BOOK REVIEWS


What historical relationships have existed between the components of what W. calls "the metaphysical trinity" of God, man, and world, and how can the historical findings guide us today? W. finds no easy answer at hand and feels compelled, indeed, to plow his own furrow in opposition to some accepted responses. He cannot accept Karl Löwith's simplification, for instance, that the move from the Greek to the Christian climate was one going from a purely cosmocentric to a purely anthropocentric-theocentric view. The Greeks are among our masters concerning self-knowledge; and contrariwise the interior man of Augustine and the Fathers was strongly interested in this cosmos which God created, loved, and kept open to manifestations of the divine. And whereas Karl Barth found a Christian anthropology acceptable but a Christian cosmology unthinkable, the medievals sought to achieve a harmonic synthesis between them. The question in the modern era remains: Have scientific and social changes in the world view opened up too large a gap for the religious process of sacral cosmization to achieve a new sense of union?

Although W. is a careful student of Teilhard de Chardin and Peter Berger, he does not use them as talismanic dispensations from doing some hard historical work of one's own in the history of human cosmogonies and social rituals. The book's distinctive feature is a twofold commitment to historical research and the renewal of Catholic speculative theology, in such fashion that advances in the latter sphere are bound up with textual and reflective work in the former. It is not enough to leap from biblical religion to the latest form of evolutionary and process theology, since such a leap eventually loses momentum and direction for failing to examine in depth the previous human modes of perceiving the bonds between religious belief, social meaning, and world image.

Part 1 investigates not "the theological background of medieval cosmology" but "the cosmological background of medieval theology." The development of arts and sciences furnished a receptive soil for assimilating Greek ideas of the cosmos, and thus for stimulating theologians to make a more realistic interpretation of the world in terms of internal structure as well as religious significance. One can expand upon this process with the aid of M.-D. Chenu's somewhat neglected Nature, Man, and Society in the Twelfth Century, which studies the interplay of scientific and social ideas with new theological perspec-
tives in Western Europe. Had the later medieval and Renaissance theologians been more historically mindful of this reciprocity and the cultural limitations it introduced into their own conceptual and linguistic forms, they might have taken a less militaristic stance against the next wave of scientific and social ideas.

Part 2 deals with the breakup of the medieval cosmos in the progression from Copernicus to Darwin. It is well grounded in the sources and studies of the scientific revolution, providing a counterpart to John Dillenberger’s *Protestant Thought and Natural Science*. Although W. gives a somewhat routine recital of the scientific developments themselves, he makes two important points about their religious and theological impact. First, the human import of the new sciences was brought home to people most forcefully through the interpretive work of literary and philosophical writers. The latter were not merely serving as scientific popularizers but were also establishing the distinctiveness of literature and philosophy. No one of these emancipations from the cultural past can be simply revoked in any present search after a new type of synthesis among human disciplines. Second, W. uses examples of Catholic theologians from Lessius and Bérulle to Newman and Ehrle to show a steadily increasing receptivity to mechanistic and evolutionary ideas.

Our best way to profit from Part 3 on the contemporary situation is to notice the components of the problem. Concepts of “world” come to us from astronomers and geneticists, phenomenologists and poets—none of whose voices can be silenced. The two final chapters look for synthesizing help in the *imago mundi* conceived by Teilhard and in the process thinking of Whitehead and Hartshorne. W. rightly regards them all as probers and inciters for reconstructing speculative theology. But the latter work will have to be done, in their own modes and methodologies, by theologians themselves who are not mere compilers or echo chambers of the latest noise. Agreeing with this, I would only add that the earlier parts of W.’s book show the need to bring historical patterns, resources, and exemplary failures into the total picture of contemporary theologizing. I hope that W. (who has lectured at the Graduate Theological Union at Berkeley) will prepare an English version of this fine account of how the future of theology is always bound up with the integrity of scholarship concerning the world.

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JAMES COLLINS


In his opening pages, M. makes the unassailable assertion that
religious faith in our time has run into serious difficulty and proposes to explore both the reasons why this is so and the implications which the present crisis has for the future. His study is divided into five parts, each further divided into several sections and followed by copious, carefully documented notes.

M. sees the root problem in that faith has become divorced from something called “reason,” a separation brought about by the Cartesian delusion, the belief that reason is one single, simple entity, with one method for dealing with the whole of human experience, with definite rules of evidence and logic applicable to all rational processes and acceptable to all decent, reasonable men. Instead, M. states as his central thesis that the human spirit relates itself to reality (or reality relates itself to the human spirit) in at least four ways, which may be subsumed under the headings of at least four first-order studies: science, art, religion, and morality, each of which has a claim to equality of citizenship in the realm of the human spirit, while being internally autonomous and externally linked to all the others.

M. works out his central thesis chiefly in the context of two secondary theses concerned with religion and morality respectively. It is impossible, however, even in a lengthy review, to summarize adequately the richness of M.'s contribution. I will therefore concentrate principally on Part 3, where, having previously shown how faith came to be divorced from reason (Part 1) and how the human spirit can and should acknowledge dependence on a Creative Will (Part 2), M. outlines what he considers a viable process of revelation. Part of the difficulty with history as revelation theory lies in the fact that attempts have so far presupposed the possibility of an armchair view of history, as though man can look at historical facts from the outside. M. insists that history must be written from within, for historical events are person-centered and as such are largely interpreted fact. Instead of trying to write the history of revelation, it would be better to write the history of faith. In this way the dichotomy between faith and history (reason) breaks down. To write the history of faith and then say that history cannot validate either this faith or its particular content is to make a remark of the utmost irrelevance. Does history expect to validate science and its content, or art and its content, or morality and its content? Man can and should acknowledge the presence of a Creative Will on whom he radically depends, a Creative Will that is “personal” (therefore trustworthy), purposeful, and active in this world particularly in key events, most especially in those key events which have major significance for the future of religious belief. Now the very least that may be said about Jesus as a man of faith is that he stands at the center of a major historical event whose effects are visible to this
day—one cannot even write the history of an apparently neutral science like economics without mentioning Christianity. But the effects of the existence of Jesus are evident primarily as they renew faith in a unique way. The religious man, then, sees Jesus and the kind of faith he inspires as brought about by the direct providence of a Creative Will. Approached from within, as the history of faith, the life and destiny of Jesus appear as natural as any other. This means that we cannot say a priori that his faith could not be of purely human origin.

At this point, it seems that one is far removed from faith, at least as Roman Catholics understand it. But if M. merits attentive reading in general, he does so especially here; for it is not merely a question of Jesus as a man of faith; it is also a matter of the kind of faith he inspires. This includes not only moral response by commitment to development of this world (M. argues in Part 4 that there is a specifically Christian morality on what he calls the integral eschatological level) but also, if M. is consistent with his principles, the content of the faith itself: e.g., the divinity of Jesus (abstracting from the culture in which this is expressed), his bodily resurrection, the hierarchical nature of the Church at least as an authority (as distinguished from power) structure. It is this totality which is part of the faith which Jesus inspires and which the religious man sees as brought about by a Creative Will who acts in history.

My primary concern, however, is not with the orthodoxy of M.'s views but with their adequacy: for all but an inveterate intégriste, everything M. says can not only be harmonized with the Catholic faith but in large measure enhances it. It should first be noted that the events of the OT and NT (i.e., those which can be verified) appear ordinary in the extreme and, as far as revelation is concerned, are not self-authenticating. What leads to the conviction that God has revealed is the result not of history but of a prereflective insight into man's radical contingency and consequent dependence on a Creative Will which is trustworthy and active in the events of this world. Now whatever else it is, such an insight is not history. Consequently, an objection similar to that which M. raises against Latourelle and to some extent against Pannenberg may in turn be leveled against him: it is still not history as such which reveals. More important, one might ask whether a Buddhist or a Muslim could not see his respective founder as the center of a major historical event affecting faith and by the same process of reasoning described above see God present in this founder and believe as wholeheartedly in him as an authentic Christian does in Jesus. Would not this act of faith, on M.'s principles, be an equally responsible intellectual act? From what M. explicitâtes in this book, it is not clear how he could logically avoid
saying with Jaspers that Christianity may be the religion best suited for the West but that like all other higher religions it is man-made through and through; that the language of revelation not only adds nothing to the language of faith but that both are reducible to the language of cipher.

These criticisms affect only the first of M.'s secondary theses. Having dealt in Part 3 with the process of revelation, M. takes up in Part 4 the relation of religion to morality. Like other first-order studies, morality is internally autonomous: nothing has to be "proved" or postulated for God and the afterlife in order to get the moral enterprise off the ground or even to be concomitant with it. But morality, though internally autonomous, is linked to other first-order studies, especially to religion. Thus, following a lead from Maclagan, M. considers that the Kantian postulate of a moral being as the ground of the universe and the afterlife, far from being the foundation of moral theory, is the product of moral response itself. Clearly, the moral agent out to improve the lot of the human race would like to feel that the universe is not indifferent to his efforts. The door is thereby open to the possibility of faith, because it is open to the possibility of hope, for the persistently moral agent implicitly asks questions which only faith can answer. Indeed, M. claims that the deliberate rejection of the possibility of faith tends to absolutize sociopolitical systems, thereby impeding future moral response at its very core. In this context, one might wish that M. had faced Ernst Bloch as effectively as he has faced Bertrand Russell. Whether Bloch has been philosophically successful in grounding hope in a materialistic principle is one thing; but to imply, at least by omission, that others have not equivalently asked themselves about the external link between religion and morality and answered negatively where M. answers affirmatively is something else again.

Common to M.'s remarks both on process of revelation theory and the source of moral law is his critique of the so-called Logos concept of divinity. This reviewer wonders whether M.'s position is not only oversimplified but to some extent inconsistent: oversimplified because, though an excessive development of this concept cannot cope with randomness in nature and man's real future flowing from his freedom, there could still be a divine plan for the evolution of man and his world without its being knowable *quaod nos*; inconsistent, because in Part 4, despite randomness in nature and man's real future, M. insists on the given in man and nature as a God-given guide to moral response. Is this so incompatible with a purified Logos concept? Those who think the Logos concept belongs on the ash heap of history might ask themselves whether Christians should too quickly discard a concept which links Christianity with a widespread religious phenomenon like Hinduism.
Space allows me to make only passing reference to other points: (1) M. seems occasionally to consider acknowledgment (a result of prereflective insight which criticism must purify but for which it cannot substitute) as an inferior kind of knowledge (p. 253), whereas it might well be the other way around; (2) the problem of the relation between faith and reason antedates Descartes by at least five centuries—the dominant scriptural passage cited on faith throughout the Middle Ages was Heb 11:1—a fact rendered more complex by the inconsistencies of the Latin Averroists; (3) M. states that Jewish belief in the resurrection preceded Jesus (p. 199), apparently unaware that at the time of Jesus not even the Pharisees conceived of the possibility of an individual resurrection prior to a general resurrection at the last day; (4) he maintains that those who follow Vatican I's views on the relation between faith and reason are really crypto-Bultmannians (p. 134), a remark which seems unjustified even as hyperbole. It is true that chapter 4 of the Constitutio de fide catholica speaks of two orders of knowledge distinct not only in principle but also in object (DS 1795); however, neither of them is concerned with motives of credibility touched upon in chapter 3 (DS 1790), motives which, though inadequate as a process of revelation even in outline form, can hardly serve as a basis for the accusation of a Bultmannian divorce of faith from reason; (5) the last part of M.'s study, dealing with problems brought about by modes whereby faith is culturally incarnated in the sacramental and power (versus authority) structure of the Roman Catholic Church, though not directly related to M.'s central thesis, is nonetheless consistent with his principal purpose; but the last sections of Parts 1 and 2, "Roman Catholic Teaching on Faith and Reason" and "Roman Catholic Teaching on the Rational Approach to God," might have been better placed in appendices.

Despite these criticisms, it is clear that M. has written brilliantly in a difficult area of contemporary theology. In doing so, he has produced a book which should be considered a milestone. It is an experience rare indeed to come upon in one author both the depth and the breadth which one encounters here. The very least that must be said about M.'s study is that it makes a difference in one's thinking. And about how many books can one say that?

Marist Residence, Boston, Mass. J. Robert Dionne, S.M.


John Bowker is a Fellow of Corpus Christi College, Cambridge University, whose previous works include The Targums and Rabbinic
Literature, Problems of Suffering in the Religions of the World, and Jesus and the Pharisees. The present work is based on Wilde Lectures given at Oxford in 1972, and it is stunning. With the succeeding two parts of the trilogy (the Wilde Lectures cover three years; the subsequent lectures will study what the theistic traditions themselves say about the sense of God), it promises a major work in religious analysis.

I find this promise for two reasons. First, B. utilizes an awesome range of pertinent, fresh, and difficult materials—utilizes them judiciously and lucidly. The Sense of God is not “merely” sociological, anthropological, and psychological. It incorporates cybernetics, linguistics, physiology, phenomenology, structuralism, biology, and aesthetics as well. This installment of the oeuvre is major, therefore, in that it travels the broad gauge demanded by the contemporary knowledge explosion.

Second, The Sense of God has an intensive depth matching its extensive sweep. It concentrates on how senses of God appear in consciousness, what they mean, whether they “make sense,” how they change: come under strain, grow implausible, rise again beyond the ruins. In effect, B. is working in the radical zones of religious meaning, where the British have long held a stable camp. He is working with more than philosophical tools, however, and he is producing uncommonly constructive results. The tools amount to various techniques for mapping the boundaries “within which particular instances of human behaviour are likely or probable or even predictably certain to occur” (p. 18). The results are uncommonly constructive, if one is used to finding analytic techniques antithetical to religious belief: “Far from the disciplines we have been surveying dissolving the possible reality of reference in the term ‘God,’ they actually seem to demand a return to that possibility if sense is to be made of their own evidence” (pp. 181–82).

The argument which these techniques serve, which these results conclude, runs in eight chapters. First, B. orients his question historically. At the turn of the century, when Henry Wilde, the scientist-inventor who founded the Wilde Lectures, was flourishing, scholars of religious behavior like Müller, Durkheim, Preuss (and, later, Freud) were quite certain about the origin of “God.” In fact, they were confident of arriving at single, simple laws governing the emergence and occurrence of all manifest religious behavior. It was a novelist like Conrad who found this ambition to confine the individual nomothetically inadequate. For B., however, Lord Jim sings more than the mysteries of individual destiny. It also witnesses to “the possible innovatory effect of the reality of the objects of our belief, which are disruptive of steady-state regularity in the sequences of human life” (p. 14). Specifically, deserting the Patna worked crushingly real changes in Jim’s whole subsequent life.
Today’s behavioral science agrees with Conrad. It is far more sensitive to both the complexity and the objectivity in man’s “senses” than were its ancestors. B.'s second chapter shows this sensitivity as developed in sociology. For instance, Peter Berger’s *A Rumor of Angels* nuances Durkheim’s axiom that the social must be explained by the social, opening to other resources that contribute to the sense of God. To estimate these resources more broadly, chap. 3 turns to anthropology.

Here B. is most creative. To deal with the reference of man’s diverse senses of God, he first draws on what is known of the homeostatic, conservative nature of human life-ways. This suggests that one can explore the senses' value to man’s survival and adaptation. Next, to specify this evolutionary perspective, he forges a theoretical tool called “the principle of the compound of limitation.” This is an analysis of the factors constraining human behavior—a kind of principle of natural selection, with the addition of social and conscious components. Its utility is to supply the frame within which particular social realities may be explained. The limitations engaged by “religion” are those men have found particularly intransigent or opaque: death, random suffering, the darkness of time future and time past, etc. Anthropologically, the religions result from projected “ways through” these most difficult human limitations.

Chap. 4 focuses this anthropology of religion on a particular limitation: death. B. argues that his theory (the compound of limitation) better explains the central thrust of man’s very diverse funeral rites than the factor-analytic or structural-functional approaches now in use. In addition, it draws attention to the variety of positive cues that men have drawn from the universe. The buried seed that flowers into resurrected life, the burning log that releases breathlike smoke, the salt that permeates its solvent—these suggest that committing one's dead to the earth, or to fire or the sea, can be ways through death to life, to continued or new existence. Still, all this symbolic meaning remains very fragile. In a beautiful excursus on death in poetry and painting, B. shows how often our art balances mortal man across the abyss.

Understandably, then, man’s constructs about death rise and fall in plausibility. This prompts a chapter investigating structural accounts of religion, since they attempt to deal with the more general process of meaning-formation. Drawing on information theory, linguistics, Levy-Strauss, Piaget, specimens of music and religious discourse, B. integrates the principle of the compound of limitation with structuralist notions of constraint and systemic transformation. The upshot of a dense discussion appears to be twofold. First, a structural theology could opine “that it is not 'literally meaningless' to talk approximately of what may in
reality be the case with regard to God” (p. 111). Second, for appropriateness to occur at all in theistic language, “God” must be posited beyond the limitations for whose penetration he seems to be required.

To test this information and structural point, chaps. 6–8 are devoted to psychoanalytic, psychometric, and phenomenological trends relevant to how the sense of God arises in human consciousness. B. finds these trends confirming the importance of the possible effect of the reality of objects as encountered. This is shown by psychoanalytic moves to an object-relations theory like Fairbairn’s, close analysis devastating psychedelists’ claims about religious experience, and phenomenological evidence that “God” could give sufficient indication of his possibility “for men to move their intentionality towards it, and to receive into consciousness constructive possibilities” (p. 178).

By way of tentative conclusion, then: God just may be the cause of some of the senses of “God.” Thus, the task for theologians in regard to the behavioral sciences becomes clear: “they must endeavour to specify what would count as an effect of the claimed object of belief in their own case, and where such an effect can be discerned” (p. 182). Still, one will never know anything about the nature of God from a theology in abstraction. Phenomenology shows that “it is necessary first to ‘bracket off’ theology, and learn the intentionality which issues in prayer” (p. 180).

In summary judgment, I find The Sense of God brave, difficult, and very rewarding. B. knows the dangers in trying to poll so much new research (“the whole project is clearly absurd”), and he never overstates its positive indications. I believe that his synthetic results more than offset any defects in his huge ambition. His full notes show great labors to understand his sources well; his bibliography is more than a primer on behavioral sciences’ offerings to theology. Finally, his original poetry and nursery rhymes keep the dense cerebration in perspective. Not even God could make sense out of the book’s price; but, mercifully, the cover says that it is also available in paperback.

Pennsylvania State University


Though modest in scope and size, this book brilliantly illuminates the character of authentic religious faith by exposing its inauthentic propensities. It grew out of a series of BBC talks, and as revised the text retains the engaging lucidity of fine popular lectures without, in the main, being reduced to an exercise in haute vulgarisation. It is, in fine, quite accessible, yet truly insightful.
Four temptations are discussed, and each represents, it seems, a variation on the focal temptation of religious hubris. This is the misguided bias that religious faith provides a sort of privileged human status which exempts true believers from the relativities of human existence and the darkness of its mystery.

The first and most fundamental temptation, the lust for certitude, is the compulsion of the believer to wrest faith from the general relativity of human truth by founding it unshakably on some proximate authority, whether that be the teaching of an infallible church, the inerrant (literally interpreted) word of God, or the incontrovertible conviction of passionate subjectivity. In each case the religious fundamentalist seeks surety against relativism’s encroaching tides in religion’s mediating symbols rather than in the ultimate mystery to which they point. Thus the system of mediation collapses into a narrow, self-referential ideology.

The second temptation, cosmic vanity, is the supposition that religion provides not simply a cosmic myth which angularly projects its social matrix onto the grand screen of universal order (thereby effectively, if provisionally, correlating time and eternity, finitude and infinity, etc.) but a transcendentally objective picture of the entire universe of being. If this illusory notion that believers are somehow privy to the cosmos’ secrets is not renounced, religion itself conspires with the secularist perspective in preventing the cosmic myths from mediating a genuine religious faith in the transcendent; for then the myths constitute merely a brand of esoteric and highly suspect pseudo science.

If cosmic vanity fails to confront the patent relativity of world views, the third temptation, the pride of history, inveighs against the radical historicity of human existence. Religion is tempted either to situate ultimate meaning and human authenticity outside the flux of history or to constrict the meaning of history to an ideology readily apprehensible from within its bounds. In either case, what is involved is a desire to obviate the darkness of faith which gropes forward trusting that there is ultimate meaning though it is never fully disclosed within history. The task of faith, rather than the provision of a short cut to history’s full meaning, is to affirm man’s openness to transcendence precisely in his temporality and finitude.

The last of D.’s catalog of religion’s deadly sins, the anger of morality, is the corrupting tendency of religions to regard themselves as the full and concrete embodiment of the drive to transcendence. The compass of authentic faith cannot be confined to any limited and relative conception of morality and religious obligation. Insistence on an established pattern of behavior and thought for its own sake causes ritual, ethics, and doctrine to lose their mediating capacity and to degenerate into a closed system of ritualism, legalism, and dogmatism.
D.'s focus on religion's negative proclivities serves the positive function of bringing into relief its genuine nature. Faith, D. suggests, "is a basic trust in reality, an openness to mystery, a being drawn toward the abyss in self-forgetfulness and awe and love." It "acknowledges the relativities of finite human existence without the nihilistic denial that these do, however gropingly, lead us toward absolute meaning and value."

Minor blemishes include an unnecessarily long-winded critique of fundamentalist NT interpretation in chap. 3; the over-all weakness of chap. 4, which lacks other chapters' zest and substance and, ironically, seems more a labor of obligation than of love; and the bald gratuity of a few statements (e.g., "the papal claim [to infallibility] is no longer a question for intellectual debate"). More seriously, D. excites but largely disappoints the hope that he will provide a fully-rounded, systematic articulation of the meaning and possibility of Christian faith in a radically relativistic and postdenominational framework. Nonetheless, the book is a fine piece of critically constructive analysis and perhaps even a minor masterwork of its genre.

_Loyola Marymount University, L.A._  

John V. Loudon


This is a wide-ranging book by a distinguished British anthropologist. It deals with a topic that is of central importance in nearly all the _Geisteswissenschaften_, and it draws on its author's extensive reading in many areas and his solid professional competence. It is a book that is both useful and impressive; but it proves ultimately disappointing, because it lacks an over-all argument. Because of this lack, _Symbols_ is more valuable for the materials it brings together and for the connections it suggests than for any conclusions it proposes.

F.'s approach to the problem of symbolism is interdisciplinary and also focused on the needs of anthropologists; his aim is "to give perspective to the anthropological study of symbolic forms and processes and the functions of symbols" (p. 9). His program for doing this involves consideration of the notions of symbolism that are operative in popular discourse and in literary criticism and art criticism (chap. 1); an overview of philosophical discussions of the concepts of sign, symbol, icon, signal, and index (chap. 2); and a critical history of anthropological theories of symbolism from the early nineteenth century to the present (chaps. 3–5). F. here devotes special attention to the speculations of the protoanthropologists of the early nineteenth century on the nature of symbolism and to the contributions of Freud, Durkheim, and Malinowski in this
century. These discussions are followed by an important chapter on private symbols and their social acceptance, in which F. is concerned with both the interpretation of dreams and the development of personal symbols by artists and mystics. This chapter includes an interesting account of the symbolism of the Sacred Heart of Jesus and the gradual public acceptance of this originally personal symbol.

The second half is a series of short studies of different types of symbolism: food symbolism, the symbolic functions of hair, bodily symbols of greeting and parting, flags, and symbolism in getting and giving. These studies serve as illustrations of the approaches and conclusions F. has already argued for and also provide a good deal of interesting and entertaining information along with frequently surprising crosscultural comparisons. The chapter on hair is as timely as a newsmagazine article; and the chapter on getting and giving touches on classical themes in theological ethics. The book concludes with a chapter on the special problems of interpreting religious symbols, in which F. discusses the "merging of literal and metaphorical in religious symbolic presentation" (p. 411), found in the claim that Jesus is black, in devotion to the Sacred Heart, and in Protestant and Catholic theologies of the Eucharist. This chapter would have benefited if F. had given some account of the distinction between literal and metaphorical meaning in his chapter on philosophical terminology (cf. p. 71).

The two great merits of F.'s approach to symbolism are his insistence on comprehensiveness and his avoidance of reductionist simplifications. His mastery of a wide range of material from disparate disciplines is impressive, and his use of it is enlightening and free from pedantry. Throughout, F. shows his desire to do justice to the complex functions of symbolism in society. He insists that the interpretation of symbolism recognize both its practical and cognitive roles and its psychological and social dimensions. His avoidance of the various forms of psychological and sociological reductionism is particularly important in his discussions of religious symbolism, where there is disagreement about the existence of the referent of the symbols (cf. pp. 403-6). F. does not approach religious symbolism from the standpoint of religious faith, and he points out the difficulties afflicting a fideistic interpretation of religious symbols. But he does take religious symbolism as a subject of serious analysis, and he shows no anxiety to explain it away. For this reason, his work should be especially suggestive and useful for theologians. His own presentation of theological positions, despite such occasional slips as his misuse of the term "celebrant" (p. 423), is generally accurate and sympathetic.

F.'s work shows the virtues of a fair-minded empiricism which neither repudiates nor dogmatizes about the speculative issues presented by his
material. While his approach to the hermeneutical problems presented
by the interpretation of symbolism is full of judicious counsels to the
anthropologists for whom he writes, it fails to provide a comprehensive
theoretical framework for these counsels. But his book, because of its
erudition and sympathy, merits careful consideration both by those
working on general theories of symbolism and hermeneutics and by those
interested in reflecting on particular uses of symbolism in religious and
social contexts.

University of Michigan

JOHN P. LANGAN, S.J.

THE SCIENCE OF RELIGION AND THE SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE: SOME
METHODOLOGICAL QUESTIONS. By Ninian Smart. Princeton: Princeton

Many of us of various methodological and theological persuasions have
come to expect good things of Ninian Smart. Even if he is not always on
the mark, he usually has a definite target in view and he seldom seeks to
ignore the real difficulties which religious studies face. Those readers who
saw his earlier book of 1973, The Phenomenon of Religion, as “an
important transition rather than a firm resting place” (Frederick Ferré,
Theology Today, October 1973) will value this volume as a significant
sequel to be prized for its directness and general clarity.

Our question is this: what is the scientific study of religion? While the
profession has freed itself from identifying religious studies with confes­
sional theology, it still has not determined satisfactorily what makes a
study of religion “scientific.” Too often a study of religion has been
labeled scientific if it simply considered more than one religious
tradition. But the inadequacy of this gambit must be unmasked, for the
pluralistic criterion often indicates little about the inner logic of the
methodology. There is a correlative dissatisfaction with the linguistic
analysts’ treatment of religion, for often under their analyses the lived
context of the religious tradition is ignored. (S. had registered this
demurral earlier in his “The Intellectual Crisis of British Christianity,”
Theology, January 1965.) So, in a “kind of critique of positivism but from
a side sympathetic to it” (p. 23), S. engages the problem head on: how
can the study of religion be scientific without distorting the true nature of
lived religious activity? He attempts to chart a course between sectarian­
ism and scepticism, between apologetic and reductionistic methodolo­
gies.

Arguing that a science should correspond to its objects, S. presents the
main aspects of his position in chap. 3, “The Nature of the Phenomeno­
logical Objects of Religion.” Here he urges an approach which implies
bracketing but does not involve reductionism. In the discourse of
religious studies, he claims, we must use brackets to avoid the too frequent assumption that others see the world the way we do and also to remain cognizant that religious concepts "are rather heavily theory-laden" (p. 53). At the same time, S. insists that this bracketing methodology also implies a thoroughgoing agnosticism concerning the existence of the religious objects. That is, "it is wrong to analyze religious objects in terms simply of religious beliefs" (p. 54), for "the reduction of statements about the gods to statements about beliefs about gods is defective in being commentarial rather than attitude-evoking. It does not bring out believers' commitments and certainties" (p. 50).

In arguing for the use of a methodological agnosticism which treats the gods who inhabit the phenomenological environment of a given cultural group as part of the social system while withholding assertions about the existence of these gods, S. is proposing a method which involves structural descriptions but not importation of theological theories. This proposal leads him to a criticism of one aspect of the work of Rudolf Otto and Joachim Wach. Otto and Wach, in explicating the central religious experience of particular cultural systems, provide a helpful phenomenological description of the sensus numinis, but "in holding that this gives us knowledge of ultimate reality" (p. 59) they abandon the methodological neutrality which is crucial to a scientific study of religion. From his consideration of Otto and Wach, S. advances to a related attack upon what he terms the "core theory" in comparative religion. While this section on the "core theory" is not crucial to the main argument of the book, it is on the mark and deserves to be read with care.

Perhaps the most exciting—and also for some readers the most disappointing—chapter of this effort is 5, "Religion and Rationality." In utilizing Steven Lukes's distinction between universal rationality and context-dependent rationality (p. 106), S. applies Lukes's fivefold grid to current work in the philosophy of religion. S.'s categorization and analysis of five theses in this discipline provide some of the most fascinating reading of the book. He classifies the work of Ayer, Flew, and Miles under the "Unintelligibility Thesis" and identifies Hepburn with the "Pre-Modern Thesis." The "Language Games Thesis" is seen in the work of Winch and Phillips, and S.'s classification is rounded out by the "Scientific Thesis" and the "Symbolic (Two Leagues) Thesis." The discussion surrounding the last classification is reminiscent of S.'s attacks on Richard Hare and Ian Ramsey during the sixties. While this section provides some of the most lively material, any thoughtful reader will be ultimately disappointed by its brevity, for S. attempts to do all this in the space of less than a dozen pages.

There is much in this work worth reading and rereading. And many of
us share in S.’s feeling that “what we need to do ultimately in the study of religion is to break down that opposition between learning about religion and feeling the living power of religion” (p. 160). That this is no easy task is evident from the intricacy of S.’s argument. He has not settled the issue, but he has taken a significant step toward its resolution.

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LARRY E. AXEL


The end of 1973 saw the publication of the ninth and final volume of the great Kittel-Friedrich, *Theologisches Wörterbuch zum Neuen Testament*. This dictionary stands today as a monument to German Protestant NT scholarship, and it is idle to try to assess its worth or measure the influence it has had on students since its inception in 1928. Now, within a few months after the appearance of the German original, the ninth volume of its English translation, the *TDNT*, has also appeared. For readers and students in the English-speaking world it too stands as a monument not only to the industry and authority of the German scholars who launched it and contributed to it, but also to the indefatigable labors of the translator, G. W. Bromiley, who rendered those bulky tomes into readable and concise English in less than nine years (see *TS* 25 [1964] 424–27; 26 [1965] 509–10; 28 [1967] 179–80, 873–74; 30 [1969] 158–59, 743–44; 33 [1972] 172–73; 34 [1973] 147–48).

It will not be amiss, as we review this final volume, to quote a few lines from Friedrich’s preface to it: “When G. Kittel began work on the Dictionary in 1928 he projected two volumes and believed that with the help of fifteen colleagues it could be finished within the space of three years. He was just as wrong as J. Grimm was when he planned his dictionary in seven volumes and hoped that it would be completed in seven years. The Theological Dictionary of the New Testament has grown to nine volumes, publication has taken forty-five years, and instead of fifteen colleagues there have been one hundred and five contributors. Many who read the first sections as students began rather anxiously through the years whether they would live to see the whole work. Of the extended circle of authors fifty have died during the period 1930–1973. When Kittel summoned me to his own deathbed in 1948, and committed the future of the Dictionary to me in spite of my resistance, he laid great stress on the fact that a younger New Testament scholar should take up the work in order that he might have a chance to complete it. Now at last the end has come and the editor and his many
co-workers can breathe more freely. During the last twenty-five years I have often been reminded of the truth of the saying *quem dii oderunt, lexicographum fecerunt.*”

Kittel’s basic conception has been carried through to the end, despite improvements made in the treatment of articles over the years because of progress in the discipline. Ordered according to Greek words and stems, the articles have continued to survey all the ancient data that bear on the philological and theological meaning of NT vocabulary. Though some material in the early volumes is outdated, the discussion even there remains basic.

The “Kittel”-type of word study was severely criticized by J. Barr in his *The Semantics of Biblical Language* (New York, 1961). While a few of his remarks have some validity and will act as a caution in assessing some of the material in *TWNT*, this dictionary has not been stowed away and forgotten as a result of them. I suspect that it will still be in use long years after Barr’s book has fallen into oblivion.

Roman Catholic theologians and biblical students should recall the lengthy endorsement that Augustin Bea, S.J., gave to *TWNT* about a decade ago: “Gedanken zum Theologischen Wörterbuch zum Neuen Testament.” It is a four-page, double-columned statement that was sent to subscribers with one of the fascicles of Vol. 7 about the time of the completion of that volume (1964). Bromiley did not see fit to make it part of his English translation of Vol. 7, and so readers will have to consult the original to find it.

Spot checks made on the English translation of Vol. 9 reveal that once again it is a faithful rendering of the German original—a Bromiley achievement that does not surprise anyone. Important articles in this volume treat such words as *Pharisaios*, *phileō*, *philosophia*, *physis*, *phös*, *chairō* and related words, *cheir*, *Cheroubin*, *chriō*, *christos*, *pseudos*, *psyche*, and *hora*. And, fittingly enough, the last article of the whole dictionary is *hōsanna*!

Minor errors are detected at times (e.g., the Aramean king’s name is given as Panammuwa [a Phoenician form] instead of Panammu, p. 621), but neither such errors nor the “traces of difficulties” experienced by the translator who had to work from proofs detract from the over-all value of this latest addition to the monumental *TDNT*.

Looking back over the nine volumes of *TDNT* and having had occasion to use them many times in the last nine years, I have come to learn how indispensable this dictionary is in the study of the NT. For the serious discussion of a word or phrase it is the obvious work to which one turns, because the treatment of them is basic and authoritative. One may disagree on occasion with the treatment of one detail or another, but one
shall never be able to dispense with *TDNT*. The theologian or biblical
scholar who might be tempted to do so will do it at his own risk.

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It was my privilege to introduce the first edition of this work to the readers of this journal (*TS* 20 [1959] 108–10). The review was enthusiastic; my enthusiasm was probably heightened by the unfavorable judgment rendered on the book by the Sacred Congregation of Seminaries and Studies in 1958. The Congregation published its review much more expeditiously than I published mine. The letter of the Congregation seems to have done the work no harm. The second edition will appear in four volumes instead of two, and Vol. 2 is the first to appear. What was covered in 622 pages in the first edition now occupies 792 pages.

Some of the contributors have been gathered to their fathers. The survivors and I are seventeen years older than we were when the first edition appeared. Something has happened to me or to them which has cooled my enthusiasm a bit. And I do mean only a bit. The book may still be the best single compendium of modern biblical scholarship available. It is written not only with clarity but with verve. The number of contributors has grown from nine to eleven, and they are still representative names of French Catholic biblical scholarship. The scholarship is generally ecumenical and international, embracing not only works written in French and German but also in English and even in American, if you will pardon the expression. Rarely is one pained by a reference to Catholic scholars as such. With all this, why has my enthusiasm cooled slightly? Obviously because the work has adopted or sustained theses with which I disagree more deeply than I did in 1959. The review then becomes an enumeration of these theses without the full discussion they should receive. My position on several of these has been published, and the others I hope to deal with in the future.

A great deal of critical work has been done on the historical character of the stories of the patriarchs, the Exodus, and the settlement since 1957. No doubt many think that some of this work is highly imaginative at best, fanciful at worst. I believe this work could have received greater attention, or at least more critical attention; the authors were under no obligation to accept new theories, but the student who uses the book could have been told more about them. The result is a summary so conservative that it runs the risk of becoming naive. There should have
been more of the candor with which the authors face the problems created by the archeology of Tell-es-Sultan and et-Tell. I write this, and then I realize that no one could write an introductory treatise to this problem which would satisfy everyone. In such a disputed area I am still not sure that a retreat to what appear to be safe positions is the best approach.

This edition retains the little essays on *valeur religieuse* (sometimes enlarged by *sens spirituel*) which ornamented the treatment of the historical books in the first edition. For Esther it is missing, as it was in the first edition, and I do not know whether the author is trying to tell us something. But the efforts to write these paragraphs for Joshua and Judges approach desperation, and one wonders whether this is at all the right category in which to approach these books and some others as well. The reader who is looking for "religious value" may think—as many have thought—that such books tell us more about ancient Israel than we need to know. This may lead us to wonder whether there is not an implicit fallacy in the category "religious value." We do not know the God of Israel except through Israel; this means the investigation of a number of topics in which candidly there is no "religious value."

I did not like the defense of the authenticity of the conclusion of Amos in the first edition, and I like it less now. This is of a pattern with the treatment of the theme of messianism scattered throughout the book. I have recently submitted to my colleagues my own treatment of messianism, which I believe is more reserved than most treatments. If the authors of *Introduction* are right, I am wrong; it is as simple as that, and I feel outnumbered. But I wrote this reserved treatment after some years of sometimes worried reflection in an effort to make sense out of what often threatened to become unintelligible. I do not see that *Introduction* was produced by similar reflection; it seems to be a careful effort to present accepted conventional thinking, just the thinking which I found murky. I still find it that, and we must leave the issue there.

The treatment of the Psalms and of wisdom is greatly expanded, especially the illustrations from ancient Near Eastern wisdom. The form criticism of the Psalms is treated with gratifying fulness; this is the kind of treatment I wish the authors had given the historical criticism of the Pentateuch and Joshua. But even here I confess to a slight disappointment. The background material of Job is presented with abundance; my complaint is that it is presented more abundantly than the interpretation of Job itself, which in comparison is a feeble effort, I regret to say.

The index is sketchy, as it was in the first edition; a work of the scope and utility of *Introduction* deserves a full and careful index. Cazelles, the editor, has two references, as does Grelot, one of the contributors.
two editors of the first edition, Robert and Feuillet, have respectively three and none.

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JOHN L. MCKENZIE


This volume, extraordinary from many points of view, deserves the widest possible notice and discussion wherever the theological dialogue on the unity of the Church is taken seriously. Sponsored by the U.S. Lutheran–Roman Catholic Dialogue, four Catholic and seven Protestant NT scholars met fifteen times from October 1971 through March 1973 to probe and evaluate the materials which were edited into this book. The contributors to the discussion, apart from the editors, were Paul J. Achtemeier, Myles M. Bourke, P. Schuyler Brown, Joseph A. Burgess, Joseph A. Fitzmyer, Karlfried Froelich, Reginald H. Fuller, and Gerhard Krodel. The book that has resulted is emphatically "a collective study, i.e., a study truly representative of discussions by a group of scholars...the end product is not what anyone of us would have written personally...The norm was not total agreement but a consensus about the reasonable limits of plausibility" (p. 5).

In ten chapters which open with a description of the origins of the inquiry and its presuppositions, literary-critical as well as theological data about Simon Peter are gathered from the NT documents in an arrangement by and large chronological. The materials are analyzed not only to further "a quest for the historical Simon" (p. 8) but also to recover the various ways in which the first and second Christian generations came to regard the roles of Simon Peter (cf. pp. 19–20). The final chapter correlates the results of the NT study with the ultimate purpose for which the work was commissioned, i.e., to serve as "background for ecumenical discussions of the role of the papacy in the Universal Church" (p. 157).

For all the provocative precipitate of the historical quest, the theologian will particularly want to reflect on the ways in which Peter and his roles became image symbols for the NT authors, as well as on the trajectory of development taken by those images from the "historical Simon" into postapostolic history (pp. 162–68). This book emphasizes yet again how crucial is the task of evaluating the way in which symbolic or parabolic language functions (cf., e.g., P. Minear, _Images of the Church in the New Testament_ [Philadelphia, 1960] esp. pp. 18–24). Thus, in the treatment of Simon as "the Rock" (pp. 89–95) there is no
denying the ambivalence of the image and its soft edges. Yet there is a hard core of significance on which exegetes can agree. No one has real difficulty in recognizing what the Psalmist means when he calls God his rock, as the synonyms produced by the qualms of the LXX translators show (e.g., LXX Pss 17:3, 32, 47; 41:10). Some sort of enduring and stable permanence is denoted, in whatever way one may eventually explain how that can be said. That also is at stake in Simon's "Christian" name. The NT documents as they take up that name imply that somehow "Cephas" was, by the will of the one who gave him the name, to be permanent, stable, enduring. The name, in a profound sense, demands continuity, demands "succession" (for all the polyvalence and ambiguity of the latter concept). Even a "stone of stumbling" is such because it is fixed and cannot be kicked aside. To have said this is not to have settled the question of how Cephas endures (e.g., in all Christians, in the scriptural witnesses, in the succession of the popes). It is, however, to say that this question is really and insistently posed by the NT scriptures themselves.

In this study, Acts has been separated from the third Gospel and positioned after Paul. The reasons adduced for this are not quite persuasive (cf. pp. 9–10, 14–15, 39). Arranging this study in the sequence of the four-Gospel collection reflects a second century (anti-Marcionite?) concern that had, as one of its unhappy side-effects, breaking the theological thrust and impact of a single work in two volumes that constitutes a quarter of the NT. Since the Lucan sources from the first generation were not the reason for this decision and since the historical content of Acts has been rather heavily discounted, it is regrettable that Luke's central claim on our attention as "an orderly and reasonably consistent theologian" (p. 113, cf. p. 128) has been effectively muted. The modern theologian who consults this study to retrace the way in which Luke has developed the role of Simon Peter will simply have to drive from a rear-view mirror.

This methodological anomaly contributes to a certain ad hoc type of comment upon Acts. Thus, the way in which Luke has edited the saying on the twelve thrones (Q: Mt 19:28=Lk 22:30; cf. Lutherans and Catholics in Dialogue 4: Eucharist and Ministry [Washington, D.C., 1970] p. 75, n. 24) adumbrates how he has dealt with the problems raised by the presence of Judas among the Twelve. The "good death" hypothesis of this study (pp. 40–41) appears to reopen in another fashion the route taken by the apocryphal Acts of the second and third centuries, a route that Luke did not choose (cf. E. Hennecke et al., NT Apocrypha 2 [Philadelphia, 1965] 173). The theologian may find it more profitable to probe the link between Jesus' prayer for Simon (Lk 22:29–30) and the
role in which Peter first appears in Acts, where the author depicts him in his turn (cf. E. F. Sutcliffe, “Et tu aliquando conversus,” CBQ 15 [1953] 305–10) as leading the first believers in their prayer (Acts 1:14) as well as initiating the process that concluded in the community prayer to discover whom the Lord had “chosen to take the place (topon) in this ministry and apostleship from which Judas turned aside to go to his own place (topon)” (Acts 1:24–25).

The authors have sown this study like a grain of wheat in a no man’s land, trenched by centuries of apologetic and illuminated by the glare of polemic. Scholarly individuality and virtuosity have been buried and the astonishing first fruits of the harvest have begun to appear. On March 4, 1974, the U.S. Lutheran–Roman Catholic Dialogue released the initial, common chapters of its forthcoming study on papal primacy (Origins 3 [Mar. 14, 1974] 585–600). The NT study reviewed here had been a critical factor in making it possible for representative Lutheran theologians to ask their churches “if they are prepared to affirm with us that papal primacy, renewed in the light of the gospel, need not be a barrier to reconciliation”; and again: “We ask our churches earnestly to consider if the time has not come to affirm a new attitude toward the papacy ‘for the sake of peace and concord in the church’ and even more for the sake of a united witness to Christ in the world.” The study will continue to challenge the churches and the theologians in the years of dialogue before us.

A select bibliography has been added to the work to increase its usefulness for students and scholars (pp. 169–77). An index of authors cited concludes the volume, which has practically no misprints and sells at an astonishingly low price.

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The present crisis in the understanding of Christian ministry has prompted theologians to focus attention on what the NT has to say on this matter. But the task of “searching the Scriptures” is rendered difficult in this case by the fact that none of the NT writings, with the exception of the pastoral epistles, is explicitly concerned with the question of ministry. Furthermore, the matter has often been prejudiced at the outset by a stance of either dogmatic or biblical positivism. The Catholic theologian has felt obliged to justify existing ecclesiastical institutions by showing how the threefold ministry of bishops, priests, and deacons is contained, at least “implicitly,” in the NT, whereas the Protestant theologian has been tempted at times to represent the picture
of ministry in the NT as the norm from which any departure is necessarily an apostasy.

The present work avoids both dangers. It is a team project, in which both exegetes and theologians have collaborated, and, what is even more significant, the theologians make the “exegetical dossier” which constitutes the first half of the volume the basis for their own reflections. The last chapter, “Interrogations actuelles,” takes up problems such as apostolic succession, the threefold ministry, “priesthood,” and celibacy, but by far the major portion of the theological section of the book allows the NT to function as the starting point for theological reflection. The results are most illuminating.

In particular, the diversity both in the reality and in the representation of ministry in the NT is shown to have a profound hermeneutical significance, rather than to be the occasion of apologetic difficulties. For example, in distinguishing “the apostles” (= the Twelve) and the envoys of the risen Lord (e.g., Paul), Luke-Acts expresses the Pauline distinction between the Twelve and the apostles, but it does so in such a way as to underline the continuity between the age of Jesus and the age of the Church (pp. 291–92). This difference in representation reflects the change from a situation in which the Church is living from the immediate witness of those who had seen the risen Lord to that of the subapostolic community, in which the theological preoccupation is to “normalize” the past (p. 397).

While respecting the need for a specialized treatment of ministry, the authors insist on the impossibility of considering this question in isolation from ecclesiology and Christology. The apostolic ministry performs for the Church a function analogous to that of the canon. Just as the latter determined the limits of compatibility of the various representations of Christ, so the former recalls the Church’s fundamental relationship to her Lord (p. 441). Furthermore, the “specialized” ministries cannot be divorced from the diaconia which every Christian is called upon to render as a follower of Jesus. The very existence of the Church is an eschatological “service” to mankind.

The dialectic between the ministry of all and the ministry of some is perhaps the most important datum of the NT evidence, since it challenges the clericalization which has divided the Church into governors and governed. Every Christian, whatever his particular position, is both active and passive in the interplay of spiritual gifts within the community.

Christian ministry is not restricted to the individual congregation. One of its principal roles is to enable different communities to live together in unity. This is reflected both by the importance assigned by the NT to itinerant ministers and by the acts of intervention taken by ministers
exterior to the community (p. 406). The apostolic ministry itself is "extraterritorial" and includes a concern for "communion" between the churches (cf. Gal 2:2).

The diversity in NT ministry is a diversity both of title and of function. The same task can have several names, and the same title can correspond to various activities (p. 414). In comparing the diverse forms of Church order, we must avoid assuming that the more ancient form is necessarily more "authentic" (p. 422), but we must also avoid the opposite error of considering "normative" whatever points in the direction of the traditional shape of the ministry with which we are familiar.

The results of the exegetical part of the work might appear to present us with a mosaic of monographs, since each NT author seems to give a different picture. However, this serves to make clear to us that the "ministerial fact" witnessed by the NT is more important than particular ministerial roles. The Church, in its present life, is bound not to the ministerial vocabulary of the NT, but to the exigency of the ministeriality which this vocabulary manifests (p. 434).

It is impossible here to do more than suggest the richness of this volume, both in the material it has gathered together and in the methodology it utilizes. Obviously, in a work of this size, points are open to criticism. At times there is an illegitimate stretching of the biblical evidence by an appeal to later tradition, such as Clement of Rome or Ignatius of Antioch (pp. 409, 411, 415). The statement that the books of the NT must always be understood in the light of the rule of faith (p. 357) conjures up the specter of a subordination of exegesis to ecclesiastical pronouncements which would be quite foreign to the spirit of the book as a whole. Finally, in the use of Acts it is not always clear whether the texts are being cited as evidence for the situation familiar to the author or for the situation which he purports to be describing.

But whatever reservations one may have on specific points, this book is an impressive accomplishment which bears witness to the possibility of fruitful collaboration between the exegetical and theological disciplines. May it find the appreciation that it deserves in current reflection on the future shape of the Christian ministry.

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The use of the OT in the Gospels, especially by direct citation, has
become an important factor in determining the existence and nature of pre-Gospel sources. By studying the formula that introduces the citation and the extent to which the citation fits the Gospel context, one can sometimes detect whether the citation has been taken over by the Evangelist from earlier Christian usage and/or fitted into an already formed Gospel sequence. Matthew and John are the Gospels with the clearest pattern of explicit OT citations. Recently Matthew’s citations of the OT have been studied intensively in a half-dozen books; and John’s citations have been investigated by E. Freed (1965) and J. O’Rourke (1967—seemingly unknown to Reim), but with less emphasis on sources. R.’s book is a major attempt to develop a theory of Johannine sources from another such investigation.

R. has studied not only citations of the OT (including the deuterocanonical books) but also the employment of OT motifs. His detailed comparison of the appropriate Johannine passages with the Masoretic Text of the Hebrew Bible and the Septuagint (and occasionally with the Targums and the Dead Sea Scrolls) constitutes the major part of the book and is his most valuable contribution. True, at times scholars might wish for a wider spread in the textual evidence under consideration, e.g., more attention to Hebrew readings other than Masoretic, attested by the versions. Moreover, R. occasionally makes an assertion a substitute for proof. Thus, in an inadequate treatment of John’s possible use of Sirach, he lists some fifteen parallels and then begins his remarks on them by asserting: “Although John did not make use of the Book of Sirach...” Nevertheless, the substance of this part of R.’s book is solid and should put an end to sweeping statements about which text tradition John preferred, since many times the varied forms of the citations he used had already been determined by pre-Johannine traditions. (On p. 189 R. distinguishes four such traditions: a Signs Source; discussions between Jews and Christians; Synoptic-like material; and a Christian “wisdom” tradition.) In fact, R. is led to the conclusion that, except for citations from Ps 69 (in Jn 2:17, 15:25, and 19:28), all citations from the OT came to the Evangelist through pre-Johannine traditions (pp. 94–95), so that in composing the Gospel the Evangelist had no written OT to draw upon, either Hebrew or Greek (pp. 188–89). The implications of this we see exemplified in R.’s study of how John employed the Son of Man motif; he argues that any Danielic features appearing in John must have come from the traditions, since John did not know the Book of Daniel (p. 252).

I think that most scholars will judge less favorably the complicated source theory that Reim attempts to construct upon the basis of his analysis of Johannine OT usage. Working with citations in John that have a certain similarity to OT citations used in the Synoptic tradition,
R. postulates a "fourth Synoptic Gospel," older than Mark, upon which the Evangelist drew. The order of this hypothetical Gospel (p. 211) is reconstructed by moving around material in John to fit the Synoptic sequence, e.g., by moving the cleansing of the Temple and the prediction of its destruction (Jn 2:13-22) to after the entrance into Jerusalem (12:12-15). In such an instance, I would have expected R. to discuss more attentively the question whether the two elements of cleansing and prediction were joined in the earliest tradition; in my own commentary I have given reasons for thinking they were not.

The Evangelist is supposed by R. to have constructed a first edition of the Johannine Gospel (outlined on pp. 239-40) without using the fourth Synoptic Gospel but employing as his main sources (a) a Signs Source (outlined on pp. 208-9) which began with the baptism of Jesus and had six miracles, concluding with the words in 12:37-41, attached to 20:30-31 (Reim omits from this source the healing at the Pool of Bethesda [Jn 5], not only because it has Synoptic parallels, but also because it is not echoed in the Elijah-Elisha cycle of miracles that influenced the Signs Source); (b) a tradition of reflecting upon Jesus according to thought-patterns stemming from the wisdom literature of the OT and deuterocanonical books. The Evangelist himself was closely associated with a Christian circle which identified Jesus as divine Wisdom and which supplied the Prologue and the raw material for the discourses of Jesus during the ministry and the Last Supper. To this first edition the Evangelist himself added the material from the fourth Synoptic Gospel, giving us the second edition of the Johannine Gospel, which is substantially its present form. This added Synoptic material produced the unevenness of sequence we now detect in John.

In evaluating this thesis, one would like to pose many questions to Reim. I, for one, do not think he has sufficient basis for attributing most of the Johannine material with Synoptic parallels to a separate Synoptic-like Gospel, while he attributes the multiplication of the loaves to the Signs Source. It should be obvious how much R. is influenced by Bultmann, with whom he is in dialogue throughout the book. His thesis of a first edition is a rethinking of the basic combination of the Semeia Quelle and the Offenbarungsreden Quelle, while the second edition has some of the features of the work of Bultmann's Ecclesiastical Redactor. The confrontation with Bultmann is partially explained by the fact that the substance of R.'s book was presented as a dissertation in 1967, and thus some of his investigation is almost ten years old. Reim notes that he has been busy in pastoral activity and could only partially update his study—and, in fact, the minor updating is usually by addendum. For instance, Fortna's The Gospel of Signs (1970) is not discussed in the
crucial section where R. reconstructs the Signs Source (pp. 208-9) but later, as a theory to be criticized. A study of references in the author index will reveal how little use has been made of books of the last eight to ten years, despite mention in the bibliography; and major studies by scholars like Kieffer, Leroy, MacRae, and Richter are missing even from the bibliography. R. has given us a good piece of work, but already the main thrust of Johannine scholarship has moved beyond where it was when he made his investigation. The editors, in justice to him, should have insisted that it be totally brought up to date or not published.

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Originally written as a doctoral dissertation in 1970, this study of Paul's discourse at Miletus has been somewhat updated by the use of more recent studies. It retains an all-too-frequent fault of dissertations, however, in that it attempts to cover a broad range of material in a short space. Its three sections deal with the text and structure of Acts 20:17-38, with the form of the discourse in the light of other pertinent literature, and with an analysis of the content of the discourse against the background of the preceding sections, of the historical context in which Acts was written, and of the position which the discourse occupies in the over-all structure of Acts. In a very brief introduction M. reviews, and adopts, the conclusions of other scholars that Acts is not a history but a faith document, a presentation of the theology of an author who was more interested in the problems of his own time than with recording the past. Thus M. justifies such studies as his own, since, as he rightly points out, it is the discourses of Acts that carry the main burden of its theology.

M.'s study of the text of the Miletus discourse contains nothing new. For Acts 20:28, he adopts the reading "by the blood of His own Son"; otherwise his reading is quite standard. He gives a brief critique of the various patterns of structure that have been proposed for the discourse, and his observations here are quite acute. He finally opts for a simple three-part division: Paul's self-defense (vv. 18-24) and his parenesis (28-35), with 25-27 being the central, culminating point of his message. But one can object to this division that 33-34 are also self-defense, and 25-27 are too completely in context with the preceding verses to be considered a distinct and central section. An analysis of vocabulary and style establishes that the discourse is thoroughly Lucan and is therefore
the composition of the author of Luke-Acts. If any traditional material or personal witness has been used, it has been completely reworked to the point of being the author's own.

In trying to establish the form of the discourse, M. refers to the biblical and extrabiblical late-Jewish books that contain examples of farewell discourse. His analysis of each example is seldom longer than a page, usually much briefer. Thus there is room for little more than the "vital statistics" of each book referred to, and an indication of where a farewell discourse is to be found in it. A more developed analysis of these examples would have gone further toward establishing the thirteen characteristics of the farewell-discourse form which M. tries to isolate. As it is, each of these elements is verified mainly by reference to chapter and verse of the books used, so that the reader is left to justify the validity of the findings for himself. In general, it can be said that the elements are present in the discourses, but not so universally that they can all be called characteristic of the form. For M.'s point, however, it is sufficient that those elements that are characteristic of a farewell discourse are all present in the Miletus discourse, and thus establish its form. Here M. solidly establishes his position as against that, e.g., of Dahl and Bultmann, who see at Miletus a simple Gemeinde-Predigt.

This has obvious importance for an understanding of the discourse. All examples of farewell discourse show more interest in theological content than in real biography. The form was used for a particular need in the life of the community at the time of writing. Its purpose was to provide a parenesis which, in the form of a "historical" discourse, would provide for the community a continuity between the past, the present, and the future, especially the immediate future. This was seen to be particularly necessary at a time of change, e.g., of generations or of leadership. Again, because of such a change, the form was often accompanied by, or included, a renewal of covenant.

It is in such a setting that M. sees the composition of the Miletus discourse. Paul and the Twelve have passed from the scene, and continuity with the present and into the immediate future must be assured. During their lifetime, Paul and the apostles had as their main function to be witnesses, principally to the glorified Christ and to his genuine teaching. Now the continuity of their witness must be assured. For M., the only distinction between Paul (who, of course, is never called an apostle in Acts) and the Twelve is that the apostles knew the earthly Jesus and Paul did not. In all else Paul figures as their equal. Aside from them, only Paul is called by Christ specifically to be a witness. M.'s thought here deserves further investigation, but it seems oversimplified as a complete explanation of the relation of Paul to the Twelve in Acts. It is a fact, however, that in 20:24 Paul does call "witnessing to the gospel"
his particular office, and it is therefore plausible to suppose, as M. does, that it is in this capacity that he is said to deliver the discourse. The coupling of Paul with the Twelve, while problematical, does seem preferable to the view of U. Wilkens that Acts 15 closes apostolic times and that Paul figures thereafter as the initiator of a “postapostolic” era, and to that of Conzelmann which divides the time of the Urkirche into an era of the Urgemeinde and one of the foundation of the Gentile Church. These too-neat divisions are not supported by an analysis of Acts.

It is the concern of Acts’ author for the continuity of the pure witness of Paul and the Twelve that accounts for the discourse’s emphasis on the qualifications of Paul and the constancy of his witness to the genuine word of God. It accounts, too, for the warning against false teaching, which M. concedes may be a Christian gnosticism of the late first century. It may be responsible for the inclusion of the (for M.) non-Lucan but traditional reference to the blood-price theme of 20:28. And, certainly, it is the reason for the reference to “elders” as to men responsible for nurturing the community. Not that they are called to continue the witness of Paul and the Twelve. For M., this witness is unique to the first generation and forms the link between Jesus and the later generations of the community. M. sees no model of apostolic succession in 20:28, although he notes that the context does force a conclusion that for the preservation of the apostolic witness some fixed form of leadership in the community is necessary. But in M.’s view, the author leaves open the question how leaders shall be constituted, whether by direct action of the Spirit or by appointment through leaders already acknowledged in the community.

One could wish that M. had devoted more space to the discussion of these questions. It can be said that he raises them and analyzes them quite ably. He does not answer them to an equally satisfactory degree.

Immaculate Conception Monastery
Jamaica, N.Y.

AELRED LACOMARA, C.P.


This book is the work of a professional. It has balance and breadth and a creative central theme. It will undoubtedly take its place as a standard theological text beside such American classics as H. Richard Niebuhr’s Christ and Culture, Paul Tillich’s Dynamics of Faith, and James Gustafson’s Christ and the Moral Life.

The heart of the book is an analysis of five basic models of the Church: institution, mystical communion, sacrament, herald, servant. Each model represents an effort to understand the community called Church
in terms of a basic paradigm drawn from ordinary human experience. After outlining how each model is specifically applied to the Christian community, D. asks three questions of each: In terms of this model, what are the bonds that unify the Church, who are the beneficiaries of the Church's activities, and what is the purpose of the Church and its ministry? Finally, the strong points and weak points of each model are indicated. The whole analysis is preceded by an illuminating discussion of the role of models in theology and followed by a series of chapter-length essays relating the five models to parallel conceptions of Christian unity, Christian ministry, Christian revelation, etc. A concluding chapter provides a critical comparison of the five models. Throughout the book D. is careful to indicate each model's credentials in biblical and postbiblical Christian tradition and identify its major proponents in contemporary systematic ecclesiology.

Among other things, the book is a marvelous teaching tool. D.'s exposition is, as usual, unusually clear and precise. It is full enough to be readily intelligible and suggestive enough to be eminently discussable. The audiences to which I have introduced the book all experienced an irresistible urge to construct one supermodel, with all of the good points and none of the bad points of D.'s five models. In the process each individual reveals the model he has already been working with implicitly in his reflection on the Church and attempts to compensate for its deficiencies by incorporating elements borrowed from other models. Since everyone has a different dream of the Church, discussion is lively. Since everyone has been exposed to all five models, discussion is also well-informed and productive. In the end D.'s own warning against exclusive reliance on any model receives empirical confirmation.

Doing ecclesiology by way of models is one way of getting behind the slogans that so often pass for theological reflection in this area. The inadequacies of both the institutional and the servant models were clarified for me by D.'s analysis—though D. himself rejects only the institutional model as a basic paradigm for the Church. Both models disclose essential dimensions of the Church. Neither, in my opinion, provides a broad enough base on which to construct a balanced ecclesiology, and both presuppose a number of essential points that cannot easily be expressed in terms of the dominant paradigm. Criticism of the institutional model is not superfluous today, particularly in American Catholicism. While few continue to build their ecclesiology around the notion of the Church as a spiritual monarchy or a not-so-mystical hierarchical body, it is my impression that American theologians continue to pay more attention to structures than to anything else in the Church. Wherever power emerges as the crucial issue, the language may
be the language of community-sharing through participatory democracy, but the basic model remains an institutional one. The servant model of the Church also stands in need of much more critical scrutiny than it has received in recent years. Christians in the past have certainly neglected their tasks of healing and reconciliation in the world beyond the boundaries of the explicit Christian community, and one of the reasons for such neglect has undoubtedly been a loss of consciousness of the centrality of God's kingdom of salvation, a kingdom that is somehow both larger than the explicit Christian community and already in the process of being realized in the course of human history. But I suspect that the role of the Church as the servant of God's coming kingdom in the world needs to be spelled out with much more precision than the servant model alone can supply. The kingdom which is served is God's kingdom precisely because it is a kingdom of salvation, and God alone saves. The Church serves this kingdom as an instrument of God's salvific dealings with mankind in Christ. What this communal experience of being saved in Christ amounts to and how it is to be shared and fostered in our tormented world must be articulated if the Christian community is to have any identity and any specific sense of mission. Such articulation the servant model alone cannot provide.

D. himself indicates a clear preference for the sacramental model of the Church. He notes that the notion of an efficacious sign community is a highly sophisticated theological concept; paradoxically, the paradigm of a community of symbolic communication is itself difficult to communicate. Nevertheless, D. believes the sacramental model offers the broadest base for constructing a balanced ecclesiology. It relates the Christian community's institutionalized activities to the shared inner life of the Spirit which such activities are intended to incarnate. It points the sign community to the world beyond its boundaries and yet insists that only a church effectively concerned for the salvation of its own members can be a credible sign of the salvation happening elsewhere in the world. It leads into mystery, and that in the end is all that can be asked of models or books about models for Christians.

Marquette University

Patrick J. Burns, S.J.


M. offers us an interesting overview and critique of life in the Catholic Church since Vatican II, plus certain proposals for moving into the future. An opening chapter, rich in nostalgic detail, captures the positive
mood of the early 60’s. A second chapter suggests why the Church, in comparative disarray a decade later, needs remaking. M. locates the cause in what he calls a theory-practice lag: “[The Church’s] theological self-understanding has not kept pace with the process of institutional change.” M. is not making the naive observation that problems are solved by better theories. Rather, his is a practical estimate of what is needed if the Church is to avoid a crippling polarization, a “schizophrenia of the soul.”

Competing ecclesiological theories and practices are set forth by M. in three pairs. Theory A and Practices A (not the most felicitous language) describe the unvarying patterns of “doctrine,” of ecclesiastical law, and of pious practice which characterized the life of the Church before Vatican II. Theory B and Practices B are all Vatican II. Liturgical reform, M. argues, gave rise to a sense of the Church as community that meshed with developments in social activism, ecumenism, and forms of ecclesiastical government. The theory of Vatican II supplied some clarification of the assumptions behind changing practice, though it in turn would, by its very ambiguity, lead practice into new paths. M. is best when he describes in detail how otherwise bland conciliar documents do reflect and have concrete roots in practical problems of Church life, and readers of M.’s previous books will find a similar talent here. In his third pairing, M. characterizes current practice (C) somewhat somberly. It is polarized, and one pole seems to be working on the theory (C) that Vatican II hedged certain theological principles (for pastoral reasons) which now must be shorn of their ideological ambiguity.

M.'s proposals for remaking the Church include plans “to bring the organizational operations of the Church into conformity with, and to place them at the service of, the historic goals, or mission, of that Church,” and, secondly, “motivating the general membership to accept and pursue the Church’s goals.” Structures reflecting tenacity or excessive elasticity will fail. “Self-determinative” structures are more hopeful, although they involve a continual investment of the Church’s resources and an acceptance of the accompanying risks. Motivation cannot be provided paternalistically, nor be scientifically managed by a system of rewards and punishments. It must aim at responsible participation by all.

Specifically, M. argues (with more nuance than we can include here) the need for constitutional rather than monarchical structures in the Church; for decentralized power; for accountability through some public-adversary system; for the election of the local bishop by the local community; for limits on papal power and on episcopal claims to be sole possessors of teaching charisms in the community; for a Catholic bill of
rights backed up by revised ecclesiastical court structures; for built-in planning and research bodies; for equal rights for women in the Church; for a renewal of religious communities; for more consideration for the rights of the ordained, especially in the areas of mobility and decision-making; finally, for practical moves to implement the Church’s existing ecumenical commitments. M. presents the theological arguments and assumptions pro and con with clarity and fairness, and his own positions seem to me always the more cogent.

This kind of book invites the easy criticism that, because it offers a practical and often untried agenda for official reform, it is an exercise in idealism, doomed to be swallowed whole by the bureaucratic monster whose game it is ultimately playing. Cardinal Suenens notes in the preface that M.’s “project is an ambitious one.” Yet, M. might be just the kind of theologian to stimulate such reforms and just the kind of ecclesiastic to bring them off. Others, more at home with unofficial growth, and less ready than M. to attribute current problems to a crisis of (official) leadership, should nevertheless support his efforts. Those efforts, especially if we are to talk about motivation for remaking the Church, might take him in several directions not highlighted in his already packed book. First, and even more directly from a theological point of view, God and Christ ought to be somewhere toward the top of the agenda, since it is in coming together in discussion, sharing, and debate on those “issues” that some hope of avoiding polarization and useless side-issues is most likely to be found. M.’s own distinction between an absolute (as kingdom) and relative (as church) future for the Church promises grounds for coexistence with the non-Christian world that may simply not be there if we were to take seriously the centrality of Christ to history and his explicit cult in the Christian churches. The current benign terminology does not escape the logic that a kingdom in which Christ will reign eschatologically more resembles a Christian churchn than it does anything else. Secondly, the theological analysis that will further reform will have to be even more “visionary,” i.e., it will have to spell out in the language of literature and art what the gospel is saying. The absence of such language, and the general lack of theologies that make dramatic sense without simply telling people what they want to hear, might in itself be a sign that we are not ready for reform. Lastly, we might have to start blowing our horn for the good things we are doing and to shed some of our institutional guilt. The intense developments in religious education alone, and the financial commitments across this country to such work (whatever it be called in a given diocese), cannot help but improve the level of Catholic understanding that M. calls for.

While these efforts are underway, M.’s own agenda is there to
challenge us. It is an intelligent, down-to-earth, and hopeful plan, worthy of the man to whom the book is dedicated, Richard Cardinal Cushing.

Fordham University

GEORGE McCauley, S.J.


The subject of Eucharistic ministry in churches of the Reformation has received a great deal of attention in Catholic circles since Vatican II's Lumen gentium provided an opening for an inclusive ecclesiology. The literature has varied in quality, especially in the description and assessment of historical data and the interpretation of Trent's decree on orders. In view of the relatively unsettled state of research on the subject, the Memorandum Reform und Anerkennung kirchlicher Ämter published in January 1973 by the ecumenical institutes of six German universities, seemed to many immature, or at least premature. A number of German scholars showed surprise that theses advocating the full recognition of Evangelical church office would be sponsored by the three Catholic institutes.

The manuscript of this work of collaboration of five Catholic scholars, prepared before the publication of the Memorandum, understandably includes only a few incidental references to it. However, these remarks, as well as the whole thrust of the presentation, make clear that the authors look in the direction taken by another interconfessional statement: the document issuing from the Frankfurter Gespräch, Das Mysterium des kirchlichen Amtes, October 22–23, 1973, which reached maturity over a ten-year period and which concludes that the way to recognition of office by both sides must lead through a new understanding of its mystery (cf. Una sancta 28 [1973] 321–27).

P. Bläser treats the NT references which point to a linking (at least sensu positivo) of apostolic office, and spiritual offices sharing in its authority and tasks, with ministry of the Eucharist. Suso Frank underscores the factors which determined the conscious binding of office and Eucharist in the early postapostolic age: the Eucharist is understood as an act of the community ordered by collegial leadership succeeding to the authority and tasks of the apostles. H.-J. Schulz demonstrates that the common tradition of the liturgy of ordination, for which the rite of Apostolic Tradition provides the paradigm, witnesses that the ministry of the Eucharist is an exercise of the pastoral office of bishops and of presbyters who share in it. The later separation of potestas ordinis et jurisdictionis in practice and theory, characteristic of the West, runs counter to the authentic liturgical tradition and consequently furnishes
an obstacle to the explanation of why the ministry of the Eucharist (and other sacraments) was reserved to the episcopal and presbyteral office in the old Church. G. Fahrnberger's analysis of Trent's decree on orders amounts to a complete rejection of the sporadic attempts to interpret it in the line of a benign evaluation of Reformation theories on the way of conferral of office. The longest article, which could be a monograph, treats of Luther's understanding of office and Eucharist. P. Manns shows that Luther demanded public office for the public worship of the Lord's Supper without exception, inclines to a sacramental understanding of office, and does not tend to a charismatic Church order or to ad hoc "emergency ordination" in his theory of emergency ordination.

It is noteworthy that both Manns and Schulz are cautious concerning the theological value which should be assigned to the practice of presbyteral ordination by presbyters which was approved by late medieval popes. Manns further notes the almost insuperable historical difficulties which meet the attempt to prove presbyteral succession in Lutheran churches and the difficulties of harmonizing such a practice with the mystery of apostolic succession as presented in *Lumen gentium,* no. 8. He also judges that the principle *supplet Ecclesia,* used by some (e.g., W. Kasper) to validate a ministry obtained without or by invalid ordination, does not find sufficient support in tradition and leads to the theologoumenon of charismatic succession.

These studies of concerned ecumenists are intended to show that a solution to the question of the reciprocal recognition of ministry must entail correctives on both sides. Undoubtedly, the authentic tradition of the Church of the first millennium, obscured in later Catholic theology and practice as well as in the Reformation tradition, must provide the point of departure for the mutual recognition of office which will further the unity of the one Church of Christ (of the East and West). And precisely here the thesis which draws a sharp distinction between *jus divinum* and *jus humanum* must be tested. Is traditional office, in its concrete form, as other historical aspects of the Christian economy of salvation, the expression of the will of God and so changeable not by men but only by the Spirit working through men?

In the confusion of the current debate over recognition of ministry of Reformation churches, this book offers a refreshing approach. It will not capture the imagination of those who seek to avoid the alternative Catholicism/Protestantism. Still, perhaps the urgency of the alternative, so disconcerting to an adogmatic age (which, of course, has its dogma: *sit pro ratione voluntas*), may ultimately constitute the ecumenical grace of our time.

*Weston College School of Theology*  
*Edward J. Kilmartin, S.J.*

Taking as his point of departure doctrinal and ecumenical questions posed by the new Roman rite of confirmation, L. engages in a historical study of the meaning attributed to chrismation and the imposition of hand in the rite of initiation of the various representative liturgies of the East and West. In the last two chapters Ligier offers a profound analysis of the theology of confirmation and gives sound advice concerning the pastoral application of this traditional theology. This study is a very important contribution to the history and theology of confirmation. L. is especially to be commended for the consistency which he shows in the pastoral application of his theology of confirmation.

It is not possible to treat here the many interesting topics raised. I single out one point: L.'s assessment of the decision of the Apostolic Constitution Divinae consortes naturae (August 15, 1971) to affirm that for the future confirmation is conferred in the Latin Church by anointing with chrism on the forehead with the words “Receive the seal of the gift of the Holy Spirit” (AAS 63 [1971] 663). L. leaves no doubt that he would have favored the choice of imposition of hand in view of its original function in the rite and because of its symbolic value. At the very least, he is uncomfortable with the decision, which does not expressly give a sacramental value to the imposition of hand and accompanying prayer in the rite of confirmation of the Latin Church. Here he raises the important issue of the liturgical structure of a sacrament. If those bound by the Latin discipline must, until some future undetermined date, accept the sufficiency of the anointing and brief formula for the valid conferral of the sacrament, what value should be assigned to the imposition of hand and its prayer? Ought this also to be considered, where performed, as an essential constitutive of the sacrament? L. thinks so and finds support in Eastern and Western tradition.

The Apostolic Constitution states that the imposition of hand belongs to the “integral perfection of the rite” (ibid., p. 664). L. understands this to be an invitation to rethink the structure of the sacrament. He reckons that there is a reciprocal correlation between the imposition of hand and prayer and the unction and its formula. The latter can serve as point of insertion of the sacrament on the candidate. Still, the prayer and imposition of hand, objectifying the intention of God in the sacrament, express and consequently realize its ecclesial and eschatological dimensions.

L. raises a question which is becoming more common in Catholic theological circles: How can a prayer and/or gesture which symbolically
represents the sacrament being celebrated not be sacramental in the strict sense? In other words, how can a rite belong to the "integral perfection" of a sacrament but not be constitutive of the sacrament when it actually finds place in the celebration? I am in full accord with L. when he interprets "integral perfection," with reference to the imposition of hand and accompanying prayer, to mean constitutive of the sacrament of confirmation. The notion of essential rite should not be determined merely by what is possible in cases of emergency. It should also be determined by what is required for the solemn liturgy to express for the community the ecclesial and eschatological dimensions of a sacrament. The fact that the liturgical structure of a sacrament is a living reality demands this.

Weston College School of Theology

EDWARD J. KILMARTIN, S.J.


Morton Smith's discovery of a fragment of a letter of Clement of Alexandria in the Mar Saba monastery is an event of importance for both patristic and NT studies. In these two works he has recounted his discovery, provided the text, and elaborated a theory of Christian origins which is both bold and original. The second work is the more popular account, and traces (with most interesting personal references) the steps in his discovery and the conversations with other scholars with whom he early shared the text. The first work is one of massive scholarship, analyzing the Greek text, commenting on it word by word in the grand style of traditional learning, and acknowledging with the most careful fidelity the manifold suggestions he received from scholars in America and Europe. In these days of piracy on the high seas of scholarship, it is refreshing to encounter such faithfulness.

The text of Clement's letter is important because it refers to a secret, expanded version of Mark's Gospel, which was current both in Clement's church and (in a different form) among the Carpocratians. Clement gives two citations from it, one a simplified version of the raising of Lazarus followed by an initiation of the resurrected rich young man, and the other a cryptic sentence on the rejection of three women by Jesus.

That the letter is genuine is proven by S. with the most careful reference to Clement's acknowledged writings. Although a few scholars (notably A. D. Nock) have disputed its authenticity, there is in my mind
no doubt that S. is correct. Thirteen years ago he was generous enough to share the text with me, and I noted the obvious similarities with Clement's style (the use of such particles as *autika*, *amelei*, for instance), the citations from his favorite authors, and the vivid use of mystery language. S. has made an analysis of the clausulae (p. 351) which further confirms this view. The genuineness of the letter can hardly be disputed.

In two notable respects the letter differs from Clement's other writings. There is, first, a different tradition of the Gospels from the one in the *Hypotyposeis* and the commentary on 1 Peter. In the letter Clement claims that Mark, after writing his first Gospel, brought it, on Peter's martyrdom, from Rome to Alexandria. There he made a second edition, significantly expanding it with both logia and acts of Jesus, and thus providing a secret Gospel for the higher Christian. The first edition was for "catecumens," the second for "those being perfected." But even in this second edition Mark did not divulge the "unutterable" truths nor write down the Lord's "hierophantic teaching." There are thus implied two stages of esoteric teaching. The second difference is that in treating the Carpocratians Clement makes no mention of Epiphanes, who figures so largely in *Strom.* 3. Clement's claim in the letter is that the Carpocratians stole the secret Gospel from Clement's church and made further additions to it in the shape of "shameless lies." Of all this there is, of course, no mention in *Strom.* 3. These differences support rather than cast doubt on the authenticity of the letter. We are dealing with secrets, which Clement hints at rather than divulges in his other works. It is incredible that a forger would have made the discrepancies so blatant.

In what context is this secret Gospel to be understood in Clement? The original suggestion I made to S., that its reference was baptismal and that it was read at the paschal ceremonies in Clement's congregation, has been accepted by him, and he has worked the theory out in his own way and with a wealth of learning. He tends to regard the initiation as a second, gnostic baptism, in contrast to that of the rank and file (pp. 168, 283). We are dealing with "those being initiated into the great mysteries," to whom alone the secret Gospel is read. In support of this view it can be urged that Clement does contrast "catecumens" with "baptized" in terms of perfection (*Paed.* 1, 6, 26), and applies the highest language of mystery initiation to baptism (*Protrep.* 12: *epopteustai*). The insertion of the story of the initiation in Mk 10 with its sacramental references (10:13 and 10:38) is significant. The six days intervening between the raising of the young man and his initiation into "the mystery of the kingdom of God" might be the six days of the paschal fast in Alexandria (Dionys., *Ad Bas.* 1). Furthermore, the reference to the young man appearing for his initiation "wrapped in a *sindôn*" suggests baptism. The fact, further, that
he was rich reflects Clement's concern for the salvation of the rich in his *Quisdives salvetur?*

On this basis S. then proceeds to interpret the first citation from Secret Mark in terms of baptism. This leads him into the most patient and precise analysis of the text and its relation to our Mark. It becomes clear that it does not belong to this latter. The style is certainly Mark's, but it is too Marcan to be Mark. While the story is told with directness, simplicity, and economy of words (there is only one reduplication), it echoes too many stories from Mark (and possibly John) to be genuine Mark. Even in doublets this is not characteristic of our Mark. There are striking verbal echoes of Bartimaeus, Legion, the young man with the *sindôn* at the Passion, the rich young man, Jairus, Peter's wife's mother, the Transfiguration, the Last Supper, the Resurrection, and possibly Lazarus and Nicodemus. The phrases often are lengthy, and while only three words are not found in our Mark, the text is not so innocent as it appears. S. solves the problem by supposing there was a written Aramaic source behind it, an earlier version of the Lazarus story, which was translated into stereotyped phrases from Mark. As a parallel, he analyzes the story of the healing of the two blind men in Mt 9:27-34 (pp. 376-77), which he shows is almost entirely made up of conventional religious phrases from Matthew and Mark. The reason he posits a *written* Aramaic source is the order of events he finds paralleled from Mk 6:32 to the Passion with Jn 6:1 to the Passion. While this order with its geographic similarities is not convincing in all details, it is certainly impressive.

From this S. proceeds to his novel reconstruction of early Christianity. Here he emphasizes baptism as a secret rite of Jesus for initiating his disciples into the kingdom. He finds the social category of "magician" (*magos*) more useful than that of "divine man" or "Messiah" for understanding the work of Jesus, and introduces much material from Merkabah mysticism and magical papyri to fortify his case. For instance, Jesus under the control of a "spirit" does the kinds of things a magician does, and the institution of the Lord's Supper finds a striking parallel in the demotic papyri where it reads: "Give it, blood of Osiris that he gave to Isis to make her feel love in her heart for him." Jesus, as *magos*, he interprets as a libertine, who releases his initiates from the law (cf. Mt 17:24-27, p. 189). Later Christianity toned this down and, losing the power to bring disciples into this magical kingdom, conformed to the social demands of the world. Finally, it was as a magician that Jesus was crucified, because magic was outlawed in the ancient world.

It must be conceded that S. has presented his case with equal rigor and learning. The obscurity of the origins of Christian baptism demands an
explanation which so far has not been forthcoming. How do we pass from John the Baptist to Paul? The silence in the Gospels about Jesus baptizing and the curiosity of the young man with the sindōn at the Passion have up to now defied explanation. Could Jesus have been baptizing him in the brook Kedron, and could the Gospel silence on Jesus’ baptizing have been due to its being an esoteric rite—Mark’s “mystery of the kingdom of God” taught kat idian to the disciples (Mk 4:11, 34)?

Such is the main theme of S.’s book. It is replete with learning. S. is as much at home in Hellenistic as in Judaic materials. His elaborate commentary on Clement’s text is exhaustive: his chapters reconstructing early Christianity are fascinating in new insights, while the elaborate appendices are invaluable in giving paleographic material on the text, collecting all references in patristics to Carpocrates, and analyzing Gospel parallels and Clement’s clausulae. The work is a major contribution to early Christian scholarship, and one which cannot fail to draw the attention of the scholarly world by its bold, original thesis, and by the obvious significance of such a textual discovery.

In such a review as this it is not possible to given an adequate criticism of S.’s work. That would take a book as large as his. I want merely to confine myself to three themes. First, is Clement’s letter really about baptism and the paschal ceremonies? Second, can an Aramaic source underlie the additions to Mark? Third, what was the character and legal status of magic in the ancient world? Was Jesus a magos?

While I first proposed the baptismal interpretation of Clement’s letter, I have lately had doubts about it, even in S.’s form of a second, gnostic baptism. There are passages in Clement where he views baptism as very preliminary to the lesser and greater mysteries (Strom. 5, 11, 7, 1). Further, the disciplina arcani regarding baptism (first known in Tertullian, Apol. 7) really does not apply to Clement. For the latter, secrets are gnostic secrets. Again, the highest form of mystery initiation (epopteuseis) can be applied to the gnostic (Quisdives salvetur? 36–37), and it is especially noteworthy that in this tract with its long citation from Mk 10 there is no hint of the secret Gospel. But in a passage on the advanced gnostic, that unobtrusive, true believer who has passed beyond the ordinary baptized Christian (ho pistos) there are definite hints of a secret initiation and of secret doctrine. “What else is necessary? Behold the mysteries of love, and thou shalt see the Father’s bosom, whom the only-begotten God alone declared.” Here kolpos is a feminine symbol of womb (not a metaphor of table fellowship), for Clement proceeds to hint at the Gnostic doctrine of God as mother. All this suggests a higher grade of initiation than baptism. Moreover, “those more elect than the elect”
(Q.D.S. 36; Strom. 6, 13, 107) may be an agraphon from the secret Gospel, just as the sayings “My mystery is for me and the sons of my house” (Strom. 5, 10, 63) and “For ask, he says, the great things and the small will be added unto you” (Strom. 1, 24, 158; cf. mikra-megala of mysteries beyond baptism, Strom. 5, 11, 71). I should suggest that such “mysteries of love” is what Clement’s text is really concerned with. The raising of the young man is a mors voluntaria followed by a sacred kiss in the nude, a form of the “bridal chamber” (cf. Gospel of Philip). Certainly, nudity is a fundamental theme of the secret Gospel’s story of initiation. It belongs to the echoes of Bartimaeus, Legion, the young man with the sindôn at the Passion, and the Last Supper in John’s account (13:4), as well as to the Carpocratian addition “naked with naked.” In Paed. 3, 3 fin., Clement has the curious remark “Man may, though naked in body, address the Lord.” The contrast between katêchoumenoi and teleioumenoi in the letter would thus be not between catecumens and those being baptized, but simpliciores (as Strom. 6, 15, 124) and the true gnostics. It is noteworthy that baptism is not specifically attributed to Jesus in the secret Gospel, though Clement in the Hypotyposeis does say Jesus baptized Peter only (frag. Jn. Moschus).

Furthermore, we must recall that we are dealing with secrets, and baptism is too mundane for that. My own present view is that we have in the Marcan additions a mélange of Gospel echoes, perhaps Encratite in origin, and used both by Clement’s church and the Carpocratians. The sacred kiss in the nude seals the kingdom’s mystery of love. Perhaps, too, the exclusion of the women in the second pericope of the secret Gospel reflects an Encratite group which did reject women, and to which the Gospel of Thomas later took exception (Logion 114). How Clement himself would have interpreted this, given his liberal view of women as capable of “philosophizing,” i.e., being gnostics, we do not know, since the text is defective and stops short of his exegesis. But his capacity for explaining away embarrassing Scripture is in any case phenomenal.

Nakedness is return to Paradise. While it characterizes baptism, it is even more characteristic of the worship of Encratite groups, as I hope to show in a later article on the Gospel of Thomas. Here the sindôn becomes important. It is a loincloth to hide the genitals (see the note in Griffith-Thompson, Demotic Magical Papyrus 1 [1921] 34). This seems its obvious meaning in the story of Crates and Theophrastus in Diogenes Laertius 6, 90. It is never associated with Catholic baptism, which is always completely nude (as in the catacomb of Callixtus, Cyril of Jerusalem, and Chrysostom, where we first have specific regulations lacking in Hippolytus, A.T.). The notable exception is in the Acts of Thomas 121, but there the girding of Mydonia with a sindôn is to prevent
Thomas from seeing her genitalia at baptism. It is an Encratite document.

We do not need to believe that the Carpocratians got their version of longer Mark from Clement, or vice versa. Perhaps it was an Encratite document serving many groups, as the Gospel of Thomas did later, and variously interpreted (libertine in the Carpocratians, catholic-gnostic in Clement).

One curious point in favor of the raising of the young man as a mors voluntaria is that the shriek (megalē phônē) comes from the tomb, whereas in John it comes from Jesus. The phrase generally signifies a prophetic-magical utterance (Ignatius, Philad. 7, 1). But here it echoes the shriek of Legion among the tombs (Mk 5:7) and suggests the terror of an actual mors voluntaria. Who, for instance, being initiated in the cult of Isis, would not scream as he was led into the dark room to meet the terrible Osiris, god of the dead, and behold his penis which the industrious and loving Isis had failed to recover? (An Antioch mosaic suggests this terror of the dark room the initiate is being led into.)

It strikes me as unlikely that some Aramaic source lies behind the pericopes of secret Mark. How could such an early source suggest so many echoes of Mark and possibly John? It is not a question of making use of some stereotyped phrases in translation. Rather, we are dealing with a purposeful secret document. Indeed, we know the Carpocratians had such a document which was an enlargement of Mark and contained the secrets spoken by Jesus to his disciples kat idian (p. 303; Irenaeus, though S. gives only the Latin: seorsum).

Finally, on magic. Jesus is certainly attacked as a magos in the Gospels (Mk 3:22) and in the Talmud. It is a neglected category in NT interpretation. My criticisms of S. at this point concern, first, the fact that he invariably treats magic in a pejorative and negative sense, and second, that he tends to misconstrue the Roman law on the subject.

The kinds of words which recur throughout his treatment of magic are “schizophrenic” and “hallucination” (p. 226). “Magician” was a “dirty word” (p. 235), “a term of abuse” (p. 220). S. leaves the impression that he shares such sentiments. Yet magic in the ancient world comprehended so much we would denominate as “mystical,” “charismatic,” and “psychical,” that such a view is really untenable. Our attitudes derived from the Enlightenment need serious revision, and the potentialities of human nature reach far beyond the rational and the superficially normal. Had magos been only a “dirty word,” we should have expected Herod to slay the Magi rather than the Holy Innocents, and we would have been surprised that Sergius Paulus kept Elymas as his private chaplain. Indeed, magos, mathēmatikos, etc. were terms of both repute and
ill-repute, depending on the context. White magic was distinguishable from black magic; spiritual healing and the heavenly vision were distinct from curses and traffic in love potions.

The laws against magic were directed against doing other people harm. This is true of the law excantare fruges in the Twelve Tables and the mala sacrificia of the Cornelian (Sulla’s) legislation. Only in the Sententiae Pauli is the scope wider, though even there the emphasis falls on doing harm, as when a doctor, e.g., kills his patient inadvertently. It may well be that such laws were often invoked for political purposes, as was the Scantinian law against homosexuality. It is highly unlikely, therefore, that Jesus and early Christians, though accused of magic, were persecuted primarily for this, as S. claims (pp. 234, 254). Other factors, especially social, religious, and political ones, surely entered in.

S. concludes his work with a challenge which must be taken seriously. “Will the reader please offer another explanation for all these problems,” i.e., of the origins of Christian baptism, and the subsequent development of baptism and “spirit” in primitive Christianity? Though we may not follow him in his grand reconstruction, we must face the challenge. As yet we are confronted with obscurity, and the category is one that may prove useful in further research. S. has provided us with a major discovery and a major work which we cannot afford to neglect.

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CYRIL C. RICHARDSON


Cusanus studies take another significant step forward with the publication of these two additions to the Heidelberg Opera omnia. The Triologus de possest, written probably in February 1460, is a brief work available in various printed editions since 1490 as well as in several more recent German translations. It deserves more scholarly attention than it has received; for it signals an important new trend in the development of Nicholas of Cusa’s God-language, which in the last years of his life and, it seems, to his great personal satisfaction focused ever more intently on such notions as potentia absoluta, posse-esse, and posse ipsum. Philosophical and theological themes which have their roots in his famous De docta ignorantia are by no means absent from his later speculation, but as he grew older and as his political life grew more painful the great gap between the finite and the infinite which so preoccupied him in his earlier writings began to disappear.
The Trialogus de possest begins on the affirmative note that the invisibilia Dei can be known through the visible works of creation (Rom 1:20). Before it came to be, creation was only able to be; the creative power by which it came to be was itself all that it was able to be, therefore an identity of posse and esse—a coincidentia oppositorum, a conjunction of nonbeing and being—in actuality. It is therefore identified as possest. Two years later, in his Directio speculantis seu de non aliud, Cusanus would come even closer to a more satisfying name for the Unnameable—the non aliud—and finally, in 1463, in his De apice theoriae, he returned again to the potentia theme and named God posse ipsum. Ironically, but by no means irrelevant to this theological quest, Cusanus's God-language became progressively dependent upon "power" words as Nicholas himself became less influential; the Trialogus de possest was written when Nicholas found himself the powerless prisoner of Duke Sigismund, who had him besieged in the castle of Andraz.

Mention should also be made of the recent appearance of a Latin-German edition of the Trialogus by the same editor, in the series Schriften des Nikolaus von Kues in deutscher Übersetzung (Hamburg: F. Meiner, 1973). The paperback volumes in the bilingual series are complete with introduction, notes, and indexes and are of the highest quality. Because the Opera omnia volumes have become too expensive for the average scholar, these bilingual texts fill a real need.

One of the richest veins of unmined Cusan source material is the collection containing some three hundred sermones. This most recently published fascicle contains six of these from the summer and fall of 1431 accompanying the liturgy of the sanctoral cycle. This group is thematically centered on spirituality and the moral aspects of the Christian life, a fact which makes them all the more important because, aside from the fact that they have never before been edited (the 1514 Paris edition of the Opera made by Jacques Lefèvre d'Étapes gives only excerpts), Cusanus' other, better-known works contain remarkably little moral philosophy. Unfortunately, these early sermones are just about all we possess from Nicholas' pen during these years and scholars will have to wait at least for the remaining fascicles of the present volume before being able critically to compare these sketches with more carefully reasoned works like De docta ignorantia and De coniecturis. One can safely conjecture that critical analysis of the remaining sermon sketches will bear out the observations of Michael Seidlmayer (Archiv für Kulturgeschichte 36 [1954] 181) that Cusanus' doctrine of coniectura, i.e., of the essentially partial and incomplete character of all human knowledge, precluded the development of a system of moral absolutes and was at the root of Cusanus' apparent disdain for moralizing sermons.

What we have, then, in the present sermones from 1431 are, for the
most part, eclectic outlines of material from traditional sources, outlines which do not yet reveal their author's creativity as they do his assiduousness and the wide range of his reading. Some of the more noteworthy material contained in this fascicle concerns the popular medieval question of the priority of the *vita contemplativa* to the *vita activa* in *Sermones V, VIII, and IX* (a theme which does not appear in Nicholas's other writings) and a rather artful treatment of grace and love, in the form of a dialogue with Mary Magdalene (*Sermon VII*). Substantial elements of the dialogue are dependent upon Bonaventure (*Breviloquium*), as are many of Cusanus' *sermones*. Geert Zerbolt van Zutphen, William Peraldus, John of Wales, William of Lania, and Hugh of Strasbourg are chief among the other immediate sources upon which these six *sermones* depend. Notably diminished is the frequency with which the name Ramon Llull appears in the *apparatus fontium*, a fact which may be a helpful qualification to the tenor of C. H. Lohr's review of the earlier fascicle (*TS* 32 [1971] 320-23). Needless to say, the editor and his collaborators have left nothing to be desired in this important addition to the Hiedelberg *Opera*.

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**JAMES E. BIECHLER**


Gerson's importance for an understanding of the Schism, the Council of Constance, and the nature of late medieval ecclesiologies is unquestioned. In a sense, he and his contemporaries launched the great era of reform which stretched for a hundred years between the end of Constance in 1417 and the outbreak of the Reformation in 1517. Despite Gerson's importance, his reform thought has never been comprehensively studied. This lacuna is lamentable but not surprising. Until the relatively recent impetus given such studies by scholars like Gerhart Ladner, P.'s mentor, the "ideological presuppositions" (p. 1) of programs of reform have not been the object of academic investigation. This situation is gradually improving, and P.'s book is itself a significant contribution.

P.'s study begins with an analysis of the nature of the Church in Gerson's thought. The impact of Pseudo-Dionysius appears clearly in the Church's reflection of the celestial archetypes and in its strongly hierarchical structure. Gerson's reform thought flows easily out of this understanding of the Church. As P. moves through his study to show the role that law, councils, theologians, and bishops play in reform, he vindicates his "basic thesis that Gerson's thinking on reform is essentially hierarchical" (p. 210). P. also vindicates the essentially conserva-
tive nature of Gerson's ecclesiology, even in the function which ecumenical councils perform. His is thus another helpful anchor for understanding late medieval conciliar thought, which is finally receiving the discriminating attention it deserves.

One of the most arresting aspects of Gerson’s reform thought is the emphasis it puts on charity as the fulfilment of all law and as the binding force within the Church, the mystical body of Christ. Union, peace, and harmony are the goal and condition for true reform. True reform can be described quite simply as reformatio pacis. These ideas bear a striking resemblance to much of what Erasmus and other Renaissance humanists had to say about the reform of the Church and about the very essence of Christianity itself. Though P. does not mention these similarities, his book provides the basis for what might turn out be a fruitful comparison.

It is precisely this failure to relate Gerson to a cultural context in any very meaningful way which is the chief weakness of P.’s book. He does supply us with a brief biography, and he distinguishes Gerson from such radicals as Marsilius of Padua and Ockham. Gerson is treated in the general context of the crisis of the Schism. But all this is rather distant backdrop. Gerson’s reform thought floats in space without much explicit relationship to larger cultural patterns or his own milieu. How did he relate, intellectually, to his teachers and fellow students (p. 5)? Were his favorite books and authors the favorites of his contemporaries? What kind of a “scholastic” was he? In what sense can Jean de Montreuil and Pierre Col be named “leading humanists of the time” (p. 8 n.)?

The book, in other words, is strongly analytical and expository in nature. It is cautious. The Conclusion is really a summary—a very good summary, as a matter of fact. It is a summary, however, which like the rest of the book gives us no sense of any chronological development in Gerson’s thought.

P.’s study, nonetheless, is commendable for accomplishing in an impeccable manner what it sets out to do, namely, to disclose the underlying “principles” governing Gerson’s thinking on reform. The triadic, hierarchical, and conservative nature of Gerson’s thought is established beyond question. It is difficult to imagine that the author’s basic theses will ever undergo very substantial revision. Careful research and lucid description are outstanding qualities of the book.

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JOHN W. O’MALLEY, S. J.


It is very appropriate that this study should appear in the centennial
year of the publication of the first edition of the third volume of Albrecht Ritschl’s *The Christian Doctrine of Justification and Reconciliation* (Bonn, 1874). Lotz critically analyzes the paradigmatic role of the theology of the young Luther, especially of the tract *On Christian Liberty* (1521), in the theological program of Ritschl.

Justification as the free act of God in pardoning the sinner without regard to his moral rectitude and as the believer’s personal experience of forgiveness was one focus, and reconciliation as the God-willed effect of justification “evidenced in both the religious virtues of faith in providence, humility, patience, and prayer ... and in the moral virtues of fidelity in one’s worldly calling and love for the neighbor” (p. 37) was the other focus, of R.’s elliptical theology. The Church as a community of forgiven sinners is the social-religious correlate of justification, and the kingdom of God as the free association of believers acting in dominion over the world according to the ultimate moral purpose of God is the social-ethical correlate of reconciliation. Lotz argues that this elliptical theology was grounded by R. in the basic themes of divine love, Christ, Church, revelation, and faith that Luther himself derived from the Christian’s experience of justification and of freedom over the world. Against the prevailing stream of recent Ritschl interpretation, Lotz contends that R.’s interpretation of Luther more than his appreciation of the moral philosophy of Immanuel Kant constituted the “decisive factor” in R.’s theological enterprise (p. 18). The net effect is that Lotz’s reader is permitted to approach Luther more on his own theological ground than in those interpretations of R. under the influence of Karl Barth.

Lotz is very critical of R.’s interpretation of Luther. R. made a sharp distinction between a more evangelical “young Luther” and a more scholastic “mature Luther,” which Lotz rightly questions on the basis of the textual evidence (pp. 94 ff). Lotz also argues—and here he is least convincing to this reader—that R.’s basic failure in interpreting Luther was his “depreciation of the central role of scriptural interpretation in Luther’s theological development” (p. 117).

Catholic readers of Lotz’s book will find it instructive on an issue not central to his concern, but which shows through both his treatment of R. and R.’s own “Festival Address On the Four-hundredth Anniversary of the Birth of Martin Luther, November 10, 1883 at the University of Göttingen” (translated by Lotz and included as an appendix), namely, how very much the liberal Protestantism represented by R. was steeped in the then prevalent cold-war attitude against Roman Catholicism on the part of Protestants in general. R. took pains to show, and Lotz faithfully points up, that his understanding of reconciliation and the ethical rule of God “is not to be compared with the Roman concept of
faith formed by love" (p. 38). This argument belongs to the then current ideological quarrel between Protestants and Catholics in which neither side was willing to concede the fact that a common substance of authentic evangelical experience lay beneath the respective conceptual languages employed for its articulation.

On the whole, Lotz's work does keep his promise of furnishing a corrective "fresh perspective" on Ritschl's theology.

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MICHAEL D. RYAN


It is valuable, even four years after the event and at an inflated price, to have in one volume the sixteen papers delivered at the initial Conference on the German Church Struggle and the Holocaust organized in March 1970 by Franklin Littell. The conference has met each year since then, save in 1973, with a change of venue in 1974 from Detroit to New York. Under L.'s able and forceful leadership, the emphasis of subsequent conferences has tended to shift towards the Holocaust and present-day Jewish-Christian relations. This is his concern in the book's opening chapter. He warns against the illusion that it is possible "to love humanity without loving concrete, earthy, historic persons and groups" (p. 18), charging that American liberal Protestants as well as the liberal left continue to cherish this illusion. Whatever reservations one may have about some of Littell's rhetoric, there can be no disagreement with his conclusion: "that the most awful figure of this century is the technically competent barbarian—especially when he claims the sanction of religion for his politics of pride" (p. 28 f.).

John S. Conway's remarks on "The Present State of Research and Writing on the Church Struggle" remain valuable for students and specialists, who may be directed to sources and accounts they have overlooked. Narrower in scope is Henry Friedlander's survey of Holocaust publications. Wilhelm Niemöller contributes a useful paper reflecting his somewhat restricted concern with the Confessing Church and the role of his brother Martin within that body, which at its peak included, Niemöller tells us, no more than a fifth of the Protestant clergy in Germany. This chapter is supplemented by the discussion of the ambiguities of Martin Niemöller's attitudes by Frederick O. Bonkovsky later in the volume.

One of the book's outstanding chapters is by a non-Aryan refugee from Hitler, Beate Ruhm von Oppen. With devastating detail and clarity as well as masterly understatement she exposes the mendacity of revisionist
historians like Günter Lewy and Saul Friedländer, as well as the literary indictment of Rolf Hochhuth. No serious student of the period can afford to overlook Miss von Oppen’s contribution as well as her equally fine article on “Nazis and Christians” in *World Politics* 21 (1969) 392–424. She offers essential correctives to the misleading treatment of Catholic resistance by Gordon C. Zahn later in the same volume, as well as to the hardly more satisfying treatment of resistance in general by William S. Allen. The excellence of Allen’s analysis of political opposition to Hitler is matched by the perversity of his conclusions with regard to church resistance, which he claims “was undertaken principally for motives of self-interest, out of organizational egoism” (p. 121). Yet he gives no reason for believing that Bishop von Galen’s protests against the Nazi euthanasia program, which Allen himself admits were successful, come within any meaningful definition of “institutional egoism”; nor does he discuss the argument that in Hitler’s Third Reich individual opposition was impossible, so that the preservation of institutions, such as the churches, was essential if resistance was to have any prospect of success at all. A far better treatment of “The Problems of Resistance in National Socialist Germany,” quite as good for the political side as Miss von Oppen’s treatment of church resistance, is contributed by Peter Hoffmann, author of the definitive work on the German opposition to Hitler, *Widerstand, Staatsstreich, Attentat* (Munich, 1969).

Michael D. Ryan contributes an excellent “Theological Political Analysis of Mein Kampf.” Like other contributors, Ryan identifies the factors common to Hitler’s Germany and contemporary America as anticomunism and racism. Hitler’s success in exploiting these issues “is a fearful warning of the strength of an aroused mass movement” which should make theologians and pastors today “very circumspect in their preaching and teaching, especially about the so-called theology of revolution” (p. 163). Eberhard Bethge sustains this high level in an article which concentrates on the tortured experience of Dietrich Bonhoeffer, whose theology led him into political resistance and beyond the fellowship and active support of all but a few members of the Confessing Church. With the authority of a participant in the Church Struggle, Bethge writes of the jungle of ambiguities and complexities through which the would-be resisters had somehow to find their way—with such meagre guidance and support at the time and so little understanding afterwards from critical historians, for whom the choices are all simple and the failure to make the right choices manifest. Arthur C. Cochrane’s remarks on “The Message of Barmen” claim for the men of the Confessing Church, however, a clarity of vision which most of those familiar with the record will be unable to concede.

The final section of “Personal Reflections” opens with a contribution
by Ferdinand Friedensburg, a lay member of the Confessing Church, which most readers are likely to find less than satisfying. Richard L. Rubinstein, one of the three Jewish contributors, argues that after Auschwitz Jews can no longer believe in the God of the Old Testament but only in a pagan nature-deity. The response of Elie Wiesel was a dramatic highpoint of the Conference: "The philosophy denying God came not from the survivors. Those who came out with the so-called God is dead theology, not one of them had been in Auschwitz" (p. 271). Wiesel's personal reminiscences of that monument to twentieth-century pagan barbarism are moving and manifest the best refutation of anti-Semitism: the moral superiority of the Jew. The volume concludes with Theodore A. Gill's attempt to answer the question "What can America learn from the Church Struggle?"—a title which promises more than he is able to deliver.

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SHORTER NOTICES


This slender volume does not purport to contribute any new OT chronology or system, as its title might imply, but only to recommend and support the working hypothesis presented by K. Stenring in The Enclosed Garden: Biblical Chronology (Stockholm, 1966). This hypothesis is claimed to be "proved," in the normal and only possible scientific way, by advancing a "sufficient" number of cases and showing that in no case does it fail to fit. L. is also of Stockholm, professor at the Royal Institute of Technology; he had already written a presentation of Stenring, "Is Biblical Chronology Systematic or Not?" Revue de Qumrân 6 (1969) 499-515, in answer to the unfavorable appraisal of Jacques Meysing there, pp. 229-53.

Stenring's originality is basically twofold. First, any time expression like "two years after x" means precisely two years to the day, hour, and minute, though varyingly in solar and lunar calendars. Secondly, the chronology thus constituted is a sort of code of the author(s?), which is internally consistent but not necessarily intended to bear any direct relation to profane chronology—in fact, deliberately made cryptic. This conclusion is not felt to be at variance with the expressed conviction that nothing in the Bible can be wrong. And the "system" in fact turns out to fit known extrabiblical datings quite noticeably.

L. shows commendable awareness of some techniques and acquisitions of modern exegesis, and of some principal recent works on OT chronology. He invokes these, however, only where they happen to support one or other detail of his thesis, and never shows any serious consideration for the basic presumption of all of them, namely, that one or more of contradictory dates is simply a careless citation for which the compiler does not really accept the "authorship." L. would perhaps have gained more adherents if he had begun from a detailed exposition of how bibli-
cal experts have endeavored to solve the massive problem, then gone on to show (if possible) how Stenring retains what is valid in their researches and better it.

Robert North, S.J.


The pilgrimage is the author's and it is presented in a series of seven articles published over the last nine years, buttressed with an introduction (“The Contours of a Pilgrimage,” pp. 1-9) and an epilogue (“Reflections from a Way Station,” pp. 104-32). An excellent bibliography and indexes of names and biblical references complete the volume. The pilgrimage begins with the apocalyptic Son of Man saying in Mk 14:62. It is the product of the Christian Church reflecting pesher-like on Dan 7:13 and Za 12:10 ff. in the light of the Resurrection. In “The Son of Man in Ancient Judaism and Primitive Christianity” the conclusion is drawn that “there can be no apocalyptic Son of Man saying in the teaching of Jesus” (p. 35). “Recent Trends in Research in the Christology of the New Testament” highlights the “tendency to locate the beginnings of Christology in the early Church, not in the ministry of Jesus” (p. 54). Then “The Son of Man in the Synoptic Tradition” examines the various forms of the Son of Man sayings and contends that “Mark is the major figure in the creative use of Son of Man traditions in the New Testament period” (p. 77). The next chapter takes up this contention and argues that Mark uses the Son of Man sayings to bolster and give content to his application of the title of Son of God to Jesus. The different uses of (para)"didonai in connection with the Passion are then examined for their apologetic or soteriological intent. Finally, “The Christology of Mark” argues that Mark has developed the inherited traditions concerning the Son of Man and produced the “three-fold emphasis which is characteristic of his Gospel—apocalyptic, authority in the present, suffering . . .” (p. 121).

P.’s concentration on the Son of Man sayings, particularly in Mark, has doubtless contributed much to his methodology in the interpretation of the Marcan redaction. Here there are excellent insights. And he is a worthy representative of the trend to see the Son of Man sayings as, almost in every case, the product of the early Church. This reviewer would still share with others the concern to give greater consideration “to Jesus’ continuity with his contemporary Judaism, and to the Christian community’s link with Jesus” (R. Kugelman, CBQ 35 [1973] 495).

Eugene H. Maly


In an open letter to Prof. Moule, the editors of this Festschrift present “this volume of essays . . . as a token of the esteem and affection of your many friends.” The words “esteem and affection” are well chosen. So is the theme “Christ and the Spirit.” Both are indicative of the kind of work done by M. and the high regard his colleagues have for him.

There are twenty-seven articles by as many contributors on various aspects and problems arising from bibli cal data referring to Christ and the Spirit. The articles are arranged into three sections: Christ in the NT; The Spirit in the NT; Christ and Spirit Today. Six of the articles are printed in either German or French; each of these is followed by a short summary in English. The whole is prefaced by a
vita and bibliography of M. and followed by a fifteen-page Index of Bible References.

I am especially impressed by the variety of the articles, their detailed scholarship in most instances, but particularly the concerned manner in which many authors personally relate their study to M.’s work. If I may acknowledge a greater kinship with some aspects of NT studies, I would like to mention by name the articles by E. Trocmé, “Is There a Markan Christology?”; B. Lindars, “The Son of Man in the Johannine Christology”; S. S. Smalley, “The Christology of Acts Again”; E. E. Ellis, “Christ and the Spirit in I Corinthians”; G. Stählin, “To pneuma Iesou (Apostelgeschichte 16,7)”; and E. Schweizer, “Christus und Geist im Kolossbrief.”

On the other hand, the variety of views proposed and explained in a collection of this sort makes one aware of the breadth of respectable Scripture scholarship. Thus, there are articles which suppose Pauline authorship (M. D. Hooker, p. 315), while others deny this (G. M. Styler, p. 181; E. Schweizer, p. 297). Or again, M. D. Hooker (pp. 315–31) insists that the false teachers at Colossae cannot be shown to be Gnostic, whereas J. D. G. Dunn argues that in 1 Cor 15 the apostle is arguing against Gnostic opponents (p. 115). I find this delightful and informative, even though personally I feel much more comfortable with the “assumption” that the captivity epistles are authentically Pauline and that the problem occasioning Colossians was primarily Gnostic. The argument that 1 Cor 15 is addressed to Gnostic adversaries is new to me. This is the advantage and pleasure of this book. It makes one aware of the diversity as well as the tenuity of much in scriptural scholarship. At the same time it gives new data and inspires new ideas by which to enhance one’s total understanding and synthesis of the Bible.

Martin W. Schoenberg, O.S.C.


C. tells us that “many years of reading the Bible according to the Psalter and Lectionary of the Churches of England and Ireland” have led him to the conclusion announced in the title. His OT chapter deals mainly with the Servant Songs. Vicarious suffering and mediation are important in the Pentateuch presentation of Moses (Dt 1:37, 3:23–26, 4:21–22; Ex 32:30–32) and thus he qualifies as the subject of the Songs. The connection between Hebrews and the speech of Stephen is already known. C. develops it further and shows how Christ the High Priest is foreshadowed by Moses the priest. In Ap 12, Moses is the child whom the Beast tries to destroy in the wilderness. C.’s main contention is that the Mosaic approach was largely lost because Paul played it down for fear of overemphasizing the law. The idea was common, however, in all non-Pauline areas of primitive Christianity. And even in Paul we hear of the Jews being “baptized unto Moses in the cloud and the sea” (1 Cor 10). Lastly, to show that Jesus was conscious of this role, C. discusses his Mosaic acts: the forty days, “the mountain,” the Twelve, the Seventy, the Transfiguration, the signs, etc. A short concluding chapter emphasizes the importance of the idea, especially for a Jew. “To be the new Moses was a far greater demand upon the obedience of Israel than to be that shadowy, dimly perceived figure, the Messiah.” This little book makes a very original contribution to the debate.

Eoin de Bhaldraithe, O.Cist.

The distinguished author composed this book in 1970, toward the end of his life. He recognizes Cardinal Journet as his mentor in ecclesiology; he has read widely in the documents of Vatican II. He does not profess to be a theologian. As a philosopher, however, M. attributes to the Church a personality that transcends that of her members. He distinguishes between the Church and her personnel, between the personnel acting as a proper cause and acting as an instrument through which the person of the Church acts. M. utilizes these distinctions in his analyses of certain historical events which have often been sources of misunderstanding of the Church. These include the Crusades, the treatment of the Jews by Christians, the Inquisition, the trial of Galileo, and the trial of Joan of Arc.

The book is interesting, too, by reason of M.'s comments on the contemporary Church. These comments are valuable, coming as they do from one who is so knowledgeable and loves the Church without naïveté and without reserve. M.'s comments range over such subjects as infallibility, the universality of the Church, authority and liberty, structures of the Church, the selection of ministers, questions of worship, non-Catholic and non-Christian religions (including the hippies), ecumenism, theological pluralism, and others. Unfortunately, the translator has not served M. well. The translation abounds with long, complicated sentences which have to be reread several times to gain the meaning.

Edward J. Grätsch


A translation of three essays written in Russia 1915-17. Research has progressed beyond the accepted views of T.'s day, and contemporary authorities would reject or modify his emphasis on the purely Russian character of the icons and his minimizing of outside influences. However, since T. was a scholar who lived in Holy Russia and was filled with the spirit of Russian Orthodoxy, his iconographical observations are still of great value.

For T., the most important quality of the icons was their invitation to man to enter another plane of existence; all the technical and artistic elements pointed that way. "[Man] cannot become a part of God's church in his present state.... That is why icons must not be painted for living people" (p. 21). "[The rounded Byzantine dome] leaves the impression that the earthly church is complete.... The Russian church tells a different story—it aspires upward in every line" (p. 80). T. associates the spiritual drive behind the icons with the religious revival of the fourteenth-century St. Sergius, begun when Russia freed itself from the Tatar threat.

T.'s method is an agreeable mixture of general observations and pointed examples; he is always lucid and readable. His treatment of St. Joseph in Russian icons best demonstrates this. Other peoples treated Joseph as a peripheral figure; Russian icon painters looked into his soul and saw a man struggling with this peripheral role. "Old Novgorod and Pskov paintings of the Virgin’s life show Joseph alone with Mary after the Annunciation. In a remarkable fresco at the Therapont monastery this scene is actually called ‘Having a storm inside’" (p. 59).

A brief appendix updates T.'s references to museum collections and provides a bibliography. There are sixteen color plates, most of which are unmentioned in the text, while icons given importance by the author are not included. This is perhaps the only shortcoming of this fine book.

Joseph F. Kelly

Antike Philosophie im Urteil der Kirchenväter: Christlicher Glaube
THEOLOGICAL STUDIES

What positions did the better-known representatives of Christian tradition in the first centuries take in regard to Greek and Roman philosophy? This question has generally been answered by showing in detail the influence of this philosophy on the Fathers. W. reverses the process and, in the form of direct quotation, shows us Greek and Roman philosophy as seen through the eyes of the Fathers. The time span is Aristides to Boethius. Two points may strike the reader. The first is that Clement of Alexandria (pp. 127-226), Origen (pp. 226-83), Eusebius of Caesarea (pp. 323-75), and Augustine (pp. 440-80) occupy almost half the book, while other highly important Fathers, such as Athanasius (pp. 376-88), Basil (pp. 389-99), Gregory of Nyssa (pp. 400-10), and Jerome (pp. 435-40) take but little space. The second is that W. ends up with rather different sets of divisions and subheadings for the material under those Fathers to whom extensive space is given. But these two differences (the quantitative and the formal), it must be remembered, reflect not the real influence of the philosophers on the Fathers, but the explicit and implicit references to or quotations of the philosophers by the Fathers. It is really not clear what kind of conclusions may validly be drawn from this material concerning the relationship between the Fathers and pagan antiquity. The procedure hitherto followed by historians of philosophy and of Christian thought (the tracing of influences) seems to have its solid justification in that such an approach tells us about the real or objective relations between antiquity and the Fathers, whereas W.'s approach seems to yield primarily a biographical fact, namely, the books (or florilegia) a given Father had read and the kind of influences he was consciously accepting or rejecting.

M. J. O'Connell


The importance and difficulty of a critical edition of Plotinus as well as the qualities and merits, the format and characteristics of the present splendid edition, here brought to its successful conclusion, have been pointed out quite fully in the reviews of the earlier volumes (cf. TS 12 [1951] 142-47; 24 [1963] 326-27). In addition to the text of the sixth Ennead, Vol. 3 contains a bibliography of works used in editing all three volumes (pp. xvii-xlxi), addenda and corrigenda for Vols. 1 and 2, and, most importantly, the indexes for the whole work (names; Greek words first found in Plotinus; witnesses to Plotinus; and sources on which Plotinus drew). This imposing work of scholarship has taken its editors over twenty-five years to complete; along with the editio minor (Oxford Classical Texts), it is now the indispensable tool for the student of Plotinus.

M. J. O'Connell


The Anticlaudianus of Alan of Lille (ca. 1116-1202, disciple of Gilbert of Poitiers, and in later life a Cistercian) was often commented on in the Middle Ages, for it is a storehouse of the allegory which many medieval minds seem to have found so congenial. For that very reason, apart from Alan's artistic skill or lack of it, the book has justly been described by Gilson as
"hardly readable today" (History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages, p. 175). This does not diminish its historical importance, however, and this smooth translation is welcome. The work—nine books containing over four thousand verses—is aimed at counteracting the influence of the Against Rufinus of the earlier poet Claudianus Mamertus; the latter had depicted in Rufinus a thoroughly vicious man, and Alan will show nature working to produce a perfect man. Since Claudianus had died around 474, it might seem odd to find this counterpart being produced eight centuries later; the reason seems to be that the interest in allegory in twelfth-century France had given Claudianus' work a new popularity.

S.'s introduction is valuable for summarizing the present state of scholarship on Alan's life and various works, as well as for supplying a sketch of the background and literary antecedents of the Anticlaudianus. The annotations are helpful not only to the reader seeking scholarly references but also to the reader with little knowledge of classical history and mythology.

M. J. O'Connell


The first of four volumes to be published by the Pontifical Academy of St. Thomas in honor of the latter for the seven-hundredth anniversary of his death. The volume looks backwards (Part 1) to some sources of St. Thomas' thought in the non-Christian philosophers, the Fathers, and the earlier Middle Ages, and forward (Part 2) to some aspects of his influence on later centuries. In Part 1 there are essays on Thomas' interpretation of the First Move and on Avicenna's theory of light; on Thomas and St. Hilary; and on Thomas and Peter Damien, Peter Lombard, and Richard Fishacre; but the greatest share of attention inevitably goes to St. Augustine and his influence on Thomas (four essays). Among the seven essays of Part 2 there is a brief but interesting synthesis of a wide range of modern scholarship on "Thomism at the End of the Middle Ages." The book is not only the first of four in this series (the others will relate Thomas to the modern scene); it is also but one of many that will have appeared by the end of this anniversary year, not a few of them coming from Rome (cf., e.g., TS 35 [1974] 406). Thus its chief value will be as a small set of contributions to the over-all picture, which the anniversary will renew, refurbish, and probably modify in details, of St. Thomas as a major figure within the stream of Western and Christian thought.

M. J. O'Connell


A few years ago, Boyer published an introduction to Luther's thought (Luther, sa doctrine [Rome, 1970]); he complements it with the present volume. Though the book's title suggests a comparative study of both Reformers, it is primarily and essentially B.'s introduction to Calvin's theological teaching; to have a detailed comparison of Luther and Calvin, then, one would have to make use of both volumes. This is not to say that the present title is misleading, for B. does engage in comparisons; but rather than repeat what he has said elsewhere, here he is satisfied with summary paragraphs (except in the matter of justification) to indicate the German Reformer's position.

B.'s book is introductory and follows in the style of such earlier works as W. Niesel's The Theology of Calvin and F.
Wendel's *Calvin*. B. has no desire to surpass these excellent volumes; nevertheless, his is a particular contribution, i.e., he writes about Calvin from the viewpoint of a Catholic theologian, and this offers him the opportunity to give a Catholic critique as well. The areas touched upon in the volume are: (a) "Creator": Scripture, providence, knowledge of God; (b) "man": sin, justification, prayer; (c) "predestination," which B. sees as the central doctrine of Calvin's thought; (d) the theme of "Church and state" is developed in two chapters: one offers the theory and the other a historical sketch of the manner in which the theory was put into practice in everyday Genevan life; (e) "sacraments." B. ends his volume with a chapter comparing Calvin and Augustine on the themes of justification, grace, predestination, and Eucharist. Throughout, B. is insistent in having Calvin speak for himself, and is meticulous in representing Calvin's position.


This new series is a heartening one for two reasons: it reflects a conviction that there exists in America a readership for highly serious and demanding books on the living of Christian life; and both editor and publisher evidently believe that the Christian past—not only, even if chiefly, the original scriptural expression of faith, but the history of faith as well—contains permanently valid impulses and helps to a vital faith. Three of the five books—*Jesus in Christian Devotion and Contemplation* (pp. xvi + 116; $3.95), *A Christian Anthropology* (pp. xv + 92; $3.95), and *Imitating Christ* (pp. xiii + 122; $3.95)—are translations of masterly articles in the *Dictionnaire de spiritualité*, each written by several hands, each (depending on the nature of its subject) providing a history of the theme, some theological reflection, and perhaps some practical application (this last especially in the *Imitating Christ* book). A fourth book in the series is a reprint of James Walsh's 1961 modernized edition of *The Revelations of Divine Love of Julian of Norwich* (pp. xix + 210;
$3.95) with its fine introduction. Only one volume, Yves Raguin’s How To Pray Today (pp. 60; $1.50), is focused entirely on the present; it is an elementary (not simplistic but getting to root matters) kind of book—“not a discussion of the difficulties of praying under today’s actual conditions, but an attempt to give a real answer to the needs of so many people who no longer know how to pray” (p. 1)—but that is really what a good many of us need just now. At least three more volumes are promised in the series; they will be welcome.

M. J. O'Connell


Hard thinking that finds clear and accurate expression, new theological insight into ancient subjects and problems, literary beauty of a high order, avoidance of overstatement and sentimentality, stimulus to clear-eyed devotion, and practical pastoral teaching—these are qualities rarely combined in a book of sermons, but they are all here. Still rarer is the possession of such preaching ability by one who was also probably the greatest philosophical theologian of his day in the Church of England. Yet John Baker can begin his brief Introduction to this posthumous collection of sermons by saying: “It is by now generally acknowledged that Austin Farrer was one of the great preachers of his generation—indeed, some of us would say, of any generation” (p. ix).

There are thirty-eight sermons, averaging four to five pages each, the majority of them preached at Oxford; the title of the book is the title of the first sermon and is not meant to characterize the book as a whole. The volume can be opened at any point and the reader’s attention will be caught. “Conscience” opens with the point that “people don’t talk about conscience when they’ve got a reason.... It’s not conscience’s job to do duty in place of reason. What is it, then?” (pp. 77–78), gives a brief but full answer to the question, and applies it to the role of conscience in “proving” God (the mere fact of conscience does not prove God’s existence, but the Christianized conscience, manifested in one’s life, does). “Consecrated Bread” centers on the idea that in making bread his body Christ takes that which is the body of all his disciples, identifies us thereby with himself, and “gives us back ourselves, that is himself, in the communion of bread and wine” (p. 115). In the splendidly reflective and practical “Radical Piety” an audience of students is pointed away from tempting rhetorical generalities about social injustice to the practical way in which they can avoid being parasites on society and may pay some of their debt to mankind.

During his lifetime Farrer published, as far as I know, only one collection of sermons, under the (American) title A Faith of Our Own (Cleveland: World, 1960). The sermons there were longer and more fully rounded productions, filled with memorable passages. The present collection is selected from a batch written on the backs of discarded manuscripts and later thrust away in an attic; at least one further set from the same source may be expected.

M. J. O'Connell


One of the most stimulating and at the same time most controversial features of the late Paul Tillich’s theology is his theory of religious symbols and their role first in religious experience and then in theological reflection. Part of the problem is that Tillich himself
never constructed an ontology of language in which he could distinguish the use of symbols in theology from their use in other modes of human discourse. As a result, he inadvertently tended to perpetuate the popular misconception of theology as a closed universe of discourse, unintelligible to any but the initiate. In the present work, E. seeks to provide a remedy for this defect in Tillich’s notion of religious symbols through exposition of his own theory of the “dimensional” structure of language. All human discourse, in his opinion, is both symbolic and non-symbolic or “literal,” since in every speech-situation reference is made both to an objective, empirically verifiable state of affairs and to a nonobjective, transempirical frame of reference which ultimately provides the rationale for the speech-situation in the first place. To the extent that the participants in the dialogue attend to the objective state of affairs, their speech will be largely nonsymbolic; contrarily, to the extent that they seek to grasp the transempirical frame of reference for their speaking and listening, their communication will be increasingly symbolic. Theology, therefore, concludes E., represents a legitimate use of language to explore the symbolic dimension of human existence, which is more or less presupposed in other, more empirically oriented forms of discourse.

Fundamental to his thesis is E.’s conviction, partially derived from the writings of the later Heidegger, that language is not simply a tool used by human beings to facilitate communication about objective realities, but that it is, even more importantly, the exclusive medium through which Being reveals itself to man and thereby illuminates the meaning of human existence. While one would readily concur with E. that this “high” or strictly ontological evaluation of language is currently much in vogue among theologians both in this country and in Europe, one might still have reservations about the identification of God with Being, even “holy Being,” as E. proposes; for there are ambiguities attached to the Heideggerian notion of Being which are not resolved but only compounded when the term is used in a theological context. For example, Being according to Heidegger is a process of progressive unconcealment or letting-be which has no reality apart from the finite beings in which it comes-to-be. Yet Heidegger (and E.) would also claim that Being reveals itself in and through the event of language. How, then, can Being be both a simple “happening,” an event which occurs to (or between) finite beings, and at the same time a transcendent reality which only communicates part of itself in any given event or encounter?

Be that as it may, E.’s analysis of theological language deserves careful consideration, if only because it provokes the reader to think more deeply about the role of symbols in religious experience, theology, and indeed the whole of human life. In this respect, E. really has deepened and extended the insights of Paul Tillich into the reality of religious symbols and thus helped to legitimate theology as an intelligible and responsible mode of human discourse.

Joseph A. Bracken, S.J.
Nietzsche volumes in two parts, one volume containing the essays on nihilism and another the materials dealing directly with Nietzsche himself. The present collection of essays forms a coherent and important collection for anyone already well versed in Heidegger, but at least one of the essays, "Sketches for a History of Being as Metaphysics," really a set of notes and cryptic reflections, is intelligible only to an advanced student of the philosopher's thought.

S.'s translation is remarkably readable. Unfortunately, she is parsimonious with her notes: only two or three times does she explain her choice of an expression. But Heidegger's majestic puns are made to carry much of the burden of thought, and they cannot be glimpsed in English translation. As the goal of such a labor is to make Heidegger's thought accessible to non-German-reading students, it seems imperative to me that someone as able as S. should explain a bit what is going on. To translate "Das Ereignis ereignet" by "Appropriation appropriates" (p. 79) does not help much. A note explaining that Ereignis means both an e-vent, in the sense of something coming to existence, a happening of history, and a coming to be that which one is, so that the connection with the key term of Being and Time, Eigent­lichkeit (authenticity with emphasis on the autos, "Eigen") would become apparent—such a note could help enormously. Even a dozen such notes could make all the difference in the world. Think how it would help the English reader to understand "Das Wesen der Wahrheit ist das Wahrheit des Wesen" if he were tipped off that Wesen (essence) is here thought in terms of Ge-wesen (what has already happened) and that the root of Wahr­heit (truth) as Heidegger thinks it is waren (to preserve). He would then understand this Delphic utterance to have something to do with an essential preserving of what has happened. This would situate him somewhere near Heidegger's thought.

Thomas Langan


This book only serves to simplify, almost trivialize, the problems of ethics. It might be serviceable to plunge students immediately into normative ethics without raising the tormenting problems of metaethics which might place all normative ethics in jeopardy. However, even as a presentation of normative ethics, there are reservations to be made about this brief work intended for college use. There is no serious treatment of teleology, deontology, or Kantianism, and the chapter on "The Ethics of Love" dismisses situ­ationism and utilitarianism in four or five pages. This will hardly be acceptable for challenging students who are questioning every presupposition in normative ethics of obligation and axiology as well as in metaethics itself.

The old-fashioned refutation of an objectionable position is still very much in operation here. The "new morality" or "situâtionism" is guilty by association with the moral relativism of John Dewey. It is simple then for the authors to conclude that this version of situationism denies absolute values and affirms that the value of values is thus determined by the situation, not by anything inherent in the values themselves. The only difficulty with this mode of refutation of situ­ationism is that it is no refutation at all, because it does not come to grips with any particular form of situationism. It is similar to the mode of refutation of existentialism which might seriously upon analysis apply possibly only to the most extreme form of atheistic
existentialism. Sharp students do not sympathize with this kind of horse-beating.

Fletcher's situationism is under criticism here, but it does not deny absolute values—it denies the multiplication of absolute values. It maintains the absolute value of agapeic love and denies that there are moral absolutes with regard to acts. It is one thing to deny moral absolutes with regard to acts and another to deny moral absolutes with regard to values. Fletcher denies that there are moral absolutes with regard to acts but asserts that there is a moral absolute with regard to value, i.e., the absolute value of agapeic concern. This reviewer agrees with Fletcher's denial but disagrees with Fletcher in the monistic position he assumes with regard to values. For myself, therefore, there are no moral absolutes with regard to acts, no intrinsically evil acts in the old frame of reference. However, there are moral absolutes with regard to values and disvalues and there are many more absolute values and disvalues than are seen in Fletcher's lonely moral universe.

Thomas A. Wassmer, S.J.


The purpose of this book is to critically evaluate the discussion of both the theology of the responsible society and the theology of revolution which emerged from the 1966 World Council of Churches meeting in Geneva. G.'s analysis has two dimensions: (1) an examination of the ethics of Bennett and Wendland (the responsible society) and Shaull (theology of revolution); (2) a comparative analysis of the three authors which uses six categories: What is the ideal society, what are the criteria for political action, what is the relation between Christian and humanistic ethics, what is the relation between individual and social ethics, on what basis can Christianity demand social change, and is it the task of the Church to assume political responsibility? On the basis of this individual and comparative analysis, G. discusses the strengths and weaknesses of each position and uses this as a basis for setting forth his own initial social-ethical framework.

G. also provides an extensive background for this examination through his analysis of Barth, Lehmann, Bonhoeffer, Fletcher, R. Niebuhr, the Social Gospel, as well as other theories. G. uses well the categories suggested by Frankena to provide a consistent conceptual framework for his analysis of different ethical theories.

Although at times it seems that G. includes too much material, the book is carefully written, well thought through, and logically developed. An outline of each subsection of the book is provided in the margin of every page, and this is of great help in following the development of ideas and systems of thought. G. also provides a worth-while summary of many ethical theories, as well as a discussion of their strengths and weaknesses, and as such the book is a valuable contribution to the discipline of social ethics. The book contains, however, an extraordinary number of typographical errors and the style of the translation is, in many places, of an inferior quality.

Thomas A. Shannon


B. argues here for the interrelation of law and religion. The long and distinguished tradition of this theme in Western thought does not diminish the
need for a new and contemporary rearticulation, and B. brings insight and even eloquence to his task. Chap. 1 deals with law and religion as dimensions of all cultures and shows how they share the elements of ritual, tradition, authority, and universality. Chap. 2 represents a historical perspective, namely, the influences of Judaic, Christian, and secular creeds on law. Chap. 3 develops the correlative legal dimensions of religion and attacks the antinomian tendencies in contemporary religious and secular expression. Chap. 4 explores the future of law and religion and outlines the new synthesis envisioned by the author to overcome a dualistic separation of the two. Undoubtedly, a reviewer could cavil about various specific points in B.'s analysis of the history of law and religion, but that would only cloud the mosaic achieved. B. recounts the over-all history fairly and accurately; in a limited space, B. does quite well. His program for the future of law and religion, however, is not particularly well argued and is skimpy on details. An index would have helped.

Richard J. Regan


Marian theologian and historian of Vatican II, L. seeks to construct a “theology of total human development.” In the French edition of 1969 this book bore the title Développement et salut. The addition of the word “liberation” to the title—and the excellent summary in the preface of the English version on the theological dimensions of “development as liberation”—reflects L.'s perception of the evolving meaning of the word “development.” L. is a pioneer in this field of theology, having earlier published a brief survey of the Church in Latin America (Flashes sur l'Amérique latine).

L. attempts to answer the central question posed by the Mexican Theological Society in 1968, at whose preparatory sessions for a national congress he was a consultant: “Does development have any significance in relation to salvation as proclaimed by Christ?” He finds in Scripture and the papal documents (especially Populorum progressio) radical implications for salvation through development and human liberation, and sees the movement for development as one with far-reaching ecumenical dimensions. Influenced by Teilhard and Louis Lebret (who helped draft Populorum progressio), L. analyzes one of the critical problems of contemporary Catholicism: how to avoid falling into a secularism in which Christianity would fade away. He faults the Church in part for the acceleration of the process of secularization in Western society. He insists, however, that “there is no salvation without the upbuilding of the world, and still less so if we scorn the task.” The final resolution of this problem for L. is indecisive. He is content to affirm that life is full of ambiguities, and so one must live with ambiguities.

L. provides new insights into the development movement, and he contributes to the continuing post-Medillin dialogue in Latin America. Clearly, he directs his argument to the leaders of the Western Church, to whom he cites the urgent need for development and liberation in the underdeveloped countries. But he cautions that theology and development cannot meet exclusively on a theoretical level. A theology of the future, he insists, will be a theology of praxis.

L.'s work is introductory to many areas of contemporary theology concerned with political-economic issues. His discussions on technology, violence, and revolution are largely unresolved, and the notion of ambiguity is not suffi-
ciently explained. He also fails to clarify the meaning of "socialization," an important concept in contemporary papal social analysis. These criticisms do not detract, however, from the importance of L.'s work as a theological reflection by a European scholar whose immediate interests and experience are with the Church in Latin America. A helpful bibliography is included.

Marshall B. Winkler, S.J.


This volume is the first of a projected two volumes on postindustrial society. It fits into that general area of sociological theorizing of predictions for the future. It is Bell's synthesis of his own thinking and his reflections and projection of our present pluralistic and nonideological society for the next thirty to fifty years. The United States is his model. While claiming not to be deterministic in the Marxian sense, Bell attempts a methodological ordering of the various major components of society (politics, economics, etc.) according to his concept of postindustrial society. Central to this concept is the extension of rationality into the area of knowledge. Knowledge, along with all of society, is conditioned by the contemporary rapid pace of change and change of scale. Shown first by the proliferation of specialities of knowledge, it is insufficient to stop here; for these specializations are in turn being conditioned by technology's insistence on efficiency of operation and optimization of results. No longer, therefore, can theoretical knowledge and practical knowledge be so sharply separated. Knowledge is now more than ever systematically ordered to produce results, and a larger and larger proportion of society's efforts is going in this direction. What follows from this is that there is emerging a new aristocracy, now not based on money or political power, but on the ability to frame the questions from the past and the present as projections into the future. Real power, therefore, will reside with theoretical symbol-makers, whose jobs will be the co-ordination and codification of the vast amounts of new learning being produced. The volume concludes with an "agenda for the future"—really a set of general methodological hypotheses about the future social structures of society. Most generally put, man will no longer confront nature itself. Rather, the world is developing into a state where "reality is primarily the social world" and human progress is primarily the ordering and reordering of theoretical knowledge about these myriad interactions. The applications of these ideas to all that we call culture remain for Vol. 2.

Joseph T. Angilella, S.J.

BOOKS RECEIVED

[All books received are listed here whether they are reviewed or not]

SCRIPTURAL STUDIES


Bourbonnais, Gaétan, S.S.S. Behold My Servant: A Study in Reading the BibleThematically. Tr. by John A.


DOCTRINAL THEOLOGY


HISTORICAL


Schell, Herman. Briefe an einen jungen Theologen. Ed., intro., and


**MORAL, LAW, LITURGY**


**PASTORAL AND ASCETICAL**


**PHILOSOPHY**


Gaultier, Jules de. Official Philosophy and Philosophy. Tr. by Gerald M. Spring. New York: Philosophical Li-


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**SPECIAL QUESTIONS**


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