basis of this "unscientific option." S., of course, does not disagree with the option, but insists that it be recognized as such. (2) Since human freedom is situated freedom, does not critical theory make use of a fictitious concept of absolute freedom which is essentially opposed to human possibilities? (3) Negative dialectics are always sustained by a positive sphere of meaning, although expressed in a pluralist way, and this gives a relative value to the radical nature of critical negativity. Forgetting this leads to absolutizing "no," to a negative absolutism, and this favors the growth of a new form of alienation.

The chief contribution which critical theory can make to theological hermeneutics, which tries to make the meaning proclaimed in history present here and now, is to make us aware of the "meaningless" elements in this history and to protect theology from accepting the sociology of the "establishment" and thus running the risk of being an ideology. By
focusing on the contingent aspect of tradition, it warns theology against an idealist concept of history, as though the history of the Church's kerygma and dogma were purely a history of ideas.

Theology thus supplemented by critical theory will not be an idealist system of thought, but will take its point of departure in the contemporary praxis of the Christian community and be the reflective and critical self-consciousness of that praxis. The necessary consequence and the necessary condition of this is that the theologian (and the believer) can only identify himself partially with the empirical Church. S. also stresses the importance of the mystical and liturgical aspects of Church life: at times we are impotent to change structures, and here the situation must be transcended, even to the point of the cross if necessary. One can only hope that S.'s very helpful contribution to theological hermeneutics will bear fruit in the future practice of Christian theology.

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Number 62 of the Quaestiones disputatae (henceforth QD) edited by Karl Rahner and Heinrich Schlier, M.'s study has as its primary purpose an attempt to harmonize (1) a Christian concept of God's action in and for man with (2) the concept of self-fulfilment in a world where a secularization process has already set in. As such, M.'s book is directed primarily to the believer, the grounds for belief having been laid by the same author in QD 40, Glaubensgewissheit in Freiheit (1968), of which the present volume is a logical sequel.

M.'s study is divided into two parts, the first being limited to an analysis of the idea of salvation as God's principal act in and for man. An examination of what "salvation" means in Scripture and in a secularized world indicates that the two views are clearly opposed; for the contemporary atheist, having lost all sense of a transcendent Absolute and consequently espousing a new kind of humanism in which man is sufficient unto himself, sees the Christian concept of salvation as an infringement on his selfhood. After concluding Part 1 with an analysis of the causes of such an impasse, M. proceeds in Part 2 to show how salvation in a totally Christian context ultimately means "wholeness." God's act on man as man is fundamentally in the gift of freedom. Hence man's act(ivity) cannot begin with his structuring of the objective world and his making of history; it must begin with the completion of himself.
Thus man has both an inward and an outward mission: he must complete himself and he must build up his world; but he cannot attain the fulfilment which encompasses both missions without realizing that he receives *(entgegennehmen)* a radically fundamental capacity, i.e., freedom. Wholeness, which is at the same time holiness, undergoes its acid test in social ethics; for the other too must achieve full selfhood, a proper balance being possible only when freedom is seen as bestowed by a transcendent Absolute in the very act of creation. Furthermore, only in the resurrected Jesus does man find an ultimate why for both his inward and outward missions; for the Jesus-of-the-beyond-this-eon is not distant from this world but part of it. The resurrection of Jesus is therefore neither a mythological sublimation of the historical Jesus nor a decoded cipher intended to help make sense of him to the world; but precisely because of its realness it enables the Christian to give himself completely not only to the fulfilment of his total self but to the building up of this material world, knowing that the essential meaning of history is now complete.

Such is M.'s central argument, but it is by no means all he has to say. He is clearly abreast of more recent biblical scholarship—the fact that he does not accept certain positions (e.g., on the resurrection of Jesus) does not mean he is unaware of what is sometimes maintained by those whose skills are limited primarily to exegesis. Nonetheless, one suspects that M. occasionally reads more into the NT than out of it. In particular, one wonders on what grounds M. insists, as he did earlier in QD 40, that it is the crucified and not the resurrected Jesus who dominates the thought of Paul. More serious reservations concern M.'s use of nonbiblical data. Thus, analyzing causes of the two mutually opposed concepts of salvation referred to above, M. makes the astounding assertions that (1) very early the epic of Homer banished magical powers from (presumably religious) experience (p. 79); that (2) after the pre-Socratics, it would have been unthinkable to try to gain control of innermost reality (*"innerste Mitte der Wirklichkeit,"* p. 78: presumably synonymous here with the notion of power) by means of ritual, the mysteries being a later development (pp. 78-79; on the contrary: one thinks at once of the oration of Andocides "On the Mysteries," ca. 399 B.C., well within the lifetime of Plato; though reference to the mysteries, specifically the Eleusinian mysteries, is incidental to Andocides' main line of defense, a minimal implication is that they had existed as a magico-religious practice for some time and that they showed no sign of disappearing); and (3) that Greek thought, once orientated through Homer around cosmic order, left place for real freedom (pp. 79 and 80). Now these assertions seem oversimplified, to say the least. M. should have first
approached the problem of early religious experience from a perspective larger than the Greek, and having done this should have, in the context of Greek religious practice, distinguished between the thought of the philosopher and that of the masses. It is true that Greek mystery cults reached their apex only in the first three centuries of the Christian era; but their origin is much earlier. As for the notion of freedom, M. should have distinguished between the psychological and ontological orders, and in this latter context asked himself how the concept of freedom can be harmonized with the concept of fate, which dominated pre-Christian Greek thought.

Another serious reservation concerns M.'s assertion that long before Descartes and German idealism, man began to conceive of himself as absolute subject positing both reality and truth. Although a traditional school of thought sees in Ockham and nominalism a clear path to epistemological subjectivism on the way to Descartes, recent studies dating from the early 1960's indicate that a strong case might be made for a contrary view. The fact that M. seems unaware of these sources recalls a similar weakness in his earlier QD: his conclusions sometimes seem broader than his documentation.

None of these criticisms, however, affects the central thesis of this otherwise worth-while book, though one might have wished that M., at least by way of extended parenthesis, had asked himself why some of his contemporaries question the fact of human freedom. M.'s detailed analysis of what "salvation" means to the contemporary nonbeliever is thorough, while his subsequent remarks on Marxist ideology in the same context are perceptive, one might almost say uncompromising. Perhaps the most useful part of the book is contained in a kind of epilogue, *Gedanken zum Weg*, in which M. suggests what the attitude of a Christian ought to be in a secularized world and what the role of the Church ought to be in bringing about a collective change of mind and heart. Certainly the Christian should not begin by leaving "God" out of his vocabulary, as has sometimes been suggested, nor should the Church proceed as though it knew the answer to every question; a few gaps in its teaching might even help its credibility. But most of all, the committed Christian should not be led to believe that in the long run nothing can be done about desecularizing a secularized world.

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As F. sees it, the crucial problems facing the theologian today do not
center around content or method but concern the very legitimacy of the theological enterprise itself. The question becoming more and more of an embarrassment to the theological community is whether theology refers to any reality at all; for if what has been called faith is merely the projection of frightened, alienated, resentful, or neurotic people, there is no need for theology. The analyses of Feuerbach, Marx, Nietzsche, and Freud are quite capable of explaining the experience. In light of the critiques initiated by Feuerbach, then, the reality references claimed by the believer must be certified. This is what F. calls "the problem beneath the problem of theological method."

F. believes that the reality references indicated by faith are located in the social matrix of the ecclesial community and can be recovered by Husserlian (not existential) phenomenology. To acquaint theologians with this philosophy, F. has included a very clear and instructive introductory chapter outlining the Husserlian concepts he wishes to employ, and a valuable appendix sketching the impact of phenomenology on Catholic and Protestant thought.

F.'s thesis is that there exists a definite faith-world characterized by three interdependent distinctive factors. This faith-world is composed of a proper language, a religious a priori, and a special kind of intersubjectivity or community. The religious a priori is the basic or transcendental element grounding the historical language and community. It consists in the claim that man by nature refuses to accept chaos, death, and evil as final and that this indicates a reference in his very being to a saving logos, life, and goodness, i.e., to redemption.

In addition to these realities directly presented in the faith-world, three others are "appresented": the historical redeemer, creation and providence, and the transcendent God. Appresentation is Husserl's way of saying that direct consciousness of any object includes an indirect consciousness of inner and outer horizons cogiven with the directly intended object. F.'s claim is that the direct presentations of religious language, a priori references to redemption, and ecclesial intersubjectivity are accompanied by appresentations of the historical redeemer and transcendent creator.

If this can be accomplished, Feuerbach is refuted not by an emphasis on the otherness of the religious as developed by Kierkegaard and Barth, but by exposing Feuerbach's failure to see the role of appresentation in human experience. "If faith is in fact appresentative, we are faced here with a staggeringly immodest claim. We are actually claiming Feuerbach is overcome. . . . For if faith's immediate realities are appresentative of the transcendent, the historical, anthropological immanence is broken and transcended" (p. 227).
Will it work? I think not. F.'s approach, while novel and noble, does not seem sufficiently radical to escape the classical atheistic critiques and involves questionable readings of Husserl's theories of appresentation and life-world. It is not radical enough, because Feuerbach's accusation that God is a projection is not avoided by shifting the matrix of faith from individual consciousness to the corporate historical existence of ecclesial man. The argument is still basically Kantian—a fact F. readily admits when he writes: "Kant's view seems to be a version of what we are calling appresentation" (p. 226). Yet it was Kant's postulate that dissolved into Feuerbach's projection, and I fail to see how F.'s appresentation would not be subject to the same fate.

F.'s thesis is subject to other critiques as well. When he argues, e.g., that there is built into man a religious a priori consisting in man's refusal to accept chaos, death, and evil as final, it recalls Nietzsche's classic texts claiming it was precisely this inability of the weak to face these dreadful realities of human existence that led them to postulate a transcendent Platonic world of truth, life, and goodness. Nietzsche would agree with F. that man's refusal in the face of chaos and evil is at the heart of religion. F. believes this refusal indicates the appresentation of a saving God; Nietzsche believes it reacts as a resentful will that builds religious and moral castles in the sky.

F.'s ambitious project is threatened on another front. His use of Husserl's theories of appresentation and life-world involves questionable readings of the texts. The appresentation adopted by F. in his argument is Husserl's "external horizon," understood as the infinite number of objects cogiven with the directly intended object of any consciousness. The major difficulty arises when it is realized that Husserl restricts this horizon to the space-time world. "All real things which at any given time are anticipated together or cogiven only in the background as an external horizon are known as real objects (or properties, relations, etc.) from the world, are known as existing within the one spatiotemporal horizon" (Experience and Judgment, sect. 8; emphasis Husserl's). Husserl's appresentation never apprêts the transcendent.

When F. relates his faith-world to Husserl's life-world, another problem of interpretation emerges. Husserl envisioned the life-world as "the horizon which includes all our goals, all our ends, whether fleeting or lasting... the universal field into which all our acts, whether of experiencing, of knowing, or of outward action, are directed" (Crisis, sect. 38). If one is a believer, his faith experience would be situated in this universal life-world enjoyed by all human subjects.

But F. argues that his faith-world "tends to a certain imperialism" in that it not only permeates and colors the life-world but "calls forth
'world' in the very special sense of the world, the one world” (pp. 102 f.). The world of the believer is no longer a discrete world embedded in the life-world. It now claims for itself the unifying and grounding role Husserl's life-world had played and hence replaces it. This move precludes any meaningful use of Husserl's life-world in the phenomeno-
logical-theological reconstruction F. is attempting and introduces once again a theological imperialism that has been no small factor in the generation of the modern atheism F. is struggling so hard to avoid.

After expressing my reservations about the adequacy of F.'s thesis, it might seem incongruous to close with a strong statement in favor of his work. His book is very important and ought to be read by theologians. This is so because F. is deeply worried by the problem so many of his fellow theologians ignore: Feuerbach and his heirs (chiefly Marx, Nietzsche, and Freud) have not yet been answered. Theological work on content and method, no matter how brilliant, will remain suspect to the critical thinker until it can be shown that the apprehensions of faith recovered in theological reflection actually refer to realities beyond the psychological needs and aberrations of man. This is "the problem beneath the problem of theological method" and F. has done the theological community a great service in insisting they face it.

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RAYMOND J. DEVETTERE


Burrell writes: "What cannot be said...must somehow be translated into the form of the discourse so that the inadequacy shows. This is the demand which the subject of theology, God, places on any philosophic idiom which we would use to speak of him" (p. 158). B. offers five studies of altered forms of discourse found in five religious thinkers (Augustine, Anselm, Aquinas, Kierkegaard, and Jung). The studies are not simply to inform us further about the authors in question, but to show us how these masters have dealt philosophically with the religious problems they faced, so that we might better deal with our own.

At times Augustine is seen to write like a Platonist (God is ultimate principle, and to see is to understand), then the whole method and format of the Confessions shows a life experience of failure and grace that goes beyond Platonism. Augustine writes that the Platonists knew the Word, but not the Word made flesh. He cannot objectify the difference into language, but the over-all form of his discourse makes the point. Anselm's ontological argument is seen as an effort to present a precise formula for what transcends the mind. B. rejects Anselm's argumenta-
tion, seeing it based on two senses of "understand," but sees great value in Anselm's effort at a precise formulation, for thus his presuppositions can be brought to light; "formulae themselves cannot be written off as tricks—if only because the tricks in them will soon out, as a reward for a precise formulation" (pp. 54-55). The precision of the formula is necessary so that the discussion might advance. Aquinas argues, "we cannot know what God is, but only what He is not." The effort of Aquinas is then to turn our very inability to know God into a fruitful piece of information about Him. B. sees Aquinas modifying syntax to present the only proper predication about God: "to be God is to be." Then in Qq. 4 to 13 of the Summa he sees Aquinas carefully turning the locution to bring out new understanding (God as good, unchangeable, eternal, etc.) without adding anything to the original: "to be God is to be." Kierkegaard is seen as presenting the ignorance of Socrates as setting the limits on what can be objectively understood. But Kierkegaard explains that Christian revelation goes further by involving the subject. It is only the doubly "offended" reader, convicted of sin and offered forgiveness, who can in his subjectivity "understand" what Christian revelation is saying. Jung is considered, though he did not claim to write theology but science. But in working out a language of the spirit in its quest for wholeness, he challenged a paradigm of science and speech that had pre-empted the field. A clear and "scientifically objective" statement of the human goal would only serve to strengthen the ego; this would distort the ambiguous and mysterious context that the ego must face if ever salvation is to be found. To avoid the difficulty, Jung speaks of the task only in the ambiguity of symbol.

In the contemporary concern with religious language, B. offers a significant account of how five masters of religious discourse have spoken. He shows how they reformed language and in the process felt called to reform their own subjectivity in order to speak of the unspeakable. Each of his studies shows an easy familiarity with the author in question. Each author is treated differently, but the book has a unity. B. presents his studies not as finished conclusions but as "exercises" in a "manual of apprenticeship," so that the reader might proceed in his own theological reflections. A rich and perceptive treatment of both theology and the theologian.

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THOMAS M. KING, S.J.


Paul Tillich's monumental theological achievement, especially as embodied in the Systematic Theology, continues to call forth both
defenders and critics. The critics usually focus on a particular idea or part of the system—e.g., the doctrine of God or the Christology—endeavoring to show the inadequacy of that part from an opposing viewpoint. This work is different. M. is clearly an admirer of T., but he is no defender of the system. Thus, although he expresses his “final estimate” that “Tillich succeeds because his vision is too large for his system” (p. 129), he presents little evidence to justify this conclusion. On the contrary, the whole force of his argument is to show that T.’s system simply cannot be made to fit together; it is “internally incoherent” (p. 128). It is in the light of this penultimate estimate that the success of M.’s critique may be judged.

A major thesis of this work is that the method of correlation is destructive of the system as it stands, but that it may be discarded as incidental to the “true shape” of the system (pp. 2, 88). An important feature is the disclosure of the precise flaw in the method. M. claims that the method requires two premises which are irreconcilable: T.’s “thesis concerning the priority of being over nonbeing . . . and his repeated insistence on the duality of the positive and negative characteristics of the categories” (pp. 89–90).

This observation encourages M. to seek the real structure of T.’s thought in a system divested of that method. The basic elements of the reformulated system are the “philosophical ontology,” the “theological phenomenology,” the “theme” of union-separation-reunion, and the “dialectic” which is the theme at work. The first two are to be distinguished sharply from one another and from the theme. The philosophical ontology elaborates the self-world structure of being, the categories of being and knowing, and the ontological polarities. However, M. insists that the ontology as such “has no access to Being-Itself” (p. 96). The theological phenomenology has as its object “ultimate concern” in its variety of ontic expressions. This element of the system only investigates cultural and religious styles and so cannot account for the way T. speaks about God and his relation to the world. For this, M. says, we must turn to the theme presupposed by both the ontology and the phenomenology as their ground. He cites three passages which are said to illustrate the theme that (1) God is “being-itself,” (2) there is separation and union between all beings and God, and (3) reunion occurs as “fulfillment” (p. 100). Thus there appears to be something like a system. Nevertheless, for coherence the system requires a “motivating force,” the search for which provides M. with his second thesis.

It is that the source for Tillich’s theme is found in the phenomenon of the Holy. Having searched fruitlessly among various of T.’s formulated doctrines, M. discovers his source in “an immediate awareness” of that which “transcends the subject-object structure of experience” and which
yet “annihilates and upholds” (p. 125). Thus M. claims that the cornerstone of T.’s real system is this self-authenticating experience of the Holy. Unfortunately, he adds, although this is the area to which religious symbols apply, T. confines them to the ontology and the phenomenology of ultimate concern. Hence the basic appeal is “misportrayed” by language not taken from the “experiential order”; it points away from “the very phenomenon he seeks to illumine” (p. 128). And so even the reformulated system is incoherent.

This work is not without faults. The most damaging is that the conflict which, M. claims, has wrecked the system turns out, by his own account, to be “spurious,” since one of the conflicting premises, the duality of the categories, is dissolved: “The positive is clearly prior to the negative for Tillich” (p. 102). But with this admission the reason for discarding the method of correlation vanishes and the project loses its foundation. Another fundamental weakness is that the criterion for judging the incoherence of the reformulated system is itself incoherent. If the “experience” is literally “immediate” and “self-authenticating,” it is senseless to expect it to be symbolized, because symbols mediate. If, however, that which is properly to be symbolized is the “Holy” as mediated through experience, can we fail to see that T. does take such symbols for “being-itself” as “power of being,” “ground of being,” “annihilation and upholding” from the experiential order?

Mahan endeavors to bring order but introduces confusion.

**John Carroll University**

**David R. Mason**


The “human adventure” is the human (read: contemplative), religious, mystical, Christian experience of man; it is, in a word, “contemplation for everyman.” This subtitle, however, does not indicate a “how to” book. Except for the second last chapter, which gives practical guidelines about praying, most of the book has to do with cultural presuppositions and philosophical and theological principles of contemplation. The book is a critique of contemporary Christianity from the viewpoint of contemplation. And contemplation, in M.’s opinion, is the door to all good things (except work); it is the answer to the world’s woes, the solution to the dyspeptic complaints listed in the Preface. M. makes his point strongly, perhaps too strongly. Alas, *qui nimis probat, nihil probat*.

My main criticism of the book is overkill. Its universalist claims for contemplation can be defended only on the basis of a broad concept of
that reality. If contemplation is life in Christ, then it is the heart of Christianity. But if it means, not the experience of the Christian Life (Experience) but an experience that is an intuition or “the experiential realization” of union (p. 23), then it is not the universal answer to life’s problems. The intuition of contemplation is the intuition of love; it is an aspect of vital union with Christ. To give the primacy to intuition over the vital union of charity is to fall into excessive intellectualism, which tends to confuse artistic, philosophical, and religious contemplation. In my judgment, M. does not escape this pitfall. To me, his definition of contemplation as “communion with the Real” (p. 66) is to be preferred to his more frequent and well-known characterization of contemplation as “a long loving look at the real” (p. 74).

There is some correlation between contemplation and the intellectual life, metaphysical truth, artistic experience, enjoyment, pleasure, and holy leisure. But none of these latter conditions is Christian contemplation. M. does not so identify them, but he gives them more stress than they deserve, giving the impression that contemplation is one more skill or act in the Christian life. Actually, it is the pervasive quality of Christian life that is best identified with subjective rather than objective consciousness, as Lonergan and others distinguish these terms. M.’s distinction between experience and sensation (p. 28) is good but does not go far enough; experience, awareness, and consciousness must also be further clarified.

While M.’s rich, polysyllabic vocabulary provides some felicitous expressions (e.g., of detachment, p. 26; mystical experience, p. 28) and happy formulations of old truths (see his reflections on vital union and intuition, pp. 81–82), the language is sometimes self-conscious and counterproductive.

M. seems more at home with Catholic letters of yesteryear (Chesterton, Eric Gill, Mauriac, Houselander, Dimnet—see his bibliography) than postconciliar writing. He is often whacking away at old errors like activism or taking on the excesses of the late 60’s like the fascination with the inner city (p. 151) or a “purely horizontal spirituality” (p. 144), when his readers might well prefer, e.g., a serious and sober examination of the contemporary charismatic experience of God which he dismisses with a few broad strokes of the pen. This reader would have appreciated M.’s insights and developed reflections on the role of the subconscious in contemplation instead of the mere general affirmation of its importance.

All in all, in spite of some excellent pages that M.’s fans have come to expect from his writing, this reader found the book something less than it promised.

*Kino Institute, Phoenix*  
*Ernest E. Larkin, O.Carm.*

Although a collection of patristic texts bearing on Jewish-Christianity is a welcome addition to works on the early history of Christianity, this source book is too restricted to accomplish its purpose. The difficulty lies both in the interpretation offered by the authors and in the choice of texts; obviously the two are closely interrelated.

The book includes a series of texts from the second century to the thirteenth, most from the second to the fourth. The standard accounts are here, i.e., the material in Irenaeus, Hippolytus, Origen, Eusebius, Epiphanius, Jerome, et al., as well as a number of relatively unknown commentators on Jewish Christianity: Marius Mercator, Gennadius, the Syriac writer Theodore bar-Khonai, Paschasius Radbertus, and others. The more important material comes from the earlier period, chiefly from writings against heresy. The texts are conveniently printed in Greek, Latin, and Syriac (a Coptic text is in German) with a facing English translation. Except for references to biblical citations, the texts are allowed to stand on their own, with the commentary reserved for a long introductory essay on the historical value of the material. Both sections are thoroughly and independently indexed. As a collection of the most frequently discussed texts, this book is a convenient and useful source book.

The book, however, founders on the definition of Jewish Christianity. The authors recognize the difficulty in defining it, but they do not discuss their own views or provide a criterion for their choice of texts. They seem to understand Jewish Christianity to be ethnic Jews who became Christians and were associated with groups such as the Cerinthians, Ebionites, Nazoreans, etc., but reasons for the definition are not given. Why, e.g., is the important passage in Justin Martyr's Dialogue with Trypho 47 omitted? Here Justin speaks of gentiles who have been circumcised and who keep the law of Moses and are followers of Christ. Though Justin says he does not agree with such people, he considers them Christians and is willing to associate with them because they are "from the same womb and brothers." Though these people were Jewish Christians, they apparently were not ethnic Jews.

Jewish Christianity has to embrace both ethnic and religious Jews, as Marcel Simon effectively argued thirty years ago. Even Judaism did not define itself solely in ethnic terms. Furthermore, in assessing the historical value of the material on Jewish Christianity, geographical considerations have to be kept firmly in view. In Western writers, Epiphanius excepted, Jewish Christians are treated as "heretics" in works against heresy, but in the East the accounts (e.g., Origen) reflect
firsthand acquaintance with Jewish Christians. Because this point is ignored by the authors, they discount what is said by the patristic sources as having "no great historical value." In spite of the outright rejection and continued hostility of the Great Church, some Christians continued to celebrate Easter on 14 Nisan, observe the Sabbath, circumcise, and in other ways keep the law. Though they might differ on their view of Jesus, e.g., whether he was an angel, born of a virgin, all stressed observance of the law (see pp. 124–29). Our only source for this phenomenon are the writings of the Fathers; for this reason they have considerable historical value.

In assessing the history of Jewish Christianity, one must consider those who are sometimes called "Judaizers," i.e., Christians who attempted in varying degrees to observe the law, as well as the history of Judaism itself, particularly in the Eastern cities of the Empire. It is not surprising that Jewish Christianity often flourished where Judaism flourished. In any collection of sources the material in the ancient conciliar collections, e.g., the Canons of Laodicea, or works such as the *Apostolic Constitutions* are of prime significance. They give us evidence of legislation dealing with Judaizers. Also sections from Chrysostom’s homilies on the Jews might be included; lest this seem far afield, it should be noted that Homily 3 addresses Christians who justify keeping the Jewish law, e.g., circumcision and Pasch, by the argument that Jesus kept the law—and this is the same argument that occurs in a number of texts in this collection (see Ps.-Tertullian, p. 135; Epiphanius, p. 165; Origen, p. 133). It is not simply that more texts should be added to this collection, but that other principles of selection should be employed to place Jewish Christianity within a much broader context of Christian and Jewish history within the Roman Empire.

*University of Notre Dame*  
**ROBERT L. WILKEN**


This is a book which should be read by the nonmedievalist more than by the medievalist. So much of what the modern world recognizes as Christian came to life in the Middle Ages, but the history of that age is still unfamiliar to many today. History depends upon historiography, and this volume offers a fine survey of how Christian historians created the Middle Ages.

Basically, the three most important historical traditions were parts of the three great traditions which formed all of medieval culture: the classical, the Christian, and the barbarian. From the sixth to the
thirteenth century medieval historiography was a mixture of these three.

For all practical purposes the Middle Ages knew no Greek. The classical world was a Roman one; the Greek historians were known in Latin dress, if at all. The Romans, in addition to being comprehensible, offered the medieval writers valuable information and examples of style. The Middle Ages inherited a Roman world; so, reading the Latins made the contemporary world understandable. Since the life of Christ took place in the Roman world, Latin history was necessary to grasp more fully the history of salvation.

On the other hand, the Romans provided the method for writing history. Cicero stressed that the historian must be truthful, no matter whom he offends, and he must investigate causes. Sallust was prized in the Middle Ages for his clear style and moral emphasis; Suetonius demonstrated how to write biographies and panegyrics. History had form; next it required meaning.

The meaning came from the Christian tradition. In the OT God had acted in history; in the NT God’s Son sanctified history by becoming subject to its forces. The Bible provided history’s framework; the saeculum began with the creation and would end with the Parousia.

Eusebius of Caesarea, well known in Latin translation, was the first to carry history beyond the apostolic age and to show that Providence was still at work, now in the life of the Church. Augustine divided history into six ages, based upon biblical events, and his De civitate Dei shaped the meaning of history for most medieval thinkers. His disciple Orosius applied Daniel’s vision of the four monarchies to contemporary as well as past kingdoms, thus offering an alternative to Augustine’s schema, while Boethius’ fickle Dame Fortune provided an explanation for the misfortunes of the good and the successes of the evil. The Jewish historian Josephus, also well known in translation, was used to supplement the OT, but Christian writers provided the understanding of history.

The barbarian historians, such as Gregory of Tours and Bede, faced a different problem: how to reconcile their peoples’ glorious yet pagan pasts with Christian principles. (An almost equal problem was the reluctance of the barbarians to abandon their pagan ways after conversion.) No real solution was found, and the historians fell back on recording myths or presenting their subjects in Roman or biblical form. This process, once begun, lasted to the end of the medieval period. Merovingian kings became Roman consuls, Charlemagne was a new Augustus, the crusading Franks were the new Israel. Anachronism moved forward as well as backward. The volume contains many illustrations of biblical and classical figures in medieval dress and setting. Chronology was less important than the continued reality of past
Time was a unifying, not a separating, factor. S. treats a number of particular topics, such as royal biographies and universal histories, but by far her best effort is a reinterpretation of the Crusades. She rightly rejects the notion of crusade which pertains only to the Latin effort in Palestine, and she demonstrates that the notion extended to all attempts to spread or preserve Catholic orthodoxy wherever it was absent or threatened. The failure in Palestine was matched by successes in southern France, Spain, and Eastern Europe. This great burst of martial energy also produced a large body of historical writing, much of it more perceptive, exciting, and humane than what had gone before.

"Medieval" historiography began to decline in the fourteenth century. New realizations of time and space demanded new perspectives rather than fidelity to traditions. Chronology, geography, and philology determined accuracy. A different world needed different historiography.

The basic weakness in the book is the obvious one for any survey: each reader will feel an important person or area has been overlooked. I would have preferred some treatment of Fulcher of Chartres and Peter Comestor. But in general this readable volume handles a vast and difficult topic with ease and even charm, and the ninety-nine illustrations are usually well chosen and helpful.

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JOSEPH F. KELLY


The past decade has witnessed a major reinterpretation of the Italian Renaissance. Until recently that period, so productive in the visual arts, had tended to be almost completely neglected in the history of philosophy and theology. It was the fashion to dismiss the period's most important intellectual figures as eclectics and dilettantes or as mere grammarians and rhetoricians. The relationship of people like Lorenzo Valla and Pico della Mirandola to religion, to Christianity, and to Christian theology, whenever it was adverted to at all, was generally influenced by nineteenth-century interpretations of the "Humanists" as rationalists or cryptopagans whose mission in life was to break the shackles which the medieval Church had clamped on man's spirit. Even Pastor saw Lorenzo Valla as a striking instance of the "false Renaissance," viz., of the "complete resuscitation of Pagan thought and ethics" (5, 135). Pico's famous Oration on the Dignity of Man, with its emphasis on man's liberty and his ability "to be whatever he desires," exemplified the break with the Christian tradition supposedly so typical of the
period. The *Oration* was a revolutionary document, incompatible with the teachings of the Christian Church.

Between 1969 and 1972 three major interpretative studies of Valla appeared in Italy: by Mario Fois (1969), Giovanni di Napoli (1971), and Salvatore Camporeale (1972). Each of these works vindicated beyond question the radically Christian nature of Valla’s intellectual enterprise, and they tried to show the important philosophical implications in Valla’s thought. Though Valla cannot perhaps be considered a figure of first-rank importance in the history of philosophy, his contribution for that reason should not go altogether unnoticed. And his message is even more significant for theology, for which it would seem to have some immediate relevance today. In 1970 Charles Trinkaus’ more generalized study of “Italian Humanist Thought” appeared under the title *In Our Image and Likeness*. This extremely important book demonstrates that the figures with whom Trinkaus deals, including Valla and Pico, were working “within the inherited framework of the Christian faith” (p. xiv). Di Napoli’s study of Pico (1965) sees him as both orthodox and significant.

This is the context into which Henri de Lubac’s book fits. It is a long work, but it has a carefully delimited purpose. L. does not intend to exhaust the richness of Pico’s many interests, e.g., Pico’s appreciation of the cabala or his work as an exegete. L. hopes to elucidate the theme of man’s liberty and dignity as expressed in the *Oration* and against the backdrop of Pico’s other writings and the Christian tradition as a whole. With a “rapid” glance at Pico’s other projects, L. hopes also to elucidate his personality and purpose, especially in the context of the often contradictory interpretations which have been placed on them.

The unique value of L.’s study of Pico is the comprehensive grasp of the Christian tradition which he brings to it. L. ranges from the Fathers of the Church down to the present in trying to show both the orthodoxy and the daring of Pico’s projects. No one is more highly qualified than L. to undertake such a task, and no one could accomplish it more convincingly. What will be particularly gratifying to students of the Renaissance is L.’s unabashed enthusiasm for Pico. He at times refers to Pico as “our hero,” and the expression is something more than a quaint literary convention. L. admires Pico’s sobriety, his devout orthodoxy, and his conviction that learning must relate to life: “Tantum scit homo, quantum operatur” (p. 370). He effectively refutes the criticism of Pico as eclectic, syncretistic, and paganizing. He sees his potential as superior to that of Ficino and Erasmus.

Pico died at thirty-one. L. dreams of how different the history of Christian theology might have been had he lived to the ripe age of
Cajetan, his contemporary. L. leaves the reader with the impression he believes Pico's Christian synthesis might have been almost as rich as St. Thomas', whom he admired so deeply. After L.'s book there can never again be question as to how Christian this extraordinary "Renaissance man" was.

L. is more concerned with showing Pico's accord with the breadth of the Christian tradition than with indicating specific dependencies, one way or the other. Moreover, it is easy to understand why L. feels such admiration for the concordistic impulses in Pico's thought, tough and analytical though they sometimes were. There is a similar tendency in L.'s own approach. Perhaps "catholic" is a better word than "concordistic" to describe that tendency.

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JOHN W. O'MALLEY, S.J.


During the past decades the history of hesychasm—the Eastern Christian tradition of contemplative monasticism—has attracted the attention of scholars, as well as that of the general public, in a variety of ways. A recent bibliographical survey, published by D. Stiernon in Revue des études byzantines 30 (1972) and covering a period of approximately twelve years (1960–72), reviews more than two hundred scholarly publications on the subject. It does not include Russian bibliography, however, although in recent years there was also a new interest in cultural influences of Byzantine hesychasm in Russia among Soviet historians.

St. Nil Sorskij (1433–1508) is one of the best known and most eminent spiritual figures of Moscovite Russia. Having himself traveled to Mount Athos, familiar with the spiritual literature of Greek hesychasm, he was involved in the Russian controversy between the "Possessors" and the "Nonpossessors," one of the most interesting episodes of Russian Church history.

As leader of the "Nonpossessors," he considered it improper for monks to own large properties, even if they are used for the maintenance of social welfare: according to Nil, the purely ascetical and prophetic role of the monks implied absolute poverty. He was also a promoter in Russia of the tradition of "Jesus prayer," the "monogical," constant invocation of the Name of Jesus, sometimes associated with breathing techniques, which aimed at maintaining mental attention upon the constantly repeated words of the short prayer "Lord Jesus Christ, Son of God, have mercy upon me."
Maloney's work is an expanded version of a doctoral thesis presented at the Pontifical Oriental Institute in Rome. It includes historical and biographical data on Nil Sorskij and a detailed analysis of his ascetical and mystic teaching. There are also two valuable appendices: the first represents a translation of Nil's letters and several of his other writings; the second contains a brief introduction to the Byzantine hesychastic "method."

Nil's personality, as it emerges from M.'s study, is that of an extraordinarily balanced teacher of spirituality, almost entirely dependent upon the classic spiritual teachers of the Byzantine tradition, in developing the stages of purification ("struggle with passions") and contemplation ("mental activity"). In a chapter on "The Influence of Nil on His Contemporaries" (pp. 200–237), M. reviews the activity of such followers of Nil as Vassian Patrikeev, the abbot Artemij and Maksim the Greek, who were more directly involved in controversy with the "Possessors" and other representatives of the more established and politicized, but also social-oriented circle of the Russian Church in the sixteenth century.

M.'s principal merit is to bring the important and fascinating personality of Nil to the attention of the English-speaking world. His conclusion that Nil "laid the foundation for the Starec-tradition that in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries would produce saints like Serafim of Sarov and the Starcy of the Optyno-hermitage made famous by the writings of Dostoevskij and I. Kireevskij" (p. 242), as well as his regret over the polarization, in the Russia of the sixteenth century, between "spirituality" and "social responsibility," agrees with that of most contemporary historians of Russian religious thought.

The book is unfortunately marred by numerous misprints and a great inconsistency in the transcription of Russian names. One can also regret that the book appeared before the new critical edition of Nil's letters (G. M. Prokhorov, "Poslaniya Nila Sorskogo" [The Letters of Nil Sorskij], in Trudy Otdela Drevne-Russkoy Literatury XXIX [Leningrad, 1974] pp. 125–43), which shows, in particular, that Letter 4 (translated on pp. 257–62) cannot be considered authentic.

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JOHN MEYENDORFF


In Defense of the Indians provides an extended insight into sixteenth-century Spanish attitudes—besides being a pioneer treatise in defense of wronged people. Almost from the start of Spain's New World conquests, nearly five centuries ago, there were sharply differing replies to the question, "what manner of beings were these American natives and what was their capacity for the Christian religion and for European civilization?" Most conquistadores allowed that armed subjugation would be the preferred civilizer and religion teacher of the dense and savage people. Other colonials, especially the missionaries, maintained zealously that persuasion and good example were the proper means of leading these docile and receptive tribes to the knowledge of Christianity and the genuine acceptance of the Spanish presence.

Spanish sovereigns consistently advocated measures intended to guard the natives from the conquerors' excesses. The Laws of Burgos (1512), the New Laws (1542–1543), and untalled royal cédulas issued during these decades manifest an unfailing solicitude for the Indians' rights. These noble enactments, unfortunately, were in large part ignored or treated with contemptuous evasion by colonial encomenderos defiant of God and man in their scramble for fortune. This melancholy friction between lofty intentions and brutalizing practice inflamed the biting dispute between oppressors and protectors of the oppressed.

Prolonged acrimonious wrangling by contending parties and opportunists seeking after royal favor had so affected the conscientious Charles V by April 1550 that he ordered the suspension of all conquests in the New World "until a special group of theologians and counselors should decide upon a just method of conducting them." An attempt to carry out this command was made by the Council of the Fourteen conducting hearings at Valladolid, 1550–51.

Bartolomé de Las Casas, fiery champion of the natives, seized the opportunity of formally defending their dignity and their rights. Juan Ginés de Sepulveda mustered the widely accepted arguments favoring resort to force in Christianizing newly discovered peoples. The two advocates engaged in no debate before the Council; each made oral presentations before the learned body and submitted written material.

Sepulveda took the position "that it is totally just, as well as most beneficial to these barbarians, that they be conquered and brought under the rule of Spaniards.... This is the easiest way for them to embrace the Christian religion...." That the exact contradictory was the correct
path, Las Casas insisted: "the preacher of the gospel should proclaim the gospel not armed with cannon... but equipped with a holy way of life and the word of God..." Advocacy of the legality and desirability of a mailed fist in spreading Christianity was an "opinion worthy of hell-fire," fumed Las Casas.

Probably a modern reader remains unmoved as Las Casas follows the usual course of drowning his adversary in a flood of appeals to the authority of the OT, NT, Fathers of the Church, popes, philosophers, theologians, canonists, kings, saints, and sundry others. His argument succeeds, nonetheless, in shedding special light on an era that speculated ardently on the realm of the spirit, while pursuing earthly goals with ravaging intensity. The Council, in any event, disappointed the high hopes of Charles: they fell to disputing among themselves and never resolved the issues.

Las Casas' case can now be read in the form of the Spaniard's own translation of, and commentary on, the 500-page Latin Apologia which he presented to the Valladolid Council. Las Casas' Spanish version, excellently translated, edited, and annotated by Stafford Poole, vigorously expounds the author's view concerning people deprived of basic rights.

All Mankind is One, Lewis Hanke's study of In Defense of the Indians, forms a scholarly, attractive introduction not only to the opinions of Las Casas but to the thought of his opponent Sepulveda. All Mankind attempts to put in historical perspective various critics who, in intervening centuries, have reflected on the roles of Sepulveda and Las Casas present at the sixteenth-century Council, and keeps alive a more than academic interest in the early defense of the downtrodden. Should Hanke carry out his announced intention of making All Mankind his "last publication on Las Casas," this volume is leave-taking worthy of a renowned Lascasista.

These two distinguished, handsome books now join Bartolomé de Las Casas: Toward an Understanding of the Man and His Work, edited by Juan Friede and Benjamin Keen (DeKalb, 1971), to comprise a trilogy of uncommon merit.

Seattle University
William N. Bischoff, S.J.


With the possible exception of Martin Buber, most Christian theologians are not conversant with modern Jewish studies of Christianity.
Names such as Moses Mendelssohn, Joseph Salvador, Hermann Cohen, Max Brod, and Joseph Klausner strike a familiar note with no more than a few specialists in interreligious dialogue. Jacob’s new volume will serve as an excellent introduction to this little-known world of Jewish scholarship. In clear and concise language he summarizes the basic positions of most of the major Jewish writers on Christianity during the last two centuries, beginning with the pioneering work of Mendelssohn and eventually leading the reader into the contemporary scene with a consideration of the views of such figures as Richard Rubenstein, Emil Fackenheim, and Samuel Sandmel.

Obviously, none of the individual chapters in this volume are meant to be definitive works on the author in question. Hence it would be unfair to subject these relatively short analyses to an overly strict critique. Suffice it to say that all seem fundamentally accurate and documented. If criticisms are to be offered of this volume, they would seem to revolve around three basic points: (1) some confusion as to whether this is a work analyzing Jewish interpretations of Jesus or of Christianity; (2) a neglect of some important journal articles; (3) a failure to adequately cover the recent Israeli scene.

With regard to point 1, it should be noted that despite J.’s title most of the essays in fact tend to focus on Jewish views of Jesus rather than on Christianity as a whole. Granted that the two are very much interrelated; still, what is missing in the interpretive section of this work, as well as in the short concluding essay in which J. offers some personal reflections on the future of Christian-Jewish dialogue, is any adequate grappling with Christianity as a valid religious tradition in Jewish eyes, a religious tradition from which Jews might profit in some ways apart from any acceptance of the Church’s belief in the divinity of Christ. Many Jewish authors have called upon Christians to acknowledge Judaism as a valid, ongoing religious tradition after the coming of Christ. This call needs to be heeded by Christian theologians. Several have done so recently, but their views are not represented in this volume. Scholars such as Irving Greenberg have begun to probe whether such basic Christian notions as grace and sacrament might not have positive insights for Jewish religious understanding. The French Jewish writer Robert Aron has spoken of Christianity as a “covenantal moment” similar to the covenantal moment of Exodus. It is the omission of these kinds of issues from the volume that makes it more a study of Jewish views of Jesus rather than of Christianity in all its dimensions. While J.’s final remarks about the need for Jews to study Christianity are to be welcomed, the agenda for such an investigation is not sufficiently delineated.
As for the neglect of some more recent journal articles, it is surprising to find no mention of some of the essays published in the *Journal of Ecumenical Studies* in the extensive bibliographical section at the end of this volume. Likewise, the failure to review, even briefly, the writings of Asher Finkel in the "Other Studies" section represents a serious omission (though one of his books is included in the bibliographical section). Finkel is one of the more creative present-day thinkers probing the Christian-Jewish relationship within the biblical context.

Finally, the failure to include any present-day Israeli authors other than David Flusser and Haim Cohn is unfortunate; for Israeli scholars such as S. Talmon, U. Tal, and P. Lapide have made some important contributions to the Jewish literature on Christianity.

All in all, the volume's strength lies primarily in its historical overview of Jewish thinking on Christianity, especially about Jesus, during the last two centuries. Its most notable weakness is the incompleteness of the view it projects for the future dialogue

*Catholic Theological Union, Chicago*


Despite a publisher's blurb leading the reader to expect a book on the tribulations of Roman Jews during World War II, this subject is not mentioned until fully three quarters of the way through the volume. Understandably, however, it is the final hundred pages, dealing with the events of that war, which have attracted the greatest publicity. And it was this material which was emphasized almost exclusively by the author, a Dutch journalist of Jewish faith and a naturalized American citizen, during an American lecture tour at the time of the book's publication in early 1974.

W. devotes some 350 pages to the history of the Jewish community in Rome from the beginning of the Christian era down to the advent of Mussolini's fascism, which originally enlisted the enthusiastic support of leading Italian Jews and became anti-Semitic only as Mussolini quite late in the day succumbed to the malevolent influence of Hitler. W.'s rambling, journalistic account of these twenty centuries is essentially a scissors-and-paste job: anecdotes culled from older works are recounted in chapter after chapter. There is no attempt at serious analysis of the forces manifest in these stories, a number of which, by W.'s own admission, are apocryphal. The bad faith and hypocrisy of Catholics is assumed throughout.
The lack of scholarly documentation makes it impossible to verify the accuracy of this enormous mass of anecdote, though its sources may be conjectured from the lengthy bibliography at the end of the volume. The absence from this list of some of the most important modern scholarly works on the subject, however, hardly inspires confidence. The same must be said of misleading statements so obvious as to require no verification. Reformation historians, e.g., will be startled to learn that Leo X was "quite a pious man" (p. 133), despite the inability of this worldly Renaissance Pope to see in Luther's flaming theological protest anything but "a monk's quarrel"—a fact faithfully reported by W. on p. 134 with no appreciation of its significance. Equally unfortunate is a highly tendentious account of the provisions of canon law for mixed marriages (p. 201), especially when W. fails to balance this by a comparison with the rabbinical treatment of such unions. Space forbids citation of numerous other examples of this kind. They will not surprise the alert reader, however, after he has been alerted by W.'s reference in the book's opening sentence to "the Jews' centuries-long resistance to the priests' exhortations to forget about the commands of Moses and to embrace the beliefs of Christ"—as if abolition of the Ten Commandments were to be found either in the Gospel accounts of the teaching of the Jew Jesus or anywhere in twenty centuries of Catholic history.

Most regrettable about all this is that there is a long and shameful history of Christian anti-Semitism, still too little known to the spiritual descendants of those responsible for it. It is an enormously complex story, which cannot possibly be adequately presented in the superficial black-and-white categories utilized in these pages. Any indictment of injustice must itself be just; otherwise it becomes counterproductive. It does not escape even W. that many of the medieval popes, as well as other charismatic church leaders such as Bernard of Clairvaux and Johannes Reuchlin, and even some of the more enlightened medieval emperors, condemned and tried to limit and stop unchristian anti-Semitism which, especially with the start of the Crusades, became endemic and virulent in the Church. But though W. frequently reports such evidence, it remains unintegrated in his narrative, is never analyzed for its true significance, but serves rather as the occasion for complaints that such instances of protection for Jews remained far behind the level of post-Enlightenment religious toleration.

Despite repeated disclaimers, the book manifests frequent instances of an anti-Catholicism which is a faithful counterpart of precisely the kind of unconscious "some-of-my-best-friends-are-Jews" anti-Semitism of which Jews, as well as their more alert Christian friends, are justly critical. The result of W.'s superficial and one-sided presentation is thus likely to be the exact opposite of that intended. Instead of leading
Christians to repent of past guilt, it is far more probable that such a book as this will cause those very Christians who most need to repent (because of their continuing and often unperceived anti-Semitic tendencies) to defend the indefensible, thus continuing and increasing tension between Christians and Jews rather than diminishing it.

W.'s account of the World War II events appears more carefully researched, though the presentation remains journalistic and scholarly documentation is lacking. W. charges that, although heroic help was extended to Roman Jews by Catholic priests and others during World War II, this assistance was not the result of Vatican orders and encouragement; and that, when financial and other assistance was sought from the Vatican, it was not forthcoming. Consequently W. accuses postwar defenders of Pius XII with exaggerating and even falsifying his role in assisting the Jews of Rome. He also accuses the Pope himself of deliberately misleading Bishop von Preysing of Berlin, the most staunchly anti-Nazi of the German bishops, in referring in a letter of April 30, 1943, to “the very large sums in American currency which we have given for overseas trips of emigrants” (mostly non-Aryan refugees from Nazi persecution), whereas in reality this money had come from a gift of $125,000 given to the Holy See by the Chicago section of the United Jewish Appeal in August 1939 and designated for “help to victims of persecution without regard to race or religion.” Postwar documentation, vigorously disputed by W., shows that this munificent and selfless gift (for which the donors received fulsome Vatican praise through the Archbishop of Chicago) represented but a small fraction of the money spent by the Vatican for the relief of Italian Jews. W. heaps particular scorn on Vatican aid for baptized Jewish converts to Catholicism, claiming that they were not “real Jews.” Nowhere does he inform the reader that these people were treated as pariahs by Jewish organizations, who by refusing them all aid imposed a special responsibility for assisting them on their Christian brethren.

An especially notable example of W.'s failure to verify his charges is provided by his conjecture that Pius XII's unwillingness to make an unambiguous public denunciation of Hitler's wartime crimes may have been due to the fear that this would have caused Hitler to abrogate his Concordat with the Holy See, with the consequent loss to the Catholic Church in Germany of the enormous income from the church tax collected by the government and provided for, W. falsely alleges, in one of the Concordat's articles. In fact, there is no such article in the Concordat, which nowhere so much as mentions the church tax. W.'s failure to check the easily available text of the Concordat is typical of his methods and hardly inspires confidence in other points of his indictment.
A detailed answer to W.'s charges would far transcend the limits of a review and will not be possible in any case until publication of the promised final two volumes of the *Actes et documents du s. Siège*, covering assistance to the victims of wartime persecution in the crucial years 1943-45. No one familiar with the attraction of powerful men, whether in the Vatican, the White House, or the Kremlin, for sycophantic flatterers, will have much difficulty believing that some of the claims made on behalf of Pius XII are inflated or even false. Something in the complex character of this Pope elicited in Catholics of a certain stripe a kind of uncritical adulation as grotesque as it was often tasteless. That their number included the German Jesuit Fr. Leiber, as W. charges, is manifestly false. Despite his readiness to defend the Pope, whose most intimate associate he had been in these wartime events, against the unjust attacks mounted against him later, Leiber was no uncritical admirer of Pius XII.

Finally, it must be stated that W.'s facile attempts to explain away the numerous public expressions of thanks by Jewish groups, during the war and afterwards, for the Pope's efforts to assist the victims of persecution in circumstances which permitted him very few chances of effective aid at all (a fact conveniently overlooked by his latter-day critics) do little credit either to the intelligence or the sincerity of those offering such thanks. The Jewish writer Pinchas Lapide, who served with the British Eighth Army in wartime Italy and who is by no means uncritical of the role of the papacy, estimates that as many as 860,000 Jews may have been saved by secret Vatican diplomacy, the price of which was precisely the public silence for which Pius XII continues to be castigated. It is impossible to verify the accuracy of such an estimate. And after the horror of six million dead, no one would wish to claim that enough was done. But to claim that nothing was done is a falsification of history. In a previous publication I have tried to outline the enormous complexity of the historical problems involved; "The Silence of Pius XII," *Jewish Quarterly Review* 63 (1972) 80-85. This complexity quite escapes the author of this book, for whom the solutions to the agonizing dilemmas which daily tormented the austere conscience of Pius XII are all clear and the Pope's abject failure to adopt them is manifest.

*St. Louis University*  

JOHN JAY HUGHES


Those familiar with the incisive questioning characteristic of Gustafson will hardly be surprised to find in this volume, derived from the
Shaffer Lectures of Northwestern University in 1967, a number of stimulating ideas. However, since G.'s original audience "included many undergraduates who were not particularly interested in [his] long-range purpose" (p. x.), the professional moralist reader is likely to become somewhat impatient while the earlier pages of the book rehearse long-familiar themes, such as H. Richard Niebuhr's models of decision-making. Indeed, these pages are not completely devoid of G.'s tendency to exercise excessive caution, a caution that at times leaves matters unnecessarily indefinite. A case in point is the statement that "there might well be in certain persons a tendency of the affections that makes their responses to moral situations somewhat predictable" (p. 44).

It is only in the third chapter, "Christian Faith and the 'Sort of Person' One Becomes," that G. begins to focus on the specific question with which the book is to deal. But the greater part of this chapter is, as G. admits, essentially "a restatement of the idea of the virtues as this has been developed in Catholic moral theology" (p. 70).

Chap. 4, "Christian Faith and the Reasons of Mind and Heart for Being Moral," develops an interesting phenomenology of the pluralistic biblical experience of God and the correlations of this experience with the reasons for being moral. The following chapter "suggests that ethics might be Christian in a limited but distinctive way," inasmuch as religious symbols and theological concepts are used to interpret the significance of other persons, events and circumstances and thereby determine, among other things, what means of action are appropriate (p. 118). For the professional moralist, these two chapters will probably seem the most thought-provoking. Nevertheless, when the latter chapter becomes a search for a criterion in selecting which religious symbols and theological concepts are to be employed in interpreting persons, events, and circumstances, G. is led to a proposal whose "looseness" is "regrettable" even to himself (p. 143). Unable to state precisely what G.'s proposed criterion is, I find myself among those to whom it seems, as G. knew it would, "too relative, too private, and insufficiently rational" (p. 143).

The sixth chapter finds that, although Christian ethics can in large measure be converted into "natural" or "rational" ethics, it cannot be so converted without "remainder." But to identify the remainder is, for G., no simple matter (p. 164). It can be said that "the centrality of the crucifixion in the Christian experience of God's reality requires that those who have this belief have obligations that are especially binding on them" (p. 165). Here G. appears to be emphasizing the word "especially"; for in the final analysis the "remainder" is seen in the formal fact that the Christian has a special obligation to act, at least at times,
in an unselfish way (p. 168). With regard to material content that might constitute a remainder, G. is content to say only that Christian transcendentality "might direct action in a distinctive way" and that "obedience unto death," which might be called for at times, "is not easily justified on the basis of rational self-interest, or even on a proper balance of self-regard and other-regard" (p. 168). The question of whether there is a material difference between Christian and non-Christian, secular ethics is thus left in suspension.

I find it unfortunate that G. chose not to dialogue with other moralists addressing the same question, especially Josef Fuchs. The remainder-approach to the question was introduced by Fuchs a number of years ago, and an explicit dialogue with him might have uncovered the possibility of a different, holistic, and more adequate approach.

University of San Diego

Norbert J. Rigali, S.J.

Abortion in Perspective: The Rose Palace or the Fiery Dragon?

The author describes his book as a "mosaic of essays" (p. xiii), and that is exactly what he offers. He also describes it as explicitly philosophical, but that claim is more open to question. What he has written in forty-two chapters is a series of loosely connected reflections on various aspects of the abortion issue which will convince the already convinced, further distance the avid proabortionist, and be of limited use to the philosopher and theologian. Yet it is by no means without merit. For one thing, it is literate, witty, and learned; I enjoyed it. For another, it is well informed in terms of statistics, medical and biological knowledge, and the use a philosopher may make of Shakespeare and Dante.

The perspective D. has on abortion is that it is always plainly and simply the slaughter of innocent life, without the possibility of defense under any circumstances. The fetus is established as clearly a human being on biological grounds, with a good deal of present medical practice used to support this claim. No recognition is paid to the problem of establishing the same truth on ethical grounds or to the stipulative character of attributing the word "human" and the word "life" to any entity. D. is either uninterested in or unaware of the place of intentionality in the description of a moral act. Above all, what the book lacks is any sense of the historical and concrete situation in which human decisions are made. Perhaps the best reflection of this weakness is to be seen in D.'s claim that in a morally fit society abortion would not be a problem.
That claim is certainly true, but fails to wrestle with the dilemma created for human beings precisely because they do not live in a society that is doing what it could do. It seems likely that a society or a church which proscribes abortion for its members occurs obligations in return.

Yet this is also a book full of wisdom, warmth, and insight. D. himself suggests that the chapters may be read in any order, and he is right. I would especially recommend the third section (chap. 13 to 18), "Restoring Missing Values," and chap. 20, in which D. gives a splendid little reflection on the difference between love and pity. D.'s strength is that he values philosophy as wisdom, not as a logical exercise, and secondly as a quest for values. In his own way he is contributing to the enterprise that Stanley Hauerwas has been suggesting is the crucial one for Christian ethics: the problem of seeing what is at stake in a moral question. The creative imagination is wanted here, and D. does in this book what ethicists like Hauerwas, McCabe, Gustafson, and Maguire have been suggesting in recent works as an essential task of ethics.

D. is not in conversation in this work with professional ethicists and theologians. His dialogue partners are philosophers, poets from the Western tradition, and contemporary slogans and attitudes. For him, abortion is not a pressing question that needs an answer. The answer is clear: abortion is unambiguously both evil and sinful. But it is a problem in that it reflects the moral malaise of a people who permit and even advocate it. He shows persuasively what other human values are at stake in a policy of permissive abortion. Though he occasionally falls into a domino theory of morality—if we abort today, can infanticide and eugenic murder be far behind?—this is not the major thrust of his position.

The two greatest strengths of the book are the pervasive sense of the wholeness of the moral life—abortion is never treated as only a discrete act—and the deep concern for the commonality of all ethical choice. D. is very clear that abortion is not a personal problem only.

The work is of value more for meditation and insight than for the precise resolution of technical philosophic and ethical issues. It by no means puts abortion in perspective, but it does bring an important and sound perspective to bear on the whole abortion debate.

Marquette University

JAMES P. HANIGAN


Motivated by the riots, protests, and assassinations of the 1960's,
Lehmann seeks to show "that the pertinence of Jesus Christ to an age of revolution is the power of his presence to shape the passion for humanization that generates revolutions, and thus to preserve revolution from its own undoing" (p. xiii, his italics).

L. begins with a discussion of revolution and humanization, but quickly slides over into his theological section. His discussion of Rom 10, which follows Barth, suggests submission and love as a way of exposing the establishment and protecting revolutions from destroying themselves. The discussion of Jn 18 and 19, following Bultmann and Schlatter, proposes silence as a way of exposing the weakness of power. L.'s main category is the Transfiguration narrative in Mt 17. He sees this as revealing a strategy of commitment, involvement, and expectation; "the politics of God has transfigured the politics of man" (p. 83). This biblical presentation is supplemented with an analysis of various revolutionaries: Mao, Torres, Fanon, King, and Malcolm X.

The third part is an application of these insights to politics. L. discusses how revolutions are signs of transfiguration and how the biblical story saves revolutions from destroying themselves. He evaluates the relation between freedom and order—freedom has the priority—and between justice and law—justice has the priority. L. then faces the problem of violence in revolution and analyzes it in terms of its apocalyptic significance. He concludes on the note that the transfiguration of revolution is the prelude to life in freedom and fulfillment.

L. is faithful to his general methodology of determining what humans ought to do by discovering what God is doing in the world. This is determined by immersion in the biblical record of God's past activity in the world and an intuitive insight, based on this, into God's activity here and now. Disagreements can arise over both the methodology and L.'s intuition into what God is doing. There are also the problems of criteria and the full resolution of an issue.

One major problem, endemic to L.'s methodology, is the affirmation that God's purpose is to make human life human. While few would disagree with this, L. offers no ways, other than his intuition, of determining either what is human or how we may evaluate a particular policy with respect to its humaneness. Hints of and suggestions about such criteria are there, but they are neither clearly proposed nor adequately defended. Therefore, when L. suggests that "current revolutionary experience signals the righteousness of God in action" (p. 109), we are left with trust as the basis of proof.

Although the power of Jesus may save revolutions from themselves, L. presents no means of evaluating the postrevolutionary situation. We
must assume that either a successful revolution saved by the power of Jesus ushers in the kingdom or that a postrevolutionary society is beyond criticism. Unfortunately, L.’s analysis only goes up to the moment of revolution. Equally necessary as a part of the theology of revolution is an analysis of how one evaluates the outcome. Of course, the concept of humanization is available; but how does one really know what is human and how does one persuade others of this?

Finally, there is the problem of revolutionary violence, which L. sees as an apocalyptic sign of the radical penultimacy of this world giving way to the power of God. L. argues that violence, as revolutionary risk, can be justified by his biblical politics; violence as a policy or program cannot. The task of a theology of revolution is to argue for a revolution­ary future, as opposed to revolutionary fate, i.e., it must keep the revolution from destroying itself by being as repressively violent as its predecessor. Again, clear criteria for such evaluation are missing. The violence of the old order and the violence raised against it may well be signs of divine judgment—but how does one know? This is a question which L. steadfastly refuses to answer clearly. This may be due partly to his own methodology and partly to his implicit trust in the righteousness of revolutionary movements. However, the position is open to the worst forms of triumphalism.

L. writes very well and his style is seductive. Many of his phrases capture the heart of a situation and problem. The book is also filled with a real sense of urgency and empathy for those struggling with the problem of revolution and the relevance of Christianity in this situation. It is necessary to move beyond sincerity and empathy to a critical analysis of the ethical issues involved, lest the last state be worse than the first. This L. fails to do. His conclusions may well be correct, but there is a real problem in tracing how he moves from his premise to his conclusions.

Despite some serious reservations, the book is well worth reading. L. attacks many comfortable ideas, provides a wealth of useful information, and challenges the reader on almost every page.

Worcester Polytechnic Institute

THOMAS A. SHANNON

SHORTER NOTICES


A revised edition of a doctoral disser­tation originally presented to the Fac­ulty of Oriental Studies at the University of Pennsylvania in 1971. C. takes up the question whether the Assyrian state actually imposed cultic demands on its subjugated peoples.
From the time of Olmstead (1908) it has been usual to claim such an imposition. C. questions the common opinion. As there is no specific Assyrian "white paper" on policies for the empire, C. turns to Neo-Assyrian royal inscriptions, state letters, and business documents. From these he inquires how Assyrian conquest and rule may have affected the ongoing native cults of defeated nations, and whether imperial policy demanded the worship of Assyrian gods. More specifically, what cultic demands were made, and was such a policy enforced in all Assyrian territories? As for Israel in the period of Assyrian domination, he probes what pagan innovations in Israelite cult were peculiar to this era, and he questions whether their origin was due to Assyrian policy. Finally, he seeks to assess the immediate and long-range effects of Assyrian policy on traditional Israelite religion.

The bulk of the volume is devoted to an analysis of Neo-Assyrian tablets. From these sources C. concludes that the Olmstead hypothesis is to be rejected, that in fact Assyria did not interfere with the continued performance of local cults. Her major concern was the political submission of subjugated peoples. Most interesting is the belief that local foreign gods, disaffected by the conduct of their devotees, were even active in Assyria's behalf. Once the contention that Assyria enforced pagan rites falls, then the cult reforms of Hezechiah and Josiah can no longer be thought of as expressions of political rebellion against Assyria. Finally, C.'s investigation calls into question critical discounting (e.g., that of F. Cross) of the Deuteronomist's charge that Manasseh alone was responsible for Judah's fall.

John E. Huesman, S.J.


Intends to introduce seminary students to the discipline of NT theology. There are six major parts: Synoptic Gospels, Fourth Gospel, Primitive Church [Acts], Paul, General Epistles, Apocalypse. The introductory chapter of the first part is a general introduction to the discipline as a whole. It gives a history of NT theology and then, under the rubric "Biblical Theology, History, & Revelation," sets forth the aim and method of the volume. "Biblical theology must be done from a starting-point that is biblical-historical in orientation" (p. 25). Consequently, L. sets out to overcome evangelicalism's "preoccupation with negative criticism of contemporary theological deviations" and to construct "preferable alternatives to them" (p. 25); so the work is, as the blurb describes it, "well grounded in the conservative-evangelical tradition."

However, even for those seminary students who share L.'s presuppositions, this book remains quite inaccessible. The table of contents is far too sketchy to give an indication of the variety of topics discussed under the unlisted headings that make up the individual chapters. There is, moreover, no analytical index. So it is hard to see how someone in need of an introduction to NT theology can be expected to trace a given question under one or more of the forty-four chapter headings. The same can be said of the bibliographies. Though limited "largely to materials available in English," they are ample. But the student who can look up the bibliography on "The Ascension" in a chapter entitled "The Eschatological Kerygma" in a part called "The Primitive Church" is hardly in need of an introduction to NT theology. Looking up the scriptural index under Acts 1:2 or 1:10 or Lk 24:51 would not be of much help either.

Stanley B. Marrow

The twenty-four articles in this collection were originally presented at the twenty-fifth anniversary meeting of the Evangelical Theological Society at Wheaton, Illinois, in December 1973. Participants were asked to prepare either (1) an evaluative survey of some particular point in the NT or (2) a scholarly advance at some particular point in NT research. The papers were grouped under four headings: (1) Canon, Text and Background; (2) Jesus and the Gospels; (3) Apostolic History; (4) Paul and the Epistles. The headings are fairly accurate descriptions of the essays in each area, though they conceal the fact that Part 1 is largely devoted to Gnosticism and that Part 4 contains an article on parallels between 1 Peter and John. One article jars with the book title: "Attitudes on Slavery among the Church Fathers" (A. W. Rupprecht).

Contributions in the "scholarly advance" department outnumber the surveys two to one. That ratio should have been reversed, for what distinguishes a volume like this from a bound periodical are the essays summarizing and evaluating an area of debate. Three of the best on this score are E. M. Yamauchi's "Some Alleged Evidences of Pre-Christian Gnosticism," R. H. Gundry's "Recent Investigations into the Literary Genre 'Gospel,'" and I. H. Marshall's "'Early Catholicism' in the New Testament." Marshall's essay is further interesting as a witness to the impact of ecumenism on a charged and historically divisive question. He concludes that early Catholicism as usually defined is not to be found in the NT, and that in fact elements labeled "early Catholic" (stress on sound doctrine, establishment of a ministry) are "early Protestant."

Jerome Kodell, O.S.B.


V.'s book is a contribution to the increasing literature of structuralist methodology as applied to the text of Scripture. The impact of structuralism on biblical exegesis is only beginning to be felt, though what is generally agreed to be the first book in structuralism, Ferdinand de Saussure's Cours de linguistique générale, compiled by a number of his students from their professor's lecture notes, appeared in print in 1915. Since then, structuralist theories have been utilized in such diverse fields as philosophy, psychology, history, the physical sciences, mathematics, and especially literature; but V. has broken new if controversial ground in suggesting a literary-critical hermeneutic for the NT based on a synthesis of structuralist, phenomenological, and existentialist modes of interpretation.

V.'s intention is to use the literary category of comedy (in the classical sense) as a means of interpreting death and resurrection in St. Paul's kerygma and the Marcan Gospel narrative. The basic assumption is that death and resurrection were the generative images underlying early Greek comedy, and that these images are also the kernel of both Pauline kerygma and the Gospel according to Mark. A comprehensive discussion of V.'s procedure lies outside the limits of a shorter notice, but it is well exemplified by the partial analysis of the Marcan narrative in section 4 of the book. In it there is a novel interpretation of the Marcan secret: "With the messianic secret Mark is not so much thematizing a problem in the history of Christology as he is man's situation before the revelation of God: the difficulty of appropriating existentially what is known or sensed intellectually, the
crucified Son of Man. It took an existential signified to provide access to the paradox which comes to expression in Mark” (p. 141). Ultimately, V.’s method rests on the distinction between synchrony and diachrony, and could with some modifications be applied to the other Synoptics. As V. comments, “The problem of priority, the question of the diachronic relationship among the Synoptic Gospels, is very difficult if not impossible, I submit, to answer. . . . What is perfectly possible and potentially fruitful is a generic or synchronic comparative analysis of the three Synoptics” (p. 6).

David Greenwood


A study of the meaning of the word “hour” (and related terms such as “now” and “time”) in the fourth Gospel. The book’s title suggests a more limited analysis covering only those passages in which Jesus speaks of “my hour” or the Evangelist of “his hour,” but F.’s thesis is that every reference to time in John is related, either directly or indirectly, to the mystery of Christ’s departure from this world and return to the Father. We have here, accordingly, an intensive analysis of a large number of Johannine pericopes, and F. applies structuralist principles to his exegesis, presenting us with yet another example of the popularity this technique appears to have gained in recent Continental biblical exegesis. The result, of course, is that the Gospel is read as a tightly knit composition needing no source criticism for a fuller understanding. Not every reader will be satisfied with this approach, and the results are, in fact, quite uneven. F. argues strongly, e.g., that “hour” has a symbolic meaning at 1:39, 4:6, 4:52, and 19:14, but seems not to realize that in each of these texts the given number of the hour must also then have a symbolic significance. To admit this, however, would undermine his controlling thesis.

The first part (almost a third of the total number of pages) takes up the question of how time is considered in the OT, in apocalyptic literature, in the Qumran scrolls, in the Septuagint (especially Daniel, where he finds parallels between Jn 5:22–29 and Dn 7, 11, and 12) and in Philo. F. points out that for the Hebrew mind time derives its meaning from what happens in it and, further, that for the apocalypticist nothing which happens in time is accidental, since God has foreseen and preordained the succession of events. He sees these perspectives as influencing the fourth Gospel.

J. Edgar Bruns


No matter how well stocked one’s personal or institutional library may be with books about the early Church, it would still be a good investment to add this judicious work by the professor of medieval history at the University of Nottingham and author of Saeculum: History and Society in the Theology of St. Augustine (1970). In nine chapters he discusses the continuities and discontinuities of early Christianity, stressing that developments are often untidy and inconsistent, marked by hesitations and uncertainties.

M. analyzes first Christians’ gradual consciousness of being a people distinct from the Jews. Likewise, vis-à-vis pagans, he shows the emergence of Christianity as a “third race.” The consciousness of what was permanent and essential to its nature is seen to emerge from the identity crisis which the Gnostic movements were for Christianity. Particularly helpful is M.’s contrast between Christian or pagan
city dwellers versus the uncultivated countryfolk. Also useful is his discussion of Celtic, Berber, Syriac, and Coptic Christianity as counterculture movements. The Arian faith of the barbarian kingdoms is judged to be a measure of the failure of Roman urban society and the catholic Church to absorb them. He has some true but disturbing comments to make about aggressive Christian intolerance toward other beliefs. One should single out for special commendation the 74 handsome illustrations which are accompanied in the text by excellent discussions (especially in chap. 4) about the significance of early Christian and pagan iconography.

Michael A. Fahey, S.J.


Uncovering a background in the demand for a just use of property in the Prophets and Torah, in apocalyptic Judaism's radical critique of wealth balanced with rabbinic deprecation of poverty coupled with an extensive welfare system, H. roots Christian attitudes toward property in Jesus' proclamation of the kingdom's inbreaking: the man who depends on his possessions and forgets his neighbors' needs is without faith. Property is not evil in itself, but trust is to be totally in God. To depend on mammon demonically blinds men's eyes to God's will.

Tracing the development of these basic concepts through the "love communism" of the Jerusalem community, the radical denunciation of property in some Gnostic circles and then ascetic monasticism, he refers to the works of men such as Origen and Clement of Alexandria, the Cappodocians, Chrysostom, Tertullian, Cyprian, and Ambrose to show how the greater Church was combining them with Greek natural-law thinking and the ascetic ideal of finding self-sufficiency by freeing oneself from dependence on property to produce a new social ethic of agape and mutual equality. Property is not malum per se, but men are freed by the gospel from dependence on it and for the use of it in the service of others in need.

H. shows how various local churches put these concepts into practice and concludes that they virtually revolutionized antiquity's attitude toward the use of wealth. Yet, for all this, a well-defined "Christian doctrine of property" cannot be extracted from early Christianity which can be simply and directly applied to our industrial world with its progressive accumulation of productive capital and the concentration of economic power in the hands of a few people (including the state), together with the transfer to public corporations of the welfare work earlier associated with possessions. He concludes with a short chapter of ten insightful theses as a beginning toward bridging that gap. Altogether, a very useful little foundation book for a time of perplexity in Christian social ethics.

Paul B. Clayton, Jr.


A workmanlike treatment of Origen's De oratione. The opening chapter, on the formal literary character of the work, is followed by a series of chapters that deal with the major topics considered by Origen and that relate those topics to theological themes in his thought. The analysis of vocabulary, style, structure, and literary form shows that we must understand De oratione as a "scientific" theological work rather than as a homily or mystical lecture. That it belongs to the genus deliberativum explains its un-
systematic character and accounts for Origen’s concentration on a variety of topics. The chapters which discuss these topics include sensible treatments of O.’s views of the different kinds of prayers, the problem whether one can pray to Christ, the role of the Spirit, the relation of prayer to God’s providence, and the question whether prayer for daily bread and for the state can be reconciled with O.’s insistence upon praying only for “great and heavenly things.” At a third level, the book goes on to show that the view of prayer implied by O.’s arguments is integral to his doctrine of the image of God, to his understanding of providence and free will, and to his account of the Christian life.

G.’s work might be strengthened in two respects. First, a more careful account needs to be given of the relationship between the literary analysis, the description of O.’s topical discussions, and the theological themes to which they are related. Second, the last of these levels deserves fuller and more systematic treatment.

Rowan A. Greer


Aelred’s best work is “both the supreme achievement of monastic speculation on friendship and the high water mark of that tradition.” Sympathetic to the humanism of his day and filled with the monastic love of Scripture and the Fathers, A. treats from his warm, personal experience (“In that multitude of brethren I found no one whom I did not love, and no one by whom... I was not loved... I felt... my spirit transfused into all and the affection of all to have passed into me...”), his excellent doctrine, and his brilliant reworking and christianizing of Cicero’s De amicitia, an issue scarcely discussed by the Fathers. By means of the Ciceronian dialogue, A. explicitates the origins and essence of friendship, its fruition and excellence, and its practical difficulties. “Friendship is mutual harmony in affairs human and divine coupled with benevolence and charity,” which must come from Christ, progress through Christ, and come to rest in Christ. Because Christ died for others, he is the supreme model for all friendships. The befriended man receives the kiss of Christ “from the mouth of another,” whereas the friendless man is entirely alone and comparable to a “beast.” Also, “God is friendship,” animating every true friendship with charity and excluding every vice and selfish motive. Because friendship is love flowing from reason united with affection, it is pure and sweet. A person must carefully select his friends, test them, and only then admit them into that communion of total openness which excludes all flattery, suspicion, evasion, and concealment.

This excellent book is the first English translation of A.’s Friendship based on a fully critical text; it contains, moreover, a fine introduction by Douglas Roby to A.’s life, doctrine, sources, and place in the monastic tradition. A.’s warm, relaxed, humane “horizontal” mysticism of friendship provides an excellent counterpoint to the traditional overstressing of the “vertical” mysticism of suffering, darkness, and the despising of all things human. It is regrettable that the mystical and monastic tradition did not follow up and develop A.’s fertile theme.

Harvey Egan, S.J.

The third of a six-volume survey of illuminated manuscripts produced in the British Isles. The series aims at revising E. Millar’s *English Illuminated Manuscripts* written nearly half a century ago, but with more descriptive details. K.’s volume contains a catalogue of some one hundred illuminated manuscripts of the period 1066–1190 drawn from an immensely rich field. He uses much of the work done in the last thirty years scattered among learned journals, inaccessible monographs, and catalogues, and presents his material clearly and concisely. After an introduction, he offers a history of manuscript production in England for this period, treats stylistic developments and the iconography of religious manuscripts, and ends with a discussion of the symbolism, typology, and pictorial diagrams. A thorough catalogue of each manuscript follows, and it includes descriptions of the illuminations, discussion of the style, sources, and influences, the provenance of the manuscript, and an up-to-date bibliography with a list of previous exhibitions.

K.’s selection of manuscripts is happy and the excellence of the four-color illustrations makes us wish that more of them were in color. Some of the black-and-white reproductions tend to be greyish in tone and less sharp than desirable. This is particularly evident in fig. 50, “The City of God,” which is not as sharp in contrast nor as clear as the same illustrated in Dodwell’s *The Canterbury School of Illumination 1066–1200* (Cambridge, 1954) pl. 17a. Otherwise this is a well-produced book and a fine addition to the growing literature that reflects an increased interest in the illuminated manuscripts of English medieval art.

*Henry J. Bertels, S.J.*


An old problem in educational theory has to do with what was called the transfer of training. Does the fact that a student has, in a disciplined and insightful way, learned, let us assume, to read Latin, mean that he or she will apply that same disciplined and perceptive approach to other questions? If we examine the religious thought of Isaac Newton from such a perspective, we are in for a shock.

M.’s short but magisterial four 1973 Freemantle lectures treat the elaborate mass of unpublished and hitherto unavailable writings of the great scientist on religion. In his lifetime Newton gave out to the public only some thirty pages of theology. Privately, however, he worked feverishly in the area, producing upwards of a million words on the majesty of God, on his own personal modified antitrinitarian posture, and on the apocalyptic tradition of the Bible. What is amazing is that some of Newton’s most extraordinary and highly elaborated interpretations of the Apocalypse seem to have been composed simultaneously with, and in a curiously similar style to, the final editing of the *Principia*, his towering scientific work that has profoundly influenced Western thought for centuries. The articulation of the careful, spare pages of the scientific masterpiece ends up being of no help and even no little harm to Newton when he moves among the images of Daniel and the seer of Patmos.

We are left with a question. Despite the self-assurance, verging on arrogance, of the tracts, is there any possibility that Newton refrained from publishing in the religious area, not only because he feared the harsh treatment meted out to the heterodox, but also because secretly he suspected something was wrong with his approach? We can only hope so. At any rate, no
student of religious or scientific thought can afford to miss M.'s jewel of a work on a great but flawed genius.
Frank R. Haig, S.J.


Roman Catholic liturgists, theologians of the sacraments, and pastors of the sick should not succumb to the temptation to dismiss this book because it concerns the healing ministry in the Church of England. Through the eyes of Anglican writers—historians, theologians, ecclesiastical commissions, and others concerned with the sick—G. presents the history of the whole Church's (not just the English Church's) healing ministry, laying on of hands, and anointing of the sick. In footnotes he refers to their Roman Catholic counterparts. A final chapter considers the revisions in the liturgy for the sick initiated at Vatican II and now promulgated.

Since the Anglican understanding of healing, discussed in chap. 2, is "high," G. provides Roman Catholics with as thorough a study of ministry to the sick and of the sacrament of anointing as can be found in strictly Roman Catholic literature at present. Immediately apparent in the first chapter, moreover, is that Roman Catholics have much to learn from the Church of England about pastoral care for the sick. What is only beginning now in this regard in Roman Catholicism. Though informative and inspiring for anyone, of any denomination, concerned about the Church's care of the sick, G.'s book is a thorough scholarly study of the past and present rites for the sick in the Church of England. Hence portions of the book will be skimmed by others besides liturgical scholars and historians.
Christopher Kiesling, O.P.


This short volume is part of a longer, unpublished study of the Anglican episcopate, presumably a thesis for the Facoltà Teologica di Milano, although the author is not too clear about it. It is divided into four chapters, a brief conclusion, and a long bibliography. The chapters examine (1) the teaching of the 39 Articles, (2) the Book of Common Prayer, (3) the Lambeth Conferences and the semi-official Report on Christian Doctrine usually called Doctrine in the Church of England published in 1938, (4) the relations between the Church of England and other, non-Anglican churches.

This book could have been written before Vatican II, the creation of the Secretariat for Christian Unity, and the publication of the Windsor Statement and the Canterbury Statement by the Anglican-Roman Catholic International Commission; for there is no allusion of any kind to any of them in its pages. The latest relations between the Church of England and the Catholic Church with which D. is acquainted are the Malines Conversations. The treatment of the material is pedestrian: very little information is given on the background of each text, and there is no attempt at historical or theological exegesis of what is quoted. The bibliography is in chronological order and ends in 1961. So, except for
one page on the Lambeth Conference of 1968, the text must have been written before Vatican II. It should not have been published without being brought up to date. Italian readers deserve better than this.

George H. Tavard


A detailed historical study of the Czechoslovak Schism, which, according to N., "represents a most advanced type of progressive rebellion against a whole theological school of thought and ecclesiastical practice" (p. 8) in the twentieth century. After a helpful, interesting introductory study of the meaning of heresy and schism and of its application to the Czechoslovak Church, L. deals with "The Seeds of Schism," "The Emergence of the Czechoslovak Church," the "Czechoslovak-Orthodox Schism," and the final realization of "an independent and national church." A useful index completes the work.

The study is noteworthy for several reasons. First, it underscores the fact that "heretical authenticity" has always been a special characteristic of the Czechoslovak Church. By denying the doctrine of the Trinity, the divinity of Jesus Christ, and the Church as an instrument of salvation, the promoters of the new church made it unmistakably clear that they wanted a Christianity "that does not get its ideas and religious testimony from the past but from the present" (p. 61), i.e., they espoused the human and, particularly, the Czech cultural and moral conditions as the main and perhaps only valid source of theologizing. This dichotomy between divine revelation and the human condition became the greatest tragedy of the Czechoslovak Church. Second, it becomes evident in the study that the Czechoslovak Church "should not be counted as merely politically or culturally or socially inspired as were some others like the Great Eastern Schism (1054). It must be considered as a real church schism, with a direct interaction between heresy and schism, since both gave preference to protest and revolt before reform" (p. 59). Finally, the whole history of this modern, contemporary schism (1918–71) is a striking example of what can happen to thousands and millions of sincere believers when they fall into the hands of ambitious leaders driven uncompromisingly by intellectual pride, indomitable ambition, and personal contention.

This study is highly recommended to all those who are interested in seeing what might happen to a particular church when the nationalistic, patriotic, and intellectual framework negates both the formal and the material elements of divine revelation.

Sabbas J. Kilian, O.F.M.


Although the title of A.'s book refers to both Emmanuel Mounier and Jacques Maritain, it is clear that Mounier, founder and editor of *Esprit*, is the central philosophical figure in relation to whom the text is organized. The intellectual thrust of his life's activities is embodied in the development of the philosophical outlook he terms personalism. A. describes Mounier's personalism this way: "Committed to the primacy of the person as a free and spiritual being, Personalism denies all attempts to reduce the human person
to any immanent order of society, politics, and history. Committed to the person as an embodied and communal being, Personalism equally denies all doctrines that deny man’s temporality and historicity in the name of a transcendent order” (p. 13).

The strength of A.’s text lies mainly in his careful, scholarly exposition of the historical ground from which Mounier’s position emerges. Special attention is given to Maritain’s influence upon Mounier and the similarities and differences in their viewpoints. In addition, A. argues quite persuasively in the case of Mounier and Maritain that “Understanding a twentieth century intellectual often involves understanding his reactions to the events of the public life” (p. 105). In this light he describes the shattering effect of World War II upon Mounier’s philosophical position. He concludes with a brief consideration of Mounier’s intellectual activity from 1945 until his untimely death in 1950.

While much of this book is devoted to a fascinating account of French Catholic intellectual life in the first half of this century, A. does undertake a critical evaluation of Mounier’s personalism. The main weakness I find is that Mounier’s description of personalism is too vague. Still, one must give credit to Mounier for his realization that something like personalism constitutes an authentic response to the human situation.

Thomas V. Curley


As the subtitle indicates, the comparison between Teilhard and Vatican II is restricted to the Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World (Gaudium et spes). The book is divided into two parts, of which the first is a survey of Teilhard’s evolutionary vision of the world. This account is the fruit of K.’s personal investigation of Teilhard’s works, although he also made use of many of the expositions of the Teilhardian synthesis that have appeared during the past fifteen years. The second and main part inquires whether the dynamic and evolutionary conception of the Pastoral Constitution is a response of the Church to aspects of Teilhard’s world vision. The cautious but generally affirmative reply K. gives to this question is based partly on his examination of the document in its final form, but mostly and more importantly on his study of many commentaries on the Constitution and histories of the conciliar debates published by several bishops and a number of experts who were actively present at the Council.

During the arduous labor of composing Gaudium et spes, the Council fathers often referred to discussions earlier conducted in France and Belgium on the relation of theology and faith to modern currents of thought, discussions which owed much to Teilhard, whose writings and lectures had stimulated a whole generation. His ideas had circulated so widely and penetrated so deeply that reactions to his thinking, both positive and negative, were voiced throughout the conciliar proceedings. As far as K. is concerned, the significant point is not that the Council draws directly on the Teilhardian corpus, but that it sees the modern world in the dynamic perspective so closely associated with the French Jesuit. The situation was well summed up several months after the Council by Cardinal König, who, in speaking of the “new look of the Church,” made
references to the influence exerted by modern theologians, with emphasis on the "great visions of Teilhard de Chardin."

*Cyril Vollert, S.J.


The major thesis of G.'s book is that the effects of the Enlightenment with which Protestantism has been contending for over two hundred years have caused the current crisis and confusion in the Catholic Church. The root of the problem, he believes, is the post-Enlightenment refusal to accept a dichotomy between two orders of reality, the natural and the supernatural, and the acknowledgment of the historicity and hence mutability of the dogmas and institutions which have embodied Christian faith. Paradoxically, G. believes that out of this institutional and intellectual chaos an authentic Catholic synthesis of the gospel and modernity could be achieved, and he looks to Catholicism rather than to Protestantism for a creative interpretation of Christianity today. Among the resources available for this task he mentions the Catholic sense of tradition, the strong awareness of being a people, the sacramental principle, and the emphasis on rational reflection as an essential moment within faith.

Personally, I found the book one of the most perceptive statements of the Catholic situation today. The book should be recommended not only for its brilliant analysis but also for its constructive statement, since G. gives us as well a concise but penetrating introduction to the problem of theological methodology. He mentions two poles in Christian theology: stories, myths, symbols, and scientific and philosophical analysis. Theology today must be characterized primarily by the story form, since the most fundamen-tal relation to God is that of dramatic encounter. But religious symbols invite conceptualization, without which they are empty and lifeless. Thus G. mentions the following levels of theology: the historical, in which the theologian inquires into what the Christian symbols meant; the eidetic, in which he works toward a unifying and coherent meaning for the symbols; the constructive, in which he explores the meaning of the symbols for us; the ontological, in which he relates the symbols to his philosophical world view; and the ethical, in which he examines the implications of the symbols for praxis.

This essay is written in the tradition of liberal theology, which is characterized by a dialog between Christian faith and secular culture. G. is aware of the risks this involves, but his approach is cautious and well balanced and hence minimizes the risk and invites the challenge.

*John J. O'Donnell, S.J.


As M. admits in the Preface, writing a book about "man" involves a "measure of presumption," but he carries it off with some success. *Man* explores the relation of the Christian vision of man to contemporary anthropology. Although brief and, due to the comprehensiveness of the topic, quite general, it is a valuable contribution to the discussion of Christian anthropology.

The first chapter discusses the significance of the question "What is man?" for concrete human experience, and locates the place of Christian anthropology with respect to biological and cultural anthropology, ethnology, and religious anthropology in general. The next chapter examines the specific predicament of humanity in modern industrial society: man's domination
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of the world through technology and industrialization has proved as much a threat to mankind as a vehicle for its fulfilment. M. then attempts to uncover the views of humanity which are implicit in three of the most typical "types" (social and political romanticism, inward emigration, and utopian consciousness) which characterize man's response to this predicament. Having thus established the context of contemporary anthropology, he examines and evaluates the specific images of humanity by which men live and work today (e.g., Marxism, activism, the legal system, the radical right and left, personalism) and the doctrines of salvation which are implicit in these visions of man. The final chapter very briefly outlines the theological vision which serves as the basis for his evaluation of these various images. The criteria he presents are essentially those which have come to characterize his theology of hope.

_**Man**_ does not offer any fresh theological insights. It does, however, offer a fresh and provocative illustration of the theology of hope's implications for Christian anthropology.

_Robert Masson_


Social questions are not as easy for the Church to judge as dogmatic questions. There was a day when Christians owned slaves, for instance, and the Church went along with the practice. So, too, there was a day when people judged the asking of interest on a loan an evil thing, and the Church shared their view. With time, however, the Church ceased seeing slavery as licit and began to allow the asking of interest on loans. Will a Pope some day call capitalism "intrinsically evil," as Pius XI called communism not long ago? And will a Pope call for a Christian socialism? Groups of Christians for Socialism have held congresses in Spain (1973), Italy (1973), and Canada (1975). But the most dramatic congress sponsored by the movement was the 1972 meeting at Santiago, Chile. Christians have been referring to that gathering ever since as a scandal—or a sign of hope—depending on their point of view.

This volume, documenting the Santiago meeting, is a well-chosen selection of the letters, statements, and counterstatements exchanged by the organizers of that meeting and their critics, including the bishops of Chile. The bishops finally forbade priests and religious to join the movement. But that only fudged the issue. No one was asking whether priests may join such a cause, but whether Christians may. After reading these documents we will realize that though the Chilean hierarchy took an unequivocal practical stand, they did not settle the root issue: is socialism the (or even a) Christian way to shape society? Temporarily, the movement has gone underground, but it will no doubt surface again. Hence the importance of this volume, which raises most of the basic issues.

_Eugene K. Culhane, S.J._


A collection of what L. considers the best items appearing during 1973 in his question-and-answer column _The Moral Angle_, which is syndicated nationally in some seventy-five newspapers. In two pages the opening chapter facilely disposes of the "new morality" as that philosophical relativism "which contradictorily proposes as an absolute truth that there is no absolute truth" and "leads inevitably to the pernicious doctrine that a good
end justifies immoral means” (p. 15). L. prefers the old morality, which “affirms that man has a definite, objective way of acting in order to fulfill himself as man” (p. 16).

The subsequent eleven chapters touch upon a multitude of topics, e.g., human life-engineering, death and life, crime and punishment, privacy, marriage, nudity and obscenity, the individual and the state. In the chapter on death and life, L. speaks approvingly of the theory of mediate animation and concludes that abortion in the earliest stages of pregnancy is to be condemned as illicit birth-control, but not as murder of a human person. Regarding the penal system, L. suggests that it might be improved by a return to corporal punishment. In his discussion of man and the state, he argues against outlawing handguns so long as the government does not sufficiently protect individuals from assault; also, the possession of such weapons by the general populace “does much to cool the ambitions of a would-be tyrant” (p. 127).

At times the gratuitousness of L.’s remarks appears rather outrageous; he views nudists as being on a retrogressive course towards savagery. An inexcusable lapse of charity and propriety occurs when L. speaks glowingly of the fact that “the normal person reacts towards faggots somewhat as he does towards maggots” (p. 102).

L. intends the book for those who think for themselves, yet he offers few sound principles for moral reflection with which readers might grapple. There is more assertion than argumentation, and L. finds in the natural law more answers to specific problems than most professional moralists would dare to hope for or care to defend.

Vincent J. Genovesi, S.J.

W. proposes that the starting point for moral discourse is the quality of relationship among people. He uses the concept of partnership, defined as mutual dependence and reciprocal influence, as a description and prescriptive paradigm for morality on the individual and political levels. The book is too brief for an adequate development of the implications of this basic premise, although there are indications of its meaning for a reinterpretation of natural-law theories and for the understanding of the Christian mysteries of suffering, hope, and prayer. The second section applies the insights of the theoretical essay to the political problems of Watergate, the relation between national interest and national integrity, and the possibility of a just war in the contemporary world. In all three instances the insights into the problems are promising. They deserve and demand a more comprehensive treatment than they receive. W. is seeking a middle ground between the political idealists and realists and between pacifists and power theorists. The book is an introduction to some of the problems of political ethics and should be expanded in both its theoretical and practical areas.

Jerome R. Dollard, O.S.B.


We have received many beautiful and inspiring books from N. in recent years, so our expectations are high, especially when we know that he considers this book to be closer to him than anything he has previously written and that it came to fulness during a long retreat in a Cistercian monastery. And we are not disappointed. The book is a response to the question “What does it mean to live a life in the Spirit of Jesus Christ?” N.’s answer (which surprisingly rarely mentions
Jesus Christ or his Spirit) is that it is a “reaching out” to our innermost self (the in and out here are a little confusing), to our fellow human beings, and to our God, with honesty, care, and prayer, “reaching out” from loneliness, hostility, and illusions to find solitude, hospitality, and prayer. There is a very sensitive and penetrating exploration of loneliness and hostility, one that might touch the nerve centers of almost every reader. Coupled with it is wise insight into the sacredness of the inner sanctuary.

As N. opens out the mystery of solitude, one may not only begin to understand for the first time why in all times and cultures some men and women have been drawn to go apart and live a solitary life, but also grasp some previously unappreciated dimensions of one’s own life. To the complex relationships of parent, child, teacher, student, counselor, counselee, and by inference to all interpersonal relationships, N. brings the deeply Christian and unifying concept of hospitality. However, as N. shows, solitude and hospitality can only bear lasting fruits when they are embedded in a broader, deeper, and higher reality from which they receive their vitality. After the rich and deep insights of the first two sections, on our relationships with ourselves and with others, the third section, on our relationship with God in prayer, is somewhat disappointing. However, N. does give a good summary of the Way of the Pilgrim and its teaching on the Jesus Prayer, along with a general introduction to hesychasm. There are many sentences in this book that should become epigrams. Indeed, a beautiful little book.

M. Basil Pennington, O.C.S.O.

A New Pentecost? By Leon Joseph Cardinal Suenens. Translated from the French by Francis Martin. New York: Seabury, 1975. Pp. xiii + 236. $7.95. S. gives us a sympathetic account of the charismatic-renewal movement abroad in the Church today. His interest, however, is not limited to “Pentecostalism,” either in its classical Protestant forms or in its more recent Catholic manifestations. Expressing concern over the lack of an adequate pneumatology in Catholic thought, he attempts to trace the role of the Spirit in faith, in the contemporary experience of God, in the Church’s worship, and in popular devotion.

Happily, S. situates the theology of the Spirit in the broader context of ecclesiology. One’s fundamental vision of the Church, he argues, inevitably shapes one’s view of the power and action of the Spirit in the Church. After exposing what he considers a false dichotomy between “charismatic” and “institutional” views of church, S. goes on to assert that mere “sociological Christianity”—institutional allegiance without mature adult commitment—has little future. Along with Rahner, S. sees a new kind of Christian and thus a new kind of church emerging: a smaller flock composed of “those who want to belong” (p. 126).

Also valuable are S.’s brief chapters on the history of charismatic experience in the Church and on the relationship between the Spirit and Christian worship. He underscores the role of the Spirit in the entire sacramental economy, rather than limiting his attention to the Eucharist alone. Of concern as well for S. is the place of the Spirit in ecumenical discussions about doctrine and sacramental practice.

S.’s book is a welcome addition to the growing literature about charismatic renewal in the Christian churches. Its balanced tone reveals both the author’s personal optimism about the future of the movement as well as his deep respect for traditional Catholic values of faith and prayer. The concluding chapter is a candid testimony to the Spirit as the source of
S.'s joyful hope for a continuing Pentecost among all Christians.

Nathan Mitchell, O.S.B.


Although this collection of essays culled from periodicals and books is intended to be a textbook for college courses on religion and modern literature, it can serve admirably as a sort of seminar for any theologian who wants to understand the difficulties, methodologies, and worth of this relatively new area of study. The book is divided into three sections: (1) "Relationships between Religion and Literature," in which the theoretical questions are discussed; (2) "Religious Backgrounds of Modern Literature," which shows the image of the modern world that literature offers; (3) "Religious Dimensions in Modern Literature," the major part of the book, in which individual works and authors are considered (Kafka, Conrad, Camus, Faulkner, Beckett, and others). Here, unfortunately, there are no studies of any of the Jewish novelists who are so important in North American literature today. It is also strange that the "Barthian" John Updike has been overlooked.

The great advantage of this collection is the stimulus it provides by embracing a variety of positions on religion and literature. In the first section in particular the reader is won over to one argument, only to have it challenged in the next essay. The different approaches to the subject are also exemplified in the practical sections. Consequently, although the editors have predictably and rightly included pieces by the leading scholars in this field—among them, Nathan A. Scott, Jr., Amos Wilder, and Cleanth Brooks—plus essays by writers such as Eliot, Auden, and Flannery O'Connor, the impact and usefulness of this critical anthology comes primarily from the interaction of the various essays, whose broad spectrum forces us to search out our own critical position on the relationship of religion and literature.

Kenneth C. Russell


B. has given us an excellent book, a veritable Portnoy's Complaint in reverse. The question throughout is, what does it mean to be a Jew? It is addressed to Jews by a Jew. His analysis and answer make us non-Jews jealous, for it is no matter easily settled or easily set forth to seek what it means to be a Jew. Doing a Jewish thing, or describing it being done, is cloaked in one escape after another. When we place our values behind our emotions, when we ask ourselves why we have values, where they came from, what difference they make, what the world would be without them—when we answer these questions, then and only then are we getting to our Jewishness.

If human dignity is self-determination, then let such determination be just that—self-determination. Our determinations as ethical are group-originated and sustaining of our humanity. So why deny where they came from or that we possess them? Why deny ourselves even to ourselves? To be Jewish is to be responsibly alienated from any group which does not strive to make human life human and to be persistent through the ages in this. Israel as a nation is allowed no moral mistakes, and the world still needs a nation so obligated. It and Jewishness rest on God, the true God. And to be Jewish is to strip away that last mask which hides ourselves from Him. He
made us, He sustains us, and our hatred of ourselves and by others lies ultimately in the fact that He chose us as His emissaries to men.

David A. Boileau

BOOKS RECEIVED

SCRIPTURAL STUDIES


Wahlberg, R. C. Jesus according to a Woman. N.Y.: Paulist, 1975. Pp. 106. $1.45.


DOCTRINAL THEOLOGY


HISTORICAL


Leaver, R. A. Luther on Justification. St. Louis: Concordia, 1975. Pp. 84. $3.95.


Mennessier, A. I., O.P. Pattern for a Christian according to St. Thomas


MORAL, LAW, LITURGY

Jamison, A. Liturgies for Children. Cincinnati: St. Anthony Messenger, 1975. Pp. 120. $2.45.


PASTORAL AND ASCETICAL


PHILOSOPHY


**SPECIAL QUESTIONS**


