BOOK REVIEWS


In this work, a translation of his 1968 *Geschichte der israelitischen Religion*, F. sees Israelite religion as the result of four influences: the original Yahwism of Moses, kingship, prophecy, and Deuteronomic theology. At its heart, Yahwism is a personal faith, a relationship of reciprocity between man and God, man's acts and God's, a communion with God based on recognition of His sovereignty. This theological nucleus was threatened by various inauthentic forms of religion, deriving from nomadic antecedents, Canaanite influences, or intra-Israelite movements, and centering around magic, cult, nationalism, wisdom, and legalism. By withstanding or assimilating these influences, Yahwism managed to develop organically, becoming even more universal and comprehensive, until it succumbed to the “legalistic piety” of Judaism.

If this is F.'s general picture of OT religion, his account of particular matters is rich, magisterial, and generally (from the viewpoint of the conventional wisdom of American OT scholarship) provocative, as the following summary may suggest.

"Israel" was a mixture of nomadic patriarchal clans, who settled in Palestine in the fourteenth century, originally Aramean nomadic tribes entering Palestine from different directions in the thirteenth century, and the "Moses host" who left Egypt in the late thirteenth century. Patriarchal religion worshiped clan gods; the relationship with these gods of the fathers was expressed in kinship terms; cult was simple, ethical obligations a tribal code. In the gradual occupation of Palestine, the anonymous, nonlocalized clan gods were assimilated to the El worshiped at various cult sites, and the legends about the fathers were associated with these shrines.

Yahwism itself was brought from Midian by the Egyptian-born 'Apiru Moses and spread among the Israelites, by the middle of the twelfth century, through the military prowess of Yahwistic elements, especially the Joseph group, and the missionary activity and skill in battle of the former priests of the Kadesh sanctuary, the Levites. The experiences of the Moses group, centering around the Sinai-Exodus complex, became the common heritage of the Israelite tribes, just as stories about the patriarchs were incorporated into Yahwism. The religion of Moses preached a God who makes ethical demands on the basis of His lordship and the possibility of personal communion with Him; the Sinai event, like the clan gods' self-revelation to the patriarchs, established a
relationship of obligation toward Yahweh. The word b*rrt means “obligation,” not “covenant”; hence Ancient Near Eastern treaties have no connection with the OT b*rrt. Apodictic law is neither uniquely Israelite nor Mosaic, because Yahwism “is not a religion of law but of ethics.” As the unity of the Israelite tribes was based on genealogical relationships (the tribal league is an unproved and improbable hypothesis, together with cognate theories about the central sanctuary, ark, “Holy War” as an institution, etc.), so their identity as the people of Yahweh was understood in terms of kinship.

Through its conflicts with nomadism and with Canaanite religion and its adjustments to the conditions of settled life, Mosaic Yahwism developed and became more inclusive. Cultus and law became more prominent, especially after the period of city-states (territorial, not tribal, units ruled by “Judges”) gave way to monarchy with its incorporation of Canaanite ideology and practices. Royal policy was to unify Yahwistic and Canaanite elements of the population within the consensus of a state religion, centering on the Temple. This politically motivated assimilation to Canaanite ways brought forth conservative reaction: the Nazirite and Rechabite movements, antiurban tendencies represented by N (F.'s “Nomadic” Hexateuchal source), and exclusivist religious nationalism (seen in J and E), with its emphasis on election and land. But settlement and agricultural life exacted compromises: Yahwism inauthentically became a cultic religion worshiping Yahweh as governor of natural processes, not as the exalted, occasionally intervening God of ethical will. Hence Yahweh was confined within the limits of the cult, the law, the nation.

The canonical prophets, in line with the tendencies of primitive Yahwism, sought to express the divine will in a comprehensive way that would transcend the multiplicity of the law’s regulations. They challenged the nationalistic axiom that Israel stood in a fundamental relationship of favor with Yahweh, which if lost could be restored by cultic measures. The prophetic call derives from a “secret experience” (Gunkel) which the prophet interprets, elaborates rationally, and expresses artistically. The prophetic message of repentance and redemption aimed at transforming man through communion with God based on recognition of His sovereignty; individuals so transformed united as a community of believers. By their religious experience the prophets brought Mosaic Yahwism back to life. They made use of tradition in expressing their experience, but were not dependent on it; the ancient traditions were not fundamental to their faith. Prophecy purified and fulfilled inadequate forms of religious understanding, subsuming them into forms consonant with Yahwism: magic into symbolic action, cult into prayer, nationalism
into a doctrine of Yahweh’s universal sovereignty, wisdom into faith in
Yahweh, legalism into an observance of law as the embodiment and
corollary, not the substance, of a right relationship to Yahweh. In
prophecy Yahwism developed from an early to a high religion. Though it
was purely religious, prophecy (unlike mysticism) sought to influence
all the realms of human existence.

The Deuteronomic reform was both a political and a religious process,
deriving from prophecy and the conservatism of Levitical priests in the
countryside. Its central axioms were the unity of Yahweh (the correla­
tive was centralization of the cult), the jealousy of Yahweh, and the love
of Yahweh. Dt revived the notion of b‘rrt (“obligation”), long fallen into
disuse. It synthesized cultic-nationalistic theology and prophetical the­
ology.

With the Exile the law became the fixed rock of Israel’s life, a substi­
tute for the cult; like the cultic movement, however, legalism reduced
life to ritual, the outward observance of law. Exilic and postexilic proph­
ecy represents a decline, beginning with Second Isaiah. Eschatologi­
cal prophecy made the mistake of reinterpreting the either/or of au­
thentic Yahwism as a temporal before/after, and erroneously conceived
salvation in corporate, not individual, terms. The often gross materialism
of apocalyptic perverted the idea of a transformation of man into the
vision of a new age and new form of the world. With Ezra, prophetical
faith gave way to legalistic piety. What was virtually a new religion ap­
peared in the latest OT times: a personal relationship between Yahweh
and man was transformed into a two-sided struggle for man; a religion
of this world was changed into a religion of the beyond.

This unnuanced and highly selective sketch of F.’s reconstruction of
Israelite religion may serve to indicate the broad lines of his approach.
Judgments of criticism and dating are based on E. Sellin and G. Fohrer’s
Introduction to the Old Testament (1965, Eng. tr. 1968); though one is
frequently unhappy with its conclusions (e.g., dating Dt 32 as exilic,
reading Jg 5 in the light of chap. 4 rather than vice versa, a tendency to
see the first literary statement of a belief as the beginning of the belief,
a reliance on Arabian parallels and a questionable idea of “nomadism,”
to the exclusion of other extrabiblical data), this review cannot discuss
them. F.’s underlying philosophical presuppositions are clear in his ac­
count of prophetism as transcending inadequate forms of religion while
vindicating the values implicit in them. Thus F. manages to preserve the
oneness of Yahwism amid the multiplicity of Israelite religious phenom­
ena. This doctrine of continuity-cum-change allows F. to discern a recur­
rent tripartite structure in the history of Israel’s religion: e.g., simple
tribal cults become complex ceremonies which finally give way to wor-
ship in spirit and in truth; a clan ethic aimed at safety and good order turns into a complex of cultic, ethical, and legal regulations, which finally are subsumed in a single comprehensive commandment; the God of a special group becomes the God of a nation, and then the only God of all nations.

Clearly, F.'s analysis continues an older tradition of German scholarship. His postulated "original Yahwism," imported full-blown from Midian ("the man of faith is a nomad"), suspiciously resembles the nineteenth-century ideal of ethical religion, especially in its resistance to law, cult, and myth, and in its emphasis on an individualistically personal relationship to God. This pure religion provides F. with a sort of canon within the canon: though accretions were "historically inevitable," whether as "expansions" of elements already present in Yahwism or as limitations of it (to cult, law, or nation), the religion Moses brought from Midian was capable of assimilating or rejecting these foreign influences. Indeed, the achievement of the prophets was to retrieve this original Yahwism through their religious experience, and to subsume extraneous elements into the rediscovered purity of the faith of Moses.

Yet one wonders if Israelite religion admits of such dissociations. Is Yahweh's rule over the divine council something given from the earliest times, or an adventitious expansion of His sovereignty, the work of "late theology"? Granted that Ex 3 and 6 presuppose a consciousness that the identification of Yahweh with the god of the fathers is historically and theologically secondary, can the titles and attributes of El be so radically separated from the figure of Yahweh? Religious insight is conceived and lived through specific forms. Symbolizations of the Godhead determine, as well as proceed from, the believer's understanding. Is Yahweh only secondarily father, creator, warrior, king; or rather, was the El language from which these titles are derived merely applied to an already formed, self-contained deity? If Yahweh's very name is a shortened form of a liturgical sentence (as the ancient title \(YHWH\) \(\text{bä'öt,}\) "he causes the hosts to be," seems to indicate), the Canaanite prehistory of the God of Israel is betrayed even in the theophany to Moses in Midian. Similarly, the association of speech with creation and governance is not a late theologoumenon but can be traced to El the creator's \(\text{rigmu}.\) F. derives the characteristic forms of Yahwism from nomadic life, and denies the authenticity of politicomorphic religious symbolizations, but it should be noted that kinship and covenant are not exclusive. In fact, fidelity to Yahweh was thought to be betrayed by foreign alliances; the implication is that fidelity and divine sovereignty were conceived in specific political forms which were considered to be called into question by
power politics, oppression, and foreign or syncretistic worship. Comparison of Israelite covenant with international treaty forms would also shed a different light on syncretism: it was not merely a something-for-everyone ploy to ensure tranquility among the Yahwistic and Baalistic elements of the population (a thesis for which the evidence seems to be slight) but an inevitable result, the domestic counterpart, of the infidelity entailed in foreign alliances. In any case, the translation (p. 133) of krt bryt as “give assurances” (Zusicherungen geben) is indefensible; it does not square with the Kutsch-Fohrer thesis that bĕrît means “obligation,” and betrays Tendenz.

F.’s dissociation of religious insight and religious forms is at the heart of his analysis of prophecy. His thesis has much to commend it: the canonical prophets did not merely pass on Israelite tradition tout court. Authentic religious discovery does transcend its sources. One given insight into the divine mystery does rediscover the meaning of traditional formulas and symbols, and without such insight any symbol system is an empty form. Hence the man of faith can deal freely, creatively, sovereignly with the materials of his religious tradition, for he shares the insight that generated its symbols in the first place. On the other hand, F.’s description of the prophets seems to detach their vision both from Israelite tradition and from the forms, derived from that tradition, which embodied it. They did not use tradition, even transforming it, simply in order to make themselves understood by the men of their time, as if any other language would have done equally well to embody their vision. Insights do not exist in such a naked state, wanting only to be clothed in this or that fashion. The moment of vision and the moment of expression cannot be dissociated. Knowledge of the creative process should warn us against such a dissociation. So should the work of scholars who have pointed out the continuity of prophecy with tradition. Similarly, F. separates Dt from its cultic setting and its form as Moses’ testament. Yet, whatever the redactional work of exilic writers might have added to the book, the law is presented as the content of an oath, and oath does require a ritual form; and even if the book’s testamental character is secondary, it has a basis in the inseparably parenetic nature of the discourses.

F.’s strictures on the widely accepted view of the OT as Heils geschichte must be applauded. Much theological writing is based on a post-nominalist dissociation of nature and history, and reductionistically throws out a good part of Israelite religion. F.’s History is wise, comprehensive, and balanced; many moving passages in this learned book testify to its author’s religious sense. It can be recommended as a thor-
ough and judicious study representative of a fruitful tradition of scholarship one ignores at his peril.

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In 1957 Gerhard von Rad, the foremost OT theologian of our time, stimulated long-dormant scholarly interest in the OT wisdom literature by including a discussion of it in his immensely influential Old Testament Theology. By demonstrating that the wisdom books represented an impressive intellectual and theological achievement, he was able to overcome the somewhat prejudiced dismissal of the wisdom literature on the part of an earlier generation of scholars. This volume, the fruit of the last decade of his life, demonstrates more philosophically that the wisdom literature is as profound as the historical books and offers new insights from the author’s own humanistic and theological viewpoint.

The central concern of the book is the wisdom authors’ understanding of reality. The intellectual milieu and the religious tensions behind the texts are examined at length. The often brief wisdom sayings and the arrangement of the collections frequently are attempts to hold in tension polarities that are perceived in the world: man’s ability to act freely and God’s control, the autonomy of the secular and God’s effective presence in the world, the orders discernible in the universe and the contingency of events. A great deal of space is devoted to the analysis of these ideas, as von Rad attempts to show the vigorous intellectual life which produced the epigrammatic literature in our Bible.

The discussion of the so-called hypostatization of wisdom (the author thinks the term is misleading) in some later wisdom poems is provocative and original. The poems in Jb 28, Prv 8, and Sir 24 describe the ordering power in the world. This order, within the world though mysterious, as a person turns to man and calls him. What is personified is thus not an attribute of God but an attribute of the world, the divinely established order. Further, the mystery of the world moves toward man and seeks his ear; wisdom is to be loved by man. This intellectual love, as von Rad describes it, has old roots, but only in late wisdom literature does it become the object of explicit reflection. The reviewer feels that this stimulating insight needs to be qualified by careful comparison with the Canaanite background of the appeals of Dame Wisdom. Language used originally of a Canaanite goddess is reutilized in the biblical appeals of Dame Wisdom, demonstrable particularly in Prv 9.

This book is important because it criticizes effectively many of the scholarly clichés that have relegated the wisdom literature to a minor
role in attempts to construct a theology of the OT. The sharp distinction between old and late wisdom, the unqualified equation of wisdom with Torah in Sirach, crude interpretations of retribution in the proverbs, all receive from von Rad a corrective discussion. The book offers a wealth of new ideas and approaches which are sure to be followed by other scholars. Von Rad's strength, however, is also his weakness. Concentration on the ideas of the wisdom books leads to neglect of careful exegesis of individual passages and of effective use of much Ancient Near East comparative material. He is led, e.g., from an analysis of the concept of the divine determination of times, to derive apocalyptic literature from the wisdom tradition. Attention to the forms and specific traditions used in apocalyptic literature would have shown rather that apocalyptic literature develops mainly from prophetic traditions.


In the past two decades, OT scholarship has begun to turn again to questions of broad theological meaning. The discovery that Hittite treaties roughly contemporaneous with Moses and the Exodus have a formal structure similar to that of the biblical covenant has led scholars to examine the quality and implications of this similarity from many perspectives. While there is not full agreement on various points, I would suggest that these new approaches to covenant in the OT and to the development of religious understanding within the OT period are going to have far-reaching effects on biblical exegesis and theological explanation for many years to come.

B.'s book was one of the first attempts to investigate the covenant formulary in the OT and to trace its development. Along with Mendenhall's articles, this book was influential not only for what it contained, but perhaps even more for what it influenced others to investigate. The translation in 1971 was long overdue. It is hard to know how to review a work whose beginnings have found successful development elsewhere. This is a pioneering effort, and OT scholarship stands very much in its debt. And yet it is not such a helpful work any longer. Its origins as a dissertation and Habilitationsschrift at Heidelberg are clearly evident in the excessive attention to minutiae of previous scholarship and in the occasional failure to move from such discussion into full development of the author's own significant theses.

The book has two major parts, "The Covenant Formulary: Its Origin
and Use in the Old Testament," and "The Covenant Formulary in Jewish and Early Christian Texts." The first part is generally useful, with some very good insights and observations. The crucial point that the covenant formulary depends on the movement from antecedent history to covenant response (with consequent obligations) is clearly accepted in Part 1, but then tends to be overlooked in Part 2. There B. is content to check off successive elements—no matter how different in tone or use—and assert that they are derived from the older covenant formulary and manifest its enduring influence.

In my opinion, the second part does not successfully show that the covenant formulary, as such, is reflected in the later Jewish and early Christian texts studied. Whatever the origins of the "dogmatic" and "ethical" sections of these works, the characteristic movement of the older covenant formulary is not shown to be present. This second part may be of interest to students of the texts discussed, but it will disappoint and frustrate the nonexpert interested in the covenant itself.

Thus, while the book has been of great value to OT scholarship, the present translation comes to us too late. It is too bad that a new revision and reworking was not undertaken for this English edition.

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Although a short book, this is an important publication for two reasons: the careful scholarship it reflects and the nature of the subjects discussed. To this reviewer's knowledge, this is the first attempt by an American Catholic scholar to treat seriously of these two doctrines for the educated, nonprofessional public, doctrines which the majority of Catholics would probably consider to be at the heart of their faith. To a limited extent, therefore, it could even be considered a trail-blazing work.

There are really three essays here, not two. The first, presented as an introduction (pp. 1–20), is a plaidoyer for modern biblical criticism—which is what is really at issue in both the other essays. Are Catholic biblical scholars really able to take seriously the Church's recent (since 1943) encouragement to apply all known sciences in the interpretation of the Bible? Fr. Brown thinks so and gives a lucid presentation both of the encouragement and of the reasons for acting in accord with it. He also shows what this will mean for the understanding of the Scriptures. It means that the understanding will differ at times profoundly and almost constantly from a fundamentalistic or literalistic approach. The Catholic Church, B. argues, is committed to the critical approach. The opening
essay was evoked by a sensitivity to the feelings of many Catholics, especially those of the extreme right who are prepared to attack any variations from traditional formulations of the faith, even before they read the treatments. This is why B. refers several times to Pope John's now famous Council dictum about such formulations and the underlying truth. This sensitivity is a desideratum for all theologians who write for the general public. Finally—and this is not the least of the merits of the book—B. writes as a Catholic who is aware of the teaching authority of the Church and of his relation to it (cf. p. 66, n. 117). What is refreshing is that he can accept this authority as liberating and not as restricting.

The study of the virginal conception of Jesus (pp. 21–68) is already well known. Originally given as an inaugural lecture at Union Theological Seminary, then published in TS (33 [1972] 3–34), it now appears in expanded form. As indicated, there are two issues involved: the scholarly methodology and the controversial character of the subject. The latter can easily lead to an ignoring of the former, and for many probably and unfortunately will. The methodology is impeccable. After a brief survey of recent discussion, both popular and scholarly, on the subject, B. gives the evidence, pro and con, from authority, interlocking doctrine, early history, and Scripture. In each case it is shown that no clear-cut decision can be made for one side or the other. In other words, “the totality of the scientifically controllable evidence leaves an unresolved problem” (p. 66). In a significant footnote to this statement he indicates that such conclusions have led him, as a Catholic, to a greater appreciation of a teaching Church (n. 117). What B. has done, indirectly perhaps but notably, is to show that belief in the virginal conception is not incompatible with critical exegesis, as long as miracles are not ruled out ex supposito. As far as the arguments are concerned, the one perhaps most often adduced against the historicity is that from the history of religions. The stories of miraculous births abound in ancient literature. B. shows that there is, however, no exact parallel to the Gospel story that would adequately explain its origin—“unless, of course, that is what really took place” (p. 65). To this should be added the basic difference between the pagan and biblical approach to the divine action in history. Hans Urs von Balthasar puts it oversimplistically but trenchantly when he writes: “are we to begin trying to distinguish between ‘theological’ and ‘historical’ truth in a religion which is concerned precisely with incarnation and therefore with the historical truth of its central content of belief?” (The Movement of Christian Witness [Glen Rock, 1968] p. 55).

The study of the bodily resurrection of Jesus (pp. 69–129) is similar to the preceding one in that it involves a miraculous event, but different in that the subject is much more central to the Christian gospel and has
been the object of an incalculably greater number of articles and books. For this latter reason the essay is necessarily much more condensed. Still, for the readers intended, it is an excellent summary of the state of the problem and of the biblical evidence. The latter includes the earliest Christian formulations of resurrection faith, the Gospel narratives of the appearances to the Twelve, and the accounts of the empty tomb. B.'s conclusion includes a summary statement on a possible development of the resurrection stories and the judgment that "Christians can and indeed should continue to speak of a bodily [italics his] resurrection of Jesus" (p. 127). This conclusion is more firmly stated than that of the preceding doctrine, on the basis of the evidence alone. To this reviewer, one of the stronger arguments, referred to by B. (p. 87), is the necessary continuity between Jesus of Nazareth and the Christ of faith which the Gospel genre itself supposes and which would seem to demand bodily resurrection at least for the Semitic mentality. But the problem is so complex that it is not appropriate here to discuss details. In summary, it must be said that B. has given a clearly written, competently researched, and admirably objective presentation of two important issues in biblical faith.

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Though addressed to rather different audiences, these two works have much in common. Both stand under the sign of the Enlightenment. After the decline of dialectical and existentialist theologies, both urge a return to experience so as to renew our fundamental talk about God. Both argue against misleading dualisms and urge the integration of men's ultimate questions. Neither recognizes as valid any Christian theory not related to Christian practice. And each is more a collection of papers than a whole book.

Z. closes his with a direct and typical plea to his readers: "Keep a place open for God in your lives. . . . For whether we believe or do not believe, God cannot die. And therefore we are never done with the question of God" (p. 265). As in his earlier, unusually popular treatment of twentieth-century Protestant theology, translated as The Question of God, Z.'s more recent work is distinguished by its clarity, breadth, and incisive language. Here he writes explicitly from faith to faith, hoping to serve as a mediator between the extremes which he considers false alternatives for "theology after the death of God." He has little tolerance
for the logic of today’s radical theology, but he does agree that Christians
must learn to speak of God in a new way, based on real experience of
Him anew. And though his own approach is occasionally marred by care­
less generalities—as on p. 5: “The only thing that is of any use is honest
determination and more profound reflection”—he more often suggests
his views with a balanced vigor which should be stimulating and helpful
to a wide audience.

In his early chapters Z. summarizes those consequences of the En­
lightenment which provide the current context for Christian faith. Char­
acteristically, he highlights positive as well as negative aspects to an­
thropocentrism, secularism, ideology critique, social humanism. All have
contributed to make the issue of faith in God today a purifying challenge,
and this entails what Z. calls a “transformation of God,” a presence of
God in history through a form embodying transcendence in immanence in
a new way. Z. is not entirely clear, much less convincing, when he sug­
gests that “it is in his experience of God that man ‘has’ God, and in no
other way, and therefore the expression ‘transformation of God’ refers
in the end to God himself” (p. 57; cf. pp. 131 f.). But if there is a key con­
cept in the empirical theology Z. is sketching, it is that of transforma­
tion: God and His purposes for man are to be discovered within human
history and experience insofar as that history is renewed and fulfilled by
God, even though this is perceived by faith alone, contrary to the ap­
pearances of the world. The point of contact for the discovery is in our
“ultimate questions” about the meaning of existence, and Z. remains
true to his Lutheran heritage by arguing that only the acceptance of
revelation enables us to recognize these questions as an inherent orienta­
tion to God.

In the central chapters of his book, and with a certain amount of repe­
tition, Z. develops his ideas on finding God in secular experience. The­
ology’s guard over the central questions of that experience is meant to
serve faith’s deepening realization that our “existence is owed to an­
other” who not only creates but recreates us. Furthermore, theology is
subject to a primary rule: it must tell the story of Jesus of Nazareth, in
whom God has interpreted Himself for men so that now “we are not
shown a new world, we only see the world anew” (p. 167), recognizing
God’s presence in it. This requires that on the basis of the teaching of
Jesus each generation write a “fifth gospel,” one for its own time which
reproduces in its own circumstances and needs God’s word of love in
Jesus.

In chapters which follow Z. gives judicious opinions on man’s personal
relationship to God and suggests discreetly that contemporary Christians
might better address God as “friend” rather than as “father.” He also
provides valuable perspectives on the Christian insight that life cannot
in the final analysis be earned but must instead be received as a gift. This comprises the basis for an "ethic of transformation" alert to the reductionist tendencies of some current political theology: men finally have confidence in their lives and in concrete social progress not because of their own effectiveness but because they are loved by an unfailing love. If what Z. says on the "purposelessness" of Christianity is only very generally coherent with his earlier approach to theory and practice, I must still agree with his basic proposition that Christian faith cannot be adequately measured by its social purpose and political usefulness.

But there must indeed be secular utility to talk of God, and Prof. Kaufman argues interestingly that it is present even when not accompanied by faith: the idea of God urges men to ask themselves what they consider ultimately real, whether they find the ground of value in themselves or beyond, and whether they are guilty of idolatry vis-à-vis any finite aspect of their world. "God" represents, as K. often says, the most profound symbol in our culture, and this book seeks to clarify some formal critical problems connected with the symbol. In an effort to make sense of the concept itself, K. argues that both our experiences of finitude and our search for significance bring us up against an ultimate Limit to our world which can be concretely conceived according to four fundamental types of limiting experience—physical, organic, personal, or normative. "Talk about God appears when the ultimate Limit is understood on analogy with the experience of personal limiting as known in the interaction of personal wills" (p. 60). But even when the limitations of human interaction are taken as the model for grasping the ultimate Limit of our experience, God must be understood not as identical with the Limit but as transcending it; it "must be grasped as the medium through which God encounters us..., God himself being conceived as the dynamic acting reality beyond the Limit" (pp. 64 f.). Whether this is a true view of God or not, whether the structure of meaning developed in the essay is verified or not, K. concludes, this we can only know if God chooses to reveal Himself to us.

Why this reflection upon the implications of the exercise of freedom casts itself in such a negative form, and why it dissociates itself from reflection on man's submission to the demands of objective values, I am not entirely sure. The idea of God acting from beyond the Limit which hems in, restricts, constrains, and constrains human life is somewhat ambiguous in its appeal, and I should think that the possibility of awakening to transcendence in the exercise of freedom would be consistent with the possibility of realizing that no single value or range of values can satisfy our shared human freedom. But for K. this latter form of experience discloses only a teleological and qualified transcendence; it is only within interpersonal transcendence in history that the divine is apprehended.
His most basic interest, then, as in the sections of his *Systematic The­ology* (1968) which concern the doctrine of God, is to develop a person­alistic conception of divine transcendence in which God can be thought of as an agent; his “image” of God is developed analogically from the privacy and transcendence which is constitutive for the human self, knowable only to the extent that it reveals itself.

Consistent with this approach to personal mystery and also with his reading of Kant, K. goes on to distinguish between the “real God” who transcends all our knowledge and the “available God” who is constructed by human imagination. Dependent on the history of culture for its various forms and nuances, this latter symbol is still of the utmost importance for ordering and orienting life. Its function, in fact, is primarily practical, and belief in it involves commitment more than logic, is a moral postulate rather than a speculative truth (cf. pp. 88–115, 237–56). “Believing in God thus means practically to order all of life and experience in personalistic, purposive, moral terms, and to construe the world and man accordingly; the meaning and significance of human action and ethics are thus enhanced by being grounded on an adequate metaphysical foundation” (p. 106).

Corresponding to Z.’s emphasis on the transformation of history under God’s influence is K.’s understanding of God’s agency and self-revelation in the course of secular events. Human purposive behavior is taken as the model for God’s activity, and the whole course of history is construed as God’s act in the primary sense. Cultural history becomes the medium of divine revelation, because it is within the interrelated events of that history that God’s moral purposive agency is discerned. Thus Israel came to see God “consistently as a superpersonal Agent who had created the world for his own purposes, who acted in that world that those ends might be achieved, who revealed himself to some and concealed himself from others” (p. 232). Thus, too, the life and death of Jesus can be seen as the supreme act of God which “began a radical transformation of man according to [God’s] ultimate purposes” (pp. 143 f.). The general argument is a persuasive one, and if its development requires further attention to the human situation of Jesus, this is a need shared by other theologians, like Karl Rahner, who have tried to relate universal history and salvific history. I am inclined to think that the project would be helped by a more positive and constructive conception of “religion” than K. here espouses.

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*LEO J. O’DONOVAN, S.J.*

This is a meditative book. E. probes the current cultural loss of confidence in the power of words to transform human existence, particularly as this situation affects a Christian faith essentially dependent upon the bestowed word of God liberating man in the world. In a post-Enlightenment world suspicious of all tradition, Christian theology must have the courage both to approach its own linguistic traditions critically and to interpret them creatively and faithfully in a new cultural context. Hermeneutics, understood as "a concern for a theory of language with the widest possible horizon," must today serve as a fundamental theological discipline, exercising the critical vigilance required to keep the language of faith in living contact with the confusion of languages present in man's world.

E. offers no fully articulated theological theory of language, only an analysis of the role of language in human culture generally and in the Christian faith community in particular, plus some tentative indications of the basic components of an eventual theological analysis of language. Any comprehensive theory of language must address itself to at least four elements inseparably involved in the basic act of linguistic communication: (1) the authorization or empowerment of the speaker to speak, (2) the responsibility to be observed in the act of speaking concretely (i.e., about this topic, to this person, in this situation), (3) the subject matter spoken about as a challenge to understanding, and (4) the mutual understanding to be effected between speaker and audience through the linguistic communication. A theological theory of language must address itself to these same four elements as they occur within the living language of faith: (1) the experience of the Spirit empowering the believer to bear witness to the faith bestowed upon him through the word of God, (2) responsible proclamation of experienced liberation that makes genuine contact with experienced bondage in the world, (3) challenging talk of God (but of God revealed only as hidden sub contrario crucis) as the source of the liberation experienced in faith, and (4) the mutual understanding effected by the word of God accepted in faith, bringing peace amid conflict as faith liberates the believer to love.

For those familiar with E.'s earlier work, this book will recall a number of his basic theological themes: the intimate connection between faith and understanding mediated through language; the world as the proper context of all genuine talk of God; speech about what is ultimately necessary and life-giving as a bestowed empowerment; language as efficacious only when it occurs concretely in a definite context; hermeneutics' primarily remedial task of correcting linguistic disorders and removing obstacles to understanding through linguistic communication; the tension-filled relationship—like the relationship of theology to philosophy or...
faith to the experience of the world—of specifically theological hermeneutics to general hermeneutic theory. For those unfamiliar with E.'s basic Lutheran categories, the book may be somewhat elusive. A sophisticated law-gospel analysis lies behind all his remarks on the language of faith in distinction but not separation from man's experience in a world where truth is betrayed and love distorted. Some familiarity with the positions E. has developed in earlier works like The Nature of Faith (Fortress, 1961) and Luther: An Introduction to His Thought (Fortress, 1969) is almost necessary to catch the allusions which place this cautious and pensive book in a more explicit theological framework. It is always difficult to speak formally of the concrete, but E.'s effort to do so in terms of the language problems of ordinary human experience is an impressive performance.

Marquette University

PATRICK J. BURNS, S.J.


In this development of a theme on which John Smith has been at work for some time, he begins with a discussion of Augustine and Anselm, then proposes an appropriate epistemology building on and respecting experience. He illustrates the understanding he offers of understanding by "showing how the experiential appeal actually . . . helps us to apprehend the content of faith" (p. 43). While the structure of the latter part is quite doctrinal, the analogies offered stem from experience and provide examples of "faith seeking understanding."

Whether S. makes an advance upon Augustine or Anselm is questionable. He indicates where they prove deficient in the face of a more historical consciousness, and his own remarks serve mightily to interpret traditional Christian doctrinal postures, yet not specifically in ways which make up for Augustine's deficiencies. Chapters 4 through 7 can be read with immense theological profit. Those on God and Christ exhibit astuteness and care; those which diagnose the human situation and speak of the Beloved Community show a kind of brilliance which itself bespeaks a lived experience. But what of his treatment of experience?

Here I speak primarily of chap. 21, "A New Approach to Understanding: Analogia experientiae," since the principal burden of chap. 3 is to warn off expecting a method called "analogy" to guarantee responsible speech about God, by reminding us that it is we who use analogies. The armature of that use, however, has something to do with our experience: which analogies do we favor? Which patterns of interpretation do we adopt and why?
The answer to questions like these has to do not with experience as such but with decisive experiences: "An experience represents the apex of meaningfulness and importance in a course of life: such experiences frequently carry with them a purpose and an orientation which give point to our life as a whole" (p. 41). S.'s polemic against the epistemological underpinnings of classical empiricism is designed to help us accept the fact that experience could be that sort of thing: "Experience is realized for each of us in experiences or situations having a certain unity marked out by a definite beginning and a terminus or closure, and characterized by a quality which enables us to identify them as individual experiences." What makes such experiences individual in the paradigm instances is that each of them "is identified by some dominant quality which may be called its upshot or import and which has impressed us because of its peculiar significance for our life" (ibid.).

Experiences like these serve as interpretative keys and offer a pattern which can help us make sense out of our lives. And it is important that our characteristic manner of philosophical reflection show us how that is possible. At this point, however, one suspects that a reflective novelist or historian would serve us better than discourse about experience itself "as an emergent and irreducible medium that results from the interaction between what is and the symbol-using animal who can apprehend and interpret it" (p. 34). For what S. is after is the manner in which what is individual and the particular can become intelligible for us. Individual life has an intelligibility, we feel and hope; but how can I get hold of it?

By a more adequate conception of experience, S. answers. What would that come to, however? How could it be conveyed? S. himself answers that. Not, however, in the chapters where he tries to say it, but in those which "work the matter out": in the theological chapters designed to show how one's own shared human life can be illuminated by traditional religious patterns, and how, once illuminated, our lives themselves can lead us to discover the sense latent in those patterns. "Experience," then, as S. uses the term, has to do with the way in which our lives lived can be brought to a quality of consciousness which reveals their inherent intelligibility. And since those lives are not themselves patterns but individual destinies, the intelligibility appropriate to them can be gleaned by correlating them with religious symbols, notably that of the Christ who is embodied in Jesus—a symbol itself an individual.

It is in the final chapter on "The Beloved Community as the Locus of Transforming Power" that S. exhibits that capacity of a doctrinal pattern to elucidate features of one's shared experience so that it becomes an experience. He shows how community is prior to the individuals who make it up, by noting how "the purpose possesses them insofar as they
have given themselves over to it..." (p. 127). Once again, an interaction is involved, for "to be a member of any community one must become a member" (p. 128). In the case of this community—the Blood Community, as Royce proclaims it—"the individual's acknowledgement of his need for the community is at the same time his confession that he leads a self-centered rather than a God-centered existence" (p. 133). So his step towards becoming a member of this community is a step out of that "circular predicament" which defines the human condition (chap. 4).

This community, furthermore, can be thought of in its relationship to the wider world in diverse ways. S. conceives that relation in a manner structurally parallel to his more programmatic conception of experience itself: "a creative tension involving mutual criticism" (p. 136). Hence, "the Beloved Community expresses...judgment on the modern secular world" as part of its very way of being, yet this claim does not end the matter. Conversely, "the secular world is made to function as a prophetic critic of the Beloved Community at least insofar as it is embodied in actual institutions" (p. 137). Without minimizing the necessity for a community to focus men's concerns and to transform our individual human purposes—"the ethical and religious guidance of the Beloved Community is needed if man is not to destroy himself, because he will not admit a limit to his will" (p. 140)—S. nevertheless reminds us that church can retain its own focus only as church-to-world: "my proposal is that the spirit leading into all truth uses the voice of secular society as a means of keeping the institutional forms which embody the Beloved Community from being tyrannized so that they either obscure God or tyrannize men" (p. 138). Such has been, certainly, our shared experience.

University of Notre Dame


This is the latest volume in the Studies in Ethics and the Philosophy of Religion series under the general editorship of D. Z. Phillips. The series has already distinguished itself as an important meeting place for the best in contemporary British philosophy and the perennial concerns of ethics and religion. Durrant, Senior Lecturer in Philosophy at University College, Cardiff, investigates the intelligibility of two propositions which have had a central position in the Catholic tradition: that God is the last end of rational creatures, and that God is three persons in one substance.

The former proposition is from natural theology, and its importance, according to D., consists in Aquinas' claim that the truth of this proposition is part of an argument which concludes that it is necessary to
man's salvation that there should be knowledge revealed by God besides that yielded by "philosophic science" built up by human reason. The latter proposition, the doctrine of the Holy Trinity, is obviously important, since it is the cornerstone of much revealed theology itself. It is D.'s thesis that both of these propositions are unintelligible, i.e., they fail to meet the minimal conditions for sense, and so can be neither true nor false.

The argument for the unintelligibility of the claim that God is the last end of rational creatures proceeds in two main steps. First, D. tries to establish the precise logical status of the proposition "that it belongs to man to act for an end." He concludes that this is best understood as a conceptual claim about our concept of human action. He then compares talk about God as the end of man with what, in Strawsonian terms, he calls "our conceptual scheme," i.e., the conceptual scheme embedded in our ordinary language, and concludes that it is simply a conceptual mistake to talk about God as an end. He concludes that in so far as the utterance "God is the last end of rational creatures" contains this conceptual mistake, it is nonsense and incapable of being true or false.

The above summary does not, of course, do justice to the intricacies of D.'s analysis, but it will give the reader some idea of what to expect. The most controversial point seems to me to be his argument that Aquinas is simply doing conceptual analysis when he says "it belongs to man to act for an end." The only alternative which D. considers is that Aquinas may be making a factual empirical claim. D. rightly concludes that this latter interpretation clearly does not seem to be right. The most obvious interpretation, which D. does not consider, is that Aquinas is making neither a conceptual nor an empirical but a metaphysical claim. It is, of course, common among those influenced by Wittgenstein to view "metaphysics" simply as an improper conflation of conceptual and empirical considerations. This may be true; but to those who see nothing defective in Aquinas' remark such an interpretation of metaphysics is at the very least not obvious and requires much more argumentation than D. offers. The argument which is offered would also appear stronger if part of it were not based on a mistranslation of the text of Aquinas. "Tunc videtur homo agere propter finem, quando deliberat" does not mean "A man does not seem to act for an end when he acts deliberately" (D.'s translation on p. 3); it means just the opposite.

The larger portion of the book is devoted to an analysis of the intelligibility of the second proposition, i.e., that God is three persons in one substance. D. begins with an analysis of the various uses of ousia in Aristotle, and follows up with a survey of the Christian use of the term "God" and of ousia and hypostasis in the Greek Fathers. He concludes that if
someone uses *ousia* in any of Aristotle's senses, what he says cannot possibly apply to God, since all of Aristotle's senses have intelligibility only within a scheme of discourse which is spatio-temporally determined. Further, D. claims that no other sense has been given to *ousia* by Christian writers, since the whole point of talking about *ousia* at all is to render Christian discourse intelligible by translation into a received conceptual scheme. The whole enterprise is thus essentially doomed to end in unintelligibility.

A similar argument is constructed concerning the use of *hypostasis*. D. concludes that no intelligible account can be offered of the Trinitarian formula and hence of the doctrine of the Trinity. He hastens to add, however, that this does not commit him to the idea that it is impossible to speak of God nor to the idea that no intelligible account can be offered of any theological proposition. "All that is implied in the above discussion and all that is intended to be implied is that in so far as theology takes over and uses categories which form an integral part of our discourse about that which is spatio-temporally determined (the categories of our 'ordinary conceptual scheme' as Strawson puts it)—such as substance and its correlates—then thus far theology remains and must remain unintelligible."

D. has written an immensely challenging and thought-provoking book. He argues rigorously and confidently—and surely this is to be commended in philosophical theology. One would like to see him develop in some future work an equally rigorous account of the Christian notion of "mystery," which is so essentially bound up with Christian doctrines such as the Holy Trinity. One is tempted to think that the doctrine of the Trinity would cease to be a mystery if it ever met the demands of intelligibility elucidated by Durrant.

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VINCENT M. COOKE, S.J.


Until quite recently, ecumenical theologians and historians have paid little attention to the fact that the first major and lasting schism of Christendom was not the break between Rome and Constantinople in the eleventh century, but the estrangement which occurred inside Eastern Christendom, in the fifth and sixth centuries, with the West playing the role of a distant, though hardly impartial observer. This estrangement, connected with the Councils of Ephesus I (431), Ephesus II (449), and Chalcedon (451), involved a variety of elements—theological, institu-
tional, political, and cultural—and its result was an ecclesiastical
schism which in turn facilitated the Moslem conquest of the Middle
East.

Frend's study of the Monophysite movement is a monumental histori­
cal work, investigating the "anatomy" of the schism and gathering a
mine of information which can be of great use both to the theologian and
the historian. It has no equivalent in the English language. The post-
Chalcedonian period in the history of Eastern Christendom was ne­
glected by Anglican historians, who generally considered Chalcedon as
the last authorized statement on Christology. General histories of the
Church written by Roman Catholic scholars are centered on the later
developments of the papacy and the expansion of the Church among the
Western barbarians. As a result, the crucial developments taking place
in the East receive only peripheral attention.

This relative neglect is not due, however, to a lack of available informa­
tion. Greek, Syriac, Coptic, and Ethiopian sources, as well as specialized
studies, are easily accessible. F.'s great merit is not in having made sen­sational discoveries, but in having brought most of this information to­
gether in a continuous account in English. So far, the interested English­
speaking reader was obliged to refer to the classic works of Duchesne,
Schwartz, Lebon, Diekamp, and others. The publications of the Russian
historian V. V. Bolotov, whose Lectures in Church History 4 (Petrograd,
1918) were recently reprinted, are also of central importance.

After an introductory chapter on "The Road to Chalcedon," de­
scribing the tragedies of Nestorius' and Eutyches' condemnations, and
an analysis of the imperial role in church affairs ("The Emperor and
His Church"), F. presents his own interpretation of the respective theo­
logical positions at the time of Chalcedon ("The Intellectuals and the
Monks"). He then turns to a detailed historical account—the most val­
uable part of the book—of the various attempts to heal the break which
occurred in 451: the Henotikon of Zeno, the de facto Monophysitism of
Anastasius, the Orthodox reaction under Justin I, and the great design
of Justinian to bring East and West together politically and religiously.
Imperial brutality and inconsistency actually resulted in an irreparable
step: the creation of a parallel anti-Chalcedonian hierarchy, i.e., the
schism itself. A valuable chapter on the "Monophysite Kingdoms"
(Nubia, Ethiopia, Armenia) provides the reader with a basic background
on the origin of the "national," non-Chalcedonian groups. Finally, a brief
account of the reign of Heraclius, with its last attempt at a theological
settlement ("Monenergism" and "Monotheletism"), ends with the Arab
conquest of Syria, Palestine, and Egypt, resulting in a "freezing" of
the schism, which thus survives up to modern times.
F.’s goal is primarily historical. He is performing an extremely valuable work, especially when he describes the minutiae and personalia involved in the polarization of opinion in Syria, Egypt, and Constantinople itself. His use of social factors and even archeological data to analyze the trend of opinion in the towns and villages respectively—a trend which eventually results in Monophysitism becoming the church of the Coptic or Syrian villages or rural monks, opposing the Greek-speaking city-dwellers and imperial officials, is often extremely illuminating. One wonders, then, whether there is no direct link between the spread of anti-Chalcedonism in Eastern provinces and the decline of the cities, which formed a well-known pattern in the sixth-century empire.

F.’s approach to ideas and theological positions is more controversial. His interpretation of Constantinople’s growth as the center of Eastern Christendom—an important factor in the conflict with Alexandria—would be more accurate if greater use was made of Francis Dvornik’s important point on the absence in the East of any serious concern for “apostolicity” of sees (cf. particularly pp. 10-12, 27 etc.). More serious still is F.’s approach to the Christological issue itself, which implies that Cyril of Alexandria in fact accepted “a complete Apollinarian thesis” (p. 19) and the Chalcedonian definition “sidetracked” his view of the hypostatic union (p. 47). This criticism of Cyril leads Frend to an utter dislike for Theopaschite formulae (“One of the Trinity suffered in the flesh”) and even to a confusion of these with Patripassianism (p. 168). Inevitably, then, the theology accepted by Justinian and the council of 553 is, in his view, nothing but a “theological pedigree” which “combined Cyril with the Cappadocian Fathers” (p. 269). In the opinion of this reviewer, as expressed more fully in Christ in Eastern Christian Thought (Washington, D.C., 1969), this conception of the Christological debates, inherited from Loofs and Bethune-Baker, and recently continued by Devreesse, Moehler, and others, is inaccurate both historically and theologically. Cyril’s Christology is the only possible outcome of both “old-Nicene” (Athanasian) and “neo-Nicene” (Cappadocian) theologies, and its basic, Theopaschite formula is found in the Nicene Creed itself, in which the only subject of “suffered and was buried” is the “Only-begotten.” The same Theopaschitism is also found in Gregory of Nazianzus (Hom. 45, 28 [PG 36, 66C]; Hom. 30, 5 [109A]) and even in the Tome of Leo. It is, therefore, quite impossible to speak of Nicaea as “a Western and Antiochene triumph” (p. 111) and inaccurate to oppose Chalcedon to Cyril. It is true that anti-Cyrillian Antiochenes like Theodoret of Cyrhrus may have hoped that Chalcedon had in fact “sidetracked” Cyril, but they were also obviously unable to produce an alternate Christology which would truly remain faithful to Nicaea. The exis-
tence of this "Antiochene" interpretation of Chalcedon in 451–553 was one of the powerful factors which compromised the Council in the eyes of eminent Cyrillian theologians like Severus of Antioch, and pushed them into schism.

Does this mean that, between Cyrillian Chalcedonians and Monophysites, there was nothing but a misunderstanding? This may indeed be the case in many individual cases. But in general they remained separate on the basis of at least one important issue of soteriology. Chalcedon and the Tome of Leo, by affirming that "the characteristic property of each nature was preserved," implied that the saving act performed by the unique hypostasis of the incarnate Logos, was not only a divine but also a human act. This issue was not always clearly formulated by the protagonists of the sixth century, but it became obvious in connection with Heraclius' monenergism. It is noteworthy that Severus' criticism of Leo and Chalcedon is centered on the issue of Christ's human characteristics and acts, which he insists on calling always "divino-human."

F.'s approach to the Christological problem is also expressed in his translation of hypostasis as "individuality" (e.g., p. 19) rather than as "existence" or "personality," which would be closer to its meaning, as defined in Cappadocian triadology. For indeed, without a personalistic interpretation of hypostasis, the doctrine of the hypostatic union—Chalcedonian and post-Chalcedonian—remains incomprehensible.

These critiques, dealing mainly with F.'s theological presuppositions, in no way diminish his great merit in providing us with a monumental history of the origins of Monophysitism. A major defect of the book, for which the author is not responsible, is its prohibitive price, making it accessible to some libraries but not to the average student.

Fordham University  
St. Vladimir's Seminary


As the scholarly world observes the seventh centenary of the deaths of Bonaventure and Thomas Aquinas, this book reminds us of the accomplishments of the first great scholastic theologian, Anselm of Bec and Canterbury (1033–1109), who is too often remembered solely as the originator of the "ontological argument," which itself is too often known solely as a clever semantic exercise properly rejected by Aquinas. H. has attempted to show the full range and originality of Anselm's thought and to place the ontological argument in this larger context.

H. acknowledges his debt to the late F. S. Schmitt and accepts
Schmitt's chronology for Anselm's works. He feels that the chronology can be determined only by references Anselm makes in later works to earlier ones and not by shifts or noticeable developments in his thought. "Although a distinction between the early and the later Plato... is crucial to discussing his theory of Forms, no such distinction... helps to understand a single one of Anselm's doctrines. In overlapping works Anselm reaffirms rather than changes his views” (p. 5). “Indeed, Anselm's works taken collectively exhibit no sense of history” (p. 6). The latter statement is important, because nowhere does H. treat Anselm the monk of Bec any differently from Anselm the Archbishop of Canterbury; he treats both the man and his doctrines ahistorically.

H. argues convincingly that with the exception of Boethius (and Aristotle via Boethius) Anselm drew most of his inspiration from Augustinian (even on such classically Anselmian themes as the ontological argument) and, of course, from Scripture. A number of lesser influences are mentioned—Gregory the Great, Lanfranc, Fredegisus—but they are not crucial to Anselm's development. Plato may or may not have been known to Anselm; H. contends that Anselm's knowledge of Plato came via Augustine, as it did for so many other medieval thinkers. Since Anselm had certainly read and lived by the Rule of Saint Benedict, its possible influences on him, however remote, could have been included.

H.'s discussions of the main points of Anselm's thought are generally clear and to the point. He acknowledges that for Anselm faith is always experiential: "'Crede ut intelligas' is thus seen to be a spiritual imperative and not a hermeneutical rule” (p. 43). Scripture cannot err and reason can only supplement its teachings. Anselm "employs reason to defend faith and justify its existence” (p. 55), but he never uses reason artificially. He does not demand that a reason always be necessary; it can also be fitting (conveniens). H. emphasizes Anselm's common-sense approach to theoretical and methodological questions.

In his treatment of the ontological argument, H. affirms that for Anselm arguments for the existence of God and the nature of His attributes are inextricably linked, at least in the Monologion. Here Anselm required a number of presuppositions, e.g., that the nature of universals does not permit several independent beings to have the power to exist per se, and the basic approach required "a chain of interlocking arguments” (p. 69) about the nature of goodness and the highest good. But in the Proslogion, the later work, Anselm tried for a single argument to make his case, namely, God is something than which no greater can be thought and so on. H. offers a coherent explanation of Anselm's position but then takes the side of Gaunilo and the fool by faulting Anselm for terminological vagueness concerning what is understood (intelligitur)
and what is thought (*cogitatur*). The fool might understand that God cannot exist but he can still think of such a situation—a point which Anselm would not concede but which H. feels is possible within Anselm's proof itself.

Although Anselm is best known for the ontological argument, he wrote on a number of topics as the occasion demanded. H. gives a fine presentation of his Trinitarian doctrine, which cannot be considered innovative but was central to his thought. Anselm was especially concerned to answer Roscelin and the Greeks (Byzantines) with a coherent explanation of the orthodox Latin position.

Another area H. treats well is Anselm's anthropology, especially the question of human freedom. Anselm had to reconcile his belief in a free will with the predestinationism of Augustine. He tried to do this by distinguishing the universal ability to will freely from the universal inability to use this free will to will the good; but in the end Augustine won again.

H.'s final chapter is “Christology and Soteriology,” concerned mainly with explicating the *Cur Deus homo*. There are two appendices: the first complete English translation of Anselm's *Philosophical Fragments* and a brief presentation of Anselm's methods of arguing. There is an extensive bibliography and a helpful guide to English translations of Anselm's works.

The book has only one real shortcoming: Anselm is too isolated from his age. Where did he stand in relation to the previous Latin theological tradition? What was the educational program at Bec? Why did so great a scholar apparently have such little influence in the century after his death? Admittedly, this reviewer speaks as a medievalist, not a philosopher, but that does not render these questions less pertinent. Another point that this reviewer questioned, although others may not, is H.'s constant debating with Anselm. Many others have done this before and perhaps H. could have relegated some of his criticisms to the footnotes.

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*JOSEPH F. KELLY*

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**GOTT UND MENSCH AM VORABEND DER REFORMATION: EINE UNTERSUCHUNG ZUR MORALPHILOSOPHIE UND THEOLOGIE BEI GABRIEL BIEL.**


In the course of a long introduction (pp. 1-129) Ernst shows clearly the problem involved in presenting Biel's doctrine and discusses the various interpretations that have grown over the past centuries and in recent decades. This discussion of what Biel taught or was supposed to have taught is placed against the background of an evolving understanding of
late medieval thought in general. E. shows that for some time a simple model had been accepted: a high scholasticism represented by Aquinas, Bonaventure, and Scotus that was followed by the decadence of later medieval scholasticism. The usual term for this latter school was nominalism, and its clearest and most destructive faction was Ockhamism. Biel was seen as the one who continued and transmitted this corrupt tradition to late medieval Germany, and so it was Biel's system against which Luther revolted and yet, even in spite of himself, by which Luther was influenced.

Modern studies have shattered this and other simplistic pictures of later medieval thought. The split between high scholasticism and nominalism is seen more as a question of degrees of emphasis on certain questions. Moreover, just as there were a multiplicity of late medieval conciliarist ideas, so too there were a variety of schools that could be labeled nominalist. No simple heading can embrace all these different groups. E. shows that there is serious doubt that the Ockhamism so decried by its opponents ever really existed, despite its convenience as a ploy for both sides in the long years of polemics between Catholic and non-Catholic writers. How, then, is Biel to be understood? E. restricts himself to the area of moral theology and philosophy; for, after all, it was the slogan of "facienti quod in se est Deus non denegat gratiam" (p. 322, n. 177), a traditional axiom but one that was associated with Biel, which had drawn the sharpest criticism.

E. portrays Biel as a man of tradition, dedicated to handing on what he had received, a man who tried as best he could to collate and to integrate the teachings of the scholastic traditions which he considered great, i.e., of Aquinas, Scotus, and especially Ockham. On this basis Biel rejected and attacked the writings he considered inadequate or unacceptable. For this reason Ernst insists that Biel desired to compile his own system and not just to copy Ockham slavishly. For Biel, Ockham was not to be normative for his doctrine; Scripture and the authority of the Church exercised this function (p. 95, 100). E. explicitly details how and why Biel rejected the doctrine of Scotus on the formal distinction (p. 136) and on the divine will (p. 170 ff.). Biel taught that Scotus' position was to be avoided except where revelation seemed to require it (p. 256). In attempting to present his doctrine of the divine attributes, their relation to the divine nature and to each other, Biel returned to the writings of Peter Lombard, Abelard, and Augustine, and in this tradition he referred to the divine names or to concepts rather than attributes (pp. 155 ff.).

For Biel, the concept of the power of God (potentia absoluta/potentia ordinata) was all-important, in his ideas on God Himself, in his cosmol-
ogy, his anthropology, and his moral theology. Since Biel had rejected the formal distinction, he had been led to assert the formal and real identity of the divine names and the divine essence. Thus the question whether it was the divine will or the order divinely established in accord with the divine intellect that was the formal basis of the moral law did not strictly hold up as a valid question within Biel's frame of reference. E. thus rejects the attacks of Iserloh on Biel's teaching, and he is also very critical of McSorley's book where it touches upon Biel's doctrine (pp. 322 ff.). Yet when E. does present Biel's doctrine (pp. 207 ff.), it appears that the charge of an arbitrary will of God may have some justification in regard to Biel and this was precisely the problem; for while a modern scholar might well show that in reality Biel's position was highly nuanced, in his own day and at first glance the common opinion was something else.

E. further defends Biel and other late medieval writers from the charges of Pelagianism or Semi-Pelagianism. He shows (pp. 290 ff.) that while to modern scholars it may seem that often these writers of the later Middle Ages did not correspond in their thoughts on grace either to the teachings of the Council of Orange or the directives issued against Jansenism, still another perspective must be used; for neither group of decrees made up the framework within which medieval moralists worked, since the Council of Orange was not known to them. The doctrine of Biel on ethical and meritorious acts must be seen as a rejoinder to the teaching of Gregory of Rimini, who had rejected the order of ethics (pp. 373 ff.).

This book, then, presents Biel's thought as a logical and sincere development out of the medieval scholastic tradition. E. shows that it is just as important (and fairer) in assessing Biel to look back to the traditions from which he drew as to look forward to the great debates of the early Reformation. Still, it was Biel who set the tone and the framework within which those early debates would take place. E. has helped in making this known, defining Biel's teaching on the divine unity, on the divine intellect and will, on God and the moral order, on the nature of man's free will, and on the meaning of ethical and meritorious acts.

Perhaps because of the nature of the material with which E. is dealing, this treatment appears at times repetitious. He writes a very dense German and his use of neologisms does not ease the way for the reader, but to understand Biel's thought this book will be a necessity for future studies.

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Thomas E. Morrissey

At the heart of Christianity the Christian believer confidently expects to find religious experience: an existential encounter in faith with his God. For him, moreover, religious experience is not an esoteric event but a dimension of his ordinary living. Throughout the long history of Christian spirituality, it is true, the tendency has often been to focus on such peak experiences as Paul’s encounter with Christ on the road to Damascus. The tradition also tended to lay stress on contact with God in prayer and contemplation, especially on those intense moments which Cassian aptly called the prayer of fire; apostolic and charitable work was usually viewed as necessary interruptions as long as we live in this vale of tears.

Catherine of Siena, the wool-dyer’s daughter who lived her life in the market place, was among the first to stress by example and by the force and clarity of her teaching that God can be found directly in the midst of the apostolate. She thereby pioneered something new: a missionary mysticism.

Ignatius of Loyola, in turn, experienced Cassian’s prayer of fire and Catherine’s missionary mysticism. He used discernment of spirits, as had the tradition before him, to differentiate between authentic and fake religious experience. He developed great skill in the use of discernment, discovering what inner moods, feelings, and impulses are divinely sanctioned and thereby creative, and which are misleading and ultimately abortive. Ignatius’ originality, however, lay in his linking discernment with election. For him, discernment became a decision-making process to be used in the service of God and of God’s people.

What follows is an all too brief sketch of Penning de Vries’s nuanced summary of Ignatius’ teaching on discernment. The author is a theologian, a poet, an experienced spiritual director who has written eight books on spirituality.

God’s plan for mankind involves a personal life-span for each individual human being. How am I to discover the important directives and demands of this plan? Suppose I am at a fork in the road: am I to turn to the right or the left? According to Ignatius, my decision will emerge from a process.

Initially, I must be in the habit of watching Christ in action—praying over the account of His life and mission and spirit as recorded in the NT. There I look for Christ’s basic attitudes, His scale of values, and His goals, all of which are identical with the Father’s. As Son, Christ has disclosed His absolute dependence on the Father and His absolute trust
in His demands. So deep was Christ's filial love and trust that ultimately it made no difference to Him what His Father asked, for He confidently recognized the Father's love in His requests. His mission, as John's Gospel insists, was not of His own choosing or design. As a follower of Christ, then, I too must strive to reach a similar attitude of love, dependence, trust, and indifference. I too must be willing to recognize God's love in all His demands.

But how do I learn God's demands? What is the next step in the process? As I consider a number of possible practical choices against this background of familiarity with Christ and His way of thinking and acting, I can confidently expect to experience a Spirit-filled reaction. My faith tells me that the Spirit is given to each believer to guide, direct, and empower. How is the Spirit's presence detected? In the moment of consolation, when I experience a feeling, a mood, or an impulse full of peace, joy, and delight. The feeling will gradually become emboldening and impel to vigorous action. This felt consolation which accompanies the consideration of a possible course of action becomes for Ignatius the norm of action. It is the weight that tips the scales in favor of one decision over another; it is, in effect, a pillar of cloud by day and a pillar of fire by night. If the feeling continues during the execution of the decision, then consolation becomes the seal of the Spirit that ratifies the decision. Does all this mean that when I feel like doing something, I simply do it? Not unless I am indifferent and in the mood to listen to God and find spiritual matters attractive and delightful. If that mood is upon me when I feel the urge to action, my feelings can be trusted.

In this way Ignatius used consolation as a clue to reach practical decisions in his apostolate, not casually or sporadically, but systematically. He was always the pilgrim, always searching for God's will, always confident of finding it, and therefore he monitored his consciousness day by day for evidence of consolation. He was never precipitous in reaching any decision; but once the decision was made, he was tenacious in pursuing its execution. He was not one to leave a job unfinished. In a word, Ignatius used consolation the way a sailor uses a compass, charting his course by choosing the option that caused consolation and avoiding the option that left him cold or brought desolation.

But what part does obedience to the Church play in Ignatius' thinking? In the early years of his pilgrimage, Ignatius ranked obedience low on the scale of spiritual perfection; he much preferred to obey his conscience and his feelings. Gradually, however, he became convinced that there is only one Spirit in the Church and that men and women who follow the lead of consolation will necessarily discover that in the long run they are in phase with each other and with those who work for reform and growth.
in the Church. It was consolation itself that ultimately brought Ignatius and his first companions to place such stress upon obedience to the Church.

In Part 1 of his valuable study of the sources, P. first provides a theology of discernment and then proceeds to discuss the phenomenon of discernment, its practice and its limits as these can be discovered from a careful investigation of the Ignatian corpus. In Part 2 he plots the role which discernment played in the various phases of Ignatius' life and in his relationships with contemporaries. Particularly insightful is P.'s analysis of Ignatius' spiritual journal, where he shows how personal faults even in a saint can interfere with the search for normative consolation.

If the ancient adage be true that a translator is a traitor, then one suspects that the translation of this book is an act of high treason. Reading it is a chore, for one must wrestle the meaning from the text. It is worth the effort, for P. significantly advances our understanding of what discernment meant for Ignatius in his search for God. Ignatius looked for the consoling sense of God's presence in his prayer as well as in his life of service of God's people. He expected to find God in all things, because experience taught him that he could find consolation in all things. P. has demonstrated how consolation is at the heart of Ignatius' mysticism of prayer and service. The importance of this book and its findings for an era of Pentecostalism, of ongoing revelation, of personal responsibility and freedom will be obvious to all.

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Newman gave what is probably the briefest statement of his personal grounds for belief in the Apologia: "I am a Catholic by virtue of my believing in a God; and if I am asked why I believe in a God, I answer that it is because I believe in myself, for I feel it impossible to believe in my own existence (and of that fact I am quite sure) without believing also in the existence of Him, who lives as a Personal, All-seeing, All-judging Being in my conscience" (Longmans ed., p. 198). For Newman, the key to faith is ultimately to be found in conscience. S.-A.'s book is a compendious elaboration of this thesis and its corollary: conscience is also the key to the problem of unbelief. All other factors are secondary.

Newman considered conscience to be "the creative principle of religion" (Grammar, p. 110). In the dictates of conscience the individual "is able gradually to perceive the voice, or the echoes of the voice, of a
Master, living, personal, and sovereign” (ibid., p. 112). To the extent that he heeds or rejects this voice, he enters upon the path of belief or unbelief. Because of the weight of sin and the influence of “the world,” human nature tends inevitably towards unbelief and irreligion unless it is nourished, directed and protected by the presence of God manifested initially in conscience. There is only one axis of belief-unbelief. Unbelief leads inevitably to atheism. Since unbelief is based ultimately on the refusal to obey the will of God, it ends by denying His existence. Belief, on the other hand, leads logically to Catholicity. The religious man who does not know Christ is on the lookout for God to reveal Himself. This He has done in Christ, and this revelation is most fully embodied in Catholicism. Hence the uncompromising statement of Newman which S.-A. confesses prompted this entire study: “I came to the conclusion that there was no medium, in true philosophy, between Atheism and Catholicity, and that a perfectly consistent mind, under those circumstances in which it finds itself here below, must embrace either the one or the other” (Apologia, p. 198).

This is not said in any sectarian spirit, S.-A. maintains; for a pagan, by the very fact that he really assents to the existence of one God, “is already three-fourths of the way towards Catholicism” (Grammar, p. 500). Indeed, he is more Catholic than many who fancy themselves such. The implicit belief of those who follow a comfortable “religion of the day,” which emphasizes Christianity’s message of love and joy but has no room for its equally essential teachings of austerity and fear, is really not so different from the explicit unbelief of that liberalism which eliminates mystery in the name of reason or the skepticism which is its normal consequence. What is missing in each case is the total surrender of faith. It is this refusal of obedience which constitutes the ultimate essence of all unbelief.

This is, in brief, what S.-A. considers to be Newman’s answer to the problem of unbelief in his time and in ours. Of course, I have oversimplified it and Newman’s thought always suffers from oversimplification. It is much too highly nuanced for that. Furthermore, Newman was a preacher, essayist, and controversialist rather than a systematic theologian. What S.-A. has done is to systematize his thought on the subject of belief and unbelief. This he has done very well, displaying a sure command of the entire range of Newman’s writings.

But has he succeeded in shedding any new light on the contemporary problem of unbelief? I am afraid not. To be sure, this book will not be without religious value for many people. It provides what the eminent philosopher and Newman scholar Maurice Nédoncelle in his introduction calls “éléments d’un examen de conscience à l’usage des chrétiens.”
S.-A., in fact, insists that throughout he has avoided all theoretical speculation so as to stay strictly on the religious level. He admits that, while Newman's approach does pose many basic problems for philosophers and theologians, he has bypassed all of these so as to treat unbelief strictly as a religious problem, and that, in so doing, he is only being faithful to Newman, who never pretended to be a theoretician. I must confess that, even while trying to avoid that most unforgivable of all reviewers' sins, which is to criticize an author for not writing a book he never intended to write, I cannot help but consider this to be a serious defect. One cannot simply dismiss all problems by labeling them philosophical or theological—at least not in a book that deals with so theological a topic as belief and unbelief.

S.-A. resolutely refuses to move out of the nineteenth-century world of ideas which formed the setting for Newman's writings. Though the book is supposed to be addressed to us in our contemporary situation, no attention is paid to questions and problems that have arisen only in our time and which cannot but occur to the reader. Every now and again one suspects such a reference; but this is only by innuendo, as when S.-A. seems to be dismissing Bultmann's work on revelation with one line of print, without even mentioning him by name (p. 32). An important theme such as original sin is treated at length with no attempt to assess Newman's use of the concept in the light of contemporary theological speculation. More important still, the very cornerstone of the whole edifice, Newman's concept of conscience, is never once submitted to critical scrutiny. Yet much has been written on the subject of conscience recently which might give rise to doubts concerning the validity of Newman's basic assumption.

S.-A. has given us a competent study of Newman's thought on unbelief. We can only hope that he will follow it up with an attempt to apply the results of his research more critically to the problem as it exists in our own times.

St. Peter's College, N.J. Thomas L. Sheridan, S.J.
ment, and criticism. It is strange that such a work has apparently gone unnoticed by professional journals; I put this down to inadequate publicity and promotion rather than to lack of interest in the topic or to lack of insight and scholarship of the author. Whether one agrees with the book’s conclusions or not, the position deserves attention and certainly the question explored is hardly settled.

In the Preface, K. states the purpose of his work: to discern “the formal structural principles which make theology what it is” (p. ix). Surely, this is a live issue if ever there was one, but perhaps the appearance of the words “Thomism” and “ontological” prematurely turn off some philosophers and theologians from any serious consideration of the work, because they assume that this can be only a rehash of old stuff long outmoded. If so, they will be disappointed by the actual content of this work and its conclusions.

The problem K. intends to elucidate by this comparative “case study” is that of distinguishing theological from other scholarly discourse—in other words, to raise the question of theology’s formal identity amid the terminology and methodology frequently borrowed from other disciplines. The ever-present danger is for theology (better, theologians) either to forget that, although it must draw upon humanistic disciplines for many of its tools, “the goal of their inquiry is not simply an understanding of man, but of the union of man and God,” or to assume that “any transposition of the Biblical message into a humanistic idiom inevitably distorts that message” (p. x). K. suggests that “any Christian theological method must be a method of correlation,” to use Tillich’s phrase, and that consequently the meaning given to “correlation” is decisive for theological method (p. xi). His study presents Thomas and Tillich as historical examples of such correlation between theology and two opposed philosophical systems (Aristotelianism and Platonism respectively) which “can provide a paradigm for the study of the correlation of other humanist disciplines to theology” (p. xii). It is K.’s contention that either method can accomplish this correlation, provided its specifically theological function is understood.

Thomism and Tillich are chosen because each is a method of correlation in terms of a metaphysics which is organized by the correlation of polar principles of being: by composition of act and potency in the one and by dialectical tension of mutually implicating and mutually contradictory elements in the other. Accordingly, K. sees them as logical alternatives and yet as strikingly similar. In the first place, the respective unities of these systems spring from their correlation to Christian revelation, which is always considered to be nonidentical with the method
itself. Thus in neither system is Christian revelation a matter of methodological necessity. It follows, then, on the one hand that Christian revelation stands independent of such theologizing, and on the other that the immanent dynamism of each system's methodology can be worked out abstractly independently of revelation. This K. would call philosophy. For Thomism philosophy in this sense is potential theology, while for Tillich philosophy is in dialectical tension with theology. Yet neither Thomism nor Tillich's systematic theology is philosophical in the sense just described, since neither is developed in abstracto, but only in correlation with revelation. The option between these systems, then, must be viewed precisely as an option between systems and not between faith and nonfaith. Both intend to construct Christian theologies and nothing in their methods prevents that. K. proposes to show that this is so by drawing out the ontological insight intrinsic to each method of correlation, in order to determine the exact meaning of "correlation" in each case. He attempts, therefore, to isolate the methods of correlation from revelation itself by considering them in their purely philosophical function. Only then can they be understood in their theological function—which cannot be assumed to be identical with their philosophical function. In a word, K. begins with the problem of general hermeneutics, i.e., with the problem of metaphysics, which seeks to understand the structures of being which are isomorphic with the structure of knowing.

How K. develops these basic questions and how he applies his analysis to Thomas and Tillich we leave to the interested reader to explore, to judge, and to criticize. I hope that I have succeeded in pointing out the general thrust of the study and so in bringing to the reader's attention the importance of the issue raised. The conclusion he draws may be unexpected, controversial, perhaps even erroneous, but it is certainly worthy of consideration. On the one hand, it challenges several standard interpretations of Tillich and Thomas; on the other, it proposes the paradoxical thesis that these theological systems are equally coherent and irreconcilable. He argues that their logics and ontologies are "completely divergent" and yet as theologies they are reconciled in the fundamental affirmation of faith. As theologies, then, they are distinct to be sure but not divergent. Indeed, K. sees them as convergent.

As a philosopher, I hesitate to offer criticism but I would like to raise a question or two. First, I would be interested in knowing whether K. sees the Thomas–Tillich alternatives as exhaustive of hermeneutic structures by which correlation of metaphysics and theology can be successfully accomplished. Is there a possibility that these represent but some alternatives in a larger spectrum? Second, I would ask for clarification
concerning the precise sense in which Christian revelation is to be con­sidered nonidentical with its systematic elaboration. I am in sympathy
with this sort of position, but I am not completely satisfied that all its
difficulties have been pointed out and overcome. Unless I misunderstand
the thrust of K.'s position (and this is one reason why, as a philosophe, I
hesitate to criticize a work in theology), it seems to suppose that revela­tion in its own content is neutral from a philosophical point of view (in­dependent?). The supposition, then, seems to be that it can be devel­oped and articulated in philosophically neutral yet meaningful language.
The difficulty which occurs to me is that every language has a built-in
point of view, explicit or implicit, which itself is open to philosophical
analysis and criticism. Even "ordinary language" has a set of rules which
define a way of seeing the world and which lead to judgments, true or
false, adequate or inadequate, about the world judged by those criteria.
Philosophy, of course, tries by reflection to articulate those rules and,
at least according to some, to evaluate the rules themselves. This, of
course, brings the hermeneutic question back to what the content of
revelation might be independent of any correlation to a system of meta­
physics. It is an open question among many philosophers whether a view­point of all viewpoints can be delineated which provides criteria for dis­tincting among particular ontologies positions and counterpositions.
Advocates of transcendental analysis give an affirmative answer, while
more positivistically oriented thinkers tend toward a relativistic position.
The question here seems very much like the vexing problem of the given
in contemporary epistemology. Is K. suggesting that revelation is to be
considered a given? If so, he must analyze precisely what that means
and how he avoids the "myth of the given."

In recent years much attention has been given to the logic of concep­tual frameworks. For example, Patrick Heelan has published several im­portant articles devoted to a context logic of languages which form a lat­tice in which higher languages subsume lower languages in a dialectical
synthesis such that whatever can be said in the lower languages can be
said in the higher and more. In a word, it is possible on Heelan's view to
have distinct and (at some levels at least) irreconcilable systematic
presentations of material which are made to "converge" in a higher syn­thesis. If A represents Aristotelianism and B represents Platonism,
then it might be that some third system can be formulated such that
A ⊕ B where ⊕ is not merely the union of A and B but more. If A ⊗ B
represents the greatest upper bound of language common to A and to B
(in our case, perhaps heritage common to Platonism and Aristotelian­ism), then we might represent the traditions and their synthesis in the
Now the question occurs to me whether K. has some such scheme in mind and, if so, in what sense does the "affirmation of Christian faith" fulfil the requirement of \( A \oplus B \)? Would not this mean that such affirmation can be articulated in a language essentially richer than either that of Thomas or Tillich? Would not this itself be another system of theology with its own "correlation" of philosophy to revelation? In a word, the "affirmation of faith" may be taken in at least two senses: as an act and as an act with a determinate content. As an act, faith is at least "believing in something and that something is the case." As such, the "something" is indeterminate and we are close to Charlie Brown's pronouncement that it makes no difference what you believe as long as you are sincere. It is obvious that K. does not intend this. But then we are back to the question of the content of the act of believing and to the question of the given and its hermeneutic.

A really colossal problem has been raised in this book.

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**CHRIST AND THE UNIVERSE: TEILHARD DE CHARDIN AND THE COSMOS.**  
By Robert Hale, O.S.B.Cam. Edited by Michael Meilach, O.F.M.  

H.'s compact but substantive monograph seeks to explore the meaning of one centrally important item of T.'s religious vocabulary, namely, the expression "the cosmic Body of Christ." An initial approach is made to this curious piece of language through Ian Ramsey's notion of models and qualifiers. The thoroughly traditional image of the Body is to be understood not as a picture model but rather as a disclosure model appropriately qualified by the terms cosmic and Christ. The purpose of the model in theological discourse is to lead us to a new and complex insight into the mysterious relationship which obtains between the risen Christ and the universe. The expression may thus serve as a rich symbolic point of entry into a theology of the universe, which, as H. rightly argues, has become a matter of some urgency in the face of the ecological crisis.
now confronting mankind.

While H. recognizes that considerable work has already been devoted to T.'s Christology, he feels that serious reflection of commensurate value has not yet been expended on T.'s repeated insistence on the Christic character of the universe. The world of man and of nature belongs intrinsically rather than extrinsically, organically rather than juridically, to the resurrected Jesus as His Body. We cannot think of the universe apart from its Christic center or divine milieu any more than we can think of the Risen One apart from His cosmic Body. This coinherence of Christ and the universe is rooted in the cosmic creative and redemptive function of the incarnate Lord, which spans the length and breadth of the evolutionary process. When viewed from the perspective of causality, these cosmic functions are seen to place the Christ in a quasi-formal relationship with the evolving world as its inner "soul" of unification. Only by making Himself "soul" can the Christ make the world Body. H. rightly insists, however, in line with T., that this "soul" is not some disembodied, "spiritual" principle but rather the resurrected Jesus, whose bodily existence has been eschatologically transformed and not conveniently spirited away.

Following a path marked out by a long line of earlier Teilhardian commentators, H. takes considerable pains to demonstrate that T. is not purely and simply an innovator in his Christic understanding of the universe. The theme, in fact, sinks deep roots into the biblical as well as the theological traditions. Paul, certain of the Greek Fathers, Scotus, and Blondel are all brought forward to bear testimony to the authenticity of this motif within the tradition. T.'s peculiar originality, which is not inconsiderable, lies, of course, in his singular ability to discern the relevance of this theme for the evolutionary world view, and conversely to discern the immense opportunity which the evolutionary world view provided to make this marginally important tradition vital and pivotal for Christian faith and life in a post-Darwinian world.

Inevitably, H.'s study treks over ground already covered in the major, systematic treatments of T.'s thought, but a very laudable effort is made throughout to keep backtracking to a minimum while keeping the fundamental focus, the Christic theology of the universe, plainly in view at all times. The book is solidly researched, draws heavily from the primary sources, is amply documented, and possesses a comprehensive index. In short, it represents a modest but real contribution to the vast literature on the great Jesuit paleontologist and mystic.

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Donald P. Gray

In his commentary on Vatican II's Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World, Donald Campion pointed out that the knowledge explosion and the culture explosion of the contemporary period require the emergence of "interdisciplinary personalities." Just what an interdisciplinary personality would produce is happily illustrated by P.'s book. Moving easily through modern theoretical physics, transcendental Neo-Scholasticism, contemporary theological speculation, and critico-historical biblical research, P. has produced a work of originality, power, and considerable controversial interest.

P. begins with a set of topics that are basically classical cosmology and rational psychology. He argues that the universe is a system hierarchically ordered in such a way that entities on each level have a unity and intelligibility which cannot be explained in terms of the lower-level systems which they integrate into themselves. His position is frankly holistic and antireductionist. He then accepts the fact of evolution in a full sense. The physical universe, the biological world, our individual psychological experience, and human culture itself show a developmental pattern, as modern thinkers such as Piaget, Kuhn, Polanyi, and others have shown. This pattern is so obviously intellectual and teleological that its root explanation must involve some kind of mind reality as its ground. P. then includes a new application of linear graph theory toward the construction of a world model. His attempt here is still admittedly inchoative and will ultimately be judged by scientists on the basis of its fruitfulness in research. Can P. make any predictions on the basis of his theory that can be tested in the laboratory? Until that time, scientists will suspend judgment on this phase of his work.

Perhaps P.'s most interesting statement coming from his scientific background occurs when he considers the possibility of producing a computer that thinks. The first question we would ask such a machine, he suggests, is whether it has an immortal soul and believes in God. His prediction as to the answer: some will say yes and some will say no, just as humans do.

P. next appeals to Rahner's theory of symbolizing activity, the tendency of all beings, and especially man, to express themselves in order to attain their own essence. This theory leads to a comparison between human personal action and the trinitarian nature of God. God as triune opens up the study of creation, predestination, and human freedom. Human freedom is grounded in the spiritual aspect of man, which is understood in an original way that exploits the Teilhardian concept of the "in-
side” to being.

But the world is not what one would have expected as coming from an all-good God. Somehow sin has entered in. P. examines the concept of man’s fall. He states the problem of evil with a full realization and explicitation of its cosmological dimension. Evil, he notes, affects even the material structures that lie below the human level and antedate the appearance of man on this planet. Hence evil is somehow the result of the actions of the Principalities and Powers against whom Paul says our struggle basically is.

Finally P. looks to the future. Under a Christian as well as scientific inspiration, he sees man’s history as only beginning. Its future awaits the final transforming word of love from the Father, prefigured in the resurrection of Christ.

P.’s book is a metaphysical essay on the world, its structure, and its relationship to God. He writes with strong scientific and theological resonances, traditional yet radically contemporary in viewpoint. As is perhaps to be expected in so original a work, he has the disconcerting habit of formulating a rich and personal insight, developing it in a distinctive way, and ending with a conclusion that is problematic, if not simply false. For instance, he develops a rich concept of time, but pushes it to the point where it is seen to contradict special relativity. He meditates on freedom and creativity, and concludes that these realities require a denial of God’s knowledge of the future free acts of man. He recognizes the cosmic dimension of evil, and removes Adam and Eve from the scene totally to replace them with an unusual concept of the role of the Principalities and Powers in creation. He deeply probes the spirituality of the human, the primordial self-transparency of man to himself, the aspect of man responsible for his freedom and creativity, and makes hominization dependent on the response to the challenges of existence, leaving the possibility open that hominization might only occur even years after physical birth.

In this very personal work, P. struggles constantly with the intellectual atmosphere of our age. Always he keeps a fundamental contact with his Catholic background, affirming that the simple rejection of tradition may not be the imaginative and creative thing to do. What is needed, he tells us, is the more difficult task of deeper understanding and more adequate expression. Quite understandably, he does not always succeed, but he raises the right questions and examines them in a fresh and personal fashion.

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FRANK R. HAIG, S.J.

When Pierre Teilhard de Chardin died suddenly in 1955, he left a great collection of unpublished writings, and a monumental synthetic task uncompleted. Since then, most of his essays and notes have come to print and have been read with awe. Now Albert Fritsch, a chemist, seems to be taking up the work of Chardin where the paleontologist reluctantly left off. A Theology of the Earth is a book of extraordinary importance to the ongoing effort to find and state the common basis for men of faith in Christ and men of faith in science.

Despite the widespread interest in Teilhard, many otherwise educated people still suffer from the notion that science and theology are irreparably separated, irreconcilably antithetical. We still have engineers who honestly believe that science has disproved the existence of God, and pious people of every rank who suspect the technician as some kind of modern antichrist. Fritsch sets out to heal this lamentable rift with the same kind of vigor and rigor that Teilhard brought to the same problem.

The book does just what its title suggests: develops a theological viewpoint on the material world in which we live. F. takes a largely scriptural approach, apparently suspecting this to be more fruitful, in writing for scientists, than starting with broad metaphysical issues. He offers eight chapters, each exploring a fundamental Christian theme: faith, revelation, Incarnation, eschatology, sacrifice, resurrection, Pentecost, and community; he explores the ramifications of each theme through the promises and challenges of an age of high technology.

F. takes the universe to be Christocentric, first and last; two chapters include sections on "Christodynamics." There may be doubt about the usefulness of his attempt to assign algebraic symbols to the components of a Christifying kingdom of love; but there is a contagious kind of excitement in his notion that the evolving universe is unified in its most basic reality: energy. With Teilhard (and St. Paul) he asserts that there is only one energy in the universe: the energy of Christ. This energy presents itself in a variety of forms: electrostatic bonds between atoms, cosmic rays that bombard our mutable hereditary material, familial love, the indwelling dynamic of the Holy Spirit in men. But notwithstanding the plurality of its guises, this energy is all one, with a single source and a single goal.

Consequently, F. proposes two "laws of Christodynamics." The first: "The entire energy required to transform the earth is found in Christ." The second: "All communicating cosmic units will proceed in
Christ toward a state of maximum order." The second law of Christo­
dynamics is, of course, precisely antithetical to the second law of
thermodynamics. But it should be clear that this is a central tenet of
Christian faith: at the Parousia there will be a new heaven and a new
earth, a universe no longer subjected to the indignities of entropy that
assail and insult the glories of complexification.

It is not only Teilhard whose important ideas grace these pages. One
discovers repeatedly the influence of such great twentieth-century
writers as Karl Rahner, Michael Polyani, Bernard Lonergan, and John
McKenzie. One marvels at the breadth of F.'s grasp of modern thought
on man and the relationship God has chosen to establish with him in
Christ. There is occasional unevenness in treatment of these borrowed
ideas, and it might be preferable that the peculiar jargon of the
various writers be preserved rather than clouded by unnecessary
translation (e.g., F.'s "cumulative involution" seems to be a direct deriva­
tive from Lonergan's "general bias").

There is also some difficulty with the dense prose in general. F.
sacrifices something in breadth of exposition on behalf of brevity; the
going sometimes becomes difficult. He may find himself charged, as
Teilhard was, with abstruseness. It is to be hoped that he will not
only offer future editions of this book, but provide us with a series of
sequels searching out the fruits of seeds barely sown here; we very
much need the work which he has begun in this volume.

This book is not recommended for the initiate to science and theology.
It is for those who seek an informed optimism, a genuine Christian per­
spective in a technological jungle. Those already a part of the scientific
community will find it a fascinating and challenging exposition of a
modern Christian viewpoint on technological hopes and problems. Those
with a theological background who are seeking to deepen their appre­
ciation of the contribution of science to their discipline also need
several readings of this text. The book will be influential in the future
of our efforts to unify scientific and theological components in the hu­
man thrust toward the Parousia.

Jesuit School of Theology at Berkeley  ROBERT ROGER LEBEL, S.J.

BEAUDUIN: A PROPHET VINDICATED. By Sonya A. Quitslund. New

Though both Dom Maieul Cappuyns and Louis Bouyer have written
sketches of the life of Dom Lambert Beauduin, Q.'s work is the first
full-length biography of the Belgian Benedictine liturgical and ecu­
menical pioneer. Six years ago Q. wrote her doctoral dissertation at
the Catholic University in Washington on Beauduin's ecumenical ecclesiology, and this biography grows out of and continues her research on that project.

Octave Beauduin was born on August 5, 1873, and was ordained for the diocese of Liège on April 25, 1897. He taught at the minor seminary of Saint Trond and in 1899 joined the Labor Chaplains, leaving that group in 1906 to enter Mont César, the newly founded Benedictine house at Louvain. On October 5, 1907, B. made his monastic profession and chose as his name in religion Lambert, the patron saint of the Diocese of Liège. In September 1909 he delivered a now classic paper on the liturgy at the Belgian National Congress of Catholic Works and in November of that year launched *Liturical Life*, an immensely popular monthly magazine which was the vanguard of the Roman Catholic modern liturgical renewal. In 1910 he founded *Liturical Questions*, a publication for the clergy, and initiated the first "liturgical weeks." In 1914 he published his *La piété de Véglise*, the only book he ever wrote. During World War I he worked closely with Cardinal Mercier in composing and diffusing the Cardinal's historic pastoral letter *Patriotism and Endurance*, engaged in political espionage against the Germans, and was forced to flee Belgium. He spent most of the war years in Holland, England, and Ireland and returned to Mont César in 1919, where he became subprior and a leading voice in the liberal element of his Benedictine community. In 1920 he expressed interest in innovations in the monastic life and preached the annual retreat at Mont César, but his ideas on Benedictine spirituality alarmed a number of the more conservative monks.

In 1921 B. was sent to Rome to be professor of fundamental theology at San Anselmo and during this period he discovered the ecclesiology of the Eastern Churches. Though his major field of interest was shifting to ecumenism and innovative forms of monastic life, his publications until 1925 were contributions in liturgics to the periodicals he had founded. His four years as a professor at Rome developed in him a passionate interest in the reunion of Christendom, and a chance meeting in the Eternal City on March 14, 1925, won for him the most influential friend of his life, Angelo Roncalli, the future Pope John XXIII. It was while B. was at Rome in the spring of 1925 that he wrote for Mercier the proposal the Cardinal read at the fourth Malines Conversation with the Anglicans, "United, Not Absorbed," which remains a seminal document in Roman Catholic ecumenical thinking.

With Mercier's backing, B. drafted a letter for Pius XI which was sent to the Abbot Primate of the Benedictines, Fidelis von Strotzingen, on March 21, 1924. In *Equidem verba* Pius XI requested the Benedic-
tines to take upon themselves a monastic apostolate to further the unity of especially the Russian and the Roman Catholic Churches. In the late spring of 1925 B. left Rome, and by December of that year he had with the aid of his wealthy family founded in Belgium the monastery of Amay to work for the goals of Equidem verba. By April 1926 Dom Lambert at the urging of Fernand Portal had launched another publication, Irénikon, as one of the works of his monks of unity. Misunderstandings over the financial arrangements in founding Amay, the degree of Russification necessary for the work of unity, and the changed ecumenical climate after Pius XI's Encyclical Mortalium animos led B. to submit his resignation as Abbot of Amay to the Congregation for the Oriental Church. To his astonishment, his resignation was accepted. In January 1931 he was summoned to Rome to answer a series of charges. On January 31 of that year Bishop Michel d'Herbigny, S.J., of the Pontifical Commission for Russia, who saw ecumenism only in terms of mass conversion to Roman Catholicism, decided that Amay should be suppressed and Irénikon abandoned. Eventually d'Herbigny relented but B. was forbidden to return to Belgium.

On April 22, 1932, B. was sent to the austere and isolated Abbey of En Calcat in Tarn, southern France; he left the severe monastery on April 4, 1934, to be chaplain to nuns in Paris, a position which he secured for himself by placing an ad in La croix, the Parisian daily. Forbidden by Rome to teach at the Institut Catholique, Dom Lambert lived for seventeen years as an ecclesiastical outcast who devoted himself to the religious direction of nuns. Through a loyal friend, the aging Raoul Harscouet, Bishop of Chartres, B. worked tangentially to found the Centre de pastorale liturgique (CPL) in 1943. With the appointment of his old friend Roncalli as Nuncio to France in 1944, B. was influential in founding yet another periodical, La maison Dieu, in 1945. By 1946 he was publishing once more and, though now well into his seventies, was much sought after as a lecturer.

In 1950 Thomas Becquet, one of B.'s earliest recruits, became Prior of Chevetogne, where the Amay monastery had relocated in 1939. Becquet, without seeking any official permission, invited B. to come home in 1951 to the community he had founded. Dom Lambert, though nearly eighty, returned from his exile, seized on the problem of defining the sacramental nature of the episcopacy, and promulgated the necessity of an ecumenical council for our time. He never wavered in his belief, expressed at this period, that Roncalli would be pope and that his old friend would convene the council for which he ardently hoped. B. died on January 11, 1960, deeply missed by his friend, now John XXIII, who was enmeshed in the preparation for Vatican II.
Q.'s evident sympathy for Beauduin does not detract from the value of her biography. Her feelings are clearly with the post-Vatican II Church. Her bias against Beuron Benedictinism and the Society of Jesus in France and Belgium seems to spring more from hearsay than research and responsible judgment. More seriously, she writes of complex ecclesiastical events from a simplistic view of ecclesiastical decision-making. For Q., Fidelis von Strotzingen and Michel d'Herbigny are villains and Beauduin a hero. Perhaps on the basis of the evidence Q. herself presents, all three seem to have been incompetent in certain areas of human and ecclesiastical affairs, and the tragically wasteful decisions all three men made display an incompetence for which no "grace of office" could provide. Moreover, Q. has not explained the extraordinary spirituality of Dom Lambert, which more than made up for his lack of political sense. She has failed to analyze the influence of Marmion on Beauduin, and consequently her synthesis of B.'s thought is abstract and does not spring from the vital center of the man. At times she misses the significance of B.'s thought: e.g., p. 239, where she renders pro Christo legatione fungimur as "for Christ we enjoy our mission." Though Q.'s prose is far from graceful and gallicisms abound, though the organization of her material is at times maladroit, she has written a solid biography and much of Lambert Beauduin happily comes through.

Woodstock College, N.Y.C. Herbert J. Ryan, S.J.


Till's book deals with the ecumenical movement in three phases: the background to the movement, the beginnings of the movement, and the contemporary ecumenical scene. The first part of the book treats of the causes and attitudes of the ecumenical movement and gives a thumbnail sketch of the united Church of the first four centuries and the divided Church of the last fifteen. The second section traces the history of the ecumenical movement from the nineteenth century until 1945. The third and by far the longest portion recounts the activities of the World Council of Churches, union negotiations (with great emphasis put on the formation of the Church of South India), the ecumenical stance of the Roman Catholic Church and the Orthodox Churches, and a survey of grass-roots ecumenism, especially in England.

The first two sections are the better half of the piece. Till uses good material on the history of the Church and succinctly tells the well-known tale in a language that is simple and felicitous. But the former
Dean of Jesus College, Cambridge, knows little about the history of Christian missions. "Thus the nineteenth century was the era of the greatest expansion of the church since its foundation" (p. 176) is one among many incredible generalizations that Till lets fly in his breezy, yet genial treatment of the Church’s history. But Till’s ignorance of Orthodox theology and lack of understanding of Roman Catholic theology are almost total. That anything Roman Catholic is little better than a religion fit for peasants seems to underlie his condescending treatment of nineteenth-century Roman Catholic theology (pp. 182–83). His incomprehension of Roman Catholic thought is so complete that his assertions are startling. In treating Apostolicae curae, the papal Bull of 1896 which declared Anglican orders “absolutely null and utterly void,” he writes: “The condemnation had not been on grounds that the apostolic succession had been lost at the Reformation, for it was accepted that this had not happened. Instead Rome found that Anglican orders were invalid because the Ordinal by which they were conferred was deficient in its theology of the ministry and sacraments.” Till misunderstands the Vatican II Decree Unitatis redintegratio, attributes to it statements not made in the text (p. 414), and then sees in the 1969 pastoral decision of the Roman Catholic Bishops Conference in the Southeast Pacific to allow Anglicans to receive Communion at Roman Catholic liturgies a proof of his misinterpretation of the Decree’s understanding of the Eucharist. His exegesis of Dignitatis personae humanae (p. 401) is as accurate as his designation of its author, “the American Father John Courtney” (p. 387). His reporting on the Anglican-Roman Catholic International Commission is so garbled that he has Owen Chadwick on the preparatory commission (p. 420), an addition, I am sure, everyone would have welcomed. But at least ARCIC is mentioned. This is a better treatment than one hard-working dialogue receives, for Till writes: “This is because there is no Joint Working Group between the Roman Catholic Church and any Orthodox Church” (p. 443).

Till’s treatment of the ecumenical movement reveals what a complex movement it really is. When he was Dean of St. John’s Cathedral, Hong Kong, he was vice-chairman of the Hong Kong Christian Council, and since 1965 he has been Principal of Morley College, London. Yet, despite his learning and experience, his lack of knowledge of the North American ecumenical scene has contributed to his failure to write even an accurate picture of what is presently going on. Yet his book is of value, especially to North American ecumenists; for it will reveal just how little genuine impact our experience has had on a well-intentioned and obviously well-regarded Church of England ecumenist whose the-
ology is sound F. D. Maurice but whose mentality is in a world quite alien from our own.

Woodstock College, N.Y.C.  Herbert J. Ryan, S.J.


Like many books in theology and ethics, Robinson's does two things: it critically assesses the writings of a number of authors who have made contributions to the issues involved, and it develops a constructive position in the course of this critique. While his conversation partners in theology are almost exclusively Protestants, his central question is one shared by most Christian ethical thinkers: How are "natural morality" and "Christian morality" to be related to each other? Catholic readers will find his interpretations of Aquinas and natural law to be remarkably unsophisticated; the treatment is a standard pre-ecumenical Protestant textbook one. Although his central question involves the theological dimensions of nature and grace as well as the more particularly moral dimensions which dominate the text, R. does not converse with any contemporary Catholic theologians. The Protestant theologians whose roles are most extensive in the discussion are Barth, Brunner, Bonhoeffer, Bultmann, Theodor Haering, Lehmann, Wingren, Cox, J. A. T. Robinson, Paul Ramsey (only his first book), Schleiermacher, and, in the appendices, Tillich, Nygren, Thielicke, and some recent Anglicans. The philosophers are Ayer, Hare, Kant, and, most important, W. G. Maclagan, whose *The Theological Frontiers of Ethics* seems to get serious attention only by theologians in the United Kingdom. (See Ian Ramsey's discussion in Ian Ramsey, ed., *Christian Ethics and Contemporary Philosophy*, pp. 152-55.)

The constructive position flows down a channel that is marked by certain buoys on each side. There are those who would make natural morality or general ethics the norm by which anything proposed by Christian ethics would be judged; there are those who seek to develop Christian ethics exclusively from revelation. There are those for whom ethics, whether philosophical or Christian, are heteronomous; there are those for whom ethics is autonomous. There are those who have a static and abstract concept of the nature of man; there are those who are "actualists" and "occasionalists." In the course of anchoring these and other buoys, R. makes many critical comments about his conversation partners that have by now become conventional wisdom; he also provides significant fresh insight into some of them.

The crucial decision in shaping the argument is the determination
that Christian revelation is an independent source of lived knowledge; thus Christian ethics is an ethics of redemption; it has a source, a vitality, and implications that make it independent from general ethics. The revelation, however, is not an "ethical fundamentalism"; rather it is the redemption and reconciliation of the world and of men in Christ. Thus it introduces "a radically different conception of moral life."

"Christian ethics is indeed the systematic study of human life and conduct as given over in faith to the rule and overlordship of Christ as containing within himself the whole duty of man" (p. 172). "Here is the fundamentally distinctive quality of the Christian ethic, that it is God who works in the Christian both to will and to do his good pleasure..." (p. 269). Neither of these quotations is to be taken to imply that natural morality is ruled out of Christian morality. Rather "it is this natural morality, judged, reoriented and transformed, brought under the forgiving and reconciling lordship of Christ, which constitutes the Christian life" (p. 228). Christ fulfils the morality of a society, and in being fulfilled it is properly centered in its source and origin, God the Creator.

R.'s argument is basically in favor of a "transformationist" view of Christian ethics and in favor of a "developmental" view of human experience (in distinction from a static and abstract view of human nature). He provides a theological ground for this in a brief discussion of grace: there is grace which is constitutive of nature, and grace which is redemptive. "Total depravity" is rejected, as it must be in this position.

While I find the basic channel a congenial one, R. shares limitations that are often found among Protestant theologians who develop ethics. First, since he is not a "moral theologian" in the traditional Catholic sense, his outlook is never tested against practical moral problems. He admits that the action of Christians will not be distinguishable from non-Christians in most instances, and that practical problems are complex and not easily resolved. But his general theory might be neatly tested by one tough case to see precisely whether there is a morally significant transformation and reorientation. If there is none, then the theory must be stated more precisely. But this is a standard Protestant habit. Second, there is no consideration of significant rethinking of fundamental moral theology among Catholics, and yet many contemporary Catholics are engaged by the same questions that R. is, and the answers of some are not radically dissimilar in general lines.

By virtue of the lack of lively interest in theological ethics at the present time, I suspect this book will not receive much attention. It deserves attention, however, not only because few systematic accounts
of theological ethics are being written, but also because of the dis­
criminating and learned journey that R. provides. If he had developed
his own thesis with greater refinement, it would have been an even
more useful book.

University of Chicago

JAMES M. GUSTAFSON

THE NEW GENETICS AND THE FUTURE OF MAN. Edited by Michael P.

Canon Hamilton has unusual talent for bringing together acknowl­
edged experts on a subject. The quality of the contributions to this
volume is high and even, unmarked by the so-so chapters which most
often creep into collections of its sort. Moreover, he makes good
bedfellows of the authors he has chosen. The others have seen the
manuscript of the lead article of the section to which they contribute,
thus adding an element of dialogue often missing in edited works. The
subjects chosen are current and pregnant with serious implications
for the future of the race: new beginnings of life, genetic therapy, and
pollution and ecology. Each of the three sections contains a whole bag
of issues: e.g., “new beginnings” treats of asexual conception, extra­
corporeal (i.e., laboratory) gestation, sex determination, in vitro fer­
tilization with transfer to the mother’s uterus.

This is not an answer book. It raises more problems than it solves.
The reader will experience profound malaise if he expects solutions.
In the area of biotechnology we are fated to an era of frustration if we
bring to it the hopes of the past for ready answers and clear directions.
More and more we must learn to live with the searching and hope of
our pilgrim existence. The authors would have been false prophets
had they attempted the older casuistry with these problems: here is
what you should do. With due humility they suggest directions rather
than impose conclusions. Yet they do not shirk responsibility or take
refuge in ambiguity. It is not easy to avoid dogmatism on the one hand
and an uneasy relativism on the other. But then we expect this of
Daniel Callahan, Paul Ramsey, Joseph Fletcher, and Charles Powers,
to mention only the theologian and philosopher contributors to the
volume.

Leon Kass does the lead article “New Beginnings in Life.” Evi­
dently he is unimpeachable in his mastery of the biotechnology field.
He is also sensitive to the ethical aspects of his subject, more so than
most biologists I have read. So far so good. He does, however, go too
far in his criticism of theology. He finds Rahner’s concept of man as an
open, self-modifying nature, a “freedom-event,” unacceptable: “The
idea of man as that creature who is free to create himself is purely formal, not to say empty. . . . The freedom to change one's nature includes the freedom to destroy (by genetic manipulation or brain modification) one's nature, including the capacity and desire for freedom” (p. 60). To hear Kass, some theologians have sold out to the technocrats and fallen into the naturalistic fallacy “What can be done should be done.” I suggest that Kass has misread his theology. One cannot escape the conclusion that he longs for an older theology that saw man as fixed, static, and therefore unchangeable. Such a theology is no longer viable. Moreover, it is precisely the advance of science that has led to the concept of nature as changeable. Kass does not seem to realize that this question is ultimately philosophical rather than exclusively theological.

The reviewer finds Kass’s conclusion embarrassing. I am on record as welcoming theological and ethical directives from the scientist. One is tempted by Kass’s remarks to return to the old adage “Shoemaker, stick to your last.” The temptation must be resisted. We can never return to the earlier status quo of each discipline, theology and science, retaining an absolute autonomy. Interdisciplinary dialogue must remain the order of the day. If anything, the progress of both biology and ethics makes even clearer the interdependence of scientist and ethicist. Mutual respect and recognition of the other’s competence is the only alternative to theological intransigence toward science on the one hand or science’s distrust of theology on the other.

The theologian, too, would be playing false prophet were he merely to transfer the conclusions of the past to the biological problems of the present on the basis of a former philosophy of nature or theology of divine lordship over life and death. To take up a challenge of science, then, who is the mother of the child, she who provides the egg or she who nourishes the conceptus for nine months in her body? The ethical question is the same as the paternity issue raised by donor insemination. In these and similar issues H. suggests a new norm of parenthood: “a husband and a wife who will accept responsibility for the care and upbringing of a baby however that baby may have been conceived or gestated” (p. 11).

The reviewer concurs. Biological considerations have weighed too heavily in the scales. Why not take our cue from Solomon? She who loves the child is the mother. Whether biological parentage is disputed because unknown (the biblical case) or because of copaternity or co-maternity (the baby that science presents us), the one who loves and is willing to rear is the genuine parent. The implications of this norm for adoption are clear.
Teilhard de Chardin predicted the gradual spiritualization of the sexual and biological. With the advance of science, the mystery of the person shifts from the heretofore unknown process of generation to the still discoverable realm of the psychological and the spiritual. Penis, vagina, gonads, conception, gestation become commonplace. What makes a person act as he or she does, what decisions are forthcoming from the depths of human freedom, assisted by what graces, are enshrouded in mystery.

This volume was not intended to be the final word on its subject. It takes, however, a long stride towards its more modest goal: to contribute to the ongoing discussion which must precede legislation and control. With such discussion we shall not be presented with a technological monstrosity as a fait accompli, as was the bomb over Hiroshima.

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ROBERT H. SPRINGER, S.J.

PRIVATE CONSCIENCE AND PUBLIC LAW: THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE.  

This is Regan's third book on the general topic of religion and public order. Readers familiar with his earlier works, American Pluralism and the Catholic Conscience (1963) and Conflict and Consensus (1967), will find the same careful research and closely reasoned argumentation that is characteristic of R.'s scholarship. The specific focus of this volume is the problem that arises when a citizen perceives a moral obligation to resist or ignore a command of positive law. R. is concerned with "claims of moral right... only insofar as they are related to perceptions of moral duty. From this perspective, complaints against the justice of public laws unrelated to perceptions of moral duty are irrelevant." The book will be of considerable value to political scientists, lawyers, and theologians interested in questions of law and conscience.

A salient theme in R.'s essay is his attack on the dichotomy of law and morals that was presupposed in so much of the public argument of the sixties over the Vietnam War and domestic racial inequities. For R., there is no such dichotomy. The personal integrity of the citizen is part of the public interest, just as the duties of citizenship are part of personal integrity. The conflict in questions of law and conscience is not between morality and legality but between "competing moral claims" upon the conscience of the citizen.

In the first chapter R. develops a typology for analyzing the relative seriousness of claims of conscience. He applies the traditional distinction between negative prohibitions and positive prescriptions to conflicts
of law and conscience in a skilful and creative manner. His method enables him to compare and evaluate the gravity of the moral burdens borne by persons as different as conscientious objectors to military service, snake handlers, and Sabbatarians whom the law forbids to work on Sunday. The extent of these conscientious burdens is then weighed against the competing public interest relevant to the various claims of conscience. Subsequent chapters apply this method to major court cases involving national security, public order, public welfare, education, and family life. A concluding chapter summarizes R.'s findings. The book closes with an appendix that presents a concise survey of the position of major political theorists on the role of conscience and public order.

For this reviewer, R.'s attempt to develop a typology for comparing the relative gravity of various claims of conscience is his most significant contribution. He does not attempt to compare the inherent values of the various claims—e.g., the conscientious objector to military service vis-à-vis the conscientious objector to blood transfusions. On the contrary, his purpose is to establish categories of conscientious claims and to rank the categories in terms of the seriousness of the moral dilemmas they pose. For example, a Jehovah's Witness who believes he has an absolute duty not to salute the flag has a "high" moral claim for exemption from the obligations of a statute requiring compulsory flag salutes. But a person whose conscience compels him to preach the gospel has a "low" moral claim to exemption from a municipal ordinance forbidding public meetings on busy intersections. The reason why one claim is ranked "high" and the other "low" is not because a perceived duty not to salute flags is inherently more significant than a perceived duty to preach the gospel. The rationale for the ranking is grounded in the different categories into which the two claims of conscience fall. The duty not to salute the flag is a negative prohibition that is absolute in character. The citizen must either break the law or violate his conscience; there is no other possibility. However, the citizen whose positive duty to preach the gospel is frustrated by a municipal traffic ordinance has many other ways of fulfilling his duty without breaking the law. Hence, he is not put in as difficult a position as the Witness who must salute the flag.

Unfortunately, this kind of casuistry is not very fashionable today. This is a pity, because there is a great need in our public debates for the kind of analysis R. presents so convincingly. All too often an appeal to conscience carries an implicit claim of sanctuary from the ordinary burdens of public argument. A claim of conscience is often presented as the end of an argument instead of its beginning. This is because of a widespread unwillingness and, perhaps, inability to evaluate claims of conscience. Jeb Stuart Magruder's argument that he felt justified in break-
ing certain laws for the sake of causes he believed in, because his former professor, William Sloan Coffin, did the same, was a dramatic illustration of the confused state of the public argument over questions of law and conscience. R.'s efforts are a welcome attempt to dispel some of this confusion.

The biggest disappointment in the book was R.'s failure to handle in a systematic way the various public interests evoked by the courts in weighing claims of conscience. In the Preface he tells us that he has not attempted to weigh the merits of the public interests opposed to claims of private conscience. Instead, he has "accepted the assessments made by the United States Supreme Court as final—at least for the present—in our constitutional system." In view of this disclaimer, it is hard to understand what Regan means when he says: "The most salient conclusion from the cases surveyed is that no claim of conscience, however high, prevailed against a public interest ranked high by a majority of justices." The problem with this statement is that R. offers us no hint of how he knows when a majority of justices has ranked a public interest high or low. Throughout the essay he assumes that courts have rated the public interest high when claims of conscience are defeated, and low when such claims are upheld. This is a plausible assumption, but it should not be presented as part of a "salient conclusion."

Governors State University

JOHN A. ROHR


It is not without inevitable misgivings that one comes to the task of reading a book of obviously limited scope which bears the ambitious title Hegel. What one finds here, however, is a pleasant surprise: not, it is true, an exposition of Hegel's entire system of philosophy, but a very readable account of Hegel's religious and political thought against the background of a metaphysics of experience which alone makes that thought intelligible.

Throughout his life Hegel was dominated by one consuming concern: to find the key to the reintegration of modern man, whose moral, religious, and political fragmentation was all too obvious to the keen observer Hegel was. What Plant has sought to do, then, is to present Hegel's thought primarily as a political philosophy and to evaluate it on the basis of its success or failure in finding a philosophical solution to a social and political problem. P. could, then, be criticized for looking at Hegel's vast philosophical enterprise only from the political point of view, for placing disproportionate emphasis on Hegel's Philosophy of
Right, or for paying inadequate attention to the Logic in attempting to establish the metaphysical framework for Hegel's political thought. These are, of course, shortcomings, but P. has succeeded where others have failed in showing not only that no facet of Hegel's thought is intelligible except against the backdrop of his highly articulated metaphysics, but also that the metaphysics itself cannot be understood if the social and political aims of the whole Hegelian endeavor are disregarded. He has not, moreover, permitted his own interest in the political implications of Hegel's thought to obscure the necessity of integrating the political into the interconnectedness of the total system, recognizing that it was a "system of philosophy in which a discussion of social and political experience and its connection with the development of consciousness was to be fitted into an overall framework of philosophical explanation" (p. 98).

P. stresses the importance of tracing the development of Hegel's own thought, if we are to come to terms with the system that emerges from that development. Constant throughout is the aim of overcoming the fragmentation of modern man's experience. The pursuit of this goal, however, is divided into three clearly discernible periods, each with its own emphasis. In his youth Hegel thought that the goal could be achieved by religious reform, resulting in a Christianity which would have recaptured the all-integrating function of Greek religion, thus discarding the divisive character it had assumed in modern Europe. Gradually this aim was transformed, during the Berne and Frankfurt periods, into an ideal of social and political reform whose focus was the restructuring of German society in particular. With the beginning of his university career in Jena was inaugurated a final stage in which Hegel would continue his efforts to overcome the fragmentation of experience, not by a program of religious or social reform but by a "philosophical redescription of experience" (p. 76). More and more Hegel looks to philosophy to provide a rational account of the development of the modern world. Historical development itself, then, takes on philosophical significance, and it is the task of the philosopher to penetrate this significance. Hegel would now attempt to overcome the estrangement of modern man from political experience by showing the role of such experience in the development of human life and consciousness.

The reintegration of man, however, was not something that would come about naturally; it was philosophy's task to bring it about. This did not mean that Hegel now looked to abstract philosophical thinking to accomplish what religious and political reform were unable to do. Rather, it meant that only when religious and political experience were informed by philosophical thought could man find a home in the
modern political community—because philosophy held the key to viable community.

P. does not fail to criticize Hegel, but the criticism is in a sense external. The philosophy is criticized because it is inadequate to solve political problems or because it solves religious problems by doing away with the need of religion at all. The criticisms may well be justified; they leave intact, however, the massive philosophical structure erected by Hegel. Even with regard to Hegel’s political thought, which is P.’s chief concern, he can say in the end: “The significance of his thought perhaps lies less in the detail of his philosophy of the state or of civil society and more in the salutary nature of his views of the role of the philosopher vis-à-vis experience in general, and political experience in particular” (pp. 205-6).

P. has given us a remarkably coherent account, not so much of Hegel’s philosophy in general nor, for that matter, of his political philosophy, but of his philosophy in the sense in which it can be of interest to and significant for the contemporary political thinker. The book is well documented, but one feature of that documentation will annoy American readers: the volumes of the Glockner edition are referred to simply by number, and nowhere is there a key to the titles contained in the volumes so numbered.

Fordham University

QUENTIN LAUER, S.J.


Before opening this book, one may well wonder whether anything fresh and useful can be added to the plethora of writings already available on existentialism. That an affirmative answer is required in the case of the present book is due primarily to two circumstances about the author in relation to his topic. First, M. has prepared himself through the direct experience of reading, translating, and writing in more restricted ways concerning his sources; next, he comes to these sources both with philosophical skills and with theological questions about them. The first trait makes him at home with the wide spectrum of existential thinking; the second enables him not only to work with them intelligently on their own philosophical terrain, but also to detect theological preoccupations and implications of which the existentialists themselves are not always fully (and never uniformly) aware. Perhaps it is in pursuit of such implications that the scope is widened to include Buber and Unamuno, Dostoevsky and Berdyaev, as well as the usual representatives. Teachers will approve of this broadening, because of the quickening interest in these four men shown by students, who can appreciate them better in the existen-
If the book has to be characterized by its general traits, I would list two primary ones: its thematic approach and its evenhandedness within each thematic treatment. For a successful work, both traits are required. There have been some attempts at thematic characterization of existentialism which faltered for failing to take account of the great diversities among the existentialists, whereas other approaches failed through myopic concentration on one or two authors to whom alone the name of "genuine existentialism" has been accorded. M. avoids both pitfalls to give us an original, well-balanced, and literate account.

Some surprises await us when the existentialists are approached thematically. Thus, an entire chapter is given to existential views of the history of philosophy. While this topic was deeply cultivated by Jaspers, M. shows how central it is for the other leaders to define their tasks through historical comparisons. A cognate chapter focuses on the tension between individual existence and the history of mankind. M. brings out some internal conflicts on history and society, when viewed as concrete developments and not just in general terms of historicity and sociality.

One more advantage of the thematic coverage is worth underlining. Chapters 4 and 14 treat respectively of "existence and world" and "existentialist influence in the arts and science." The connection between these two topics arises, once more, from M.'s willingness to press on from generalities about world and the mundanity of existence to concretizations about our everyday world, nature and bodily life, and the worlds of science, art, and religion. What the existentialists contribute to the elucidation of art and science is just as theologically resourceful as their explicit views on interpersonal relations, alienation and guilt, freedom and the attainment of selfhood—all of which are concisely and precisely considered here.

M. concludes this fair and informed inquiry with a thoughtful weighing of charges of irrationalism, amoralism, excessive individualism and subjectivism, narrow humanism and pessimism. In the course of the evaluation he remarks: "I would want to modify or broaden or alter the existentialist way of philosophizing at so many points that the result may not be recognizably 'existentialist' any more. Yet I would still have to say that from existentialism we can learn truths that are indispensable to our condition and that will be essential to any sane, human philosophy of the future." There is much of the discerning spirit, in its philosophical and theological modes, manifested by and successfully communicated to us in this balanced analysis and critique.
SHORTER NOTICES


This book raised many problems for me. E.g., S. insists on the importance of the function of canon rather than structure, by which he means content. That is, we should ask what canonical books did before we ask which ones are canonical. This is meaningful in S.'s usage, which is to take books any community which uses the Bible would accept and ask how they became canonical. But it could have been thought through better and expressed more clearly. Structure and content are not the same thing, and structure has something to say about canon. LXX is functioning when it puts Esther through Maccabees with historical books, and so is Vg when it detaches Maccabees and puts them after prophets. Not to mention the obvious function of any Christian Bible's structure, with prophets after writings—whatever books it may or may not include. This is not a mere quibble; it is an example of the perplexity I often felt in the face of S.'s thought and language.

And what is his answer to the question of how some things became canonical? It is that they did so in order to define a community at a point of crisis. Hence his paradigmatic case: the canonization of Torah because of "the existential necessity for Israel to seek her identity in the midst of disintegration" at the Exile (p. 91). But paradigms can become straitjackets, and this one does when it leads to attaching the formation of the NT canon to the fall of Jerusalem in 70 A.D.

In other words, S. has touched a crux: the relation of canon to community. The canon(s) have been given us by communities. It is essential to ask: why precisely those communities? And why did they canonize what they did? And why are their decisions binding for us? The answers lead to further questions. E.g., does the ancient community's decision to take a mix of traditions in the Pentateuch give that mix an authority greater than its parts, especially J? Or does the amended and expanded Christological hymn in Col 1 take precedence over the original which modern criticism thinks it can reconstruct? If one considers modern practice, the answers to these questions is no. And this is one reason why no one is today seeking the unity of the Bible (p. ix). And so it could go on.

The point of all this is to show that the book did indeed invite me to think about the meaning and importance of canon. And that is its expressed object. One can only hope that it leads many to ask more questions and to find better answers.

Dennis J. McCarthy, S.J.


This handbook is grossly overpriced. The Introduction contains a good presentation of the state of the text of the Septuagint (LXX), largely as it stood in the 1940's. Especially commendable are the criticisms of the Brooke-McLean Cambridge editions of the LXX based on the codex Vaticanus (B) taken not as a fourth-century manuscript but with its corrections by various later hands. Also good is the evaluation of the principles of classifying the manuscripts of the LXX into stemmata codicum underlying the Göttingen texts and Rahlfs's Stuttgart edition (two heavy quarto volumes called a "pocket edition" following the curi-
ous translation of Handausgabe in the editor's English Preface). The greatest usefulness of the book consists in the extensive grammatical notes, in which vast amounts of data are marshalled and interpreted. These consist of analyses of orthographic variants, morphological and syntactical developments of Hellenistic Greek, and Semitic interference phenomena in syntax and vocabulary. There are also fifteen interesting and profound excursuses on individual words and forms.

Most questionable is the methodology advocated in the introductory remarks for establishing the text of the LXX (as if there were one LXX). Sound textual criticism would try to reconstruct the text of an archetype so as to arrive as closely as permitted by the evidence of the extant manuscripts to what was originally written. Katz presumes to go further by correcting the text of the LXX in light of classical Greek standards when he writes (p. 26): “So real faithfulness compels us to standardize the orthographical presentation of our texts, and in doing so we simply restore what was before the author's mind, even if it may have undergone some modification on the way from his mind to his hand.” He spells this out more clearly (p. 27): “Our task is to decide not what the author actually wrote—for when he wrote, itacistic or other influences, e.g., from analogy, may have already misled him—but what is the normal spelling which best expresses what was in the author's mind, if not necessarily in his pen.”

Francis T. Gignac, S.J.
George S. Glanzman, S.J.

SYNOPSIS OF THE FOUR GOSPELS:

Just as the long-used Greek Synopse der drei ersten Evangelien of Huck-Lietzmann eventually found its way into an English form in B. H. Throckmorton, Jr.'s Gospel Parallels: A Synopsis of the First Three Gospels (London, 1949), so the highly esteemed and eminently superior Greek Synopsis quattuor evangeliorum (Stuttgart, 1964) now finds an English counterpart. But in this case the English version faces the Greek original, now set in smaller type. Just as the RSV was used in Throckmorton's Gospel Parallels, so too here it is made to face the Greek text. And even the Greek apparatus criticus has its English counterpart too; for it lists all the variant readings in the Authorized Version (1611), the American and English Revised Versions (1898, 1901), and the Catholic edition of the RSV (1965), insofar as they are relevant. Throckmorton's book made it abundantly clear why the RSV excels other English versions for pedagogical purposes; hence no one will find fault with the choice of it (especially with the English apparatus) in such a diglot Synopsis. To accommodate the English version, several things have been omitted from the Greek Synopsis, for which one will still have to consult the original Greek form (now available in its seventh edition): the appendices that provided a Latin, German, and English translation of the Coptic Gospel according to Thomas and the patristic testimony to the origins of the Gospels, as well as the additions to the individual pericopes from apocryphal Gospels or patristic writers. The book closes with a table of Gospel parallels and an index of NT passages.

This is a book that no serious English-speaking student of the Gospels will want to be without. The ability to
compare the English text not only against its variants in the different revisions of the King James tradition but also against the best form of the Greek text available today, fitted out with a rich *apparatus criticus* makes this publication a gold mine of information about the Gospels that one cannot find elsewhere. The editor and his collaborators on both sides of the Atlantic have put us all in their debt.

*Joseph A. Fitzmyer, S.J.*


This completes the modern English translation of Calvin’s NT commentaries in twelve volumes. Calvin’s commentaries on both Testaments have given him a unique position among the Reformers, for no other has matched his clarity in biblical exposition. His commentaries are not the expansive lectures of Luther, nor are they the selected themes of Melanchthon, but a flowing commentary on the entire text, blending exegesis and theological reflection. The Reformer wrote on all the NT books with the exception of 2 and 3 John and Revelation. The *Harmony of the Gospels*, which appeared in 1555, was first translated by Paget in 1585 for use among the English Puritans, and was again translated by Pringle in 1845 for the Calvin Translation Society. This second translation with its many reprints has served the Reformed and Presbyterian communities for generations, and this modern version will surely serve those to come. The commentary on James dates from 1550, while that of Jude is the 1551 version and not the brief exposition of 1542. The translators, Morrison (Vols. 1 and 3) and Parker (most of Vol. 2) have given Calvin’s text a smooth-flowing quality and have preserved the clarity of expression that was uppermost in Calvin’s mind. The publisher deserves commendation for completing this modern version of Calvin’s commentaries on the NT in a handsome and reasonably priced edition.

*Joseph N. Tylenda, S.J.*


This *Festschrift* offered on the sixtieth birthday of F. L. Moriarty is made up of a congratulatory word by the editors, eighteen articles by former Jesuit students of his, and a bibliography of his writings. The articles are classified under three general headings: the biblical world, the Christian world, the modern world. Worthy of particular note are M. Dahood, “Some Rare Parallel Word Pairs in Job and Ugaritic,” which perhaps would gain a larger audience elsewhere; N. H. Cassem, “Ezekiel’s Psychotic Personality: Reservations on the Use of the Couch for Biblical Personalities”; D. J. Harrington, “The ‘Early Christian’ Writings of the New Testament: The Church Adjusting to World-History”; R. J. Daly, “The Hermeneutics of Origen: Existential Interpretation in the Third Century”; and O. Blanchette, “History and Language.” The last-mentioned article is highly speculative and could generate much discussion; I, for one, doubt that most persons are as historically conscious in their understanding of the words as he seems to imply, nor do I agree with his connecting historical conscious-
ness and freedom. The editors offer in the Preface an apologia for having only Jesuit contributors for the volume; at a time such as ours, this pride in a religious community in the canonical sense of that term is laudable.

**John J. O'Rourke**


One of the results of Vatican II has been the passing of the theological manuals as the tools of theological education. With regard to their emphases and methodology, the manual's disappearance is a welcome occurrence; however, the articles, monographs, and books of current theology have not matched the manuals in their systematization and comprehension. E. attempts to maintain the thoroughness and orderly presentation of the older theological works while presenting the findings and methods of the best contemporary theologians. He intends his book to be a contribution to the need voiced in Vatican II's Decree on Priestly Formation: "Ecclesiastical studies should begin with an introductory course of suitable duration. In this initiation, the mystery of salvation should be presented in such a way that the students will see the meaning of ecclesiastical studies, their interrelationship, and their pastoral intent" (Optatam totius, no. 14). E.'s book is aptly suited to this need. An aspiring student of theology, either seminarian or layman, will find it a thoughtful presentation of widely held theological views set in light of their historical and biblical antecedents. The book is technical and precise, but without the scholarly apparatus which could confuse the beginner.

The twofold theme E. develops is the centrality of the notion of salvation in every religious consideration and the multidimensional reality of salvation. Four sections consider the mystery of salvation under its biblical, historical, social, and existential aspects. In the biblical and salvation-history sections, he presents a lucid distillation of the major insights of recent scholarship in an exact and balanced treatment. In the sections dealing with the social and existential aspects, he considers current theological opinions in an unpolemical way; he is careful to cite the historical precedents relating to contemporary debates and, where applicable, cites the texts of Vatican II. His treatment of the doctrine *Extra ecclesiam nulla salus*, with its long and controversial history, is a valuable contribution to ecumenical theology. An extensive, up-to-date bibliography is appended; the subject and proper-name indices add to the book's usefulness.

**Robert W. Gleason, S.J.**


Distinguished by solid, up-to-date theological competence and genuine sympathy for the personal problems of his contemporaries, S., professor of dogmatics at the University of Mainz, offers in this eloquent little book an answer to the increasing resignation experienced by many of today's youth with regard to their membership in the Church. He begins his approach with a pellucid analysis of the fundamental importance of other people for the development of one's own individuality and locates Jesus of Nazareth at the point of intersection between the awareness of this fact and the hopeful experience of God as the approaching absolute Future. "Being a Christian means being together with one another like Jesus Christ" (p. 34), as well as being together with Christ. In order to partake in His critical stance toward
the law, we must adopt Christ's standpoint in its entirety. His message lives on because He Himself lives on. And it is solely in the community of the faithful that the reality of Christ is to be encountered. S. brings his winning "plea for a real Church" to a close by explaining how our lives function within the divine mercy: Christian faith is reducible to the all-embracing recognition that we are unable to love fully altruistically, that we need to be loved by God, who fortunately does not measure us according to our own deficient capacity to love. "Faith means that we let ourselves be loved, be forgiven, and that out of the reception of this goodness we try to be lovers ourselves" (p. 75).

William J. Hoye

GROUPES LIBRES ET FOI CHRÉTIENNE.

P. studies, from a sociological and theological point of view, the phenomenon of small groups (floating parishes, communautés de base, underground, etc.) that is spreading at this time in the Catholic Church. The first part offers a careful sociological analysis of the small groups and their relationship to the institutional Church. While they differ greatly one from another, some being in continuity with the parish structure and others independent from or even at odds with it, P. is able to come to some significant conclusions. The appearance of the small groups indicates that the traditional structures of the Church, due to a lack of flexibility, are unable to respond to the aspirations of the Christian people. The groups exercise a sociological function: they institutionalize contrasting interpretations of the Christian message; they in one way or another affect the traditional ecclesiastical structures; they are thus part and parcel of the total development of the Catholic Church.

The second part tries to find the theological foundation for the creation of small groups within the Church. P. analyzes the essential, many-valued nature of religious symbols. Symbols have several meanings that remain in tension and can never be reduced to a single concept. P. pays special attention to the multiple meanings of "church" and "world" in Scripture and in the theological renewal associated with Vatican II. Vatican II has recovered an awareness of the multiple meaning of religious symbols. This plurality of interrelated, contrasting, and yet not disparate meanings is the theological ground for the diversification of the Church's structures. The unity of the Church itself must be read as a multivalent symbol. Through the tensions and interactions that these images create, the Catholic Church constitutes its history and submits to the rule of the gospel.

P.'s interesting book deserves attention. It belongs to the few theological studies that try to transcend, from within the Catholic tradition, the inherited self-understanding of the Catholic Church in terms of dogma and jurisdiction.

Gregory Baum

FUNDAMENTOS TEOLÓGICOS DE LA FIGURA DEL SACERDOTE.

This beautifully written monograph is fully in line with a series of seminars on the priesthood held at the theologate of Burgos, Spain (reviewed in these pages by the present writer, TS 34 [1973] 310-12). In a sense, the entire thrust of the Burgos school is in the nature of a gentle refutation of the views of theologians like Hans Küng on the nature of sacerdotium, although it may be noted that Küng's disturbing Wozu Priester? (Zurich, 1971) is not
mentioned in the extensive bibliography (pp. 7-13). The present volume is a testimony not only to the priesthood but also to the priest who wrote it: his character and integrity seem to stand out on every page. Presently a professor of theology at Burgos, I. spent five years as a missionary in the diocese of Taica, Chile, and thus he speaks from his own experience as a pastor of souls. Indeed, this is the focal point of the book: it is a historical and systematic study of the priesthood, with an attempt to redefine its role in the world today. Ordained by the bishop, the priest is another Christ among men to minister to their needs for the salvation of souls within the community of the faithful; from this essential pastoral function flow all the other virtues and qualities of the priesthood. It has always been difficult, I. admits, for the priest to live in the world but not be of it; but today it has become more difficult because of the pressures of the communication media. The traditionally pastoral priest is considered inhuman, whereas the hero of modern literature, however selfish, vicious, sensual, is held up for universal praise.

I. summarizes a great deal of ancient and modern literature; his conclusions are as follows: (1) The priest’s pastoral, sacramental role is primary; all else is secondary. (2) Any other position he may hold should be only temporary, e.g., for economic reasons, or perhaps (as in the case of the French worker-priests) by a special mission from the hierarchy in a particular country. (3) The theory of self-fulfilment in the priesthood is “an abuse” and a delusion. (4) Living on the fringe of poverty, the priest should not dress like an outcast or a Bohemian (pp. 235-46) or in any other garb that would detract from his ministerial role; in other words, he should be recognizable as a priest and be clearly out of the area of sexual attractiveness (p. 245). (5) The essence of the priesthood involves a subordination of one’s personality to Christ in view of the special tasks to be fulfilled; hence, no matter what the priest does, he must expect to be unpopular in certain circles and disliked by those who do not respect what he has been sent to accomplish.

Such is I.’s provocative thesis, presented with an enthusiasm and warmth that is quite persuasive. At the same time, it might be objected that he does not allow sufficient scope for the particular pressures of time and place, and the different human personalities; and it is uncertain whether he really would condone the work of the teaching orders of the Church as it must be performed in many countries of the world today, i.e., on a somewhat secular basis, as, e.g., in America and the Moslem countries. He would certainly be opposed to priests in political office or at the head of a government (as, e.g., in Cyprus). It is, in other words, a return to an austere traditionalism that he would present in this monograph, without allowing much in the way of adaptation or evolution. It is a thesis that not all will agree with, but surely one that deserves a hearing in these days of priestly conflict and confusion.

Herbert Musurillo, S.J.


This final work of S.’s lamentably short career is an extremely clear and solid collection of essays in philosophical theology. S. was a Thomist whose inspiration came from Jacques Maritain rather than from the more popular transcendental Thomism of Lonergan and Rahner. Like his better known colleagues, however, S. demonstrates the fruitfulness of an imaginative and innovative use of Thomistic metaphysics in speculative theology. His collection of essays ranges over the
major themes of speculative theology: faith, the Trinity, the hypostatic union, grace, and the sacraments. Although S. is clearly an original thinker, the general orientation of his thought reminds his reader of the more familiar works of the transcendental Thomists. We find the same appreciation of the valuable contribution made by contemporary phenomenology to the thematization of intersubjective knowledge and the same determination to incorporate that contribution into his theology of faith. Like Lonergan and Rahner, S. had discovered how the Thomistic epistemology of self-awareness could be combined with the Thomistic metaphysics of esse to forge a contemporary metaphysics of the person. S. makes masterly use of that metaphysics in his original and brilliant essay on the Trinity. In addition to their speculative merit, which is of a high order, S.'s essays are valuable for their brief, accurate, and thorough summary of the classical Thomistic positions on the act of faith, the constituent of personality, and the hypostatic union.

S.'s untimely death has deprived the American theological community of a brilliant speculative theologian whose sound historical sense and firm grasp of classical and contemporary philosophy would have made him a major figure if he had been granted a few more years to live.

Gerald A. McCool, S.J.


There is probably no more exasperating and thankless a task in the field of ecclesiastical studies than editing a dictionary of Church history. The companion piece, on a smaller scale, in this diptych of frustration must surely be the reviewer's task when he is faced with tens of thousands of odd pieces of data in chronology, geography, and biography. Perhaps the best way to give a critical judgment on B.'s work is to compare it with Cross's prestigious Oxford Dictionary of the Christian Church, which first appeared in 1958 and is still available in a 1966 revised edition. B. has attempted to make WDCH more helpful to American researchers and readers than C.'s ODCC. In my opinion, B.'s effort, even given his own criteria for selection and the audience in view, does not measure up to C.'s earlier achievement. B. has no article on Paul VI or Arthur Michael Ramsey. This might be explainable, but why Jesus Christ is omitted from listing strikes one, I think reasonably, as somewhat odd. Reading the articles listed under J, one finds that B. has 88, while C. has 159. B. usually does not have bibliography after an article, while C. has ample bibliographical references. In only three articles in the section studied is B. superior to C., viz., Jehovah's Witnesses, Society of Jesus, and Justification. B. does have articles of specifically American interest, such as a brief sketch of Samuel Johnson, the first president of King's College (Columbia University), but makes no mention of the famous English lexicographer and controversialist of the same name. B. includes Louis Joliet, the missionary-explorer, and the American ecumenist Eli Stanley Jones, but omits Inigo Jones, the great architect. In general, B.'s Dictionary is by no means the equivalent of Cross's ODCC. Had B. sought conscientiously to supply an American supplement to the ODCC, he would have made a useful contribution to ecclesiastical studies. But B.'s effort, unfortunately, is not of the caliber to be helpful to scholars or serious students.

Herbert J. Ryan, S.J.

Athenagoras: A Study in Second Century Christian Apologetics. By

One can only praise the good scholarship, sound thinking, and literary skill which went into the production of this full and well-ordered (into twelve neat chapters and conclusion) introduction to the life, works, and thought of the most elegant of the Greek apologists, little known during his own era but enjoying a well-deserved resurgence in our own (cf. the works of Bardy, Crehan, and Schoedel mentioned in the Select Bibliography). While emphasizing his place within the ecclesiastical tradition, B. has also deeply anchored Athenagoras within the secular culture of the second century and placed him in relationship to contemporaries such as Galen, Marcus Aurelius, and Celsus.

Following Philip of Side, B. believes that Athenagoras wrote at Alexandria. The philosophical and medical knowledge which he possessed would be consonant with the encyclopedic tradition of Alexandria, where there was an apologetic tradition beginning with *The Preaching of Peter* and *The Traditions of Matthias*. Incidentally, B. gives interesting background information on the origins of the Egyptian Church (chap. 11 *ad init.*), indicating that Alexandrian Christianity was not Gnostic in origin and that Christian Gnosticism was only one facet, though an important one, of the Alexandrian Church, on the basis of the presence of Christian papyrus codices in Egypt during the early second century.

Of Athenagoras’ two works, the *Legatio* for the Christians, which is dedicated to Marcus Aurelius and his son Commodus and so dated A.D. 176–80, is in B.’s opinion an actual address made to the Emperor in person, perhaps when he spent the winter at Alexandria in 175–76. The authenticity of the second work, *The Treatise on the Resurrection of the Dead*, which has been questioned by R. M. Grant (1954) and W. Schoedel (1972), is defended, successfully in my view, by B., who asserts that it was a public lecture aimed at philosophically-minded pagans who were interested in the Christian doctrine of the resurrection.

This volume is an excellent addition to the distinguished series *Théologie historique*, edited by Charles Kannengiesser. B. has successfully shown the originality and importance of the apologist who faced the challenge of pagan philosophers to defend Christianity without reference to Scripture, and did so by using only as much (Middle) Platonism as would not conflict with the substance of Christian doctrine. By comparison, Justin and Clement of Alexandria were far less critical in their use of philosophy. Moreover, Athenagoras’ writings deserve to be studied as literature, for they are equal to the best productions of the Antonine age. Throughout it is shown that he wrote not to Hellenize Christianity but to Christianize Hellenism.

Margaret Schatkin


In the Preface H. says: “I have written this book because it is needed” (p. 11). Few readers will disagree. H. has provided a clear, relatively brief, and remarkably thorough survey of the present state of Early Irish studies. The nine topics covered are archaeology, secular laws, ecclesiastical legislation, historiography (the annals), secular literature, ecclesiastical learning, hagiography, art and architecture, and eleventh- and twelfth-century literature; we will discuss the Church-related topics.

In regard to ecclesiastical legislation, H. contends that the Irish ecclesi-
astical system, i.e., monastic parochiae instead of Romanized bishoprics, grew out of native, pagan institutions because "Ireland had never known Roman organization at all and had none of the central administration which formed the background to the Roman-style bishopric" (p. 73). Much of our knowledge of this church organization derives from the surviving canons. H. dates the earliest canons to the sixth century, rejecting L. Bieler's attribution of some to the Patrician Church. Until the question of dates is settled, the original organization of the Irish Church remains uncertain. The treatment of ecclesiastical learning is necessarily a transitional account, as more and more previously undiscovered and unedited (and therefore unstudied) texts become available. But H. does provide a helpful guide to the literary genres employed by Irish ecclesiastical writers, specifically grammar, exegesis, poetry, and voyage tales, emphasizing the uniqueness of the Irish approach. Her treatment of hagiography is probably the most thorough because almost all the major vitae have been edited and available for years. Since most are of a late date in relation to their subjects, H. skilfully demonstrates how the Irish hagiographical traditions developed and how, using Formgeschichte, one can determine the historical value of the vitae. Occasionally the footnotes cite frustratingly untitled articles (p. 195, n. 1). A good book, a welcome book, and for some years to come, indispensable.

Joseph F. Kelly


S.-W.'s edition and translation of the first book of the Periphyseon was reviewed in TS 30 (1969) 746-47. The manuscript tradition upon which this new edition is based was critically and favorably appraised in the previous review. S.-W. continues an exceptional display of paleographical competence, patristic scholarship, and command of English. As in Book 1, the same Latin word is consistently translated by one English word throughout but the text remains lively and literate prose. Eriugena intended the second book of the Periphyseon to be an exposition of the second division of nature, the primordial causes, but he deals with this subject only twice, and each time briefly, in the whole book. Book 2 of the De divisione naturae is actually an exposition of the doctrine of the Trinity, which begins after E., having recapitulated the first book, discusses Maximus Confessor's system of division and raises questions concerning the accidental nature of sexual differentiation and the asexual nature of the glorified, risen human body. According to E., the creation of the second and third divisions of nature is mystically recorded at the beginning of Genesis, where the creation of heaven refers to the primordial causes and that of earth to their effects. Consequently, S.-W. judges that Books 2-4 of the Periphyseon make up one unit, a hexaëmeron or commentary on the opening chapters of Genesis. Book 2 of the Periphyseon covers only the first two verses of the first chapter of Genesis. The creation of the primordial causes and their effects is a Trinitarian work, and this explains why the bulk of Book 2 of the Periphyseon is an exposition of the doctrine of the Trinity.

S.-W.'s explanation of the literary form of the Periphyseon makes evident good sense. His translation is accurate and refined, the textual criticism is both strong and balanced, and his 626
notes to the text and translation are masterful. S.-W. is making a notable contribution to the history of theology; one awaits with increasing anticipation the publication of the two remaining books of the *Periphyleon*. The Oxford University Press has produced in this volume for the Dublin Institute for Advanced Studies a masterwork of the printer's art.

*Herbert J. Ryan, S.J.*


The transmission of conciliar legislation poses no major problem for the Church in the twentieth century, given the modern techniques of transcribing, printing, and duplication at its disposal. Such, however, was not the case in the eleventh and twelfth centuries. During this period it is not even clear whether official records were made of the session-by-session deliberations of a council. Frequently it was impossible for a bishop to get a complete transcription of the canons promulgated. He necessarily had to depend upon abbreviations of the canons or else concerned himself only with those canons which were of immediate importance for his own diocese.

Under such circumstances it is easily understandable how the transmission of conciliar legislation during these centuries was for the most part piecemeal and unorganized. Such was the case for the important Council of Clermont in 1095. No official list of the canons promulgated at Clermont exists. Much of what is known of the Council’s legislation comes to us mostly in abbreviated form from episcopal and curial officials who either attended the Council or lived shortly thereafter. Medieval historians and chroniclers who had access to contemporary sources also have contributed to our knowledge. The conciliar collections of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, moreover, merely gathered and reproduced these materials with little attempt at organization, analysis, or correlation.

S. has set himself the goal of examining and synthesizing this body of material in the light of subsequent manuscript discoveries of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The first part of his work analyzes the chaotic transmission of the Council’s decrees as presented in the earlier conciliar collections such as Baronius, Labbe-Cossart, Hardouin, and Mansi. In the second and more important section, S. investigates the manuscript tradition for the decrees of the Council. In addition to the manuscripts known to earlier conciliar historians, S. studies all the new manuscript evidence which has come to light since the work of Mansi. His work in this section is especially valuable because for each source studied he presents a critical edition of the canons and texts related to Clermont.

There emerges from this masterful analysis and editing of manuscript sources a much clearer and more accurate image of the legislation of Clermont than that revealed by earlier conciliar collections. S.’s work is further enhanced by a topical analysis of the canons of Clermont as well as by detailed indices of Latin terms and proper names. In brief, he has admirably achieved the goals set for himself. He has, consequently, laid a firm textual foundation for further studies of the Council of Clermont as well as of the conciliar activity of Urban II. The scholarly and methodological excellence of this work places its author among the leading historians of medieval canon law.

*Louis B. Pascoe, S.J.*
This study follows closely the publication of the Corpus christianorum edition (Continuatio mediaevalis 11) of Peter Abelard's Commentary on Romans, edited by Eligius Buytaert. P. has reservations about the CC text and complains that Buytaert never discussed Abelard's biblical text. To remedy this, P. has listed all Abelard's variants from the Vulgate text of the epistle. But he does nothing with this list. He claims that until a critical edition of the Vetus Latina is available, he can draw no definite conclusions, leaving the reader wondering why he raised the issue in the first place. P. next offers a very short discussion of Abelard's exegetical method, making a dichotomy between the traditional glossae on the text and the newer method of quaestiones. Abelard favored the latter, and although he was not the first to use this method, it was he who made it important.

P. then begins an extensive, thematic analysis of Abelard's exegesis. Some of the themes he explores are inspiration, multiple interpretation of scriptural passages, law and gospel, and the theological virtues. On the question of natural knowledge of God, recently discussed in these pages by William Vandermark (TS 34 [1973] 36-52), Abelard took a twofold approach. The great OT figures were reckoned iusti because they accepted the divine caritas. However, since this was available only through faith in Christ, these OT saints must have had some foreknowledge of the Incarnation, a sort of pre-Christian faith (p. 68). On the other hand, the pagan philosophers could have had no knowledge of the Incarnation, but they did have some knowledge of the Trinity, manifest in God's potentia, sapientia, and benignitas. The pagans could know the true God innerlich via the natural law, and äusserlich via the works of creation (p. 77). Although P. generally just explains what Abelard had to say, this study is helpful in relating Abelard's ideas to those of his contemporaries. The appended bibliography is excellent.

Joseph F. Kelly
should be added the translation by J. Mullaly (Milwaukee, 1964). Petrus’ *Expositio librorum b. Dionysii* (ed. M. Alonso, Lisbon, 1957; and earlier in *PL* 122 as a work of Scotus Eriugena) appears to be authentic, in spite of F. Ruello’s learned attempt (1952) to attribute the work to Adam Marsh.

Petrus’ scientific works consist primarily of commentaries on Aristotle. Basing himself on important new studies by A. Schlögel (1965) and T. M. Goldstein (1969) as well as on his own researches, C. maintains the authenticity of the *Quaestiones super librum De animalibus* (found in mss. Madrid BN 1877 and Firenze BN Conv. Soppr. G.4.853, but as yet unedited). Although the two copies differ considerably, he regards both as authentic and the Madrid version as the earlier redaction. The extracts from this work found in various European libraries under the title *Problemata* are of doubtful authenticity. Petrus’ commentaries on Aristotle’s psychology, *Scientia libri De anima* (ed. M. Alonso, Madrid, 1941) and *Quaestiones libri De anima* (ed. M. Alonso, Madrid, 1944), are authentic, although there are difficulties concerning the two forms in which the latter is preserved. The *Expositio libri De anima* (ed. M. Alonso, Madrid, 1952) and the treatise *De rebus principalibus naturarum* (ed. *ibid.*) are spurious. It is to be hoped that C. will follow up this work with a study of Petrus’ significance for the beginnings of Latin Aristotelianism.

Jordi Gayà


Twelve lectures delivered at Calvin College and Seminary of Grand Rapids on several facets of Calvin and Calvinism. Quirinus Breen’s “St. Thomas and Calvin as Theologians: A Comparison” deals not with their theology but their method, and he finds that Thomas wrote as a philosopher while Calvin wrote as a rhetorician in the sophistic tradition but without sophistry. “Calvin and Toleration,” by Paul Woolley, maintains that the Reformer favored a limited toleration, i.e., in all areas except the interpretation of Scripture. Calvin’s rejection of Servetus and Castellio resulted from their rejection of the teaching of Scripture. Philip E. Hughes’s “John Calvin: Director of Missions” briefly outlines the missionary and evangelistic activity of the Genevan Church during Calvin’s time, and R. Pierce Beaver recreates the unsuccessful attempt of the first Reformed missionaries to South America in “The Genevan Mission to Brazil.” Two essays deal with liturgy: James H. Nichols’ “The Intent of the Calvinistic Liturgy” and Howard Hageman’s “The Liturgical Origins of the Reformed Churches.” Hageman is interested in the liturgy of the Dutch Churches and finds that it was German in origin, with elements from the French liturgy of Strassburg, mixed with something from the Dutch Church of London and the Lutheran Church of Württemberg. The most interesting essay of the twelve is “Calvinism and the American Revolution,” by Charles W. Akers, who feels that several ministers of Revolutionary times were, by their preaching of the Word, as effective in fomenting rebellion as were the political heroes of the day. Three other essays deal with related Reformation themes: Robert L. Kingdon’s “Calvinism and Democracy” gives an account of Jean Morely’s desire for “democracy,” making him the first congregationalist in France; Clarence K. Pott has a general essay on “Erasmus and the Reformation”; and Carl Bangs’s “Arminius as a Reformed Theologian” sees Arminius as one of the great theologians of the Dutch Reformed Church,
who cannot be properly understood under the category of dissenter, schismatic, or heretic. These essays reflect Calvin’s influence, direct and indirect, on the sixteenth century, the succeeding centuries, and our own. This volume is a worthy collection of excellent essays by outstanding authors.

Joseph N. Tylenda, S.J.


Since 1969 the Woodstock Center for Religion and Worship has been laboring in the area of ritual. Theory and practice have gone into the preparation of this book by a member of the Woodstock team. Six chapters present ritualized life-situations: birth, consolidation, commitment, reconciliation, separation, sharing. The suggested structure of each is reminiscent of Harvey Cox’s juxtaposition of celebrative elements: past, present, future. The book is primarily intended to present “guidelines for the individual and/or communal creation of new events” (p. 7)—creative ritual making. Among those who have specialized in ritual there is still wide disagreement as to how the word itself should be used and how the ritual performance is to be understood. J.’s approach is phenomenological. “Individual or corporate action addressed to a meaningful transcendent” is called worship, liturgy, ritual, “or whatever word describes the phenomenon” (p. 1). This reviewer finds such a generic definition disturbing. It is so open-ended that it can include everything and at the same time mean nothing. Perhaps the best word to describe J.’s brand of ritual would be “play.” To this reader some of the material does indeed seem less than profound, distant at least from the rich, classical understanding of ritual. Positively speaking, J. is encouraging creativity, a reawakening of the senses—time, action, space, and structure. And that is good.

Thomas A. Krosnicki, S.V.D.


Ten essays investigate the religious vision emerging from the fiction of William Faulkner. The contributors include prominent Faulkner scholars such as Cleanth Brooks, Hyatt Wagoner, and Roma King, Jr., along with theologian Amos Wilder and critics John Hunt, Herbert Perluck, Philip Rule, S.J., Harold Douglas, and Robert Daniel. Barth frames the essays with an introduction in which he discusses a rationale for correlating theology and literature, and an epilogue in which he accents motifs explored by the essayists. A brief commentary after each essay highlights other relevant critical materials and accents correspondences and differences among selections in the book. Along with providing an overview of the religiosity in Faulkner’s fiction, the book contains essay-length treatment of The Sound and the Fury, As I Lay Dying, Light in August, Absalom, Absalom!, “The Bear,” and A Fable.

Several essays locate the sources of F.’s religiosity in familiar locales such as Southern Puritanism, Stoicism, and the Bible; others purview themes such as freedom, good and evil, predestination, time, love, et al. The essays accurately portray how F.’s fiction pictures destructive elements in Southern religiosity, while at other times, particularly in the later novels, the literature points to positive human values in the Christian heritage.

There is considerable merit to Barth’s contention that a complete criticism involves an assessment of the religious vision implicit in F.’s art.
Difficulty arises, however, when several of the critics make explicit that which functions implicitly (i.e., aesthetically and dramatically) in the literature. At times F. appears as a cryptotheologian: e.g., when Waggoner finds the final implication of *Light in August* to be a "kind of Christian existentialism"; or when Hunt locates in *Absalom, Absalom!* a "Christian critique of the modern and traditional visions"; or when Barth suggests that "Faulkner reveals God as a 'presence' in the lives of men."

With the exception of Rule's contribution, the major essays were first printed between 1956 and 1965; hence we discover very little that is not already well known to students of F. The problem of timeliness is compounded by the fact that a theological anthropology dominant in the mid-fifties permeates the religious perspectives of the critics. Moreover, when Barth defends the volume by speaking of "the growing rapport between literature and theology," he speaks out of a context which no longer prevails. The radicality of recent developments in both literature and religion renders Barth's judgment, and the assumption on which the entire volume rests, somewhat precarious. If religion-and-literature is even continuing today as a viable enterprise, much less growing as Barth suggests, it is following a mode of interpretation significantly different from that practiced by most contributors to this study of Faulkner.

Ted L. Estess

**BOOKS RECEIVED**

[All books received are listed here whether they are reviewed or not]

**SCRIPTURAL STUDIES**


*Synopsis of the Four Gospels: Greek-*