BOOK REVIEWS


If there are Christians who feel betrayed by biblical scholarship for its failure to support and enrich their faith, it is in large part because scholars have concerned themselves too little with the pursuit of biblical theology. Harrington’s work must be acclaimed at least for this, that it seeks in its way to compensate for this negligence. From this point of view it is timely and well conceived.

Specifically, H.’s intention is to provide the biblical student with a brisk and adequate orientation in the various theologies of the OT and the NT. To achieve this goal, he has felt it necessary to offer full summaries and evaluations of the more significant works in these areas. As a rule, he has been most felicitous in defining the importance and values of a particular work; an instance is his adroit assessment of van Imschoot’s second volume, which he precisely and lucidly characterizes as to content and style.

In his survey of both OT and NT biblical theology, H. succeeds in charting the drift of research from the beginnings to the present. In his chapter on OT theology, he is particularly helpful in isolating the controlling ideas and presuppositions that have conditioned this study. In this connection he writes with a welcome clarity about the conflicts and interrelationships between the Religionsgeschichte approach and that of biblical theology. On NT theology, H. is at his best and most useful when he writes about what he designates as “four representative theologies.” Here he analyzes with some care the contributions of Bultmann, Richardson, Stauffer, and Meinertz, concluding with an admirably executed critique of each.

The section most easily read is chap. 3, on the theology of the Bible. In these pages H. writes in a nuanced and interesting way about the elusive connections between the OT and the NT. He also examines, with skill and balance, the vexed question of the unity of the Bible.

Some aspects of the book leave something to desire. The use of verses from Ps 119 to launch the book seems strained and offers the occasion for homiletical musings. Occasionally H.’s résumé of a book becomes enmeshed in details and so fails to give an impression of the sweep of the work; see the discussion of Kümmel’s book (pp. 128 ff.). At times H.’s review of a book reads much like a table of contents; see his treatment of Spicq (pp. 147-48), whose book is judged with more reserve and guarded commendation than it seems to merit. More subdividing would not have been amiss; the granite mass of text is formidable and results at times in
a jumble of elements too disparate to bear satisfactory grouping. Yet, in taking the measure of the book as a whole, one is compelled to say that it is successful and should prove immensely helpful to the student beginning the serious study of biblical theology.

_Darlington Seminary, Mahwah, N.J._

_JAMES C. TURRO_


There is considerable difference between this and most other NT theologies of Germanic origin currently on the market. In keeping with its initial format (a 1969 supplementary volume in the _NTD_ series), the book is popular in style and structure. Its sole demand on the reader is that he be prepared to follow a generally well-balanced survey of good contemporary critical thinking on the three major witnesses of its title. There are no footnotes, no exotic types, and only a short list of additional suggested readings. Kümmel’s name, of course, has long been associated with original NT research, some of which is contained here; but it is also edifying to find it enlisted in the service of the broader readership that also deserves scholarly attention.

The first part is by far the most intriguing. K. differs from many of his colleagues on both sides of the Atlantic in his willingness to make Jesus the beginning as well as the presupposition of NT theology, and he is rather more confident than they of the scholar’s ability to reconstruct the body of Jesus’ teaching. While the Jesus of his pages takes on the now classic form of the eschatological proclaimer of the kingdom who broke with the law as well as with Pharisaical practice, there are some distinctive nuances. K. accepts as a historical datum the miraculous element in Jesus’ ministry, and while he is vague about the criteria for distinguishing the real from the merely legendary, the important thing is that “they [the miracles] clearly show that Jesus ascribes to his person a decisive role in the eschatological saving event.” It is not that Jesus demanded faith in his own person, but rather that he recognized himself and his activity as indispensable in bringing men to an encounter with God’s eschatological redemptive action. This position will be rejected by many, but it squares with various seemingly authentic sayings in which Jesus ascribes a decisive role to himself and his teaching. But what role? Prophet? Inadequate. The Christ? In a sense. Son of God? No (K. does not accept Jeremias’ reconstitution of the “Johannine meteorite”). Son of Man? Emphatically yes. In what is possibly the least likely of his conclusions, K. essentially agrees that Jesus identified himself with the Servant: “Since Judaism was not acquainted with a salvation-bringing
figure who passes through suffering [hardly correct], but Jesus, in spite of his claim to be the ‘Man’ sent from God who would appear as such in the future [probably correct], reckoned on his violent death [probably correct], the combination of the anticipation of suffering with the ‘Man’ claim can only go back to Jesus himself” [possibly correct, but here a non sequitur].

Where so much is attributed to Jesus himself, it is understandable that relatively less in the development of Christology is credited to the genius of the primitive community. K.’s view is that the experience of the Exalted One (Marxsen’s interpretation of the Resurrection?) more than anything else served to confirm what Jesus had already revealed in an obscurer way. The really new title given to him was Lord, but even this developed out of a title of respect accorded him in his lifetime. With Hellenism, however, came the concepts of “natural” divine sonship and of virginal conception.

Thus far we see K.’s critically cautious conservatism. His approach to Paul is similarly traditional. He attributes to the apostle rather more of a heilsgeschichtlich mentality than is usual or, as some may think, warranted. (Surely the Philippians hymn, whether in its putatively original or its Pauline form, can hardly be considered a “history.”) He rightly recognizes that Paul attaches no historical content (somewhat confusingly, he says “no theological significance”) to the names of Jesus or Christ.

He also deals predictably with John. His tendency is to harmonize the eschatological viewpoint. John, in his view, professes a moderate sacramentalism: there is no need to invoke Bultmann’s “ecclesiastical redactor,” but at the same time the sacraments constitute no major emphasis for John. The Gospel reflects a mitigated kind of gnosis, but a legitimate Christian expression of the Christ-event. It carried with it the danger of an incipient docetism, but (contrary to Käsemann) this was kept in check by constant reference to the historical realia.

The reader will know by now what to expect from this book. It is distinctively a work of its author, as it should be. When it differs from an alternative synthesis, it does so courteously and gives its reasons. And even if it does not persuade in every detail, in the whole it is both plausible and reliable.

_DePaul University, Chicago_  
Bruce Vawter, C.M.


A study devoted to the biblical concept of pre-existence is an
interesting project, precisely because pre-existence is most often treated as an aspect of some other concept. Indeed, the author has to struggle to find a working definition. He offers the following: “Pre-existence is a mythological term which signifies that an entity had a real existence before its manifestation on earth, either in the mind of God or in heaven.” In an introductory chapter he makes an important distinction between types of pre-existence. Some notions of pre-existence imply an existence antedating creation (protological pre-existence) while others imply simply an existence antedating manifestation; in the case of final manifestation, the latter may be termed eschatological pre-existence.

While H.-K.’s main concern is the application of pre-existence to Jesus in the NT, he does analyze the pre-Christian Jewish concept. There are three distinguishable strains of thought: (a) the priestly strain, interested in the pre-existence in heaven of realities entrusted to priests on earth, e.g., the law and the tabernacle; (b) the apocalyptic strain, interested in the pre-existence of realities or mysteries to be revealed at the end, e.g., the Son of Man or the heavenly Jerusalem; (c) the wisdom strain, where Wisdom is described as a pre-existent figure from the time of creation (perhaps in imitation of the goddess Isis).

In tracing these strains into the NT, H.-K. does not avoid the difficult questions. While his main technique is redaction criticism with its primary focus on the theology of the various writers, he is not afraid to ask what Jesus thought of his own pre-existence. H.-K.’s attitudes are not simple or fundamentalistic; he says of Jesus: “While it may be true that one simply cannot conceive of a sane human consciousness which could believe itself to be pre-existent as the Christian tradition understood this idea, it is quite conceivable that a man’s words and deeds should be such that others would attribute pre-existence to him.” Yet, by modern biblical standards, H.-K.’s response to the question of Jesus’ outlook is quite conservative. He approaches the issue through the Son of Man sayings and follows Schweizer rather than Bultmann or Tödt: Jesus spoke of himself as the Son of Man in contexts in which his authority was challenged or his person rejected. Jesus implied by that title that he would appear as the heavenly advocate in the future and then men would see who he really was. Since, according to H.-K., the Son of Man imagery in Daniel implied pre-existence, Jesus did think of himself as eschatologically pre-existent.

It was the work of subsequent Christian thought to present Jesus as protologically pre-existent. In part this was done through a combination of apocalyptic and wisdom thought. For “Q” Jesus is the Son of Man who is the final envoy of “the Wisdom of God” (Lk 11:49), but is not Wisdom
itself. In the thought of Matthew and Luke, Jesus has become identified with divine Wisdom (the law, in Matthew). Indeed, in Matthew the influence of the concept of the Son of Man in Enoch aided in developing an implied understanding of Jesus as pre-existent before creation. Tendencies in this direction may also be found in the Pauline hymns and in John, but often under different influences. For instance, John has come under the influence of Alexandrian Jewish Logos theology, where the figures of Wisdom and of the true heavenly man are joined.

In arguing his thesis of the growth of Christian thought about pre-existence, H.-K. shows a considerable ability to cover the pertinent modern literature (there is a good bibliography) and to digest the key insights concisely. He exegetes many passages of the NT, yet maintains a clear train of thought by frequent summaries. Thus, on a difficult topic he has given us a detailed work that remains easy to read. Inevitably, since his study delves into some of the most disputed areas of NT thought, there are major doubts about some crucial steps in his argument. Can one assume that the "Son of Man" in Dn 7 is a pre-existent figure or image, so that if Jesus identified himself as the Son of Man, pre-existence is implied? In H.-K.'s interpretation of Mark, he opts for Mark's correcting a miracle source in which Jesus was a theios aner. This is a popular thesis today, but I for one remain very skeptical about reconstructing the theology of a nonexistent source, especially on the basis of its supposed rejection of the Passion motif. H.-K.'s interpretation of Matthew depends on the assumption that the sections of Enoch that deal with the Son of Man are not Christian interpolations—a more and more risky assumption.

But, all in all, H.-K. has made a respectable case for detecting some form of the concept of pre-existence in Jesus' own ministry and for not attributing the whole idea to the Hellenistic church (Fuller's theory). His distinction between eschatological and protological pre-existence permits one to recognize development in the Christian understanding of Jesus' pre-existence without stripping Jesus of a key understanding of his own mystery. Moreover, H.-K. is to be commended for carrying the discussion of Jesus' pre-existence into modern theological attempts to understand the function of such terminology. He does not accept a simple metaphysical view of the pre-existence of Jesus, e.g., he associates with Roman Catholics a view that would interpret pre-existence in terms of Jesus' unity with God in essence. But he is not afraid of seeing metaphysical implications in the biblical language, and he does not reduce Jesus' pre-existence to a dimension of transcendence in a Christian's experienced response to the Christian proclamation (Bult-
mann and, to some extent, Cullmann). He maintains that, in the several biblical approaches to pre-existence through sapiential and apocalyptic language, something is said about the nature of Jesus himself.

Union Theological Seminary, N.Y.C. RAYMOND E. BROWN, S.S.
Woodstock College, N.Y.C.


This volume is a contribution to the same series as Schweizer's well-received Das Evangelium nach Markus and is a replacement for the famed Schniewind commentary of 1936. The NTD series is intended for the well-read nonspecialist, hence footnotes and active debate with wissenschaftliche issues are absent. The format of this study follows that of the series: a short isogogical discussion, brief summary comments prior to major sections of the Gospel, a translation of a pericope followed by a verse-by-verse commentary. There are also several excellent excursuses (e.g., the OT citations; righteousness; the Son of God; prophets, wise men, scribes, and the righteous in the Matthean community; the Sermon on the Mount). The study concludes with a Rückblick centering on the meaning of Jesus, the theological relationship of the Christian community to Israel, the problem of law, the community as a band of disciples, and the gospel. There is a good but unnecessarily complex subject-and-name index. While the title page identifies S. as translator as well as commentator, S. notes that fundamentally he adopts Schniewind's translation with some changes.

In fulfilling his intent that this be a redaction study, S. is consistent in seeing the text as addressed to the Matthean community and not as a string of traditions whose proximity to one another is simply an imitation of Mk. S. identifies this community as one made up of "diese Kleinen," who are recognized by their charity and who keep alive Jesus' words and deeds by prophetic proclamation (in reinterpreting Jesus' teachings to meet present problems and situations) and by charismatic activity (in healings and exorcizing). These true disciples are not (as in Mk) those who do not yet understand Jesus, but are those who understand the messianic secret: Jesus, as God's servant, works privately to bring salvation to the weak. This messiah in word and deed is not now simply the exalted Lord (as in Jn or Paul) but is still present in this community which understands him and follows his way in speech and deed.

S. follows the general view that Mt originated in Syria after A.D. 70 in a community whose past lay rooted in Judaism and in which dialogue with the synagogue had not yet been completely broken. Mk's Gospel was known there and Mt used it along with other written and oral
sources. S. adroitly employs the two-source hypothesis; he is at pains not simply to view Mt over and against Mk, but rather to see Mt in terms of Mt. His argument comes from the Gospel text itself, with synoptic comparison bringing out Matthean distinctiveness.

My reservations about this work are few. S. finds six major sections of the Gospel (with breaks at 4:16, 11:30, 16:12, 20:34, and 25:46). Fundamentally his division is thematic, which is legitimate. However, little attention is paid to structural divisions within the Gospel, e.g., the Passion predictions (16:21, 17:22–23, 20:18–19), the fivefold formula (7:28, 11:1, 13:53, 19:1, 26:1), geographical shifts (such as 8:1, 14:1, 20:29), as well as various summary statements. While I disagree with points of S.'s division, it is broad enough not to detract from his effort.

S. rightly notes the lack of reference to an institutionalized ecclesial structure and suggests, as he has done elsewhere, that such a formalized structure would be rejected by the Matthean community. In his major point that the community was charismatic, active in word and deed in witnessing to Jesus, S. may well be right. However, his picture of a virtually unstructured community is less than compelling.

Too often with a commentary, the reader moves from verse to verse in a lineal movement from beginning to end without ever grasping a vision of the whole work. S. follows Mt's own example and points us forward and backward in showing just where we are in the progression of the Gospel's movement. There is little chance that the serious reader will miss the "road signs" which are within the Gospel and so effectively demonstrated in the commentary. S. is completely conversant with the major lines of current Matthean research and has achieved what more studies should attempt. He has made available to specialist and nonspecialist Mt's Geist. All too often we read scholarly works dissecting our holy books without reflecting that their purpose was and is to deepen our faith and strengthen our heart. Eminent and meticulous a scholar as S. is justly recognized to be, he has succeeded magnificently in making Mt alive for today's band of disciples.

With the addition of this volume to those of Bonnard, Grundmann, and others, an excellent cluster of redaction-oriented commentaries on the first Gospel is available. I hope all of these will soon appear in English.

Marquette University

J. Alex Sherlock


This book does not propose a new look at God. It nevertheless represents something novel in theological writing, for it is modest, careful, and clear. Borrowing from Anglo-American philosophy of mind,
King proposes a number of models for God—the elusive subject, the self-in-community, and the agent-in-action—showing how each can be put to a transcendent use. He clarifies nicely how a model may be distinguished from an image, and shows how models in use must often be given appropriate direction by an explicit commentary. In taking this approach, he borrows heavily from Austin Farrer, who has written persuasively of the manner in which diverse models for God must mutually correct the inadequacies of each other.

Selecting the model of agent-in-action as primary for quite traditional reasons, King carefully elaborates the notion of intentional agent from the works of Anscombe, H. L. A. Hart, and Hampshire. On this model, God's action would be "fully intentional," without being subject to the failures endemic to human activity. This notion will also allow him a way of characterizing miracle which allows for it to be a fully expressive as well as an utterly effective action.

Explicit treatment of Christ allows King to contrast two manners in which God's activity could show itself as divine. The first approach parts from a numinous context which most men would recognize to be revelatory; the second accepts an explicitly revelatory action on the part of God. He explores the contemporary proposal that "the future" offers an appropriately numinous context for us, but prefers the explicitly revelatory activity related in the form of a story. The fact that God's word inevitably takes the form of a story reinforces King's choice of agent-in-action as his primary model for divinity. Jesus becomes the appropriate revelation of such a God, as "the story of Jesus has become for Christians the master-image by which God's action is identified" (p. 112). King accepts quite classical grammatical rules for showing forth the ultimacy of God: (a) "God cannot be subject to the limitations of bodily agency" (p. 86), (b) His action is always efficacious, (c) and ever marked by originality or self-determinacy. With Barth, he sees no difficulty in an ultimate agent-in-action interacting with His creation, since "in establishing fellowship with the creature, God allows himself to be influenced" (p. 95).

The only misleading portion of King's elucidation lies in his speaking of "a meaningful concept of God" (p. 70), when "the art of speaking religiously is the art of balancing off against one another these several ways of speaking" (p. 158). In short, when one speaks as King does persuasively of the necessity for holding contrasting models or motifs in tension so that one is ready to correct the other, it becomes questionable whether the locution "the concept of God" has any further application. Without quibbling over terms, I take it that a concept is adequately expressed by a formula, and not by an art. I do not take it to be a
weakness that King leaves us with an art rather than a formula; quite the contrary, I am only suggesting that he could well dispense with any further search for a "concept of God."

The ultimacy of this art raises another and serious question. In contrasting the two spiritual ways corresponding to the models of elusive subjectivity and of personal agency respectively, King describes the discipline correlative to the more mystical model of elusive subjectivity. In summarizing the dominant thought-form in Christianity and Judaism that favors the model of personal agency, however, there is no word of a correlative discipline. Does not this silence point to a serious oversight in contemporary Christian life and thought? This gap is serious precisely to the extent that it leaves people at a loss how to go on after so competent a study as King's. For he has demonstrated how it is that philosophical skills can bring one to the point of responding responsibly to his God. Yet if the movements characteristic of such a response are not also being taught, one may be unable to grasp the point of a book such as this for want of a way to go on. Furthermore, a scrutiny of practice of Western spiritual disciplines would lead us closer, I feel, to adopting that model which tends to elude King (and which he dubs "elusive subjectivity"), yet adapting it perforce as a working complement to the agent-in-action model which cannot but be more congenial to our own tradition.

*University of Notre Dame*  
David Burrell, C.S.C.


The major thesis of G.'s book is expressed in the Preface: "I find the conceptuality provided by process philosophy allows one to maintain both the formal commitment to rationality and his substantive conviction as to the truth of the essentials of Christian faith, at the center of which I place the notion of the self-revealing activity of a personal God" (p. 10). G. is convinced as well that Jesus has saving significance for us first of all through his significance for our outlook on reality; for it is the cognitive dimension of our experience which mediates Jesus' saving significance for the affective and volitional dimension (p. 15).

The major problems relative to a revelational theology have to be reckoned with, however, and G. enumerates five: (1) such a theology is accused of being irrational, resting as it does on a commitment to something which transcends human reason; (2) such a theology has to confront the problem of the content of revelation: *what* of God is said to be revealed?; (3) talk of self-revealing acts of God in history raises the question of reconciling the modern conviction that all events have
natural causes with such intervention from “outside”; (4) trying to bring “Jesus” and “truth” together makes one appreciate how wide the gulf is between this first-century figure and ourselves; (5) it must be shown that a reconstruction of theology supports Christian existence.

It is in terms of these five problems that G. considers in some detail four major theologians: Paul Tillich, H. Richard Niebuhr, Rudolf Bultmann, and Friedrich Schleiermacher. In each case G.’s analysis reveals to him that the theologian, for all his strengths and positive contributions, becomes involved in serious inconsistencies and even contradictions in his argument. In Tillich’s case, the problem is found principally in the doctrine of God. By treating God as Being itself rather than as an individual being, Tillich is unable to assert God’s real relation to and involvement in the world, which is equivalent to saying that Christology becomes unintelligible. In Niebuhr’s case, the basic problem is the formal one of the relation between reason and a faith based on revelation. In other words, Niebuhr is not able to reconcile the relative character of all personal standpoints with the substantive and “absolute” affirmations of Christian faith. Bultmann’s effort to free Christian faith from all cognitive standpoints about reality, leaving the latter to natural common sense and the sciences, involves him in inconsistency when he tries to speak of God’s acts in history and the relation of God to naturally caused events. Trying to save theology from metaphysics, Bultmann indulges in a bad metaphysics which makes God’s involvement in the world a factor which contributes nothing to a coherent, adequate, and illuminating analysis of worldly events as such. Schleiermacher’s God is that of classical theism and his effort to express the union of God and man in Jesus, particularly the humanity of Jesus, is threatened in this account, for God, who is immutable and absolute, foreordains all that Jesus was and did.

After his critical assessment of the four theologians, G. points the way forward to a solution of their impasses by indicating the possibilities he finds present in modern theological thought about revelation, which he then fleshes out in Part 2 by introducing the reader to the world view of process thought, especially the thought of Whitehead. After describing briefly the nature of actual entities, G. discusses the nature of God as a living person, who is dipolar, categorically unique, possessing His own unique subjective aim, relatively omniscient, transcendent, infinite, perfectly powerful, and trinitarian.

Only in Part 2, the last fifty pages of his study, does G. offer his own process Christology. The key to G.’s Christology is found in his understanding of Jesus as God’s supreme act of self-expression, who is therefore appropriately apprehended as God’s special and decisive
self-revelation. There are three conditions which must be met if a human act or event is to be affirmed as an unsurpassable act of God: (1) it must be an act in which a new vision of reality is offered, (2) for which God’s aim was a direct and unsurpassable reflection of His eternal character and purpose, and (3) in which God’s aim was actualized to an unsurpassable degree. All events in the world are acts of God in the sense that they originate with an initial aim derived from God. God’s initial aim for every finite actual entity is always formally the same, that is, His aim is for the best possibility for it, given its own actual situation. Significant for G., however, is Whitehead’s contention that God’s involvement with every finite actual entity is materially different, for the contents of the initial aims differ greatly. In actualizing God’s particular aims for him, Jesus expressed God’s general aim for His entire creation. Herein lies Jesus’ uniqueness as an act of God, as well as his unsurpassable character as an act of God and his universal importance.

This reviewer is convinced with G. that a renewed Christology calls for a renewed doctrine of God. Process theology emphasizes aspects of God’s nature and activity which make Christology more coherent than it otherwise would be. Yet G.’s book, precisely as a theological work, causes some uneasiness, and the reasons can be briefly listed. First, he engages in precious little dialogue with the Church’s Christological tradition. Second, his trinitarian theology is offered in a bare two or three pages: how Jesus is related to the Father and the Son and the Spirit is collapsed usually into talk of Jesus’ unity with God, simply understood. Third, the Resurrection plays no role that I can discern. Fourth, it is difficult to ascertain what G. means by faith. Fifth, his dialogue with the NT is pretty much restricted to a dialogue between Whitehead and G.’s summary of Jesus’ relation to the kingdom of God. Nonetheless, this emphatically philosophical discussion of Jesus’ universal significance is an important contribution to a more thoroughly theological process Christology which remains to be written.

Weston College School of Theology  BRIAN O. MCDERMOTT, S.J.


Tübingen’s OT professor Herbert Haag surveyed in the Journal of Ecumenical Studies 10 (1973) 259–89 recent contributions to the theology
of original sin which witness to a lively interest, at least among European Catholics, in identifying the scriptural roots and reassessing historical developments of this doctrine. Among the Germans, he singled out as particularly creative interpreters K. Rahner, J. Scharbert, K. H. Weger, but especially K. Schmitz-Moormann and U. Baumann (for their evolutionary, Teilhardian interpretation of traditional teaching). To this growing corpus of theological literature must be added the two publications reviewed here, the joint work of Flick and Alszeghy and Grelot’s rereading of Romans in dialogue with Sigmund Freud. Neither represents a fresh major contribution but each offers a useful summary of the present research among Catholics.

The book of F. and A., two professors of the Gregorian University involved for over fifteen years in theologizing about original sin, is more comprehensive in scope. Intended as a compendium of their already numerous writings, this full-scale treatise surveys the dogmatic developments from the first four centuries to Trent and assesses many modern Continental theological writings on original sin before offering in Part 3 (pp. 271–374) personal contributions toward future doctrinal development. Toward this end F.-A. emphasize the communitarian, ontic, and interpersonal aspects of original sin, stressing in particular the third dimension. They note that although popular descriptions of redemption use a descending schema, beginning with Adam and coming down to Christ, the NT employs an ascending schema, a historical etiology which starts with Christ as savior of humanity and relates his redemptive act to an implied universal reign of sin. F.-A. reason that the innate misery of the human condition (styled by scholasticism peccatum originale originatum) is not simply the natural weakness of created persons but rather a dialogic alienation, man’s basic inability to dialogue intimately with God and with other human beings caused by separation from the divine life. For the joint authors, it does not pertain to faith that the original fault occur in the first man from whom all descend. One could imagine that generations of men once existed in an infantile state, so that although oriented toward a personal encounter with God in the afterlife, they remained incapable on earth of forming intimate ties with God. Thus Adam could be understood as the first man sufficiently aware of his freedom to enter into a dialogic friendship with God. Had Adam so responded to God’s overture, subsequent humanity would have been in a different state. But since the “first” man refused God’s friendship, this can now be achieved only through the cross and paschal mystery of Christ. F.-A. maintain further that the Christian is not obliged to hold humanity’s paradisaic state prior to the first sin. The so-called preternatural gifts had therefore only a virtual existence from the beginning. In
the authors' perspective, monogenism is not necessarily implied, since even if man descends from different genetic phyla, all would still have evolved from a common primordial matter created by God as the substratum for hominization (p. 322). One can easily see in this book how Catholic theology has progressed since the publication of *Humani generis*.

What strikes me as limited in this book is its lack of a strong sacramental (especially baptismal) theology and of a developed modern Christological focus. It fails, too, to stress the hierarchy of truths, in which the doctrine of original sin plays only a partial function. The authors generally neglect contemporary non-Catholic traditions, both Orthodox and Protestant. They might well have stressed the fact that European theology for centuries focused rather narrowly on partial aspects within salvation history.

Grelot's work offers an essay in Pauline theology which initially appeared in three parts in *Nouvelle revue théologique* 90 (1968) 337–62, 449–78, 598–621. He rereads Romans in the light of Freud's psychoanalytic description of sin and culpability as outlined in *Totem and Taboo* (1912) and *Moses and Monogenism* (1938). After an introductory section on the modern problematic of original sin (pp. 13–53), G. analyzes three sections of Romans (pp. 55–198) by discussing Paul's understanding of the sin of the world (Rom 1:18–4:25), the schizophrenic disturbance in man's relationship with God (Rom 7), the theological parallels between the first and Second Adam (Rom 5:12–21). In his translation and interpretation of Rom 5:12, G. follows Lyonnet's studies on ἐφ' ἡ. He then shows that for Freud the feeling of guilt does not come from personal sin but from a neurotic sense of responsibility for the murder of the father by a son. As Oedipus unknowingly killed his father, so, says Freud, at the beginning of mankind lies a murder of the father who forbade the desire of his son. The Israelites killed Moses, who took the place of the father-god. A murder was committed against God and only the death of the Son could expiate it. This reconciliation, however, led to the dethronement of the Father, since Judaism was the religion of the Father and Christianity that of the Son.

G.'s final section (pp. 199–440) describes in broad strokes the doctrine of redemption and reviews current exegetical interpretations of redemption, reconciliation, and resurrection. He also draws upon the research of Sabourin and Rivière to criticize the faulty notion of penal expiation inherited from the sixteenth-century Reformers. In this section G. simply summarizes already available information without opening new frontiers, although of course his biblical treatment is much more sophisticated than F.-A.'s. Here, in this faulty and unbiblical theory of penal
expiation and vicarious satisfaction, G. correctly locates the source of Freud's misconceptions. But despite G.'s request to judge him mildly for his brief treatment of Freud, one must still criticize his overly facile contrasting of St. Paul and Freud. His methodology is both confused and confusing. He is surely correct when he writes that another theologian will have to develop this same topic in depth (p. 441).

It is instructive that G. never relates salvation to the understanding of liberation most recently developed by G. Gutiérrez as liberation theology's most articulate spokesman: redemption in Christ as related to social justice and economic equity. What one most misses in G. is a careful hermeneutic of Church documents which would indicate how our understanding of both original sin and redemption is hampered by a faulty perception of dogma. Do not many labor under an understanding of dogma which entered Catholic theology only in the eighteenth century and which was taken over in official Roman documents only in the nineteenth century?

Both works are intelligent and useful; they summarize modestly in two different theological genres how Catholics can work within an inherited theological tradition. But the authors need to go further if Catholic theology is to develop a kerygmatic description which would have a richer and more comprehensive focus than the ones outlined here.

Weston College School of Theology

MICHAEL A. FAHEY, S.J.


The systematic aspect is not the strongest point of this book. In spite of the very orderly setup of the contents, which create the impression that S. was guided by a rather systematic approach to the problems of the contemporary Church, it becomes evident rather early that the main feature that holds together the ten chapters of this book is the contemporariness of the problems, not necessarily their interrelatedness. The very fact that most of them had been published previously as contributions to various periodicals and are now grouped together here in a book format indicates the problem of those who are, perhaps, looking for a systematic treatment of the mission of the Church. First, it is at least questionable whether one can subscribe to S.'s claim that "the church's mission is in the first instance directed inwardly, for constant self-reformation is something that the church always needs, but this has to take place in her service to the world and is thus also directed outwardly" (p. ix). Naturally, these two aspects can never be separated in considering the mission of the Church, but this reviewer is not as sure as S. seems to be in claiming priority for the former. Changes directed
inwardly usually reflect needs and demands immersed in and dictated by the realization of the mission directed outwardly. And if this supposition is valid, S.'s methodology is hardly relevant to the topic and purpose of his book.

Second, greater care should have been taken to eliminate repetitious material that is responsible, perhaps, for losing sight of the systematic plan of the entire enterprise. Take chaps. 5 and 6. Both deal with the new concept of the layman as it has emerged from Vatican II; each is beautiful in itself, offering some personal and theologically meaningful reflections on the subject. But as soon as they are found together in the same book, they only annoy the reader by their lack of fusion. Furthermore, the missing link between the different chapters, the lack of continuity in the developing thought-pattern, and even the different style and methodologies discernible in the different chapters, have contributed to the "unsystematic" treatment of the mission of the Church (compare chaps. 1 and 2).

In spite of the systematic misgivings, this is an admirable book for its ideas and fresh reflections. It fits into S.'s *Theological Soundings*, indicating and creatively contributing to the deepening of contemporary theological thought. A man of knowledge and imagination, S. is in an ideal position to bring out the *nova et vetera* and fuse them into a palatable, enjoyable reality for the hungry and thirsty Christian of the post-Vatican II era. He handles infallibility imaginatively, yet remains faithful to the history of Christianity (pp. 34–38). At the same time, he can reach the conclusion without hesitation that "there is no direct link between the contemporary offices of the church [episcopate, presbyterate, and diaconate] and an act of institution on the part of Jesus while he was on earth.... The sociological process within the church which caused the episcopate, the presbyterate and the diaconate to emerge from an originally greater number of offices in the church ... is, however, correctly interpreted on ecclesiological grounds ... as the work of the Holy Spirit, the Spirit of the exalted Christ” (p. 207). It is, therefore, not surprising that he espouses the concept of functional priesthood and claims that "Christians cannot and should not be divided into two groups—clergy and laity ..." (p. 171). And it is still less surprising that he considers the hierarchy as "a function which leads and guides, directs and judges the life of the church" rather than as "primarily a creative organ" (p. 172). The initiative must be provided by the whole people of God, for the hierarchy cannot do without living material.

What happens, then, to the sacramental character in this functional approach to the priesthood and the hierarchy? Because its immediate importance is to the officeholders, "it does not therefore in itself refer to
the whole duration of the office-bearer’s life and does not apply to everything that he does, even though a distinction cannot always be made . . . between official actions and everything that the office-bearer may in fact be able to do in addition to these official actions” (p. 226). The reader can only guess the implications of such a position for developments in ecumenical theology.

I am particularly happy with S.’s approach to revelation and the human condition. When he observes that “what is human is thus the material through which the revelation of God’s grace is expressed” (p. 75), he comes very close to my own position, expounded elsewhere, that the human condition is a genuine locus of theological reflection; for “the mystery of salvation is concretely and actively present wherever man experiences his own existence, even before there is any question of his coming into contact with or becoming a member of the church” (ibid.). Where does this lead us? To the realization that coming into contact with the Church “is not the first decisive element” in the process of salvation. Man’s attitude toward the reality that surrounds him and especially toward his fellow men, however, is that element because his consent to or rejection of the mystery of salvation is already implicitly stated in such an attitude. Revelation and the human condition are, therefore, ordered to each other. The former provides man with the norm by which he can “hear God’s word faithfully and truly in the appeal” made by his contemporary experience; the latter requires that his own authenticity be responded to positively by the data of revelation. One might say that these two source-realities of ecclesial and human life should also be looked upon as the most natural and effective checks and balances of productive theological reflection.

The Mission of the Church is a theological sounding board—nothing more, nothing less. But as such, it invites the reader to imaginative thinking and deep theological reflection. It challenges the complacent and the fearful and it excites the hopeful and the daring. In any case, it creates ferment in the theological enterprise. For this, our gratitude.

Fordham University

SABBAS J. KILIAN, O.F.M.


This author, long identified with the liturgical movement in Holland, formulates a theology of the Eucharist with an eye to the ancient view of symbolic reality (= “manifests to us an internal finality tending to assimilate itself to the signified” [p. 129; cf. chap. 3]). This understanding of symbol, elaborated in contemporary anthropological studies, along
with the Hebrew concept of man (animated corporeity) and of bread and wine (symbols which contain the reality of human existence), constitutes the perspective from which de Jong interprets the Last Supper accounts of the institution of the Eucharist: Jesus appropriates to himself bread and wine (symbols of bodily life and spirit). By referring to the blood separated from body (shed blood: Mk), he represents his offering of self to the Father in death. At the same time, he gives the sacrificial food to his apostles as symbol of their participation in his sacrificial death and future resurrection.

There follows an analysis of the Eucharistic theology of Irenaeus. The Bishop of Lyons conceives the sacrifice of the Church, symbolized in the gifts of bread and wine, as receiving its essential content only when the Lord Jesus has made of the symbols of the Church the symbols of the gift of himself to the Father. The connection between the offering (Eucharistic prayer) and the Supper is supplied by the epiclesis of the Logos, who transforms the earthly gifts into heavenly nourishment.

The subsequent chapter treats of the secondary symbolic action (offertory procession and the mingling of the bread in the cup), which flows naturally from the primary action and which is judged to be indispensable for an integral view of the sacramental event. The concluding section reviews the limits imposed on the Council of Trent's affirmation of the Real Presence because of the loss of understanding of symbolic reality.

De Jong gives a good account of the necessity—deriving from the nature of the Eucharist—of considering it as symbolic reality and the dangers inherent in the lack of sensitivity to this. He also is to be commended for stressing that the symbolic action of the Eucharist is based on symbols already at hand and is not a creation of Jesus out of thin air. However, in my opinion, he concentrates too much on the material symbols of bread and wine and does not give sufficient attention to the concrete symbolic action to which the words of Jesus are referred. The sharing of bread and cup, together with the prayer of praise and thanksgiving, is the direct object of the "words of institution." The cultic accounts of the Eucharist do not focus attention on the bread and wine as such, and so on their value to serve as symbols of human reality. The sharing of bread, e.g., must be seen as a symbolic action which inaugurates table fellowship and signifies communion of life which finds its grounds in the relationship to God expressed in the blessing. The words of Jesus give this prayer and action a new meaning: the sharing of bread now signifies a relation of identity between Jesus and the disciples grounded on the new relation between Jesus and the Father resulting from his offering of self.
The author finds explicit support in the NT for the theological position that the sacramental sign of the sacrifice of Christ is the separation of the symbols of the body and blood of Jesus. It is questionable that this was the viewpoint of the primitive Church. His argument is based on the capacity of bread and wine to serve as symbols of human reality and the reference to blood separated from body (Mk 14:24). Certainly the Antioch tradition (Paul) does not give support for this theory. To be sure, in Mk there is a shifting in imagery in the cup formula whereby the death of Jesus is related to the Mosaic covenant rite as antitype. However, it is unclear that this shift reflects a direct concern for the element of wine, or that Mk has accepted an interpretation of Jesus’ death essentially different from the Servant image underlying the Pauline account. The allusion to ritual sacrifice in Mk 14:24 does not seem to supplant the basic idea of vicarious expiation of the one just man.

The presentation of Irenaeus’ understanding of the dynamics of the Eucharist is likewise unconvincing. A better argument can be made that Irenaeus grounds the acceptability of the Church’s offering on the fact that it possesses the Spirit of Christ and that the prayer of thanksgiving, made to the Father by means of praising the Son (Adv. haer. 4, 17, 6), is also an epiclesis which elicits the activity of the Logos to transform the gifts into nourishment unto eternal life.

This work has much to recommend it from the viewpoint of sensitizing modern man to the symbolic dimension of the Eucharist and thereby enabling him to transcend difficulties which stem from the overevaluation of material reality to the detriment of symbolic reality. However, to support his personal synthesis, the author seems to have read too much into the NT and Irenaeus.

Weston College School of Theology

Edward J. Kilmartin, S.J.


Originally the 1971 Thomas More Lectures at Yale, this book is a reprise of Dunne’s three previous books. Its principal chapters engage anew the themes of his literary odyssey’s successive stages. It retraces old ground from fresh perspectives, thereby consolidating gains and advancing the ongoing quest to a threshold of new beginnings. “What kind of story are we in?” is the question that propels D.’s inquiry. It is thus a quest for a myth by which contemporary man might authentically live. The search carries us through the great epics of civilization, the stories of becoming—cosmic myths and personal autobiographies, and the timeless stories of man and God.

Initially, it seems, there is an emergent story of man through time. It is
the story of the encounter with the problem of death in each of civilization’s four ages, as each age fashions in its epics a vision of man to meet the demand for a way of life that satisfies the desire to live despite the fact of death. One may discover that what survives death, in a life and in an age, is not the things of life—the seasonal things of which Koheleth speaks that are common to all lives and every age—but the unique relationship a man takes to the things of life, the distinct shape that an age gives to human destiny: man’s spirit. Each age is a discrete adventure of the human spirit—whether as a quest for immortality (the epic of Gilgamesh) or a homecoming to mortality (the Odyssey), a journey through the other world of spirit beyond death (Dante’s Divine Comedy), or an exploration of this world’s full compass (Kazantzakis’ Odyssey: A Modern Sequel)—and as a man discovers this life of the spirit, he discovers that there is a rhythm in life’s depths that survives the tides of time. What survives is not the things of life, for they come into being and pass from being; nor is it any one relationship to the things of life, for no form of the conscious self endures through history. What endures is the life of the spirit, the self-relating, that carries on from relationship to relationship, from age to age. The spirit lives in its unceasing voyages of discovery over which death has no final dominion, for death itself is a thing of life and time to which man can relate and thus one of spirit’s adventures.

When it appears that the human story is a constant voyaging into the unknown, a spiritual quest enveloped in mystery, it is a forbidding vision. The anchor of our being is cast in space, with each advance our foothold crumbles, and we are left prey to the encompassing mystery that alone abides. It is like falling into the hands of the living God, yet again like being adrift in nothingness. It is not a way of human life. Unmediated, the unknown confronts a man as the holy, as horrifying and fascinating, impersonal and other. At each stage of life the unknown wears a different mask, and what is required at each passage is an odyssey from confrontation to consent which is correlatively a process of the divine becoming human. It is an appropriation of the creative process at work in one’s life—a wholehearted embrace of one’s facticity, sexuality, mortality, and spirituality as a divine work.

It appears, then, that there is a dimension of man independent of time and age that pervades ages of men and stages of life: it is simply the relationship to the unknown. This is the dark truth told in children’s games and undimmed eyes of old age. Life is a wrestle with the unknown, as comic as play and as tragic as war. It is spent establishing a relationship with mystery as it is encountered afresh at each of life’s turning points. This is how it appears in the stories of man and of God told by the great religions. As a story of man, it is the coming-to-be of
what man really is. It entails the realization of oneself as flesh and spirit, as a whole whose self-discovery is gift, as alone yet reaching fulness only in the reciprocity of human love. As a story of God, it is His gradual disclosure as the personal power impelling to wholeness in the crises of self-realization.

This spare book is a feast of images and insight. It blazes a trail of thought that neighbors on poetry and song. It is primitive theology—primordial speech about man and God, being's figure and ground—that rings so true, is so instinct with the immediacy of life, that it is no longer an embarrassment to the profane man we have become but a telling revelation of our being. Increasingly, D.'s work is a startling verification of Rilke's presentiment that in storytelling lay the rediscovery of God.

Loyola-Marymount University, L.A. John V. Loudon


In Egeria's Travels Wilkinson and his publishers, the SPCK, have provided a finely illustrated, well-documented and judiciously annotated fresh translation of the travel memoirs of a pilgrim of late antiquity, whose relatively short text, some twenty-two manuscript leaves, has elicited not only numerous editions and translations but a wealth of scholarly commentary and speculation. Extant only in one long-neglected manuscript brought to light in 1884, and there unfortunately incomplete, without authorial attribution and more distressingly without sure internal evidence for dating, written in a colloquial idiom that reflects the complex sources of the Christian Latin Sondersprache and foreshadows the primitive romance sentence structure, the text has required from the outset extensive exegesis. In presenting a new English translation (there have been three others: J. H. Bernard in 1891, M. McClure and C. Feltoe in 1919, and the present reviewer in Ancient Christian Writers in 1970), W. has done for his reader as much as one can legitimately ask in anchoring the text in its age and in interpreting its rich data.

He offers us a translation that is familiar, even chatty, though never losing the quasi-hieratic tone that is consonant with the pilgrimage genre. His introduction and several appendices focus on such questions as early monasticism, the liturgy of the church of Jerusalem, and travel in antiquity. Translations of illuminating ancillary texts that shed light either on the contents or the identity of the author are included—letters of Abgar of Edessa and Valerius of Bierzo, extracts from Eusebius' Life of
Constantine and the Pseudo-Cyril, plus selections from the Pilgrim of Bordeaux and Peter the Deacon's Book on the Holy Places, in which we very likely have traces of the lost portions of Egeria's travelogue. There are maps of the regions through which she traveled and sketches of major buildings that she visited. Finally, to his excellent grasp of the critical literature on the text, W., who is dean of studies at St. George's College in Jerusalem, brings the discernment of one who has himself traveled in the footsteps of the author.

The abundant scholarship surrounding the text attests to its significance and to potentially thorny problems that no single volume can ever adequately treat. If we admit that the critical literature on the name and state of life of Egeria need not be surveyed in detail, it is less obvious why the various alternatives for dating the text should not be more fully discussed. J. G. Davies noted that dating Egeria's journey "must rest on a delicate balance of probabilities" (Vigiliae Christianae, 1954). Short of unmistakably identifying events in the text with given historical occurrences, establishing a date reduces itself to determining an approximate moment before which the journey could not have taken place. That moment would appear to this reviewer to lie early in the fifth century. Egeria's Travels follows P. Devos, who situates Egeria's three-year stay from Easter 381 to Easter 384, a return in essence via Baumstark but with an impressive reinterpretation of known data to the hypothesis of Gamurrini, who first edited the rediscovered manuscript. Consequently, W. rejects J. Ziegler's arguments that Egeria knew either Jerome's translation of the Onomasticon (circa 390) or Rufinus' translation of the Ecclesiastical History (403); and although he states that "Egeria was steeped ... in the classics ... of the Church" (p. 5), he appears inclined to discount suggestions that evidence of such contemporary literary sources should be sought in her narrative. Admittedly, Egeria's great value to liturgists and Church historians is as an eyewitness from whom invaluable contemporary data can be gleaned. It is not to minimize that role to suggest that her text may also reflect both borrowings from written sources and certain stylized speech patterns and word usages, the proper study of which may yet yield clues to help fix an approximate dating.

On occasions, W. pinpoints textual and linguistic problems that still await resolution. We can only regret that he did not do more on this line. But this may be to ask that a translation with commentary go beyond its legitimate goal of making a text comprehensible to a larger reading public than would ordinarily be acquainted with the original. In this Egeria's Travels has succeeded admirably.

Catholic University of America  

George E. Gingras


Seven centuries are a considerable period of time. The first two volumes of this five-volume Festschrift to mark the seventh centenary of the death of St. Bonaventure are an indication that his place in the Church today and his importance for the future are the result of something more than mere longevity. Over the course of the past century, in particular since the publication of the monumental Quaracchi edition of his Opera omnia (1882–1902), there has been a continuous and growing interest in B.'s life and work in diverse and sometimes startling quarters. If we are to judge from the number of printed studies devoted to him (whose documentation will fill the entire fifth volume of this series), his vitality today is in some ways greater than it was during his own lifetime.

Contemporary accounts are unanimous in describing B. as an impressive person, handsome, courteous, genial, clear and profound, loving and beloved by all who had dealings with him, a man at once thoroughly human, a part of his times and towering above them. For those separated from him by seven centuries, it is no easy task to discover his genius beneath the thirteenth-century style and hagiographic stereotype, and to appreciate the vital source of his thought and continuing influence. One way to begin, not hitherto attempted, is a study of his iconography. Petrangeli Papini's perceptive commentary on nearly every known piece of Bonaventurian art is surely a definitive work. While a great deal of the work examined is only average-to-good as art, a considerable portion by any criterion can only be classed among the masterpieces of Christian art. Outside of France, where he died and was buried, B. was only infrequently depicted by artists until after his canonization in 1482. What is seldom realized, in view of the relatively few great works of art dealing directly with him as subject, is how great an influence he has had on Christian art, aside from any influence of his aesthetic theory. It was the Francis of the Legenda maior that inspired many of the greatest artistic representations of St. Francis. In the sense that the artist is in his work, B. can be found in these works if one knows how to look. Secondly, the original design of the tree of life for B.'s Lignum vitae, sketched by B. himself it is commonly thought, has continued to inspire no small number of masterly variations on this theme, artistic as well as literary. An encyclopedic work of reference, this tome will be a delight to all who
know and love B., but for those who seek to know him hardly a substitute for an adequate biography, to my knowledge still to be written.

“For some thirty years or more,” wrote Gerson, “I have familiarized myself with these two tracts (Brevisloquium and Itinerarium), reading and rereading, meditating single sentences and words; and even now at my age and with the leisure I have enjoyed for this I have hardly begun to savor what I always find, no matter how often repeated, fresh and stimulating.” In their own way the authors of the essays collected in the second, third, and fourth tomes of this work confirm Gerson’s experience. It detracts in no way from the encyclopedic proportions of the work nor from the scholarship of each of the contributors to observe that they cover but a small part of what might have been treated. In the Avant-propos Gilson, one of the early leaders of the Bonaventurian revival in the world of scholarship, notes the essentially theological character of B.’s work, both literary and pastoral, one stamped with the unmistakable personal genius of B. and which is at the source of his perennial vitality. Understand this and one has understood B.’s place in Christian history and can estimate that place for the future.

Neither the theological character of B.’s work nor its distinctive features were fully appreciated at the beginning of this revival. The Quaracchi editors displayed in their scholia a remarkable zeal in interpreting Bonaventure as a thoroughgoing Thomist, one who might have outdone the Angel of the Schools, had he not been burdened so young with pastoral care. And the first scholarly studies to be concerned with B. after the publication of the critical edition of Quaracchi concentrated almost exclusively on his “philosophy” and “psychology.”

There is a single explanation for the total reversal of perspective within the century, viz., historians realized that B. is not a truncated anticipation of Aristotelian Thomism or the last great defender of a traditional Augustinianism, but first and foremost the master of Christian wisdom and prince of mystics, rightly called Seraphic Doctor, because he is the faithful interpreter of St. Francis in the intellectual world, in the active world, and in the realm of contemplation. And that interpretation is described simply as a loving reflection on Scripture: “Sacra Scriptura quae est theologia.” B.’s own testimony to his dependence on St. Francis for his theological synthesis could not be more explicit in the Prologue to the Itinerarium. And what is the center of this loving reflection is unambiguously set forth in the final chapter of the same work: the person of Christ and our passage with Him from the world to the Father via the cross. A synthesis of Jn 1:1 ff. and 1 Cor 1-2, this Christian wisdom embraces and shapes the whole person in the body of Christ which is the Church. This wisdom, variously explained by B. as a metaphysics of
exemplarism and illumination, is the only wisdom worthy of the name, whose center and circumference is Christ, Son of the living God, the one teacher of all from within and without. It is this wisdom that is at the root of his synthesis, whether it is elaborated in terms of theology (Breviloquium; Quaes. dis. de scientia Christi; Quaes. dis. de myst. SS. Trinitatis) or in terms of pedagogy (De reductione artium ad theologiam) or in terms of contemplation and mystical charity (Itinerarium mentis in Deum) or in terms of history (Collationes in Hexaemeron seu Illuminationes ecclesiae) or in terms of pastoral government, spiritual guidance, and religious life. These are, in the judgment of Gerson and every serious student, among the incomparable classics of Western, indeed Christian theology, whose influence to the present has been incalculable, but whose fame regrettably is unacknowledged in inverse proportion.

The sources from which B. drew to elaborate his vision, the structure of his work, the activities in which he engaged, and the influence that he subsequently exerted form the subject matter of the essays in Vol. 2. A more detailed discussion of these will be left to a later review of Vols. 3 and 4, still to be published.

It has become the fashion to discuss the importance of any theologian in terms of his relevance. Is B. sufficiently relevant to justify a memorial of this size? The answer depends on one’s estimation of two points: how relevant is St. Francis, and how well has B. expressed Francis’ significance? An affirmative to the first would hardly be denied except by the hardest of hearts. As in his own time, however, especially among the circles of the ecclesia spiritualis, the “charismatics and prophets,” voices are heard today claiming that B. misread the spirit of Francis and “monasticized” and “clericalized” his order, in order to adapt it to the times and the current needs of the “institutional” Church. In a word, B. is culturally dated.

But if we accept an affirmative to the second as a just estimate (which with the editors and contributors I believe the correct one), then the synthesis of B. provides a sure basis and inspiration for the clarification of two problems at the core of Christian thought, action, and contemplation today: the relation of faith to understanding, reason, and consciousness, and the relation of faith to history and development. In this context the observations of Fr. Grégoire de Tours (Études franciscaines 12 [1904] 143–48) on the similarities of thought pattern and radical opposition of B. and Hegel are still pertinent. The similarities manifest the abiding demands of personal existence for understanding and synthesis in a time of pilgrimage; the differences, the results when faith or lack of faith in God the Father form the alpha and omega of this understanding.

And if the culmination and meaning of Francis’ life on earth are to be
found with B. in the miracle and experience of stigmatization on Mt. Alvernia (cf. *Itinerarium, Prol.*), the beginning of this pilgrimage centers on Francis' acknowledgment of God as his Father. As B. would have it, the Father of the Word is the fontal source of all goodness and love within and without the Trinity, the Father of lights from whom all good things come (a text from James B. cites over and over), who in the view of St. Francis did so much in creating this wonderful world but did even more in sending His Son to be born of a virgin and to die on the cross to save sinners and make this world even more wonderful. Those who approach B. from this perspective will discover in all his works, whatever their particular theme or angle of vision, what Scheeben found the *Breviloquium* to be: a jewel chest with the pearl of great price, whose every word unravels profound questions and on the basis of faith succinctly develops a theological synthesis.

As the world stands in debt to the Quaracchi editors of a century ago for the monumental and model critical edition of B.'s *Opera omnia*, so for this massive memorial, at once a reminder of B.'s importance and a milestone in the history of Bonaventurian studies, their present heirs deserve the congratulations and thanks of all.

*St. Anthony-on-Hudson*  
*PETER D. FEHLNER, O.F.M.Conv.*  
*Rensselaer, N.Y.*


Reginald Pole was in his own lifetime and has ever since remained an enigmatic figure. Part of this reputation he earned by his character but, as this book brings out so well, his times and circumstances made a person of his bent a very unfathomable individual. Just about everything he touched became a source of controversy or misunderstanding. Few individuals were so involved in the key events of their day and yet have remained so much of a question mark. It is almost as though there were two men's lives going on at the same time. It is one of the great merits of F.'s study that in so far as it is possible the two men come more or less together: Reginald Pole, the introvert and pastor of troubled souls, and Cardinal Pole, the man of affairs in the chaotic age which produced the Counter Reformation Church in Italy. It would be easy to dismiss Pole's troubles by claiming that he was born out of his time, but on the evidence presented it is hard to picture in what age Pole would have fitted.

F. does far more than tell the outward story of Pole's checkered career: an ambassador of Henry VIII and Cromwell, then a man in temporary exile which was to last for twenty years. At the execution of More and
Fisher, Pole wrote strongly and movingly against Henry. In Italy he lived as a welcome and respected aristocrat; later he would be a cardinal legate and advisor to Mary Tudor and would die on the same day as the Queen. His warmth, friendliness, and open mind drew friends and anxious souls to him. His pastoral zeal and experiential orientation, however, meant that he was far from satisfied with rote or purely academic responses to the critical religious questions of his era. In this context he became a leading member of the reformers and spirituali of Italy in the 1530's.

Pole never looked for trouble and his view was that one should avoid any closed position until the proper place and moment had arrived. But for Pole this never worked out, for trouble sought him out even when he thought the moment for a fixed pronouncement was not at hand. Time and again he was forced by circumstances to express his views publicly on disputed questions. Even then he usually tried to be circumspect and so only drew greater suspicion upon himself. This is the tragedy of Pole. What man had more respectable credentials for orthodoxy: an exile for his faith and his mother a martyr, he himself at one time a member of the Roman Inquisition, a cardinal and a papal legate at the Council of Trent, and finally a persecutor of heretics in England under Mary Tudor? Yet when Pole died and for some time before this he was under a cloud of suspicion. The reasons are easy to find. Many of those who had been spirituali or associated with Pole had defected to the other side; there they commonly became his most outspoken critics. Pole himself seemed to many to hold opinions that were indistinguishable from Luther's. How could this be? Was he a cryptoheretic of the worst kind?

As F. shows, Pole and the chief religious protagonists of his time began from disparate points. Pole had two convictions that were central to all he did and thought. The first was an unswerving loyalty to the Church of Rome and to the traditions and teachings of the Church; the second was the need to start theologizing from an experiential awareness of the action of God's grace. In an age when the chief Catholic figures were tending always to demand a precise definition of Catholic doctrine in the highly technical terms of late Scholasticism, Pole found himself in a bind. His first conviction made him critical of the Lutheran and Calvinist publicists as being disloyal to the Church and its teachings, while at the same time he was aware of the positive content of their teaching on justification and other key doctrines. His second conviction made him ask for simple and clear definitions and explanations of doctrine which could then be preached to the people to ease their anxiety and confusion, and thus he was at odds with and suspect to the leading figures in Rome who argued from and for an abstruse and technical theology. To both sides Pole seemed too hesitant, too conciliatory, and inconsistent if not deceptive.
F. admits that perhaps from our present perspective Trent can be interpreted in an ecumenical light. But he also shows that despite the ambiguities inherent in the decrees on justification—and for Pole and many others, this was the key topic in the early sessions—the general tone and intent of the canons and decrees that resulted were distinctly polemical. Pole protested against this thrust of the texts at various stages both before the Council and at its sessions, but finally accepted them. Yet even then his own theory on councils demanded papal approbation before the canons became official. This meant that Pole could claim that they were not binding, since papal approbation only came after his death. In fact, Pole eventually gave public assent and support to the decrees only to find that the suspicions of his orthodoxy remained unabated.

What comes out strongly in this fine study is a remarkable story and an enduring problem. Pole, to be sure, was a unique person, but the questions remain. The spirituali in Italy faced a real question and dilemma. What does the committed man do if he is torn by conflicting loyalties to truth as he sees it? What does the teacher and pastor do when the appointed authorities in the Church insist on debating and defining a crucial topic in terms that appear experientially inadequate and pastorally inept? As this study shows in close detail, Pole agonized over the decisions that he faced because he knew that the questions meant so much for so many people. He could not satisfy either side. And so in the end Pole died lonely and disgraced, while his chief accuser on the Catholic side and inquisitor sat on the Chair of Peter. If a man of Pole’s character and feeling would have a difficult time in most ages, it is a sad comment on the state of affairs in the Church of Pole’s day that a man like Cardinal Carafa could become pope. How this was possible and what it meant for the Church, for Italy, and for the Counter Reformation are not the least useful lessons that can be drawn from this excellent book. It is to be hoped that more studies of this type will appear on the Church in the sixteenth century and in other eras.

State University College at Fredonia, N.Y. Thomas E. Morrissey


In their first fifty years the Quakers produced some 3,700 printed works and 2,000 manuscripts. Barbour and Roberts have done a superb job of collecting and editing over fifty representative samples of this literature
omitting the longer works of Fox, Barclay, and Penn, which are readily available), plus a few anti-Quaker documents. As Edwin Bronner points out in his preface, this is one of several recently published editions of primary Quaker sources, including Freiday’s *Barclay’s Apology in Modern English*, this reviewer’s *Journal and Major Essays of John Woolman*, and Cadbury’s *Narrative Papers of George Fox*.

The present editors have wisely provided historical and theological context for the early writings by means of a thirty-page general introduction and shorter introductions to each of the five sections. In the first section are “tracts of proclamation,” usually addressed to particular individuals or groups. They warn of the judgment of the Lord and urge readers to repent. Several of these tracts are appeals to persecutors, penned by their victims. Among the writings in this section are items by Fox, Burrough, and Dewsbury, and the famous *Lamb’s War* of James Nayler.

Next come a group of journals—spiritual autobiographies of Francis Howgill, Stephen Crisp, and lesser known Quakers. They depict the heights and depths of the inner struggles of the writers, with which the reader might identify as he contemplates or travels the same road. The third section contains theological broadsides—generally defending Quaker beliefs and practices against specific charges. Here we find a section of Fox’s 420-page *Mistery of the Great Whore Unfolded*, answering the “lies and railings and brawlings and revilings” of Richard Baxter and other Puritans. Testimonies on varied ethical issues comprise the fourth category. These express a wide range of concerns: simplicity of dress and furniture, nonviolence, ethical sensitivity in one’s vocation, and religious toleration. Beyond the specific evils under fire, these tracts were usually directed against the total life-orientation of the reader, who was urged to turn to the Light. The volume closes with fifteen letters and other documents concerning ecclesiastical discipline and organization. These are less lively than the others; yet they provide an interesting firsthand picture of how the movement became a church.

Better than any other source, this collection reveals the dynamics and dedication of the early Quakers, their reliance on the Inner Light, their theological convictions, and their application of the gospel to the social order. A map, some well-chosen photographs, and biographical notes enhance the value of the volume.

In contrast to the multifaceted collection just described is the clearly-focused, tightly-knit study of Melvin Endy. Numerous studies of William Penn have appeared and his importance as a Quaker theologian is generally recognized. Yet students of his thought have almost universally concentrated on his political convictions and activities rather
than his religious ideas. E.'s volume is the only really thorough examination of Penn's religious beliefs in their historical and intellectual setting. Since most of Penn's writings were more religious than political in nature, the need for this work is evident.

In describing Penn's relationship to the early Quakers, E. stresses the latter's affinity to the "spiritualists"—the Seekers, Familists, Ranters, and kindred souls who left the company of "outward" believers for the fellowship of the church invisible. To E., the first Quakers are better viewed as a part of the spiritualist movement than as "radical Puritans," the designation given them by Barbour and Roberts.

Relating Penn's religious ideas to those of his contemporaries, E. takes account not only of Quaker thinkers but also of the intellectual, social, and political currents of the time. His primary contribution, perhaps, lies in depicting how Penn's religious beliefs and assumptions affected his thinking and action on social and political issues. In his chapter "William Penn the Quaker," E. presents a perceptive account of Penn's early life, conversion to Quakerism, and subsequent expression of his faith. Penn believed the faithful should separate themselves from the world. Yet he was an activist—a leader in the Quaker movement and a political reformer. His most distinctive Quaker witness in society is rightly perceived to consist of his efforts for religious toleration and his "holy experiment" in Pennsylvania.

Most of E.'s volume consists of a careful examination of Penn's thought regarding theological and ecclesiastical issues of special concern to Quakers. Here are extended discussions of the Inner Light, divine-human dualism, "outward" and "inward" reality, the relationship of faith to reason, the person and work of Christ, coercion versus consensualism in state and church, and the governance of Pennsylvania. Penn emerges as an able, complex, at times inconsistent theologian, whose religious thinking generally occurred in the context of a practical issue he confronted.

E. has no thesis to defend. He is content to marshal the available evidence on the points at issue. This he does with clarity and precision. He has taken account of the relevant literature, primary and secondary, as the seventeen-page annotated bibliography makes evident.

Adrian College, Michigan

Phillips P. Moulton


With unusual skill, van der Heijden weaves exposition, discussion, and criticism in his interpretation of Rahner's Grundposition as the self-com-
munication of God. The theme is explicated as the core and organizing principle of R.'s whole system. True to R.'s own method, H. moves from a patient penetration of the texts to an engagement with the matter in question. And he succeeds in not merely systematizing theses but in setting the background against which the theme can be understood and within which the inner consistency of the whole can be assimilated.

Five chapters indicate H.'s view of the logical development of this whole. The first, "The Economy of the Self-Communication of God," deals with R.'s early work on the meaning of grace, an effort which resulted in two important emphases: (1) grace is first and fundamentally God Himself, Uncreated Grace; (2) the mode of this personal self-communication is technically expressed as "quasi-formal causality," a category which guarantees that such grace is not reduced to something created. H.'s criticism here pinpoints the central ambiguity he sees running through the whole of R.'s theology. The causal schema is inadequate, because it properly refers only to the creator-creature relationship, or "nature." Self-communication or grace, on the other hand, indicates for R. a personal relationship. Hence H. criticizes the use of quasi-formal causality as a failure to differentiate clearly the being-communication of God (Seinsmitteilung) from His self-communication (Selbstmitteilung). H. is in agreement with R.'s use of the self-communication of God as the positive definition of the supernatural, a move beyond the tradition which defined it only negatively, and with his development of the notion of the supernatural existential as a reflection of the universality of grace, at least as "call." H. stresses the final development of R.'s thought on the existential—its identification with objective redemption, the light of faith, and transcendental (implicit) revelation—and indicates the consequent question of the significance of categorial (explicit) revelation.

This is pursued in the second chapter, "Remarks on Rahner's Philosophy," which raises in another form the critical question of the whole study. H. finds ambiguity in R.'s definitions of human "transcendence" and "categoriality." Do these refer to the transcendence of being (Seinstranszendenz) or selfhood (personale Transzendenz), to the worldly limitation of human being or selfhood? The unclear use of "self" in both contexts is background to the question of the self-communication of God. Does it refer to His communication of being to created reality or to God as communicating Himself personally? This ambiguity is clearest in R.'s Hominization; and while the positive meaning of categoriality is more clearly expressed in personal terms in his theology of symbol, H. still maintains that R. fails to differentiate between the Realsymbol as a natural necessity and a Personsymbol.

Chap. 3, "The Hearer of the Word of God," lays out R.'s reflections on
the meaning of revelation from the point of view of the human receiver. In a brilliant sketch, H. synthesizes data from Hearers of the Word, Visions and Prophecies, R.'s work on the experience of God and "mystagogy" in his analyses of the Spiritual Exercises of St. Ignatius, his "spiritual" writings, and his theology of faith. The special interest of the chapter lies in the inclusion of writings not often submitted to rigorous study as an integral part of the development of R.'s more technical work. Within this exposition, however, there is the same critique: the abiding lack of an account of the difference between natural and supernatural revelation, God as revealing His being and His person. Moreover, a new problem emerges as the experience of grace as the source of revelation is clarified in R.'s thought. If transcendental revelation is the locus and event of God's self-communication, what positive meaning can the categorial or official revelation really have?

Hence, in the fourth chapter, H. pursues the theme of "Salvation and Revelation History" in further detail. Here the much-discussed questions of the universality of transcendental revelation and anonymous Christianity are explicated in relation to the not fully answered objections raised within the Catholic theological community. Here, too, the question of the Christocentrism of R.'s theology is developed with reference to his understanding of salvation history: the meaning of the OT and the definitive significance of Jesus as the fulness of revelation.

The fifth chapter focuses on "Christ, the Revealer of God," emphasizing the polemical context of R.'s Christology, i.e., his criticism of the theology of the schools and overriding concern to correct its implicit monophysitism by stressing the humanity of Jesus. Here H. takes issue with R.'s discussion of the person or "I" of Jesus. R.'s insistence on the human subjectivity or person (in the modern sense) of Jesus means a union, not an identity, between the immanent Logos and the "economic" Logos made flesh. Such a conception undermines not only R.'s Christology, in H.'s view, but also his theology of the Trinity; for R.'s work on the Trinity is the final development of the theme of the self-communication of God; its import is to show the identity of the economic self-gift of God in Christ and the Spirit with the immanent self-communication of Father, Son, and Spirit. H. asserts that because, again, there is no clear distinction between the being of God as communicated on the level of creation and the persons of the Trinity in personal self-communication to man, such an identity cannot be grounded in R.'s own thought. According to R., the economic reality of the Logos is the event of Jesus. And Jesus is not God but a created reality because of his human "I" or subjectivity. Hence R.'s Trinitarian theology remains unsatisfactory, ultimately because of the confusion of the being of God with His personal reality. "Because no real identity between an economic reality and the imma-
ent Logos and Spirit can be affirmed... the logical consequence would be that supernatural grace and revelation are not possible and not given” (p. 442).

Within the framework of R.’s theology, H. resolves the inherent problem by showing how the proper distinction between the being and the personal communication of God, and the assertion of the divine person or “I” of Jesus, allow the concept of self-communication to achieve R.’s real purpose. H.’s criticism amounts to a call for a more rigorous inner coherence, for R. to hold fast to his initially affirmed distinction between nature and grace.

H.’s is a rewarding treatment of R.’s thought within the context of its surrounding discussion. One of the values of the book is its extensive bibliography, indicating not only the important sources in the widely scattered primary materials, but also the relevant European, and in some cases the English and American, discussion. However, none of the critical studies which are considered questions the original distinction between nature and grace. William C. Shepherd’s work on the same theme in Rahner’s thought, Man’s Condition (New York, 1969), is listed, but its fundamental argument with that early distinction is nowhere engaged in H.’s study. Shepherd, too, notes the internal inconsistency in R.’s whole system: while one thrust of his thought maintains that distinction in order to preserve the gratuity of grace, another and perhaps stronger dynamism moves beyond it in the ideas of the supernatural existential, universal and transcendental revelation, and the cosmic, evolutionary dimensions of the later Christology. Shepherd’s discussion is representative of the line of argument taken by other American critics who question the “double gratuity” of creation and grace. It is regrettable that this otherwise thorough and compelling analysis, centered on the question of the experience of God in the contemporary situation, does not grapple with a criticism of the nature-grace distinction inspired by a similar concern.

Indiana University                   ANNE CARR


A philosopher who calmly says that the social scientists are the ethicists of our day identifies himself in his attitude toward the discipline. Obviously, he has little if any sympathy for much of contemporary academic moral philosophy, which is more concerned with metaethics, the language of ethics, the logic of ethics, second-order moral discourse, and with questions such as the definability of ethical
predicates and the cognitivity or noncognitivity of ethical statements. Blanchette supports the position for a more concrete idea of metaethics on the grounds that analytical ethics and moral language analysis leads unavoidably to the abdication of real ethical philosophy. At first blush, it appears to the ethicist-reader that he is posing some of the same questions as Henry Veatch does in calling for a meta-metaethics in his rigorously reasoned *For an Ontology of Morals: A Critique of Contemporary Ethical Theory*, which ethic would break through the failures of the analytical "language of morals" or the phenomenology of morals.

B. cites Herbert Marcuse's criticism of logical positivism in ethics, which disclaims any content of its own and reflects the attitudes and values already established in language, whether technical or ordinary, and in society, laboring only at the clarification of the ideas contained therein. Moral philosophy that is not merely satisfied with clarification of terms would regard this contemporary attitude that maximizes the position of metaethics as concentrating on the propaedeutics of ethics. Departing from this purely analytical approach toward the concrete in metaethics, B. briefly looks at two of the basic problems currently occupying some ethicists, if not most: "that of situationism and that of the role of social science in moral judgment, and to see what kind of solutions they seem to call for." Situationism is criticized because we are left, in the words of Bonhoeffer, with "a casuistic system so unmanageable that it could satisfy the demands neither of general validity nor of concreteness." Although the debate between context and principle has been misplaced by many ethicists and has been pointed out countless times as a nonviable distinction, it does not serve to stop the debate at all. In an ethic of conviction we consider that the accentuation is on principle, with lesser importance assigned to context; in an ethic of responsibility the priority is on context, with lesser importance assigned to principle. This unavoidably leads one to conclude that the genuine authentic ethic is one of tension between the two ethics of conviction and responsibility, which closely resembles a form of act deontology in normative ethics together with the notion of summary rules as opposed to constitutive rules of John Rawls. This is a normative ethics which many find satisfies the criteria of respectability for scientific theories in ethics better than any other theory.

To separate so broadly the contextualist from the principlist is only to conclude that the polarities really exist of the extreme act-egoist and the former rule-deontologist. In the latter use, this is to represent Kant as the extreme formal rule-deontologist, which is done in most textbooks in ethics but which is understood as not reliably Kantian if one studies the work of Jeffrie Murphy. To criticize Kant as an extreme formal rule-deontologist is about as consistent with truth as to criticize Fletcher
as an extreme antinomian. To deny constitutive rules is not the same as to admit into the situation and context a large or small number of summary rules. This Fletcher does with the same consistency that Kant admits teleological consequences into his normative ethics.

B. favors Max Weber's treatment of the ethics of responsibility in his essay "Politics as a Vocation," wherein Weber understood responsibility as focusing neither just on the end to be achieved nor just on the means available for action, but on both at the same time and on the relation between the two. It is interesting that this idea of responsibility arose at the same time as modern democracy and developed as a moral category corresponding to the new kind of social awareness that had been developing since the beginning of the nineteenth century. Gibson Winter in his Elements for a Social Ethic refers to responsibility as the ethical corollary of man as a maker of history, as answerable for his future. H. Richard Niebuhr in The Responsible Self compares and contrasts his own ethic of responsibility with two other normative ethical positions, the teleological and the deontological. The teleological looks upon man as a maker, *homo faber*, and is concerned with the *good* to be achieved, whereas the deontological starts with man as a citizen, *homo politicus*, and is concerned with the *right* to be maintained. The symbolism of the first is that of technology, the symbolism of the second is that of politics. B. points out that Niebuhr considered that the ethic of responsibility could cope with the difficulties arising from the teleological and deontological ethical stances by starting from man as an answerer, *homo dialogicus*, man governed by the symbolism of interaction with other men. That stresses are placed upon the usual meanings of teleological is easily apparent to the ethicist. It is customarily assumed that teleology is emphasized in the ethic of responsibility, and deontology in the ethic of conviction, and that the genuine ethic is one of tension between the two which can only be satisfactorily realized in the moral consciousness of each individual.

Reflecting on the two notions of community (*Gemeinschaft*) with its elements of the familiar and the intimate, the spontaneous and the natural in society, and of association (*Gesellschaft*) with its characteristics of the more complex and remote, the more rational and complicated, B. concludes that the social order is the objective correlative of responsibility. It is objective not in an impersonal, inhuman way but in the sense that it draws the individual subject out beyond the privacy of his own self into the more universal realm of community and society: "Responsibility appears in the historical tension between communion and social structure. It flows out of a sense of belonging with others, the communitarian sense, and is aimed at the social structures which serve as expression and means for community. To act responsibly is indeed to
personally assume one's own role in the historical drama of the social order."

The concepts of social order, common good, the dialectic of the common good, the dialectic of ends and means are developed in the chapter "The Good of History," which concludes with a view of history that is neither cyclical nor linear but both at the same time. This conception, according to B., follows from his understanding about the presence of the end in the now of historical actuality: "the good is real now and only that good-real-now can bring us to any good in the future. History, as we have already suggested, follows a sort of cycloidal movement alternating between future and present, between the end and the means. It is not tied to any line inexorably, but it ascends in a sort of spiral which, ideally, will come to include one day all men in a good of well-being and communion."

The notion of common good leads directly to a consideration of justice and friendship and to a dialectic of friendship and justice which Aquinas represented in his comment "ultima in justitia sed principium in amicitia." This chapter was found more satisfying than some others, possibly because we found it more metaphysical in its analysis. The concluding chapters on "Authority and Law" and "Totalitarianism and Revolution" did not come off as well as the first three chapters of the book.

An ethicist-critic analyzing this book is always tempted to bring up to the author his implicit metaethical presuppositions of "cognitivism definism" and "cognitivism nondefinism." Such presuppositions are there and are never validated. Exceptions might be taken to several points—that normative ethics and responses to practical social questions have been left more and more to religious ethicists because of the preoccupation of contemporary moral philosophers with analytical metaethics. In addition, the reference to Pieper's synderesis as "the presence in the mind of universal principles and prudence" would not reflect Aquinas' conception of synderesis as the habit of forming universal moral principles.

Perhaps it is embarrassing to ask an ethicist to defend his metaethical presuppositions, because it would mean confronting eventually the crucial Kantian problem in metaethics—whether a normative ethics is even a possibility. To face this question is to ask whether a book like this should or even could be written.

Southeastern Massachusetts University  THOMAS A. WASSMER, S.J.


The Dark Center is a creative effort to establish a new approach to
black theology. The type of black theology that came out of the 60's used a social conflict model and attempted to establish the role of the black community in salvation history. B., a native of the Philippines, presently on the faculty of Federal City College in Washington D.C., approaches black theology from a therapeutic and symbolic direction. He shows what "light" and "darkness" have meant in metaphysical symbolism and how this symbolism became attached to racism.

The use of the symbol "light" or "white" to mean "good," and "black" or "dark" to mean "bad," is very old and virtually universal in culture. Originally this had nothing to do with skin color, but derived from the universal experience of day and night. Day was the time when one could see, where objects appeared in their familiar light, and one could establish meaning with clarity. Night was a time when one was delivered into the terror of the unknown. Thus light comes to mean what is good, rational, clear. It is the realm of truth, moral goodness, cleanliness. It is the sky realm where God dwells, so it is associated with heaven, angels, and salvation. Good people are "sons of light." Darkness is the realm of ignorance, evil, terror, damnation. It is the lower realm of the devil. Evil people are the "sons of darkness." These meanings of light and dark are general to the Bible and Christian theology.

However, light and dark were traditionally ambivalent symbols. Dark did not always mean "bad," and light "good." People also had alternative experiences of these colors. White could mean lifelessness, the dead whiteness of the desert or the tomb. It is in this vein that hypocritical men are called "whited sepulcres" in the NT. Dark is a symbol of dirt, and hence of moral "uncleanness," but it is also the symbol of the rich earth, the source of all life. So, too, night was a time of sexual intercourse, of love, communion, ecstasy, and procreation. It was the time of dreams, visions, the mysterious, a glimpse into the transcendent realm. It is from this experience that darkness is seen as a symbol for higher truth and knowledge beyond rationality, the darkness of mystical vision and revelation. God comes to man wrapt in darkness, and redemption takes place in the middle of the night in Exodus, Christmas, and Easter. Night is the time of birth and rebirth.

This ambivalent meaning of light and darkness continued in the Christian tradition throughout the medieval period. Moreover, the negative meaning of darkness could not be attached to skin color because, for medieval philosophy, skin color was an "accident," not an essential attribute of man. As long as essentialistic thinking prevailed, skin color could not be regarded as having any essential meaning. Darkness, as sin, could be understood only as a state of the soul, not a state manifest in outward appearance.

However, from the sixteenth century on, three changes took place that
prepared the way for the transfer of the negative meaning of darkness to skin color. Essentialistic philosophy gave way to nominalist and empiricist philosophy. Now the world of independent essences vanishes. Truth is known only through appearances. Secondly, a rationalistic thinking came into vogue which rejected mystical and symbolic knowledge. Apollonian man fled from the dark side of himself, the mysterious, transcendent unknown. He wished to have only the clear light of rational day. Hence the positive meaning of darkness as revelatory mystery disappeared, leaving only the negative meaning of darkness as evilness. These two changes in consciousness were happening at a time when Europeans were embarking upon the age of colonialism. The peoples whom they were conquering in Asia, Africa, and Latin America all were markedly darker in skin than the European. Particularly in the case of the enslavement of the Negroes, the traditional identification of darkness with negative and inferior attributes now became utilized to justify the domination of the light-skinned man over the dark-skinned man. The profundity of darkness, repressed in the rationalistic European, was projected upon the dark-skinned native as a negative identity.

B. does not believe it is sufficient simply to reverse this symbolism, as in the black theology of Albert Cleage or James Cone, making black good and white evil. Such reversal ignores the depth psychology of symbols. Moreover, it leaves the psychodynamics of dualistic, polarized thinking intact. Rather, we must reach for a more profound solution. The alienated white man must come into contact with the darkness in himself, which he has repressed and projected upon the Negro. He must open himself to the mysterious and transcendent darkness that transcends rationalism. A process theology of darkness would understand dualistic, polarized consciousness as a stage of development, which itself must be transcended by a new integration that unifies rational consciousness with the higher darkness of revelation. This higher darkness stands for the mystical and eschatological dimension, in contrast to the negative darkness of sin, rejected by developing consciousness.

This analysis is very provocative, but it leaves the social implications of B.'s thought unclear. The repression and projection of the dark side of the self on the Negro has been a white problem. So salvation for white men is to come into contact with their higher darkness. Then darkness will no longer appear as a negative symbol for them. But it is not clear what the counterprocess for oppressed black people should be. Are we to understand by this that black people should now be seen or see themselves, no longer as the symbol of lower or negative darkness, but rather as the symbol, and even the mediator, of positive or transcendent blackness, that the black man should be the savior of the white man, mediating to him his "lost soul"?
A similar development took place in nineteenth-century romanticism, when women, instead of being seen as the symbol of the lower, carnal self, came to be seen as the symbol and mediator of the higher, intuitive, poetic self. But the results of that were to box women in in a new way. Women again were to stay out of science, power, and rationality, so they could mediate to alienated males their "lost soul." B.'s thought could easily produce a similarly romantic concept of the role of blacks. Although the repression and projection of the dark side of the self is a white problem, blacks have also been deprived thereby. They have been deprived of the right to enter the sphere of rationality, education, power, and autonomy. To make them the mediators of "soul" for white men would only continue that status in a new way. Rather, we must recognize that, while whites need to recover their soul, black people must also recover the realms of humanity denied to them. Only then can they advance together as friends to that wholeness of humanity envisioned by Baltazar.

Howard University

ROSEMARY RADFORD RUETHER

SHORTER NOTICES


There is no reason to add to the favorable notices given to the first edition of the Dictionary nor to detract from them. The changes in the second edition consist in forty new articles, a growth in the number of pages from xxix + 618 to xxxii + 712, and a raise in price from $12.95 to $17.50. The most interesting of the new articles is certainly "Jesus Christ," strangely omitted from the first edition. A new index arranges a large number of articles for systematic reading under three major headings: God, Father and Creator, His Plan; The Lord Jesus, Savior; The Holy Spirit and the Life of the Church. It will get the reader fairly well over the customary old treatises under new names and in a different order. The question still remains whether theology can be done in the dictionary treatment. I still think it cannot be done. The best the dictionary treatment can be is an aid to doing theology. This work is an extremely useful aid.

John L. McKenzie


These two essays are personal statements of why the authors remain, respectively, a Christian and in the Church. The second essay, Ratzinger's "Why I Am Still in the Church," is brief and simple; his argument is not new but it is not therefore less valid: only through the Church does faith in Christ come to me (R. does not specify the Roman Catholic Church; the argument as such would perhaps not require that limitation). The argument
has value, of course, only if the Church be something more than the political entity, to be remodeled according to one’s heart’s desire, which many today are taking it to be; R. deals with this point in the first two of his three chapters. The argument is also valid only if there is any point to believing in Christ; R. presupposes that there is.

Balthasar’s much longer, more complex, and admirable essay (“Why I Am Still a Christian”) deals directly with belief in Christ. The claim “I am the way, the truth, and the life” is something absolutely singular. It is a claim to be the eschatological moment, i.e., the all-embracing principle which gives meaning to all becoming, and the center in which all converges; it is also a claim that must be powerful enough to make itself intelligible in all times and places without dependence on hermeneutical expertise (here is where many readers will have trouble, but if B. is not correct, then hermeneutical expertise is nothing more than a pleasant preoccupation with historical texts). The justification of Jesus’ claim is his resurrection, which reveals the goal attained by mankind in Jesus (pro nobis). The resurrection “completely re-values the whole of individual human life, as it does the whole of human history, since history has reached its end in the death of Jesus” (p. 50). In good measure, B. is saying that Jesus makes sense of death and all that is related to it in human experience; that God is with man in Christ; that the claim of Jesus, his cross and abandonment, and his resurrection are the manifestation of the triune God’s love for man. Only faith can accept this; hermeneutics and theology can only serve to bring its implications to light.

In the last pages of his essay B. shows his awareness of the attacks on the claim and its fulfilment in cross and resurrection, and that they need answering. If B. is right, then there must be valid answers, even for “modern man,” and it is for hermeneutics and theology to find them. If B. is not right, then hermeneutics and theology are just another parlor game.

M. J. O’Connell


Farrer died in 1968, leaving an imposing legacy of theological writing and the deserved reputation of having been the greatest philosophical theologian of his generation in the Church of England. Conti, who has also gathered two volumes of previously unpublished sermons of F., here brings together various papers in philosophical theology, some of them public lectures, some contributions to collections or introductions to books, and some apparently written simply for F.’s own satisfaction. The editor distributes the papers under two headings: (1) “Rational Theology: The Study of Theological Reason,” where F. deals with the existence of God, the grounds for belief in Him, and the role of analogy in theology (nine essays in all); and (2) “Philosophical Theology: The Analysis of Faith”: here F. handles such subjects as God’s personal nature and providence, grace, and freedom (nine essays). In a few pages of helpful “Study Notes,” the editor relates these various papers and points in them to sections of F.’s published work. This welcome book will give added pleasure to those who already know and value F.’s writings, and may serve those unfamiliar with him as an introduction to one whom John Hicks, in his Foreword, describes as “an important figure, both because his work is a shining example of intellectual integrity and style, and because his theology has been shaped by a universal criterion” (p. xiii), and “a formidable figure,
unable to be ignored. The sheer distinction and brilliance of his mind was backed by a vast learning that was never paraded but was always available” (p. xv).

M. J. O'Connell


One sometimes thinks that it is not another book of essays but a courageous act of will that is needed to get the intercommunion discussion off dead center. Once again, in this Tenth Downside Symposium, the familiar ground is retraced, as if the repeated survey is bound to turn up just the insight that will accomplish the desired break-through. There is no such exciting insight in this book. Nevertheless, essays by Piet Fransen, Maurice Wiles, Nicholas Lash, John Austin Baker, David B. Clark, John Kent, and Robert Murray have a kind of cumulative impact. John Coulsen puts his finger on this in a concluding comment. He identifies as a main concern of the symposium the task of establishing a distinction “between the conditions requisite for full, mutual common membership, and those sufficient for sharing in the eucharist” (p. 288). The elaboration of this distinction, already admitted in principle for extraordinary occasions, is an important step. Fransen, whose essay seemed the most valuable, points out that present legislation for Roman Catholics rests on prudential judgment (in a tutoristic vein, at that) and should not be given the weight of dogmatic statements. The criteria for admission to the Eucharist do not stand up well under careful criticism and cannot be applied as juridical yardsticks. This demythologizing of the present Roman position is a helpful beginning. The essays of Lash and Murray develop the critique of these criteria further, particularly with respect to how “unity in faith” might be determined in an age of theological pluralism, and how concern for orthodoxy needs to be balanced by equal concern for catholicity and orthopraxy. The net result of all these essays—theological, sociological, historical—is to urge wider Eucharistic sharing. With the exception of a note summarizing current thinking on it, the ministry question did not even come up—a welcome indication of progress.

Sara Butler


The text of this book was completed in 1962 as a dissertation at the University of Innsbruck under the direction of Karl Rahner. It was subsequently published in German in the series Quaestiones disputatae in 1969. The starting point for M.’s investigation was the scholastic thesis Subjectum ordinatio-nis est mas. He limits himself to an analysis of the proofs which dogmatic theologians have used for the thesis. The conclusion which he reached has by this time become the working basis of much of the discussion about women in relation to priesthood: the rejection of ordination of women on the basis of a jus divinum relevant to all cultural situations demands further study. The translators’ Foreword and Afterword focus on the current shift in literature toward the development of positive arguments in favor of ordination of women.

This rather full summary of the arguments for the traditional practice of the churches of the East and West, together with a serious critical assessment, paves the way for a positive
approach to a very complicated problem. The question of ordination of women to the priesthood must be taken up within the context of a theology of orders, ecclesiology, and Mariology which takes seriously the findings of the human sciences concerning man and woman. Beyond this, the present experience of God at work in the life of the Christian community will undoubtedly provide the most important single contribution toward the resolution of a question which is both valid and seemingly insoluble. Gordian knots, as history teaches us, have been cut by a theology derived from experience.

Edward J. Kilmartin, S.J.


Z., an Italian statesman and recently Director General of the Council of Ministers of the European Communities at Brussels, is convinced that the world ethos is changing and that there is abroad not only the periodic weariness with war and desire for peace but a trend to pacifism. The aim of this book is to uncover the distant past of the idea of and desire for universal peace. To this end Z. studies Greek civilization from its beginnings down to the Hellenistic age (pp. 16–130), Roman thinking and later Hellenistic speculation (pp. 131–84), the OT (pp. 185–206), and Christian teaching down to Augustine and Pelagius (pp. 207–315).

In his Introduction, Z. distinguishes four pacifisms: mystical (deriving from man's congenital propensity to humility), philosophical (peacefulness as part of a more comprehensive ethical system), sociological (the problem of war and peace as a social problem), and political (peace as the objective of all sane government). The distinctions are not very helpful and in any event do not influence the body of the book. To cover so much ground in so small a compass inevitably means that there is not much helpful analysis. Z. is content, in fact, to leave us with a lengthy recital of sources and quotations, along with sketches of the historical context in which these are to be set. This is all to the good as far as it goes and doubtless justifies Z.'s conclusion that "the problem of universal peace was posed, sometimes overtly, sometimes less so, at the center of classical and ancient Christian thought, sometimes also influencing artistic and literary invention. On the other hand, it exerted much less influence on the decisions of those exercising political power" (p. 15). The real thrust of the book is to provide support and inspiration for the contemporary peace-lover and peace-maker in the knowledge that he has behind him a long series of generations who also yearned for universal peace.

M. J. O'Connell


Scholars have long disagreed about the theological interpretation of Christian art in the pre-Constantinian Church (the catacombs, sarcophagi, and Dura-Europos house-church), and specifically about the presence of images of repentance in this art. This is the subject D. tackles in this extensive study. His basic principle is that we must expect early Christian art, a creation of the people, to mirror in some fashion their central religious concerns, among them the need for baptismal and postbaptismal forgiveness of sins, which was felt to be a major problem by the people as well as
An important and stimulating essay on suffering in the works of Chrysostom, well organized and clearly written, in three long chapters: (1) philosophical analysis of false opinions on the origin of evil, and Chrysostom's view; (2) theological analysis of suffering in relation to Christ and God; (3) moral analysis of suffering according as the sufferer is sinner or just (a distinction, I think, not entirely valid). With Chrysostom the problem of suffering is never posed in the abstract; it is forced on him by real circumstances. This book is based largely on writings from the Constantinople period, which have a particular depth since it was a time of intense personal tragedy for him.

Chap. 1 deals with the origin of evil. For C., evil's true origin lies in the free choice of man, and the only valid cause of suffering is sin (a Stoic notion). Chap. 2 attempts to answer the fundamental question for Christians about the relation between God and the sufferings of the world. C. indicates two paths by which God enters into human suffering: His economy and His providence. The supreme assurance of this is Christ's own suffering. C. denies the "scandal" of reason before suffering, and puts man in his true place before the unfathomability of God. Thus suffering is one of the mysteries of God, incomprehensible to reason, apprehended by faith. Through it one learns the weakness of reason and is led to the mystery of God. Chap. 3 describes the positive value of suffering. Whereas the Stoics classed suffering as one of the "indifferent" things, C. says it brings good and is a good. Included among its benefits are: punishments of sin, remission of sin, acquisition of glory, and witness to the resurrection.

My only criticism is that N. places too much emphasis on C.'s use of common Stoic themes and does not offer a deep enough interpretation of
the Christian ideas, which represent C.'s distinct contribution to our understanding of suffering. The "Conclusion Générale" is especially misleading in this respect, and makes this a book which must be read from cover to cover in order to derive utmost profit from the primary source material contained herein.

Margaret Schatkin


B.'s monograph on the provincial council of Vienne in 1289 is a valuable contribution to Church history not because of the importance of the council itself, but because the council is representative of provincial councils in the thirteenth century, especially with regard to its convocation, organization, legislation, and influence. In brief, Vienne is a fine example of a local church in action. B.'s method in organizing his work is also an excellent model of the manner in which studies of local councils should be written. He deals first with his sources, which, in this case, consist primarily of a single ms. preserved in the cathedral archives at Viviers, and which, unlike many local ecclesiastical documents, escaped the ravages of the French Revolution. This ms. contains the complete statutes of the council and was probably made for the use of one of the suffragan bishops. B. analyzes, moreover, the entire history of the manuscript, its authenticity, and its various editions through the later Middle Ages. A critical edition of this document is printed at the conclusion of the book. B. also provides a description of the ecclesiastical province of Vienne in the thirteenth century, emphasizing its political and geographical history, its diverse social strata, its religious life and organization, and the personality of its archbishop and suffragan bishops. As a result of these efforts we are better able to see the council in its proper historical context.

In his treatment of the activity of the council, B. discusses first its convocation and organization and then its principal legislative themes. Like many provincial councils, Vienne sought to implement within the local church the legislation of previous general councils—in this case, Fourth Lateran and Second Lyons. The work concludes with two chapters on the promulgation of the statutes of Vienne and their influence upon subsequent conciliar legislation. The reviewer's only criticism is that B. did not treat in sufficient detail the specific problems to which the council addressed itself. His handling of such problems tends to be excessively general and occupies only fifteen pages. Greater emphasis on the legislation of Vienne would have given us an even richer understanding of that local church.

Louis B. Pascoe, S.J.


Carlyle characterized his age as "the Age of Machinery." In novels like Hard Times Dickens voiced the growing Victorian disillusionment with technology. This fine study provides an excellent insight into the efforts of six late Victorians to cope with the dehumanization of culture brought about by the pervasive influence of technology, scientific method, and the residual rationalism inherited from the eighteenth century. Two were Cambridge philosophers, Henry Sidgwick and James Ward. Two were scientists, George John Romanes and Alfred Russell Wallace—the latter the codiscoverer of evolution by natural selection. Two were men of letters, Samuel But-
All six had abandoned the safe shores of both organized religion and scientific certitude. The book records their respective and often crisscrossing voyages in search of viable alternatives to chaos. T. quotes George Eliot's famous words to Frederic Myers. Speaking of God, Immortality, and Duty, the novelist lamented: "how inconceivable the first, how unbelievable the second, how peremptory and absolute the third." This lament sums up their central concern. They turned variously to psychic phenomena, spiritualism, phrenology, humanistic faith, nonreligious ethical systems, in an effort to defend that something "more" in man which makes the "human" unique in the universe. However successful or unsuccessful each man was, as a group they represent the persistent and growing revolt against positivism that characterized the turn of the century. As thoroughly objective and historically detached as the book is, its subject matter will still prompt even the dispassionate reader to recall the young Matthew Arnold's description of himself "Wandering between two worlds, one dead,/ The other powerless to be born." The book concludes with a very helpful bibliographical essay on each man.

Philip C. Rule, S.J.


This volume is the first of a series to celebrate the 700th anniversary of St. Thomas' death. The others in the series will be monographs on significant figures or important schools in the Thomistic revival in nineteenth-century Italy. To some extent the first volume seems to be an overview of the range of subjects to be handled in the monographs. There are two studies on Canon Vincent Buzzetti and his school, and two previously unpublished texts of Buzzetti; a lengthy study of the Thomistic Academy of Naples; a further seven essays on key figures and localities in the nineteenth-century revival; and a closing essay on the "geography of Thomism" in late nineteenth-century Italy as reflected in the pages of the periodical Scienza Italiana (Bologna, 1876–88). Most of these studies consist of detailed lists of persons, places, events, publications, disputations, etc.; as such, they are rather research tools than readable syntheses.

The next few years will see the anniversaries of other events that are significant for the history of Thomism: the centenaries of Aeterni Patris (1979), the foundation of the Roman Academy of St. Thomas (1979–80), and the proclamation of St. Thomas as patron of Catholic schools (1980), and the 700th anniversary of the death of St. Albert the Great (1980). Presumably each of these dates will add further volumes to the twenty-one projected for the 1974 anniversary.

M. J. O'Connell


This work is a sociological investigation of ethical problems in biomedical research dealing with human subjects. Based on methods of survey and selective interview research of biomedical researchers, the central focus of the
study is the relationship between the social structure and controls of the biomedical profession and the ethics of research dealing with human subjects. There are indications that a growing minority of biomedical researchers are becoming more permissive (less ethically rigid) in performing experiments either without their human subjects' consent or at levels of considerable risk to their subjects' health. This finding presents a clear ethical challenge to the medical research profession. In many cases the observed motivation behind such risky research on human subjects appears to be the researcher's desire for personal advancement rather than the desire for therapeutic payoff.

The authors investigate several social controls of this type of medical research. Socialization (e.g., medical school) has shockingly little consideration of or influence upon research ethics, while at the same time socialization sets high standards for scientific achievement. Similarly, research teams were found to be ethically selective in the sense that ethically strict as well as riskily permissive researchers tended to collaborate only with researchers of their own ethical persuasion, excluding dissident voices. In general, committees of peer review of research proposals are found to be the most effective means for safeguarding humane ethical practice in biomedical research. In addition, it is strongly recommended that nonresearchers (e.g., members of the outside community) be represented on committees which evaluate all research on human subjects.

This study is a fine example of much-needed policy research at the interface of the ethical, social scientific, and medical disciplines. Ideally, further research of this type would probe more deeply into the sociology of knowledge and science questions implied, such as the ideological basis of research evaluation or the relationship between social position and ethical stance. It is a significant achievement, however, when a first step such as this is taken, placing both ethical dilemmas and research practice within a broader context of sociocultural organization. With this beginning, and perhaps following similar methods, important findings concerning social structure, ethical stance, and humane policy should be forthcoming.

Edward B. Arroyo, S.J.


A useful source book on the classical approaches to methodology in the study of religion, assembled by the Senior Lecturer of Islamics and Phenomenology of Religion at the University of Utrecht. It is to be supplemented by a second volume containing both an introductory and a general bibliography listing publications by and about all the scholars it anthologizes. Together, the two volumes will provide an extensive background for understanding the hundred years or so since the study of religion became an academic discipline.

Vol. 1 has two parts. First, it offers a seventy-five-page Introduction that surveys historically the past hundred years' study of religion. This deals with the figures responsible for (1) establishing the study of religion as an autonomous discipline, (2) connecting it with other disciplines, (3) developing its focus as a special research, (4) accepting later contributions from other disciplines, and (5) opening perspectives for a phenomenological study of religion. In effect, the Introduction covers economically the materials of such histories of the study of religion as Jan de Vries's The Study of Religion. Its distinctive mark is to stress meth-
odology, and its only failing is that it often becomes a catalogue of ships.

The second, major part is an anthology of methodological statements organized according to the five concerns of the historical Introduction. As a matter of principle, all the figures anthologized are now dead. So, what one reads is the disciplinary self-understanding of the giants who developed the rich, complex field of religious studies: F. Max Müller, James George Frazer, Rudolf Otto, Bronislaw Malinowski, Max Scheler, etc.—to a total of forty-one. For each author there is a brief bibliography, and there are indices of sources, names, concepts, and subjects. An excellent collection, useful especially to those interested in the development of the study of religion's self-understanding.

John Carmody

BOOKS RECEIVED

[All books received are listed here whether they are reviewed or not]

SCRIPTURAL STUDIES


Conflict at Colossae: A Problem in the Interpretation of Early Christianity Illustrated by Selected Modern Studies. Ed. and tr. by Fred O.


PASTORAL AND ASCETICAL

PHILOSOPHY

SPECIAL QUESTIONS


