BOOK REVIEWS


These first two volumes of papers from the International Lonergan Congress held in 1970 at St. Leo College, Florida, provide a wide range of essays which enter into dialogue with Lonergan's thought or which suggest applications of his ideas in areas as various as hermeneutics and ecclesiology. Some of the articles have already appeared in journals of philosophy and theology, but it is helpful to have them collected together here. In addition, Vol. 2 presents us with significant comparisons between Lonergan and several major thinkers of the past century. There are, e.g., extended and valuable treatments of Lonergan and Dilthey (by Matthew Lamb) and of Gadamer and Lonergan (by Frederick Lawrence).

In brief replies to the papers, L. argues against Langdon Gilkey's contention that he wrongly conceives theology by analogy with natural science. Re-emphasizing his rejection of the Aristotelian notion of science, he points out that he has reversed Aristotle's procedure as well. Whereas Aristotle gave primacy to metaphysical categories which were then further determined by physical and psychological ones, L. begins with cognitional categories and derives from these his critical and metaphysical conceptions. The method which is thus developed should apply then to any field of human inquiry, and to this extent he can agree with Karl Rahner's statement that his theological method is so generic as to fit any and every science. But a specific theological principle, according to L., is to be found in religious conversion, and it becomes precisely a Christian principle "when the gift of the Spirit within us is intersubjective with the revelation of the Father in Christ Jesus" (Vol. 1, 233). Whether this specification will satisfy all his critics seems to me doubtful. From several points of view, Charles Davis and David Tracy point out that there seems to be an unexamined dogmatic moment in L.'s thought. L.'s answer does not seem to feel the force of the objection, and his highly methodological remarks again raise the question whether methodologist and theologian can be so neatly distinguished as he argues they can.

Nevertheless, inexact reasons are often suggested for considering L.'s philosophy to be dogmatic or uncritical. If I understand correctly his cryptically terse reply to Emerich Coreth, L. recalls there the moving viewpoint in Insight from which he comes to speak of being as the
objective of the pure desire to know—a viewpoint which in no way precludes one's later affirming in a synthetic way that one has always already been in knowing contact with reality whenever one sets out to ask a particular further question about it. In Coreth's paper I suspect that a common prejudice is once again operative, namely, that L.'s approach in *Insight* is overly concerned with objectivity, to the exclusion of subjectivity. Actually, however, the dynamic and cumulative activity of the inquiring subject is what is being studied in the book from its first pages onward.

Robert Johann acknowledges this when he argues that L.'s intellectualism is not excessive, as Johann once thought, but is in fact remarkably similar to John Dewey's instrumental theory of knowledge. Johann goes on to suggest that L.'s concept of experience could profitably be broadened by reference to Dewey. When L. responds that *Insight* “was not a study of human life but a study of human understanding” (Vol. 2, 310), I think readers sympathetic to Johann's point will remember that the narrowly defined concept of experience as one moment in the cognitional process is still not the only concept of experience used in the book. Such readers will probably also regret that L. has not seen fit to pay more attention to Schubert Ogden's thesis that for modern thought “the main problem of cognitional analysis has been held to be, not to discover intellect, but to rediscover experience” (Vol. 2, 229). A meeting of minds is required here, and it would undoubtedly be fruitful for the appreciation not only of L.'s metaphysics of the finite but also of his metaphysics of transcendent being, about which a number of the writers express serious reservations. (Some of the needed clarification is indeed begun in Bernard Tyrrell's careful comparison of the philosophy of God in Lonergan and Rahner.)

L.'s *Method in Theology* has, of course, been published since the Congress, and these two volumes will be valuable aids to any serious reader of *Method*. Many of the essays will undoubtedly continue to provide authoritative interpretations and complements to the thought of a man who has contributed immensely not only to the present transition in theology but also to its future. “If we wish either to praise or to blame, we must first understand,” as Frederick Crowe has insisted, and if this applies to one man's thinking, it applies still more to the ongoing collaboration he has sought to illuminate in theology.

Woodstock College

LeO J. O'Donovan, S.J.

This work is more the ambitious statement of a project than its scholarly fulfilment. Within the brevity of eighty-seven pages Winquist moves densely through the epistemological conceptions of the transcendental imagination in Kant and Lonergan, finding Kant too classical and Lonergan guilty of a dialectical illusion, dismisses the ontological conception of the transcendental imagination in Heidegger as too bound to a Kantian notion of temporality, places the ontology of the transcendental imagination in Whitehead's conception of a complex of propositions, and ends by drawing some consequences for theological hermeneutics.

The essay is promising; for the purpose of any analysis of the transcendental imagination is to uncover the dynamic unity-in-difference between image and concept, symbol and thought, act and content. Yet W. so stresses the difference between act and content that he fails to articulate properly how the imagination as transcendental is the orientation of act to content and so the matrix of thought from symbol. This deficiency shows up in his discussion of the four philosophers. No mention is made of Kant's critique of aesthetic judgment, despite the renewed importance given it in the interpretation of Kant over the last decade. W. overlooks how for Lonergan the objective of the unrestricted desire to know is the content of knowing rather than the act. The centrality of the early Heidegger's discovery of the transcendental imagination as unity-in-difference is missed, so that the profound difference between Kant's physical conceptions of temporality and Heidegger's existential notion of temporality is minimized. The treatment of Whitehead is open to conceptualist misunderstandings, insofar as W. did not advert to how *Process and Reality* moves from the subjectivist principle through symbolic reference to propositions; W. makes no allusion to either of the former.

The uncritical assumption underlying these serious oversights might be found in W.'s starting from "a radical disjunction between being as it appears to us in the context of the knowing act, and the being to which the knowing act stands in relation" (p. 9). This Kantian disjunction (p. 26) is the basis for W. rejecting Lonergan's notion of being (pp. 25 f., 32), and for moving from an epistemology to an ontology of the transcendental imagination (pp. 39, 41, 51), although even here W. is not fully satisfied that the disjunction is overcome (pp. 45, 76). Such an assumption is uncritical, inasmuch as it fails to grasp how the phenomenon-noumenon dichotomy in Kant is defined only in relation to *Anschauung*. Not only has the Frankfurt School indicated how this aspect of Kant had a stifling effect on understanding imaginative action, but Lonergan's cognitional theory-praxis, grounding critically both epistemology and ontology, sublates the confusion in the Kantian
Anschauung and its resulting disjunction. Lonergan's insistence upon the "crucial experimental issue" of self-appropriation (Insight, p. xviii) radically criticizes Kant's idea of aprioristic knowledge as "independent of experience" (p. 15), revealing how a disjunction between knowing and being in terms of Anschauung is really a distinction between body and thing. The "dialectic illusion" (pp. 32, 38) is not so much Lonergan's as it is W.'s own, leading him to miss how the crucial experimental issue of self-appropriation delivers the intellectual pattern of experience from a false conceptualism, dynamically relating it to the other patterns of experience (contra W.'s assertions on pp. 32 ff.). The transcendental imagination in Lonergan is not limited to proportionate being (pp. 25 ff.) but is intellectually (the unrestricted desire to know is not merely conceptually mediated) as well as religiously oriented into the images and symbols of mystery.

W. uncovers this intellectuality of imagination in Whitehead, although even there he tends to clothe it in a Kantian conceptuality (cf. pp. 55, 76). Had he attended to it within Kant's writings on esthetic judgment and practical reason, within Lonergan's notion of rational self-appropriation and within Heidegger's analysis of Dasein's temporality, his comparisons and contrasts of their respective positions would have been more historically accurate and dialectically relevant to foundational theology. A central condition for creative passage toward theonomous community (p. 84) in an age of highly specialized consciousness is precisely that theology be capable of a critically intellectual mediation from the first naïveté of religious symbol to a second naïveté of those symbols communicative of the religious mystery of the subject-superject. The objectivity of intellectual critique is essential (contra W. on p. 84) once that critique is attuned to its own imaginative and experimental ground and expunges the sterile objectivism of a false conceptualism. Such a theological task is not only personal and existential (p. 86) but collaborative and dialectical as well. The horizon of religious understanding will be experienced in the thrust towards increased order (pp. 82 f.) only if that order is collaboratively differentiated from those abstract ideologies in both East and West which have atrophied the imagination by turning a conceptualist transcendence into a purely quantifiable technicity. Only the recovery of the intellectuality of imagination as transcendent can effectively liberate human intelligence and life from that conceptualist captivity of instrumentalized reason which, as the dialectic of the Enlightenment intimates, replaces the intellectuality of the religious imagination with symbols of material progress, simultaneously trivializing human existence into a consumerist ethos and fanatizing it by its pathos for the manipulation and mechanization of human behavior.
W.'s essay is invaluable in its central insight into the intellectuality of the transcendental imagination; the above criticisms aim only at clarifying that basic intention of his project.

Marquette University

Matthew L. Lamb

The Way of All the Earth: Experiments in Truth and Religion.

Recently Bernard Lonergan observed that Insight is "both a way and something like a theory." Dunne's book involves a similarly enriching ambiguity. It represents the culmination of a journey of discovery that began with his The City of the Gods and took its definitive turn in the subsequent A Search for God in Time and Memory. As theory and way or, in D.'s phrase, as experiments in truth, this final cycle of the trilogy is both a record of his own wending path of discovery, blending symbol and thought, theory and myth into a uniquely exigent inquiry, and a challenge to a comparable adventure on the part of the reader.

The book's thrust is generated by a dynamic hermeneutic of sympathetic understanding and personal appropriation which he calls simply "passing over and coming back." It is a method of inquiry dialectical between intimacy and distance, objectivity and subjectivity, universality and particularity, and has emerged as theme and motif of the entire, three-stage quest. The initial venture entailed passing over to the great civilizations of history in search, like Gilgamesh its chosen paradigm, of a viable answer to the problem of death compellingly conceived as the question "If I must someday die, how can I satisfy my desire to live?" The question fruitfully mediates between contemporary inquirers and past societies inasmuch as their various distinct characters are founded in the different answers to this problem. The second phase pushes the life story into central focus and, with Socrates and Augustine as principal models, involves passing over to other lives in quest of a personal myth to live by, an existential orientation in time and in face of mystery. The question which functions as the daimon of inquiry now becomes "Does becoming end in being or does it end in nothingness?" What authentic shape can the life story take in the modern context of radical relativity? In the third phase, the challenge is to pass over to the other great religions and to come back to one's own tradition enriched. This quest invests the gains of the prior phases in its own enterprise: D. thus chooses to approach the religions by way of the life story and to relate insights into the existential process of individuation to an understanding of human development in history.

D.'s title is richly polyvalent, but focal in its intent is the realization
that the experiences on which the religions are based are common and that the uncommon thing is the insight into the experiences, the enlightenment, and the revelation. Accordingly, the energizing question of this phase, "Is a religion coming to birth in our time?" is equivalent to asking if there is emerging a new set of insights into the common experience of mankind. The question is in continuity with those of the prior phases in that it amounts to wondering whether there is emergent now a fresh myth to live by, appropriable by the modern man of planetary consciousness and providing a novel theme to the life story and the story of mankind. Here the paradigm is a man like Gandhi, and the experiments with truth which constitute his life story may serve as a model of the ventured odyssey.

Integral to the common experience of mankind is the empirical discovery that the sphere of the unknown, of being, and of complete wholeness is always vaster than the compass of knowledge, consciousness, and personal achievement. In short, we are human but yearn for the divine. But we know not who man is or who God is. Nonetheless, by passing over to other lives we may begin to discover what man is. Incrementally, we can become conscious through others of undisclosed regions of our own being, and the conviction can grow that potentially we each are what anyone else is. This insight can induce an attitude of universal compassion, a caring for the being of all beings, which amounts to a passing over to God, and it may seem in doing this that you are what God is. In passing over, then, you appear to be what man is and what God is, and it seems that in the dark potentiality of his being every man is an incarnation of God. Thus the first section of the book (chaps. 1–3), as experiments in passing over, is called "A God in Disguise." But there is always the equal and opposite process of coming back, the return to the self, the re-entry into uniqueness and distinctness, finitude and personal care. In coming back to oneself, it looks as if one is ever on the way toward the vision glimpsed in passing over. It seems that the envisioned wholeness is achieved only as a journey from one revelation to another, a living from insight to insight that in abandoning the security of a fixed standpoint becomes a positive quest of mystery and a progressive transformation of behavior into action. If man's journey in time (both lifetime and history) is transformed into an adventure of discovery, the bounded vision of the earthly journey is transformed into the unbounded vision glimpsed in passing over, since the bounding horizon will be constantly changing. Thus the second part of the book (chaps. 4–7) depicts such a life as "A Journey with God," in which what man is and what God is remain mysterious, but with the heuristic insight that the dark creative power in one's life is what God is and its aim is what man is.
Not a few may cavil at D.'s temerity in approaching the great religions relatively innocent of the massive critical scholarship available, and personally I fear that his emphasis on the centrality of achieved insights in the religious quest may miss dimensions of numinous agency central to all religious experience. But such criticism pales before the fact that D. has almost singlehandedly restored my shaken faith in the possibility of doing theology meaningfully and responsibly in the present age.

*Loyola-Marymount University, L.A.*

John V. Loudon


Ninian Smart is Professor of Religion at Lancaster University, England. In this and previous writings (*Reasons and Faiths, The Concept of Worship*, etc.) he has utilized a twofold background in Eastern languages (Chinese, Pali) and analytic philosophy (Oxford). The result here is a stimulating if not completely successful essay on religious phenomenology. In four chapters (entitled “Exploring Religion,” “Religion as a Phenomenon,” “The Mythic Firmament,” and “Resolving the Tensions between Religion and the Science of Religion”), S. focuses on distinguishing “Religion” from “Theology” and characterizing religion’s phenomenology.

“Religion” itself is a problem. By this term S. primarily means an academic or scientific study (of “religion”—with a small r—as “History” is the academic study of “history”). Where Religion essentially differs from Theology is in being neutral about the truth claims of its subject matter. “Theology” involves “Expression”—the promotion or defense of a truth position. S. discusses the complexities and difficulties of this distinction quite ably, pointing out, e.g., that historical studies in Theology may be quite scientific, and that neutrality or non-Expression is not easily come by. He concludes, however, that “we always need to make a distinction between historical and structural enquiries, such as sociology, phenomenology, etc., which are the proper province of Religion, and the use of such materials for expressive ends, that is, the doing of Theology” (p. 16).

Having identified his specimen, S. sketches its anatomy. Religion finds six principal “dimensions” in religion: institutions, ritual, experience, doctrine, myth, and ethics. Conveniently, these six dimensions group into two “divisions.” The “belief division” subsumes doctrines, myths, ethical and social beliefs. The “practical manifestations division” subsumes rituals and practices, experiences and sentiments, institutions, and symbols (as products of myths and rituals). Religion as study basically divides into two approaches or kinds of explanation, historical
and typologically phenomenological. Coupled with the study of how religious ideas and institutions develop and interact ("dialectical" studies), this division of Religion yields four principal foci: histories of religions, historical-dialectical studies, phenomenological and structural studies, and dialectical-phenomenological studies. Each focus has several subfoci—e.g., histories of religions divides into holistic, divisional, aspectual, and itemized approaches. For the goal of the whole enterprise, S. accepts M. Eliade's notion of "creative hermeneutics," cautioning only that its efforts "to assimilate culturally the spiritual universes" of other religious peoples not become Expression (see p. 34).

Treating religion as a "phenomenon" involves S. in original efforts to relate the "epoche" of phenomenology to what he calls the "Focus" essential to the meaning of religious behavior. It also leads him to tackle the mythic consciousness crucial in much religious meaning. The neutral stance of Religion is well served by a bracketing of expressive interests when one studies how some religious activity appears. The phenomenologist has to deal with the intentions of his subjects, however, and this involves him in a delicate relation with the divinity or ultimate that religious activity often intends. Working with the Anglican Eucharist as an example, S. shows that any significant description or explanation involves the "Focus" of its prayers, beliefs, postures, etc. As phenomenologist, the Religionist neither affirms nor denies the existence of the Christian God. He does his job best when, by empathetic imagination and logical study, he penetrates Anglicans' Christian emotions and beliefs. In S.'s view, the best way to this neutral penetration is a careful inventory of one's own assumptions and prejudices.

S.'s sketch of myth runs down its common types (etiological, eschatological, etc.), notes the mythic interest in primeval time and place, and generally rings changes on a basic description of myth as "a moving picture of the sacred" (p. 79). Myth is coupled with ritual, as its usual setting, and makes most sense for S. as a logic where things are associated by a similarity of powers (e.g., every fire and heat relates to Fire). Man finds these powers beneficent and maleficent, so many myths and rituals are welcoming or averting, as S. exemplifies in many religions. The Phenomenon of Religion concludes with an intelligent discussion of the tensions between religion and scientific Religion. S. expands on his convictions about Religion's neutrality, but he never deals with Theology's real basis (which I take to be man's need to be more than academic, his need to choose and love in face of Mystery).

On balance, then, I find this work stimulating but not entirely successful. It deals with a timely, important, and confused nest of methodological issues, but it fails to sift them completely; it is competent and balanced on myth and phenomenology, but not especially.
new or profound. Strangely, S. gives no clear and concise explanation of what “religion” essentially is, and his anatomies and descriptions of “Religion” are never given an epistemological base. Therefore, they often appear unfocused and arbitrary. So, S. suffers when compared with the inner-directed differentiations of Wach for comparative religious study, Lonergan and Voegelin for religious consciousness. A valuable cluster of recipes, then, but no trim and elegant haute cuisine.

**Pennsylvania State University**

**JOHN CARMODY**


Prof. Price’s new book, a revised version of the Sarum Lectures which he gave at Oxford in 1971, has rather more unity than is suggested by its title. The six lectures are dominated by P.’s interest “in two subjects, the Philosophy of Religion on the one hand and Psychical Research on the other, and in the relations between them” (n.p.). They may also be regarded as an extension of his larger work *Belief* (London, 1969), especially of its last chapter. In these lectures P. shows himself venturesome, acute, and devout, a combination rarely found among contemporary analytic philosophers of religion; in fact, he seems closer in temper and interests to those English divines and moralists of the eighteenth century who aimed at combining orthodox belief with an empiricist epistemology and a literal view of the world. The main value of the book lies in P.’s willingness to adopt unconventional approaches to certain familiar problems in the philosophy of religion. Its major limitation lies in its complete neglect of the explicitly metaphysical traditions in philosophy of religion and theology.

The first lecture, a fairly standard criticism of theological utilitarianism and the divine-command theory of the meaning of ethical terms on the general lines of Moore’s “open question” argument, stands apart from most of what follows. It is in the second lecture that P. begins to sketch his views of paranormal cognition, which he conceives of as a two-stage process, in which we unconsciously receive paranormal impressions and in which these impressions then, despite the opposing and frequently transforming activity of the censorship, emerge into consciousness. While P. distinguishes mystical and telepathic experience, he suggests that paranormal cognition can be relevant to theological views about life after death and to accounts of the miracles of Jesus. He also offers an interesting telepathic theory of the working of prayer, in which he extends the reductionist self-suggestion theory of prayer by postulating a Common Unconscious. While P. wishes to maintain the traditional
view that prayer is part of a personal relationship to God, he also hopes to find a way of accounting for the efficacy of prayer without requiring innumerable miraculous interventions by God. He then goes on to discuss man's latent spiritual capacities, which he distinguishes from paranormal capacities; and he gives a sensitive account of the search for God, in which he is concerned to vindicate the legitimacy of this quest against positivistic objections to its circularity.

In the two final lectures he considers personal survival of death. In the first he argues that there are weighty motives for believing in the survival hypothesis and that these motives are disregarded by those who regard belief in survival as mere wishful thinking. In the second he compares two conceptions of survival, embodied and disembodied, and the corresponding conceptions of the Next World, which he understands as "the one into which we are supposed to pass immediately after death" (p. 99) and which he holds to be distinct from both heaven and hell. He argues that the two conceptions of survival actually show a striking convergence, since what is being described in either case is "something which is intermediate between the physical and the mental as we ordinarily conceive of them" (p. 114). P.'s speculations on this issue are both imaginative and careful; but it is typical of the limits of this book that he says very little of the metaphysical problems involved in postulating a tertium quid between the physical and the mental. Nor, for that matter, does he discuss the metaphysical and epistemological problems of personal identity and identification which have been central in recent analytic discussions of the intelligibility of the survival hypothesis. P. also fails to discuss in any detail the bearing of the evidence of psychical research on his conceptions of the afterlife.

The proper way to regard this book is, it seems to me, as a series of interesting suggestions for further reflection; it is too idiosyncratic and sketchy to be anything more than this. The suggestions will be of most interest either to those who are conversant with the conclusions of psychical research or to those who are looking for literal accounts of eschatological claims.

University of Michigan

JOHN P. LANGAN, S.J.


This book continues Christian's analysis of the logical issues raised by the examination of claims made in different religious traditions, an analysis which was begun in his Meaning and Truth in Religion
Such analysis forms, in C.’s view, a part of the critical philosophy of religion, which he distinguishes from both religious philosophy and the development of doctrine in a religious community, though the present work benefits from C.’s familiarity with both the Judaic and the Buddhist religious traditions. The book also bears the impress of analytic philosophy, especially in its method of argument; and it shows something of the meticulousness and painstaking search for accuracy that mark the writings of G. E. Moore. As a consequence, it both requires and repays careful reading, even when its conclusions seem obvious and noncontroversial.

The point of C.’s book is not to show that oppositions of religious doctrines actually occur, but to show how they are possible. More specifically, he is interested in external oppositions of doctrines that arise between different religious traditions and not in oppositions that arise within a religious tradition with common principles of judgment or in oppositions between believers and nonbelievers. Furthermore, he limits his concern to religious doctrines, that is, to what “is taught or set forth for acceptance or belief” by a religious community (p. 2). Oppositions of doctrines are distinguished from conflicts of opinions or beliefs among religious persons, which might or might not be evidence for the occurrence of oppositions of doctrines. It is this concern with doctrinal oppositions that determines the strategy of C.’s work. He sets up a model situation S, in which each of the speakers is well informed about his own and other religious traditions, is intelligent and candid, is a convinced adherent but not an official representative of his religion, and “puts forward some doctrines of his religion for acceptance by the others and is ready and willing to give reasons for accepting the doctrines he proposes” (p. 17). In this situation no one is in a position to command or to teach authoritatively; each can merely recommend and propose. An example of such a situation for dialogue is found in Ninian Smart’s *A Dialogue of Religions* (Harmondsworth, 1966).

In the situation C. proposes, explicitation of the oppositions of doctrines belonging to different religious traditions requires attention to the entire doctrinal schemes of the traditions in question, since the religions often lack common concepts and their possibly conflicting claims fail to have common reference, at least as they are initially proposed. To illustrate this process of explicitation, C. examines together the Buddhist claim that the Dharma is the path to attainment of Nirvana and the Judaic claim that the Torah teaches us to respond rightly to God. In the main part of the book, C. shows that these claims, when developed in accordance with their respective religious traditions, involve opposed recommendations for courses of action, opposed propos-
als for valuation, and opposed proposals for belief. It is in this section (chaps. 4-6) that C. employs both his philosophical acumen and his familiarity with the religious traditions under discussion to produce a generally useful map of the varieties of oppositions that are possible among religious doctrines. In a concluding chapter he discusses the bearing of his conclusions on the thesis that all the major religions really say the same thing—which he neatly demolishes—and makes some wise remarks on the moral requirements of the dialogue situation.

Two problems in C.'s work should, however, be mentioned. First, the notion of "doctrine" needs clarification. C. is appropriately cautious in his use of this term, but he nowhere gives it a careful and explicit analysis of the type it deserves. Given the varying importance of doctrinal elements in different religions and the varying ways that the religions have of drawing the line between doctrines and permitted opinions and of according doctrinal status to religious claims, C.'s use of this notion needs much more explicit defense and argument. Second, in support of his contention that there are opposed proposals for belief, C. argues against Braithwaite and other religious noncognitivists that, if we construe creedal affirmation as course-of-action recommendations and not as reasons for such recommendations, we will be unable to provide reasons for such recommendations. Our recommendations then will be arbitrary and hence not true recommendations. This argument overlooks the possibility that reasons of a nondoctrinal sort may be offered in support of religious recommendations; this sort of move is, it seems to me, made by William James in some of his essays on religious belief. Despite these difficulties, C.'s book stands as a solid contribution to both the critical philosophy of religion and to our understanding of the process of religious dialogue.

University of Michigan

JOHN P. Langan, S.J.


At first glance one may be dismayed by the Table of Contents, listing 27 essays in these 626 pages. But in their careful Foreword the editors point out that this is not a collection of disparate articles but the fruits of a unified scholarly purpose. That aim has been to trace the "structure and growth of philosophic systems from Plato to Spinoza," with special reference to the Jewish interaction with other faiths and philosophies during this Greek-to-early-modern span. The now emeritus Prof. Wolfson of Harvard has issued major books on the philosophies of Philo, the
Church Fathers, and Spinoza; and he is now engaged in publishing a second volume on the patristic age, as well as two books on the medieval philosophy of Kalam and its repercussions in Jewish thought.

The present Studies can be regarded as the exploratory bases upon which those well-known books rest. Originally published between 1924 and 1971, these essays (some in now revised form) range chronologically from Plato and Aristotle to Maimonides, Aquinas, and Kepler. The article on Philo Judaeus (reprinted from P. Edwards’ The Encyclopedia of Philosophy) is a classical instance of lucid compression of the major positions of a complex thinker. For the most part, however, W. prefers to use a comparative methodology and to concentrate on some specific, historically continuing theme. Thus, he follows the later fortunes of Greek views on the plurality of immovable movers, the souls of the spheres, pre-existent matter, the eternity of the world, and the knowability of the divine principle of things. Each topic is shown to have a branching continuity and to serve as a dialectical focus for Church Fathers and medieval Schoolmen in East and West.

Another way in which these studies achieve historical organization is through a clustering of papers around some common problems. Thus, the question of divine attributes is examined through four main facets: the descriptive names of the divine principle in Plato and Aristotle; the formal classification of attributes through negations worked out by Albinus and Plotinus; the harmonizing of God’s ineffability and negative attributes in Gregory of Nyssa and John of Damascus; and the large role of the problem of definition and divine unity in Avicenna and Averroes. In each case W. goes straight to the comparative and connotative shades of the basic terms, and still manages to bring out some general comparisons which are always illuminating and often provocative of counterresearch.

His most sustained and influential contribution, manifested in these essays as well as in The Philosophy of Spinoza, lies in the field of medieval Jewish philosophy. Except for cases of self-inflicted historical blindness, scholars today are unlikely to omit consideration of W.’s pioneer findings on the meaning of creation ex nihilo in Isaac Israeli and Maimonides, their teaching on the internal senses, and the medieval Jewish contributions to the classification of the sciences, amphibolous terms, the double-faith theory, and the proofs of God’s existence, all represented in this rich lode of research. Difficulties arise over precisely how the Jewish sources are used by the Latin medievals and Spinoza. But we are forever in W.’s debt for setting forth in lucid prose the grounds for acknowledging that this source-presence is persistent, permeating, and challenging. And I look forward to another volume which will
perhaps gather W.'s remarkable articles on Renaissance and modern philosophers, seen in their wrestling with many of the same problems examined here.

Saint Louis University

JAMES COLLINS


Building on the solid foundation of the biblical presentation of Jesus of Nazareth, analyzed according to a critical methodology that would be acknowledged by the leading scholars of our day, Vawter presents a Christology that wrestles with almost all the problems that modern theologians have brought to the fore concerning Jesus Christ. In a series of some fifty-six essays, each about three to five pages in length, these problems are treated in turn. It is a tribute to V.'s synthesizing ability and conciseness of thought that each essay could stand on its own as a separate study; yet they form a whole that is remarkable in its unity. After introductory essays on methodology, he treats in turn the Resurrection, the crucifixion, the titles “Lord” and “Christ,” the titles “Son of Man” and “Son of God,” disparate studies that finally focus on a modern systematic Christology “beyond Chalcedon,” and a concluding chapter dealing with the historical Jesus, including several essays on the Virgin Birth. A final postscript, scriptural citations, and an index complete the volume.

V.'s acknowledged competence in the field of biblical theology, his evident familiarity with the Fathers, the early councils of the Church, and modern systematic theologians, coupled with a true gift of literary expression, make this an erudite book. In fact, the erudition will probably dismay many nonprofessional readers; the complexities of the problems and the concise form of their presentation do not make for leisurely reading.

For the most part, V. steers a fairly middle course between maximalist and minimalist positions. His discussion of such problems as the Resurrection (including what is meant by “physical” resurrection) and the Virgin Birth shows that he is not closed a priori to these doctrines and that, in fact, they do have a solid basis in Scripture, although in the latter case he takes a much more nuanced position than in the former. Also, he takes John A. T. Robinson to task for his very speculative and questionable Christology that is apparently unwilling to accept the NT's eventual naming of Jesus as “God as well as Son of God” (p. 151). On the other hand, having laid the biblical foundation for a Christology, he is willing to ask whether we can go “beyond Chalcedon” in formulating a
modern systematic Christology. This does not mean that, like some modern theologians, he simply relegates Chalcedon to a primitive, irrelevant past. Of it he says: “we are probably incapable today of assembling a better vocabulary to draw the distinctions more finely” (p. 148). But this firm respect for the past does not prevent him from taking up the question of possibly new formulations. In his essay “Beyond Chalcedon,” he discusses briefly the position suggested by Schillebeeckx and Schoonenberg on the pre-existence of the Christ (pp. 168–71). The position, especially as enunciated by the latter in his book The Christ, is a difficult one to understand, at least for me. V. probably sums it up as well as it can be summed up in one sentence: “The Logos pre-existed rightly enough, Schoonenberg will say, for he is God; but he did not exist as a separately constituted person until the incarnation” (p. 171). Many will wonder how this statement, with its theological consequences, is beyond and not contrary to Chalcedon. But V.’s treatment of it is lucid in its brevity, and he frankly acknowledges that no final judgment can be made on “these recent theological ventures” (p. 171).

My most serious problem concerns V.’s discussion of “The Final Ecumenicism” (pp. 171–75). Noting that the world view has changed radically from the time of Paul, when the oikoumene was conceived to be more or less coterminous with the Mediterranean world, he suggests that perhaps the notion of a church evangelizing the whole world should give way to a cosmic Christology that is not necessarily or always ecclesial. He proposes a biblical foundation for his reasoning. He has argued that in the redaction of the NT documents the redactors approved the earlier theological expressions even while they went beyond them. This approval would, supposedly, support the adoption of this earlier Christology today. But the earlier form of the Christological hymn in Col 1:15–20 had proposed a cosmic Christology in which the kosmokrator of 1:18 was not confined “to headship over the church . . .” (p. 172). This was done by the Pauline redactor, “who tampered with the entirely realized eschatology of Colossians 1:16.20, 2:15 . . .” (p. 172) and thus formulated an ecclesial Christology. It is an intriguing suggestion but seems laden with difficulties. What would this mean for the concept of Christianity as a covenant religion? Would this not lend support to the kind of “Jesus-and-me” theology that has been associated with the fundamentalists? On the more academic level, what would be the difference between this “canon behind the canon” and Käsemann’s “canon within the canon”? What, ultimately, is the value of the canon? It would seem that more study could be given to all the dimensions of an ecclesial Christology that would address itself to the very real problems V. proposes, that would perhaps go beyond the traditional ecclesiology but
at the same time respect the NT canon. At any rate, V. has raised issues with which both the biblical and the systematic theologians will have to grapple.

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**EUGENE H. MALY**


The relation of Jesus to the social upheaval of His day has been the subject of lively debate in recent years, as evidenced in the work of S. G. F. Brandon, *Jesus and the Zealots* (New York, 1967), M. Hengel, *Was Jesus a Revolutionist?* (Philadelphia, 1971) and *Victory over Violence* (ibid., 1973), and O. Cullmann, *Jesus and the Revolutionaries* (New York, 1970). Coupled with this discussion is the larger issue of the relevance of the teaching and ministry of Jesus to the construction of a contemporary social ethic. Writing from a professedly pacifist standpoint and tradition, Yoder attempts to move beyond the historical statement that Jesus was nonviolent and to construct a NT theology of "revolutionary subordination." The major thesis of the work is that the ethic of Jesus is a "Messianic ethic." Jesus' proclamation of the kingdom is not only an ethic of demand—the call not only to radical individual conversion, but also to an equally radical restructuring of social relationships. It is also an ethic of response—the response of powerless discipleship in the face of the powers of the world.

The NT analysis begins with a study of the Lukan Jesus. From an examination of the hymns in the infancy narratives (Lk 1:46 ff., 68 ff.) Y. concludes that "we are being told that the one whose birth is now being announced is to be an agent of radical social change" (p. 27). He rests much of his case for the social relevance of Jesus' teaching on the proclamation at Nazareth (Lk 4:14–19). He states that the allusions to Isaiah (61:1–2; 58:6) in this pericope are really the proclamation of a new Jubilee Year (cf. Lv 25; Dt 15), a time when the soil was left fallow, debts were canceled, slaves were liberated, and mortaged property was returned. The second major theme which emerges from Y.'s study of Luke is that the temptation narratives and the Passion narrative portray a Jesus neither accepting the Zealot option nor retreating into quietism. The teaching of Jesus is thus the proclamation of a social ethic, and His life and death an embodiment of the cost of such a proclamation.

The second major exegetical thrust of the book is to show that this ethic of Jesus became normative in the early Church. By assembling a testimonium of Pauline texts, Y. holds that, while rejecting literal
imitation of Jesus, the texts converge in affirming that "Servanthood replaces dominion, forgiveness absorbs hostility. Thus—and only thus—are we bound by the New Testament 'to be like Jesus'" (p. 134). Y. then moves from this vision of individual discipleship to its social implication. Strangely, he makes no attempt to pursue his earlier idea that the conditions of the Jubilee Year should be normative for the restructuring of social relationships, but rather sees the social dimension of discipleship in relation to the "powers" of the world. The exegetical evidence Y. assembles for a Christian response to the powers is from three sources: (a) the use of the Haustafeln (household regulations) in Paul, (b) Paul's attitude to the state in Rom 13, and (c) the view of history in the Apocalypse. The underlying unity in all these texts is that the Christian is not to rebel against the powers over him, but to take a dialectical stance of patient suffering coupled with resistance to any idolatrous intrusion of power. Such a stance is not rooted in any phenomenological observation of the effect of Christian social action, but in a faith which affirms that "The relationship between the obedience of God's people and the triumph of God's cause is not a relationship of cause and effect but one of cross and resurrection" (p. 238).

Though much of what Y. says is not new, his work represents a consistent and well-articulated NT theology of pacifism which is not passivism. There are, however, serious exegetical difficulties with the work. While claiming to portray the Lukan Jesus and cautiously avoiding the problem of whether the Lukan Jesus is in all respects the historical Jesus, when he moves beyond the theology of Luke to find the unity between Jesus and the early Church, he implicitly assumes that the Lukan Jesus is the historical Jesus. His selection and exegesis of the Pauline texts, while challenging, is at times too ahistorical and smacks of the proof-text method. In the hermeneutical sphere, while criticizing Bultmann for proclaiming only a formal ethic of obedience, Y. himself is in danger of proclaiming a formal ethic of suffering, where pacifistic suffering is self-justifying. Such a view leaves large questions of the relation of Jesus' ministry to complex ethical issues unanswerable. Nonetheless, Y.'s work is an important contribution to the current debate and his attempt to move beyond history to theology challenges NT exegesis to do the same.

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Burkill is Professor and Head of the Department of Theology at the
University of Rhodesia. His earlier *Mysterious Revelation: An Examination of the Philosophy of St. Mark's Gospel* appeared in 1963. Four of the studies in this present volume have already appeared elsewhere. In “The Hidden Son of Man in St. Mark’s Gospel” he investigates the secrecy motif in the teaching of the Evangelist and the pre-Marcan tradition, and then, in a critique of E. Sjöberg’s *Der verborgene Menschensohn in den Evangelien*, he tries to detect what may lie behind the tradition in the teaching of Jesus. In “Should the Wedding Guests Fast?” B. starts with the presumption that Mk 2:18–20 reflects a controversy in an early Christian milieu. Again he seeks to establish three phases of the tradition: a saying of Jesus commending feasting as opposed to fasting on some particular occasion, a utilization of the saying to justify the nonobservance of fasts in certain sections of the apostolic Church, and an adaptation of the paradigm to a Christian situation in which fasting had established itself.

B. believes that “The Syrophoenician Woman” (Mk 7:24–31) occupies a central position in the Gospel. The pagan woman’s confession of Jesus as “Lord” (7:28) corresponds to Peter’s confession of him as “Christ” (8:29). Once he has integrated this story into Mark’s theologico-literary scheme, B. raises the question of “The Congruence of Mark 7:24–31,” dividing the pericope into five sections centering around (1) defilement, (2) residual superabundance, (3) the bread of life, (4) reciprocal visitation, and (5) Jesus as Lord. “The Life History of Mark 7:24–31” begins with a tradition reflecting Jesus’ historical limitation of His ministry to Jews and culminates in the Evangelist’s representation of Jesus’ visit to pagan territory as a prefiguration of the Gentile mission.

The “Theological Antinomies” which B. finds both in Ben Sira and in Mark are predestination and freedom, optimism and pessimism, retributive justice and factual truth, universalism and particularism, reason and revelation, and ritualism and ethics. Finally, “The Formation of St. Mark’s Gospel” offers a critique of E. Trocmé’s *La formation de l’évangile selon Marc*. B. denies that Mark reflects a dualism between rustic miracle materials from Galilee and Jerusalem traditions of a more academic character, and he rejects Trocmé’s hypothesis of two editions of the Gospel, the latter including the Passion narrative and empty-tomb story.

During the years between B.’s two books, Marcan studies have evolved considerably. A deductive approach, in which genial insights into Marcan theology were substantiated by ingenious interpretations and combinations of texts, has given way to a more inductive methodology, which isolates Marcan redaction by studying in detail the characteristics of the Evangelist’s style. B.’s essays reflect the earlier, more synthetic
approach. We find generalizations about Marcan theology which detailed textual analysis might not sustain, as in his references to "the fundamental secret" common to all the parables (p. 24), to the "mystico-sacramental" presence of the Messiah-Bridegroom with His disciples (p. 40), and to Jesus as "the object of saving faith" (p. 133). At times B. makes disconcerting comparisons with other NT books: "to use terminology derived from John 6:22 ff" (p. 85), "when St. Paul's stress on original sin is borne in mind" (p. 158), "to use Pauline language" (p. 161). We even find the statement "Perhaps here we may discern tentative approaches to Spinoza's doctrine that virtue is its own reward" (p. 131). "Antinomies" are found in the Evangelist which are quite foreign to his thinking, e.g., "revealed theology" vs. "theological naturalism" (p. 173).

As our summary indicates, there is no lack of careful analysis of particular passages. But in this book, as in his earlier work, B. is primarily concerned with interpreting the Gospel as a whole and situating it in the broader context of NT theology: "as in the case of the Law, so in the case of natural religion, St. Mark's philosophy, when considered as a whole, may be said to mediate between the contrasted doctrinal positions held by St. Paul and the author of Luke-Acts" (pp. 172-73).

After all the work that has been done on Mark, it might seem paradoxical to suggest that B.'s aspirations are premature. Nevertheless, I concluded this volume not only with appreciation for the genuine insights which it contains but also with the impression that much more spadework needs to be done if truly "new light" is to be shed on the earliest Gospel.

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Some people seem to function by a salmon instinct that drives them to swim unremittingly against the tide of prevailing opinion. Jerrell has been favored with such an instinct. The seemingly unassailable views on Luke-Acts he assails and, as time may show, to good effect.

A few instances of his maverick conclusions may be in order. It has been generally supposed, e.g., that in Acts Luke has wanted to detail the passage of the gospel from the Jews to the Gentiles. J. rejects this view on the grounds that a more discriminating study of the text discloses rather that the gospel, preached first to the Jews, was embraced by them in large numbers. Those Jews who turned their backs on the resurrected
Jesus, as some undeniably did, must be understood, in Lucan terms, to have defected from the true Israel, which in reality is represented by those Jews who became Christian, thereby helping Israel realize its destiny.

As a further example of J.'s singular viewpoints, mention might be made of the role of the apostles as he conceives that to be. Contrary to the common view, which sees the apostles as turning to preach the gospel to the Gentiles after having been rebuffed by the Jews, J. prefers to think of them, first and last, as very much part of the Jewish scene. He believes that Luke portrays them as replacing the religious leaders of Israel, who forfeited their position by refusing to accept Jesus as the Messiah promised to Israel. In other words, the Twelve are to function as eschatological leaders of the true Israel that has emerged among those Jews who went over to Jesus.

One of the more engaging discussions is J.'s study of the Samaritans as depicted by Luke. He begins by remarking Luke's abundant interest in these people—more extensive than that of any of the other Gospel writers. Generally this has been set down to the universalistic tendency in Luke. Luke was at pains to show that the gospel was in transition from the Jews to the Gentiles, notably the Samaritans. J. refuses, however, to credit this judgment. He feels that it is precisely the Jewish dimension of the Samaritans that fascinates Luke. J. does not doubt that Luke views the Samaritans as being in fact genuine Jews. He argues that, for one thing, if Luke needed a reference to Gentiles to make his case for the universalism of the gospel, it is not clear why he should have settled on the Samaritans as a representative Gentile group. J. very shrewdly observes that the preaching of the gospel to the Samaritans is not by a long shot treated with the same excitement and surprise as the first broaching of the gospel to an outright non-Jew. It is also significant, J. believes, that Luke has placed the Samaritan mission in chap. 8 of Acts; i.e., just before the pericope on the Gentiles. This too is construed as showing that Luke did not consider the Samaritans to be Gentiles.

One has the impression that J. is at times carried away by his passion for the theses he has spun, even to the extent of giving short shrift to points of evidence that do not bear him out or that at times seem to contravene his views. So, e.g., in elaborating his case on the Samaritans as Jews, he does not cope with sufficient seriousness with the reference in Lk 17:18 to the Samaritan leper as a foreigner (allogenēs). In the main, however, it must be said that J. gives a very good account indeed of his positions.

The book suffers slightly from a want of integration, being as it is a collection of essays, four of which have previously appeared as articles in
various periodicals. Having noted this, one must quickly add that, all in all, this is a book of high excellence.

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_JAMES C. TURRO_


Barnard Professor Elaine Pagels’ book on an apparently esoteric subject, the Valentinian hermeneutical principles for biblical exegesis, is an important contribution not only for understanding how the Church’s first great systematic theologians of Scripture could find doctrines in the NT which baffled their orthodox opponents, but for challenging the often accepted opinions of Gnostic exegesis as arbitrary and contrived (the ancient Fathers) or as admitting of radical internal development (e.g., de Faye, _Gnostiques et gnosticisme_, p. 108; Jonas, _Gnosis und späantiker Geist_ 1, 362). This short book, complementing her previous work on Valentinian exegesis of Romans (“The Valentinian Claim to Esoteric Exegesis of Romans,” _Vigiliae christianae_ 26, 241–58) takes the three-level hermeneutical principle she espouses as the basis of Valentinian exegesis and works through selected passages of John: 1:1–14; 1:19–34; 2 (the temple); 4 (the centurion’s son and the Samaritan woman) and 8 (“generation” compared with “seed” in 4:35 f.), to demonstrate how Valentinians could use their principle consistently and find different doctrines in the same passage.

In pursuing this objective, P. touches on the main themes of Valentinian theology as they affect the gnostic devotee: orthodoxy’s attacks (pp. 38–46), Gnostic attitudes toward the sacraments (pp. 57–65, 75–82), the difference between the “conversion” experience of psychic and pneumatic Christians (pp. 83–92), and the final destiny of both (pp. 92–97). The operative word in the heading of her final chapter, “Synthesis: The Experiential Focus of Valentinian Theology,” is “experiential” and it is from this point that P. conducts her investigation. A refreshing and welcome change this, from long and involved discussions of myths which did not center in on the very reason for the myths’ existence—to interpret to adherents the spiritual experiences they felt and their dissatisfaction with the life style of mainline Christianity.

Valentinus’ school assumed that reality was tripartite: the _plerōma_ in which divinity dwelt; the _kenōma_, _topos_ of Sophia’s misadventures—fall, restoration, and effects—and the _kosmos_, the visible world. The human race is tripartite as well: pneumatics, chosen rather than determined to be such (an important distinction for P.; see below);
hylics, who can experience and understand nothing beyond the material; and a middle group, the psychics, among whom are numbered the bulk of Christians. The generating principle ("father") of each type of humanity (the immutable God, the demiurge, or the devil) shares with his own their capacity for understanding and experiencing reality. Thus the NT account is patient of three interpretations, depending on the innate (or "given") ability of the reader: literal (hylic), salvific (psychic), or symbolic (pneumatic).

The symbolic or spiritual interpretation—and here is the hermeneutical principle—can symbolize processes in any of the three topoi. The Valentinian exegete sets the boundary for his interpretation and refers to events in one of the three realms. Thus, the Valentinian selection in Irenaeus' *Adversus haereses* 1, 8, 5, probably authored by Ptolemy, refers to the *pleroma*; *Excerpta ex Theodoto* 45, 3 to the *kenoma*; and Ptolemy's *Letter to Flora* to matters in the *kosmos*. What appears to be arbitrary exegesis or internal development of a school is merely a biblical theologian's choice of one area of concentration, with the other topoi assumed.

At this point I looked in vain for a reference to the works of the fine Valentinian scholar Antonio Orbe, S.J. His masterful *En los albores de la exegesis Iohannea* (*Estudios Valentinianos* 2; Rome, 1955) would have merited consideration in P.'s book, e.g.: "The exegesis of Jn 1:3 is a typical example of the plurality of senses. Heracleon applies the text to the creation of the Cosmos and all it contains. The *Excerpta ex Theodoto* 45, 3 applies it to all the beings in the Kenoma, without distinction of spheres, and Ptolemy (Iren. 1, 8, 5) to the creation of the Eons. The three interpretations are equally valid and provide a parallel application of the text to the sphere to which it refers in a given context. Consequently, in evaluating a Valentinian exegesis we must determine the sense of the scriptural word or words by reference to the level to which the document refers. There is, strictly speaking, no contradiction between the doctrine which Origen ascribes to his opponents and that which Irenaeus denounces in the Valentinians" (pp. 56 f.).

P. concentrates on Heracleon (the most important of Valentinus' disciples, according to Clement, *Stromata* 4, 9), whose exegesis of John is partially preserved in Origen's *Commentary on John*. P. carefully demonstrates Heracleon's consistent use of the Valentinian principle of interpretation and uses this study to infer to its presence in the other Valentinian documents. Her work gives a satisfactory explanation of some of the problems presented by Valentinian membership in the church. These Gnostics could accept Christian doctrine and ethics as true for psychics ("ordinary Christians"), while themselves adhering to
teachings which were, as the hereseologists claimed, in direct opposition to the ordinary understanding of the Church’s *regula fidei*. They saw their mission within Christianity to preach to the “called” (the psychics) in the hope that some of them would be numbered among the “chosen” (the pneumatics). The attacks of the Church Fathers have a counterpart in Christian Gnostic assertions that they are misunderstood and persecuted “even by those who think they are advancing the name of Christ” (*The Second Treatise of the Great Seth*, Nag Hammadi Codex VII, 2, 59, 22–26).

In a discussion of the attacks leveled at the Valentinians by the Fathers, P. asserts, following the lead of Quispel (“La conception de l’homme dans la gnose valentinienne,” *Eranos Jahrbuch*, 1947, pp. 262, 274 f.), that what appears to be a doctrine of determinism in Valentinianism is really a development of the biblical theology of election. The question “Are men determined to salvation or have they free will?” is a query that the texts cannot answer, for they do not address themselves to these categories (p. 112). P. further demonstrates that some sort of “choice” is available to psychics, even though their filiation is with the demiurge (p. 103).

It is well to recall, however, that the hereseologists’ problem was less with Valentinian teachings about the psychics than with their theory of the election of pneumatics. It is this which tended to rupture Church unity; for, within the fold itself, there were “Christians” whose ontological make-up and self-understanding were altogether different from the rest. These persons had an esoteric teaching (“But those who are to receive the teaching . . . receive the teaching for themselves alone” [*Gospel of Truth* 21, 3–6]) and a missionary zeal which caused the Fathers to see them rightly as wolves in sheep’s clothing. Given this pastoral concern, the hereseologists were quite within bounds when they posed the philosophical question of free will to the Gnostic texts; for the Valentinians were clearly teaching a doctrine of divine election which predetermined two classes of humanity, hylics and pneumatics, to either pleromatic bliss or ultimate disappearance.

P.’s work, succinct and well argued, will be a fine contribution to the issues in Valentinian Gnosticism now under consideration among scholars.

*Stapleton, N.Y.*

This volume of the new *Hermeneia* series, together with the 1971 translation of B.'s commentary on the Gospel of John, brings to completion in English the entire range of the author's influential commentaries on the Johannine corpus. His commentary on the epistles was originally published in the Meyer series in 1967. It is here translated with great competence and fidelity and is, in fact, made more useful to students of the epistles by a greatly expanded bibliography. It is a welcome addition to the studies of the Johannine writings that are available in English.

B.'s introductory material is slight, confined to little more than two pages. For questions about the date and authorship of the epistles, he is content to refer the reader to other standard works on the subject. Authorship is discussed only in reference to the relationship of 1 Jn to the fourth Gospel and to the relationships of the three epistles to one another. As in his earlier writings on the subject, B. continues to hold that 1 Jn and the Gospel had different authors, basing his conclusion on the fact that the two works are addressed to two quite different problems. The Gospel is directed primarily against the "world," represented by the Jews, while the epistle combats the errors of heretical teachers who call themselves Christians. Little is said by B. about differences of style, vocabulary, and doctrinal emphases between the two works, and it can be questioned whether differences in purpose give a firm basis for postulating two different authors. Whatever might be said for other reasons for judging that the Gospel and the epistle are from different hands, could not the same author address himself to different problems at different times? For B., 1 Jn is dependent on the Gospel (and hence was written later) but it used the Gospel in accordance with the church tradition to which its author adhered. This would account for the similarities between the two works.

2 Jn is considered to be a secondary work dependent on 1 Jn. B. thinks that it is not a true epistle, but rather a "fiction" which shows evidence of a developing "early catholicism." 3 Jn, on the other hand, is a genuine letter. Its precise historical context is uncertain but, like 2 Jn, it seems to presuppose 1 Jn. For B., this letter shows evidence that at the time of writing the Johannine tradition was in conflict with a newly developing church order. Unanswered by B. is the question, if 3 Jn is a genuine letter, written for a specific occasion, why could it not have been written in relation to a problem in a particular church, rather than about a more generalized problem of ecclesiastical organization? Is there really any evidence that Diotrephes was the representative of an emerging hierarchy, rather than merely the troublesome leader of one community?

In considering the structure of 1 Jn, B. adheres to his earlier opinion that the letter is based on a prior written source (Gnostic in origin) whose
text was reworked and annotated by the author. A later ecclesiastical redactor brought it into closer conformity with Church tradition by adding suitable glosses and the ending in 5:14–21. The work of the redactor is identified by its references to traditional eschatology, to sacraments, to the expiatory function of Christ’s blood, and, in 5:14–16, to the differentiation of sins which seems to stand in contradiction to what is said in 1:5 ff. While certain stylistic elements may support the contention for 5:14–21, it is difficult to recognize that such passages as 2:28, 3:2, 4:17 (eschatology), and 1:7, 2:2, 4:10 (expiation by blood) interrupt their contexts in such a way as to be considered glosses. Passages from the source document are recognized by the fact that they form periods of antithetical parallelism, each of three lines. This seems to be a change from the criteria that B. used in earlier studies of the text. But even this new criterion does not make it any easier to differentiate where the source material ends and the work of the author begins. B. recognizes this, and seeks to explain it by saying that the source has been reworked by the author and made to interweave with his own writing. But this difficulty of isolating the alleged source, not only stylistically but doctrinally, makes it just as likely that the author merely incorporated traditional material into his work as that he used a written source, Gnostic or otherwise.

B. sees the unity of thought in 1 Jn as resulting from the fact that the letter is directed against a Gnostic error within the Church, an error that denigrates Jesus, in whom alone the revelation of God is to be seen, by denying that the Christ is to be identified with the historical Jesus who “came in the flesh.” This had for its consequence the perversion of a genuine knowledge of God and an arrogant notion of what it means to be “begotten of God” that led to violations of Christian love and community fellowship. All sections of the epistle are directed against this error. Still, B. does not believe that the body of the letter was a unified composition. In his view, 1:5—2:27 was the original rough draft of 1 Jn. To this were added separate sections which deal with the themes which the early passage outlines. In these later sections, which may have been added by the author himself or by his disciples (individually or in seminar fashion), modifications and expansions of the themes have been made, but not according to any definite plan. Thus, e.g., 2:28—3:24 is a variation and development of 2:3–11; 4:1–6 is a variation of 2:18–27. Putting this composition by addition alongside B.’s theory of an original source, a rough draft, and a later ecclesiastical redaction, one wonders if the process by which B. sees 1 Jn coming into being is not a bit too complex for so short a work.

As with all his writings, the erudition and perception which B. brings
to the exegesis of individual passages make this book indispensable for the student of 1 Jn. And one must note that the physical plan and design of the volume itself make it not only eminently readable but beautiful as well. One looks forward to further publications in the *Hermeneia* series.

*Immaculate Conception Monastery*  
*Jamaica, N.Y.*

*Aelred Lacomara, C.P.*


These two volumes provide American readers with translations of Rahner's *Schriften zur Theologie* 8. Many of the essays are already familiar to followers of R.'s work as lectures delivered in this country or as pieces previously published in American journals. Others of the essays develop the distinctive patterns of thought now clearly associated with R.'s theology: the diaspora Church, the Church as sacrament, the supernatural existential, transcendental and categorical revelation, and anonymous Christianity. Still others represent R.'s immediate postconciliar reflections on authority in the Church, the roles of pope and bishops, new directions for theology in its pastoral dimensions, the restoration of the diaconate, and the significance of the local church.

Beyond these areas, however, several of the essays pursue themes only hinted at in R.'s earlier and better-known work. In "Observations on the Doctrine of God in Catholic Dogmatics" (Vol. 9), R. explores further his convictions about the identity of God-in-Himself and the God-of-our-salvation; the relationship of human knowledge and experience of God to "regional" spheres of knowledge as their fundamental source and horizon; the proofs for the existence of God as an element in the single experience of God, even in the unbeliever; and atheism as the constant inner temptation of the believer—a Catholic doctrine *simul justus et peccator*. R. speaks more insistently than ever the language of mystery and of mysticism in probing the meaning of theological talk about God: such talk is genuine if it derives from the ever-escaping source of one's individual and collective history and returns through love of one's fellows to that source as the absolute future.

Such language reappears in two essays characteristic of R.'s more recent concerns with cultural experience. In "The Problem of Genetic Manipulation" (Vol. 9) and "A Fragmentary Aspect of a Theological
Concept of the Future” (Vol. 10), he focuses on the experience of increased human self-determination and the possibility of a planned future. He maintains his usual positive stance toward the heightened freedom and responsibility which is afforded in a technological culture; always self-determining on the level of conviction and conscience, today man is able to plan himself and his future in bodily, psychological, and societal terms. Here, however, the note of mystery is struck with new power. In a carefully reasoned rejection of artificial insemination, R. points to a wider dimension embracing the notion of futurology. Most of the future that can be planned actually belongs to the present, since concrete plans require only a little more time to become reality. It is at the point where plans are threatened by uncertainty (e.g., it is the next generation, essentially unpredictable, who will walk the ways now planned) that the mystery of the future appears. Hence, he argues, the real future “is that to which we ourselves cannot reach out, but which rather comes to us of itself” (10, 237); it is the future which is not under control, which escapes all human calculation and attempts to freeze it into place. It is that silent mystery which cannot be manipulated but only received in trust and hope. The attitude which such an “awareness of unawareness” elicits is a dialectical one of absolute seriousness about the future which can be planned and concomitant realization of that mystery which makes the content of all plans ultimately relative and conditional. Existence in hope lies at the fine point of unity between action and passion, agency and receptivity, doing and being.

It becomes apparent in another essay that this attitude of hope and trust is not merely an appropriate one which may or may not be assumed in the face of present cultural experience. In “On the Theology of Hope,” R. works out the ontological foundations of the theological virtue of hope in such a way as to indicate a major rethinking and reformulation of his own anthropology. Over against the traditional dispute about the priority of intellect or will, knowledge or freedom, R. asserts that hope points to the radical center of unity underlying both. In his early works the reciprocity of intellect and will is maintained, but there is little doubt about the primacy of knowledge in the originating phenomenon of human questioning. Now, however, R. is suggesting that a more original experience underlies the duality of knowledge and freedom or love which in fact is their unifying source. As it is worked out in this essay, the ontology of hope not only overcomes the intellectualism of R.’s earlier formulations but also the “privatizing” of individualist tendencies for which he has been criticized. In elucidating the situation of man and society before the incomprehensible mystery which is its ultimate source and absolute future, he sketches the shape of hope as the courage to dare
more than can be planned. Hope ceases to be a provisional, interim *virtus* and becomes the radical and enduring structure of the human spirit in this world as in the next.

In these and other essays, R. demonstrates his continuing power as an original thinker, one whose fundamental concern remains the same, even as it develops: to demonstrate the abiding unity of spirit and flesh, of metaphysical questioning and the concrete issues of human history. The development is most apparent in the sharpened emphasis on the experience of mystery as the constitutive origin and goal of the human spirit which provides the courage to plan the future by saying yes, and no, to concrete possibilities.

*Indiana University*  
Anne Carr


The author addresses himself to an important and difficult problem: how does God operate in a miracle? The traditional answer holds that in a miraculous intervention God acts directly, without the co-operation of secondary causes. W. shows that, for scientific and philosophical reasons, this answer has become more and more unacceptable and has, in fact, been given up by many Catholic theologians. Today’s theology is more inclined to admit that God never acts without the help of secondary causes, except in the all-encompassing creative act by which He produces the universe. Moreover, it insists on the fact that miracles happen only in the order of salvation, as signs of God’s salvific will; they can be read only with the eyes of faith, their occurrence cannot be demonstrated scientifically. These considerations may be true; they do not provide us with an explanation of the way in which God operates when He intervenes miraculously in the world.

W. looks for a solution to this question by distinguishing innerworldly causality in the physical sense and innerworldly causality in the metaphysical sense. The former is studied by science and may, at least theoretically, be predicted. The latter refers to whatever a creature may bring about as a secondary cause, hence also to effects that are essentially unpredictable.

W. devotes many pages to a solid philosophical discussion of this distinction. He insists that the principle “nothing passes from potency to act except under the influence of a being that is in act” should not be misinterpreted as if every increase of perfection in a creature came entirely from without this creature. This would amount to a denial of all
finite activity. Beings are not merely receptive and passive; they are also active, to some extent they pass from potency to act by their own power, they develop new perfections which they did not possess previously. They transcend themselves (Selbstüberbietung). This self-transcending activity is not strictly determined, it allows a certain leeway, it cannot wholly be caught in the meshes of scientific determinism. Thus W. can hold that, scientifically speaking, everything in the world of matter is determined, that God always acts in the world through secondary causes, and that nevertheless the new, the unexpected, the unpredictable may occur, so that God may freely intervene in the course of history without giving up His transcendence.

I might summarize W.'s theory by using an enlightening remark made by R. Sonnen and mentioned by W. (pp. 53–54). God is more immanent to His creation than our soul is to our body; yet He transcends the universe more than our spirit transcends matter. Now, when we speak or act, every sound we utter or gesture we make may be entirely explained by the action of biochemical and physiological factors that are strictly determined; yet the meaning we convey through our activities is by no means reducible to these factors. We cannot act without the co-operation of the physico-chemical factors, although our meaning and purpose by far surpass the range of their possibilities. This applies a fortiori to God, who may freely use the secondary causes, without whose co-operation He cannot act in the universe, to produce effects that by far surpass the possibilities of these causes.

W. shows a wide range of information, thinks the problems through, writes clearly, and organizes his thought in a lucid way, so that even abstruse metaphysical discussions are not too difficult to follow. Several objections have come to mind. Was it necessary to treat the problem of evolution in a work on miracles? There are admittedly similarities between the two problems. Are they great enough to warrant this extension of the topic? W. has derived much of his philosophical inspiration from "transcendental Thomism." He quotes Scheuer, Rahner, Coreth, Lotz; yet he never mentions Maréchal, whose ideas might have helped him considerably. Is an epistemology that combines de Petter's intuition of being with the Maréchalian necessary affirmation of being (not to mention the dialectical approach of p. 85) not rather eclectic?

These difficulties do not detract from the great value of this work. It was accepted by the Gregorian University as W.'s dissertation for the doctorate in theology; yet it does not read like the work of a beginner, but rather like that of a seasoned theologian, from whom we expect to hear more in the future.

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J. DONCEEL, S.J.

Body Theology “is both a sophisticated approach and a ‘radical experiment’ dealing with the experiential dimension in Christianity,” states the blurb. Actually, it is often a finely experienced awareness, and “radical” would mean getting at the roots of personal, Christian experience. Vogel moves primarily *ex fide ad fidem* to encourage one to experience, or “taste,” the reality of God’s presence in us, in our body, in the world. A fine example of growing awareness is the presentation, i.e., the making more present, of the reality of creation. Such growth goes hand in hand with V.’s message: Christian commitment in a world of change is living faith with a God “of change.” How does he challenge one to more experiential openness? Through the notion of “living one’s body” comes the operative point: presence. A eucharistic significance is the experience of man as body, word, and community; God’s presence is “grace.”

These closely related notions are worth meditative reading, yet they lack an intrinsic unfolding of their fundamental points: intentionality and project, which would better open the humanizing role of Christian trust and belief; the relation between time and history, presence and freedom, which would open the structure through which call does arise. Perhaps we have not chosen the proper ground for a critique; yet V. employs “world” in the phenomenological and scriptural senses and summarizes “the best descriptive data about man with which we are furnished today” (p. 103) with omissions significantly needed for this book. But what we deem juxtaposition of ideas and sources may well be meant to provoke and dispose the reader to experience the life of faith. We discern the fruit of serious, religious reflection on Pauline theology with a sensitivity to the sociological scene—a courageous witnessing. Then, e.g., the lack of a development of the idea of change would not obfuscate a God “of change”: we are beyond the restraints of mere conceptual thought. His message is clear, the experiential indicators do communicate.

We can both suggest the drama of lived experience wed to sound dogma and keep the context of a critique if we give insights by chapter with references outside of it.

1) “Personal Presence in the World” combines influences from Merleau-Ponty and Levinas. “All our understanding begins in a world to which we belong,” a preconceptual relation where our bodily orientation comes to express an “infinite presence” of the person. Some phenomenological development of “belonging” is needed in view of the theological (p. 84) and to show that, also philosophically, one cannot speak of the future as “meaningless” (cf. p. 141).
2) "God as Presence" is a positive development of God as nonobject, the familiar theme of category-breaking. "Meaning—all meaning—for a Christian is a call and motivation; it is a life, an adventure, companionship, trust and hope." Then, presence as parousia and trinitarian. A good chapter to counter residual rationalistic tendencies; though, philosophically, "things" have no original source of meaning.

3) "Creation as a Fact of Experience" makes the point: "the greatest difficulty with the Christian doctrine of creation is the difficulty of letting ourselves be loved!" "Old doctrines would become new," esp. creation, hope, humility, and peace, "when they are radically personalized by the God who is Presence." V.'s definition of creature, however, is proper only to a Dasein; and his insight into Kierkegaard remains unapplied, even to the distinction of fear and anxiety of the next chapter, where he could well drop the unintegrated matter from experimental psychology (pp. 68–76).

4) "Time and the Problem of Man." "We need courage to be ourselves in the simple unfolding of time" to which "trust is the answer," whose blessing is "freedom to be oneself." Time is then God's agent. "To rely on God is to reveal God..." Trust overcomes anxiety, hope overcomes fear. Most unfortunately, V. does not distinguish time and history (cf. p. 109); moreover, he skips a crucial step: trust is not much if not first personal presence trusting a presence that bears now a promise.

5) "Body-Meaning." Man's life and body as project, and "a project is promise, hope, creation." Words are an extension of our bodies; Christ fulfills man as a body-word; His body will be our Word through death. We find difficulty in grasping project without its development as freedom, thus relating the idea of mission with a human task that we would ground with "the basic intentionality of our being," which V. only mentions (p. 52).

6) "The Way We Act and the Peace We Seek" stresses humility developed with Teresa of Avila and St. Paul. V.'s thought becomes dialecticized and enthusiastically socially situated. For him, no Spirit which is not Christ's. "Peace, for a Christian, is a gift; the absolute difference of another person...it is always a revelation."

7) "God's Presence and Man's Future" brings to fruit a starting point: "meaning can ultimately originate only because expression is volunteered from an inexhaustible speaker who will not abandon his words." "By the Spirit, Christians become filled bodies." With the Introduction's tone of urgency set with Toffler's Future Shock, V. poignantly returns to commitment within change and to change. Then the gift to Presence manifests a superabundant meaning for the oriented "here" of the individual through that Presence which is grace and the goal of creation.

St. Peter's College, N.J. ROBERT H. COUSINEAU, S.J.

This book is the result of an effort toward explaining the all-pervasive role of information in the Church of the cybernetic age. The validity of its claims rests with a threefold consideration: religious change parallels the changes in the rest of society; problems created by our cybernetic age need cybernetic solutions; and cybernetic solutions to Church problems call for democratization. Those who accept this threefold premise will have no problem with the book. Those who refuse it will remain unaffected by the book. The reason is simple. The threefold premise implies the applicability of the principle of contingency to the Church; contingency connotes the concept of organic incompleteness; and these two, contingency and incompleteness, validate G.'s claim "that the Church needs cybernetic reform through democratization" (p. 211), for they affirm "the probabilities of interaction, claim and decision" (p. 3) that make the Church susceptible to cybernetic analysis. G. calls this analysis "functional ecclesiology with an emphasis on communication and control, information and power" (ibid.).

The book has four parts, set up nicely and neatly. Part 1 deals with the cybernetic analysis of the Church by outlining such cybernetic concepts as system, environment, negative entropy, and the conversion process (input, output, feedback). It also explains the organizational unity of both the universal and the local Church. Part 2 is devoted to the cybernetic analysis of four problem-areas: slavery, birth control, ecumenism, and priestly celibacy. The Church has succeeded in applying the conversion process to the slavery question and the ecumenical movement; it has failed to react in the same way to both the birth-control debate and the celibacy controversy. Part 3 is a study of the meaning of democracy as well as of the historical development and the theological foundation of ecclesial democracy. The section on the egalitarian, the hierarchic, and the charismatic aspects of the Church (pp. 173–210) offers very interesting thoughts for reflection. Part 4 is oriented toward the future by examining the problems and the techniques of ecclesial democracy. The possible different methods of the selection of bishops are presented here (pp. 247–54). In the Appendixes one finds the 1971 document of the Canon Law Society of America on choosing bishops for the U.S. and the 1972 norms published by the Vatican for selecting bishops. An index of scriptural references and a general index complete the volume.

Though G. characterizes the book as "functional ecclesiology" (p. 3), the reader must be cautioned not to expect a full treatment of the Church. The human element, important as it is, is just one constituent of the Church. But cybernetic analysis is concerned with the proper
functioning of this human element, not with the entire ecclesial reality. It was, therefore, no oversight on G.’s part not to treat the supernatural aspect of the Church. For him, it was a methodological necessity. Due to the sacramental nature of the Church, the supernatural operates in and through the natural, the human, the analyzable. The incarnational principle implies this. Yet this reader is convinced that, even from the viewpoint of input, output, and feedback, more attention should have been paid to the operational role of the Spirit. To some extent, G.’s own words seem to request this when he writes: “The Church is a unique political organization with a God-given character. For democracy to function in the Church it must be compatible with the Church’s nature. History and theology are necessary in order to ascertain this compatibility” (p. 209). History is present in this book, but theology, particularly that of the Spirit, is conspicuously absent. One can see this lack of basic consideration when one tries to draw a parallel between *Ecclesial Cybernetics* and Heribert Mühlen’s *Una mystica persona*. Both are ecclesiologies, yet the common ground is minimal between them. While the latter offers a full-fledged Spirit-ecclesiology, the former is limited to a systems analysis of authority and decision-making in the Catholic Church, without ever indicating the how of the claim, made in connection with prophesy, that “the Spirit, dwelling within all the members of the Church, can enlighten and guide the whole input-output-feedback cycle. To the extent that the members of the Church are open and docile to divine grace, the life of the system becomes the life of the Spirit” (p. 200). This passage called for a creative interpretation of the assistance of the Holy Spirit, but unfortunately G. stopped short of developing it.

This reader is also dissatisfied with the treatment of *consensus fidelium* in reference to infallibility and the faithful. First, it is translated and interpreted as “the unanimous agreement of the faithful concerning their belief in a revealed truth” (p. 206). Then, instead of pursuing this lead on the universal and infallible level as a directional sign and a corrective principle, G. unexpectedly abandons the dogmatic concept of *consensus fidelium* and switches to that of juridical consent or approval not required by Vatican I for the exercise of the pope’s infallibility. By this *non sequitur* procedure he missed another opportunity for an in-depth treatment of a reality that offers almost unlimited possibilities for theological reflection.

From the technical point of view, it is regrettable that when reference is made to pre-Vatican II ecclesiology (p. 172), no bibliography is offered. Post-Vatican II ecclesiology fares a bit better, though the sources listed in this regard (p. 172, n. 2) can hardly be considered representative. The
same is true, in reverse, about the bibliography on *communio ecclesiarum*. Though the concept is used in the context of Vatican II's approach to collegiality, none of the references was printed after Vatican II (cf. pp. 190–91, n. 58); and the theology of the local church has generated considerable interest in the last few years.

These deficiencies, however, are minor if one bears in mind the total value of the book and the methodology G. had to opt for to bring home some basic concepts. Has he succeeded? Certainly. Anyone who studies this book carefully must come to the conclusion that some form of participatory democracy, if cybernetically sound and theologically justified, must be used to help the Church through the present period of crisis to a new age of Christian consciousness and community.

*SABBAS J. KILIAN, O.F.M.*


This book is concerned with two questions: (1) What is man? (2) How does the Christian symbol system facilitate and develop the process of man's growth in personhood? It deals with the theme of Christian humanism and the processes of humanization within the Christian economy of salvation. The human in human existence is described in terms of spirit which is experienced as openness to the world, as liberation to become something which cannot be precisely defined. For its concrete realization love must reign: the unconditioned recognition of the other. Here the vision of man encountered in Jesus Christ comes into play to reveal the ideal person: being for others. The fulfilment of man's humanity consists in his being for others, i.e., in sacrificing his will to power. On the other hand, the Christian symbol system is viewed as the outgrowth of the human experience of the first witnesses of the risen Lord: the experience of what they could be now and will be in the power of the Spirit. Christian symbols thus represent the answer to the question, what is man? They suppose an experience and celebrate it. Hence it is crucial for the truth of the celebration that the participants share in the experience being celebrated. Only then can the celebration facilitate and develop the process of humanization.

This process of humanization is outlined in terms of man's experience of humanization in a world where powerful forces work against it. It begins with man's acceptance of the invitation to self-transcendence issued by that mysterious power in human life we call God and which makes it possible for man to transcend himself: to grow in personhood, to become spirit. Concretely this is experienced in growth of consciousness...
of self, inner time, freedom, hope, and in the mutual sharing of spirit with other men. This transforming power, this absolute Spirit, works through Christ, Church, and sacraments to facilitate and deepen man's sharing of Spirit. Precisely because the goal of the Christian symbol system is the humanization of man, the activity of Spirit therein does not take place apart from man's activity. If man is to enter into his own humanity, he must participate in this process grounded in the Spirit and realizing spirit.

Such is P.'s main proposal. He is preoccupied with the meaning of the Christian symbol system as the basis for renewal of Christian life. Such a quest and discovery will not cause real renewal but may serve as impetus for many to seek out the experience original to the Christian symbols and thus provide an opening to the transforming action of the Spirit which enables us to make that experience our own.

The thrust of the exposition allows P. to continually return to an underlying principle of the Christian economy of salvation: the process of becoming human can only be achieved by our faith, hope, and love resulting from shared Spirit. In this perspective it becomes clear that the power of the sacraments cannot be that of an exterior principle operating on us without our activity. In a telling way P. drives home the fact that the sacraments are not a source of "cheap grace," that the structure of sacramental justification does not differ essentially from extrasacramental justification.

The insistence that the goal of the Christian symbol system is the progressive humanization of man reflects the contemporary reaction against "theology in itself" and affords a sound principle for judging both its concrete efficacy and the propriety of liturgical forms in which the community expresses its faith. Moreover, this synthesis, which finds its focus in the theme of Spirit, helps to draw attention to the meaning and importance of this dimension of Christianity long neglected in the West. The last reflection, "The Body of Christ," expresses well the comprehensive meaning of the Eucharistic body and offers good grounds, though not developed by P., for explaining the ambiguity of the Pauline use of "body" in 1 Cor 10:11.

While the reader may find the text rather repetitious and verbose, it is an original synthesis of many of the better insights of contemporary theological literature which will prove rewarding to the patient, reflective reader.

Weston College School of Theology

Edward J. Kilmartin, S.J.

There has been nothing in English or French to compare in combined quantity and quality with the spate of studies of Christian natural law that have appeared in German over the last two decades. Some have been new probes of the historical tradition; others have discussed what elements of the tradition could be pertinent to the contemporary scene. The result, however, has not been any positive consensus but, on the whole, a massive critique of Christian natural law and consequent controversy and confusion. In the present volume, Franz Böckle, moral theology professor at the University of Bonn and moral theology editor of the *Concilium* series, has invited specialists of theology, philosophy, and the social sciences to press the critique more radically and appraise the very viability of Catholic natural-law thinking at the present time. The authors of the essays, all written for this collection and published for the first time, are, besides the two editors, Stefan Andreae, Alexander Hollerbach, Franz-Xaver Kaufmann, Niklas Luhmann, John T. Noonan, Willi Oelmüller, Gerhard Otte, Stephan H. Pfürtner, Robert Spaemann, and Rainer Specht.

The scope of the critique is not as broad as the book’s title would suggest. The object of the critique is natural-law thinking as it is basic to Catholic Church teaching, particularly Catholic social doctrine. The Protestant theologian Hermann Ringeling observed that the kind of natural-law thinking shown in *Naturrecht im Disput* (a collection of essays, similar to the present one, brought out under Böckle’s editorship in 1966) made possible an understanding between Protestants and Catholics on the subject. But the authors of the present volume give little attention to recent Protestant contributions to the natural-law problematic, e.g., those of Løgstrup, Thielicke, or Ringeling himself, not to mention earlier, still influential ones, such as those of Barth and Brunner. The critique of the book is narrowed also in that, with the exception of the essays of Noonan and Luhmann, it refers and responds mainly to publications in German.

This narrowing of perspective undoubtedly helped produce the unified impact the book has. It is a pervasively negative impact. Essay after essay dismantles natural law of claims made by its champions of the last hundred years, particularly the claim that the continuation of the natural-law tradition will continue to enable one, on the basis of unassailable logic and first principles of reason, to arrive at absolute moral principles, mirroring objectively divine, eternal law. The essays converge to give a quite different picture of what really has gone on and is going on in natural-law thinking. They do this in various ways, e.g., by bringing psychoanalytic insights to bear, by interpreting sociologically the Church politics behind the revival of scholasticism and natural law in the nineteenth and early twentieth century, by disentangling philosophi-
cally traditional strands of natural-law thinking which are in conflict with one another. The signaled conflicts pertain to contemporary discussion, because they concern the degree of theonomy vs. human autonomy in natural-law ethics, the extent to which immutable principles of natural law can be objectively ascertained, etc.

The point John Noonan makes epitomizes, in its own way, the general critique of the book. In the Christian natural-law tradition, juristic models of human origin have contributed far more to introducing new moral positions and revising old ones than the theory of a transhuman law confronting man’s decision would give to think. One of Noonan’s several illustrations: moral theologians had over the centuries judged as sinful all marital relations where the spouses did not consciously intend to procreate by their action. Around 1600, Thomas Sanchez introduced the contrary view and it eventually prevailed. He did this while maintaining the operative natural-law principle of the earlier position, namely, that marital relations could be justified only by the intention of having children. Sanchez worked the turnabout simply by applying the juristic method of implication. He interpreted “intention” to mean not only “explicit” but also “implicit” or “virtual” intention. Now when married people had sexual relations without consciously intending to have children, it was seen as generally a virtuous act.

Böckle finds, however, that the drastic critique of his authors leaves intact, in fact clarifies and supports, the basic thrust of natural-law thinking and its tradition, i.e., to provide an objective basis for social order. The critique reinforces the validity and necessity of this kind of thinking for our times, though under certain presuppositions. (1) No absolute (i.e., exceptionless) moral rules of social action are possible unless they be tautological and thus of little use, e.g., “Injustice is wrong.” (2) Moral obligation, as such, is always absolute, arising as it does from the absolute Ground of man’s being. But to recognize this absolute obligation and to formulate general moral principles of social action, one need not recognize the divine ground. Thus in its content natural-law ethics is secular and autonomous, not theonomous. (3) There can be a pluralism of valid social ethics, since they will be based on the relative values of human life and some preferential choice of values is inevitable. The values themselves, however, should not be arbitrarily conceived, but rather in congruence with man’s “nature,” i.e., with the specific limited possibilities of human reality. Modern empirical sciences disclose this human nature better than any earlier mode of knowledge. Though Böckle makes no reference to critics of his position, he seems to be responding to the objection of more conservative natural-law exponents such as Johann Meissner that he has stripped natural law of all
objective foundation. (4) The judgments man makes of moral values are historically contingent and mutable, and yet also objective and irreversible precisely because they are part of the real, irreversible development of man’s culture and knowledge. (5) Since the Christian gospel and its theology has been a component agent of this historical process, it has made lasting contributions to it as well as undergone it. The last words of Böckle’s book: “This interaction offers a chance, for the future, too, for Christian natural law.”

In this book, as in much of his other writing, Böckle is clearly carrying out a deliberately chosen strategy. Like Curran, Springer, McCormick, and other American moral theologians, he is trying to engineer from within the renewal of Catholic moral theology. The strategy involves honest dialogue and critical reform within the Catholic natural-law tradition. It aims at and, I believe, achieves progress through organic growth. Böckle and his authors prune more radically than their American colleagues, but they too prune only that the tree may grow. The advantages and even necessity of such a strategy for the life of today’s Church are obvious. However, the equally obvious slowness of progress and meagerness of results that this laborious, involute strategy yields in the face of the burning moral questions of the day encourages those others in the Church who are essaying a different strategy, having its own advantages and disadvantages, the strategy, namely, of starting a new tradition of Christian moral theology.

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**John Giles Milhaven**


This book provides a synoptic, simple view of the work of Paul Ramsey. Ramsey is, without doubt, one of the more significant figures in Christian ethics today. A synoptic view of his work is welcome because he has published extensively and in a variety of places. A simple view is also welcome because Ramsey’s argument, while always forceful, is sometimes convoluted and his prose, always vigorous, is often dense. Curran offers a broad overview of R.’s thought on the topics he has treated most frequently in recent years: politics, warfare, and medicine. The overview presents R.’s argument both in a discursive manner and in light of the development of his ideas. The clarity of exposition and the exposure of the evolution of thought make this volume a useful introduction to an important author and a valuable source book for serious discussion of several crucial issues of contemporary ethics. The reader will miss R.’s
pungency and impact, but may gain appreciation for his position and arguments.

This book fails to live up to its subtitle. The dialoguists never engage very vigorously. As a result, the style may remind the reader of a capable doctoral dissertation, in which the author exposes at great length the work of a master and then appends, cautiously and diffidently, some personal comments. A volume which might have been a searching examination into underlying methodological issues in Christian ethics, done by two capable ethicists, becomes instead an informative survey of one author's substantive contribution.

The dialogue fails for several reasons. First, C. merely comments on R.; he never challenges him. The concluding section of each chapter is entitled "critique," but the criticism consists most often of statements of disagreement or qualification. It is never drawn out in argument sufficiently detailed to grasp the essence of the disagreement. Secondly, R. has no opportunity to respond; and Ramsey is at his best when forced to respond. He clarifies the ground of his argument, adduces examples, distinguishes terms, and defends with alternative reasoning. The cut and slash, which clears away the overgrowth of intellectual debate, is not at all evident in this dialogue.

However, the dialogue fails for a third, more important reason. The value of a dialogue between R. and C. would lie in the revelation of certain underlying methodological issues. It is interesting to hear well-conceived views about just war, conscientious objection, organ transplants, and in vitro fertilization. But it is more important to learn how those views come to be conceived and how ethical arguments are made. There are a number of methodological issues which could stand analysis. C. alludes to many of them but does not pursue them in a sustained way. One issue, mentioned frequently, is particularly crucial. It would have been illuminating to watch R. and C. grapple with it.

This issue is mentioned explicitly during a discussion of experimentation on human subjects. After stating R.'s position against nonbeneficial experimentation on children with parental consent, C. comments: "all these arguments presuppose an absolutizing of the individual and seem to forget that every individual has a social and community aspect to his existence because he belongs to the whole family of God and shares creaturehood with many others" (p. 135). I would contend that R. does not "forget" the social, communitarian aspect of personhood. He explicitly acknowledges it in order to give it a lower ethical priority than the rights of individuals. R. is often criticized for such "absolutizing," but it results not from forgetfulness but from a conscientious choice of ethical priorities. C., on the other hand, like a number of contemporary
Catholic ethicists, may be open to criticism for invoking the "social nature of man" without clarifying how it relates, as a relevant ethical argument, to the uniqueness of individual life and freedom. C.'s frequent critical comment about R.'s deontologism and his suggestion that a dash of teleology would help is germane to the same problem. A certain sort of teleology, much criticized in recent years, finds it acceptable to subordinate the good and rights of individuals to the greater good of the greater number. It is not enough, as C. does, to note that this social good must be taken into consideration in ethical calculations and decisions. One must proceed to show how such consideration bears on ethical judgments about individual good and rights. This problem is an ancient one in ethics and is probably resistant to solution. Nonetheless, it is important for ethicists to clarify their stand on it and to offer reasonable, if not conclusive, argument for or against. The areas treated in this volume are particularly susceptible to careless, cloudy discussion of this problem. R. has taken a definite stand; C. should have done so as well. Out of such a direct confrontation some sharpening of the problem might have emerged. A serious discussion of this and other basic methodological issues would have made this a more important and perhaps more illuminating book. As it is, it is an informative and rather interesting one.

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In a sharply critical review of an earlier German work on the relationship of German Protestantism to democracy since 1945, I stated that we would have to wait "for an author with greater gifts of synthesis and more literary talent" to tell the story for which the writer of the book then under review had provided the raw materials (see my review of H. G. Fischer, Evangelische Kirche u. Demokratie nach 1945 [Hamburg, 1970] in Church History 41 [1972] 130 f.). Frederic Spotts, identified on the dust jacket of his book as "a young American diplomat," has now fulfilled the hope expressed in the earlier review. Indeed, he has done more; for he has included both major confessions in this thoroughly researched, smoothly flowing, and always interesting survey. Though S. has several axes to grind, the book is dispassionate in tone and his narrative is enlivened with the right amount of quiet humor.

Having stated at the outset my positive judgment of the work as a whole, I shall use a good part of this review to put readers on guard against reading S. uncritically. A fundamental weakness is his equivocal
use of the crucial terms "liberal" and "liberalism." Nowhere does he make clear that in Germany these terms seldom have the meaning normally attached to them in England and America. In Germany "liberalism" normally denotes the view that there is no such thing as absolute truth, but merely a variety of more or less interesting opinions, and that therefore any church claiming to possess a divine commission to teach men objective truth is an objectionable anachronism in the modern world, rightly scorned and rejected by all enlightened people. Readers of S.'s work must bear this crucial fact constantly in mind if they wish to avoid being misled.

S.'s accounts of matters which can be checked by personal knowledge contain enough errors to arouse scepticism about his reliability elsewhere. A case in point is the report in chap. 8 of the heated controversy over Catholic schools in the late 1960's; S. accepts uncritically the propagandists claims of the militant secularists. What these people, "liberals" in the German sense, really wanted was the exclusion of any serious Christian influence in education. Because this could not be openly stated without alienating too many parents of both confessions, the secularists launched a clever advertising campaign to the effect that confessional schools were "small and inefficient": only secularized schools could do the job of preparing the masses for higher education and remedying in the bargain the paucity of Catholics in universities and the learned professions. When in the very large diocese of Münster, in which I was a parish priest at the time, church spokesmen pointed out that the largest schools (which were "more efficient," according to the secularists' argument) were all Catholic, such corrective statements were ignored in the national media, which for months continued to sell people the formula "Catholic-equals-small-equals-educationally-inefficient." S. is among the very large number who have been taken in. He also fails to make clear that the controversy had to do solely with Volksschulen (for which his translation "elementary schools" is wholly misleading), which graduate their pupils into vocational life by age fifteen at the latest and prepare none of them for university. The efficiency or inefficiency of these schools, the only ones attended by the bulk of the population, cannot possibly have anything to do, therefore, with the underrepresentation of Catholics at the universities, since these schools do not prepare anyone for higher studies. S.'s clearly implied claim to the contrary does not inspire confidence in his judgment of other matters where the reader must take his word on faith.

No less misleading is his statement that the progressive Catholic weekly paper Publik was "liquidated by the bishops in 1971" (p. 180). In fact, the bishops supported the paper, despite its frequent sharp
criticism of them and their policies, with enormous subsidies for several years, until they finally decided they should no longer carry the financial burden. The wonder is not that they finally terminated their support, but that they maintained it as long as they did. Would the Catholic episcopate of any other country have been as broadminded or generous?

Though such examples could be multiplied, it must in all fairness be stated that they can also be countered with numerous instances of matters about which S. is both very well informed and eminently fair. His incisive analysis of Adenauer’s policies and motives is a case in point. Another is his critique, all the more devastating for being low-keyed, of the political blindness of the early “political theologians,” Niemöller and Barth, the latter of whom in the late 1940’s found it “absurd . . . to mention a man of the stature of Joseph Stalin in the same breath as such charlatans as Hitler, Göring . . . etc.” Comic relief is provided in the early part of the book especially by the figure of Cardinal Muench, the Pope’s exceedingly simple-minded American representative in Germany in the immediate postwar years.

Despite its shortcomings, the book must be judged, on balance, a notable success. Again and again S. demonstrates the ability, after errors of detail, to make broad judgments which go to the heart of the matter. This is the more remarkable in that he is dealing with highly complex issues and a situation so unfamiliar to Americans as almost to guarantee misunderstanding. The book is recommended especially as an excellent antidote to the unconscious cultural imperialism into which Americans so easily fall when commenting on affairs in other countries. Almost automatically, American standards are taken as the frame of reference and applied with self-confident superiority in countries and cultures (mostly far older) where they are quite simply irrelevant. In an early chapter, S. shows with devastating clarity the disastrous results of this approach during the postwar occupation period. Though none of the three Western military governments achieved much success with their attempts to “denazify” a populace already in violent reaction against a regime which, for all its popularity in the days of its success, had brought only devastation and ruin to the country, no occupation policies were as fatuous as those of the Americans. If this book helps us to realize that “goodwill” is not a sufficient basis for understanding foreign countries, and that they must be encountered and judged on their terms and not on ours, it will not have been written in vain. That S. himself has learned this lesson, of which the vast majority of his countrymen remain ignorant, becomes clear in the judgment with which he concludes these often highly critical pages: “Since 1945 the German churches, whatever their mistakes, have had a vigor and strength that few, if any, other
churches in the world can claim. Today they are alive and responsive to the problems of their country in a way that perhaps no other churches are."

**Saint Louis University**  
**JOHN JAY HUGHES**


The theme of Dr. Schilling's book is that the shift from modern to "postmodern" science, the return to a more truly "biblical" style of religious faith, and the growth of a "new consciousness" especially among the young combine to make a rapprochement between science and religion possible today, after centuries of mutual mistrust. He admits that our present culture is not yet a "flower style of life," because "it is still dominated too much by the old consciousness," which "lost sight of the reality of mystery . . . and of the significance of tenderness" and became preoccupied with "megapower and megatechnics." Only a radical "revolution by consciousness" can help. "It is one of the main themes of this book that such a revolution-by-consciousness is already under way and that, much popular opinion to the contrary, both science-technology and religion in some of their contemporary forms are contributing mightily to it" (p. 35).

The main burden of S.'s argument rests on the claim that "science has changed radically in the twentieth century, and in such a way that it can now be said that mystery is discernible through its eyes" (p. 37). To document this, the central section of the book describes how "postmodern science" has begun to reveal the "depth" of natural things, the hierarchies of structures that lie concealed in the simplest-seeming object. No longer do we suppose that the elements of which the world is composed can be characterized by a few familiar properties like extension; as we go down in size, stranger and stranger properties are encountered, and the qualitative variety endlessly increases. It also increases over the course of time; beginning from a simple state, the universe has gradually developed more and more complex forms of existence, a process which still continues. The universe is thus "open"; there are endless horizons of time, space, and material potentiality. Science, therefore, must also now be open in a way it was not before:

It is now humbly conscious that while its methodology is powerful . . . it is not all powerful. It realizes that each science has its own interests and preoccupations. . . . None undertake to explicate all of the universe; nor do all of them together, as now constituted, cover all of it. Moreover, it just may be that the universe is limitless in an infinity of physical dimensions, in which case it would make no sense to suppose that it could ever be fathomed completely. Surely, then, much
of it may indeed be inaccessible to scientific analysis and description—as Einstein believed it to be. Therefore not nearly as many scientists as formerly are ready today to assert dogmatically that there is no ultimate, insoluble mystery. (pp. 42-43)

This passage conveys not only the theme but also the rather slippery logic of this section of the book. Qualifiers ("it just may be") are liberally used but not taken altogether seriously.

In the final part, S. describes what he regards as a parallel shift from the categories of classical theism to a more "open" and tentative view of God. Just as science has shown the falsity of the traditional distinction between man and nature (man at last becomes "natural"), so theology, and "large sectors of the new consciousness," call into question the older view of God as transcendent to nature, in the sense of being somehow separate from and "beyond" nature. The stress is now on immanence and continuity, on the relational instead of the absolute. There can still be "signals of transcendence" (Berger), but it is a transcendence that leads us to search among experienced realities, not to posit an unknowable beyond experience (p. 199). Indeed, "to believe in God' and trustingly to accept 'the way things are' are one and the same thing" (p. 196). Revelation is not an encounter with something utterly new but the seeing of something familiar in an utterly new light (p. 200).

The continuity between nature and God would lead one to expect a continuity between science and religion, and this is (S. argues) what we now discover. There is a continuum between scientific faith (in the order and dynamism of nature) and religious faith (in the fidelity and creativity of God). The "most promising" way (p. 244) of conceptualizing this new view is through process philosophy (which S. summarizes in a perilously succinct manner). God is seen as "co-reality"; He is said to "co-create," to "co-redeem"; these terms are intended to bring out nature's part in the processes of creation, redemption, etc. Yet He can still be said to "mould" or even to "inject" new possibilities (pp. 252, 263). "Man has become by grace the co-determiner with God of future reality in nature-history" (p. 262); with Dewart, S. wishes to retain the category of grace, while discarding that of the supernatural. He concludes with a confident affirmation of faith in a future where science and religion will work together for "a radically different pattern of human attitudes and commitments" (p. 265).

The rhetorical form of the book is that of a report on recent trends. But it would have to be admitted that S.'s assessment of the significance of what has been happening in science is highly interpretive, and that his choice of authorities could give the impression of special pleading. His book is strongly reminiscent of Teilhard's *Phenomenon of Man*, but it
lacks the unity of conception, and consequently the force, of that work. This may, in part, be due to his attempts to incorporate elements from at least three other rather disparate sources: Charles Reich, Paul Tillich, and A. N. Whitehead. It is a courageous, if perilous, venture.

S. intends the work for “general readers of modest competence” (p. 11) who already possess some good will towards its central themes and who are eager for some sort of overview. One cannot, therefore, reproach him too much with a certain vagueness of concept, e.g., “spirit” (pp. 148–62) and “freedom” (p. 166), though his designated reader may balk on occasion at the abstractions offered him: “Nature has again become for the human consciousness a window open to the transcendental and immanent reaches of reality, whence come intimations of creative-redemptive divinity transcendent to and immanent throughout nature or the cosmos” (p. 32). Shades of Loren Eiseley!

Some minor recommendations: omit Wheeler on “thimblefuls of vacuum” and the marvels of energy they may contain (p. 110); add Heisenberg, who is the main proponent of the view (p. 112) that we cannot carry particle-type analysis any further than we have; explain what is meant by an “empty time” (p. 123); dispense with the reference to Galileo, who did not replace the deductive by the inductive approach and did not “base his unconventional claims squarely on observational experience” (p. 198). But a far more important query would have to do with the exhaustiveness of the two theistic alternatives with which S. faces us: the “intervening God” (p. 217), who “forces his way in from the outside” (p. 239) and stamps out patterns that fix the characteristics of things for all time (p. 238), or the relational God-in-process who “persuades” nature as its co-cause. Not too surprisingly, he rejects the former conception, but what is surprising is that he identifies it with that of classical theism. If he had really considered the creationist alternative (instead of what sounds almost like a caricature of deism), the process alternative might not have seemed quite so inevitable as the choice of the “new consciousness.” The Creator whom Augustine envisaged did not force His way in, nor was He an intervener, nor did He violate the integrity of nature, nor did He stamp out the pattern of natures once and for all. It would have been interesting and more authentic to face the process conception with a real opponent.

University of Notre Dame

Ernan McMullin

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Buber considered it his lifelong task to make visible "a neglected, obscure, primordial reality," to bring to the surface that submerged reality which "lies buried" beneath the day-to-day living of man in modern society. "I have no teaching. I only point to something. I point to something in reality; I point to something in reality that has not been seen, or too little seen." This primal reality is a common possession of all men, for it is that which is genuinely human, genuinely personal. It is the reality that lies between man and man, the reality that comes into being only through meeting, encounter, dialogue. "All real living is meeting."

Yet B. saw as the critical danger of our age the ominous disappearance of true personal life. And without true personal life there is no true communal life. Community demands throughout "the element of the person, the sphere of the person, the freedom and responsibility of the person." State and Church have become immersed in rigid structures and are no longer capable of producing true community; they embody only the remnants of community. It is not merely a loosening of structure that is needed. No amount of change in institutional or social structure will be of any avail unless life between man and man is also changed. True transformation of society can be had only when human relations themselves are changed. This transformation in turn leads to the realization of God which takes place between man and man. Ultimately, true realization of God takes place only in community, and that is why for B. true community is "the Sinai of the future."

Central to B. 's thought was this essential relation of the thou spoken to man and the Thou spoken to God. B. was no secular humanist. "The word of him who wishes to speak with men without speaking to God is not fulfilled; but the word of him who wishes to speak with God without speaking with men goes astray." This is a humanism with deep biblical roots.

Grete Schaeder traces the development of B. 's thought from its mystical, almost pantheistic beginnings, through the struggle for realization as expressed in Daniel and in the early addresses on Judaism, to its mature expression in I and Thou and in his later writings on the concept of dialogue. She elaborates the various influences on B.: such teachers as Wilhelm Dilthey and Georg Simmel, the mysticism of Jacob Boehme and Nicholas of Cusa, the writings of Nietzsche, Hölderlin, and Meister Eckhart, his friendship with the socialist thinker Gustav Landauer, dating from the turn of the century. More importantly, there were B. 's immense efforts in Zionist causes, including his disenchantment with the political Zionism of Theodor Herzl, his studies and writings in Hasidism, and finally his work with Franz Rosenzweig in a German translation of the Hebrew Bible which led to other works such as Moses, The Prophetic
Faith, and Kingship of God.

S. portrays a man of extraordinary breadth and sensitivity. B. strove to clarify the Ur-humanum religious experience of Moses and the prophets as the model of every man's encounter with God as well as the expression of his own personal religious experience. Here we find the meaning of B.'s Hebrew humanism: it sees man as an "open person," open to God and to his fellowman, and it understands God's people as a community open to humanity, a people striving to become the true people of mankind, serving willingly out of love and suffering boundlessly, if needed, for God's sake. S. shows convincingly how I and Thou embodies so much of the biblical spirit, especially in its description of the encounter between man and God and in its juxtaposition of love of God and love of man. B. has taken the language and teaching of the Bible, as experienced in his own life of faith, and expressed this in a way accessible to all men. I and Thou, along with B.'s later writings on this subject, is markedly unsystematic, yet highly appropriate for conveying B.'s conception of the biblical experience as a deeply human and universal religious experience.

There are a number of hidden assets in this work. S.'s analysis of B.'s studies in the mysticism of East and West, her treatment of his theories on education, her analysis of his dialogue with Christianity, her critique of his long-standing opposition to the abuses of organized religion—these represent a few of the aspects that enhance the over-all value of the book—a most valuable addition to the growing literature available in English on one of the foremost Jewish thinkers of this century.

Fordham University

DONALD J. MOORE, S.J.


Theologians who speak of recognizing the work of the Spirit in faiths other than Christianity usually have in mind the great world religions: Islam, Hinduism, Buddhism, and perhaps a few others. But if God is revealing Himself throughout human history and in all human societies, then He must be actively present in those religions we have carelessly named "primitive" as well as in those we admire as great. This presence itself, and the habitual Western inability to deal with it sympathetically, are the subject of African Traditional Religion. The author was Professor of African Religion for several years at the University of Ibadan in Nigeria and was recently named President of the Methodist Church in that country. Here he is attempting to meet an urgent need: as interest in African religion grows, students inside and outside Africa must be provided with a sound basic text which will survey the material and
establish methods and criteria for the study of this extremely complex topic.

Clearing the record of the prejudice and disdain which marks so much of the writing presently available takes up the first half of the book. For balance, a chapter on methodology shows that even those who approach the topic sympathetically and in relative freedom from ethnocentric bias will have no easy time of it. The language problem alone is awesome: estimates usually run to a thousand or more distinct African languages, not counting their dialects. And since the traditions are preserved orally and not in any written records, only the most patient researcher can hope to become really knowledgeable about even a few of them. Idowu develops a painful history of the ludicrous misunderstandings published by those not gifted with such patience.

Lest any naive confidence still remain, Idowu also discusses difficulties of basic terminology, but even he can offer only a tentative "diffused monotheism" as an acceptable descriptive term for African traditional religion. Clearly inappropriate expressions such as "idolatry" and "fetishism" are examined and rejected, along with other pejorative terms like "tribe" and "primitive religion." Brief acknowledgment, but not much progress toward a solution, is given to the serious problem of the unity of African traditional religion, and of relationships among the many traditions; Idowu himself sees a basic common concept of God as the key to understanding the traditions as fundamentally one.

With definitions given and many mistaken notions criticized, Idowu offers a chapter on the structure of African religion. Insistence on the unity, activity, and other qualities of God is the main interest in these pages. In addition to this, Idowu uses his own interpretation to correct the unfortunate tendency of many non-African writers to speak of "a supreme god" in African belief or of the worship of "a high god," without any recognition of the identity of this God with their own. Expressions like "the god of the Yoruba" or "the Ashanti god" indicate to Idowu an unwillingness to acknowledge Yoruba or Ashanti religious insight as insight into the reality of the one God revealing Himself in different ways to all men. This is seen to be a serious mistake, since the authenticity of this African knowledge of God—*the* God—is the basic theological theme of the book.

Despite real contributions, this is a disappointing piece of work. Much of it is a droning catalogue of individual misguided opinions, many of which are quite dated, and all of which could have been criticized together in one well-written chapter. A fifty-page section on "Religion" presents only a rush through the philosophy of religion and is seriously overweight with name-dropping. More importantly, the one chapter
which actually deals with African religion is very limited in scope: after such strong emphasis on the reality of the personal God, no mention is made of how prayer, ritual, or sin might be seen as elements in a personal relationship with Him. Frequent remarks about the deleterious effects of “priestcraft” on religion in Africa are left to stand without a word about what priest hood is and how it functions correctly. And it is difficult to understand why even this book’s excessive use of quotation includes not a single quotation from an African author other than Idowu himself, or why room could be found for reference to George Bernard Shaw, Charles Williams, a 1945 film production of *Caesar and Cleopatra*, and a novel called *The Deliverance of Sister Cecilia*, but not for a discussion of morality, suffering, or death, or for a significant number of liturgical and other traditional texts with some explanatory notes.

More than anyone else, the reader who is convinced of the value of serious study of African religion and of the sorry inadequacy of the work done to date will be disappointed at how little progress the book makes toward the goals it proposes. Those interested in a solid study of a single major tradition will do well to consult Idowu’s own *Olodumare: God in Yoruba Belief*; those in need of a useful survey will have to wait for the development of more reliable data and of a more refined method of analysis and interpretation.

Woodstock College, N.Y.C.  Edenor J. Cripps, S.J.

**SHORTER NOTICES**


K. takes an informed and solidly conservative approach to biblical interpretation. Thus he claims, against von Rad, that Deuteronomy’s treaty structure clearly establishes it as “a renewal of the Sinaitic covenant administered by Moses to Israel when transferring the leadership to Joshua” (p. 11). His justified acceptance of the Hittite treaty as the analogue or pattern for the original covenant on Sinai leads him to see the covenant text as
the original “canon” of Scripture. Thus canonicity dates back to Moses and was an operative concept throughout the period in which the OT materials took shape. They were seen as authoritative from the beginning, and the Israelite community always had a canon to obey (or reject). This general position seems untenable to me, although specific observations in the book are valid and helpful. While some directly covenantal material is preserved in the OT and while prophetic statements are often given with the assurance of divine sanction, there is much else in the OT that took shape slowly, that only gradually assumed importance in the eyes of the community, and that came to be formed into an authoritative collection only very slowly. The notion of canonical Scriptures, not merely authoritative but also clearly delineated collections, grew only gradually in Israel. The different collections of laws within the OT lead us to conclude that the covenant law was not fixed and unchanging, but open and fluid. The original covenant bound the people to total loyalty and obedience before Yahweh, but the details of that obedience were worked out gradually and in different ways in different parts of the community. While scriptural authority may have covenantal roots, the notions of canon and canonicity are neither Mosaic nor covenantal, but Ezran (and to a limited degree Josianic) at best. And the fixed delineations of biblical canon are much later still.

The book is an interesting example of conservative scholarship that has opened itself up to the best in modern biblical research, but the outlook and perspectives remain solidly conservative. Its value for Catholic theologians is inevitably limited.

Kevin G. O'Connell, S.J.


The biblical preaching is that the origin of sickness and all manner of discord is to be found in sin, disruptive of the integrity of mind, body, and spirit (Gn 3; 12:17; Dt 28:22, 59-61; 32:39; Ex 4:11; Lv 26:16, 25). OT sees healing of sickness as sign that the kingdom arrives (Is 35:5-6; 61:1-2), and Yahweh, though He punishes, is healer (Pss 41, 46, 62, 74, 116, 121, 147). Jesus heals both sickness and sin (Mt 12:27-28; 11:2-10; Lk 4:17-21), correcting the impression as well that the sickness of a particular individual is necessarily due to his own personal sin. The Church’s ministry continues the healing ministry of Jesus. At least it did in the Western liturgy until the seventh and eighth centuries, when the Church’s attitude toward sickness developed as a view which regarded it to be God’s corrective scourge for man, and urged that men accept such punishment and incentive to reform, all the while looking forward to the relief of life after death (this present life being, fittingly, a vale of tears, a view fortified by the simultaneous development of a monastic spirituality which took a dim view of the body’s worth and sacred value). Though the biblical doctrine was more truly preserved in the East, the Western liturgy shifted its emphasis in the healing-anointing ritual from the prayer of faith for cure of sickness (sign of kingdom) to forgiveness of sin. Thus, for more than a thousand years the healing liturgy of the West has been cut loose from its properly inspirational source and compromised in its own meaningfulness by an orientation never intended (not unlike confirmation). Only recently, under the influence of the current Roman reform of liturgical service books as well as a renewed interest in the world of spirits and evil powers (Jung), has the Church returned to serious consideration of its healing ministry.
K. outlines all this history and its implications in a relatively short book as frustrating as it is provocative. The exhilaration that comes from the rediscovery of hope in God's healing presence pervades the book, but the data of the tradition are frequently submerged in an uncleanness of style, a failure to make more important facts stand out from the details of their context, a rambling vagueness of focus all the more perplexing because of the exciting power of K.'s thesis. Perhaps more time should have been devoted to writing a longer, less disjointed statement. But K.'s contribution helps to break ground long left untended.

John Gallen, S.J.


The new edition of this invaluable aid, which first appeared during Vatican II (cf. TS 24 [1963] 157-58), is welcome on several counts. The two most significant novelties in this edition are the documents of Vatican II (arranged according to period and session of adoption, which enables the informed reader to recapture something of the ups and downs of the Council itself) and the revision of the indexes by the addition of several new ones and especially by the extensive expansion of the subject index. The introductions to each council and the brief bibliographies there given have been revised where required. There has been some reordering of texts for the early councils, as well as some additions: e.g., Nicaea's letter to the Alexandrine Church, then disturbed by the Miletian schism; Nestorius' second letter to Cyril; the letter of Ephesus on the Eastern bishops who left the Council with John of Antioch; the Formula of Union; Cyril's letter of reconciliation to John; the Tome of Leo. The detailed table of contents for the volume takes the form of the Index Chronologicus.

M. J. O'Connell


A precious book, in which the Freiburg historian hides the instruments of his craft and resorts to inspired forgery, the better to lay bare some roots of our present predicament as Catholics. The fictive creations do not present a post-factum ideological revision of history, but attempt to recreate what a contemporary of Dupanloup or Döllinger or Loisy or Ehrhard, an ideal contemporary endowed with the hindsight and perspective of a historian, might have noted down about certain unhappy by-products of the Catholic revival under Pius IX and X. This form suggests itself to K. not merely because he wishes to dramatize certain states of mind which are in danger of falling into oblivion, but because he feels that a major component of the postconciliar crisis in the Roman Catholic communion is a sort of repressed collective consciousness which resists the light of critical reflection—hence the title with its allusion to psychic disturbances.

K. has composed letters, diary entries, and so on that help the reader reflect on some tension-filled moments in the lives of Hefele, Janssens, Pius X, Kraus, Schell, Hügel, Pastor, Lagrange, Buonaiuti, and those mentioned above. The way in which each man's conscience dealt with Church authority is sympathetically examined, not without signs of distress. Lessons to be learned are unobtrusively suggested in the telling and brought out more fully in open letters in K.'s own name at the beginning and end of the volume.
The scholarly use of such a book is limited, though it does set up a legitimate perspective, complete with selected documentation (not forged), on the last hundred years of Catholicism and culture (including a few fascinating pages on Bishop von Keppler, the kind of influential conservative churchman who is normally passed over by Church historians and left for profane historians, in this case Fritz Stern, to discover). Its real value lies, however, in the realm of responsible and literate popularization, like some of Meriol Trevor's work. Surely, if scholarly popularization of biblical research (such as Vawter excels at) is badly needed for the well-being of the Church in advanced societies, a similar haute vulgarisation of the Church's historical experience is equally necessary. It could appear even more necessary in the light of the pathological resistance, which now seems so widespread, even to hearing about the old Church. Perhaps K.'s book could serve as a model for some American author to bring forth a similarly engrossing work that would get behind counterproductive quasi-psychic defenses and start a healing process.

Paul Misner


A competent, painstaking account of the activities of the English bishops at Vatican I. C. draws on previous studies and adds fresh data from archival research. Manning, Ullathorne, and Clifford apart, the English bishops can hardly be said to have had a significant impact on the course of conciliar debate, but it is good to have them and other English figures like Acton and Newman studied in the context of the church of which they were a part. The introductory section on nineteenth-century England is written from too Continental a perspective. It does not get inside the peculiar genius that had developed in English Catholicism before the great ultramontane wave broke over the Channel, and so is overly content to accept the myth that Gallican theses imported from French schools explain English Old Catholic attitudes. The bio-data on the bishops is adequate and helpful, and C. threads his way carefully through the intricacies of the Council, showing how his bishops played their part. The final chapter, on their ecclesiology, is a bit thin. Manning bulks large—no quarrel with that; but one is left to wonder if a different perspective from the introductory chapter on might not have resulted in fuller appreciation of the actual, if inarticulate, ecclesiology of those whose views differed from those of the Archbishop.

James Hennesey, S.J.


This scholarly overview of the Jesuit past will prove in time to have been an important contribution to the quality of the Jesuit future. What that future will be, no one can say. But contemporary Jesuits have, in this volume, cause for admiration and a source of inspiration as they work together to choose and build a future. Admiration of one man's mastery of facts would be any reader’s response to B.'s book. Jesuit readers, however, will admire even more the heroism, sanctity, scholarship, and dedicated resourcefulness that are chronicled in this account of the life of the Society of Jesus from the birth of its founder in 1491 to the end of
Now, as the Jesuits prepare for their 32nd General Congregation in 1974-75, attention to their recent and distant past is most appropriate. In an epilogue, B. identifies three characteristic marks of the Society: apostolic action, a penchant for Christian humanism, and a common spiritual ideal. Unless the delegates to the next General Congregation totally neglect to read the "minutes" of their previous meetings, these three thrusts will be carried forward.

It is not the historian's task to predict the shape of the Jesuit future. If and how these three characteristics will be evident in the future, is for the whole Society to decide. If some elements are lost and others acquired, future historians will record the changes. But B. might have served his brethren better had he taken more careful note of the contemporary Society's interest in personalized, directed retreats and in communal discernment. He might then have highlighted the presence or absence of authenticating historical evidence of these practices in Jesuit governance structures and in external Jesuit apostolates. He has, of course, noted the intellectual and educational apostolates, the apostolates of pulpit oratory, foreign missions, sodalities, devotion to the Sacred Heart, preached retreats to priests and laity, and many other ministries. Are all things Jesuit authentically Ignatian? The question undoubtedly calls for an interdisciplinary reply.

B. set out to provide a "relatively brief but comprehensive account of the Society of Jesus," incorporating the "important scholarly findings in the strong rush of research on the Jesuits which has been in progress the past fifty years or so." He has achieved this objective well.

William J. Byron, S.J.
mutter” and is intended to provide reference material for it.

_**M. J. O'Connell**_


In addition to twelve books (many of them translations, with commentary, of liturgical material or patristic writings on liturgy), M.’s bibliography lists sixty-five scholarly contributions to periodicals or collections. To honor M.’s eightieth birthday, the editors have selected thirty-nine essays which illustrate the wide range of M.’s scholarship (liturgy; Church history; monasticism; art and iconography) but also make more accessible an important body of writing. The essays here presented have indeed, many in instances, been seminal ones, or, as the title chosen for the book puts it, _sarmenta_: seedlings set out to produce abundant fruit. Much of what M. had to say in earlier years—on the nature of the Church and the liturgy (here he showed himself the disciple of Odo Casel) and on historical problems of liturgy—later became commonplaces. His more recent writing continues to deal with important and wide-ranging themes: e.g., the most recent item reprinted here dates from 1970 and discusses the prophetic character of the liturgy and the historicity of theology. One thing I find striking about the great majority of these studies is their brevity. They average only about five pages, yet M. manages to say what he wants—and what he wants to say is often significant—and then end: no padding, no excess verbiage. He writes with clarity, broad erudition, a realistic grasp of important problems, and a sensitivity to authentic tradition; these qualities, especially in combination, are always in short supply.

_**M. J. O'Connell**_


“The tension of the soul toward encounter with God,” a theme from Gregory of Nyssa, provides the title for this Festschrift. The title is justified on the ground that D.’s early occupation with Gregory has provided a center and continuing inspiration for the twentieth-century scholar’s thought and activity. It would be impossible and rather pointless either to list all sixty-two contributions to the volume or arbitrarily to single some out for comment. Grouped under five headings (exegesis, hagiography, and liturgy; Origen and the Alexandrian tradition; Gregory of Nyssa and Christian Cappadocia; Christianity under Theodosius; disparate essays), there is something here for everybody: textual criticism, patristic _topoi_, philosophical themes, historical analyses, theological speculations. The range of the essays is impressive, especially when we realize that it mirrors quite accurately the range of D.’s own essays and significant contributions. The volume is beautifully laid out and a pleasure to handle.

_**M. J. O'Connell**_


In the ten years since _Sacrosanctum concilium_ (Dec. 4, 1963) the direction of liturgical studies has shifted perceptibly. Part of this shift is due to the pastoral crisis induced by rapid changes in the form, style, and language of worship. Part of it is due to a broadened understanding of the scope of liturgical research. Prior to Vatican II, and under the dominance of European scholarship, research was geared largely to the production of critical editions of texts, the search for “classi-
cal" liturgical forms, and efforts to purify existing prayers and rites. These endeavors, valuable and necessary, bore fruit in the Council's twofold call for (1) reform of existing sacramental rites and (2) cultural adaptation in worship.

The conciliar document left much business unfinished. The essays in this volume explore some of that business and reflect the need for a more interdisciplinary approach in liturgical studies. Although many of the papers were presented at a conference at the University of Notre Dame in June 1969, the delay in publication does not detract from their value for anyone interested in discovering what liturgists, architects, film makers, sociologists, anthropologists, and philosophers think about the human need for ritual behavior. The essays have been revised to include more recent literature, and there is a substantial, useful bibliography.

The relation between ritual (variously defined) and human culture provides the unitive theme of this collection. The contributions by Kavanagh, Smith, Burrell, and Wicker are especially noteworthy. Kavanagh, basing himself on Erik Erikson, probes the integratory process which allows the maturing individual to manage the random elements of experience through ritual patterns. Smith's thesis is that changes in society are pre-eminently symbolic changes (e.g., the shift from a "locative" to an "open" view of the world). Starting from the principle that "conceptions of self differ according to differing conceptions of understanding" (p. 186), Burrell argues that the construction of reality (a social act) must not exclude the human constructor (a deficiency he finds in the work of P. Berger and T. Luckmann). Wicker presents a reasoned analysis of the "rituals of dissent," identified in the late sixties with adherents of the counterculture.

Taken together, these essays provide a good barometer of the issues currently exercising liturgists, and they indicate that the Council's second mandate (cultural adaptation) can be realized only through an intense study of those repeated ritual patterns by which men order their experience and discover its significance.

Nathan Mitchell, O.S.B.


By continuing to translate into English L'Eglise en prière, the editors render a valuable service to the study of the liturgy. This second volume (pp. 251-484 of the last French edition) begins with general considerations concerning the Mass and its sources, moves into an analysis of the prayers and rites of the Mass, and ends with Père Béraudy's section on Eucharistic worship outside the Mass. Madame Denis-Boulet, the late French liturgical historian, is responsible for most of the book. Shortly before her death in 1969, she together with Canon Martimort revised her French text to bring it up to date. Béraudy's text also takes into account several recent Roman documents. Thus, carefully integrated into the first two major parts of the book are statements from the Institutio generalis Missalis Romani and the Ordo Missae (1969).

Obviously, no book today could keep up with the acceleration of liturgical change as it is still happening across the Christian world. What this book does quite well is to trace the long and varied history of the Mass, showing the major influences in East and West which helped shape especially Latin
euchology. Some readers will find that it devotes too much space to the Roman canon and not enough to the new Eucharistic prayers. However, at this date in history, especially given the unique circumstances of this book, great care has been taken to try to redress the imbalance. This book wastes no words. Wisely, it avoids entering into any ephemeral discussions of possible liturgical developments. It will be of great aid to all who wish to understand the history of the Eucharistic liturgy, to see the relative importance of certain recent changes in its regard, and to discover basic healthy liturgical principles. The English edition is at present more valuable than the French because of its incorporation of recent reforms as well as its more up-to-date bibliography.

John Barry Ryan, F.S.C.


An interesting and valuable book. P., monk of Montserrat and well-known specialist in the old Spanish rite, offers a reconstruction of the book of prayers (to which allusion was made in a document of 920 A.D.) which was used in the daily celebration of the Divine Office in Spanish cathedrals of the early Middle Ages; the book supplied prayers to be said at the end of each psalm in the Office. While P.'s reconstruction, which means taking prayers from various liturgical sources and forming series (four of them) of collects for each psalm in the Office, is obviously the main point of the book, his long introduction does far more than supply technical information on manuscripts and editorial principles. In two lengthy chapters he first puts the psalm collects into their historical context in antiquity generally (their function; the African and Italian series of collects with an analysis of the prayer style and doctrinal content) and in Spain in particular (the development of the Office in Spain; the function of the psalm collects from the fourth century on). He then analyzes extensively the psalm collects as a genre of prayer (chief sources of their inspiration; major doctrinal themes; comparison with other genres of prayer to be found in the Office). There is a rich harvest here for the theologian and historian of liturgical spirituality. For this reason, an index of names and topics for the book-length introduction would have been welcome. As it is, the indexes are limited to the *incipits* of the collects, arranged according to psalm and alphabetically.

M. J. O'Connell


Among the many fine essays that comprise this well-deserved testimony to Gaines Post, a few should be singled out for their interest to the theologian and the Church historian. Francis Oakley's "The 'Hidden' and 'Revealed' Wills of James I: More Political Theology," reveals an interesting interplay of theology and political thought in the early seventeenth century. W. Perrin ("Azo, Roman Law and Sovereign European States"), D. Sutherland ("Conquest and Law"), and K. Giocarinis ("Speculation on the Origins of Lordship: Francesco Suarez in his De legibus") study the evolution of political thought on the rights to property and dominion as natural and not dependent upon grace. A. M. Stickler once again provides a clear analysis of an important medieval canonist with his "Der Kaiserbegriff des Bernardus
Compostellanus.” Yves Congar has a masterful essay on status ecclesiae, a very useful summary and a reflective starting point for further research on this term and its role in late medieval thought, especially in so far as concern for the state of the Church led men to speculate on the limits upon authority in the Church. L. Fowler’s “Recusatio iudicis in Civilian and Canonist Thought,” shows a familiar problem: what to do with a judge who was suspected of incapacity or prejudice; S. Kuttner re-examines the work of Urban II, “Urban II and the Doctrine of Interpretation: A Turning Point?” H. Kaminsky examines (in my opinion, exaggerates) the influence of the French and in particular of the University of Paris upon the conciliarist movement, “Cession, Subtraction and Deposition: Simon de Cramaud’s Formulation of the French Solution to the Schism.”

Thomas E. Morrissey


The mysticism in question is Christian; the time, the twenties; the place, Germany, where the confessional divisions favored discussion between Catholic and Protestant but the decisive impulse to discussion came from elsewhere, especially France. M. discusses the renewal of interest in mysticism among Catholics after the First World War (mysticism had been rendered suspect in the Modernist crisis) and the controversy over its essence: Poulain vs. Saudreau (and their influence in Germany), and Mager in criticism of both. The other side of the “conversation” of the title is represented by the Protestant view or views of mysticism: the history-of-religions school in which mysticism was defended but in quite a different sense than in Catholicism; the rejection of mysticism in the Lutheran renaissance and in dialectical theology, both of which, however, unfortunately identified all mysticism with that promoted by the history-of-religions school and thus failed to come to grips with the mysticism of Christian tradition. The last section sketches the influence exerted by “popular mysticism” on German Protestant theology; the mysticism in question has only the name in common with the mysticism of Christian tradition. Ironically, it was men of the Luther renaissance who, while rejecting all Christian mysticism (misconceived indeed), were seduced by the mysticism of race, nation, and blood which found expression in National Socialism.

M.’s book is essentially a report on a historical juncture, a gathering of materials, and must be read as such. The most interesting part for many readers will be the section on Alois Mager’s attempt to determine the essential nature of mysticism. I must confess, however, to getting the smothered feeling of being wrapped in suffocating yet almost intangible cotton which discussions of mysticism usually arouse in me. The problem is not a lack of clarity in Maass’s or any other author’s presentation. It is rather that in passing from the description of interior experience, as apprehended in recollection by the subject of it, to the determination of the “nature” of mystical experience, one is beset at every point by unresolved problems of psychology, by conflicting philosophical world-views, and consequently by theological presuppositions which unwittingly or wittingly bypass the psychological and philosophical difficulties. Perhaps a helpful starting point today would be a good “sociology of mysticism and mystical theories.”

M. J. O’Connell
DAS VERMÄCHTNIS DES URSPRUNGS:

The developments of the first two centuries of monasticism in Egypt, Palestine, and Asia Minor contain all that is decisive in later monastic history. Even the language of spiritual experience was coined during that period; then it was filled with life, later it became a set of clichés and was debased. Here, then, in B.'s eyes, we have a heritage that needs constantly to be rediscovered (pp. 7-8). In aid of this rediscovery he offers the text and translation of the *Book of Horsiesius*, the disciple and second successor of St. Pachomius. The work is a quasi-systematic presentation of Pachomian spirituality; originally written in Coptic, it was translated from a Greek version by Jerome as part of a Pachomian dossier, and survives only in this Latin form. Horsiesius was a man of intellectual culture and a contemplative, not a man of action or a creative personality, but a respecter of tradition. His book helps to bring home in concrete fashion the fact, long recognized by scholars, that the Hellenistically influenced monasticism represented by Evagrius of Pontus was not the only monasticism practiced in early Egypt. The latter, indeed, attracted almost all the attention and was the only one that influenced later monasticism and religious life generally.

In this book B. is intent on using Horsiesius and reflection on the type of religious life he represents in order to aid in the contemporary effort to distinguish the specifically Christian elements of traditional spirituality from the Greco-Hellenistic ingredients. In his introduction and commentary B. brings his rich knowledge of early monasticism to bear, so that the notes are a treasure house of information and stimulating suggestions. What strikes me about the two types of Egyptian monasticism which B. contrasts is less their differences than their common presuppositions. Thus, e.g., they share what was to become the traditional view of poverty as uniformity and non-independence; any differences are within this framework. But one might break through the framework and turn to the poverty of Acts, as many have been doing today; here the "all in common" requires the detachment shown in sharing, not in uniformity of life. The question of poverty, or of obedience for that matter, cannot, of course, be resolved so simply; for each is the center and focal point of numerous spiritual dynamisms: asceticism, common life, apostolic efficacy, to name but the most important. In any event, B.'s book is a valuable one to those who are concerned with these basic questions; but the discussion cannot in the long run be carried on solely within the framework B. sets up.

M. J. O'Connell


The Cyprian volume contains four works of very varying importance. The *Ad Quirinum* and *Ad Fortunatum* are simple collections of Scripture texts, not treatises but material for treatises, as Cyprian himself notes in the *Ad Fortunatum*. The short *De lapsis*, on the contrary, deals with a key issue of Cyprian's day, and the likewise short *De ecclesiae catholicae unitate* goes to the heart of Cyprian's theology and churchmanship. Bévenot here reproduces the critical texts he has already published elsewhere; some years back he published a translation and com-
mentary on both works in *Ancient Christian Writers* 25 (1957).

In 1962 H. Weyer published a German translation (with Latin text) of Novatian's *Trinity*, with an extensive introduction and theological commentary (cf. the evaluation in *TS* 24 [1963] 457). G. now provides us with an improved text of the *Trinity* (cf. pp. 6–7 for his critique of Weyer's text) and the *De cibis judaicus*, as well as of four other works generally regarded today as Novatian's: *De bono pudicitiae*, *De spectaculis*, and *Epistulae* 30 and 36 from the correspondence of Cyprian. He accepts Ep. 31 as also authentic and prints the pseudo-Cyprianic *Adversus Iudaeos* as possibly Novatian's and the anonymous *Ad Novatianum* because it is preserved in numerous manuscripts of the *De bono pudicitiae*.

Intrinsically the least significant of the three volumes contains Prosper's *Expositio psalmorum* (Pss 100–150) and his *Liber sententiarum*. The former is a summary of Augustine's *Enarrationes*; the latter, a series of 392 sentences or paragraphs from the works of Augustine. Historically, of course, Prosper's *Liber sententiarum* was doctrinally influential, since it was one important way in which Augustine's thought was mediated to the early Middle Ages.

M. J. O'Connell


First published in Germany in 1970, this book is based on a retreat given in 1961. Its pre-Vatican II origin is duly noted in the preface. Its "datedness" is not that much of a problem, not least because the approach and content of the book are weighted in favor of St. Ignatius' *Spiritual Exercises* in general, upon which the retreat and book are based and ordered. Only pp. 99–170 are devoted precisely to the ordained ministerial priesthood. This section is placed between the meditations on the Hidden Life and the Two Standards. There is another value in this proportion, for it can help combat the current inflation of both celibacy and priesthood by recalling "the essential claim of Christianity and the priesthood: to be at the service of love among men and thus of the coming of God's kingdom" (p. 3).

R.'s primary concern is not theoretical but mystagogical; it is an introduction to the practice of priestly life. Familiar Rahnerian themes recur: holiness as coincidence of person and office; theology and anthropology; God, Jesus, resurrection as the absolute future; existential, but not situation ethics; the ambiguity of freedom. Although this is hardly one of Rahner's major works, in comparison to so much of the instantly and momentarily relevant it has value for anyone who wishes to renew both his *Adsum* and his *Suscipe*.

Robert Kress


This personal, daily journal, written by Merton during his long-awaited trip to the Orient between October 15 and his accidental death by electrocution in Bangkok on December 10, 1968, stands as a last testament and final gift to his many readers throughout the world. His editors, all lifetime acquaintances, who had helped with many of his previous publications, clearly look upon the publication of this journal as a labor of love. Working from a handwritten, cryptic text, they have produced a beautiful volume with many photographs and explanatory notes, which clarify M.'s otherwise
obscure references to persons, places, and concepts. Since M. was deeply involved in the study of Oriental religions and Hindu and Buddhist meditation techniques, in order to deepen his understanding of human reality, the fifty-five-page glossary of Oriental terms which M. used is an invaluable aid to reading this journal. The book also has a Foreword and a Postscript which explain the setting and purposes of his journey and previously unpublished details about his death. Nine appendices are included which contain the texts of some of his conferences and talks and hitherto unpublished personal letters, all of which complement the ideas expressed in the journal.

This would be a difficult book for those unfamiliar with M.’s style of writing, but those who have read his previous works will find deep satisfaction in the breadth of his vision, his many observations on the possibility of the adaptation of Oriental meditation techniques for Christian usage, on the possibility and inherent difficulties of dialogue with Oriental religious philosophers, his comments on Oriental art, his constant search for a deeper understanding of religious truth, and his determination, aided by his contact with the Orient, to remain a Christian contemplative of the Gethsemani Community forever. Several of his poems and antipoems composed on the inspiration of the moment, which give some insights into his views of contemporary human reality, are included.

Frederic J. Kelly, S.J.


Described as a “broad phenomenological survey of the relationship between the two notions of woman and God in the history of Western religious tradition,” this book concentrates on “one theme dominant throughout the material chosen: the equation of woman with intelligence and civilization” (p. 1). B.’s examples begin with the fertility goddesses of prehistory (these suggest that early men and women thought of God, like woman, as source of new life and of nourishment for it). Inanna is regarded as having obtained the basics of civilization for Erech, while Isis achieves equality with Ra (by getting his knowledge) and with Osiris (by getting his seed and impregnating herself), thus reflecting the realization that “the highest prerogatives of divinity were not restricted to one sex” (p. 30). OT data to the point are Eve’s quest of knowledge, the feminine gender of “spirit” and “wisdom,” and the women who were instruments of God in carrying out his plans. In the NT, Mary achieves what Eve sought, inasmuch as Mary bears eternal Wisdom within her; later on, wisdom, when taken as “created,” is regarded as verified in Mary above all others, while Mary as intercessor acquires an extraordinary status. Catherine of Alexandria and Pope Joan are offered as surpassing “all other men of their times in knowledge and intelligence” (p. 70).

The evidence offered is sketchy indeed. Apart from its sketchiness, however, the whole argument is afflicted with a weakness that is resident in its basic terms. “Goddesses” and “the divine,” on the other hand, and “intelligence and civilization,” on the other, are far too slippery terms and cover a multitude of meanings. Some of these meanings (e.g. “intelligence” as philosophical wisdom in Catherine of Alexandria, as practical cleverness in some of the OT figures cited, and as a low and somewhat disreputable cunning in Inanna and other mythic figures) emerge without being explicitly adverted to and cause the argument to disintegrate in the reader’s mind.
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B. offers an interesting thesis and some interesting material. It will not, in this form, support any far-reaching conclusions. But, then, B. sets out to stimulate our thinking along certain lines, not to prove anything.

M. J. O'Connell


A broad survey of the "phenomenon" of religion, as seen by a sensitive humanistic sociologist. After a piquant introduction on the constant quarrel of intuition (anima) and reason (animus) in humanistic studies, D. deals with the rise, structure, and prospects of religion. Apparently, this schema is a deliberate focusing of historical memory, sociological consciousness, and utopian imagination.

D. sees the rise of the religious phenomenon in two stages. The first, grand stage is the four millennia from about 1500 B.C. to 1500 A.D. Here the great traditions emerge into history and the founding figures flourish. The second stage is from 1500 to the present, where there occurs a conjunction of geographically disparate religions (including American Indian, African, and Australian) because of the European expeditions. Structurally, religion shows "archeological" stages of growth, differentiation into "attesting" and "contesting" types, etc. Its sociological core is the tension of ecstatic and regulative elements. With the more problematic God or gods (problematic because of, e.g., Theravada and Taoism), they draw a "religious triangle." (Structurally, D. feels himself akin to Harvey Cox's Feast of Fools.)

Religion's prospects are sketched by brief studies of discerning "utopians": Hegel, Schleiermacher, Solzhenitzen, Djilas, etc. They suggest various futures: demise, convergence into some amalgam, or continued splintering. More basically, however, they show the "religious" constant in all utopian hopes for man's development. D. concludes with a tally of the deficiencies in this work (e.g., its broad scope, the tussles between sociology and theology) and with bibliographical aids. The tally is accurate but perhaps too modest. I found this a salutary overview, well informed and winningly interested in religion's future.

John Carmody


Camara, the outspoken Archbishop of Recife and Olinda in northeast Brazil, has accused his country's military government of methods "that sadly bring back to memory the hideous days of Hitler and Stalin." Recently he appealed for an end to such abuse in an address to the Pernambuco state legislature. This is the man whom his enemies call "the Red Bishop of Recife," and whom former civilian presidents have offered to appoint to high offices in the Brazilian government. This collection of C.'s speeches, sermons, and lectures presents his candid message as a challenge to the status quo and provides an insight into a controversial critic of the established church.

The title of this compilation of C.'s writings reflects his position as an apostle of peaceful revolution in the reform of existing social structures. He rejects violent revolution, yet he warns of the inevitability of repression if world leaders ignore the legitimate aspirations of oppressed and impoverished peoples of the Third World. Like his earlier Church and Colonialism, the themes cover a wide range and include such chapters as "Evangelism and Humanism," "The Church in the
World,” and “Christianity, Communism, and Democracy.” The composition of the book makes inevitable a repetition of C.’s statements.

C. writes with passion and a sense of urgency. His appeal for social justice on a global scale makes him an articulate witness to the need for faith and hope, and also for commitment and technology in the practical order. He calls for an open dialogue with Marxists. While clearly repudiating the totalitarian models provided by China and the Soviet Union, he believes that socialism does not have to crush people but can help the human person. He favors a democratic, humanistic form of socialism in a system “which serves the community and mankind.”

Marshall B. Winkler, S.J.


A thoroughly revised, updated, and enlarged edition, under a new title, of the Neuner-Roos Teaching of the Catholic Church (Eng. tr. 1967; cf. TS 28 [1967] 894). The work is no longer a translation of a German original but the result of the collaboration of a team of theologians active in India. Introductions to chapters have been revised in the light of Vatican II, introductions to documents in the light of contemporary scholarship. The book keeps, of course, its arrangement of documents according to theological themes. It includes, however, new chapters on “The Church and the Churches,” “The Church and World Religions,” “The Church and the Missions,” and “Christian Worship,” which either reflect a specifically contemporary theological concern (the first two listed) or a contemporary sense of the problematic character of a central Christian activity (missions) or a renewed grasp of the ancient heritage itself (worship).

M. J. O’Connell

BOOKS RECEIVED

[All books received are listed here whether they are reviewed or not]

SCRIPTURAL STUDIES


DOCTRINAL THEOLOGY


Hughes, Philip Edgcumbe. Confirmation in the Church Today. Grand
Bibliography:


HISTORICAL


MORAL, LAW, LITURGY


PASTORAL AND ASCETICAL


Perrin Jassy, Marie-France. Basic


PHILOSOPHY


SPECIAL QUESTIONS


ERRATUM

In the December 1973 issue of *TS,* a printer’s error in George H. Tavard’s “Episcopacy and Apostolic Succession according to Hincmar of Reims” resulted in a paragraph that is largely unintelligible. On page 595, line 9 (“with the kings of Eastern Frankland found him prepared to assume a”) should be totally deleted and replaced by:

with the King in the affair, which he lost, of Wulfad of Bourges. His re-