
This volume represents the most complete presentation thus far available to English readers of the provocative theology emerging from the Latin American Church. Liberation theology, it is clear, is not a neatly defined essay that simply complements already existing theological wisdom; it is an angle of vision through which the totality of the Christian message can be interpreted.

One of the strengths of G.'s book is its success in bringing into relief what is distinctive about liberation theology, and at the same time locating it in relation to other theological history and developments. The method at work, e.g., is contrasted with two classic understandings of the task of theology: wisdom and rational knowledge. Both of these remain valid dimensions of theology; distinctive of liberation theology, however, is its understanding of theology as a critical reflection on the actual experience of the Church. The fundamental questions for such a theology is simply: What does it mean to be a Christian today? What does it mean at a time when the political dimension of human activity, and therefore of the gospel message as well, is realized more keenly than ever? What does it mean, in particular, to be a Christian in Latin America when this political dimension becomes a participation in the revolutionary process by which the continent is to be transformed?

This kind of reflection, of course, is not limited to Latin America. G. draws on the political theology of J. B. Metz (but regrets M.'s lack of contact with social scientists), the discussion of secularization by Harvey Cox and other North American writers (but points out that secularization in Latin America is an uneven process), and Jürgen Moltmann's theology of hope (but finds it insufficiently rooted in the demands of the present). The fundamental difference, however, between all of these and Latin American experience and reflection is that the latter proceeds from a perception of a society locked into a pattern of domination and dependence. Domination is exercised by the richer nations of the world over the poorer, and within the poorer countries the masses of the poor and powerless are dominated by a small, affluent elite. What further distinguishes Latin American countries from other Third World nations is the fact that, until quite recently, the Church was identified with this dominant elite and, as a social institution, continues to be an important cultural factor.

Such a perception of society leads to the conclusion that Christians
must work to liberate men from this domination. Its evil resides less in the malice of individual men than in unjust structures and systems, of capitalist economies and international trade. Institutional violence must be resisted by revolutionary violence (though the question of the type and degree of violence is left undefined). This call for a radical attack on unjust structures reflects a different spirit from the relative optimism concerning development during the 50’s and early 60’s. “Developmentalism” is rejected as a self-defeating gradualism. Foreign aid and investment, without radical change in the structures of power, will only increase the domination of rich nations and classes over the poor.

The theological reflection on this kind of historical praxis by Christians is not happy with the distinction between two planes of activity, the spiritual and the profane. There are not two histories of man, one secular and the other sacred, but only one. Salvation cannot be measured in quantitative terms (how many public converts to the Church), only in qualitative (how fully can men realize their dignity as self-determining persons). The notion of pre-evangelization is transcended by such an emphasis on salvation as intrahistorical. The humanization of society is itself a dimension of salvation, not simply a tactical prelude to preaching the gospel. (G. recognizes the danger of reducing salvation to simply immanent terms, but he is characteristically suspicious of people who seem too concerned with this danger.)

Such a view of history and salvation, G. maintains, is well founded in biblical sources. The God of Exodus is Lord of an ongoing history, not architect of an ordered nature. Faith in His promises means an orientation to the future in hope, an eschatology that sees the seeds of the future in the concrete present, that assumes the categories of utopian thinking as subversive of the given situation.

The Church, then, must become a sacrament of liberation, a fulfilment of the plan of salvation, and a manifestation of what the world is to become: a place of truly human community. Yet the Church itself needs liberation. If its focus remains narrowly intraecclesial, such self-liberation will not take place. In Latin America the renewal of the Church depends on its solidarity with the poor and the oppressed; it must recognize class conflict as a historical fact and make its option on behalf of the oppressed; it cannot remain neutral.

Although G. recognizes the fallacy of attempting to schematize social realities, his division of all of society into oppressors and oppressed seems overdrawn. Similarly, the emphasis on the communal values of socialism seems oversimplified. It would be hard to identify any society in the world today that is organized along the lines of a pure socialism or a pure capitalism. Catholic thought may have exaggerated the rights of private
property in the past, and there are probably a number who need to be
disabused of the belief that the gospel canonizes capitalism and free
enterprise. We do not need to canonize a new social dogmatism, however.
As G. and other writers make clear, a political option chosen in one
situation should not be identified with the imperatives of the gospel
concerning the liberation of all men. To apply the conclusions of Latin
American Christians to other contexts too quickly, to apply, e.g., the
dialectic of oppressors and oppressed as a ready-made formula for every
social conflict, would be to miss the whole point. Theology as a critical
reflection on praxis in the light of God's word means that we must
determine the meaning of that word, always both particular and
universal, in our own proper struggles for liberation.

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Joseph A. O'Hare, S.J.

Liberation Theology: Liberation in the Light of the Fourth Gospel.

This is an important book, devoted to a theme neglected or ignored by
many theologians. The Introduction itself is a manifesto to theologi non
credentes, whom the author shows to be unbelieving simply because they
do not have to believe, not being blacks or other oppressed peoples, not
suffering scorn and rejection by white society, but enjoying tremendous
prestige, success, and even power—the power to shape the idea of God in
the minds of their similarly privileged students and readers, but not,
certainly, for the oppressed masses, who need the power of the living
Saviour to liberate them from oppression.

To such theologi non credentes this book may not be pleasant but it
could be beneficial. Besides, this reviewer at least does not consider it
unfair to suggest to all theologians that, though the ascent may have
been arduous, we climb down from the ladder of intellectual pretensions
and gaze upon the ghastly spectacle of real life, or rather what life really
is, not for white middle-class America or Europe but for the majority of
oppressed people, whom Christ came to save, with whom He identified,
and whom He directed us to emulate in their humility and poverty of
spirit. "Why should theology be based on the flimsy grounds of bourgeois
self-analysis?" asks Herzog. While pseudo theologians try to find
themselves and to define their God, the needy and lost of this world cry
out for the Saviour and for knowledge about Him, which is contained in
the Scriptures.

H.'s thesis is that theological analysis must begin with the wretched of
the earth, the lost, who are able to reach theological truth simply because
they are oppressed. "Does self encounter God in encountering process
(Cobb-Ogden), presence (Dewart), or future (Cox), or in a man's identifying with the wretched of the earth?" (p. 13) The answer is clear, unless we are no longer operating within the framework of Christianity. "The issue today," he asserts, "is whether in a secularized church we are still talking about Christian faith at all when we do theology" (p. 14). And again: "The test of discipleship is rejection by secularity. Let the disciple be especially wary of the secular theologian! The secularity that rejected Jesus was first of all the secularity of the church" (p. 293).

For a scriptural demonstration of his theme H. uses the fourth Gospel because it provides "a carefully articulated theology of Jesus' identification with men who had no identity in the eyes of the established church and society of his day" (p. 17). The fourth Gospel reminds us that the "God problem" of contemporary white middle-class theologians is not the chief business of theology. According to St. John, God has been revealed in the flesh, has given His word, and now we, not He, a. the problem, as our sinful selves confront God's intelligible reality and will, manifest in Jesus Christ, and react either as divine (unconcealed) or diabolical (concealed) men.

Several important concepts emerge in H.'s spiritual and truly theological meditation on the Gospel of John, which forms the core of the book. First, there is no shame in needing faith to believe that Jesus is indeed God incarnate, since disbelief implies a private and exploitative nature. Faith itself hinges upon reading of the Scriptures, "which testify to the true reality of human selfhood. They point to its embodiment in the man called Jesus" (p. 89). But in white divinity schools and churches the Scriptures are either read mechanically or not at all, or else are subject to fantastic refraction in the concealed selves of the leaders of ecclesiastical establishment, whose goal is to mystify the mystery of our salvation to the point where it cannot be shared with the true humanity of oppressed peoples and thus secure their liberation.

Second, it is necessary for us to recognize with Anselm "quanti ponderis sit peccatum"—that we confront Jesus' true manhood as false, concealed selves, anxious to retain our privileged status in human society and our own minds. We must honestly confront Jesus in the Scriptures in order to restore our corporate selfhood, and the sensus communis which we share with all of humanity, especially with the oppressed races. This sensus communis is the ultimate test for the truth of the gospel, rather than pseudo theology and pseudo scholarship. It is the poor and oppressed who preserve this sense undefiled, and witness to the truth of Jesus Christ's incarnation and resurrection, just as He specially relates to them. From this point of view missions have a great significance for the Church. "It is not an attempt to impose strange dogmas upon other men
not Christian, but the radical risk of sharing corporate selfhood with the wretched of the earth” (p. 147).

Finally, H. develops his understanding of liberation. Only Jesus is the liberator, and those who actualize His word. His work of liberating is in the form of servanthood in agape, costly love, by which we are loved and through which we can love others. Those who follow Jesus become true selves, crucifying eros and serving where no one else cares. They form the liberated community, whose traits are joy, freedom, and election, and opposition to the secular world.

To this reviewer, H.’s book is an intellectually and ethically serious attempt to face the crisis of meaninglessness in modern theology. His points, based upon a thorough study of and creative assimilation of the text of St. John, are well taken and illuminate the mission of Jesus to all men insofar as all are oppressed. Like Abou Ben Adhem, may theologians of the tribe of Frederick Herzog increase!

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MARGARET SCHATKIN


"The more insight a living creature has, the more it is able to free itself in its ethical demands from the laws of nature. All the problems which invite man to interfere in creation for the purpose of regulating it are ultimately social problems, and for this reason we have urgent need of insights into the natural laws of social life." This and a few other early challenging statements, coupled with the enticement of Wickler’s title, may give the reader the perseverance and patience to wade through two very abstruse and often unintelligible opening chapters. The reward is worth the effort.

W. works with Konrad Lorenz, the grand patriarch of modern ethology and its controversial applications to human behavior and morality: aggression and the territorial imperative. His interests are, wisely, not a simplistic natural theology which seeks a morality for man in a study of animal behavior that extrapolates to the human without allowing for the fact that man’s intellect allows him to modify nature in the process of an ongoing creation. W. avoids this pitfall, trying rather to derive basic principles underlying indisputable biological facts, principles he can then use to analyze and evaluate human behavior.

W. focuses on the last seven "social" commandments, leaving aside the first three. Sketchy though they are, the brief chapters on "Aggression between Members of the Same Species—You Shall Not Kill," “Is
Aggression a Spontaneous Need?”, “Intercommunications—You Shall Not Lie,” “The Inheritance of Acquired Characteristics—Honor Your Father and Your Mother,” and “Property—You Shall Not Steal” contain a miniature treasure of perceptive, incisive comments, analysis, and correlations between animal behavior and human morality.

Brevity is risky, especially in an area of controversial exploration, but W. carefully avoids overextending his conclusions. For instance, after a provocative eight-page indication of the innate honesty of communications among blackbirds, song thrushes, polar foxes, and baboons, W. limits himself to a cautious “All we can say with certainty is that the Eighth Commandment has a biological origin and that it is only sensible to investigate it.” One area of investigation one wishes W. had explored is that of mimicry as a form of lying in self-defense.

Unfortunately, this caution is thrown to the wind whenever there is question of sexual relationship, marriage, and the family. The chapter on “Sexual Partnership—You Shall Not Commit Adultery” is perplexing and irritating. It opens on a biased and untypically dogmatic tone: “In 1954, the Supreme Criminal Court of the Federal Republic of Germany declared that there is an objective moral law which is binding on all men and which is based on an existing scale of values to be accepted by all men. This moral law ‘places monogamy and the family before man as an obligatory way of life and makes them the foundation of life for all nations and states.’” As if this pronouncement by the Supreme Criminal Court makes all further discussion irrelevant and a waste of time.

Among many orthodox and popular ethologists, primarily Desmond Morris, pair-bonding has assumed the status of infallible dogma. Extrapolated to the human level, pair-bonding has been subtly reduced to and equated with a lifelong sexually exclusive monogamous relationship. This reductionism ignores quite a few indisputable biological and sociological facts. W. himself seems to acknowledge the invalidity of this dogmatic reductionism when he states that “environmental or ecological factors have a decisive influence on the structure of society and on that of the family.” But he then pursues this on an obviously biased basis.

In arguing that sexually exclusive lifelong monogamy is almost a genetically required behavior pattern, he ignores the fact that of the 185 extant cultures reviewed by Beach and Ford, only 29 restricted marriage to one mate, and of these 29 only 9 completely disapproved of both premarital and extramarital relations. More significantly, 72 of the 185 cultures actually approve of and have institutionalized extramarital relations. In his own competence, W. ignores the considerable research by animal behaviorists and psychologists into the “Coolidge effect,” whereby sexual activity of many animals is related to the variety or
novelty of partners available. Instead of engaging in a behavioral-cultural dogmatism of a Western European variety, W. could have made an invaluable contribution to our understanding of marriage, its biological roots, and its unknown future by commenting on the possible interrelationship between the Coolidge effect and the aggression associated with territory and mating of both humans and subhumans. He should also have consulted some anthropologists or sociologists to avoid blatant errors like his equation of the nonexclusive monogamy of the Eskimo with polyandry.

Whatever its many flaws and limitations, W.'s essay is valuable and worth reading critically in an area that is bound to become more and more productive in our understanding of the roots of human behavior and morality.

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**ROBERT T. FRANCOEUR**


The largely unchallenged works by the standard historians of the Christian canon, Zahn, Jülicher, Harnack, Westcott, and Lagrange, have long needed friendly but critical probing with an eye to assessing their methodologies. C. accepted the challenge in his 1968 German work, which now appears in an excellent translation produced by Oxford fellow J. A. Baker. C. insists that authors over and over confused the use in the early Church of a NT test with its canonicity. What interests him is not when and where the various books of the Bible first emerged, were quoted, grouped together, disseminated, and finally inserted into the canon. Rather, he concentrates on the historical process of the Christian canon's formation as such, especially on the pressures and resistances which helped and hindered its emergence. In his rebuke of arbitrary criteria, C. is especially severe on Lagrange, whose work he finds badly marred by juristic and formalist dogmatism.

C. first investigates the relationship of Jesus to the Scriptures in the Synoptics, then he studies the Pauline, Lucan, and Johannine uses of the law and prophets. He notes that the Scriptures were not originally a burning issue in Judeo-Christian controversies with Judaism. Quite rightly he stresses the importance of the words and the deeds of Jesus as the source of authority for the early Church and as the hermeneutical key for reinterpreting the Jewish Bible. Unreflecting confidence, we are told, characterized the pre-Marcionite Church, undifferentiated from primitive Christianity in its lack of formal authentication for the tradition
deriving from Christ, a Church still lacking a "New Testament." Only about A.D. 200 did conscious differentiation between Old and New Testament emerge in the Church. Against Harnack and Zahn he holds that the idea of a Christian canon was the work of Marcion. Although the Great Church rejected Marcion's list, it actually followed his example in delineating a canon broader, to be sure, than its Marcionite counterpart. C.'s treatment of Marcion (pp. 148-67) is very suggestive and will help orientate those who want to reread at this time Tertullian's *Adversus Marcionem* in the new Evans text and translation. What is more original is the emphasis on Montanism (pp. 221-38) for the shaping of the canon. In reaction to the Montanist urge to expand the canon to include the "New Prophecy," the Church was pushed to set the boundaries of the orthodox canon. Montanism did play an important role, I agree, although C. tends to see Montanism lurking in every corner of the Mediterranean basin.

C. argues most effectively in chap. 7 when treating post-Irenaean theology in Hippolytus, Tertullian, Clement of Alexandria, and Origen (the *terminus ad quern* of his study). He shows how these writers mirror the view begun in Justin that unites the old and new dispensation through the concept of salvation history. However, C. is too vague in referring to their notion of salvation history without noting that the dimension of progressive revelation which we naturally include in the concept is frequently lacking in the nontemporal view of biblical revelation in the post-Irenaean period. C.'s failure to cite some important works on the exegesis of that period (e.g., T. P. O'Malley's study *Tertullian and the Bible*) is explainable perhaps by the fact that his research in general extends to 1966.

The following demurrers might be registered. C. is overly quick to reject the significance of texts from the Apostolic Fathers (e.g., *Barn.* 4, 14 and 2 *Clem.* 2, 4) for what they reflect of a growing sense of Christian canon. More recently this material has been better treated by K.-H. Ohlig in *Die theologische Begründung des neutestamentlichen Kanons in der alten Kirche* (Düsseldorf, 1972). His treatment of the Muratorian canon (pp. 243-61) is colored by his overarching conviction that the formal canon concept emerged late. Also in chap. 7 he might have analyzed the significance of such introductory formulae as "it is written" or "Scripture says" for NT passages, as well as instances where the Holy Spirit is said to speak not only in David and Daniel but in Paul and other NT writers. Finally, as B. Metzger pointed out in *Gnomon* 42 (1970) 729 ff., C. might have considered whether the Christian persecutions did not also accelerate the canon formation.

In his Retrospect, C. repeats succinctly the book's thesis. This
formulation will doubtlessly remain the standard description of the historical process, though different theological conclusions can be adduced from the reconstruction. Few will question his assertion, less frequently heard in the older polemic debates about Scripture and tradition, that the Bible was never regarded as the sole source of Christian faith but that it has been constantly accompanied by tradition, the preaching of the Church. All in all, students of the early Church will enjoy reading this work and will profit from its breath of erudition, sane assessments, and honest probing.

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Foerster's Gnosis makes a major contribution to the study of Gnosticism. The first volume contains translation of selected passages from Greek and Latin texts that can be grouped in four sections, the first of which includes patristic accounts concerning Simon and lesser known figures, Basilides, the Ophites, and the Barbelognostics (including M. Krause's translation of the Apocryphon of John). A second section includes the patristic evidence for major Valentinian theologians and concludes with the fragments of Valentinus. A third group of texts includes writings from Hippolytus, while a final section includes the Poimandres texts and the Acts of Thomas. A second volume, already prepared in manuscript, will offer translation of selected Coptic texts from the Nag Hammadi collection, as well as an index of key words and biblical passages. The editor notes that although the texts previously were translated into German, the original texts were consulted in rendering the translation into English.

The excellent Introduction omits detailed discussion of historical derivation, philosophic background, and scholarly debate over interpretation. It offers a clear and general exposition of fundamental themes in Gnostic literature, and rightly places gnōsis in a religious context (rather than in a philosophic one).

One appreciates F.'s intention to guide the reader by commenting on difficult passages throughout the volume. Yet such comment necessarily involves interpretation, and in some cases his attempt to resolve apparent textual contradictions leads him to make statements that are,
if not misleading, at least questionable. On p. 175, e.g., he states that Heracleon’s description of “the souls of the faithful” refers “to the pneumatics,” and equates the eschatological “rest” with the “marriage” of AH 1, 71; yet the context does not allow for discussion of his evidence, and the points seem to me highly debatable. In such cases the editor would do well to point out the apparent discrepancies in the text and to offer his interpretation as conjecture (as he does on p. 173).

The English translation, edited by R. McL. Wilson, reads more fluently than any of the generally available translations of similar collections. Its value for the student would be increased by the addition of marginal notes on textual variants, and especially by the introduction of greater precision into the translation. In some crucial passages, e.g., the distinction between neuter and masculine nouns in Greek, and even between singular and plural, are not noted in the English translation (To psychikon of Exc. 56, 3, ho psychikos of 54, 2, and ta psychika of 56, 4 are all rendered identically in English as “the psychic,” pp. 149–50).

One further addition (perhaps to the Introduction in future editions) would help the reader: a brief account of the reasoning behind the arrangement of texts (i.e., the separation of AH 1, 6, 3 from the rest of Irenaeus’ account; the placement of the fragments of Valentinus after those of his followers; the classification of selections from Hippolytus under the heading “Systems Involving Three Principles”). Whatever criticisms one makes of specific details, however, this volume, together with its companion, will offer the most complete and competent introduction to Gnostic sources available in English—a valuable and much-needed resource.

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ELAINE H. PAGELS


The subject of the first volume, the eucharistic doctrine of Philo, has received only cursory treatment in the past. Hence it should prove a welcome contribution to those interested in the background of early Christian eucharistic doctrine, especially that of the Alexandrians (for another recent contribution to the more general theme of Philo’s concept of sacrifice and which takes into account its influence on Clement of Alexandria, Origen, and the Epistle of Barnabas, cf. R. Daly, Christian Sacrifice: The Judeo-Christian Background up to Origen (Washington, 1973).
The author's terminological inquiry into *eucharistia-eucharistein* and related terms concludes that (1) the Philonic eucharist has its roots in the Mosaic law and the sacrificial system of Leviticus rather than in Greek philosophy; (2) the originality of Philo consists in extending the implications of his biblical faith and the terms and images which express it to cosmology, anthropology, and the life of the virtues; (3) the use of these terms in the Jewish community and elsewhere allowed Philo to recapitulate his doctrine of thanksgiving around them; (4) the terms are given an importance without precedent in Judaism and Greek philosophy.

The further investigation of these terms as used in the sphere of liturgy affords the grounds for a less equivocal definition of Philo's eucharistic doctrine. Philo's development of the notion of priesthood in this line of thought is especially enlightening and it leads to his concept of spiritual sacrifice, which consists in the offering of prayers, good works, and oneself.

Laporte shows how the eucharistic doctrine of Philo is intimately linked to his cosmological and anthropological speculations and how the eucharist functions in the sphere of the development of the interior life of man. In this latter case the eucharistic disposition serves as a remedy for the pride of the ascetic who is advanced on the way of virtue, lest he be tempted to attribute to himself the authorship of his good works. In L.'s judgment, Philo's reflections on the interior life and its problems should merit for him a place among the great masters of the spiritual life (p. 264). Here a word of caution might be inserted. Philo's understanding of the spiritual sacrifice proper to the *homo religiosus* stands in sharp contrast to that of the early Christian communities. In his case the ethical, and so communitarian, aspect of sacrifice is subordinate to the "gnostic." While the early Church maintained a decidedly incarnational idea of sacrifice with emphasis on the practical life of virtue, Philo's perspective was almost exclusively vertical. For him, the true sacrifice of thanksgiving consists in the soul becoming free from material things and elevated to the contemplation of things divine.

The second volume reviewed here is a condensed version of a doctoral thesis presented to the Institut Catholique of Paris in 1971. Tarby is Lauréat du prix Jean et Maurice de Pange for the year 1970-71. In the first part, having discussed the manuscript tradition of the Eucharistic Prayer of the Church of Jerusalem, T. offers a French version of his construction of the original text alongside a translation of the oldest Greek version (Vat. gr. 2282). This is followed by an exposition of the basic characteristics of the West Syrian eucharistic prayers, in order to situate the Eucharistic Prayer of James the Apostle within the scope of
Oriental liturgies. The remainder of the work is an evaluation of and reflection on the theological riches of this prayer. The internal dynamism of the anaphora is brought out by situating it in the life of faith from which it derived.

I find no difficulties with the method used to establish the most ancient Greek text, while recognizing, as T. does (p. 45), that one cannot expect to recover the actual prayer used by Cyril of Jerusalem in the fourth century. The laws of evolution of liturgical texts prevent this. The careful analysis of the theological content of this eucharistic prayer provides us with the best commentary available. Here we will be content to single out only one important observation of the author. L. Bouyer, in his commentary on the Anaphora of James, speaks of a regrettable trichotomy which reserves creation to the Father, redemption to the Son, and sanctification to the Spirit (Eucharist: Theology and Spirituality of the Eucharistic Prayer [Notre Dame, 1968] p. 278). However, T. shows how the prayer presents the Trinity not simply as acting one after the other, but entering into the action and revealing themselves together: the specificity of action and unity of action are admirably expressed (pp. 90 ff.).

In the theological perspective of this prayer the whole cosmos is called to return to God in a unique liturgy which links heaven to earth. The history of salvation is viewed as animated by the synergism of the three divine Persons and crystallized around the divine image impressed on man the sinner, whom Christ, the full expression of divine philanthropy, comes to renew in the perfection of His sacrifice. The Eucharist is understood to insert the believer into the economy of salvation, which is fully realized in the effusion of the Spirit. It is the sacrifice of propitiation which the Church, attentive to the fearful return of the just Judge, ceaselessly offers to the Father to draw down on itself His mercy and pardon. Simultaneously the Eucharist is, for those who participate in the body and blood of Christ, the source of communication of the Spirit, who divinizes man progressively in the totality of his being. This representation of the faith of the Church of Jerusalem, which in its essentials goes back to the fourth century, can provide our Eucharist today with deeper meaning in the measure we listen to its proclamation.

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At ancient sites, only the rare guide combines enough erudition and imagination to make old stones come alive and weird mounds take shape.
Evans' gifts in Latin patristic fields betray such a rare talent for vivid, shrewd reconstruction. He will be your guide through five churches: of Tertullian, Cyprian, the Donatists, Augustine, and the twin monument of Leo and Gregory. This guided expedition into the past will surely cast light on the condition of the Church today. Furthermore, his pleasant literary style shows traits we have come to expect from British scholars but not from his fellow Americans.

E.'s chapter on Tertullian is astute. He explains how Tertullian's sectarian, morally rigorist notion of eschatological holiness led to a sectarian perfectionism whose ultimate conclusion was Christian separatism from pagan society. For Tertullian, the Church was, E. notes, a colony, the outpost of the heavenly kingdom to come. Much sympathy is shown in this chapter to the role that the Holy Spirit played in Tertullian's Church, though, as he suggests, this Spirit is rather chary of His gifts.

Having personally poked around the Cyprianic fields, I was especially interested in hearing E.'s rundown on Cyprian's Church. His facts and information are very accurate. Here, as throughout, though his notes refer only to primary sources, obviously he has read widely in the secondary literature and is not afraid then to take his own stand pro or con. It is quite true, as E. says, that early Latin ecclesiology moved between the two poles of the Church's eschatological sanctity and the Church's unity conceived on political and legal models; also his observation that Cyprian was quite revolutionary in asserting his freedom from Tertullian's Church model. But I, for one, consider that E., perhaps because of the influence of A. Beck, has overemphasized the legal, constitutional element in Cyprian's ecclesiology. Is it really true to say that "Cyprian considers the entire Church Catholic in constitutional terms" (p. 47) or that it is "a universal society founded upon law which it is the business of the Church's own governors to administer"? (p. 48) Here E. reflects some of the views of H. Koch without assessing the recent correctives by U. Wickert. Especially helpful would have been weighing the well-balanced presentation of B. Renaud on Cyprian's Church viewed as liturgical assembly in Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale 38 (1971) 5–68. A matter of detail. It would be more accurate in footnote 39 in chap. 2 (p. 165) to cite Ep. 59.4 and 66.4 rather than Ep. 75.16 (which is actually by Firmilian) to document a correct statement.

E. appreciates the values of Donatism and its deep roots in the North African scene even before Cyprian. He shows a healthy skepticism with regard to W. H. C. Frend's economic interpretation of Donatism and sees it more accurately, I think, in terms of conflicting spiritualities. The chapter on Augustine, especially the presentation of the De civitate Dei,
is brilliant and a model of conciseness.

For the final chapter, he combines the humorless Leo with the first monk-pope, Gregory. Leo's legal and imperial model of Church culminating in a theory of papal rule is seen as an outgrowth of the interest in the Church as the one, "spiritual" society standing as both a parallel and a contrast to the temporal society of the Roman Empire. Leo is said to mark the high point in "a history of tactical manoeuvre and fragmentary theorizing that had marked the bishopric of Rome" (p. 135).

The conclusion (pp. 154-61) is the guide's final philosophic-like summation of the tour. Again, E.'s uncanny sense for spotting the ironic in the course of Church history comes to the fore. We are reminded to be wary of absolutizing ecclesial structures obstructing Church participation in the world. We are warned of parroting theological formulations from ages past which may well now convey the exact opposite of their original intent. E.'s reasons to be open toward the office of papacy and the collegiate episcopate have pertinence to today's bilateral conversations and other ecumenical exchanges underway.

The misprints on pp. 12 and 157 need correction. The useful six-page bibliography will be appreciated for further reading. In short, here is one guided tour not to be missed.

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Several features mark this book (a doctoral dissertation at the Institut Catholique of Paris in 1970) off from other works on ministry in the early Church. Its theme is not the episcopacy but the presbyterate. Its approach is not developmental but synchronic, i.e., Vilela examines various ecclesiastical authors who lived about the same time and attempts to construct a picture of the presbyteral ministry as it existed in the third century. Alexandria, Syria, North Africa, and Rome are studied individually in light of the works of Clement and Origen, the Didascalia apostolorum, Tertullian, Cyprian, Hippolytus, et al. Its approach is, at least in part, sociological as well as theological, i.e., V. uses his sources to answer such questions as "How did priests live in the third century?", "Did they live apart from the larger Christian community?", "Were they married?", "Did they wear distinctive dress which set them apart from other Christians?", "How were they supported?" The book surveys and analyzes the major texts bearing on these topics and the variety of terms used for priesthood and priestly ministry. V.'s acknowledged purpose is
is brilliant and a model of conciseness.

For the final chapter, he combines the humorless Leo with the first monk-pope, Gregory. Leo's legal and imperial model of Church culminating in a theory of papal rule is seen as an outgrowth of the interest in the Church as the one, "spiritual" society standing as both a parallel and a contrast to the temporal society of the Roman Empire. Leo is said to mark the high point in "a history of tactical manoeuvre and fragmentary theorizing that had marked the bishopric of Rome" (p. 135).

The conclusion (pp. 154-61) is the guide's final philosophic-like summation of the tour. Again, E.'s uncanny sense for spotting the ironic in the course of Church history comes to the fore. We are reminded to be wary of absolutizing ecclesial structures obstructing Church participation in the world. We are warned of parroting theological formulations from ages past which may well now convey the exact opposite of their original intent. E.'s reasons to be open toward the office of papacy and the collegiate episcopate have pertinence to today's bilateral conversations and other ecumenical exchanges underway.

The misprints on pp. 12 and 157 need correction. The useful six-page bibliography will be appreciated for further reading. In short, here is one guided tour not to be missed.

Weston College School of Theology
Cambridge, Mass.

Michael A. Fahey, S.J.


Several features mark this book (a doctoral dissertation at the Institut Catholique of Paris in 1970) off from other works on ministry in the early Church. Its theme is not the episcopacy but the presbyterate. Its approach is not developmental but synchronic, i.e., Vilela examines various ecclesiastical authors who lived about the same time and attempts to construct a picture of the presbyteral ministry as it existed in the third century. Alexandria, Syria, North Africa, and Rome are studied individually in light of the works of Clement and Origen, the Didascalia apostolorum, Tertullian, Cyprian, Hippolytus, et al. Its approach is, at least in part, sociological as well as theological, i.e., V. uses his sources to answer such questions as "How did priests live in the third century?", "Did they live apart from the larger Christian community?", "Were they married?", "Did they wear distinctive dress which set them apart from other Christians?", "How were they supported?" The book surveys and analyzes the major texts bearing on these topics and the variety of terms used for priesthood and priestly ministry. V.'s acknowledged purpose is
to reassess more accepted views of the role of the episcopate in the third century by calling attention to the important place of the presbyters. In this he succeeds. Much in the book will be familiar to scholars in the field, but V.'s unique angle of vision sheds new light on the history of the period.

V. believes that there existed in the third century in most urban Christian communities a corporate body called the *presbyterion* and that the bishop was the chief of this corporate body. His argument is based on the use of the Greek term *presbyterion* and the Latin *concessus*, the descriptions of the responsibilities of presbyters, as well as the comparison sometimes made between the Church and the secular *ekklēsia* of Greek cities or the Jewish Sanhedrin. For example, he cites *Contra Celsum* 3, 30, where the faithful are compared to the *ekklēsia* of Athens, the clergy to the *boulē*, and the bishop to the *archōn*. To be "inscribed in the *presbyterion*" is equivalent to being ordained as priest.

V. shows that in many cases the presbyters exercised sacramental authority, e.g., they baptized, they celebrated the Eucharist with the bishop, and in his absence without him, they administered penitence, they participated in ordaining the bishop (*Apostolic Tradition*), and they assumed administrative responsibilities when there was a vacancy. He has somewhat greater difficulty showing precisely what were the responsibilities, if any, of the *presbyterion* as a corporate body when the bishop was present. Furthermore, in some cases the presbyters were charged with teaching. Often teachers and presbyters are different persons, but in some cases the two functions are combined in one person. Priests did not live apart from the church at large. They shared to a high degree a lifestyle similar to that of the faithful. More often than not they were married, though some authors think celibacy was preferable. They wore no distinctive dress. Some writers (Cyprian) were opposed to priests having outside employment, but others (Origen) were more lenient if the situation demanded it.

In general, the cumulative effect of the evidence and V.’s exposition of the texts is persuasive, but in details I sometimes found his argumentation unconvincing. This is due in large measure to the great ambiguity of the many texts he uses and the possibility of different interpretations. Origen’s reference to the *boulē* and *archōn* of the Greek cities (*Contra Celsum* 3, 30) is part of an argument to show the moral superiority of Christians to others. The secular *boulē* is mentioned only as an analogy; it is not clear that the analogy holds at any other point than the one Origen had in mind. Similarly, the term “priest” in Origen’s *Homilies on the Hexateuch* (87–91), as well as “blessed presbyters” in Hippolytus’ *Contra Noetum* (p. 368), are open to conflicting interpretations. So also
in V.’s interpretation of Tertullian’s Apology 39. Yet he takes all these passages to support his argument for the importance of presbyters, not bishops. All these bits of evidence are taken to support a similar conclusion, but each individual piece is open to question. Further, in some cases, notably Clement and Origen, the use of metaphorical language or biblical language for priests and Levites makes it difficult to know precisely whom the authors have in mind, priests or bishops. Symbolic language yields hard data only with great difficulty.

V. also accents the role of the Jewish Sanhedrin in shaping the Christian understanding of the presbyterion. But he draws his evidence primarily from biblical texts or first-century parallels rather than from third-century Judaism. Finally, he draws his materials primarily from ecclesiastical authors and does not draw on any archeological sources, e.g., inscriptions about religious associations in the Roman Empire, which might be able to illuminate how religious groups were organized.

University of Notre Dame

ROBERT L. WILKEN


This book deals with the reaction of the Scholastic theologians to the spread of the doctrines of Ramón Llull (+1315) in Europe in the period from the Reformation to the Enlightenment. Among the many new intellectual currents which accompanied the momentous social changes of the times, Lullism was one of the more important. Because most of these movements—Ramism, Scepticism, Stoicism, Cartesianism, as well as Lullism—were incompatible with the old Aristotelian and Scholastic educational system, the period is marked by controversy on many fronts, as the established institutions fought to defend their position against the new directions. To Lullism, with its affinities to Neoplatonism, Hermetism, and cabalism, the Scholastic authors, already under pressure from the Reformers, reacted sharply. In 1559 Llull’s works were included in the Index of Paul IV. Four years later they were subjected to criticism at the last sessions of the Council of Trent. Between 1578 and 1607 the Directorium inquisitorum of Nicholas Eymerich, the Dominican Inquisitor for Aragon in the late fourteenth century, went through five editions. This work includes a detailed enumeration of Lullian “heresies” and played a decisive role in the criticisms made by the Scholastic theologians. The same wave of conservatism which led to the condemnations of Bruno, Galileo, and Vanini affected the adherents of Llull. In 1620
Cardinal Bellarmine branded many Lullian teachings as heretical or dangerous. To these challenges the Lullists replied by publishing apologies, by introducing a petition to the Holy See for the ratification of the age-old cult of Llull in Mallorca, and by appeals to the support of Philip II and Philip III of Spain. Very conscious of the importance of their own tradition, they also published lists of the celebrated names associated with Lullian teaching: Nicholas of Cusa, Lefèvre d'Etaples, Charles de Bouelles, Agrippa of Nettesheim, Giordano Bruno. In reply, there appeared in Scholastic circles, around the turn of the eighteenth century and for the most part anonymously, *Elenchi auctorum de Raimundo male sentientium.* These lists are the subject of the present work.

Madre enumerates the various *elenchi pro* and *contra*, analyzes their genealogical relationships, and provides an extensive repertorium of the 183 authors included in the *elenchi contra*, with a brief biobibliographical note and identification of the places where Llull is criticized and the doctrines for which he is criticized. He then discusses in more detail the six chief figures in this tradition: Eymerich (+1399), Jean Gerson (+1429), Bernard of Luxemburg (+1535; his *Catalogus haereticorum* [Cologne, 1522] follows Eymerich exclusively for the errors of Llull), Dominicus Bañez (+1604), Gabriel Vásquez (+1604), and Franciscus Suárez (+1617). Then he discusses the particular doctrines for which Llull was criticized: the notion of *rationes necessariae*, against which the Scholastics claimed that Llull held the demonstrability of the articles of faith; the conception of the divine activity, from which it was deduced that Llull taught a multiplicity of natures in God; the idea of a *demonstratio per aequiparantiam*, according to which it was thought that Llull held that the Christian doctrine of the Trinity could be proved—the criticisms of Vásquez and Suárez centered on this point; and the emphasis on the *perfectio Dei*, from which it was concluded that Llull maintained the absolute necessity of the Incarnation. In a last chapter M. turns to an evaluation of anti-Lullism. He shows that, in spite of the great number of authors cited in the *elenchi*, the criticisms derive almost exclusively from Eymerich's *Directorium*, that very few of the authors seem to have known Llull's works in the original at all, and that those who did were satisfied with the consultation of one or two. Vásquez cites three of Llull's 240 works, but seems to have read only one; Gerson cites only one; and Eymerich's charges are based on an acquaintance with only 20.

Many recent studies have concerned themselves with the influence of Llull's thought in the Renaissance and early modern times. The Lullian background of Cusanus' early thought has been shown by E. Colomer,

Madre’s book, a model of economy and conciseness, provides us with a valuable complement to these studies. Concerned rather with the opponents of Llull than with his adherents, he enables us to observe a moribund institution in reaction against a vital new direction. The anti-Lullists were for the most part representatives of established organizations, members of religious orders, Dominicans, Carmelites, and Theatines with their official doctor Thomas Aquinas, Franciscans behind the banner of Duns Scotus. (The Jesuits, perhaps more in tune with the times, were divided.) With a self-assured and inflexible dogmatism, these Scholastic doctors of the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries met innovation with condemnations, legal measures, and institutional pressure. Making no effort to learn the new languages which the new social situation had created, they complained of Llull’s strange terminology and falsified his utterances in their uncomprehending translations of his expressions into their own rigid and outdated systems of discourse. Llull was for them a heretic and his adherents hopeless outsiders, but it was in fact to such movements that the period from the Reformation to the Enlightenment belonged. A study of the Lullists of this period would perhaps throw some light on the process by which such structures supersede one another. It is to be hoped that M. will follow up his treatment of the elenchi contra with a study of the personalities listed in the elenchi pro Raimundo.

Raimundus-Lullus-Institut, Freiburg i. Br. CHARLES H. LOHR


The Bull Apostolicae curae (1896), which declared against the validity of Anglican orders, raised a number of issues: (1) the validity of
Archbishop Parker's ordination, (2) the sacramental intention of the Edwardine Ordinal, (3) Archbishop Cranmer's Eucharistic theology. The historical studies of Francis Clark, *Anglican Orders and Defect of Intention* (1956) and *Eucharistic Sacrifice and the Reformation* (1960; *ed. 1967*), which provided the most complete presentation of the argument in favor of the decision of the Bull, reopened the debate in Catholic circles and led Hughes to undertake an examination of the background of the papal decision. The result was *Absolutely Null and Utterly Void* (1968), wherein H. concluded that the judgment expressed in the Bull was motivated more by arguments of expediency than by theological considerations. In this new book H. deals with the theological issues involved in any reappraisal of Anglican orders, prescinding from the way they were handled at the time of *Apostolicae curae*, since a correct decision could have been reached for bad reasons.

The second part of this volume deals with the problem of the defect of intention alleged by Leo XIII. Clark had argued in his first book that it concerned the internal intention of the minister in the strict theological sense—in particular, the consecrators of Archbishop Parker. H. rejects Clark's argument based on the "principle of positive exclusion," i.e., a positive intention to exclude an essential of Christ's sacrament vitiates the whole sacramental intention. He argues that the consecrators of Parker had only one intention: to confer the ministry instituted by Christ (chap. 13). This leaves only the question of defect of form at issue. The defect of form, according to *Apostolicae curae*, resulted from the deliberate suppression of references to sacrifice and sacrificing priesthood. But what were the reasons for the suppression of such concepts in the Edwardine Ordinal?

In Clark's second book evidence was amassed to show that the late medieval doctrine about the Mass, as understood by Catholic theologians of the day, was orthodox and that it was this doctrine which was rejected by the English Reformers. He observed, moreover, that this has implications for the ordination controversy, i.e., Leo XIII correctly rejected the Edwardine Ordinal because of the circumstances of its origin, which rendered its wording incapable of serving as a sacramental form of ordination (*op. cit.*, p. 16). In the first part of his new study, which takes up two thirds of the text, H. attempts to show that the English Reformers were reacting against a deficient theology of the Eucharist and ministry. He opposes Clark's thesis about the soundness of sixteenth-century Eucharistic theology with the help of German scholarship—in particular, the investigations of E. Iserloh.

Three important conclusions emerge: (1) The intention of Parker's consecrator(s) was sufficient to convey the sacrament of orders; (2) the Edwardine Ordinal, as used by the English Reformers, was adequate for
the conferring of apostolic ministry; (3) both “the views of the Reformation as well as the theology of ministerial priesthood which underlie *Apostolicae curae* have been rendered untenable by new evidence which has become generally available in recent decades” (p. 2).

While there is no doubt that the English Reformers intended to break with the understanding of ministry and Eucharist held by the Latin Church, a careful reading of the sources and studies such as those of Clark and Hughes make it equally clear that no certain conclusion can be reached regarding the extent of the break. Only a prudential judgment can be made in the matter. This accounts for the fact that Clark and Hughes investigated the same sources and used, for the most part, the same secondary literature (mainly German), and yet reached opposing conclusions.

This, of course, leaves open the question of the historical continuity of Anglican orders. Such are the historical complexities of the problem of Anglican orders that another examination of the matter by a new commission is precluded. If a solution to this question is considered indispensable, following the tutioristic principles which have always guided the Latin Church in such matters, Rome will have to remain in doubt about the authenticity of Anglican orders. But if the old principle of apostolic succession by tactile ordination from a bishop in historical succession—a guarantee of authentic ministry—is replaced by a new principle which understands episcopal succession to be transmitted in and by ecclesial consensus expressed in various ways, then the question of the historical continuity of Anglican orders becomes marginal.

It is significant that current Roman Catholic literature on the subject of Anglican orders does not consider the issues raised by *Apostolicae curae* as central ones. The historical approach to resolving the question has been found inadequate and the theological understanding of orders represented by *Apostolicae curae* is generally recognized as unsatisfactory. The focus of attention is now centered on the intimate relation between ministry and church and the possibility of accepting that ministry of a community of faith which serves the essentials of apostolic life, faith, service, and authority. Such a ministry surely points to the presence of the apostolic Spirit, the living principle of continuity with the apostolic Church.

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Edward J. Kilmartin, S.J.


Though much of the dust stirred by "radical" or "death-of-God" theologies has settled, there remains standing their residual claim that the God of traditional theism—the transcendent Creator-God, cemented in the past and perpetuated by static institutional expressions—is incapable of speaking to the present of human experience or of opening up the future for human growth or consummation. At the same time, secularized man, gripped by the urgency of social crises and mesmerized by the "future shock" of a technological age, has abandoned traditional Christian eschatology to devote himself to immediate, short-term planning. Oddly enough, both religious and secular men were left wondering whether mankind has that "usable future" of which both dream. This pressing concern about the future has occasioned a massive literature, much of which radically questions the relevancy of a "Christ-centered" or "God-directed" eschatology. Two specifically "Christian" approaches to the future of man stand out of this literature as worthy of note: the two works reviewed here.

The title On the Way to the Future is expressive of the perspective of eschatology which Schwarz wishes to maintain. To call a view of the future "Christian" is to suggest that "the future has already begun in the resurrection of Jesus Christ." Even in the alienating experience of the failure of "secular progress" to produce the "new creation," man senses a movement toward final transformation. Christian eschatology, centered in the Christ event, "dares to anticipate proleptically" this future that is begun. This phrase, "proleptic anticipation," shields the traditional Lutheran simul iustus et peccator; for while S. maintains that "active anticipation strives for a better man, a more just society, and a more worldly world to live in" (p. 225), he nonetheless asserts that man's "intrinsic self-alienation" leaves him yet in anticipation of the "new world to come" which can only be brought about "through God's undeserved action" (p. 225). Like Carl Braaten, S. wants to mediate Luther's notion of the two kingdoms, world and Church, via a temporal image, not a spatial one. The Christ event reveals that the kingdom of God is "already now" and "not yet"; these, notes S., are the "present and future aspects of the power of God's rule" (p. 106).

Reformed theologian Berkouwer extends his voluminous Studies in Dogmatics to a lengthy, systematic treatment of God's promise and man's expectation of "new heavens and a new earth in which righteousness dwells" (2 Pt 3:13). Berkouwer, as Schwarz, is concerned to differentiate between futurology and eschatology: "the promise of the
future is not the religious counterpart of secular fortune-telling” (p. 12). Christian eschatology is directed at neither metaphysical abstractions nor spurious and unrelated future events; it is “always concerned with the expectation of the Christ who has already been revealed” and whose parousia is awaited (p. 13). True eschatology, claims B., is “actual-teleology,” a catch phrase which signals the rejection of any “modern idealist or existentialist categories” in favor of an exclusively “biblical proclamation of the future” (p. 30).

These are markedly different treatments of eschatology, despite their common agreement about the future world that is established and on the way. B.’s often tedious and repetitive work focuses on the problem of man “falling asleep” awaiting the “return” (p. 65). With the dogmatic assertion of the resurrection and parousia as its given, most of B.’s book is devoted to alleviating the “crisis of delay” by pointing out and analyzing the “signs of the times” of the coming so anxiously awaited: the “antichrist,” the millennium, and the “restoration of Israel.” B.’s strength lies in the extended conversation in which he engages with recent biblical scholarship and prominent spokesmen of Protestant and Catholic theology. His weakness stems from so guarding the eschatological hope for “the last things” from “personalization” that he cannot converse as well with secular man. To the latter he can only proclaim “Eschatos!”

S., on the other hand, has broadened his discussion to an interdisciplinary, ecumenical, and catholic perspective in order to indicate that secular man’s passion for “progress” originated in the linear concept of time central to Judeo-Christian religion. His point is that the tension between “secular progress” and “Christian hope” results from the loss of this religious origin: progress entails a starting point and a telos. Secular concern for the future is part of the “proleptic anticipation,” but it is preliminary and incomplete apart from history’s “God-promised goal” (p. 24). This perspective automatically draws S. into a dialectic which converses with and draws insights from biblical research, contemporary theology, biological and earth sciences, and existential and Marxist philosophy.

The rigor and incisiveness of B.’s systematic placement of eschatology cannot be slighted. However, if you will pardon my kind of Tillichian bias, I much prefer S.’s correlative, dialectical approach. He brings a vitality and sense of urgency to this discussion at a time when “a Christ-centered and God-provided final transformation and new creation of man and of his environment seems to be an old-fashioned idea finally to be discarded” (p. 11).

Georgetown University  
James W. Thomasson

Cistercian Publications first issued this book in 1971 under the title *Merton's Theology of Prayer*. H. has written the first extensive analysis of the thought of the Trappist Thomas Merton (1915–68). M. wrote over fifty books and well over two hundred and fifty published articles during his twenty-seven years as a monk, many of which were directly concerned with the central preoccupation of his life and writing, the place of prayer in contemporary Christian life. H. has produced a concise, well-written study, compressing within a relatively short compass this vast amount of material with consistent insight into the roots of M.'s thought.

M. constantly emphasized the transcendental and immanent elements of man's relationship to God and the need for some human experience of God, without which man cannot fully realize his human potential. Contemplative prayer is the font in which man will find his real self, and in finding his real self he will also find God, the origin and ground of his being. Contemplative prayer, for M., is not to be confused with the exaggerated heights of "mysticism." It is a simple search for God, a continuous effort to realize God, that produces a constant awareness of God's presence in Christ within the depths of one's own being. M. never wrote any one specific treatise on prayer that contains all the elements of his spirituality, but H. has succeeded in systematizing all the key elements of M.'s theology of prayer. The central message of M.'s spirituality is that human life should be a continuous seeking for God, finding God by love and sharing that love with other men.

H.'s well-structured study has four analytical chapters, followed by a tightly written critical evaluation which emphasizes the originality of M.'s thought on contemplative prayer, its contemporaneity, and its value for modern man in his quest for God and meaning in life.

M. was concerned with the problem of achieving divine union and finding God immanently present within oneself, the sources of that divine union, the modes and consequences of that union. H. treats these topics in the first chapter. Then he deals with another foundational aspect of M.'s spirituality, the prerequisite transformation of consciousness within man himself as a mode of finding his authentic self which is an antidote for modern man's alienation and spiritual isolation. This estrangement from himself, from society, and from God has resulted in modern man's apparent incapacity for any kind of genuine religious experience. After entering into the deepest center of himself in contemplative prayer, the Christian is enabled to pass through that center to discover his true freedom as a son loved by God. M.'s notion of personal renunciation and sacrifice in the life of prayer, as a means to this personal freedom, is then analyzed. M. attempts to call modern man,
confused and adrift in a technological society, back to the real and abiding human values in everyday life by highlighting this personal freedom, thus re-establishing the integrity of his own human person.

The third is the key chapter, on the meaning, nature, and significance of contemplative prayer in M.’s spirituality. The essence of contemplative prayer is a habitual awareness of, and listening to, the presence of God in Christ within one’s being which elicits a loving, open response to that divine presence. H. admirably highlights the apostolic thrust of the contemplative life and the function of the Eucharistic liturgy in the life of the Christian contemplative. It is axiomatic in M.’s spirituality that before a Christian can given himself to others in apostolic work, he must become imbued with the spirit of Christ attained through contemplative prayer. M. was convinced that the most important and most enduring work of a Christian must be accomplished within the depths of his personal being.

M.’s balanced view of asceticism, his much-controverted attitude toward “the world,” and the function of solitude in the life of a contemplative Christian in attaining communion with God and one’s fellow men are analyzed in the fourth chapter.

Neither M. nor H. presents any planned technique of contemplative prayer. Both highlight the need of contemplative prayer in an authentically Christian life. Those trying to live such a Christian life in the modern world, as well as those trying to form new types of Christian communities, should find this book very appealing. Another attractive feature is that H. has compiled the most extensive Merton bibliography published to date. H. has brought out well the reasons why no other contemporary American writer has had the impact M. has had on the development of Christian spirituality in the 50’s and 60’s.

Canisius College, Buffalo

Frederic J. Kelly, S.J. 


The publication of this volume at once attests and abets the recent renewal of scholarly interest in Ritschl’s theology. During the last decade or so, Ritschl has been the subject of a steadily increasing number of dissertations, journal articles, and monographs, all prompted, in great measure, by an underlying intent to rescue R. from his erstwhile neo-orthodox detractors. One of the most valuable features of the present volume is the fifty-page Introduction, in which H. surveys recent Ritschl scholarship (particularly unpublished dissertations), summarizes the
inner dynamics of R.'s system, and comments insightfully on R.'s theological significance for his own day and ours.

The three essays here presented—two for the first time in English translation—are the "Prolegomena" to *The History of Pietism* (1880), the *Theology and Metaphysics* (1881), and the *Instruction in the Christian Religion* (1875¹, 1881², 1886³). Given the relative paucity of Ritschl material in English, any translation is welcome; but these essays are particularly well chosen, since each possesses intrinsic significance. Besides advancing the well-known thesis that Pietism represents the recrudescence, on evangelical soil, of a monastic and Anabaptist *Weltflucht*, the "Prolegomena" is a splendid introduction to R.'s characteristic historiographical procedures and particularly to his operative axiological category of the Christian *Lebensideal*. The *T. & M.*, on the other hand, tends to confirm the widespread judgment that philosophical thinking was not R.'s forte; yet this essay provides the most succinct and forceful statement of his opposition to speculative (Hegelian) theology, Protestant scholasticism, mysticism, etc., and should be read as a commentary on his somewhat obscure methodological assertions in the opening pages of Vol. 3 of *Justification and Reconciliation*. The *Instruction* is not so much a summary of Christian doctrine as of R.'s own theological system; it was first published in 1875 after the completion of his monumental work *The Christian Doctrine of Justification and Reconciliation* (3 vols., 1870-74). This essay was previously translated into English in 1901 by Alice Mead Swing from the third German edition. The present translation follows Swing but takes note of important variations between the first and third German editions—an obvious plus for students of R.'s theological development.

The translations are most readable. A random check also indicates that they are quite accurate, although on p. 86, l. 7, *Ehrfurcht* should have been rendered as "reverence" rather than "fear"; and ll. 29–30 on p. 112 should read: "In the exposition of the prophet Joel which Veit Dietrich published in 1547 from Luther's lectures" (not "Luther's lectures of 1547," since Luther died in 1546). Some typographical errors have also slipped in and the "Notes" to the "Prolegomena" are especially confused and confusing (e.g., notes 92 and 95 on p. 145 should refer to R.'s essay "Die Entstehung der lutherischen Kirche" (1876), not to his youthful monograph *Die Entstehung der altkatholischen Kirche* (1850 ff.). Such lapses, however, are relatively minor and should not detract from the signal service rendered by the translator and publisher in making readily available this valuable source book.

*Union Theological Seminary, N.Y.C.*

DAVID W. LOTZ

*The Edges of Language* records the advance of one of the most controversial American theologians from the verificationism of his earlier work, *The Secular Meaning of the Gospel*, to a conception of religious language that is both postpositivistic and posttheistic. This development in van Buren's thought has been strongly influenced by Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Investigations*; and one could plausibly hold that the point of his book is to show how it is possible and even desirable for a nontheistic Wittgensteinian to use traditional religious language.

After first observing that traditional Christian claims seem to the contemporary educated Christian to be "not so much wrong as too explicit" (p. 9), van Buren rejects factual theism and doctrinal literalism as well as the moral and quasi-metaphysical interpretations of religious language that have been offered by recent analytic philosophers on the ground that these are all based on a faulty understanding of language. He then sketches a broadly Wittgensteinian account of language, which emphasizes its public and rule-governed character and its setting in a shared way of life; and he uses this account of language to argue against positivist critics of religion that language about God must be considered as part of the whole pattern of religious linguistic activity and in the context of religious behavior. Then, in the two chapters which are the central and original part of the book, van Buren explicates the basic metaphor of his work: language is a platform which has a central area governed by clear rules and also edges, which are extensions of our ordinary language, but at which language functions in a peculiar way and even threatens to break down completely. Among these peripheral areas are puns and jokes, poetry, the language of lovers, metaphysics, and religious language. Different religions extend language in different ways; both the religion of Israel and of Christianity extend language in their concern with history. Christian theology, for van Buren, is essentially a prolonged argument about what rules are to govern this extension of language (p. 130). The word "God" functions as the furthest limit in this extension of language; it is not the name of an entity and is not subject to the criteria of coherence governing the central areas of our language. Rather, "God" is a "religious way of indicating all that could possibly be said on some matter of great concern" (p. 145). He concludes with a brief consideration of the moral and metaphysical aspects of religious language.

The details of van Buren's argument, though rarely profound, are
frequently interesting and are put with commendable forthrightness; but his book is marred by some serious faults. First, he generally ignores the classical forms of Christian theism which do not take God's existence as an empirical hypothesis (e.g., Anselm and Aquinas) as well as the more recent work of Hartshorne, Pike, and Plantinga in natural theology. Second, in his desire to show the adequacy of his account of Christian religious language, he disregards or minimizes theistic elements in the Christian religious tradition; thus he finds the biblical claim that God speaks embarrassing and misleading. Third, he frequently appeals to what "the educated Christian" would be prepared to say or accept. Such appeals are almost always invidious and question-begging; and they leave unexamined the possibility that the educated Christian of our time may have to criticize or revise some commonly held views if he wishes to remain a believing Christian. Fourth, he repeats and magnifies the obscurities in Wittgenstein's suggestions about language and "forms of life." At times it seems that every new sentence requires a new form of life. The reasons for van Buren's muddled treatment of this issue lie in his neglect of the distinctions between truth and meaning and between logical and psychological accounts of meaning that have been fundamental to analytic philosophy of language. Fifth, if our use of "God" is an expression of our serious concern and has no cognitive value, I would suggest that we should forget traditional religious language and look for less misleading ways of expressing our concern, e.g., the use of italics or speaking with a loud voice. Sixth, I would suggest that van Buren's description of the functioning of religious language fails to meet the criterion of respecting the religious mystery which he himself lays down for any such account. His own account of religious language in effect reduces it to an emotion-laden linguistic anomaly.

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JOHN P. LANGAN, S.J.


This is an altogether interesting book with much to recommend it. The original work was done as part of a doctoral dissertation for the Department of Social Relations at Harvard. It is an attempt to approach the understanding of the psychology of religious belief systems and the failure of belief in such systems from an empirical point of view. The theoretical context employed is that of psychoanalysis, with particular emphasis on the concepts of Erik Erikson.

The subjects were selected on the basis of a questionnaire distributed
in several theological schools. The questionnaire provided a rough assessment of tendencies to be liberal or conservative in theological perspectives and also indicated the extent of doubt about beliefs the individual experienced. The more extensive psychological testing and interviewing was done on a subset of subjects drawn from the larger group of subjects on the basis of questionnaire results. The main substance of the book rests upon the case reports of ten subjects who run the gamut from staunch religious conservatism, with no manifestations of doubt in beliefs, to radical liberalism, in which doubt is handled respectively by commitment to a liberal belief system in one case and by pervasive and persistent doubt in the other.

The basic thesis is well stated and amply justified: that the nature and degree of religious belief, or conversely the nature and intensity of religious doubt as the opposite of belief, is a function of important personality variables. What emerges from the data collected in this study is that the content and form of religious beliefs are quite closely related to the patterning of internalizations and correlative externalizations which derive from the individual's inner experience. That experience is a product of his life history and the actualities in terms of persons and circumstances in which that experience took shape. While the study was conducted on Protestant theology students, so that the information it provides may be limited in view of the narrow base it rests on, nonetheless the basic thesis would seem to be more broadly relevant and applicable to religious phenomena in general. One might suggest that Protestant theology students are more useful to study in this regard, since they are more apt to reflect a broader variability in their belief systems and thus would be more likely to reflect the divergency in individual backgrounds. But I suspect with the proper amendments, taking into consideration a more consistent standard of orthodoxy and perhaps a greater trend toward religious conservatism, that perhaps a similar pattern of psychological relevance could be demonstrated in Catholic divinity students, or in those of any denomination for that matter.

Helfaer provides us with a more explicit theory of religious doubt. He sees the religious doubter as one who lacks a unified, coherent orientation to life, and who is in conflict as to how to respond to his world and his experience. This represents a disruption of the processes of ego synthesis in which the ego is either unable to integrate itself around one superordinate life orientation, or having relinquished an older orientation is in the process of renewed conflict resolution in the service of establishing a new one. Thus the religious belief system can serve an important psychological function in the stabilization and definition of a
sense of identity or self. An important conceptual contribution here is H.'s notion of "precocious ego identity," which he finds characteristic of certain kinds of conservative Protestant ideologies. Such precocious identity formations, however, are predicated on premature internalizations of parental imagoes and may be susceptible to later disillusion or reorganization under the impact of further developmental and life experiences.

The material presented raises in a very forceful and direct way an important and relatively unexplored question. The question has to do with the psychodynamics of religious belief systems. H.'s account follows in Erikson's footsteps in suggesting there is an intimate connection between such belief systems and the formation, integration, and maintenance of important personality dimensions. H. also suggests that the line of influence also runs in the opposite direction: from the internal organization of the personality and the capacity for ego synthesis to the formation and maintenance of belief systems. There is much in this that yearns for fuller understanding and more penetrating documentation. However, H. has made a substantial and important contribution.

Cambridge, Mass. W. W. MEISSNER, S.J.


This is a somewhat disappointing book, which seems to promise more than it provides. It promises a synthesis of psychoanalysis with existential philosophy and Zen Buddhism. Unfortunately, any connection with psychoanalysis seems remote, the existentialism is a heavy leaning on Martin Buber's I-thou concept of personal relatedness, and the Buddhism seems to come out to be a somewhat superficial, if nonetheless pragmatic, application of the tenets of Sivananda. Consequently there is more loose conceptualization and easy slippage in this book.

A major distinction that plays itself out through the pages is that between ego and self. As is implied by the title, it is much better if one gets to the level of psychic attainment and integration represented by the self, and much worse if one is mired in the badness of ego. It is not at all clear in the development of the argument what the authors are talking about. They are obviously trying to describe a transition from psychic impairment and neurotic self-engrossment to a state of spiritual potentiality and realization, which is nestled under the rubric of "self."

The argument runs that this evil ego is somehow identified with the psychoanalytic concept of ego. Any resemblance between what the
authors describe as "ego" and the psychoanalytic concept of ego is purely coincidental. What is it, then? As nearly as I can make out, it represents some variant of neurotic self-involvement, defensive conflictualness, and narcissistic entitlement. Perhaps it lies closer to what has become known as the "false self." Nor is it quite clear what the authors intend by their notion of self. Their presentation enjoys no systematic development or frame of reference within which it can be conceptualized and integrated with psychoanalytic thinking. Consequently it must be said that the concepts of ego and self as they operate in this volume are in effect philosophico-theological conceptions which are given rather arbitrary connotations by the authors and bear little resemblance to any systematic formulations. They can be taken, however, to represent psychic states of spiritual deprivation on the one hand, and spiritual openness and potentiality for growth on the other.

Other confusions have to do with the presentation of the therapeutic methods that the authors have evolved and apparently utilized with some success. We have to take their word for the latter. But they advance the claim that the approach they offer is distinct from so-called encounter groups and also distinct from more commonly recognized therapy groups. However, in reading the details of what is involved in the organization and functioning of their groups—even though this is presented in only the vaguest of terms—I can see no difference from what my own experience of psychoanalytically oriented therapy groups has been. Such groups have been conducted by responsible therapists over the course of decades. The problems that the authors describe in the participants in these groups are by and large substantially neurotic difficulties, and there is little reason to avoid regarding such group efforts as therapeutic. What they have to say about the way in which their groups are run is quite straightforward and seems altogether sensible. Their contribution, however, comes in the introduction of the meditative techniques of Hatha Yoga and Zen Buddhism as a follow-up to the therapeutic gains achieved through group participation.

Instead of the vague distinctions offered in the book, it would be much more useful to have some of the authors' rationales and approaches spelled out in more specific detail, as well as having some indication of how the process works and with what effect. As it is, we are left only with a surmise based upon the authors' assurances that it is all very helpful and useful.

The other element which is of importance in this presentation is the authors' enlargement of the focus of their concern to more cognitive dimensions. Their great commandment seems to be "Thou shalt not be an ego, thou shalt strive to be a self!" Since ego is evil and self is good, all
evil can then somehow be attributed to the persistence of ego, and a utopian wistfulness and wishfulness can be dangled on the tail of the elusive self. Thus not only the use of drugs but the rise of Hitler and the Nazi movement and Vietnam will all be derived from and attributed to the persistence of ego in our midst. It should be said immediately that this is serious and important stuff. If the authors are quite correct in labeling the underlying propensities as paranoid, they do us a disservice in that the basic elements of their understanding are so loosely constructed. The argument quickly slips to a level of moralizing philosophical reflection, rather than helping us to understand the basic mechanisms involved in the transition from a level of personal pathology to a level of social anguish, so that they leave us with little more than a cosmogony of good and evil. Thus we are left with the implication that if everyone could surrender their attachment to the evil ego within them, could enjoy the liberalizing benefits of the authors’ group experience, and could come to an achievement and realization of that authentic selfhood within them, all evil would be dissolved and the peace of God would reign among men.

A significant fallacy and a terribly naive misunderstanding underlie such a view. The view naively postulates that the route through psychic integration and spiritual maturity is a valid corrective of social and cultural evils, and that such a route is available to most men. To me, neither assumption is valid. Moreover, the crucial point overlooked in such a reflection is that in some profound sense, given the human condition and the potentialities of men’s nature, the rudiments of man’s psychopathologies and of his capacity for spiritual and human greatness cannot be so simply divorced. The essential path for reflective men lies in the direction of a deeper and more probing understanding of these interrelationships rather than in the direction of moralizing oversimplification.

If the present volume presents itself as an attempt to integrate a religious and psychiatric perspective, it does not seem to live up to that expectation. If the authors have achieved an integrated approach in the therapeutic efforts they have implemented, the integration does not extend to or reveal itself in the formulations of the present volume. If real synthesis between these respective and important areas is to be achieved, it must be done in terms of the solid understanding of the respective contributions of both man’s religious quest and his scientific understanding about the workings of his own mind. Perhaps the most difficult distortion in the dialectical process between psychiatry and religion is the tendency of the religious mind to prematurely moralize its conceptualizations. Perhaps this is only a dialectical reaction to the opposite
tendency of psychiatrists to prescind from the moral and valuing aspects of man's psychic experience and existence. The present volume seems to err decidedly in the direction of the religionizing tendency. One cannot achieve a synthesis of religion and psychiatry by simply substituting religious concepts for basic psychiatric understandings.

Cambridge, Mass.                  W. W. MEISSNER, S.J.


The author has not written a history. That was not his purpose. He has brought together "a collection of primary source materials" which throw a good deal of light upon the subject dealt with and which should be of considerable service to anyone attempting to construct a history of the vicissitudes endured by religious bodies, Christian and non-Christian, since the establishment in 1949 of the People's Republic of China.

Mao Tse-tung's own view of religion has been clearly and consistently, if infrequently, stated. (1) The ancient and traditional religions of China—Buddhism, Taoism, and the popular forms of animistic superstitions—are strongholds of reaction, one "of the four thick ropes binding the Chinese people, particularly the peasants." The other three ropes are the political system, the clan system, and the male domination of women. (2) The Christian religion is a form of cultural aggression, serving the interests of foreign imperialism. (3) Nevertheless, religious beliefs are not to be rooted out by force but by persuasion. (4) Freedom to believe or not to believe is the right of every citizen so long as he obeys the law. Statements by other party and state leaders and official documents, both before and after the accession to power, reflect the same general view.

As Marxists, the leaders of the regime, and first of all Mao himself, no doubt expect that with the development of a socialist society religion will in due course wither away. Speaking to a meeting of Christian leaders in 1950, Chou En-lai gave a rather genial expression to this point of view: "So we are going to go on letting you teach, trying to convert the people. . . . After all we both believe that truth will prevail; we think your beliefs untrue and false, therefore if we are right, the people will reject them, and your church will decay. If you are right, then the people will believe you, but as we are sure that you are wrong, we are prepared for that risk. . . ."

This freedom was conditioned, however, upon the acceptance of what
Chou En-lai called "the principle of the independence and self-administration of their churches." The insistence upon the elimination of foreign control and influence reflected not Marxist doctrine but Mao's view of the churches as tools of cultural aggression and servants of foreign interests. Refusal by Catholic authorities to accept this condition led to open conflict in the early 50's, to the imprisonment of many bishops, priests, religious, and lay people, and to the violent death of some. It also resulted in a painful and continuing division within the Chinese Catholic community.

There is, nevertheless, considerable evidence in the documents compiled by MacInnis that the Protestant churches and that faction of the Catholic Church which accepted the principle of "the three autonomies" (self-support, self-government, self-propagation) were not prevented from carrying on their religious activities. The degree of freedom was considerably circumscribed (all educational and medical institutions, e.g., had been nationalized by the end of 1951) and varied from place to place. It is evident from the documents that many Christian leaders responded to Mao's invitation in 1957 to "let a hundred flowers bloom" with sharp criticisms. The result, if one reads between the lines, was that they shared with other critics who responded too enthusiastically to the invitation in the repressive reaction which followed.

Between the years 1963 and 1965 a sharp debate about the place of religion in a Marxist society was carried on by party theoreticians in the columns of leading newspapers and journals. The debate ended, as did any pretense of peaceful coexistence, with the outbreak of the Cultural Revolution in 1966, when Red Guards forcibly closed every place of religious worship in China. There is nothing in the documents to suggest that this was an expression of official policy. Neither is there anything in the documents to suggest that this overt attack upon religion met with official disapproval.

The glimmer of hope in the generally somber scene which emerges from these documents is that, the wave of youthful zealotry having subsided and organized religion having been so shattered as to eliminate any ground to fear it as a possible counterrevolutionary threat, the leaders of the regime in accordance with the present trend towards normalizing relations with the noncommunist world, might be disposed to give substance, at least minimally, to the consistently declared guarantee of religious freedom.

In concluding his work, M. warns that "the lack of access to information and to individuals in China, and the volatile nature of Chinese politics even now, rule out the possibility of any meaningful
speculation on future developments in religious policy and treatment of believers.” This will not dissuade anyone interested in the subject from engaging in speculation, however beset with uncertainties the exercise may be. The documents compiled by M. offer him a wealth of information upon which to ground his speculations and supply the historian with valuable material out of which to reconstruct the record of the recent past.

Switzerland

GEORGE H. DUNNE, S.J.

SHORTER NOTICES


The Greek New Testament of the UBS was first published in 1966, the product of the collaboration of some of the world's best NT textual critics (K. Aland, M. Black, B. M. Metzger, and A. Wikgren). The publication of its third edition is still awaited (for which the collaboration of C. M. Martini, S.J., rector of the Biblical Institute, Rome, was also secured). However, because it has been prepared for some time now, it was possible for Metzger to issue this companion volume, which he had been preparing for several years, as a textual commentary on the third edition. The UBS Greek NT differs from other critical editions of the NT mainly in two ways: (1) its apparatus criticus is limited to the chief (1440) textual problems of the Greek text today (for minor problems one has to consult other editions or the manuscripts themselves); (2) each textual problem noted in the apparatus is accompanied by a “full citation of representative evidence” and by a letter that assesses the value of the reading adopted in the text; thus [A] indicates that “the text is virtually certain,” [B] that “there is some degree of doubt,” [C] that “there is considerable degree of doubt whether the text or the apparatus contains the superior reading,” and [D] that “there is a very high degree of doubt concerning the reading selected for the text.” M.'s commentary now sets forth “the reasons that led the Committee, or a majority of the members of the Committee, to adopt certain variant readings for inclusion in the text and to relegate certain other readings to the apparatus” (p. v). Hence, this companion volume is not a commentary in the ordinary sense, i.e., one that seeks to explain the meaning of words, phrases, sentences, or paragraphs of biblical books. It is rather a precommentary on the biblical text, seeking to set forth briefly for each book of the NT the main problems involved in the transmitted Greek text and the resolution of them as reflected in the voting of the committee. As a member of it, M. had access to the “more or less full notes of the discussions,” and he has also included comments on about 600 additional minor variant readings in the NT (most of them in Acts).

Needless to say, this is an invaluable book; for it not only sorts out the textual problems of moment and pro-
vides an accurate description of the most relevant readings of the mss. and pertinent evidence from ancient versions and patristic citations, but it also shows how a group of scholars working together have resolved issues and provided the best Greek NT text available for translation into modern languages. M.'s careful scholarship is reflected on every page of the commentary; abundant coverage is provided for secondary literature. When there were differences of opinion in the committee, the vote of the majority was recorded, and the dissenting view is explained in square brackets, with the member identified by his initials (e.g., pp. 82, 331, 574). M. has also provided a brief introduction which surveys literature on NT text-problems, the history of the transmission of the NT text, criteria used in choosing among conflicting readings, and lists of local text witnesses. An appendix presents a supplementary list of Greek mss. Every serious theologian should have the UBS Greek NT and this companion volume.

Joseph A. Fitzmyer, S.J.


The discovery among the Dead Sea Scrolls of fragments of a Targum on Job as well as the identification of Codex Neofiti I as a complete Palestinian Targum on the Pentateuch have provoked considerable new interest and vitality in Targumic studies. M. had previously published a major work on the subject, The New Testament and the Palestinian Targum to the Pentateuch (Rome, 1966). While the debate about the antiquity of the Palestinian Targum and the nature of the Aramaic language used in Palestine in the first century A.D. continues (see J. A. Fitzmyer's review of M.'s work, TS 29 [1968] 321–26), the student will be grateful for the present volume, a general introduction to Targumic studies and their relevance for NT scholarship. Published a few months earlier by the Irish University Press, the book is not a popularization of the author's previous work but almost entirely a new work.

In Part 1, M. introduces the notion of Targum by placing it within the context of synagogue worship and also discusses the Aramaic language and the characteristics and transmission of the Targums. There is a clear summary, cautiously expressed, of the arguments for an early, perhaps pre-Christian, date for the Palestinian Targum. Part 2 singles out a succession of parallels between the Targums and various NT passages, several of them developed in some detail. Minimally, there can be no doubt that both the Targums and the NT witness to popular exegetical traditions current in Palestine at an earlier date; whether the former gives an insight into the language of the primitive community is another question. M. sets forth a case for considerable Targumic light on the NT, especially the Johannine literature, but he does so with awareness of the complexity of the NT traditions and language. An appendix to the book offers brief introductions to all the extant Targums, with some useful bibliographical information.

George W. MacRae, S.J.


L., of the Fuller Theological Seminary, is well known to all students of the Dead Sea Scrolls as one of the first bibliographers of scholarship on the Scrolls. In the present work he offers the nonspecialist reader a survey of the whole question of the Scrolls, after a
quarter century of discussion, in relation to the NT. Though it is not divided, the book has two distinct parts. In the first, L. introduces the Scrolls themselves, their nature, the organization and attitudes of the Qumran sect, the theology of Qumran, the portrait of the Teacher of Righteousness. There is also a chapter on the ancient accounts of the Essenes, whom L. does not identify categorically with the sect of Qumran. The second part of the book takes up the alleged parallels between Qumran and the NT under a succession of headings, including John the Baptist, the early Church, Paul, Hebrews, John, and the life, teachings, and redemptive work of Jesus.

Throughout there are useful brief summaries for each chapter, and the book has a select bibliography and several indices. The exposition of Qumran life and ideas wisely relies for the most part more on citation of the Scrolls themselves, in L.'s own translation, than on discursive interpretations of them. The book is a useful survey of the whole area of relationships between Qumran and the NT, but it is not a mere factual survey. L. takes a very moderate, even conservative, position toward the extent of Qumran influence on the NT. No harm in that, of course, but his presentation is marred by a preoccupation with refuting the "radical" claims of such scholars as Dupont-Sommer, Allegro, and others, and this polemic is distracting. The tendency to adopt a minimalist position regarding the extent of Qumran influence seems implicitly to serve the purpose of maintaining a (quite unnecessary) claim to the utter "originality" of Jesus and of early Christianity.

George W. MacRae, S.J.


This book is divided into six parts: the concept of inspiration as it is found in the Bible, patristic thought on inspiration, the Scholastic synthesis, Scholastic and later Protestant thought, contemporary Catholic thought, and an approach to a synthesis. The historical sections are well done; many of the criticisms of earlier views are very well taken, although some are questionable; thus, does it necessarily follow: "If God had really 'dictated' a text—however literally the anthropomorphism might be taken—then surely that text and its verbal exactness ... would have been the object of continuing divine concern" (p. 85)? The conclusion is that the analogy of instrumental causality is to be given up and that inspiration is to be thought of primarily as a social charism, a constituent of the Church, which acted in various ways on different authors.

When we consider the conclusion, we must ask either of two questions: Has V. done the work of a theologian if he has not produced a concept applicable in all cases when the same term is used, or has he actually produced such a concept, vague as it may be? Since there is a divine action involved, does not the notion of condescension, which he takes from Chrysostom, devolve to some type of instrumental causality?

All communication is social and contextual, but it is incorrect in the case of the biblical works to view their authors as merely spokesmen of the community; at times they were that, but at times they spoke to the community, at times even against the community. Thus, to view inspiration as a movement through the community to the author is not universally valid. Obviously, this observation is not a positive indicator for the progress of theological thought, but it should show that we had better beware of further false steps.
Undoubtedly the progress of historical exegesis has created great difficulties for any speculative consideration of inspiration and the annexed topic of biblical inerrancy—one which V is disposed to discard—but perhaps the reason that more progress has not been made is that distinctions have been insufficiently made in theological considerations. What in a given context is meant by God’s word? How in a given context can the Bible be said to be God’s word? Is every portion of the Bible God’s word in the same sense? How is the Bible God’s word for some one today? Is the historical meaning of a text God’s word today? And so on.

For the trenchant views concerning positions of authors of the past and the present the book is worth while.

John J O’Rourke


A strange book. It could have been most interesting as a history of an idea, or as a theological speculation on the evidence of Scripture, or on the mystery of evil—with its manifestation in human suffering and in man’s experience with malice and totalitarianism. Or it could have been a consideration of the imaginative literature of evil, the development of the literary figure of Lucifer or Satan, or the Promethean myth in Western civilization. A touches on all these possibilities, yet, in the end, she has written a cautionary tract in which she seems to presuppose what she does not demonstrate that the devil exists as “a great lord in his own sphere.” Although she states on p 1, “It is by no means certain that the Devil exists,” again and again she talks of him as if he were an individual, personal, conscious being, as much a figure in world history as Napoleon or Benedict Arnold, but then she describes him as lurking “between being and not being,’ participating in both, while, with subtle strategy, unlike God, he “does not insist on his reality.” A’s best chapters speculate on the psychology of revolt—Lucifer’s + that of Adam and Eve—and on evil’s positive function in increasing man’s choices and opportunities, her oddest is on alleged man-devil pacts. The book includes sixteen pages of interesting illustrations—Goya’s “The Disasters of War,” Blake, Picasso, a Tibetan Buddhist “Bull Copulating with Woman”—which have little specific connection with the text. Unforgivably, there is no index and no bibliography.

Raymond A Schroth, S.J.


M is professor of historical theology in the University of London and a committed Thomist who has written extensively on natural theology. This book is his 1970-71 Gifford Lectures in Natural Theology. A principal aim is to “vindicate a fundamentally and unashamedly metaphysical approach to theism” (p vii). Natural theology has enjoyed a vigorous revival of late and M chose to do a survey of recent writings. As befits one writing in the English context, he begins with a discussion of the meaningfulness of language about God. Central also to discussions of God in analytical philosophy has been the revival of interest in the ontological argument. M presents a clear and lucid account of the recent debates on this which have engaged the attention of such philosophers as Hartshorne, Malcolm, Findlay, and Plantinga. A lengthy (two chapters) treatment of the transcendental Thomism of Rahner, Lonergan, and Coreth is also presented. M considers their argument that God is the necessary
condition for the possibility of human knowledge a most important contribution and hopes to make their work better known in the Anglo-Saxon philosophical world.

M. restates his own approach to natural knowledge of God in chap. 6, "The Case for Realism," and chap. 7, "Creature and Creator." As he admits, there is little new here except a placing of his interpretation of the cosmological argument in the context of recent discussions and objections. For one who is so well acquainted with recent treatments, it is somewhat surprising how little M.'s own views have been affected. The discussion of God and time (chap. 10) was especially disappointing in this regard. M. seems to have missed the plausibility of recent arguments which both admit an element of temporality in God and affirm His transcendence.

Over-all, this work is an excellent discussion of issues involved in natural knowledge of God, especially the ontological and cosmological arguments in their traditional forms and in recent works. The treatment of the relation of natural knowledge of God to grace and revelation (chap. 9) makes this book of interest not just to philosophers but also to theologians.

Stephen Rowntree, S.J.


A thoughtful and all too brief study of one of the most perplexing and disturbing problems in the contemporary Church. M.'s work reveals a long, deeply searching, and probingly personal struggle with the rudiments of Christian conscience and the vicissitudes of ecclesiastical authority. The tensions he struggles with are age-old: freedom vs. obedience, conscience vs. authority, individual vs. institution. He has successfully grasped one of the most basic issues in the whole question of authority, which has the tendency to elude most thinkers on the subject. Rather than the polarization and dichotomization between conscience and authority, he is able to see them in their essential congruence. He is able to see that the question of authority is not simply one of institutional derivations, nor is it merely a question of self-possession. The fact is that there are multiple authorities. There is at least an external authority and an internal authority. It is inescapable that they can survive only in terms of each other. If there is to be a truce between them, despite M.'s wishful optimism, there cannot be truce without tension, and I would suspect that the tension carries within an element of ultimate irreducibility. M. is to be applauded for his effort, and those who are prepared to have their assumptions about authority in the Church brought into probing question are advised to read it.

W. W. Meissner, S.J.


This book concerns primarily the influence in the sixteenth century of the sceptical ideas contained in Cicero's Academica. Among the many intellectual movements which accompanied the social turmoil of the times, one of the most important was a tendency to assume a sceptical attitude with regard to traditional doctrine. This tendency had in common with other Renaissance movements the fact that its representatives looked back to classical authors for the expression of their ideas. The sceptics made use of Cicero, Diogenes Laertius, Plutarch, Sextus Empiricus. S.'s study shows that Cicero's dialogue served as the
major source of information about ancient scepticism until the first printed translation of Sextus Empiricus (1562). After outlining the tradition of the Academica from ancient authors like Lactantius and Augustine by way of medieval writers like John of Salisbury to early humanists like Petrarch to Salutati, S. concentrates on the sixteenth century. In the early years of the Reformation the debate concerning scepticism and the ideas contained in Cicero’s work involved Erasmus and Castellio pro, and Melanchthon and Beza contra. In mid-century a dispute at the University of Paris on the question whether Cicero’s work can provide a suitable vehicle for teaching philosophy to young students involved Ramus’ friend and associate Omer Talon against the Aristotelian establishment represented by Pierre Galland and Guy de Brusé. In Italy the traditional Aristotelianism was defended against the Academica by Giulio Castellani (1558). In Protestant Germany the Jena professor Johannes Rosa composed a commentary on the work (1571) in which he tried to avoid the danger that Cicero’s eloquence might lead students to accept his scepticism. Common themes through these disputes were the epistemological question of the reliability of sense experience and the fear that the sceptical attitude would lead to an overthrow of the established system of education, law, and religion.

Charles H. Lohr


Festschriften are notoriously difficult to review, but this one is especially so due to the large number of contributions—thirty-seven. Furthermore, although some articles deal with persons and issues of general interest (Hus, Cusa, Luther, Gropper, et al.), many are concerned with relatively narrow areas of research and even local history. Nonetheless, all at least focus on the period from about 1300 to 1600, and thus, in principle, will be of interest to Church historians for the period. The names of some contributors will be new even to scholars who specialize in this era; other names (e.g., Paul de Vooght, Erich Meuthen, Wolfgang Reinhard, Erwin Iserloh) will be familiar.

The fact that the editor resorts to a simple tripartite chronological arrangement of the contributions suggests that topical arrangement was impractical because of the variety of topics covered. Perhaps all the articles could be gathered under the general rubric of “Reform,” but that term would have to be defined broadly indeed. However, the point to be insisted upon is that, because of the brevity and wide range of the articles, the volume is an important one. In some ways, as a matter of fact, it can be viewed as a reference tool, especially because of the helpful bibliographical references contained in many of the articles and the complete index of persons.

John W. O’Malley, S.J.


Dutch priest-psychiatrist Nouwen, in this book subtitled Thomas Merton: A Contemplative Critic, presents a penetrating analysis within relatively few pages of several of the root trends in the development of the Trappist contemplative and writer (1915-68). Though it is difficult to judge at present the influence of M.’s thought on contemporary American spirituality,
there is increasing evidence of renewed interest in M.'s writings on both spirituality and social topics among university students throughout the country. This study of N. will direct and deepen that interest in M.'s own spiritual journey and his social insights into the America of the 1960's.

The book is divided into two parts, preceded by a brief biographical study. Part 1, "For Instruction," sketches in five concise chapters the influence of M.'s developing contemplative prayer and his deepening search for solitude in God on the awakening and expansion of his social consciousness and prayerful compassion for all mankind. N. lists some of the books, persons, and events which chiefly influenced M.'s development prior to his entrance into the Trappist Abbey of Gethsemani in 1941. Aside from references to two published diaries, *The Sign of Jonas* (1953) and *Conjectures of a Guilty Bystander* (1966), there is no mention of the similar sources, literary and personal, from within the monastery during his twenty-seven years as a Trappist. Such sources, because of the wealth of M. material still unpublished, are not available to critical studies as yet. However, this study abounds with fine psychological insights into the early stages of M.'s growth in prayerful awareness of the workings of God's love.

From his background of some experience in journalism, M. developed within the monastery into a penetrating social analyst who in his later years was quite successful in uncovering the root causes within man himself of the alienation, illusion, and violence which plague modern man in a technological society. He was singularly able to comment on some of the concrete social and political happenings of his time from the depths of his own contemplative silence. In his latter years, M. turned to Eastern modes of thought and contemplation to secure added dimensions of human understanding which free men from the world of objects and strictly material concerns.

The second part, "For Meditation," contains specific selections from several of M.'s early writings as well as those from the 1960's which enable the reader to savor more fully, in an introductory way, M.'s progress in uncovering the root causes of religious and social unrest. These readings parallel the topics discussed by Part 1. Through prayerful consideration of these selections, the reader could be drawn to a more extensive study of the whole published body of M.'s writings on religious and social topics.

Physician-psychiatrist John Eudes Bamberger, who was a fellow monk and collaborator of M. over twenty years at the Abbey of Gethsemani, has contributed a concise preface with several insights into the development of M.'s human compassion which underlay so much of his social criticism.


The Anglican Bishop of British Honduras reviews here the experience —largely one of disappointment and disillusion—of Third World peoples with the actual course of development in their countries. In eight clear and balanced chapters he discusses the critical problem areas that have emerged in the development efforts of the last two decades. In two final chapters he presents a theological understanding of development and, in particular, attempts to identify the major contribution the Church can make.

The economic fallacies of earlier development thinking have become
clear; economic independence is necessary for true economic growth; aid programs that create new modes of dependence are self-defeating and contribute to economic colonialism. Statistics like the GNP and per capita income are misleading, since they do not reflect the inequity of income distribution. Radical changes in structures are needed, political and economic, national and international. Radical change is impossible without creative conflict; V. is perhaps at his best in warning against the delusions of a fictional peace that in the name of Christian harmony papers over real injustices; true peace is a dynamic process that can make conflict creative.

The oppositions between emerging nationalism and lingering neocolonialism, indigenous values and the techniques of modernization are analyzed sympathetically. Native cultures need not be westernized; rather, the attempt must be to release the initiatives and energies already implicit in the culture. Education for development, therefore, is obviously crucial; human resources are the most important factor. In this connection V. recalls Illich's critique of Western educational models with sympathy if not total approval. The insistence of Freire on developing self-awareness in actual situations of praxis indicates the direction that education for development must take.

The specific contribution the Church can make to development, V. concludes, is more often one of reconciliation than prophetic witness, although the latter is called for also. Greater communication and greater co-operation among the various factors in society, however, V. sees as essential, and the Church's efforts would best be spent in this direction. Some readers will find this conclusion lame and inconsistent with V.'s own warnings against false notions of peace. Throughout, however, the tone is thoughtful rather than impassioned, more preoccupied with pragmatic solutions than ringing calls to arms. Significantly, V. points out that liberation and freedom are not identical.  

Joseph A. O'Hare, S.J.


This anthology contains pieces by nine contemporary American philosophers of science, plus excerpts taken from Aristotle, Newton, and Einstein. M. contributes a lengthy introduction and a bibliographical essay, in addition to an anthological entry of his own. The term "scientific realism" is taken here in a peculiar sense. The philosopher is not supposed to investigate why and how far science is realistic; he is supposed to take the realism of science as "functional" and make it "philosophical." That is, in M.'s words, he seeks "consciously and critically [to] construct from the scientific world view a consistent conceptualization of reality" (p. 62). Thus the problem of scientific realism means here the "critical," i.e., Kantian, problem of finding the "real," namely, a priori conception of science.

The criterion for selecting authors and pieces is unclear. The editorial presentation of the entries is unsatisfactory as regards personal background of the authors, context of their doctrine, and explanatory footnotes. Aristotle and Newton are cited in translations by anonymous writers. Contemporary historical scholarship in their regard (e.g., A. Koyré's Newtonian Studies) is ignored. The bibliographical essay is spotty and rather outdated (it generally fails to list works published after 1968).
The usefulness of this book is difficult to assess. It can be used as a handy reference by students, but the risks are great. One is that of misunderstanding the meaning of the writers quoted, owing to the lack of context. A still greater risk is that of accustoming oneself to see science not objectively and directly but indirectly and only through the eyes of philosophers. Philosophers seem to be taken here as the judges of what science is and should be. This attitude tends to worsen the split between the so-called two cultures.

Enrico Cantore, S.J.

BOOKS RECEIVED

[All books received are listed here whether they are reviewed or not]

SCRIPTURAL STUDIES


Voeltzel, René. L’Enfant et son éduca-

DOCTRINAL THEOLOGY
The Mystery of Suffering and Death. Ed. by Michael J. Taylor, S.J.


HISTORICAL


MORAL, LAW, LITURGY


Michels, Thomas, O.S.B. Sarmenta:
BOOKS RECEIVED


PASTORAL AND ASCETICAL


PHILOSOPHY


SPECIAL QUESTIONS


Agent for Change: The Story of Pablo Steele as Told to Gary MacEoin.


Killinger, John. The Fragile Presence:


